

# DOĞU PERİNÇEK

## Bozkurt Efsaneleri ve Gerçek

Orta Asya Kavimlerinin Tarihsel Gelişmeleri



GELİŞTİRİLMİŞ 5. BASIM

DOĞU PERİNÇEK

**Bozkurt Legends and Reality**

© Publication rights of this book

Analyses Printing, Publishing, Design and Implementation Ltd. Şti.

First Edition: December 1976, Aydınlık Publications (5 000  
copies) Second Edition: August 1978, Aydınlık Publications (8  
000 copies) Third Edition: January 1980, Aydınlık Publications  
(10 000 copies) Improved Fourth Edition: November 1997 (3  
000 copies) Enhanced Fifth Edition: February 2003

Cover: Felt ornaments of the Huns found in Pazırık kurgans dating from the  
2nd and 1st centuries BC. (See Bahaeddin Ögel, *History of Turkish Culture  
Before Islam*, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara 1984, p.67.) Back Cover

Photo: Mustafa Kınalı (*Hürriyet* correspondent)

Technical Preparation: Analyses Printing and  
Publishing: Analyses Printing and Publishing

ISBN: 975-343-213-5

SOURCE PUBLICATIONS: 239

ANALYSES PRINTING PUBLISHING DESIGN APPLICATION LTD. CO.

Istiklal Cad. 184/4 80070 Beyoğlu-Istanbul web  
address: [www.kaynakyayinlari.com](http://www.kaynakyayinlari.com)  
email: [iletisim@kaynakyayinlari.com](mailto:iletisim@kaynakyayinlari.com)

Tel: (0212) 252 21 56 - 252 21 99 Fax: (0212) 249 28 92

DOĞU PERİNÇEK

**Bozkurt Legends and Reality**

Historical Development of Central Asian Tribes

*"Yer basrukı tağ  
Bodun basrukı beg"  
(Earth oppression  
mountain Bodun  
oppression beg)  
An old proverb  
(Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk)*

## **PREFACE TO THE EXPANDED FOURTH EDITION**

### **First Edition Written in 1973**

This investigation was conducted in Mamak Military Prison in 1973. First, some parts of it were published in *Aydınlık* magazine in August 1976.<sup>[1](#)</sup> Then it was published as a book by Aydınlık Publications in December 1976. The second and third editions were published in August 1978 and January 1980 respectively. A total of 23 thousand copies, 5 thousand, 8 thousand and 10 thousand respectively, were printed and attracted great interest.

<sup>[1](#)</sup> "The Importance of Ideological Struggle against Panturkism", "Bozkurt Legends and Reality", "Orhun Ya-On opposites", issue 66, August 1976, pp.1, 3, 9 et al.

### **What the Study Reveals**

In 1973, the first aim of my work on the social development of the tribes of Central Asia was to explain the adventure of Turkish society's transition to civilisation. Even some historical materialists attributed the Seljuk and Ottoman feudal societies to the Iranian, Arab and Byzantine heritage. Those who saw the Ottoman state as a continuation of the Byzantine Empire were caught up in Eurocentric views and ignored the civilisational background of the Turks.

This study, relying primarily on the earliest sources such as epics and inscriptions, demonstrated that the Turks were on the verge of establishing feudal states at the end of a two-thousand-year process of class formation in Central Asia. No society could move on to a more advanced social stage without reaching a certain level of development. Each social system was fostered in the bosom of the previous society. A social organisation could not be artificially implanted in a society through conquest and wars alone.

The second important finding of this study is that there was no slave period in the history of the Turks. It has been shown on the basis of concrete facts that slavery never became the dominant relationship in the development of Turkish society.

In fact, not only the Turks, but also on a universal level, slavery was experienced as secondary. 24 years ago, when we analysed the development of Turkish society, we did not express our findings in precise terms. However, in the fourth edition, which we have developed and published today, we can say that the slave mode of production was limited to the Mediterranean. Like the Turks, the peoples of Western Europe, the forerunners of capitalism, also passed from a classless society to a feudal society. Western capitalism did not rise on the slavish legacy of Rome. On the contrary, when we look at the history of the pioneers of capitalism, we see that they remained on the periphery of Rome. The peoples in the process of classisation, while overthrowing the Roman Empire, experienced a leap in which the feudal relations that sprouted in their own bosoms became dominant.

## **Racist-Nationalist Historical Theses**

Studying the process of civilisation of the Central Asian tribes undoubtedly confronts every historical scholar with racist-nationalist views. The civilisation adventure of the Central Asian tribes did not fit the nationalist historical theses at all. Views such as the Turks had been living as a *nation* since time immemorial, that God had endowed the Turks with the ability to establish a *state*, *Turkishness of the world* and *Turkish dominance of the world* contradicted concrete history. Nationalist historians manipulated historical documents and texts in order to justify their theses. For example, Huseyin Namik Orkun and Muharrem Ergin, while translating the *Orkhon Inscriptions* into modern Turkish, subjected them to the control of nationalism. The most important intervention they made was to change the word *budun* to *nation*. *Bozkurt Efsa- neleri and Gerçek* showed that *budun* does not mean "nation", but *tribes*. This determination was made based on the meaning of the concept in *the Inscriptions*. At that time, we did not know that Giraud had read the word *budun* as *bodun*. *Bod* meant *boy* in the Turkish of the time, and *un* was the suffix *ço- ğul*. Thus, not only the meaning of the word in the text, but also its etymological meaning confirmed this study. In the 1970s, Talat Tekin criticised the translation of the word "*budun*" as "*millet*" in his book *Orhun Yazıtları (Orkhun Inscriptions)* published in 1995, for the same reasons I mentioned in the first three editions of *Bozkurt Efsaneleri ve Gerçek*. Talat Tekin, like Giraud, read the word as *bodun*.<sup>2</sup>

<sup>2</sup> Talat Tekin, , Simurg Publications, Istanbul, 1995, p.7 et al., p.14.

In this edition, in accordance with the determination I made in 1973, I preferred *bodun* instead of *budun*. I should mention that I had some hesitation in doing so. *Budun* was widely used in historiography, it was mentioned in Kashgarli's book, and it had also entered today's Turkish. However, since its etymological meaning proves a very important historical-sociological fact, we decided on *bodun*, especially when referring to *the Orkhon Inscriptions*.



## Effects of this Book

Since *Bozkurt Myths and Reality* was the first work on the historical development of the Central Asian tribes in Turkey to be carried out with a historical materialist conception, it paved the way for and influenced later works. Although Hikmet Kıvılcımlı had also expounded the theory of history on the processes by which societies make the leap to civilisation, his work did not specifically deal with the Central Asian process.<sup>3</sup>

<sup>3</sup> See Dr Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, *Tarihsel Maddecilik Yayınları*, Istanbul, 1965.

In 1973, the history section of the *Defence* of the defendants of the Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey at the Ankara Martial Law Court No. 3 contains the theses in *Bozkurt Myths and the Truth*, which was freshly written at that time. *The Defence*, it can be said, is the first compiled and scientific work covering the whole of Turkish history, written with a historical materialist comprehension.<sup>(4)</sup>

<sup>4</sup> was first published in 1974 by Aydınlık Publications and was the best-selling book of the period.

became the first edition of the book. When the first edition of 15 thousand copies was sold out in less than a month, the second edition was published in November 1974 in 25 thousand copies and sold out immediately despite the ban. The 3rd edition was published in December 1979, again by Aydınlık Publications, with 5,000 copies, and the 4th edition was published in March 1992 by Kaynak Publications with 3,000 copies. We recommend that readers study the collectively written history section of this book.

Doğan Avcıoğlu began to publish in 1978 a book entitled *The History of the Turks*. In his comprehensive study on the transition of the Turks from tribal society to feudalism, he adopted the analysis in *Bozkurt Myths and Reality*. In Book 1 of his work, Avcıoğlu states:

"Doğu Perinçek, for example, when he writes that the Gokturk federation was not a state, but 'a stepping-stone on the way from tribal system and organisation to statehood' and adopts the 'military democracy' argument, which he regards as 'the seed of the state falling to the ground', comes closer to the concrete historical reality than the theorists looking for a 'central despotic state' in the steppe."<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, Tekin Publishing House, Istanbul, 1978, vol.1, p.102. Avcıoğlu reiterates the same view on page 274.

Beyond the theses of tribal confederation and military democracy, Avcioğlu agrees with *Bozkurt Myths and Reality* in the whole analysis of the transition of Turks from tribalism to feudalism.<sup>(6)</sup>

<sup>6</sup> Avcioğlu, while taking the analysis almost verbatim, made reference to it only in two places. See *First Book*, pp. 37, 102, 111, 213, 214, 215, 251 et seq., 258, 274, 283, 291 et seq. The relevant chapters of the second and third books may also be consulted.

My dear friend Server Tanilli, in his compilation entitled *The Lies of Fascism*, He was judged for taking the 27-page section between pages 65-82 of *Bozkurt Myths and Truth* from .<sup>7</sup>

<sup>7</sup> This compilation, published by Tanilli under the signature of Kerem Noyan, was published by Anlam Publications, Istanbul, March 1978.

Halil Berktaý, on the other hand, wrote the following on the contribution of *Bozkurt Legends and Gerçek* to the analysis of history in his book titled *Kabile'den Feodalizme*, published in June 1983:

"It is only recently that the Marxist reinterpretation of this very successful 'sketch' put before us by Fuat Köprülü has begun. It is in Doğu Perinçek's work that we find the combination of the clues provided by primary sources such as *the Oghuz Kagan Epic*, *the Orkhon Inscriptions*, *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, *Dede Korkut Tales* and Nizamül Mülk's *Siyasetname*, and the descriptive accounts of Köprülü, Barthold, Eberhard, Sümer, Ögel and Osman Turan, with Engels' categories plus the earlier syntheses of Vladimirov or Werner. According to this author, Central Asian societies, ...in the two millennia from c. 1000 BC to c. 1000 AD, without witnessing slavery becoming the 'dominant mode of production', moved directly towards feudalism through the deepening dissolution of tribal society. ...Since Perinçek's research emphasises the phenomena of dissolution, transcendence of primitive equality and transition to private property, without dwelling on the description of the Turkic tribal order, it is noteworthy that the aforementioned work is the first of its kind by Fuat Köprülü, Abdülkadir İnan and Faruk Sümer.

We recommend that it be read together with the other historians mentioned above."<sup>(8)</sup>

<sup>8</sup> Halil Berktaş, Kaynak Publications, İstanbul, June 1983, pp.153-156. See also pp.83, 85, 96, 106, 118, 124, 149, 153, 154, 159, 190, 206, 240, 256, 261.

The five-volume *History of Turkey*, prepared under the direction of Prof. Dr. Sina Akşin, adopted the theses in *Bozkurt Myths and Reality* on the transition of the Turks from tribal society to civilisation and made the following assessment:

"...we have before us an example of bourgeois materialism that overcomes all the blockages of bourgeois materialism that we have criticised at length, even though it does not object to almost any of the empirical determinations of nationalist historiography and does not engage in a documentary debate with them. Doğu Perinçek's *Bozkurt Myths and the Truth* easily shows that both the factual accounts in the secondary sources and the primary sources -which are also behind them- confirm Marx and Engels' views on the historical development of societies as soon as they are compared with other material on other tribes, unless they are distorted in order to find a 'dev- let' everywhere, to present every institution as purely Turkish. ... In *Bozkurt Myths and Reality*, Doğu Perinçek ... captures the material reality of the long-lasting stage of military democracy of the Central Asian Turkic society, and behind it, far further back, he discerns the silhouette of a pure, pristine, unspoilt kinship ."<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> Cem Publishing House, İstanbul, 1987, c.I, p.82. The chapter titled "Economic and Social History of the Turks until the Rise of the Ottoman Empire" is written by Halil Berktaş.

After this assessment, *History of Turkey* summarises "the evolution of the Turks before their mass entry into the cultural circle of Islam in the 11th century, and their two thousand years of fluctuating and zigzagging development in the direction of feudalism" from *Bozkurt's Myths and Reality*.<sup>(10)</sup>

<sup>10</sup> p.100, p.82 et al., p.94 et al., p.110, p.125.

Ümit Hassan, in his book *Studies on the Ancient Turkish Society*, published in 1985, also makes use of *Bozkurt Legends and Gerçek*.

immediately catches the eye. However, no reference is found. We do not know how this can be explained. [ruz.11](#)

[11](#) Ümit Hassan, Kaynak Publications, March 1985.

I learnt from some nationalist theorists that *Bozkurt Myths and Reality* had a shaking effect on the nationalist ranks.[12](#)This effect was also reflected in the fact that the three editions of the book sold 23 thousand copies in a few years.

[12](#) I'm not naming them without their permission, as it was given to me verbally. And it's interesting I have a memory: In March 1981, when I was brought from Istanbul to Ankara in a police van as a prisoner, I had a deep historical conversation with a prisoner with whom I was handcuffed. Near Düzce The prisoner, who didn't know me and I didn't know him, said the following: "Doğu Perinçek's book has upset the ranks of the nationalists." I introduced myself to the detainee, who I later learnt was an MHP Beşiktaş executive, saying, "Here you are handcuffed together with the author of that book".

Only scientists and enthusiasts were interested in *Bozkurt Myths and Reality*. It was not. This work has also attracted the attention of prosecutors since the summer of 1976, when some parts of it were published in *Aydınlık* magazine. First for the articles in the magazine, and then for all three editions of the book, criminal cases were opened on the basis of Article 142/3 of the Turkish Penal Code. My esteemed friend Server Tanilli was also put on trial for including a 27-page chapter from *Bozkurt Efsaneleri ve Gerçek* in his compilation entitled *Fascism Yalanları*.

Folders of documents from these trials are among the examples of what the endeavour of science and thought in Turkey has to deal with. After convictions, consolidation with other cases, statutes of limitations and changes in the law, these cases, like others, have become memories.

## **Improvements in the Fourth Edition**

For more than ten years, a new edition of the book has been requested.

The desire to deepen and to remove political polemics that do not contribute to the book has delayed this fourth meeting with readers. Having had the opportunity to read historical texts and studies that I had not been able to examine before, I have developed the concluding chapter of the book and present it for criticism.

This edition does not change the basic theses of the book. Part I of the work, on the *Historical Development of the Tribes of Central Asia*, beginning with *the Huns* and ending *with the leap to the feudal state*, remains as it is, except for a few rephrasing and some minor additions. Thus, the book's characteristic of capturing the grain of history, rather than recounting historical events at length, has been preserved.

On the other hand, the *Conclusion* has been rewritten and improved. In this chapter, the social, political and ideological processes of Central Asia are analysed under the headings of *Tribalism to Feudalism*, *Tribal Confederation to State*, *Goktan God to Allah* and *Bodun to Nation*. The course of history in Central Asia has been summarised and re-deepened through these processes. In fact, I have presented the reason for delaying the fourth edition for years to the reader with this *Processes* section.

In the first edition in 1976, contemporary polemics were added that were not included in the first edition written in prison in 1973. These additions were like patches in the research on "The Historical Development of the Tribes of Central Asia". Beyond their removal, there was a need for a general summary analysing and discussing the Turks' leap from steppe anarchy to civilisation. This more theory-intensive chapter is even longer than the first part of the book, which gives the historical development.

**Why are there no Khazars?**

While developing the book, I thought of adding the Khazars to Part I, which covers the "Historical Development of the Central Asian Tribes". I even took notes and made a plan. The Khazars had already established a state in the middle of the 8th century in a geography far west of Central Asia, in the vast areas of Europe between the Caucasus and the Volga. The rulers of this first state of the Turkic tribes had also pioneered the transition to the monotheistic religions of the Middle East by adopting Judaism. This historical priority made the Khazars important. However, I did not want to thicken the book, considering that what is to be said about the Khazars is no different from what is said about the Huns, Gokturks, Oghuzs, Qarakhanids and others in terms of historical processes.

## Correction

In the first three editions of the book, the three lines in *the Book of Dede Korkut* beginning with "Ağaç ağaç dersem gö- nüllem ağaç" were mistakenly referred to Pir Sultan Abdal. I am correcting this important mistake. I was more interested in the revolutionary periods of history. *Bozkurt Myths and Reality* deals with the first of the historical leaps of Turkish society. The continuation of this leap towards feudalism in the Seljuk and Ottoman periods is analysed in the book titled *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to Today*. I planned to analyse the second great leap of our history in five books entitled *Kemalist Revolution*.

The first two books have already been published. [After 1997, when this Foreword was written, the Kemalist Revolution series His 3rd book, *Six Arrows*, and his 4th book, *Kurdish Politics in the War of Independence* also published successively in June 1999 and November 1999].

My work titled *Aydın ve Kültür (Intellectuals and Culture)* looks at history from a cultural perspective.

*Bozkurt Legends and Truth* is one of the products of the passion for history that I started to feel at my grandfather's knee before I started primary school. I hope it will be criticised and discussed.

Dođu Perinçek  
22 October 1997,  
Istanbul

#### **NOTE TO IMPROVED FIFTH EDITION**

New sources were analysed and some additions were made. Especially chapter 5, "Myths and Reality", has been improved. There is no change in the basic analysis.

January 2003, Istanbul

## I-DEVELOPMENT OF CENTRAL ASIAN TRIBES

1. Huns
2. Gokturks
3. Uyghurs
4. Karluks and Karakhanid State
5. Sir-i Derya Oghuz
6. Leap to Feudal State

### 1. HUNS

The history of Central Asian societies from 1000 BC to 1200 AD and even later is the history of the dissolution of tribal society and the formation of feudalism. Seyfeddin Aziz has also noted that the process of civilisation of the Turks spanned a very long period of more than 2000 years.<sup>(1)</sup>

<sup>1</sup> A member of the Political Bureau, the highest organ of the Chinese Communist Party under Mao.

Seyfeddin Aziz, in his novelisation of the establishment period of the Karakhanid State, *Satuk Buğra Khan*



He states: "Uighur history has progressed step by step into a process of unification, first tribes were formed, tribes dissolved and formed the nation. (...) This development process lasted more than 2000 years." (Seyfeddin Aziz, *The Transition of Turks to Islam/ Satuk Buğra Khan*, trans. Prof. Dr. Rukiye Hacı, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, February 2000, p.14.)

We are sure that they spoke Turkish and appeared on the stage of history under the name of Turk.

The first people to emerge were the Göktürks, who established a large nomadic confederation in Asia in the 6th-8th centuries AD. We know that Turkish-speaking tribes had previously taken part in the Hun confederation. We begin by looking at the life and organisation of the dominant element called Huns, without dwelling on which tribe they came from.

## **Level of Social Development**

Chinese sources have consistently referred to the nomadic horse-drawn tribes living to their north. These were steppe nomads, shepherd tribes, who later appeared in history mainly under the names of Turks and Mongols. They reared mainly horses, sheep and cattle. There were also more backward tribes living in forests and subsisting mainly on hunting. In fact, nomads are also at various stages of development. There were even semi-hunting tribes among them.

The kurgans (tombs) unearthed in Central Asia show that there was a deep social differentiation within the tribes as early as the 8th century BC. The finds in these graves show that a rich tribal aristocracy had formed. Herds were concentrated in certain hands. The clan (lineage) organisation based on blood ties dissolves with the formation of the tribal aristocracy and the concentration of wealth in its hands.<sup>(2)</sup> The patriarchal family, which expresses the property ownership of the male, emerges. Private property grows with the family and in the form of the property of the head of the family. This tribal aristocracy undoubtedly emerged when some clans dominated others over others

emerged. Dominating other clans led to and accelerated differentiation within the dominating clan, and a clan of chiefs was formed. This development means the opening of the age of nomadic heroism<sup>(3)</sup>

<sup>2</sup> "The lower the stage of development reached by the work, the lower the total work product and its Consequently, the less wealth the community possesses, the more the superior influence of blood relations appears to be decisive on the social order." (F. Engels, *The Origin of Family, Private Property and the State*, trans. Kenan Somer, Sol Publishing, 3rd edition, pp.14-15.)

<sup>3</sup> "Like the Greeks in the age of heroes, the Romans, who lived in the age of so-called 'kings', lived in a military democracy which grew out of and was based on clans, fratricides and tribes." (F. Engels, *ibid.*, p. 178.)



Pazırık'ta bulunan bir keçe süsü.

The nomadic tribal aristocracy seeks to plunder other tribes and exerts pressure on its own tribe. As the tribes are divided into lords and shepherds, relations of dependence arise between tribes. To paraphrase Engels, "Organisation for warfare is the means by which community life is organised."

"has become a duty". The tribes are in a military-democratic organisation.<sup>(4)</sup> While the relations of dependence were initially between tribes, in time they changed towards a relationship between the dependent tribe and the chiefs of the dominant tribe. This relationship of dependence is the germ of feudal relations, in concrete terms, the relationship between the lord and the serf.

<sup>4</sup> "A denser population requires a tighter cohesion internally as well as externally. Everywhere, It becomes a necessity for the related tribes to unite into a confederation. These tribes soon fuse with each other, and with them the lands of the individual tribes are fused into the collective land of the people. The military chief of the people... acquires the status of an indispensable, permanent official. Military chief, council, popular assembly: This is how a communal organisation can become a military democracy. are the organs which have been transformed. Military organisation - for war - has now become a regular task of popular life. In peoples who regard the acquisition of wealth as one of the chief aims of life, the wealth of their neighbours arouses greed. These are barbarous peoples; plundering seems to them easier, even more honourable, than earning by working. War, which used to be fought only to avenge a tyranny or to expand a shrinking territory, is now fought only for plunder and has become a permanent industry. It is not without reason that intimidating walls were erected around the new fortified cities. In the ditches of these walls, the well-like grave of civic organisation is opened, while the towers of civilisation in it. The situation was the same internally. Marauding wars increase the power of both the supreme military chief and the subordinate chiefs; the custom of choosing their successors within the same families, especially after the introduction of patrilineal law

Then it gradually becomes an inheritance which is first tolerated, then demanded as a right, and finally usurped; the basis for descendant kingship and descendant nobility is established. Thus the organs of civic organisation gradually break away from their roots in the clan, the fratri, the tribe, and the whole. The communal organisation is transformed into its own opposite. Whereas it was a tribal organisation with the aim of freely regulating its own affairs, it becomes an organisation which robs and oppresses its neighbours; and consequently the organisms of this new organisation, which were formerly instruments of the popular will, become organisms of autonomous domination and oppression against their own people. But this would never have been possible if the thirst for wealth had not divided the members of the clan into rich and poor, if 'the difference of property within the same clan had not transformed the unity of interests of the members of the clan into irreconcilable antagonism' (Marx), and if the extension of slavery had not begun to make the fact of earning one's living by labour an act worthy only of slaves and more dishonourable than plunder." (F. Engels, *ibid.*, p. 228.)

Again, Marx and Engels, in their work *The German Ideology*, state that war is "a 'normal mode of economic intercourse' in the life of conquering barbarian peoples" (trans. Selahattin Hilav, Sosyal Yayınlar, Istanbul, 1968, p.42).

## Political Organisation Confederation of Tribes

The first confederation we know, formed by these nomadic tribes who constantly engaged in plundering wars with each other, is referred to as Hiung Nu in Chinese sources. Many historians believe that the origin of the word Hiung Nu is Hun. As it is known, since the Chinese script cannot reflect the sounds, proper names from foreign languages can be recorded with the signs of the nearest Chinese words.

The concentration of the population was an important factor in the gathering of tribes into confederations. The main founder of this confederation, Mao-Tun (Mete) came to power in 209 BC. In his letters to the Chinese emperor, Mao-Tun mentions that he had united all the tribes in Central Asia and that these tribes lived in peace and tranquility. This confederation was formed in It lasted for five hundred years, from the 3rd century to the 3rd century AD.

There were twenty-four major positions in the Huns. Based on this, we can conclude that the Huns consisted of twenty-four tribes and that the tribe of Shan-Yü, the head of the confederation, was dominant. Shan-Yü was perhaps the name of this tribe, or even of a clan (lineage) within that tribe. We learn that five of the Hun tribes formed aristocratic clans. There is a hierarchy (subordinate-superior relationship) between clans, tribes and clans.

The tribes and clans within the Hun confederation had almost the same life style. This lifestyle is nomadic animal husbandry. Although it is certain that private property on pastures has not yet emerged, tribes use certain pieces of land as pastures. It can be said that the tribal aristocracy has, in a sense, appropriated this piece of land<sup>5</sup>

<sup>5</sup> "Among the nomadic shepherd tribes... the land, like other conditions of nature, in its primitive limitlessness ... These peoples recognise the land as their property, but never define the limits of this property. ...Here it is not the land that is appropriated and reproduced, but the herd; the land is owned It is used in common when staying overnight." (K. Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Forms of Economy*, trans. Mihri Belli, Sol Publications, p.96.)

Established confederation ever no doubt this grasslands  
Tribes between  
and this is how peace was ensured. Some Turkish

tribes were called "custom". Along with animal husbandry, agriculture is also found. In the Altai region there are irrigation canals from the Hiung Nu era. On the banks of the Selenga River and Lake Baikal we find various ploughshares from that era. Agricultural implements such as sickles, pits for storing grain, stones for grinding grain and irrigation canals have also been found in this region. All historians unanimously agree that blacksmithing flourished in the Altai mountains.



Pazırık'ta bulunan bir keçe süsü.

**Confederation**

**Based on Social  
and Exploitation**

**Differentiation**

Nevertheless, it is certain that the vast majority of the rulers of the confederation and the dependent communities were nomadic pastoralists. The establishment of the confederation, as Mao-Tun wrote to the Chinese emperor, means that an order (peace and tranquillity) has replaced the plundering wars between the tribes. This order is established on the basis of the tax/exploitation of animals by the aristocracy due to the dependency relations that have emerged. In addition, the dominant element at the head of the confederation also organises large plundering raids against the outside world. The Great Wall of China was built against this threat.

The organisation of the Central Asian tribes and tribes into a confederation constitutes the core of the state. We learn from Chinese sources that Mao-Tun, based on the Hun aristocracy, tried to establish a state organisation similar to that of the Chinese, and to create a bureaucracy separate from the palace officials and the mass of the people like the Chinese emperor. The emergence of a bureaucracy is evidenced by civil offices and titles. However, all tribal members who took up arms were also warriors. The fact that a public power separate from the people, i.e. the army, has not yet been formed shows that private property and money economy have not developed sufficiently. But this is the direction of development. The private troops at Mao-Tun's headquarters are the first nucleus of this private armed force, the "public force".<sup>(6)</sup>

<sup>6</sup> "The state... is characterised, firstly, by the distribution of its subjects according to the territory. ...Secondly, the establishment of a public power, which is no longer directly identical with the people organised in the form of armed force in person." (F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p. 235 ff.)

Mao-Tun's and Hun aristocracy wanted to dominate China we know. The aim of this is undoubtedly to make the large masses of peasants who are engaged in agriculture dependent on them. In this way, they were moving towards a more advanced stage, i.e. towards a system based on the exploitation of the peasants, so that they could no longer obtain their food and wealth through wars of plunder, but through a system based on the exploitation of the peasants.

Indeed, there are examples in history where nomadic tribes subjugated settled feudal societies and sat at the top of these feudal societies and showed a corresponding development within themselves.<sup>(7)</sup> However, the Huns did not do this.

It seems that they were not at a level of development capable of achieving it. A Chinese says to the chief of the Huns in 174 B.C:

[7](#) The Germanic peoples, masters of the Roman provinces, had to organise the conquered territory.

The Roman masses, however, could neither be admitted into the cohort groups, nor could they be subjugated through them. First of all, it was necessary to replace the local Roman administrative bodies, which in many places still existed, with something that could replace the Roman state, and this could only be another state; therefore, the organs of the civic organisations had to be transformed into organs of the state, and this had to be done very quickly under the pressure of circumstances. But the closest representative of the conquering people was the military chief. The internal as well as the external security of the conquered territories required the consolidation of his power. The moment had come for the military command to become a kingdom." (F. Engels, *ibid.*, p. 211.)

"Even if you, Shan-Yü, were to subdue the Chinese territories, you would still not be able to live there!"

These words indicate that the Huns had not developed enough to move from a nomadic tribal system to a settled feudal society and to dominate such a society. In other words, class differentiation and the development of private property within the Huns were not yet at a level where they could make such a leap. As a matter of fact, Mao-Tun adopted the plundering policy of the tribal chiefs and did not attempt to dominate the vast Chinese territory inhabited by peasants.

With all this, we know that great wealth accumulated in the hands of the Hun aristocracy and luxury increased in their headquarters. Here we recall Marx's words "The state represents consumer wealth and luxury". The tombs of the Huns contain an astonishing amount of Chinese and Iranian goods. Apart from looting, this phenomenon is also evidence of the Hun aristocracy's control of the Silk Road through Central Asia and its role in Asian trade. Bronze coins of the Chinese Han dynasty between 118 BC and 589 AD are found in the Northern Hun cultural neighbourhood. This shows the existence of commodity exchange, albeit a narrow one.

The hierarchy of the Hun confederation was as follows:

1. Shan-Yü tribe.

(At the top was undoubtedly a clan within this tribe).

2. The five most important (noble) Hun tribes.

3. Other Hun tribes.
4. Tribes dependent on the Huns, such as the Huns, and tribes and clans within these tribes, such as the Yüe-ci and the Tungus.



Altay Hun çağına ait Tuyakta kurganlarında bulunmuş kurt resimleri.

### **"Peace and order" necessary for the development of private property**

We do not come across any information that the Huns tried to develop new feudal relations by disrupting the tribal system based on blood ties within the tribes and tribal communities they subjugated to themselves. On the contrary, they preserved the existing tribal hierarchy and system and sat at the top of this hierarchy. They received a share of exploitation and functioned as the dominant element maintaining "peace and order". The Hun aristocracy protected the defeated tribal aristocracy they had subjugated, leaving it as a proxy for its own rule.




This relationship also expresses the core of feudal relations. The realised "peace and order" created the conditions for the dissolution of tribal relations based on blood ties and the development of trade.

By bringing the tribes under subordination and establishing a central authority, a stable

The establishment of "peace and order" undoubtedly accelerated the development of private property. Thanks to this peace and order, it was possible for the herd-owning hearths (a kind of large family) formed within the clans to migrate separately, whereas under clan ownership they migrated in crowded camps and kept livestock. This order favoured the dissolution of clan ownership and the development of private hearth ownership. Of course, the establishment of a centralised authority, which ensured order, came at a certain level of development of private property and further developed private property. In the Huns, too, the emergence and development of private property was accompanied by the gradual contraction of the family.

The establishment of a central authority to protect the livestock of the hearths from plunder and pillage was necessary for this development. Looting and plundering fights between tribes and clans necessitated migration in large groups to protect themselves from raids. The establishment of "peace and order" brought the opportunity to migrate in hearths and to develop hearth property. This level of social development necessitated the existence of an authority over the tribes and clans.



Great Hun Confederation

## 2. GÖKTÜRKLER

As it is known, the first community in history to appear under the name of Turk was the Göktürks<sup>(8)</sup> The name Göktürk is mentioned only in two places in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*. This community is generally referred to as *Turkic* in the *Inscriptions*. However, we have found that in 552, the Central

In order to distinguish the alliance of tribes called Turks who seized the sovereignty in Asia from the other Turkic tribes that would later appear on the stage of history under the name of Turks, we prefer to call them the Göktürks.

<sup>8</sup> Since the Gokturks are based on Chinese sources, there are no previous studies on them among Turkish historians. Prof. Dr. Ahmet Taşağıl's researches, which go beyond this, should be particularly examined. See *Göktürks*, I, II, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara 1995, 1999.

The Turks put an end to the Avar (Juan Juan) domination in 552 and the Middle In Asia new and big one Tribes confederation they set it up. *Türk*,

was the name of the neck or tribes that initially dominated this confederation.<sup>9</sup>

<sup>9</sup> For the explanation of the word Turk in the 11th century, see *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk Tercümesi*, c.I, p.350 et seq.

However, the Nine Oghuzes, Turgish, Karluks, Kyrgyz, etc. in the confederation never called themselves by the name of *Türk*. Likewise, the Turk Bilge Kagan did not refer to them by the name of *Türk* and distinguished them from *the Turkic* bodunu. It is known that foreigners who looked at the geography and tribes controlled by the Gokturk confederation from the outside called all Turkish-speaking tribes within the confederation *as Türks*.

## Historical Phase

We learn the most important information about the life and history of the Gokturks from *the Orkhon Inscriptions*.<sup>10</sup> These inscriptions were erected in the name of the Turkish Bilge Kagan, his brother Kültigin and their advisor Tonyukuk. Tonyukuk Monument was erected in 720-725, Kültigin Monument in 732, Bilge Kagan Monument in 735. Kültigin died in 731, Bilge Kagan died in 734, and the Uighurs took control in 745.

<sup>10</sup> *The Orkhon Inscriptions* are the economic, social and political records of Central Asian societies living in the 8th century AD.

The Mamak Military Academy provides unique information about their structures and their past. In 1973, Mamak Military

While I was doing this work in prison, in order to analyse the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, I was given a copy of the book prepared by Muharrem Ergin.

In this book, in addition to a translation of the *Orkhon Inscriptions* into modern Turkish, we consulted the original text written in the Göktürk alphabet and the original text translated into Latin letters.

There is a Turkish text. Since we are not an expert on the Gokturk language and script, we used the text translated by Muharrem Ergin and also looked at the dictionary appended to the book.

However, while preparing the 4th edition, we also analysed Hüseyin Namık Orkun's *Old Turkish Inscriptions* and Talat Tekin's *Orkhon Inscriptions* published in 1995.

In 630, we see that the Eastern Turks came under Chinese rule. 680 years, Kutluk Kagan (İlterish) re-established the confederation. During this new revival, Bilge Tonyukuk says, "We were sitting in Karakum... eating deer and rabbits". From this, we understand that although the economy was mainly based on nomadic animal husbandry, hunting also continued to be important. We learn from *the Inscriptions* that the Turkish aristocracy had accumulated considerable herds of animals and wealth:

"Tuygut, who managed Kültigin's gold, silver, treasure, wealth and a herd of four thousand horses..."

Although nomadism was essential, the shovels and ploughs found in the kurgans (graves) of the Göktürk era show that the agriculture in the Hun era continued. The inscriptions written in Göktürk script found on the banks of the Talas River show the existence of a settled agricultural life. An inscription mentions the organisation of fields and water ditches. Again, according to a treaty made with China in 697, the Chinese Emperor will give the Gokturk Khan 3 thousand agricultural tools, 10 thousand pounds of iron (40 thousand pounds according to the Chinese yearbook T'ang shu), 100 thousand hu (1250 tonnes) of seed millet.<sup>(11)</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Ibrahim Kafesoglu, "On the occasion of the 1250th anniversary of his death Bilge Kagan", *Belleten*, XLIX, issue 194, August 1985, p.263.


In addition to all these, it is mentioned that agriculture declined in the Gokturk era and that there was a return to nomadism from settled life. It is noteworthy that crafts, for example, the technique of drapery, was inferior to that of the Huns. All these have led to the view that the Göktürks were more backward than the Huns. "If we remember that it is a mistake to suppose that the history of the world is slippery and uniformly progressive, without regressing at times by giant leaps<sup>(12)</sup> this is hardly surprising. Just as agriculture has not progressed, neither have cities.

was not established. However, a few city names are mentioned in *the Orkhon Inscriptions*. Moreover, when Ilterish Khan took seventeen men into battle against China, it is said that "the city went up the mountain and the mountain came down". It is possible that these cities ("fish") were large headquarters; or, more likely, that they were the first cities built of mud-brick and surrounded. The city, as Marx pointed out, is embedded in the economic structure:

[12](#) V.I. Lenin, "On the Junius Pamphlet", June 1916.

"The history of Asia is a kind of undifferentiated unity of the city and the village. (Here the great city must be regarded as the headquarters of the ruler, superimposed on the real economic structure .)"[13](#)

[13](#) K. Marx, *Pre-Capitalist Forms of Economy*, p.84.



Göktürk çağına ait Altaylar'da Kuray buluntuları.

**Dissolution of Tribal Society**



We observe that there was a strong social differentiation within the tribes during the Göktürk period and the tribal system was transformed in the direction of dissolution. In parallel with this, some tribes and tribal communities established dominance over others and subordinated them to themselves. In 552, the Göktürks, in this way, put an end to the domination of the Juan-Juans and gained supremacy. As it is stated in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, Bumin Kagan, who was at the head of the union formed by the Gokturk tribes, "He always subordinates the bodun on all four sides by sending an army. He renders the provincial without a province and the kagan without a kagan. He makes the head to bow down and the knee to kneel. He has settled them as far as Kadykan forest in the east and Demirkapi in the west. Between the two, he organises the Gokturk, which is not very organised, and sits there."

This is how the foundation of the Göktürk confederation is summarised. A population of this event

We also understand from the words of Bilge Kagan, "when we were few, we became many", that this was a necessary consequence of the increase in population. Engels states that the concentration of population "made it a necessity for the related tribes to unite in a confederation"<sup>(14)</sup> In the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, these communities formed by related tribes are called "bodun".

<sup>14</sup> F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, pp.14-15.

It is understood that the word *bodun* in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* expresses a relationship of subordination. *Bodun* does not mean nation as nationalist historians say, but it is the name given to the alliance of tribes dependent on Bilge Kagan. For example, Bilge Kagan says "Turgish Khan was our Turk, our bodun", "Nine Oguz was my bodun". The relationship of subordination between the dominant Göktürk tribes and tribes (tribal alliances) such as Dokuz Oğuz, On Uyгур, Kyrgyz, Tardush, Tobi, Tatar, Kıtay was the bud of feudal relations. Only at the beginning, the dependence was not on a lord, but on a tribe. Over time, this relationship changed in the direction of subordination of subordinate tribes to the lord of the subordinate tribe. Unlike the attachment to the land in agriculture, here it is a question of dependence (subordination) on a certain aristocrat, of "giving his labour to him".

Between tribal communities and tribes, a hierarchy was formed. This

In the hierarchy, the one below was subordinate to the one above. Subordination relations such as serfdom and vassalage, as seen in European feudalism, were still between tribes. Subordination to the aristocracy formed within the tribes and to

the topmost kaghan was a



The dominant tribe was developing in the direction of becoming a kind of serf. Naturally, the differentiation within the dominant tribe also deepened and the mass of the dominant tribe also became serfs.

The number of tribes of the tribes mentioned in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* is also often specified. For example, Dokuz Oguz (nine tribes), On Ok (ten tribes), Dokuz Tatar, etc. There is no doubt that there is a hierarchy among the tribes within all these tribes. There was also a hierarchy among the clans within each tribe. While the name *Turk* was probably the name of a single tribe, perhaps even a clan, it later became a general name given to the clan alliance and gradually by foreigners to all Turkish-speaking tribes (such as Dokuz Oguz, Turgish, Karluk) within the Gokturk confederation.

The hierarchy in the Göktürks can be roughly expressed as follows:

1. Kagan,
2. The Khan's clan,
3. A tribe of the Gokturks to which the Khan's clan belonged,
4. Gokturk tribes (Turkic bodunu),
5. Nine Oghuz, Karluk, Kyrgyz, Turgish, etc. boduns who were subject to the Gokturks.

The subordination of other tribes by the Gokturks also meant the elimination of the war of plunder and enmity between tribes and tribes and the establishment of an order. In fact, this was the reason for the existence of the confederation. In the past, plunder wars between tribes were replaced by a relationship of exploitation based on a certain law and order.<sup>15</sup>In the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, Bilge Kagan often says the following:

<sup>15</sup> "It is a common traditional belief that in some periods people lived only by looting. But plunder in order to be able to plunder, there must be something to plunder, that is, there must be production. And it is this mode of production which determines the mode of plunder itself. A stock-jobbing nation (a nation of stock-jobbing speculators) cannot be plundered like, for example, a nation engaged in animal husbandry." (K. Marx, *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, Sol Publishing, p. 264.)

"I have always subjugated the bodu on all four sides, I have made it enemy-free, it has always obeyed me. He gives me work." "I have always brought all these bodies into order."<sup>16</sup>

<sup>16</sup> The verb "kop itdim" in the inscriptions was translated as "put in order" by Muharrem Ergin. "Kop itdim" in today's language means "I made the whole", "I united". Indeed, that period meant uniting various tribes and tribal communities, boduns, and bringing them into order. Gokturk

The confederation maintained order by putting an end to wars between tribes, raids and anarchy in the Central Asian steppe.

Again in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, various boduns were subordinated to a certain place.

and organised. Here, the kaghan gives a limited piece of land as a homeland to a certain tribe. That tribe maintains its economy within these borders and undertakes a certain obligation to the kaghan in the form of products and labour. If a tribe fails to fulfil this obligation, an army is sent against it. This situation is expressed in *the Orkhon Inscriptions* as "when the caravan was not sent, we went against it" or "we sent an army".

*In the Orkhon Inscriptions*, when Ilterish Khan is described, it is said that he organised the Tolis, Tardus bodun and gave them positions such as yabguluk and shad. In addition, various titles such as tigin, tarkan, tutuk, buyruk are also found. As can be seen, after the boduns consisting of tribes were brought under obedience, they were headed by beys bearing titles such as yabgu and shad. For example, while Karluk and Uighur khans were mentioned before, after they were defeated and subjugated, the titles of Karluk and Uighur ilteber were mentioned. Ilteber is the head of a community subject to the kagan. It is certain that he was also a military commander. The hierarchy formed by subordination ties is also a military hierarchy.

Yabguluk and shadlik are the old aristocracy of a bodu which is subjugated. As well as the nobles directly from the ruling Göktürk clan also received yabguluk etc. For example, Bilge Kagan says that he sat as shad over the Tardush bodun when he was fourteen years old in his father's time. Here we encounter a system whereby chiefs emerging from the bosom of tribal society receive a "homeland" in return for their services in war.

## **Classification and Exploitation**

Constant hostility and wars of plunder between tribes will gradually disappear. Exploitation in the form of animal taxation and drudgery takes its place. This exploitation based on subordination relations is the bud of feudal exploitation.

This system of exploitation is expressed in *the Orkhon Inscriptions* as an open and legitimate relationship without any need for concealment:

"I have always subordinated the bodu on the four sides, made them without enemies, they have always obeyed me. He gives me the power."

In another place, it is stated that the rebellious Turgish karabod was subjugated and settled in Tabar and that they "gave the power to work".

In fact, all hell breaks loose over the question of who will "give power to whom". On the eastern façade of the Kältigin Monument, it is stated that the Turkish beys "gave power to the Chinese kagan" for fifty years when they left the Turkish name and took the Chinese name and obeyed the Chinese kagan.

*The Inscriptions* even record that the Chinese kagan thought, "Let me kill and exterminate the Turkic bodun, without thinking that he had done so much labour". Here, there is a reference to tribes and clans destroying each other, as in the ages when human labour had not yet created surplus production. With this statement, *the Orkhon Inscriptions* consider the Chinese kagan's thinking of killing the Turkish bodun, when there was so much labour to exploit, as a situation contrary to the existing order.

We see two main classes in the Göktürks:

1. *White-boned bodun* (tribal aristocracy).
2. *Black-boned bodun* or *karabodun*, i.e. the mass of people who "do the labour".

In addition to these, there were slaves and concubines called "kul" and "kün".

The Gokturks called the tribal aristocracy white-boned bodun. The shepherd people who "did the labour" were called karabodun. Göktürks believed that nobility was not through blood, as it is now, but through bone. For this reason, today's bozkurt should speak of "noble Turkish bone" instead of "noble Turkish blood". The characterisation of white and black was used not only by the Turks, but also by other

In Turkic tribes, it also signified the distinction between the ruling class and the people. For example, the Khazar Turks were divided into *White Khazars* and *Black Khazars* on this basis.<sup>17</sup> It is understood that the White Huns, who invaded India and Iran, took their name from the nobles.

<sup>17</sup> See Arthur Koestler, *Onüçüncü Kabile*, Ada Yayınları, İstanbul, 1977, p.18.

In addition to nobles and shepherds, the Gokturks also had slaves and concubines (*kul* and *kün*). These are mentioned in many places in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*.

Gumiliev argues that the word "*kul*", which means "a certain degree of independence", means "to submit to a foreigner" rather than "slave", citing evidence from *the Orkhon Inscriptions*.<sup>(18)</sup> Since slaves were captives taken in wars, slavery was a condition that was caused by the act of "submitting to a foreigner". Turks, as stated in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, were also reduced to the status of slaves and concubines when they submitted to a foreigner. Moreover, the existence of the status of "*kul*" and "*kün*" outside the people dependent on the beys called *karabodun* shows that these words correspond to the state of slavery resulting from captivity. The fact that slaves in Central Asian tribes were "independent to a certain extent", as Gumiliev states, is due to the fact that they were at the lower levels of the commodity economy.

<sup>18</sup> Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, trans. D. Ahsen Batur, Selenge Publications, 2nd edition, İstanbul 2002, p.76 et al.

In the Göktürks, slaves and concubines were employed in various jobs, especially in the service of nobles, etc. However, it is certain that the economy was not mainly based on slave labour. The fact that slave labour was not widely used is also evident from the fact that the custom of not taking the enemy prisoner in war but putting him to the sword was partially maintained. Moreover, some beliefs requiring the killing of captives were still alive. For example, ten men captured from Oghuzs were killed at the funeral of Tunga Tigin, one of the Gokturk nobles. It was believed that these captives would serve Tunga Tigin in the afterlife.

This belief is a relic of a period of development when the productivity of human labour was backward. People could not produce more than what they consumed, production

There is no economic benefit in enslaving people at a time when tools and technology were backward.

The Göktürks were certainly not at such a backward social stage. Wealth was accumulating in the hands of the aristocracy and a surplus production was being created. Nevertheless, the belief in killing captives still survived, which can be explained by two reasons. Firstly, this belief is a remnant of the superstructure of the old society and is gradually disappearing. Secondly, prisoners can be killed because slave labour is not widely used.

Slavery has never become the dominant relationship among the Turkic tribes in Asia. Slavery has always been a secondary relationship in the process of transition from tribal society to feudalism<sup>(19)</sup>

<sup>19</sup> Engels describes societies in which slavery is of secondary importance as follows:

"Before slavery is possible, a certain level of production must have been reached and a certain degree of inequality in the distribution of wealth must have arisen. And for slave labour to become the dominant mode of production of a whole society, an even greater increase in production, trade and the accumulation of wealth is necessary. In ancient natural societies, where there was collective ownership of the land, slavery either does not manifest itself or plays a secondary role." (F. Engels, *The Role of Force in History*, trans. S. Vahap Erdoğan, Sol Publishing, 1st edition, Ankara, November 1974, p.29.)

## **Class Struggle**

The existence of class differentiation in the Göktürks naturally led to class struggle. It can be said that *the Orkhon Inscriptions* are a literary expression of the ideology of the nomadic aristocracy, which preaches obedience and loyalty to the carabody. In the inscriptions, in order to express the peace between the classes, in other words, the aristocracy's dominance over the carabody, it is said "Beyleri de bodunu da tüz imiş". The mention of beys and bodun being "tüz" **i m p l i e s** that there may be cases where they are not "tüz". As a matter of fact

*In the inscriptions*, the struggles between the beys and the bodun are mentioned. For example, while explaining the reasons for the fall of the Turkic bodu under Chinese rule, it is said that "because the beys and bodu were untidy" (i.e. the peace and agreement between the beys and bodu was broken) and the Chinese "because the beys and bodu were quarreling with each other". That is to say, there is a situation in which the "tüzlük", that is, the order between the Göktürk beys and the karabodun was broken, and the beys and the people were quarreling. Bilge Kagan reminds the karabodun of this incident and asks them to obey him.

On the eastern facade of the Kültigin Monument, the rebellion of the Turgish karabodun is described.

In line 37, after it is stated that the Yugish bodun was raided, the kagan was killed and his province was taken, and the Yugish karabodun was subjugated and put in Tabar and given power, it is interesting that the term karabodun is used a little later when it is explained that the Yugish were "enemies". Because when a tribe, together with its lords, becomes an enemy, this tribe is referred to as bodun in many parts of *the Inscriptions*. Therefore, in this case, it was only the karabodun who rebelled against the Göktürk sovereignty after being subjugated; in other words, the mass outside the aristocracy. The karabodun, who were subjugated after the murder of their kagan and their ruling beys, probably revolted against the Gokturk aristocracy appointed over them. As a result, Alp Şalçı killed and defeated the Turgish karabodun.

On the eastern façade of the *Tonyukuk Monument*, the Tugish kagan (of the Ten Arrows

khan) It is stated that when he was planning to defeat the Turkish kagan in co-operation with the Kyrgyz kagan, he said: "My body is there, he said. He said, "Turk bodunu is in confusion again. Oghuz is in trouble again, he said." The fact that the Turkic bodun is "in turmoil" expresses the conflict between the beys and the karabodun. "Oguz is in distress" is due to the fact that he was subjugated by the Turkish kagan and "given labour", that is, exploited.

In many parts of the *inscriptions*, the Turkish bodun is addressed and its lack of discipline is shown as the cause of all disasters, and it is explained that the province and the ceremony deteriorated because of this, and the bodun became a slave and concubine to China.

As well as the struggle between Karabodun and the beys, the bloodiest conflicts were undoubtedly between the aristocracy of various tribes (or tribal communities). All *Orkhon Inscriptions* are full of historical events related to these struggles. Göktürk aristocracy four one side by side army

dispatching , Nine

Oghuzs, Ten Arrows (Turgish), Kyrgyz, Karluks, Tardush, Basmil, etc. were brought under his subjugation. Bloody wars and rebellions continue. The Gokturks killed the aristocracy they defeated, subjugated those who submitted to them and left them at the head of their tribes or tribes with various titles.

Winning wars meant subjugation of the defeated and confiscation of their property: "I defeated Tengut Bodun, I took his son, his wife, his herd of horses, his wealth there". Similarly, Bilge Kagan said, "Basmıl Idık Kut was my descendant bodun. Because he did not send caravans, I sent an army, subjugated him, and brought his wealth back".

As can be seen, these wars between tribes or tribal communities were linked to the process of class formation. The relationship between the victors and the vanquished sprouted in the direction of class relations as the vanquished were subordinated or made slaves and concubines.

### **The State is Budding: Military Democracy**

Over time, the lords of a tribe subordinate other tribes and tribal communities to themselves. Pillage wars and raids between tribes are replaced by a system of rules shaped by the new subordination relations. In other words, the Kagan "holds the province and regulates the custom". While *province* here means a certain piece of land and the people on that land, in time it will also refer to the political organisation established on it. The phrases "loss of the province" and "gaining", "confusion of the province" are understood in these terms. *A province* is a certain group of subject peoples, and sometimes it is "mixed". On the other hand, a province is a territory, a property. And *a province* is a political organisation; it is the nucleus of the state.

The Gokturk aristocracy is depicted in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* at the time of the Chinese domination, He makes the black-boned bodun (exploited mass of people) speak as follows:



"'Illi bodun idim, where is my ilim now? To whom am I gaining province? I was a bodun with kagan, where is my kagan, to which kagan do I give my labour? Saying so, he became an enemy of the Chinese kagan. Since he could not organise himself, he surrendered again."

It is understood from this that *the province* was the territory dominated and the order and organisation established on it, based on exploitation. *The Orkhon Inscriptions* frequently speak of *the* "conquered" and "organised" *province*.

The relations of subordination between the people on a territory and the nomadic confederation are developing in the direction of transforming into relations between the state and its subjects. This one for a reason *il* Word, over time State before It has also taken on the meaning of political organisation. It is noteworthy that not only in Turkish but also in other languages the word "state" originally means

"property".<sup>(20)</sup> [20](#) Talat Tekin has always translated the word "*il*" into Turkish as "state" (*Orkhun Inscriptions*, pp.37, 39, 41

and many other places). However, the Göktürks had not yet reached the state stage. If analysed carefully, it will be seen that the word state looks foreign in the relevant parts of the text. In our opinion, the word "province" in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* should be left as it is. There is no word in today's language that can fulfil the concept of *province* at that time. This is because *province* is a historical category specific to that era and its content has changed over time.

Within the confederation established by the Gokturks, there is no doubt that the dominant Turkic

tribes (Turk Sir bodunu) also received a share from the exploitation. Bilge Kagan says: "I won and arranged solid gold, white silver, edged silk, silk cloth, riding horse, stallion, black otter, squirrel for my Turk, my bodunum".

The fact that "Turküm" and "bodunum" are listed separately strengthens the belief that the name Turk belongs to the most noble among the tribes called "Turk Sir bodunu". The fact that Bilge Kagan's name is mentioned as Turk Bilge Kagan also confirms this idea. Because the name of the nomadic aristocracy was prefixed with the name of the clan they belonged to. In time, this *Turkish* name was extended to other Göktürk tribes and foreigners (Arabs and Iranians) gave this name to all Turkish-speaking tribes.

The noble clan that benefited the most from the exploitation was undoubtedly the clan to which Bilge Kagan belonged and to which he said "I am Turk" and its most noble clan. Turk Sir

Bodunu and other Göktürk tribes, on the other hand, were in the best situation as they were in a dominant position within the Göktürk confederation. As a matter of fact, Bilge Kagan says, "In order to feed the Bodun, I dispatched an army twelve times towards Oguz in the north and towards Kıtay and China in the east. I made them subject, I made them without enemies". *In the Orkhon Inscriptions*, it is often said, "I sat on the body without food inside, without clothes outside, poor, miserable. I resurrected and fed the dying body. I made the naked body clothed, the poor body rich. I made the little body many. I made the body on all four sides subject and enemy-free".

Here, besides propaganda, there are undoubtedly traces of the primitive solidarity of the nomadic aristocracy with their related tribes.

It seems that the tribes referred to as Oghuz or sometimes as Dokuz Oghuz in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* had a separate status from the other subordinate tribes. Gumiliev explains this position of the Nine Oghuz as follows: "The Uighurs, who submitted to the Turks, relatively became their budun, but retained their internal structure and maintained their status as 'oguz' ".<sup>21</sup>

<sup>21</sup> Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.85.

Gumiliev rightly puts forward Bilge Kagan's statement that "Tokuz Oguz was my bodunum" as evidence for this view. "That is to say, the Nine Oghuzes were his shad-tardush-loyal budun; in other words, they directly obeyed him."<sup>22</sup><sup>22</sup>  
Gumiliev, *ibid.*

*In the Inscriptions*, Bilge Kagan calls out, "Hear, Turkic Oghuz beys bodunu". It is understood from this that the Nine Oghuz beys were close to the Turkish beys and were directly subordinate to the Turkish Kagan.

However, we will discuss in the section on *the* Oghuzes that the Oghuz or Nine Oghuz in *the Orkhon Inscriptions* is different from the tribe that would organise the Oghuz Yabgu confederation in the late IXth century and then flow into Anatolia.

War and raids were a source of livelihood for the Turkic tribes. Everyone who took up arms received a certain share from the spoils of war and plunder. As the *Orkhon Inscriptions* put it, "at that time kul kullu became kullu, concubine became concubine". In other words, the dominant element, the Turkic tribe, had become richer.

As Engels states, "Organisation for warfare had become a regular duty of community life."<sup>23</sup> However, it cannot yet be said that arms were concentrated in the hands of a special public power. All members of the tribe who were armed went to war. However, it is also understood that a military force, a retinue, called alps, which had nothing to do but fight, began to gather around the beys and kagans. Engels describes the role of this military retinue in the birth of the kingdom and the state as follows:

<sup>23</sup> Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p.228.

They emphasise the role of war itself as "a regular form of intercourse for the conquering barbarians".

See *German Ideology*, p.42.

"Having gained a certain reputation, the military chief gathered around him a crowd of young men with their eyes on the spoils; these young men were bound to him by personal loyalty - as the chief was bound to them. The chief provided for their needs, gave them gifts and organised them hierarchically. Thus they formed a guard and a fighting corps for small campaigns and a whole officer corps for larger ones. (They)... constituted a seed of destruction for the ancient freedom of the people... On the one hand, they facilitated the emergence of kingly power, but... their disintegration could only be maintained by constant wars and expeditions... These retinues of the kings, together with slaves and Roman court servants, constituted the second of the main elements of the future nobility ."<sup>24</sup>

<sup>24</sup> Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p.201.

The Gokturk confederation, just like the Hun confederation, is a stepping stone on the way from the tribal system and organisation to the state. The differentiation in the nomadic society, where there is a large private property on animal herds, gives birth to the state.<sup>(25)</sup> Bilge Kagan says that God sent him so that "the land and the waters would not remain ownerless". Theft is punishable by death. This is a common practice in societies where private property is just developing and becoming established. The tribal aristocracy establishes and reinforces private property with severe penalties.<sup>(26)</sup> Looting and plundering are also prohibited within the Confederation.

and exploitation is linked to a new system<sup>27</sup>

[25](#) While analysing other societies, Engels describes this development, which had not yet been completed in the Göktürk period, as follows:

"Primitive and spontaneous democracy had degenerated into an abominable aristocracy. Finally, civic organisation arose out of a society without internal strife and was suitable only for a society of this nature. This society had no means of coercion except public opinion. But a society had arisen which was internally divided by the totality of the conditions of its economic existence into free men and slaves, rich exploiters and poor exploiters, a society which could no longer reconcile these irreconcilable antagonisms, but had to develop them to the utmost. ... The life span of the communal organisation had expired. The division of labour (and, as a consequence, the division of society division into classes), it was shattered. It was replaced by the state." (*ibid.*, pp. 233-234.)

[26](#) Ibn Fadlan states that the Bulgarian Turks also killed the thief and the adulterer. See Ibn Fazlan, *Seyahatnâme*, Published by Prof. Dr. Ramazan Şeşen, Bedir Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, 1995, p.61. [27](#) Franz Oppenheimer explains the difference between plunder and exploitation with the difference between a bear and a beekeeper.

The plunderer is like a bear that destroys the hive while eating the honey in the hive. The beekeeper, on the other hand, establishes a relationship of exploitation by leaving enough honey for the bees to survive the winter. The exploiter also creates a security system to protect the labourer he exploits against bears (*Devlet*, trans. Alâeddin Şenel-Yavuz Sabuncu, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, March 1984, pp.75 et al., 80, 122).

Gumiliev, evaluating this success of the Göktürks in establishing a certain peace and order in the steppe, argues that in the VIIIth century, the barbarian army

recognises that they have moved to a state order [\(28\)](#)

[28](#) Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.396.

Despite all these, the Göktürk confederation is the organisation of the period when the transition to the state was not yet complete; an army separate from the people had not yet been organised. The commodity economy was not sufficiently developed. The Gokturk kings did not issue coins in their own name.

Bilge Kagan insists that it would be death for the Turkic tribe to leave the forest of Ötüken and go to China. Undoubtedly, this death is to melt into the feudal relations in China. For this, it is necessary not to approach China: "If you sit in the place of Ötüken and send caravan caravans, you will have no troubles." With these words, Bilge Kagan means "do not go and melt there, feudal society will swallow you!" [\(29\)](#)

[29](#) The attempts of societies at a more backward stage of development against more advanced societies Engels analyses the result of conquests as follows:

"A conquest by a coarser people obviously undermines economic development and destroys many productive forces. But in the great majority of cases of continuous conquest, the coarser conqueror is forced to conform to the higher 'economic situation' as it emerged from the conquest; he is assimilated by the conquered people and is often even forced to adopt their language." (Engels, *The Role of Force in History*, p.59.)

## **The Revolution Narrated by the Orkhon Inscriptions**

The dissolution of blood ties in parallel with the development of wealth and private property is very clearly described by Bilge Kagan. The view that emerged at the end of the subordination of many tribes and the booty gained through wars is as follows:

"At that time, servant became servant, concubine became concubine. The younger brother did not know the older brother, the son did not know his father. We had a province and customs that had been won and organised in such a way."

As a result of the development of private property, blood ties were dissolved to the extent that "younger brother did not know older brother". Society is no longer shaped on the basis of clan (lineage), but according to the emerging private property relations. Clans are being dispersed, people from the same clan are being placed in different places, military units consisting of warriors from different tribes are being formed. It is no coincidence that the dissolution of the society based on blood ties and the organisation of province and ritual are expressed one after the other.

In short, society is going through a period of revolution. *The Orkhon Inscriptions* describe this social development, this revolution, from beginning to end. Engels expresses this historical development, in which the kinship organisation has disappeared, as follows:

"In this process of social evolution, let us see what has become of the kinship organisation. This organisation was powerless in the face of new elements which had sprung up without its own contribution. The first condition of its

existence was that a clan or

the members of the tribe were united on a territory inhabited only by themselves. This situation had long since disappeared. Everywhere clans and tribes were mixed together."<sup>30</sup>

<sup>30</sup> Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p.232.

What were the new elements that were disintegrating the old tribal organisation based on blood ties? Private property was at the head of these elements. The collective property of the clan was receding and disappearing in the face of private property. Classification within society was disintegrating the egalitarian tribal organisation based on blood ties. Being a member of a certain tribe was replaced by dependence on a certain aristocrat. This was the revolution that Central Asia had been experiencing for centuries and which is reflected in *the Orkhon Inscriptions*. The establishment of the Gokturk confederation represents a new wave forward in this development in waves.

Bilge Kagan, in contrast to the racists who today use him as a flag, played a role that served the progress of history. Bilge Kagan was at the head of the attempt to make the transition from the predatory war-chiefdom to the system of exploitation of the labourer, in other words, to civilisation. The historical development was in the direction of the emergence of society from primitive communism, the development of private property, the emergence of classes and the state. Bilge Kagan also served this purpose. As a matter of fact, Chinese sources state that Bilge Kagan had the idea of accustoming his subjects to urban life and the rites of the Buddha religion. However, this idea met with the opposition of Tonyukuk.<sup>(31)</sup>

<sup>31</sup> Abdülkadir İnan, *History of Ancient Turkish Religion*, Ministry of Culture, Istanbul, 1976, p.8.



Gokturk Confederation in Central Asia (552-659 AD)

### 3. UYGURS

The Uighurs put an end to the Gokturk kaganate in 743 and established their rule in the Orkhon region. In the foundation of the Uighur kaganate, the Nine Oguz



.(<sup>32</sup>)In addition to the Nine Oghuz, the Karluks and Basmils were also part of the Uighur confederation.

<sup>32</sup> For example Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.449 et seq.; Collin Mackerras, "Uyghurs", trans. Prof. Dr. Şinasi Tekin, in *Early Inner Asian History* edited by Denis Sinor, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2000, p.429.

The word Uyghur appears only in one place in *the Göktürk Inscriptions*: "Uyghur Elteber fled to the east with about a hundred men and went away."<sup>33</sup>

<sup>33</sup> See Talat Tekin, *Orkhon Inscriptions*, pp.74-75.

The views that the Uighurs were actually part of the group of tribes referred to as "Nine Oguz" in the *Gokturk Inscriptions* or that they formed the On Uyghur by subjugating these tribes are debated. Gumiliev, who unhesitatingly determines that the Nine Oghuz and the Uyghurs are the same tribe, states that the Uyghurs were the strongest among the alliance of nine tribes.<sup>34</sup> Chinese sources refer to the Uyghur kagan as "the kagan of nine lineages" .<sup>35</sup> Radlov also states that the names Uyghur, On Uyghur, Nine Uyghur, Oguz, Nine Oguz all refer to the Uyghurs.<sup>36</sup>

<sup>34</sup> Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.85, 397.

<sup>35</sup> Collin Mackerras, "Uyghurs", trans. Prof. Dr. Şinasi Tekin, in *Early Inner Asian History* edited by Denis Sinor, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2000, p.429.

<sup>36</sup> Cited in: Seyfeddin Aziz, *Türklerin Müslümanlık Geçişi/ Satuk Buğra Han*, Kaynak Yayınları, February 2000, p.16.

As it is known "Nine Oguz" "Nine Oguz" he of the Turkish of the time  
*Nine Boylar*  
meant the Uighurs.

The rule of the Uighurs lasted about a hundred years until 840. At this time, the Uighurs, defeated by the Kyrgyz, migrated to the west and settled in the Five Fish (Five Cities) region (Sincian-Uygur, today an autonomous region of the People's Republic of China).

## **From Marauding War Chief to State**

We see that the Uighurs built cisterns in Five Fish. In the same way, crafts were also developing. An edict issued in 1055-1065 prohibited the sale of copper and iron ore. It is clear that this prohibition was imposed to favour the processing of ores. We can also consider this prohibition as a symptom of the emergence of feudal guild restrictions.

Parallel to this development, nomadic warriorism is also weakening.

After the 9th century, the Uighur tribal confederation gradually resembled a merchant state, with the development of trade, the transition to settled life and the establishment of cities. Although this development began during the Uighur rule in the Orkhon region, which lasted until 840, it is mostly seen in the cities established by the Uighurs after their migration to the Five Fish-Turfan region. In this period, Uyghur society is identified with this urbanisation process. As a matter of fact, in *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, Kashgarlı Mahmut defines the word Uyghur as "the name of a province with five cities"<sup>(37)</sup>

<sup>37</sup> In *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, the concept of Uyghur is explained as follows: "The name of a province with five cities. Zulqarnayn built these cities after making peace with the Turkish sultan. (...) There are five cities in this province.

The inhabitants of the province are the strictest heretics; they are extremely shooters. Sûlmî, Koçu, Canbalık, Beşbalık, Yengi Balık." (c.I, p.113.)

The confederation , of which the Uighurs were at the head , just like the Huns and

Like the Göktürks, it was a step towards transition from a marauding war chief to a state. The kaganate, which was a temporary position chosen to command raiding and plundering expeditions in times of war or to lead hunting expeditions, was institutionalised and became permanent in these confederations. Dynasties were established in which the kaganate passed from father to son.

In connection with this development, a retinue was born around both the kagan and the nomadic lords who depended on him. These were the "alps", "erenler", "yiğitler" (brave men) who had broken away from the clan organisation based on production and blood ties. The "sevens, nines, forties" etc., which are still sung in folk tales today, are reflections of this retinue in epics.

In time, this military retinue was joined by warriors belonging to other tribes and clans, who were not related to the kagan or bey around whom they gathered. Thus, a public power separate from the people began to form and institutionalise

[38](#) "The vast area of the empire could no longer be governed by the old means of civic organisation.

The council of chiefs could not meet even where it had long since ceased to exist, and was soon replaced by the king's permanent circle." (F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p. 212.)

Naturally, this process goes hand in hand with the development of private property and the enrichment of the nomadic aristocracy, the sharpening of class differences and the dissolution of the tribal organisation based on blood ties. The new class society also creates a permanent armed force to control the population. While every member of the tribe who can hold a gun continues to participate in the war, on the other hand, a power of oppression and coercion is formed that is separate from the mass of the people and has no relation with production. This process culminated in the creation of private armies, which were composed entirely of recruits or paid soldiers.

In the same way, a bureaucracy is also being established. Permanent civil servants emerged to fulfil the duties of the emerging state. For example, in the Uighurs, these court officials were called "tapıgçı". This phenomenon shows that the bureaucracy is sprouting.

The chiefs of the tribal society now bear titles such as shad, tarkan, buyruk, ilteber, yabgu, and so on. These titles indicate the existence of a development in the direction of feudalism, albeit at a backward stage.

This process, of course, zigzagged and included occasional reversals. When the central authority, which wanted to base exploitation on relations of dominance and dependence instead of plunder, was shaken, tribal chiefs engaged in wars of plunder, leading to regressions. The dominant tribes on which the kaghan depended were the drivers of social progress in the direction of developing private property and trade, sharpening class differences and building cities. On the other hand, the subjugated tribes resisted this development. For example, this resistance was manifested in the form of the reaction of nomadic tribes against the Uighur Khan Bögü Kagan's acceptance of the Mani religion, which was an urban and merchant religion.

## **Religion of the Urbanising Aristocracy: Mani**

For the first time in 762, Böğü Kagan accepted the Mani religion. Initially, this religion was naturally adopted by the urbanising aristocracy and faced increasing opposition from the large nomadic masses. In parallel with the development of urbanisation and trade, an aristocratic caste of priests also emerged.

The Uighur words ige, ite, iti, idi mean both master and owner, and God.<sup>(39)</sup> The fact that property owners and merchants first accepted the Mani religion and then Islam was the ideological expression of the historical development they experienced. We will summarise this process under the title of Karluks hereafter.

<sup>39</sup> Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, *Türk Lügâtı*, p.513 and 514 as cited in *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, Kaynak Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, May 1996, p.266.




Uighur priestesses.

#### 4. KARLUKS AND KARAHANLI STATE

Karluks, one of the first Turkic tribes to settle down, are important in terms of establishing the first Turkish-Islamic state, the Qarakhanid state (932-1212). The Khazars, also a Turkic tribe, were organised as a state in the geography between the Volga River and the Caucasus in the west of Central Asia in the middle of the 8th century, two centuries before the Qarluqs. However, they had adopted the Jewish religion.

In the second half of the 8th century, the Karluks came to the Chu River basin west of Lake Isig. They settled on the tributaries of this river and started agriculture. They founded villages, towns and cities. Some of them continued their nomadic life in the favourable pastures in the upper parts of the Chu Valley.



Karluk çağı çanak ve çömlekleri.

## Development of Agriculture, Trade and Crafts

When we analyse the *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, a product of Karakhanid culture written by Kashgarli Mahmut in 1072, we come across many Turkish concepts and terms related to settled life, trade, agriculture and crafts. Kashgarli Mahmut gives us important information about the level of development of the production forces and production relations at that time.

It is seen that private property developed rapidly in Qarakhanids and affected human behaviour. Kashgarli Mahmut included two lines in his *Divan* to explain this, as follows: "Because of wealth, men are always corrupted; when they see wealth, they descend like eagles upon the carcass ." <sup>40</sup> Another saying is as follows: "For the sake of wealth, not thinking of God, they drown their brother and son ." <sup>41</sup>

<sup>40</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.II, p.17.

<sup>41</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.86.

The source of dignity is property. In a poem quoted by Kashgarli it is said: "Whoever's property multiplies, beylik is favourable to him; when a bey is without property, he suffers from lack of men." The same event is described in another stanza in today's Turkish as follows:

"His voice was hoarse  
Eri surrendered his  
horse His disguise was  
ruined

Who keeps his word?" <sup>42</sup>

<sup>42</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.118.

The share of inheritance is called arrow. <sup>(43)</sup>

<sup>43</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.48.

Commodity economy had reached a certain level of development in Karakhanids. In 1069, in *Kutadgu Bilig* written by Yusuf Has Hacip, goods from China, India and Byzantium are listed. Among them, there are a wide variety of items ranging from silks, clothes, ornaments such as pearls to fragrances such as incense. <sup>(44)</sup> On the other hand, people were employed for a wage. The wage is called *ter*, and the labourer is called *terci*. <sup>(45)</sup>

[44](#) For the translation of this great work of Yusuf Has Hacıp, also known as Balasagunlu Yusuf, by Reşit Rahmeti Arat and its translation into today's Turkish, see *Kutadgu Bilig*, I, Text, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1991 and II, Translation, 6th edition, Ankara, 1994. See also A. Dilâçar, *Kutadgu Bilig İncelemesi*, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1995, p.150 et al.

[45](#) *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.III, p.148. The phrase *tiş teri* (tooth fee) mentioned in *Kutadgu Bilig* has also become tooth rent and has been used for over a thousand years from the Karakhanids until today. See A. Dilâçar, *age*, p.151.

We learn from the works of Yusuf Has Hacıp and Kashgarli Mahmut that there were handicrafts such as blacksmithing, shoemaking, leatherwork, lacquering, dyeing, mattress making, bow and arrow manufacturing in Karakhanids.

Again in *Kutadgu Bilig* and *Divan*, various agricultural and livestock products are mentioned: Cigit (cotton seed), ügür (millet), urug (seed), badhıc (vine trellis), talka (coriander), kımız, milk, yag, yoghurt, kurut (cheese), rose water. Some terms related to agricultural technology are as follows: Orgak (sickle), aim (farm oxen, agricultural implements; also means target), op (ox in the middle of oxen running for threshing), sacrifice (grapes) wood used for making arbour legs in vineyards).

There is also information in the *Divan* on the state of the art in handicraft industry. For example, the piece of wood placed on the millstone is called *iteği*. If the flour is desired to be a little thicker, the stone is lifted up by means of *iteği*, and if it is desired to be thinner, it is lowered down. Opposite the word *arkag* is the following explanation: Argach, a thread or yarn thrown transversely when weaving cloth, carpets, rugs, etc.

## **Trade Security, Forced Settlement and Class Struggle**

The emergence of the Qarakhanid state in the regions covering the Chu and Tarim basins, where the transition to settled life and agriculture took place relatively earlier



meaningful. This state undoubtedly accelerated the development of settlement, agriculture, urbanisation and feudalisation. As can be understood from *Kutadgu Bilig*, the most important function of the state is to ensure the security of trade. The people expect three jobs from the headbuğ called "ilig": To keep the silver in tune, to enact correct laws and to secure the caravan routes.<sup>(46)</sup> To *Kutadgu Bilig* According to him, "A principality stands only with the law."

<sup>46</sup> A. Dilâçar, *age*, p.148 et seq.

Yusuf Has Hacıp mentions three social classes in Qarakhanids: *Baylar* (the rich), *middle people* and *çıgaylar* (the poor).<sup>47</sup> This classification is different from the classification of bey, gün and el in Sir-i Derya Oghuz. While the classes in the Oghuzs express the division of aristocracy, commoners and servants that emerged in the tribal society, in the Qarakhanids, the rich-poor division of the new commercial society comes to the fore. On the other hand, the word karabudun, which has been used since *the Orkhon Inscriptions*, is also mentioned in *Kutadgu Bilig* as a remnant of the old society.


<sup>47</sup> A. Dilâçar, *age*, p.149 et seq.

In the 1156-1160s, the Qarakhanid state was forcing the Qarluq mass of people to settle down, by detaching them from military service.<sup>48</sup> The newly formed state was accelerating the process of transition from nomadic life to settled agriculture by force. Exploitation was increasingly based on the agricultural economy.

<sup>48</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol.6, p.352 a-b.

This great change and upheaval in society also intensified the class struggle. There were bloody conflicts between the Qarakhanid state, which represented the interests of the wealthy class, and the shepherds of the Qarluq tribe, who were forced to settle on the land. *The Encyclopaedia of Islam* states that this class struggle was "the main reason that shook the foundation of the state and led the dynasty to collapse".<sup>(49)</sup>

<sup>49</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, vol.6, p.263-b.



Karahanlılar'ın başlangıç devirlerine ait çanak ve çömlekler.

### Disarmament of the exploited nomadic masses

The contradiction of the age is between the state and tribal organisation. The Qarakhanid state was dissolving and disbanding the moribund tribal society. In this process, tribal traditions such as revenge are also being shaken. The saying "They cannot destroy blood with blood", which has survived to this day, is also mentioned in Kashgarlı's *Divan*.<sup>(50)</sup>

<sup>50</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.III, p.66.

The state disarmed the population in order to protect property owners, to ensure the security of trade and to force nomads to settle down. *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk* reveals that a book called *Aybitiği* was kept in the Karakhanid state. Information on the soldiers and their livelihoods, etc. was kept in this book.

.<sup>51</sup>The keeping of such a book signifies the formation of an armed force and bureaucracy separate from the people. The Qarakhanid state disarmed and controlled agriculturalists and shepherds.

<sup>51</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.40.

Yusuf Has Hajip's *Kutadgu Bilig* is full of evidence that the Qarakhanids had already acquired the character of a state. This book itself contains the state theory and philosophy of the Karakhanids. Beyond this, the book contains many information and concepts that prove the existence of a state organisation. Yusuf Has Hajip divides the rulers into three classes: Wise scholars, muhtesib's (armed force maintaining order) and tapugçı's (administrative officials, bureaucracy).

Again from *Kutadgu Bilig*, it is understood that a highly developed state hierarchy was formed. After the chief, who is called Ilig, there are the following duties and offices in order of importance: Vizier, er ögi, ilbeg, yuğruş, yavgu, çavlıbeg, tiginbeg, çağrıbeg, mançbeg, kökayuk, öge, ilimga, agıcı, hacib, ilbaş, sübaş, on otag, hilbaş.<sup>52</sup>

<sup>52</sup> See *Kutadgu Bilig* and A. Dilâçar, *Kutadgu Bilig Review*, p.149 vd.

The palace organisation also developed.

Another concept indicating the formation of bureaucracy in Karakhanids is urunç. Urunç means bribe.<sup>(53)</sup> Proverbs quoted by Kashgarli Mahmut suggest that bribery became a well-established practice that opened doors: "The wind opens the black cloud, the hand opens the bribe ."<sup>54</sup> Even the gate of hell can be opened with wealth: "Tamu kapuğın açar tawar ."<sup>55</sup>

<sup>53</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.132.

<sup>54</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.III, p.234.

<sup>55</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.III, p.234.

In the tribal society left behind, there was plunder, but no bribery. Bribery emerged with the formation of bureaucracy.

## **Ideology of the Settling Aristocracy and Merchants: Islam**

It is natural that the Qarluqs and Oghuzs, who adopted settled life, agriculture and built cities, were also the first Turkic tribes to accept Islam. This shows that Islam spread among the Turks as the religion of the aristocracy and merchants who settled on the land; it responded to their class needs. Seyfeddin Aziz's novel *The Transition of the Turks to Islam/ Satuk Buğra Khan* and its preface describe the ideological role of Islam in the transition to civilisation.<sup>(56)</sup>

<sup>56</sup> 17 Abdulkirim Satuq Buğra Khan, the ruler of the rise period of the Karakhanids, was a Muslim.

This novel, which deals with the formation of a new generation, has been translated and published in Turkish. See Kaynak Publications, trans. Prof. Dr. Rukiye Hacı, Istanbul, February 2000.

The ruling classes in the Karakhanid state accepted Sunnite Islam. This A group of scholars representing this ideology had also formed. These ulema accused those who belonged to the Batinî sect of heresy and demanded that their leaders be punished in the most severe way<sup>57</sup>. As can be seen, Batinîism had become the ideology of those who rebelled against the state as early as the Karakhanids. The masses of people engaged in nomadic animal husbandry and agriculture carried out their opposition to the Sunnite Islam of the ruling classes under the banner of Batinite sects.

<sup>57</sup> *Encyclopaedia of Islam*, c.6, p.263-b.

## 5. THE SYR-I DERYA OĞUZ

The word *Oguz*, just like the word *bodun*, meant tribes and the union of tribes. *Og* meant boy, and *-uz* was the plural suffix. The word *oguz* turned into *oguz* with the softening of the letter *g*. For example, *Dokuz Oguz* in *the Orkhon Inscriptions* meant nine tribes. *Üç Oğuz*, which was used to commemorate the Karluks, meant three tribes. The Nine Oghuzes later took part in the Uighur confederation.

The Oghuzes who came to Anatolia from the Maveräünnehir region were a group of tribes different from the Nine Oghuzes. The word oğuz, which means the union of tribes, turned into the special name of an ethnic group in Sir-i Derya Oghuz. In this respect, the word oğuz followed the adventure of the process of transition from a community of tribes to an ethnic group. In the past, each alliance of tribes was referred to as Three-Oghuz, Eight-Oghuz, Nine Oghuz according to the number of tribes in it, but in time the word oğuz became the proper name of the Sir-i Derya Oghuz. It can be assumed that Oguz Kagan, mentioned in the epics, had the meaning of the Khan of the Tribes before it became a proper name, and then it turned into the proper name of a certain kagan who was the hero of the epic<sup>(58)</sup>

58 Gumiliev, referring to Abul Ghazi, says in this regard: "Over time, the word 'oğuz' (meaning "budun") lost its original meaning and became the name of Oghuz Kagan, the legendary ancestor of Turkmens, whom Muslims consider among their prophets. (*Ancient Turks*, p.86.)

Starting from the 11th century, they migrated to the Near East and Anatolia in waves.

The Sir-i Derya Oghuzes were the ones who founded the Seljuk and Ottoman states.

At the beginning of the 10th century, the Oghuzes lived along and north of the Sir River, which flows into Lake Aral. They had an economy based mostly on nomadic animal husbandry.



Baş kesen Peçenek bahadırları.

### Formalisation of the Tribe

According to the Persian *Oghuzname* (Oghuz Kagan Epic) in the *Jamüü't-Tevârih* written by the Ilkhanid Vizier Reşidüddin, the Oghuz, consisting of twenty-four tribes, were headed by the Oghuz yabgusu<sup>(59)</sup> It would be erroneous to think that these twenty-four tribes were all communities based on blood ties. Because the organisation based on blood ties is dissolving. It was no longer kinship that united the members of the tribe, but the relationship of dependence on a certain tribal lord. As it is known, the number of tribes was twenty-four in Huns. This shows that tribes have gained a formal meaning and are no longer based on blood ties.

[59](#) As is known, *the Oghuzname* narrated by Rashid al-Din and the *Oghuz Khan Epic* translated into Uyghur are two narrations of the same epic. For information on this subject, see Faruk Sümer, *Oğuzlar*, p.374 et seq. and again Faruk Sümer, "Oğuz Han and his Epic", *Resimli Tarih Dergisi*, issue 20, August 1951, p.895 et seq.

The Persian version of the *Oghuzname* was translated into Western Turkish by Yazicioglu in the 15th century and into Eastern Turkish by Abulgazi Bahadır Khan in the 17th century. We can learn the content of the *Oghuz Khan Epic*, the whole of which has been lost, from these narrations. The only known manuscript of the epic today is in Uyghur. The German edition of the *Oghuz Khan Epic*, first prepared by W. Bang and G.R. Rahmeti in 1932, was published in Turkish in 1936. This work was republished in 1970 in the "Devlet Kitapları" series (Milli Eğitim Basımevi, İstanbul, 1970).

Unlike the *Oghuzname*, *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk* mentions twenty-two Oghuz tribes in the article "Oguz" (c.I, p.55 et seq.), while in the article "Turkmen" it states that they were "actually twenty-four tribes" (c.III, p.415). However, he also explains that there is no contradiction between these two information: "The Xalachians, who consisted of two tribes, were not considered as Oghuz because they sometimes separated from them; this is the main thing" (*ibid.*, p.416). For a detailed explanation on this subject, see Faruk Sumer, *Oguzlar*, p.201 et seq.

In the course of historical development, people from different clans and tribes may be organised within the same tribe.

merging and moulding. Many historians, such as Barthold and Cahen, point out that the organisation based on blood ties among the Oghuz masses that migrated to Anatolia was significantly dissolved. According to these historians, compared to the Arabs during the Arab conquests, the organisation based on blood ties among the Oghuzes was much weaker. It is clear from this that the class differentiation within the Oghuz had already begun to disintegrate the cohort society while they were still in Central Asia. The Russian historian Roslyakov also states that the patriarchal lineage chain in the Oghuz clan structure was rapidly dissolved and a feudal order was formed instead.<sup>[\(60\)](#)</sup>

[60](#) As cited in S.G. Agacanov, *Oghuzlar*, translated from Russian by Akbar N. Necef and Ahmet Annaberdiyev, Selenge Publications, İstanbul 2002, p.61.

The fact that the Oghuz tribes are no longer communities based on blood ties is also evident from *the Book of Dede Korkut*. Dede Korkut describes the life of the 11th century Sir-i Derya Oghuzes. Around the beys, a retinue consisting of *vassals* from different tribes is gathered. Blood ties are replaced by personal feudal relations, in a broader sense by dependency relations. For example, this is clearly seen in the last story of the *Book of Dede Korkut*, "The Revolt of the Outer Oghuz against the Inner Oghuz". Bamsı Beyrek is the believer of Salur Kazan, the Inner Oghuz bey, that is, the bey of the Three Arrows. *The believer*

$i$  is a member of the



He is the head of the guards and the most reliable man. It is also understood from the story that Bamsı Beyrek is not from the Three Arrows. Grey Arrows, who rebelled against the Three Arrows, call Bamsı Beyrek to their side and consider him as one of them. Bamsı Beyrek, as it is understood from the story, is actually a member of the Grey Arrow tribe, but he has joined the retinue of Salur Kazan, the lord of the Three Arrows. Beyrek says, "I have eaten a lot of Kazan's blessing. If I do not know, let it be in my eyes". There is a relationship of personal dependence between Beyrek and Salur Kazan. This relationship replaced the blood bond. In fact, *vigilantes* are musketeers who leave their tribe and enter the retinue of another master. *The practice of servitude* spreads to the extent that private property develops and contributes to the dissolution of the tribal society.

## **"Oghuzs have many cities"**

Oghuzs used to live in cities for wintering. Although there were a significant number who settled down, the majority of them were nomads. The Arab historian Masudî mentions the Oghuzes who lived a settled life. There are also ruins of cities from this period. Among these, the city of Cand is a kind of capital city where the Oghuz yabg lived. The transition to settled life had begun even before the adoption of Islam. Idrisi says: "The cities of the Oghuz are many, they extend to the north and west". Kashgarli Mahmut also lists Oghuz cities in his *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*.

In this period, there was a lively trade between the Oghuz and neighbouring Islamic countries. In *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, there are many Turkish words that are stated to be Oghuz, and they are related to agriculture, mining, crafts and trade. For example, the word "*borrow*" comes to us today from a thousand years ago.<sup>(61)</sup> Numerous evidences show that the Oghuzs were moving from nomadic animal husbandry to agriculture, building cities, and advancing in trade and crafts. This point

very important. Because the Oghuz masses migrating to Anatolia were not only nomadic elements. Settled people engaged in agriculture and crafts had also come to Anatolia. While they were still living in the Sir-i Derya tribes, feudal relations were developing among the Oghuz.

[61](#) *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.131.

## **Classification and Class Struggle**

We see that there was a strong class differentiation among the Oghuz. We learn from Arab writers that wealth was concentrated in the hands of the beys. Ibn Fadlan mentions that there were beys among the Oghuz who owned a hundred thousand sheep and ten thousand head of cattle. [62](#)*The Book of Dede Korkut* also confirms this. Salur Kazan, the lord of the Three Arrows, has ten thousand sheep only in a place called Kaygulu Derbendi. Deli Karçar in the story of Bamsı Beyrek asks for a thousand camels, a thousand horses and a thousand sheep as a bride price for his sister. As can be seen, great wealth accumulates in the hands of the beys. Wealth is mainly animal herds.

[62](#) Ibn Fazlan, *Seyahatnâme*, p.45.

As Marx points out, in nomadic shepherd communities it is not the land that is appropriated and reproduced, but mainly the herds of animals. Land is seen in its primitive limitlessness. Private ownership of land is not yet in question.

In the Oghuzs, the right of disposition over the pieces of land and herds that are moved and settled develops in the direction of private property. Tribal lords have sovereignty over certain pieces of land. Dominance and disposition over the lands are organised within the tribal aristocracy which has a certain hierarchy.

We also see in the Oghuz that land was given to those who showed valour in battles. *The Book of Dede Korkut* writes that after Salur Kazan defeated the enemy, "Many countries were given to heroic koçyigits".<sup>(63)</sup>

<sup>63</sup> *The Book of Dede Korkut*, prepared by Muharrem Ergin, Ministry of National Education Publication, p.51. Orhan Şaik

Gökyay translated the *Book of Dede Korkut* into today's language: *Bugünkü Dille Dede Korkut*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 1963. Gökyay also wrote a 366-page work on the mistakes in Muharrem Ergin's two-volume *Dede Korkut: Destursuz Bağa Girenler*, Dergâh Yayınları, Istanbul, May 1982.

The source of the right to dispose of the land, being a member of the aristocracy and is the heroism shown in battles. The lands, as seen in the story, are organised by the beys at the top of the Oghuz aristocracy.

Since ancient times, the Oghuz had been divided into *bey*, *el* and *day* classes. These class divisions are frequently mentioned in the Uighur *Oghuz Epic*. Considering that there is almost no trace of Islam in this epic, it can be seen that the Oghuz were divided into classes long before Islam.<sup>64</sup>

<sup>64</sup> W. Bang and G.R. Rahmeti in the Turkish Works section of the Paris National Library 1001

For the translated text of the *Oguz Kagan Epic*, which was published in German in 1932 and in Turkish in 1936 in Istanbul, based on the Uyghur copy registered under no. *Oğuz Kagan Epic*, 1000 Basic Works, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Istanbul 1970. For the places where the classes Bey, el, gün are mentioned, see p.7, 9, 11, 14, 23, 24, 26, 27. For the verse translation of the same epic, see Prof. Dr. Bahaeddin Ögel, *Turkish Mythology*, c.I, AKDITYK Publication, Ankara 1993, p.115 et seq.

*The beys* were the dominant tribal aristocracy.

*El* was the exploited mass that was dependent on the beys, i.e. shepherds and agriculturalists. The word "*el*" comes from the word "*il*" which we see in Göktürks. This was the name given to the dependent people on a certain piece of land.

We come across the concept of *day* in the form of *kün* as early as *the Orkhon Inscriptions*. In the Gokturks, *kün* meant female slave, concubine. Oghuzs, on the other hand, called their slaves and servants as *gün*. Since settled agriculture, commodity production and trade were backward in Oghuzs, slavery was insignificant.

The idiom "against all odds", which is still alive in our language today, has its roots in these class differences. This idiom is a way for the lords to protect their reputation against the people and slaves.

It expressed the concern of the people.

The phrase "the hand is mightier or the bey is mightier" refers to the power of the people in the class struggle between the mass of the people and the beys and has survived to this day.

The Arab scholar Masudî also divided the Oghuz into three classes:

1. High (al-ali),
2. Middle (al-awasht),
3. Lower and poor (al-asafil).

This classification resembles the distinction of baylar (the rich), middle people and ıgaylar (the poor) made by Yusuf Has Hacı, who wrote the Qarakhanid state theory in 1069. It can be said that the distinction of bey, el and gün reflects a more backward period in the process of the dissolution of tribal society. The distinction between high, middle and poor can be considered to have emerged with the development of trade.

Since there were classes among the Oghuzes, there was naturally a class struggle. Expressions indicating this are also mentioned in *the Book of Dede Korkut*. In the story "Begiloğlu Emren", his wife, who sees Begil, an Oghuz sovereign, in distress, asks:

"Did your tribe quarrel with your tribe, did your strange head stay in the fight?"<sup>65</sup>

<sup>65</sup> Muharrem Ergin, *The Book of Dede Korkut*, p.188.

Apparently, "quarrel" and "fight" between the clan (beys) and the clan (dependent people) is a common situation. When the khatuns see the beys in trouble, they immediately dwell on this possibility. In the same story, Begil Bey says, "Let it be known that I am a traitor to Oghuz". His wife, on the other hand, gives advice to her husband by saying "the one who is in disobedience to his sultan will not have good luck".<sup>(66)</sup>

<sup>66</sup> In the same place.

Class enmity is reflected in an old proverb in the *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk* as follows:

"Kul yağı, it böri." That is, "Kul is the enemy, dog is the wolf." Kashgarlı explains this proverb as follows:

"When the servant takes possession of his master's property, he devours it, looks for opportunities, behaves like an enemy; the dog is like a wolf for the house he is in, because food

When he finds something, he does not hesitate to eat it. This argument is said to show that the slave has no love for his master."<sup>67</sup>

<sup>67</sup> Kashgarli Mahmut, *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.336.

Other from the side tribe aristocrats between da  
bloody conflicts are observed.

## Towards State Building

The "state" of the Oghuz yabgu was based on this class differentiation. The question of whether the Oghuz yabgu organisation was really a state is debated among historians. Some, such as Ernst Werner, are of the opinion that there was no state. A larger group of historians, including Tolstov, Roslyakov and Agacanov, are of the opinion that the Oghuz yabgu formed a primitive state in the 10th century, even before the Seljuks.<sup>(68)</sup>

<sup>68</sup> For more information see S.G. Agacanov, *Oghuzs*, p.62 ff. Agacanov describes the state of Oghuz Yabgu in broad terms

He analyses it based on sources. See *the same work*, p.183 et seq.

In fact this of the debate every Two side Also, the truth  
one emphasises his face. Oguz their  
yabgu sovereignty, It refers to the stage of transition from a  
confederation of tribes to a state. This "state" is based on the exploitation of the  
shepherd people called *el* and slaves called *day*.<sup>(69)</sup> <sup>69</sup> On the social structure of the Oghuz,  
see Faruk Sumer, *Oghuzlar*, p.37; S.G. Agacanov, *Oghuzlar*,  
p.60 et seq. and especially p.129 et seq.

The shepherd population is being disarmed day by day. Karacuk Shepherd in the epic "The Sacking of Salur Kazan's House" is unarmed and Kazan Bey cannot bring himself to go to the enemy with the shepherd. Because fighting is gradually becoming the job of the tribal aristocracy and the musketeers gathered around them, and an armed "public power" separate from the people is being organised step by step.

The formation of the state is also evident from the emergence of a hierarchy and bureaucracy. Titles such as subashi, külerkin, tarkan, yinal signified certain ranks and high offices.

We have tried to summarise the lives of the Oghuzes who founded the Seljuk and Ottoman feudal states. Undoubtedly, this work should be based on much more detailed research and study. Faruk Sumer's book on *the Oghuzes* is still an important source. However, this work concentrates more on the post-Seljuk Oghuz history than on the Oghuz yabgu state. *Dede Korkut* His book, Oghuzlarsocial and economic It is a very important source for those who research their lives. However, it has not been analysed in this respect until now. A l t h o u g h these epics were translated into written form in the 15th century, they are a collection of the remnants of the centuries-long life of the Oghuz at various historical stages, and especially reconstruct the life of the 11th century Oghuz of Sir-i Derya. The elements of the *epics* from different epochs have been carefully analysed and the economic and social information about their lives can be deduced.

## **Religion of the Oghuz Aristocracy: Islam**

The sharpening of class differentiation, the dissolution of the clan, fratri and tribal social organisation based on blood ties, the spread of agriculture and settled life, all these processes went hand in hand with the introduction of Islam into the Oghuz tribe. As a matter of fact, Islam was first accepted among the aristocracy and merchants in Central Asia. They adopted Sunnism, the ideology of the Islamic ruling classes. Because Islam responded to the ideological needs of these classes.

As for the mass of the people of the tribes, who were mostly shepherds, they did not have a religion that connected **t h e m t o** God as quoted by the Arab traveller Ibn Fadlan ,

they used to consult their minds in their affairs. They did not worship anything. On the contrary, they called their elders lord, that is, Allah. When one of them consulted his chief, he would say to him, "O my Lord, what should I do in this matter?" <sup>(70)</sup>Ibn Fadlan, who travelled to the region where the Oghuz were located in 921, narrates an interesting memory that reveals the attitude of simple shepherds towards Islam. An Oghuz Turk said to Ibn Fadlan, with whom he was travelling in the cold, "What does our Lord want from us. He will kill us in the cold. If only we knew what he wanted, we could fulfil it". Ibn Fadlan replied, "All he wants is for you to say, 'There is no God but Allah,'" to which Oghuz laughed and replied, "If we knew it was true, we would say it."<sup>71</sup>

<sup>70</sup> Ibn Fazlan, *Seyahatnâme*, p.34

<sup>71</sup> Ibn Fazlan, *Seyahatnâme*, p.34. Ibn Fadlan quoted in: Arthur Koestler, *Thirteenth Tribe*, p.39. There is a difference between these two translations. However, Arthur Koestler's translation seems to be more accurate. It is understood that "our lord" here means, as quoted by Arthur Koestler, the chief or caliph.

## 6. THE RISE OF THE FEUDAL STATE

Oghuz masses started to migrate to Asia Minor and Anatolia in the 11th century due to population growth and shrinking pastures. This migration wave created the Great Seljuk and Anatolian Seljuk states. The establishment of these feudal states meant a leap to the stage of feudalism for the Oghuz-Turkmen masses, in whose bosom feudal relations had begun to sprout.

The land of Anatolia witnessed the deepening of the classisation within the Oghuz masses with a historical leap. If the Oghuzes who conquered Anatolia had not reached a certain level of development that would lead to feudalism, they could neither have adopted the Iranian state tradition, nor the Islamic ideology, nor the various economic and social institutions of the Arabs and Byzantines. For no society can leap to a social stage which is not favoured by its own internal development. Every

The structure of society germinates in the bosom of the previous society. Various historical events may create favourable conditions for these emerging relations to become dominant and overcome the old. As Marx puts it in the preface to his *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, "new and higher relations of production do not replace the old ones unless the material conditions necessary for the existence of these relations themselves germinate in the bosom of the old society".

Such was the birth of Seljuk and Ottoman feudalism. Feudal relations were not grafted on to the Turkish communities coming from Asia. These feudal states were not founded by tribes of "three or five hundred tents" at a very backward historical stage, as some historians claim. This conclusion is based on serious research on the social and economic relations of the Oghuz masses migrating to Anatolia .<sup>72</sup>

<sup>72</sup> In his *Ottoman History*, Namik Kemal states that the state was founded by a tribe of a few hundred tents. he wrote. This view influenced Mustafa Kemal, as it did many intellectuals of the time. Atatürk, On his first visit to Ankara on 28 December 1919, in his speech to the notables, he said, "Our nation has established an independent state in the motherland from a small tribe" (*Atatürk'ün Bütün Eserleri*, vol.6, p.28). However, before he started his historical studies in the 1930s, he had determined that this view was very wrong.

Fuat Köprülü analysed two waves of migration of Turks in the 11th and 13th centuries, He explains with all historical evidence and documents that the Turks at the state-building stage had gone beyond tribal society.<sup>(73)</sup> The process of classisation in Central Asia had reached the maturity to make a leap in the direction of feudalism. For this reason, the Turkmen masses migrating to the Near East did not melt and disappear there; on the contrary, they established large feudal states.

<sup>73</sup> See especially the following works by Köprülü: *The Foundation of the Ottoman Empire*, Turkish Historical Society

Publications, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1988; *Byzantine Müesseselerinin Osmanlı Müesseselerine Tesiri*, Kaynak Publications, 3rd edition, Istanbul, March 2002; "Yerli Kaynaklarının Anadolu Selçukluları Tarihinin Yerli Kaynaklar", *Belleten*, issue 25, July 1943, 26, 27, pp.379-484; "Ottoman Empire'nun Etnik Menşei Meseleleri", *Belleten*, no.28, 1. Teşrin 1943, pp. 219-314 (this study was published as a book by Kaynak Publications under the title *Ottoman'nın Etnik Kökeni*; Istanbul, April 1999). See also Claude Cahen, *Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans*, E Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, December 1984 and *The First Entry of Turks into Anatolia (Second Half of the XIth Century)*, trans. Yaşar Yücel-Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, TTK Publication, Ankara, 1988.



For our analysis of the foundation of the Seljuk and Ottoman states, see Doğu Perinçek, *Osmanlı dan Bugüne Toplum ve Devlet*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, July 1986, especially pp.49 et seq., p.79 et seq., p.83 et seq.

For example, let us look at the foundation of the Great Seljuk state. Tuğrul and Çağrı

The nomadic aristocracy, headed by beys, pursued a certain goal both in their struggle against the Ghaznavid state and in their orientation towards Iran. This aim was to create a new feudal state. From the writings of historians, we understand that the Seljuk aristocracy was already in such an orientation while they were still in the Maveräünnehir region. However, in the period when the Seljuks were newly organised as a state, before their arrival in Anatolia, the ruler was not yet an "absolute ruling emperor", but a great chieftain who, like his subordinate chieftains, was "obliged to act according to tribal customs and traditions"<sup>74</sup>

<sup>74</sup> Fuat Köprülü, *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni*, Kaynak Yayınları, Nisan 1999, p.63 vd.

The aim of the Seljuk beys to establish a feudal society through the state they organised became more and more apparent and led to long years of bloody class struggles. Some tribal chiefs, who wanted to preserve the military-democratic organisation and were after plunder, and the nomadic Turkmen masses gathered around them resisted feudalisation and rebelled. The Seljuk aristocracy bloodily suppressed these rebellions, which lasted for many years, and advanced the process of civilisation.

The establishment of the feudal state was based on the disarmament of the nomadic population and the creation of an armed public power around the Seljuk aristocracy. The Seljuk aristocracy seized the feudal property in the lands they conquered, distributed these lands to the tribal chiefs as "ikta", thus breaking up the Oghuz tribes, prohibiting plunder and pillage and establishing a new state based on feudal exploitation.

The distribution of the possession of conquered lands to the nomadic aristocracy in the form of *yurtluks* had already been observed in Central Asia. However, the domination of the nomadic aristocracy over these lands was not yet at the level of private property. It was not the land that was subject to private ownership, but the herds of animals. The Seljuks' dirlik system **s i g n i f i e d** a deepening of the aristocracy's control over the land. This system was based on the distribution of

The Seljuk aristocracy confiscated a portion of the produce produced by the peasants farming on the land. *The Siyasetname*, written by Nizamülmülk, the famous vizier of the Seljuk Sultan Melikşah, is a fundamental explanation and defence of this new system. The Turkmen aristocracy, which flowed to the Middle East, had reached such a point of maturity in state-building that it not only practised but also theorised the state. The Seljuk vizier Nizamülmülk, with his *Siyasetname*, produced a work that deserves to be called "Machiavelli's master".<sup>(75)</sup>

<sup>75</sup> Nizamülmülk, *Siyasetname*, Dergâh Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, February 1987. Eastern scientists and politicians who produced important works in the field of state theory centuries before Machiavelli.

The journal *Bilim ve Ütopya* analysed the contribution of Nizamülmülk. For Haluk Hepkon's comparative article titled "The Art of War, Siyasetname and the Prince" see issue 94, April 2002, p.15 et seq.

The new feudal order, a part of the nomadic Turkmen masses a part centralised

The old nomadic aristocracy was transformed into a new feudal aristocracy that exploited the peasant masses and levied taxes on the market. The old nomadic aristocracy was transformed into a new feudal aristocracy that exploited the peasant masses and levied taxes on the market.

The waves of Turkish migration brought dynamism to the Anatolian economy and social life. The Anatolian peasants, who wanted to get rid of the Byzantium's outdated and heavy exploitation, welcomed and supported the Turks as saviours. Claude Cahen shows with evidence that the Turks opened up lands that had not been cultivated until then to agriculture, leading to a significant development in the Anatolian economy. The Seljuk and Ottoman states provided the necessary prerequisites for agriculture by providing the necessary security even in places far from the cities. Again, Cahen describes the revival of city life in the 12th century. Especially in the 13th century, he notes, cities reached a higher level than they had in the last few centuries of Byzantine rule.<sup>(76)</sup>

<sup>76</sup> Claude Cahen, *Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans*, E Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, December 1984, p.190 et al.

The development towards the feudalisation of the Turks who came to Anatolia was interrupted for a while by the Mongol invasion in the 13th century. A new wave of feudalisation was then led, as is well known, by the Ottoman state.

The Ottoman beys could not have achieved such a development if they had not assimilated the feudal Seljuk tradition, ideology and institutions. It is noteworthy that the entire Seljuk ulema flowed to the Ottoman frontier and gathered around the Ottoman beys. The Seljuk scholars, who represented high Islam, could not have gathered around a primitive tribal lord. The Ottoman dynasty used tribal beylik as a title of nobility in order to strengthen its influence over the Turkmen masses. As the emirs of all the northern extremities, the Osmanogulları were one of the two most important feudal dynasties, together with the Germiyanogulları, as early as the Seljuk period. This is why the Ottomans were able to dissolve the new wave of Turkmen nomads coming to Anatolia within feudal relations and lead a new leap in the direction of feudalism.

On the other hand, among the Oghuz masses, there was a gradual It is because a sharpening class differentiation emerged and feudal relations had already developed at that time that these communities were able to pass to the feudalism stage.

Differences of opinion on the socio-economic level of the Turkmen migration waves to Anatolia is one of the main reasons why this book was written in Mamak Military Prison in 1973. Not only in the scientific world, but also among my friends at the time, there were those who believed that the Turks who came to Anatolia lived in primitive tribal conditions. Because of this erroneous view, which was not based on historical facts, these friends regarded the Ottoman social-economic organisation as a continuation of Byzantium.

Especially after analysing Fuat Köprülü's books based on historical evidence, they partially corrected their views. However, they still could not completely get rid of the influence of the old mistakes<sup>(77)</sup>

<sup>77</sup> As a matter of fact, the debate between us started after Halil Bertay wrote his book *From Tribe to Feudalism*. (Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, 1983). For this review published under the signature of Derviş Polatay, see *Saçak*, issue 30/2, March 1984, pp.60 et seq. I also included the section of this review on the emergence of Ottoman feudalism in my book titled *"Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to the Present Day"* (see the section titled "A Short Note on the Seljuk and Byzantine Legacy" on p.79 et seq.). As a continuation of the same discussion, Tarık Buğra's film "Kuruluş", which depicts the foundation of the Ottoman Empire on film

For an interview with Tarık Buğra, Yücel Çakmaklı, Doğu Perinçek and Halil Berktaş, see *Saçak*, issue 52, May 1988, p.48 et seq.

Theses doubting that the Ottomans were civilised during their principality period, I criticised it as follows:

"The nomadic Turkmen wave brought by the Mongols in the 13th century was on the threshold of civilisation. However, the Ottomans were not part of that Turkmen wave, but of Seljuk feudalism, and for this reason they were able to lead that Turkmen wave to join the 200-year-old civilisation born with the wave of the 11th century ."<sup>78</sup>

<sup>78</sup> Doğu Perinçek, *Osmanlı dan Bugüne Toplum ve Devlet*, p.81.

Distinguishing between the ruling class that established the feudal state and the nomadic tribes that assimilated into the new feudal system is of decisive importance for understanding the foundations of the Seljuk and Ottoman states. As a matter of fact, Fuat Köprülü makes this distinction carefully. In his study analysing the ethnic origin of the Ottomans, Köprülü, after determining that the Kayı tribe was still living a semi-nomadic life at the beginning of the 14th century, states that it is natural that this small ethnic nucleus played no role in the establishment of the Ottoman state. He concludes the last sentence of his work as follows:

"...and it is for this reason that the Ottoman state, even in the early stages of its political evolution, never showed a tribal character ."<sup>79</sup>

<sup>79</sup> Fuat Köprülü, "Ottoman Empire'nun Etnik Menşei Meseleleri", *Belleten*, issue 28, 1. Teşrin 1943, c.VII, p.303. This study of Köprülü, which had a wide resonance in its time, was also published as a book.

See *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, April 1999, p.92.

The founders of the Ottoman state, just like the founders of the Seljuk state, were not tribes, but feudal lords who transformed those tribes within the new system. If the Turkmens had not been divided into classes, they would not have been able to establish a state. Those who think that the Ottomans were not yet divided into classes during the Beylik period and that the bey class was not formed cannot explain the foundation of the Ottoman state. Inevitably, then, one is led to the view that state-building was based on Byzantine heritage. Thus, a greater mistake is made. Because if a society has not been civilised, in other words, if it has not experienced a class differentiation that would allow it to establish a state, then it cannot be called a state.

State-building cannot be grafted in from outside or state-building cannot be imported from outside. If state-building were to be imported from other social processes, the tribes of Central Asia would have adopted the thousands of years old Chinese state tradition.

Moreover, even a cursory glance at Anatolia of that time is enough to see that Turkish society was already divided into classes, had passed the state-building stage and had become civilised. For example, Ibn Batuta, who travelled through Anatolia in the early 14th century, describes the life of Turks settled in cities. Beys live in mansions with a large retinue. The large bazaars, caravanserais, madrasahs, mosques, masjids, baths, the organisation of craftsmen and guilds known as Ahîlik in Turkish cities are all immediately visible signs of a feudalised society. The beys, who lived in palace-like mansions, protected trade, had armed forces separate from the people, and were surrounded by a highly developed ulema .<sup>[80](#)</sup>Anatolian beys, who formed the Seljuk feudal aristocracy, not only ensured the security of the vast lands opened to agriculture and the market, but also led the process of feudalisation by transforming the tribes they settled on the land into land-bound peasants. The Ottoman beys flourished not because they were tribal lords, but because they led this feudalisation process and brought other principalities under their control.<sup>[\(81\)](#)</sup>

<sup>[80](#)</sup> *İbn Batuta Seyahatnâmesi'nden Seçmeler*, Devlet Kitapları, İstanbul, 1986.

<sup>[81](#)</sup> For a lively discussion on the foundation of the Ottoman state between Tarık Buğra, Yücel Çakmaklı, Halil Berktaş and Doğu Perinçek, see "On 'Foundation'", *Saçak*, issue 52, May 1988, p.48 et seq.

For a more detailed analysis of our analyses of the emergence of the Seljuk and Ottoman states at the end of the 13th century, see our book titled *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to Today*.<sup>[\(82\)](#)</sup>

<sup>[82](#)</sup> Doğu Perinçek, *Osmanlı dan Bugüne Toplum ve Devlet*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, July 1985.

See also Ernst Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht-Osmanen*, zweite verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage, Hermann Böhlau Nachf., Wien-Köln-Graz 1972. Among the theoretical studies on the birth of the Ottoman state and the transition of the Turks from tribal society to feudalism

This work, which attracts attention with its robustness, was translated into Turkish in two books: *The Birth of a Great State - The Ottomans*, 1 and 2, trans. Orhan Esen-Yılmaz Öner, Alan Publishing, İstanbul, October 1986 and January 1988.

## **II-SOCIAL, POLITICAL AND IDEOLOGICAL PROCESSES**

1. From Tribe to Feudalism
2. From Tribal Confederation to State
3. From God to Allah
4. From Bodundan to Subject, from Subject to Nation
5. Myths and Facts

### **1. FROM TRIBALISM TO FEUDALISM**

#### **Dissolution of the Tribe - Leap into Civilisation**

The societies of Central Asia, like all societies of the world, first lived in the primitive communist era, when private property and classes did not exist. Private property, which nationalists today regard as "sacred", was unknown to Central Asian societies in the primitive communist stage. What was sacred then was equality and fraternal solidarity among clan members.

All clan members were armed. Since there was not yet a ruling class, there was no monopoly of arms in the hands of this ruling class. Since classes had not yet emerged in this age, **t h e r e** was no need for a special armed force to repress the mass of working people in order to protect private property and wealth. All community members participated in production together and

They shared what was produced. Since society was not yet divided into property owners and the propertyless, the property owners did not have a special armed force.

When production technology rose to a certain level and people produced more than they consumed, this surplus production, i.e. wealth, began to be concentrated in certain hands and private property emerged. Some of the members of the former egalitarian society were now, as it is said in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, "giving their labour" to a small aristocratic minority.

When we analyse the history of the tribes of Central Asia, we find the following processes in the two thousand-year period beginning around 1000 BC and continuing until 1200 AD:

- Collective clan property disappears, private property emerges and develops.
- Primitive classless society is disappearing, social differentiation and classisation within tribes is emerging and deepening.
- Tribal society based on blood ties dissolves and is replaced by a new social organisation consisting of members united by a relationship of personal dependence on a particular tribal lord.
- Livestock farming, which is carried out by migrating in clans (lineages), is replaced by the private economy of newly born families.
- Tribal democracy, in which all tribal members are armed, is dissolving, the mass of the population is disarmed and the monopoly of arms is concentrated in the hands of the tribal aristocracy and the armed retinue formed around it, and gradually the army.
- As a product of all these developments, the system of exploitation replaces plunder, law replaces steppe anarchy, and the state emerges as the special repressive power of the privately owned class over the mass of the people.

Overall, the event is a leap into civilisation.

## **Military Democracy**

This historical development, which covers a period of more than two thousand years from 1000 BC to 1200 AD, is the history of the development of Central Asian societies from a primitive communist society to feudalism through a social organisation which Engels calls "military democracy".

Engels explains the reasons for the emergence of military democracy as follows: Clan members are divided into rich and poor. The difference of property within the same clan transforms the unity of interests of the clan members into irreconcilable antagonism. With the emergence of slavery, earning a living through labour is humiliated and seen as the work of slaves. Looting, on the other hand, is regarded as an honourable act.

With the increase in population, it becomes necessary for the related tribes to unite in a confederation. These tribes are soon fused with each other and their lands are united as the collective land of the people. The military chief of the society becomes an indispensable and permanent official. The council and assembly, which are formed alongside this military chief, constitute the organs of military democracy. War, which had previously been fought only to avenge a tyranny or to expand a shrinking territory, is now fought only for plunder and becomes permanent.

With the introduction of patrilineal law, the military chiefship passes from father to son over time, thus laying the foundations of descendant kingship and nobility. Now the old communal organisation has been transformed into its opposite, military democracy. The organs that were the instruments of the popular will in the old tribal organisation become organs of oppression against their own people. <sup>83</sup>

<sup>83</sup> F. Engels, *The Origin of the Family, Private Property and the State*, p.228.

The historical development of the Central Asian tribes confirms Engels' analyses of the emergence of military democracy.

## **Class Struggle**



The engine of development is not, as reactionary historians claim, wars between tribes, but the internal division of societies into classes in connection with the development of the commodity economy, in other words, the struggle between emerging classes. The development of private property, the dissolution of tribal society, the emergence of the state, etc., are all developments created by the contradictions between the aristocracy and the shepherd and farmer people, the so-called carabodun, and by the struggle on the basis of these contradictions. The aristocracy endeavours to develop private property, to dissolve tribal society, to disarm the people and to create the state. The exploited masses, on the other hand, struggle against the tribal aristocracy in longing for the old democratic and egalitarian society. But it is no longer materially possible to return to primitive communist society. The aspirations of the labourers for equality will be answered by the working class and its revolutionary ideology, which will emerge centuries later.

The expression "the pressure of the earth is the mountain, the pressure of the people is the bey" in *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk* expresses the weight of the pressure of the beys on the mass of the people with a very beautiful analogy. The pressure of the beys on the bodun (people) is considered so heavy that its degree is measured by the pressure of the mountain on the earth. As a natural consequence of this situation, there were frequent earth tremors among the Central Asian tribes and the mass of the people revolted against the aristocracy.

## **The Birth of Feudal Dependency Relations**

After emerging from primitive communist society, the Asiatic tribes we have analysed advanced in the direction of feudalism without experiencing the stage of slave society as the dominant mode of production. It is not that we do not find slavish relations among the Central Asian communities. But these relations are not dominant. In the Turkic tribes of Asia, the exploitation of slave labour did not become the basis of the economy, but remained secondary in the long historical process of the transition from primitive to feudal society.

In the Central Asian tribes, the exploited shepherd people are not slaves. The shepherd is not regarded as a commodity which is itself the subject of property, which is bought and sold. The relationship between the shepherd people and the tribal lords develops in the direction of personal dependence, in the direction of the feudal relationship. It is from this relationship that the relationship between the feudal lord and the serf has developed.

The shepherd is dependent on the lord as a member of a certain "tribe" and when the lord changes, he becomes dependent on the new lord together with his "tribe". However, the "tribe" referred to here is no longer the tribe of the old primitive society. With the development of private property, the tribe continues to exist only formally. This is because the bond that unites the members of the tribe is no longer the fact that they are related to each other. The tribe has become the formal appearance of a community of people who are personally dependent on a certain aristocrat. The tribal organisation based on blood ties was dissolved and dependence on a certain lord took its place. Under the guise of a "tribe", people of different descent are now united.

Exploitation takes the form of drudgery, in the form of tending the herds of the lord, or in the form of taxes paid in the form of animals. The mass of people in a dependent state can own some means of production, livestock, etc. However, part of the product produced is confiscated by the aristocracy by force.

Historical development is in the direction of settling down. Agriculture and crafts are developing, and cities are being built with increasing trade.

However, all this development is in waves, both in terms of time and spread. Although the progression of history is in the direction of feudalism, this progression zigzags and includes reversals from time to time. For example, the rise of Genghis Khan in the 13th century was a powerful breakthrough for the Mongols in terms of feudalisation,

For the Western Turks, who lived between the Caspian Sea and Lake Aral and had relatively advanced trade and crafts, it had stalling effects on progress.

## **Centre In Asia      and Universal      As      Slavery      The Secondness of the Relationship**

When I was studying the tribes of Central Asia, my first conclusion was that in the process of the dissolution of tribal relations in these societies, feudal relations became dominant. However, in many textbooks teaching historical materialism, it is stated that societies pass through primitive, slave, feudal, capitalist and socialist stages. Since theory can be deduced from practice, I did not hesitate; I stated that the Turks did not live through a slave period as the dominant mode of production. This determination was met with scepticism and objection in dogmatic circles.

In the course of time, however, I have seen that many important researchers of historical materialism have made the same determination for various societies. There were even those, such as George Thomson, who determined that the widespread transition from tribal society was towards feudalism, and that the slave mode of production was limited to the advanced commodity societies of the Mediterranean.<sup>84</sup>

<sup>84</sup> George Thomson's most important works on the Aegean and Greek civilisations are also available in Turkish. published. See *Prehistoric Aegean*, I, II, trans. Celâl Üster, Payel Publishing House, Istanbul, April 1983 and November 1985; *İlk Filozoflar*, trans. Mehmet H. Doğan, Istanbul, May 1988; *Aiskhilos and Athens*, Payel Publishing House, Istanbul, March 1990.

Samir Amin, too, published his very important book *Eurocentrism* in 1988. In his book, Samir Amin, citing the societies of Egypt, China, Japan, etc. as examples, states that "in the evolutionary trajectory of many peoples, there is not even a trace of the slavish phase, which is considered inevitable". Moreover, Samir Amin determines that the universal form of the transition from classless to class society is not slavery:

"Feudalism did not arise from slavery; it is not true that the two followed each other in time. Feudalism is subject to the law of transition from classless to class society: The communal stage is followed by the tributary stage Feudal

There is no essential difference between property and extortionate property. Feudal property is a primitive form of extortionate property, and its distinguishing feature is that political power is weak and decentralised. ...as the productive forces develop, political decentralisation will give way to centralisation. And in this respect the absolute monarchies of Europe are very close to the advanced extortionate forms. The primitive feudal form gradually evolves into the advanced tributary form."<sup>(85)</sup>

<sup>85</sup> Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, trans. Mehmet Sert, Ayrıntı Publications, Istanbul, July 1993, p.166 et seq., 180 et seq.

The observation that the Central Asian tribes had passed into feudalism without experiencing slavery was also made by Ernst Werner in his analysis of the foundation of the Ottoman state, written before 1970.<sup>86</sup>

<sup>86</sup> Ernst Werner, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht-Osmanen (1300-1481)*, zweite verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage, Herman Böhlau Nachf., Wien-Köln-Graz 1972: *The Birth of a Great State*, I, II, trans. Orhan Esen-Yılmaz Öner, Alan Publishing, Istanbul, October 1986 and January 1988.

Much earlier, with his book *Devlet*, first published in 1909. Franz Oppenheimer, who is also well known, identifies two distinct sprouts in the process of development after the primitive conquest state. One is characterised by merchant capital, the other by the landed property of a small minority. The first of these two main branches of development is the "maritime state" based on a developed monetary economy and the "capitalist" exploitation of slave labour; from the second emerges the developed feudal state. The "maritime states" developed "stronger forms of sovereignty and a more advanced state art", as the examples of Ancient Greece and Rome show. Oppenheimer, however, concludes that the maritime state is "a side branch that does not produce new shoots", while the feudal state is "the main branch, an extension of the trunk".<sup>(87)</sup>

<sup>87</sup> Oppenheimer, *Devlet*, trans. Alaeddin Şenel-Yavuz Sabuncu, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, March 1984, p.108 et seq., 160.

Theses on the universality of slavery have also been questioned in Turkey. After the publication of *Bozkurt Efsaneleri ve Gerçek* (*The Legends of the Bozkurt and the Truth*) in 1975, first in *Aydınlık* magazine, the view on the transition of Turks from tribal society to feudalism was taken into consideration by researchers. Doğan Avcıoğlu, in his comprehensive work *The History of the Turks*, the first volume of which was published in 1978, accepts our thesis of the transition from military democracy to feudalism, with occasional references to *the Bozkurt Legends and the Truth*<sup>88</sup> Avcıoğlu is of the opinion that not only slavery but also feudalism is not universal.<sup>(89)</sup>

<sup>88</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, *History of Turks*, c.I, pp.99 et seq., 213 et seq., 224 et seq., 252 et seq., 274 et seq., c.II, p.794 et seq.

<sup>89</sup> *Same work*, c.I, p.225 et seq.

Halil Berktaş, in his book titled *From Tribe to Feudalism*, published in 1983, also concludes that "the first major historical stage after tribal society was not generally and universally slavery". Berktaş states that apart from Asian and North African societies, Russians and other Eastern European peoples, Germanic peoples, some regions of Germany, Scandinavian countries, England and Ireland "did not experience a period in which the slave mode of production gained dominance".<sup>(90)</sup> Thus, according to Berktaş, the Iberian peninsula and parts of France and Germany remain as the geography in Western Europe that experienced the slave mode of production.

<sup>90</sup> Halil Berktaş, *Kabilelerden Feodalizme*, Kaynak Yayınları, 1st edition, Istanbul, June 1983, p.227 et al.

## **Western European Feudalism and the Greco-Roman Legacy**

Halil Berktaş's first mistake is that he thinks that Western Europe as well as the Mediterranean region "witnessed the slave civilisation". As a continuation of this misconception, the researcher argues that the feudalism and capitalism of Western Europe was developed from the Greek and Roman civilisations.

to its origins. The author sees Western European feudalism as a Roman-Germanic synthesis.<sup>(91)</sup>

91 *Ibid.*

Berktaý fails to explain how Rome's "legacy of highly developed private property" was transmitted to contemporary Europe, and even provides evidence that refutes his own thesis. This was one of the most important criticisms I made when his book *From Tribe to Feudalism* was published. To summarise it today: Berktaý fails to show concretely in which relations and institutions of Western Europe the Roman legacy of developed private property lives on. Moreover, Berktaý's book provides evidence that contradicts his own thesis. I listed these at the time as follows:

- "The commodity economy suffered a significant setback with the Germanic invasion and it took centuries for it to resume its development."
- "Western European feudalism sprang not so much from the collapse of slavish Rome as from the upper barbarism of the Teutons in their ascent to civilisation. Not the manor itself or the manor as a whole, but the 'laboured *demesne*' represents the Roman heritage. Western European feudalism was reconstituted not on the direct basis of this or that part of the *latifundium*, which bore very distinctly the stains of slave civilisation, but on the basis of a much freer and more dynamic organisation, the Germanic *mark*. In the meantime, however, a remnant of that slavish *latifundium*, in the form of drudgery and *demesne* labour, entered the bosom of the *manor* derived from the *march*."

Based on these observations, I put forward the following questions:

"In the first place, the Germanic invasion had significantly set back the commodity economy, and it took centuries for the commodity economy to recover. Secondly, the Roman inheritance in the manor is the part that is laboured through drudgery, i.e. not the advanced but the backward. Halil Berktaý does not show a Roman element of development in the Roman-Germanic synthesis, a progressive element in terms of private property and commodity economy; he only abstractly mentions such a progressive legacy. The 'barbarian vaccine' is tangible, but a progressive, repulsive legacy left over from Rome, in the pages of Berktaý's book elle

It can't be held, it can't be seen, it hits your ear like a legend, that's it ."<sup>92</sup>

<sup>92</sup> For this critique of mine, published under the pseudonym Derviş Polatay, see "Problems of Kabileden Feodalizme'nin Sorunları", *Saçak*, issue 30/2, March 1984, pp.60 et seq. I have also included the section of this critique on the emergence of Ottoman feudalism in my book *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to the Present Day* (see the section entitled "A Short Note on the Seljuk and Byzantine Legacy" on p.79 et seq.). For Berktaş's evidence refuting his own thesis, see *Kabileden Feodalizme*, pp.269, 271.

If the clues I picked up then are taken to certain conclusions today, we can determine the following: The advanced feudal state and capitalism grew and developed not out of the Greek and Roman heritage, but out of its environment. The Germanic tribes that destroyed the Roman Empire revived and adopted serfdom relations, which were secondary to slavery. They were already at a stage where feudalism was flourishing. Therefore, to put it more accurately, the Teutons and other semi-barbarian peoples, while overthrowing the Roman Empire, also developed feudal relations born in their own bosoms. Thus, the societies of Western Europe, the first to establish capitalism, did not actually rise on the basis of the Greek and Roman heritage, but on the feudal development that destroyed that slavish heritage.

This does not mean that the Greek and Roman heritage has been erased from history.

Greek and Roman civilisation, both a developed commodity economy and the organisation of cities example they left, Both too Rome's in your personality this monetary economics developing one centre Empire Model Old Mediterranean civilisation around found in West Europe, this legacy

Although it did not develop on its own basis, capitalism, in making its great historical breakthrough in the direction of capitalism, was nourished by that legacy. This nourishment came both from the Islamic Middle Ages and from the relations and culture left by Rome in its sphere of widespread domination. It was natural for Western Europe to attach itself to this Mediterranean heritage in the age of its rise. Because an advanced meta economy which is capitalist civilisation itself in history The ideological source was the commodity civilisation of Greece and Rome. This phenomenon can also be seen in the Christianisation or Islamisation of the peoples of Western Europe and the Turks as they made the feudal leap. Every society adopts, on the ideological plane, the advanced model of the stage into which it has entered. However, the adoption of this ideological model does not mean that these societies

It does not show that they have developed in a historical line descending from the societies from which they took that model.

Oppenheimer and Samir Amin have also identified the same historical fact. Oppenheimer determines that the Western European process leading to feudal states, absolute monarchies and constitutional states did not come from the "sea state" representing the Greco-Roman heritage, but from the "land state" based on land ownership.<sup>(93)</sup>

<sup>93</sup> Oppenheimer, *The State*, p.109.

Samir Amin, on the other hand, states:

"European feudalism was born not on the shores of the Mediterranean, where slavery flourished and spread, but in the barbarian forests of the North. The sequence of slavery and feudalism only makes sense if it is accepted that Greeks, Romans and Europeans constitute the same people ."<sup>94</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Samir Amin, *age*, p.181.

Again, Fernand Grenard, in his work *The Rise and Fall of Asia*, states that the capitalist civilisation of Europe was not a continuation of Rome, but on the contrary, it developed in the environment where Roman rule had collapsed. Where empire existed, "there was no manifestation of the virtues that conquered the world."<sup>(95)</sup>

<sup>95</sup> Fernand Grenard, *The Rise and Fall of Asia*, trans. Orhan Yüksel, MEB Publication, Istanbul 1992, s.159.

The peoples of Western Europe, the forerunners of Western capitalism, lived on the periphery, not at the centre, of the slavish Greek and Roman civilisations. They did not have a history that led to the advanced commodity economy of the Mediterranean and slavery, but a history that led to the leap from tribal society to feudalism. For this reason, the first breakthrough of capitalism did not take place in the societies originating from the Roman and Greek civilisations, but around them. Spain, Portugal, Holland, England, France, Germany, the Netherlands, England, France and Germany came to the fore at different periods in the history of the rise of capitalism from the 16th to the 19th centuries.

This capitalist upsurge took a special interest in the culture of the Greeks and especially the law of Rome, the most advanced commodity economies in history, and utilised that accumulation to advance capitalism, the most advanced commodity economy. What we are talking about here is the development of a capitalism of Greek and Roman origin.



It is not continuity. The disconnect is so obvious that Western Europe did not learn the Greek and Roman civilisational heritage from its own history, but from the sources of Islam and the Middle East, which carried these civilisations to the age of the emergence of capitalism. The new civilisation rising from the periphery has taken the accumulation of the civilisational centre of a thousand years ago from the Islamic empires, which formed a bridge between them, and made use of it.

## **Eurocentrism**

As the pioneer of capitalism, Western Europe, beyond feeding on the historical heritage of the Mediterranean, produced a special history for itself. This fabrication of history, linking Western Europe to the origins of Greek and Roman civilisation, was undertaken during the period of the rise of capitalism. The Eurocentric ideology of developing capitalism detached Greek civilisation from its Asian and African roots and put it on the market as its own history. Those who theorised the "progress and superiority" of Europe were thus able to create a special past for themselves.

A very fundamental criticism of this forgery of a special past has been made by Martin Bernal in his work *Kara Atena*. This book, translated into Turkish with Özcan Buze's meticulous translation, presents the Middle Eastern, Asian and African sources of Greek civilisation with solid evidence that no one can say a word about proves<sup>(96)</sup>

<sup>96</sup> See Martin Bernal, *Kara Atena*, trans. Özcan Buze, Kaynak Yayınları, Istanbul, June 1998.

Eurocentrism might not have been considered so harmful if it had remained a mere pickpocketing of history. However, the exploitation of the oppressed world by Western imperialism was quickly justified and wanted to be perpetuated. While capitalism was on the rise in Western Europe, Asia was said to have a peculiar mode of production or a petrified feudalism. Europe's

While the clock "never stood still", in the East "time had stopped".<sup>97</sup>In short, a "dynamic" model of development was being created, deriving from Greek and Roman origins, while the peoples outside this model were condemned to "stagnation". This stagnation had never and could never haunt those societies. In this situation, external intervention was necessary for the peoples of Asia, Africa and Latin America to join the Eurocentric bed of human development. The introduction of advanced capitalism there was a historical favour that freed these poor peoples from their historical shackles.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>97</sup> Even a socialist philosopher like Havemann chained himself to Eurocentrism. See *Morgen*, p.28-29. The Turkish version of this book was published by Ayrıntı Publications under the title *Tomorrow*.

<sup>98</sup> For a critique of the Eurocentric East-West distinction, the theories of Asiatic society and orientalism, see Doğu Perinçek, *Aydın ve Kültür*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, April 1996, p.85 et seq.

The revolutions of the 20th century shattered these Eurocentric theories that portrayed Europe as dynamic and Asia as static. The revolutionary wave rose from semi-Asian Russia, Asian Turkey and Asian China. Its succession always came from Asia. The centre of the revolution had shifted to the East.

We will not discuss it here, but the theories of Asian stagnation were not valid for the feudal period either. Oppenheimer, for example, in his 1909 book *The State*, finds that in the Middle Ages China was ahead of Europe in leaving behind feudal vestiges, and in some ways closer to the "order of free citizenship" than any Western European country.<sup>(99)</sup>In the first half of the 15th century Chinese sailors dominated the oceans. Admiral Zheng He's floating dragons formed fleets of hundreds of ships, five to six times the size of Portuguese ships and with a crew of 30,000 men. It is now scientifically accepted that Chinese and Arab sailors travelled to America long before Christopher Columbus.<sup>(100)</sup>

<sup>99</sup> Oppenheimer, *Devlet*, p.108. The Turkish translation reads "in many respects". Whereas "in some "in mancher Beziehung". In German: "in mancher Beziehung".

<sup>100</sup> See *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 95, May 2002.

Samir Amin is of the opinion that European feudalism was not an advanced but a primitive form of the "tributary" mode of production in Islamic societies. Until the 11th century, European feudalism had semi-barbarian characteristics, but in the 11th and 12th centuries,

It moved from feudal fragmentation, representing the primitive form of "tributary" society, to the more advanced form of absolute monarchy. At this stage, the Christian West had only just reached a level of maturity to adopt the Islamic Middle Ages.<sup>(101)</sup> [101](#) Samir Amin, *age*, p.72.

It is important to recognise that the slave mode of production was not universal, even in Western Europe.

In what way does it concern our subject to determine that even though it witnessed slave relations, it did not pass through a slave stage? Thus we come to the following conclusion: Western Europe, the pioneer of capitalism, and the Central Asian tribes in their emergence from tribal society are similar in the sense that they remain on the periphery, not at the centre, of Greek and Roman history. Eurocentrism, which condemns Central Asians, along with all Asian tribes, to stagnation, is not based on historical facts. The Western European process is not linked to the Greco-Roman heritage. In this respect, the history of Western Europe itself refutes the Eurocentric theses of history.

The revolutionary intellectuals and scientists of the oppressed countries of the world have turned to the criticism of Eurocentric historical theses as a primary task for the liberation of their own nations. The axis that separates scientific socialism from revisionism has, in a way, clarified the historical polarisation between the Westernist imperialist interpretation of socialism and the revolutionary interpretation centred on the oppressed world.<sup>(102)</sup> In Turkey, the journal *Bilim ve Ütopya* has carried out a seminal and intensive research and investigation campaign on this subject.<sup>(103)</sup>

[102](#) The title of a study criticising Eurocentric "socialism" in Latin America is interesting:

"From Eurocentric Marx to Latinamerican Marxism". See Carlos Franco, *Entwicklung Nation und Sozialismus, Vom "eurozentrischen Marx" zum lateinamerikanischen Marxismus*.

[103](#) On the critique of Eurocentric historical theses, see the article published in the journal *Bilim ve Ütopya*. In particular, one can refer to the following articles: Ender Helvacıoğlu, "Critique of Eurocentrism", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 21, March 1996, p.7; Özcan Buze, "Kara Atena: Afroasiatic roots of classical civilisation", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 21, March 1996, pp.9-11; Özcan Buze, "Some studies criticising Eurocentrism and their implications", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 21, March 1996, pp.14-16; Vehbi Hacıkadıroğlu, "The problem of Eurocentrism", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 26, August 1996, pp.36-37; Ahmet Öncü, "Western-centred sociology and Ibn Khaldun", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 57, March 1999, pp.44-46; Prof. Dr. Fahri Işık, "Greek miracle or Ionian or Anatolian miracle?", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 63, September 1999, pp.86-89;

Ender Helvacioğlu, "The forgotten pinnacle of the history of science: Medieval Eastern Mathematics", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 70, April 2000, pp.6-9; Ender Helvacioğlu, "Mesopotamian origin of Ancient Greek science", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 73, July 2000, pp.6-8; Hilmi Ziya Ülken, "The East at the foundation of Western Civilisation", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 89, November 2001, pp.24-36; Ender Helvacioğlu, "America's discoverer, more changes!", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 95, May 2002, p.6; "Admiral Zheng He and his 'Floating Dragons'", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 95, May 2002, pp.14-17; "Comparison of Chinese and European seafaring in the Middle Ages", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 95, May 2002, p.17.

## **2. FROM TRIBAL CONFEDERATION TO STATE**

### **Tribal Confederations**

The tribal confederations that nationalist historians refer to as "states" all emerged on the basis of class differentiation.

The Huns and the Göktürks were tribal confederations rather than "states". This was because class differentiation was not yet at a level to create an armed public power and bureaucracy separate from the people. These tribal confederations were formed through the "subjugation and subjugation" of a certain tribal aristocracy both to its own tribe and clan and to neighbouring tribes. The aristocracy at the head of the confederation not only brought peace and order to ensure the development of private property in the territories it dominated, but also organised plundering expeditions to foreign countries. It can therefore be said that khans such as Mao-Tun (Mete) and Bilge Kagan were in some ways chiefs who organised the great plunders of history. However, both of them also put an end to raids and anarchy among tribes.

In their endeavours to give, they created the conditions for the development of private property and trade, even if only for a while. They therefore served the progress of history.

In Central Asia, tribal confederations were unable to stabilise. Because the development of private property has not yet dissolved the tribal organisation based on blood ties. and to the state basic will be levelone Classroom did not create differentiation. Miscellaneous Tribes and tribe communities between constant wars, special ownership created by Classroom differentiation based on It prevented the establishment of a stable state on which to build. Relations of dependence between tribes took precedence over personal dependence on a particular aristocrat. The hierarchy between tribes still played a more important role than class differentiation. The steppe law, i.e. the law of "he who has the upper hand", had not yet disappeared. was not Tribes between established hierarchy, Namely For tribes, becoming the head of a confederation of tribes was a prerequisite for enrichment. The organisation of the Uighurs, and especially of the Khazars and Karakhanids, was closer to the state than that of the Huns and Gokturks. However, the first truly Turkish states were the Great Seljuk, Anatolian Seljuk and Ottoman states. Khazars and Karakhanids can be added to them. Earlier ones, were strong steps towards state-building.

As a matter of fact, there is no word meaning state in Central Asian Turkish. Although nationalist historians have argued that words such as *il*, *budun* or *kut* express the state, they are forcing the concepts. In fact, it is true that the words *il*, *budun* and *kut* are related to the formation of the state. However, these concepts are not identical with the state.

A *province* is a territory with defined borders. The kagan is the tribe dependent on him. It has sovereignty over this piece of land through its communities. In this respect, *the province* can be seen as the germ of the territorial element of the state, i.e. the concept of country. However, since the differentiation between classes has not yet developed sufficiently and a public power separate from the people has not yet been consistently formed, the state has not yet emerged. For this reason, the word "*il*" has not completed the process of evolving from its original meaning of a piece of land to the meaning of a state.

The concept of *bodun* is used in *the Göktürk Inscriptions* for tribal alliances loyal to the kaghan; in this respect, it expresses the budding of the human element of the state. However, the concept of *bodun* did not mean the subjects of the state.

*Kut*, on the other hand, expressed the ideological basis of the newly formed tribal aristocracy, especially the kaghan, and was linked to the concept of sovereignty. As a matter of fact, in the Uighur *Oghuz Khan Epic* from the pre-Islamic period of the Turks, Uruz Bey's son addresses the king as follows:

"Bizning kutubiz sening kutung olmuş, bizning urugıbiz senning ıgaçungungung urugı bolmuş bolup turururur, tengri senge yir birip buçurmuş bolup tururururur, men senge başumrı kutumrı bire men, bigü bırıp, dostlukdın çıkmaz tururururur men, tep said."<sup>104</sup>

<sup>104</sup> *Oguz Kagan Epic*, published by W. Bang and G.R. Rahmeti, 1000 Basic Works, Istanbul 1970, p. 23.

This chapter, which unravels the mystery of the concept of *Kut*, is translated into today's Turkish as follows:

"Our state is your state; our tribe is the fruit of your tree. God has favoured you with a place; I give you my head and my state; I give you taxes and I will not leave friendship, he said."<sup>105</sup>

<sup>105</sup> For the translation of the same text by Prof. Dr. Bahaeddin Ögel, see *Türk Mythology*, I, AKDITYK Publication, Ankara 1993, p.121.

The mistake of translating the concept of *kut* as state is seen in three lines of text. Uruz Bey's son speaks of his own box and gives it to the kaghan. Uruz Bey's son does not have a state, but he has the power to rule and he transfers this power to the kaghan to whom he is bound. Here, the divinely originated power to rule, the authority to levy taxes, which is crystallised in the concept of *kut*, is seen in all its clarity. Undoubtedly, this power is an expression of the process leading to the state.

The kagan received the power to rule from God. In the process, it was the kagan and beys who would establish the state. After this process reached a certain maturity, during the Karakhanids period, as can be seen in Yusuf Has Hacıp's *Kutadgu Bilig*, the concept of *kut* gained a content related to the state. (*Kut*

the concept of "God-Kagans", further on, in the chapter "From Goktan God to Allah", under the heading "God-Kagans

)<sup>106</sup>

<sup>106</sup> See p.115 et seq.

It can be said that the sum of *il*, *bodun* and *kut* constitutes the state. These words express the territorial and human elements of the state and the feature of domination.

When the tribal aristocracy of Central Asia turned into a ruling class and established a state, it also adopted Islam, the ideology of state-building in the Middle East. For this reason, the Turkish word for state was not formed by the evolution of *il*, *bodun* or *kut*; it was borrowed from Arabic.

When the exploitation of human labour, which is the economic and social basis of the state, creates an irreconcilable opposition, the formation of an apparatus of domination separate from the people becomes necessary. The concept of the state in the language emerges within this social-economic-political process. In a period spanning centuries, the word that emphasises the origins of the state or expresses one of the elements of the state gradually takes on the meaning of the state. For example, in Ancient Greece and Rome, the words *polis* and *civitas*, which express the concept of state, originally meant city. These concepts reveal the connection of the state with the money economy and urbanisation. In Renaissance Italy, the word *stato*, the root of the concept of state in Western languages, signified "the prince and his entourage who seized power by force". This word later acquired the meaning of the whole of a territory and the state.<sup>107</sup>

<sup>107</sup> Oppenheimer, *The State*, p.45 et seq.

The word *state* in Arabic is rooted in the concept of property. In a way, Turkish has gained an advantage by finding this concept ready-made after breaking away from the Arabic word origin. For the state is not a city, a piece of land, property, subjects or domination, but a concept that includes these elements and is distinct from them.

## State

Surplus production, private property, trade, money, class, writing, science, art, the army, the bureaucracy, the state: all these social relations and institutions emerged at a certain stage of social development as mutually developing parts of a set of relations that we can call the civilisation package.

The state emerged in a long historical stage as a product of the division of society into classes. When the division into classes leads the ruling class to form a public power separate from the people, to completely disarm the people, and to create an organised bureaucracy, we encounter the state in its true sense. However, the leap of societies to such a stage does not happen all at once, but takes place in a process that continues over centuries. For this reason, the organisations before the Karakhanids and Seljuks are the sprouts of the state. The budding state grows, develops and matures.

The Khazar Empire, which reached its peak in 740 AD, which we have not analysed in this study, can also be seen as a state. The Khazars established their sovereignty immediately after the Göktürks, in the same period with the Uighurs and Sir-i Derya Oghuzes. However, the political organisation they formed in the far west of Central Asia, between the Caucasus and the Volga, was more developed than the Uighur and Oghuz confederation and had the characteristics of a state. The Arab writer Ibn Havkel states that the Khazar kagan had 12 thousand soldiers under his command, and when one of them died, a new one was appointed in his place. It is understood from this that the Khazars had a professional army separate from the people.<sup>108</sup>

<sup>108</sup> Arthur Koestler, *Thirteenth Tribe*, p.57.

As explained in this study, the Turkish waves towards class society, state-building, in other words, towards civilisation, followed one another from 1000 BC to 1200 AD. The Khazar, Qarakhanid and Oghuz aristocracies, which founded the Turkish states, transformed into feudal lords and formed autonomous foci of power in this 2,000-year zigzagging process of private property. In the Turks, the state emerged at the same time as a solution to the long historical quarrels between the centres of power created by private property. This tribal origin of power



The focal points took over the heads of confederations and attempted state-building, but since the commodity economy was not sufficiently developed, these powers did not stabilise and did not turn into states in the full sense of the word. However, it was only when the process of division into classes reached a certain maturity that the Khazar, Qarakhanid, Seljuk and Ottoman states were born.

It is certain that the Turks were at a more advanced stage in state-building than the Mongols. While the tribal confederations led by the Mongols established temporary sovereignties in the places they spread and then withdrew or melted down, the Turks took root in Anatolia in the social-economic sense, were able to feed on the civilisations that had previously flourished in this geography, and became the property of that geography by establishing states. The confederations before the Seljuks and Ottomans and the Mongols, like a flood, had devastated the areas they invaded. However, after the formation of a relatively developed aristocracy in Central Asia, this ruling class organised itself into a system of class domination and exploitation in the lands to which they migrated and formed states with a lifespan of 200 years and 600 years. The lifespan of the successive Seljuk and Ottoman states, which exceeded 800 years in total, shows that the Oghuzs had left behind the period of tribal confederations that had disintegrated and been established in the 11th century. During the Seljuk and Ottoman periods, waves of invasions from outside, although they led to crises, could not destroy the state. Since the depth of the division between the classes made the state necessary, the state crisis experienced during the Seljuk period due to the Mongol invasion and during the Ottoman period due to the Timurid invasion could be overcome. However, the Turks, who had reached a stage where they could be regulated by the state, not only did not destroy the Iranian, Byzantine and Arab civilisational heritage they encountered in the lands they came from, but also protected this civilisational heritage against the waves of Mongol invasions that followed. Moreover, Turkish feudalism, in its period of ascendancy, gave Anatolia a shot of youth by putting an end to Byzantium's heavy pressure on the peasantry and its antiquated institutions.

## **The Historicity and Universality of State Building**

In the history of every people there is a stage of barbarism, an "age of heroism" in its higher stages, then an epoch of civilisation in slave or feudal forms and the establishment of a state, and the stages of transition to capitalism. Some nations are now living in the period of the establishment of socialism.

Due to the uneven development of societies, these stages occurred at different times. The heroic age of Central Asia, which we read about in *the Oghuz Kagan Epic* or *the Book of Dede Korkut*, is present in the history of all the peoples of the world. For example, *the Homeric epics* and the *Shahnameh* of the Iranians describe these epochs. As a matter of fact, the culture, values and behaviours of heroes such as *Achilles*, *Hector* and *Paris* in *Iliad and Odyssey* have the same characteristics with those of *Bamsı Beyrek*, *Boğaç Bey*, *Salur Kazan* in *Dede Korkut Stories*. When we read the epics of different tribes, we get the impression as if the heroes had seen each other and had exchanged their thoughts, beliefs, morals and values. The pride of the aristocracy in the age of heroism, their look down on their old tribal equals, their admiration for themselves, their passion for heroism, their respect for property, their jealousy, are all similar to each other.<sup>(109)</sup>

[109](#) See Doğu Perinçek, *Intellectual and Culture*, p.55 et seq.

## **The Role of the State**

The state is the product of classisation, which deepens all over the world with the development of private property. On the other hand, by creating the peace and order necessary for the development of the commodity economy, the state has developed the private property on which it is based. Therefore private

The question of whether property is the product of the state or whether the state is the product of private property has been discussed. One can answer yes to both aspects of this question.

However, in different societies, the weight of the yeses varies. For example, in the history of Central Asia and Turkish society, the role of the state in developing private property is more prominent. It is the same in Islam. While in the Turks and Islam the state emerged at an earlier stage of private property, in the West the state emerged at a relatively more advanced stage of private property. In both cases, the state created the political framework and environment within which private property could develop. Most importantly, the state introduced the legal order that developed commodity production and institutionalised the power of armed sanction.

Depending on the state-private property relationship, the question has been raised whether the state created society or society created the state. The society here is a society divided into classes determined by private property. This is also called civilised society (civil society). The thesis of the creativity of the state was considered particularly valid for Eastern societies. This view was first put forward in Russia for the Russian state and imported to Turkey via the West<sup>(110)</sup>

<sup>110</sup> For the debate in Russia in the 19th century on the state's role as a creator of society, see East

Perinçek, *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to Today*, p.14 et seq.

Undoubtedly, every state was founded by society, or rather by the property owners of a society divided into classes. On the other hand, every state has also built society, or rather civilised society; in other words, by developing trade and private property, it has deepened the division into classes and destroyed the bridges to a return to the tribal period without the state<sup>(111)</sup>

<sup>111</sup> "civil society" in Western languages has acquired a different meaning in Turkish, meaning "non-military".

It has come to be used as a euphemism. In fact, the equivalent of "civil society" is civilised society, a society marked by private property. This concept is also used to denote social-economic relations outside the political society, i.e. outside the state.

Every state, in its youth, develops private property and builds civilisation. This For this reason, every state is born assuming a progressive role and maintains this role for a period of time.

To summarise: First, the property owners of a society that has reached a certain level of maturity in private property and is on the threshold of a civilisation breakthrough establish the state.

At the same time, the state realises the civilisation of that society through the use of force. In a sense, the state establishes, organises and implements the monopoly of force needed for civilisation. The state was born as the force of civilisation.

The role of the aristocracy in leading civilisation began in the period of tribal confederations. In the process of statehood of the Central Asian tribes from 1000 BC to 1200 AD, the contradictions between the common property of the tribe and private property, between tribal organisation and the state, between pre-religious beliefs and religion, between the forces resisting civilisation and civilisation, always overlap. Confederations against tribal organisation and state initiatives against confederations lead this process of civilisation.

The attempts of the more advanced representatives of private property to move towards confederations and the state are thwarted by the representatives of tribal society. As the example of Genghis Khan and Camoka shows, this contradiction is at the root of the steppe quarrels. While the state-builders tried to establish an order in which private property and trade would flourish, the steppe forces tried to maintain the predatory war chiefdom.

### **Centre and Centrifugal Relationship**

By disarming the tribal people, the state monopolises force and liquidates the old tribal society. The individuality of the new private property forms the basis of civilised society, which arises from the interests and initiatives of individual private property owners separate from the state. The state is the common organisation of those private owners and develops individual private property. The contradiction between the centralised state, which represents the common interest of the property-owning class, and the individual property owners creates the problem of the relationship between centralism and centrifugation.

Every centripetal development towards the establishment of tribal confederations or primitive forms of the state at the lower levels also corresponds to peace between the tribes, to the development of private property and the germination of the commodity economy. The strengthening of centrifugalism, on the other hand, means tribal strife and plunder.

Those who find a strong centralist tradition at the time of the formation of tribal confederations on the steppes of Central Asia are gravely mistaken. The centralist tradition was undoubtedly strong in China. This is because China is in a sense the Rome of Asia with its deep-rooted state tradition based on advanced commodity production. These two empires are two important examples of centralisation in antiquity. Rome developed centralism in the course of a highly developed commodity economy, which made even human beings tradable (slaves). China, like Egypt, created a centralised state and developed a commodity economy in order to realise large transport and irrigation projects. Although this centralised state was seen by theorists of Asian despotism as the cause of "stagnation", 11th century China produced as much iron as Europe did in the 18th century and had five cities with a population of more than one million.<sup>112</sup> And China, as Western scholars have recognised, had made more progress than Europeans in getting rid of the remnants of feudalism and in some respects was closer to the "order of free citizenship" than Western European society.<sup>113</sup>

<sup>112</sup> Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, p.158.

<sup>113</sup> Oppenheimer, *Devlet*, p.108. The Turkish translation reads "in many respects". However, it should have been translated as "in some respects". In German: "in mancher Beziehung".

However, the situation of the Central Asian tribes was different. The formation and disintegration of confederations shows that the level of development of the money economy was not advanced enough to keep them together. Tribal confederations such as the Huns and the Göktürks, organised by marauding war chiefs of nomadic peoples living on the fringes of great trading civilisations, did not have a commodity economy mature enough to be the basis for a centralised state. For this reason, these confederations were like large buildings built without mortar. An enormous military power, which plunged into civilisations on the back of population explosions, swept over a vast geography like a hurricane.

and the confederation was passing through. However, since the beams to connect these vast areas, strong commercial ties and commodity economy did not exist, the economically makeshift building collapsed in a short time; the confederation disintegrated; and then it was re-established under the domination of another tribal union.

This is also the reason why the Central Asian kaganates produced a dual East-West power structure. Moreover, this dual power is divided into lower power centres due to the still unresolved tribal organisation. This structure, which is under strong pressure from centrifugal tendencies, can turn into steppe anarchy at any moment. Tribal confederations put an end to the steppe anarchy by creating a great military power to dominate the steppe and ensure peace and order among the tribes. Both in this environment of internal peace and through the plundering of neighbouring civilisations with the military power gathered, a certain accumulation of wealth is created; private property and commodity economy develops. Thus, a breakthrough towards centralisation is achieved. However, this centralisation is relative. Tribal confederations are more centralised than periods of tribal anarchy. However, if you compare it with advanced commodity economies, it is a country with extremely strong centrifugal tendencies.

they are founded on a social basis.<sup>(114)</sup>

<sup>114</sup> See Doğu Perinçek, *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to Today*, p.34 et seq., p.81 et seq., p.98 et seq.

This was the reason why Bilge Kagan complained about fragmentation in *the Orkhon Inscriptions*. Nationalist historians attribute the frequent disintegration of the Central Asian "states" to trivial reasons, to "betrayals" or "weaknesses in national unity", and so on. But they are not at all interested in the level of development of the commodity economy which would hold these political organisations together.

The tribes of Central Asia overcame the contradiction between steppe anarchy and the relative order brought about by confederations in a period lasting about two thousand years. In the foundation of the Khazar, Karakhanid, Seljuk and Ottoman states, which represent the leap to class society, statehood and civilisation, the centre leads the advance to more advanced forms of private property and thus social development.

The Seljuk state was destroyed by the Mongol invasion before it had reached the peak of its development and before it had fully exhausted its possibilities for the advancement of society. The waves of invasion of the Mongols and Timur from the relatively more tribal world into the civilised world revived the remnants of tribal society, i.e. the reaction, with centrifugal force.

In the Seljuks, at a lower stage of feudalism, the centrifugal beys were more powerful than in Ottoman society. The emirs, who were given large provinces as *ikta*, were like petty rulers commanding an armed force of over a thousand soldiers. By weakening the power of the centrifugal feudals, the Ottoman state strengthened the authority of the centre over them and prevented the formation of autonomous power centres.

Until the middle of the 15th century, the centre was the leading force in the development of private property in the Ottoman state. In the later period, the centralist state became a heavy burden that destroyed the possibilities of reproduction. During this period, centralism not only established a system of heavy oppression and exploitation on the masses of productive peasants, but also suppressed and blunted the autonomous tendencies within the feudal ruling class and the initiative of the merchants.

Centralisation once again appeared on the stage of history with a progressive role during the Kemalist Revolution.

Every revolution is a reckoning with reaction. At the stages when the class struggle is at its sharpest, the forces of revolution and counter-revolution inevitably turn towards centralism. Revolutionary crisis forces the will, mobilises it to the utmost. In such periods, the centre of the revolution is strengthened to the maximum extent. A revolution that is not centralised cannot succeed and cannot survive. Like other revolutions, the Kemalist Revolution has confirmed this law.

Eurocentric views, looking at the centrifugal character of European feudalism, consider centrifugality as a sign of progress. In ancient Egypt, however, centralism served the development of transport technology. The centralisation of Rome developed the commodity economy. In the advanced stage of feudalism in Europe, the process of centralisation was strengthened by the development of the money economy and local feudals were weakened.<sup>115</sup>

<sup>115</sup> On the relationship between centralisation and the development of productive forces, see Doğu Perinçek, *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to the Present*, p.34 et seq.; Oppenheimer, *State*, pp.135, 151 et seq., 178, 181 et seq;

Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, p.166 et seq.; Halil Berktaý, *From Tribe to Feudalism*, footnote on p.171 and p.184.

Overall, we can see that the monetary system was able to consolidate the power of local powers.

weakens and strengthens the centre. Samir Amin observes that as the productive forces developed, political centrifugation was replaced by centrism. This is why Europe was able to catch up with the level of the "tributary mode of production" of the East only during the period of absolute monarchy, after it had been freed from the lower rungs of feudalism.<sup>(116)</sup> The modern centralised state played an important role in the liquidation of feudal fragmentation and the development of money production. <sup>116</sup> Samir Amin, *Eurocentrism*, p.167.

Some historians focus on the role of the state at its birth and in the revolutionary period theories of the "Kerim state", referring to the state as the vanguard of progress. The fallacy of these theories lies in the fact that they always declare the state to be the leading force of progress, regardless of its class character and role. In the analysis of Turkish history, those who hold this view have turned the concepts of centre and centrifugal into ideological tools that dismiss classes and class roles.

On the other hand, there are those who ascribe to the state and the centre always reactionary and to the periphery and outside the state always progressive. They put the reactionary state and the revolutionary state in the same basket. Since they declare the state unclean, they reject the seizure of state power, i.e. revolution. Thus they serve to keep the popular forces always in opposition and crushed.

The state and the centre do not have an unchanging role throughout all periods of history. The role of the state and the centre is determined by the role of the ruling class. Social-economic development and centralisation sometimes go hand in hand, sometimes they come into conflict. For this reason, history cannot be explained in isolation from the class character of the state, from the youth and old age of the classes, from the historical roles of the classes, with abstract concepts such as "centre-edge" which are not materialised in society.



### 3. FROM GÖKTANRI TO ALLAH

#### The Deification of the Master

In the history of Central Asia, as in the rest of the world, a class of property owners, masters, was first born, and then this master was carried to the sky. In Hüseyin Kâzım Bey's *Türk Lügâtı*, it is explained that the words iye, ike, ite mean both property owner and Allah in various Turkic dialects.<sup>(117)</sup> This explanation shows that the concept of Allah in Central Asian Turkic societies also has the phenomenon of property owner and master at its root. As it is known, in Middle Eastern languages, words such as *Ba'l*, *Rab*, *Mevla*, which denote God, originally meant property owner, master.

<sup>117</sup> Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, *Türk Lügâtı*, p.513 and 514 as cited in *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, Kaynak Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, May 1996, pp.220 and 356.

Euhemerios, one of the philosophers of the Cyrene school of Greek philosophy, describes this process in a very concise manner:

"The worship of gods grew out of the veneration of kings and other such great people, and is therefore nothing more than an enlarged and further developed form of this veneration. The gods are heroes, kings, exceptional people who were elevated to the rank of gods after their death ."<sup>118</sup>

<sup>118</sup> Macit Gökberk, *History of Philosophy*, p.71 and Alfred Weber, *History of Philosophy*, p.43.

## God Kings

The khans, kagans at the head of the tribal confederations of Central Asia were originally considered to be Gods or sons of God. They were superhuman, *divine*, *blessed* beings.

The title of the Hun emperor was *God Kut*; the famous emperor of the Western Huns, Atilla, was God. The Khazar kagan is divine. The Bulgarian khan was also placed on the throne by God.

*In the Orkhon Inscriptions*, Bilge Kagan is blessed as "He became like God in God". More strikingly, the name of Bilge Kagan's younger son is Tengri Kagan. The unity in the origin of the concepts of God and kagan is seen in this name in all its simplicity.

Genghis Khan used the title "God in the sky, God's power on earth" as a signature in his letters.

The honouring of khans and beys as "God" dates back to the 10th century. Afşin, one of the Seljuk beys, is addressed as "O God of Gods"<sup>(119)</sup>

<sup>119</sup> Hasan Reşit Tankut, *Sosyological Studies on Zazalar*, p.73.

The word *kut* in *the Orkhon Inscriptions* also reveals the relationship between property ownership, state and divinity. *Kut* is a characteristic of kagans and aristocracy; it carries the meaning of dominance and might. The source of *Kut* is God. The kagans have *kut* because He has ordained it. As explained above under the heading "From Tribal Confederation to State", in the Uighur *Oghuz Kagan Epic*, as in *the Orkhon Inscriptions*, the concept of *kut* includes the meanings of divinity, property ownership and sovereignty.

*In Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, the word *kut* is explained as follows: "Blessedness, state. It is taken from this word and called *kutluğ*." Further, the following two verses are given:

If *kut* *kuwıǵ* berse idhim *kulıńǵa*

Kûnde ıǵı yükseben yokar agar<sup>120</sup>

<sup>120</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.320.

The meaning is as follows: Idhim, i.e. my lord, my God, if he gives his servant blessedness and greatness, his business will rise every day.

Here, God and the property owner blessed by God are no longer identical, God has become a separate concept from the property owner and blessedness is linked to the abstract God. By giving kut to the property owner, God makes him mighty.

On the other hand, the word "kut" not only includes the unity of origin between the property owner and God, but also the unity of origin between the state and religion. Kut is also might; it is sovereignty.

Thus Centre Asia Turkish tribes where he lives process de, It proves the links between the birth of property ownership, the state and God.<sup>(121)</sup> [121](#) [121](#) Although Sencer Divitçioğlu gives extensive information on the concept of kut, he also states that this concept was not a part of the concept of kut, It does not mention the feature that explains the relationship between property, political power and divinity. Thus, the essence of the concept is lost in the details. See *Köktürkler*, Ada Yayınları, İstanbul, 1987, p.59 et seq. The same blur is also found in Ümit Hassan. While discussing the concept of kut, the researcher, who has devoted a great deal of effort to the study of Central Asia, does not seem to have a clear understanding, although he draws attention to the fact that words have gained new contents in history. (See *Türkiye Tarihi*, Cem Yayınları, vol.I, pp.309-317.)

## **The Advanced God Model of the Middle East**

The historiography on the beliefs of the Central Asian tribes is dominated by ignorance. The reason for this is the lack of theory. Ancient pre-religious beliefs, such as witchcraft, are confused with the religion that emerged in class society. For example, did the Göktürks, or even the Huns, believe in Shamanism, a pre-religious belief, or in God ?<sup>122</sup>

[122](#) On Shamanism, see Abdülkadir İnan, *Tarihte ve Bugün Shamanizm*, Turkish Historical Society Publications, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1986.

For detailed information on the relationship between social establishment and organisation and belief in Central Asia, see Ümit Hassan, *Eski Türk Toplumu Üzerine İncelemeler*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, March 1985.

The Turkic tribes of Central Asia had, in fact, reached the abstract concept of God in their own class formation and state-building processes. The Huns had gods of the universe who "were born in heaven and earth, became the sun and the moon". Gumiliev describes these gods as

He likens them to the cosmic gods of the Greeks. Gumiliev also notes that the Huns were interested in Buddhism and sees this phenomenon as a "broad horizon" indicating the level of cultural development. The fact that the Huns had an administrative mechanism that attracted a cultured Chinese, undoubtedly contributed to the concept of God.

[123](#)

[123](#) Gumiliev, *Huns*, trans. D. Ahsen Batur Selenge Publications, Istanbul 2002, p.114 vd.

Gumiliev, in his work *Ancient Turks*, states that the ancient beliefs of the Turks were not primitive beliefs. The beliefs of the Turks were highly developed in the 5th and 6th centuries like the religious systems of that time.[\(124\)](#)

[124](#) Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.103 et seq.

The Goktan God in the Gokturks is described in *the Orkhon Inscriptions* as follows: "Uze kök tengri, asra yağız yer kılıntukda ekin ara kişi oğlu kılınmış." In today's Turkish: "When the blue sky above and the greasy earth below were created, human beings were created between them." [125](#)

[125](#) Talat Tekin, *Orkhon Inscriptions*, pp.62-63.

The creation assumption here reflects the same plane of belief as the creation descriptions in the Torah, the Bible and the Qur'an. In the Turks, who are divided into classes, God is the creator of the universe. The idea of the afterlife was also present in the beliefs of the Turks.

The Goktan God of the Turks is a little more principled than the abstract God of the Middle East. This observation, which we have made in previous editions of this book, is exactly the same in Seyfeddin Aziz's novel. When Satuk Buğra Khan, the first Muslim ruler of the Qarakhanids, asks "Who is Allah?", Abu Nesir, a preacher of Islam from the Samanids, replies: "Allah is not a man, in your language, it means God." Seyfeddin Aziz narrates a historical reality by making the heroes of the novel speak.[\(126\)](#)

[126](#) Seyfeddin Aziz, *Türklerin Müslümanlığa Geçişi*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, February 2000, p.54.

Many historians state that the religion of the Turks, the religion of the Sky God, is very similar to the Hanafi faith preached by Prophet Abraham.<sup>(127)</sup>

<sup>127</sup> Quoted in Prof. Dr. Şaban Kuzgun, "Our Ancestors were not Shamanists", *Yeni Ses* magazine, April 2002, p.29 et al.

When we look at *the Orkhon Inscriptions*, we do not see sorcerer kam (Shamans), we see Göktan God. However, some Eurocentric superficial scholars have ignored Göktan God by putting forward frivolous theses. Such scholars have even appeared at the Turkish History Congresses.<sup>(128)</sup>

<sup>128</sup> For example Spuler. See *VII. Turkish History Congress*, vol.II, p.659 et seq.

In the Uighur *Oghuz Khan Epic*, the Khan believes in a monotheism and implores God.<sup>(129)</sup> Shamanism is not religion; it is sorcery. The shaman does not accept the existence of a supernatural power outside himself, and believes that he can dominate nature with his spells. There is no begging in sorcery.

<sup>129</sup> *Oguz Khan Epic*, p.3 and 19.

Classification process which is Central Asia Turkish in their tribes, among nomads Shaman their beliefs and applications no doubt in the cities. In cities If, no more to the centrepiece Middle East to their gods resembling The gods are seated. For this reason, the rulers and the people worship separately.<sup>(130)</sup> <sup>130</sup> Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.103 et seq.

*Neşri Tarihi (History of Neşri)* also states that various classes of Turks had different religions and beliefs at the time of their encounter with Islam:

"Turks are divided into many classes: Some of them are the owners of cities and castles; some of them are tent dwellers; that is, they live on the mountain tops and in the fields with their gathering-houses. Some of them worship the sun, some idols, some cattle, some trees, some stones; there are some who do not know any religion at all; some of them imitate Judaism. They call their ruler Hakan; they wear silk and put a golden crown on their heads. "<sup>131</sup>

[131](#) *Neşri Tarihi*, prepared by Prof. Dr. Mehmet Altay Köymen, c.I, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Publications, Ankara, March 1983, p.12.

During the period of the Central Asian peoples' leap into civilisation, the Huns, Gokturks, Uighurs, Khazars and Oghuzs had left behind their pre-religious beliefs with class formation, and had also come under the influence of religions coming from neighbouring civilisations. For example, Bilge Kagan wanted to build fortress walls and establish Buddhist temples within them. Vizier Tonyukuk, on the other hand, opposed Buddhism and Taoism, which preached kindness and tolerance. He says that these teachings would destroy their ability to fight and gain power.<sup>(132)</sup> During this period of contradiction between civilisation and predatory war chiefdom, the Central Asian aristocracy accepted religions such as Buddhism, Manichaeism, Mazdeism, Christianity, Judaism and Islam. Before they became Muslims, the Karluks had temples, on the walls of which were painted pictures of the kings who had lived before.<sup>133</sup>

[132](#) Liu Mau-Tsai, *Die chinesischen Nachrichten zur Geschichte der Ost-Türken (T'küe)*, Otto Harossowitz, Wisbaden, c.I, p.173 as cited in Sencer Divitcioglu, *Köktürks*, p.201.

[133](#) Grigoryev as cited in Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.111.

Turks, in their social development, abandoned the so-called "superstitious" beliefs and discovered religions as the ideology of civilisation. The era of sorcerers and kam (shamans) was leaving behind. Since the Central Asian aristocracy and urbanites had deified their own lordship and carried it to the sky, they had come to a point where they believed in the God of the Middle East. It has even been suggested that the celestial deities, the sun and moon gods at the origin of Allah were taken from Asia to the Middle East.<sup>(134)</sup>

[134](#) *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, Kaynak Yayınları, 2nd edition, 1996, p.353.

We are not disputing the correctness of this thesis. What is important is that the process leading to the developed abstract God of the Middle East, together with the dissolution of the tribe and the division of society into classes, has been experienced all over the world.

Islam was founded on this process. The tribes of the Middle East, who experienced the process of creating surplus production, class division and state formation earlier and deeper than the tribes of Central Asia, starting from Sumer, are more

They had developed and created a more abstract concept of God. This historical priority lies at the basis of the export of this concept not only to Central Asia but also to Europe and the whole world. In the fertile lands irrigated by the dykes built on the Euphrates and Tigris, the first Sumerian gods were finished and these gods were transferred to the societies that later became classed under the brands of Judaism, Christianity and Islam.<sup>(135)</sup>

<sup>135</sup> Muazzez İlmiye Çığ's book titled *The Origin of the Qur'an, Bible and Torah in Sumer* illuminates. Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, November 1995.

This is the reason why not only the tribes of Central Asia, but even the Roman Empire, which had previously created a highly developed commodity economy and a slavish civilisation, finally accepted the God of Middle Eastern origin. The God of the Middle East expresses a more advanced level of abstraction than the Roman gods or the Sky God of the Göktürks. For this reason, it is the product of a deeper experience and a greater accumulation in terms of deepening and securing classisation. The acceptance of the religions of the Middle East is, in a way, the reception of this historical experience.

The rising Turkish feudalism came into contact with the Islam of the period when the Arabs were at the height of world civilisation. Moreover, after a while it occupied leading positions in Eastern civilisation. In this period, when science in Central Asia was making a very significant progress, it was not the puritanical interpretations of Islam that prevailed, but rather those that opened up a wider field of freedom for world affairs and science. Yusuf Has Hacı, who put forward the ideology and political theory of the Karakhanid state, states in his great work *Kutadgu Bilig* that "it is difficult to combine religion with world affairs".<sup>(136)</sup> Rising feudalism has reached understandings that catch the concept of secularism that will be brought by bourgeois democratic revolutions.

[136](#) Quoted from *Kutadgu Bilig*, Ahmet Taner Kışlalı, "The three roses of our politics", *Cumhuriyet*, 5 March 1999.

## **The Ideology of Civilisation Conquering Conquerors**

The role of Arab conquests in the spread of Islam among Turks is emphasised. The famous historian Gibb analyses the relations and wars between the Arab conquerors and the peoples of Central Asia in his work entitled *Arab Futūhatı in Central Asia*, which was also translated into Turkish.<sup>(137)</sup>

[137](#) Gibb, *Arab Futūhatı in Central Asia*, trans. M. Hakkı, Evkaf Matbaası, Istanbul, 1930.

Some Kemalist historians, due to their nationalist perspective, clung to the thesis that the Turks were forced to convert to Islam by the sword. For example, Besim Atalay describes this event, which he calls the "Arab storm", as follows:

"It was crushing and deadly like a hurricane. According to Islamic historians, 'The temples of the Turks were destroyed. Their scholars were killed. Their books were burnt.' Ofşin, who had rendered great services to Islam, was sentenced to death for reading a book in Turkish. Thus, a terrible blow was dealt to Turkish culture and Turkish language. Everyone was forced to speak and think like Arabs."<sup>138</sup>

[138](#) His introduction to *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, vol.I, p.XXXIV. The *Outlines of Turkish History*, which contains the official historical view of the Kemalist administration, also emphasises the atrocities and plunder during the Arab expansionism, but draws attention to the role of the Samanids, who were of their own race, in the spread of Islam among the Turks (p.369).

Undoubtedly, many of the events narrated are true. However, it should not be forgotten that the period is the Middle Ages, the era of the sword. However, the sword, even if it enables the conquest of countries, is not always a sufficient tool for ideological conquest. This includes



Nevertheless, views that attribute the spread of Islam to the Arab sword and the purpose of plunder have recently found renewed favour. One example: Erdoğan Aydın's book *How We Became Muslims*.<sup>(139)</sup>

<sup>139</sup> Erdoğan Aydın, *How did we become Muslims*, Başak Publications, 1st edition, Istanbul, March 1994.

Those who see the sword as decisive in the spread of Islam among the Turks ignore the social-economic development stages of the Turks and the relation of this process with the ideological-cultural field. The main factor was not the conquest, but the level of development that the Turks had reached. The rising Turkish aristocracy found the Islamist ideology of the Umayyad and Abbasid states, which represented the advanced feudal civilisation of the age, as a model. Islam offered to the feudalising Turkish aristocracy all the values necessary for a social life in which the master-slave system prevailed.

This event is described in accordance with historical reality in the novel *Satuk Buğra Khan* by Seyfeddin Aziz, a former leader of the People's Republic of China. The book was also published in Turkish under the title *Turks' Transition to Islam/ Satuk Buğra Khan*. Satuk Buğra Khan was the Qarakhanid sultan and accepted Islam not by force of the sword, but as a necessity of the ideological needs of the Qarakhanid aristocracy and the civilisation breakthrough.<sup>(140)</sup>

<sup>140</sup> Seyfeddin Aziz, *Transition of Turks to Islam / Satuk Buğra Khan*, trans. Prof. Dr. Rukiye Hacı, Kaynak Publications, February 2000.

It is very misleading to think that the conquerors were always able to impose their religion by force. For example, the Romans could not impose their religion on the Middle East, which they conquered, and eventually they themselves became Christians. The religion of the Middle East swallowed even Rome. Barbarian tribes such as the Teutons, who destroyed Rome, submitted to the God of the Middle East through the Christianised Rome. The same thing happened to the Vikings who conquered the steppes where the Slavs lived. They surrendered to the religion of the Slavs they defeated and became Christians. Another example is the empire of Genghis Khan. In the vast geography they conquered, the Mongols could not impose their beliefs on any people by the sword. Although Slavs and Middle Eastern tribes lived under Mongol rule for centuries, they did not convert to Christianity and

They maintained Islam. On the other hand, the Mongols themselves surrendered to the religion of the Middle East, where they left no stone unturned. All these examples show that military conquerors cannot always be ideological conquerors.

Islam spread in Central Asia because it corresponded to the needs of the feudalised Turkish aristocracy and merchants rather than Umayyad and Abbasid conquestism. The acceptance of Islam by the Turks was, as Barthold argues, the ideological expression of the leap to the superior civilisation of the age.<sup>(141)</sup> The Islamic sword was effective in this historical process.

<sup>141</sup> V.V. Barthold makes the following accurate analysis: "The Turkic tribes living in Central-Asia at that time They were at very different levels in terms of civilised progress. Among them, the Turks, who did not have iron weapons but used weapons made of bone, are also mentioned. The acceptance of Islam by the Bulgarians shows that Islam in general was able to spread especially among the more or less civilised Turks. ...The superiority of Islam over the Buddha, Mani and Christian religions is probably due to the material It consisted in being superior to the civilised countries of mankind at that time in spiritual civilisation as well as in civilisation. ....With the property of the Muslims and at the same time with the civilised The nomads, who gradually became acquainted with their life, were not only under the religious influence of Islam, but perhaps even completely under the influence of Muslim civilisation." (*On the Turkish History of Central Asia*

*Dersler*, edited by Dr. Kâzım Yaşar Koprıman, Dr. Afşar İsmail Aka, Ministry of Culture Cultural Publications, Ankara, 1975, pp.93-95.)

## **Trade and Islam**

Islam settled in Central Asia against the backdrop of the development and spread of the commodity economy. Historian Faruk Sumer states that the intensive trade between Arabs and Turks was the most important factor in the conversion to Islam.<sup>(142)</sup> This determination is undoubtedly important. However, what is more important than the development of trade between the Arabs and the Turks is the fact that trade was established within the Turkish societies

developed. If the Turks had not developed a commodity economy, they would not have adopted the ideology (Islam) that corresponded to this economy.

[142](#) Faruk Sümer, "How Turks entered Islam", *And*, issue 7, 3 December 1983, p.5.

Islam, the "religion of merchants", responded to the needs of the feudal ruling classes and merchants in the process of its formation and became their ideology.

## **Muslim and Infidel Turks**

For the above reasons, Islam first spread among the Western Turks, where cities and trade were more developed and class differentiation was at a more advanced level. They even declared the Eastern Turks, who were at a more backward stage than them, as "infidels" and waged war against them. Today, it is known that the tribes labelled as "infidels" in the *Book of Dede Korkut* are Turkish tribes. In the copies of the *Book of Dede Korkut* written in the 15th century, the beys and warriors of these "infidels", who were labelled Christian, still bear Turkish names in the book. For these were the Kipchaks, who lived in the 11th century as neighbours of the Oghuz and had not converted to Islam.

As written in the *Book of Dede Korkut*, Kashgarli Mahmut also refers to the Uighur people as "the most hardened infidels".[\(143\)](#)

[143](#) *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, c.I, p.113.

It is natural, because at that time the Turks who accepted Islam and the Turks who did not abandon their old religions believed in different gods. Kashgarli Mahmut describes the Turks who believed in God, but not in Allah, as follows:

"The disbelievers call the sky 'Tengri'. Again, these men call everything that seems great to their eyes, such as a great mountain, a great tree, "Tengri". Therefore they prostrate themselves to such things. Again, these are the scholars

They call a person 'Tenğrigen'. We seek refuge in God from their perversions."<sup>144</sup>

<sup>144</sup> *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk Translation*, c.III, p.377.

Large masses of nomads resisted Islam because they saw that it favoured the aristocracy and merchants.

The process of Islamisation also caused conflicts among the Turkic tribes. The wars between the tribes who first accepted Islam and those they labelled as "infidels" and even "giaour" were also reflected in literature. *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk* includes the following quatrain describing the raids of the Turks who accepted Islam to the Uighurs:

"We flowed like torrents  
We came upon cities We  
destroyed the house of  
Put  
We shit on idols"

After quoting this quatrain, Kashgarlı Mahmud said: "This is the type of the Muslims; w h e n they enter a giaour country, they yesteh on their idols ."<sup>145</sup>

<sup>145</sup> The quatrain we quoted from *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk Translation*, c.I, p.344 in today's Turkish is as follows:

Kelengizleyü aktımız  
Kendler üze çıktımız  
Furxan ewin yıktımız  
Burxan üze sıçtımız

In the Middle Ages, it was common for forces of different faiths to engage in such acts in order to desecrate symbols held sacred by others. In a revolt in the 9th century, the blacks of Bahrain took the Black Stone, which was considered sacred by Muslims, to Basra. According to Nizamülmülk, their leader Abu Tahir "cut Hajar-ul-Aswad into two pieces and placed it on the footpath so that when he sat down, he would place one foot on one piece and the other foot on the second piece." (See *Nizamülmülk, Siyasetname*, p.313.)

There are also those who argue that the ideal of jihad was decisive in the Turks' acceptance of Islam. Those who hold this view argue that Islam's promises of veteran status for warriors and paradise for martyrs influenced the warlike Central Asian tribes. However, not only Islam, but all religions of the time included the promise of paradise and the punishment of hell. In this respect, there was no difference between them. More importantly, while the most warlike of the Turkic tribes initially resisted Islam, those who had become more commercial and civilised converted to Islam earlier.

### **Religion of Nomadic Masses: Batinism**

The differences of belief among the Turks continued in the form of sectarian differences after the majority of them accepted Islam. Against the Sunnite sect of the Oghuz aristocracy, the nomadic Oghuz masses mostly adopted Batinî sects. The Alevi belief in the *Book of Dede Korkut* also shows this. Uruz, the son of Kazan, talks to the tree as follows:

*"If I say tree tree, don't be sad tree*

*...*

*The saddle of the Döldül of Ali, the king of soldiers, is  
made of wood The scabbard and hilt of Zülfikar are  
made of wood*

*The cradle of Shah Hasan and Hussein tree*<sup>146</sup>

<sup>146</sup> Muharrem Ergin, *The Book of Dede Korkut*, p.44.

The effects of the Karmatî movement, which was initiated by the oppressed masses in the Islamic world, had reached as far as Turkestan. It is noteworthy that the Western movements in Anatolia were connected to Khorasan and Ahmet Yesevi. In fact

For centuries, Alevis in Anatolia have referred to themselves as "the men of Khorasan".

While the Seljuk and Ottoman aristocracies adopted the ideology of Sunnite Islam, the masses of people in Anatolia gathered under the banner of Kızılbaş-Alevî. It was the feudal ruling classes who despised Kizilbashism. The masses of the people, on the other hand, organised themselves in the sects and orders of the Batinîs in order to defend their class interests against the sultans and beys. Historians state that in 15th century Anatolia, the overwhelming majority of the popular masses were Kizilbash. This situation changed over time due to the heavy persecution of the Ottoman sultanate. The "enmity against Kızılbaş" is in fact nothing but a popular enmity inherited from the Ottoman sultans. Within Alevism, the Turkish masses have preserved many of their pre-Islamic beliefs and customs. Alevism has carried many of the value judgements and solidarity of the old egalitarian society to the present day. Against the oppression and bigotry of the feudal Ottoman culture, it was the labouring masses who gathered around Alevism and other Western sects that perpetuated Turkish folk culture. For this, it is enough to look at the works of Yunus Emre, Karacaoğlu, Pir Sultan Abdal and other folk bards.

#### **4. FROM BODUNDAN TO SUBJECTS FROM SUBJECTS TO NATION**

#### **Bodun is Not a Nation**

It is an indisputable fact that Turkish tribes come from a history of thousands of years. However, the concept of tribe should not be confused with the concept of nation. A tribe is a community of people who speak the same language and have a common ethnic origin. This community does not have a common economic basis; it is not united on a nationwide market. Therefore, there is no national consciousness. National consciousness will be created by bourgeois democratic revolutions.

The nation was unknown to the nomadic communities of Central Asia. In the tribal period, the factor that united human communities was blood ties, being a member of a certain clan or tribe. When social differentiation within tribes emerged with the development of private property, the mortar that formed human communities was now dependence on a certain aristocrat. Thus, tribal communities ceased to be ethnic groups and turned into political communities.

The human element of the kaganates, which were the "political" organisations of those times, was not a nation. Sometimes Dwarves (Avars), sometimes Gokturks, then Uighurs, then Oghuzs, then Mongols were at the head of the confederation. The tribes and tribes that were subordinated to the kaghan at the head of the confederation, "brought to their knees", spoke different languages. There was no linguistic unity among them, let alone a national bond.

Steppe tribes, through various alliances and arrangements, were living in the passion of defeating the leading tribe (actually the aristocracy of that tribe) and becoming the head of the confederation, thus seizing the riches, raiding and plundering other tribes and clans, rounding up their herds of animals and women. In these wars, it was natural for khans to collaborate with the surrounding civilised empires and other tribes against their own or related tribes.

Nationalist ideologists regret that the Turkish nobles and tribes, who were at each other's throats, co-operated with the Chinese Empire. However, this practice was common and ordinary; it was not "shameful" in terms of the aristocratic value judgements of the time. In that era, the dominance of one aristocracy or tribe over another was the main issue. Value judgements and consciousness were formed accordingly. The stigma of "treason" attached to the cooperation of Turkic kaganates with others against each other belongs to today, not to that day.

For the formation of the consciousness of "national unity and solidarity", it was necessary to wait for the dawn of capitalism. The capitalist market, the material basis of the nation, was still centuries away.

The simplest evidence refuting the claim that the Turkish nation was formed thousands of years ago is the fact that the word "nation" in its present sense did not exist in Turkish until the late 19th century. In fact, the concept of nation in its 19th and 20th century content did not exist in any world language before. Because the phenomenon of nation has a history of only a few centuries.

For example, *bodun* in *the Göktürk Inscriptions* is translated as "nation". However, *bodun* is not a nation; it denotes a relationship of dependence. *Bodun* is an alliance of tribes that "provide labour", goods and services to a certain aristocracy. Some non-Turkish speaking tribal communities also became dependent on the Göktürk ruler and became *the bodun* of Bilge Kagan.

As explained above in the section "Oghuzs", the word "Oguz", like the word *bodun*, meant tribes and signified a relationship of subordination. Communities consisting of a certain number of tribes were called Eight Oghuz, Nine Oghuz, Three Oghuz, Ten Oghuz, etc. according to the number of tribes. The word Oghuz was later transformed into the name of a tribe during the Sir-i Derya Oghuz period.

In ancient Mongols, the concept corresponding to *bodun* was *nation*. Clans, tribes, tribal unions subject to tribal aristocrats such as *haan*, *noyan*, *tayşı*, *baatur* were called *nation*. Here, *nation* meant "property-people", "subjects" .<sup>147</sup> [147](#)

Vladimirtsov, *Mongols' Internal Organisation*, trans. Abdülkadir İnan, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara 1944.

## Political and Revolutionary Origins of the Turkish Name



The concept of *Turk* in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* is not the name of a nation at the beginning. The inscriptions speak of "Turk Bilge Kagan". The term "*Turk*" referred to the dominant tribal group that "brought to its knees" various tribal communities such as *Turgish*, *Nine Oghuz*, *On Uyghurs*, *Karluks*, etc., and even the lineage (clan) of Bilge Kagan. Just as "Seljuk" and "Ottoman" were initially the names of a clan, but in time they came to include all the people under the rule of that clan, so was the name "Turk" in the beginning.

Again in the *Orkhon Inscriptions*, Bilge Kagan says, "Türküm bodunum idi". From this, we understand that the Turkic bodu also meant a group of tribes dependent on Bilge Kagan and sat at the top of the hierarchy of the Gokturk confederation.

Again, when we read the *Book of Dede Korkut*, we see that the bond that unites people there is not membership to a nation, but dependence on Salur Kagan or another lord.

In the light of these facts, it does not seem to be a scientific attitude to date the name Turk, *as the name of a tribe*, back thousands of years. The fact that the region north of the Sea of Azov was called Tucae in the 1st century AD, or that Tyrcae was mentioned in the list of peoples in the same region, seems controversial in this respect.<sup>(148)</sup>

<sup>148</sup> See Denis Sinor, "The Foundation and Fall of the [Gokturk] Empire", trans. Prof. Dr. Talat Tekin, in *History of Early Inner Asia*, compiled by the same author, p.385.

It is an absolute fact that the history of the peoples speaking the language we call Turkish today goes back thousands of years. For example, it is known that some Hun tribes spoke Turkish. Of course, Turkish-speaking tribes had existed before. However, none of those peoples were called Turks in those times. Hence the need to use the term "Proto-Turk" to refer to those Turkish-speaking peoples.

It was the Iranians and Arabs who called all the Turkish-speaking tribes of Central Asia "Turk". For example, the Oghuzes never referred to themselves as Turks before Islam. The Oghuzes or Tokuz Oghuzes in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* were Uyghurs, not the Oghuzes we know.

The Oghuzes of Sir-i Derya, who migrated to Anatolia, were related to the Gokturks, who first appeared in history as Turks, but they were a different alliance of tribes. Most probably, the alliance of tribes referred to as *the On Arrows* in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* later migrated to the west and became known as the Oghuzes. However, after they became Muslims, they distinguished themselves from other Oghuzes and started to use the name Turkmen. It is understood that the adoption of the name Turkmen was due to the influence of Arabs. As can be seen, there is not a single tribe called Turk in history, but more than one related tribe. And these tribes called themselves by different names.

Those who looked at the Central Asian tribes from the South or the West used the name Turk in a sense that included all the tribes within the Gokturk confederation. The Chinese name *Tucyu*, and the Arabs *Turkic* name encompassed all the tribes under the rule of the Turkish Khan. Some of these tribes spoke different languages, but were referred to as *Turkic*. So much so that some Arab writers even refer to Russians and Slavs as Turks.<sup>(149)</sup> Again, general names such as *Mongol* and *Tatar* referred to the totality of peoples from different languages and tribes affiliated to a certain confederation. <sup>149</sup> Ibn Fazlan, *Seyahatnâme*, Published by Prof. Dr. Ramazan Şeşen, Bedir Publications, 2nd ed, Istanbul 1995.

It can be seen that the name Turk has a political basis. Initially the name of a dynasty and a group of tribes, it came to include all the tribes under the domination of that community. The political bond expressing loyalty to the Gokturk confederation determined the concept of Turk.

Ziya Gökalp confirms the political content of the Turkish concept by linking the origin of the word "Turk" to the word "*honour*".<sup>(150)</sup>

<sup>150</sup> Ziya Gökalp, *Türk Töresi*, İstanbul 1339, p.4 as cited in Hikmet Kıvılcımlı, "Dinin Türk Society", *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, issue 17, March 1970, p.10.

Thomsen translates the word *töre* in the *Orkhon Inscriptions* as law and institution. In the Inscriptions, the question "Who artty Turk budun ilinin, törünün kim artty" (Who would destroy the political organisation and institutions of the Turkic people) is asked.<sup>(151)</sup>

[151](#) Thomsen, *Çözülmüş Orkhun Yazıtları*, trans. For the concept of Töre, see Ümit Hassan, *Osmanlı/ Örgüt-Inanç- Davranış'tan Hukuk-İdeoloji'ye Osmanlı/ Örgüt-Inanç- Davranış'tan Hukuk-İdeoloji'ye*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul 2001, pp.25 et al., 71 et al.

Again, in *the Orkhon Inscriptions*, there are various explanations showing the relationship between the concept of custom and power, governance and law. For example: "Olurupan, türk boduning ilin, törüsin tuta birmiş, iti birmiş."

In today's Turkish: "Sitting on the throne, he ruled and regulated the law of the Turkic people."[152](#)

[152](#) See Talat Tekin, *Orkhon Inscriptions*, pp.62-63.

After stating that the word tör means custom, tradition, Kashgarli Mahmut gives the following proverb: "Il kal kal tör kal", i.e. "Il is left, tör is not left."[153](#)

[153](#) Kashgarli Mahmud, *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, III, p.221.

As the word Töre transforms from the meaning of custom in tribal society to the law enforced by state sanction, i.e. by force, the word Türk also appears on the stage of history.

Law is the set of rules set by the state and enforced by armed force. For this reason, as custom acquired the meaning of law, the organisation of the army also emerged.

The concept of *bodun* was historically connected with the concept of *orda*, which was the military organisation of that period. The military organisation of the bodun, which was subordinate to the beys, was the orda. The orda, consisting of tribes, had turned into an army and a state in time.[154](#) [154](#) Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.83 et seq.

The word "Turk" originates from Törük and means "honoured historians and social scientists have put forward a thesis that may or may not be correct or incorrect from an etymological point of view, but is historically correct. Even if this thesis is skewed, it corresponds to the truth.

The concept of Turk emerged at the stage when the tribes of Central Asia were in the process of state formation, and thus had acquired law and political institutions. Turk is indeed ceremonial; it became the name of a tribe organised into a state. From the name of a clan or a collection of tribes, it became the name of a

It became the name of a feudal society, a political community, a tribe that established a state.

The emergence of the word Turk was accompanied by a revolution; it coincides with the process in which the tribes of Central Asia made their great historical leap, their leap to statehood and civilisation. This historical reality is more important than the linguistic origin of the word.

The fact that the name Turk has a political and revolutionary meaning from 1500 years ago is a very important legacy for today. Because it is not race, but political affiliation that constitutes a nation. And the Turkish name appeared on the stage of history in a revolutionary process.

## **Subject or Ummah Period**

Later, during the Seljuks and the Ottomans, the concept of nation in its present context did not exist. In the Turkish of those times, the word "nation" meant a religious community. In Yunus Emre's 13th century poem, "Seventy-two nations we called seventy-two nations right, this is my crime", "nation" meant a religious community. This is also the case in all historical texts.

Therefore, the answer to the question "who are you" was not "we are Turks" in those times. Turkish nationalists cannot find any historical document showing that any historical person recognised himself as belonging to the Turkish nation. Neither Mao-Tun, nor Attila, nor Bilge Kagan, nor Selcuk Bey, nor Osman Gazi or Sultan Mehmet the Conqueror considered themselves as belonging to the "Turkish nation". In his famous letter to King François of France, Suleiman the Magnificent, after praying to Allah and the Prophet, explains his identity at length. However, in that splendid presentation, there is no Turkishness or being a Turkish sultan.<sup>(155)</sup> Nor could there be. Because there was a Turkish tribe in that age, but there was no Turkish nation.

More importantly, the emperors and lords of that age did not express their identity by referring to the tribe from which they came, but by emphasising the dynasty to which they belonged. In the Middle Ages, the identity of the aristocracy was determined by being a sultan or a lord, while the mass of the people were the "sultan's" or "lord's" servants, his subjects.

[155](#) See *Mufasssal Osmanlı Tarihi*, II, İstanbul 1958, p.820 et seq.

Despite this historical fact, it was the novelists, theatre actors and filmmakers of the nationalist era who made the sultans or beys of the Middle Ages speak in the name of Turkishness.

Even in the first half of the 19th century, as Yusuf Akçura points out, the Tanzimatists consciously avoided using the concept of *nation*.[156](#) Because this concept would have served the deterioration of the Ottoman social structure. There was still the ummah, the subjects of the sultan, but there was no nation.

[156](#) Yusuf Akçura, *History of Turkism*, translated into New Turkish letters and prepared for publication by Sadık

Perinçek, Kaynak Publications, November 1998, p.26 et seq.

## **Bourgeois-Democratic Revolutions Created the Nation**

The nation is a historical category; it emerged everywhere in the world at the time of the dissolution of feudalism, with the dawn of capitalism, and will disappear with the disappearance of classes.

Two interrelated processes created the nation: One is the disintegration of feudal markets and the formation of a nationwide market. The second is the transformation of the peasant dependent on the lord and the land into a free worker by getting rid of these dependencies.

The ideological expressions of this development are the concepts of homeland, nation and freedom.

The bourgeois-democratic revolutions dispersed and integrated the feudal markets with the national market on the economic plane and with the concept of homeland on the ideological plane. The labourer who would sell his labour to the capitalist in the national market had to be freed from feudal shackles. Man could not be the servant of the landlord. The democratic revolutions, which took Jean Jacques Rousseau's famous slogan "Men are born free and live free" as their flag, liberated the peasantry. The labourer, thus freed from dependence on the lord, could now "freely" sell his labour to the owner of capital in the market called *the homeland*.

The bourgeois-democratic revolutions proclaimed *freedom, equality and fraternity*. People of opposite classes, who sold their labour and bought their labour in the national market, were declared "equal and brothers". The bourgeoisie, the master of the new system, covered the class contradictions between them with the concept of *nation* and made it appear as if they were in unity of interests; it based the "common spiritual formation" on these ideological distortions. The bourgeois and the worker, who were regarded as "equal" and "free" members of the nation, became brothers, had common interests, a common future and spiritual formation. However, the bourgeoisie could only make a profit by not paying a part of the value created by the worker, by confiscating a part of the labour. In this relationship there was not a commonality of interests, but an opposition. The concept of nation reflected this antagonism on the ideological plane by making the antagonisms within it disappear. The bourgeoisie, which theorised classes in the feudal period and led the class struggle against kings and lords, covered up the class antagonisms in capitalist society and wanted to reconcile the classes. Those who sold labour and those who bought it together constituted the nation.

The bourgeoisie did not invent a new word for the newly created concept of nation. "nation", which means tribe in Latin, gained a new content in the 19th century by assuming the meaning of "nation".

Nationalism not only formed the dominant ideology of capitalist society; it also rewrote the history that preceded it, and carried the nation it created into the depths of history by putting it in a time tunnel.

As can be seen, the nation is an ideological conception (image), an ideological fiction belonging to the 18th and 19th centuries. This fiction on the ideological plane is undoubtedly

It was created on the facts of the age. The land on which the nation lives, the human element that constitutes the nation and the market that is the economic basis of the nation are all realities; however, the nation and nationalism created by adding the spirit of "national culture" to these elements was initially nothing but the imagination of a class.

The piece of land on which the nation lives has existed since the formation of the present geological structure of the world. However, it was only through bourgeois-democratic revolutions that this piece of land became a homeland.

The human element of the nation is a historical heritage that was formed by the great migrations and the mixing of various tribes throughout the world.

The market on a national scale, on the other hand, is formed with capitalism as the developing bourgeoisie gradually eliminates feudal fragmentation.

However, these realities are not enough to form a nation if there is no spiritual element called "spiritual formation" or "national culture".

The conception of the nation was part of the bourgeoisie's conception of dominating the market and the world. However, since this vision belonged to a class that marched to power and came to power, it has raised hundreds of millions of people to their feet for several centuries, leading human practices and, in a sense, shaping the substance of societies and influencing the destiny of humanity. However, the real power here lies not in the conception of the nation and nationalist ideology, but in the fact that this ideology coincides with the interests of certain classes.

The nation is the product of a development in the progress of societies in which feudalism has been liquidated. In this respect, it is a step forward. As a matter of fact, equality, freedom, fraternity, homeland and nation were born together as products of democratic revolutions. It was the Great French Revolution, which overthrew feudalism, that made the French a nation. The Germans and Italians became a nation in the struggle against feudalism.

In short, the nation is the product of bourgeois democratic revolutions all over the world. The organisation used by the bourgeoisie to create the nation is the state; the ideology is nationalism.

Hobsbawm summarises this phenomenon as follows: "Nationalism precedes nations. Nations do not create states and nationalisms, that is true.

The opposite is ."<sup>157</sup>

<sup>157</sup> E.J. Hobsbawm, *Nations and Nationalism from 1780 to the Present*, trans. Osman Akinhay, Ayrıntı Publishing House, Istanbul, July 1993, p.24.

For a nation to exist, the bourgeoisie and bourgeois culture must first sprout. The bourgeoisie, with the culture it creates and of course through its intellectuals, begins to create the nation even before it takes power. However, the period in which the nation is actually created is the period when the bourgeoisie, after overthrowing the kings through revolutions, takes possession of the state.

Because ideological hegemony is the condition for moulding the majority of the society into a certain culture. First, the intellectuals of the bourgeoisie create the "national culture"; then the national state of the bourgeoisie creates the nation.

The bourgeois state creates the nation both by expanding and deepening the national market, and by injecting "national culture" into the cells of this market. In this process, even the national language was popularised by the state. What the market needs is the national language. The state plays a decisive role in the assimilation of various languages and dialects by the national language. The reader is introduced to the historicity of the nation, its creation by the bourgeoisie and through the state, the function of national culture, the reality and illusion underlying the fiction of the nation.

I recommend them to examine the study titled "*Intellectual and Culture*"<sup>(158)</sup>

<sup>158</sup> See Doğu Perinçek, *Intellectual and Culture*, p.63 et seq.

The explanation so far has revealed the connection between the processes of the dissolution of feudalism and the development of capitalism and the birth and development of the nation.

Societies delayed in nationhood, pre-capitalist or state societies. At the beginning of this century, almost the entire continents of Asia, Africa and Latin America had both deficiencies and constituted the vast majority of the world's population. At that time, only Turkey, China and Iran had states in the oppressed world. The others were colonies.



state; they were stateless. In the world balance after the October Revolution, the Turkish Revolution and the Chinese Revolution, most of these societies, which we call the Oppressed World, fought wars of liberation, were able to establish states and made an important breakthrough in the process of nationalisation.<sup>(159)</sup>

[159](#) For the relationship between state-building and nationalisation, see Hikmet Gökalp, *State-Nation*, Kaynak Publications, April 1998. We recommend our readers to study this valuable work of the true scientist Gökalp.

The history of the 20th century has shown that in our age, the main obstacle is no longer feudalism, but imperialism. The medieval powers are able to survive in the Oppressed World with the support they receive from the developed capitalist countries and by adapting to the world capitalist system. Therefore, the most important force undermining the process of nationhood on a world scale is imperialism. Both the independent state and the national market can only be established and developed through the struggle against imperialism.

One of the most striking examples of this is Turkey. The War of Independence was the most powerful and decisive leap in the process of Turkish nationalisation. The War of Independence was followed by the Republican Revolution, which overthrew the sultanate and paved the way for national development by scaling back medieval relations. Thus, in the era of proletarian revolutions and national liberation wars opened with the October Revolution, the Turks put into practice the model of nationalisation of the oppressed countries of the world.

## **The Idea of Nation Coming from Europe**

The Young Ottomans/Young Turks, the revolutionary movement of the bourgeoisie, introduced the concept of nation in today's sense into Turkish. Europe's democratic

The concept of nation, which acquired its present content in the revolutions, was indigenised in the national democratic revolution of Turkey.

This fact was also recognised by the first thinkers of Turkish nationalism. They recognised that nations were formed in Europe in the 19th century. Yusuf Akçura, one of the most well-informed theorists of Turkish nationalism and Kemalism, explains in his book *The History of Turkism* that the Turkish tribes learnt the idea of nation from Europe. In this work, which is perhaps the most important work analysing the development of Turkish nationalism, Akçura states

"The rise of the feeling of tribe and clanhood to the level of the idea of nationality occurred not in the East but in the West. The European tribes, under the influence of many reasons, especially from the XVth century onwards, worked on the subject of nationality, and finally, towards the middle of the XIXth century, they determined the idea of nationality in the sense we understand it today. (...) Since the idea came from Europe, the Turkish tribes, who had the most contact and relations with Europe and who began to take more or less inspiration from European civilisation, should have been acquainted with this idea before others. The Turkic tribes that fulfil these conditions are the Western Turks, formerly called Ottoman Turks, the Crimean Turks, the parts of the Northern Turks living in the Idyll basin and the Azerbaijani Turks living in the Caucasus. Indeed, towards the end of the XIXth century, we see that the idea of nationality was emerging and spreading in all four of these four clusters of Turks. "[160](#)

[160](#) Yusuf Akçura, *Türkölüğün Tarihi*, Kaynak Yayınları, p.17 vd.

Ağaoğlu Ahmet also states that the nationality movement, which started with the French Revolution, came to Turkey 150 years later. In another article, he wrote, "We are

We took the movement of tribalism from the West".<sup>(161)</sup>The "Kadroists" of Kemalism also see the nation as a product of historical development<sup>r162</sup>

<sup>161</sup> For the full text of the conference published in Ağaoğlu Ahmet, "Tarihî Devirler Arasında Milliyet", *Türk Yurdu*, March 1926, pp.534-537, see *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı*, c.I, p.154 vd). "Turkish Realm" *Türk Yurdu*, issue 5, 25 January 1912 (published by Tutibay Publications in New Turkish) *Türk Yurdu* corpus, vol.I, p.180).

<sup>162</sup> Şevket Süreyya, *İnkılâp ve Kadro*, Ankara 1932, p.94.

As Yusuf Akçura points out, Turkism, which first emerged in the field of language in the Neo-Ottomans, among literary figures such as Şinasi, Ziya Pasha, Ahmet Vefik Pasha, had its first coherent theorist with Mustafa Celalettin Pasha. Mustafa Celalettin Pasha, who can be considered the first Turkish nationalist on the ideological level, was a former Polish nobleman named Constantin Bojenski and a Polish nationalist. When he was only 22 years old, he participated in the 1848 Revolution for the independence of Poland, but upon failure, he sought refuge in the Ottoman Empire in 1849. Bojenski, who entered the Ottoman army, later converted to Islam and published his famous French work *Les Turcs anciens et modernes (The Old and New Turks)* in 1869. The fact that the first Turkish nationalist was a European revolutionary and the first important work of Turkish nationalism was written in French is noteworthy in terms of showing the historical and ideological source of nationalism all over the world.<sup>(163)</sup>

<sup>163</sup> See Yusuf Akçura, *Türküluğun Tarihi*, Kaynak Yayınları, pp.26-41.

After the 1908 Revolution of Freedom, the national movement's idea and practice of "creating the Turkish nation" became more evident. In this regard, the following views expressed by Mehmet Ali Tevfik Bey in the conference he gave on 5 Kanunusani 1327 (18 January 1912) at the İttihat ve Terakki Dock Club in Thessaloniki reflect the attitude of the nationalist movement of the time in all clarity:

"Alas, the concepts of homeland and nation were established in Europe centuries ago. Now, even the anti-nationalism, which has been launched for their destruction, has advanced considerably. We poor Turks will start building a homeland now. (...) We will build a Turkish nation, a Turkish homeland!

"We will do this because we know that, as the honourable Ahmet Bey Agayef has said, a tribe that is incapable of forming a nationality lives for a while in the form of tribes and clans, and then, when it comes face to face with tribes whose nationalities have been formed, it will either perish completely. Or it melts and disappears in those tribes.

"Turkish nation, Turkish homeland should be made I say.  
"<sup>164</sup>Cumhuriyet

### **"National Era" opened with the Revolution**

<sup>164</sup> *Genç Kalemler Magazine*, eds: Prof. Dr. İsmail Parlatır, Assist. Assoc. Dr. Nurullah Çetin, AKDITYK Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara 1999, p.443.

In the process of nationalisation of Turks, the real breakthrough took place with the establishment of a national Turkish state after the War of Independence.

It can be said that there were inconsistencies in the Kemalists' views on the formation of the nation, especially at the beginning. They often thought that the nation was born thousands of years ago. The establishment of a confederation by a tribe taking the others under the domination of others, the formation of the nation as they saw.<sup>(165)</sup>

<sup>165</sup> *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Methal Kısmı*, Devlet Matbaası, İstanbul 1931, p.48.

On the other hand, they described the revolution they led as *a transition from the ummah to the nation*. In his speech at the Izmir Economic Congress in 1923, Mustafa Kemal stated in three different places that the Turks had until then been "real,

that they did not experience a national era in a scientific, positive sense" and that they "did not experience a national

they do not possess history" in precise terms.<sup>166</sup>

<sup>166</sup> Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, c.I, Türk İnkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, second edition, Ankara 1961, pp.100, 101, 105, 106. Mahmut Esat Bozkurt, in his speech at the Izmir Economic Congress, states that the Turks "have not experienced a national era in history" (Afetinan, *Izmir Economic Congress* Congress, TTK Publications, Ankara 1982, p.78).

Ağaoğlu Ahmet, on the other hand, puts this fact into daily language: "Our fathers died before they realised their Turkishness. When they were asked who they were, they could not answer other than saying 'Alhamdulillah İslam'".<sup>167</sup>

<sup>167</sup> Ağaoğlu Ahmet, *agy*, p.158.

Tekin Alp, one of the intellectuals of Kemalism, states that after living under the rule of kings and princes for thousands of years, humanity has reached the consciousness of nationalism in the last two centuries thanks to democratic revolutions.<sup>(168)</sup>

<sup>168</sup> Tekinalp, *Kemalism*, trans. from the original text published in Istanbul 1936: Çetin Yetkin, Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları, May 1998, p.259.

The "national era" began with the Kemalist Revolution. Atatürk emphasised this function of the revolution he led when he opened the Ankara Faculty of Law in 1925:

The Turkish revolution, "with the bond of Turkish nationality instead of the bonds of religion and sect" millet

.<sup>169</sup>

<sup>169</sup> Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri, c.II, p.237.

Again, in his book *Civilised Knowledge*, Atatürk linked the formation of the Turkish nation, which he defined as "the people of Turkey who founded the Republic of Turkey", to the establishment of the Republic.<sup>(170)</sup> This definition, written in Atatürk's own hand, reflects the official view, as it is taught in Civics courses.

[170](#) Afetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2nd edition, Ankara 1988, p.351 and p.18. Unfortunately, Atatürk's definition of the nation has been altered in some official publications. For example, the Turkish Ministry of Culture in October 1999 In his book "Kurtuluş Kuruluş Cumhuriyet" (Liberation, Establishment, Republic), the term "people of Turkey" was changed to "Turkish people".

## **Atatürk's Revolutionary Definition of Nation**

In Mustafa Kemal Atatürk's definition of nation, three elements stand out: Turkey (homeland), the people of Turkey and the Republican Revolution.

*The first element* is Turkey, the homeland created by the establishment of an independent republic. The nation lives on this homeland.

*The second element* is the people of Turkey. The people are the substance of the nation, that is, the dough. It is significant that Atatürk, in 1930, defined the human element that constitutes the nation not as "Turkish people", but as *the people of Turkey*, that is, all the people living on a certain geographical area. Here, the nation is defined not according to ethnic origin, but according to a common homeland, common culture and common revolution.

Our nation, like all great nations, is a mixture and assimilation of different races and tribes.

Today, our Kurds, besides being citizens of the Republic of Turkey, recognise that they have a different ethnic origin. This different origin will not be changed by force, but will gradually lose its significance in the process of natural fusion. Whatever their origins, Turks and Kurds have co-existed for centuries, even centuries

They have mixed with each other for thousands of years. This fusion, their common homeland

and continues on the basis of the Republic they founded together.<sup>(171)</sup>

<sup>171</sup> For explanations on the subject, see Doğu Perinçek's *Kemalist Revolution-4/ Kurdish Policy in the War of Independence*, p.251 et seq, p.253 et seq.

*The third element* is the revolution that turns a people into a nation.

This third element is decisive in the formation of the nation. Because the element of the country and the people living on that land already existed. By establishing the Republic, the people of Turkey also transformed themselves into a nation. The people's practice of establishing the Republic constitutes the basis of the nation's consciousness of coexistence.

The act of "establishing the Republic of Turkey" is a revolution. This founding of the Republic is the *political* element of the nation.

With the definition of the nation created by the revolution, Atatürk emphasised that the political bond was decisive in the formation of the nation. In 1926, in his notes on the "Principle of Nation and Nationalities", he wrote that the word "nation" was confused with the word "tribe", and then said

"The word 'nation' refers to a political organisation. The word 'people', on the other hand, reminds us first and foremost of origin and race." <sup>172</sup>

<sup>172</sup> Sadi Borak, *Atatürk's Söylev Demeç Correspondence and Conversations not included in Official Publications*,

Kaynak Publications, February 1997, p.377.

In the continuation of these notes, Atatürk states that the state creates the nation, that the nation is a historical category, that the principle of nationalities emerged with the French Revolution, and that nations are formed by assimilating different tribes.

The understanding that defines the nation with political bonds was also included in Article 2 of the 1931 Programme of the CHP:

"A nation is a political and social group of citizens bound together by the unity of language, culture and ideals. "<sup>173</sup>

<sup>173</sup> Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-3/ Altı Ok*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, June 1999, p.31.

The Republican Revolution, which created the Turkish nation, was also a break with the Middle Ages; it was a break from the sultanate on the political plane, from the Sharia on the ideological plane, and from the agha and sheikh on the social plane. From now on, the subjects of the state are no longer the ummah, "consisting of sheikhs, dervishes, çelebis, murids and members", but the nation.

As a matter of fact, Atatürk, while writing the chapter titled "Nation" in his book *Civilised Knowledge* with his own hand, opens his own revolutionary definition of nation. Under the heading "Factors in the formation of the Turkish nation", he describes the picture of the Turkish nation in two points:

"1. The Turkish nation is a state governed by a republic, which is a popular government.

"2. The Turkish State is secular. Every adult is free to choose his religion. "<sup>174</sup>

<sup>174</sup> Afetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, p.18.

Here Atatürk explains the link between the Six Arrows, which is actually a nationalisation programme, and the nation. The Six Arrows, which summarise the programme of the Turkish Revolution, were developed within the practices of the revolution and brought to their most mature expression through the experiences of the Republic. Kemalism's principles of Nationalism, Republicanism, Populism, Secularism, Statism and Revolutionism together constitute the Six Arrows of the Turkish Revolution. These *Six Arrows* are interconnected and summarise the programme of the democratic revolutions of the 20th century in the countries of the Oppressed World.<sup>(175)</sup>

<sup>175</sup> On the Six Arrows, see Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-3/ Six Arrows*, Kaynak Publications, 1. edition, İstanbul, June 1999.



The difference between the Kemalist Revolution and the democratic revolutions in the developed capitalist countries of the 19th century lies in statism and populism. This is because the revolutionary leaders of Turkey had experienced revolutionary practices that the French revolutionaries could not see, and they had carried out their actions after the October Revolution of 1917. In a way, the other five arrows also influenced the definition of nationalism. In connection with this, and more importantly, the anti-imperialist practice of the Kemalist Revolution also drew the predominant direction of nationalism: This is not a reactionary nationalism in co-operation with imperialism, but a revolutionary nationalism.

### **The Common Content of the Turkish Name in the Two Waves of Revolution**

Turkish history includes two great waves of revolution.

The first wave of revolution was the transition from tribal society to state and civilisation. During this revolutionary process, which took place in waves from 1000 BC to 1000 AD, the name Turk emerged with a content emphasising political affiliation.

The second great revolution is the national democratic revolution that began in the mid-19th century and is still ongoing. The most important breakthrough of this process, which signifies the transition from feudal society to a national and democratic society, is the Kemalist Revolution. In the Kemalist Revolution, the name Turkish was transformed from the name of a tribe to the name of a nation, and once again gained a content emphasising political affiliation.

The Turkish name came to the agenda of history through revolutions.

In its first appearance on the stage of history, the Turkish name coincides with the process of civilisation, statehood, institutionalisation and the creation of law.

The second appearance of the Turkish name on the stage of history has been imposed by the national democratic revolution.

When we look at the Turkish name as a whole, it has gained a content related to the state, politics and law in history.

## **5. MYTHS AND FACTS**

### **The Myth of Race and the Reality of Political Bonding**

As can be seen, whether during the Gokturk period or during the Republican Revolution, the name Turk did not refer to people bound to each other by blood, but to people bound to a certain state.

In the Gokturks, Turks were the dependents of Bilge Kagan.

Turks, in the Republican period, are those who are bound to the state by the bond of citizenship. The bond that constitutes the Turk is the political bond in both cases.

For this reason, the concept of Turk historically denotes not a race, but a subject or a nation with a common political bond.

This historical fact coincides with the fact that the people called Turks constitute a racial blend. A pure Turkic race did not exist even at the beginning of the known history of Central Asia. Due to confederations bringing together various tribes, relations between different tribes, migrations, wars, etc., the tribes living in Central Asia formed a mixture of various races. It can even be said that Central Asia is one of the geographies in the world where racial mixing is the most intense. And as serious historians have determined

The Turks distinguished themselves and civilised themselves by their ability to organise these racial mixtures.

Take the Huns for example. The examination of human skeletons found in Hun graves today reveals that most of the Hun aristocrats, who were the rulers of the confederation called Huns, were of Mongolian descent. However, the ancestors of the tribes that would later appear on the stage of history under the name of Turk were also part of the Hun confederation, and the two tribes were constantly mixing with each other.

Turkish-speaking tribes constantly mixed and exchanged culture not only with Mongols, but also with blond, blue-eyed tribes of Aryan race, Iranian tribes of Aryan race, Slavs, Samoyeds and Tungus from Ural-Altai tribes and various other tribes. For example, the Kyrgyz, one of the Turkic tribes, mixed with more blond and blue-eyed tribes from the Aryan race. It is known that they started to speak the Turkish language later. For example, Uzbeks emerged when some of the Mongols who migrated to the west mixed with Western Turks and adopted the Turkish language.

In addition to the peoples assimilated into Turkishness, there are also former Turkic tribes that dissolved into other tribes. For example, the Bulgarians fused with the local Slavs and even lost their language and started to speak the Slavic language known as Bulgarian. It is seen that the Khazars, who adopted the Jewish religion, also melted in time. There are even claims that today's Eastern European Jews are largely of Khazar origin<sup>(176)</sup>

176 The most important evidence on which Arthur Koestler bases this thesis: From Western Europe to Eastern Europe

No traces of a Jewish migration can be found in history. On the other hand, it can be determined that the Khazars spread to Russia and Eastern Europe. See *Thirteenth Tribe*, Ada Publications, Istanbul 1977.

Let us not prolong, while the Turkish-speaking peoples were still in Central Asia, other

There is a consensus among historians that they mixed with various peoples speaking different languages. In the Turks, after a certain level of social development, the clan is no longer based on blood ties, but on political ties that find expression in the dominance of the brain. In the process of classisation that dissolved kinship relations,

People from various tribes come together in the same clan. From this moment on, the clan exists on the basis of loyalty to a chief. Thus, the clan based on blood ties becomes a shell. The content is determined by the bond of subordination to the beys. Due to this development, new unrelated tribes were added to the clan alliances or related tribes left the alliance and joined other communities. Like all historians of Central Asia, Gumiliev determines that the Turks consisted of tribes belonging to various tribes.<sup>(177)</sup> According to Gumiliev, the Turks, thanks to their ability to unite different tribes into a confederation, as well as their order of warfare, were able to lead other Central Asian tribes and established the most advanced socio-political system of the 6th century. century's most advanced socio-political system.<sup>(178)</sup> Gumiliev also called the geography inhabited by the Turks "the region of ethnic fusion" and gave this title to the fourth chapter of his work *A Thousand Years Around the Caspian*.<sup>(179)</sup>

<sup>177</sup> Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.105. Likewise Dennis Sinor, *History of Early Inner Asia*, p.388 et seq.

<sup>178</sup> Gumiliev, *same work*, p.87.

<sup>179</sup> Gumiliev, *A Thousand Years Around the Caspian*, pp. 132-189.

All these are facts about the ability of the Turks to establish social systems that transcend kinship ties and thus go beyond racial unions. Based on these historical facts, Gumiliev concluded that racism was "alien to the culture of the ancient Turks". True and very important.<sup>(180)</sup>

<sup>180</sup> Gumiliev, *Ancient Turks*, p.209.

Nevertheless, efforts to cling to blood ties have always played a reactionary role since the development of Turkish history in Central Asia. The history of the civilisation of Central Asia is the history of getting rid of blood ties and turning towards organisations based on political ties on the basis of the development of private property and enrichment.

The tribal blending of the Turks, which started in Asia, naturally continued in Anatolia. The Turkish aristocracy, which had established a feudal society on the basis of political ties while still in Asia, especially after coming to Anatolia

It was not possible to return to a society based on blood ties, or even to slow down the dissolution of these ties. You cannot organise a feudal society, in other words a society that has made the leap to civilisation, within tribes based on blood ties. This is why we see that the Seljuks and Ottomans, even in Central Asia, dismantled the tribal organisation, which was not based on blood ties, and further developed their political organisation, which incorporated the peoples living in Anatolia and other geographies they conquered into their own system. The Turkish aristocracy, which established a state by leaving behind the tribal organisation based on blood ties, could and did civilise different tribes by incorporating them into their feudal system. Therefore, for the Turks, as for all tribes, the process of civilisation, or in other words the progression from tribal society to feudal society, was also a process of mixing with various tribes.

### **The Blending of Tribes in Anatolia**

In this respect, it is important to discuss the tribal origins of the people living in Turkey today. Leaving aside the previous ones, two important Turkish migrations to Anatolia and Thrace in the 11th and 13th centuries are identified.

Mükrimin Halil Yinanç estimates the Turkish migration in the 11th and 12th centuries as 1 million<sup>(181)</sup> According to İbrahim Kafesoğlu, this number is 550-600 thousand<sup>(182)</sup> **E r e m e v** estimates the Turkmen migration in the 11th century as 500-700 thousand.

He estimates that the population increased to 1 million in the 12th century.<sup>(183)</sup> Claude Cahen reduces the Turkish population of the 11th century to 200-300 thousand.<sup>(184)</sup> The Turkmen migration in the 13th century, brought by the Mongol influx, is not included in these numbers. Mehmet Altay Köymen calculates that 3 million 300 thousand Turkmen-Oghuz lived in Anatolia in the mid-13th century. In the 14th century, there were 890 villages named after 24 Oghuz tribes in Anatolia.<sup>(185)</sup>

<sup>181</sup> Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, *Türkiye Tarihi Selçuklular Devri I, Anadolu'nun Fethi*, İstanbul 1957, p.49.

<sup>182</sup> İbrahim Kafesoğlu, *Turks and Civilisation*, İstanbul 1957, p.69.

In a newspaper article, he states that the Turkish migration to Anatolia was estimated at 550 thousand until 1085 and 2 million with later migrations. See "Anadolu'daki Anıt ve 16 Türk Devleti Meselesi", *Tercüman*, 11 June 1984.

<sup>183</sup> D.E. Eremev, *Ztnogenesis*, p.91 as cited in Werner, *The Birth of a Great State*, I, p.47.

<sup>184</sup> Claude Cahen, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, New York 1968, p.10. We could not find the same number in the Turkish translation of this book. See *Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans*, E publications, İstanbul 1984.

For Cahen's important study on the Turkish influx into Anatolia in the 11th century, see *Türklerin Anadolu'ya İlk Girişi*, trans. Yaşar Yücel-Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara

1988, especially p.53 et seq.

<sup>185</sup> For the account of Mehmet Altay Köymen's lecture on "The Turkification of Anatolia" given at Ankara DTCF on 31 January 1986, see A. Seryüce, "The Turkishness of Anatolia", *Forum*, 1 June 1986, p.37 et seq.

Estimates for the population of Anatolia before the Turkish migration vary widely. According to William of Rubruk, the proportion of the non-Muslim population was ten times that of the Muslim population.<sup>(186)</sup> Vyronis states that the estimates he came across vary between 9-13 million. Cahen, although he does not give a number, says that the population of Anatolia before the Turks was small, but the indigenous people were still more than the newly arrived Turks.<sup>(187)</sup> İbrahim Kafesoğlu, on the other hand,

Turkmen migration of the Anatolian population, which had been thinned by Arab raids

1.5 million before the wave-<sup>(188)</sup>

<sup>186</sup> Cited in: Cahen, *Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans*, p.203.

<sup>187</sup> Same work, p.149.

<sup>188</sup> İbrahim Kafesoğlu, "Anadolu'daki Anıt ve 16 Türk Devleti Meselesi", *Tercüman*, 11 June 1984.

As it is known, the people of Anatolia were called *Greeks* when the Turks arrived. The term "*Rum*", just like "Turk", is not an ethnic designation; it refers to the people who belonged to the Roman Empire. These people, who were bound to Rome through feudal relations, were composed of a mixture of various tribes.

Burçay Anger summarises the pre-Turkish population of Anatolia as follows: *The indigenous inhabitants*, who had been few and far between since 5,000 BC, the *seafaring tribes* migrating from the eastern Mediterranean coast *mixed with the Persians*, the *Mycenaeans and Cretans*, who generally used the Hellenic alphabet but were clearly ethnically non-Greek; the *Gauls* of Celtic origin, who had lost their identity from the first great invasion of Anatolia in 2500 BC; *the Kurds and Laz*; the various Caucasian peoples, such as the *Abaza, Circassians, Georgians* and, more massively, *Armenians; Iranian tribes, a mixture of Turks, Kurds, Arabs and Medes*, who created the Kommaneges, Urartu, Late Hittite, Hurri and Mittani civilisations; the remains of *the Hittites* in the Kızılırmak arc, of the *Phrygians* along the Sakarya, of the *Scythians* in the highlands of Northeastern Anatolia; the remains of *the people who lived in the Old Bronze Age*, which left considerable traces in the 3rd millennium BC towards the centre from the interior of the Central Black Sea mountains, and of the people who lived in the Iron Age in the 1st millennium BC in the interior of the Eastern Taurus Mountains; the remains of the people who lived in the Iron Age in the 1st millennium BC in the interior of the Eastern Taurus Mountains; the remnants of *the people, first devout Jews and then early Christians*. thousand BC; *the remains of the people who lived in the Iron Age in the interior* of the Eastern Taurus Mountains; the remains of the first ascetic Jews and then the first Christians

the *Assyrians* from Syria, a group of anonymous tribesmen bearing tribal traces of the Welsh and European Crusaders; the *Druze*, descendants of the Phoenicians who occupied the southern part of the eastern end of the Taurus Mountains; the *Cretans* who infiltrated from south-western Anatolia and the fragmentary Aegean islands; *Cypriot pirates* clinging to the shores of the Mediterranean; marauding *Russians* from the Northern Black Sea region and *Gagauzians of Turkish origin*, who were well established in Thrace; *Balkanised people with Slavic roots mixed with Tatars*; and others.<sup>(189)</sup>

<sup>189</sup> Burçay Anger, "What Anatolia left us", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 7, January 1995, p.14.

Moreover, there were also remnants of the pre-Malazgirt Turkish and Mongolian migrations among the local population called *Greeks*. It is known that the Byzantines had settled the Pechenegs in 1048, the Avars in 577 and 620, and some Bulgarian Turks in 530 and 755 in Anatolia.<sup>(190)</sup>

<sup>190</sup> Prof. Dr. Meliha Aytok Kaşgarlı, *Siyah Beyaz* newspaper, 19 August 1995; see also Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türklerin Tarihi*, I, p.142.

There are also controversial theses regarding older dates. Many historians, from the famous anthropologist Pittard to Mükrimin Halil Yinanç, argue that the Sumerians and Hittites were also of Asian and Pre-Turkic origin. The fact that the Sumerians spoke an articulate language similar to Turkish and other information proves that they were of Asian origin.<sup>(191)</sup> The founder of anthropology Lewis Henry Morgan's Turanian kinship among the ancient Greek tribes

The determination of its form also comes to mind here.<sup>(192)</sup>

<sup>191</sup> For Pittard's famous paper, see "Neolithic Devirde Küçük Asya ve Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler", *İkinci Türk Tarih Kongresi*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, İstanbul 1943, p.70 vd.



[192](#) Lewis Henri Morgan, *Ancient Society*, II, trans. Ünsal Oskay, Payel Publishing House, Istanbul, June 1987, pp.6, 108 vd., 280 vd., 287, 295 vd.

Whatever their proportions, it is a fact that the indigenous peoples of Anatolia and the Turks who arrived in the 11th and 13th centuries have been living on the same land for 900 years. Moreover, there were others who came to Anatolia after the Turkmens. In the 13th century, the Mongol invasion included, besides the Oghuzs, the Turkish-speaking Kipchak, Pecheneg and Khwarezmian tribes, as well as the Mongol masses. The 15th century Timurid invasion also left some remnants in Anatolia. In the 19th century, it is estimated that the number of Muslims of different nationalities called Circassians, who came with the great Caucasian migration, was not less than 1.5 million. After the defeat in the Balkans, hundreds of thousands of Muslim Pomaks and Bosniaks made Anatolia their home along with the Turks. These migrations continued during the Republican period. During the population exchange, a significant Turkish and Muslim population came from Western Thrace. After 1950, Turks from Bulgaria, Greece and Yugoslavia, as well as Muslims from other tribes living in the Balkans, settled in Turkey as immigrants. Especially in our western provinces, neighbourhoods inhabited by immigrants were formed.

## Discussion on Turkification and Islamisation in Anatolia

To what extent did all these tribes mix in Anatolia? Nationalist historians are of the opinion that the Turks did not mix much with the ancient people of Anatolia called Greeks due to religious differences; they say that there are no historical records of Christians becoming Muslims in large groups. According to them, the exchange after the War of Independence shows that the Turks maintained their purity until the 20th century. Gobineau, on the other hand, claims that some 500 thousand Christian family heads converted to Islam within 400 years.<sup>(193)</sup> It is known that families belonging to the Greek aristocracy such as Mihaloğulları and Evranosoğulları became Ottoman beys. Again Doğan Avcıoğlu states that there was a rapid Islamisation in Anatolia. The Christian upper classes in the cities were Islamised through Ahîlik and Mevlevîism.<sup>(194)</sup> The Janissary Corps, the central army of the Ottoman state, and the Enderun, which trained the pen and scholars, did not admit people of Turkish origin. It is obvious that a population of Balkan origin was Turkified and Islamised through these institutions.

<sup>193</sup> Gobineau, *Essai sur l'Inegalite des Races Humaines*, Paris 1853-1855, p.221 as cited in Taner Timur, "Batı İdeolojisi Irkçılık ve Ulusal Kimlik Sorunumuz", *Yapıt*, issue 5, June-July 1984, p.15.

<sup>194</sup> Doğan Avcıoğlu, *Türklerin Tarihi*, I, p.43.

In historical documents, there is no record that the Turks who came to Anatolia exterminated the local Greek population masses. Western historians also

As they acknowledge, the local population, tired of the heavy pressure of Byzantium, welcomed the Turks as "saviours". Although Kafesoğlu claims that after 1071, a part of the Greek population was transferred to the Balkans by the Byzantine Emperor Mihael<sup>(195)</sup>, but the histories record that there was no significant Greek migration to the West. Moreover, since the so-called Greek population did not do military service, they did not break down in wars. On the other hand, the Turkmen population coming from Central Asia suffered great massacres. The Seljuk Sultan Sancar slaughtered about a hundred thousand Turks. The Turkmen who perished under the sword of Yavuz Sultan Selim

The number of Alevis is around 60 thousand.

<sup>195</sup> Ibrahim Kafesoglu, "Anatolia'daki Anıt ve 16 Türk Devleti Meselesi", *Tercüman*, 11 June 1984

Rum was not the name of a tribe or ethnic group, but of a geography and the people living on that geography. For this reason, Muslim writers refer to the state established by the Seljuks in Anatolia as "Rumî". Mevlana Celâleddin's name is "Rumî", meaning "Rumi". Ottoman sultans do not describe themselves as "Turkish sultans", but as "Sultan-i İklim-i Rum". They were the rulers of the Greek geography. However, after the settlement and dominance of the Turks, writers looking at Anatolia from the West began to refer to this country as "Turchia" (Turkey)

they start<sup>(196)</sup>

<sup>196</sup> For the same idea, see Cahen, *Turks in Anatolia*, p. 150.

Turks made Anatolia *Turkey*. It is an important mistake to explain this great event, which spans centuries, as a racial change in a certain geography. Turkish migration to Anatolia is undoubtedly very important. There have been great changes in the tribal character of the population. Equally important, however, is the influence of Seljuk and Ottoman rule. Turkish dynasties

The feudal states ruled by the feudal states are the main reason for the Turkification of Anatolia.

The claim that 900 years of coexistence did not result in the mixing of peoples is not based on evidence, nor is it logical. This mixing is much more valid for Muslim peoples such as Kurds, Circassians, Georgians, Arabs, Laz, Bosnians and Pomaks. Anatolia has been called the "Gate of Tribes" or "Bridge of Tribes" throughout history. Since the earliest known inhabitants, it is obvious that Anatolia has been a mixture of various tribes. As a matter of fact, Atatürk states that Turks have "lived and mixed with other tribes for thousands of years"<sup>(1) (9)</sup> <sup>(7)</sup>*The Outlines of Turkish History*, which sets out Kemalism's official view of history, states that Turks have mixed with various tribes.

accepts:

<sup>197</sup> See Afetinan, *Medenî Bilgiler ve M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 2nd edition, Ankara 1988, p.351 and p.18.

"In prehistoric and historical times, this race also mixed with neighbouring races in the regions it occupied and on the borders of its homelands. In most of these mixtures, the cultural characteristics of the Turkic race, which are the result of its clear and vital mind, remained dominant, and these mixtures did not cause the Turkic race to lose its own characteristics. However, those who have been subjected to mixtures in long periods and in large majorities have been assimilated and could not preserve their names and languages."<sup>(198)</sup>

<sup>198</sup> *Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, p.50.

This is not an ordinary mixture. The Turks, who became the dominant element after 1071, left their mark on the new composition. It is a historical fact that the Turks created a new homeland for themselves by partially assimilating the local population. In fact

Almost all the peoples of the world are made up of a repeated mixing of immigrants and natives. This phenomenon is even more true for the people of Turkey. The Turkish nation living in Anatolia and Thrace today is the result of the assimilation of such a variety of tribes that it is unrealistic to speak of a "pure Turkish race".

Since Anatolia is the Gateway of Tribes, it is natural that it has been subjected to migrations of tribes originating from Asia in every period of history. Prof. Dr. Vecihe Hatiboğlu, based on various historical documents and evidences, has announced remarkable theses that the Gaslar, who lived in Northern Anatolia in the 13th century BC and made Kastamonu their centre, were also of Turkish origin.<sup>(199)</sup> The researcher Halûk Tarcan, who shares the same opinion, argues on the basis of Western sources that the Gutis, who came to Anatolia between 3000 and 2000 BC before the Gaslar, were also Oghuz.<sup>(200)</sup> However, those who put forward this view based on the word Oguz/Guz take into account that the word Oguz was not originally a tribal name, but a word meaning tribes.

They do not.

<sup>199</sup> Vecihe Hatiboğlu, "The Beginning of Turkish History", Journal of *Turkology*, 1979, Volume VIII, No. 1. See also "The Gas'lar in the North of Anatolia", *Cumhuriyet*, 10 March 1984.

<sup>200</sup> Halûk Tarcan, "The First Oghuz Migration in History", *Cumhuriyet*, 21 February 1984.

His work titled *Ön-Türk Tarihi (Pre-Turkic History)*, written on the basis of Kâzım Mirşan, whom he claims to have deciphered Etruscan writings, argues that the Etruscans were also among the "Pre-Turks". See *Ön-Türk Tarihi*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, February 1998.

It is best to take a scientific stance and avoid any attempt to prove that the peoples of ancient Anatolia were necessarily of Asian origin or of Turkic or Pre-Turkic origin. Undoubtedly, Anatolia has been inhabited

Asians poured in. However, instead of trying to fit everyone into the Pre-Turkic concept, it is necessary to determine this fact as it is.

When we define the people of Turkey, who founded the Republic of Turkey, as the Turkish nation, there will be no need for these compulsions. On the other hand, the historical theses of Eurocentric historians based on the enmity of Asia and Africa need to be shaken off. This is the racism that is dangerous for us.

### **A Blend of Tribes Creating Great Cultures**

As Hugo Winckler, the famous German archaeologist Hugo Winckler, who also directed the excavations at Boğazköy, has pointed out, nations that have created culture have never been pure in terms of race; on the contrary, culture has always been the product of the mixing of various races to one degree or another in all ages.<sup>(201)</sup> (Undoubtedly, we understand "creating culture" here as a deep-rooted and rich culture. Because there is no society without culture). Therefore, Turkish racism automatically includes the claim that Turks are not a nation that creates rich and effective cultures. We know that this thesis is Western-centred. Europe has imposed its racism on the Turks, who are actually foreign to racism due to the realities of Asia. However, this is not the historical facts.

<sup>201</sup> Cited in A. Ahmet Uhri, "Anatomy of a Book Name: Kara Atena", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 99, December 1999, p.83.

## Historical-Cultural Heritage that Makes a Nation a Nation

Kemalism's solution to this blend of tribes in Anatolia is very striking. As can be understood from the definition of nation, Atatürk did not only see the source of our nation in Central Asia, but also based it on the Anatolian civilisational heritage. So much so that, even by naming the established banks Etibank, Sümerbank, etc., he extended the sources of nourishment of the national history to its roots in ancient Anatolia and Mesopotamia. This is true and in accordance with reality. Because the Turkish nation living in Asia Minor today is a mixture of migration waves from Central Asia and the peoples of our region. Apart from Central Asia and Anatolia, the tribes that make up our nation originate from Mesopotamia, the Balkans and the Caucasus. It is even appropriate to say the following: Considering the thousands of years of common history dating back to the Hittites, Urartians, Sumerians, etc., Kurds living in Anatolia today are closer to Anatolian Turks than Central Asian Turks both in terms of culture and kinship. This closeness also manifests itself in facial and body features.

In order to connect the Turkish nation to the cultural heritage of the lands it inhabited, Mustafa Kemal, starting with his speeches as early as 1923, stated that the people of Anatolia were "essentially Turkish and Turanian since ancient centuries"<sup>(202)</sup> This view was later turned into a historical thesis. The ideologues of Kemalism interpreted the date 1071 as "the date when the Turks who converted to Islam

"to be reunited"<sup>(203)</sup>

<sup>202</sup> For this speech dated 16 March 1923, see *Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, II, p.126.

<sup>203</sup> Afetinan, "Osmanlı Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış ve Türk İnkilâbı", *Ülkü*, issue 55, 1937.

The Kemalist historians' search for evidence to support these theses should be understood as an attempt to unite with the historical heritage of the land in which they lived, even if it led to many scientific debates.

The Kemalist Revolution's solution is, of course, unrealistic when the definition of a Turk is based on a racist basis. But when you recognise the people of the Republic of Turkey as Turks, regardless of their ethnic origin, because of their political affiliation, it becomes possible to understand Atatürk's solution.

Since the Turks living in Anatolia today are a mixture of the peoples who have lived in Anatolia since the Hittites and those who came from Central Asia, it is not contrary to historical facts that the ancient peoples of Anatolia should also be considered among our ancestors. The Hittites were not racially "Oghuz", but it would not be wrong to say that we are a bit Hittite. This is so even if we assume that we have no blood ties with the Hittites and other Anatolian tribes. Because we are the heirs of Anatolian culture, agriculture, crafts, architecture, food culture, cuisine, aqueducts, temples, baths, hot springs, entertainment and art, and everything made with human labour. The cultural heritage that forms the mortar of our nation was formed in this history. And it is culture, not race, that creates human society. A society without culture and therefore without cultural heritage is unthinkable. A society that rejects the cultural heritage of its own geography because of racist understandings is also unthinkable. Racism, in this respect, is the renunciation of being a society.



## Revolutionary Nationalism and Orientalists Directed Racism

Turning its front against imperialism and the sultans, Turkism was the ideology of the democratic revolutionaries of our country in the 19th century. Yusuf Akçura's

His book *The History of Turkism* describes this revolutionary movement.<sup>(204)</sup>

<sup>204</sup> Yusuf Akçura, *History of Turkism*, Kaynak Publications.

The 19th century's first Turkist intellectuals fought in a revolutionary, independenceist, progressive, populist, secularist and libertarian line. Akhundzade, who strongly influenced the Turkist movement, produced radical solutions against imperialism and reaction. Hüseyinzade Ali Bey, Yusuf Akçura, Gaspıralı İsmail Bey, Ağaoğlu Ahmet Bey and others, who were among the most famous of the first Turkists, defended leftist and some even socialist views, and were friendly with the Bolshevik movement. They were influenced by the socialist movement of the period. They participated in the meetings of the International<sup>(2) (0) (5)</sup> Parvus Efendi, one of the famous socialists who fled Russia after the 1905 Revolution, was one of the leading theoreticians of the Turkists' journal *Türk Yurdu* and wrote especially on economics.

<sup>205</sup> On the revolutionary character of the Turkist movement, see Arif Acaloğlu, "Sağcı Değil Solcuydular", *Aydınlık*, issue 768, 7 April 2002; Ali Bey Hüseyinzade's article titled "Sola, Sola, Sol Tarafa" in the same issue and his speech at the Second International published in *Aydınlık*, issue 769, 14 April 2002.

In the second half of the 19th century, the Ottoman court saw the nationalist movement as the greatest danger to itself. Nationalism, which was the ideology of democratic revolutionism at that time, partly with Ottomanist images 1876

He led the Constitutional Monarchy and the 1908 Revolution of Freedom. Of course, this struggle developed in the face of heavy pressure from the Caliph Sultan. In June 1876, in the committee convened to discuss the Constitution, the Emini of Fetva said: "I gathered some ignorant Turks of Anatolia and Rumelia Are you going to ask them for advice and caution?"<sup>206</sup>

<sup>206</sup> Niyazi Berkes, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, Doğu-Batı Yayınları, İstanbul 1978, p.305. See also Mehmet Bedri Gültekin, *Laikliğin Neresindeyiz*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, February 1995, chapter titled "Ümmet İdeolojisi, Milliyetçilik ve Mustafa Kemal", p.97 et seq.

The repression of Turkish nationalism began during the years of Abdülhamit's reign,

It continued with aggravation before the Constitutional Monarchy II. The works of Süleyman Pasha, one of the thinkers of the Turkist movement, such as *Tarih-i Alem*, Necip Asım's *Turkish History and Evliyâ Çelebi Seyahatnamesi* were among the banned books of Abdülhamit II. Even books written in plain Turkish were banned during this period. Veled Çelebi Efendi makes the following observation: "A sultan's order was issued saying: "'Language books are forbidden'." <sup>207</sup>

<sup>207</sup> Yusuf Akçura, *Türküluğun Tarihi*, Kaynak Yayınları, p.48 et seq. and especially p.92 et seq.

Ahmet Mithat Efendi emphasises that "one of the elements of the idea of nationality is populism (democracy)" and determines that nationalism and populism are born and developed together.<sup>(208)</sup>

<sup>208</sup> Same work, p.54.

Yusuf Akçura summarises this historical character of nationalism in the personality of the poet Mehmet Emin Bey (Yurdakul) as follows: "Nationalism is populist. Everywhere the great majority of the nation is made up of the popular strata. The idea of nationality has its roots among the popular strata; and it develops and matures inspired by them. Mehmet Emin Bey fully grasped this fact by instinct or consciousness: Turkish poems are populist poems." <sup>(209)</sup> Emin Bey, Ottoman social

Emin Bey is filled with a deep and persistent hatred and enmity against the Sultan, who constituted the pinnacle of the foundation of the Ottoman Empire, against the creatures that surrounded him, against the palace and government men who filled Istanbul, against the pseudo-intellectuals who frowned upon them and enjoyed themselves, and generally against those who were the source or instruments of oppression and domination... Emin Bey is not only a democrat; his poems depicting the cruelties inflicted on the peasants by the mukhtar, the local beys, and the masters of Istanbul

with the spirit of a revolutionary. "[210](#)

[209](#) *Same work*, p.54.

[210](#) *Same work*, p.119.

With these lines, Akçura explained the ties between nationalism, populism and revolutionism at that time. As a matter of fact, Mehmet Emin Bey was one of those who travelled to Ankara during the War of Independence and was also the poet of the Republican Revolution.

Like every revolutionary movement, nationalism also faced the intervention of dominant powers. Imperialism has also produced its own "nationalism". With the interest of British imperialism in Central Asia, Turkish racism became an area of interest for imperialism in the second half of the 19th century. During the years of the First World War, Turanism merged with the Asian policy of German imperialism. For the sake of the German seizure of Baku oil, 80 thousand Anatolian labourers were slaughtered in the Sarıkamış Operation alone. Enver Pasha's dreams of "Turan" and the "Red Apple", though sincere, served as a veil over German interests.

It can be seen that revolutionary nationalism, which is the ideology of the democratic revolution, and racist nationalism, which serves the counterrevolution of imperialism, began to diverge as early as the 19th century.

## **Differentiation of Revolutionary Nationalism and Racist Nationalism**

Kemalist nationalism, unlike the nationalist movement of the Ottoman period, clearly distinguished itself from Pan-Islamism and Panturanism and condemned these movements. Unlike Turanists and racists, the nationalism of Kemalism is Turkishist. So much so that the Kemalists tried to link the Turkish nation in Turkey ethnically to the pre-1071 peoples of Anatolia. The thesis that the ancient peoples of Anatolia came from Asia is the work of an effort to create a nationalism rooted in the geography of Turkey.

The attitude that bases Turkish nationalism on being from Turkey is particularly evident during the War of Independence. In the Amasya Minutes, which can be considered one of the first constitutional documents of the Republic of Turkey, Turkey is defined as "the land inhabited by Turks and Kurds". Erzurum and Sivas Congress Regulations and Declarations, Atatürk's speeches, Turkey

"homeland of brotherly nations".<sup>(211)</sup>

<sup>211</sup> See Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Revolution-4/ Kurdish Policy in the War of Independence*, p.202 et seq.

During the War of Independence, the concept of "Turkiye" was widely used to define the nation. Atatürk said, "We, the Turkians, are an Asiatic nation".<sup>(212)</sup>

<sup>212</sup> adi Borak, *Atatürk'ün Resmi Resmi Yayınlarına Girmemiş Söylev Demeç Yazışma ve Söyleşileri*, 2nd edition, February 1997, p.140.

At the beginning of 1923, after the victory in the War of Independence, Atatürk made speeches explaining the foundations of the Republican project. At the Izmit Press Conference held on 16-17 January 1923, it was stated that within the national borders "Turkish and Kurdish

elements".<sup>(213)</sup> In his Izmir speech of 2 February 1923, he once again emphasised that the people of Turkey were composed of different races.<sup>(214)</sup> One month before the proclamation of the Republic, the secret session of the Grand National Assembly of Turkey discussed what should be understood from the concept of Turk and defended the concept of Turk.<sup>4215</sup> Yusuf Akçura, one of the theorists of revolutionary nationalism, continued this understanding in 1925.<sup>(216)</sup>

<sup>213</sup> See Doğu Perinçek, *Kemalist Devrim-4/ Kurdish Policy in the War of Independence*, p.235 et seq.

<sup>214</sup> Sadi Borak, *Atatürk'ün Söylev Demeç Correspondence and Conversations not included in Official Publications*,

s.211.

<sup>215</sup> *TBMM Secret Session Minutes*, c.IV, p.270, 309.

<sup>216</sup> Yusuf Akçura, "Asri Türk Devleti ve Münevverlere Düşen Vazife", *Saçak*, issue 5, p.18.

The separation of Kemalism's revolutionary nationalism and Turanism also determined the reactionary fate and role of Turanism. Turanism and racism were left with a role opposite to revolutionary nationalism. That is to be a tool of imperialism and the sharia forces of the Middle Ages. Those who take a stand against revolutionary nationalism can only be reactionary nationalists.

As a matter of fact, Turanism, which gained strength from the orientalism that emerged under the guidance of the British in the 19th century, entered the service of the Nazi imperialists in the 1930s. During the Second World War, it was the pro-Nazi, profiteering section of the Turkish bourgeoisie, as well as the Hitler regime, that nurtured this movement. At that time, in an encrypted letter sent by the German Foreign Ministry to its Embassy in Turkey, it was written as follows:

"I have ordered that 5 million gold Reichsmarks be sent to you so that we can support our friends in Turkey in view of their poor financial situation. "<sup>217</sup>

<sup>217</sup> *Secret Documents*, May Publications, p.113.

During the years of the Second World War, the Republican administration continued to keep the line between itself and racism clear. İsmet İnönü's historic speech on 19 May 1944 is meaningful:

"We are Turkish nationalists, but we are enemies of the principle of racism in our country. ...In the village institutes, in all kinds of schools, in our army, we endeavour to impart the ideals of the common homeland to Turkish children with equal feelings of justice and compassion. We are endeavouring to fuse them in the great republican pot and produce Turkish patriots. "[218](#)

[218](#) smet İnönü's speech was the result of the National Security Council's decision of 28 February 1997. It was distributed at briefings organised by the Turkish Armed Forces after the meeting. For the text of the speech, see Nejdet Sançar, *İnönü ile Hesaplaşma*, Ankara 1973, p.37 vd. For a summary of the speech, see.

*Aydınlık*, issue 540, 23 November 1997, p.6.

As can be seen, the Kemalists, in their struggle against racism, also reached the concept of "patriotism" and once again continued to define Turkish nationalism on the solid foundation of a common homeland and republic.

Racist nationalism, on the other hand, continued its adventure in its own bed. During the Second World War, the Bozkurt Regiments, led by Turanists, were commanded by Nazi commanders. Thus, racism also came under the military command of the most reactionary imperialist states. In these Nazi regiments, the swastika, the symbol of the Nazis, was replaced by the Grey Wolf.

After the Second World War, the USA, wearing Hitler's boots  
The imperialists have also taken the strings of fascist and reactionary movements all over the world in their hands. Parallel to this development, our racists have also entered the service of US imperialism.

From the 1960s onwards, Türkeş's Grey Wolves worked as a subsidiary of the Special War organisation established according to US and NATO prescriptions. Starting from the Anti-Communist Associations in the 1960s, the Turkish Revenge

Organisations such as the Brigade (TIT), the Army for the Liberation of Captive Turks (ETKO), the Islamic Movement, the Islamic Fist, Hezbollah (İlim group), the Islamic Great East Raiders Front (İBDA/C) were used to suppress and intimidate popular forces through terror. After 1 May 1977, all the activities of the underground organisations, which took part in the CIA's operation to destabilise Turkey, organised the massacres in Kahramanmaraş, Çorum, Sivas, Erzincan and murdered Turkey's distinguished intellectuals, have now been exposed. The fact that the ringleaders of the Nationalist Movement were trained by the CIA, that they took part in the CIA's 12 September operation, that they were involved in drug trafficking under the supervision of the CIA, are facts that ordinary people now know. [\(219\)](#)

[219](#) On this subject see Doğu Perinçek, *Çiller Special Organisation*, Kaynak Publications, December 1996, p.12.

Under the cover of "nationalism", organisations and gangs have been formed which have turned committing petty crimes such as murder, drug trafficking, extortion, threats, collection of cheques and notes into a professional activity. Racist nationalism eventually turned into a CIA-linked mafia movement under the guidance of the USA. "Ülkücü- mafia" is a term that has now become part of everyday speech and is widely used by the nationalists.

In the course of this process, the contrast between Kemalist nationalism and patriotic nationalism has become even clearer today. Today, the parties and organisations of Türkeş origin are aligned with the Americanist-clericalist front that is coming to terms with the Republican Revolution. This positioning has also placed the nationalist nationalism on a line attacking the Turkish Armed Forces. The determination and practice of the Army to defend the Republican Revolution, as reflected in the National Security Council Decision of 28 February 1997 and the National Military Strategy Concept announced on 29 April 1997, was met with hostility by the forces under the MHP leadership. This hostility was based on a concrete alignment and was not in vain. In addition to the reactionary movement, the Turkish Armed Forces also included "nationalism, which was wanted to be transformed into racism" and the "nationalist mafia" within the scope of threats. This strategic decision of the Army became a state policy with the National Security Policy Document adopted at the National Security Council meeting held on 31 October 1997. [220](#)

[220](#) See *Hürriyet*, 4 November 1997. For detailed information and analysis, see Hikmet Çiçek, "İrkçi Türk Milliyetçiliği Hedef Tahtasında", *Aydınlık*, issue 538, 9 November 1997, p.4 vd; Hikmet Çiçek, *İrticaya Karşı Genelkurmay Belgeleri*, Kaynak Yayınları, November 1997, p.19 vd.

For the first time after the Second World War, the Republic of Turkey included racist nationalism within the scope of strategic enemies. This is because racist nationalism has become a threat for Turkey, the price of which will be paid in blood in international adventures. In order to confront the imposition of the "intervention force in crisis zones" that the USA insisted on Turkey in the 1990s and to prevent international plots, it has long been necessary to neutralise racist nationalism at home. When the US imposition came to the point of establishing a de facto puppet Kurdistan in Northern Iraq, the eyes of those who did not want to see this reality were opened. In order to protect the territorial integrity of Turkey, it has become necessary both to frustrate the plans of the USA and to include racism, which is a tool of the US plots, in the enemy determination.

It was significant that the Turkish Armed Forces, leading the new attitude targeting racist nationalism within the state, started to distribute the above-mentioned speech of İsmet İnönü during the reactionary briefings in the spring of 1997. It seems that the Army had already targeted racist nationalism at that time. However, it was necessary to wait until 31 October 1997 for this policy to be accepted by the National Security Council.

The content of İsmet İnönü's speech on 19 May 1944 is also reminiscent of today's conditions:

"The Turanists have found the perfect talisman to make the Turkish nation irreparably and immediately hostile to all its neighbours. In order not to lose the future of the Turkish nation to the lies and deceit of such unconscious and unscrupulous mischief-makers, we shall of course use all the measures of the republic. The mischief-makers thought that we could not openly discuss their ideas, which deceive young children and gullible citizens, before the nation. They have been deceived and they will be deceived more.

"Racists and Turanists have resorted to secret measures and organisations. Why? By organising secret mischief among their fellow citizens.



will it work? Can countries in the east and west be subdued by secret Turanian organisations? ... These are such things that can only be started after the laws and the basic organisation of the state have been trampled underfoot.

"In the present state of world events, those who claim that Turkey must be racist and Turanian are beneficial to which nation and for whose purposes? It is certain that those who want to carry out these ideas, which will only bring trouble and disaster to the Turkish nation, will not be of any service to the Turkish nation. Only foreigners can benefit from these movements ."<sup>221</sup>

<sup>221</sup> Nejdet Sançar, *İnönü ile Hesaplaşma*, Ankara 1973, p.37 vd.

Today, racist nationalism is once again being used by "foreigners", and by the world's number one imperialist state.

## **The Divisive Role of Turkish Racism**

US-guided Turkish racism is the ideology of the most reactionary, chauvinist, profiteering sections of the Turkish ruling classes, the most dependent on imperialism.

This current has always justified the national oppression of the Kurdish masses. So much so that they have even defended the shameful idea of expelling the Kurds from the lands where they have lived for thousands of years. They have fuelled national enmity between our Turkish and Kurdish compatriots living together in almost every part of Turkey, and have undermined the unity of the people of Turkey against imperialism and reaction. With these characteristics, Turkish racism has been the tool of imperialism's "divide and rule" policy.

National discrimination and oppression are always the ideas and practices of the ruling classes. Those who are in favour of oppressing other nations, oppress their own people.

They also keep them under oppression and exploitation. Therefore, nationalism and racism are alien to the reality of the labourer himself; they are imposed from outside.

The labourers of Turkey, of course, have a history to be proud of. Their Asian historical roots and the geography they live on carry a unique civilisational heritage from the depths of centuries. They have a tradition of not submitting to oppression and exploitation, and they have inspired all the oppressed peoples of the world with the War of Independence and the Republican Revolution they achieved at the beginning of this century.

### **Is the "Turkism of the World" a single nation?**

Today, the Turkish-speaking population in the world is over 150 million. Turkish peoples are spread over a vast geography from Central Asia to the Balkans. Let us mention in passing the absurdity of using the term "Turkic" for these peoples apart from "Turk".

Besides the Turks of Turkey, Azerbaijanis, Turkmen, Kyrgyz, Uzbeks and Kazakhs now have independent states. What is the nature of the connection between the peoples of these so-called *Turkic republics* and the Turks of Turkey, and can the Turks of the world be seen as a single nation?

The Oghuzs who migrated to Anatolia became a nation from the end of the 19th century after mixing with many tribes in Anatolia and being moulded in a different history and culture. Anatolian Turks lived for long centuries unaware of their fellow tribesmen in Central Asia. Even though their languages come from the same root, these peoples have lived different histories in different geographies for centuries; they have created different cultures in terms of form. Between them and the Turkish nation in Turkey, there is neither territorial unity, nor a sense of coexistence, nor

economic unity. These conditions that make up a nation have never been fully realised among the Turkish-speaking peoples in any period of history.

Just as the Swedes, Germans, Austrians, Danes and some of the Swiss, although speaking related languages and descended from Germanic tribes, formed separate nations, today the peoples speaking languages related to Turkish are also separate nations. However, the process of nationhood is not over for Turks as it is for Arabs. In the coming period, the nations gathered under the Turkic title may, as a requirement of their common interests, come closer to each other against imperialism and strengthen their ties by developing a populist and secular culture. This process may lead to the formation of further unions, especially among the Turkic peoples whose geographies are neighbouring.

### **Unity of those who do not want to be shared in a shared geography**

Especially after the collapse of the Soviet Union, interest and relations between these peoples intensified. Beyond the common language and kinship, common interests have created a rapprochement among the Turkic republics. This development is undoubtedly positive and has a special importance not only for the common interests of the Turkic peoples but also for the future of the oppressed world.

Because the "geography of chaos" in which the Turkic republics and peoples live is the most important area of the struggle for sharing in the world today. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, one of the most important foci of the competition between the great imperialist states is Central Asia and the Caucasus. This region contains a large part of the world's oil, natural gas, gold, etc. resources.

Turkey, due to its geographical and historical position, as well as its ties with other Turkish republics, is also in this area where the competition for hegemony is intensifying.

The First World War was fought to divide the Ottoman Empire. Today, one of the main causes of the conflict between the great imperialist states is the division of the Turkic republics. It is a struggle to seize the oil, natural gas, gold and other riches of these peoples. The parties to the conflict are, of course, not only the imperialists, but also the Turkic republics and peoples who have to defend their own homeland and resources. Therefore, the course of history will be influenced by the fact that these countries, which are in the position of being shared, realise that there is a unity of future and interests between them beyond being of Turkic origin.

This historical task can be fulfilled with a common attitude against imperialist hegemonism. Those who do not want to be shared against those who want to share must of course meet on the same front. However, it is not only the Turkish republics that are being shared. Therefore, there is a great potential for an alliance extending from Russia, Iran and Arab neighbours to China and India. Success depends on utilising this potential. The Turkic republics and peoples can frustrate the plans of the great imperialist states by allying with countries under threat like themselves. A favourable ground has emerged for the solidarity of the Turkic republics with all the countries of Eastern Europe and Asia (Eurasia) against the imperialist hegemonists. As a matter of fact, the international organisation established by Russia, the People's Republic of China, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan in April 1996 under the name of the Shanghai Five was founded by Uzbekistan.

After its accession, it was renamed the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in June 2001.<sup>(222)</sup>

<sup>222</sup> For extensive information on the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation, see *Theory* magazine, issue 150, July 2002.

With the 2002 agreements, Russia, China and India formed the so-called Eurasian Triangle.

It is important for the Eurasian countries to preserve their independence, to protect their resources and to cooperate economically on the basis of mutual benefit and equality. Therefore, it is in the interest of the workers and peoples of the world for the Turkic republics and Arab countries to strengthen their ties with each other, provided that they do not target their neighbours and other oppressed countries.

The Turkic republics and peoples will face a new test at this historical stop. If they utilise the ties between them in harmony with the future of the oppressed world and for the purpose of struggle against imperialism, they will pass this test with flying colours. Then the Turkic peoples, beyond liberating themselves and advancing to prosperity, will play a historic role in the coming great civilisational leap of humanity.

Under these conditions, the US imposes on Turkey "to be an intervention force in crisis zones". The "crisis zones" are clear: Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Middle East and the Balkans. Worse still, the US is engaged in international conspiracies and provocations for Turkey to assume this role. The neo-liberal governments, represented by Özal and Çiller, have been instrumental to the US in the Gulf War, they have served the US plans for the establishment of a puppet state in Northern Iraq, they have sent troops and weapons to Chechnya, they have entered into a confrontation with Iran, they have sent sabotage teams etc. to the Sincian-Uyghur region of the People's Republic of China, and they have pitted Turkey against the countries it would ally with. Their aim is to force Turkey into a fateful alliance with the USA. This has had very harmful effects. The fact that Turkey's loss of up to ten billion dollars a year due to the embargo on Iraq has been covered by the smuggling of drugs and nuclear materials is another example of the US influence on our country.

control of the CIA. This is because this activity was inevitably carried out in cooperation with the CIA. The cause of "Turkishness of the world" is not based on the struggle against imperialism, but on the contrary on hostility to neighbouring peoples.

When Turkey enters the Caucasus and Central Asia as a US dagger, it assumes a mission to divide the Eurasian front. This role will also distance Turkey and the other Turkic republics from each other. Because the Turkic republics have very important economic and cultural ties with Russia and China. Being an instrument of US-led coercion aimed at severing these ties has caused reactions in the Turkic republics.

For these reasons, under today's conditions, solidarity among the Turkic republics can only develop by taking a stand against imperialist control and within the framework of a Eurasian alliance.

As a matter of fact, the development is in this direction. Turkey, through the Black Sea Military Cooperation Organisation, especially with the efforts of the Turkish General Staff, and by building military relations with Russia and China, and by developing its relations with the Turkic republics in all fields, has entered into a solidarity with the Eurasian Cooperation Organisation that determines the world of the future.

It can be said that the Turkish-Russian-Chinese axis is being formed, and this is the direction of travel.<sup>(223)</sup> [223](#) On the Eurasian alliance, see Doğu Perinçek, *The Eurasian Option*, Kaynak Publications, expanded 2nd edition, Istanbul, April 2000.

We have now entered the period of the rise of Asia. The new balance of power offers the Turkic republics and peoples the possibility of solidarity against imperialism not only among themselves but also with all the Eurasian powers.

## **The Truth of the Nation**

We are still living in *the age of imperialism, national liberation wars and labour revolutions*. Just as imperialism is a fact of this age, nations and national states are also a fact of this age.

The nation, like all social processes, is historical; it emerges, rises, declines and dies out in a certain period of history. The nation emerged with capitalism and will disappear from the stage of history only with capitalism.

Capitalism first created the nation in Europe, its homeland, and then, during the period of imperialism, imposed nationalisation on the whole world. The financial capital exported to Asia, Africa and Latin America drew those continents into the bed of the capitalist world system. Thus, the phenomenon of nationhood, which was limited to the European geography, became globalised. Peoples, who were previously in feudal relations and even tribal life, fought wars of liberation against imperialism and made the lands they lived in their homeland; they established states and became nations.

## **Processes of Our Age**

The processes of the age of imperialism have been summarised very well by great revolutionaries such as Lenin, Atatürk and Mao.

Lenin had determined that we were living in *the age of imperialism, proletarian revolutions and national liberation wars* and that the centre of revolution had now shifted to the Oppressed World, in other words to the East.

Mustafa Kemal Atatürk, as recently as 1934, saw that the awakening oppressed nations would "destroy and destroy imperialism" as certain as the fact that the sun would rise tomorrow.

In the 1970s, Mao Zedong summarised the main processes of our age as "Nations want liberation, states want independence, peoples want revolution".

### **Imperialism will not eliminate the nation, but the nation will eliminate imperialism**

All three are the same formula, extracted from the material of our age. The age has not changed. For the epoch to change, the imperialist system must disappear. The capitalist-imperialist system cannot abolish the nation. On the contrary, the reality of the nation is *today* the strongest of the dynamics that will abolish the imperialist system.

This is the reason why the world revolution is shifting to the Oppressed World, to the East, as Lenin determined. The struggles for the liberation of nations and the independence of states are the expressions of the class struggle in the international arena.



In the period ahead;

First, the classes of workers, farmers, small capital and national capital of the Oppressed World, in other words, the nation, will resist the threat of colonisation, which is the ultimate goal of imperialism.

Secondly, imperialism cannot eliminate the contradiction between imperialist states. Nor is it possible for the whole imperialist system to unite under the hegemony of a single imperialist state. Therefore, the contradictions between imperialists will continue to increase.

The working classes will mobilise to dominate the future of their country.

## **The Revolutionary Response to Globalisation is Coming**

For all these reasons, the nation, the homeland and the revolution have not yet expired. On the contrary, imperialism's attack on the statelessness of the oppressed world will find its revolutionary answer. This process has begun; it is certain that the first quarter of the 21st century will go down in the history of humanity as a new period of revolutionary rise. The revival in the Oppressed and Progressive World, in contrast to the stagnation and decay in the centres of imperialism, gives the clues of the immediate agenda. The centre of the world economy has shifted to Asia and the Pacific; China is on its way to becoming the world's first economy. While the economies of the USA, Europe and Japan are sinking into recession, Asia is tearing the IMF prescriptions

economies are developing. Eurasia, the main force of the world revolution, is uniting. The stench of decay in the West can be smelt across the oceans.

## **We are Asian**

Turkey is going through the same process. When we say "we are globalising, joining the EU, becoming European", our great reality has suddenly come to the forefront of our consciousness. As Atatürk emphasised, we are an "Asiatic nation", the pioneer of the oppressed world. Turkey and the Turkish nation, In the 21st century, pioneering roles await.

## **SOURCE**

[ACALOĞLU, Arif, "Sağcı Değil Solcuydular", \*Aydınlık\*, issue 768, 7 April 2002.](#)

AFETİNAN, *İzmir Economic Congress*, TTK Publications, Ankara, 1982.

AFETİNAN, *Civilised Information and M. Kemal Atatürk'ün El Yazıları*, Turkish Historical Society Publications, 2nd edition, Ankara, 1988.

- AFETİNAN, "Osmanlı Tarihine Umumi Bir Bakış ve Türk İnkilâbı", *Ülkü*, 1937, issue 55.
- AGACANOV, Sergey Grigorevich, *Oguzlar*, translated from Russian. Akbar N. Najef- Ahmet Annaberdiyev, Selenge Publications, Istanbul 2002.
- For the full text of the conference published in AĞAOĞLU Ahmet, "Tarihi Devirler Arasında Milliyet", *Türk Yurdu*, March 1926, pp. 534-537, see *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı I*.
- AĞAOĞLU Ahmet, "Türk Âlemi", *Türk Yurdu*, issue 5, 25 January 1912 (*Türk Yurdu* corpus published in New Turkish by Tutibay Publications, c.I).
- AKÇURA, Yusuf, "Asri Türk Devlet ve Münevverlere Düşen Vazife", *Saçak*, issue 5, June 1984.
- AKÇURA, Yusuf, *Türkülüğün Tarihi*, translated into Turkish and prepared for publication by Sadık Perinçek, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, November 1998.
- AKDAĞ, Mustafa, *Türkiye'nin İktisadî ve İçtimaî Tarihi*, I, II, Cem Publishing House, İstanbul, April 1995.
- ALİ-ŞİR NEVAYÎ, *Ferhad ü Şirin*, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1994.
- ALTHEIM, Franz, *Asia's Teachings to Europe*, trans. Emin Türk Eliçin, May Publications, İstanbul, 1967.
- AMIN, Samir, *Eurocentrism*, trans. Mehmet Sert, Ayrıntı Publications, İstanbul, July 1993.
- ANGER, Burçay, "Anatolia left us", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 7, January 1995.
- Atatürk's Complete Works*, c.6.
- Atatürk'ün Söylev ve Demeçleri*, c.I, Türk İnkilâp Tarihi Enstitüsü Yayınları, 2nd edition, Ankara, 1961.
- AVCIOĞLU, Doğan, *Türklerin Tarihi*, c.I-V, Tekin Yayınevi, İstanbul, 1978.

- AYDIN, *Erdoğan, How did we become Muslim?*, Başak Publications, 1. edition, Istanbul, March 1994.
- AYDIN, Mehmet, *Bayat Boyu and History of Oghuzs*, Hatipoğlu Publishing House, Ankara, 1984.
- AZİZ, Seyfeddin, *Transition of Turks to Islam/ Satuk Buğra Khan*, trans. Prof. Dr. Rukiye Hacı, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, February 2000.
- BANG, W.- RAHMETİ, G.R, *Oghuz Khan Epic*, prepared by W. Bang-R. Rahmeti Arat, 1000 Basic Works, Ministry of National Education Publication, Istanbul 1970.
- BARTHOLD, V. V., *Turkestan Until the Mongol Invasion*, prepared by Hakkı Dursun Yıldız, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1990.
- BARTHOLD, V. V., *Lectures on Central Asian Turkish History*, ed: Dr. Kâzım Yaşar Koprıman, Dr. Afşar İsmail Aka, Ministry of Culture Cultural Publications, Ankara, 1975.
- BARTHOLD, V.V., *Zwölf Vorlesungen über die Geschichte der Türken Mittelasiens*, Hildesheim 1962.
- BERKES, Niyazi, *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma*, Doğu-Batı Yayınları, İstanbul 1978.
- BERKTAY, Halil, *Kabilelerden Feodalizme*, Kaynak Yayınları, 1st edition, Istanbul, June 1983.
- BERNAL, Martin, *Kara Atena*, trans. Özcan Buze, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, June 1998.
- BORAK, Sadi, *Atatürk'ün Resmi Resmi Yayınlarına Girmemiş Söylev Demeç Yazışma ve Söyleşileri*, Kaynak Yayınları, 2nd edition, February 1997.
- BOZKURT, Fuat, *Türklerin Dili*, Cem Yayınları, İstanbul, undated.
- BULUT, Arslan, *Türkçü-Devrimci Diyaloğu/ Doğu Perinçek ve Attilâ İlhan'la Interviewlar*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, September 1998.
- CAHEN, Claude, *Turks in Anatolia before the Ottomans*, E Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, December 1984.
- CAHEN, Claude, *Pre-Ottoman Turkey*, New York, 1968.

- CAHEN, Claude, *The First Entry of Turks into Anatolia (Second Half of the XIth Century)*, trans. Yaşar Yücel-Bahaeddin Yediyıldız, TTK Publication, Ankara, 1988.
- CLAESSEN, Henri J.M.-SKALNIK, Peter, *Erken Devlet*, İmge Kitabevi, İstanbul, 1993.
- ÇİĞ, Muazzez İlmiye, *The Origin of the Qur'an, Bible and Torah in Sumer*, Kaynak Publications, İstanbul, November 1995.
- ÇİÇEK, Hikmet, "İrkçi Türk Milliyetçiliği Hedef Tahtasında", *Aydınlık*, issue 538, 9 November 1997.
- ÇİÇEK, Hikmet, *İrticaya Karşı Genelkurmay Belgeleri*, Kaynak Yayınları, November 1997.
- DİLÂÇAR, A., *Kutadgu Bilig İncelemesi*, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1995.
- DİVİTÇİOĞLU, Sencer, *Köktürkler*, Ada Publications, İstanbul, 1987.
- DIYARBAKIRLI, Nejat, *Hun Art*, Prime Ministry Undersecretariat of Culture Publication.
- EBERHARD, Wolfram, *History of China*, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1947.
- EBERHARD, Wolfram, *China'in Şimal Neighbours*, trans. Nimet Uluğtuğ, Turkish Historical Society Publications, 2nd edition, Ankara, 1996.
- EBULGAZİ BAHADIR HAN, *Genealogy of Turks (Şecere-i Terakime)*, prepared by: Muharrem Ergin, Tercüman 1001 Basic Works, İstanbul, undated.
- ENGELS, Friedrich, *Ailenin, Özel Mülkiyetin ve Devletin Kökeni*, trans. Kenan Somer, Sol Yayınları, 3rd edition.
- ENGELS, Friedrich, *The Role of Force in History*, trans. S. Vahap Erdoğan, Sol Yayınları, 1st edition, Ankara, November 1974.
- ERCİLASUN, Ahmet B., *Örneklerle Bugünkü Türk Alfabeleri*, Ministry of Culture Publications, Ankara, 1993.
- ERGİN, Muharrem, *Dede Korkut Kitabı*, I, II, AKDITYK Turkish Language Institution Publications, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1994, 1997.

ERGİN, Muharrem (prepared by), *Dede Korkut Book*, 1000 Basic Works, Ministry of National Education Publications.

ERGİN, Muharrem (prepared by), *Orhun Abideleri*, Boğaziçi Publications, 20th edition, April 1996.

FRANCO, Carlos, *Entwicklung Nation und Sozialismus, Vom "Eurozentrischen Marx" "zum lateinamerikanischen Marxismus"*.

GENÇ, Reşat, *Kashgarlı Mahmud'a Göre XI. Yüzyılda Türk Dünyası*, Türk Kültürünü Araştırma Enstitüsü Yayınları, Ankara 1997.

*Genç Kalemler Magazine*, eds: Prof. Dr. İsmail Parlatır, Assist. Assoc. Dr. Nurullah Çetin, AKDITYK Turkish Language Association Publications, Ankara 1999.

GESCHICHTE DER PHILOSOPHIE, I, II, III, IV, V, VI, VEB Deutscher Verlag der Wissenschaften, Berlin 1960-1967.

GİBB, *Arab Futūhatı in Central Asia*, trans. M. Hakkı, Evkaf Matbaası, Istanbul, 1930.

GÖKALP, Hikmet, *Devlet-Ulus*, Kaynak Yayınları, Istanbul, April 1998.

GÖKBERK, Macit, *Philosophy History*, Bilgi Publishing House, expanded 2nd edition, Ankara, June 1967.

GÖKYAY, Orhan Şaik, *Bugünkü Dille Dede Korkut*, Remzi Kitabevi, Istanbul, 1963.

GÖKYAY, Orhan Shaikh, *Unsuppoted Baga Entrants*, Dergâh Publications, Istanbul, May 1982.

GRENARD, Fernand, *Asia's Rise and Fall*, trans. Orhan Yüksel, MEB Publications, Istanbul 1992.

GUMILIEV, Lev Nikolayevich, *Ancient Turks*, trans. D. Ahsen Batur, Selenge Publications, expanded 2nd edition, Istanbul 2002.

GUMILIEV, Lev Nikolayevich, *Huns*, translated from Russian. D. Ahsen Batur, Selenge Publications, Istanbul 2002.

GUMILIEV, Lev Nikolayevich, *A Thousand Years in the Caspian Neighbourhood*, trans. D. Ahsen Batur, Selenge Publications, Istanbul 2002.

GUMILIEV, Lev Nikolayevich, *Muhayyyel Hükümdarlığın İzinde*, translated from Russian. D. Ahsen Batur, Selenge Publications, Istanbul 2002.

GÜLTEKİN, Mehmet Bedri, *Laikliğin Neresindeyiz/ Kemalizm Laikliğinden Türk-İslam Sentezine*, Kaynak Yayınları, 3rd edition, İstanbul, February 1995.

GÜRÜN, Kâmuran, *Türkler ve Türk Devletleri Tarihi*, I, II, Karacan Yayınları, İstanbul, March 1982.

HASSAN, Ümit, *Eski Türk Toplumunu Üzerine İncelemeler*, Kaynak Yayınları, March 1985.

HASSAN, Ümit, *Osmanlı/ Örgüt-İnanç-Davranış'tan Hukuk-İdeoloji'ye*, İletişim Publications, İstanbul, 2001.

HATİBOĞLU, Vecihe, "Gas'lar in the North of Anatolia", *Cumhuriyet*, 10 March 1984.

HATİBOĞLU, Vecihe, "The Beginning of Turkish History", *Journal of Turkology*, 1979, vol.VIII, no.1.

HOBSBAWM, E. J., *Nations and Nationalism from 1780 to the Present*, trans. Osman Akınhay, Ayrıntı Publishing House, İstanbul, July 1993.

HÜSEYİNZADE, Ali Bey, "Sola, Sola, Sol Tarafa", *Aydınlık*, issue 769, 14 April 2002.

İBN FAZLAN, *Seyahatnâme*, published by Prof. Dr. Ramazan Şeşen, Bedir Publications, 2nd edition, İstanbul, 1995.

İBN BATUTA *Seyahatnâmesi'nden Seçmeler*, Devlet Kitapları, İstanbul, 1986.

*Second Turkish History Congress*, "Neolithic Devirde Küçük Asya ve Avrupa Arasında Antropolojik Münasebetler", Turkish Historical Society Publications, İstanbul, 1943.

İNAN, Abdülkadir, *Old Turkish Religious History*, Ministry of Culture Publication, İstanbul, 1976.

İNAN, Abdülkadir, *Tarihte ve Bugün Şamanizm/Materyaller ve Araştırmalar*, Atatürk Culture, Language and History High Institute, Turkish History

Kurumu Publications, 3rd edition, 1986.

Articles on the history of Central Asia in various volumes of *the Encyclopaedia of Islam*. KAFESOĞLU, İbrahim, "Anatolian Monument and 16 Turkish States", *Tercüman*, 11 June 1984.

KAFESOĞLU, İbrahim, "Your death 1250. Anniversary Münasebetiyle Bilge Kagan", *Belleten*, XLIX, August 1985, issue 194.

KAFESOĞLU, İbrahim, *Türkler ve Medeniyet*, İstanbul, 1957.

KAPLAN, Mehmet and his friends (preparators), *Atatürk Devri Fikir Hayatı*, c.I and II, Ministry of Culture Publications, Ankara, 1992.

KAPLAN, Mehmet et al. (editors), *Devrin Yazarlarının Kalemiyle Milli Mücadele ve Arkadaşları*, c.I, Kültür Bakanlığı Yayınları, Ankara, 1992.

KAŞGARLI MAHMUT, *Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, three volumes and index volume, trans.

B. Atalay, Turkish Language Association Publication.

[KAŞGARLI, Meliha Aytok, \*Siyah Beyaz\* newspaper, 19 August 1995.](#)

KAYMAZ, Nejat, *Kuruluştan "Lâle Devri"ne Osmanlı İmparatorluğu (Çıplak Gözün Gördükleri)*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, October 2002.

[KIŞLALI, Ahmet Taner, "The Three Roses of our Politics", \*Cumhuriyet\*, 5 March 1999.](#)

KIVILCIMLI, Hikmet, "The Effects of Religion on Turkish Society", *Aydınlık Sosyalist Dergi*, issue 17, March 1970.

SPARKLING, Wisdom, *History Revolution Socialism Historical Maddecilik Publications*, İstanbul, 1965.

KOESTLER, Arthur, *Thirteenth Tribe*, Ada Publications, İstanbul, 1977.

KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuat, "Anatolia Seljuks Indigenous History Sources", *Belleten*, issue 25, 26, 27, July 1943.

KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuat, *Byzantine Institutions and Ottoman Institutions*, 3rd edition, Kaynak Publications, İstanbul, March 2002.

KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuat, *Kuruluşu Osmanlı Devleti'nin Kuruluşu*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 3rd edition, Ankara, 1988.



- KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuat, *Osmanlı'nın Etnik Kökeni*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, April 1999.
- KÖPRÜLÜ, Fuat, "Issues of the Ethnic Origin of the Ottoman Empire", *Belleten*, issue 28, 1. Teşrin 1943, c.VII.
- KUZGUN, Şaban, "Our ancestors were not Shamanists", *Yeni Ses* magazine, April 2002.
- LAMB, Harold, *Genghis Khan*, trans. Ali Naci, MEB Publications, İstanbul, 1931.
- LENIN, "On the Junius Brochure", June 1916.
- LIGETI, L., *Unknown Inner Asia*, trans. Sadrettin Karatay, Turkish Language Association Publications, Ankara, 1986.
- MARSHALL, Robert, *From the East Rising Power Mongols*, trans. Füsun Doruker, Sabah Kitapları, İstanbul, 1995.
- MARX, Karl-ENGELS, Friedrich, *German Ideology*, trans. Selahattin Hilav, Sosyal Publications, İstanbul, 1968.
- MARX, Karl-ENGELS, Friedrich, *Die Deutsche Ideologie, Marx Engels Werke*, 3, Berlin, 1969.
- MARX, Karl, *Contribution to the Critique of Political Economy*, trans. Sevim Belli, Sol Yayınları, Ankara, 1970.
- MARX, Karl, *Pre-Capitalist Economic Forms*, trans. Mihri Belli, Sol Publications.
- The Secret History of the Mongols*, trans. Ahmet Temir, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1986.
- MORGAN, Lewis Henry, *The Old Society*, Volumes I and II, trans. Unsal Oskay, Payel Publishing House, İstanbul, March 1994, June 1987.
- Mufasssal Ottoman History*, İskit Publishing House, İstanbul, 1958, c.I, II.
- NEŞRÎ, Mehmet, *Neşrî Tarihi*, I, II, Prepared by Prof. Dr. Mehmet Altay Köymen, Ministry of Culture and Tourism Publications, Ankara, March 1983, December 1994.

NİZAMÜLMÜLK, *Siyasetname*, Dergâh Publications, 2nd edition, Istanbul, February 1987.

NOYAN, Kerem, *Yalanları of Fascism*, Anlam Publications, Istanbul, March 1978.

OCAK, Ahmet Yaşar, *Türk Sufiliğın Bakışlar*, İletişim Yayınları, İstanbul, 1996.

OCAK, Ahmet Yaşar, *Zındıklar ve Mülhidler*, Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, İstanbul, July 1998.

*Oguz Kagan Epic*, published by: Bang, W. - Rahmeti, G.R, Milli Eğitim Basımevi, Istanbul, 1970.

OPPENHEIMER, Franz, *Der Staat*, Gustav Fischer Verlag, Vierte Auflage, Stuttgart, 1954.

OPPENHEIMER, F., *Devlet*, trans. Alaeddin Şenel-Yavuz Sabuncu, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, March 1984.

ORKUN, Hüseyin Namık, *Eski Türk Yazıtları*, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1987.

ÖGEL, Bahaeddin, *Development Ages of Turkish Culture*, 1000 Basic Works, Ministry of National Education Publication, two volumes.

ÖGEL, Bahaeddin, *Turkish Mythology*, I, II, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1993.

ÖGEL, Bahaeddin, *Türklerde Devlet Anlayışı*, Başbakanlık Basımevi, Ankara, 1982.

PERİNÇEK, Doğu, *The Eurasian Option*, Kaynak Publications, 2nd expanded edition, Istanbul, April 2000.

edition, Istanbul, April 2000.

PERİNÇEK, Doğu, *Aydın ve Kültür*, Kaynak Yayınları, İstanbul, April 1996.

PERİNÇEK, Doğu, *Çiller Special Organisation*, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, December 1996.

PERİNÇEK, East, *From the Ottoman Today Community and State*, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, July 1985.

- PERİNÇEK, Doğu, *Kemalist Devrim-3/ A l t ı Ok*, Kaynak Publications, 1st edition, Istanbul, June 1999.
- PERİNÇEK, East, *Kemalist Revolution-4/Salvation In the war Kurdish Policy*, Kaynak Publications, 1st edition, Istanbul, 1999.
- PERİNÇEK, East, "I told Werner According to Ottoman Feudality", *Ankara University Journal of the Faculty of Law*, 1968, vol.XXV, no.3-4.
- PERİNÇEK, Doğu, *Kıvılcımlı'ın Burjuva Ordu ve Devlet Teorisinin Eleştirisi*, Aydınlık Yayınları, İstanbul, 1975.
- POLATAY, Dervish [East Perinçek], "'From the tribe Problems of Feudalism" *Saçak*, issue 30/2, March 1984.
- Saçak*, "On 'Foundation'", issue 52, May 1988.
- SANÇAR, Nejdet İsmet, *İnönü ile Hesaplaşma*, Alşın Yayınları, Ankara 1973.
- SERYÜCE, A., "Anatolia's Turkishness", *Forum*, 1 June 1986.
- SEVİM, Ali, *The Conquest of Anatolia, Seljuklar Period*, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1988.
- SINOR, Denis (Ed.), *Erken İç Asya Tarihi*, İletişim Yayınları, Istanbul 2000.
- SUE, Tszun Cjen, *Turkish History*, in Chinese, 1992.
- SÜMER, Faruk, "Oğuz Han and his Epic", *Resimli Tarih Dergisi*, issue 20, August 1951.
- SÜMER, Faruk, *Oghuzlar*, Ankara University, Faculty of Language, History and Geography, 2nd edition, Ankara, 1972.
- SÜMER, Faruk, "How Turks entered Islam", *And*, issue 7, 3, December 1983.
- SÜREYYA, Şevket, *İnkılâp ve Kadro*, Ankara, 1932. TANKUT, Hasan Reşit, *Sociological Studies on the Zazas*.
- TARCAN, Halûk, *Pre-Turkic History*, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, February 1998.
- TAŞAĞIL, Ahmet, *Göktürkler*, I, II, Turkish Historical Society, Ankara 1995, 1999. *TBMM Secret Session Minutes*, c.IV.

- TEKİN, Talat, *Orkhon Inscriptions*, Simurg Publications, Istanbul, 1995.
- TEKİNALP, *Kemalism*, Istanbul In 1936 printed original trans. from text: Çetin Yetkin, *Toplumsal Dönüşüm Yayınları*, May 1998.
- THOMSEN, Vilh., *Solved Orkhon Inscriptions*, trans. Vedat Köken, Turkish Language Kurumu Publications, Ankara, 1993.
- THOMSON, George, *Aiskhilos and Athens*, Payel Publishing House, Istanbul, March 1990.
- THOMSON, George, *First Philosophers* trans. Mehmet H. Dogan, Payel Publishing House, Istanbul, May 1988.
- THOMSON, George, *Prehistoric Aegean*, I, II, trans. Celâl Üster, Payel Publishing House, Istanbul, April 1983 and November 1985.
- TİMUR, Taner, "Western Ideology, Racism and Our National Identity Problem", *Yapıt*, issue 5, June-July 1984.
- TOGAN, Zeki Velidi, *Oğuz Destanı/ Reşideddin Oğuznamesi Tercüme ve Tahlili*, Enderun Kitabevi, 2nd edition, İstanbul 1982.
- TURAN, Osman, *Seljuks History and Turkish-Islamic Civilisation*, Turkish Culture Research Institute, Ankara, 1965.
- TURAN, Osman, *Türkiye Selçukluları Hakkında Resmi Vesikalar*, Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1958.
- TURNER, Bryan S., *Marx and the End of Orientalism*, trans. Çağatay Keskinok, Kaynak Publications, Istanbul, 1984.
- TÜRK DİLİ, *Divanü Lügat-it-Türk Special Issue*, issue 253, 1 October 1972. *Turkish Encyclopaedia*, c.XIX, article "Huns".
- VII. Turkish History Congress, c.II.*
- Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları*, Kaynak Yayınları, 2nd edition, Istanbul, May 1996.
- Türk Tarihinin Ana Hatları Methal Kısım*, Devlet Matbaası, İstanbul, 1931.
- Türk Yurdu*, c.1-17, Tutibay Publications, Ankara, 1999-2002.
- Türkiye İhtilalalci İşçi Köylü Partisi Davası/ Savunma*, Kaynak Yayınları, 4th edition, Istanbul, March 1992.
- Türkiye Tarihi*, Cem Publishing House, Istanbul, 1987, c.I.

- UHRİ, A. Ahmet, "Anatomy of a Book Name: Kara Atena", *Bilim ve Ütopya*, issue 99, December 1999.
- ÜLKÜTAŞIR, Şakir, *Kashgarlı Mahmut*, Türk Dil Kurumu Publications, Istanbul, 1946.
- VLADIMIRTSOV, B.Y, *Mongols' Internal Organisation*, trans. Abdülkadir İnan, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1944.
- VON GABAIN, A., *Grammar of Old Turkish*, trans. Mehmet Akalın, Türk Dil Kurumu Yayınları, Ankara, 1988.
- WEBER, Alfred, *History of Philosophy*, trans. H. Vehbi Eralp, Istanbul University Main Science Books Translation Series, Istanbul 1938.
- WERNER, Ernst, *Die Geburt einer Grossmacht-Osmanen (1300-1481)*, zweite verbesserte und erweiterte Auflage, Herman Böhlau Nachf., Wien- Köln-Graz, 1972.
- WERNER, Ernst, *The Birth of a Great State-Ottomans*, 1 and 2, trans. Orhan Esen-Yılmaz Öner, Alan Publishing, Istanbul, October 1986 and January 1988.
- YILDIZ, Naciye, *Manas Epic (W. Radloff) and Kyrgyz Culture*, Turkish Language Association Publications, Ankara, 1995.
- YİNANÇ, Mükrimin Halil, *Türkiye Tarihi Selçuklular Devri I, Anadolu'nun Fethi*, İstanbul, 1957.
- YUSUF HAS HACIP, *Kutadgu Bilig*, I, Text, 3rd edition, Turkish Historical Society Publications, Ankara, 1991 and II, Translation, 6th edition, Ankara, 1994.

## INDEX

AB, 175.  
Abaza, 152.  
Abbasid, 122; - conquest, 123.  
USA, 98, 165, 166, 171, 172, 175; - imposition of, 166; - imperialism, 164; -  
guided Turkish racism, 167; - plans, 166, 171.  
Abdülhamit II, 160.  
Abul Gazi, 65.  
Adygs, 152.  
Africa, 96, 96, 138, 173.  
Afşin, 115. See Ofşin.  
Agacanov, 72.  
Agici, 63.  
Aga, 135, 144.  
Tree worship, 118.  
Agaoğlu Ahmet Bey, 140, 142, 160.  
Ahîlik, 80, 154.  
Ahmet Bey Agayef, 141.  
Ahmet Mithat Efendi, 161.  
Ahmet Vefik Pasha, 140.  
Ahmet Yassawi, 126.  
Ahundzade, 160.  
Family, 24, 32, 86; -s, 154.  
White Huns, 41.

White-boned bodun, 41.

Akçura, Yusuf, 134, 139, 140, 159-161, 163.

Mediterranean, 12, 90, 92, 95, 96, 152; -'s historical heritage, 96; - heritage, 95; - civilisation, 94.

kin, 131; - languages, 169; - tribes, 37, 46; - tribes, 129; - kinship, 87, 158; - bonds of kinship, 149; - sense of kinship, 169; - relations of kinship, 148; - lineages, 89.

Akşin, Sina, 16.

Alevi belief, 126.

Alevism and Alevis, 126, 127, 154.

Ali, 126.

Allah, 13, 57, 73, 103, 114, 114, 116, 117, 120, 124, 134.

German; - interests, 162; - imperialism, 162; -s, 137, 162, 169.

Germany, 92, 96, 163.

Alps, 47, 55.

Alpine Shawl, 43.

Altai Hun age, 29.

Altai, 27, 35.

Six Arrows, 19, 144, 145.

Gold, 34, 46, 164, 170; - crown, 119.

Amasya Minutes, 162.

Amin, Samir, 90, 95, 98, 112.

Anatolia, 47, 65, 67, 68, 74, 75, 78, 80, 105, 106, 126, 131, 149, 150, 151-160, 162, 169; - beys, 80; - Turkification and Islamisation in, 153; - economy, 77; - labourer, 162; - people, 158; - invasion, 152; - peasantry, 77; - culture, 159; - ancient peoples of, 159; - Turkification of, 155; - population, 151; - Turks, 158, 169; - civilisational heritage, 158.

Anatolian Seljuk state, 74, 101.

Anarchy, 39, 100, 110, 111.

Constitution, 160.

Constitutional state, 95.

Angarya, 40, 89, 93.

Anger, Burçay, 151.

Lake Aral, 66, 90.

Arab, 152, 155; - raids, 151; - conquerors, 121; - conquests, 67, 121; - storm, 121; - sailors, 98; - neighbours, 170; -s, 46, 67, 74, 120, 123, 131, 169; - Legacy, 11; - civilisation Legacy, 106; - countries, 171; - expansionism, 121; - authors, 68, 131.

Arabic, 103.

Aryan race, 148.

Aristocracy, 28, 39, 42-44, 48, 57, 57, 37, 37, 61, 64, 69, 73, 76, 88, 89, 100, 104, 105, 108, 115, 115, 119, 125, 129; pride of, 106.

Aristocrat, 52, 128; - dependence on, 37; - minority, 85; - tribes, 26.

Asim, Necip, 160.

Nobles, 39.

Assimilation (see also assimilation), 156.

Military, 104, 111, 171; -s, 62; -lik, 61, 154.

Military - unions, 51; - democracy, 14-16, 25, 45, 76, 86, 87; - transition from democracy to feudalism, 92; - conquerors, 123; - power, 47, 110; - hierarchy, 39; - relations, 172; - command, 29, 39, 164; - retinue, 48, 55; - chief, 25, 29, 48, 87; - organisation, 133.

Asia, 23, 42, 74, 89, 92, 96, 97, 109, 119, 138, 149, 153, 157, 162, 163, 173, 175; - despotism, 109; - economies, 175; - tribes, 88, 98; - tribes of origin, 156; - people, 157; - historical roots, 168; - theories of stasis of, 97; - rise of, 95, 172; - politics, 162; - history, 36; - trade, 31; - countries, 170; - and African hostility, 157. Theories of Asiatic society, 97.

Achilles, 106.

Tribes, 75, 141; - bey, 80; - principality, 78; -s, 74.

Horse, 24, 69; -li nomadic tribes, 23.

Patriarchal; - family, 24; - lineage chain, 67. Atalay, Besim, 121.

Proverbs, 63, 132.

Atatürk, Mustafa Kemal, 75, 141-144, 155, 158, 159, 159, 162, 163, 173, 175; -Atatürk's Izmir speech, 163; Atatürk's definition of nation, 142.



Atila, 115, 134.  
Av, 55.  
Avar (Juan Juan), 33; -lar, 152.  
Hunting, 24, 34, 55.  
Avcioglu, Dogan, 14, 15, 92.  
Eurasia, 170, 175; - front, 172; - forces, 172; - alliance, 172; - Triangle, 171; - countries, 171.  
Eurasian Cooperation Organisation, 172.  
Europe, 19, 91, 93, 96-98, 120, 139, 141, 157, 173, 175; - revolutionary, 140; - feudalism, 37, 98, 112; - feudalism, 95; - Crusaders, 152; - capitalist civilisation, 95; - tribes, 139; - people, 175; - people, 95; - civilisation, 139.  
Eurocentric, 118; - East-West divide, 97; - socialism, 99; - historians, 157.  
Eurocentrism, 90, 96, 97, 98.  
Eurocentric; - views, 11, 112; - historical theses, 99.  
Austrians, 169.  
Moon, 117; - god of, 119.  
Shoemaking, 59.  
Moonbite, 62.  
Aydin, 75; -lar, 137, 161, 165.  
Aydın, Erdoğan, 121.  
*Aydin and Culture*, 20, 137.  
Azov Sea, 130.  
Azerbaijani Turks, 139, 168.  
Aziz, Seyfeddin, 23, 64, 117, 118, 122.  
  
Baatur, 130.  
Paternity law, 87.  
Independent; - state, 138; - states, 168; -ness, 171, 173, 174; -nessist, 160.  
Bigotry, 127.  
Bahrain Negroes, 125.  
Copper, 54.

Baku oil, 162.  
 Ba'l, 114.  
 Fish, 36.  
 Balkan, 158; -s, 152.  
 Balkans, 153, 154, 168, 171.  
 Bamsı Beyrek, 67, 69, 106.  
 Banks, 158.  
 Barbarian; - vaccine, 94; - peoples, 25; - tribes, 122; - stage of being, 106.  
 Peace, 26, 27, 31, 32, 43, 49, 54, 100, 107, 109, 110.  
 Barthold, V.V., 15, 66, 123.  
 Basmil İdık Kut, 44.  
 Basmils, 44, 53.  
 Basra, 125.  
 Bashbug, 28, 61, 63, 73.  
 Capital, 68.  
 West, 107, 131, 139, 154, 155, 175; -ci, 99; - languages, 103, 108;  
 -  
 imperialism, 97; - capitalism, 12, 95; - resources, 156; - science  
 men, 109; - centred, 157.  
 Western Europe, 92, 94-98; - feudalism, 92, 93; - peoples, 12.  
 Western Huns, 115.  
 Superstition, 119.  
 Batinî; -ism, 126; - sect, 64; - sects, 126, 127.  
 Western Thrace, 153.  
 Western Turks, 90, 124, 139, 148.  
 Lake Baikal, 27.  
 Baylar (rich), 61, 70.  
 Begil, 71.  
 Begiloğlu Emren, 71.  
 Berktaş, Halil, 15, 16, 78, 80, 92-94.  
 Bernal, Martin, 96.  
 Five Fish (Five Cities), 54.

Bey, 26, 37, 61, 67, 69, 71, 86, 89, 130, 135, 148; -ler, 25, 39, 43-45, 47, 68-70, 80, 88, 102, 111, 115, 124, 126, 133-135, 149; -ler class, 41, 79.  
See also feudal lords.

Beylik, 59.

Bilge Kagan, 37-39, 43, 43, 44, 46-49, 51, 52, 100, 111, 115, 119, 129, 130, 134, 147; - Monument, 34.

Science, 104, 120; - men, 99, 118.

Scientific socialism, 99.

1848 Revolution, 140.

Constitutional Monarchy of 1876, 160.

1905 Revolution, 160.

1908 Revolution of Liberty, 140, 160.

1917 October Revolution, 145.

First World War, 162, 170.

Byzantium, 59, 74, 77, 78, 80, 154; -impression of, 106; -lords, 152; -heritage of, 11; -  
heritage of civilisation, 106.

Byzantine Emperor Michael, 154.

Bod, 13.

Bodun, 13, 36-41, 43-47, 65, 88, 101, 103, 128-130, 133. See Budun.

Boğaç Bey, 106.

Bogazköy excavations, 157.

Bojenski, Constantin, 140.

Bolshevik movement, 160.

Bosniak, 153, 155.

Boy, 13, 38, 46, 53, 55, 131, 148, 149, 151; -lar, 13, 33, 39, 56, 65, 65, 129, 157; -s alliance, 33, 131, 149; -s community, 133; - community, 132; - communities, 44, 130.

Khan of the Tribes, 65.

Grey Arrows, 67.

Steppe; - anarchy, 18, 86, 110, 111; - nomads, 23; - forces, 108; - tribes, 129; - quarrels, 108; - law, 101.

*Bozkurt Legends and Reality*, 92.

Bozkurt, 164; - regiments, 164; -lar, 41.  
Bozkurt, Mahmut Esat, 141.  
Bögü Kagan, 56, 57.  
Bronze coins, 31.  
Buddha, Buddhism, 52, 117, 119, 123.  
Buddhist temples, 119.  
Budun, 13, 101. See Bodun.  
Buğra, Tarık, 78, 80.  
Bulgar; - khan, 115; - Turks, 49, 152; -lar, 123.  
Bulgarian, 148.  
Bulgaria, 153.  
Bumin Kagan, 36.  
Bourgeois, 135; - democratic revolutions, 120, 128, 134-137; - culture, 137; -  
materialism, 16.  
Bourgeoisie, 136, 137, 139; -intellectuals of, 137.  
Buze, Özcan, 96.  
Bureaucracy, 28, 55, 56, 62, 63, 72, 100, 104.  
Sorcerer; - kamlari, 118; -ler, 119; -lük, 116, 118. See Shaman, Shamanism.  
Great French Revolution, 137.  
Great Seljuk state, 74, 75, 101.  
  
Cahen, Claude, 67, 77, 150, 151.  
Mosques, 80.  
*Camiü't-Tevârih*, 66.  
Camoka, 108.  
Canbalık, 54.  
Cand city, 68.  
Concubine, 41, 44, 47, 51, 70; -s, 42.  
Hell, 63; - punishment, 125.  
Genghis Khan, 89, 108, 115, 122.  
Paradise, 125.

Germanic; - peoples, 28; - invasion, 93; - tribes, 94, 169; - people, 92-94, 122; - mark, 93.

Penalties, 49.

CHP, 144.

CIA, 165, 172.

Jahan Turkism, 13, 168, 172.

Jihad, 125.

Murder, 165.

Civitas, 103.

Republic, 142, 143, 164, 167; - Revolution, 138, 141, 142, 144, 147, 161, 165, 168; - period, 147, 153; - declaration of, 163; - founding, 143; - project, 163; - administration, 164.

Republicanism, 145.

Dwarfs (Avars), 128. See also Juan Juan.

Tent, 118.

Chagribeg (Çağrı Bey), 63, 75.

Çakmaklı, Yücel, 78, 80.

Capul, 49; - fights, 32; - expeditions, 48.

Bazaars, 80.

Cavlibeg, 63.

Chechnya, 171.

Çelebiler, 144.

Circassians, 152, 153, 155.

Chigays (poor), 61, 70.

Farmer, 174; - people, 88.

Chiller, Tansu, 171.

China, 28, 29, 31, 34-36, 40, 44, 46, 49, 59, 90, 97, 98, 109, 138, 170-172, 175; - sailors, 98; - state tradition, 80; - revolution, 138; - domination, 43, 45; - empire, 129; - emperor, 26-28, 35; - kagan, 40, 45; - resources, 23, 26, 28, 33, 52, 53; -li, 117; -liler, 28, 43, 131; - goods, 31; - Great Wall, 28; - writing, 26; - yearbook, 35.

People's Republic of China, 54, 122, 170, 171.

Chinese Communist Party, 23.

Chinese, 26.

Shepherd; - people, 41, 62, 70, 72, 88, 89; - tribes, 23; -lar, 25, 62; -lik, 73.

Corum, 165.

Chu; - basin, 61; - river, 58; - valley, 58.

Danes, 169.

Dede Korkut and his book, 15, 19, 67-69, 71, 72, 106, 124, 126, 130.

Deli Karchar, 69.

Demesne, 93.

Iron Age, 152.

Iron, 35, 54, 109; -ism, 27, 59; - weapons, 123.

Demirkapi, 37.

Democratic, 160; - revolution, 162; - revolutionaries, 159; - revolutionary ideology, 160; - revolutions, 135, 137, 139, 142, 145; - society, 88.

Sea state, 91, 95.

Maritime tribes, 151.

Dervishes, 144.

Epics, 12, 65, 72, 106.

State, 14, 16, 19, 28, 29, 45, 46, 48, 49, 52, 54, 55, 58, 61, 62, 64, 72, 75, 76, 86, 88, 91, 98, 100-105, 108, 109, 113, 115, 116, 133, 137, 138, 144, 146, 150, 155, 166-168, 173; - outside, 113; - leap to, 111; - tradition, 74, 109; - hierarchy, 63; - role of, 107; - class character of, 113; - of creativity theses, 107; - societies unable to establish, 138; - establishing, 13, 117, 138, 173; - founding, 71, 75, 76, 80, 104, 105, 106; -s, 174; - merger, 120, 133, 146; - pre-political organisation, 45; - private property relation, 107; - policy, 166; - the art of, 91; - de-privatisation, 174; - sanction, 132.

Statism, 145.

Revolution, 19, 52, 112, 113, 133, 139, 142-144, 146, 173, 174; - wave, 145; -s, 97, 137; -nation created by, 143; -leaders, 145.

Revolutionary, 160, 174; - movement, 159; - intellectuals, 99; - state, 113; - ideology, 88;

- crisis, 112; -ler, 173; -lik, 145; - nation, 144; - nationalism, 145, 159, 162, 163; - rise, 174.

Devshirs, 55.

Tigris, 120.

Language, 131, 132, 137, 140, 144, 148, 153, 169; - unity, 128; -s, 128.

Linguistics, 133.

Religion, 56, 57, 64, 73, 108, 116, 118, 124, 144; - separation, 153; -s, 125; - pre-religious beliefs, 108, 116, 119; - and sectarian affiliation, 142.

Religious systems, 117.

Religious community, 133.

Dirlik system, 76.

*Divan-ı Lügat-it Türk*, 15, 54, 58, 58, 60, 62, 66, 68, 71, 88, 115, 125.

Divitcioglu, Sencer, 116.

Natural gas, 170.

East, 97, 112, 139, 173, 174; - societies, 107; - civilisation, 120.

Eastern Mediterranean, 151

Eastern Europe, 92, 170; - Jews, 148.

East-West, 110.

Eastern Turks, 34.

Eastern Turks, 124.

Nine tribes, 54.

Nine Oghuz, 37, 38, 46, 47, 47, 53, 54, 65, 129; -lar, 33, 44, 130.

Nine Tatars, 38.

Nine Uyghurs, 53.

Stasis, 97, 98, 109.

The bullocks, 126.

World; - revolution, 174, 175; - economy, 175; - labourers, 171; - population, 138; - history, 36; - civilisation, 120.

Druze, 152.

Eberhard, Wolfram, 15.

Abu Nesir, 117.  
Abu Tahir, 125.  
Ebulgazi Bahadir Khan, 66.  
Literature, 125; -cılar, 140.  
Master, 57, 71, 114, 135; -kul system, 122; -ler class, 114; -lik, 119.  
Legend, 94.  
Aegean islands, 152.  
Aegean and Greek civilisations,  
90. Dragon, 98.  
October Revolution, 138.  
*Contribution to the Critique of Political  
Economy*, 74. Economy, 66, 89, 160, 175.  
Hand, 61, 69, 70, 72.  
Labour, 40, 42, 159.  
Labourer, 135, 168; - revolutions, 172; - masses, 127; - people, 88; - classes, 174.  
Umayyad, 122; - conquest, 123.  
Imperialist, 99; - state, 167; - states, 164, 170; - hegemonism, 170;  
-s, 170; - system, 174.  
Imperialism, 97, 138, 159-163, 167-169, 172-174; - age, 173; against  
struggle, 171, 172.  
Enderun, 154.  
Engels, Friedrich, 15, 16, 24, 25, 37, 42, 47-49, 51, 86, 87.  
International (Second), 160.  
Enver Pasha, 162.  
Er ögi, 63.  
Eremev, D.E., 150.  
Erenler, 55.  
Ergin, Muharrem, 13, 39.  
Armenians, 152.  
Erzincan, 165.  
Erzurum Congress, 162.  
Captive Turks Liberation Army (ETKO), 165.



Captive, 42; -ler, 41.

Ancient Anatolian peoples, 157.

Ancient Egypt, 112.

Old Bronze Age, 152.

*Old Turkish Inscriptions*, 34.

Ancient Greece, 91, 103; - tribes, 153.

Uneven development, 106.

Equality, 85, 88, 135, 137, 171.

Egalitarian society, 85, 88, 127.

Inequality, 42.

Etibank, 158.

Ethnic, 151, 162; - group, 155; - groups, 128; - fusion zone, 149; - origin, 128, 143, 159.

Etruscans, 156.

Etruscan writings, 156.

Euhemeros, 114.

*Evliyâ Çelebi Travelogue*, 160.

Evranoşoğulları, 154.

Gods of the universe, 117.

Evolution, 90.

Oppressed World, 97, 99, 138, 145, 145, 169, 173-175.

Oppressed; - masses, 126; - countries, 171.

Persian, 66.

Fascist and reactionary movements, 164.

Conqueror, 49; - the people, 29; - the people, 122; - the ideology of civilisation conquering the people, 121.

Feudal aristocracy, 77.

Feudal; - dependence, 88; - bey, 89; - beys, 79, 105; - state, 72, 74, 76, 79, 91, 94, 95, 155; - leap to state, 18, 74; - states, 12, 75; - order, 77; - dominant class, 112; - dominant classes, 124, 126; - relationship, 89; - relationships, 31, 37, 49, 67, 68, 74, 74, 78, 90, 94, 151, 173; - remnants, 98; -s, 111, 112; - merger,

61, 76, 77, 80, 89, 122; - property, 76, 91; - Ottoman culture, 127; - fragmentation, 98, 112, 136; - markets, 135; - shackles, 135; - leap, 95; - systems, 150; - exploitation, 40, 76; - society, 11, 12, 28, 133, 149, 150; - transition from society to a national and democratic society, 145; - civilisation, 122.

Feudalism, 138.

Feudalism, 14, 17, 23, 56, 74, 75, 78, 86, 88-92, 94, 97, 109, 111, 112, 120, 134, 137; transition to, 19; dissolution of, 138.

Conquest, 76, 121, 122; -s, 49; - and wars, 12.

Conquering barbarians, 25, 47.

Fatwa Emini, 160.

Euphrates, 120.

Philosopher, 114.

Phoenicians, 152.

François (King of France), 134.

France, 92, 96.

French; - revolutionaries, 145; - Revolution, 144; - Revolution, 140; -s, 137.

French, 140.

Fratri, 25, 73; -s, 24.

Phrygians, 152.

Gagauz, 152.

Gauls, 152.

Gauls, 152.

Swastika, 164.

Booty, 47, 51.

Gaslar, 156.

Gasp, 165.

Gaspıralı Ismail Bey, 160.

Gaza, 124.

Gazilik, 125.

Ghaznavid state, 75.

Tradition, 76, 168.

Advanced extortionate form, 91.

Advanced capitalist countries, 138, 145.

Young Ottomans and Young Turks, 139.

Reactionary, 163, 167; - the state, 113; -liness, 112, 113, 160, 168; - nationalism, 145;

- historians, 88.

Germiyanogulları, 78.

Gibb, Hamilton Alexander Rossken, 121.

Giraud, 13.

Cretans, 152, 152.

Gobineau, Joseph-Arthur, 154.

Migration, 32, 54, 65, 67, 68, 74, 75, 77, 86, 105, 131, 148, 150, 156, 169; - waves, 78, 158; -s, 136, 147, 153.

Nomads, 35, 123; - aristocracy, 43, 46, 55, 75-77; - beys, 55; - shepherd tribes, 27; - shepherd communities, 69; - people, 76; - peoples, 110; - life, 58, 61; - animal husbandmen, 27, 26, 34; - animal husbandry, 64, 66, 68; - tribe aristocracy, 25; - tribes, 26, 56, 79; - tribal system, 29; - heroism age, 24; - tribes, 28; - masses, 57, 125; - religion of the masses, 126; - confederation, 23, 45; -s, 24, 62, 118; -lik, 34; - Oghuz masses, 126; - warfare, 54; - communities, 128; - society, 48; - Turkmen wave, 79; - Turkmen masses, 76, 77; - elements, 68.

Immigrants, 153, 156.

Gök, 117, 119, 124.

Gökalp, Hikmet, 138.

Gökalp, Ziya, 132.

Göktan God, 103, 114, 116-118, 120.

Göktürk, 33, 37, 101, 116; - alphabet, 34; - aristocracy, 44, 45; - beys, 43; - age, 34, 35; - language and script, 34; - federation, 14; - khan, 129; - Kagan, 35; - kaganate, 53; - confederation, 33, 37-39, 46, 48, 49, 52, 130-132; -ler, 19, 23, 33, 34, 34, 36, 36, 38, 41-43, 46, 49, 55, 70, 100, 104, 110, 117, 119, 120, 128, 131, 147.

*Göktürk Inscriptions*, 53, 101, 129.

Grenard, Fernand, 95.

Gumiliev, Lev Nikolayevich, 41, 47, 49, 53, 65, 117, 149.

Gutis, 156.

Day (Kun), 41, 61, 69, 70, 72.

Sun, 117; - worship, 118; - God, 119.

Georgian, 155; -s, 152.

Hajar-ul-Aswad, 125.

Hacib, 63.

Hakan, 119, 134; -lar, 115.

Hakim; - ideology, 136; - class, 64, 79, 113, 168; - element, 156; - mode of production,

15.

Dominion, 115, 116.

Caliph, 73; - Sultan, 160.

People, 28, 43, 45, 55, 61, 62, 68, 70, 71, 73, 80, 86, 88, 89, 95, 100, 101, 126, 128, 130, 132, 134, 143, 151, 154, 155, 161, 169; - hostility, 127; - powers, 113, 165; - stories, 55; - will, 87; -s, 131, 169, 173; - assembly, 25; - bards, 127; - freedom, 48.

Populist, 160; -ness, 145, 161.

Dynasty, 55, 132.

Haniphism, 118.

Khans, 115, 129.

Han dynasty, 31.

Tribute, 165.

Tributary; - stage, 91; - property, 91; - society, 98; - mode of production, 98, 112.

Khwarezmite tribes, 153.

Hassa troops, 28.

Hassan, Ümit, 17, 116.

Hatiboğlu, Vecihe, 156.

Hatuns, 71.

Havemann, 97.

Livestock, 27, 32, 38, 60, 86.

Caspian Sea, 90.

Khazar Empire, 104.  
Khazar, 105, 111, 148; - kagan, 104, 115; -lar, 19, 58, 49, 101, 104, 119, 148; - Turks, 41.  
Hector, 106.  
Hellenic alphabet, 152.  
Hepkon, Haluk, 77.  
Christian, 152; - family chief, 154; - the West, 98; -lar, 154; -isation, 95, 122; -lik, 119, 120, 123, 124.  
Hilbashi, 63.  
India, 41, 170, 171.  
India, 59.  
Hittites, 152, 153, 158, 159.  
Hitler, Adolf, 163, 164.  
Hiung Nu, 26, 27. See Huns.  
Hierarchy, 26, 31, 37-39, 48, 69, 72, 101, 130.  
Hezbollah (Scientific group), 165.  
Hobsbawm, E. J., 137.  
Netherlands, 96.  
Homeric epics, 106.  
Khorasan, 126; - soldiers, 126.  
Tolerance, 119.  
Law, 38, 86, 132, 133, 146; - order, 107; - creation, 146.  
Hun (Hiung-nu), 23, 26, 27, 131; - aristocracy, 28, 31, 29; - aristocrats, 147; - age, 34; - emperor, 115; - confederation, 23, 26, 31, 48, 147, 148; -lar, 18, 19, 23, 26, 28, 28, 29, 31, 35, 36, 55, 66, 100, 101, 110, 116, 117, 119, 147; - tombs, 147.  
Hurri civilisation, 152.  
Ruler, 75, 111, 117, 119.  
Hüseyin Kâzım Bey, 114.  
Hüseyinzade Ali Bey, 160.

Race, 133, 144, 147, 155, 156, 157, 159; - legend, 147; -lar, 143; -sal change, 155; -sal mixture, 147.

racist; - understandings, 159; -s, 52, 167; -ness, 149, 157, 159, 163, 164, 166, 168; - nationalism, 162, 164-167; -nationalist historical theses, 12.

Lake Isig, 58.

Worship, 73, 118.

Iberian peninsula, 92.

Ibn Batuta, 80.

Ibn Fadlan (Arab traveller), 49, 68, 73.

Ibn Havkel, 104.

Prophet Abraham, 118.

Ideology, 43, 57, 64, 73, 73, 77, 95, 96, 102, 103, 113, 119, 120, 122-124, 135-137, 140, 144, 159, 162, 167.

Ideological; - distortions, 135; - conquerors, 123; - conquest, 121; - hegemony, 137; - need, 122; - fiction, 136.

Idi, 57.

Idyll basin, 139.

Idrisî, 68.

Ige, 57.

Ike, 114.

Second World War, 163, 164, 166.

Ikta, 76, 111.

Power, 132.

Ilbashi, 63.

Ilbeg, 63.

Progressive, 160; - World, 175; -lik, 113.

Ilig, 61, 63.

Scholar, 154.

Ilimga, 63.

First Turkists, 160.

primitive, 90; - solidarity, 46; - transcending equality, 15; - conquest state, 91; - beliefs, 117; - tribal conditions, 78; - communist age, 85; - communist society, 86, 88; - communism, 52; - transition from society to feudal society, 89; - and spontaneous democracy, 48.

Ilteber, 56; -s, 39.

Ilterish Khan, 36, 39.

*Iliad and Odyssey*, 106.

Emperor, 76; -lar, 134; -luk, 55, 94, 95, 122.

Inan, Abdülkadir, 15.

Faith, 116, 127; - differences, 126; -lar, 117, 118, 122, 125.

Believer, 67.

Bible, 117.

British; - imperialism, 161; - domination, 163.

England, 92, 96.

İnönü, İsmet, 164, 166.

Silk, 46, 119.

Silk Road, 31.

Iran, 41, 74, 75, 138, 170, 171; - tribes of, 148, 152; - people of, 46, 106, 131; - property, 31; - heritage, 11; - civilisational heritage, 106.

Ireland, 92.

Irtica, 166; - briefings, 166.

Scandinavian countries, 92.

Scythians, 152.

Islam, 107, 117, 118, 118, 120, 126, 142, 158; - ideology, 74; - empires, 96; - sword, 123; - becoming, 95, 154; -isation, 154; - medieval, 94, 98; - pre-medieval periods, 102; - historians, 121; - societies, 98; - countries, 68; - and Middle Eastern sources, 96.

Islamist ideology, 122.

Islamic Great East Raiders Front (IBDA/C), 165. Islamic Movement, 165.

Islamic Fist, 165.

Islam, 57, 64, 68, 68, 69, 73, 103, 119-127, 131, 140; - cultural circle, 16.

Spain, 96.

Istanbul, 17; - masters, 161.

Invasion, 105; - waves, 111.

Swedes, 169.

Swiss, 169.

Revolt, 44, 64, 125; -s, 76.

Italy, 103.

Italians, 137.

Ite, 57, 114.

Its, 60.

It, 57.

İttihat ve Terakki Dock Club, 140. İye,  
114.

Izmir Economic Congress, 141.

Izmit Press Conference, 163.



Japan, 90.

Japan, 175.

Juan-Juans, 33, 36, 152. See Avars, Dwarfs.

Tribe; - aristocracy, 24, 27, 41, 49, 69, 70, 72, 86, 88, 100, 102, 103; - aristocrats, 71, 130; - lords, 66, 89; - beys, 69; - unions, 130; - democracy, 86; - transition from feudalism, 15; - traditions, 62; - hierarchy, 31; - alliance, 38; - confederations, 105, 108, 109, 110; - confederation, 15; - confederation to state, 100; -s, 24; -s alliance, 129; - confederation of, 26, 33, 101; - confederation of, from transition to state, 72; - organisation, 48, 52, 55; - system, 14; - chiefs, 26, 29, 56, 76; - caste of chiefs, 24; - society, 14, 16, 23; - society to state and transition to civilisation, 145; transition from - society to feudalism, 42, 81, 92; leap from - society to feudalism, 96; dissolution of - society, 36; - lands, 25.

Kadykan forest, 37.

Kadroists, 140.

Kafesoglu, Ibrahim, 150, 151, 154.

Infidel, 124, 125; - Turks, 124.

Caucasian, 158; - migration, 153; - peoples, 152.

Caucasus, 19, 58, 104, 139, 170-172.

Kagan, 37-39, 43, 45, 47, 47, 53, 56, 56, 65, 101, 102, 118, 128; -lar, 115, 128; -lik, 55.

Heroes, 114.

Heroic age, 24, 106.

Kahramanmaras, 165.

Kale, 119; -ler, 118.

Kamlar, 119. See Shamanism.

Public power, 28, 47, 55, 72, 76, 100, 101, 104.

Blood ties, 31, 51, 52, 55, 66, 67, 73, 86, 89, 100, 128, 147-150, 159.

Blood relations, 24.

Cognate; - groups, 28; - tribal society, 87; - organisational organs, 29; -ness, 16; - organisation, 25, 51, 55, 87; - society, 67; - Turkish tribal order, 15.

Suleiman the Magnificent, 134.

Capitalist, 90, 135; - world system, 173; - imperialist system, 174; - market, 129; - exploitation, 91; - society, 135, 136; - civilisation, 95; - rise, 96.

Capitalism, 12, 93, 94, 96-98, 136, 173; transition to, 106; development of, 138; - dawn of, 129, 134.

*Kara Atena*, 96.

Kara state, 95.

Black-boned bodun, 45.

Black Stone, 125.

Karabodun, 40, 43, 44, 45, 45, 61, 88.

Karacaoğlan, 127.

Karacuk Çoban, 72.

Black Sea Military Cooperation Organisation, 172.

Karakhanid, 58, 70, 105, 111; - aristocracy, 122; - state, 23, 61, 62, 120; - khan, 122; -s, 19, 59, 61-64, 101, 102, 104, 117.

Karakum, 34.

Headquarters, 36.

Karluk, 38, 39, 53, 61, 64; - age pottery, 60; - tribe, 62; -s, 33, 44, 57, 58, 65, 119, 130.

Karmati movement, 126.

Kastamonu, 156.

Kashgarli Mahmut, 13, 54, 58, 59, 62, 63, 68, 71, 124, 125, 132.

Tribe, 128, 130-133, 136, 139, 141, 143-145, 155; -ler, 143, 147-149, 151, 153, 156, 158; -ler threshing, 158; -ler threshing, 149, 150; -ler Gate, 155, 156; -ler Bridge, 155. Kavmiyet; -

current, 140; - emotion, 139. Kaygulu

Derbendi, 69.

Kayı tribe, 79.

Kazakhstan, 170.

Kazakhs, 168.

Kazan Oğlu Uruz, 126.

Celtic, 152.

Kemalist, 162; - Revolution, 19, 112, 142, 145, 159; - people, 141, 164; - nationalism, 162, 165; - historians, 121, 158; - official history of administration opinion, 121.

Kemalism, 139, 140, 142, 145, 158; revolutionary nationalism of, 163; ideologues of, 158; official history of, 155.

Kent, 109; -s, 25, 118; -s' organisation, 94; -s, 119.

Karim state, 113.

Caravan, 39, 44, 49; - roads, 61.

Caravanserais, 80.

Cypriot pirates, 152.

Sword, 122, 154; - force, 121, 122.

Kımız, 60.

Kipchak, 153; -lar, 124.

Kyrgyz, 37, 38; - kagan, 44; -lar, 33, 44, 54, 148, 168.

Kyrgyzstan, 170.

Crimean Turks, 139.

Kıtay, 37, 46.

Kıvılcımlı, Hikmet, 14.

Red Apple, 162.

Kızılbaş, 127; - hostility, 127; -Alevî, 126. See Alevism.

Kizilirmak, 152.

Clan, 25, 26, 31, 51, 52, 73, 85, 86, 128, 130; -s, 24, 38, 40; -ownership, 32; - organisation, 24, 55.

Collective; - clan property, 86; - property, 42, 52; - land, 25, 87.

Columbus, Christopher, 98.

Kommaneges, 152.

Communal stage, 91.

Confederation, 25-28, 33, 34, 34, 37, 38, 46, 49, 55, 87, 128, 129, 132, 141, 147, 149; -s, 105, 108, 110, 111.

Council, 25, 87.

Cosmic gods, 117.

Kogayuk, 63.

Etymology (etymology), 13, 133.

Slave, 41, 44, 48, 70, 71, 71, 89, 109; - labour, 42, 89, 91; - relations, 98; -s, 42, 72, 86; -isation, 42; -lik, 25, 41, 42, 70, 86, 90, 94.

Slavery, 90; - relations, 88; - being, 12, 15, 90-92, 95, 96; - inheritance, 12, 94; - Rome, 93; - society, 88; - civilisation, 92, 93, 120; - relation of production, 92; - mode of production, 12, 90, 92, 98.

Köprülü, Fuat, 15, 75, 78, 79.

Peasant, 106, 112, 135; - masses, 28; -s, 29, 76, 77, 80, 161. Köymen, Mehmet Altay, 151.

King, 55; -lar, 48, 114, 135, 137, 142; -lar era, 24; -lik, 29, 48, 87.

Crisis zones, 171; intervention power in, 166, 171.

Kul, 41, 47, 51, 61, 71, 116, 134, 135.

*Kur'an*, 117.

Kuray finds, 35.

Kurgans (graves), 24, 34.

Wolf, 29, 71.

Liberation struggles, 173, 174.

War of Independence, 138, 141, 154, 154, 161, 162, 163, 168.

Liberation wars, 138, 173.

Kurultay, 87.

Foundation film, 78.

Establishment, 132; -consociation, 146.

Kut, 101-103, 115, 116.

*Kutadgu Bilig*, 59, 60-63, 102, 120. Kutluk

Kagan (Ilterish), 34.

Kutluluk, 116.

Holy, 125.

North Africa, 92.

Northern Anatolia, 156.

Northeast Anatolian highlands, 152.

Northern Hun, 31.  
Northern Iraq, 166, 171.  
Northern Black Sea, 152.  
Northern Turks, 139.  
Small capital, 174.  
Külerkin, 72.  
Kültigin, 34; - Monument, 34, 40, 43.  
Culture, 106, 122, 137, 137, 144, 157-159, 169; - exchange, 148; - heritage, 159.  
Kun, 41, 70. See Day.  
Kurdistan, 166.  
Shovel, 34.  
Globalisation, 174, 175.  
Kurdish, 155; - masses of people, 168; -s, 143, 152, 158, 162, 168.  
Kyrene school, 114.

Secular, 160, 169; -lik, 120, 145.  
Latifundium, 93.  
Latin America, 97, 99, 138, 173.  
Latin, 136.  
Laz, 155; -s, 152.  
Polish; - nobleman, 140; - nationalist, 140.  
independence of Poland, 140.  
Lenin, V. I., 173, 174.  
Guild, 54; - organisation of, 80.  
Luxury, 29.

Temples, 159.  
Machiavelli, Niccolo, 77.  
Material civilisation, 123.  
Mining, 68.  
Malazgirt, 152.  
Financial capital, 173.

Manchbeg, 63.  
 Spiritual; - civilisation, 123; - element, 136.  
 Mani, 123; - religion, 56, 57, 119.  
 Manichaeism, 119.  
 Manor, 93.  
 Mao-Tun (Mete), 26, 27, 28, 29, 100, 134.  
 Mao Zedong, 23, 173.  
 Mark, 93.  
 Marxist, 15.  
 Marx, Karl, 16, 25, 29, 36, 47, 69, 74.  
 Maveranuehir, 65, 75, 78.  
 Mazdeism, 119.  
 Oppressed nations, 173.  
 World of the Oppressed, 175.  
 Med, 152.  
 Civilised; - lives, 123; - progress, 123.  
 Civilisation, 123.  
 Madrasahs, 80.  
 Mehmet Ali Tevfik Bey, 140. Mehmet  
 Emin Bey (Yurdakul), 161. Melikşah  
 (Seljuk Sultan), 76.  
 Civil service, 28, 72; -s, 55.  
 Centre, 111, 112, 113; -ism, 112; - and centrifugal relation, 109.  
 Centralised; - despotic state, 14; - state, 109; - army, 154; - authority, 32; -  
 organisation, 91, 110.  
 Centripetal; - state, 110; - tradition, 109; -likeness, 109, 112.  
 Centrifugal, 109, 112, 113; - tendencies, 110, 111.  
 Constitutional Monarchy II, 160.  
 Masjids, 80.  
 Masudī (Arab historian), 68, 70.  
 Meta, 89; - exchange, 31; - economy, 42, 49, 59, 88, 93-96, 105, 107, 109-  
 112, 120, 123; - societies, 90; - civilisation, 95; - production, 70, 107, 109.

See Money and monetary economy. Mevla, 114.

Mevlana Celâleddin Rumî, 155.

Mevlevîlik, 154.

Mesopotamia, 158.

MHP, 17; - management, 166.

Egypt, 90, 109.

Mihaloğulları, 154.

Mikenai, 151.

Millet, 12, 13, 37, 75, 75, 99, 128, 130, 133-141, 143, 144, 147, 157, 158, 161, 163, 167-169, 173-175; - idea, 139; - fact, 172; - birth of and development, 138; -in substance, 143; -in formation, 141; -in historicity, 137; - fiction, 137; -s, 106, 143, 144, 168, 169, 169, 172, 174; -isation, 138, 141, 173; -isation programme, 144; - definition of, 142, 158; - and the Principle of Nationalities, 143.

national, 158; - discrimination and oppression, 168; - oppression, 168; - consciousness, 128; - unity and solidarity, 129; - current, 140; - democratic revolution, 139, 145, 146; - revolution, 141, 141, 142; - state, 137; - states, 172; - language, 137; - hostility, 168; - development, 138; - reality, 174; - liberation wars, 172, 173; - culture, 136, 137; - function of culture, 137; - market, 135, 138; - capital classes, 174; - borders, 163; - history, 141; - Turkish state, 141.

National Security Council, 164-166.

National Security Policy Document, 166.

Concept of National Military Strategy, 165.

Nationality, 141; - movement, 140; - idea, 161; -s, 153; -s principle, 144; - perverlik, 161.

nationalist; - current, 140, 160, 162; - point of view, 121; - epoch, 134; - ideologues, 129; -s, 85; - purists, 17; - historical theses, 12; - historians, 13, 37, 16, 100, 101, 111, 153.

Nationalism, 13, 136, 136, 137, 142, 145, 160-162, 168.

Architecture, 159.

Heritage, 59.

Mirşan, Kâzım, 156.

Mittani civilisations, 152. Modern centralised state, 112.

Mongol, 23, 131, 147; - influx, 111, 151; - migrations, 152; - domination, 122; - invasion waves, 106; - invasion, 77, 153; - mass, 153; -s, 79, 89, 105, 111, 122, 128, 130, 148.

Morgan, Lewis Henry, 153.

Muhtesib's, 62.

Judaism, 152; - religion, 148; -lik, 119, 120.

Mustafa Celalettin Pasha, 140.

Absolute monarchy, 95, 98, 112; -s, 91.

Exchange, 153, 154.

Property, 69, 103, 130; - owner, 116; - owners, 57, 62, 85, 107, 108, 109, 114; - ownership, 24, 115.

Property, 24, 27, 32, 59, 89, 106, 116; - difference, 25, 86.

Propertyless, 85.

Disciples, 144.

Muslim, 64, 117, 119, 119, 126, 131, 151, 154; - peoples, 155; -s, 65, 123, 125, 125, 153; -laşma, 125; -lik, 122, 125, 154; - Turks, 124; - writers, 155.

Namik Kemal, 75.

NATO, 165.

Nazi; - regiments, 164; - imperialists, 163; - commanders, 164; -s, 164.

Neoliberal governments, 171.

*History of Neşri*, 118.

Nizamülmülk, 15, 76, 77, 125.

Noyan, 130.

Nökerler, 67, 67.

Population, 109, 150, 151, 155, 168; - increase, 74; - explosions, 110; - at intensification, 37; increase of, 87.



January; -lar 32; - ownership of,

32. Ofşin, 121. See Afşin.

Og, 65.

Oguz, 66.

Oguz, 46, 47, 53, 65, 129, 130, 156, 159; - aristocracy, 69, 73, 126; - bey, 71; - tribes, 76; - masses, 67, 78; - confederation, 104; -s, 19, 42, 61, 64-72, 74, 105, 119, 119, 124, 128, 131, 153, 169; - Turku, 73; - Yabgu confederation, 47; - yabgulari, 71, 72; - yabgu, 66, 68; -Turkmen masses, 74.

Oghuz, 68.

*Oghuz Epic*, 69.

Oghuz Kagan, 65.

*Oghuz Khan Epic*, 15, 102, 106, 115, 118.

*Oguzname* (Oghuz Kagan Epic), 66.

Arrow, 59.

On Oguz, 129.

On Ok, 38; -lar (Turgish), 44, 131.

On Otag, 63.

On Uyghur, 37, 53; -lar, 130.

Oppenheimer, Franz, 49, 91, 95, 97.

Orak, 27.

Orda, 133.

Army, 28, 36, 39, 44, 46, 46, 49, 77, 86, 86, 104, 133, 164, 166; - organisation, 132.

*Orkhon Inscriptions*, 34.

*Orkhon Monuments*, 34.

Orkhon region, 53.

*Orkhon Inscriptions*, 13, 15, 33, 34, 36-41, 43-47, 51, 52, 61, 65, 70, 85, 111, 115, 117, 118, 130-132.

Orkun, Hüseyin Namık, 13, 34.

Central Asia, 12, 14, 18, 19, 26, 28, 28, 31, 33, 34, 39, 41, 52, 58, 67, 73, 75, 76, 100, 101, 104, 105, 107, 109, 114, 119, 120, 123, 128, 131, 147, 148, 150,

154, 158, 161, 168-172; - aristocracy, 119; - peoples, 121; - tribe confederations, 115; - kaganates, 110; - tribes, 11-13, 80, 87-91, 98, 108, 108, 110, 111, 120, 125, 131, 133, 149; - beliefs of the tribes, 116; - heroic age of, 106; - historians, 149; - societies, 15, 23, 85, 86; - Turkish tribes, 117, 118; - Turkish society, 16; - Turks, 158.

*Arab conquest in Central Asia*, 121.

Middle Ages, 98, 121, 125, 125, 134, 144, 163; - powers, 138; - relations, 138.

Middle East, 19, 76, 97, 103, 117, 119, 122, 171; - God, 119, 120, 122; - languages, 114; - religion, 122, 123; - religions, 120; - deities, 118; - tribes, 120, 122; - nun advanced model of God, 116.

Common; - language, 169; - culture, 143; - property, 108; - spiritual formation, 135; - consciousness of life, 143, 169.

Orientalists, 159.

Orientalism, 97, 163.

Osman Gazi, 134.

Ottoman, 11, 19, 65, 72, 130, 155, 162; - aristocracy, 126; - beys, 77; -c1, 160; - state, 75, 77, 80, 81, 101, 105, 111, 140, 154, 170; - of the state birth, 81; - foundation of the state, 91; - feudalism, 78, 94; - feudalism, 74; - dynasty, 78; - army, 140; -s, 78, 79, 133, 150; - sultans, 155; - palace, 160; - social life, 161; - sultans, 127; - sultanate, 127; - social structure, 134; - society, 111; - Turks, 139.

Osmanoğulları, 78.

Grasslands, 26, 27.

Troop, 130.

Borrow, 68.

Ögel, Bahaeddin, 15.

Death penalty, 49, 121.

Asia Minor, 74, 158.

Pre-Turkic (Proto-Turkic), 131, 153, 157; -ler, 156.

Örf, 76.

Ötüken forest, 49.

Ozal, Turgut, 171.  
Uzbekistan, 171.  
Uzbeks, 148, 168.  
Private property, 24, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32, 48, 49, 51, 52, 55, 56, 58, 67, 69, 76, 85, 86, 88, 89, 93, 94, 100, 104, 105, 107-111, 128, 149; transition to, 15.  
Special war organisation, 165.  
Free; - labour, 135; - citizenship order, 98, 110.  
Emancipation, 171.  
Freedom, 135, 137.  
Assimilation, 137, 144.  
Assimilation, 143, 148, 156.  
  
Sultan, 161; -lar, 159; -lik, 144.  
Pan-Islamism, 162.  
Panturanism, 162.  
Money, 49, 104; - economy, 28, 91, 94, 103, 112; - system, 112; - production, 112. See Commodity economy.  
Paris, 106.  
Parvus Efendi, 160.  
Pacific, 175.  
Sharing quarrel, 170.  
Pecheneg, 153; - bahadars, 87; -ler, 152.  
Perinçek, Doğu, 14-17, 20, 78, 80.  
Persians, 151.  
Oil, 170.  
Prophet, 65, 134.  
Pir Sultan Abdal, 19, 127.  
Pittard, 152.  
Market, 128, 135-137.  
Polatay, Derviş, 94.  
Police, 103.  
Political society, 108.

Pomak, 153, 155.  
Portugal, 96; - ships, 98.  
Prince, 103; -s, 142.  
Professional army, 104.  
Propaganda, 46.  
Idol; - house, 125; - worship, 118; -s, 125.

Lord, 73, 114.  
Radlov, 53.  
Priest, 57.  
Rashid al-Din (Ilkhanid Vizier), 66.  
Rome, 12, 28, 29, 91, 93-95, 103, 109, 112, 122, 151; - Germanic synthesis, 93, 94; - law, 96; - empire, 12, 94, 120, 151; - heritage, 93; - gods, 120; - and Greek civilisation, 96; - court servants, 48; - people, 24, 122.  
Roslyakov, 67, 72. Rousseau, Jean Jacques, 135.  
Renaissance, 103.  
William of Rubruk, 151.  
Spiritual formation, 135, 136.  
Rum, 151, 152, 153, 155; - aristocracy, 154; - emigration, 154; - masses of people, 154; - population, 154.  
Rumeli, 160.  
Rumî, 155.  
Russian state, 107.  
Russians, 92, 131, 152.  
Russia, 97, 107, 148, 148, 160, 170-172.  
Bribe, 63.

Ploughshares, 27.  
Sahib, 57.  
Sakarya, 152.

Sultanate, 160.  
Salur Kazan, 67-69, 72, 106.  
Samanids, 117, 121.  
Samoyeds, 148.  
Art, 104, 159.  
Sancar (Seljuk Sultan), 154.  
Perversion, 124.  
Palace, 80; - power, 28; - organisation, 63; - and government men, 161.  
Sarıkamış Operation, 162.  
Cistern, 54.  
Satuk Bukhra Khan, 23, 64, 117, 122.  
War, 25, 40, 42, 44, 47, 55, 72, 119; -çı, 126; -çılar, 55, 124; - for organisation, 25, 47; -lar, 39, 41, 48, 69, 88, 100, 121, 125, 129, 147, 154.  
Eight Oghuz, 65, 129.  
Thessaloniki, 140.  
Seljuk Bey, 134.  
Seljuk, 11, 19, 65, 72, 77, 77, 81, 105, 111, 130, 150, 155; - aristocracy, 75, 76, 126; - lords, 76, 79, 115; - feudal aristocracy, 80; - feudalism, 74, 79; - tradition, 77; -s, 72, 75, 76, 78, 104, 111, 133, 155.  
Selenga River, 27.  
Celestial deities, 119.  
Serf, 26, 38, 89; -s, 77; -lik, 37; -lik relations, 94.  
Accumulation of wealth, 42.  
Cattle worship, 118.  
Class, 41, 61; - contradictions, 135; - antagonisms, 71; - differences, 55, 56; - differentiation, 29, 43, 67, 71, 73, 78, 100, 101, 124; - domination, 105; - quarrels, 76; -s, 71, 85, 113, 118, 135, 136; -splitting into, 119, 120; - division into, 79, 88, 104, 105, 107, 117; - reconciliation of, 135; - extinction of, 134; - historical role of, 113; - becoming societies, 114; - becoming, 40, 44, 52, 68, 74, 75, 86, 104, 107, 117-119; - struggle, 43, 61, 62, 68, 70, 71, 88, 112, 135, 174; -less primitive society, 86; -less class society transition to society, 90, 91.

Class society, 55, 104, 116; - leap to, 111. Class; - decomposition, 80; - divisions, 69; - roles, 113.

Weapon, 26, 28, 47, 55, 76, 85, 100, 171; -power, 28, 55, 62, 80, 85, 111, 132; - retinue with, 86; - sanctioning power with, 107; - deprivation, 62, 72, 77, 86, 88, 104, 109; -shors, 67, 72; -purification from, 76; -monopoly, 85, 86.

Sincian-Uyghur, 54, 171.

Sir River, 66.

Sir-i Derya; - tribes, 68; - Oghuz, 61, 65, 67, 73, 104, 130, 131.

Sivas, 165.

Sivas Congress, 162.

Civil society, 108.

Political; - decentralisation, 91; - bond, 132, 133, 143-145, 147-149, 159; - institutions, 133; - centrifugation 112; - organisation 45; - organisation, 132; - community, 128, 133; - element, 143.

Politics, 146; - theory, 120.

*Siyasetname*, 15, 76, 77.

Political; - committee, 144; - organisation, 144. Slavic, 152; - language, 148; -s, 122, 131, 148.

Socialist, 90, 97; - movement, 160; - views, 160; -s, 160.

Socialism, 99, 106.

Soviet Union, 169, 170.

Lineage, 38, 87, 130.

Noble; - clan, 46; - class, 48; -s, 41, 42; -luk, 87.

Colonisation, 138.

Colonisation, 174.

Exploitation, 27, 28, 31, 40, 44-46, 49, 52, 56, 61, 62, 70, 72, 77, 86, 88, 89, 97, 103, 105, 168; - relationship, 38; - system, 112.

Stato, 103.

Aqueducts, 159.

Subaşı, 72.

Irrigation; - canals, 27; - projects, 109. Sûlmî, 54.

Sultan-i İklim-i Rum, 155.  
Sultans, 126.  
Sumer, 120; -s, 152, 153, 158; - gods, 120.  
Syria, 152.  
Sübaşı, 63.  
Suleyman Pasha, 160.  
Sumer, Faruk, 15, 16, 72, 123.  
Sümerbank, 158.  
Sunnî; - Islam, 64; - Islamic ideology, 126; - sect, 126; -lik, 73.  
Herd, 27, 32, 34, 44, 69, 89; -s, 24.  
Assyrians, 152.

Shad, 47, 56; -lik, 39.  
Shah Hasan, 126.  
Shah Hussein, 126.  
Shaman; - beliefs, 118; -lar, 118, 119. See Kam.  
Shamanism, 116, 118.  
Shan-Yü, 26, 29; - tribe, 31.  
Shanghai Five, 170. Shanghai  
Cooperation Organisation, 171.  
Chiefs, 40, 56, 100; - council, 55.  
City, 54; -s, 36, 56, 58, 64, 68, 68, 77, 80, 89, 118, 124, 125; -s  
establishment, 54; - merger, 57, 61, 103.  
*Shahnameh*, 106.  
Shari'ah, 144; -cist powers, 163.  
Sheikhs, 144.  
Shinasi, 140.  
Shoven, 167.

T'ang shu, 35.  
Tabar, 40, 43.  
Nationality; - bond, 149; - bonds, 39; - relations, 40, 45; - relationship, 37, 129.

Tajikistan, 170.  
Talan, 38, 76, 121; - expeditions, 100.  
Talas River, 34.  
Tanilli, Server, 15, 17.  
God kagans, 103, 115.  
God Kut, 115.  
God, 48, 59, 73, 102, 115-117, 118, 124; -lar, 120; -laştırma, 119; -nın son, 115; -sanity, 115, 116.  
Tanzimatists, 134.  
Taoism, 119.  
Tapıgıcı (Tapugçı), 56, 62.  
Temples, 119.  
Tapugçı'lar, 62.  
Tarcan, Halûk, 156.  
Tardush, 37, 39, 47; -lar, 44.  
Agriculture, 28, 35-37, 58, 60, 60, 61, 64, 68, 68, 73, 76, 80, 89, 159; - tool, 35; - implements, 27; -cultivators, 62, 70; -culture, 34; -economy, 61; -technology, 60.  
Agricultural basin, 61.  
History, 113, 136, 146, 152, 169, 173; - thesis, 14.  
*Tarih-i Alem*, 160.  
Historian, 66, 72, 118, 133; -s, 67, 71, 74, 75, 113, 126, 147, 148.  
Historical; - category, 134, 144; - heritage, 136; - cultural heritage, 158.  
Historical materialism, 11-14, 90.  
Historiography, 13, 116.  
Sects, 126.  
Tarkan, 39, 56, 72.  
Field agriculture, 27.  
Stone worship, 118.  
Tasagil, Ahmet, 33.  
Tatar, 37, 131; -lar, 152.  
Tayşı, 130.  
Subjects, 101, 128, 130, 133, 134, 144, 147.



Threat, 165, 166, 174; - countries under, 170.  
Monotheistic religions, 19.  
Tekin Alp, 142.  
Tekin, Talat, 13, 34, 45.  
Technology, 42, 60.  
Monotheism, 118.  
Tengri Kagan, 115.  
Tengut bodunu, 44.  
Theorists, 160, 163.  
Ter, 59.  
Terci, 59.  
Terror, 165.  
Torah, 117.  
Thomsen, V., 132.  
Thomson, George, 90.  
Trade, 31, 42, 54, 56-58, 68, 70, 80, 80, 89, 90, 100, 104, 107, 108, 123, 124, 126; - security of, 61, 62; - capital of, 91; - civilisations of, 110.  
Tigin, 39.  
Tiginbeg, 63.  
Timur, 111; - invasion, 105, 153.  
Tobi, 37.  
Seed millet, 35.  
Tokuz Oguz, 131. See Dokuz Oguz. Tolis, 39.  
Tolstov, 72.  
Tonyukuk, 34, 52, 119; - Monument, 34, 44.  
Social; - evolution, 51; - differentiation, 24, 27, 36, 86, 128; - delegation, 144.  
Soil, 26, 27, 27, 42, 45, 45, 69, 70, 76, 77, 80, 100, 101, 103, 103, 105, 120, 135, 136, 143; - allegiance to, 37; - unity of, 169; - ownership of, 91, 95.  
Taurus, 152.  
Töre (Töre), 27, 44, 45, 51, 132.  
Törelî, 133.

Töre, 132. See Töre. Törük, 133.

Thrace, 150, 152, 156.

Tucea, 130.

Tucyu, 131.

Tugrul Bey, 75.

Tunga Tigin, 42.

Tunguz, 31, 148.

Turan, Osman, 15.

Turan, 162; - societies, 167; -cılar, 164, 167; -cılık, 162, 163; - kinship form, 153.

Turanian, 158.

Turchia (Turkey), 155.

Turfan, 54.

Tutuk, 39.

Tuyahta kurgans, 29.

Tuygut, 34.

Merchant; - state, 54; -s, 57, 64, 73, 112, 123-125; -s religion, 124.

Turgish, 38, 40; - bodunu, 43; - kagan, 37, 44; - karabodunu, 43; -ler, 33, 43, 130.

Turk, 23, 33, 38, 38, 40, 46, 130-134, 145-147, 152, 168, 169; - aristocracy, 34, 122, 123, 149, 150; - beys, 40, 47; - bodunu, 33, 40, 43, 44, 47, 49, 132; - tribes, 46; - world domination, 13; - republics, 168-172; - children, 164; - language, 121, 148; - feudalism, 106, 120; - General Staff, 172; - migration, 150, 155; - ruling classes, 167; - folk culture, 127; - people, 143; - peoples, 168-171; - racism, 157, 162, 167, 168; - race, 147, 156; - kagan, 44, 47, 131; - kaganates, 129; - tribes, 139; - tribe, 134; - concept, 163; - culture, 121, 149; -s, 75; -s acceptance of Islam, 123; - isation, 154; - nation, 134, 141, 142, 142, 144, 156-158, 162, 167, 169, 175; - luxury, 134, 148; - creating the nation, 140; - nationalism, 139, 140, 160, 162, 164; - nationalist, 140, 164; - nationalists, 134; - nationality bond, 142; -

sultan, 134, 155; - Sir bodunu, 46; - nobles, 129; - history, 145, 149; - homeland, 141; - patriots, 164; - and Kurdish elements, 163.

Turkish Bilge Kagan, 33, 34, 46, 130.

Turkish Revolution, 138, 142; - programme of, 144. Turkish Revenge Brigade (TIT), 165.

*Turkish Dictionary*, 114.

Turkish Armed Forces, 164-166.

*Turkish History*, 160.

*Outlines of Turkish History*, 155.

*Türk Yurdu*, 160.

Turkish-Islam, 58.

Turkish-Russian-Chinese axis, 172.

Turkish, 13, 23, 33, 34, 38, 45, 46, 54, 58, 59, 66, 96, 101-103, 108, 117, 121, 122, 125, 129, 131-133, 139, 148, 153, 168, 169; - books, 161; - poems, 161.

Turkist; - movement, 160; - intellectuals, 160.

*History of Turkism*, 139, 159.

Turkism, 140, 159.

Türkeş, Alparslan, 165.

Turkic, 168.

Turkestan, 126.

Turkey, 13, 17, 92, 97, 107, 138-140, 142, 143, 143, 145, 150, 153, 155, 162-172, 175; - bourgeoisie, 163; - geography, 162; - labourers, 168; - people, 142, 143, 157, 163, 168; - territorial integrity of, 166; - Turkish, 169; - Turks, 168.

Grand National Assembly of Turkey, 163.

Republic of Turkey, 142, 157, 162, 166; - people, 159; - citizen, 143; -ni establishing, 143.

Turkish Revolution, 145.

Revolutionary Workers' and Peasants' Party of Turkey, 14.

*History of Turkey*, 16.

Turkiyeli; - concept, 163; - becoming, 162.

*Conversion of Turks to Islam/ Satuk Buğra Khan, see Satuk Buğra Khan. History of the Turks, 14, 92.*

Turkmen, 66, 131; - aristocracy, 76; - wave of nomads, 78; - migration, 151; - masses, 75; - mass, 78; - population, 154; -s, 65, 79, 153, 168; -Oğuz, 151.

Tyrcae, 130.

Transport; - projects, 109; - technology, 112.

Ulema, 64, 77, 78, 80.

Nation, 23, 38, 130.

Titles, 39.

Ural-Altaic tribes, 148.

Urartu, 152; -lar, 158.

Urunç, 63.

Uruz Bey, 102.

Uşak, 70.

Civilised; - empires, 129; - society (civil society), 107, 109.

Civilisation, 12, 23, 76, 80, 108, 119, 122, 126, 146, 147, 149, 150.

Transition to civilisation, 64, 86, 111, 119, 133.

Civilisation, 11, 14, 16, 18, 25, 52, 52, 79, 93, 96, 104, 105, 106, 108, 110; - heritage, 106, 168.

Uyghur, 39, 53, 54; - public, 124; - the Khan, 53; - kaganate, 53; - confederation, 53, 54, 65, 104; -lar, 34, 47, 53-56, 101, 104, 119, 125, 128, 131; - priestesses, 56; - history, 23.

Uyghur Elteber, 53.

Uyghur, 57, 66, 69, 102, 115, 118.

Nationality, 45.

Wage, 59.

Paid soldiers, 55.

Three Oguz, 65, 129.

Three Arrows, 67, 68.

Country, 101, 128, 136, 143.

Country unity, 144.

Ülkücü; - ringleaders, 165; -s, 165; -ness, 165; - mafia, 165, 166; - nationalism, 165; - ranks, 17.

Ummah, 133, 134, 144; - transition from nation to nation, 141.

Productive power, 49; -s, 91, 112.

Production, 38, 42, 55, 85, 112; - means, 42, 89; - form, 42; - surplus, 40, 42, 85, 104, 120; - forces, 58; - relations, 58, 74; - style, 38, 88, 90, 97; - technology, 85.

Superior civilisation, 123.

Vascularity, 37.

Homeland, 135-137, 141-143, 170, 173, 174; - antagonism, 141.

Citizen, 144, 167.

Patriotism, 164.

Veled Çelebi Efendi, 161.

Tax, 28, 40, 77, 89, 102.

Vizier, 63.

Vikings, 122.

Vladimirtsov, B.Y., 15.

Volga, 19, 104; - River, 58.

Vyronis, 151.

Werner, Ernst, 15, 71, 91.

Winckler, Hugo, 157.

Foreigners, 167.

Yabgu, 56, 72; -luk, 39; - organisation, 71. See Oğuz yabguları.

Plunder, 25, 31, 32, 47, 49, 56, 63, 63, 72, 76, 86, 87, 109, 110, 129, 152; -ci war chiefs, 11; -ci war chiefdom, 52, 54, 55, 108, 119; - wars, 26-28, 38, 40, 45, 56; - expedition, 55; - politics, 29.

Jewish; - religion, 58; - emigration, 148.

Judaism, 19, 119.

Near East, 65, 75.

Creation, 117.  
Semi-savage tribes, 24.  
Semi-barbarian; - European feudalism, 98; - peoples, 94.  
Prohibition, 54, 76, 161; - books, 160.  
Yavgu, 63.  
Yavuz Sultan Selim, 154.  
writing, 104.  
Yazicioglu, 66.  
Inscriptions, 12, 34, 130, 132.  
Sevens, 55.  
Yengi Balık, 54.  
New Ottomans, 140. See Young Ottomans.  
Janissary Quarry, 154.  
Underground organisations, 165.  
Settled; - feudal society, 29; - feudal societies, 28; - life, 35, 58, 61, 64,  
68, 73, 89; - transition to life, 54; - agriculture, 61, 70; - agricultural life, 34.  
Natives, 156.  
Yigitler, 55, 69.  
Yinal, 72.  
Yinanç, Mükrimin Halil, 150, 152.  
Food culture, 159.  
Yogurt, 60.  
Poor, 86.  
Yugoslavia, 153.  
Yugrush, 63.  
Yug (funeral), 42.  
Upper barbarism, 93.  
Greek; - philosophy, 114; - culture, 96; - civilisation, 96, 97; - and Roman  
history, 98; - and Roman origin, 93, 96, 97; - and Roman heritage, 92, 94, 95,  
98; - and Roman civilisation, 94; - and Roman civilisations, 95.  
Greece, 153.  
Greeks, 24, 117.

Yunus Emre, 127, 133.

Yurt, 39, 40, 153, 155, 156.

Yurtluk, 76.

Citizenship bond, 147.

Yusuf Has Hacı, 59, 61, 62, 70, 102, 120.

Yüceci, 31.

High Islam, 78.

Craft, 68, 89; -s, 35, 58, 90, 159.

Rich, 86; - and the poor, 25, 61. Zheng He (Admiral), 98.

Heresy, 64.

Zina, 49.

Ziya Pasha, 140.

Force, 108, 122; - power, 132; - placement with, 61; - monopoly, 108, 109.

Cruelty, 121, 127, 168; - and domination, 161.

Zulfiqar, 126.

Zulqarnayn, 54.

## **BOOKS BY DOĞU PERİNÇEK**

### **Books Published by Kaynak Publications**

- *Bozkurt Legends and Reality* (Improved 5th edition)
- *Critique of Kuvâcımı's Theory of the Bourgeois Army and State*
- *Society and State from the Ottoman Empire to the Present* (3rd ed.)
- *Kemalist Revolution 1/ Theoretical Framework* (6th edition)
- *Kemalist Revolution 2/ Religion and Allah* (5th edition)
- *Kemalist Revolution 3/ Six Arrows* (3rd edition)

- *Kemalist Revolution 4/ Kurdish Policy in the War of Independence* (2nd edition)
- *Lenin Stalin Mao's Turkey Writings* (3rd edition)
- *Constitution and Party Regime*
- *Chiller Special Organisation* (6th edition)
- *28 February and Army*
- *A State Operation*
- *The Eurasian Option* (Expanded 2nd edition)
- *From Stalin to Gorbachev* (3rd edition)
- *ÖDP's Identity* (3rd edition)
- *Interview with Abdullah Öcalan* (5th edition)
- *Intellectual and Culture* (Expanded 2nd edition)
- *Party and Art* (Expanded 2nd edition)
- *Homosexuality and Alienation*
- *The Emails of Karen Fogg* (4th edition)
- *Tales for Memidik Captain*

#### **Unavailable Books**

- *Internal Regulation and Prohibition Regime of Political Parties in Turkey*  
(AÜHF Publication, 1968)
- *Fascism Cannot Stop the People's Struggle - Speeches and Petitions at the Martial Law Courts* (Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul 1975)
- *Cyprus Issue* (Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, 1976)
- *The Struggle Against Social-Imperialism and Revisionism in 1970*  
(Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, 1976)
- *Criticism of the Revisionist Programme of the Fake TKP*  
(Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, December 1976)
- *What is Right Action?*  
(Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, two editions, 1977-78)
- *The Source of Anarchy and Revolutionary Politics*  
(Aydınlık Publications, two editions, Istanbul, 1978-1979)
- *The Path of the Turkish Revolution* (Aydınlık Publications, 1979)

#### **Books Compiled by Doğu Perinçek**

- Communist International Documents on Turkey Series (5 Books)



1. *War of Independence and Lausanne*

2. *Kemalist Republic*

3. *Kurdish Question*

4. *Communist and Labour Movement*

5. *Şefik Hüsnü Writings and Speeches*

• Atatürk / *On Religion and Secularism*

• Mustafa Kemal/ *Eskişehir-Izmit Speeches (1923)*

**Published Translations of Doğu Perinçek**

• Antonio Carlo, *The Socio-Economic Character of the Soviet Union*  
(Source Publications, Istanbul, 1985)

• Jacek Kuron-Karol Modzelewski, *Monopoly Bureaucratic Socialism*  
(Source Publications, Istanbul, 1986)

• Enver Hoxha, *Revisionism and Adventurism Lead to*  
*Defeat Marxism-Leninism Leads to Victory*

(with Şule Perinçek, Aydınlık Publications, Istanbul, 1975)