



PHENOMENOLOGY OF THE ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUAL



Preface to the first edition



This volume can be regarded as the second part of a total work, which has its first part in the already published Theory of the Absolute Individual and which, as a whole, constitutes the exposition of our doctrine in purely philosophical terms.

The delay with which - for various reasons - this volume comes out (the work, begun in the Alpine trenches, was already completed in 1924) should be borne in mind by those who, having followed us in the more concrete and lively forms given by the application of the same doctrine in the field of the philosophy of culture and initiatic science, might be surprised by this publication; consider it almost as a step backwards; perhaps not find in it what they expected. But, on our part, to close the game already begun, so as to settle when the so-called "modern 'critical thinking' can advance towards a point of view that is superior to it, was a definite duty.

Moreover, it must remain firmly established that our 'philosophy' does not end in itself - all converging in a kind of postulation of an action - just as it does not begin in itself. In its essential elements, what we expound is not merely the product of the subjective speculation of a modern philosopher, but rather the intellectual transposition of certain traditional, primordial doctrines, not subject - in a certain sense - to becoming.

Those who hold the viewpoint of rationality as ultimate instance, must naturally consider this as unspoken, consider us under the purely philosophical point of view, and do not care where that which they may eventually assent to, leads them. But we think we also have another category of readers, for whom the study of this not easy work will serve as a useful mental discipline, aimed at a further purpose. These, therefore, will not have too much trouble to notice the frequent convergences between the meanings emerging through conceptual forms and dialectical passages, and the meanings of teachings of another order. How, for example, could the relationship between the two great options of transcendental freedom, which in our philosophy are called the "way of the subject" and the "way of the other"¹, with the two great traditions, royal and priestly, of action and identification, Nordic-Uranic and telluric-southern, which loom majestically amidst the shadows of myth and prehistory, escape them? The doctrine of the 'three epochs', how could it not refer back to the mystery teaching about 'he who holds himself up; who holds himself up, who holds himself up in

standing up there, in the uncreated power; standing down there, having received generation from the image of the River of Waters; standing by the blessed Power without end, to resemble it perfectly "3? Do not the theetical moment and the autarchical moment of the dialectic contain the meaning of the 'procession' and 'conversion' of the Alexandrian tradition, of the pravrtti-marga and nivrtti-marga of the Hindu one? In the transition from spontaneity to personality, does not the meaning circulating in the cycle of myths about the 'fall' betray the same sense as in the Promethean ones?

In the first "categories", is it perhaps difficult to find through logical deduction what under the heading of "involution" and regression, of degenerating remnants of primordial states of consciousness, still remains in the traditions and mentality of the so-called "primitives" or is "reified" here and there in cosmogonic symbols? And in the latter 'categories', is not the dialectic blatantly a subtle weave around which is organised what has traditionally and uniformly been taught in the East and West about possibilities and experiences

"transcendent" of the spirit? These are but a few of the points that will become apparent to the astute reader. All that remains is to warn that we are not dealing with extrinsic references here: we did not start out from a philosophical system, and we did not later turn to mythology and mystery (as they appear to the 'layman') to illustrate its concepts (as in the case of Schelling, for example), but vice versa: we have started from a certain knowledge of a non-philosophical character, capable of deductively accounting for what is concealed in traditional symbols and myths, and from it, with an adaptation, a reduction and a negation, we have derived a philosophical 'system', the existence of which, today, has its own *raison d'être*.

After which, with respect to our work precisely as 'philosophy', we say that, *mutatis mutandis*, the present Phenomenology obeys a similar requirement to that which led Hegel to the work of the same title. *Mutata mutandis*: since the premise here is not the Hegelian panlogism, the universal legislation that the 'Idea' carries out according to its own internal necessity and force. Instead, the premise is that reduction of every gnoseological, ontological and deontological criterion to the principle of power and freedom of the real individual, which we have already carried out in our Theory of the Absolute Individual; leading idealistic immanentism to its ultimate consequences; affirming a decisive surplus of the possible over the real, of contingency and freedom over every kind of necessity; blossoming into an active realism of a transcendent and supra-rational nature.

Let us recall that from the premise, that an absolutely free being would not be such if, in addition to being itself, it could not also be the negation of itself, we have deduced two 'categories' or primordial experiences, the subject of a "subjective option" (the way of the absolute Individual) and an "objective option" (the way of the "other").

The present Phenomenology determines a set of possibilities conform to this second option, or experience; responding at the same time to the requirement, already formulated⁴, that transcendental principles must not be reduced, as in the last idealism, to empty and indeterminate forms, but must be capable of reducing the elements of our real experience into a system of distinct meanings and values.

The formulation of this system implies that a determined group of fundamental forms. This does not contradict - as some might believe at first glance - the concept of absolute freedom, since these forms do not represent - as in Fichte, Schelling and Hegel - the continuous line of a more or less obligatory itinerary, but rather a group of compossibilities, possible ways, each irreducible to the other, of experiencing the value of the absolute Individual. We must never cease to keep in mind what we will say in this regard about the "category" of the absolute Individual⁵; and so we must not fall into misunderstandings that would have no reason to exist in our regard. Freedom, understood as the pure indeterminate, is the instinctive and passive one of the "objective option"; it is when, with the experience of a quantum, one determines that of the power to choose absolutely between distinct possibilities, each separated from the other by a radical discontinuity, and to dominate in the part the whole - it is then, in that power of the limit, which already in the Greeks was joined to the idea of perfection, one has the manifestation of a positive freedom.

In addition to this factor of discontinuity and contingency, a fundamental point of difference to the various category systems of Romantic idealistic speculation lies in this: that by 'category' we do not mean a logical condition of possible experience, but instead the sense of a possibility of experience⁶. And, in a certain correspondence with the principle of excess of possibility over reality, of freedom over necessity, in the system of experiences constituting the Phenomenology, what is mere and common human experience figures only as a particular case. We consider 'humanity', in the total sense, as one among many possible conditions of individual existence,

in no way privileged compared to others. Man neither begins nor ends in man, however much the moderns - apart from the chimeras of faith and the 'constructions' of the intellect, which continue to be part of what is only 'human' - have been reduced to knowing nothing else. We have restored to the human condition the sense of an episode, of a possibility; two great epochs - which we have called the epoch of 'spontaneity' and the epoch of 'domination' - in our phenomenology stretch out as the subject of possible experiences and as possible ways of being, on both sides of 'man'. The view of the idealists, that - having reached philosophy, religion or the ethics of the absolute state - the process of the spirit reaches its culmination and comes to a halt, for us accuses a limitation and a lack of metaphysical sense (in the literal meaning: lack of sense for what no longer has any relation to bodily conditions) that is most peculiar to moderns. Moreover, the 'modern world', far from representing, as widespread prejudice claims it to, a privileged condition, is itself no more than an apparition, one among many 'cultures'; and the very possibility of ending up in such surprising illusions, so - why not say it? - infantile, itself testifies, with a paradox, to the absolute freedom of the spirit.

One final point. Precisely because this Phenomenology comprises an overall view, which in a certain sense - with respect to a very limited understanding of the 'immanent' - can be said to be transcendent, there is a way to indicate the 'place' and direction of our own most recent activity. The ideas on the crisis of western civilisation; the critical instances with regard to the values of speculation and culture in general; the same statements in socio-political sphere; all that concerns "magical idealism" and the valorisation and effective practice of the initiatic sciences and primordial symbolism - these various aspects our personal activity converge in a single and precise meaning, which betrays the point of a passing of the forms of the "personality" beyond itself, and which alone are justified in it.

In contrast to relativism, which holds that temporal contingency produces, by way reflex and epiphenomenon or backlash, a given 'truth' in knowledge and action, which then 'phenomenalises' the whole according to its form - in contrast to this, we have formed our doctrine in order to a special part and a special purpose, corresponding to a precise 'moment' of what a Hindu would call mahâmâyâ - the 'great game'. E

grasping the rhythm of a vision that is itself, that transcends itself, and then again grasps and reaffirms itself in this transcendence, should what matters most in this regard.

J.E.

Rome, 1929

¹ [Book I \[Theory of the Absolute Individual, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1998, pp.67-93\].](#)

[Z Cf. Introduction to Magic as a Science of the Ego, vol. II \(1928\), p. 321 ff., vol. III \(1929\), p. 65 ff. \[On the "sapiential" and the "heroic" and on the Western Tradition and The Dawn of the West, texts not included in the later Introduction to Magic, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1971\]. Cf. also H. Wirth, Der Aufgang der Menschheit \(Untersuchungen zur Geschichte der Religion, Symbolik und Schrift](#)

der atlantisch-nordischen Rasse), Jena 1929; J.J. Bachofen, Urreligion und antike Symbole, Leipzig 1926.


[3 Apud Hippolytus, Philosophumena, VI, 17.](#)

⁴ [Book I, Foreword, p. VI \[Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 1924\].](#)

⁵ [See supra § 30](#)

‘See, for the notion of 'sense', Book I, Introduction (Of the concept of 'value')
[Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 25-29].

Introduction



In the first book of this work we outlined the general principles of a Theory of Absolute Individual by assuming and integrating the positions of idealism through the reaffirmation of a concept of the ego: a) as pure freedom; b) as absolute power and immanence. In this second book, on the other hand, we want to account for what has been called the positive option (the option of freedom for an order of sufficiency and domination rather than dependence) according to an articulated system of distinct meanings and values. Such is the Phenomenology of the Absolute Individual.

1. As they are based on freedom, both the order of affirmative option and that of the negative option are contingent. Hence, dominated by the 'other', the contingency proper to the second case leads to absolute indeterminability: with respect to its own possible experience, the 'I' cannot jurer de rien, since with principle of it it stands in an external and dependent relationship. Not so in the other case: here the contingency becomes positive, that is, it is that of a free power to determine, which the Ego appropriates, and thus it is possible to fix a definite, absolute, unequivocal system of forms - a system that is absolutely certain, precisely because it is the Ego that will determine, in function of dominion, its principle and structure.

A 'Phenomenology' is therefore possible in the order of the affirmative option; it is not so in the order of the opposite option, due to the very concept of the latter.

We reject some of the difficulties raised against the possibility of a 'Doctrine of Categories'.

a) It is said¹: Under a doctrine of categories the concept as reality can fall, not the concept as concept; hence the abstraction of the concept and its remaining outside immanent science, outside the universal of the concept itself. - The answer is: abstraction is, instead, the detachment of the form of the concept from its concrete content (from its 'as reality') according to the hypostasis of a concept of the concept that is presumed to be determinable a priori once and for all, in indifference to the various articulations in which it is concretised. The 'concept of the concept' may in truth be no more than a particular moment of reality or of the realisation of the concept in

general, taken among many other moments.

b) Determination and 'quantity' - say others^Z - fall only in the order of a 'thought' assumed in itself, abstractly, and not in function of the 'thinker', which is only pure actuality and infinity. - Here we will note: α) That the objection starts from a doctrine that denies the act a power, of which it is the act, but then the thinker will be its thinking, and therefore its various determinate thoughts: in these will reside its only ratio cognoscendi, and the science of the thinker will consequently be identified with that of the thought, that is to say of the determinations in which the thinker gradually reveals itself. Once the conceivability of a power of thinking has been denied, the conceivability of a thought 'abstractly taken' also falls (how can the thought be detached from the act that thinks it?) and all that remains is the qualified matter of an order in which thinker and thought are one, the possible object of a doctrine of categories. β) That the objection concerning the determination of infinity has identical efficiency against a doctrine of the category (rather than of the categories) or of the concept as concept (rather than of the concept as reality) - because, just as 'negative theology' realised it, by determining the supreme freedom as one or as absolute, one determines it no less than by determining it as multiplicity or as relativity - and that he who makes this objection, coherently should keep himself absolutely silent, like a plant, indeed like a stone. And since he does not do so, in the objection he only confesses the presumption of a philosophy that believes itself to be 'concrete', where a few generic and empty concepts exhaust it, as opposed to other philosophies that instead feel the need to develop their principles into an articulate body. γ) Moreover, it has already been said several times what is to be thought about the 'infinity' of the spirit in the order of the affirmative option. Here the spirit is not the 'thing in itself' or the transcendent divinity of negative theology - it is instead the profound principle of the individual. Now if this principle is wanted in a certain system categories and meanings in which it contracts its "possibility" at the full awareness of the freedom of this determination, the spirit - and, indeed, precisely as infinity - will be this system of categories, and nothing else. Because, let us repeat, for us the truth of the infinite does not lie in the point of the indefinite, but in that of a function of the limit lady of itself. False indeed, not expressing perfection but instead defect, is that infinity which means incapacity, impossibility of bearing form: true infinity is instead that positive infinity of the infinite power of formation, which has no fear of contaminating itself in the act, but instead in this bears witness to itself and is what it wants to be, infinitely.

c) Therefore, if one were to ask whether the various degrees that are to be determined are in fact the necessary and inconvertible stages of the spirit, one would naturally answer: yes and no. Yes a posteriori, insofar as in them an absolute affirmation of the individual is expressed, which no others against it but as error or as moments that can be taken up in it, since this is precisely what he wants as truth. No, because the value of individuality of the statement, which alone, according to the principles set forth, can guarantee the absolute certainty and inconvertibility both of those degrees and of the specific concatenation of them, implies that at the deepest level of the statement itself there is the actual persuasion that if it is so, it can also, as soon as one wants it and insofar as one wants it, be otherwise.

d) But all this - one would then say - has no 'objective basis', no necessity, no 'scientific' value! It is purely a matter of private arbitrariness! - We answer: one moment. This is all well and good, but this for nothing. Before the above words can take on any devaluative meaning, the opponent is required to demonstrate the hierarchical superiority of a theory of certainty and reality other than the one already set forth in the first book. Our explicit declaration, that the constructions in which the phenomenology of the Absolute Individual takes place in their deepest root are essentially arbitrary, simply expresses that nous ne sommes pas des dupes, that we do in consciousness of freedom and in autarky what the 'objective', 'scientific' philosopher and, in general, those who may consider, after said declaration, that the present system is not worthy of any consideration, do unconsciously, passively, empty of self as in a dream. This arbitrariness simply expresses that what has been actively posited: not that it is believed that the present doctrine is as valid as others, which may happen to be opposed to it. On the contrary: these others for us are false, we do not tolerate them near but attack them, and we absorb or destroy and rationally prove (there is no contradiction: reason for us is but a form of assertion) against them the necessity and truth of our system. The character of arbitrariness does not therefore concern the relationship with other positions, with respect to which the one we pose is to be said and shown to be universal³, necessary, unique; but instead concerns the relationship of the position with respect to the Ego, the sense of the act that posits and imposes it. Necessary in relation to the others, here it is not so in relation to its creator, who remains its lord. Once again we return to the Cartesian distinction between wanting a certain thing to be necessary and necessarily wanting it. We know that nothing is further from the present order than scepticism: the affirmed principle of contingency here does not

proceeds from the state of one who, uncertain and powerless, is at the mercy of 'chance' and foreign forces, but rather from that of an absolute, sufficient affirmation. Truth and philosophy as power.

2. When by 'category' is meant an abstract logical condition of experience, the phenomenology of the Absolute Individual certainly cannot be called a 'doctrine of categories'. Here it is not so much a matter of concepts - still less of distinct objects - but, essentially, of meanings, of qualifications of the way in which the ego can experience its activity in general, an activity that constitutes the sole object. Transitions do not take place from one given matter to another, but only concern the various relations of the Ego to activity, the various functions according to which it is gradually experienced up to a form set as supreme. Therefore, rather than an order of "transcendental conditions of possible experience", it is an order of possible transcendental experiences, the material and logical determination of which is to be taken in the sense of a contingent symbol and an evocative trace: it has no end in itself, but in the arousal of certain values of transference peculiar to particular relations - through which arousal the sense of what is the point of the absolute Individual is progressively constructed and made manifest.

Let us add that this same warning from author to reader here is to be traced and justified within phenomenology, where it is itself to be desymbolised in the 'sense' of a certain passage or act.

Value', insofar as it is the forming principle that lies beyond formations, can only be grasped with the creative leap of an act of pure freedom. The reader will note a certain difference between the manner of exposition proper to the first book and also to the annotations to the individual categories, and the manner used in the construction of the latter: where it can be said that very little is given directly and in logical rigour. Instead, the subject matter is deliberately placed, so to speak, in power - in many places one will simply come across empty places, almost tasks for intuition, passages of which only the terms and solution are apparent. The reader must not be disconcerted and must adopt a particularly active and integrative attitude, working creatively on what is given

logically. The more he is capable of this, the more that which cannot be communicated will become animated in him and which, on the other hand, insofar as it is given, will be able to make him see an internal connection, justification and convenience of elements that at first - especially for a feminine-intellectualist attitude - might not even be suspected.

Of course, the idealist will consider this warning pleonàstic, asking for it what is already presupposed in any reading. But this principle idealism is abstract and generic; it can say nothing about the quality, mode and degree of the act. Meaning in various passages (especially in the first and third 'epochs') lies almost as far beyond the purely intellectual understanding as the latter lies beyond mere letters and words.

3. The element of becoming that will generate the various categories in this order is positive, individual, concrete, free, synthetic.

a) In contrast to the other option, in this order the act is for itself - it is not for its object or matter but vice versa. Hence: it is not the passing of craving, demand, dependence and motion towards something other than the power that turns to it, but instead infinity that acts and frees itself from itself in determined and central acts of power. Remember: it is not enough, for example, to say that, in general, the ego is affirmed entirely in the activity that passes by transcending a limit, for it is still necessary to see whether or not the passing proceeds from law and spontaneity, whether or not the limit is resolved in a position of the ego itself and then in which - again: whether the identification of the reality of the ego in the concept of a freedom transcending a limit is itself to be understood as given, or whether it can be reconnected to a value.

b) Essentially: in every passing the ego will never be in the surpassed but always in the surpassing - the passing is not transcendence but affirmation, it does not alter, it does not take the ego beyond itself, but instead reconfirms it, individualises it, and is the act of an ever deeper possession, of an ever wider and more intense extension and domination.

Clear opposition, therefore, to all those views that make becoming proceed from an obscure conatus, from an inescapable law, from an immanent contradiction which, according to the 'heterogenesis of ends', repels more and more in

there, in recurrence of surprise, expectation and disappointment, the limit - the concreteness and sufficiency of an individual act.

Specifically: consciousness and intentionality of the transcendental moment from which and for which are the particular qualifications of value and experience. It may also be the case that certain originally transparent positions in the ego are objectified and alienated, which implies their appearance according to a certain degree of relative unconsciousness to the conscious principle of further positing. One does not reject such an unconscious, but rather the unconscious in act admitted by the philosophies of Fichte, Schelling and Hartmann: one may well recognise the unconscious, the in-intentional and the 'given', but only as a particular note of the object posited by an act that is itself neither unconscious, nor in-intentional, nor 'given'.

c) real syntheticity of the element of the process itself borrows - let us say it - with arbitrariness. Can one perhaps really call synthesis that which is proper the motion of a grave that, beyond the variety of its situations, always finds itself satisfying the same equation, determinable a priori? This also applies to every law of becoming. Certainly, in the becoming we admit a determined dialectical rhythm, but this rhythm, besides being compossible with one opposed to it (because the rhythm proper to the becoming of the subjective option is opposed to the rhythm proper to the becoming of the objective option), here is simply an elementary matter, an abstract possibility - in the sense given by Aristotle to these terms with reference to universals - not a conditioner but a conditioned. To make sense of it, we will start from the concept of dialectics as Hamelin⁴ understands it.

Hamelin's demand is for a synthetic method, and a positively synthetic one at that. He rightly points out at the basis of the Hegelian concept of dialectics the assumption that the particular as such is not a degree of being, but rather the opposite of being, something contradictory and negative; hence dialectics, as a process towards being, can only have a destructive and abstract character - not at all progressive - it cannot have the sense of a "negation of negation", of a subsequent erasure of the particular that, strictly speaking, should result in nirvâna, in the absolute indeterminate of the 'negative theologies'. This time universality, which for a thoroughly thought-out Hegelian dialectic is point of arrival, Hamelin understands it instead as the point departure, as the poorest degree of reality that, through a synthetic development - from the simplest to the most complex and richer, from a deprivation and a

genericity to ever-increasing and original degrees of determinacy and actuality - tends to possess itself in the individual as in its perfection, in its τέλειον that does not exclude or contradict the various orders of determination, but instead understands them hierarchically and dominates them in a superior synthesis. - From the first book we know to what extent this neo-Aristotelianism of Hamelin is also our⁵.

Synthetic dialectics will thus be opposed to Hegelian dialectics for this reason: that for the thesis or starting point it will take a particular understood as something that is already, albeit incompletely, 'being', against which the antithesis will not be its contradiction and negation, but rather its completion, its integration, something it lacked so that, passing through it, the thesis reaches, according to a continuity of composition, a higher degree of perfection.

In striving to possess itself, each particular determines what it lacks, in which it therefore defines and delimits itself and with which it tends to integrate. And the synthesis will be a broader and more complex reality than the previous ones in which it did not yet exist - which, in our doctrine, will mean: it will be a broader possibility of power and a broader domination. For we know that particularity for us means only inconvertibility, indifference of possible and actual, non-power; the antithesis that arises in opposition to the thesis will then be a certain possibility that escapes power, that is not dominated in the function that posits the thesis; and the process will thus simultaneously extend in extension and in understanding: the burning of an ever-higher flame of individuality and autarchy in correlation with being able to take up, organise and dominate the ever-increasing wealth of possibilities and spontaneity unleashed by the thetical moment. Like a tree, the more it rises the wider and deeper and more dangerous the zone into which its roots descend. The meaning of the dialectic will thus be: development increasing degrees of possibility, of arbitrary power and inner agility from a certain system of rigidity and univocal determination, towards the limit of an absolute indeterminacy that coincides with that of an absolute individuation. - This is the first point, after which we can move on to what we properly wanted to say about syntheticity.

Let us explain with an image. A thirsty person manages to drink. In drinking he evidently completes himself, integrates himself with something. But this 'something' not arbitrary, it is already determined - albeit negatively, by deprivation - by the state of being thirsty as water or similar and not something else, for example salt. So here, next to the material syntheticity, there is a formal analyticity, proceeding precisely from the deprivation being determinately given. In the synthetic dialectic of Hamelin, one has, at a certain point, the same thing, and so one can

go one step beyond it. If in the thesis a deprivation is determinable a priori, if such a deprivation can be said to be inherent in it not relatively but essentially (by an 'esse in' and not by an 'esse ad'), what its particularity will call in return and into which it can be integrated will be necessary, the process, materialiter synthetic, formaliter will remain analytic, analytic precisely because of that specific empty place presupposed in the antecedent. If the concept of syntheticity is to be complete, it is therefore necessary to reaffirm the exposed principle of the relativity of privation, i.e. to say: taken in itself, every single position can be sufficient at all - it incorporates a moment of privation only from the point of view of other positions, i.e. contingently and conditionally from passing on to something else. Such a passing over is the prius that thus determines the two dialectical correlatives, thesis and antithesis, antecedent and consequent; it is the place of the actuality of the value of those which, as we have seen, is made up of distance, of interval, and will be understood as absolutely free - free with respect to the future or not as with respect to this or another possible qualification.

Then:

a) The process is purified of any character of need, of necessity, of an inescapable law, a character that instead reaffirms itself immediately when particularities, privations and antecedence are posited as in-selves. Only in the case that a deprivation is not inherent analytically and a priori to a given element, but instead only under the condition that a certain transition takes place, only in this case is the need to refer to another in which to complete itself removed for said element. We can therefore assume the two fundamental presuppositions of Buddhist metaphysics: 1) There is no craving because there is an object but, vice versa, it is craving that creates its own object, almost as its symbol; 2) There is no craving because there is privation but, vice versa, privation is generated by craving: what is before is an act, generator, at one and the same time, of the privation of being and of the correlative object to which this privation itself turns, craving.

b) Just as there is no necessity for the transition in general, there will be none with regard to the particular identification of the relationship in which it takes place. There is no particular empty space with respect to which there would remain no alternative but to fill it or not to fill it. The consequent always remains original, radically contingent and unpredictable with respect to the antecedent while being connectable to it according to rational continuity after the synthesis has taken place.

c) And now to a third point. We have said that phenomenology deals with

essentially of meanings, of ways in which the act is experienced. The elementary dialectical rhythm must therefore be assumed in this order, in which it is presented as follows.

The ego asserts itself by determining a certain interval, from which arises the relationship from an antecedent to a consequent. It detaches itself from something with which it was in a relationship of identity, places another to delimit it, which has the value of a will as opposed to a spontaneity, of a subjective as opposed to an objective. The antecedent then assumes, as such, a character of privation and tends to resolve itself in the consequent in order to integrate itself in the form proper to the latter. On the other hand, if the passing flashes the point of the individual, in the consequent, on which the ego's emphasis shifts, mediation is in a form that is in its own way immediate. If it is will with respect to the antecedent, it is therefore spontaneity with respect to itself, i.e. with respect to that new content which is posited precisely so that a material distinction is made from the antecedent itself. Moreover, if the consequent in such a movement denies the antecedent - as objectivity, as privation - it is now only placed in relation to it, on the other hand this conditioning of the consequent is also a conditioned being (it is only willed against the antecedent, and materially, as something that does not have to be what this is), another aspect, this one of dependence, of its immediacy. This opens up the possibility of a new synthesis: that in which the Ego frees itself from such immediacy or elementary mediation and goes to realise it as an objectivity, with a movement that appears in that of the consequent that assumes and transforms in its specific form the antecedent, which is thus freed from its deprivation while the former thereby mediates that form of its own. For if, on the one hand, it is mediation, this movement, on the other, concludes in a 'being', in an identity insofar as it abolishes the distance between the term of will and the term of spontaneity; but such a 'being' is only in function of, and within, a further distancing or passing away, from which it is made possible to experience it precisely as such. Distancing that implies, in its theoretical and material moment, a difference, i.e. a new content, a new possibility, the task of a vast affirmation according to an identical rhythm.

This rhythm, in itself, would therefore be continuous: the one term is only placed in relation, which rests on another relation, and so on: it is therefore only placed in the totality of the others, just as, on the other hand, once placed, this totality itself is placed, by a nexus analogous to that of organisms, where the part presupposes precisely the real unity, the whole including all the other elements, and the hierarchy of their relations. The dialectical rhythm,

We say then, in itself would be continuous: but here 'in itself' is not. In the objective option, we know that the 'I' is dependency, that it is subject to the relation and so the whole, mentioned above, is not dominated, but is an infinite task. The subjective option, on the other hand, is that of a power which has in itself its own limit (αὐτοπερί γραπτες): its definite, sufficient, unequivocal affirmation therefore gives a priori ὑποκείμενον of a total simplicity, with which consistency is communicated to the individual elements, for which there is not simply a process, a pure going, but also a possession, a positive progressiveness, a process commanded not by deprivation and craving but by affirmation. Let us therefore repeat that in the order of this option, the dialectic, mentioned above, is only continuous in power, in the order of an abstract logical possibility: it is not a law, an a priori necessity, but a power, and as such it is only real in and for the various individual, defined unities according to which the Ego, affirming itself, implements it. Its necessity and the law of its continuity remain problematic at all: they have as their measure and condition the act, freedom.

Dialectics performs the varied transition of the contraries included in the interval or unity of the contradictors proper to a given synthesis⁶ : for it the one relation is resolved in the other and the whole in an autarky, in the supreme liberation of the one in whom, precisely through the synthesis of contradictors, through that act of power which with respect to the infinite is simultaneously affirmation and negation, all 'matter' is burnt in a pure relation of possession.

4. On the basis of the dialectic now outlined, let us indicate in general terms the moments in which the world of the affirmative option is articulated.

Insofar as it simply posits itself, we have seen that the subjective principle is a passing, heterothetic function - that is, it initially implies the appearance of said principle in the form of the objective. A form which, however, cannot simply be that proper to the order of the other option, where it is ultimate in : the affirmation of the individual if, in its reality, it always implies it as its own thing, as one of its moments. That is to say: the moment of the object that erupts from the affirmation is subordinate to the realisation of the 'I' of this option. This means that first moment will already result within an interval, in which objectivity in general is complicated in a certain form in which it is related - and, thereby, to a certain extent transformed by - positive value. Thus initially there is an objective formation subjectivity, subsumed however under the condition, that its becoming is for the individual. Let us fix the particular divisions through which this synthesis is

Then there will be a certain group of categories or partial degrees, having this in common: that in them the 'for itself' is absolutely an 'in itself', that subjectivity, in its immediacy, materialiter appears as universality and spontaneity - and such will be at first the form for every possible position of the individual. We will understand these categories, which will construct the first term or antecedent of the first relation as the term of the relation (and thus the matter, the 'power' of the individual), under the title of the epoch of spontaneity or 'being'.

This objective position is through the aforementioned complication, in turn, and at the same point, heterothetic; the determination the objective as such, or the awareness of objectivity, implies a projection, a distinction, so that the point at which the principle of the first epoch perfectly realises itself is also that of the actuality of the consequent, that is to say, of that dawning of the individual as a pure interval that was already its reason. That upon which, through such a transition, the value is shifted to the limit of the epoch of spontaneity is the 'other of being', the non-being, something purely negative with respect to the antecedent; negative but at the same time affirmative, since it is well from it that the other term receives its current signification, it is well from it that it is determined as being, it is well from it that it depends according to what it now is - *ετερον* [the other] and no longer *αὐτόν* [itself]. Therefore. Negation and affirmation at one and the same time. To fully affirm the limit of the first epoch is thus to affirm an activity in which the unity of these two moments is assumed and carried out - an activity that denies the other by positing it and posits it by denying it in this sense: that it conditions the being of the 'other' to its being reproduced in the form of that which has exceeded the state of simple spontaneity, a form which, with respect to the antecedent, has been said to be negation, the non-being of that which is: subjectivity. Given such a situation, the becoming of the 'other', of the antecedent, mutates with the mediation of the consequent, which with this activity dissolves itself in the dependence of the immediate relation and places it for itself - in reflection. We will indicate this development, which will gradually reabsorb the forms of the first epoch, under the title of the epoch of freedom or of the 'personality'.

Gradual position of the relation within the epoch, according to a series of states in which being is annulled in one sense (as spontaneity) and placed in another (as object of reflection); absolute position, distinction, objectification of its relation to the limit. But, again, the possibility of such an absolute distinction postulates a further interval - that of the form in which the relation to an opposite is determined, to which the value is shifted: and this is the relation to the

term of absolute unity, with absolute I. The actual fulfilment of the reflexive distinction results in a new distinctive form, in the distinction that has as its terms distinction itself as opposed to absolute unity. Reflexive distinction, in its mediation, resolves the immediate distancing (first epoch) whereby the 'other' is in the form of a pure appearing and being; it idealises, i.e. derealises, the 'other', since it takes it back in the form of the non-being. Briefly: it derealises objectivity. The further distinction restores this objectivity. For a deeper point, reflection is projected, distinct. This means: creation, reflection that exceeds itself by passing into an absolute act, into realisation. It is the One that affirms itself, that possesses itself, in freeing itself and liberating itself at a determined act of power. Hence an Epoch of the Individual or of "power": a series of states in which the interval gradually mediates until the absolute synthesis of unity and distinction in which the point of selfhood, the very act of affirmative value, burns.

A continuity dominates the three moments or epochs and gathers them, together with the articulations within each of them, into the singular simplicity of the absolute synthesis. This is the identical, eternal and formless substratum within which the entire process - differentiation, succession, formation - draws its possibility, lives and is consummated.

¹ [B. Croce, Logica, Laterza, Bari 1920, p. I, sec. III, p. 149 ff.](#)

[Z G. Gentile, La riforma della dialettica hegeliana, Messina 1913, pp. 915.](#)


[3 On our concept of the universal see Book I of this work, sect. VIII, § 8 \[Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 179-193\].](#)

[⁴ O. Hamelin, Essais sur les éléments principaux de la représentation, Paris 1907,c. I, § 1 passim, and p. 31 ff.](#)


⁵ To Octave Hamelin (1856-1907) Evola had dedicated an extensive examination in Saggi's 'Idealismo magico' of 1925: IV, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 2006, pp. 127-132 (Ed.).

⁶ See Book I, sect. VII [Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 95-132].

AGE OF SPONTANEITY



Section One



§ 1 - QUALITY

The first epoch comprises the objective state of the subjective affirmation, that is to say, the aspect of it in which the moment of posing in general predominates: posing in general is in fact mutualised with the will of an object, that is to say, with the direction of the other option, so that, by right, it will unleash the becoming proper to this very option. Such a becoming will therefore appear; but it will appear only insofar as it is already to a certain extent transformed, subordinate to a further instance, which is precisely that proper to what is not directed towards the object and which nevertheless, in its immediacy, generates, and cannot but generate, said becoming. It is therefore a question of a syntheticity, the moments of which we will now unfold.

Taken in itself, objective becoming is known to have any meaning: it is continuity, a uniform passing without any defined limit; in extraverted spontaneity, in absolute identification and passivity in relation to the act, it runs indefinitely, all phenomenality and dependence. But here this element is determined, fixed, distanced. It is defined and thus has its opposite - the subjective value in general, which now, in this respect of opposite, appears simply as the central function of absolute limitation, of αυτοπεριγραπτον [self-limitation]. And the two correlatives precipitate, in a first, immediate synthesis.

Consumed in the consequent, the series is syncopated, its continuity runs by absolute flashes that make itself its condition. On the other, the consequent assumes the antecedent, denies it, absorbs it into itself; in the synthesis, this is maintained as the positive simplicity of self-assertion, but therefore as such only insofar as it burns within itself the moment of the continuous and thus precipitates itself into pure appearance. It is value in the form of absolute experience, of self-affirmation, of pure feeling. It is the category of the original quality or sensation.

We therefore see there resolved and as contracted the element of dependence proper to the objective becoming: it is transformed into self-dependence, it passes into the character of immediate assent, of instantaneous compulsion and triggering according to which the quality appears - into an astonishment. Similarly, invested in the function of the limit, moment irreversibility passes into that specification of the negative moment which, as we have said, makes the 'this' a condition of what is posed

inconvertible dazzling of appearance - that is, having in itself the consummation of the passage, but not in a mediation, but in naked immediacy. Quality in general, in terms of its form, in the discontinuity it establishes in the series, implies a negation of necessity, but insofar as it is an immediate negation, it is not actually free of it, it has it instead as an essential moment. That is to say: in the synthesis, the law of recurrent dependence is no longer present, but necessity passes from this form to that proper to the immediacy of the limit as it is given in the pure qualification of feeling. The ego in the absolutely absent quality - indeed: it is simply assent. It is simply its content, it is fertilised and deepened in it. In this elementary degree, it makes no sense to say that the Ego has sensation - it is sensation and outside that as sensation it does not exist. The formal side, or feeling, is one with the material side or quality; and, in turn, the Ego is one with this unity. Such is the generic sense of this state: value as miraculousness and astonishment, its original conception as the boundary between a being and a non-being.

In the order of the reality of what is by this option, quality is the undeductible, the elementary substratum of all other forms, that which is uniformly presupposed by them, albeit under the condition of the further determination in which they are affirmed.

From this first synthesis, the objective continuum is thus taken up as the indeterminate possibility (reflecting the moment of deprivation that is established in that which by the first dialectical transition has become antecedent) that qualitative individuation opposes in its determinate statements. Quality therefore dominates and conditions it; and the character of indeterminacy, which is precisely the power of quality, the division of the continuum according to this or that term, is the first blossoming beyond necessity, it is the positive conversion or individualisation of indeterminacy, governed by dependence, of the indefinite flowing and transmuting proper to becoming objective: while remaining firm that this power is nothing more than a power of mere apparition, nothing mediated but pure apperception on the limit of non-being.

The positive moment, of progressiveness, conquered in the present category refers properly to the discontinuity that now, by right, dissolves, agilitates the series, while for its element remains, in this first phase, an indifference of activity and passivity; a point of passivity as activity - since activity there

is like an instantaneous neutralisation that ends and contracts in the simple appearance or sensation -; and of activity as of passivity - since passivity or appearance is consciousness, limitation, determined assent breaking the series, and is therefore at one with the position of that neutralisation.

We can therefore define quality in this way: activity instantaneously burns and throws itself beyond itself - it is appearing.

Let us recall that in the order of options, the categories positing and negation, always understood formally, that is, as moments of meaning of acts, can never be taken separately, but always in a functional connection. The most elementary form of such a functionality in the world of the subjective option is precisely quality, understood as the category, or state, now constructed: its synthesis is the prius, the concreteness that is presupposed to positing and negating, inherent in all determinacy in general, and includes them its instrumental moments.

This, like every other determination in phenomenology, refers only to a meaning, to a state of consciousness: it therefore not a question of this or that quality, but of quality as category, i.e. of the value of the act in general with which the dependent continuity is interrupted and specified. Still less must this category be understood as the genus of quality: qualities, strictly speaking, do not yet exist here - in the sense that from the point of view of value one cannot yet account for what can specify one quality as opposed to another (indeed: not even of the transition from one to the other), in the sense that from the point of view of value this difference is now completely indifferent. Which matter or genus the quality may be considered, if at all, from another perspective, that is, in order to a possible interval, and correlative position of a consequent, which stands to the quality itself in the same relation with which it, in asserting itself, has placed itself in relation to the objective series.

§ 2 - FEELING/ACT

Each category turns towards a determinateness or ideal objectivity - this, in correlation with the passing of the ego to a new point, to an opposite that defines and fixes it and that is identifiable as that in relation to which the antecedent accuses a deprivation.

Now, what the quality that has become and is realised sets against itself and denies, is the not-this, the other from that pure appearance of which it is substantiated, that is, an activity not neutralised in instantaneous equilibrium but dissolved, unfolded in a given interval. It is the element of the discontinuous, the solution of continuity between quality and quality, an element that quality as such lacks but on which at the same time it depends in order to its being determination, a defined limit as opposed to mere transmuting continuity. Now the Ego, which passes from one qualification towards another, makes this "qualitative leap", but with this it also passes beyond the quality itself: it realises the experience of such an interval, on this interval it displaces the value, the dazzling simplicity. It becomes consequent, and quality is now opposed to it as the antecedent that turns to it to integrate itself, to raise the synthesis to a superior unity, to a unity sufficient to the relation by which it is limited, defined, made possible.

Now, the qualitative 'this', the instantaneous, punctual apperception and slicing into sensation, resolved in the form of the consequent is the point that is point insofar as it is explained as a determinate interval, it is simplicity that is simplicity of a definite act, it is an immediate that is such only apart from an elementary dynamic unleashing. The 'this', that is, is 'this' insofar as it is its other as "this" - just as, on the other hand, the other - the interval, the mediating element - is only such in the form of the quality, i.e.: in the new synthesis, actuality remains a natural spontaneity, an immediate determinate manifestation, of a force rather than of a state - i.e. this force. The absolute assent contracted in the quality is now unfolded, but in nothing removed from its original character. We call this category or state an act.

From a more particular aspect. Essential to quality as term or limit is the negation that makes that which is term such, i.e.: a power of position beyond the particular limit is negated, restrained within the position itself. The ego is

absolutely the quality, but always as I, i.e. as something that profoundly contradicts the form proper to the quality: so that he does not live in the sensation other than insofar as it is present to him as an intimate compulsion, as a congeal that is, however, arrested and held still. This means that quality is also feeling and that without feeling there is no real quality. Now in the passing quality, the point of equilibrium, of position and negation fused together, specifically expressed by feeling, is dissolved, altered - the 'I', as we have said, is immediately in the meaning of an interval, which becomes the dialectical correlative of quality, that from which it is distanced, determined, rendered objective. The objective limit of the preceding category is conditioned by such a movement - on which the synthesis is immediately reaffirmed, the eruption of the form of feeling into that of the determined act, in which static unity proper to quality becomes actual simplicity, in which the irreversibility of the continuum, contracted as the immediacy of feeling in quality, unfolds again, becomes in the absolute self-repulsion that commands this original release, which is act understood as the simplest of mediations.

With an image it can be said that the incoercible, indefinite, chaotic objective flow has instantaneously contracted and burned at the contact of the value of its opposite, only to be summed up again, but under the condition of a certain differential whereby, as if taken up in a *List der Vernunft* [cunning of reason] through the various categories, it is only at the service of the manifestation of positive value. The present category represents the first element of this development: the element of a becoming that is no longer the objective one, whose interval no longer has as its meaning a going out of yearning insufficiency, almost as if it were a being magnetized, but instead already has something positive and determined by virtue of precisely the qualitative unity that the interval now implies. We also note that of "The 'element' of becoming in the real sense can only be spoken of here - in the sphere of the objective option there is no place for it: there, every particular act is inconsistent - having value outside itself, it is taken up and absorbed in a series, the limit of which is procrastinated in an indefinite task. It is not real in itself as it is here, where the interval as a dynamically integrated and mediated quality is something closed, having the limit in itself.

Sentiment, or rather, quality as sentiment, is the medium between quality and act; it is the moment when value is about to disidentify itself from quality to make it, with

this, an objectivity, in need, as such, of a further relation in which to complete itself. We can call the feeling an act (in the sense given to the term here) in its nascent state, and the act an integrated feeling.

The 'I' was sensation. Now it is seen to reassert itself in a wider sphere to which, with the now conquered interval of passing, it is proper to take up and assume what could be the 'other' of a limiting or causing sensation. For and at the pure sensation, this 'other' does not exist in any way; therefore in the category of the act is implicit the power to place it, that is, to deny it, since the power to place it takes it back under the condition of the central, subjective possibility, preventing, destroying the possibility of an 'other' that places the other.

It should be noted, therefore, that just as the 'I' used to be sensation, it is now act, it is at one with this, it is only insofar as it is act (qualitatively determined). Its form, if it is now beyond the point of astonishment, of absolute inner appearance, is nevertheless on this side of all sufficient causality or will. It is rather indifference, the neutral of the two: pure arousal of a natural energy that is also revelation of the Ego, in coalescence. The element of act may be contained in the causal, final actuality, etc. - in general, in all the forms through which the central affirmation expands, multiplies, absorbs and actuates the non-being deprived of the non-entity of power - but all this is not already contained in it. It would now be unable to account for it. As meaning, it simply remains the unity quality and interval.

§ 3 - DIFFERENCE

The synthesis proper to the act because it is excited by the passing into another quality, leads to the point of duality. Duality is its dialectical consequence. It is already understood in the act, but in an implied and dynamically resolved form, since the act is dominated by the simplicity of 'this': only when the act is exhausted does it erupt in its own form, that is, as the double limit given by the element of the continuous, by the solution of continuity. As such, it is a new value no longer understood by the act, which traverses and determines the act but also transcends it and opposes it as something essential to it, on which it depends but of which nevertheless suffers deprivation.

At the end of this category, the central function thus turns to a synthesis of act and duality. In this synthesis, the simplicity of the act must be doubled and also unified in this same doubling. That is to say: the act will be distinction, the position of a pure sense of difference, but this only as a simple form, since the power of passing is clearly present - in the moment of the antecedent - from which the content of the 'other' is assumed, absorbed, interiorised. It is thus the pure alienation of an experience, which the 'I' therefore continues to feel as its own, it is an intimacy directly linked to an elusive sense of otherness, it is the state of an 'I' that draws its certainty from the point of appearing, of becoming in him, almost of another life that nevertheless confirms him, in which he finds himself and perceives, and out of which he is nothing.

In this state there is no element of opposition: it would be necessary for the 'I' to have a content of its own as opposed to the 'other', whereas it is identical with the positing, which here immediately has the simple form of a distinguishing: the 'other' is simply form, meaning, in the simplicity of an apperception, the content of which is directly mutated with the very certainty of the 'I'. In such a category, the qualitative unity through the other from its original form - that is, through the interval in which it has integrated itself as a category of the act - thus becomes sufficient to what, in general, it can be according to a principle of difference; a difference that, therefore, has nothing quantitative or spatial about it, but remains a meaning, a datum of internal experience and of feeling proper.

In this immediacy therefore remains the irreversible character that has been

determined by the act. Here, too, no real possibility dominates the manifestation: value flourishes, is aroused by it, expresses itself from it, comes into being. So: here it enjoys itself under the condition of the distanced form now assumed by its enjoyment; from which, with its intimacy, almost in miraculous impulsion of spiritual generation, difference is determined.

We have repeatedly critically shown the inconceivability of an 'other' that is absolutely other, since, as such, it would not tolerate any relation - the absolute exclusion itself is still a relation - and therefore could not be called other either. The "other" is never an in-itself, but always a form according to which the identical can be experienced - and the first moment of its possibility, its first root in the still unformed intimacy of the subject, is given - and, as well as simply given, also exhibited according to value - precisely by the elementary *porre-distinguere* relative to this category.

The negativity whereby the ego in itself becomes nothingness, an empty echo medium, and the otherness taking up that content which is transparent to it, in which it immediately recognises itself, are two integral moments brought about at the same time by the passage of the individual which synthetically determines the new category. Here we could refer to the state of the spiritual veiled by the Vedantic *mâyâ*, by this elusive entity that, according to the saying of the *Shâmkara*, "neither is, nor is not, nor is and is not at the same time"; a moment of an indefinable sense of difference that now becomes inseparable from perception - as the hidden power of that which can create a distinct interiority beyond the pure subjective flashing. Similarly, one could refer to the state of intuition as immedesimation, as the possibility of allowing a certain experience to be ignited in oneself, which, while it is grasped directly as such, and is therefore self-experience, is also felt as distinct; provided, of course, that this distinction is spontaneous, and yet passive relation to itself, and not active, not by a central power of projection, as in the intuition that we will consider in the third epoch.

§ 4 - CAUSALITY

In the meantime, the distinction can be determined in objectivity by the Ego, insofar as it further distinguishes itself according to a new power of function. A unity sufficient to duality in fact implies the form of a negating by positing (or a positing by negating) the other, and is realised insofar as, at the same point, the emphasis of value shifts to this. That is to say: the Ego, in accomplishing itself in the distinction, also becomes aware of itself as the interval of a "transforming", and the *mâyâ* then reveals itself to it as the matter or "power" of a further synthesis which, completing that sufficiency to the limit, which was already determining in the anterior form, pushes the dialectical process towards a mediated unity of the interval, opposed to that of the simple distinction. Hence, insofar as it is accomplished and fixed, the latter appears as an abstract genus taken up in a relation analogous to that which from the quality draws the act.

Now the consequent is no longer the simple element of the transition, just as the first term is no longer the simple limit: the value, in the form of that for which that immediate subjectivity that dynamically developed from the quality of the act affirms itself only insofar as it implies an internal distinction, is rather that of an elementary self-position; and the new synthesis will have as its terms this point - with the element of otherness inherent to it - and the aforementioned transformative interval. Its determination can thus be as follows: a certain state will only count as self-position in correlation with another.

But the meaning of this correlation will be a transmuting. That is, the position of self must take place in function of the transformation of another, just as the position of the other must only take place under the condition of a position of self in function of precisely the same transmutative interval. Precisely this interval, understood as a synthetic *prius*, would implement the further category, which we will call qualitative causality.

Explicitating. In the experience of distinction there are already two terms, potentially opposed, which are therefore given joined together, in simultaneity, immediacy, coalescence. When, precisely by virtue of the movement of this category, the sense of a self-position arises, the opposition becomes declared, and the terms, insofar as they are held together as the antecedent wants them to be, but find themselves in mutual tension; their real unification then refers to a

interval that on the other hand they elementarily presuppose in the very possibility of their coexistence. Such is the causal interval, medium terminated on the one hand by duality as opposition, on the other by duality as (reduced to) unity. The duality of the two powers, of the identical and other, of Yes and No, in this state of consciousness is but an abstract moment, subsisting only in its immanence in a dynamism, in which the negation or the other exists only insofar as the positive term must be reaffirmed or recognised in it by right, in the same way that this term cannot do without its reaffirmation.

The synthesis traverses two moments: the first is that in which an element is placed in an inescapable correlation with something that is opposite to it, that is essential to it and yet, insofar as it remains opposite to it, is only worth it as a negativity. This is desire, as the state in which the being of an antecedent implies something whose negativity suffers in the same way that this something or consequent, in turn, has a being only in function of the negativity of the antecedent. The second moment is the proceeding desire in interval or dynamism, it is transmutative causality in action in which, as we have expounded, the distinction remains synthetically joined to the self-position.

If we consider the form of this synthesis, we have the qualitative change: the interval, mentioned above, is precisely the intellectually elusive and contradictory simplicity in which shifting and altering of the "this" - simplicity that here certainly only appears in its transcendental aspect, in that elementary point and value from which proceeds possibility and generic meaning of the particular changes that can develop the various qualities, or the further determinations of these given by the previous categories.

The character of irreversibility or objectivity now passes into the immediate conatus of the ego to fertilise itself, to arouse itself through the synthesis that generates and, at the same time, struggles against the other. Synthesis, outside of which the subjective is still nothing.

Thus: distinction leads self-position; *mâyâ* then ceases to be the elusive sense of difference immediately conjoined to the identical, and precipitates itself into an opposite principle: but in this it is properly only 'matter' that gives possibility to the further formation of the 'I'. Which now can only receive itself from it in the manner of an interval, which is causality; and only in the synthesis

relative to this he can preserve the unity proper to the previous category. The transformant only becomes by means of the transformed and the transformed only by means of the transformant - without, therefore, it being a matter of the efficiency of a given element possessing certain powers separately, but of an absolute synthesis, to which distinction is an internal element. The Böhman "No" becomes, is aroused, is contained by the same affirmation; just as it is but the task of the same "Yes", which can only be achieved by triumphing over it, by denying the "power" of God. The God of Light and the God of Darkness are nothing outside their relationship and their conflict. This is the prius; and in it the value of interiority turns to an act insofar as it gives reality to the other through the transmutation of it into the subjective principle.

It may seem strange to give desire a place hierarchically posterior to the act. This appearance of strangeness ceases when we remember what the criterion of progression is here. The act is direct, homogeneous spontaneity; desire, as we have now deduced it, implies instead an infrenouncing, a distancing, a dynamic play of positivity and negativity that, from a formal point of view, is already connected to a certain mediation.

On the occasion of desire, we would also like to recall a very important point that, to be honest, applies to every other category. In desire, there is the correlation of one element with another, whereby the former is felt as deprivation and subordinates the completeness of one's being to the reaffirmation of the latter. In this there is a characteristic appearance of rhythm precisely in this dialectic. Now at such a situation it will not be said that the transcendental activity as a value is desire; but rather that it is what posits desire and, again, mediately: a certain passage determines the element as antecedent, and because of the privation that then, as such, is inherent in it, desire arises, according to the construction set forth above. This is therefore a posterius with respect to the absolute prius of the relation; the true prius is in fact that which can be understood as the transcendent with respect to all possible determinations and yet also to the becoming of these, which nevertheless proceed from him and immanent in him. Thus in this hierarchy the brute act, desire, dependence, passion, etc. have no end and reason in themselves, have no priority, are nothing original. They presuppose the transcendental point of a sufficiency, which posits certain intervals of which they are the correlative syntheses or resolutions. As such, they remain rational, v.d. constructible. It is known, from what has been said in its place, that the irrational in the present theory is placed much higher.

In general: one must not confuse the immanent end or transcendental value with the various material and relative ends that can be determined in the process: these ends are in reality only means to that. The moment of distancing itself is, strictly speaking, itself a phenomenon, which is only for the sake of the simplicity of the absolute synthesis of domination of which it is nevertheless the element.

§ 5 - SUBSTANTIALITY

The value of causality exhausting one's own position excites a privative moment, and yet, for the rhythm now known, the possibility of a new synthesis.

The principle of dynamic transmutation, which is essential to the category action, in fact proceeds towards the reduced 'other', where its unity passes to that of a state of existence, where it actually encounters its own negativity. Nor can it be worthwhile to reiterate the relationship in a new desire and causality: this, from the point of view of value, leads to nothing new: it simply repeats the situation, from which the problem arose.

It is that the self-position according to causality calls against itself, as a condition of its resolving and objectifying itself, a new element: the power of a no longer struggling but pure negation. And on this consequent the synthesis must reassert itself if it is to have entirely within itself that by which the limit of its previous experience is made possible. Which leads to the category substantiality.

Indeed, in substance we have the situation in which negation immediately resolves, punctually burns out, the transformative interval from which in the form of causality the identical and the other were opposites and bound together - we have the situation that gives in simultaneity the unity of opposites that was previously in the form of tension and struggle. The one term is the accident, which is an appearance, an immediately self-negative positivity, since it is the appearance of the substance, from which and in which it is. But on the other hand it remains an appearance, and as such it is simultaneously a negation of the substance itself which, by appearing, passes into it. Therefore, in the state of spontaneity that actuates movement, the two terms simultaneously are and are not, in mutual conditionality of being and non-being. The I, the other, and the relation, fall into the same point, are swept into a unity that is no longer their indifference, but the simplicity and continuity of a synthetic circular function, which is of distinction at one and the same time. What leads to this unity, what dominates and folds the interval back upon itself, is precisely the negative moment that causality in its objective limitation excites against itself.

Here, negation is therefore no longer the effort of the affirmation that in affirming itself unleashes its "No", this power that is therefore only matter, the task of value; but it is a transcendence of a direct position, it is a position that in its production exceeds itself, it becomes a sign of value as of an essentiality that transcends it. The act becomes a symbol, a "mystical participation": a world of allusive flashes emanating from activity, from the subjective now joined with itself. No longer the 'power' of a value that draws itself from transformative tension, the principle of the 'other' illuminates itself from within and to the identical, to which it yields without struggle, expresses the immanence of a superior principle.

If at this point an act appears that is mediation, it nevertheless emerges from an immediate apperception and feeling, from that spontaneity that is the elementary substratum of the entire epoch. Substantiality is a qualification of pure experience: the principle of transcendence, which it implies, still remains an episode of this. In no way is the principle of a power of freedom presupposed in the act: it is a content, and not power, of experience.

It is clear that the substantiality now being spoken of, having its sense in a non-sensible state or mode of consciousness, has nothing in common with substance as a concept, which is an accident internal to the possibility of that other state of consciousness, from which the category of discursive reflection will proceed; a state of which, therefore, nothing is yet known here. - For this experience beyond the struggling and dilapidated unity of Yes and No - for this form in which activity unfolds and frees itself in a value that is no longer overwhelmed and resolved hatred, but transcendent meaning - we could rather refer to the order of theurgical practice, to the original 'tragicness' of symbols, to exaltation and excess "Dionysian". These references, therefore, are purely allusive and indicative; and here it is indeed good to take the opportunity to repeat what applies to every other reference, given or to be given, to phenomena having a more or less determined or determinable empirical place. The development of the categories as forms of value is not temporal or 'historical' (time and history are merely particular moments in it), and the various hierarchical relations can be concentrated and actual in a single point or ordered in any way in this or that series, without thereby losing their internal sequence, which is purely ideal and is determined only by the various relations of individuation placed in the original statement. The references only serve to suggest that the categories are not abstract moments of a logical function, but are forms

necessary deduced from the analysis of 'a thought in general', are instead concrete experiences, living possibilities of the individual, each of which, on the other hand, if it implies the antecedents, can nevertheless close in on itself according to sufficiency and affirm itself as the last instance. It is likely that the conceivability of the categories set out thus far independently of the system of others, which the construction has not yet encountered, will not appear clear here: for example, it will be asked what meaning qualityact or feeling can have when no matter, space, special organisations, etc. are presupposed.

Here we fall into the error, already pointed out several times, of rejecting in anterior degrees that which only appears as a function of posterior degrees that are reached synthetically. Matter, space, etc. become necessary conditions and inseparable elements of quality only at a category, which is certainly not that of quality itself, and before which not even their necessity, but the mere possibility of their existence is an abstraction. Given that the world of quality and sentiment cannot be deduced in any way from external experience without running into a vicious circle, and that on the other hand this is only formed through it; one should well have been pushed to attempt a reversal of the position, namely to consider the qualitative as the original background of reality and from it to deduce the physical and the objective (in the vulgar sense of the term) as its further and particular qualification - as the present theory wants. According to which one must not even refer, for example, to a matter with quantitative laws of its own, initially included *sub specie qualitatis*: since this substratum beyond the form of its appearance in quality is nothing actual, it can only be coherently affirmed from a point of view that is not that of quality, but subsequent to it; a point of view which, however, in accordance with what has been said above, does not impose itself, the Ego being able to remain, if it wishes, in a purely qualitative state of consciousness. Hence the illegitimacy of the same fallback of considering quantitative determinations as something that already exists, if not currently, at least in potency in quality so that this, as simply such, would be a 'deprivation'. But potency is only potency as the term of a relation, the deprivation that defines it only arises as a function of a distancing which, let us repeat, has the unconditioned as its basis; therefore it cannot be considered to be contained analytically or by right - to refer to the present case - in the original affirmation, which can be developed in an incorporeal world, in a purely qualitative world. Will one retort by demanding that the congruence of qualitative conjunctions to those determinable according to quantity or other posterior categories be explained? This,

even granted, says nothing more than that from the primitive matter of quality more individual and complicated forms can be derived, which therefore find containing as an abstract genus or elementary condition the determinations of that; with which therefore they cannot but stand in a solid relation.

The possibility of the very exposure of these first categories remains to be justified.

There is no need to refer to particular forms of cognition, which would not be able to expound their guarantee here; on the other hand, 'transcendental reminiscence' and the automatic development of the concept according to the a priori order of an objective reason are rejected; instead, it is sufficient to hold fast to the principle of the ideality of history in general, for which history is only real in those statements according to which transcendental activity arises from a point that, in itself, is certainly meta-historical. The determination of categories then appears simply as the reflection on a certain order of possible acts of freedom.

§ 6 - ALTERITY

From the experience of difference the Ego draws a first reflection of interiority; the development of causality integrates this principle with the element of posing, which in the relation of substantiality joins synthetically with a negative moment, the Ego in realising itself according to last form finds a mediation as the content of its immediacy or elementary spontaneity. He is then in a certain way aroused to a new form of being: a power of self-position flashes as a value at the limit of the last category, but : always in absolute pure, unleashed manifestation, and yet according to the point of a self-consciousness or natural individuality. Point of crisis, point of contradiction between mediate or mediation, between form and content-matter, 'power', imminence of new synthesis.

And the 'I' in fact frees itself from ambiguity: its new value is a being-to-self and cannot tolerate condition, mediation: the substantiality, which aroused it, must be torn away from , it must be assumed and transformatively subsumed in the consequent. Its mode must be put at the service of a spontaneity that dissolves itself. Thus it is resolved in the following meaning. According to the moment of the antecedent - that is, of what is realised by the limit, by the objective fulfilment of the substantial function - the Ego directly posited and distinguished (or denied), proceeded and returned to itself in the other. Now this form that applies itself to itself, that takes itself for its object - it is the further synthesis: position-distinction in the form of self-consciousness; an 'other' (that which was the moment of the accident) placed in the mediation, in the circular unity proper to self-consciousness as it knows its substantiality, by a self-consciousness that in this projects its natural form, that by distinguishing itself transcends itself and by transcending itself affirms itself, in this releasing from the state of pure experience, of absolute being-attached-to-self-ness proper to the thetical immediacy, an a-self, a principle or centre of experience.

All that which, in general, appeared in pure internal apperception, in the new synthesis will therefore gradually acquire a mediated form up to the mode of subjectivity itself, where, in the externalised, liberated a-self, there will be precisely the liberation of the individual from its own mediation: a situation in which the very mode of substantiality appears - to pass into something that, as identical and revelatory of that which is the same, is the same.

which in turn passes away, while remaining a simple, immaterial element of distinction - elevated to a higher function, subsumed into the consequent, integrated into it.

This category - we will call it alterity - constitutes the extreme power, and the point of alteration, of purely natural subjectivity, of the order in which the spontaneity of an instantaneous, interior perceiving was the form of every possible position. It therefore develops correlatively to the progressive assumption of everything that was previously placed as matter and task of the new function, so that it is articulated in a series of moments corresponding precisely to the categories in which the immediate position took place. Only at the end of this series is self-consciousness active - self-confirming - against the totality of mediation.

A) Perceiving - First it is the very simplicity of the thesis that passes into a "deprivation", corresponding to the state of the ego as "this" or quality: but immediately it is reflected and detached in a rudimentarily, tenebrously reflecting form of that self-consciousness, which now passes over to that which is aroused precisely in the act of this detachment. The distinct remains dominated by the element of immanence proper to the thesis and constitutes the simplest element of the mode of that which exists in itself. We call perceiving the immanent function on which it depends.

Note: it is not yet a question of a spatial exteriority; this is constructed from an absolute distinction, which is impossible here, in which the sense of the subjective a-self is still but a conatus linked to the function and matter it invests. The in-itself of the perceived, which reflects it, is by no means indeterminate: it is the elusive πρώτη υλη, the ασχηματιστος ουσια [raw matter, formless substance], the simple substratum of a 'presence', of an objective possibility, always given qualitatively, as a state of spiritual consciousness. The in-self of this 'elementarity', of this 'subtle nature', is only identified, implemented, animated, in the further moments correlative to the greater individualisation, energisation and sufficiency of the distinctive power.

B) Affection - The distinctive energy that in the perceived objective, as a further

"reflection" and integration of this, the moment of "being to other" by which the perceived, as such, is conditioned, determines the category of passion, whereby what was simple, inert substratum or possibility of matter is transformed into elemental force, into dynamic nature. Here the indeterminate individuality, aroused in the perceiving, reaches a degree of mediation analogous to that possessed by the act (§ 2) with respect to quality (§ 1).

C) Recognition - Destined to move, the perceived is an a-self and a for-other, two moments that in the previous form still lie in extrinsic coexistence. A further conatus of mediation turns instead to make it a concrete unity - then the obscure 'power' must come alive, must appear as something within itself. That is to say, self-consciousness is called upon to project something of what it itself is, if the further power of distinction is to take place: it no longer has to place the other than by recognising it: and insofar as it does not recognise it, it does not place it (as that which is to be placed), This takes place by various degrees, which, due to their uniformity from the point of view of value, it does not matter to construct. Along these the distinction, if from a material point of view it seems to become blurred, in reality it becomes intimate and turns to absolute expression: for the more the other as such reflects the identical, the more absolute the distinction. It remains, however, that even at the limit of such forms, the interval, with respect to the terms, is immediate and extrinsic: the one and the other are not yet caught up in a continuity.

The aforementioned intermediate series of recognising determines the awakening of 'nature' in its various hierarchies, given in qualitative formations, i.e. outside of space and time, in formations made of internal experience, of 'mind', as 'archetypal' or

"Subtle": from the limit of the indeterminate *δυνάμις* precipitated in death and in the blazing darkness of minerality, the sleeping forms of the vegetable kingdom are generated and, from these, the dreaming and demonic life of the animal kingdom, which gradually enlightens itself to the point of open consciousness. The development of these forms, in which life gradually awakens, expresses nothing more than the objective moment of the very process of recognising oneself in that will of distinction that commands it. In the becoming of all these forms before it (this 'before' therefore always remains an 'within', something spiritual), self-consciousness gradually purifies itself and frees itself from its own root of nature, until in recognising the same consciousness it brings the principle into itself and makes the distinction inherent in the end of the moment; and it is this freeing of the immaterial *prius* and *τελος* that generates these forms, that alone for which and in which they are and

become.

D) Expression - To take back into simple subjectivity, which recognition has liberated into autonomy of other, the very act of recognition, which is the contradiction of this autonomy; to liberate it therefore further with respect to the transcendent principle excited by the last distinguishing - is the next moment of the category. But integrating the subject with act of its recognition - that is, recognising it no longer in a perceptive-ideal or Apollonian way, but in its very being, in its active moment - leads to an identification: the distinguishing that is internal to the object of this immedesimation insofar as its object becomes precisely subjective activity, an activity that is distinct and yet reflected and closed within itself - such a distinguishing that is internal to it must therefore simultaneously bring about a distinguishing according to another dimension, that is, according to that which brings the immanent principle of the category beyond itself, which breaks the balance of recognition. The 'I', which no longer in its mere knowing itself but in its reflexive placing itself immediately is a distinguishing - expressing. It is the infinite sacrifice and miracle of the Word, the miracle and mystery of light and beauty that gushes forth from the act steeped in nature in an amazement (what in its reflection in the art of men will be the sensation of the genius) resonant of the act of the Ego that alienates its own elementary power to excite and sculpt itself in a deeper interiority. In this, the contradiction inherent in 'natural self-consciousness' is on the way to its crisis, but still does not resolve it: the ego still IS, and does not have, the Logos: the Logos kidnaps it and only in this does it dazzle it with the experience of superior value. Here expression is in its 'free state', it is absolute outpouring, a cry in which beings themselves say their 'Name', express themselves as nature and according to nature. As for the level of this experience, one could refer to what Indian esotericism calls the mantra - "sound" and "essential or universal name" of things, the original expressive power within which the very "bodies activity" of the "gods" (devâta) flash in magical apparition.

E) Revelation - Finally, not the mere form of the ego, not even its movement, but precisely that superior ineffable principle that has revealed itself to it by distinguishing all that, is distinguished from the power of the category now turning to absolute interval, is placed with a position that, simultaneously, is distinction of


self. Such is the revelation, appearance of the 'God', of the 'Sun', of the pure value beyond the body of activity of the; of ουσία [substance] at the bottom of the world of δυνάμεις [potentiality]. In this the entire natural potency passes away. Everything that mediated the Ego is now mediated by the Ego. The Ego has rendered itself entirely empty, it has exhausted the ultimate sacrifice - more appropriately: the natural power that manifests itself as Ego here has reached complete self-consumption - with which the category of otherness has reached its limit, its total explication.

In otherness, therefore, the resolving phase of the purely spiritual, purely, amorphously qualitative world develops. At the first awakening of self-consciousness relative to the consequent of substantiality, the ideal limit, the indeterminate possibility, of existence in itself is aroused - the πρώτη υλη, the "chaos", the "waters" - the first phenomenon of the original "reflection" of nature. Through the further empowerment of this self-reflection, the elusive otherness energises, moves, moulds and illuminates itself in forms in which the subject recognises itself and distinguishes itself more and more. This brings about the experience of a hierarchy of 'types' - an experience still free of space, time and particularity. The transition from the experience of one of these forms to another dominated by a greater degree of perfection, of internal transparency - for example from the vegetable to the animal - is nothing other than that from one degree of spontaneous self-recognition and self-distinction of the subject to another, higher degree. At the end of the moment of recognition, there is a point of equilibrium: the natural subject finds the reflection of itself as the subject experience. The point of the individual, which dominates development, however, breaks this balance: it itself, in its supernatural essence, is given in experience. The Word, the articulated world of "Names" announces "divinity" and in the experience it brings to the Ego it prepares as the body in which it can incarnate. Finally in the God who appears, who takes the form of another, the supreme principle itself, the prius of the category is distinguished. Then the world of quality passes : beyond pure nature, flashes the value that transcends it; experience, the principle of it. A spirit soars over the 'waters'. The 'dream of Brahman'¹ vanishes and, through absolute distinction, it is all an expectation of the eruption of that order, from which physical reality will be - of the order of the aeonic powers.

¹ [In Indian metaphysics, while the 'night of Brahman' alludes to the state of not](#)

manifested, the 'dream of Brahman' alludes to the order of those transcendental experiences, which, though belonging to manifestation, stand apart from the physical order, the order of existence and subject-object law and constitute the so-called 'subtle world' or subtle state (sûkshma) of the world.

Section Two



In the preceding categories, there is like a gradual transpiring of value within the objective in relation to the particular conatus from which it has now derived its condition; transpiring for the category of otherness realises the crisis of that in which it transpires, and yet comes to be pure self-expression. This final point, however, is itself immediate; as such, it is inseparable from the relationship with that with which it stands in a relationship of simple negativity, so that the meaning that animates it is not truly for itself, but still in an ambiguity. In order to overcome this, it is necessary to be able to exclude the possibility of a 'nature' that in the affirmation of the principle of individual also affirms itself - and this requires that the simplicity that has emerged at the limit of the section be made the 'power' of a further development: to guarantee itself with a free position with respect to , that is to say: the power to dissolve its own substance in an objectivity, and this, to tell the truth, no longer qualitatively, but according to a principle of real initiative. Aroused precisely by the act of making an 'other', the individual is in the act of making such a condition pass into objectivity - in the sense of reality, of existence. Its evidence now coincides with this further distinguishing, identical to a creative act of ex- sistance. The development to the limit will give an absolute, physical object, which is therefore solely from the pure affirmation of the value of the option, so that it exhausts the task of the first epoch.

§ 7 - POWERS OF EXISTENCE

In the term, in which the category of otherness reaches its ideal objectivity, the moments that it as an act kept resolved in a dynamic synthesis will be found statically. These moments are the simplicity of an accomplished, circular mediation and the absolute exclusion of this same unity, which thus, in a certain way, doubles. With regard to the second moment, it is important to note that it differs markedly from the various distinctions encountered in the previous states, and even in otherness itself in action, because of this, that in these, since the form of the individual had not yet appeared, a certain complication and impurity was essential to the relationship, so that its terms always remained in some way fused together, and opposed, more so, by matter. Here, on the other hand, the relationship is simple, the terms each take the form of the absolute point, and thus realise a perfect indifference, a pure opposition of identities. That is, we have on the one hand the element of quantity, on the other the simple unity proper to the distinctive moment proper to otherness. These two points converge statically, merging in a certain way with each other in the ideal term of the previous section, in which the form of the spatial relation is placed:

v.d. the form of a simple and quiet medium constructed from the interval of the pure exclusion of identical and indifferent terms. If one fixes the point of the identity of the element in connection with the simplicity of the relation that splits it, one deduces, in addition to that of homogeneity, the character of reversibility of the spatial form. Fixing instead the point whereby identical elements are nevertheless different, one has the element of the pure quantum and, beyond this, a possibility of qualificability in the homogeneous itself that is revealed for example in the paradox of non-overlapping symmetrical figures and that, in general, makes the principle of orientation or direction possible. Finally, one can unfold the simplicity of the relation in a recurring affirmation of itself: then one obtains a progression of elements, each of which is relation and term of relation on the face, respectively, of the preceding and following; conversely, one can assume the simplicity of an element as that of a relation and make the multiplicity proceed in the other sense - analytically. Hence the continuity of form. The continuous, homogeneous and reversible system of multiplicity is thus the form determined by the experience of the limit of affirmation according to otherness.

On the other hand, by going through function of otherness the ego goes to assert itself in the

new point of absolute causality, of a principle of action. To tell the truth, this element already appeared within the category (indeed, it was what specified it): but not properly in itself or as such, but given in a sensation, perceived. Although the irreversible course in positing it was negated, it, in its immediacy, remained connected to this negation and in this, in a certain way, still dominated by the principle of spontaneity. The point of real causality is therefore to be understood properly as a consequent that is efficient in fulfilment of otherness, yet transcends it. The Ego reaches it only by passing again - specifically: by passing into the interval of a pure freedom that is constructed precisely as a distinction from its elementary appearance, which at its end defines the spatial form. Beyond this, the synthesis: the spatial relation realised in a term that, nevertheless, is its distinction - that is to say, an active representation (*vor-stellen*), determinator of existence. Representation is to be understood as that double, cohesive distinction which, on the one hand, is the absolute passing of the instant (temporal limit), the actual making of a 'this' and a 'here' that distinguishes itself from the static background of indifferent spatiality; on the other hand, it is freedom that passes beyond itself or quality, according to a distinction, whereby it projects itself before (*vorstellt*), makes its own determination ex-sistent (*entlasst*). Hence the form of an objectivity whose determinability in general is spatial, and which, on the other, is only brought beyond indifference, the empty, indeterminate possibility inherent in the pure element of space itself by the temporal limit: it is the instant that, in a distinction from pure spatiality, also makes the element this present at a defined point, which can now be properly called reality, existence. The spark of representation synthetically connects space and time, or, more precisely, it is the prius that is determined through the unity and distinction of space and time - and through it the elementary principle for the possibility of a physical and quantum world is laid down. The medium of this conjunction, in any case, is precisely the spatial element, which on the one hand is the form of what is distinct, and on the other is the form of the act of distinction itself, of the instant or limit of time, insofar as in this the Ego makes its own element, realised through the splitting of otherness, be for itself in an existence (in a relation of identity of different ones); an element that is now altered as the spatiality of the object placed.

The ego, as mediated freedom, implies space: it posits itself by opposing, and in so doing positing, unfolding, actuating, space; and thus transcends spontaneity, whose limit is the element and freedom of space itself. Representation is a spatialised and liberated quality - rejected, emancipated.

The concept of representation implies the possibility that the variety of the represented - who, however, are only posited as such, without any further principle of individuation and specification - is susceptible to being taken up in the homogeneity of a spatio-quantitative system. What remains, however, is that the foundation of relation here is simply the opposition to an identical opposite - at the simplicity of the pure representative relation it only gives an indeterminate genus. In a word, the law that is posited for now is simply that of spatiality or quantitateness in general.

The following points result from the previous construction of representation: 1) Space is not really a distinct autonomous form, but rather a moment of a category. It is not actual in itself: it becomes, it is actual, only in its distinction - in the reality that constitutes an irreducible moment of it. It is nothing outside the principle that distinguishes it by giving reality to an object in general. There is no space before its distinction or filling - which is not to be understood nominalistically, but in the sense that the distinction, and the abstract substratum of spatiality, are inseparable terms of the same relation. It follows from this that space is inseparable from time (properly, for now, from the limit of time or instant), this being connected to the moment of reality. 2) Spatiality, since in the synthesis of representation it is present according to distinction, is indifferent to the particular nature of the represented, i.e. the freedom of the given positions has no material condition from that.

Existence objectively expresses, and yet reflects, the character proper to the pure immediacy of the individual, as it flourished in the previous category. The sketch of justification, or reason, does not lie here in the matter of the represented - which is absolutely without further foundation - but of its being causally for the Ego, in the principle of action that is joined to it: such is the progress of the present category over that of otherness.

In relation to this, it cannot be said that the ego is simply representation, as was said for example in relation to substantiality. The position of the function now implies a certain distancing from it. Representation is only possible insofar as the 'I' is already to a certain extent a principle of experience; while not making itself possible as such only through representation, the 'I' experiences this in a certain way as accidental. This is the character that distinguishes the categories of the second

section from those of the first, in which ego, content and function are entirely fused together.

The phenomena of the first section have often been referred to as something purely interior: this, however, should not be taken literally. A true interiority only makes sense in contrast to an exteriority, and of this there is no question in the previous forms. That 'purely interior' is to be referred to what Bergson calls the 'plane of the dream', and which in truth counts as that original matter in which object and subject, exterior and interior are still confused together. It is, on the other hand, with space that the first element internal experience proper born; and, conversely, the forming of the first principle of an internal experience - certainly not ex abrupto, but in functional relation previous forms - is the foundation of possibility for quantitative-spatial elements.

It also follows from the construction that spatial determinability implies quantitative determinability. What we have called the temporal limit or representative instant, is the actual element that resolves what is pure quantum into the concrete simplicity of a spatial synthesis proper (which we refer to as the 'spatial distinct'). Secondly, it turns out that the spatial-quantum element is essentially relative, which leads to continuity and infinity. This constitutes nothing inconceivable, given that one knows how to recognise the right place of the elements. Aristotle already noted, it would be that the abstract 'power' ($\nu\lambda\eta$) of the quantitative as such was not infinite. But this substratum, remember, is simply a moment: it is but in relation to its distinction, v.d. to the determinate position that opposes continuity and indifference to itself and is identified in spatial fills or syntheses and in definite numbers.

The moment space has the character of homogeneity. It is a well-known criticism that the theory of non-homogeneous or finite-parameter space is ultimately forced to presuppose an elementary homogeneity, for without this one would end up in a discontinuum, in which no measurement would no longer be possible and no transitions determinable; so that in truth the very concept of space would fall and one would move on to the purely qualitative. There can, however, be a relative heterogeneity, which does not exclude the homogeneous, but is in a certain way merged with it.

In addition to the aforementioned property relating to non-overlapping symmetrical figures, one could refer to a non-Euclidean world, albeit with the caveat that here one would not have so much the moment of pure spatiality (which properly

refers only to the general substratum of quantity), as much as that of a certain distinction or identification of it (with which the same Euclidean space is borrowed as a particular case, if order of a certain reality).

A similar consideration can be made about the dimensions and directions of space, which, a priori, can be said to have none, in the sense that it is indeterminacy and indifference of all dimensions and directions. These are determined only by the nature of the various distinctions that, by identifying space in accordance with certain values, gradually make it become; and the question relating to them could not be resolved by a deduction from the pure concept of spatiality, i.e. within the category that is now being dealt with. Logically, when the content of the categorical statement demands a space with any number of dimensions, such a space would undoubtedly be assumed by the abstract spatiality with the same simplicity with which, in the mental order of particular problems, equations are complicated by a congruous number of parameters. It will be seen, for example, that with the category of intuition of the third epoch, a "fourth dimension" goes condition the form possible experience. Pure spatiality oppose such determinations, since precisely in and through them - in relation to the individualisation of them, which is opposed to it - it becomes in reality according to this construction.

§ 8 - POWERS OF DYNAMISM

Instantaneous actuality, whereby it becomes the element of existence, is the correlative of the simplicity of the original spatial relation. But in this, according to his concept, there is the possibility of a development by recurrence in an indefinite continuum: to this corresponds the development of the present in a time series, or time proper. But in the synthesis of representation, the instant is as the form of a determinate and individual synthesis of reality. This means that a full unfolding of the category will turn to a specified time, i.e. to a system of determinations that connect according to a linear exclusion. More distinctly: the 'instant' again brings a point of irreversibility, albeit distinct from that which the category of otherness has passed. Qualitative irreversibility in fact expressed the state of immediate spontaneity, of the absolute appearing of the 'I' in and through formations, with which it was one, from which in no way it distanced itself as their 'possibility'. Here, on the other hand, irreversibility is referred not to form but to matter, and the moment of possibility is presupposed and inseparably connected to it¹ - specifically: it is a category of reality, of that which proceeds from the existential power of the Ego.

According to this new material function irreversibility remains defined as the linear proceeding by simple negation (negation, which takes place from that pure exclusion of identical elements already given with otherness). But this relation must be synthetically connected with the spatial one, and yet the simple exclusion will only realise itself through the becoming of spatial distinctions. That is to say, time, which is the issue here, is spatialised time - determined in every moment by the pure character of irreversibility no less than by that of the relation to spatiality in general: it is therefore quantitatively differentiable time, certainly not in the sense of mathematical time, but in the sense of a fluid simplicity or immaterial continuity, which has spatial distinction as a moment essential to its filling or actuality. Beyond representation, there is only time insofar as it is, directly or indirectly, spatialized, and therefore fixed on the canvas of quantitative determinability; just as there is only space as individuated and distinct in the various units of reality that are gradually posited in the instant-time-distinction of representation.

The representation thus ends in the form of an exclusion according to irreversibility or progressiveness of spatially distinct elements. On the other hand it

elevates the Ego to the value of a power that makes itself become through the creative distinction relative to an existence. This value, to tell the truth, is in act in the category itself; but as that power, further into which it can integrate itself, so that what mediation makes become existentially for Ego is the same dynamic moment, efficient in immediacy in the act of the spatial distinct, this value goes beyond the representative synthesis, it is rather the consequent that logically ends it, that conditions the point of becoming in objectivity. With which we pass to a new interval, and yet to a new synthesis. Now, the irreversible exclusion of distinct spatial determinations, within the form of a principle that posits itself in realising, liberating, or positing for itself the dynamic relation that presides over the same spatial synthesis in general, determines the content of the eventual affirmation in dynamism or physical causality. The cause is the antecedent that derives its determinacy from the power with which it makes, according to irreversibility or temporal progressiveness, a determination distinct from itself, or effect, from the indeterminate moment of spatiality; and which is therefore only such within a relation, in the dynamic interval in which it immanates and of which it is a moment.

By making this interval proceed in the order of the real by unfolding the limit of the instantaneous position in a series of causes and effects, the ego enhances the form of the

'from itself', which now reasserts itself over the distinctive principle from which the pure represented, or element of physical reality, was made possible. And for this new category, the eventual position remains terminated by two parts, since its concept dictates that the single element is only fixed insofar as it logically opposes an antecedent and a consequent to less than a dynamism.

There then remains in law a principle of order or linear law in the abstract gender and discontinuous indifference of the flashing of the simple distinction, in which the freedom of the previous category was realised.

That objective time, that which unites in an intelligible linear order the modifications of external experience, is by no means pure qualitative time (which remains restricted to the power that gradually unfolds in the determinations of the preceding section), but rather a time that has come into contact with space according to a compromise in which the former gives simplicity and continuity, and the latter divisibility and quantitative distinction - this is certainly conceded by the intuitionist doctrine^Z. However, this doctrine does not explain how the 'external' from which pure 'duration' is generally possible

is altered 3; external which, to tell the truth, if in any way it is present in the experience of the 'I', must only be external in a relative sense, and so proceed from a category, the meaning of which would then have to be given. Of course, according to the 'contingency principle' the possibility is granted of adapting the totality to each category, for example to that of a pure subjectivity; here one is not dupe [laughing-stock] of the illusion of connecting, according to the essence, deprivations to points where they only appear accidentally, with respect to further forms. But since in the doctrine in question the factual existence of a space is presupposed, even if connected to a negative value judgement, such a reference is legitimate. Then what is in no way conceded is that pure quality has a value of subjectivity and freedom as opposed to what is relative to spatialised quality. Here it is asserted instead that there is no real interiority when this is not mediated by an exteriority: mere spontaneity, pure *erleben* [lived experience], the fusion or indifference of ego and experience, mark not the realm of subjectivity and freedom, but that of nature, necessity and the objective. It is an irradiated Platonism that drives one to understand the spiritual in the 'subtle' and immaterial, and in the physical the negation of that rather than its act, its deepest affirmation and expression. This explains the apparent paradox, which may have been felt by those unfamiliar with consideration according to form or value, in having found the entire sphere of qualitative determinations in the age of 'being' or the objective.

Objective time and physical causality are born in a single birth and are held in an inseparable unity: it is dynamism that gradually makes time, or that in which time, actually as spatialised, gradually becomes, and thus also space as actual in reality or filled. As Kant already noted, one cannot form a distinct concept of objective time without being led to conceive, at the same point, in a more or less distinct form, causality. It is only to be warned that here causality is not to be understood as a simple concept, imposed on the mind by the logical analysis of representation; nor is it to be understood as a pure fact of internal experience, as for example in Maine de Biran⁴'s conception of 'effort': here, at the same point that it is a transcendental condition of experience, it is also experience, i.e. it is the formation of a real power of the subject, which in this section is constructed and experienced through the objective, eònic construction of the categories of reality or cosmogony.

The deduced concept refers to specified and quantifiable causality; in it we

has above all a syntheticity, a syntheticity not of a term, but of a relation. That is to say, it is not the synthesis of a term in itself, which goes on to produce a certain effect, but rather the synthesis that includes the one and the other term presupposing the relation by which they are made possible and fixed as cause and effect. Taken in itself in its purely spatial moment, this relation has a mechanical nature: the position of the one element, which is conditioned by the distinction of the other, is the thrust of the former, which excludes the latter from its place by developing the function of the position in a progressive or irreversible interval. The mechanism, however, is but a moment: it does not have the initiative of the action in , but receives it from the Ego; which now has its act so conformed that it immediately incorporates itself into the mechanism and appears in the physical or spatial movement. And it is precisely because of such a way of appearing that the Ego realises the value of the present point, v.d. the liberation of itself as that function by which in representation the individual was conditioned. It therefore remains that here, unlike in personal consciousness, the subject is immanent to the physical series, holds all its terms within its act, and is the conscious principle determining the identification of the various connections of that series. A series that is development, an elementary law of movement of sequences in solidarity, progressive beyond the freedom of the instant understood as a pure limit of the unrelated representing or ex-presenting.

From the correlation of causality to time, and of this to the spatial relation, there follows the extension to causality of the observation made about the continuity of space itself. That is, causality is posited if it is posited and to what extent it is posited. It is not a transcendent logical law that conditions the happening, but rather a posterius with respect to the happening from which it receives its condition and limit. Here the abstraction of the utterance, that 'everything has its cause', can lead one into error. A purely hypothetical utterance. Rather, it should be said that every cause has its own things, in the sense that at the point where the 'I' realises itself in that value, to which the form of causality corresponds, things come afterwards, they are only by means of determination according to a causal interval; this interval is the prius, the constructor of its terms; and since here it is referred not to a pure concept, but to an actual principle of position, it does not have the fatality of , it does not subject itself as to an automatism that would disperse it in an indefinite series. The sequence of mechanical drives continues as far as space is filled, but space is filled as far as this series continues, whose transcendental principle is a function that gives itself its own limit. This is true for objective causality, and it is also true, as will be seen below, for causality as the principle of a

conscious science of nature.

With representation lies the generic possibility of the mathematical law; with causality that of the physical law proper. Causality, as the pure form of the progressive unity of the various spatial moments, does not, however, by itself offer any identification of this law, of which it nevertheless constitutes the elementary condition: for the time being, it is essentially indifferent to the distinctions in which it is realised, and such indeterminacy can only be overcome in further hierarchical degrees. But already from here we can go to the criticism of the other axiom of causality, that 'to the same causes correspond the same effects'. Such an axiom is abstract, for the reason that dynamism includes time, and therefore progressiveness and irreversibility, as an essential element.

Unfolding with time and being nothing apart from the actuality of the individual causal intervals, what causality as a principle of reality postulates, is instead, that the same cause and, hence, the same dynamic interval and the same effect are never given a second time. This axiom and, with it, the

'principle of constancy', only makes sense when one refers to it precisely when referring to the indifferent substratum of causality, with abstraction from its individuations, from the 'form' of which it is 'matter' (in the Aristotelian sense of these terms). The sophism arises as soon as one pretends to take up in this indeterminacy the same

'form', in the order of which there are instead only the particular, qualified, unrepeatable causalities.

§ 9 - POWERS OF SPECIFICATION

The limit of dynamism has its objectivity as a function of the progress of value at a further point. Now the 'I' that stands against the development of representation according to causality comes to know itself as the distinct in general from that which distinguishes itself along progressive differentiation, v.d. as permanence; and the opposition of this value to simple dynamism is the 'power' of a new synthesis. More specifically: the elementary confirmation of the individual is realised in correlation with the synthesis of causality; now the spatio-temporal development according to which this synthesis forms the objective real demands the substratum of a continuum, of a unity. Such unity serves as a limit to the category. It can only be sufficient to this limit by a further distinction - by the distinction of which one term is the dynamic interval or element of causal becoming assumed in the objective real, and the other is the unity itself, which thus remains defined as permanence. From these two terms, a further category can be traced. What will be its determination?

The principle of the consequent must go there to take up in its form, and to command, its own mediation or antecedent. Now, the resolution of causality in the value of the permanent defines a situation in which a certain form is held firm in reality only through a development of distincts, of which it is nevertheless the principle. We will call this a function of specification: in it, the immovable is brought from 'against' to 'within' the dynamic; in the dynamic, in the very causal becoming of physical reality, a distinct and indifferent principle is now reflected, the distance that in the service of individual value had determined the previous category from immediate to mediated. The moment of the immobile defines the genus; the other, of the distinct, which it gradually unfolds and frees from itself, defines the species and individual. Both are in a single objective dynamic function, in which they lean on other, according to a relationship, which here is nothing logico-formal or classificatory, but the immanent structure of a power at work in space-time reality. The species here is then not the accident of a genus, which could exist in itself, separate from the γένεσις [origin] of its distinction, but is essential to the genus, since the syntheticity and difference of the species in this experience are valid as that objectivity of the dynamic principle, only in relation to which the point of unity and indifference is awakened to itself.

The unity proper to dynamism dominated the simple passing one element into the other, gave the elementary υποκειμενον [object], for which the point of a radical becoming, of a pure change that, as such, could not even be called becoming or change, dispersing or concentrating everything in the various absolutely discontinuous and unrelated present elements, is avoided. In dynamism, however, υποκειμενον is nothing more than what suffices, so that the passage included in a unity of consciousness, is for agent, but materialiter the dynamic interval remains of a radical syntheticity. For the development of the distinction to appear commanded, in its very objective formation, by distinct units, for the antecedent not to be completely dissipated but somehow preserved in the consequent, it is necessary that the higher principle itself, from which the dynamic interval passed existence or 'for Ego', be objectified and synthetically connected to the dynamic interval itself. This leads in a certain way to the remission of the static function of space to a function of dynamism. That certain element that now remains in and through the change, that elementary principle of formal unity (in the scholastic sense) that now, with specification, encompasses the mechanical series and orders and distributes them, can indeed be called the dynamic resolution of spatial unity. On which every physical law, as determined, is based. The order of pure quantity or indifference implicit in the representation, and that of change or difference given by dynamism, are joined together by determining generic possibility of distinct laws of occurrence.

Like causality, specification only implements a transcendental value insofar as it expresses itself in the order of physical existence: it is only categorised as the power whereby the Ego makes a certain situation of reality become a certain situation of reality, in which the differentiation of simple dynamism is delimited and enclosed in particular zones of elementary homogeneity, more or less persistent and more or less resolvable, in the order of the distinctions within each, in circles further extended by means of an analogous relation. In the concept of specification it is in fact understood that if a given group of differentiations is resumable, under a law, to the law itself a distinction or exception is in turn essential, which is however resumable, with its development, in a further law and so on.

It is important to bear in mind the real immanence of the genus in the species, to be understood in the sense that the ordering of the distinct does not proceed from a principle

acting from the outside on the various dynamic causes or powers, but from an internal conformation of these same causes, given by the further specification of the same relation or prius of dynamism. And just as this relation is presupposed in its terms (cause and effect), so the specification is also the process producing the various material determinations required as its substratum. It commands from the bottom and conditions the various spatio-temporal and dynamic moments inwardly, and yet in the order of the present category it applies as the same generic condition for the possibility of any content of representation and physical reality as it may be.

If we understand the elements of preservation and distinction as 'substantiality' and 'causality' respectively - then the relation of the point made here to what Kant says in the first two 'analogies of experience' becomes clear: substantiality and causality are really two conditions of experience, integral to each other. Only here, again, we are not dealing with mere gnoseological conditions deduced from reflection, as happens in the order of discursive consciousness (second section of the second epoch), but with real conditions: and in their solidarity is thus expressed their immanence in a single power in action, which is properly that indicated as specification; which power in the present connection is then not an opaque thing of nature, but the sign of a value, specifically: of the value according to which the individual includes in unity the merely distinguishing and efficient moments of its own justification and, by objectifying them, reaffirms itself over them.

The possible recurrence in the concept of specification has been mentioned: the determinacy of a genus, which is permanence with respect to a certain series, can, with respect to another series, be a difference. However, the warning made about space and causality must be repeated: in no way must a currently infinite series of specifications be admitted (according to infinity not of the sufficient limit but of the indefinite). Certainly, specification according to the concept is infinite: but this infinity simply expresses the indeterminacy inherent in the *δυναμικς*, or possibility, of the specifying function, which, however, is only real in and for definite acts. The general principle always remains, that the categories are only in and through acts of the Ego; which are what is first in the order of real conditions.

§ 10 - POWERS OF ORGANISATION / TELEOLOGISM

From an accomplished statement according to specification arises the possibility of a further value. For the immanent, identical subsistence of a principle of reality as it proceeds is comprehensible only when a double relation is present, so that if a certain determination comes, in general, to distinction by unfolding dynamically as cause, the distinction that proceeds from it is such that it returns in a certain way - better, in a certain measure, in a certain part - to confirm, to fix in reality that principle that had at first altered in it. In other words: if the specification is to rise to complete sufficiency, the Ego must assume a causal relation that in a certain way doubles and becomes reversible and, through this germination, realises an internal, living unity: reciprocity of ideal totality or of real parts.

The ego, whose experience becomes an order of specification as an existing reality, in the meaning that is unleashed within the process of this, thus finds, at the same time, the experience of reciprocal causality. On the other hand, that in which the specification can materially end, that which can be projected as a dialectical antecedent by the passing over, is the relation of a certain group of differences, it is an indifference (gender) that is maintained against a multiplicity and a becoming of distinctions. If, therefore, we turn to a synthetic conjunction of the two moments, we will find ourselves before a unity that is produced in the real through the elicitation of a complex of differences enclosed, however, in a substratum of elementary, virtual homogeneity; Differences that are then in reciprocal causality, and yet exist or consist to the extent that each one simultaneously refers to all the others by means of that unity or fundamental determination that circulates in them and holds firm in the reference to itself as to a simplicity or indifference that only sets them up as integral members of a system. Such organisation. In the organism, the abstract distinction of representation is resumed and identified with itself in its own objectification; in it, therefore, the principle of space is expressed in its transparency in the power of the 'for the I' in which it is now entirely resolved - the space that becomes the light of life, the self-diaphanity of the real.

Here, too, one must not 'reify' the moments and put the end or entelechy on one side and the system of causes on the other. Rather, organisation results as a further, progressive mediation of the causal interval itself, whereby in it the terms are resolved in the movement and this in the terms, and the whole resumed in a unity that is the full expression and transparency in the existent, in the physical, of the same elementary liberation and construction of the individual, with which this section opened. Organisation is therefore an entirely immanent principle, it is the prius from which every possible reality is now conditioned. We need only return to the caveat that organisation too, is not to be understood as a 'natural power' in the vulgar sense of the term: it is essentially a category - that is, a value function of the 'I': nor does it refer to a 'in itself', but rather proceeds from the affirmation of a certain meaning that the 'I' determines its own experience so that in the light of an 'intuitive intellect' (in the Kantian sense of the term) sets and teleological series unfold. In this theory, moreover, there is no place for a physical power: for in the first epoch there are indeed powers, but they are not physical, the ego intimately immanent in them, even if according to pure spontaneity, and the physical referring only to what proceeds from them and is made possible by them; In the second epoch there is indeed a physical nature, but not of powers, but of concepts of powers, discursively assumed as explanatory principles beyond the phenomena; in the third epoch there are again powers, but physicality is even less present there than in the first, since they are immediately connected to a "state of autarky". In general, in space, in time, in their specification, in their dynamic development as far as the beings of the various hierarchies of nature - in all this, only the building up and purification of representation is expressed, that is, the progressive causality of the ego's conatus to free itself from the being of freedom, to possess itself in a pure, autonomous distinction. In the next category we will have the limit of such a process, and thus the passing of the epoch.

Just as in the order of specification there is the possibility of considering the various continuities, whatever they may be, as provisional, and thus of developing them further either in sense of unity or in that of difference, so organisation, in general, can be understood as a process, i.e. as the production of various distinctions such that while in each of them, according to their internal possibility, the mode of the teleological concept is reflected, on the other hand they, in the individual, active individualities, pass into moments of a larger system. Life, in each case, becomes the general form of representation or the real: implicit in the concept of position at this point is that of

organisation, of vital unity. Certainly, in accordance with the general principle of the interval, there is the possibility of a distinction between animate and inanimate, between organic and inorganic; but this distinction can only be relative: due to a reassertion of the interval, what at a given moment is fixed as inorganic may turn out to be, as we have said, organic with respect to another term, and what was organic inorganic with respect to another term, the first of inferior, the second of superior organisation or, in general, with respect to a further identification of the system.

It follows from the relationship and distinction of this category with the previous ones that every organism implies the general laws of spatio-temporal and causal determination and, at the same time, transcends them, dominates them from a superior principle, which is properly the organic law - an original synthesis that, to tell the truth, in itself precedes, then unfolds the various series of hierarchically inferior determinisms that it nevertheless exceeds, to mediate and finally reconcile with itself alone. Life at this point goes to constitute the condition for the reality of every purely physical-quantitative and specifying law.

The interval that separates and joins these two orders of laws is indeed precisely that in which the power of the ego is identified in this category.

§ 11 - PERSONALITY POWERS

In determining the content of representation as organic life, the ego takes the generic principle of representation to its limit. According to the previous construction, in the living organisation there is in fact the ex-existence that immediately reflects its own mediation, the transcendental moment from which it is: the represented becomes there the body and, at the same time, the very transparency of value, the articulation and process of the physical, now reflecting the same transcendental interval of the transition to the physical, mediated in itself. The experience of organic life⁵ gives such unity. Now if one considers this unity at its ideal completion, one sees that it gives rise to a duality with respect to which a further determination can understand it as a deprivation. In fact, from the concept of the category in question, on the one hand we have that the ego, in affirming itself according to this category, does not so much represent (stellt sich vor) the organism, but rather is an organism, organising life: in other words, the ego cannot represent an organism as such (note: as such - an organism can very well be made the object of other categories, for example of otherness, of scientific consciousness, etc., but then it is no longer understood in its proper form or in itself, but extrinsically, by accident) except insofar as it itself becomes an organism, v.d. the value relative to the previous category can only be posited insofar as the elementary objectifying distinction proper to representation becomes the immanent power of objective formation, the very principle that arouses, organises and burns into a harmoniously connected whole the various spatio-temporal causes and determinations, as mentioned above.

However, the individual can still affirm itself on this incorporation of value in making it, just as what it is, an objectivity again; that is, it can reflect on the power with which it implements the category of organisation, which determines a new interval from which the ideal limit of said category would properly proceed. Now if, as an organic power of life, the ego is the function of representing in general in the concrete unity of its given moments in real existence, the state, from which the truth of the category can be terminated, must properly be defined as a representation of the ego as representative.

The organisation expresses the accomplished mediation, the completeness of the 'per se'; now to say that it, as such, is perfectly posited, what does it mean if not to affirm that it is not simply, but that the very power of the per se is at

itself transparent, that representation itself is itself within a representation, is itself representation and thus free of self?

Now how can the ego represent itself as representative? The representative would have to be posited, and, indeed, as a content, as an objectivity (which one would like to designate with A): but it is evident that if such a positing (= B) could be resumed in the same representing considered up to now, one would have a closed circle - in any case not the self-representation of the representative, so that the in-self is all pervious to the per-self, as is the requirement, but the simple positing of the function of representing in a real existence, which is proper to the previous category. That by which representation in general can be, as such, distanced and liberated, cannot therefore be, itself, of the species of the former, but a further, distinct power of it. To understand its meaning, let us reflect on the nature of the term A. In the category of representation proper (§ 7), the individual arrived at its first confirmation, or self-construction, in arousing, beyond its own immediacy, the power that, by projecting or positing this for itself, generates the order of the real. But this movement continued in the dynamism, proceeding from the Ego that reaffirms the per-self on the energy or distance of the representing, and, then, in the specification, whereby in the represented existing appears the same reference as the movement to the simple unity of value. Finally, in the organisation the 'I' experiences the reflected unity of its own mediation, the principle of the per-self that directly assumes its moments of position and distinction and accounts for them. It follows that what in function of which the ego as organisation can become object, is the individual itself in its truth - that is, as unconditioned and pure autarchy - is the very principle in otherness was terminated, which, however, has now self-demonstrated itself in creative mediation and which fulfils its guarantee in this, distancing itself from the body of this same demonstration or mediation insofar as it ultimately still depends on the relation at the end of the first section. Consequently, in the Ego's transition to absolute freedom lies the meaning of B, the value within which the organisation can have its term and its ideal fulfilment. The consciousness or objectivity of the self as representative is the ultimate power of the mediation of freedom, which in the category of representation was simply: the passing into the point of the pure unconditioned and the task of a representation of the representative are thus one and the same thing. This would be the deduction of B.

Now bear in mind that the general characteristic of the categories in this section - and thus also what determines the meaning of the mediation there

performs - is their objective, physical reality: the ego in such categories enjoys moments of value insofar as beyond pure qualitative interiority it makes real existence the condition or generic substratum, which incorporates the elements of its mediation. Therefore this order must now be overcome en bloc: the Ego will now, in the distinction in which it elevates itself to absolute freedom, move beyond the totality of the powers of mere representation. It follows that its act will cease to be that of an objective power of creation - going beyond the completeness of being, a pure form, an image, something no longer real but ideal, abstract - almost again a quality - will be the principle of that in which the representation of the representative can be identified. On the other hand, according to what has been said above, this abstraction is the condition for the objective order to reach full completion. Such a freeing and distinguishing of a pure form from the real is what makes this pure form perfect, in an enclosed completeness, and yet exhausts its inherent function. A completely unconditioned formal freedom is thus what can determine B and whereby organisation is taken up in a new interval.

The term of the ego as organising life and the term of the ego that in formal abstraction lives the value unconditional freedom are now to be resolved into a single term, which can be specified if one closely considers what proceeds from a

'represent the representative'. The represented must be the representative: now the representative, as such, is a closed mediation in itself; it is not 'posed', but poses itself, and a posing, indeed from itself, is its being. Instead, according to the new requirement, it would be an object, a represented, and yet something that is not posited, but is posited. It cannot, however, be posited in this way, without immediately being denied as a representative.

It follows from this that the requirement contained in the proposition: 'the Ego represents itself as representative' - can only be satisfied by this situation: by the object of the new relation being posited as not posited. The representation of the representative can only consist in the act by which the determination of the object is posited as not posited, as given - always, however, as a given for the 'I' - and, beyond that, as taken up and resolved in the ideality of a pure reflection. Only when the principle of the representative appears as given, and as pure content of reflection, does that conjunction disappear, whereby the representative himself would result as posited and yet no longer as the representative⁶. A positing as non-place correlative to the absolute freedom of reflection is thus what identifies the synthesis proper to the new category.

So, in conclusion: the mediation of the second section takes place for a

group of physically creative powers, in categories that could, from the point of view of their matter, be referred to as cosmological or aeonic. In them, the ego mediates and demonstrates itself, but this value is only completed at the point where the ego itself affirms its freedom from its own mediation or demonstration, thereby wrenching it from the dependence inherent in its relation to the order of quality. With this, the form of the power of reality or objective syntheticity is surpassed. The 'I', in a certain , exhausts powers of being and passes into non-being, and this surpassing of being, this going beyond itself, is the passage of value to the principle of the image or pure reflection. The slow distinction of the 'I' from 'being', the process of twinning of qualitative unity whereby an interiority is formed against and in function of the becoming of an external experience and physical reality, has here its apex, its *τελειον*. The form of the image implies an absolute abstraction, its position is also, and essentially, the position of its own content as non-placed, v.d. as given. The Ego cannot affirm the pure value of the unconditioned without tearing itself away from its own substance and projecting this into an aseity, without positing its own body, its own mediation, as something that is there, in pure external existence - as nature, as non-ego. To surpass being in a pure form and, in this, to counterpose it, to give it an absolute being - to precipitate the mediation of one's own freedom into a nature, such then is the meaning of the further experience.

In particular. According to the antecedent, the ego is unfolded and living in a certain organic system, albeit still of a non-particular nature. This system by the new synthesis is posited as non-placed and the pure form of its 'law' is opposed - and, through opposition, connected - to it and, indeed, in the value of unconditional freedom. The correlation having as its terms an organic life that, although posited as life, v.d. as an inner essence and in itself mediated, appears as given - and its self-representation in the seat of an absolute autonomy, unleashed in images, can be indicated as personality. Personality, which is evidently not yet to be understood as finite and particularised, but as the pure form correlative to the system of reality posited, and which to a certain extent, as 'mode', would correspond to what was hypostatized by a still mythological thought as the 'soul of the world' or *îshvara*. Note, too, that what has been deduced here is simply the generic form of the datum - the value by which the possibility of experiencing something as not placed arises for the ego. The particular meanings in which the genus of the datum can be qualified are not to be asked of the present category, but are to be connected to the further individuation proper to new forms.

It is not necessary for the organism to integrate itself into the personality: the basis of this transition, as of the others, is to be found solely in a transcendental arbitrariness; it proceeds, however, from its very definition that the personality implies an organism, the centre of dynamic and spatio-temporal relations - and this not in the sense that an organisation is given before or separately, but in the sense that if the object of the transcendental statement is the value relative to the personality, it will also pose and include an organisation, albeit as a moment and abstract matter. - Attention should also be paid to this particularly important point, that the Ego's emphasis, at least at the present point, does not fall on the formal distinct (the image), but on that which distinguishes the image itself, v.d. he is in that interval in act by which both the organic (objective) and the formal term (the image) are conditioned.

If in the personality there is that pure affirmation of the individual that has as its condition the becoming into objectivity of the very substance of its own position or mediation, it is clear that for such a category the task of the first epoch is exhausted. In the personality, the absolute objective in-self, proper to the form of the given, of the 'placed as non-placed', and the absolute subjective per-self, proper to the non-entity, condition, generate and balance each other. The element of immediacy and the element of mediation in it remain synthetically reconciled in the same way as the first moment of the subject's becoming.

It will be good to specify what can proceed from the condition of the present category with regard to the problem of knowledge. An important doctrine of Schelling - admittedly detracted from the view of Leibniz - is that whereby, at recognition of the necessity, for knowledge, of a correlation to particular organic determinations, it is nevertheless affirmed that not the representation (in the common sense of the term) in itself, but only the consciousness of it necessitates the organic or physical modification; and it is deduced from this that, for example, the blind man does have a representation of light, but this representation is not for him, since, due to the lack of aptitude of the physical organ, it cannot become an object in itself⁷. - This view must be supplemented by the principles of a more complete idealism. The concept of value must not be mistaken for the concept of consciousness in general. Every category, as such, i.e. as a subjective statement, is conscious. Therefore one cannot, strictly speaking, speak of determinations that are first unconscious and then become conscious, as if it were possible to achieve consciousness in some

point, when it was not already presupposed from the beginning. Organic formation must itself be considered as a state of consciousness, as a form of experience; on the other hand, there are also possible modes of perception which, although conscious, are quite independent of organic correlation in general or of correlation with particular organs⁸. And as for the idea that there is no consciousness unless one objectifies oneself and in this objectification recognises oneself, this is nothing more than a suggestion of a physical mode of knowing, so that, for example, one only comes to consciousness of one's physiognomy when one sees it reflected in a mirror; a mode by which, of course, there are other possible modes.

What must be argued, however, is that if one is to place oneself in the value relative to personality and not in another (e.g. in that inherent in quality), then the correlation and conditionality of an organic determination must be posited for perception and, indeed, so that what in itself, as a category of the organism in action, was conscious, now appears as unconscious, v.d. is posited as not posited, no longer experience but the object of experience. When this correlation and position is lost - in particular or in general - then, to the same extent, perception as proper to a personal subject is no longer possible, although the possibility of it exists according to another value.

This view reconciles the realism of immediate consciousness and the idealism of reflection. If we hold fast to the state of ego, in which it manifests itself according to absolute formal freedom of the image, we must maintain that representation, if understood in its completeness, is not only a mental process and abstract ideality, but also a concrete and physical process that includes the spatiotemporally determined object in the series of mediations that lead it to the organism and that continue in the correlative physical-physical modifications of organism; a series that therefore not mechanical, but flashes with elementary degrees of consciousness. According to this moment, everything proceeds as realism wants it to; and the possibility (in the abstract, not according to, a value, since deduction of positive investigation as a value still unknown) of natural science, which is and must be based on it, is fully confirmed. But here we have only a particular aspect, and realism would be exaggerating its rights if it made this objective complex something existing in itself, and wanted to deduce from it the representation and, indeed, as the consciousness of a free personality. The realist, when he runs this naive adventure, does not realise that he is already presupposing what his theory would claim to explain, because to speak of object has

sense only from the point of view of a subject and consciousness - consciousness according to imagine - is already present before its examination, for the simple reason that the realist himself, before being such, is already, in general, a person. Psycho-physical parallelism cannot refer to an X external to consciousness that determines consciousness, but rather to two elements equally internal to consciousness, which thus remains the matter or elementary substratum of the objective term itself. What must be said is that representation in the person is an image, i.e. an immediately distinct, distanced unity; that there is no way of being able to take the term of the object and that of the subject separately; and that therefore, in order to understand the possibility of correlation, one must refer to an apriori. This is not reduced one term or other, but includes them both and places them in simultaneity with the same relation that makes them possible as they are determined here, namely: the objective as factual, as given, and the subjective as freedom. But, once again, this unity or category must be understood - one may not stop at it as before a transcendental fact, an original law of the spirit, one may construct it as a value, implying various degrees that in themselves may be conscious and worth each as a complete affirmation of the spirit⁹. With this idealism in turn remains satisfied and is taken a little further than its simply gnosological form can. Representation as personality is therefore not object and subject, nor causation of the subjective by the objective or vice versa: these terms only come later; what lies before is simply the synthesis, whereby the positing becomes being and the demiurgic power is freed, idealising itself, in the pure transparency of the image. It therefore not accepted - and idealism must hold firm to this - that there are developments organisation that are in themselves unconscious, that is, absolutely free from a correlative in an image. The unconscious is but a moment of what is posited as not posited, a function, this, not unconscious, but conscious, whereby even the apparently deadliest or most opaque forms are traversed and animated by a thrill of occult spirituality, to which indeed their whole being hangs. And, referring to a particular being (although here it is not yet a question of such a being), its perception in the strict sense must be considered as the τέλος of a continuous dynamism that is essentially spiritual, which already awakens in the physical and organic conditions in a dull form, and gradually burns and illuminates itself until it reaches, precisely in this τέλος, the act of distinction that precipitates a 'given' (non-Ego) against its image (I). If, therefore, the new experience from the material point of view appears as the simple learning and reflection of a reality that in itself, this is, in truth, to be understood in the sense that here the placing of an object is in the form of a simple mirroring, that the form in which what is placed

is placed, is that of a reality in itself existing. Simply perceiving through an image an object that is not immediately posited by the ego is now the form proper to the syntheticity of the category. In a word: here analyticity is a particular form in which syntheticity appears. Realism is a category. From which it follows that 'I' is that which posits the formal term of the image only insofar as it is also that which posits, in general, that objective and physical content, of which it is the image, since the two terms are inseparable correlatives: if one is posited, it means that a relation is posited which also includes the other; and to say that the 'I' affirms itself as personality means that it gives as content to its actuality such a relation or functionality. He who confines the principle of the 'I' in a term, instead of placing it at the head of the relation itself, loses all hope of accounting for the representation, for he has thereby opened such a gap that no miracle will be able to fill it again. Thus, in general: if, on the one hand, the pure form of personal self-consciousness depends on a nature (for if the aeonic power did not make itself exterior to itself and factitious as nature, there would be no self-consciousness, interiority, freedom), on the other hand the reality of an exterior world articulated in those various moments whereby its objectivity is mediated up to the sufficiency of a teleological system, does not have its own principle in itself, it is distinct that would not be outside a distinguishing, that is, outside the small light, the 'irrelevant' psychological actuality of the principle of the person.

From such a point comes a light on the problem of birth. Why do I, as this unconditionality that I experience in my innermost being, find myself here, now, in this form and at this time? What is the meaning of this radical contingency? Implicit in what has been said is a solution to this problem. Personhood, by definition, implies the moment when the whole of the various determinations in which organisation realised (in the broad sense= § 10) being posited, together with the particular factor of freedom inherent in each of them, as not posited, this whole simply appears as given, i.e. as something that is there according to absolute randomness, without any further mediation, and whose possibility as the experience precisely of a personal consciousness - a question to which the dogmatism of the empiricist does not even dream - would undoubtedly be contradicted when it could, within the form of the personality, be explained. The inexplicability of the order to which the person awakens is not factual insofar as it is in law, it is not real insofar as it is necessary: v.d. it can be perfectly explained, because it cannot be explained. If one wants, beyond this, a material explanation - then one does not have to turn to this order itself, which already does not have it in itself, but one has to create it in it by bringing it forward, by locating the principle of the person - and thus his experience - in further

categories.

Another question: What was the world before I was? This must be answered: If by the world is meant the world of things of a nature correlative to the personality, that is to say, if an answer is to be given in accordance with the value of the personality, it must certainly be said that the world before I was was absolutely nothing. The 'past', the filling of time apart ante according to the forms of the given, is simply the projection of a certain development of the personality, to which the posing of the personality evidently presupposes itself. Here we must once again be aware of that sophism of antedating - which now, by the very nature of the category, has a particular efficiency, so that in the structure of the image the content appears independent of the act in which and from which it arose; and while this act is fixed in the present and referred to the personality, that content is placed, for example, in a time anterior to that very act, which places it. But things, in truth, are the other way round. The past comes after the present, it is determined by the present and not vice versa.

It must also be said that prior to the position of the person is null not only the world as the world of the person - which is obvious - but also as the world in general (e.g. as that proper to a prior category). This point is of fundamental importance: it is connected with the proposition that every category is a principle in itself, that every value in act encompasses and dominates the entire series of its conditions; which series therefore falls en bloc with the fall of the one, and can only be arrested at a hierarchically anterior moment with a new original position. Thus, for example, if the affirmation relative to the representation falls, it is not that we pass to the anterior form of the quality, but the quality itself remains negated, since it is present in the representation not as in itself, but as a moment of the superior synthesis: for the quality to exist, it is necessary that, beyond the representation, the value relative to the quality itself be affirmed with a distinct, discontinuous dazzling.

The separation between ideality (form) and reality, or more precisely, the separation between form and matter in the substance of the ego, is thus the law that now commands possible experience. This implies that the mediation is fully posited, and thus the hierarchy of previous forms; but these, in relation to the personality, are no longer what, when the value stops at them, they can be in themselves, but are recreated and transfigured ab imo from the proper principle to the consequent. The posterius, as category or τέλος, is the prius of all its

moments and all its conditions. The personality will not therefore be understood the flower of the objective world, but rather as that from which the objective world itself, its reason, the power that governs and traverses, without exhausting itself in them, all the categories and the infinite determinations, in this always remaining within itself and in the apparent psychological and 'subjective' irrelevance that seems to characterise the act in which an ideality is liberated and distinguished, is to be seen – the fulcrum on which the reality of the entire universal system now gravitates. - On the other, as conditions for the possible positions according to the value of the person, the various categories of representation remain, with which - naturally, at this point, without prejudice to what may happen for further values - the substratum of certain elementary laws, such as space, time, cause, etc., remains in place. All these elements are already included in the character of 'given'.

The order of the first and second sections can be made to correspond, with due speculative reservations, to what some Indian metaphysical traditions call *sadâkyatattva* and *îshvaratattva*, i.e. with the manifestation of power (*shâkti*) in a distinction, in which the ideal principle (*aham*) and the real principle (*idam*) predominate respectively. The degrees of the second section can be understood mythically as divinities (*devatâ*) or aeonic powers: they perform the real principle of an ever more intense affirmation, which has as its limit the appearance of the 'this' in absolute polarity with the 'I' (= *sadvidyâtattva*)¹⁰. In the brute fact can then be understood, with Fichte, as the body of the Absolute itself - of the very powers of being - mediated, concluded in itself, which reflection opposes and distinguishes; and yet in the person the passing away, the exceeding of the Gods. To this the energies of being become the abstract condition or 'power' (in the Aristotelian sense): formal order, the order of the person, the ideality, is the ultimate affirmation, in which they go beyond themselves - to grasp and liberate themselves.

§ 12 - SUMMARY

An overview of what has been achieved so far can be presented, in a way, as follows.

In the affirmation of the individual according to the positive value, its affirmation is at first taken up by the principle of the immediate and thus appears as the very power of objectivity, which, however, develops in relation an intimate contradiction and only realises the objective insofar as through it it proceeds to the manifestation of a content that transcends it. Hence the ego originally experiences the absolute spontaneity of an incorporeal nature transmuting into the miracle of qualitative determinations (first section). The central assertion at first is the discontinuous, the pure instantaneous limit in the voracious phenomenal continuity: it creates the pure appearance and self-affectation of the principle: quality. From this form the value as 'other' distances itself, the phenomenal power turns to fill the interval, so that beyond the dissent and compulsion of feeling flashes the absolute manifestation of the act. But this mediation is rather the negation of mediation: duality remains to it properly as a limit to which it only becomes sufficient when by an individualisation of the pure interval, by adapting itself to the other as properly such, it reaches distinction. But insofar as the distinction is accomplished, the value of the position as a superior unity of right arises against it as a consequence, and this, by going on to reabsorb it, passes into causality, into the power that is drawn in function of the reduction of the other to itself. In qualitative causality, in the striving and doubling force, in the energy that, beyond desire and nostalgia shaping the *mâyâ*, develops change and transfigures the opposite, the nature of the simple position is complicated, it becomes the positive, dynamic unity of the two terms. But in proceeding to its satisfaction, this form also proceeds to its dissolution: the God of Darkness, the divine No that the power of the Yes has made all transparent of its own value leads to the experience of absolute negation, and this consequent penetrating and dominating the demiurgic force of qualitative causality, unfolds it in the drunken overflow and blaze of Dionysism, in the enlightened and essential ambiguity of the symbol, of theurgic and divinatory participation, of spiritual perception - in the double negativity of the substance in which the supernatural light of the individual already flashes, as an inescapable moment and condition of nature; and this

principle, which appears in its freedom and purity at the limit of the agitated and demonic ecstasy of the experience of substance, determines the last relation, the extreme tension of the order of pure spontaneity. If the principle of the immediate is to become sufficient for this new term, it must entirely surpass itself, alienate its own substance, condition its mediation to the moment of making itself other; thus, in the 'mixture of bliss and bitterness' involved in generation, the form of the other develops from the obscure, elusive 'presence' of 'original matter' to luminous pain and absolute freedom of the revealing God. Insofar as it becomes in the objectivity or distinction of revelation, nature grasps in its own death life and in its own life, also, death.

The form of the first moment has unfolded to the point of taking the manifestation of the content back into itself; the term is the same as the individual, but in this there is only an unstable point of equilibrium, since an individual whose mediation is nature, or a nature whose matter is its own negation, cannot be understood as anything else.

Therefore, a new cycle (second section) opens in which the individual is reaffirmed in what it considers its own mediation as immediacy and thus as mere power for its actual position. Then the primordial, igneous nature of quality dissolves into the determined, unequivocal clarity of a physical, quantifiable universe. The Ego that testifies to its freedom in the simple distinction and distinct takes up the spatial form in which the objectivity of the term of the first section is resolved, represents, creates existence. Reality, in which the very power of representing is then freed, in which the I goes to place for itself that interiority that remained in itself or immediate in the representing in act, becomes in the form of dynamism. However, the progressive development of the spatial distinction as and in determined time, remains under the condition of the unity of value, so that the interval of pure dynamic difference must be composed with a principle of continuity, and therefore the Ego, brought the existential act of the unity of the two moments of its new mediation, experiences specification. Now since in the relation of specification the individual has in objectivity his own distinguishing and therefore his own assurance, the relation of representation is folded back upon itself and remains reversible, the distinguishing and the distinct, or rather, the distinguishing and the distinguished in which the distinct proceeds, are synthetically joined, objectivity adapts itself to subjectivity and vice versa, and thus the generic form of a teleology, of an organisation, of a principle that expresses itself in reality through production of a system of distinctions, in the reciprocal and essential connection of which it holds firm and actual, absolutely mediated with itself. With this, the individual has entirely freed its mediation, has

redeemed its dark past: but, beyond redemption, the act of redemption. - The 'I' reabsorbs mediation or nature, and distinguishes it from itself into existence: such is the meaning that commands the development of the elements of physical reality, a development that nevertheless has its fulfilment - that fulfilment whereby being is exhausted, is brought to its completeness, to its absolute state - only in the final act of the section, whereby the personality becomes the object of transcendental affirmation. The individual, with a final thunderbolt, distances itself from its own mediation, destroys the balance of purity and impurity that pertains to objectivity, and asserts itself decisively in the principle of unconditional freedom.

On the one hand, the whole system of mediation, the completeness of 'being' - the totality of power teleologically deployed in space and time - is unleashed and precipitated - on the other hand, and at the same time - the non-entity, a pure form, a pure transparency (image, reflection, ideality), as an act of transcendent value, is unleashed and freed from this 'precipitate'.

¹ Please note: this is not to say that the forms already proceed from an absolute will, from a will entirely sufficient to itself: this will only begin to be possible at the end of the epoch, when the series of forms according to which value frees itself from its own mediation is complete. For now, the 'Possibility' has only the sense, that the subjective presides as a p r i n c i p of action over the experience in which it manifests itself, although this experience remains inseparable from it.

Z H. Bergson, Essai sur les données immédiates de la conscience, Paris 1921, p. 83.

³ It is clear that there is no point in referring space to needs of a zion, when the meaning of this has not already been explained and the possibility deduced.

⁴ The flaw in Biran's doctrine is that it connects in a certain way a temporal contribution, however infinitely small it may be, to the point of effort, and does not see in this an a priori from which all time (naturally, not qualitative) is made possible. Hence the causality of which he speaks oscillates between that which is purely qualitative and psychological, and that which is merely a concept of discursive consciousness. [François Pierre Maine de Biran (1766-1824) was the major representative of the revival of spiritualism in French philosophy in opposition to the Enlightenment. During his lifetime he published only one book and his entire oeuvre was published posthumously by V. Cousin].

⁵ Of course, spirit is always life: but that life which is connected to a certain set of organised physical elements and determinisms, is but a particular s p e c i e of the g e n e r of that life, which is mutualised with categorical activity in general.

⁶ On the deduction of the principle of the 'given' from the task of the representer to represent himself as such, see J.G. Fichte, Transzendente Logik; Darstellung der Wissenschaftslehre aus der Jahr 1801

⁷ J.W. Schelling, System der transzendental Idealismus, ed. 1858, p. 497.


⁸ Even keeping to its current state, science today is becoming convinced, for example, that one does not only see with the eyes, and that one can also see independently of the eyes; in general, that there is a knowledge that, although it concerns physical determinations - v.d. explicable by means of the categories within this section - is determined outside the organic conditions.

⁹ Here also appears the absurdity of those views, which conceive of an evolution of consciousness from 'matter' through the various organic forms to man: for matter is not at the beginning, but at the end of the series.

It is a phenomenon proper to the level of the person and outside of this it has no meaning: if before the person there has to be a series, this can only be fundamentally non-material.- Matter, Leibniz had already noted (Considerations on the doctrine of a universal spirit, ed. P. Janet, vol. 1, p. 689), is not to be referred to the spirit in general, but to the representation that is imposed on a limited spirit as limited.
Aristotle, Physics, II, 194b, 9: των προς τι η υλη [the (notion) matter is a relative one].

¹⁰Cf. J. Evola, L'Uomo come Potenza, Atanòr, TodiRoma 1926, sec. II. (A totally revised edition of the work later appeared as: The Yoga of Power, Laterza,Bari 1949).

PERSONALITY ERA



At the end of the first epoch, the point of the individual no longer emerges according to the ambiguity inherent in the middle between the two sections, but in purity, as something that has its own guarantee in itself. This, with respect to the antecedent: but with respect to itself, this principle in the category of the personality is again immediacy, for its body is an abstract distinction, a mere flashing. - According to the principle of the arbitrary, this point can be understood as sufficient to itself, and definitive, in the same way that it can be understood instead as matter for a further individuation: and, certainly, if the second alternative takes place, through it the equal possibility of the first is also postulated.


According to the last form of the first epoch, there is mutual excitation of freedom and the antithesis of a being as given. The principle of freedom corresponds to the pure form of this being - to the particular individualisations according to value present in this, it is however indifferent. Hence the way to understand the consequent - which for the moment is simply the empty form of ideality, a bare formless transparency - as a pure power whose act is affixed to the movement, according to which the elementary value, which is proper to it and which is the flower of the first epoch, goes to reassert itself on the varied matter of the antecedent. That is: the principle of formal freedom can proceed in a process whereby, through a series of categories, the

"The 'given' of individuation is reduced, that is, constructed in its various elements in function of the same formal freedom or ideality. But this freedom always implies and posits the "other", the objective correlative, and thus the completeness of the aforementioned process, whereby nature becomes a system posited by reflection and freedom, does not so much deny the antithesis, but rather strengthens and develops it: only when the Ego, through the formal resolution of the datum, reaches the entire fulfilment of itself as the consequent of the relation, does the absolute opposition arise. The point of the Ego's perfect mediation, in its own consequent, is at once that of absolute opposition and - since this, in its primitive form

(= § 11), was what underlay the value of the individual - in this is also the perfect, absolute affirmation of the unconditioned. The progressive polarisation of the two principles thus plays out the mediation of the pure element of the individual - and such is the matter of the second epoch.

¹ For those with a taste for mythological coverings. God creates his own image or, more precisely, poses himself as the image of himself. The image, as such, is empty, it has its own content - or substance of God or the real I - outside of itself, and so as nature. Now it turns to make internal what has become external to it, and this, since its new mode is formality and freedom, means idealising the real I in an order, which has freedom as its condition and elementary substratum.

Section One



§ 13 - FINISHED EXPERIENCE

In the category of personality, freedom becomes in a formal distinction, and yet under the law of the opposition of an in-itself-existent to an image, which appears as the mere reflection of it. Hence, the objective termination of the category is essentially inherent in the characteristics of necessity and identity: in the image there is nothing more than what is factually in the datum; the principle of the per-self, which is realised in it, is felt in it as determined and bound by the content, of which, because of the passage, the Ego can no longer, and must no longer, be recognised as the immanent, real producing power.

On the other hand, the category is fulfilled insofar as the substance of the Ego comes alive in the value of the unconditioned. Hence the category, at the point of its becoming real, ends up in a dilaceration: in it, form and content come into conflict and contradiction; and with this, the place for a new synthesis would be determined.

Such a synthesis cannot abolish the principle of distinction inherent in the image in general, as this would contradict the very condition for which a synthesis beyond personality can now be thought of. Included in the very concept of formal freedom, the correlation to the being of a 'given' must remain as a substratum for any further determination of it. It will therefore only be a particular determination within said generic distinction. While the law of the distinction objectifying the content remains firm, what this substratum will live in will no longer be a materially identical relation; instead, freedom will invest the term of the image, generating a particular difference. Such is the direction of the new synthesis. In it, therefore, there will no longer be a pure eye, but already a principle of action and, indeed, of personal action will be reaffirmed. However, this action is only experienced formally, it enjoys itself on the level of the image, while on the other hand its physical-physical correlative remains in place as unplaced (albeit as a simple condition existing for the further value, by which in law it remains, in the totality of its determinisms, dominated); arousing itself in a certain sense from this objective, formal freedom in its further power reacts on it, and of the content it makes a raw and abstract matter to which the effective image is according to a synthetic and contingent relationship. Freedom, which in the earlier category was limited to the

pure distinction of the real in an image of itself, here passes to a distinction within the general matter of the image itself, from which the first distinction is taken as an implicit and subordinate moment.

The nature of this further difference remains to be determined. In the simple personality, the content had the character of universality and teleological totality, expressing the closed mediation, the exhausted process of the elements of existence. As for the distinct, it was the transparency or reflection (as "of a flower in a crystal") of this total and accomplished being (macrocosm), without any individualisation of its own. Now insofar as in the new synthesis beyond the freedom of simple distinction an act is still affirmed in the order of matter, the content of this act can no longer retain a character of universality. The mediation of the per-itself principle is only possible insofar as as it were, it quantitates or divides the content relative to affirmation according to the category of the personality in general (îshvara), and only realises in the image a particular determination among the possible ones that are thus given. - And vice versa: the material moment of the unconditioned requires the act to count as one possible among several others. Now this cannot be thought of at the point of the universal, which is all that can be, in which real and possible are one and the same thing. This point must therefore be abolished, an analysis, a division must create in the given whole a multiplicity, which counts as that multiplicity compossibles, from the hovering over which the act of freedom can derive precisely the sense of itself as such. But then in the new category there will be the position in consciousness of a partial form of the given to the exclusion of others, that is, in general, the position of a particular point of view, of a finitude¹.

Thus at the point where the transcendental function inherent in the pure transparency of the image ends itself, an activity arises that from a particular point of view carves out a system of aspects of representation against which the others are obscured, submerged. The power of the individual passes precisely to this further distinction, to the interval of this individuation of a particular in the exclusion of the remaining particularity: the person is now the forming of a centre through the obscuring, in consciousness, of a certain quantum of reality placed, placed (in the integral sense of the term) according to the principle of the priority of syntheses, precisely through this negation. The object then appears in a certain way once again in a quality, even though the existential form with its various physical categories remains there: the real that can now come to consciousness is inseparably connected to a qualitative tone, it is as if surrounded by a strange halo that is the obscure presence, in the form or particularity of it, of everything

what is excluded from it Z. A reflection of the totality one, this elusive quality that imbues the physical object, reflects the synthetic simplicity, the immaterial continuum that binds the various perceptions into a unity of experience, constituting to the person its original matter, its obscure, contracted infinity.

The transcendental in such experience is thus as the act of the finite subject. The act that forms the person and the act that forms the world relative to it are one and the same thing: the finitude of the person and of the world are interconditioned and spring from a single point, determined therefore by the reflection of the absolute for-itself on its own primordial affirmation.

In a retrospective consideration, the moment of generic distinction relative to a particular image is to be seen as that which posits the series of corresponding physio-physical determinisms; as for the specific synthesis of the present category, it appears as the subject's particular 'reaction', as his particular perceptive capacity or aptitude in relation to the physio-physical antecedent. The fact that the person elevates to actuality and distinct consciousness only a finite part of the possible experience, correlative to the particular faculties and the limits of these (and, with this fact, the theory of organ-leptic properties), and, indeed, precisely as a fact, here therefore finds an a priori deduction and value. The notion that the sorting of special elements from the indeterminate of experience corresponds to a finalistic disposition, falling, as soon as it claims to really explain something, into a vicious circle, will give rise to the view, that the personality and its world are constructed by a single synthesis, whose foundation, if with regard to matter is pure contingency, with regard to form is the aforementioned value. Certainly, one can admit teleological orderings - which not here, but when consciousness becomes a natural science, will be able to be determined - with regard to the functions of a given personality; but these finalisms in turn are simple means that have their end in the actuality of the value deduced for this category.

Perhaps it will not be unnecessary to point out what is more distinctly implied in what has been said about the continuity of organisation: , that of the genus of finite consciousness the human one, relative to the known system of organisation, is a species. To the present point personality is to be understood in the extension of the Indian concept of *jîva* (opposed to *îshvara* as the personality in general, or universal subject, of the previous category) the

which refers as much to principles of lower organisation than man as to higher entities of which man himself could be taken up as a member³. That the 'I' then finds itself existing in a certain form of personality rather than in another, this must at this point be explained as little as the problem of birth itself in general; and a similar obscurity - as far as can be glimpsed - may extend to every further form of this epoch, v.d. until the principle brought by the image has so perfectly mediated itself, as to pass into a conscious and sufficient causal relation with that relation, which originally determines in factual existence the content of its experience.

One more word on an important point. Here it is to be affirmed that it is precisely the activity of the finite person that makes the plant vegetate, that which animates the animal, etc., and that it is the activity of the person that makes the plant vegetate. Which to some will appear entirely absurd: what else does the person have in common, it will be said, with a plant, an animal, etc., if not an empty, abstract image? It is only of this image, and in so far as it is pure image, that the 'I' is the cause; but is it to the image that the life and reality of such beings rests? - Certainly. It is precisely insofar as it is abstract that the image gives real and distinct life to those beings. It is all a matter of not thinking of the image taken separately, but of the image as a self-distinctive actuality: such an actuality on the one hand places the image - that is, ideality - on the other, and conversely, that real content that the image as such (as empty and abstract) opposes. In becoming itself in an image, the finite person distinguishes itself, empties itself, and without such a distinguishing, in the beings it knows precisely in images there would be no life, precisely as the life of real, distinct beings external to it. In the psychological act of the image, the finite person is thus truly, objectively creative: in it, as we have said, the same aeonic powers, the same powers of being, pass without residue and are exalted in the synthesis of Yes and No.

To clarify the relationship between the anterior category of personality and the present of finite experience, one can refer to the life of instincts, which for admirable wisdom, decisiveness and precision far transcend what can come from the faculties of an autonomous person, either directly or through the mediation of discursive knowledge. - Of particular significance is the study of so-called 'supernormal knowledge': first of all, it has that character of immediate perception; and through a sort of 'lowering' of the personality in the strict sense (of its particular individualisation) correlative to the taking over as it were of another entity, from which the former is reduced to a pure, passive learning and receiving, the barriers of space and time fall for perception - certainly not in general, but according to those particular individualisations that

are relative, in our case, to man's sensitive perception - so that the possible experience extends to an almost universal content. This corresponds perfectly with states of consciousness, an echo of which can be found in Oriental wisdom, especially in that from which the Hathayoga arose, where it alludes to a knowing understood as a resonance of the life of the cosmos within the organic functions themselves and, in particular, the breath⁴. But this formless, elemental person, who was an accomplished mirror of the macrocosm (= hiranyagarbha), is abolished in the further mediation of freedom: it becomes like an obscure web, only in opposition to which the act, which the law of particularity commands, gives rise to the various images. In correlation, the various organs from functions of the universal become functions of the finite, of the particular: from organs of 'sense' they become organs of the senses.

If one looks for that which in the form of freedom reasserting itself on the image can correspond to an objective interval, has mental association: that is to say, relations that are also liberated, tightening or unfolding the various images in quite subjective and contingent orders. On the other hand, homologue of what as ontological unity was organisation, is memory, on which the identity and continuity of consciousness now rests. Memory thus turns out to be founded on two elements: the distinctive one proper to the particular image and the one proper to association. And just as every development of organisation is unity in distinction, so, correlatively, memory will be a moment inseparable from perception, that is, from the becoming of the particular image. Perception (acquisition) and memory (retention) will be found in the person in reciprocal action, as two inseparable moments of a kind of dynamic unity or entelechy, without reference to which there is no way of conceiving the possibility of psychologically conditioned experience: which is not a proceeding by sedimentation, a mere layering of impressions, but a process, a living syllogism in understanding - even if the various connections in which it is determined are for the moment contingent, subjective, extrinsic in a certain way to an essential order inherent in the elements.

Again: according to the principle of continuity organisation, we have that if a perception in general on the one hand has the sense of a distinctive or acquisitive moment at first opposed to memory, on the other hand, it is itself a memory system, an organic synthesis: hence the fact that the simplicity of elementary perceptions is relative and can in turn result in a unity of a series of elements of a lower order - the analysis of acoustic sensations by Helmholtz⁵ and taken up by Hartmann in his

Kategorienlehre⁶; and the relationship between elementary perceptions and memory studied by Bergson; unity in which the qualitatively unified particular is always expressed in the simplicity of that total microcosmic synthesis, which is the elementary form, the substratum of the personality. This formal unity of the person, a reflection of the absolute synthesis, is the transcendental foundation of memory and, with it, of the possibility of all perception - in general: of the subsistence of a subjective unity of the world as psychological experience.

As aspects of the particularity of experience, sleep and death can also be indicated. Death, as mentioned with Novalis, is the privilege of a higher essence: through it the 'gods' overcome and liberate themselves. In the order of this category, the spirit is mortal. This is therefore not to be understood as if with the death of a particular person the possibility of experience is thrust into nothingness once and for all; but rather in the sense that the generic object of transcendental affirmation or function is now finished, and yet the various experiences or lives are switched on and off without being able to connect in a continuity or memory, lacking a higher, non-particular principle of relationship. Such is all the sense that the doctrine of rebirths can have at this point.

The identification of the ego with a particular, finite system of experience is that of ahamkâra, which for the Indians is synonymous with ignorance (avidyâ); ignorance, since the ego is an infinite power of freedom, and never any particular, finite system. However, this very identification bears witness to, denudes precisely such a power of freedom and is justified in it - only that the act still lacks a mediated awareness of such a value, so that it only appears as precipitating, enclosing the ego in an obscure limit (myth of the 'fall').

§ 14 - PERSONALITY AS ACTION

Freedom manifesting itself in the pragmatic finalising moment can reflect on itself; and the ideal termination of the category is conditioned by this self-penetration of the principle of personal limitation. Now what can be properly fixed as antecedent is a unity of the two moments, formal and material, of freedom; v.d. the particular image will now appear to consciousness only in function of a principle of action that intimately interpenetrates it, i.e.: that transformed into motive or object of tendency. On the other hand, to say that the principle of material freedom reflects on itself is to say that an ideal multiplicity of compossibles is posited, it is to say that the 'I' in its determination goes to possess itself no longer simply in a given part, but in that as also in the possibility of all the others - v.d. in an absolute agility of the particular. Actually, 'quantity' is already present in the previous category, but as of right and not explicitly and consciously: due to the immediacy of the pragmatic moment, what lived in consciousness was precisely the content of the particular act, the position of which coincided, without further mediation, with the annulment of the other possible options. Only when material freedom reflects further on itself, is the discretion of totality according to the ideal value of choice and arbitrariness connected to it fully placed for and in the ego.

There is therefore a point at which there is a multiplicity of motives, of possible directions for the further formation of freedom, so that the act must essentially be connected to deliberation. Secondly, the new power of reflection complicates the relationship between the distinct. It is that through it the person experiences himself in a mediated principle of activity; but since the condition of an elementary distinguishing subsists, one is led to the determination of the consequent as the interval of the proper or extraverted action, where the motive pushes the power of the finite determination beyond the simple image - and this affirmation now essentially counts as a distinction between the various compossibilities - or refracting itself and making an effort, to extrapolate into a non-ego that infinity contracted in the previous category as a quality of the various finite images. The moment of the given is thus affixed to the passing of the freedom that has asserted itself on the content, in the form of actual action - it only becomes in the opposition of the ideality of the motif to physical reality - and it is in the relative

interval of effort and contrast that the principle of distinction is preserved, and thus the condition for the elementary law for personal consciousness to subsist at the further value that flares up here. Action, as the synthesis into which the world of finite experience passes, is thus essentially an objective reflection of freedom, i.e. it has the sense of a distinguishing relation, of the position of a particular determination as the position of the others possible as not posited, the partition of reality into zones in which the Ego is actual because they are directly assumed by action, as opposed to others which, if they are likewise posited in the action itself as a distinct term, are connected to a negativity of the subjective moment - and the reality of these, since the affirmation does not make real that a particular determination, yet it is dominated by the reflection of freedom and yet from the point of view of totality, is rejected to a non-ego.

The category would thus comprise two moments: the ideal moment of deliberation and the real moment of action, distributing the various quanta of reality and negation: moments that are therefore inseparable, because in the concreteness of the synthesis, there is no deliberation that is not already to a certain extent an effort, that does not already excite and define, in a play of obscure organic exponents, various antithetical elements; and as for action, here it is nothing but an objective promotion, a precipitation in the plane of reality, of the situation proper to deliberation. The 'I', while passing beyond the image, retains the distinctive principle that makes it a person, because the extraverted action implies the 'other', produces the 'other', albeit no longer from immediate distinction, but from the internal drive towards nature as the object of 'desire'. In such an 'other', the ideal unity or indifference of the particulars (the 'I' that has penetrated itself as a principle encompassing the indeterminate manifold of possibility) is projected, and manifests that transcendental law, whereby what is not posited by a particular realisation of action, is posited in a non-ego, which itself appears as a reality.

The possible action thus remains, in a certain sense, peripheral: the unity that forms it falls in the moment of the given, the arising of the non-Ego, while remaining in general conditioned by the action itself, appears as independent of the Ego; likewise, the various physical categories appear as elementary but nevertheless indispensable conditions of the action, insofar as said unity implies its conjoined system. And, indeed, what can still be determined from the point of view of formal consciousness must fall, according to its concept, under a similar situation. Quite apart from the originality and unconditionality of the point of personal initiative, the movements in which it then unfolds and takes shape must, in the final analysis, be the subject of a similar situation.

analysis, appear as inadequate as the image in general is in relation to what one knows about image and ideality.

It follows from the principle, already referred to, of continuity of organisation that this category can admit various degrees. The simple movement of deliberation already distinguishes and defines in reality a first organic system - correlative to the immediate order of motives and tendencies - as $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$ against certain antithetical elements. A new power of action, which serves as its own affirmation of this first organic system already constituted, can remove the terms and arouse and define a new order of elements in which the $\alpha\upsilon\tau\omicron\nu$ incorporates new functions and opposes new antitheses. Thus the resonance of the action and, with it, the further becoming according to reality and hardening of the finite experience, can extend indefinitely through the successive distinctions that the individual affirmations gradually arouse.

With this category, imaginary representations are made possible as opposed to real ones. They arise from the abstract moment of the antecedent: they are velleities, missed or barely proposed actions, thus still indeterminate in function of the system of the possible; the ego, as it were, withdraws from the fundamental opposition of the present epoch and renounces the principle of freedom. From which it follows that they would not be possible in a person without the use of elements stored in the memory, coming from other determinations previously implemented through action. Such representations are abstract as is the moment of the antecedent taken separately: they, in a certain sense, express the logical passage from the experience proper to the anterior category to one in which the finalising distinction is no longer immediate and ideal, but is appended to a *nisus*, to an action proper. - It follows from what has been mentioned that the one theory is that 'consciousness' is born for action, and the other that there is no consciousness where there is no inadequacy to the 'environment', no contrast, no differentiation of the act for something that resists it or that takes it beyond itself in realisation (heterogeny of ends) - since consciousness is understood as reflected personal consciousness, cf.d. reflection of freedom - and then to dispel the empiricist misunderstanding of unconsciously transforming what is mere factual correlation into order of law and metaphysical causation, entirely disregarding what can arise in the search for transcendental conditions of possibility.

As a whole. If, on the one hand, the totality of the multum of possibilities is posited for further reflection, on the other hand there is, according to the principle of the antecedent, a finite act. But if the antecedent is to be taken up again within the new form brought about by the consequent, it is necessary that by means of the finite act itself, the other possibilities that it excludes as such (and this in a factually objective order in accordance with the generic moment of distinction) are also illuminated, and that the 'I' in these is placed as negation. The dynamic deprivation of the ego thus remains deduced from the reflection of the principle of the previous category in connection with the general condition for the active personality which, *sit venia verbis*, precipitates or actually distinguishes its ideality. The limited position is also the position of those limits, whereby it is limited. The experience of an objectification here is merely the experience of limits or synopses immanent in the action itself, of the No with which the action itself is imbued. - Objects are now, so to speak, nothing but the "The 'concave' of a limited action, nodes of activity and passivity of the only immanent power; the so-called laws of nature, which are the projection of the formation and conditions internal to the action itself, and yet real only in function of it and for it; finally, the generic antithesis of the not-I is nothing but the shadow cast before it by the action, what it suppresses in itself and posits as its negativity - and this because material freedom implies finiteness. Between representing and acting, there is no substantial difference: a representation is always an experiment, a more or less complete attempt; an action is always the organ that makes and sustains the varied articulation of experience.

Thus position ceases to be simple: between ideality or motive objectivity there is a differential. Nature 'resists' and the determinations in which the category ends are neither pure objectivity nor pure ideality, but a synthesis of the two notes, of arbitrariness and necessity, of quality and spatiality, of particularity universality. And the universe, as it immediately appears now, i.e. in the images delineating the various impulses to action, remains a pure moment, an indeterminate that is only completed through the concreteness of the very action that gives rise to the distinction, the "lesson of experience" - in which, on the other hand, a reaffirmation of experience is also expressed, a new biting and shaping of the objective according to the particular arbitrary formation sketched in the previous category; and by means of this movement - which to those who do not have the habit of the transcendental gaze may appear as an 'action of the external' - there is a shaping and identification of one's own personality as a dynamic system: to operate on the outside is simultaneously a sculpting of the substance of one's own personal interiority; at the present point one does not know what one is, other than through the experience of our own power and, therefore, that in function of a

distinct. Action certainly implies an irreducible ante rem initiative; but, according to the form that now commands every possible position, the determination becomes properly the substance of the person only post rem or, better, in re - only in function of the action that aims at reaffirming and, so to speak, refracting its formation in the distinctive interval.

Just as in the previous experience there is no subject other than in correlation with an object according to the pure distinguishing of the image, so here there is no subject other than in function of the distinction τῶν ἐργῶ [in fact] of the resistant thing. But this duality, like the other, must be taken synthetically. Conditioned by the experiencing in act, the substance of the person is also conditioned by the object - environment, bodily vehicle, etc. (realism). However, what is object?

As an in-itself, it could be nothing to the subject and would therefore fall outside the aforementioned relationship (take care not to fall under the illusion of touching a

in-itself of the determinant by means of an indirect knowledge, such as that proper to the physio-chemical sciences, since such an indirect knowledge implying a direct one, is always given as a function of a person's particular hold on things): but as the term of the relation it is as it is determined by the action of the subject (idealism). Contained in an inseparable, reciprocal relationship, the two terms are not explained by one another, but by the unity of action, of experiencing in action, which is the transcendental prius of both. It is not that there is action because there is something outside and against, but rather there is something outside and against only because there is action.

The various manifestations of action result from personal arbitrariness in synthesis with the various elements of objective representation, which give the former that opus conditionis, against which the latter can assert itself as such. These manifestations can come together in bundles of lesser or greater uniformity, bundles that, taken in their objective moment, appear as the laws of nature personal experience. Referring to such a conjunction, it was stated earlier that the laws of nature are but habits; and that the constancy of world order is but that of a transcendental character of the ego. This, admittedly, extends to a much broader sphere; but for now we need only refer to the original root of law as it springs directly from a pre-scientific and pre-logical moment, in action and action (properly so called). At this level, laws do not presuppose themselves to the will, but instead the will presupposes itself to them, determines them, conditions their reality. Natural determinism in no way commands my act - it is my act that at every moment sustains it and confirms its particular formation. By right the whole world is at

every moment hanging on my will and my acting as its τέλος [end]. Thus: if now a will of mine goes into writing, this does not happen because a certain energy is subsumed by a law X in itself existing (which a sufficiently advanced science will also be able to determine) of the connection of the psychological modifications to those of the brain, and then by another Y of the centrifugal transmission to the given effect of my writing hand and finally by the general complex of external physical laws: but all these determinisms are created or recreated by my act, by my affirmation; they, again, are hypothetically condensed in the determination of this and only unfold and become true at and by the passing into fact of the act of said affirmation.

Thus the most insignificant action sustains, contains and commands the entire universal necessity, since everything, for moment of organic unity, is in solidarity: it is the impetus of the act that gives continuity to nature, that connects and justifies its various determinisms by casting those jatis, the elimination of which science has only in its ideal.

Further: if what is originally and essentially arbitrary and subjective agility is, by habit, crystallised into automatisms with the appearance of laws of their own, which, insofar as the will obeys them almost as lines of least resistance, seem to impose inconvertible conditions for the efficacy of an action that is not aroused by its deepest root; this too, as we have shown, is generally to be explained by an original direction of freedom. If by the very structure of action, as it results in the hierarchical locus to which it is now referred, a moment is inseparably connected to the life of the root of the arbitrary, whereby the 'other' is demanded and the appearance in this for confirmation and faith in that power and in that particular formation which in the transcendental moment of any act of the person is but from a purely inner initiative; yet without an original, buried persuasion and creative spontaneity that immediately escapes from the subjective consciousness and is incorporated and multiplied in the various resonances animating the sensible world, the entire system of reality would be deprived of its foundation. - It must therefore be emphasised that the laws mentioned above are stable to the extent that subjective determination is stable; they generally follow and reflect the development of the person; and, conversely, the person becomes shaped by the becoming of the laws, which proceeds from his action. Action, in general, is individuation: it is it that now creates the body of the person (v.d. that which lives as ταυτον within a reflected freedom). Our world is the mirror of our person or, better, our person is consciousness, the mirror of that act, which is our world: we are what the world is, and yet what we make ourselves, acting in the

world or making a world. We ourselves determine the conditions and forms in which reality, truth and, in a certain sense, freedom too, must appear to us.

§ 15 - SELF-PRESERVATION / CO-ACTION / SEXUALITY

Personal freedom, which is affirmed no longer in fact, but in self-reflection, finds in its immediate object a limit, something transcendent that ends it in moments of deprivation. And reciprocally: from the outpouring of this transcendence the reflection, the per-self of freedom in the person is now aroused.

The experience of an 'other', in which the character of the given is maintained, as a function of action, is therefore what results at the ideal end of the category.

On the other hand, in the category which, in coming to an end, encompasses and objectifies itself, there will be a synthesis of the two moments, formal (§ 12) and material (§ 13) of freedom; these will be taken up in a mediated unity, given precisely by the person in the act of realising himself as the option of freedom penetrated by reflection. But since this unity presently remains connected to an 'other' given, in accordance with the fundamental law of the epoch, in factual immediacy, the experience in which the category action ends can also be understood as 'power' with respect to a further synthesis. Of which the meaning would be a new mediation of the heterothetic function in the personal centre; that is, this centre that in a new measure assumes and becomes sufficient for the production of the original distinction, which in the moment of transcendence that it generates is still commanded by a pure spontaneity. But this immanentization cannot be absolute. - According to the consequent, the other results simply as the possibility contained in the principle, now in itself reflected, of personal affirmation, the brute, factitious form according to which it springs from simple action can no longer be tolerated: it must be transcended into an ideality. But on the other hand, according to the antecedent, the principle of distinction in some way must exist, otherwise the universe of the person would collapse into that of a quality. So what can determine further syntheses will be a merely formal resolution of the otherness of the other, a construction which, if it makes the objective whole, which the person sees generated against the particular affirmation, something transparent, something ideally identical to this affirmation itself, nevertheless appears to the consciousness as limited to the "what", and, as for the correlative "what", it always appears posited as not posited. Firstly, the formal construction or mediation will assume and absorb the function in general that underlies the otherness given in the previous category; then, in the second section, the content of this otherness, in its various elements.

a) In a first, generic moment, the being of the person will be directly connected to the other, in the sense that this will become the essential material for a conatus of self-preservation. The person becomes a craving, a need, and in the object he will only see a matter for his own enjoyment, for his own particular affirmation. This intimidates the relationship: as a correlative of craving, the other no longer introduces itself extrinsically into the action, but is organically included in it, is almost willed in the person's own will, which thus no longer experiences, but assumes the condition for the consciousness of freedom in its own particular form, or body, in which it has enclosed itself. But with this, the unity that can command the further synthesis is not yet truly achieved. Craving is in itself contradictory: on the one hand it wants, in the absorption of the other, the extinction of itself, and therefore of that interval, whereby it is value; on the other hand, its conatus is impotent because of this, that the object is only a symbol of craving itself (craving - as we have said at the meeting of an analogous form - creates its object, in the otherness proper to it, and not vice versa: sufficient being has no other in its counterpart - it is from the deficiency of being that the other to which desire turns arises, and need is the act that by creating deficiency in the ego simultaneously gives birth to the non-ego); and by asking it and grazing on it, the Ego feeds only on its own deficiency, which in this it does not deny, but rather reconfirms, since this asking holds firm the point of a life that does not live by itself, and therefore precisely that which gave life to the other⁸. Hence this first moment rather presents the terms of the problem than bringing the solution. Insofar as the person seeks to reaffirm itself, according to further consciousness realised through the fulfilment of the previous category, on the thing as for this craving becomes in the new experience, a development is determined, which goes from the relation of co-action to that of sexuality.

b) The ego thus becomes aware of the inadequacy of its own solution to simple craving as an immediate impulse for self-preservation, which does not reduce, but rather recurrently generates its object against the person. From this correlativity he now tries to escape, partially renouncing his own mode of craving, switching to a co-operation, respecting the other, placing him as a recognised and accepted element for the objectivity of his own action. That is, the person transitions, desists from his voracious affirmation that as an immediate negation of the thing contradicts itself; instead, he gives a person to his own

deficiency to introduce it into its function as a positive on which it relies.

Dependence on simple craving is then articulated in new correlations, whence arise the hypostases of the various things-to-be as conditions of power, concreteness, life. And action becomes explicitly impure, it only realises its object - and, in this, itself - insofar as its act is also that of a principle supposedly other than the centre from which it proceeds.

Such an *ετερον*, which action, insofar as it is determined in the form of cooperation, arouses and recognises, must, in general, be made *ταυτον*, i.e. it must be understood as a compossible, subsumed under the indifference of freedom. This initially takes place insofar as in it is to be found the very situation in which the person lives, i.e. that deprivation which demands, which relies on it, which exploits it. And such is indeed the truth of the other at the present point, for the dependence relative to co-operation is reciprocal, the other here is only in so far and to that extent that its affirmation is also that of the conscious personality: it only imposes itself on it in the act in which it also serves it, and yet it is formed from the same substance as the latter. Hence the transition from the relationship of co-operation to that of sexuality.

c) In the experience of the woman determined as a function of love, the person seeks to entirely consume the original contradiction of craving. - It is an enhancement of that abdication, which the previous form already partially incorporated. The being, which in co-operation was only wanted and recognised in the service of an object of action, which nevertheless the person still wanted for its simple and direct enjoyment, is now wanted in itself. In this other willed in itself, the person now seeks and demands, according to sexual relations. Here, the potent function of the other is love: the former being is only as loved. But to love means to interiorise the other, to pass into it, which therefore, as the object of love, remains dissolved in its material aseity, is determined by right as a negativity, returning to the very principle of affirmation: that is, it, insofar as it is loved, loves, distinguishes itself, returns. The relation is such that the other is not perfectly placed and willed in itself except when its very substance comes to be determined in love: love forgives no beloved not to love, it brings to perfection the activity that is willed in it, only when it is found and reflected in the other's love, since it is precisely the other that is distinguished that proves the other's having entirely willed it for itself. The other, who is for love, is woman; who therefore becomes in reality to the extent that she loves. But this her

Love is passive, it is from an initiative that falls not in her, but in a force that transports her and that appears transcendent to her, since it is reconnected to the central power of the category, which in woman posits love as τέλος and condition its very substance: not woman as a per-self conditions love, but love conditions the only per-self that woman as such can have⁹. - Now the person insofar as he loves perfectly, and thus generates love, truly succeeds in recognising himself in the other, in resolving the resistance, obscurity and heterogeneity inherent in the other's previous appearances, and thus in reconciling himself with himself in a circular mediation that makes the antecedent adequate to the consequent of the category¹⁰. This point is expressed in the transition from woman to son - which is precisely the objective or distinct correlative of the act in which the person goes on to confirm himself, to possess his own identity through the resolution or dedication of the lover (sexual conjunction).

Thus for the relationship between man and woman, the principle of freedom begins penetrate that heterothetic which, in the immediacy of his reflection, flowed unforeseen from, or against, realisation; the other is understood as identical to the identical, is recognised as compossible. The son's independence is the objectivity of this consciousness, within which the transcendent is alluded to as the real possibility of freedom itself - indeed, of freedom as that distinctive interval of a person, which now stands at the principle of posing - to want otherwise. If the ego must truly resolve the datum and at the same time maintain its value as a person, then it must transform that into an intimacy, it must recognise therein it likewise can and can be and yet, in service to principle of material arbitrariness, has distinguished from what it has properly and finitely willed.

The three first, already described categories of the present epoch successively realise the pure appearance of the unconditioned in ideality, its simple reflection in act, and its mediated reflection, i.e. the form, in which the particular affirmation is joined to the consciousness of the agility or indifference that essentially and truly suits the principle from whence it proceeds.

The affirmation, in the person, is conditioned by absolute freedom, and this is for the ego: such is the value that commands the present category and that in the reality determined by it implements, as it were, its objective experience. It is thus that, beyond the sexual relation, the synthesis falls into a son - v.d. one is certain of oneself insofar as what is now understood as homogeneous to the central principle always has substratum in otherness. An objective reflection of the transcendence of the real power generation with respect to the conscious will of the lover, this situation is

also of the imperfection proper to love itself, which in its concept implies the dyad, the turning again to others - but, in this, the destiny, that the body persuasion does not fall into the identical but into a distinct, that there is heterogeneration and not self-generation. And so it remains that the person here only by recognising himself in something else - in the son who is 'synthetic' or contingent with respect to the act love - feels still. In this, while the original distinction resounds, the transition to a new power of reflection is also accomplished.

Note the distinction between the moments now described and those belonging to the subcategory of recognition (§ 6, C). There one had something entirely qualitative and spontaneous, a transformation of absolute perceptions within a consciousness, in which object and subject, real and ideal are fused together. Here, on the other hand, recognition is something active and free, it is a 'construction', it is an effort (mediated by the system of images, associations, etc.) to refer the immediately given physical reality to a subjective essence. Hence what is recognised here is also a spatial distinction, a physical organism, etc.

Wherever one does not only ask oneself but also another, who thus fills a deprivation of *taùtòn*, for the efficacy of one's act, wherever the immanent principle does not draw from itself all the means or intermediaries so that its affirmation succeeds objectively - in short: wherever the action is not simple, the principle cooperation is present. The realist philosopher in explaining perception by a power that does not come to act, that insofar as this act is also that of the object, understood as a subsistent principle in itself, is subject to the law proper to such an experience.

It may be of some interest to indicate how woman is to be thought of according to the above view. - Man is such insofar as he is, by right, self-assertion, reference to self and possession of value. His antithesis is that which does not know how to find value in itself, but has it from reference to something else, and yet, lapsing from affirmation, desires it. Such is woman. The substance of woman is, fundamentally, hetero-reference, passion: not a being, but a denial, a asking, a putting oneself off and giving oneself to something else: all a need not to be in order to be. But this is not at all its own faculty: as has been said, there is, according to the order of conditions, not woman first as an in-self and then love, but love first and then woman. Love in woman is fundamentally something negative - not a possession, a faculty, but something that overwhelms and transports her;

but only it gives her an essence, only it gives her the semblance of a personality ¹¹. Experience shows precisely that only passion has made possible that in which woman has elevated herself from an amorphous and obtuse thing; that feminine mysticism itself, insofar as it is feminine, is in the main justifiable with deviant or refoulée sexuality; and an absolute mediocrity of feminine work in those categories that imply a principle of mediation and positive initiative, starting with science and philosophy, not to mention the superior realisations of power and autarchy proper to the third epoch. Already morality is in woman an empty sound as is the logical place in which it is determined, which is hierarchically prior to such formations. To claim, on the other hand, to deduce this non-value of woman from external conditions, essentially brought about by man, is discoursing, not thinking: for if this is in fact the case, it means that things could not have gone otherwise, i.e. that woman lacks that power which could have given her a better substance (and here there is no need to refer to a physical power, this being in contrast to the intelligent principle always having the worst of it); for when this substance was instead to be begged from a "allowing" or "respecting" or bestowing of man's superior power - as according to that remnant of mediaeval barbarism and superstition called "chivalry", whence arose the absurd modern type of "Lady" against which Moebius¹² so justly revolted - it is clear that woman could not make it her own: coming not from herself but from something else, it would be problematic for her, not essential but accidental.

And if things are so in fact, it is hard to see why in law they should be otherwise. There is nothing reasonable about making a man out of a woman: for no matter how little a woman progresses in the higher categories of culture, she even physiologically loses the characteristics of femininity; that what she achieves in such cases she achieves not because she is a woman, but because she is a man (Weininger) - this is a point in which experience and a priori deduction fully agree. The 'evolution of woman' is an absurd concept, since it is the evolution - in the order of value - not of the phenomenon, but of the transcendental function on which it depends; now such an evolution refers to the logical transition that through the mother overcomes the woman in the value of the son - v.d. of the other that is recognised by the person as self - and which, beyond it, leads to the point of morality. Instead, to take woman as she is according to her concept and as a fact of experience, and to add to it those notes that are relative to the further development of the person as transcendental centre, and that transcend it, is to form something hybrid and contradictory.

Therein lies the fundamental point: those who delight in giving woman a person are obliged to show, and not merely assert, that woman possesses spiritual forms irreducible to those proper to man; and that they as such (i.e. as specifically feminine) can be recognised as valuable.

For if what there is of value in woman were instead to be recognised as masculine, the demonstration would succeed in the very opposite of what it aims at, namely precisely the spiritual negation of woman as woman and not man. But the above assumption is chimerical. Once the elements proper to man are removed, feeling, sexuality, passion and motherhood exhaust the essence of woman. Now everything that makes sense as subordinate moments to the deduced category, taken in itself represents nothing but brute nature and impurity, falls within a passive, irrational and insufficient life that is still infinitely below the level of the personality, indeed it falls within the form of the objective option¹³, which here stands as a non-value.

Woman, in her essential nature, against the positive will of the true man, is a desire to give herself, to be dominated, to serve and adore, to confirm in loss and full dedication to the other her original non-centrality. Man's will is corrupted and degenerated - then, in relation and proportion, there arise in woman claims to autonomy, to her own will, to equality. But man alone is the cause and principle responsible for this: the non-being he creates in himself is transformed into a congruous being of the opposite principle. Which might explain the fact that the female tends to become equal to the male and sometimes even to overwhelm him, the lower one descends in the hierarchy of the zoological species and the more one settles into epochs of evident decadence in human history *stricto sensu*; and might therefore lead one to think that the Bushmen, in their treatment of women as things, are, in this respect, higher up than various "highly civilised" societies - the English and the American in particular - in which a person is superstitiously given to them, or, to put it better, in which the man, having made himself a woman, finds himself recognising in her a fellow human being. The importance, respect, and - *sit venia verbis* - the 'spirituality' of woman is in direct proportion to the degree of ideal degeneration of a race. And again: woman as an 'in-self' is not yet woman, v.d. does not refer to the final moment of the category, but to that of co-operation: she is the hypostasis of what is simply a correlative of desire, she is the reification into a fetish of the powerlessness of the fallen androgyne.

This leads to a clarification of the more general sense of the feminine principle. At this point in the woman as 'other' the person sees the mythical figuration of that power which transcends him and only by joining with it can he reach

to a generation. The transcendence to the person's conscious principle of the real principles that form and govern organism - a transcendence in the inability to give herself a body proceeds - and the existence of woman are two points that are integral. But insofar as the generative act is impure, insofar as it requires the 'other', it must, as we have said, result not in self-generation but in heterogeneration. Thus the feminine is connected to the generic principle of deprivation or non-being of the ego, as it appears at the level of the person; it is the *ετερον*, and yet, as according to ancient soteriologies, the original root of impurity, evil, that which should not be and which, insofar as it is, bears witness to guilt and injustice. The process turns to consume it in the one who is no longer divided, but whole, as the sufficient cause of all one's life - in the spiritual Androgyne. - As long as the woman imposes herself as a content of experience, as long as he is unable to unsee her, the person will be "impure" and guilty; this will continue, however (even if the feminine principle takes on other forms: moral principle, rational necessity, God, inspiration) until ego, passing into the age of the individual, goes to possess itself in those real powers of the organism or "divinity", from which it is now alienated because of the principle distinction proper to formal freedom. Then it will have 'put an end to the woman's work' - it will have consumed and mastered its own theetical, extraverted moment.

One more remark on a point that has already been contemplated. might be asked whether, by any chance, one really expects the person to create the woman before him, as that concrete being given in common experience. To this one replies that what the ego, according to conscience and freedom, creates in the experience of sexuality, is the differential that from the heterothetic point of action or from the obscure in-itself of compulsion draws precisely that which, for it, has the meaning of woman: for, as far as the physical element is concerned, it is, in accordance with the law of the person, something quite factual. However, insofar as the act of love, whereby woman as such becomes from the abstract matter of this factitiousness, presupposes the value of the person, because of the principle of the unity of the category and the priority of the synthesis or *τελος* over its own conditions, it must be said that in that position according to freedom is also included that of all the elements that it logically implies, even if partly according to the form of positing as not posited. And the same is to be said for the son and other who, in later forms, will be recognised as a person itself. - It is then idle to dwell on the question, of what woman was before this point: she, by definition, was not woman, although she could appear elsewhere, for example as an object of mere lust, as one of the 'ideas' or archetypes of qualitative otherness, and so on.

§ 16 - MORALITY

With the former category, the material principle of otherness in general remains resolved, but not so the formal principle of the relationship, within which the other appears. Hence the possibility of a further task. Beyond the act that, reducing the content to identical, mediates it, the reflection of this same act, so that this same identity is mediated.

For freedom, of its true principle, is not simply the consciousness of the act, but also of that transcendent arbitrariness from which the act proceeds. Thus that form, which by recognising the compossible in their identity illuminates the unconditionality of the position, may not be valid as an extreme instance. Only, one must always keep in mind the condition of that distinction that, so to speak, envelops and sustains the formation of the person throughout the age. - In order to specify the further task: in so far as the ego recognises the other, see, in so far as the previous category comes to an end, in so far as the ego is no longer precisely identical with the other, since with this experience of recognition it has added a differential to its own substance, that is, it has positioned itself as the freedom of recognition, as the power of the relationship, and since in this relationship the experience of compossibility is taking place, as that which gives this its condition is precisely the unconditioned self-determination, the absolute self-position. Value, which, however, only shines out in inseparable connection with the antecedent, with the becoming of other recognised beings, so that the sense of a synthesis will be an experience in which the position of self, reflecting a self-position in general of the other, has as the condition of its unconditionality the form of the universally valid. In other words: the other will no longer be given in a 'concern', in a relationship that is immediately turned towards and supported by him, as was case for both lust and love, but from within, through the autonomy of freedom itself. This implies that in its deepest self-penetration the personal principle immediately becomes a universality, that the particular position is directly conditioned by indifference to this particularity. On the other hand, according to the principle of the consequent, such a point must only be reached by an act of absolute, reflexive freedom. The perfection recognition or indifference - universality - and the power of the person to determine absolutely from within are therefore elements that must interconnect here.

At this point, the appropriateness of morality to the synthesis is clear. As preparatory forms of , in which the immediacy, factuality of identity is gradually mediated and initial extrinsicity passes into intimacy, can be considered the personality conforming to custom, the personality conforming to the state, the human personality; but the fulfilment is only in the formal morality, in the autonomous determination according to the universal form of the person: 'act according to that law, which can be valid as a principle of universal legislation', which here is founded only on an absolute reflection of formal freedom. In such a synthesis, the other is even more interiorised and, at the same time, liberated, drawn by the person from within himself; and a new step is taken towards perfect adaptation of the immanent principle to the original distinction: which here moves from the material opposition between sameness and otherness to the formal opposition between autonomy and heteronomy. The person, in fact, is now autonomous only insofar as is heteronomous (according to conformity to objective law) and heteronomous only insofar as it is autonomous (insofar as the centre always falls on the arbitrariness of the personal principle, without which there would not be a free adhesion, a spontaneity, but an extrinsic conformity to law or, *sit venia verbis*, a spiritual automatism).

This leads to the concepts of 'lower nature' and 'moral nature', concepts that therefore only make sense as terms of a correlation. In fact, the category, insofar as it is not immediately, but mediately, reflexively identified, implies the moment of difference: morality as pure, unchallenged determination would not be morality, but quality, the spontaneity of a natural act. The value of the person is preserved in the form of morality precisely, and only, in this: that the person itself twins itself, sees itself as other and the other as itself in its own closed unity, in the sense that in the principle of universality (which is nevertheless a reflection of the pure act with which it has placed itself) it understands a law that is valid in itself, a transcendent normativity, to which it nevertheless conforms as to the true self, opposing the particular determinations of its material, indifferent freedom as something that must be resolved in that. Morality, like the interval principle that it is in general as a category, appears precisely in the elementary distancing of a universal from a particular within the will; and it is in the synthesis in which then a personal conscience, filled with duty, elaborates its particularity in a way that conforms to the universal principle. The transcendence of duty in the same intimacy and autonomy in which it lives as such, and the principle of the antithesis of a non-moral nature that cannot be reduced but only 'informed', are the conditions for which, in the present category,

the value of the person can be preserved; conditions that, moreover, determine each other. Thus, that morality is, essentially, intention and materialiter - process to infinity - this proceeds from the very concept in which it is determined here.

The generic foundation of the so-called categorical imperative for us is therefore the act - which has drawn the particular individuation of the person from the infinity of the determinability of freedom - in its reflection or appearance in formal consciousness; its categoricity simply reflects the character of bare unconditionality or contingency inherent in this act itself. As for its imperative character, this proceeds precisely from the formal character of the consciousness in which it is reflected; which, while striving to penetrate itself in its deepest principle and thus to make itself sufficient for itself, nevertheless has for its condition and elementary place a particular, finite formation. And so, just as previously the compossibles had to appear heterothetic and others, so the original affirmation, in which this heterotheticity is by right resolved since it is precisely what dominates it by the title of its compossibility, will appear to it as something that, while being felt by the person as the truth of its deepest nature, transcends and commands it. Hence, the person here only gets rid of the other by reviving it within himself, by absorbing it intimately: the otherness, which was extrinsic and given to him, is absorbed and internalised¹⁴. This, in a way, takes the person beyond himself. Through morality, formal ego-principle passes from the order of the subjective to that of objective. Reflection or construction now has a form appropriate to the distinct as such. In this, then, it can only mediate with itself, and thus idealise, formalise entirely that world or content to which, as immediate, the first powers personal affirmation were insufficient. These affirmations were directly referred to the person as a separate term of the original relation, against which the content was then polarised into impenetrability. As, on the other hand, with morality this creative self-reference of antithesis fails, the way is opened for the form to reassert itself in the very bosom of the opposite, v.d. to construct, according to its own principle, the objective powers.

"The 'Perfect' and the 'other' never meet: their paths are constantly parallel"¹⁵: for the one who lives according to reason, who subsumes his own arbitrariness as a person to the universal, 'other' no longer exists - because otherness has become inward to him, has made itself his own intimate substance.

The moral moment of morality is purely formal, it is beyond the various morals, like the apriori that makes them such and is indifferent to diversity of their matter: it is the pure element of dutifulness, of obedience to a universal law intimately and immediately recognised as imperative in itself. Inseparable from a matter, since its principle, which is the reflex volition of freedom, can only be affirmed within a particular individualisation, it nevertheless has such a matter only as a means, as a body for its expression. - On the other hand, it should not be understood that if morality arises ex abrupto - transcendently it is rather the limit of an interval, the origin of which is the simple apprehension of the other as personality, and the meaning of which is the passing of the simple fact of this personality (§ 14 D) to the consciousness of it as a formal unity, v.d. as the act or law that constitutes it. In the termination of the previous category - because of the play of values that this excites - the other appears as a principle of spontaneity; thus, beyond the completed material equilibrium of the previous form, it resurfaces in a residue of contingency, in a differential that is in truth its own being-interior: this the ego cannot dominate and comprehend within itself until objectifies its own inner being, until it subsumes its self-determination to the pure formality of the moral law - which transcends it, but by transcending it identifies it with the other, brings it into the bosom of the other. Thus 'pure' morality is rather the flowering of the development of a 'material' morality, the degrees of which are, as mentioned, the law of custom, of the state and of humanity, when one does not also want to take up the degrees of the earlier categories, i.e. the units proper to coercion and sexuality. These units become less and less "given" and more and more free to the extent that they turn to express and take up a principle more intimate than the other, until the limit brings about its complete interiorisation or absorption, brings the reflection of the relation on itself in correspondence with the legislation of the categorical imperative, to the dutiful formation of pure autonomy. Hence pure morality, while on the one hand it is a principle in itself, on the other hand it is connected to a whole matter, from the interior mediation and purification (formalisation) of which it arose. Hence a continuity, in which is to be seen the basis of the real possibility of the subsumption of the matter of 'lower nature' to the form of pure duty.

Here, too, it is hardly worth warning that it is not because other beings are now experienced by the person as ends in themselves that they cease to be phenomena and 'positions' of it. The consciousness of the One always remains the principle that underlies them, the matter in which all their reality is carved out. They are only for themselves insofar as, by realising them as such, the 'I' penetrates itself into a certain value,

and yet they are not in themselves, but relatively - in their being ends, they are means. Equally relative is their objective independence and it is reconnected to the moment of positing as not posited. Generally speaking, the relationship between that 'I', which, as such, is 'without a second', and the multiplicity of 'other' 'I's', at this point can be traced back, for example, to Plato's situation with regard to the various characters in his dialogues, each embodying a certain thesis, from the play of which his own thought was clarified. Thus the others of society, culture, etc. are dialectically placed within the ego as the multiplicity of compossibles, which, excluded at first from the particular position, are then taken up in relations, objectively unfolding a kind of 'transcendental discussion', through which the mediated consciousness of freedom¹⁶ is realised. Thus from the present categories one can deduce as value everything that is social agreement, the work of conviction and culture, proselytism, sympathy, etc.

However, it is of capital importance to observe that all this is liable to be taken up by two quite distinct meanings, depending on whether the other is resolved through the medium of a principle or law, which is recognised as being in itself valid and yet transcending the very will of the one who takes up the other through it; or whether it is merely an absolute causality operating directly on others from their depths, according to what is willed by a point, to which every law or duty is an empty word and which is only pure power. Now only the first case fits the present place: the ego here realises a certainty insofar as it experiences in itself a unity that takes up the multiplicity of other particular beings; but the category is such that this unity cannot be realised directly - but only because one has been the first to recognise a law superior to one's own particularity and to obey it, one demands, and obtains, assent from the other. In the feeling of dutifulness lies the foundation whereby certain determinations appear to us as necessary, universally valid, and the reason why one demands the consent of others, that is, equal submission, so that in the name of such a mean they are taken up in the ego.

This feeling in turn has its roots in the original deprivation of formal consciousness. For he who has power within himself has no need to refer his affirmation to a higher normativity in order to make it objectively valid, his strongest will being sufficient for this; much less is he driven, in order to confirm and persuade himself, to ask for the consent of others, to receive himself only from the negation of the other: the reduction of the other for him is not before, as a condition, but after, as
a

consequence and an accident reflecting the absoluteness of the central determination of persuasion, which already possesses itself a priori. Laws, norms, conventions, imperatives, duties, etc. are like dandies to support the act of an I that is not yet entirely mediated, of an I that is still outside itself, under the law of ideality. A similar situation will reassert itself in the order of the remaining categories of the epoch: and before things can go otherwise, there is still a long to go. However, in the law of human respect, which extends to universal love, i.e. to a sense of identity in the infinity of possible points of view of representation, the consciousness of freedom, of absolute indifference, is celebrated: in this the supreme value flashes forth, albeit under the conditions of the form of simple ideality and the substratum of the existential datum.

Lastly, it emerges from this that the instance of universality and necessity that accompanies certain determinations in the person constitutes a problem not only with regard to how, but also with regard to what: it is reduced to a fact, to an immediate datum of consciousness, which must be constructed in its intimate significance for the ego, and not merely traced back to a set of relatively external conditions, as for example according to Kant's investigation.

¹ In the first section of the first epoch, there was pure spontaneity; in the second section, contingency, in sense that the act is presupposed the prius of a causality of the ego. In the second epoch, this contingency becomes properly liberty insofar as the ideal antecedent of compossibility is connected to causality, first in fact, then in consciousness.

Z Here we have a connection to the Leibnizian theory, that the soul would be a divinity (v.d. its experience would have a cosmic character) when it was capable of distinctly perceiving all that is given to it in a confused way as 'qualities' of things. Cf. G.W. Leibniz, Teodicea, § 64; Principii della natura e della grazia, § 13. E. Carpenter (Art of Creation; transl. ital. [Roma 1909], p. 167): 'In the individual [= person] is accumulated the past of the world. Thus we see the object not naked, but encircled in a strange halo, which is the reflection of all the past'.

3 That such a position does not contradict certain categories that may later be fixed (such as that of natural science) is clear to anyone who remembers what was said (pp. 45-46) about the uniquely symbolic significance of the material determinations of the categories beyond the pure articulations of value, of which they are contingent vehicles.

4 The reference is only for clarification: this is because in these resonances of ancient Indian consciousness, as well as in the various cases of supernormal knowledge, it is very difficult to determine from an external and general point of view whether one has a true objective vision and not elements of the world of quality or, again, hints of the further magical powers of the third age.

5 Hermann von Helmholtz (1821-1894), a professor of physiology in Königsberg, Bonn, Heidelberg, and of physics in Berlin, examined physiological phenomena with the tools of physics and theorised a kind of materialistic Kantianism.

6 Becoming famous at only 27 years of age with his Philosophy of the Unconscious (1861), Eduard von Hartmann (1842-1906) was inspired by Schopenhauer, Hegel and Schelling to theorise an unconscious principle in reality and then develop his own cosmic philosophy with a mystical and spiritualistic background. The Doctrine of Categories is from 1896.

7 Bear in mind that at this point, relating to the original formation personal experience, natural necessity is simply to be explained habit, and a formal or legal necessity has no place here; this is a further power, which only arises when, with the next category of science, the transition to the 'other' is conditioned by the form of the universal.

⁸ Cf. Plotinus, *Enneads*, III, v, 7: Και εστινερωσον οι στρος απορος τη εαυτου φυσει. διο και τυγγανων απορος παλιν. ου γαρ εχει πληρουσθαι, δια το μη εχειν το μιγμα. μονον γαρ πληρουται αληθως, οτιπερ και πεπληρωται τη εαυτου. ο δε δια την συνουσαν ενδειαν, εφιεται, καν παραχρημα πλερωθη, στεγει [Eros is like a nag that by its own nature is devoid of everything; therefore even if it obtains something it is again devoid of everything; for it cannot fill itself, because it does not possess the necessary mixture; it can only truly fill itself that which already has fullness by its own nature. He, on the other hand, by his immanent destitution, always desires and, even if momentarily has fullness, does not retain it].

⁹It is therefore a woman who is fully aware of her own nature that had to enunciate the principle: 'I love, therefore I am' (S. Aleramo, *Andando e stando*, Firenze 1922, p. 141). [In 1927 Aleramo published the novel *Amo, dunque sono* in which under different names she spoke of Julius Evola and Giulio Parise (Ed.)].

¹⁰Cf. O. Weininger, *Ueber die höchsten Dingen* (transl. ital.: *Intorno alle cose supreme*, Bocca, Torino 1912, p. 59: 'Man u c c id e la donna [as a metaphysically autonomous being] by loving her, because for such a love woman is but an instrument that helps man to better attend to his own work'. Such work, he says elsewhere (p. 80), is a rediscovering and confirming of himself: indirectly through woman, who is thus always a means to an end).

¹¹ There is a love that proceeds from a superabundance of being and a love that proceeds from need, from deprivation of being - and that of woman (of woman as type) is, in principle, the latter. The first love does not yet appear at the present point. As for the ego as a man (and insofar as it is such), he here properly wants a love, tends to determine a love in the other, with which he is pleased, whence a differential from which the task and function of recognising is brought to the following category of morality.

¹² P.J. Moebius, Ueber den physiolog. Schwachsinn des Weibes, Leipzig 1902.

¹³ This is important to note. For what counts is always the form. And woman is defined precisely by the passive and extraverted form of living even those things, which may, in other situations, refer to higher values. In this sense, it is not necessarily the case that every man can call himself a personality. On the contrary. Masculine positions can be experienced femininely as masculine positions can be experienced femininely.


¹⁴ This could be illustrated in Spinoza's observation (Tractatus Theologicopoliticus, ed. Van Vloten, c. IV, p. 8), that Christ did not free men from the law, but to fix it more firmly, since he transported it from the outside to the very depths of men's hearts.

¹⁵ Lao Tze, The Book of the Way and Virtue, translated by J. Evola, Lanciano 1921, § LX [Rectius: Carabba, Lanciano 1923].

¹⁶ Royce (The World and the Individual, New York 1908, vol. III, p. 178) states that other beings 'provide us with that complement to our fragmentary understandings which we continually need. Consequently, since reality is always that which completes our incompleteness, our fellow beings are truly real'. - This 'as a consequence' is a perfect inconsistency: what is missing from the partial affirmation is negation, not reality. - But 'other' is only insofar as it is missing. It is reality only when it ceases to be the missing thing and is instead incorporated by my affirmation - but then it is destroyed as 'other'. The others insofar as they are others, and as others are real, do not eliminate, but confirm, but hold firm my incompleteness. Water, insofar as it keeps away from me, thirsty, does not complete me, but keeps me deficient: it only completes me when I cease to be other, when I go to enjoy it and yet deny it in its being other or being real as water. Thus other beings can never be other than a matter to be taken up in my affirmation, not to be respected, but to be denied, penetrated, and dominated in me. So, for example, as

According to Stirner's principle - which not coherence but lassitude and fear make one reject - Society exists only for my enjoyment. But, as will be said below, this at the present point implies a moment of transcendence. - As corollary we have that intolerant and despotic objectivity is but an intensification of subjectivism. If, for example, I enclose myself in my own particular doctrine and others I admit and tolerate outside it, then, in the end, I deny this same doctrine: only when I go to persuade others, when I go to show them that mine is 'truth' and they must recognise it, do I dissolve the otherness of others, which I bring back to me. The means to this vary: a sufficiently strong individuality does not need to ask for the mediation of logic: it has a causality that invests others directly from their depths, in the manner of so-called conversions' and 'graces'. To persuade others is to dominate and empower oneself. Since the ego is not in a perfect and solitary life, but rather has moments of non-being, it does not proceed if in these it does not develop the value of the ταυτον, if it does not persuade them. And therefore it has been said that the objection against the solipsist in so far as he communicates his doctrine, goes completely empty, since, precisely by doing so he is solipsist, and inept - he reduces that possibility of thinking differently which makes 'other' another thought, another mind. The apostolate itself is a deeper degree of solipsism in action. The theory of One can thus contain every form of morality without making itself understood by any of them, and instead giving it a further foundation according to the central value of the ego.

Section Two



§ 17 - SCIENTIFIC AWARENESS

The individual can reflect on the moral formation itself, thus fix it in an objectivity, and yet bring forth from it a new duality, announcing a further value. - That the ego goes on to make transparent the particularity of its material affirmation in the principle of pure freedom, according to what has already been said, is quite contingent; but that this movement should imply the feeling of duty, the recognition of the intrinsic, completely independent of personal will, validity of a law, this proceeds from the very fact that morality should continue to be valid as a person's experience. That is to say: that from which the category can be terminated, and the function whereby, without further mediation, something inwardly transcendent is posited, are integral elements. - On the other hand, morality is neither exhausted in the moment of 'lower nature', nor in the moment of law, but is the interval of that which on the one hand subsumes the law and on the other hand brings the term of nature back to it. This means that the concrete act in which the transcendent is recognised is also that in which the person himself takes the form of the transcendent. Morality is not exhausted in an abstract 'ought-to-be', but implies realising activity that conforms to it. But he who recognises and executes the divine law, formaliter in the point of recognising it, and materialiter in executing it, in moral praxis becomes God-like. God is in act in the one who acts according to the pure divine will.

The objective implementation of the category and evocation in itself of the very principle of legislation, fall into the same place. Thus: on the one hand, morality insofar as it is moral and subsumption to the law, that is to say, distinction, exclusion of the ego from the point of an arbitrary and sufficient determination, of a Lordship of the law; on the other hand, morality in its concreteness, surpassing in praxis the abstract 'ought to be', arouses in the will, which only truly recognises the law at the point of subsuming its own nature in it, the very principle of legislation.

Now to the synthesis: the antecedent must be taken up in the consequent, it must exist solely insofar as it is generated in and through the form of the consequent. The nature of the consequent itself, of which this is a question, must therefore be well established. According to the general principle of the second epoch, the conscious centre falls in ideality, in formal freedom; it follows that what can be experienced as value through the objectivity of moral experience, is the immanence of the universal as an ideal form or, to it better, is the faculty of resolving determinations

particular, proceeding from the arbitrariness of the elementary moments of the personality (finiteness in general, associations, determinations of action, forms proceeding from the various *idola tribus*, etc.) in function of an ideal universality. This is equivalent to saying that the consequent is the faculty of the concept, and the synthesis will therefore refer to the interval of that free activity of the person (it is important to note this character of freedom proceeding precisely from the nature of the moral will, which is really such only if it is determined independently of any coercion or parenetic), in which a transcendent becomes within and by virtue of the concept, as the organ of the absolute self-mediation of the image. This can be referred to as scientific activity, meaning precisely an objective determinability of personal experience through the autonomous legislation of the concept.

This brings about that passage of form mentioned earlier: the per-itself, which is the principle of the concept, through correlation to the antecedent - and this, once again, means: in the service of the value of the person - is only per-itself almost like the organ within which 'nature' gives itself its own laws. That is to say, the datum, the place as non-place, goes back, as to its content, to what it is as "essence", to the formal freedom of the person; but, in turn, in that, in a certain sense, it abstraction of the person itself, thus flowing into the world of a phenomenon that mediates itself.

The further determination of the synthesis results from the nature of the antecedent. It can be said that, in a certain sense, the categories of the first section lead once again to a qualitativity: in them, the physical determination of the datum is a simple substratum; and what the person solely strives for is instead to arouse those values that determine an experience, through which he arrives at the reflection of his deepest principle. With that, pure physicality disappears, it gradually becomes imbued with subjectivity and ideality. But with morality this process is exhausted, since it gives as the meaning of experience the indifference that is proper to the elementary power affirmation, and beyond which one cannot go. In this, however, as we have seen, form is taken beyond the order of particular and properly subjective affirmations - into a principle transcendent to this. But what can such a principle ever be, if not precisely the determination according to the elements that constitute the proper substance of the given (§§ 7-11)? And what else can the relative movement be, if not that by which the new quality generated by the personal finite world comes to be subsumed under quantity and the other forms

objective that proceeds from it, insofar as quality has now properly become the locus of the particular - just as up to the point of morality there was precisely the opposite movement, of subsuming quantity and the physical objective under quality? The moral law marks, to tell the truth, the crisis of the qualitative proper to immediate personal experience: as the imperative of wanting the object as an end in itself or of giving very form of the law as content, in universality, it provides the substratum on which the physical and quantum universe of science can be built from the qualitative.

Thus, beyond the reflection of form in the realm of subjectivity, its reflection in the realm of objectivity. This second moment of mediation, which, in a certain sense, is correlative to the second section of the first epoch, consists in a reduction, in the form of objective universal, of nature, as it appeared subjectively or psychologically according to finiteness, desire and action; thus it does not consist in a pure universality, but in a universal assumption of the particular; hence an interval, which corresponds, in the new form, to that indicated as essential to moral praxis. Because of this, and because in it the transcendent (the concept) at first must well appear in a formally formless immediacy - to the synthesis according to scientific consciousness proper, a certain disproportion between form and matter will be inherent, the symbol of which is the opposition scientific activity to the 'given' of experience.

However, it is to be expected that - by a process analogous to that by which in the personal and psychological order the principle of the image came to mediation - the abrupt heterogeneity of moment of experience will gradually be reduced to the power of science itself so that, through a completed adaptation of form and matter, the concept of imperfect actuality will pass into a perfect and sufficient one, and the form that in the objective order acquires the autonomy and creative spontaneity of an organic life. Where, by virtue of the gradual evolution of the category according to which the object is understood, the matter of science will have become identical with the form, the principle of the person will have absolutely fulfilled itself and then the conscious centre will have become capable of positing for itself, that is, of conditioning, that fundamental distinction by which it was previously conditioned as a person. Hence the transition to the individual.

Meanwhile, for the present point: like morality, science is functionality, an interval of movement; it is a transcendence of the immanent that is at the same time an immanentisation of the transcendent. The prius of the category is the concept, which in the first, immediate moment of its transcendence, is formed according to quantity: further, according to the other known objective principles, in which it is accomplished

the absolute being of the given. Just as there is no morality without the antithesis of natural being, so there is no scientific concept other than in correlation with experience as matter of the given imbued with qualities and personal subjectivity. But just as the antithesis of the 'natural man' comes into being only in relation to ethical law, so the antithesis of the concept is only for the concept itself, it is not a thing in itself, a relative thing that in law only takes on reality and meaning within very function of the concept: that is, it is not the 'other' of the concept, but a moment of it - in a certain way nothing other than the still formless power of the concept that its formations gradually oppose and consume. And science, insofar as it is category, i.e. life, meaning, activity, is precisely the dynamic-transformative relationship of the two terms. In it through the concept must become the 'other', but this is not possible without an original transcendence of the matter it will inform. One understands, then, the fundamental importance given experience by the criterion of certainty proper to scientific consciousness.

To sum up: the category here refers to the determination, according to laws, of a transcendent objectivity along an interval terminated on the one hand by pure quality, on the other by quantity: this determines positive science proper, in which therefore the first power unfolds, the simple unreflective appearance of the concept or objective ideality. Note that here we are always dealing with a syntheticity: the work of science is something that continues 'nature', that determines an objectivity and regularity in it that was not already there. The categories of the first section realise an initial, sketchy formation of things that science continues in an objectively valid fixation. These new powers that are added to experience also remain by right commanded by freedom, although the generic distinction of the existential moment of what they in 'essence' resolve is always inherent in them.

A few considerations regarding the nature of the category deduced above.

Firstly on the role experience in science. It can be said in general that there is no science without experience, but only, as has also been said, that there is no subject without object: v.d. is to be understood as a correlation only, so that it must also be said that there is no experience without science; this is not also true of the experience or nature that is gradually made and ordered through the scientific category and that in no way can be deduced analytically from the immediate datum

of personal conscience, but also with regard to what is designated as 'pure experience', as brute matter of fact. For either the ego has not yet placed itself at the level of the concept, and then this brute matter is not such, but is the determination of one of the other categories - e.g. physical resistance, the powers primitive animism, etc.; or such a position has taken place, and then it cannot be guaranteed that the character of 'pure datum' is not relative, i.e. synthetic, that the opposition of concept and experience does not proceed from the structure proper to a higher function. What with respect to science is a datum, in other respects might well turn out otherwise: and as a datum for the concept, it is a term that only takes its meaning in relation to the system of the concept - properly: it is but a problem of the concept itself. It is thus that modern epistemology has realised that in reality facts taken in themselves say nothing, that a true experimentum crucis is not to be expected from them alone, so that they never constitute an extreme instance, never possess an unambiguous answer to be given once and for all to the scientific theories that seem to defer to them almost as to their judge; but vice versa, depending on the scientific theory, the fact takes on a different meaning. But if experience is thus downgraded to an internal moment of the scientific synthesis, this does not mean that it is in any way suppressed by science and that science, at least insofar as it relates to the value of which it is now a question, can unfold on its own, in the autonomy of an a priori system: for it is not necessary here, too, to go to a fait accompli, and from the circumstance that a science, whose actual possibility has been shown to be inseparably connected with the moment of the 'other', in certain of its stages can order its matter according to a deductive system, to infer that to it experience is accidental or indifferent. Mach rightly notes this: the crowning glory of systematic deduction must not conceal the original efficiency of empirical observation; the purported demonstration of principles or the intrinsic evidence of axioms always radiates into a more or less explicit experimental ascertainment. And if the facts, in the terminus ad quem of science, in a certain way dematerialise, if they seem to deny their own mediation and order themselves, by means of calculation and general laws, into a kind of autonomous ideal system, we must not forget the place that conditions origin and that transmits to all constructions the criterion of certainty specific to scientific consciousness: for science, in its concreteness as a category, is not the abstract result, but this in function of the sense of the specific actuality within which it has become: but such specificity must be dissolved, when the moment of experience is abstracted from it.

Experience, however, from the transcendental point of view here remains nothing more than the very power of the concept insofar as it simply appears - v.d. insofar as it is only in an immediate way - in the world of personal consciousness. This can be clarified by considering the relationship between necessity and contingency in science. To the consequent is inherent the moment of universality and necessity; thus the ego here is not certain of itself, if it does not invest the matter of its own experience in universally valid and necessary determinations.

The concept, then, is immediately affirmed, it is in a certain sense lost in its acts to the extent that in them it contemplates the moment of the universal: It tends to crystallise the categories into which it gradually objectifies its world, to make them almost into things Z; but, according to the nature of the matter that now stands before it alone, which is finite and particular - by which it means by eternal what is contingent - it wants those categories and those laws, which are justified only in relation to a given particularity, to be valid once and for all, to be able to dominate any matter. Such is the dogmatic moment, which contrapuntally recalls its own antithesis: since to impose the form of universal on the particular is to pose the 'madness' of the universal; hence the contingency, the experience that 'resists', that breaks the mould of any closed and exhausted system, that imposes revision and agitation of the system, and thus new developments in scientific practice. Hence, the parts are reversed: whereas previously universality was attached to the qualitative particular resolved in the necessity of a law, it is this law that now becomes the particular, and the new particularity that escapes the law carries precisely the universal, is the symbol of that power that projects itself beyond the given precisely because it is infinite while the latter is finite and particular. Tightly bound to the contingency of experience, science is therefore such that it would not know how to tear itself away from it and cease to 'become', without at the same point lapsing from its need towards a concrete universality. What seems to confuse it, in reality gives it life: a contingent is not opposed to what is gradually fixed, only in service to it, by the interval that the act of it arouses - just as a duty does not separate itself from 'nature' except by the tšloj of the moral act. And yet this contingency is relative, it no longer has a person, it is nothing irreducible, it is always a scientific problem, a simple interval that is filled, and only makes sense, by the reaffirmation, through a new synthesis, of science. If, consummated, it perpetually resurrects if it can be said: "ignoramus, ignorabimus" and: "cognoscimus, cognoscemus" - this also falls within the determination of the present category and is justified by referring to said immediacy or disproportion between form and matter. This restlessness, the dogmatic moment and the manner - inorganic, almost per jato - according to which one

presents the antithesis, the 'new' phenomenon, are integral elements that will come to an end as the concept becomes mediated, that is to say: that it turns away from the object of its immediate affirmation to grasp its deeper power, which is that which still only appears to it in the form of the contingency of nature.

Science thus remains a dynamic synthesis of two opposite directions that are alternately and organically efficient: one is the one in which there is a tendency to deny change and difference, in the sense that the explanation has as its ideal the tracing back of all novelty and difference to a given uniformity, from which it is possible to deduce it according to an order of necessity that resolves everything almost in the motionless unity of the Eleates and the analysis of it; on the other hand there is an irrational, a 'nature' that continually resists the unifying effort and only yields on condition that unity is not only itself, but admits a qualification from which it is complicated and articulated into a system.

This leads to a second observation, on the pragmatic character of science. It can be said that praxis is the foundation of the possibility of what is called the 'success' of science (the adaptation of scientific knowledge to its object), and this because the 'given' itself is praxis, because the passage from the particular to the universal has for meaning the grafting of one act onto another, the continuation and articulation of that same activity that determined the particular and contingent world. That experience, from a set of contradictory and disordered qualitative data, as it appears in relation to the pure and empty form of the universal, passes into a system that is increasingly ordered and conforms to laws, depends solely on the activity of man, just as it depends on the work of the sculptor that the amorphous clay takes on a certain figure; but this transcendently pragmatizing activity of the person, which creates an order in nature, has the passive form of intuition. We are in fact always in the sphere of formal consciousness, which cannot remain as such and also assume an objective formation, which, insofar as it, in a certain way, alienates itself, distances itself from the centre: the person can only become aware of itself as an objective power on condition that it alienates its own persuasion; it must believe in a nature until it goes and folds it back on itself, to return to the very bosom of the 'other' the point of consistency that the person has given back to it. And that before this, creating and ordering must particularly appear in the form of observing, describing or, at most, discovering - of this the immediate form of science is the cause: since the concept in its immediacy cannot pose and, at the same point, reflect itself as a posited³. Therefore: no reflection merely

reproductive of a nature in itself, but a creative reflection apparent in the form of description. This therefore implies that in science, the ego does indeed have an objective efficiency, but according to necessity, so that the real that becomes in it cannot command it directly, from within, but only mediately, through the knowledge of general laws, i.e. only by asserting itself at the caput mortuum of the process. With praxeology and technique, the person transports himself out of the immanent actuality of scientific experience, where only the principle of an autonomous, objective legislation lives, and parasitically exploits this for the use of passions, desires or needs, making himself a slave, in the recognised and accepted laws that condition efficacy of the act, to himself. And before the image has exhausted its own objective mediation, of which science is just the first step, the 'I', for example, is not given the power to move a stone, but only to make it move by 'nature' in accordance with those laws in which science will gradually sculpt it.

If this the case, the intemperate nature of the pragmatists' claim that they do not simply wish to ascertain, in science, the fact of the arbitrary, but also to elevate it to a method, becomes clear. Were such a claim to be realised, then, instead of going, as in the intention, to the state of power, we would return to that primitive man, to the formless world of desire, of immediate experience, of myth; and yet it is a fact that science proceeds in so far as the scientist performs a constant abstraction from his particular person and gives himself to disinterested research, free of prejudice and with the deliberate intention of transforming the world⁴. The pragmatism of science could be said to be effective only insofar as it does not know itself to be so: where this consciousness is attained and elevated to a principle without simultaneously transcending the level of the present category, there would be a paralysis, an absolute aphasia of science. Pragmatism as a doctrine is, in truth, the product of an afterthought, which prescind from the conditions of the actual making of science - essentially: from the form in which the activity in it is experienced. In its desire to place a principle of conscious utilitarianism at the centre of scientific research, it only succeeds in an aporia that is an untimely anticipation.

An analogous criticism also invests philosophy when it claims to supplant the methods proper to scientific investigation with a priori conceptual deduction. The a priori construction is in fact inherent to a degree of centrality and mediation that is not that proper to scientific experience: it is therefore a matter other than that which flows against the

immediate position of the concept, to which only the organ proper to science itself is adequate correlative. Certainly, the principle of science rationalism, but an experimental and not a priori rationalism. Hence the lack of scientific value and the hybridism of the 'philosophies of nature', whose

"Rationalisation" is in truth performed not in but on nature, borrowing from science proper, or from categories that precede it, a matter that in 'rational necessity' goes on to hypostatise according to a hypertrophy of the dogmatic and fixative moment of science itself. The true philosophy of nature, logic, which, in order to the given as such, is also metaphysics, is exact science itself without further mediation, as it is formed from the elementary substratum of quantity and observation in the mathematician's study, in the physicist's cabinet, in the field of investigation of the biologist and historian. Only in this does the person truly descend into the bosom of nature as nature, and by making it become, in the becoming of science, into immanent intelligible relations, does he imprint the seal of his own activity upon it; whereas the conceptual rethinking of the results of science, the extrapolation, anticipation and reduction to a priori necessity of those principles that instead only make sense within science itself and in relation to the particular matter it gradually takes on, leads away from the immanent legislation of the objective - into a realm of subjective digression and opinion.

Ultimately. Science is inseparable from experience: it starts from it and maintains it as the substratum of its ideal syntheses. For scienceexperience is that which our spirit does not command, that over which our desires and our personal will cannot have hold, that which is given and which we do not do. This is the part of realism. However, this same concept of experience is to be understood simply as the form according to which precisely a desire, a will, in short the person's power of affirmation, makes its objects and its legislation appear. The translation of the centre to the 'other', the abstraction from the subjective, is, in truth, a synthesis, something that science itself, understood as transcendental prius, brings into existence. If that which is in itself freedom and arbitrariness is almost wrested from the consciousness of the creative initiative and immediately liberated and alienated in objective determinations; if, therefore, nature gradually appears to be resumed in laws of rigid necessity, indifferent to the person and reaffirming itself more and more in the realm of life and freedom - all this, in truth, does not reflect an order existing in itself, but is a phenomenon generated by the scientific attitude itself, is the consequence of the direction taken by an elementary freedom. Science is not the ascertainer, but really the creator responsible for natural determinism - mechanical, psychological, historical (thus

as various other forms of necessity will be posited by further categories) - determinism that therefore lives and dies with the scientific attitude itself, to which it corresponds. Such would be the part of idealism. There is no science because there really is an ordered and objective nature, but there is an ordered and objective nature because there is a science. This in itself means an end; in all that it determines, it only wants itself - v.d. the realisation of that value, which is the transcendental foundation of its possibility. Only this value is what is properly given a priori, and only what is connected with it is to be said here. As for the actual content or subject matter of the category, it is given by the history of the sciences themselves: and not in a metaphysical and extrinsic reconsideration of its results, but rather as it has been determined in its own sphere.

Now what can be said with reference to the moment of value alone comes down to little. On the one hand, with regard to principles, we know that they proceed from the recurrent opposition of a particular instance of identity and uniformity to an instance of contingency. The reduction of these oppositions unfolds the field proper to each particular science, but in so doing, by fixing zones of homogeneity, it produces a new opposition whereby each science passes into another. - On the other hand, it is possible to sketch out a formal hierarchy of the sciences, based on the fundamental principle that science is constructed by gradually taking up the matter of particular personal experience in the universal forms in which the moment of being is gradually realised. The scientific consciousness in its transcendental development will thus, in a certain way, summarise the various categories of the second section of the first epoch, naturally entirely *κατ' αὐτό* [for itself] - not because of an external law, but because of the spontaneous conatus to implement its own value ever more perfectly in the order that is proper to it. This development tends, as we have said, to reduce the quality, particularity and contingency relative to the personal world into a system of intelligible relations - but this reduction implies a progressive overcoming of the immediate form of the concept to which, in correlation, its own object becomes more and more intimate until, at the end of the category of the organism (§§ 10-11), the concept will find itself reflected back upon itself.

I - The concept, as immediate transcendence, is the principle of quantity; and the first moment of science is therefore that in which the qualitative manifold is generalised and idealised into a system of quantity. The quantity that at first appears within the qualitative itself, in a conjunction that in a

to a certain extent preserves it (the number of the Pythagoreans), already in an elementary reflection it encounters, in the 'irrationals', a principle of contingency, whence arises the antithesis of περας [finite] and απειρον [infinite].

The first reaffirmation of the scientific requirement on απειρον is synthetic geometry (Euclid and Apollonius) in which, however, quantity is maintained only insofar as it treats itself qualitatively, elaborating itself in factual syntheses (the data of the various entities intuited and exhibited rather than constructed of quantity); second affirmation is analytic geometry (Descartes), in which the principle of περας, already generalised and dominating the varied quality of quantities as algebra, resolves the qualitative and factual element of its first realisation, since it reduces spatial determination to pure symbolism of a quantity that has become sufficient in itself and is capable of drawing from its own principle the constructive development of what, geometrically, appeared as given, as something that cannot be properly deduced, but only shown, intuited. With Descartes, the geometric problem is brought back to the algebraic problem, so that the concept already begins to dissolve itself from the sensibility of intuition and to enjoy itself in a purely intellectual order, nevertheless capable of accounting for the sensible datum itself: for the space constructed by analysis is the medium, through which the mathematical concept can take hold of external nature itself. - But the distinct having the continuous as its correlative, in the new sphere of analytic geometry, which is nevertheless its first solution, the problem of περας and απειρον arises again to limit its extension: the number that constructs space in definite syntheses has contingent its own construction, that is, the infinity of the "numbering number". On this antithesis, science reaffirms itself through the theory of infinitesimal, which determines the synthetic finite as a function of the infinite and thus adapts the principle of number to that infinity that was tacitly contained and currently given in the simplicity of the spatial intuition of geometric entities. With this, the way remains open for the further extension analysis, which now has an organ adapted to the synthetic formation of reality in general (relation of the differential calculus to physics - Leibniz). On the other hand, since this organ of infinitesimal analysis presupposes the bringing of the consciousness to the direct intuition of the formal unity - order or law - beyond the indefinite of the differential series that is generated from it in recurrence, the pure intellectual of number is now capable of autonomously carrying out its own mediation; which happens first of all with generalised arithmetic (to which Poncelet's projective⁵ and Argand's theory⁶ create a geometric signification, they then fertilise space in new determinations - which transcend its purely, factually intuitable element - thereby confirming the plasticity and subordination of

this to analysis); then, with the reform of the principle of continuity brought about by the Weierstrass⁷ and the related arithmetisation functions, whereby analysis decisively renounces spatial reference and in the unity of set theory and class logic, realised by logistics (Russell, Peano)⁸, reaches the extreme generalisation and quantitative intellectualisation. But the point of fulfilment is also the point of transition. The logistics that becomes self-conscious, beyond the aporia of those who deluded themselves into thinking they could find in it a system of absolute deduction, understands itself as a pure formalism, as an abstract 'hypothetical-deductive' system, thus incapable of providing real certainty, so that it tends, for a content, back towards experience. Since it can no longer draw a criterion from the spatial reference itself: materialised by pure quantity, by the autonomy of an intellectual principle freed, in reflection, from its immediate forms linked to a factual sensible evidence, space has now become something plastic and ambiguous: it is the canvas of pure relational determination, the "generalised space" of which the Euclidean system, the Lobatschewskian system, and again: the Riemannian and non-Archimedean system, are special possibilities, a priori completely indifferent.⁹

II - The Cartesian notion of space and differential algorithm are the mediums through which the concept, which is in itself pure transcendence, can express the formations of the qualitative datum in a physical order ordered in intelligible relations. This already appears in the concept of 'virtual velocity', a mechanical application of the notion of differential; a concept that allows Lagrange¹⁰ the construction of a mechanics that, with respect to Newton's, achieves on another level a progress corresponding to that which, in relation to the spatial contingent, analytical geometry had achieved on Greek geometry (see the passage from intuitive syntheses to their analytical construction). However, on this side of the pure algebraic system - ordered in a regular and uniform development - of analytical mechanics, the cardinal theorem of virtual velocities turns out to presuppose a certain group of primordial facts (the laws of inertia, of action and reaction, of independence of movement) whose cause is not sought and which only result from common observations confirmed by all experience. This factuality, traced back to representable figurations since Poincaré¹¹, founds the mechanism. Which thus implies an elementary contingency, which is then reaffirmed in the opposition of the principles of conservation to those of irreversibility (and which in any case is preserved in the necessary presupposition of an original 'state

improbable" included in the statistical theory of thermodynamics): a contingency to which science can only be sufficient on the condition that it disarticulates itself, renounces the residue of substantialism inherent in the "primitive facts" of the mechanical doctrine and the claim to a conceptual deduction of the various phenomena from the single type of kinetic phenomena, and thus immerses itself in experience, becoming entirely plastic and immanent to it in concentrating on the agile indeterminacy of a pure mathematical system. This is already the requirement energetics (Rankine)¹² - right up to Einstein's theory.

It is important to note this conjunction: that the demand towards an objective understanding of the 'other' is only fulfilled by a complete intellectualism; in ultimate physics, experience itself forces the scientist to go beyond it, to 'purify himself' - as Weyl¹³ puts it - of every intuitive and sensitively representable element, to immerse himself in the intelligible of a pure mathematicalism, if he really wants to account for it, if he wants to completely and faithfully understand it according to unity and universality. In other words, absolute objectivity already begins transmute into absolute ideality. Thus, having surpassed the sphere of an abstract formal perfection, mathematics merges with physics in an immanent unity and mutual fertilisation, and goes on to materialise the very skeleton of what is in the objective real. This results from the further development, in which physics brings to its end that abstraction from the subjective and particular centre, which lies at the root of the category, and enhances moment of unification in the various domains of physics. Indeed, Einstein's 'transformation system' eliminates the contingency relating to the variety of possible reference systems in of space, time and acceleration, so that it almost succeeds in providing a view of things in , indifferent to the relativity of observation - but only insofar as it dissolves every datum of sensible intuition into the intelligible of a pure mathematical system. Just as energy and entropy, Riemannian 'interval' and the 'unity of action' of the theory of quanta - which seem to express the objective κατ' ἐξοχήν [par excellence] - evaporate into nothing outside their analytical expression. Again: the last instances towards an absolute objectivity, towards indifference to any particular system of reference, v.d., are pointed towards a further mathematisation. Weyl's theory of the generalised metric continuum, which, beyond the Einsteinian tensor continuum, resolves the contingency relative to the sample interval function by the use of covariants and contravariants, of cogredients and contragredients, and reduces the double individuation assumed in Einstein by the principle of least action respect to electromagnetics and the theory of gravitation; and Eddington¹⁴ theory, which also eliminates the contingency of direction

vector system that Weyl's system with regard to the measurement of the sample-interval tacitly implies. Having thus become the agile and immanent function of the 'other', quantity, through stereochemistry and crystallography, has opened up the way to penetrate and resolve into an intellectual objectivity the various qualitative syntheses in which the experience of the person has immediately determined itself.

With mathematical physics, the first moment of science is thus fully posited: the form, transcended into the physical immanentism of that universal adapted to the particular as particular, proper to the mathematical method, with which, at the catharsis of real connections in the 'distinct notions', Descartes inaugurated positive enquiry, in its determination directly takes up the synthesis that in the category of dynamism (§ 8) opposed pure spatiality. The interdependence of physics and mathematics naturally follows from this: the reflection on the universal, which lives itself in a particular, excites a moment of contingency that leads us back to more compossibles (e.g. non-Euclidean geometries and, in logistics, the various individuations of the 'propositional functions'), thus to an indeterminacy, which is only specified within physical reality. Thus the idea of mechanics as a deductive science a priori, giving once and for all the universal and absolutely necessary principles, to which physics should be subsumed, in order to achieve a quantitative resolution of concrete experience - as had been cherished by Kant - was dissolved. The relationship from the further development of science has been rather reversed: it is physics that identifies mechanics, that drives the latter to take as its explanatory principle now mechanism, now dynamism, now pure mathematics¹⁵. Mechanics has become an experimental science¹⁶. And this fertilising reaction of the other on the universal which, crystallising in its acts, makes of itself a particular, this inseparability of the aposteriori from the apriori goes, in accordance with phenomenological determination, far beyond pure mechanics. With Einstein, geometry, the principium individuationis of which Riemann and Lobatschewsky had already referred to experimental verification, becomes physics to the extent that, on the other hand, physics is fully permeated with mathematics. On the other hand, one can see with Fourier¹⁷ how the in-depth study of nature is the most fertile source of mathematical discoveries. Just as it was, for example, the experimental study of radiant heat that led to the completion of the theory of discontinuous functions that cannot be developed according to Taylor's method¹⁸, and geodetic problems that provoked Gauss's theory of curves, so Planck's theory of quanta today presses on the same foundations of infinitesimal calculus according to the

discontinuous. The moment of the increasing generalisation, abstraction and autonomy of methods, and other, of the efficiency of the contingent principle of experience, are completely united - experience, as we have seen, being nothing but the very power of science, distinct from the convoluted formations of science only at the service of a moment of the value of the individual. And if, as has also been said modern epistemology has come to the strange ascertainment, that on the one hand principles are contingent and arbitrary (Poincaré)¹⁹, on the other hand that 'facts' are ambiguous, incapable of satisfying the need for an experimentum crucis (Duhem)²⁰ - this proceeds from the fact that science in its concreteness is, essentially, interval, self-synthesis: it is principle or theory that determines the fact as well as, simultaneously, fact that determines the principle or theory - and its centre is not in this or that, but in the dynamic and integral unity of the two moments. A pure fact or an absolute principle would be the negation of the particular or the universal and, with them, of the very possibility of science as that value, which can be experienced in a person's consciousness.

Finally, it should be noted that the heterothetic is also efficient within the most abstract degrees of this moment - such as arithmetic and geometry: in the individual positions of which a power takes place, which transcends the particular, accomplished arrangements. Thus, in arithmetic, for the irrationals and imaginaries; thus for the prime numbers, whose law of production is still unknown (Goldbach's theorem, as we know, has a purely empirical foundation), although their genesis is at all a priori. Hence Galois's observation that mathematical analysis, when penetrated in the concreteness of its making, is not at all methodical and rationally co-ordinated, as a widespread prejudice would have it: instead, it is realised by trial and error, bumping into one side and the other²¹; and the analogous character, which so disturbed Hegel, of geometrical demonstration, in which, instead of a linear demonstrative proceeding, one has the idea of a continuous struggle of cunning and skilful agility to conquer an enemy power, which never lets itself be confronted face to face²². It is precisely this transcendence and heterotheticity of mathematical science with respect to the various positions that has led to a strengthening of the realistic moment coming from the initial empirical determination, up to the understanding of the most abstract and artificial relations as objective entities, as for example in Russell's mathematical realism²³.

III - The ideal completeness of mathematical physics, on the other hand, is delimited by

a contingency: for at the very point that it entirely dominates the various syntheses in the homogeneous and continuous of quantitative functional relations, the syntheses themselves are opposed to it as real syntheses or simplicities. The perfection of physics implies, as we have said, the renunciation of a system aprioristic deduction, plasticity to the real and the reserve for all anticipation and extrapolation projecting the hypostases of given moments onto possible experience; but with this it is terminated by the physio-chemical essences understood as real foundations of the various syntheses or relational nodes; presupposed by physics, which derives its own matter from them, they traverse it and go beyond what it reduces them to; and this appears all the more clearly, the more advanced the quantitative resolution of the sets in which they are realised. Every physico-chemical law implies a quality, from the restatement of the quantity on which it comes into existence: but against this individuating principle as such, physics is powerless. It can account for the compound, but the synthesis as such - a simplicity that is not exhausted in that - is irremissibly contingent to it, while on the other hand it remains the substratum that underlies all its definite construction. Thus, beyond the order of quantity as a mere mathematical relation, we are led to that of the units of the quantitatively discontinuous and heterogeneous⁶; to which science seeks at first to make itself sufficient by passing into a classificatory science, subordinating the whole bound in an extrinsic way by quantitative relations and given by them in a completely formal way, to principles that an internal order of generation, division and hierarchy commands. That is, physical law passes through the syllogism in extension to the syllogism in comprehension. By element we have the notion understood as commanding unity of a given, more or less permanent, group of properties; and the scientific process is the genus that, by relating itself to a certain node of reality, identifies itself as a function of the various differences inherent in this: therefore not abstract juxtaposing and dividing, but rather an immanent process of genre formation as a unity of the concept that is composed with the power of qualification, in a development of arrangement and hierarchical organisation that gives reason, according to an articulated body, to the discontinuousness of that individuating contingency, which is the substratum of mathematical physics. The notion of counter to what is law and quantitative continuity, is the pattern and static unity, originally indeterminate, of a formality that is grafted onto change and with this is identified in the various hierarchies of types, *λογοι σπερματικοι* [principles generation] of syntheses. This leads to a more organic objective immanentisation of the ideal principle. According to the new form of scientific consciousness, the interval that in physics opposed the ambiguous and indeterminate matter of phenomena to a theory in itself hypothetical, which instead of starting from the

background of the former almost came to them from the outside by approximation of probability⁷, is lost, and experience itself directly gives a formed object, to which the power of the syllogism is immediately and determinatively applied.

However, at the point at which science understands the phenomenon in classification, this is distanced from it, and it no longer appears as the static relationship of certain differences and functions, but rather as an interiority that transcends them, as a power of individualisation that, instead of being explained by the connection of the various classificatory notes ('type' or 'organic formation'), is rather what explains this connection - what makes it possible and what contains it. From the static law of 'connections', the scientific consciousness is led to the dynamic law of 'correlations' and, through this, to the concept of 'type' as a vital act, as the prius of formation, the reason for the synergy and harmony of the various organs and functions, the economy and hierarchy of the various parts⁸. ⁹The general character of irritability⁸, the disproportion between excitement and reaction and, in general, between 'matter' and 'form', expresses in its own way the state of the particular which, in its assumption under the notion of kind, exceeds itself and to a certain extent universalises. Hence it follows from the very notion of organic type that it refers to an evolution or, more generally, to a development; the individual, according to the moment of particularity, can affirm itself insofar as it also posits a relationship that transcends it and yet is essential to its individualisation. The vital function, because it is immense and is only concrete in particular individualisations, pushes itself out: it is not a motionless act closed within itself and fixed once and for all, but an individualisation against and within an environment, which is at the same time an individualisation of an environment. Life organising and accounting for types in their concreteness, is precisely this reciprocal action, an individualisation by connecting oneself to distinct and yet individualising distinct that in turn reacts formatively on the individualising function. The biological sciences are thus forced to defer to general and complex laws of development, organisations and hierarchies to the process of a single vital act that in a certain way takes in itself both the conditioner and the conditioned and seeks to grasp the phenomenon according to the rhythm of the dynamic unity of the two. However, this unity, which is at the root of the various theories of adaptation, transformation, mutation, etc., insofar as in concrete terms the conditioned can only be understood as a function of what it nevertheless conditions, insofar as the concrete datum can never be life and environment as two distinct things, separately knowable and determinable, but rather the point of their encounter or the simplicity of their relationship - this unity brings the

science to the object as pure experience, i.e. as the immediate datum of consciousness; and thus science passes into the further degree of psychology³ .

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But even here, in accordance with the transcendental structure of the category, the exchangeable play of the principles of conservation (περας) and change (απειρον) is repeated. While on the one hand psychological laws, determinisms, faculties and uniformities are fixed, on the other hand the contingency of the person's act and its priority over the relations in which it is articulated appear: like the organic principle, the psychic principle is, in its order, at once cause and effect of environment, society, race, habit, character, etc., so that its determination shifts to the laws that govern very becoming of human experience - to historical laws. And with history, the determination of this category reaches its end. The principle of history, insofar as, according to its hierarchical locus, it remains defined as the ideal prius of all experience, cannot be understood under a more general law that is external to it; and, the other, it transcends the character of mere being-present proper to psychological reality. History cannot be resolved by the juxtaposition of something factual or general, in it law coincides with spontaneity, there reigns an originality that dominates various elements in meaning. This situation already flashed in the field of biology, where, beyond the naive one-sidedness of the doctrine of the 'conditions of existence' and the indetermination of the 'fundamental type' of transformism, the theory of de Vries³¹, admitting an autonomous principle of variation, in relation to which the laws of selection and adaptation would only be valid as instruments aimed at executing the mutation that transcends them, seems to give the best account of things. Science can therefore in no way grasp unity and ideal formation of the law in history - which is to say: it cannot adapt itself to itself, it cannot satisfy the need always resurgent in previous forms with the resurgence of the 'other' beyond the various positions conquered - if it does not elevate itself to a further dimension, if it does not deny the principle of the factual and external relation in that of freedom and meaning; that is to say, if it does not make the principle of determination, that is to say the power of the scientific category, coincide with the object of it. This means that history is possible insofar as the scientist makes himself the reflection of history itself, insofar as the concept, which has immanent the moment of other, ceases to be in itself, to live itself in the immediate affirmation relative to the describing and observing consciousness, and becomes for itself and therefore reflection, which as such is production, production that is such only insofar as it is also reflection. The concept, at the point that it adapts itself entirely to the other and penetrates the heart of the contingent, is reflected upon itself, is purified and freed from the last form according to which its actuality is imbued by the

data of sensible experience. This is the limit of the category.

Which therefore has its own crisis in itself. Because historical science, by purely identifying itself with history in action, ceases to be science, universality, objectivity, and becomes an accident closed in a simple moment of history itself; insofar as it is history that understands itself objectively, it is history that surpasses itself, and leads, in order to the requirement of scientificity, to a principle that rises from history so as to dominate its becoming and relativity. Thus science, in order to maintain and fulfil itself entirely, is taken beyond itself - according to a transition corresponding to that from the organism of the person (§§ 10-11).

§ 18 - PHILOSOPHICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

The category of science thus ends with the reduction of particular and qualitative experience to that form, in which the position of the concept is no longer immediate, but mediated. Opposed at first to a nature, the concept has now become the concept of nature itself or nature as concept: the 'other', in reflecting its form, has reflected it in itself but, at the same time, has placed itself as the substratum of its concreteness: the concept, as for itself, is now immediately and intrinsically for the other. Objectivity is the character of its own determination as it derives it no longer by applying itself to an extrinsic matter, but from its own interior. In this the person turns to full transcendence, to absolute morality. Such a term has been seen to become, insofar as the principle of science is determined in the form of history. But from the possibility of history as science, v.d. as objective and universally valid, a new step has been taken. For if the principle by which a history is formed in personal consciousness is understood as a simple moment of an objective history that transcends it, the point of science is undermined, since it is dominated by a contingency and relativity that does not allow it to understand history as it is in itself, but only as it appears from the particular, changing point of view proper to the historical moment to which it belongs. Thus insofar as history as a science is possible, insofar as it passes to a principle, whose legislation may be valid beyond time and change, on which nothing prevails and to which nothing precedes, which is therefore a spontaneity permeated by eternity and the immutability of the absolute. However, such a value becomes only at the moment of the full alienation of the concept, of the objective formation of its very essence, so that the unity of the two points, the synthesis that gives the previous category the possibility of ending, must be referred to a formal activity, in which freedom and necessity fall into the same point, in this sense: that the metatemporal legislation and the correlative, perfect transmutation into the objective of all that constitutes the primordial experience of the person, in so far as it is fulfilled, in so far as from within, it feels intimately bound to itself, in so far as in the person it does not experience itself unconditionally, as mere personal activity, but as the manifestation of a superior, universal nature. With which the category of philosophy remains in place. Reality, insofar as it is assumed by a history, which is also science, is philosophical or, better, metaphysical reality. This reality goes to constitute a

order absolutely closed within itself, the organ of which is the freedom of a concept, which is for itself (κατ' αὐτό) according to objectivity, of a concept that has its concreteness no longer in experience, but in itself, the thing having now become an interiority, an immanent note to its structure.

This specific character of philosophy, that for which, to put it in a word, it feels itself as science and not as art, irony or power, or that it is the equivalent of that original moment of distinction, which already in science determined the submission of theory or persuasion to the 'experiment', lives in the philosophical need so that it is not limited to the pure affirmation of the rational, but the need is felt to understand that what is rational is also real (to place as a necessary moment to the concept the negativity of its other, which remains in place, and yet it is said that it is rational, that the concept finds in it nothing but itself) - this, of course, not out of an extrinsic confrontation neither with the given, nor with a transcendent criterion - a confrontation that in no way could be carried out in this sphere, due to the very nature of metaphysical reality, closed within itself - but out of an intimate conformation of freedom itself, which feels "objective". Hence in philosophical consciousness, thought does not appear to us as a spiritual power of creation, but rather as the transparency of a higher existing rationality: and only under the condition of such a form does that objective, unitary, transcendent reduction of contingent personal experience take place - in which scientific consciousness comes to be sufficient for itself.

The idea, that the world of metaphysics is constructed almost automatically, according to the intuition of an eternal and impersonal system of truths that it does not create, but recognises, is therefore an intrinsic note to the very concept of philosophy; it is, however, only intelligible to those who trace philosophy back to its transcendental genesis. Philosophy, like science, without the substratum of a set of profound conations, wills, inclinations, etc. (what Indian speculation calls *samskâra*), would be absolutely nothing - the idea of a philosophy that is not an expression of a person is an empty abstraction. But this is not to be understood psycho-naturalistically. By desire, action, etc., are here alluded to the same formative forces underlying the particular experience born in the service of a reflex freedom, forces that the scientific consciousness, in the immediacy of the concept, which is proper to it, knows in the objective determinations of mathematical, physical and bio-psychic nature, and which here are formed in a system of metaphysical relations and transcendent meanings. Hence it is not to be thought of as an extrinsic causation or influence or action exercised on the

philosophy, understood as a particular intellectual faculty, by the will and desire. Instead, philosophy expresses the very conformation that action and desire have now assumed, and by which their reality is now conditioned. Hence the moment of autonomy: the philosopher's discursive act is a freeing and direct expression of the person's own elementary powers, in the form of pure, intelligible self-conception. Correlative to this is the moment of transcendence: this liberation is only possible in relation to the end of science, that is to that direction, whereby the reflection of the concept becomes in an increasing abstraction from the subjective and disinterested interpenetration in the 'other'. Thus the freedom of the concept is also a passivity: in the philosophical form, the ego affirms itself as positive, autonomous - but, at the same time, it cancels its own freedom and realises it as a letting itself be thought. The absolute identity with the other - i.e. the character of evidence, and the moment of absoluteness and universality in philosophy - is precisely conditioned by this situation, expressed by rational necessity: in rational assent, the 'I' feels free - it is almost a recognition of its own substance, it is evidence, self-consciousness, spontaneity - but on the other hand there is in it, at its very depths, passivity: The Ego in no way feels itself to be beyond that content which it recognises as true, beyond it as its arbiter: on the contrary, it identifies itself with it without residue, freedom binds itself to it inconvertibly and therefore renounces itself: so that in rational experience, truth must appear as independent of the act that recognises it as such, as if it were something valid in and of itself that imposes itself as soon as it presents itself to any mind, in any time and place.

This category develops in an interval that in certain way is the equivalent, *sur un'altrattava*, of that in which the value of scientific consciousness was seen to unfold, and whose meaning is the progressive mediation of the criterion truth. According to scientific attitude, the criterion of truth fell outside the concept, in reality understood as pure other: thus at first there will be an objective metaphysics as equivalent of the moment of physical science: the concept becomes the power of expression of a reality that, although it is by no means ideal and commanded by the value of universal, is in the Ego as philosopher in a relationship analogous to that of the external physical world (contemplative philosophy). Beyond this point, the concept proceeds in a work of mediation and critique whose term is that form, according to which the criterion of truth is placed within the thinking subject, in its immanent rationality: the objective, the true, is then identified with self-position, as the self-position of a universal subject, that is, of an I that is not the unconditioned, but a unity of freedom and necessity, immanent law, rational freedom, *causa sui* (in the Spinozian sense).

In the 'transcendental I' of absolute idealism, the instance of philosophy is fulfilled: immanence and transcendence are immediately joined, whereby the person as form, ideality, is now aware of itself as objective power - and not as abstract and immediate objective power, as it already appeared in science, but as reflected objective power, as one, which is to be in act, to be for itself, *conceptus sui*.

Philosophy thus remains fixed as the category in which a contingent world is intellectually assumed *sub specie aeternitatis*. As a category, it is a meaning that remains unchanged in the variety of possible philosophies: it is a value, in a certain way indifferent to their various contents, situations and particular problems: these are only worth to it as means, assumed only so that it comes into being. In this transcendental activity is present, as we said, the moment of the absolute: hence a fatal immanence of the note of categoricity and universality in any speculative judgement as such. The philosophical principle cannot come into contact with anything, without the form of absoluteness being communicated to it through this very coming into contact: the philosophy of contingency, the sceptical, relativistic or dialectical becoming doctrine, insofar as they benefit from themselves as philosophy, do not escape this destiny: they give the contingent, the relative, the elusive and the transmuting as the content of the eternal and immutable. One can say *veritas filia temporibus*, but this itself is a truth that is placed outside of time. One can say *panta rhei* [everything flows], but this same formula is not thought to flow. And just as this fate cannot be averted except by renouncing the philosophical attitude in general, so too one cannot escape the other, connected to it, of categoricity, whereby every speculative judgement - as has been particularly clearly emphasised by Rickert 3Z - is formulated insofar as it is informed by an inescapable Sollen insofar as it implies, as a *prius*, the absolute and intimate feeling of being tied to a transcendent normativity, from adherence to which it draws its meaning and its right³³. Ineliminable destiny, since at the level of philosophical consciousness the very negation of the Sollen [duty (possible)] will become the object of judgement, only insofar as it appears as necessary in the choice against the opposite possibility, in which again the generic principle of a pure transcendent normativity is recognised³⁴.

On the other hand, the point of the absolute needs a body, through which

express itself, and this only the personality can offer it. Hence the contingency of the speculative absolute when in the philosophies one moves from the formal moment to the material moment. That which unfolds in the various doctrines and which in the actuality of each of them - that is, in their categorical moment - seems invested with intrinsic evidence and extratemporal necessity, may in fact, for the concept of philosophy itself, further count as transient.

Every concept, logic and system, materialiter always has a hypothetical value, since the principium individuationis, the profound power that determines and affirms the various metaphysical realities, is always the principle of the person, v.d. a contingent thing, a particular drawn from a compossibility³⁵. It was already shown in our first book how, if beyond the empiricist scepticism, victorious over a naively dogmatic realism, a transcendental or critical idealism renders a system of objectivity intelligible and well-founded, such idealism from a further point of view turns out to be a transcendental realism and is overwhelmed by a transcendental contingentism. Of the further significance of this movement, more below.

As for philosophy as a categorial principle, it is constituted in a certain interval or motion, the element of which is the relationship between the function of thought and the criterion of truth. Hence the notion of a transcendental history of philosophy that coincides with the becoming of the concept of philosophy itself, since this, like every category, is not in a given, but in a synthesis; a history that, to tell the truth, can only be referred to as history very improperly, since it falls in time only by accident - in itself it is a pure, ideal mediation of the concept. Therefore, this gives the possibility to outline the precise relationship between history and philosophy.

First of all, that relating to the limit connecting the current category with the previous one. This relates to the exposed problem of the possibility of history as a science, the solution to which relies on the postulation of a metahistorical principle that encompasses what unfolds under the condition of temporal relativity in an ideal unity permeated with meaning. With this metahistorical principle, one is already led to philosophy, and one can say that history - in the broad sense, as universal history - is a philosophy in potency (or, to use a term from Crocian neo-Hegelianism, an intuited philosophy, i.e. still imbued with that form of immediate, sensitive knowing on which the concept rests in scientific consciousness) and that philosophy is the act of history, point at which history gathers and burns in pure intellectual transparency. More specifically: historiographic activity, which is reflected and liberated as immanent, self-conceptual science, is a consequent to which the matter of the

history: this, it turns to take up and resolve in itself, and thus we have an interval, of which philosophy is precisely only the ideal limit, the τέλος. Now the history of philosophy transcendently results precisely as the medium between history and philosophy, as this interval in which the concept becomes autonomous and is confirmed in its own internal mediation in the substratum of simple history. In this sense, the history of philosophy is identified with the same ideal construction of philosophy: and its end is there where it tears away that last veil of immediacy that is inherent to "ideal time", to become the pure consciousness - the present eternity closed within itself - of the "transcendental Ego" in which the nature of the metaphysical principle in general comes to perfect, purified expression.

Development, which is then that of the very criterion of logic, which from the intuitive basis, and from formal and extrinsic (as a canon for thought so that it can adapt itself to its own content understood as distinct from it), passes to transcendental and immanent, that is, to the reflection of a thought, whose act is the very act of its own content. And that the medium of the transition is the concept of logic as dialectic, this proceeds directly from the determination that philosophy develops from the scientific moment insofar as it understands that the concept as such is the internal unity self and other. This already appears in Aristotle and, in part, also in Plato, who to a certain extent admitted in the rational what, for example, in Parmenides was pure antithesis, pure irrationality that does violence to the; , and distinctly, in Hegel, in order to the need to take up within the Schellingian 'identity' the set of distinctions of concrete reality; thirdly, in Weber and other modern philosophers of science, in accordance with the need to reaffirm the concept on the objective formations determined in the positive disciplines beyond the dissolution of that "philosophy of nature" in which it had primitively attempted to assert itself. In all this, the principle of a dialectical logic makes its way.

Let us now consider the category as a whole. According to our general principle, the synthesis conditions and posits the entire series of its conditions in its proper form. Such a form here, as we have seen, takes place in the ideal assumption of history. Philosophy therefore comes to transcendental construction of itself, by virtue of that activity whereby the entirety of its conditions becomes to it in the form of an ideal history; in hidden conatus, it is that whereby the opacity and contingency of history proper is transfigured into the eternity of an ideal process, up to the transparency of the pure mediation of a form, which is the very act of the objective universal. Here we can give the outline

paradigmatic of one such process of the historical-philosophical embodiment of the categories; we say 'one' because of this, that history, no less than space, causality, organisation, science, etc., is not a datum or a thing in itself, but a power of position that, moreover, does not have the fatality of the indefinite, but affirms itself when and to the point where it affirms itself and wants to affirm itself. It is certainly a priori as a category, v.d. it has articulations, which are general and uniform elements for the possibility of any history in general, constituting the conditions for the very flashing of the value inherent in historical consciousness. But the body, the sphere, in which the historical principle asserts its own determination, is by no means contingent: a certain epoch may be valid as the complete historical expression of the categories, just as it may represent, from another point of view, a mere moment - and vice versa, as according to the principle of continuity repeatedly mentioned. Since the object and purpose of history is history itself, see the experience of transcendental value, by which it is defined.

Now, the state of direct objectivity of the concept, of the truth that is simply a being in itself, can be connected to the Indian speculation, as echoed in the Vedas, and which can be called pre-preligious in the sense that the distinction had not yet arisen, so that against the certainty that had become a problem, the need for a 'religare' (religio) had to assert itself. Such is the correlative of the world of quality. Already the concept of *mâyâ* differentiates this objective consciousness and lays the first seed of that split that will have to generate, with the logical-discursive form, the equivalent of the principle of image (§ 11). The transition point is provided by Greek philosophy. Here, on the one hand, the objective moment is preserved, especially in the pre-Socratics and the mystery doctrines, which are more directly connected to the earlier wisdom. The proposition 'το ον εστι, το μη ονεστι' [being is, non-being is not] in its historical place is not to be understood as magical Idealism might (in the sense, that is, that the 'identical' of the power of the ego is being, and every 'other', deprivation) 3⁶, but, on the contrary, as an affirmation of certainty as objective content, as opposed to which it is subjectivity, still only sketched in the insubstantial fog of the "opinare" (δοξα), which is that "non-being that no violence can ever make it be". However Greek objectivism is no way to be understood as a function of the idea of object as it is in modern consciousness. When Thales speaks 'water', the Pythagorean of 'number', Xenophanes of *εις θεος* [god one], when Plato of 'ideas' and Plotinus of 'intelligibles', it is still neither objective nor subjective in the proper sense, but the promiscuity of the one and other, of the ideal and the real, of the immanent and the transcendent,

proper to a consciousness not yet differentiated, to a consciousness to which certainty is not so much from an intellectual problem as from an intuition, an experience - from an experience grasped not by an external sensible objectivity, but by an inner supersensible objectivity. Such is the qualitative stage of the criterion of certainty.

The same Socratic catharsis in the concept has its proper historical place if illuminated with that in which it culminates: with the Aristotelian theory of the *οργανον* [organ], in which the logical movement is referred to an objective hierarchy intelligibles - even if, as we will say, such a meaning, due to a lack of the original, its own level of consciousness, could only have been realised through the matter of the "other", seed. with the discursiveness of sophistry, which in the reaffirmation of the concept is almost subsumed under a 'cunning of reason'. This is reflected in the pessimistic and soteriological interest of early Greek philosophy. In the first moment of tearing itself away from the immediate connection with objective and universal, consciousness found itself lost in a changing world of phenomena or contingent forms³⁷ in which certainty and unity were diluted, the sense of a 'fall' arose, of an injustice and violence - which was rightly referred to existence as an individual³⁸ - whence the pessimism, whence the nostalgia for the 'golden age'(hence the taking over of the *φιλο-σοφία* from the lost *σοφία*), whence, again, the remission of the principle of certainty to a theory of reminiscence³⁹. Given the still shapeless form of the principle affirmed by said wrenching from the objective, certainty could in fact only rest on a reference to the past, to the pre-individual vision in the spiritual world not yet disturbed by the principle of the "other" (*ετερον* = *mâyâ* = *avidyâ*). Hence the idea of a cathartic conditionality for knowledge, i.e. that it is only realised when, having resolved the guilt of individual affirmation, one returns to the pure vision of truth. In other words, the criterion of true knowledge refers back to a theory of salvation - and specifically according to the solution that Schopenhauer is to distinctly enunciate in the third book of his main work, v.d. - for a resolution of individuation that blossoms into pure contemplation (*θεα* [view], *θεωρία* [consideration]) of the objective world of Ideas and One.

However, this pessimistic and ascetic direction, given essentially by the mystery philosophies, would in itself have meant only a retreat, a halting of development: but the presence of a centre already formed in the logical-discursive order meant that it did not result in the restoration of intuitive objectivity, but rather in the establishment of a new form of

objectivity: that proper to conceptual mediation. That is to say, the 'cunning' referred to above is reciprocal: if Socrates only assumed discursiveness in order to reaffirm the objective through it, on the other hand in doing so he simultaneously fertilised it in a mediation, giving it the form of sufficiency.

The profound aspiration turned to the past in Socrates blossoming into the concept, determined the principle of modern philosophy, since with the concept, certainty, which was being, became image, knowledge. Thus in the Greek world, cathartics could be opposed to discursive science as a regressive moment.

Aristotle's doctrine, insofar as it fully adapts objectivity to discursiveness, the other hand, in sustaining that the idea is nothing if not in re in matter - that is, in the Platonic "other" - as individuating reality, marks the limit between Eastern and Western truth. Beyond him, truth explicitly transcends and alienates itself - in the Christian consciousness: here the "other", the pure transcendent, becomes a value, and to it, through faith, the criterion of certainty is referred.

This transcendence at first is immediate, qualitative: it is revelation, religion proper, apocalypse of a supernatural world through faith and feeling. As millennial enthusiasm and orgasm of primitive Christianity is succeeded by theological accommodation, quality is mediated, until in the formalism of scholasticism that which has gone beyond the original identity becomes aware of itself, of its own purely abstract nature⁴.⁰

From scholasticism to the natural science of the Renaissance there is but one step. Naturalistic consideration has as its deepest meaning the refinement of scholastic formalism so that, having consumed the 'other' as quality, it moves on to quantity and realises a further power of the decentralising direction proper to Christian consciousness. If in scholasticism reason was ancilla theologiae, in science it is ancilla rerum naturae - but in both cases the dependence remains, the idea that reason is not an autonomous power, having in itself its own criterion. But with the science of nature, thought, which in Eastern truth was being, becomes not only form, but a form of phenomenal knowledge. With the system explanation according to intelligible natural principles (Descartes), according to the simple mathematical relations between empirical states beyond 'substantial causes' and spiritual powers (Galilei), an order of pure exteriority is placed. But it is precisely this exteriority that completely dissolves the transcendent criterion of truth and, beyond mediaeval theo-ontological rationalism, leads the concept to liberate itself, to mediate with , to feel itself no longer as a thought around the object, but the real expression of what the object in itself is. When the enquirer, who had almost drawn himself away from the object, came to

he saw it vanish in his hands and instead came to experience himself precisely as that pure form that he had made himself: for science concludes in the dematerialisation of nature into a system of abstract ideal relations closed within itself, in which nothing but its own abstract essence is reflected. However, the consciousness of this has its perfect realisation only in modern idealism. In this formation of speculative consciousness, discursiveness definitively takes the form of sufficiency, becomes self-consciousness and sets the criterion in itself.

In Kant's theory of the 'synthesis of apperception', the subject is drawn into the act that posits the object, as the object of science: it is 'I think', the creative faculty of an experience, which is mutated with the immanent science (= discursive knowability) of things. In Kant, the power that makes the real become and takes the real into itself by idealising it thus becomes ; the objective has become the 'I' - but this only insofar as, in the same act, the 'I' has become objective: the 'I' here only resolves the 'other' on condition that it shifts from the Bewusstsein [consciousness] to the allgemein [common]; this shift conditions the absolute immanence of truth to thought, the unity of the empirical and the rational. The direction develops: Kant's critique presupposed on the one hand a dogmatic conception of Newtonian mechanics, Euclidean geometry and Archimedean arithmetic, and on the other the dualism between form and matter of intuition; thus in Kant the resolution of the empirical in the transcendental could not be complete. Identity in him is restricted to that aspect of the ego, from which proceed the general principles for the legislation or possibility of an experience as a discursively scientifically possible experience, a legislation that is nevertheless limited on the one hand by the sensible and contingent manifold, and on the other by the noumenon. This limitation is removed in two ways: firstly, formaliter, through the progress of critical consciousness, whereby the noumenon - 'wood made of iron' - was denied as of right and an organ was constructed with the Hegelian dialectic so that the 'Chaos ausserhalb des Systems' [Chaos outside the system] and the noumenal antithesis could be understood organically in the concept. Secondly (materialiter), in the demise of the 'philosophy of nature' system itself. The true transcendence of the Idea or discursiveness, whereby it demonstrates its own freedom and absoluteness and takes up the possibility of the other - as according to requirement of the dialectic - is not that, within the system of the Encyclopaedia, of the 'Logos' in 'Nature', but that of the whole of Hegelism in the exact sciences, through the intermediary of the Hegelian left and positivism⁴¹. And the synthesis is not the 'philosophy of the Spirit' but, through the medium of philosophy of science and idealism

mathematician of the Marburg School, absolute idealism - understood to be identical with absolute positivism - where the concept, disengaging from the determinations of a unilateral dogmatism, immerses itself entirely in the other, becomes the very act of the particular and empirical, so that in the development objective experience it sees only the eternity of the mediated form in itself and sufficient to itself - the pure logical universal⁴Z. In this the interval of philosophical consciousness comes to an end: empirical and transcendental, freedom (possibility) and necessity (reality), universal and particular, transcendence and immanence, ταυτοτης [identity] and ετεροτης [otherness], rational and irrational merge into a unity that expresses only the self-concept of the pure concept.

The criterion of truth, which, according to the category's antecedent, was originally placed in an intuitive-objective identity (Oriental and Palaeo-Greek spirit), becomes alienated from itself (Christian spirit, logical formalism and naturalism) to become immanentised again as a pure concept, discursiveness mediating itself (modern criticism). Truth as being, dead through transcendent divinity to the phenomenal matter of science, passes to transcendental logic, to the discursive form that is υποκειμενον in itself mediating itself. In this, the element of all metaphysical reality as such, the metaphysical moment of all metaphysics, comes to fulfilment. History is its power; and the interval that separates this power from its act is precisely the history of philosophy.

Finally, we want to return to what was said in the first book about the practical-synthetic nature of philosophy in general, a nature that gives justification to its eventual presence in the world of the absolute Individual. There is no philosophy because there is a rationality in things, but philosophy gives things a rationality that they did not have before - this is the fundamental point. There is never a recognising, but even the possible recognising is but a form according to which a posing appears. Philosophy, in its rationalisation of experience, is only justified by a practical will that sounds like this:

"The irrational, the other, must not be". Its is always a commanding and a determining, which before itself has an indeterminacy, a problematic both subjective (in the thinker) and objective (in things) - and its presupposition is not an objective rationality of fact, but the power of being able to rationalise the given irrational. From this function at the level of philosophy as such, the ego, however, is in a certain way acted upon (in the moment of Sollen); but this does not make it any less synthetic with respect to its object, and immanent in its form of transcendence.

This exposition of the categories, insofar as they are taken as meanings, we have said that it is drawn from a reflection of freedom according to the affirmative option. When, on the other hand, it is taken on a simply philosophical basis, this exposition is broken down into two parts by a limit or centre, which is precisely the category of philosophy: the first part takes up the categories described so far, which will then be understood as the elements resulting from an analysis of the conditions of possibility of the philosophical form itself (theoretical philosophy); the second part will take up the set of further categories, which will become postulates, i.e. ideal determination of tasks, the effective realisation of which is a condition for the absolute becoming sufficient of the Ego to the problem that immanent in philosophy.

§ 19 - MYSTICAL CONSCIOUSNESS

Philosophy thus ends in that formation, where the concept of the transcendental 'I' is placed. Therefore, this point - in which the form, insofar as it is the form of objectivity, freely reflects and mediates itself - fully penetrated, becomes an unstable point of equilibrium, dominated by the need for a further definition. This, in the sense that the transcendental 'I', as the determination of philosophical consciousness, is only insofar as it is understood and produced in a concept; but understanding it in this way is not possible without contradicting its essence. The concept that really wants to conform to it and, in this, itself, is driven to take the general principle of philosophical formation beyond itself.

Determinately. What is realised at the end of the philosophical category as 'transcendental I' is the actual principle objective experience in general, v.d. the thinker of all thinking. Now the thinker as such cannot be the object of a construction or mediation, v.d. of a concept proper. That thinker, which can be given by a concept, is the negation of the thinker - not the thinker itself, but a thought - which contradicts the principle of the identity of form and content that should command the term of the category: or, rather, at the point at which the concept actually posits the thinker, it consummates its own discursive formation and pushes the centre into that, as the power of all thinking - and yet also of that from which the fixation of the concept of the thinker itself can proceed - can never be thought, and thus falls outside of any philosophical determination while inevitably remaining postulated by each of them. Thus the concept of the transcendental 'I' marks a point of crisis: on the one hand it must be philosophically affirmed - it is the conclusion, the τέλος, on which the entire development of the criterion of truth gravitates, it is the principle of perfect metaphysical resolution; but this affirmation either denies its own object and, torn apart by an internal contradiction, finds itself powerless before its own problem and that of philosophy in general; or, if it conforms to its deepest aspiration, in the very act realising itself it ceases to be a philosophical affirmation, it goes beyond the order of the mediate, of the conceptually constructible. Just as the cognition of a sequence of phenomena can only be objectively valid as history within a principle that, it, is outside history, so that position which, by adapting freedom

to objectivity, gives rise to the 'transcendental Ego', insofar as it does not resolve itself into a qualitative category but, according to its possibility and hierarchical place, is instead a personal determination and, specifically, the development of scientific consciousness - is only realised within a value that transcends and dominates it. And if the transcendental 'I', in its speculative understanding, is absolute identity of freedom and necessity, and in it the concept mediated in itself in the objective is expressed, its becoming - the fact that in general it is possible for a philosophy to have it as a principle and yet still have the value of ideality and science - postulates or confesses, at one and the same time, the passing of the person into a further element, which transcends the determination of the demiurgic *causa sui*, of the assumed imperativeness in which the actuality of thought is formed, which has also become an act of the object. In short: the ideal term of philosophy is only possible as correlative to the value of unconditioned, of the principle that, as the principle of thinking, it cannot be taken up under any law - and yet is infinite; that, as the principle of thinking, it cannot be made the object of thinking in the strict sense, of that deducing and constructing of which the philosophical category was a question - and yet is heterological; that, as the principle of all mediation, it cannot be anything other than immediate. Beyond correlation, the synthesis: the form of the unconditioned and heterological must be the condition in which that absolute, ideal unity, to which the concept as transcendental I previously sufficient, is resolved. The category, in which the principle of the person resolves in immanence the point of the exlege [outside the law] and the infinite, albeit maintained, in accordance with the moment of the antecedent, in the value of the necessary absolute, of the deepest root of objectivity, can be indicated as mysticism.

The content of the mystical experience is precisely the absolute unity of the empirical and transcendental, formed in a principle of infinity, v.d. in a principle beyond all form, law and condition - a unity that while remaining something immediate, something that exists only in a direct, inner realisation of the mystic himself, is nevertheless felt as objective, in and of itself existing (= as "God"). It is that the new synthesis, although the extreme, is always an interpenetration and absorption of the ideal principle in the other. Determinately: formal freedom, having experienced the value of objectivity as a simple position with science, as reflection or mediation with philosophy, with mysticism goes to experience objectivity itself as the power of mediation. And if such a power is the supreme, in mysticism the supreme immanence facentesi transcendence is expressed, as well as, at the same time, the supreme transcendence, the deepest possible root in the other, facentesi immanence, form. With 'ecstasy', with the act of

dedication whereby the person denies the very transcendental individualisation of the "intelligibles", of "ideas", and plunges into the unutterable abyss, into the solitary desert, into the eternal, naked essence of the "Father", the objective formation of the person is thus brought to its end, to its τέλος.

Hence a connection religious experience, since there is fundamentally understood to be faith in the objective existence of a supernatural principle, having its attribute infinity, the power transcending any law or formation. And since the synthesis, the τέλος, is always the matter from which the conditions of it are formed, so now it would appear that 'God' is the very substance in the bosom of which live and from which they derive their reality, reason and supreme unification, the whole of the sciences, and yet also the objects which in the service of the becoming of these become in experience - it is the centre on which gravitates, and which bears, the whole system of objectivity. But then divinity must be given according to that organ that alone befits the present hierarchical place.

Thus: the God of theologies is in truth a negation of God - a particular formation of speculative consciousness (the meaning of which is the one determined above for Christianity in the ideal history of philosophy). The true God does not have to be demonstrated, thought, determined: it is either faith and pure internal evidence, or it is nothing, religion as such beginning where the form, having abandoned the plane of that thought, which is determinant only insofar as it is simultaneously also determined, identical with necessity, shifts the centre to the formless moment of the determinant itself, which, however, can only be grasped directly.

Hence we will say that all religion, in that it is religion and nothing else, is mysticism.

Now mysticism, as a value, is, like every other category, an interval: the mystical God will not therefore be given ex abrupto, but in a transcendental way will be originally connected, as to a matter not yet realised, to the moment of the antecedent, that is, to a certain philosophical concept and, more generally, to a certain vision of the world; from this it is gradually elaborated - just as the philosophical concept itself was gradually elaborated from the scientific moment through history to the pure principle of immanence. Only, due to the very character of what has now become categorical prius and τέλος, such a development does not entail a discursively determinable phenomenology: it falls into the interiority of the person, who within the natural formations goes deeper and deeper into the sense of the infinite and the whole. But if the gradual realisation of the concept of philosophy is to be understood in the various stages of speculative thought; and since on the other hand this realisation is not complete

that in the transcendent act that affirms and grasps the mystical principle - one has way of understanding the process of speculation, from the objective concept to the immanent concept of truth, as the phenomenon or myth, inwardly turning to its own consummation, of the unnameable movement by which the principle of the person goes on to realise within itself the presence of the mystical God.

Here, too, what has been said about philosophy applies: religion as an experience of the person always has its roots in that irrational world of action and particularity, which constitutes its elementary substance. A human element reflecting the various local and historical contingencies will therefore be indispensable to it, albeit purely as an instrument of expression, from which it increasingly seeks to free itself in order to transform it into its purified form.

Thus, on the understanding that it is always the superior that, as final cause, conditions the inferior and the elemental correlative to it, there is no reason to exclude the positive investigation of the psychological-naturalistic substratum of religions. Indeed, only on the basis of it is a concrete understanding of the becoming of religious value possible. And one can conceive of a kind of phenomenology in which the mystical experience from a substance determined by the elementary needs of animal life is elaborated up to unconditioned, the infinite principle. Not only that, but one can go so far as to affirm, with Carpenter, that the 'gods' in truth reside in the physiological centres: they correspond to the energies that through the various developments of the races and recurring experiences have formed the concrete individuation of the person, and immanent and sustaining it - to these energies insofar as they are aroused and objectivised in the mystical moment of their elemental power. Then the physiological (not just the psychological) would be *ratio cognoscendi* of the divine. The world of transcendental demiurgical essences or "ideas" to be reduced by *πλῶσις* [simplification] to the pure ineffable of the *εν* [One], of the Shiva or nirguna-Brahman, would express the appearance, within the value of the thinking or unconditioned, of the elementary forces "precipitating" as organic functions of the person.

The object of religion, it was said, is the supernatural, in the sense of that which is superior to laws, that which is capable of arbitrariness, of a 'miracle', of the fulfilment of that which with respect to a certain system of determinations appears as absurd or impossible. "*Credo quia absurdum*", *aghatana-patīyasi* (= that by which the impossible is made possible) - this is the element proper the religious object as such - which therefore constitutes a category and value in itself, distinct both

from the philosophical than from the scientific. "I believe" means: the impossible IS possible, all that is is not of itself, what is not infinitely transcends what is, and this non-being IS. The ideality of the person in faith absolutely wants to exhaust the other: it wants to take up the possibility as absolute total freedom, and yet it gives itself the incomprehensible and the impossible as its object. Hence, in the category that arises from such an instance, a residue that will never allow itself to be borrowed from the concept and will instead condition it wherever religion is not an empty name. Since the passage from each category to another is contingent, one can remain fixed to the philosophical point of view: nevertheless, resolving God into a thinkable, affirming that religion is valid for its doctrinal content, which in it is presented in an immediate or figurative form, in itself remains fundamentally something rational; discarding therefore the mystical infinity as an empty outline - insofar as it is possible, inasmuch as religion has not yet in any way become religion, and therefore insofar as philosophy has not yet come to understand, to finish, itself. The claim that the mystical object gives an account of itself as a function of the discursive concept is as unreasonable as claiming to show green to one who has first welded red glasses to his eyes and in no way intends to take them off. Let philosophy go ahead, realise its own value to the full - and a bridge between it and religion will in itself be thrown⁴⁴.

In mysticism, the connection of the two moments of immanence and formalism can be noted. On the one hand, what distinguishes mystical certainty is its character immediacy: that which is mystically true - as has been said - is always something that, although it counts as an objectivity, is given directly in an evidence, essentially ineffable, since its content is not the formation but the power of it. Yet mysticism, as what corresponds to the present point, is always a formal category, taken up, as such, under the law of distinction, and thus connected to the substratum of the profound determinations of the finite will. Therefore, if on the one hand the mystical τέλος is such that in no way can it be transmitted or taught, on the other hand any possible synthesis always remains, materially, something abstract, subjective, ideal: it is not the real resolution of things, it is not a flame that concretely consumes the person and, with it, the particular finite world at an absolute point, leaving nothing behind - in short: it is not cosmic praxis. There is no rapture of ecstasy so absolute that the ecstatic does not return to his own flesh. And since according to this understanding in mysticism is essentially expressed the extension of the other down to the extreme root of the ego, the supreme objectivity or abstraction, realised by a strengthening of the motion of transcendental philosophy, so that it does not resolve itself

the object, that in so far as it objectively conforms to a deeper power of the subject; that is why the experience of the mystic, in its activity, is essentially passive, that is why in the immanence of the unnameable there remains awe, the principle of grace: just as the Ego in action in science so far realises its own persuasion insofar as it relies on the myth of the experiment and believes that a nature in itself guarantees its theories and principles; and in philosophy likewise it defers to the absolute evidence of the logician to the point of making the Ego the mere self-consciousness of Reason, the passive subject of the Sollen; so in mysticism the various realisations must be permeated by the meaning of a superior illumination⁴⁵. In it, the ego is not lord of its own movement: in the deepest root of activity it is instead abducted, transported - it is alienated, it is dedication, that is to say: this deep root - the absolute immanence inherent in the antecedent of the transcendental ego, which goes to conform to the principle of the infinite - here is only realisable under an intimate sense of dedication, of autonomy, of love and, at the lowest level, of devotion.

This has a distinct expression in Novalis' view. The 'Amen of the universe', the 'supreme real', this author refers it to the principle of love; the deepest point of the ego, conditioning all activity, he understands as an absolute Empfindung [absolute sensation]; thus in a sense of humility and passivity, even if freely determined - as must be the case for every form of the world of the person⁴⁶. This inner attitude of the mystic, which is essential to the category, is the intimate root of all religiosity⁴⁷. The mystic does not maintain himself and from himself conquer God, he does not make himself God in the proper sense of the expression: he rather draws himself aside, lets God speak and generate himself in him: his work does not appear to him as positive but instead as negative. As if the divine principle another entity, buried within the person, that one would only have to listen to, to let it speak by keeping silent, by denying oneself. Mystically, the ego does not pass into God as overcoming, but rather as overcome. This in meaning remains even in the deepest 'states of union' and maintains the factual moment at the time: in its abstract reflection it determines the doctrine of grace.

In contrast to mysticism, magic would thus be defined primarily by the objective, positively effective character of its praxis. The function would no longer be aesthetic-formal on the basis of a fundamental objectivity, but real resolution of the physical antithesis; no longer subjectivity that only insofar as it is experienced objectively does it penetrate the unconditioned, but subjectivity that if it is unconditioned and objective, is only so insofar as it is power and dominion. Hence

character of absolute, explicit sufficiency of the ego to its own act, of pure affirmation and active overcoming of place of the forms of grace, love and ecstasy.

§ 20 - PURE ART

With the category of mysticism, the form has definitively adapted itself to its own content: in all the powers of this - in the simple objective with science, in the relative mediation with philosophy, in the principle of infinity with mysticism - it has penetrated it and resolved it within itself, that is, it has reconciled itself with itself by idealising it.

Now in mystical experience, objectivity is in the unconditioned state, which means: in the state that includes the possibility of its crisis, the freedom to transcend itself, to pass into something else - into the subjective. And this possibility of it is indeed not such, but a reality in the act of becoming that which is the *τελος* of mysticism - ecstasy. In the ecstasy, the person is denied - and yet a difference subsists, a living in the divine life and yet distinct from it, for, otherwise, there is no place for the objectivity of this life itself. But the power of such a distinction, posited as it is posited, can no longer be provided by the person, nor can it be provided by the objective as such - which is all posited, all exhausted, led to its limit - it must only be asked of the objective that uses its infinity to pass qualitatively, to differentiate itself, allowing a subjective to arise - but another, transfigured subjective, a sufficient, central, self-arching subjective, a principle of reality and no longer just an image and abstract ideality, because the Ego has now taken on, mediated in itself - but, again, abandoning itself to infinity, transcended - all those powers of the "other" which, in the immediacy of itself precisely as image and reflection, were factually opposed to it and transcended it. Such is the meaning of the mystical "rebirth in God" of the one who gave himself entirely to him.

From the ideal exhaustion mystical experience there arises, as a consequence, the principle of the person, or ideal ego, elevated to absolute centre, to objective individuality. This point, as we have said, conditions the end of the previous category and, at the same time, is only in correlation to it.

As for the antecedent, we can refer it to a form, which remains objective and universal insofar as it conforms to the principle of unconditioned - the category of mysticism, at its end, giving rise precisely to an experience in which the infinite, objective and the formal are joined together. This unity must now be drawn into the value of the consequent, that is, it must become the matter in which

is mediated and gradually manifested, to the point of pure expression, the returning subjective consciousness. The synthesis will thus arise from a situation in which a formal activity of creation, indeed in itself materially permeated by the value of objectivity, is assumed by the person so that, through a congruous arousal of the principle of the unconditioned, which must also be its own, it consumes the form itself, and transforms the universal and the objective into the self-consciousness of an Ego as absolute "sufficiency". Now to this formal creativity inwardly conditioned by the Ego's position as self-consciousness beyond the indifference of immanence and transcendence proper to the previous categories, art, as pure art, can be considered suitable. In such art, the passing of objectivity and the return of the unconditioned subjective is realised, certainly not as the simple principle of the first category of this epoch, but enriched with the experience of the universal and objective - which are still communicated to it here from the antecedent - and passing from form to matter, from the ideal to the real.

One will recall having already encountered an analogue of the aesthetic phenomenon in the first epoch (§ 6D): but there it was absolute mediumship. The ego in it was, quite simply, in awe of a transcendent that revealed itself through its expression. There was no conscious determining and producing, but an absolute spontaneity, a pure 'sensation' that immediately transported the ego, which only by and from production drew consciousness of the superior value. Hence the 'genius', the 'inspiration', 'enthusiasm' in art, the idea that in this one is almost caught up in a higher spirit, which expresses itself through us.

Now, albeit under the condition of the further realised value, there is something analogous in the objective categories of the person. In them, in fact, the ego arises, so to speak, from the outside. Although its activity is no longer a passive compulsion, but a free act of a per-self, experience too is determined, as far as its content is concerned, in a direction of receiving itself from something else. And without the preliminary moment whereby the 'I' alienates itself and gives form of reality in itself to nature, rationality and the infinite, the principle of the person could in no way conquer the persuasion of itself as a real principle.

Art, like the new synthesis we are now discussing, in relation to the antecedent provides this point, and rests on a manifestation of the universal in form, indeed such that it carries with it the sense of infinity and springs from the depths of the person; but insofar as it is an interval and properly a category, art is this manifestation so conformed that in its realisation the centre of the universal and thus of the unconditioned, consummates its own

transcendence, to, in the end, take the form of subjectivity instead. Art, that is, here becomes an instrument for the internalisation of 'genius', for the reaffirmation of the ego on that original point of its productivity in , in service of objective formation, it had placed itself as passive and unconscious - a reaffirmation on the non-being love and absolute Empfindung, such as "digesting" the mystical God in the Ego. Its transcendental development is the gradual realisation of this shift, whereby the 'I' recovers from the objective that it has passed through: its conclusion is precisely the pure apprehension of the 'I' as such in infinity or arbitrariness of a power that has now become at the value of absolute, conscious, formally sufficient creation. Resulting as it does from a process of resolution and reduction of art in general to a fact of pure individual will, the category therefore, in relation to what art itself is according to its qualitative concept, could well be said to express a self-consumptive process of art.

When confronted with the value of 'sufficiency', the inner situation from which so-called 'great art' was born cannot but appear as something typically negative. In 'great art', in fact, the artist was as much productive - and productive of forms with objective, universal value - insofar as he abandoned himself to inspiration and intuition, insofar as he allowed himself to be possessed and transported almost by a superior, divine force (Plato's *μανία*, the genius of the ancients and the aesthetics of Kant and Schelling), of which he knew nothing and which in the very moment of creation had him almost as a mere instrument. Since, therefore, in such a situation it was not so much the 'I' that had the art, but rather the art that had the 'I', at the further mediation of the individual consciousness there is, according to logical necessity, a crisis of this category; and from the problem of overcoming this fundamental 'femininity' and 'medianity' of the artist, and therefore of realising an art that, while being such, was positive, individual, arose that determination, to which the present category is appropriate and which, in its ultimate power, can be indicated as pure or abstract art. - The organ of 'abstract art' refers to the principle of so-called 'aesthetic formalism'. Where in the 'great art' the expressive medium was subordinated to an objective and transcendent content, in the new form the focus is instead placed on the expressive medium, against which all content becomes means to an end. In other words: the paradox is realised, according to which form is placed as the content of the work of art. This, of course, not in the sense of mere technicality or virtuosity, but in the sense that form is assumed in a purely harmonic use (in the sense

musical): it, in a certain sense, no longer means anything, since a kind of counterpoint, a pure orchestration of forms and colours, words and images, tones and chords exhausts the work of art. Expression that has as its object pure expression itself, which is not for anything else (impure art), but for itself.

Now the pre-eminence of the content over the expressive medium in classical art can be seen as a reflection of that situation, whereby the artist in himself was nothing and created insofar as he made himself, in his immanence, the passive instrument a universality that expressed itself through him; so that this reversal of the relationship, which erects to self-sufficiency, the pure expressive medium, which makes to be for itself what before, when the artist was but the expressive organ of God, was for something else, comes to testify to the shifting of the centre to the subjective, to celebrate, in the aesthetic sphere, the sufficiency of the immanent principle, the overcoming, of the objective form of the unconditioned - the realisation in an art as individual value.

From another point of view. In customary art, the work revealed and embodied far more than the artist had intended: the artist did not so much determine a priori the situation of beauty that he then expressed, but rather saw it spring up unexpectedly in his work beyond, and often even in spite of, what he had consciously intended - according to a typical efficiency of Wundtian 'heterogenesis of ends'. At the still unformed moment from which the particular creative formation starts, the artist, by and large, is passive; it is a "mystery", not a possession: it is in him almost unconsciously, and yet in him not as in a creator, but in him as in a worker, a doer. There where consciousness (as a personal value) begins to shed its light, it already finds an infinite disproportion between what has been produced and what has been willed. And the more perfect the production is in classical art, the greater this disposition, the more it seems that the personal will makes itself a minimum, sets itself aside or entirely surrenders to the transcendent power, which fertilises it and in it generates infinite - as according to the experience proper to the mystical antecedent. Now, the modern demand for art as an individual value reacted very sharply to such a situation, and - already with Novalis, Schlegel and, to some extent, Wagner - in contrast to the concept of the work of art as genius, it affirmed the concept of the work of art as will. Thus in the schools that were drawn from the organ of the "Aesthetic formalism" also agitated - albeit not always in a sufficiently conscious form - these two demands: to reaffirm the principle of the person as the profound source of aesthetic creativity; and secondly

place and correlatively: to contain the entire work within the will, to reaffirm and determine in the lucid will what gushed forth from the intentional position. The process of immanentization, of the consummation of mediumistic or feminine art into individual or active art, developed in the modern era according to various moments, correlative to the progressive resolution of the principle of the ineffable transcendent proper to the mystical antecedent. These moments range from symbolism to Dadaism analogism, cubism, primitivism, futurism and expressionism, in a logically continuous order. The lineaments of the dialectic of these forms have already been expounded in another work of ours⁴⁸, to which reference is made and from which the present deduction of the concept of pure art has been taken. Here we will only say a word about Dadaism, understood as the τέλος [end] of the interval.

Immanentizing 'genius' ultimately means putting the foundation of aesthetic value back to a wholly self-possessed, yet unconditional will. This is a fundamental point. As long as the person is absent from its centre, values in general present themselves to it as facts, almost as something fatal. This is certainly not because they have a real foundation in things - in the aesthetic order, Kant himself showed that beauty is not to be referred to the object in itself, but to a certain situation of the subjective faculties, which the object reflects - but because the person, in normal life, is crystallised in certain forms, and passive with respect to the faculty of judgement, which is determined almost automatically, as if by following lines of least resistance given by ideal and social habits, culture, environment, etc. - in general: by one's own samskâra. Now it is clear that to the extent that the person ceases to be what he is, and instead reasserts dominion and freedom over all that he is, the situation changes: values will lose that 'aseity', that transcendent and fatal aspect according to they previously appeared, and will become contingent. That is, they will be experienced as plastic and indifferent matter, whose principium individuationis, whose measure, is personal will. Hence, for the person who has raised himself to such a level, the 'Mona Lisa' and a tram ticket can be works art in the same way - any element of common experience can be the cause of a lyrical emotion as intense as the values resonating in the 'great cries of tragic art'. - With this, the essence of Dadaism was exposed. In this school of abstract art technique, a kind of elementary chaos is drawn, in which the ego is transmuted as lability, as the power to animate everything and to deny everything indifferently. In the absolute incoherence, in the unspeakable fluctuation of opposites in the 'grande bouche pleine de miel et d'escrément'⁴⁹, in the 'impossibility of discerning between the various degrees of light' - which the 'dada' manifestations go to

realise, one has aesthetic power in its free state as a formal expression of the person's selfhood, as a mediation of the principle of morality, as an aesthetic reflection of what may be the supreme value ⁵.⁰

If art in the true sense of the word - i.e. that which is made of spontaneity, that which in its essence relies on qualitative value - exhausts its function precisely in the revelation of the halo that transcends the placing of a conscious will, it is clear that the development of the ego must impose a limit on it, beyond which aesthetic consciousness can only continue on condition that it incorporates the negation of its own nature in a certain way. Hence, the opinion of those who, fixed in a traditional order claim against modern art today that it no longer has to do with art, or that art is dead, is entirely understandable. To tell the truth, from Symbolism to Dadaism, we are dealing in an 'irony' of art, with schools that in their innermost essence, albeit to varying degrees, are metartistic or even anti-artistic. However, it is a higher value of self-assertion, of 'morality', that wants this. Compared to the individual, 'great art' is something feminine, something immoral.

Dadaism is a limit: in it, art, in its religious value and, in general, as spontaneous expression in universal form, realises its own negation. ideal or image principle is consumed there and, unleashed, liberated, the Ego finds itself as Ego within the determination of the real. Hence the passing of the category. That dialectic according to which pure art went on to realise itself up to the experience of Dadaism through the progressive resolution of the objective and the spontaneous proper to art, from a further point of view can only appear to be an anticipation in formal imagery, an apparition, within ultimate power of form, of a further process determined by an analogous rhythm of immanentization and reduction to freedom, brought, however, into the order of the powers not of the ideal world, but of the real world. Thus pure art can be said to be the prelude to magic.

§ 21 - INDIVIDUALITY

At the limit pure art, the person realises a sufficiency to that original moment of his act, to which he was previously absent, and thus, by right, attains the level of a true and proper creation. The last interval resolves the elementary religiosity of the form, and places the ego, in the value of freedom and absolute for itself conquered in the experience of the personality, at the centre: in this interval, there appears an energy commanded by the objective formation that overcomes itself and flows into the principle that then frees itself and confirms itself in a self-consuming process of the form.

But here we would have the contradiction that the body of value, that in which it is mediated and realised, is consumed to the same extent that value is affirmed. What in fact results within the previous form, within its concept, is only that the new principle benefits from itself insofar as it remains in a certain way incomplete in its affirmation, due to its inherence to a certain form (that relating to metartistic manifestations), even if it is extremely rarefied and entirely commanded by subjective arbitrariness: but its perfect actuality, the limit of the category, as such, should be conditioned by a definitive negation of the form. Thus it remains that when this negation were to be understood in an abstract and immediate manner, it would at the same point annul the law of the relationship that, until now, remains the unavoidable condition so that the value of the person is not lost; a value that, certainly, should not be abolished, but integrated, strengthened.

To resolve this point, let us reflect on the meaning of aesthetic development: in it, value, in accordance with its own nature, was present as a dynamic principle: it developed a series of formal situations such that in the experience of them, the person is increasingly led to deepen and tear himself away from transcendence. This evidently implies the appearance of a power, from which form is posited as negated, albeit to varying degrees. It follows from this that at the end there is not a simple, mute evaporation of distinction, but rather the point at which the ego no longer simply deepens through the creation of increasingly liberated and rarefied forms, but instead directly takes possession of its own value and now affirms it in a decisive actuality, flashing in the power from which that which can be pure negation of form is placed.

About the meaning of such power. In the first epoch we witnessed the building up of being to its perfection and, thereafter, its passing beyond itself - in the light of reflection or ideality. The formal principle in the second epoch carries out a process parallel to the first, and progressively adapts itself to the various powers of being, which are thus taken up in an ideal mediation. In correlation with the perfection of being, we have the perfection of reflection, the form that has completely resolved the 'other' and made itself entirely sufficient to itself. But just as the perfection of being implies its passing beyond itself, so too will the perfection of reflection, which is its correlative in the formal order. It is that such perfection is the absolute self-consciousness of form. But what else can it be, if not the form that realises the abstract and dependent nature of itself as such, of its negativity, and distinguishes and recognises a real principle, of which it is precisely the form or reflection? This, the sense of the act, within which the previous category can be terminated. We have an absolute distinction, which, to tell the truth, is the same distinction with which the second epoch opened; experienced, however, no longer factually, but positively, as the act of the person, so that it coincides with the promotion of the person to the order of the real powers.

We determine the new experience, to which one is thus led. On the one hand, due to the presupposed sufficiency of the form, the 'other' is excluded: everything that in the period of the person's mediation seemed to be for itself is known as a phenomenon, as a purely ideal and dependent existence projected by the person. But insofar as this formal sufficiency is also connected to an unravelling of the person from itself, the phenomenon is placed as such, that is, connected to something that transcends it, that is its negation. And the act in which the progressive posing of the Ego consummating the form culminates, therefore, coincides with that wave beyond the now self-conscious reflection of itself as such and exhausted in a completed system, the antithesis of a 'being' is born again: a being - by which is meant which, in itself, is the negation of the nature of the image, and which this, as formal freedom, opposes - is the inseparable correlative of the position of that point, whereby the absolute liberation and contestation of the principle of the person - the term of the previous category - is made possible. Now that such a being should not be thought of as a 'thing in itself' at this point, this proceeds immediately from the fact that such a point hierarchically implies the perfection of formal mediation, which has always exorcised such phantasms: because of what it has achieved in the previous categories, the 'I' now remains alone with itself in the entire sphere of the universe, according to a circle that can no longer be broken.

Being must therefore be found within this circle: it must therefore be that which in form the ego can place as negation of form. But the character of form is pure freedom; it follows that that which in absolute reflection, in its extreme possession, the person opposes, is necessity. But thus the question is not yet resolved. For how can there be necessity in the form, which is now all a 'construction', if the ego is now only reconciled with itself? Necessity cannot therefore refer to the form insofar as it is such, that is, insofar as it is essence; but to the form insofar as it is something else, that is, the essence of an existence. Here, then, is the result: beyond the essential order, now resolved in the 'I' by the free formal mediation (second epoch), the order of existence in brute factuality is opposed to the 'I'. The being, or non-being, to which every form passes when it is consummated in absolute mediation, when it reaches perfect self-consciousness, is the form itself, however, no longer assumed as a function of the peripheral freedom of the ideal ego's reflection, but instead as the sign of a profound necessity, of the deprivation of the free ego with respect to the order of the real powers, which only now, in the light of the new value, at the end of the entire formal system, is stripped bare and bursts out against it. Such is the term sought.

Having sunk down to the root of its own substance, the person thus resurrects its original antithesis; which now acquires an entirely new meaning, a direction opposite to the primitive one. The antithetical being or non-being is here aroused by the overcoming of the ego as a formal principle, by its fruition in the consciousness of power pretending to the universal and the objective, while at the same time the value proper to the personality is held firm. Whereas at the beginning of the epoch, the surpassed was being, and the surpassing, that on which the Ego's emphasis shifted, was form, here, vice versa, the surpassed is form, the surpassing is the point of being.

Observing, however, this: that the form made deprivation by the second distinction is that in which what in the first distinction was being has become without residue; and the new principle of real power, which is the surpassing, the Ego, is that which in the first distinction was form, reflection then elevated, through the second epoch, to the level of an absolute being-from-self. The emphasis of the Ego has thus shifted from one term to the other; and, with it, what will be called reality.

Another distinctive character. According to the moment of the consequent, the ego knows of itself as of an autonomous creativity; from this point the distinctive act is thus experienced, so that the antithesis is no longer in a simple appearance as, the immediacy of value, it must have been at beginning, and to a certain extent also within, the epoch. Instead, it is now within the form

of the subjective unconditioned. The person is now sufficient to it - which means: it is sufficient to itself, to its own substance.

By which it ceases to be a person, and passes into individuality. Individuality expresses the state of the person in that it is no longer the relationship that defines it, but instead dominates it and places it according to absolute freedom, so that it has the first experience the point of a no longer simply existing, but mediated, positive *causa sui*. Such is the category, from which the ideal term of aesthetic consciousness is made possible.

This act converts the order of form into that of a necessity and a deprivation, generating an opposition and a detachment of the 'I' within the very body of its own reality. For on the one hand, the 'other' is entirely resolved in the form, so that the ego, albeit in the entirely subjective order of essence, knows itself as the absolute principle of everything in which it lives its life.

On the other hand, this absolute consciousness implies a further distinction, and yet it leads to the higher point of freedom as real power, in relation to which it becomes non-being, privation, necessity, everything that, according to its time, as form or ideality, was being, life, freedom. A principle of real insufficiency is thus reaffirmed within the closed order of ideal sufficiency; a new world tears itself away from the ego and resists it, and it finds itself in naked affirmation, deprived of all support, in the midst of a nature that is utterly foreign and other to it, even though it is recognised by it, by virtue of the mediation that this very affirmation presupposes, as nothing other than itself, as its body, as its own substance and condition.

It should be noted that while the simple personality (§ 11) had experience as a pure datum, it did not, however, appear with the decisive character of a negation of the ego, but rather as something with which the ego itself was immediately connected, and at which it lived confidently in developing its ideality.

Similarly, in later forms, the ego continues, albeit in various complications and to varying degrees, to rely on the matter of the distinct, from which it even receives the persuasion of its own assertions. Only when the objective experience has taken place entirely, and the person is suggested by discursiveness the consciousness autonomy, does clear separation and antithesis arise, and what was "given" and simple "other", becomes the mortal non-being and enemy to the ego. Being, when the person was the non-being of a simple ideality, nature becomes non-being with respect to the person conquered in the value of sufficiency to a real principle. But this birth of the antithetical is not violence: such was not

to the personality, because it lacked the term, in relation to which it could be so; such it is not to the individual, for this is now absolute reflection, and he sees the darkness transparent with light: he has the consciousness that it only becomes from a freedom that tears itself away from its own substance and repudiates what in its formal powers it has constructed; he takes the responsibility for his act entirely upon himself and does not want to put the burden on anyone. He is thus sufficient to the privation - born of him, caused by his own, supernatural worth as an individual, he now takes it on with joy and recognises in it the matter from which alone he can derive absolute life and reality. A vain glow lost in the tenebrous and boundless desert of necessity and deprivation, the individual therefore knows that in that light is the reason and condition of such an order, the act, the *τελος* to which everything else, as mute power, hangs.

The determination of the category is thus connected to the point at which the immanent centre carried by the person passes beyond the formal, dependent consciousness, and arrives at the threshold of the order of real powers; and to the consequent antinomy of an 'I' that ascribes value to itself, absolute being by right, and denies it to everything else - but which, on the other hand, in its reference to power, is still only a non-being, is still only a task, a *Sollen* with respect to the infinite passion of the world, to the privation to which it is connected, almost as if to a paralysed body of its own.

To put it in Michelstaedter's terms, the present point is where the ego, having assumed the person of its own deficiency, consists as 'persuasion'. On this, we have already said extensively in the last section of the first book⁵¹. Suffice it to recall the fundamental principle, expounded there, that from the privation he ascertains in himself, the person cannot infer the reality of another, filling with an ideal act of pseudo-recognition that emptiness which instead calls for a real, magical act, of which he is afraid. And hold firmly to the relativity of the concept of deprivation: a given element is never deprivation in itself, but always in relation to the value of selfhood. The transition to such a value makes what was positive as a formal construction, something negative and 'in potency' with respect to the further point; just as only the transition to the value of person makes what was subjective as spontaneity something objective, the 'other' of nature with respect to reflection. Therefore to those who do not want to pass from the logical point of view to that of the will to power, the concept of deprivation will not be intelligible - but then you have the order of abstract ideality as the last instance. Indeed, he who believes

to 'surpassmagical Idealism by not stopping at the negative concept deprivation with which it explains every necessity, but by explaining this with a distinct reality, instead of taking a step forward, it takes a step backwards, since it makes use of the category of causality, with which this same supposed reality becomes conditioned, logically posited by the formal ego. And the circle closes again, and, indeed, to the experience mentioned in § 18. Instead, it goes further by absolute positivism. What is the difference - we have said - between a real thing and an imagined thing? Represented, they are both equally so, and from the logical or essential point of view, there are no notes in the one that the other does not have. But beyond this, the representational activity to which the real thing corresponds is an activity with respect to which I am impotent⁵³. That is all. There are things about which I and others about which I cannot. The so-called real things are symbols of this non-power of mine, of this privation of mine. It is because I experience privation that I call a thing real, and not vice versa. Deprivation explains the concept of an objective reality, not objective reality the concept of deprivation - and to refer to another in order to make one understand how deprivation is possible is a pure vicious circle. If one does not understand this point, which we thought it useful to expound again, one remains at the level of the person and, in particular: in abstract idealism. Spontaneity, in itself (in the first epoch), is an act; with respect to the person it becomes 'potency', whose act is ideality, representation (second epoch); with respect to the individual, ideality, representation or essence, in turn becomes 'potency', whose act is the real, objective - magical - affirmation of the individual. (Remember: these moments do not coexist, but are in a transformative continuity; there does not remain, for example, a residue of spontaneity to the image - a thing in itself - but that activity that was cosmic spontaneity is all transformed into representative activity, into ideality, and so for the rest).

Now, it is important to distinguish the character of the determinations that are hierarchically posterior individuality and which, let us say straight away, are related to the esoteric-magical sciences as a whole, from that proper to various determinations that are only formally objective, and yet remain within the mediating range of the principle of the person. Nothing is more common than the confusion of these orders, which can be traced to two causes. First of all, to an inadequate penetration, as a function of the principle of individual, of the value inherent in the intimate spiritual attitude from which categories such as philosophy, art, etc. spring; hence the paralogism, whereby freedom, which is only productive insofar as it lives formally - and yet insofar as it remains imbued with a moment of necessity and otherness - is mistaken for the full and powerful freedom relative to the value of individual. Such a misunderstanding has possibilities only in the sphere of

Theoretical, v.d. as long as the individual of which one speaks remains a mere idea; for when, on the other hand, one passes from saying to doing, it immediately becomes apparent what antitheses must be overcome in order that any activity may be objective while retaining the value it has acquired. Hence, when a system is based on such a misunderstanding, its value is not that which it believes itself to have, but that of philosophical consciousness in general, of which it is but a particular adaptation; and it remains to wait until freedom decides, if it believes, to go further in its experience, until, having truly reached the individual, it comes to realise what the true meaning of the objective act is.

But such confusion can also occur at an actual communication with the individual according to the immediacy proper to the mere end of the person's epoch; and then it is connected to the moment of a fantasising deficiency: that is to say, value can flee before the real antithesis, instead of understanding itself as a task, as a τέλος, whose reality defers to the resolution and dominion of that 'being' and of that necessity, which does not oppose it and does not separate itself from it except by the light of the individual itself; it can feign to itself a sufficiency vibrating in a purely formal creativity, that is to say, by incestuously exploiting its own mediation. Such a situation must be asked for the meaning of the criticism made earlier of discursive sufficiency, of the exhibition of it as piétiner sur place [pawing on the spot] leaving the fundamental and real antithesis intact. Here, then, activity is rejected to hierarchically prior forms that therefore cannot be adapted to the individual, but only to the person; to the individual, only on the condition of conceding reason to the irrational, of admitting violence, alteration, rhetoric.

What proceeds from this for philosophy, thus elevated to a real affirmation of the immanent principle, we have already seen sufficiently in the first book: an irrational untamed bursts forth, in its system, an 'I' risen to self-consciousness goes on to ask itself the absolute reason for the various determinations. And this irrational is only discursively reducible on condition that the 'rational' is made increasingly irrational. - There is no need to make any particular remarks about science, as it has, by and large, remained outside the rhetorical movement of deficiency, of which it is now the word. Even in the boldest philosophies of science, such as Weber's for example, emphasis is correctly placed on 'Knowledge' and not on the 'I'. Rather, the distrust invests technique, applied science - praxeology - insofar as it fantasises the dignity of a state of power. This has already been

Mentioned in the following remarks is the category of compulsion. The power to which man can attain through technical applications of scientific knowledge is in no way power - if one understands command in this term: direct domination according to autarchy. It is rather a recognition of powerlessness, an alienation of subjective persuasion - which, of course, itself corresponds to a value, constructed in its place, but not the value, which we now need.

Indeed, in praxeology what comes first is knowledge; action succeeds only on condition that it conforms to recognised and presupposed objective laws. Secondly, and in connection, the act is not simple: it does not draw from itself, nor does it dominate, all those intermediaries that lead it to success: instead, it has them as things that transcend its power, and which it goes to use and combine extrinsically. Its efficacy thus rests *sur una cambial* - on the principle of constancy of the realm of the 'other', a principle that is a pure datum of faith: its sufficiency is an empty name. In such an order, the positive centre falls instead to scientific activity, from which nature becomes nature in its laws. Praxeology or technology, on the other hand, have the life of the parasite, they are the theft that makes a value of itself, and in no way can they agree with that activity in which the individual proceeds in an objective affirmation; activity, which is an unconditional domination, without recognising laws but imposing them, without asking anything but itself in pure power for the success of the act. - Instead, it will be more appropriate to stop consideration on the relationship of this activity with religion and art.

If one places the organ of religion in faith and wants to see in it the locus of the objective affirmation of the individual, it must indeed be said that the basis of such faith is a lack of faith. When, in the face of the distance separating reality from value, one is not so persuaded and steadfast in this that one can think of informing reality in spite of everything, and yet one feels that only through such a reaffirmation is it possible to concretely enjoy oneself at the point of the individual - then faith arises with its postulates. Value is no longer recognised as , in such a hierarchical place, it is: a requirement, a purpose, a task for real activity; but is instead immediately transformed into an existence - into an existence, however, which, simply thought, is not an existence, but the concept, the supposition of an existence. Hence the God of faith; hence its formation of the various attributes that are the projected abstract hypostases of powerless desire, i.e. of the various determinations that value as a task can assume with respect to its own antithesis. Therefore, insofar as desire, in grazing itself, in such abstractions, on its own deficiency, also holds the value of the individual, it finds

always against itself the antithesis; and so it is that the God, the being created by faith, projects itself beyond the ego, that it becomes another. The formal, rhetorical character of the realisation, and the note of transcendence that is connected to the object of this, are two points of solidarity, proceeding from the very concept of the religious phenomenon in general, as a coming to terms with the act, as *de-linquare*.

More decisively. The fact religion simply expresses the existence of a *conatus* to deification⁵⁴. Let us add, on the other hand, from this point of view, that there is no life of a person that not even for an instant is not, in its deepest root, religious, since, if it were not, it would be detached from the transcendental condition, from the *τελος* of the individual, for, in this order, every existing is. In every human desire or need, in every act, only God⁵⁵ is desired and affirmed. However, this religiousness is a myth, the meaning of which must be penetrated, the need laid bare, and a real satisfaction given to it. And so an ideal history of religiosity can be conceived, to be borrowed with the development in which the unconscious divine desire gradually takes conscious and adequate form. The perverted moment of religion, on the other hand, is where the reality of the desire for a reality is exchanged for the reality of what is the object of this desire itself. For it, the verb, immediately, becomes flesh: the bad thing is that here the verb is pure discourse, hence the *theo-gono* is imagination, not real power; so that religion, as Feuerbach⁵⁶ noted, is arranged at the very level of aesthetic creativity culminating not in divine existence, but in the mere thought that God exists, as something else. Hypostasis of the differential between the essence of the individual and its mediated existence, the transcendent God is therefore only true as antithesis and negative moment to be consumed in the immanent principle, as fuel that resolves everything in giving life to the flame of a divinifying activity. Such is the deeper meaning of the mystical meal of the flesh and blood of God: God must be killed in the ego, to become its absolute life. It is, on the other hand, false, the God, when, assumed as something that already is, it arrests the individual, takes away all meaning from his activity, drains him of the task of creating him, of making himself God⁵⁷.

Empirically, such a position arises from the antithesis between man and nature, nature being the most immediate and sensitive symbol of deprivation: God is positivity assumed in what is felt as its own negation by an ego, which does not yet dare to attribute to itself the task of realising it, or has failed at such a task and creates a superstitious compromise, at the belief that, through the mediation of the recognised God, solicited through prayer, sacrifice, ritual, it can reaffirm its sufficiency over the negative, over the

nature ⁵⁸. Such a situation has not only been confirmed by the science of primitive cultures (Moore, Frazer, etc.) in which the gods seem to succeed magic, but is also found in apparently higher forms - for example in the doctrine of grace and the mediation of Christ and the "Saviours" in general ("without me you can do nothing"), obvious products of times relaxation and moral lassitude. With this, on the other hand, one is brought back to the category of co-action, and so, again, is the disconnect of the phenomenon in question to the point of individuality.

And, let's it: is it by a different line of reasoning that Kant derives religion from the doctrine of the primacy of practical reason? Does this 'primacy' perhaps say something other than the optimism of an ignorant will, of a will that is not such, but mere wishful thinking, and by alienating the body of that concreteness in which the act of its real wanting would be expressed, it remits it to another, to whom it thus gives the task of wanting for it? Since Kant's reasoning is this: the moral imperative exists, with objective certainty: but since man by himself would not be able to realise it in the natural order, just as this imperative is certain, so too is the existence of a principle (God, the supernatural order) through the mediation of which the antithesis is resolved - that is: be illusory, be not. must, therefore you can; I cannot - there is something else, in which you can. But who does not see that the whole force of the argument gravitates on the dogmatic-optimistic assumption, that unity, rationality, providence, and not contradiction and tension is the law currently existing in things? I.e. on a vicious circle? ⁵⁹.

Insufficiency, cowardice, the state of an individual whose being is hunger for being, who in order to be needs others to be - such then is the psychogenetics of the religious phenomenon in dualistic-devotional forms, such as the Christian. This need creates *αργος*, the foolish sophism of optimism, that is, the belief that what is necessary to us, for the mere fact that it is necessary to us, is - be, and he will take care of our deprivation, be, and so we can abandon ourselves, and so we can avoid imposing ourselves, wanting. As if hunger could not remain hunger, craving craves, eternally unsatisfied, eternally consumed by its immanent privation - craving without any object! Faced with this vision, which a Buddha, a Nietzsche, a Michelstaedter knew how to keep their gaze fixed on, and reaffirm themselves in tragic splendour, the Christian, on the other hand, shudderingly withdraws - and believes: he believes, and here the anguish is resolved, he is reassured, here the mirage of God, of the Saviour, of Grace arises - 'bright spots to help the offended eye for having stared into horrible darkness'.

In conclusion: the God generated by desire is as real as this desire itself is capable of producing the reality of its object. The existence of God is witnessed in proportion to the degree to which the will towards God, the Wille zur Gottheit, having become aware of itself, is capable of actually realising itself.

The only 'proof' of God is therefore: to make oneself God (αποθεωθηναι= deificatio) - a purely technical problem, beyond the dull projections and fine words that sentiment and devotion in hope and terror juxtapose to an inert humanity: God as an act and state of the individual. - Nor can the demand to admit the transcendent God in a pragmatic way be accepted, that is, in the name of utility, which can proceed from the belief that it is, in order to certain realisations; because if realisation is necessary to value, a realisation to which its value or meaning is not immanent according to actuality, is nothing - what matters is not the doing in itself, but the value that this doing incorporates and of which it is an expressive means. Nor can we tolerate the phenomenon of transcendence as a provisional moment: did not such a moment take place throughout the second epoch? But the problem, which is now in question, is now beyond this epoch itself, and yet, if it is to be resolved, no such compromise is no longer possible: all development must instead be entirely dominated by the self-consciousness of an ego that feels itself the centre and condition of everything.

Thus the individual will no longer ask anything but himself for his assurance and concreteness; he will consider that even if there were a God, he would not know what to do with him, because whatever he could achieve not merely by his own power, he would in fact not have achieved at all and would have achieved not by essence, but by accident, contingently. Persuasion and power by any other path conquered, than by that of his own unique, sufficient initiative, would not be his persuasion and his concreteness and, in the material semblance of a fulfilled life, would instead give him the curse of an absolute, internal death because they would crush him in his possibility of being from himself, in his possibility of being as value. So: this must be known by him who wants to pass beyond the human state existence: that he is alone. Alone with his infinite deficiency and his will - and nothing to ask for, nothing to defer to, nothing to hope for; nothing that is due to him, nothing that is already given to him - immortality, bliss, survival. The spirit is mortal. The innumerable contingencies of existence are not illusions, they engage my deepest substance, they are the only thing that is real, and this - mine - is the state to which 'God' himself has now been reduced! Here, then, is the dilemma of despair: either to crash, to disappear - or to impose oneself, to become creator,

standing up in the middle of this desert to draw from it an absolute being, a glory. The world is left to itself, it is free. Absolute, supersensible, there is no more, than insofar as the Ego creates itself there; celestial kingdom, υπερκοσμία there no more, than insofar as he can make the terrestrial world become such; spirit, than insofar as he can make the flesh become such, from itself. And yet the 'ought-to-be', which the individual can experience in himself, but which does not burst forth in power of overwhelming dominion over the non-being of brute existence - is nothingness, is error, is illusion.

An art that reflects on itself can be said to be a religion that becomes aware of its own nature and that of its objects. For while art, especially in its most modern manifestations, is originality and subjective creation, the fact remains that these values in it restrict their efficiency to the purely ideal sphere: art is fantastic creativity; it stops at the limit of the objective; the 'nature' of its agitation in no remains untouched. To the task, to the individual, the world art thus appears only as the phantasmagoria in which an impotent magician can console himself, as a realm of shadows (shadows not of things, as Plato thought, but of the form or mode of a creation of things)⁶⁰; and the sufficiency that can be presumed in a reference to this world in no way reaches the concrete substance of the individual, which can only be conquered by actually biting and shaking real, by making poetic activity what, according to the derivation of the term, it is: ποιησις action, from ποιεῖν [to make]) and, to tell the truth, objective, cosmic action, embodying a meaning and a power no longer in organisms of words, signs or sounds, but in real, animated and dominated forms, in which the entire system of those physical, external determinations, which instead are presupposed by the poet in the strict sense, which limit and transcend him, goes to resolve itself, as plastic matter torn from its elementary necessity and rigidity. Art is thus merely propaedeutic to individual life: just as religion is the abstract, static - we might say: Apollonian - apprehension of the objects of deep conation in mythical-fantastic form, so art is the ideal itself, which is experienced, in the formal sphere, in the opposite Dionysian, dynamic aspect of this creative fantasy of hypostasis. It is therefore perversion in the same conjunction in which religion is also such: that is, when it goes to constitute the formal reaction with which an individual thinks to resolve the antithesis that is in his own concept and to which, instead, no formal activity can ever again be adequate. In that case, art is absolutely mimesis, parody, a shadow of being on non-being, an image not of the 'other', but of the very substance of the ego (of the absolute act), which ego cannot live except in the mere shadow anticipated by the fantasy,

creating myths makes itself myth.

The real problem is therefore this: to understand that what matters now is only the real, concrete, denuded relationship of self with things and beings; a relationship that for men is the extrinsic and contingent one proper to the physical state of existence to the space-time categories that govern it. Of such a state, what men call 'spiritual' is but a mere outline and accessory, and with all the values and non-values of its categories, logical, cardiac, moral, devotional, etc., it does not take one step beyond it, it does not transform into anything what metaphysically, in the order of an absolute concreteness, the Ego is as man, as person. Because the greatest 'genius' or man of action as well as the last bumpkin are in equal measure slaves, in their 'spirituality', to an accident that affects their physical being. Whoever wants to call himself an individual must have the strength to understand this, to take all that one is, thinks and feels, put it aside, say: 'Enough, and go forward. To go forward in a radical and inner transformation of the relationship according to which one is with things and with oneself.

According to the category, which closes the first epoch, the emphasis of the ego fell on the ideal aspect of a correlativity of which the other term - real, physical - remained placed as non-placed, its function obscured or even submerged in the subconscious. The further mediation of the person along the second epoch does not essentially change the situation: it is a development to which the objective always remains a distinct, a transcendent.

For an action beyond the category of the individual, on the other hand, it is question of an entirely different attitude: by overturning the relationship proper to personal consciousness, by dying to psychological subjectivity, the Ego will displace the self-conscious principle within that which objectively corresponds to the image, it will assume it, it will identify with it, and thus it will act from there, in the function of dominion, in the construction of interior superiority. Only that which becomes by virtue of such an affirmation beyond the original factual, spontaneous or automatic functions, is the real body of the individual beyond the mere principle of it; it is absolute being, life that possesses itself, autarchy. No longer persuading oneself as a function of (receiving oneself from) things, but persuading oneself by persuading things, taking oneself back from them, realising in being, in the assumption according to power, the non-being that as 'others' represent me.

Such is the meaning of the already postulated 'objectivity as subjectivity', of what with

Novalis called himself 'active empiricism'. To think of dominating nature from outside, i.e. from the image and the ego, is an illusion that is at the same time a contradiction in terms. Instead, one must descend into the very heart of the objective and from there act, command, liberate.

A distant reflection of this can be seen in the hypnotic and mediumistic states: a lowering of the ego, a submerging of the 'higher psychism' in the dark power of the so-called 'subliminal ego' is what brings about powers that far transcend what the normal waking ego is capable of. The ego, restricted, as a person, to rational functions, is almost the periphery of itself, and finds in the 'subliminal' powers of action and knowledge of a higher order⁶¹. In the development beyond the second epoch, there will be a similar 'lowering', but a conscious, active one: the person, if in its substance, not in its principle and value, will remain dissolved: it will consist at the pass, it will be not what is surpassed, but what surpasses, it will reassert itself within its negation according to a higher principle that will not dissolve into the objective and the universal in qualitative regression, but instead will reduce it to itself, in dominative progression. However, if the person does not renounce the world of the particular, of desire, of action, of the form that can feign to itself a sufficiency insofar as it has not yet perfectly realised the consciousness of its own nature, the path of the absolute individual is precluded to it, v.d. its freedom does not really want itself as individual. As Michelstaedter would say, the ego as a person cannot but obey, because it has already obeyed: it cannot fantasise a power according to desire, science or devotion, since these determinations already by their very possibility presuppose an impotence, an elementary, essential dependence. A radical catharsis can thus be glimpsed as propaedeutic to the higher forms of affirmation; a catharsis that, to tell the truth, has nothing moralistic or sentimental about it, and, again, instead of abolishing or limiting freedom, leads it to realise itself integrally, to extend itself and possess itself on the deepest level of things.

Let it therefore remain firm that in relation to this plane, everything that is called good and evil, pure and impure, material and spiritual, superior and inferior, etc., by men no longer has any meaning. All this appears as parasitic, pale, insubstantial flora, external to being, which the point of being devours like fragile fescues. Whoever turns towards magical self-realisation must completely sweep away the whole world of feelings, values, 'humanity' and 'spirituality': this had a *raison d'être* before - now, no more. Now it is a matter of a realm of naked powers that have no

attributes, which are only themselves, in the pure nature of lightning and flashing. Terms, as lightning, dizzyingly pure, can, themselves, only give a distant suggestion of it. Nietzsche touched on this when, in a youthful fragment, he wrote: "How beautiful, how pure are these free forces of nature, not yet tainted with spirit!" (Spirit: i.e. the whole world of feelings, of the 'human', of the moral, of the psychological).

Only now it is not 'not yet stained', but 'now purified by the spirit'. Through the 'spirit' they have passed and become distilled. The 'I' will now appear to you no longer as a force cast among other forces, but as an extranatural ruler and lord - superior to them all.

§ 22 - SUMMARY

The 'I', tearing itself from the body of an objective affirmation that has now developed the point of complete mediation, at the end of the first epoch appeared to itself as the transparency ideality from which an ex-existence, a given exteriority, dissolves. On the other hand, this only happens insofar as the experience of the value of absolute freedom is realised. Opposed to this value, precisely at the formal moment of the category, is the nature of 'given' proper to the category's matter. Hence the simple personal consciousness already contains an antithesis; the categories of the second epoch proceed from this in the sense of a reflection of what, as a formal value, in the simple person still lived immediately. Thus in the first self-consciousness as a categorical principle, the person reasserts itself on the datum of the image and draws from it a finite experience according to the theme of arbitrary agility. As a consequence of such a movement, the ego experiences a being that is also connected to a non-being, and this experience of it stimulates a reflexive assumption of precisely that freedom which, according to immediacy, has now proceeded in the material sphere. This happens with eruption of a world of action from the spell of freedom immersed in its new affirmation. But for the fact that a transcendent is immanent to the action - because it already in the intimate sense of its carrying beyond itself the pure contemplating ideality turns, and in this gives life, to another, of which it becomes consciousness formed by the heterogenesis of the end, with the resisting or fertilising heterothetic power in multiple repercussions of the initial affirmations - the person is brought to an awareness of freedom no longer as a direct affirmation, but as a unity of the affirmed real and the excluded compossible, as an affirmation that in its own finiteness in a certain way also grasps the sense of virtual infinity and agility that permeates it. The ego that seeks to understand this freedom proceeds in forms in which it tends to reduce 'other', to experience the identical, the indifference of the compossible. At first, it is desire. But the "other" eternally eludes desire: for its negation by the satisfaction of desire, being immediate, only succeeds in confirming the deprivation of the particular affirmation of which in truth the "other" is merely the symbol. Reduction is real, rather, in the form in which the transcendent is in a certain way liberated, which happens first through the compromise of coercion and exploitation; but since here the "aseity" of the "other" depends on the relation to the ego that evokes it, the successful

of the instance is rather where the reality of the other is connected to the possibility of its own autonomy - in love. However, this gives rise to a new difference, a new task; the other is to be recognised not only in the naturalness of a

"son", but also as a free possibility, since it is precisely in the awareness of such a point that the anterior movement, from desire to love, has gone on to determine the central principle, i.e. the ego of the person. The task of identification thus elevates the 'other' into such a form that the person cannot internalise it and adapt it to himself - and in this perfectly fulfil the reflection on his own principle - if he does not accept it in his own intimate substance, in his pure principle of self-determination. When it does so, it is morality. Morality is thus the form in which the element essence (not that of existence, which is not a question for the whole epoch) - of the given or of the content - is understood and resolved in a conscious activity of the formal ego. Beyond this element is the assumption of various powers, so that such an 'I' arrives at an entire sufficiency to the original duality. This implies that he experiences himself in objective activity: but the person, being only subjective ideality, can only experience himself in this way insofar as he alienates his own activity.

That is to say: the person here can only find self-persuasion insofar as he receives himself from his own substance, which he projects and externises into a 'nature': in the form of which he goes on to perform those same moments that formed his mere subjective consciousness Z.⁶

Thus, at first, it is science of nature. But the science of nature is fulfilled - then the world of objective formations, the world of mathematised observation, is countered by the power of science itself, which presupposes the given world and whose symbol, formed at the moment of alienation, it learns precisely in the experience of the contingent, eternally reborn against the arrangements due to the character of the immediate, abstract position according to which these are realised in said science. Such a contraposition appears in all its energy at history and proposes the task of a new power of alienation to which the 'I' adapts itself by placing itself according to the category of philosophy: in philosophy the 'other' takes into itself its own mediation or knowledge, immerses itself, then, in the very act of the subject. But, once again, the unity of freedom and necessity, of ideality and reality, which is proper to the philosophical category, is dominated by the principle of the unconditioned: contingent and other with respect to the formed thought, obscure power of life of which logic and truth are only phenomena, it represents the moment of pure subjectivity which, with respect to the subjectivity that is now objectively experienced, is like a transcendent, which is only justified in reaffirming

on it, in mystical praxis, the principle of alienation. Then the whole substance of the person, as articulated in the moments of the first categories, is given in objective form. In this, the 'other' is, at one and the same time, brought to its crisis: in mysticism, it has, in fact, become absolute freedom and this, at the limit of its manifestation, goes as far as to repel ego to itself, goes as far as to restore its autonomy with, in addition, self-awareness as objectivity. This movement of the return of the ego determinately fulfilled with pure art, in which the objective form, i.e. the determination proper to the exteriority of personal consciousness, has its development conditioned to its own consummation until the positive principle of a central creativity coincides with the conscious will of the ego, in which a 'genius' and an absence previously dominated. The limit art is thus also that of the person's objective apprenticeship, beyond which the act is affirmed in which its original law becomes a mediation, a transparent freedom. That is to say: beyond the unfolding whereby formal freedom, by 'constructing' it, understands the other as nothing other than its own substance (positive moment), an experience in which this same substance is distinguished, that is to say, is posited, with respect to the now entirely mediated form, as a non-being; and which therefore realises the distinct no longer according essence, but according existence - according to its το οτι [the quod], or Dasein [being]. Such is the act creating the principle of individuality - of a person, that is, who is wholly lady of the substance of self as such, who has redeemed in selfhood and pinned to the value of the unconditioned that distinctive law with which, at the beginning of the epoch, he coincided according to spontaneity and immediacy.

¹ He was the Austrian scientist and philosopher Ernst Mach (1838-1916), a professor of physics in Prague and later of the history and theory of inductive sciences in Vienna. He theorised a radical empiricism that goes by the name of 'phenomenalism': scientific concepts and theories do not reflect the nature of things, but are merely tools for organising acquired data.

Z É. Boutroux, De la contingence des lois de la nature, Paris 1921, p. 160:
"Mais cette spontanéité libre, éprise en quelque sorte de ses actes, comme si, d'abord, ils réalisaient l'idéal, se laisse déterminer par eux et se transforme en habitude. Cette métamorphose est oeuvre de l'entendement métaphysique ou instinct d'immuitabilité qui, les yeux fixés sur l'essence immuable de Dieu, prête

la forme de l'absolu à la face des actions humaines qui regarde l'idéal divin. Cette halte serait légitime, s'il arrivait que les oeuvres de la spontanéité humaine présentassent jamais toute la perfection qu'elles comportent, si l'idéal humain était jamais réalisé. Mais la spontanéité libre, dans les conditions du monde actuel, ne peut que s'en approcher de plus en plus. Elle n'est jamais au bout de sa tâche" [But this free spontaneity, having somehow fallen in love with its acts, as if, at first, they realised the ideal, allows itself to be determined by them and turns into habit. This metamorphosis is the work of the metaphysical intellect or instinct of immutability which, having fixed its eyes on the immutable essence God, attributes the form of the absolute to the aspect of human actions that refers to the divine ideal. This would be a legitimate step, if it were the case that the works of human spontaneity would never show all the perfection they entail, if the human ideal were never realised. But free spontaneity, in the conditions of today's world, can only get closer and closer. It never reaches the end of its task].

3 Positive science is the person's effort to conceive himself, while remaining within the formal sphere, as the very power that governs the objective, nature. Self-persuasion here appears in the form of the objectivity of the laws determined in science, it is realised in the 'success' of intellectual procedures - in the moment of 'objective deduction' (in the Kantian sense) it now has its act.

⁴ This is an observation made by various authors. Here we may quote for example the words of Windelband (Geschichte der Philosophie⁹, p. IV, chap. II, 2) in relation to Bacon: 'The golden fruits of science ripen only when they are not utilitarianly sought....The spiritual creations that have enabled the science of nature to build the foundation of our modern civilisation derive ... from those thinkers who, animated by the pure desire to understand, and without proposing to transform the world, understood order and harmony of that nature which they admired.

⁵ French mathematician and engineer, Jean Victor Poncelet (1788-1867) published

in 1822 his *Traité des propriétés des figures* that places him among the founders of projective geometry, intuiting the 'principle of duality' whereby theorems are presented in identical pairs in structure.

⁶The Swiss geologist Émile Argand (1879-1940) in *La tectonique de l'Asie* (1924) expounded his mobilist tectono-genetic theory of strata.

⁷ Considered to be one of the greatest analysts of the 19th century, the German Karl Theodor Wilhelm Weierstrass (1815-1897) imposed a new rigour on mathematical analysis in particular with his works with a view to its 'arithmetisation'. His name is linked to numerous entities and theorems.

⁸ Russell is Bertrand Russell (1872-1970), English mathematician, philosopher and politician who opposed all metaphysics in the name of logical empiricism. Peano is Giuseppe Peano (1858-1932), the famous Italian mathematician and logician to whom we owe the well-known 'Peano axioms' on basic mathematical notions.

(9) On the theories of the Russian Nicolai Lobatschewsky (1793-1856) and the German Georg Riemann (1826-1866),

⁹On the theories of the Russian Nicolai Lobatschewsky (1793-1856) and the German Georg Riemann (1826-1866), see J. Evola, *Essays on Magical Idealism* (1925), Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 2006, pp. 334-7 (ed.).

¹⁰Born in Turin to a family of French origin, Joseph Louis de Lagrange (1736-1813) owes his fame to *Mécanique analytique* (1788) and *Théorie des fonctions analytiques* (1797). His name is linked to equations, functions, methods.

¹¹ The name of French mathematician Louis Poincaré (1859-1942) is linked to the study of the motion of solids considered to be undeformable and the geometric interpretation of their rotation.

¹² English physicist and engineer, Alexander Oliver Rankine (1869-1926), also devised an apparatus for measuring the viscosity of gases (1910-1926) that was named after him.

¹³ Claus Hugo Hermann Weyl (1885-1955), German mathematical physicist, applied Einstein's General Relativity to geometry and published a fundamental *Reine Infinitesimal geometrie* in 1918. He also extended Riemann's mathematical concepts.

¹⁴ Astronomer, physicist and astrophysicist, the Englishman Arthur Eddington (1882-1944) was, with his observations confirming them, one of the greatest popularizers of Einstein's theories. He applied General Relativity to the study of the universe considered as a whole.

¹⁵ As we have said experience itself leads to a rationalism that is therefore not a priori, but *posteriori*; to a rationalism that is received from the 'other', which does not appear so much imposed by the 'I' on nature as by nature on an 'I' that has abstracted itself in it. See E. Meyerson, *La déduction relativiste*, Paris 1925, pp. 134, 143: "Le relativiste, qui n'était pas du tout parti avec l'idée de chercher de l'*a priori* dans la nature, l'a pourtant découvert, en dépit de lui-même, peut-on dire... Le physicien einsteinien, foncièrement réaliste comme tout physicien, se trouve cependant, par la réussite même de sa déduction, à aboutir à une construction tout aussi foncièrement idéaliste." [The relativist, who did not at all set out with the idea of seeking the *a priori* in nature, has nevertheless discovered it, in spite of himself one might say... The Einsteinian physicist, essentially a realist like all physicists, nevertheless finds himself, because of the successful

itself of its deduction, to arrive at a construction that is also essentially idealist]. Cf. p. 170.

¹⁶H. Weyl (Raum, Zeit, Materie, transl. franc. Paris 1922) explicitly declares the impossibility of conceiving an autonomous geometry, and that geometry, mechanics and physics in modern science constitute an inseparable theoretical unity, which must be assumed en bloc (pp. 292, 57). It is from the determination of physical reality," adds A.S. Eddington (Espace, Temps, Gravitation, transl. franc. Paris 1921, p. 223), "that the new geometrical theory took birth.

¹⁷ C. Fourier, Oeuvres, Paris 1888, t. I, p. XXII.

¹⁸ A disciple of Newton, the English mathematician Brook Taylor (1685-1731) worked on capillarity, ballistics and the theory of perspective.

¹⁹The French physicist and mathematician Jules Henri Poincaré (1854-1912) was also interested in epistemology and advocated a kind of intuitionism: a mathematical concept or entity is defined not in logical terms but from intuitive data.

²⁰The French physicist and epistemologist Pierre Duhem (1861-1916) criticised the possibility of so-called crucial experiments', i.e. those that could falsify one hypothesis and thereby verify another.

²¹ The Russian mathematician Christian Goldbach (1690-1764) worked on number theory and differential equations. He expounded two 'conjectures' in 1742, the first of which is still unsolved to this day, and the second only partially solved in 1937, thus after the writing of the Evolian text.

Z² A talented young mathematician, Évariste Galois (1811-1832) died at the age of 21 a duel, leaving behind a kind of scientific testament in which theories and insights are summarised only much later verified.

Z³ E. Galois, Manuscrits et papiers inédits, in Bulletin des Sciences Mathématiques, 1906, I, p. 259, apud L. Brunschvicg, Les étapes de la philosophie mathématique, Paris 1922, p. 22. Cf. ibid., p. 490: "Cette spéculation abstraite (theory of numbers) se développe suivant le rythme d'une science naturelle; les vérités s'y découvrent et s'y établissent par une méthode qui est effectivement, comme Hermite l'avait montré (Conférence de Chicago, 1893, transl. Laugel, 1898, p. 58), une méthode d'observation, tandis qu'au contraire l'arithmétique vulgaire, sortie de la pratique et développée en vue de la pratique, a conservé l'allure d'une construction deductive où l'esprit crée lui-même ses concepts et pose a priori les lois de leurs relations" [This abstract speculation develops following the rhythm of a natural science; truths are discovered and established through a method that is indeed, as Hermite had demonstrated, a method of observation, whereas on the contrary, common mathematics, born of practice and developed in a practical sense, has preserved the course of a deductive construction where the spirit itself creates its concepts and establishes a priori the laws of their relations]. E. Bouteux, De la contingence, cit., p. 52: 'Ce n'est pas au premier coup que l'homme a découvert les premiers principes des mathématiques. Il a tâtonné, il a employé l'observation, l'expérimentation, l'abstraction, l'induction' [It was not on the first blow that man discovered the first principles of the mathematical... He went trial and error, he used observation, experimentation, abstraction, induction].

Z⁴ See E. Myerson, De l'explication dans les Sciences, Paris 1921.

Z⁵ See L. Rougier, Les paralogismes du rationalisme, Paris 1920, p. III, c. X.

Z⁶As transition points: the need to give a physical interpretation to the mathematical coefficients, which is contingent on them; the stopping of physical deduction at an irreducible, purely given primordial 'quality' - the 'improbable state' in thermodynamics, spatial curvatures in relativism, the impenetrable foundation of the discontinuity of quanta (on which see F. Reiche, Die Quantentheorie, Berlin 1921, p. 160),etc.

Z⁷ This situation appears particularly clearly with theories of physics of the type of Duhem's, for example.

Z⁸ Here it will be objected that the phenomenon studied by biology and physiology is distinct from that studied by classification and physics; that it is arbitrary to hierarchize the various sciences, which, on the other hand, are on the same plane as opposed to a matter given as a whole, each of which takes as its object a particular domain.- If such a concept is correct in the empirical sphere it is of little significance in the transcendental sphere, where, in the study of the conditions of possibility, it is maintained that the diversity of the phenomenon proceeds from the diversity of the scientific conscience that affects it, and not vice versa. The disordered multiplicity of the various objects of science masks an ideal succession; and their simultaneity in fact is, so to speak, the 'petrification' of the total mediation of scientific consciousness itself in general, abstracted from the process of its becoming. The object or phenomenon is, in reality, one and the same: in the effort to adapt itself and make itself ever more sufficient to itself, science transforms its own principles, and then the object becomes from one form to another, for example it ceases to be the physical phenomenon and becomes the organic phenomenon, and so on. But, again, it is not that the organic phenomenon coexists with the physical, as two distinct phenomena: the organic phenomenon is instead the physical phenomenon itself as it appears to physical science when it, in striving to realise more perfectly the degree that identifies it, finds itself carried beyond itself and becomes biological. And all can be considered organically, physically, etc.

Z⁹Blondel (L'Action, Florence 1921, vol. I, p. 127) notes how something

similar is already thought of in the same physical concept of bodies manifesting their inertia against a dynamic stress. A concept that is, moreover, very familiar from Indian metaphysics.

3⁰ Note that here we are dealing with psychology as a positive science of the phenomena of the subject considered objectively - hence the distinction from the early categories of the time, which are not psychological, but psychology in action.

3¹ The Dutch botanist and geneticist Hugo de Vries (1848-1935) introduced the concept of 'pangens' in 1889 to refer to hypothetical carriers of individual qualities, a term later adopted in contraction of 'genes'. Fundamental is his 'mutation theory' of 1901.

3² A pupil of Wilhelm Windelband, the German philosopher Heinrich Rickert (1862 - 1930) succeeded him in the Heidelberg chair (1916) and as head of the Baden School, which developed a neo-Kantian 'philosophy of values'. For Rickert, the object of philosophy is the essence of value.

3³ H. Rickert, Der Gegenstand der Erkenntnistheorie, Leipzig 1904, p. 116.

3⁴ Ibid, p. 130.

3⁵ The expressions, extremely recurrent until recently, in which, in order to give an idea of the intrinsic evidence and eternity of certain metaphysical truths, reference was made to geometrical propositions, such as that of the sum of the internal angles of a triangle, for example, are very conspicuous. Now it is known that such propositions are, from the logical point of view, quite hypothetical; they express

simply one possibility among several others, and the intuitive evidence that may be inherent in it depends on the fact that the person finds himself in a physical environment that is inherent to a certain density index that one might well think different. Such a finding is then only to be explained by the original arbitrariness of the personal ego and the samskâra according to which it develops its experience.

3⁶See Book I, sect. VIII, § 3 [Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 148-155].

3⁷The Greeks, as is well known, did not have the idea of *ma t e r i a* in the modern sense until late Stoicism, i.e. close to the advent of Christianity: until Aristotle *υλη* itself had nothing material about it, it was merely a principle of disorder and indeterminacy. *was not even a term to express the idea of matter.* Cf. Rivaud, *Le problème du devenir dans la philosophie grècque*, Paris 1906.

3⁸ Consider for example the well-known fragment of Anaximander (Diels, Frg. Vors., 9: *εξ ων δε η γενεσις εστι τοις ουσι και φθοραν εις ταυτα γινεσθαι κατα το χρεων. διδοναι γαρ αυτα δικην και τισιν (αλληλοις) της αδικιας κατα την του χρονου ταξιν* [The things from which beings are born, are those to ruin also comes, according to what is to be; for they inflict punishment and vengeance on one another for their injustice, according to the disposition of time].

3⁹The concept of knowledge as a remembering is expressed by the same term used by the Greeks for truth: *αληθεια*= *α-ληθεια*= abolition oblivion (oblivion = *ληθη*).

4⁰If at this stage there remains a substratum of transcendence, an objective background - as if the possibility of thought to articulate itself rests on the condition of

living its own form in representation of divine substance or essentially metaphysical structure - in truth, only the rhythm of determination and analysis of the formal conditions of the concept takes place in it. As Kant noted (Kritik der reinen Vernunft, pp. 135-136), the scholastic: 'quodlibet ens est unum, verum, bonum' [the entity is in any case one, true, good] is merely an exposition of the pure logical conditions of thought. To suppress this ontologism, and again the allegory of divine hypostasis of earlier theology, is to mediate the form, to develop the criterion to the sufficiency and immanence of idealism.

⁴¹ However, it is important to note that this transition here always takes place within speculative thought, because here science itself is not taken as such, but rather as a philosophical moment, as a form of the conceptual criterion of truth (the same can be said of Christianity): the antithesis between form, which, as in itself absolutely mediated, advances the instance of powerful and individual freedom, and matter, felt as necessity and real deprivation of the ego, relates instead to a further category (§ 21).

⁴² Observe the suitability of even the extreme forms of contemporary immanentism to the general structure of the category of philosophy. For example, Gentile (Logica, Laterza, Bari 1923, vol. II, p. 78) speaks of an "unconditionally imperative character of the law of the concrete logos", i.e. of the supreme principle of dialectical becoming, and adds: "all thinking is the enunciation of truth, which would have no value if it were not to be expressed and if it were not therefore to be presented as unconditionally imperative with respect to its opposite" (ibid., p. 300). Cf. H. Rickert, Das Eine, die Einheit und die Eins, Tübingen 1924, pp. 10, 57: "Wir denken logisch alleindann, wenn wir etwas finden, das es als Gegenstand unabhängig von unserem Denkgibt" [We consider logical only when we find something that as an object is independent of our thinking]; "Das logisch denkende Subjekt kann immer nur anerkennen, was unabhängig von ihm oder "objektiv" gilt" [The logically thinking subject can always only recognise that which is independent of him, i.e. which is "objective"]. Such a position does not differ at all, mutatis mutandis, from that of Plato's Euthyphro, where it was argued that things are not good because they are willed by the gods, but are willed by the gods.

Gods because they impose themselves on these as good. That is, the moment of the Sollen remains in any case, which, as we have seen, fixes philosophy in its hierarchical place. And - this too has already been said - as long as the Ego wants itself according to the philosophical category, there is no way to make it understand the possibility in general of a consciousness that, on the basis of that general imperativeness that is said to be unconditional reaffirms autarky and, with it, pluralibertymagica, the arbitrary.

⁴³ It goes without saying that here the 'gods' are only valid as purely ideal forms. Of them as power functions of the autarky will not be a question until the third epoch.

⁴⁴ There is no need to point out that it is now a question of a God who has passed through philosophy, and not of one who is still on this side of it, in the sphere subjective feelings and qualitative intuition. It cannot be recommended enough to bear in mind that we hierarchize the various elements only according to their form, according to the particular meaning that animates the experience that the Ego has of them. Those who do not bear this in mind cannot fail to accuse us of repetition, of making differences where there is identity, and vice versa. Of 'gods', for instance, there are some in the first epoch, there are some in the category of co-operation, philosophy, mysticism; again there will be some in the third epoch, and indistinct appearances. But, according to value, none is similar to the other.

⁴⁵ Idealists who accuse mystics of transcendence do not know what they are saying: mysticism is a deeper transcendence - but always along the same, whereby nature has become, in idealism, a category: and yet, compared to this, it is a deeper immanence.

Valis, Schriften, ed. Heilborn, vol. II, pp. 101, 333.

⁴⁷ H. Simon (Der Magische Idealismus. Studien zur Philosophie des Novalis,

Heidelberg 1906, p. 141) summarises Novalis' view as follows: 'Dieses tiefste Selbstempfinden ist nicht das stolze Resultat des moralischen Gottesbewusstseins, das uns in unserem wertenden Tun zur Gottheit erhebt... - sondern in der Demut, in dem, was Schleiermacher "s ch l e c t i n n i g e A b h ä n g i g k e i t" nennt, liegt die Beruhigung für den immer weiterfordenden moralischen Menschen. Hier ist das Positive gerade die Aufgabe aller Aktivität, und doch ist diese religiöse Liebe nicht nur das reinste Emp f i n d e n , sondern als solches auch die Voraussetzung aller lebendigen Tat. Denn nur sie kann uns die "Kraft des Glaubens" verleihender wir zu allen idealen, wertsetzenden Taten bedürfen. Diese reine, 'absolute Empfindung ist religiös' (II, S. 101), in ihr vereinigen sich 'alle einzelnen Neigungen in Eine, deren wunderbares Objekt ein höheres Wesen, eine Gottheit ist' (II, S. 279)" [This deeper sense of self is not only the mere result of the moral awareness of God, which elevates us in our actions to God - but in the humility in , what Schleiermacher calls 'dependence par excellence', lies the pacification for a man of ever more moral demands. Herein lies the positive element, the task of all activity, but this religious love is not only the purest perception, but as such represents the transposition of all human activity. It is only on the basis of this that the 'power of faith' can be transformed for us into valuable activity. This pure 'absolute sensation is religious'; in it, 'all individual propensities are gathered into unity, whose magnificent object, as the highest essence, is a divinity'].

⁴⁸ J. Evola, Essays on Magical Idealism, Atanòr, Rome 1925. Appendix, p. 184f. [Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 2006, p. 143 ff.]

⁴⁹ T. Tzara, 7 manifestes dada, Paris 1924, p. 15 ff.

Iñ Dadaism, however, the moment of the infinite and the reduction of content is much more important than the reduction of spontaneity. Hence 'abstract art', albeit distinctly defined as a need (and here it would be worth noting, more than has been done so far, the personal contribution made by the pictorial and poetic work of the writer), in order to an accomplished

statement still remains, in part, as a task today.[Evola expounded theoretical and practical position in Abstract Art, Maglione e Staini, Rome 1920; anastatic edition: Fondazione J. Evola, Rome 1992. Half a century later he brought his verses together in Raâga Blanda, Scheiwiller, Milan 1969. On Evola the painter, see us two catalogues: Julius Evola e l'arte delle avanguardie, Fondazione J. Evola, Rome 1998, and Julius Evola: arte come alchimia, mistica, biografia, Iiriti Editore, Reggio Calabria 2005(Ed.)].

⁵¹ Cf. J. Evola, Theory of the Absolute Individual, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1998,pp. 139155.

⁵² Similarly, the system of passions, natural appetites, etc., which becomes the antithesis for those who have awakened to a moral value, remains being, concrete life for those in such a value has not arisen.

⁵³ See D. Hume, An Inquiry concerning Human Understanding, V, II. Belief, which for him is the criterion that distinguishes real ideas from imaginations, has as its distinguishing criterion that it 'does not depend on the will and cannot therefore be commanded at will'.

⁵⁴ Cf. O. Weininger, Ueber die höchsten Dingen, transl. ital., p. 193, 195: "Faith in God is but the highest faith in itself"; "God is man's task, religion is man's will to become God".

⁵⁵ Cf. Meister Eckhart, Schriften um Predigten, f. 292 a: "If God were not in all things, creatures would desire none. Whether they know it or not, in the slightest desire it is God they seek. BrhadârañyâkaUpanishad, II, IV, 5: Not for the sake of things, creatures, the world, are dear to us, but for the sake of âtmâ.

⁶⁵ L. Feuerbach, Vierzig Stunden über die Wesen der Religion, c. XX.

⁵⁷ God," Guyau rightly says (Esquisse d'une morale sans oblige ni sanction), "can only demoralize man. Cf. A. Schopenhauer, Neue Paralipomena, § 395: 'I am no longer nothing as soon as God is placed'.

⁵⁸ L. Feuerbach, Vierzig Stunden, cit., c. XXIII. Cf. J.M. Guyau, Esquisse, cit., p. 86: "Man has always wanted to climb the heavens and, not being able to do so on his own, he invented God to stretch out his hand; then he attached himself lovingly to this saviour".


⁵⁹In passing, we note the unmistakable superiority of the moralistic over the christian one, which in place of the sufficient will and "content", in place of virtue as an aim and a reward in itself, posits the concept of the supernatural realm where it is thought that, according to a violence, the powerless are freed from unhappiness and made partakers, by grace, of that beatitude which instead, according to justice, belongs only to a perfect will. However, the Stoic doctrine is incomplete with regard to its renunciation of the will, a renunciation that testifies to not knowing that this, a subjective affirmation, is intended in itself. The 'supreme good' agrees, and in an essential way, with the Stoic affirmation given that it is truly sufficient, that it overcomes dualism and is also potent. Suffering is always a sign of imperfection. In the religious doctrine of 'supreme good' the individual, however, goes to sell his persuasion to happiness.

⁶⁰d. it is claimed that aesthetic activity imitates not objects (this is factually untrue, art has never been photography), but the form of the creative act of a real object, i.e. magic.

¶ Such is one sense of the mystical 'descent into hell'. - You will not say," notes Eckhart (ed. Buttner, vol. I, p. 126), in a passage of singular depth, "that it is the coal that burns you, when it burns you, but the n u l a is the cause of it: for the coal burns you only as something you do not possess (= something you are deprived of); but if you possessed its nature, all the fire that has ever flared up could do nothing to you. This n u l l a t i o n w h i c h i s i n t e r n a t i o n e d t o y o u , s e e v e n t h i s i m p e r f e c t i o n , t h i s i s w h a t y o u h a v e i n y o u r i n f e r n o . A n d o f t h i s 'n o t h i n g n e s s' y o u m u s t p u r i f y y o u r s e l f .

¶ In summary form, it can be said that the datum and necessity apparent various ways throughout the second epoch are the ratio cognoscendi of arbitrariness, which nevertheless remains its ratio essendi.


ERA OF DOMINATION



The distinction that, at the end of the previous epoch, posits and assumes non-being, that is, existential necessity, in formal freedom, thereby realising point of individuality, only arrives at the generic substratum of the existential principle itself, that is, at what in the previous forms corresponded to the 'given' in general. But the new antithesis proper to that term does not present existence 'in general', but rather an existence already qualified, correlative to all the articulations of the personal world. For this formation, the sufficiency proper to the category of individuality (§ 21) is insufficient, while the other, according to its hierarchical place, it presupposes it, because only when the form has exhausted the perfect development of all its powers does the transcendent point of selfhood arise. The latter is therefore faced with a new matter or task, the resolution of which rests on the implementation of the constituent elements of the world of the person, its mediation, in specific acts of power and possession: and thus on the one hand a negation, and on the other a filling and rebirth into perfect life and unconditional freedom of that system of determinations which, at the point of the pure affirmation of the individual, incorporates the deprivation of an ego aware of its own substance as an empty world of reflection. In this last epoch, it is precisely a question of drawing from the non-being of the formal world, which now takes over all reality, an unconditioned, magical existence, so that each in-itself, immediately as such, realises and expresses the power and nature of the absolute for-itself.

The generic categorical form here is that particular unity of identity and distinction proper to the experience of domination. The distinctive element involved in domination is that into which that proper to reflection passes and is preserved, and yet it is that by which the value of the person in further categories is not abolished, but rather confirmed, exalted, brought forward. It follows that all those directions of development beyond the human state of existence that are not strictly magical, but rather identifying and tending to dissolve, as it were, the nucleus individuality in a 'universal', in an undifferentiated superior principle (as in certain mystical and initiatory oriental currents), making the moment of distinction fall, are to be said to be regressive, degenerative, turning not towards a superhuman, but towards a prehuman - to the world of quality.

Section One



§ 23 - EXPERIENCE OF 'FIRE'

At the end of the second epoch, the reality of the person's world gradually becomes derealised to the point of the pure negativity of the principle of reflection becoming perfectly aware of its own abstract nature. In the non-being that thus emerges, the ego now reasserts itself as the objective against the subjective and formal of that world. This transcendence of the form defines what is properly conquered in the previous category and, as we have said, is in symmetry with the transition at the very end of the first epoch.

So: the principle that made the category possible, and which is a sufficient gesture of distinction and negation, is countered by the determinacy of what is distanced by it. The first synthesis with which the individual reasserts itself on this antinomy is that proper to the interval according to which the principle of realisation through and within a negation, is posited as the reason for the various formal determinations. These, therefore, in a further category, will hang on their burning in a destructive power, and the moment of objectivity and persuasion, and that of negation vibrating on formal determinacy, will fall into one and the same point. Having transcended the state of simple, inert consciousness of its antithetical character in relation to the world of reflection, which nevertheless recovers its substance, the Ego will transform this consciousness into an energy that actively confirms this antithetical character within the form, so that the determinacy of the form itself is no longer experienced by it as anything other than a matter be denied and contradicted, and this not with a view to a new formal affirmation, but for the pure love of negation and contradiction. We shall refer to such a moment as the 'trial or experience of Fire'. The 'I' here is like a standing still in the negating power, in the principle by which it is possible for all phenomena to be removed and dissolved, thus in the midst of dilaceration and burning of what constitutes its life. He is not, and does not create himself, that by destroying and remaining in the midst of this destruction as the Lord of Fire - in the indeterminacy of things and laws that fail in the wild rush he celebrates the value autarky. Such a blaze negation and contradiction expresses the first, most immediate appearance, within the particular, of a universal now assumed by the ego its absolute purification.

This is one of the senses of the initiatory expression: 'washing in the Waters'. The Waters symbolise the 'feminine' instrumental power - which in itself is pure, chaotic, unleashed dynamism - of the supreme 'masculine' principle; and 'immersing' oneself in it, the ego is dissolved, i.e. liberated, purified, reintegrated into the principle of original indeterminacy. Identical to the purifying fire; this Water is thus, according to an alchemical expression, a "burning water", and does not "moisten" but "desiccates" (it is the source not of abandonment, but of hardness and unbreakability new to the essence of Ego - "gold" or "sulphur").

The present experience differs from that of pure art: which falls essentially within the formal sphere; which gives the consummation of form always as and for a form: in which point of autarky appears only at the terminus, not at the origin, where the unconditioned is instead the objective one proper to mystical consciousness. It likewise differs from finite experience (§ 13), because there the terminus ad quem was the determination of form, albeit by means of a principle of partial negation and arbitrariness - but here it instead its indeterminacy. Moreover, in that distinction, in which the categorical act was articulated, it was not in a mediation, but in a simple occurrence, and the moment arbitrariness and agility was therefore not experienced ante rem, but, due to the immedesimation of the Ego in the act, in re, as a function of the experience of the given, of the limit and of the heterothetic of the action. Here, on the other hand, the absolute mediation proper to the individual having taken place and being presupposed, the principle of distinction is no longer experienced in re as a datum, but ante rem, in itself, as the power and arbitrary will of the Ego; and what is assumed as terminus a quo or abstract matter to which - albeit provisionally, in assigning it a certain moment of rigidity, precisely because it is simple matter or starting point - the character of datum passes, is instead the terminus ad quem of the entire process finished experience.

So: while personal experience is determined under laws of correlation - that of object and subject and the others that proceed from them - the point of the individual establishes the element of a self-sufficient life. This life, therefore, at the end of the second epoch, neither inserts itself nor commands itself, but simply opposes concrete life. Sufficient to its own principle in general, as far as its determinate actions are concerned, the ego is always dependent on the determinisms in which personal consciousness is realised. But from the point of view of the new conquest, the presence of these conditions is directly felt as a non-being, and thus its own concrete life becoming a negation of life, the ego turns to the further step, with which it dissolves all relations and conditions, breaks

what sustains it from its externalised body, to which it substitutes an entity of agility, of pure negation ¹, adequate to its autonomy. Such is the sense of the present category. Outside of it, there is Stoicism, that is, the life of he who does not know how to give a body to his own firmness and yet, having to act in any case because of the correlative of the world of reflection, suffers in every action a contradiction and a violence.

With this category, we certainly cross the threshold into the world of hermetic and magical sciences. Such a world exists. To make a finite being an infinite being, to draw from an 'earth' a 'Sun', a God, an entity of power, of glory, of domination, is not fantasy, it is not myth, it is not an object of faith and hope, it is instead a concrete possibility for a will that knows how to say to : I will succeed or I will break in the rush. To this higher realisation, the subject a positive technique in action to which the Hindu yogas already turned, which circulates in an entire tradition of ours whose roots mingle with those of history itself - a tradition discredited and veiled by mystifications and superstitions that nevertheless do nothing to harm its true essence - which flashes through the lives of saints and founders of religions, which is finally reconfirmed at the first ascertainments of modern metapsychics - to such a realisation hangs the entire hierarchy of forms in the order of the absolute individual. It is its crowning, the *τελος*, that which, from a certain level, must decide its truth or falsity.

Knowing how to throw everything away, knowing how to bring oneself to despair - this, as has been said, is the first condition for such a path. It is the previous experience: the 'Great Solitude', the lightless desert in the midst of which the ego must consist, by means of a force that it absolutely must create from nothing. Beyond this is the 'trial fire'.

In every reality of his experience he sees his own negation, but no longer according to the opposite of a static antithesis of deprivation, but rather - since he now feels that this deprivation is from and in him, and yet appears to incorporate an activity of his own, hence an assent of his own - according to a force that tends to tear him away from the centre he has conquered. This new form, according to which the antithesis appears, in truth reflects the dynamism proper to the first draft of mediation, and only from this, as its correlative polarity, is it provoked and aroused. Beyond the simple

to consist, to continue the self-consistency by means of a negating force that overwhelms the determinations in which the body of the person inseparably connected to it finds itself enmeshed; within such a force to keep itself firm and whole; to generate in itself the power to give itself a higher life by means of the fire and catastrophe of its own life; to confirm one's autonomy by consisting when all ground is slipping out from under one's feet, when 'one no longer touches the bottom' and everything on which persuasion previously rested loses all firmness and dissolves in an uncoercible chaos - this is the new task. It invests - as has been said - every category of the person; it can thus transmute from irony for every aesthetic expression and the dissolution of all religiosity, to a conscious and reasoned madness: from an implacable and all-pervading scepticism corroding every philosophical and scientific certainty, to the deliberate violation of every moral or social law; from the reaffirmation beyond all recognised values and authority, to the denial of all faith, ideals or enthusiasm and the disregard of all feelings of humanity, love or respect - finally from the severity of a discipline of asceticism and mortification having in itself, in its simply negative moment, its own end and joy, up to an unbridled orgasm that, in pushing them to the extreme, burns in itself every passion. Beyond everything: to know how to bring to the apex everything from which the original terror is exasperated, everything that our natural and instinctive being desperately does not want, to know how to break the limit and dig ever deeper, everywhere, the sense of the vertiginous abyss, and to consist in the passing, to subsist there where others would be overwhelmed. Nothing must exist, at this point, that can be respected, nothing that one feels unable to do. And yet one will disengage oneself from both the 'pure' and the 'impure', from both the "material" than by the "spiritual"; we will turn to breaking not so much the outer law, but the inner law, not so much the God-fetish of the ages, but the "God in us", the "conscience", the "moral" and "spiritual" law.

To unleash entirely: one addiction is no better than another and the aim is not to change masters (law of 'good', 'spirit', 'freedom', etc.), but to reaffirm the 'I' above all correlations, whatever they may be - to make it something agile, hard, cold, elusive, ready, something that is free in this living dangerously as a power denying all determination and support.

In that sense here the negative moment exceeds the positive, and we could call this 'trial by fire' of evil. The 'good' (which we identify with the dharma of the Hindus) expresses conformity to the order of determinations and laws of a particular personal world placed; 'evil', on the other hand, is that which transcends

this order into that of a 'power in a free state'. Deadly for those who hold on to the former, it thus becomes the way, the condition, the source of health for those who turn to realise themselves beyond it: in moments of guilt, in moments of crisis and collapse of laws, 'ecstasy' can occur, the veil of consciousness formally rips open so that, facing the primordial force, man plays the game of his perdition or of his becoming superior to life and death (meaning of the rites of Kâlî).

In connection with this, we have not been afraid to state elsewhere that crime (in the German sense *verbrechen*, where *ver* is the reinforcer of *brechen*= break) is the act par excellence - certainly not in function of the succumbing being, which in itself, as a poor thing of the external world, represents nothing, but insofar as one feels that such a being is myself, and yet the act is experienced as cruelty of me to myself, as a breach of my fundamental inner law. And so also suicide and, with it, all that is 'against nature', all that is conscious and reasoned corruption, can incorporate this value of misdeed, of infraction of order, of metaphysical self-cruelty, which is a necessity for those who yearn for titanic power.

It is hardly worth noting that there is nothing 'passionate' about this work of negation, which is cold discipline, a naked play of forces. The act is only acted out to excite the unleashing of forces, of reactions on the part of the violated 'nature' (both external - and internal, e.g. remorse, the Erinyes) that would tend to overwhelm and break the one who dared. The latter, on the other hand, will create himself stronger than them, will be able to dominate them under himself by realising a broader, new form of organisation free from the inconvertibility of the world of 'natures', and taking up within himself Yes and No. Then, communicating with what is properly the subject of the next category, we see that this 'experience of evil' is also that of 'purification from evil'. Because - this too has been said - and here and elsewhere - the character of evil in an act comes from the impotence to take it on absolutely, from the state of contradiction determined by the presence of a limit or internal restraint that it cannot overcome. He, on the other hand, who succeeds in organising and mastering such a limit and contradiction, has killed the 'guilt': his 'conscience' will invariably remain pure, in absolute decision, whatever act he performs.

Let us add a few specific considerations on the meaning of corruption. We have said that in the power that sustains and unfolds the system of personal determinations, the individual as such no longer recognises himself, but lives

instead a passion and an antithesis. Give it a person - then you have concepts, the characteristic type of which is the Schopenhauerian Wille [will]; and the point that was previously one of identity, appears as a point of subordination. In each of its acts, the ego has the sense of being dragged by a transcendent power, which takes it beyond itself, into results other than what it wants - of which, therefore, as autarch, it does not possess the reason. In his operating in the semblance of intentionality and autonomy, he, in this situation, recognises himself rather as the eternal laughing-stock of a 'cunning of nature', the principle of which falls in that power. - Corruption is a value where it aims at a reversal of this relationship, at taking up in turn the transcendent power, with the play of its determinisms, in a 'cunning', of which the directing principle and end is instead the individual will. This movement, which within the form has already appeared with modern art (which, therefore, entirely justifies the aversion that decadent types, such as Tolstoi, nurture for it), can be illustrated here by means of a reference to affectivity.

There is a pleasure that has activity as prius, which is the flower that springs from the fulfilment of every affirmation as sufficient in itself, perfect, successful. Insofar as then every position, in its becoming, is an interval - v.d. is a distinguishing itself from its own contrary - every pleasure, in realising itself, distinguishes itself, as if from a dialectical antecedent, from pain, according to a relation, which remains the actual prius of the two terms, so much so as to deny to pain that real antecedence, whereby it might appear to be a determining condition of activity (as an escape from pain), and lower pleasure itself to a negative (cessation of pain). Transcendentally, each affective element is instead conditioned by an act, and not vice versa.

However, at the distinction now undergone by the world of the person, whereby the actuality of the person is transformed into deprivation and every reality of the person into an empty form, the situation presents itself in a different light. Pleasure and pain - the affectivity relating to the various directions according to which the person originally willed himself - are experienced as if they were determinants: and it is felt that the activity in fleeing the latter and seeking the former, as they flash by in the events of the distanced world, is like an instrument that implements determinations, in no way understood in the conscious will. This appears in a typical way in the case of sexual relations, for example, in which voluptuousness was rightly understood by Schopenhauer as a flattery through which the 'genius of the species' enslaves the individual to its endsZ. - In corruption, in the face of the correlation between a certain determinism and a certain pleasure so

as it is offered in a relatively stable way by experience, the relationship is instead reversed, the transcendent purpose is thwarted: pleasure is not made to serve 'nature' but 'nature' to serve pleasure. Which is thus rendered sterile, it is no longer experienced in meaning, but for its sake; ceasing to be an organic part of the action, it becomes an instrument self-consumption and of freeing itself from it. The ego cannot yet dominate its affectivity, to the extent that it arbitrarily gives itself the criterion of what is to be pleasant or painful; instead, it is given correlations, representing almost the traces of its previous activity. What he can do with regard to them at the present point is to fold them up and make them consume, alienating them from the deep trunk of the life in they originally unfolded - which life has now become the enemy, irrational, transcendent 'will of nature' - and dissolving them in the sterile fire of pure, inorganic enjoyment. Such is the place of corruption as power discipline.

Let it be remembered, however, that what can be the object of negation at this point is only the peripheral aspect of what in things has been determined by means of the categories of the second epoch: both their other aspects or modes of being, and what in them corresponds to the universal determinations of the first epoch falls, for the time being, outside the power of negation. For this to be otherwise, it is necessary, as we shall see, that the ego does not antithetically assume the personal world merely as a phenomenon, but rather in the various metaphysical powers from which it was produced ("underworld gods") and asserts itself over them in a dominating function up to the point corresponding to the element of personal value - beyond which the aeonic world opens up ("gods above").

§ 24 - SUFFERING AND LOVE

According to the previous category, a power of negation invests the distinct determinations of form that the formlessness of the individual found against itself. At the same point it was seen that, because of the plane in which these determinations appear, negation is extrinsic, it invests the exteriority of them, not the deep root. But then the moment of the determination of the negating activity can only fall outside the principle of selfhood. In general, in the value of the individual, the undifferentiated foundation of an antithesis has already been justified (§ 21) and, again, that of action (§ 23) - but of action only as a genre, as an indefinite possibility in which the object, the 'what', remains undecided at all. Now with the transition from negation in general to the act of a particular, determinate negation (and this is what actually results at the end of the category), the sphere of what has hitherto been justified by the value of the individual is transcended: here the negation insofar as it is negation in general is freedom and value; insofar, however, as it is a particular negation - falling, that is, over an object or law that if it will be pushed into indeterminacy by an agitation to which other directions are equally possible, nevertheless ab initio it is a given, a presence, a presupposition - it incorporates a principle of necessity, and thus realises a new instance of deprivation against the individual. At the point that is the most advanced for the moment, the individual is confirmed by a consistence within a negativity: but this negativity is not a simple, empty negativity; it remains in any case determined by the given, of being the negativity of a given positive - of those elements that the individual finds in his or her own experience and which are those, and not others. The moment of the given thus echoes within the negative power and, almost reacting on it, makes it the enemy and contradictory to itself.

Here, then, at the end, or reflection, of the previous experience, the Ego distances itself from its own negative power and makes of it an antithetical principle, its own negation, which must be negated, which must be displaced if it is to be truly detached from the given: autonomous. To a negativity of negation is thus shifted the value insofar as the 'I' enacts the 'experience of Fire'. Consequent, which as an inseparable correlative has the same negative activity; not the pure power of negation, but a determined negation in action being what now goes to violate the Ego's autarchy.

The possibility of a new task, of a new synthesis, is then open: to reduce the antecedent to matter for the τέλος of the consequent - that is to say: that the negative power invests the same form of negation (antithetical, violent, destructive, fighting-against-enemy-forces) as the experience of fire; that it therefore creates a new dissolution as the place for a new generation and subsistence of the Ego. It is a negation that exasperates itself by distancing itself from the negation, that turns and reflects on itself, detaches it, strong enough to subsist without referring to it; neutralised, acting passes into not acting, wanting into not wanting as in a higher, perfect, purified activity; and then the same power of the 'other' against which the ego had hurled itself in the function of negation - this power liberated, suffered, indeed sought and willed in its very otherness, in its transcendent and unpredictable violence that engraves an absolute, painful non-being in the deepest depths of the individual substance - embodies it, it itself becomes the manifestation of the further, more perfect power of this same negating function.

It is, therefore, the test of passion, of suffering, of renunciation, of mortification as the way of selfhood knows it. To break, to humiliate the will - this superb, indomitable will, Lady of Fire - or rather to let it break, to let it humiliate itself - to allow, to will, this - is it perhaps possible if not for an even higher will, even more inward and cruel and hard and sure, whose cold splendour disconcerts and confounds 'nature' and obscures by comparison that which is required for the most extreme fighting tension and madness of destruction?

At its limit, the experience of suffering passes into that love. Of that autonegation, of that violation, which is the supreme reaffirmation of the negating power, inherent to suffering, to wanting one's own non-being which, in suffering, unpredictably, independently of us, invests us in the varied vicissitudes of a world left to itself - it, the assuming and wanting the existence of a thing in itself - that is: loving it - is the deepest, most subtle, cruelest form. To love is an active, purified, intrepid suffering - a suffering that gives itself to itself; it is, on the other hand, the element of a perfect act, of the act par excellence, for such is the act of he who knows how to absolutely abolish himself, to refer nothing to himself, to be only in the 'emptiness' of an inexhaustible giving of everything, to say yes to everything, to abandon himself in a dedication that asks for nothing, that is not moved by anything and never at the head of itself. To be in all that, to consist of all that. The 'fire' here stuns and becomes 'light' - a freshness that is freedom from the ego and freedom from things. And then the dependency that strikes in bosom of violent and antithetically negative action is resolved. That which is 'given', as such, immediately

and integrally, is now an autonegation in act, and thus an act of a superior freedom, of a power no longer resting on relations. This liberated action thus dissolves from the plane in which the particular world is only in the form of a pure, exterior appearance, or being, of its phenomenal-ideal caput mortuum; it generates an organ, a possibility in which the deepest powers that lie beneath that world itself can be evoked.

Titanic and destructive violence, while constituting a necessary phase - for by it the inner Fire is initially aroused, the sense of daring indomitability and superiority aroused - would not in itself be able to achieve the order of true domination. Rather, it represents a negative.

For true power cannot have enemies, cannot fight, cannot have any 'against'. With struggle, intolerance and violence, instead, a state of particularity is confirmed, a shackled agitation at the same level as that which is denied: a will that is so absurd that it can make itself mistress of the whole, as much as a hand of the whole organism: here the ego is not yet free of things, it confirms that they can resist, and all the more, insofar as, by suffering them, it wants to deny them - it therefore testifies to an impotence, an extrinsic and dependent relationship: after all, by its very temerity it gives sign of fear. He who truly can does not fight, does not destroy, has no need for violence. He imposes himself directly, without action, through his inner individual superiority over what he commands. But this superiority implies precisely freedom from things, it implies the abolition of their antithetical otherness, which instead remains rigid and fixed as long as the Ego polarises itself against them, affirming its limitation as a person. But when the 'I' frees itself from itself, when it awakens to sufficient strength to abandon its own affirmation, to exalt its dominion to the point of self-denial and death, the antithesis falls - the support failing; and things not only cease to have any power over him - he can no longer be offended, in an imperturbability, which is not indifference but real superiority, he can offer himself to every blow without it being able to reach him - but they also remain defenceless before him, before the act that proceeds from such a superior level.

Thus: whereas in the 'experience of Fire' the Ego drew superiority from power, here it turns to draw power from superiority, and this of the exasperated harshness of suffering, of renouncing, of sacrificing itself where all monstrous force would tend instead towards affirmation. And the cessation of the 'against', annulling of oneself, the admitting of things, the being able to will them in their very will and

even more than they can - is love, purified fire. cannot truly dominate something that one has not first loved, that is, with which one has not placed oneself in a relationship of real identity. To love is to realise in a relationship of understanding that with which one was previously in a relationship of antithesis, coexistence or correlation - it is therefore to organise, to organise inwardly, to organise in a freedom, because the occult principle does not touch the diversity and autonomy of beings, but only prolongs them, makes the ego their deepest dimension, the root to which they do not reach and in which, nevertheless, a superior unity takes them back: a subtle force with respect to which nothing is, which cannot be dominated or broken, since it acts from within things, taking on their very person which is thus at the mercy of the command that does not appear to them as such, but rather as their deepest and truest will. - This is a general indication of the true place of magic, which, however, refers to a sphere that is not yet precisely that of the present experience. But already from here, in this concept of love and sympathetic identification as magical instrumentality, there is a way of suspecting in the various practices commanded by the so-called 'principle of imitation' something more serious than is apparent to that positive investigation, which has modernly ascertained its uniform recurrence in the magic of primitive cultures.

On the opposition between this love, which is made up of pure activity and freedom, and that, which is craving, solidarity, the need for others to be, we need barely pause. It is a well-known magical principle that desire kills power. For how could power be possessed by the being, insofar as it desires, declares itself insufficient, in need of something else and therefore dependent with respect to other - the being that, failing the act, demands, and, in a relationship analogous to that of violence, seeks to absorb the other in order to confirm its particular individuality? All this is still self-reference, fear. But the one who through calm renunciation and detachment has created himself into a life in need of nothing, the one who has broken craving in himself, the one who has made himself capable of wanting things not for himself, but in himself - of wanting purely - the one who has in his fist the principle of power and domination: his being-from-self attracts infinite dependent things, creates a vortex they cannot resist because in him they have that by which, knowing it or not, in their need they are conditioned. Love here is therefore not need, it is not abandonment, it is not 'altruism' - nothing sentimental, nothing 'moral', "beautiful", "noble", or anything else, nothing, in the end, of all that men, or rather women, call such - it is something pure, something frightening, something transcendent: it is the freedom of a life that one possesses so much and so high that one can give oneself all, throw it all without thinking of oneself. One could refer it, therefore, to the

nishkâma-karma of the Indians, which precisely encompasses the concept of an action devoid of desire, of an action that, not acting for its own , detached from any interest or attraction, can be willed without simultaneously being willed by anything; victorious over karma (immanent law of sanction for conformity or non-conformity to the natural order = dharma) - the texts say - because the egoic centre, tightened by correlations, on which karma could take hold, is no longer there. What could sur a being, who can say yes to everything? Which places the act beyond both gain and loss, both pleasure and pain - motive to itself³ ?

In Western esoteric traditions, there are allusions to this state in a particular meaning the symbol of 'air': the subtle principle that carried the Lord, beyond wind, fire and earthquake (Book of Kings, I, IX, 11-12); the 'wind' that 'blows where it wills and you hear its sound but you know not whence it comes nor whither it goes' - connected to the one who is 'born again in inspiration' (John, III, 8);

"wind" in whose womb is carried the telesma, the principle destined to take within itself "the power of all things, lower and higher" (Tabula Smaragdina) and which feeds the flames from which the Mithriac Aeon is drawn.

§ 25 - DYNAMIC EVOCATION

Let us examine the experience now deduced at its end. On the one hand, we have the act of love in which the various antithetical formations come to life, in truth precisely and only as antithetical, as mere negations of the ego, which, wanting them in and for itself, makes itself a pure void: as autonomous entities, he thus frees from himself the things of his own experience - his body as a person - and suffers them; but he suffers them in an act, not in a fact, in a reality that is merely the symbol of a self-abandonment of the powers, of a negation, which from external and extrinsic has become internal to the things themselves. So while on the one hand the form subsists, on the other hand it has as its correlative its absolute negativity in the I or as I, and it hangs on this as a disembodied activity, as an ardour that has now consumed all its material and has freed itself in pure actuality, in light.

This correlative, which stands as condition of phenomenon and image, and which is nevertheless their excess, the inner resolution of their factual and immediate being, can only be the principle of an order of formative forces, the elementary mediation of a dynamism. And if it - as a living sense in the Ego - is counterpointed by the pure being of the external things not yet otherwise affirmed by love, in this can be understood the interval distancing power from the act of a new synthesis, to be unfolded according to the well-known dialectic of the abstract principle of the consequents that consume in their expressive body the matter of the antecedents. Here, then, exteriority will be assumed and actuated, regenerated, in this dynamic subtle order that still, as consequent, is a pure, undifferentiated meaning; so that this, in turn, is given act, form, concreteness in it. An actualisation of the experience of a dynamic world as a direct transparency of that of sensible imagery, through a gesture in which the mode of love prolonged - this is the point at which the previous experience can pass over and grasp its perfection.

Now, if the consequent in itself is a pure interiority, disengaged, all conditioned and materialised by the absolute spontaneity of the ego's self-surpassing - it - in the moment of opposite, objective transcendence equally understood in love as that which precisely in the absolute given sees the absolute act - in the phantasms of images subsisting as negation of negation, which it encounters in the antecedent -

has a principle whereby the synthesis will not be a pure, transcendent formation of dynamism, but rather a formation of dynamism in a certain way projected, becoming an inner objectivity, in a supersensible visibility of flashing 'powers' as trans-formations of forms, of images, of things. The Ego evokes these powers: all their reality is drawn, materialised, from this evocative gesture of his - and yet he remains distinct from them. On the contrary, it only makes them be by distinguishing itself from them, almost by hurling out of itself - precisely through the mode of love - something with which it was identical, and which only then becomes perceptible and such that it can be known visually. And it acquires it in the seat of a physical object whose exteriority - as if not withstanding the new power that absolutely takes it on - pales, yields and dies and is enkindled, transhumanises itself into the transparency precisely of an entity of dynamism, whose objectivity is an interiority.

Such an experience is therefore only achieved by the active dissolution and expansion of one's own centre in accordance with a gesture without desire, of an intrepid outburst that transfers one's own interiority to the "outside"; and this same gesture does not produce, but is immediately a luminous force, a dynamic spiritual ether, which is the substance in which the entire realm of the phenomenon is recreated, in which the entire realm of the phenomenon is reborn integrated and purified in activity - that is to say: not only the physical determinations, but also the very world of thoughts, feelings, forces; for even of these - as has been said - the person grasps only abstract and particular sensitisations. The object of the new experience is nothing more than a "rhythm", almost as if it were the form of the gesture caught in the air, before its precipitation into a thing: it is not a new species of phenomena, but the resolution of what is phenomenal in general in the sense of a particular quality of spiritual movement - almost an immaterial synthetic "sensation" of its process. As such, it is but as the object of a productive perception, as the individuality of a gesture in which the 'I' itself itself, almost expressing a deeper, buried life of its own. The 'I' is thus truly the demiurge of such a world, which is only insofar as he becomes it. On the other hand, this reality is also objective: it is experienced as the resolution of a real object, not as 'another world', but as something to which not only is transferred, but also the character attributed to things of nature, which in comparison become shadows without life and consistency, is strengthened. The 'thing' is no longer perceived as such: the act of perceiving it, transformed into an act of loving it, of wanting it, consumes it and regenerates it by giving it the form of a dynamic entity, so that the predicate of real and objective, if, in general, it was attributed to a formal determination, now cannot fall on anything but it

entity, into which it has passed.

In fact, here we have the first form of that identity-difference, which is proper to the state of autarky. The interiorising of the exterior - proper to this category and to the following ones - is, at one and the same time, a projecting, a detaching and distinguishing of oneself from what was interior, from that with which, in an spontaneity, one was in a relationship of theetical identity, of freedom-necessity: a distinguishing, however, that is no longer that of reflection, but that of power. Dynamic nature, insofar as it refers to an objective, is distinguished from the ego, so that in the new world the externalization of the same transcendental body of the samskâra is expressed in its first power of simple dynamism. Beyond the phenomenon and the "passion" of the world, the Ego thus generates from within itself, with a mathematical image, we might call the "first integral" of that - the dynamic formations from which it derives: but by freely producing and objectifying itself in the dynamic world - insofar as it constructs itself as the power capable of this - the Ego creates itself, on the plane of the formative powers of its samskarras, in a magical principle, that is, in a principle that is inwardly superior to them. In this preserved, transformed, that distinctive law to which the value of person was attached; which is therefore not abolished, but developed: in the first epoch the ego IS the power, in the second it is the distinct of the power as ideality, in the third it is the distinct of the power as dominion. The aeonic powers, dormant in the form of various bodily functions, return here to act, but no longer in a relation of simple identity, but in a relation that is also one of distinction and that makes them objectively intuitable beings - but this as creatures of a real and sufficient possibility. Such is the hidden meaning of magical and theurgical evocations: to creatively externalise the interior, to bring into being the cosmic principles or 'gods' that are in potency in - or as - the body. To each object corresponds a subject, each objectification or externalisation excites a higher, a deeper power of the ego. By projecting its dynamism into an inner objectivity - that is, by making the world elemental - the Ego therefore purifies itself and, simultaneously, becomes its lord. The power by which it is possible to make the 'gods' become perceptible, to evoke them, is what brings the Ego above them and gives it the possibility of commanding them. Only, in relation to what only results immediate experience, it is for now only a matter of those powers, on which the world of particularity - the world of the second epoch - depends.

From this point, phenomenology extends into experiences that, while not

being for that reason less real, they fall outside of what may be apparent to those who hold fast to the human state of existence; and yet also outside the usual objects of philosophy. It is that philosophy, just as its hierarchical place, falls precisely into this sphere, of which, indeed - in its 'apriori' and its 'necessities of law' - it is irresistibly inclined to hypostatise the elements into indispensable measures of every possible experience. Fichte noted this with reference to Kant⁴: the thought that is in question in speculation is that which is linked to the physical senses, and yet it is no wonder that the supersensible must be denied by it. The fact, however, that the supersensible reality can be explained precisely by a mode of that same dialectic of self-objectification to which the idealists have recourse in order to render

'rational' account of nature, confirms all irrationality of this "rationality", which as the foundation of its Sollen [duty (possible)] has a brute Müssen [duty (necessary)]. Recall Schelling's critique: there is no nature because it is an intrinsic necessity of the Idea to pass into it, but rather the concept of a rational necessity of the Idea's passing into nature is a contrivance of speculation in the face of the fact of the actual existence of a nature. And since the philosophical consciousness is not immediately constrained by the supersensible order in the same way as it is by the sensible order; since it is not, if man does not go and create it in his own sense by turning it beyond himself - so it must always be infinitely more difficult for the philosopher to discover the 'rationality', rather than 'irrationality' and unreality, of that order itself.

As for us, it is enough for philosophy to hold to the principle of the ideality and relativity of the sensible mode of perception: the autonomous, external existence of objects, and likewise the passive, sensible form in which they are habitually perceived by human beings, is a contingent mode possible experience, which is dependent on a certain transcendental attitude of the 'I'; so that, transformed as this is, it cannot fail. We have forced absolute idealism to recognise the fact, that the 'I' is deficient in one part of its activity, and we have shown that the world as a sensible, external existence in its own right is but the reflection of such a deficiency. It can therefore be foreseen that from that exasperation of possession and internal energy which is imposed by the Ego in order that the 'trials' described above may be overcome, a renewed, transformed mode of appearance of the world must proceed from itself.

This is a fundamental requirement of the initiatory of all times: the submergence of the passive, peripheral, sense-discursive form of perceiving and transmutation into another active, positive, central, creative one. This - remembering that impure is said to be everything that is not of itself and that only reaches the act

through correlation to something else - is found referred to in some occult traditions as 'purification of the senses'; purification that is the subject of precise and absolutely positive disciplines.

This has been said elsewhere⁵, to the extent that we are allowed to say so, and it is not the case here. We will only mention that two phases can be distinguished in practice. The first can be summed up in the highest part of the Platonic καθαίσις:

"Detach, disengage your eyes and, in general, your soul, from sensible things" - when taken not in the ethical-metaphorical sense, but literally, in the crudest positivity. It is a matter of immersing oneself in the powers of the senses and mastering them to the point that - dissolved, disidentified from that into which they had previously rushed and identified themselves - the 'violence' of the sensory impressions no longer has any power over them; folding them in upon themselves, then, and fixing them: suspending them at will in a state that is intact, non-altered - pure: 'hearing without sound', 'sight without the object' - as some Taoist texts express it. This discipline unfolds progressively through various stages, particularly studied in the treatises on Indian yoga - especially in Patanjali's classic one - and culminates in a state-boundary in which every modification, be it mental or perceptible, is eliminated and only the mind, one, united with its bare power alone (samadhî, kaivalya) subsists - the summit under which the whole self is gathered.

In the second stage, this stillness gives rise to a projective expansion, an ex-stasis, and objects return, but captured no longer through space, but rather 'passing from within'. Of course, it is a particularly awkward thing to communicate the meaning of such experiences to those who do not already have at least an inkling of it on their own. We can try to say that it is like renouncing all grounding and 'rushing out': taking on absolutely, and then abolishing by an internal act, limit and support that viscosity and the sensibility in general of things represent, projecting one's own activity into the corresponding 'void'. From and in this - almost forming itself, reflecting itself - the thing manifests itself, re-emerges, flourishes, but no longer as a thing but as a freedom, as a form of motion. The obstacle here is the manifestation of an instinctive, organic terror for such an act as for a death and dissolution. And whoever, tending towards these directions, experiences the rapidity and force with which, on the hint of it, the whole of the deepest being throws itself back, also realises the doctrine, which we have expounded elsewhere⁶, that the viscosity of a thing is a creature of terror for a thing, its solidity is almost the very syncopation of this fear that arrests and suspends the insufficient being on the brink of the chasm of Dionysian power. And one understands then the whole necessity, in the order of a propaedeutic still

moral, of the 'proof love': in the petty selfishness of a greedy ego all contracted and clutched to itself, the fear for spiritual power is expressed, for that absolute act in which the sensible world would turn to its transfiguration into that of freedom. And to those who cannot break such selfishness, finite and mortal nature will remain the ultimate limit.

The organ of further experience could therefore be described as a synthesis of faith and perception. Faith is the audacity of pure initiative, the certainty of a will capable of throwing itself beyond itself, creating an active certainty outside all those supports and pairs of contraries within which the senses, desire and reason move. On the other hand, such a certainty here is not something incorporeal, something abstractly ideal - but is also the concrete, direct evidence of a 'this': faith here transports with it the perceptive faculties freed from the sense organs and acts on them, implements them in the actual vision of a supersensible object. It is therefore a matter of real experience: only that this has the condition of a pure spiritual initiative where the perceptible one has as a condition the passivity of the excitement of external sensory impressions.

Thus elsewhere, by way of analogy, we have referred to the centrifugal mode proper to visualisations imagining in a form that is either spontaneous (dream, hallucination) or provoked (suggestion); although we caution that this should not give rise to the idea that it leads to a world of fantasies and illusions, for it is merely a new way in which the same objective content is experienced. Just as external things are not realities in themselves, but phenomena determined - through the category of the possibility of experience according to the sensible mode or "impure" - from causes that reside in the interiority of the Ego - in the deep complex of tendencies, conati, activities, etc. in which the particular essence of the person (= samskâra) is formed - so the dynamic or "subtle" world expresses these same causes, which manifest themselves through the new positive and active mode of perception. That is, there remains an 'invariant', an elementary body of λόγοι οπερματικοί as an identical principium individuationis which, latent in the state of samadhî, returns to assert itself in the new possibility of experience and determines it in a way that corresponds to the one whose place it has taken. Naturally, in this it is assumed that the mind arrives at the new state cleansed and "transparent" like a crystal, absolutely neutral with respect to every kind of subjective connoption and appetites; for these, now that the form of perception is freedom, would have an unconditioned efficiency - in a fantastic agitation, in a perturbation and deformation of the world as it springs from the latent body of samskâra, instead of an exact correlative of the objective world, they would generate a chaos from which the way to any higher realisation would be precluded. It will be recalled,

that in this category it is essentially a question of the power of making oneself superior to one's samskâra by disidentifying with it, projecting it objectively; now by an arbitrary agitation of one's own experience - the possibility of which therefore remains open to some extent here - such a distinction would not really take place, the existing samskâras would be replaced by others, a new 'mixture' would be produced, not the 'separation of the bird', not the state of real superiority. And if projection in general implies a power over that which is projected, yet in the world generated by an impure mind it will not be possible to realise the extent to which the command invests objective elements rather than mere creatures of subjective craving and imagination⁷. Hence he who sincerely aspires towards absolute power will avoid exploiting the magical possibilities offered by this and the following phases that are concerned only with personal samskâra (second epoch), and which he will instead pass through in a relationship of pure knowledge - grasping only the moment of transcendental catharsis and superiority that they realise; reserving the state of potency there where, in correspondence with the evocation of the cosmic, universal layers of samskâra (first epoch), it can be truly unconditioned - by means of an internal and absolute relationship with the ultimate root of the entities, and no longer by imposition and command upon their particular projected emanations. - Moreover, in the present order, the protection of the imaginative organ from subjugation to an incomplete subjectivity is related both to the preceding phase, which is directed up to a culmination of abstraction and detachment; and from the hierarchical antecedence of the category, where it is required that one gets used to denying any arbitrary will, to wanting things for themselves subsisting only as the correlative 'emptiness' or non-being of those things.

The technique of magic here would, in any case, have the following formula: to give as the body of the command the act by which a given being is evoked and mentally transcended or suggested in its 'way', in its subtle form made up of activity. The presupposition, which can be detected quite easily in the various procedures, whether evocative or ritual, is the so-called magical principle of analogy from which the sympathy of objective reality with such a form is postulated, which prolongs it and to which, through living identification, the centre of Ego is transferred: the action on the subtle image of a thing, the mode of which has been inwardly reconstructed or implemented, is an action on the thing. As for the maxim, which is added, of "modelling one's imagination on the 'cosmic imagination'", this must be understood in the light of what was said above in relation to the condition of purity of mind: since to speak of a 'Imagination of nature', which already exists as a transcendent model (e.g. in a divine mind) of phenomena, is meaningless - it is in fact

something that is generated by the process, is the understanding of experience in a more perfect form, which stands to the sensible one in the relation of act to power. Suprasensible reality is a true synthetic integration of the phenomenon, an integration that exists only by virtue of the inner energy of the I, in the I and as the I.

The dynamic world itself, therefore, already constitutes an initial mediation between the ideal and the real - between the two terms of the antithesis of the person: it is the world of 'enlightenment', of the neo-Platonic *ελλαμψις*, it is the 'subtle' world (*sûkshma*, *linga*) of Indian traditions, the world 'reborn in mind' or from the "magnesia of the philosophers" (Hermeticism) or from the "diaphanous" (Kabbalism, Martinism); its matter or abstract possibility - called "astral light", "great magical agent", *aour*, etc. - is like a luminous spiritual aether (*cidâkâsha*), as a correlative of what in sensible experience is spatiality and, on the other hand, as the resolution of the state of sleep. - is like a spiritual luminous ether (*cidâkâsha*), as the correlative of what in sensible experience is spatiality and, on the other, as the resolution of the state of sleep. These processes imply a progressive re-actuation of the consciousness in those areas that have been obscured in the service of personal affirmation: it is like a rebirth more and more backwards and inwards - the luminous centre of the Ego takes up again and again from the depths (i.e.: mediates, creates a will where there was only spontaneity) what it was simply looking at, those powers that were only manifested to it as immediate external images by the law of reflection. These powers sink into the dark waters of dream, sleep and death, only at the surface of which float the fragmentary bright spots of personal consciousness. Already in sleep all that comes from the realm of the senses disappears, but at the same time the presence of a consciousness that, like that of the human state of existence, is under the condition of correlation precisely to a sensible, to an external. One understands, therefore, that it goes another way for the one who has achieved that detachment, that purification and fixation of the mind, mentioned above. He already to a certain extent crosses, alive, the 'threshold of Proserpine', already to a certain extent participates in a life freed from the immediate corporeal vehicle. This life is liberated in the state of sleep as a luminous aether, in whose initial differentiation later resurfaces and takes shape, in kind of new active and purified dream⁸, the world, transfigured into a dynamic world or 'subtle'. The state of sleep, indeed, is the one in which, in principle, the first realisations occur, since it in a certain way naturally protects the nascent formations from the violence of the sensitive impressions, the former of which would not suddenly be able to match intensity. However, this is provisional: active perceiving must not in fact be another faculty, limited to particular moments and juxtaposed to sensitive perceiving, but rather the transformation without

residue of this. Let, then, the powers of the senses know how to tear themselves away, to divert themselves from the objective, on which they remain as if hallucinated and enchanted; let the power 'imagination' become stronger than that to which the objective itself corresponds. From the physical, sensitively conditioned waking world, one must be able to abstract it with an internal act that denudes it into intellectual essences: into entities of rhythm and 'harmony'⁹.

In principle, freedom, in addition to form (brought from passive perception to active perception) must certainly reassert itself on content - but this not yet possible at this point, where the dimension, which is dominated, is the indeterminate, immediate, indifferent formative power of the phenomenon; but when the Ego has resolved the mediated, individualised and individualising power of the phenomenon itself. Just as the world of form in relation to the principle of the individual becomes indistinct and indifferent at all, taken up in a single dimension, so analogous characters inherent in the dynamic world, which is its simple conversion into the active. In this world, or in this essence made up of activity, the ego cannot perceive any internal distinction: it is entirely dissolved and everything, however dissimilar, is similar to it. If, beyond Schwelgen [silence], a need arises in the individual in this irradiation into liberation analogous to that which, for example, in sensual experience led him to the distinction of a semblance from a reality, its satisfaction is only to be sought in a going forward, in a further power of selfhood - in a passing into a new category.

§ 26 - WORLD OF THE 'WORD

With the category now constructed, the 'I' therefore surpasses the phenomenon, and makes the transcendental powers that form the world of the person in their moment of pure dynamism the subject of objective experience; , it is no longer the metaphysical dynamism of the self as person. It distinguishes from it, and yet transcends it in the higher power that makes possible, and actually implements, this exterior distinction. Such an expansion and projection beyond the sensible, into an inner conception of the exterior according to dynamic formations, is thus the value that underlies the previous category, and dominates its movement. However, this experience, at its end, leads to a new distance, matter for a further synthesis.

Does not the possibility of the dynamic, which is its principle, in fact follow, precisely and essentially, from a dynamic element, defined above as an expansion beyond the sensible limit? This means that of the postulated objectification, that relating to the dynamic world proper is but a partial form: for it demands that the ego be capable of detaching from itself, of releasing in a higher evocation, this same power with which the elemental of samskâra has made itself the object of supersensible experience. The value of mediation thus distances itself from the movement proper to the category: it presides over it, forms it and expresses itself in it, but it also transcends it. By objectifying its own immediacy, the individual mediates itself; but the perfection of such mediation is to be achieved by overcoming the immediacy of the power by virtue of which the immediate is distinguished. All that remains to be clarified is the possibility of such a requirement, that is, how the power of distinguishing does not imply this same power, and thus how something other than a vicious circle can be had.

Certainly, nothing is, which is not for the Ego and, therefore, which does not have as its basis a certain positing - an elementary activity must be a condition of this, as it is of any other form. The question will therefore not be about such a generic activity, but about the mode, the meaning that must qualify it in order to the instance; a meaning that in a certain sense should elevate the distinguishing to a new power and, almost, distance it from itself.

The dynamic supersensible proceeded by an expressive gesture from within,

directly referred to the ego. Now when in the body of activity, which he experiences, such a centrifugal direction is immediately overturned and reversed into the opposite one, he will certainly feel distinct in its earlier distinctive power. And so, in the further illuminative flash of a more intense and decisive gesture of evocation-distinction, here is an expansion, a freeing of things: they come alive, they move of themselves, and they come, as it were, to meet the Ego in an expression, even though they always remain experienced in an active and interior manner, even though they always have for matter and condition a creative perceiving: almost as if the freedom of positive perception were a mere instrument lent for the manifestation of an inspiration, of something that one can no longer creatively self-define, but which one receives, one hears, as if proceeding from self-existing cosmic functions in the spiritual void. Such is the 'sound' of things, clarity, the act of their 'light' and their silent rhythmicity; a reflection of the objectification and understanding in the subtle realities of that same power that brought them into existence.

And insofar as the productivity appropriate to the objective according to the dynamic formations of the previous category had the value of an elementary mediation, just as something mediated, like an interiority must appear as the principle of what the ego experiences or produces in this further mediation: the world will no longer appear as a collection of elementary energies, indifferent in themselves, but rather as a collection of reflections; and just as in relation to the dynamic 'subtle' the sensitive was felt as a mere shadow and peel, so relation to these, it is the dynamic itself that becomes a symbol, an abstract expressive body. We could therefore refer to the idea of meaning: the dynamic that includes within itself the innermost principle by which it can be conditioned is, properly speaking, conception; and the world that now resonates within the Ego is like a living language in which a system of meanings is conceived and expressed. It reveals and embodies the profound interiority of samskâra at the moment of its determination as a whole of needs, values, original reasons - a whole which, because of the inherent nature of the new mediating element, is, unlike the simple elementary world, something inwardly distinct and articulate. In such a whole, what was the sensible world appears without residue. The objective thus becomes like the mirror, like the spiritual transparency of the person's original formation; everything is immediately given as a function of the profound reason from which it was elementarily brought into existence in the order of the particular, so that now the experience of it is undoubtedly that of a metaphysical self-recognition in action. Self-recognition which, as we have said, is simultaneously a distinguishing, an objectifying and freeing from itself an even more

deep interiority - but in that, in the subject and power of such an act, an arousal in a centre that is inwardly superior to what is known, and in the order of that.

At the present point we are in an experience, which is the resolution in metaphysical 'purity' of that which is concept related to physical perception - in the same way that the subtle world is the resolution in metaphysical 'purity' of this perception itself. We can call it gnosis. The proper of gnosis is to grasp an object directly, not as an object or even as an entity of rhythm, but as a meaning. "Directly" - that is: not by induction, inference or analogy on the basis of the immediate datum of physical perceptions (in the manner of understanding proper to the human plane, e.g. by writings or the word of others), but by a simple act that is a transformation of the very act of sensible perceiving. In other words, the discursive condition, the Kantian distinction of the intellectual forms from the sensibility of which they are the form, is lacking - and it is lacking not in law, but in fact, not in a particular doctrine, but in the immediate datum of consciousness: perception dematerialises entirely, and immediately as such is an intelligere; but, again, intelligere not as a cold, abstract judgement or concept, but as the transparency of living realities, of which every concept is but the 'corpse', the dead and exterior reflection.

Experience is thus illuminated with an intrinsically noetic character: it is the locus of what in some esoteric schools is called 'occult scriptural reading'; it is the direct realisation of nature as a great symbolism, as a myth in which - to use Olympiodorus' well-known phrase - 'the principles and powers of the intelligible world' - *κοσμος νοητος* [intelligible cosmos], the world of 'formative ideas' - are outwardly and sensitively manifested; the unfolding of things into "sounds" that are their "names", "syllables of wisdom", *λογοι σπερματικοι* [seminal words], "letters of light", mantras, *mâtrkâ*, *claviculae*, articulations of that "objective universal language" whose concept is so recurrent in initiation, that in schools, such as the Tantric and Kabbalistic ones, it has given rise to a true positive science of potency.

The structure of the category, however, is such that this thought, which is living spirit, has an objective character and nothing more personal or psychological. It cannot be referred to the ego in direct relation to its production, as was the case with the thought that he laboriously worked out from the material world;

he has it rather in the sense of a 'thought of the world' that fertilises his mind, that almost comes to him as in an aspiration and a gift. This, the second heterogeneity between the intellectual act proper to the world of gnosis, and that inherent to the world of the person, particularly reflection.

On the other hand, as we have already said, the objective character of the content of such categories directly expresses the condition for real self-recognition, for self-awareness as a metaphysical entity.

Let us repeat: it is a matter of knowing, which is to understand, to possess - but none of this can take place as long as the 'I' is immersed, in an identity-in-act relationship, in what it is to know, in its own substance or mediation as a person. Given such a situation, the urge to understand oneself transcendently, far from being able to be satisfied, would only succeed in creating a new material, in addition to the existing, for self-knowledge. Instead, it is necessary to free oneself, to distinguish oneself, thus to project one's interiority, to make it a somewhat external reality, something that stands before us. But this, the other hand, implies assuming external reality in such a form of perception that it directly reflects the interiority of the Ego¹⁰ : the process of such a knowledge is therefore mutual with that of interiorising and investing with subjectivity - according to progressive degrees - the exterior beyond the trace of its simple formal emergence. And things then show themselves to us as the realisation of what the Ego has willed and still wills as a person, albeit under the alteration proper to the law of reflection; he understands his own transcendental will, and every determination - those very ones that at another point had the semblance of evidence and intimacy - is to him simple matter of myth that in the new perceiving is immediately consummated in meaning.

Hence, on the whole, we can say that gnosis is a transcendent science of self identical to a spiritual science of things according to the unique phenomenon of an absolute objectivity given in direct, immaterial insights of meaning as "sounds of wisdom". Self-science that is not only living reality, but, again, simultaneously, realisation - realisation of domination, of liberation, of superiority according to the already indicated procedure of such values from every active self-projection.

Let us say, then, that what was understood in earlier phases as natural law, physical formation or function, etc., turns out to be nothing more than the outward and phenomenal aspect of cosmic currents of desires, sensations, wills, etc., which various meanings command. That foundation of affectivity, of

will, of immanent teleology animating the physical, which in the person remained connected to his body alone and of which the rest of nature - which is also a constitutive part of the person - was deprived, determining this almost in the sense of paralysed limbs or fallen into an incomprehensible automatism devoid of interiority; that foundation, let us say, now invests the entire system of things. Internal experience and external experience thus transmute into one another, they become co-extensive with one another - not in the critical sense that the external itself is but an accommodation of the psychological datum, but in the sense that now the whole of nature is understood inwardly as a gesture or movement is understood in the will, passion and purpose of the person who determines it. It is the same process of the construction of the person that is now experienced in the events of the world, no longer from the reflective-formal point of view, but from that of an interiority of being of meaning. The whole of nature wakes up, comes alive, becomes something living: everything in it comes together in an organic being whose whole says: I. The 'I' is the supreme sense that is received from the whole of the world as a set of syllables and phrases.

In connection, we can add a few words about what was said earlier about the 'gods'.

A single act determines the person and the special world he experiences, the subjective and the objective two refractions of an identical ray. Lived in an immediate way, such an act is the ideal unity, presupposed by the possibility of knowing in general, principium relationis of two aspects that therefore remain extrinsic to each other. Mediatedly experienced, the identical act instead founds the resolution of such extrinsicity and purely formal unity in the sense of living correspondences between macrocosm and microcosm. Thus the correspondences of the various organs and functions of the body with certain elements and powers of nature are revealed directly to the Ego and, beyond this, as a moment of unity of the correspondences, as acts of absolute perception, now transcending the law of reflection, the various 'gods' come into existence, precisely in the sense of the simplicities of the very syntheses that construct the person. And at the

"The 'vision' opens up precisely the world of the gods as perfect actuality - no longer experienced in the indifferent dynamic moment as in the previous category, but according to the mediated and distinct principle of conception - of the various relations in which the polarity of sensitive perception is characterised - i.e. on the one hand the organic functions, on the other the elementary principles of nature. It has already been pointed out that we are dealing here with the so-called underworld gods' or 'lunar gods' of the powers that characterise the world of particularity, not with the 'superior gods' or 'higher gods' of the world of the universe.

"solar" that correspond to the aeonic powers of the first epoch and that will only be encountered, and under a different relation, in the following section; as well as it has been said that the individual, by right, is and must be something superior to the various Gods that he gradually makes become in his experience. We can note that the structure of the Gnostic experience, its inspirational and objective form is such, that in those who venture along these directions without the immanent science of what they are doing (and this is the case of the majority of mystics and saints) can lead to the conviction of a kind of experimental proof of doctrines such as those of the

'grace' or of an eternal transcendent Wisdom as the ultimate limit. But, in , it is nothing of the sort. We have seen that this particular mode of the Gnostic experience only arises from a tempering of the Ego in a more subtle sufficiency (analogous to that of "love" with respect to the "trial by fire"): and that the act of experiencing and accepting this inspired transcendence, just as such, without residue, is the act that makes the Ego superior and transcendent with respect to this transcendence itself - superior to the world of Wisdom. An 'inferior' God is surpassed at the point where he is evoked, whereas a true conquest is required for 'surpassing' Gods.

In relation then to the unique personalising act experienced, as we said, first immediately and then mediately, and to the relative transformation into an intelligible act of what is mere sensible factuality, while anticipating to a certain extent what is proper to the next category, we can make the following suggestion. In its literal meaning (and even more so in the German terms *begreifen* [contain], *ergreifen* [grasp]), which is its most concrete,

'Understanding' expresses the idea of a containing in itself, of a mediating and mastering. It is intelligible to me what I 'understand' and what I determine. We have already set out the reasons that lead us to deduce the world of the not-I from a subjective activity, yes, but a spontaneous one. Spontaneity, on the other hand, has been said to be an identity of the possible and the real, and this can also be understood in this way: an unleashing from the depths of powers that are too impetuous, but, above all, too rapid for me to be able to grasp them, hold them back, control them before I simply find myself before their fact, their mere appearance in representation: too rapid for me to be able to comprehend them. But for one

"transcendental readiness", for a lightning quickness in launching and intrepidly adapting the point of self-sufficiency (the dominion of that "being able to say no when all a prodigious force wants yes") to the spontaneities in the subterranean level in which they are aroused and which opens up to the ego in its ever-increasing backwardness - deeper and deeper; for such a capacity, sensitive reality is understood, is conceived - is made intelligible: evidence arises, intimacy, where there was darkness of

things of nature. What prevents one from grasping the first metaphysical experiences is rightly an insufficiency of inner quickness, sympathetic to that 'fear' and 'egoism' mentioned above.

Also for the awakening of gnosis there are precise methods, on which, given the nature of the present exposition, we will not dwell, referring, for some elements, to our already mentioned Man as Power - where we speak of mantras and nyâsa - and to the practical instructions given in the magazine Ur, which we direct. Generally speaking, and in a predominantly intellectual way (dhyâna-yoga), we can say that it is a rhythm of absorption, in intensification, in a dynamic entity to which suddenly happens an act of abstraction, a lightning destruction of the subjective energy with which said entity was materialised. This evokes, denudes in flashing, the deepest power, hierarchically prior to the subtle formations.

The world of 'sound' is the resolution of the level proper to deep sleep, the place of what in Indian traditions is called the 'causative body' (kârana- sharîra).

§ 27 - INDIVIDUATING INDIVIDUAL

Every externalisation of the interior excites a deeper interiority, and yet at the point at which the powers of conception become supersensibly objective, the ego - in the correlative moment of subjectivity - taps into the level of the principle that is hierarchically superior to them, the principle that conditions and implements them. This transcendent and conditioning with respect to conceiving, can only be the person in his naked being, in that unnamable, elemental root on which gravitates the totality of that world, which has arisen from the mediation of formal freedom throughout the entire second epoch. Distinct from the two first powers of samskāra beyond mere phenomenon, the Ego is not so with respect to this third. At the ideal limit of the previous category it is, however, undoubtedly aroused, placed, but according to dialectical correlation with function, whereby value is derived from freeing from self-reference what is nevertheless but a productive intuition. Hence the way to a new synthesis: a synthesis in which the individual's Ego itself becomes a matter to the projecting function, in which it is invested by it as by something, only by acting in which it has its act. It is the distinctive power of the individual that takes on the person itself, which is overwhelmed, projected, liberated: it dies in an affirmation that affirms the principle beyond, that is, that affirms the distinction, with which it is elementarily materialised; the object of which - that is, that which is projected, externalized, that which is felt as something else in absolute spiritual freedom - is itself, the Ego itself as transcendental personality, as the centre of the world of particularity and reflection. Thus, beyond the world of sense, the higher power of an individuating individual, in which this whole phase, which we might call 'transcendental purification', 'denuding', comes to an end. It is, therefore, the state of an I bypasses individuation not negatively, but actively, creatively, of an I that no longer IS, that is no longer passive with respect to its own existence, but that its own existence as an individualised I lives as a function of cause, under the title of a particular possibility in which contingently an infinite power of individualising can be determined, in which its centrality now passes through and is transformed. And on such a higher level, to know is precisely to project oneself, to flash as Ego in the various beings, in the various individualisations - that is, to implement the various beings, the various individualisations as Ego from above this absolute principle, which now has the sense of a plastic genus, of an indeterminate power capable of assuming the

arbitrariness the person of any being, further still than their luminous essence made of motion, further still than their resounding in names of wisdom - in formless, motionless spiritual simplicity. It is that 'projection' - the power to make oneself appear, as it were, before , to externalise one's personal self - which, according to the symbol, creates 'multiplication' - a multiplication that then reconverts into a transcendent principle of unification: a life that has conquered the necessity of a particular, unconvertible individuation, which is a free higher 'dimension' than this one, in fact, by right; continuum of an identity, of a 'same' (ταυτον) in the discontinuity, in the 'other' (ετερον) of infinite individuated beings into which she projects herself: in her continuing as in a higher depth, these are unified just as in the submarine mass of a continent the scattered multiplicity of separate islands emerging from the waters is continued and unified.

The ego, therefore, multiplies itself, awakens in the various beings coexisting in space, resolves space itself, dematerialises it - from its factitious form (place external coexistence of things) - and realises the profound meaning that is buried there and in which it consists: indifference, place of coexistence of several meanings that can be composed for freedom, dominated by an inner understanding, which is now given a 'state of power' by the projective function. And in this space that is resolved and made spirit, in this space that extinguishes all particular or privileged self-reference, knowledge acquires a synthetic, integral character, whereby it transmutes into gestures of a cosmic consciousness. And just as the many coexisting externally in space find unity in the individual individuating individual, so too do the many unfolded in time, so that time ceases to be a condition, and in that "eternal memory" that the Book of Psalms connects to the "Just One", the truth of the doctrine of reincarnation is constructed according to direct experience - the continuity of personal syntheses, discontinuous when, in the immediacy of his function, the individuating individual identified himself, precipitated himself, in what was gradually placed by him. And yet the apex from which this glory of omniconsciousness proceeds is an immortal life: for free from death, free from alteration, generation and corruption is αυτοζων, the life that is from itself - its being being being resolved in the cause of being, its individuated finiteness being transcended into the infinity of the individuating.

And one thus arrives on the threshold of pure magical realisation. From self-projection the process of selfhood, from formal, is made material. The individual, up to this point, affirmed himself in actively assuming the various orders a reality that in immediacy was present according to the antithesis of a

"given"; but, as to content, it always obeyed the original individuation of samskâra, which remained unchanged beyond the transformed form of perception. But in the simple element of the Ego there is a principle that transcends this individuation, and in which form and matter fall into the same point. It follows that the act which, in bringing the process of disidentification to a conclusion, projects this same element, is an act that at the same time invests the order of content - of being, of the universal. He who has conquered the principle of being in itself and resolved it into freedom, has also virtually resolved it in everything, so that the possibility opens up for him of an act that is absolutely - not only formally, but also materially - sufficient for himself, of an act that truly starts from the depths, from an absolute purity, and is therefore capable of commanding and agitating not what is particular in beings, but what is universal and substantial in them. And metaphysical knowledge implying, as we have said, projection, this, then, is the point of the Gnostic's evidence: "Know thyself, and thou shalt be king".

Again: since in the 'thus it is' transformed into the 'thus I will', in the act that beyond the rational construction of the essence of a thing also assumes its existence in order to give it a power, lies, according to what was said at the time¹¹, the condition for that absolute certainty, in which simultaneously absolute reality, reason, the pure state of right of beings is kindled; we can say that only for and in the life of the individual individuating the contingency, the relativity, the oblique uncertainty of things and of the mind is vanquished. In it, things are "They 'transform according to substance', they are 'formed of power', they open up to the fulfilment of a magical world - of a world in the state of act and autarky - but, in this, they take place in the ether of an absolute truth and being.

In that of the present category, the very interval separating the first epoch from the second is thus re-generated - an interval terminated on the one hand by the power of being, on the other by the absolute freedom that grafts, onto the universal of such a being, the contingent factor, relative to a particular possibility. Only that the meaning of this interval is here turned upside down: the value, from personally experiencing being, shifts to experiencing the person from the level of the principle of being, which has therefore been transformed from the intermediate process into that of a 'state of power'. And if such a re-generation of the interval from which the person is drawn emerged already at the beginning of the epoch, then the ego was only sufficient at the antithesis of the abstract principle of being of a particular world, and precisely as antithesis. Now - he is instead to the complete mediation of it, correlative to the totality of the second epoch and, at the same time, to the abstract principle

of being of the universal. To master, then, in a sufficiency not such an abstract principle, but its accomplished mediation (correlative to the totality of the first epoch) - constitutes a further task, from which one is led to the following second section.

The doctrine of reincarnation in the West, especially in various theosophist currents, has been created an absolutely erroneous concept, due to the fact that it neglects the fact that it is a doctrine that can only be justified within esoteric wisdom; that it cannot be said to be true for the profane, for vulgar man, but only for the "initiated", for the siddha, for the sadhu, for the rshi - as the Indian texts express it. It is that beyond the second age there is no valid truth, except as evidence of a realisation, of a present, direct experience. Now to a personal being in no way does it become apparent either that he has lived other lives or that he has to live more lives - not only that, but he knows positively that his sense of self, his sense of his own individuality, is inseparably connected with specific unity of that concrete incorporation, in which he finds himself living; so that to say that he himself has lived in other bodies has evidently no meaning whatsoever. It will have it only when the ego can disidentify itself from the individuated and realise itself as individuating: then it will actually possess itself in something that, as superior to any individuation in particular, can realise a continuity of consciousness and recollection in the transition from body to body. But that means: having conquered death.

Against the concept immortality as a given rather than as something to be constructed, the argument, in fact, is the same one that removes all foundation from the doctrine of reincarnation applied to plane of finite being: since the path that, alone, men can experience in themselves - comprèsvi all the 'highs' and

"the 'lower', the 'material' and 'spiritual' and the remaining matter of the categories of reflection - is inseparably bound up with the correlation to the unity of a corporeal substratum (an injury can disrupt or sever the consciousness of a 'genius' just as much as that of the last peasant), there is no basis for assuming a permanence of the conscious identity of the ego when this unity is lost. Hence it must be said that, by its very nature, the human soul is not immortal, but mortal. Immortal, it is only so far as it makes itself so - that is: so far as it knows how to re-generate itself according to a life that subsists independently of the condition of the body. But - and this is the essential - this is not in an absolutely positive sense. It is a matter of addressing, according to precise and ordered methods

given by the esoteric, and independent of any belief, faith, philosophy or morality, stages in which, through loss of support, through the dissolution of the 'compound' (as the hermeticists call the state of an ego in blind sympathy with corporeal nature), the consciousness of a finite being would fail - that is, up to the limit of reabsorption, of death: To voluntarily arouse, therefore, the very blaze of death but, nevertheless, to be able to bear it, to be able to identify with it lightning-fast and actively so that, not overcome but overcoming it, in it one grasps not death but the very act of the individuating individual, in it one has that which trans-forms, which brings about a reaffirmation of the Ego beyond itself, beyond form, beyond its particularity^{1Z}. Beyond the particular - but, also, beyond the universal.

This is a fundamental point. If the aim of some schools, which rather than esoteric we could say mystical, is to resolve the individual into non-individuals - be it an undifferentiated infinity, such as the Vedântine nirguna-brahman, be it a transcendent order or harmony - in the magical direction that, alone be it an undifferentiated infinity, such as the Vedic nirguna-brahman, or a transcendental order or harmony - in the magical direction that is appropriate to the present hierarchical place, holds fast to the point of the Ego, to the point of an autarchy subsisting beyond all "dissolution", which, precisely, will only serve him to dissolve and reassert himself even higher, in the world beyond the human, beyond the finite. And yet the man who has crossed the 'threshold of Proserpine', who has crossed the 'underworld' will present himself not as a god, but as a ruler of gods. But this requires above all that that identification with the power of death, which is the element of the universal, be only a point of passage, beyond which a superiority is again asserted; it requires that with mortal nature this power too be vanquished, broken, torn from the original form in which it immediately erupts - which is the spontaneity, the 'nature' of the first epoch - and tamed under 'I'. Such is the 'rescue from the waters', the "mercury fixation", the "dragon fight" or the "Taurus", the "incest". Death is that life, which is mortal to the absolute Individual.

It is thus that, in the same projective act of this category, the 'heavens collapse' - the supersensible worlds dissolve in the frightening vision of a wild, chaotic, voraginous activity, of an activity unleashed in a 'going', in a radical craving that, burning with eternal thirst and eternal disgust, runs in perpetual generation and destruction of its forms, in destiny of rebirths ever different in their identical inconsistency and transience. Tañha, ocean of samsâra, mâyâ- shakti, Typhon, Jaldabaot, 'humid principle' or 'lunar', 'terrestrial Venus', "Great Flowing Down Jordan", "Great Magic Agent", "Astral Serpent" - so many names from traditions of East and West, signs for this experience, for this sense in which, against the value of the individual, the pure

evoked theetic power. Such are the "waters" - and an Ego that, freed from its corporeal life, can "fix" them, is one "saved from the waters" (cf. the connection of this symbol to the legend of Moses), is one "walking on the waters" (hence the symbolic sense of the well-known Christic "prodigy"). And one can understand how the

"remembrance" of the infinite rebirths and the terrible vision of samsâra flashing to the point of that bodhi, which is transcendent liberation, the actual possibility of nirvâna, are elements present simultaneously in the well-known episode of the Buddha's life.

In this regard: If for 'sublunar' beings (that is, for beings who are under the 'wet principle', who in the deep substratum of their personal life are dominated by it) there is no immortality, but only a residue of larval life among the realms of the underworld gods that gradually reveal themselves and flash back to them for and in the very act a progressive unravelling and sinking - for the one who has faced the impetus of the 'waters', who has created an ever-growing resistance to them to the point of breaking the law and overwhelming them, making them all gravitate towards himself as towards something that has proved stronger than them - for him a double possibility opens up. On the one hand, nirvâna, as the power of grasping the supreme act in the destruction of the root of samsâra-moksha, liberation as a reabsorption that does not mean annihilation (as according to the vulgar meaning of the term nirvâna), but rather conversion into the pure essence of the Ego, sufficiency of a universal that possesses itself in the state of a contained, detached, unmanifested possibility. On the other hand, an autarky not as suspension or destruction, but as the dominion of unleashed force: the power to wield it, to fold it inexorably back upon itself and, through this purification (symbolised by the "Virgin" who holds the lunar serpent underneath her), to kill it at spontaneity, at "craving", and then regenerate it and organise it under itself as a "body of power"¹³. Such is the "conversion of the lower waters into higher waters", such the equivalent of *ενωσις*, of "union with the Father", such the "incest" - the act of the son reaching out and possessing her from whom he was born¹⁴ - such, finally, the Gnostic and Buddhistic "flowing up of the waters", the conversion of the kundalinî and its ascent along the "Via Regia" of sushumnâspoken of in the yoga of the Shâkta ¹⁵.

And so a further stage unfolds, the development of which gives rise to the remaining categories. The 'dragon' or 'bull' is the 'guardian of the threshold' of the magical world - only by those who have been able to conquer and subdue the wild force of spontaneity does the 'kingdom of heaven', the world of the overcoming Gods or Aeons, suffer violence. And such a kingdom, such violence, is its further task. The Gods

superior are the enemies of initiate, of the 'saved from the waters'; inasmuch as they are the powers of spontaneity of that primordial nature of his only after which the Ego, the value of the person, was born, each of them, unleashed, tends to overwhelm such a value, to submerge it, to reabsorb it in its own wild nature¹⁶. So if to him whose ego tends to dissolve into the universal 'like a grain of salt in an ocean of water', the world of the spirit may well appear as the realm of order, of peace, of eternal unity - to him, on the other hand, who has the universal as a test, as a point of non-difference beyond which, more vast and intense, renewed, made free and divine, the mode of the Ego must be found, it appears instead as a set of powers in a free state, naked, voracious, blissful and terrible powers and at one time not governed by any law, reason or providential plan, but caught up in a play of tensions, against which all that is struggle on the material plane is but a reflection; without, therefore, hatred, destructive violence, will in the muscular sense of the term, so to speak, finding any place in it. Here, the struggle is like a calm coming face to face of 'presences', like a coming together of degrees of being, of quanta of intensity. No power wants, strictly speaking, to overwhelm and dominate the others, but this proceeds in a natural way, by virtue of the highest degree of being that is proper to it, which is a vortex into which the lesser powers that come into relation with it are irresistibly attracted, taken over and subordinated. To win - that is, to maintain one's autonomy and, in this, the summit of the hierarchy - here means to hold firm. That which invests an entity and fails to overwhelm it, is fatally overwhelmed by it and taken over in its law. There is no gap in this world of tension: not to subordinate is to be subordinated.

Such is the sphere into which the individual is carried by the 'serpentine force'. And in order to maintain its quality, here it must make itself the highest quantity: its value does not subsist in the face of the aeonic powers except on the condition of conquering them, of wresting from them the quantum of "fate" that they bear in order to take upon itself, as on a larger consistency, the weight and responsibility. In its ascent along sushumnâ, it is taught that kundalinî awakens the various tattvas, which are precisely the planetary gods, the "rulers of the spheres of Fate"¹⁷, the hierarchy of the moments in which demiurgic power is articulated and in which it naturally encounters a mediation that exasperates and ever deeper within itself restrains, burns and converts. The rhythm is: evoke - relate - identify - transcend. The projection of the Ego into a given element now excites its universal nature, unleashes monstrous and instantaneous vortices that transport it: it is necessary to transform oneself into them, to let oneself go intrepidly but, at the limit, where their power is exhausted, to reassert oneself: to make the Ego continues them, what takes them even further, where they do not dare, do not know how to

reach - which therefore transcends and overwhelms them insofar as it proves itself as something that in the very order of their quality, of what they are, is more than them and stronger than them. And such a 'stronger' is 'more than strong', such a 'more power' and 'more than power' - it is the transcendence of power, it is value: domination.

In this extremely dangerous life, frighteningly vibrating between chasms, cyclones, ever more intense, ever more lightning-fast and overwhelming spiritual thunderbolts, upwards, from sphere to sphere, from hardness to hardness even harder, stronger, more irresistible - in such a life the *εκπύρωση* - the consummation, the act, the *τέλος* of the worlds - is progressively ignited. The Ego that at no point fails in tension, that at no point lags behind the dizzying tide of the unleashing of its entire nature - of an entire infinity - but simultaneously creates itself in exact, co-extensive sufficiency that enchains it and 'fixes' it, such an Ego transforms chaos into order, into logic, into absolute, unequivocal law: it organises a world in the state of absolute reason.

This is because of the generic sense of the remaining process, which can be summarised as follows: transforming the unity of mere understanding, or Apollonian (proper to a consciousness that can extend to any content), into the unity of domination, or Dionysian (proper to entities assumed no longer in function of consciousness, but in function of power - and this properly means: organising). Returning, however, to the present point, we would like to add a few considerations from a more exoteric level.

[On cosmic consciousness] - The individuating individual is defined by a freedom from the 'I' (in the personal sense), which, however, does not mean deprivation of the 'I', but rather the power to manifest or project an 'I'. To whatever he directs his attention, that, then, he becomes - his thought of a place or instant his presence in that place or instant. Thus things are grasped as certain and absolute as the Ego, in the very evidence of the Cartesian cogito, is certain and absolute. We note, however, that this power of transformation here is restricted to a psychic, cognitive sphere: in order to be able to transform oneself entirely, i.e. not only in the consciousness, but also in the 'nature', in the 'bodies' of a being (which, in fact, amounts to creating that being), one must go further, in reabsorption of the various powers of the universal and spontaneity (the state of the first epoch).

[On androgyny] - The power of the passing away appears as death and also appears as the force of sexual generation - for in such generation there is precisely the passing away of life into something else - an act that rips continuity from the individual and rejects it to the transcendence of the species. Hence the connection of Tantric kundalinî, of the Gnostic and Kabbalistic "serpent", of the Hermetic "mercury" (as well as of various related practices) to sexual energy - and, from another aspect, the importance given to virginity and chastity in many magical operations. It is clear then that to overcome death is also to overcome the law of generation - and to transform heterogeneration into self-generation. The individuating individual, the victor of the Dragon, the reborn in inspiration (the 'spirit' that hovers above the waters) has life in himself, is αὐτοζωόν, and yet is androgynous. He has killed alteration, impurity, lust: he has 'put an end to the work of woman'. He himself gives his life, which does not pass away, but in and from himself subsists, immortal.

[On the Rule of Law] - On the occasion of what was said in the first book about the problem of essence and existence¹⁸, we said just above that in the conversion of the elementary principle of spontaneity the first element of the conversion of the irrational into absolute rationality is also brought into being. If, in contrast to what the thing is (τι ἐστίν what is), Wesen, what, essentia) and which the concept can dominate, there is the being of things (το ὅτι [the quod], Dasein, that, existentia) which, contingent on the former, eludes such dominion (the deduction, i.e. the determining, of the concept can, at most, arrive at the idea existence but existence as such eludes it), such a heterological can appear either as the inexplicable absolute, or as the absolute explanation, depending on whether it is experienced as something one undergoes (the sensible 'given', that which is and yet does not allow itself to be thought of - hence the profound sense of the negative moral characteristics, such as violence, 'injustice', imperfection, etc., attributed to it by ancient doctrines of the time), or as something that is not thought of (the 'given', that which is, that which is, that which is, that which is not thought of). attributed to it by ancient Greek doctrines); that is, as something that arises and of which the reason cannot be given simply because it is not to be given, power being in itself the ultimate reason. The rebirth of the will in the 'virgin' through the mediation of the unleashed force, realises precisely the passage of the irrational from the first to the second of these forms - and in the active relationship with that point on which essences depend both as to being and as to being as these certain powers and not others, determines precisely the pure state of law or 'justice' that

However, for now it only takes up a generic, undifferentiated substratum of things. And such absolute evidence, which does not proceed from 'reasons', but from the sense of a state of power, redeems, in the first place myself being there, experiencing myself precisely as such and so determined life, ceases to be the eternal mystery to me - not because I have 'known' the 'whence', the 'why', the 'where', the cause or end etc., vain semblances of reasons imagined to make up for the deficiency of the central reason - but because I can assume it and say: 'This is how I want myself - this is my absolute will!

Here we find one of the senses of the alchemical: 'With mercury, dissolve fixed': being, in these stages, is effectively dissolved, wrenched from necessity, made free of itself. It is resolved: as being, it is not - except as semblance, and hence the concept of *mâyâ* - which in various Indian schools expresses both "illusion" and creative power, magic - and the consequent penetration of the truth of Mahâyânic *Mi-rtog-pahi-yeshes* (gnosis) and Taoism, both of which affirm that the true substance of things is "emptiness" (*shûnyatâ*).

This view, which does not contradict the other, that in the individual individuating, what flows is "fixed" - but which integrates it in a complementary aspect according to a customary way of initiatory expositions, and oriental expositions in general, which certainly creates serious embarrassments for the profane. This has already been clarified where it was said how the process towards contingency can also be that of a progressive individuation¹⁹. When we speak of dissolving being, by being we mean the mode of being-bound-to-itself, of the identity of the possible and the real, proper to spontaneous activity: when, on the other hand, we speak of fixing the volatile or fluid ("freezing the waters"), by volatile we mean the contingency proper precisely to that which is subject to necessity, which does not have the principle in , and yet 'goes', in an unpredictable affair that at every point escapes possession. Autarky fixes such a contingency, even if it then regenerates it, transformed (conversion into 'higher waters').

¹ Note that now only that which the individual in the previous category opposes falls under negation, i.e. everything in the pure being of reflection or abstract form. Every determination is invested by the negating power, but only insofar as there is pure formality in it.

This negation therefore remains in a certain sense peripheral and phenomenal, it stops at the level of completed, exhausted formations without penetrating the deep current roots from which they arose as moments of value. It is therefore abstract: corresponding to the first gesture of the individual, the sphere in which it can only manifest itself reflects the immediacy and elementary nature of this. Just as the relative matter is uniform, all the various articulations of value remaining cancelled in the single character of pure formality, so uniform is the negation that takes place within a value, which remains identical and undifferentiated in contrast to the diversity of transcendental moments, from which the formations proceeded, against which it turns.

Z Evola's adherence to this theory of the German philosopher was superseded by Evola in Metaphysics of Sex in 1958 (4th edition: Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1996) (Ed.).

3 This is the famous precept recommended by the god Krishna to the hero Arjuna in the Baghavadgita and which Evola took up again, theorising it as a life behaviour, thirty years later in Riding the Tiger, published in 1961, but written at least ten years earlier (Ed.).

⁴ J.G. Fichte, Transzendente Logik, cit., p. 222.

⁵ Essays on Magical Idealism, cit., ch. V; and especially: Man as Power, cit., sec. III; Introduction to Magic as Science of the Ego, cit., vols. I, II and III.

⁶ L'Individuo e il divenire del Mondo, Libreria di Scienze e Lettere, Rome 1926.

⁷ Here, however, the way remains open to understand the possibility of certain practices of a certain kind of 'black' or witchcraft magic, in which fluidic beings are created through the projection of certain forms of exaggerated passion, and then have them act upon other beings that one is powerless to command directly - in the main because those who resort to such practices are still under the dependencies of a personal life.

⁸ That is to say: one speaks of dreams in an analogical way, since one assumes here that the irrational roots, made up of sensations, residues and desires of personal waking life, from which, send normal, the dream world is aroused, are now destroyed.

⁹It is important to note that, just as the datum is the antithesis of the form in general, indifferent to the various individualisations, what was previously valid as internal experience here only goes to constitute a particular domain, a species of the kind of that external, which must be internalised. The very thoughts and feelings, as they were customary to the person and interwoven with him, are superseded in particular dynamic beings, in relation to which they appear as mere phenomenal and lightless reflections: They are no longer thought and felt, but the ego, having detached itself from them and freed itself from them, goes on to perceive them as elements of a sui generis objective reality, as 'things', and can therefore move among them, observe them, act upon them, attract them or project them at a distance (telepathy) as well as 'load' objects onto them, which gives rise to a number of magical practices that, certainly at level of normal consciousness, must appear superstitious and 'materialising' of the 'spiritual'. And, in truth, it is indeed a matter of a true materialization, materialisation, which therefore implies the fulfilment of a spirituality that is elevated and detached as much from that of human beings as it is from the things of nature, which, however, at least according to the idealists, are themselves a projected spirituality, among which it is no wonder that one can move freely and dominate: as the magician does with respect to his thoughts and feelings. In this order another occult practice is the extraction or construction of one's physical body of a 'subtle double' as a vehicle for operations, which are not subject to the conditions of the former. Cf. Dîghanikâya, II, 85: "When the monk's mind is so concentrated, purified, transparent, devoid of desire, unblemished, pliant, skillful, fixed, unwavering, he directs and turns it towards the production of a body made of spirit. And so he draws from this [physical] body

another body, which has all organs and faculties, which has a form, but which consists of spirit'.

¹⁰The more objective the externalised powers appear, the deeper and more interior they are originally. This character must not, therefore, exclude recognition: it is necessary for the ego not to take the beings of the new world as something foreign, but rather as a reflection of what it is itself, so that their knowledge may be free of self-knowledge and, simultaneously, of superiority and detachment. "This is you" and "This, all of , is another", such are the principles that must simultaneously permeate the new experience. The a c t of recognising oneself in the various meanings within which oral things are pronounced in o g j e c t i v i t y is precisely what brings to perfection that value of active assumption and self-liberation, which is the basis of such experiences.

¹¹ Book I, § 5; § 7 [Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 161166 and 174179].

¹² This process, to tell the truth, is already developing in the disidentification proper to the previous categories, starting with the "trial by fire": however, its culmination is only now - and the projection of the root of the world of the second epoch assumed in its totality is the equivalent of death. Dynamic world, 'sense' and 'I', however, always remain objects of out-of-body experience, realised outside bodily conditions.

¹³ From the wound of the bull 'slain' by Mithra does not gush forth blood, but grain, 'divine bread': on the ground, it generates all new vegetation - a symbol for the world view of the aeons (cf. F. Cumont, Les Mystères de Mithra, Brussels 1913, p. 137). And the ear, again, in the Mysteries was connected to the "Virgin" (cf. Eratosthenes, Catasterisms, 9), i.e. to the "unaltered" power, free from the impurity of the dyad (v.d. from the duality inherent in the lust for a life that is not of itself, and the law of reflection of the human world). The meaning of all those myths in which a 'hero' slays a 'dragon' in order to 'liberate' from it a 'virgin' who then

he 'marries', is the same. Similarly, in an alchemical hieroglyphic of Notre Dame, one sees a Dragon departing, with its tail, from a man (from the 'rough stone'), embraces the 'atanòr' to show that it must be put in "digestion" and places its head under the foot of a "bishop": this is the autarch, born of fire, which, although it has mercury or dragon for its substance, is nevertheless the "digestion" v.d. the surpassing of the elemental (theetical) power into a possession. - Cf. J.W. Schelling, *Darstellung des philosophischen Empirismus: un "Being" is presupposed in the concept of being lord* (p. 260), and such is the potency of God. Schelling derives power (Macht) from mögen and mögen, in turn, from Magie; and since 'power' is also called können, there would be a verbal suggestion of the identity of knowing (kennen) - understood as the extraverted, phenomenal moment of power - with power (können). Thus this power or knowledge or 'substantiality' of God is, at the same time, the 'magician' that God draws from himself and enchains, since he would not be God - v.d. the lord being, and therefore the one who is free with respect to being - if he had not tamed this magician, which is his original power (p. 265).

¹⁴ Zeus, according to the myth reported by Athenagoras (XX, 292), after dismembering his father (passing into the age of individuation and finitude), presents the 'kingdom' (form of dominion proper to the person), chases his mother, Rhea (from e...n, 'she who flows', the 'going' proper to the nature of the theetical moment) that eludes him in various transformations, until, in 'serpentine' form, it is taken and possessed. In a whole variety of Hellenistic-Gnostic myths of the early centuries, the doctrine equally shines through, according to which the earthly man, descended from the heavenly man, is called to return to such a stage through his dominion over the powers of the cosmos (cf. G.R.S. Mead, *Thrice Greatest Hermes*, London Benares 1906, vol. I, p. 196 and ch. VII passim).

¹⁵ For the doctrine of kundalinî and related practices see our *L'Uomo come Potenza*, cit., sect. III [Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1988, pp. 147-292].

¹⁶ Such submersion, such insufficiency to the spontaneity unleashed,


leads back to the personality, to what Indian esotericism calls 'way of the ancestors' (pitrâna) or 'way of the Moon'.

¹⁷ The 'waters' - the first power to be overcome - correspond in symbolism to the 'Earth': it is from the 'mineral' that the androgynous germ is extracted (see post) of the 'mercury', it is in the 'earth' cakra (prthîvi) that kundalinî 'sleeps', it is from the "rock" or "stone" that one draws Mithra (θεος εκ πετρας), etc. After the Earth, the various planets, to which 'celestial' hierarchies, or archangels, genii, logoi, etc., correspond.

¹⁸ Cf. Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 3134.

¹⁹ Book I, sect. VI, p. 155 [Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 7794].

Section Two



§ 28 - THE LORD OF THE LIMIT

At the end of the previous category, therefore, the unconditioned function is realised which, in general, resolves the element of being or content. A further stage would consist in realising in a concrete and mediated body - in correspondence with the other powers of content - the new principle of the individual relating to this function; a principle which, for the moment, is by no means indeterminate, it is merely the abstract genus of the power.

Therefore, like any other, this passage beyond the forms of the first section is not commanded by any necessity. The individual now realises the contingency of his own individuation as well as of nature in general and, as has been said, can make such a point - of the abstract, formless power of selfhood - the ultimate instance (nirvâna). The term then would be the pure distinctive-dominative act, which, however, is indifferent - and therefore inadequate - to the varied material individuation of the distinct or dominated. To transcend the mere point of power and launch oneself into the unleashing and conquest of precisely those energies that are exactly congruent with such an individuation, and with them build oneself as a body (the 'cosmic body' or "magic" or "power", "the flaming mantle" with which "he who is naked" is wrapped) of which they are members - is instead the further possible perfection in which the individual can be conceived. This can be called 'redemption' or "liberation" or "regeneration" of the "world": after the naked I is renewed, 'reborn from above' - and, in him, things are now I - entire system of reality - things as they are, in their specific being - must be regenerated, made 'reborn from above' - and the two points stand between them as the power (in the Aristotelian sense) of the autarch in his act. Only there where all the infinite quality of the 'waters' as it is can be absolutely willed, can it be realised as a power that possesses itself and that only on its own pure essence is founded and rests - 'all in all, composed of all powers' - can principle and end be resolved in a dazzling lightning bolt that is that of value itself.

Now the possibility of reality is ordered according to three hierarchies parallel to the varying depths of the transcendental function that defined the three worlds of samskâra's externalisation, namely the dynamic world (sûkshma, linga), the world of conception (kârana) and the world of the ego (para). This tripartition as defined by the mediation

formal autarky, thus also defining its material mediation. That is, in the power of the unconditioned descended into the existential and in a simultaneous multum of real and distinct possibilities, the quality, the 'matter' of the universe must gradually be renewed in its three powers: a dynamism, a function of conception and one of pure determination erupting from the 'illusion' as forces no longer of the particular, but of the universal, are to be fixed, frozen, in entities literally made of freedom and domination, in transfigured, immaterial, eternal essences for an immobility that is the self-transcendence of power, the flower, the apex of the most extreme tension. - It remains to hint at a dialectical construction of these last three phases.

The previous category develops from that disidentification, in which the ego builds up a power to project and distance itself: it carries the value that, at the limit, is a purified form of domination. Now on the one hand, the elementary law of the distinctive and disidentifying act implies, justifies, wants a certain subsistence of the distinct, a certain reality of its own. On the other hand, the form of domination that is reaffirmed by the function would annul the distinct, showing in the act that it is contingent upon itself, that, ultimately, it does not exist except as a mere semblance. Before the end - i.e. in the interval - of the previous category, where the function is a struggle, a transformative tension, a conatus of regeneration through the derealisation of the individuated factitious Ego, this antinomy, to tell the truth, still remains conciliated, i.e.: it does not yet come to the surface. But where the category has reached ideal fulfilment, this derealisation is to be understood as exhausted - so much so that the possibility of nirvâna arises; and if the value is to be maintained, it is necessary that in the distinctive function itself a transcendence be determined with respect to what it resolves, that is, that it be subtended by a superior function that its fulfilment gradually lays bare and into which, in the τέλος, it is transferred.

Now if what comes to appear in this term, ο τέλος, existence as pure datum, dissolved in pure activity, nowhere else than in such activity can it be the place of that transcendent in the function of which, through the arousal of new powers of conversion, can the gesture of dominion continue when, precisely, nothing is 'being' any more, but everything, completely, mâyâ, magical fact. In the positive, not suspensive but affirmative, purity of being, the individual, indeed, does not realise 'nothingness', but rather an entity of activity. He gradually becomes, is (identity) this activity, but it is precisely with this that his freedom and power transcend themselves, that in this identity, in this freedom without limit, spontaneity itself, the universal itself, is unleashed.

which is correlative to such a plan: the 'gods' of the dynamic powers its very conquest attract it, its very conquest taking it as an organ for their appearance. Existence' is thus transposed, as it were, onto another octave - onto that of a cosmos as force - and in it it must be conquered: it must be conquered by the very excess of this freedom as precise, determined, absolute, individuals, of energy, in absolute positions, in limits in which the voraginous activity almost shatters and swirls about itself, enslaved to the various units of the very - to the infinite beings - in which the central function is ignited. They are the "allotments" (tanmâtra), the "measure" of the high motion entities of unity that in creatively vibrating transcends and transcends themselves.

So: a further category, according to which the power with which the individual goes to possess itself in being goes to possess itself, goes now to want uniquely and to make itself an interval and domination of itself. And the function according to which being was resolved in its fulfilment now appears to be conditioned precisely by a hidden fertilisation by this further function, in which the activity relating to it becomes the cause of itself, and into which it finally, in its 'act', passes.

Just as, at one and the same time, the individuator is identical and different to itself, the individual here is also one and very - and transcendence, the dominance of the wave of spontaneity is precisely a will of the very, the power of individuation in the seat of many dynamic bodies of beings, have conquered being.

On the metaphysical imperfection of the ascetic cathartic vision, we have already said, on several occasions: it has a 'given', which it cannot explain, a non-value with respect to which it is only capable of the violence of the impotent, of the mere negation of he who cannot persuade. But the knot cut is not a knot untied, rather the cutting is a reconfirmation of insufficiency, of dualism. Let there remain no residue, no dualism, nothing that I cannot assume - this demands instead a 'state of justice'. The very reduction of the 'waters', then, would no longer know how to be anything more than a provisional stage. Does not the reducing, the struggling, the transforming as it were, imply, in the end, a non-security, a fear? a doubt in the state of absolute power? Does not domination itself, in that immediate form according to which it appeared, unmask, in the end, concern, a need for proof, a wanting of persuasion rather than being persuasion? an act therefore to which value is not actual possession, immanent quality, but transcendence, and dependence?

It is for this reason that a further power liberates the waters, an intrepidity launches itself into them in confirmation of their nature, awakening, regenerating in the new principle the subterranean power of spontaneity that is now, precisely, in the form of the

"subtle", of that "breath" that hovered over the waters. But this gesture testifies precisely to dying to the need to dominate, to the test of the dominator, it testifies to a dominion that has become immanence, category, security, something that IS without the need for the act - at the same time, immediately, it is virtue of conversion, it is communication of persuasion and liberation: it is power fix, to 'measure' within the ocean universal energy. It conquers the Gods into beings that awaken from spontaneity, that are liberated, regenerated, transfigured as beings in their own right, distinct, willing: it is the very power of their liberation that accomplishes in itself a possession that reflects what the individual previously referred to itself but which it can now, in its highest domain, give. And here we have one of the senses - the highest - of what exoterically appears in the myth of the Saviours and the Idi who 'sacrifice' themselves. In particular: beyond the Buddha of the Hînayâna, the ideal of an abstract individual liberation for a detachment that, in truth, is a

"nirvâna with remnant" (sopadhisesanirvâna), the Buddha of the Mahâyâna, the cosmic being who "returns to the world", who "sacrifices" himself for the world, who the world itself understands as his task and who draws himself from a multiple transmuting body igniting in the liberation of all those who tend towards liberation. Not wanting liberation from the world but the world as liberation, abandonment as an absolute security, from which the very 'power' of such abandonment - absolute freedom, absolute formative expansion - is irresistibly converted, such is the sense of the God who crucifies himself to the 'wood of the world', who by sacrificing everything to it and killing the 'kingdom of heaven', redeems and purifies it - he sets out for the frightening purity of absolute justice ¹.

Of course, here the "sacrifice" - like the "return" and "redemption" - is pure allusion to a mode in which in a certain sense is reflected, transposed onto the plane of the universal, that proper to the "proof of love"; but, in their proper form, these are metaphysical, non-human experiences, entirely transcendent of the sentimental world; and so such a "mode" is to be understood as that of the transition from a certain hierarchy of "spheres" to a further one. And one could rather refer that phase of the "formations" spoken of in Sepher J'sirâ (II): Elohim ("He-the-Gods" - note the idea of the multiplicity of the "one-many" which, in the special use of this divine name, is simultaneously connected with an idea of power). "Living Lord and King" engraves in the voice, carves in the breath, purifies, weighs the "signs of foundation" - "carves great columns in the breath that cannot be understood (or grasped)". - And again note the recurring expression:

"bound to each sign a crown and purified this with this and formed" the elements corresponding to the signs themselves - where it is clear, in the symbol of the

'crown', the central idea of a domination from which the dynamic powers (the "signs" are carved in the "breath") are bound and sealed; which is connected to a self-purification of them ("he purified this with this" - which then corresponds to the saying, that nothing else is to be added to the "mercury", as the 'bride' of mercury is mercury itself, that it is both matter and instrument of the Work) - which finally leads to the determination, in the fixation of the natural element. A central idea, because, as has been said on several occasions, here it is neither a question of identification, nor of simple "knowledge" of the world of the aeons, but rather of the task of their substantial transformation, from their being overwhelmed and dying to their nature of spontaneity at the hands of a superior power, which now takes them over and transforms their act into its act. Hence, in other traditions, Egyptian and Gnostic, one speaks of the adept who "marries" the "sacred animals" (sometimes the four elements referred to the four "animals" of Ezekiel's vision and of the Johannine Apocalypse, sometimes the twelve "animals" of the Zodiac, etc.), that is, he joins, he puts himself in a relationship of possession and fertilising act with the original passivity of the principles that identify cosmic ocean of elementary vitality. And we have the same idea in the East, in the Kâlîche and Shivaite schools, where the only ornament to the 'nakedness' of the goddess Kâlî drawn from the flames is a necklace of fifty severed heads, representing precisely the articulations of the 'supreme sound' (made to correspond, in turn, by the symbolism of the mantra-shastra, to the fifty 'letters' of the Sanskrit alphabet) insofar as they are wrested from their creative, demiurgic, extraverted (bahirmukhî) nature, and reduced in this

"Kâlî's 'purity', identical to 'Virgin' and 'Empress' of other traditions.

We may add - albeit in passing, given the nature of the present exposition - that there would be a way of giving a foundation to the correspondence of the four dimensions of the transcendental function - the phenomenon, the dynamic, the causer, the Ego (sthûla, sūkshma, kârana, âtmâ) - with what appears to men in their sensitive perception as the mineral, vegetable, animal and personal realms of 'nature'. This assumption clarifies the view of some esoteric schools, which compose the "magic body" with three elements or

"depths", which correspond to that which proceeds from the subsequent reabsorption, or hierarchical resolution by fixation in domain, of the principles of each of these realms in the superior one. To clarify, let it not be forgotten that here we are in the order of that Novalysian "active empiricism", in which reality is meaning and meaning is reality, the transcendental is the empirical and empirical the transcendental: and it is to be understood then that the "mineral", taken as an expression of the "empirical", is the "empirical".

of solidity, of resistance, of impenetrability, is the objectivity of that 'being' and of that 'matter', in which the mysteriousness and the ancient philosophers of Greece, with an interference of interests that may seem capricious to the abstraction of modern culture and to the oblivion of the concrete and original sense of things, saw 'unjust', the principle evil and impurity³. In such a case, the individuating individual, as the one who has vanquished "being", is also the one who has vanquished "matter", who has resolved the diabolus - but this in its concreteness, in its minerality: the lowest degree experience would become that of a function in which everything that is the root of resistance, of rigid, precipitated and dead form, is transformed and maintained in plastic dynamism, in an inner function of agility. And that further world that is made up of signs and bodies engraved in this matter of activity - 'wind' and 'flame' - is the equivalent of an experience in which the mineral no longer exists, of a world made up of the assumption in a state of autarky of that which inwardly can correspond to the vegetable world.

And one understands then, from this level, how Taoist esotericism the possibility of s'ikiai is affirmed - that is, of making one's physical (or 'mineral') body disappear without residue by an act of will; one understands the Mahâyânic doctrine, that the Buddha's body after bodhi is "without bones" (mineral principle of the organism)⁴ and that the bodies with which he appears in his abiding in the world "out of pity for beings" and which he can assume at will (nirmânakâya) are non-material and "apparent" (manomaya-kâya, which is mâvâv-rûpa); to which the doctrine of Alexandrian gnosis, asserting that the 'resurrection body', while being as 'real' as any other, is a body "made of spirit"⁵; and, even better, the Rosicrucian elaboration of this very view, whereby it is affirmed that the descent of the "Holy Spirit" or "Fire Principle" upon a physical body overcomes and resolves the "bones", that is, precisely that which represents the mineral nature in it.

And many other suggestions could still be made in this regard. In the alchemical hermeticism of the 'earth' or 'salt' (a symbol for the body, and defined precisely as that which resists Fire), mercury, exalted and 'baked' in the sulphur flame (θειον [divine]= sulphur= divine), draws a 'philosopher's stone' which is the 'medicine (= principle of regeneration) of the three kingdoms' and which will lead to the 'phoenix', to a self-generating life from a body of pure flame. In reference to the first of these realms, it is in a literal sense philosopher's stone, i.e. 'magical realisation applied to the mineral world'⁶. Hence a light to understand also how in the terms Vâjra (Sanskrit) and Dorje (Tibetan)⁷ - corresponding to the αὐγοειδής that is

"radiant body or flame" of Hellenistic gnosis - the idea of thunderbolt is also joined to that of an adamantine⁸ hardness and unbreakability: it is a hint of that power of magically giving bodies - even the human body itself - the instantaneous property of resistance and incorruptibility of the hardest metal⁹, a power that in nocturnal reflection already echoes, for example, in the phenomena of stiffening that accompany certain states of catalepsy. - These and similar reminders - which we could multiply at will from the treasury of a whole hidden science stronger than any contingency of history and place - if, on the one hand, they are dangerous in the sense of incentives to 'reify' the immateriality proper to all that is meaningful, on the other, they have the merit of drawing attention to the fundamental point, viz: that development is an illusion when it does not invest and act upon the bodily factual reality in which men live; that the material world is not something to be set aside, forgotten or masked with mental constructions, beliefs and subjective digressions layered on top of it, but rather the locus of the only action to which the predicate of individuality is appropriate: absolutely positive, empirical, concrete action - transcendental only insofar as it is real, effectively transforming and agitating the factual reality.

One final observation, which is more than obvious. The detail, here, of bodies - "The term 'magic body', 'body of freedom', etc., especially: of an 'immortal' body, for such is a body in which what is 'matter' is resolved in the form of activity - must not be thought of as one particular living body among many others, which would not be immortal. Instead, it is essentially a matter of functions, and functions that transcend all particularity. The 'immortal body' is like the possibility of infinite bodies: there is the very multitude of bodies included in the immortal point of a creatively free function in which they are immediately one^{1.0}

Just as by possessing the faculty of speech I may or may not express myself, and in these or other words, so the Self now stands at a power of bodily manifestation, which is the immortal body of freedom¹¹. In this sense, the first of the Mahâyânic Buddha's bodies, mentioned above - the nirmânakâya (note also that kâya in pâli means faculty, mode of action), i.e. "body of transformation" - is like a plastic and multiple possibility (He-the-Gods) of appearing, of taking form in the various "saviours", in the bodhisattvas, beings whose substance (sattva) is not made of matter, but of "illumination" (bodhi). - A resurrected body is no longer either a body or a bodhi, but a centre in which the various powers and entities of the cosmos are kindled, upon which they gravitate and from which they draw command and confirmation. As the body of the absolute Individual, indeed, is to be said the universe, gradually in the various functions in which selfhood, in relation to the various kingdoms of nature, mediates itself, with an act that is that of becoming

transcendental, of the realisation of the world.

§ 29 - THE LORD OF THE VORTEX

It is easy to see that at the end of the category constructed above, an analogous situation occurs to that which, at the end of the previous category, opened up the possibility of taking the rhythm of the process even higher: that is, there is a gradual fading away of the distance of an identity. This identity is the same identity with the 'sign', with the measure, with the form, with that which bends the entities of force and flame - and through it a new identity is re-awakened and erupts.

"nature": the universal no longer as a dynamic function, but as a function of conception and qualification. The possession that in the body of 'signs', of vertiginous fixities, implacably takes hold breaking at the root, shaping, liberating, shaking in mediating beings what was power in its pure state - exasperating itself, leading itself to the apex of itself - up to a world in which all that is motion, is in the form of its transcendence, in a supersaturated immobility of frightening tension, in vamperies made of frost, in chasms enchanted in magical spatiality; such an apex, in which all the power of the antecedent is burnt out - and insofar as it is burnt out, completely - such an apex feels its mediation dissolve, disengage, overturn, become an instrument no longer of possession, but of the appearance, of the flashing all around of the reign of 'those-who-are' - of the universals correlative precisely to the new order - terrible powers that fix the individual, almost immense weights in the imminence of precipitation.

And when the individual reasserts himself, resists, detaches himself from his power made mortal - then a new relationship of instability, of intevallation, of danger, is instantly created in this world of potential immobility; and he is called, in order to subsist, to an even higher value, to an even more prodigious force.

Such can only be the power of the 'other', the continuum alteration as value. If the world of forces and dynamic transformations is vanquished by that function which is force, free liberty transcending itself in the power of quantity, of discretion, of fixity - the world of "those who-are", of the Lords of forms, in its turn can only be vanquished by an Ego that knows how to assume them in order to take them where they do not arrive, to the passage - and this precisely according to the generic law of dialectism whereby the antecedent is the consequent matter for its own act, for its own purity. And as to the consequent, therefore, it is immanence

the point of an active activity on , becoming possession, the cause of itself; thus, in the synthesis, the element of difference or mutation proper to the antecedent becomes that supreme difference, constituting the very value of the Way of the Ego: being-not-being, identity-difference - that is, identity as identity that is conquered and confirmed only by the act whereby identities and fixities are overcome, by the act of one who in the excess, in the elusive moment alteration lives - still - the infinity of the deepest nature.

This is the new persuasion - 'persuasion according to infinite' - in which the aeons are overwhelmed and reborn: and are reborn organised, resolved into moments of a continuum - for now their stability is the matter of difference, of a distancing, of a passing and converting; their unity is that of gestures of communication, as qualities of leaps, of illuminative transformations, of natures that are ignited, dazzling in elements of simultaneity, and are not in this or that point of being, but in the non-being that separates the various points - no longer this, not yet that. In such intervals, the central power now transmutes and recreates itself: it frees the multiplicity in a circulation of acts, of novelties, in a continuity of flames that throw themselves at each other according to a gesture that transcends them, but which, in this transcending, makes them live even higher, in the supreme being of the non-being - a gesture that is their total unity but, nevertheless, also its gesture, the gesture of the central power of the individual, which is now in the form of self-giving. This life that is all an overflowing, all an incessant coming out of itself in inexhaustible richness of unexpected leaps, of leaps out form and identity in intoxication of ecstasy, of mutation, of ubiquity like flashes in which, however, all is denuded and an eternal essence is fixed; this life without any more weight, place, support, all newness, made up of simultaneous acts - an immense current of spirit that engulfs and transports beings almost in an exaltation that affirms and denies them - this life is the body of the Lord of formative fixities. He draws himself from the moment of his highest vertigo, there where the vortex becomes centre, axis, motionless act, detached, identical as extreme intensity, self-transcendence of his movement itself, of mutation itself.

Trying to make sense of these experiences, so distant from everything related to that human state of existence only in function of which language has been elaborated, is certainly extremely awkward and dangerous. Intuitive allusions, such as those of a certain poetry of a semi-luminative nature, may perhaps more useful here than the strictly logical construction,

for example Rimbaud. In any case, for the present point, we could refer to what in Indian traditions is called the cakravartî - 'the Lord of the Wheel' - of the Wheel, i.e. of the samsâra, of the cosmic becoming that in him renews itself in its deepest root, is transfigured, becomes valuable, acquires confirmation, justification, being of right. It is therefore that "blessing of the circle" in Dionysus for which, in the first book, reference was made to Nietzsche - the change that in the cyclical course is joined to identity reflects the simultaneous going out of oneself and reconverting, remaining, precisely to this life that is grasped in the excess, in the non-entity, in the non-this according to a passing that is not from privation but from abundance, that is not craving but creative positivity, present-day enjoyment¹². Hence, in itself enclosed and persuaded, this cosmic circulation is identical to the Gnostic pleroma - as well as to the sambhogakâya (lett.: "mode of fruition" or of "wealth"), the second "body" of the Mahâyânic Buddha, superior to the world of desire and, at the same time, to both that of form and that without-form in its simultaneity of rupârûpa, that is of con-form-and-without, like this lability, like this power of transformation, of passing every form towards every form; one and manifold body, as is explicitly stated in a stanza attributed to Nâyârjuna preserved through the Chinese translation of Fat'in, where it speaks precisely of a plûrima, supernatural, uninterrupted action of the sambhogakâya developing within a "assembly"¹³. Further west, the sambhoyakâya, the body of the "Lord of the Law" (dharmarajah), reappears in that "fiery nature" (πυρ) "Lady of mixtures" or "transformations" that in Heraclitus is transcendent "rationality" in action (λογος) - and, finally, we mention the Sephirothic world of the Kabbalah, quoted from the Sepher J'sirâ (I, 5-6): "Ten sephirot, suspended, made of nothing (belinâ), their sight as thunderbolts and as to end, nothing to them end. And the word of Him in them in (their) proceeding and converging and at His command like whirlwinds they stir and before His throne they bow. Ten sephirot (ten and not nine, ten and not eleven): their end is confined in the beginning and their beginning in the end as the flame is bound to the burning coal"¹⁴.

On the other hand, taking up the concept as it was deepened and reformulated in our first book, we could say that here the life of the individual is elevated to the experience of the pure Aristotelian act in its proper form.

Let us recall that purity for Aristotle means the absence of matter and that, for him, matter, being in potency and, again (given the negative concept of δυνάμις = στερησις), being powerless are one and the same. Only that this 'purity' - it was said - should not be hypostatized into an identity without motion; instead, it should be understood as the mode, as the sense of an infinite function, of a freedom, of a life whose unity does not

is justified only in the multiplicity of its simultaneous acts.

Materialiter: infinity as value, the immanent quality of the act; necessity as non-value, the quality not of the act, but of in-power; contingency as a positive thing, as the real power of 'other' - such are the principles of difference from Aristotelian doctrine. Power, in Aristotle, is desire¹⁵, it does not have in itself but in something else the principle of its act (*nihil reducitur de potentia ad actum nisi per aliquod ens in actu*) - in God, from whom it is passively attracted; and the contingency and infinity that is predicated of it as matter lies in its power to resist, to diverge, to alter - but this not positively, through a principle of autonomy of its own, but negatively through inertia, through meta, obtuse inability to act, through turbid chaoticity. Hence it is said that the infinite is imperfection, evil, the quality of what is not accomplished¹⁶. But this power of "other", this power of diversion or *clinanem* turned upside down in the positive, experienced as victory over necessity and identity, experienced as the autonomy of a freedom that possesses itself and, precisely, is always and eternally an act of "other", destruction, disidentification, passing, never being but always freeing itself, leaping, seizing possession in the destructive instant of passages and creations in signs being, of limits, beaten by flashes in a swirling tide - such, instead, is the value.

But, on the other hand, formaliter: the pure act is finite, the Greek ideal of perfection in the limit (*περας*) is value, insofar as there is reflected in it a sense of autarky, of self-domination in the act; in the act which is therefore, materialiter, bound to nothing, is without measure, is alone - an absolute power of wanting everything identically, in justice - everything - and is therefore also infinite and contingent¹⁷. Positive power, then, in whose life the finite and the infinite are joined together: indeterminacy (*arûpa*, contingency) appearing in determination, in multiplicity (*rûpa*), and determination appearing, which reconverts, in indeterminacy (as passing, communication). Above, the circle, law of the two laws. In the centre its unity, the absolute Individual - "Dragon in the Universe like a King in his throne".

§ 30 - ABSOLUTE INDIVIDUAL

So: on the one hand, domination, deterred in a centrality; on the other, simultaneously, an infinite going out and flowing that moves the entities, animates them, exalts them, vibrates them in the cyclic vortex of transformations. This is the supreme correlation that comes into being with the act, with the τέλος of the last category; and this is matter for yet another synthesis, for a synthesis that is the ultimate apex of the entire hierarchy, its beginning and its end.

For in that autarky which draws itself from the master vortex of the form, the last instance of the enemy power pounces. It is autarky - it is value and freedom - with respect to the many, it is not with respect to itself: with respect to itself it is passive, with respect to itself it is that being of value, which is the supreme negation of value, it is that act, which is the supreme negation of the 'act'. Sufficiency still rests on something - in that relationship of distance to which nothing can now reach, it has a body and, in it, a deprivation. This body, in truth, is made of its own freedom, it is excess, richness, overflowing - but, nevertheless, this very manifestation in itself realises a being, it serves as its support and confirmation: that is to say, absolute freedom itself is not itself resolved, consummated, it is not transparency to itself, it is not free with respect to itself - it is not an act of itself: rather, in its being in itself it leans on itself, it is enjoyed, it is enjoyed. Thus the sufficiency that is witnessed by the pleromatic vortex, transcendent act of acts, is transformed into insufficiency, mere 'power' of the true act.

The rhythm of the dialectic according to the ego's option thus awakens to a final synthesis. The consequent - domination, the motionless axis of the vortex - takes on the antecedent - the power of excess, of passing - it assumes it, and with it it frees itself and becomes realised. It 'makes itself flame', v.d. it becomes a self-consuming act, an absolute electrocution. To be able to break itself, to be able to go beyond itself, to be able to dissolve itself from itself - this is the extreme perfection of selfhood, this its limit, the infinite act, affirmation and negation, Yes and No - abyss, ultimate vertigo, fearful, total blaze, in which the absolute Individual is evoked, in its own unnameable nakedness.

Such is the black God: God's violence upon himself - creation, his being creation: a free world, given to himself, suspended in nothingness: absolute immanence as absolute

self-transcendence. And autarky, freed then, becomes category, that is, it becomes the immanent quality of objects, of the many - and here the cyclical fluidity breaks through again, here from the vortex of beings in action a world of beings is aroused, each in itself an ego, a domination, an autarchy - hurled into this flaming and transmuting universe, each one extreme to itself, without any law, without any transcendent principle, without any order except that which they themselves create in their collision, in their tension in great waves of light and darkness, in catastrophes and glories, in transfigurations and precipitations, in peaks of ecstasy amid deserts and suns of atrocity.

This, on the one . On the other, an actu, as immateriality, spirit, sense, reason immanent in this voraginous world of dominations - in identity - a naked simplicity, a nature in which there is neither a 'here' nor a 'not here', which is silence and illumination and solitude as in an infinite ocean. It is the essentiality of the individual drawn from its sacrifice - like a 'distillate' from that 'precipitate'; unnamable, occult essentiality, without beginning or end, eternal sense out of the 'before' and the 'then', out of the transmuting and the still, out of the one and the many, out of being and non-being. Perfection of perfection, possession of possession, in it the entire hierarchy is consumed and purified without residue as if in the extreme contestation of its own principle; in it is the very act of the process, that is, the entire process as an act, because in it the absolute transcendence lives and burns, the unnamable and homogeneous moment of the generating interval which, the foundation of the various distinctions, is now only itself in extreme self-liberation, in the apex of a possession substantiated only by itself, fruiting only by itself, perfect. And this is the point of the supreme redemption, of the supreme justification of all elements and all beings, of the entire development and multitude of forms of the hierarchy of value, which now exhibit themselves as the body in which he generates, dominates and transcends himself - and this his dominating himself is their freedom, the renewed and confirmed world, the world only world - without God, in a desert: devoid of purpose because he is purpose to himself, devoid of reason because he is to himself his own reason, devoid of criterion, devoid of value because there is nothing outside of him that can measure him, because there is nothing outside of the whole that is enclosed in him, in this finite and motionless quantity, swirling, and beaten, furrowed and fixed by dominations.

Cosmic crucifixion, here everything is consumed: now, in its deepest nature, the 'wet principle' is assumed, is purified. In the simple, deserted apex, in the 'emptiness' of the absolute Individual it, such as it is, in all its differences, in its unbridled, untamed contingency, is sculpted into eternal, identical being,

fearful of the state of autarky, of value, of absolute justice. Here becoming is not becoming, but being, difference is not , irrational is not irrational, but rational, evil, insufficiency, contingency - all that in the three realms and according to the three times was, is or will be, in light as in misfortune - everything is in an eternal Yes that affirms itself infinitely, that justifies and liberates everything, not as other than what it is, but as what it is - but, in this, materialised only in autarky, in its metallic, atrocious purity. This Is, this nakedness without alteration - absolute relationship, value - in everything, or as everything - such is the absolute Individual.

So: a unique act - an infinite identity and an infinite difference: a chasm of flames and thunderbolts in mutation and exasperation over a lake of ice, identical and deserted; Shakti's wild, inebriated dance over the motionless body of the eternal Shiva; the desert throne and domination as domination of dominations - in identity - sufficiency as the self-sufficiency of the world, the law, as chaos detached to symbolise the unconditioned, the absolute reason; extreme possession and extreme renunciation - such is the τελειον, the εκπυρωσις, the limit. Beginning and end.

A certain connection to the latter realisation can be found in the concept of the supreme body of the Mahâyânic Buddha, which a commentator on the Bodhicaryâvatâra calls an "absolute reality empty of all essence, neither born nor extinct, neither perishable nor permanent - which as a deed (lit.¹⁸ and to which the stanza translated from the Fat'in pays homage as the "incomparable body-law of the conquerors, neither one nor multiple, which neither exists nor does not exist, which is transcendent and the great blessing of salvation for itself and for many". And from the Mahâyâna we could also take the view, that nirvâna and samsâra, vidyâ and avidyâ - i.e. absolute and contingent, transcendence and becoming - are but two co-existing aspects or moments of one and the same, supreme reality - shûnyatâ¹⁹ . On the other hand, we have already drawn attention to the well-known discourse of the Buddha, where he contrasts himself with Brahman and pushes him to a confession of hierarchical inferiority in reaffirming before him the power of disappearing, of not being able to lean on positivity itself and, therefore, of not depending on it⁰ . The same meaning incorporates that moment in the Egyptian mysteries, in which the initiate who, after the harshest trials, reached the realisation of Osiris - the universal light - was given the fearful revelation that Osiris himself is a "black God" (see

a non-value; in this may be expressed the last step to be taken, in which the antecedent becomes a deprivation), and called upon to subsist before the collapse of the supreme splendour and to adjust to the shadow of the great, indefinable Isis^{Z1}. - Even in Patañjali it is explicitly stated that supreme realisation implies the 'renunciation' of the cosmic powers to which the yogin has elevated himself. It is to be warned, however, that given the dualistic moment of Sâmkhya philosophy on which the Patañjali doctrine is essentially based, it is not distinctly clear whether we are dealing here with the perfect act both formally and materially, or only with the act in which the ego, sufficient to its pure principle, frees itself from prakṛti which it does not yet, however, turn to resolve. The enumeration of the yogin's various powers, given in the second book of the Yogasutras, insofar as it precedes the passage in question, would, however, push towards the first meaning, and only in this case is the reference justified. Here, indeed, we are dealing with a form of "renunciation" that is indeed the pinnacle of domination; but such is only that which, beforehand, has "known" all power, which has everything resolved, which has everything only under itself, without any residue.


And now a final return to the general principles of the entire phenomenology.

It should not be conceived as if the process, with the various categories in which it takes place, were on the one hand, and the pure act on the other, outside of it or as a solution to it: the supreme category instead contains all the others; these are like the body, which finds its absolute unity in it, its act, which burns in it in inspiration. Similarly, it is not to be said that this category stands after or at the end of the others. - For the sequence of forms in the process of value is not temporal, nor even, in a certain sense, dialectical: it is rather an order of dignity, of perfection, and that which is highest is that which is most complete, so that in itself as such, without presupposing them, it bears its elementary or less perfect powers.

Thus the act in the perfect act is not the last act, but rather the entire actuality of the process, though not punctuated, but given in the form of purity and possession tota simul: in it, the thetical power being simultaneously and perfectly conjoined with its own negation and 'fixation'. To those who ask what there was before or what there will be after this act of the autarch, one must therefore answer: 'nothing'; or rather: 'this act itself'.

On the other hand, it should not be said that in general the various categories - the term 'category' in the theory of the Absolute Individual, being used in a quite formal way, means value, the immanent meaning of an experience - are already

included in the eternal synthesis that would then already presuppose itself to it. Of course, this is how things stand from the point of view of the supreme category; but beyond , as has been repeatedly pointed out, each category can stand for itself as the extreme instance of distinct option of unconditional freedom, and have itself as its only presupposition. Then it represents an original and irreducible synthesis, adequate, in its own way, to the totality possible experience, v.d. to infinity; it does indeed contain the other categories, specifically: those hierarchically prior to it - but these, insofar as they are contained in it and subsumed to the synthesis proper to it, are denied as others, as those that can represent autonomous directions of freedom, that is, precisely, as categories, values, distinct and absolute ways of assuming totality. And this also applies to the antecedent categories that are hierarchically understood by a consequent. The 'superior' is not added to the 'inferior' ab extra, almost by stratification, but to a wider depth of the creative synthesis, from within which (i.e. from the superior) the inferior is originally generated. This can be fixed in a graphic representation. AB, CD, EF represent three levels of consciousness or categories. They, as such, stand absolutely each by themselves: in a superior, for example in EF, the inferior are indeed contained, but only as C'D' and A''B'', i.e. not as the original elements AB and CD, but as their resolutions in the element EF, absolutely internal to this although expressing the former. And the passage from one category to another is absolutely contingent: it is not the prolongation of an anterior position, but a leap, an entirely original, discontinuous projection, to which nothing precedes, since the interval is the prius of its terms, from the antecedent as well as the consequent.



$$AB = A'B' = A''B''$$

$$CD = C'D'$$

ecc.

That is, each category creates the world anew out of nothing, and, indeed, a new, unrelated, unique world, since each relation is not external but internal to it. It starts alone from the unnamed creative centre, without a second and without a first. Only on the basis of this unconditional syntheticity are the various relations of power to act justified, the consideration and reality of which thus remains possible only a posteriori, in the order of a particular plan once it is in place.

In other words: between AB, CD, EF, etc., i.e. between the various categories as values, there is no possible relation: in no way can it be said that AB is the power CD, EF the act of CD, etc., but what can be said is that A'B' is the power C'D', EF the act of C'D', etc., and this connection of the three forms is, in truth, precisely what it is. What can be said instead, is that A''B'' is the power of C'D', EF the act of C'D', etc. and this connection of the three forms is, in truth, precisely what defines and identifies the same act, the same synthesis of EF. Similarly, it cannot be said that any category in itself or as such is more or less perfect than another, has more or less value, expresses a greater or lesser degree of freedom, etc.; since in the present order there is no category that is more or less perfect than another. In the same way, it cannot be said that any category in itself or as such is more or less perfect, has more or less value, expresses a greater or lesser degree of freedom, etc.; since in the present order there are no transcendent criteria, and value is simply what the act wants, insofar as it wants it; so that any category, insofar as it is an affirmation of that original power, which has its limit in itself as a function of possession and unconditionality, is in the same way perfection, value, freedom: the various distinctions only come later, according to what has been affirmed and the system reference that follows.

Hence it is not necessary to presuppose the absolute point to the various forms, almost as a fatal condition of them and of their development. A single power of positive self-determination, freely setting itself the limit, is what determines them: and at the very level of the absolute Individual, in which all forms find their essential life, the character of pure actuality does not take away the synthetic moment, of progress from the least to the most, from the poorest to the richest and most complex, on the contrary, it strengthens it and brings it to the extreme perfection inherent in the interval which, an act of itself, burns up all the "power", gives in a flash the totality of the processions.

This resolution of the successive is at the same time the resolution of the multiple. And here too, the synthetic moment must be held firm. The notion that there are several autonomous centres of consciousness - and this outside of any higher foundation of relationship - is certainly contradictory. It has already been said, and

Repeatedly, that the multiple is not conceivable without unity; that two subjects and consciousnesses that were absolutely two would not even be two, but one subject and one subject, i.e., from the immanent point of view, one single subject. Insofar as speaking of two or more subjects makes sense, insofar as a single subject is presupposed, by which they are understood and in which they enter into relation. The multiple experiences can then be no more than particular determinations of a single consciousness, although each has its own individuality and relative autonomy, just as the various members and functions of a living body have.

Now at this instance monadism must be corrected: certainly, one can conceive of several monads, each with its own experience and, it must also be added, radically irreducible to any other - but not as actual co-existing existences, but as ideal compossibilities of a single power. Co-existent in reality they can be not in themselves, but as the content of a particular monadic experience - of that which Leibniz called "monad of monads"; which nevertheless always remains a monad, that is, an experience that can well have as members of its unitary body the other monads, hierarchically inferior to it, but not as monads - that is, not with reference to those irreducible values that each can represent in itself and for itself - but as monads of the monad of monads. The ultimate instance, whichever way you look at it, is therefore always the unity, the monad, the One.

It was also said earlier that, given the hypothetical fundamentum relationis of an adequate synthesis, one can think of a development of the finite monad to the monad of monads - progressive development, i.e. such that between that and this there is not coexistence, but continuity, a relation of power to act. The finiteness of the terminus a quo can be that inherent in the sensible experience of a personal centre, where to speak of other I's is to make empty sounds, at such a point the other I's being nothing more than mere hypotheses, abstract explanatory principles to which I have recourse in order to realise particular phenomena: as I (I meaning actual experience) do not exist here: they do not exist, and cannot exist, because actual experience of something else is a contradiction in terms, because an I experienced as I would cease to be something else and would be the one experiencing it. The discursive judgement is thus in no way grounded in positing Egoes beyond the ideas of Egoes, in assuming the fullness of another subject as subject in the cable of representations (albeit determined with the note of being representations of other distinct and personal beings) that are the only thing that concretely, presently I experience here.

The hollow, that is, remains hollow, deprivation: its filling not exist, but is

Synthetic and contingent, and it must be asked of the power of a deeper affirmation of the single subject, so that it surpasses the form of the personal or finite consciousness, and becomes capable of multiplying itself and keeping itself one in the present experiences of several individualities, to which it remains as the life of the entelechy in that of the various limbs and cells^{Z3}. Thus monadism is founded only from the standpoint of a monad of monads, and, eminently, in correspondence with the supreme category of the value process. Just as in the act of the autarch the successive are consummated in simultaneity, so in it the many are consummated in organic unity. But the two points remain synthetically reconciled. This opens the way for a final, fundamental observation.

It is that Leibniz's 'principle of indiscernibles' must be given its due. Two individuals are not two if they do not differ in some note: now this note, in the sphere of value, can only refer to the principle of hierarchical differentiation, which here, given the foundation of relation at the point of the absolute Individual, it is legitimate to assume. "Two individuals" therefore means nothing more than two moments in the process; the infinite individuals are nothing but the same categories or values in the infinite degrees in which, as an interval, unfold or can unfold. Thus, the apex of the monad of monads, in which the multiplicity of individuals consummated or inhere, is also immediately, at the same point, the actuality *tota simul*, the simultaneity of the procession.

An intuitive figuration of this can be given by developing an image devised by the Bhagavân Dâs^{Z4}, albeit at a somewhat different viewpoint. This image also clarifies the solution to the fundamental problem of the coexistence of the attributes of freedom and absoluteness in the act.

A free act is a particular act, since without an ideal multiplicity of compossibilities there is no choice, agility, arbitrariness, pure self-determination. Where the object of the act is unambiguous, where it is everything in general that it can be - as in Spinoza's divinity - to speak of freedom is meaningless. This is the point conquered in the second epoch, from which one cannot disregard and yet not fall into the world of being.

On the other hand, the act must be absolute. That is to say, in it the quantum of compossibility must give itself to itself without residue, at present, in a single burst: but then there is no longer a particular object against others

non-actual composites - and the ideal condition of freedom is contradicted.

However, the act must be both perfect and free. The concept of multiplicity resolves the antinomy. And so let us give the image, discussed above.

Think of a gallery of paintings (symbolising the various distinct categories or values) immersed in darkness, and a person with a lamp capable of illuminating only one of them at a time. This would incorporate the condition of freedom: this one person can arbitrarily choose the picture (v.d. the experience) he or she wants, paying, however, for this power of choice with the deprivation of the vision of the other pictures, which he or she can, if at all, see later, causing what was previously in light to pass into darkness⁵. - Now imagine instead that there are as many individuals with lamps as paintings, each moving freely and exchanging places with the others. The entire gallery will then be illuminated, current, although from the point of view of each individual only his painting is illuminated and the others are as if they were in darkness. The articulation in quantum of actuality and possibility - the condition of freedom - in individuals is thus reconciled with perfect, total actuality through the multiplication of finite centres, each of which has actuality that which the others as whole suffer deprivation of, and vice versa. This dazzling one that shines from the single individualisations (the completely illuminated gallery) is experience, act of the absolute Individual: the act of the absolute Individual precisely because it requires multiplication of value, absolute immanence, that absolute assumption, that absolute being - in identity, in perfect justice - the single, free, distinct forms, each self-arching to itself, from which only absolute transcendence freed.

The absolute Individual is immediately himself in the infinite individual affirmations - v.d., according to the degree conquered in the last category, in the single individuals, in the single values - and in each of them he enjoys himself as freedom, as unconditional agility and absolute arbitrariness flashing variously and circulating on the canvas of the multum. But, on the other hand, while he produces and affirms himself in each individuation, at the same point, according to principle of self-consuming actuality, he takes it back into himself and makes it communicate in the unnameable transcendent, in that absolute combustion to which not the individuated particular is adequate, but the infinity of individuation as unity, simplicity or simultaneity of an infinite circulation.

Such is the Absolute, that which, according to the mythological word, is, was and will be. - Now the question may arise: "There is a level at which such an Absolute can only be thought of as a final goal. But as an ultimate goal it is not what it is and what it was, so the view is contradictory. The Absolute can only be presently: it must exclude all that is process and distance - otherwise it is not absolute'.

This objection is based on the exchange of the concept of the Absolute with its factual existence. What is the Absolute, in the plane referred to? Value, that which I want to be. Now I can want to be precisely what was, is and will be. However, this note refers to an idea of mine, not to something that already exists at present: it refers to an object of possible realisation. As the content of what is to be, I can place what was, is and will be. Is this a contradictory concept? Only when one has not understood the relativity character of the category of time, when one makes time an ultimate instance by placing the end under the category of time. It is otherwise when one thinks of a progression such that, in one of its passages, not this or that moment in time is transcended, but the category of temporality itself in general. The result would be an experience, in which the last is no longer last and the first is no longer first, which is no longer conditioned by an antecedent since the antecedent is no longer antecedent, nor by becoming, since in it becoming is not as becoming, but as being - as being proper to the state of absolute reason. Antimony arises when one wants to take simultaneously what proceeds from two distinct points of view such that one is only when the other is no longer: the one in which the end is the end, that is, the object of possible realisation - and the other in which the end is not the end, but experience in act, actuality. From the point of view of the second, the antinomy, therefore, does not exist.

From the other point of view, the sense will be that what is, was and will be (this expression is also quite improper, because it is always imbued with temporal relations) experiences itself in the form or category of 'will be'. The 'will be' is but a particular way in which the absolute experiences itself - almost a symbol of the ego's distance from itself.

One would then ask for an explanation of this distance. But the explanation, in truth, does not exist. Not in fact, but in law. There must always be a residue of obscurity, there must always be an irrational, something before which the explanation stops - if all that is act, value and freedom are not to precipitate into nothingness. It has been said: the supreme value of the absolute Individual itself is derived by negation from the compossibility of its opposite, and the same can be said for the particular values within the hierarchy, which it determines. This is

the last word of this doctrine: The absolute explanation to action, to power, to the act in itself measure that does violence to chaos, to *απειρον*, to the irrational - truth as the subject of praxis, as command.

But further still: the will is alone, in the middle of a desert, at the origin of origins: nothing outside, nothing above, nothing against, nothing to look at, nothing to desire, nothing to lean on. What then will it be, if not what it wants to be - unconditionally? Nature, man, God - water, blood, flame.

But, then, only one root to absolute reason, to absolute power: persuasion. I can never be but what I want to be, from the infinite. You who do not want you, but want 'God' and turn towards the ladder of Light - you flee from God, you are afraid of his tremendous purity, you kill yourself, you cut yourself off from being, from the act. Anguish, problematic, impotence, finitude do not exist: all of this is but a fact of ignorance, a subjective shadow projected by a state of fear, of disharmony, of inadequacy with respect to myself, a state to which, again, I am not sufficient and active, a state that I am not capable of assuming: it is but the same infinite power, the same lady nature of yes and no, insofar as it has not yet become persuasive in itself. This is the unheard of word: nothing to go, nothing to wait for, nothing to fear, nothing to ask. You yourself, such as you are, you are eternity, you are the Lord of gods, the Aeon of Aeons - all in all, composed of all powers. A single moment that you knew how to take on everything - in this being of yours made of metal and wounds, of glory and darkness, of intoxication and death - a single moment that you knew how to be - to be only - absolutely, identically, infinitely - and the whole universe, resolved, would avalanche into the ultimate apex, into the supreme liberation of the absolute Individual.

§ 31 - SUMMARY

Since domination implies a substratum of which it is precisely domination, the individual must at first not be, i.e. be, in the sense of posing simply or according to immediacy; which has led to a set of productions having as their limit the perfection of accomplished being (first epoch).

However, the ego, insofar as it is the superior value that underlies, articulates, superordinates and fertilises the whole of development, passes such a limit, thus bathes itself in that which is not being and implements the mode of the per-self, of reflection, of the person. In the reproduction and idealisation of being through reflection or formal freedom (second epoch), the person then mediates, takes on body, becomes aware of its own nature. But the perfection of the world of reflection, correlative to the point of that of being, implies an analogous transition: the perfect self-consciousness of reflection is in fact the discernment of a real of which it is precisely the reflection, the ideality. This real, to which the perfection of reflection leads, then becomes the element, the mode of the individual (transition to the third epoch). Thus at the end of the world of the individual, a naked, still formless principle of power and freedom stands in opposition to the articulated world of reflection, which is felt as a mere phenomenon and, in relation to the new mode of the individual, as deprivation. To redeem such a world of phenomenon and necessity into a reality of power and freedom, to integrate the point of self-sufficiency by reaffirming it within those powers of cosmic construction and universality that are summed up at the moment of idealisation, of the wrenching of the ego from being - such is the task of the third epoch.

The first moment of development is immediate affirmation of the principle of the individual in its nature as the negativity of the negative, i.e. of form. Thus a power of destruction and arbitrary agitation invests the system of ideal correlations and values proper to the personality: reaffirming itself in it, consisting at the disappearance of such a system, the individual confirms in a sketch of active mediation that autonomy or superiority to the relation, which is its essence. However, insofar as every immediate negation is preoccupied by the object it turns to negate, an element of duality also remains confirmed, on which the instance of the individual can only reassert itself through the alienation of such a mode of negation. There follows the absolute autonomisation of the ego in the first place as a simple principle (in order to consist at

to suffering and renunciation) and, secondly, as an act, or movement - in the 'proof of love' and 'wanting without wanting'. Having thus formed an organ appropriate to its instance, the individual turns to resolve the antithesis, first formally, then materially.

The first phase takes place with the substitution of active or productive perceiving for passive or sensitive perceiving, and with the regeneration of the person's world within it. This regeneration also has, at the same point, the sense of a self-liberation: the determination of the new perceiving is such, that the external is not resolved, except by externalising the internal, by projecting into the phenomenon the transcendental powers of the samskâra relating to the second epoch - animating it, internalising it with them - which in turn implies that in relation to each of these powers, with which it previously stood in a relation of identity, the Ego is generated into a principle inwardly superior to them, in which precisely the principle of domination is maintained and reaffirmed. In the three experiences of the dynamic world, the world of sense and the world of intuition, which proceed from it, the liberation and possession of the ego is thus realised in the function of individuality and formally perfect actuality in relation to the three metaphenomenal depths, v.d. of the efficient principle, of conceiving or forming, and of egoity; by means of these the world of form is also gradually resolved from its deprivation, integrated and restored to the central principle, so that the antithesis is levelled out, and, at the end of this phase (first section), the ego in being finds itself reconciled only with its own power. Self-caused, he now realises contingency to himself, freedom in relation to the law of individuation. Having freed itself from the necessity of a single, particular individualisation, the centre passes to the function of the universal, understood as the possibility and unity of multiple persons and, therefore, of multiple systems of experience; on the other hand, this passage, corresponding to the very interval of passage from the first to the second epoch, also expresses that of power and freedom from the formal to the material sphere: what is act with respect to form (correlative to the category of the individuating individual) is, in one, potency (in the Aristotelian sense) with respect to matter, that is, with respect to the universal elements, to the cosmic spontaneities of determination of the content of the form itself; by which we pass from the order of what is correlative to the second epoch to what is correlative to the first epoch (second section).

This power, in turn, turns to the act, in the order that makes it such, and this happens through the evocation and domination of precisely that cosmic spontaneity, gradually in its powers, which now regenerate themselves and in the wider life

by which they are overwhelmed are transformed according to substance, are materialised by possession and self-possession, burning in the 'magic body' that drawn from nothingness - from mâyâ, from 'illusion' - is the act itself, the eternal self-generation of the absolute Individual, of value.

The first phase is the sufficiency to the efficient power (or sufficiency as efficient power), the transcendence of this in the "signs", in the discontinuities of magical equilibriums; the second is the conception or formation liberated from itself, vibrated in flashes of a change, of an absolute, radical passage: this is the pure magical substance, the creative vowel - the Logos, the Om - which has consumed the consonant and which in itself articulates, free and naked, launching itself into a voraginous vortex that gradually fixes and purifies itself in the immobile axis of a pure domination. Finally, in the last category, this same centrality dissolves and frees itself in the self-consuming thunderbolt of an extreme sufficiency, of a transcendent possession. It is absolute negation and absolute affirmation, the abyss, the eternity from which a free, naked, aproving world blooms, a world of autarky in light and in darkness, like the very gesture of the absolute Individual.

Neutral Quota of Cimone 1917

Rome 1924

¹ "The Telesma, the Father of all things - it is said in the hermetic Tabula smaragdina - is here: his power is whole if converted into t e r r a " - that is, the immanent spiritual power has its perfection there where its act is the "earth", the earth, or "salt", being understood as that which resists fire, that is, the spirit. The 'Work' is precisely divided into two phases: separation of the subtle from the dense, extraction of the quintessence and, in this, awakening of the 'mercury of the philosophers', which is to be subsequently drawn from the raw ore, from silver and then from gold, v.d. from the entirely purified metallic nature (= gold) - , as we have already said, refers to the gradual process of disidentification, of the extraction, by projecting motion, from the bodies of the samskâra into a superiority (quintessence) that culminates in the evocation of the power of the universal or individual individuating (mercury). In the second phase, such a power is aimed at volatilising, at solving the 'earth' itself and the metals from which it has detached itself to the flame of the fluid sulphur or living Gold. Such is the process of the "generation of the strong force of each

force', 'ascending from earth to heaven (= first phase) and descending again from heaven to earth (= second phase) 'by which the world is won to glory' and "every darkness for ever departing". On all this see Ur,1st series (1927) [now, in part, in: Introduction to Magic, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome1971, vol. I].

Z Dominion, which here is a chaining of cosmic force, an articulation and projection of it fixed in limits, in absolute neutralisations, is expressed by the symbol of the 'Seal of Solomon': two triangles with opposite vertices intertwined - descending, feminine demiurgic power (inverted triangle C) that binds and balances in ascending, masculine power (triangle with the vertex at the top B) in the magical immobility of a 'sign'.

3 Diabolus, on the other hand, is the 'opposer', the o b j e c t o r, that which opposes, that which resists, that which therefore bears witness to an imperfect, i.e. imp u r a . See Book I, sect. VIII, § 6 [Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. 166174].

⁴ Suvarñaprabhāsa, 8.

⁵ Cf. G.R.S. Mead, The Doctrine of the Subtle Body in Western Tradition, London 1919, p. 110 ff. Note precisely that the fact that a thing is reduced to my power does not make it at all i r r e a l , but, instead, supremely real. A body in which there is no longer matter simply means a body in which there is no longer anything that resists the spirit, a perfect act. Transformation is s o u s t a n t i a l in the sense in which this term was used by scholasticism when, with regard to the Eucharist, it argued for an identity and preservation of sensible attributes in the particle, and also a transformation. But here the 'so stanza' is not one thing substituted for another, it is instead the form or function according to which that certain set of attributes constituting, for example, the human body is experienced. Not these attributes, but this form is transmuted - from "robe of bondage" to "robe of power" (Pistis Sophia). The designations of 'fiery body' etc. also refer to the renewed sense of life in which the

body, and not necessarily to something visible.

⁶ Cf. Papus, Traité élémentaire la Science Occulte, Paris 1903, p. 571.

⁷ Iconographically it is represented by two tridents joined at the base. As such it is used by both Hindus and Buddhists in India as well as Tibet and the rest Asia as far as Japan. Esoterically it is the diamond-lightning body, i.e. the immortal body that the Buddha acquires enlightenment, as Evola also mentions later. The philosopher drew it on the cover of 1930 edition of this book, which now reproduces one of Tibetan origin.

⁸ See Shrîcakrasambhâra, ed. Dawa Samdup, LondonCalcutta 1919, p. IX. There is reference, for example, in Indian yoga texts where they speak of the power of creating in the body, by means of mantras, such a state that a bullet vibrated against it not only does not affect it, but rebounds on the one who vibrated it. - And minerality resolved in a 'power', contingent in itself, leads to the real possibility of what was a disguise of initiatory science in the West: the alchimia, the art of transmuting metals, but for a spiritual power (for a 'projection' and 'multiplication') not for the impotent power of begging, through physics and chemistry, to 'laws of nature'.

⁹On the transformation of the physical body into a 'metallic' body by means of a mercurial body, see C.S. Narayanaswami Aiyar, Ancient Indian Chemistry and alchemy of the chemophilosophical Siddhânta, Madras 1925. On the other hand, in the siddhas in prânavidyâ it is an experimentally ascertainable fact that the course of respiration is altered in such a way that carbon is retained in the body, which normal man draws instead, in the main, from food; and oxygen is emitted. "minerals'.

¹⁰See G.R.S. Mead, Some mystical adventures, London 1909, c. XVI: 'To be free from form is to be able to assume any form at will. True form is this power of freedom; true death is to be bound to a form of body, thought or feeling, that is, to be incapable of change. [...] That which can take all forms is always present at all times and is itself immortal.

¹¹To be able to comp r e n d e the body - one's own or that of others - to absorb it, to fluidise it, to 'vegetalise' it: to love it until it is all in action in the mind - and then to think oneself in a place, means: to transport oneself - or rather: to be instantaneously - in that place, or to project, to make the other find oneself in that place, and no longer in mere consciousness, as in the previous category, but in real, physical presence.

¹²The 'transformation', in which the powers of form are dominated, can be understood as the perfection of the element of an a s s o l u t e f e d e : absolute faith as the absolute power of momentum, of destroying the ground where one stands, of instantly being a new 'It'.

¹³Cf. Kazi DawaSamdup, Commentary on the Sricakrasambhâra, LondonCalcutta191919. P. Masson Oursel, Les trois corps du Bhouldha, in Journal Asiatique, May-June 1913; and especially: L. La Vallé Poussin, Studies in Buddhist Dogma, inJournal of the Asiatic Society, 1906, p. 943 ff.

¹⁴This is not the place to explain why the number ten esotericism is a sign of perfection, of fulfilment (siddi, τελειον): take it, if you will, as a symbol; as a symbol in which the moment of absolute quantity proper to the dialectical antecedent is also incorporated, which moment, however, is here joined to the other of passing, of continuity (the "running forward and backward" or "running forwards and forwards").
"proceeding and converging" and "waving" of the sephirot). The balimâ, which we

translated as 'suspended, made of nothing', expresses precisely the elusive moment or flashing of the no longer not yet in which the essence of 'those who are' is fixed and materialised in their further revolution.

¹⁵ Aristotle, De Anima, III

¹⁶ Ethica Nicomachea, II, 106 a, 15: το γαρ κακον του απειρου, το δε αγαθον του πεπερασμενου [Evil in fact pertains to the unlimited, while good pertains to the bounded].

¹⁷ God as necessary being, as those in whom actuality proceeds 'analytically' from possibility - we have said - is the death of value. - Spinoza's argument, taken from the principle of sufficient reason, is inconsistent. For him, the possibility of implementing a given element is one with the impossibility of not implementing it. What would prevent God - he says in the Short Treatise (chapters II, IV) - who has nothing outside himself, from implementing everything he can implement? That's fine; but one can just as rightly ask: what could prevent him from not bringing into effect that which depends solely on him whether it is or not? For either one takes away from the concept of "power" its own content by identifying it with that of "duty", müssen, i.e. the indifference of Yes and No, which can only be broken by affirmation that is to itself, as pure contingency, its own sufficient reason. F.W.J. Schelling, Zur Geschichte der neueren Philosophie, cit., p. 35 (cf. Lagneau, (like the pure Aristotelian act and the Spinozian substance), excludes all power and all freedom: it is that which exists without power - it is the imp o t e n t e e .

¹⁸ Prajñākaramati, Commentary on the Bodhicaryâvatâra, IX, 38.

¹⁹ See e.g. SmonLamStobsPoChe, § 1 (English translation by A. Avalon, vol. VII of the Tantrik Texts, LondonCalcutta, 1919, p. XX).

Z⁰ Majhimanikâya, I, XLIX.

Z¹ Éliphas Levi, Histoire de la Magie, Paris 1922, pp. 29, 532.


ZZ Patañjali, Yogasutra, III, 50.

Z³ The same is said with regard to power and the degree of organic unity. The fact that I do not yet perfectly dominate other beings, that they can oppose me, resist me, act independently of me, does not correspond to a necessity of things, but is merely the symbol of the privation inherent n a t u r a l l y inherent in that which is in power insofar as it is in power: at the terminus a quo of a possible development. Full potency, perfect unity refers to the terminus ad quem, to that in which privation waits to be resolved by a free act of the individual.

Z⁴ Bhagavân Dâs, The Science of Peace, Adyar 1921, pp. 341342.

Z⁵ This zone of obscurity is the v i r t u a l, or, to put it better, the i d e a l, as opposed to the actuality; it is that which, in actual experience, is contained in the species either of a condition of poss ibility (such becomes for a later what in a hierarchically anterior degree was actual experience) or of d o w n e r s e r e, end, τέλος. When one disregards the differences between ideality, actuality and ought-to-be, one has everything in one place.

Evola-Gentile-Spirit: traces of an impossible encounter



Alessandro Giuli

The Phenomenology is like a point of arrival, a mature seal conceived in the mid-1920s, and arrived in bookshops in 1930, when Julius Evola was by then dedicating only residual energy to philosophical speculation. Concentrated as he was in the doctrinal search for a gentlemanly tradition that could rectify the plebeian survivals Fascist Italy, the Roman thinker had left behind the heart of his own great, youthful idealistic tension. A rarefied and metallic season in which the philosopher's logos began to transfigure into the alchemist's stone. A season also "public", in the sense of the officiousness and height contained in Evola's challenge to contemporary philosophers. A path investigated but not enough, to which a few more details can be added here.

1. Foreword

The difficulties of finding and examining material dispersed among different foundations and archives, most of the time still uncatalogued, make it impossible to establish a fixed point regarding the complex web of relations that existed between Julius Evola and the most authoritative personalities of the cultural world of his time. The state of research, however, allows us to reconstruct the meeting between Evola and Gentile with good margins of reliability. For the purposes of the study, the examination of the letters sent to Gentile by the numerous contributors to the *Enciclopedia Italiana*, as well as those that we know to have been common acquaintances of the philosopher from Castelvetro and Evola himself, may be of fundamental importance. The original copies of the works Evola sent with an autograph dedication to Gentile already constitute, together with four autograph letters, a central testimony of Evola's repeated attempts to open a space of interlocution with the representative of the philosophical current then hegemonic. The relationship between Evola and Spirito is similar, of which there is no epistolary evidence but which is nevertheless ascertained by certain "traces" on which we will shed light later. As far as the relationship between Evola and the Treccani is concerned, the position taken by the Historical Archive of the Encyclopaedia in the person of Dr. Margarete Durst excludes the possibility of finding, in addition to the entry "Atanor", other attribution cards concerning entries that Evola might have edited. Durst, however, not deviating except marginally from our theses, specifies that "the role of the scholar [Evola] as a collaborator of the EI was always limited". The reason for this limitation would derive from a fundamental mistrust nurtured by Gentile and his closest collaborators (Spirito and Calogero) towards the 'irrationalist and vitalist' viewpoint with which Evola tackled the themes occultism and esotericism. Without clearly distinguishing them - as Gentile wanted - from philosophy in the strict sense¹. We must deduce, therefore, that any further supposition regarding other unsigned voices remains, in the absence of other certain testimonies, on a conjectural level. And it is precisely in the awareness that we are on such a plane that we take the liberty of suggesting, by way of addition to the interpretations put forward by Stefano Arcella², the possibility that the entries "Smaragdina Tavola" and "Filosofale Pietra", regardless of whether or not Evola was the author, are part

of those items that, due to their intrinsic brevity or the lack of importance accorded to them by Gentile himself, were not to be signed³.

2. The comparison

I) Foreword

Having mentioned a few hermeneutic problems relating to the Treccani, it will be possible to return to it later in order to illuminate its most relevant aspects, but not before having thematised the places Evola's philosophical course where the trajectory of the Roman philosopher's theoretical speculation intersects with Gentile's.

To tell the truth, it would be appropriate to say at once that Evola's philosophical discourse takes its starting point from idealistic theoretical models, beginning with the comparison with Gentile himself. If it is in fact true that it would be methodologically incorrect to place a clear caesura between the artistic experience and the philosophical speculation of the young Evola⁴, it is also true Evola's more properly philosophical debut directly affects the conceptual nucleus that orients Italian idealist philosophy, more specifically Gentile's actualism. In fact, the last Evola writing of the Dadaist period⁵ and the first contributions of an eminently philosophical nature are placed simultaneously in 1923⁶. And it was, not by chance, precisely a book by Gentile, the *System of Logic as a Theory of Knowing*, that was the subject of the first long and articulate review signed by Evola in the columns of *Ultra*⁷.

II) The cultural horizon of the time

Before examining the speech with which the 25-year-old Evola, with a reputation as an avant-garde painter and a devotee of esoteric disciplines behind him, chose to make his debut on the philosophical scene by challenging the almost 50-year-old Gentile⁸ - formerly Professor of the History of Philosophy at the University of Rome, founder of the emblazoned *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana*, the official organ of actualism, as well as already known as the author of the reform of public school education, in his capacity as a member of the first Mussolini Cabinet as Minister of Education (October 1922-June 1924) - it is well to dwell briefly on the historical and cultural context in which Evola's lunge was situated.

We are, as mentioned, in 1923 and the Italian philosophical landscape is entirely dominated by neo-idealist philosophy of which Gentile is most representative interpreter. Gentile's speculative architecture had acquired a systematic guise and made the Sicilian philosopher the major protagonist of that 'reaction' that in the space of just two decades had put the dominant materialist currents at the end of 19th century in Italy on the ropes. Almost as if, by reaffirming the rights of philosophy and the spirit, Gentile had paved the way for the logical manifestation of Evola's practical idealism.⁹

Indeed, after his years of apprenticeship at the Normale in Pisa (1893-1897), under Alessandro d'Ancona and Amedeo Crivellucci - his first essays on literary criticism are significant testimonies to this - Gentile soon moved on to the more philosophical cultural climate, through the mediation of Donato Jaja, and embarked on a brilliant academic career. In particular, with the philosophy of Bertrando Spaventa, without shying away from a profound analysis of Marxian historical materialism, highlighting his own clear opposition to the positivist currents then hegemonic. An opposition that was charged with a strong anti-Enlightenment colouring, supported by a critique centred on the spiritualist instances expressed by the thinkers of the Italian Risorgimento¹⁰.

But it is from the first two decades of the 20th century that Gentile begins to

play a leading role in the national philosophical scene: 1903 saw *La rinascita dell'idealismo* (The Rebirth of Idealism), the 'programmatic' lecture to the course of theoretical philosophy at the University of Naples, while the following years the publication of works in which the central themes Gentile's philosophy began to take shape.

III) Reality as processuality: on the Gentile dialectic

We are in the midst of an idealistic climate, in the wake of Hegelian philosophy planted in the need for authentication of philosophical discourse in relation to the religious problem: in fact within a rational theology. As is well known, Gentile identifies reality with the processuality of thought that unfolds dialectically. Immanent to this conception is the distinction between actual thought and thought, or the abstract, which in relation to the former represents nothing more than a negation of thought itself, inserted however into a dialectic whose poles (affirmation and negation) are contained in thought itself.

In so far as the real is entirely resolved in the actuality of thought, in so far as the actual subject unconditionally creates by virtue of the freedom of its thinking thought, in which freedom and necessity would coincide at the logical point of rational necessity. On this basis, i.e. once the ideality of the real has been postulated, the subject does not recognise to the object intentionalised by thought any status of independent reality outside the thinking act that posits it.

However, this actuality of thought is not exhausted in the theetical activity of an empirical 'I', but rather in that infinite and unconditioned creative activity proper to a transcendental subject with respect to which every empirical subject - which of the transcendental 'I' is no more than a mere object or abstract thought - cannot but vanish. A foundation, this, entirely Hegelian¹¹ and yet originally assumed and developed by Gentile within his own philosophical horizon. If we consider that it is precisely here that Evola's critique will focus, it is appropriate to let Gentile himself speak: "Consciousness, as the object of consciousness, is no longer consciousness; as the apperceived object, the original apperception is no longer apperception: it is no longer I but non-I".¹²

It is clear how, in the face of the unitary instances of a universal consciousness, multiplicity is shipwrecked in the absolute immanence of a thought in which even time, and therefore history, is resolved. The universal subjectivity, eternally active in the process of its own theetical function (a self-production philosophically known as autoctysis) and satisfied in its own immultiplicity, leaves no ontological residue outside itself. All particularity is denied as abstract consciousness¹³.

It is in this way that thought as a spiritual act is resolved into a single category¹⁴. The nature of the empirical 'I' as thought is established. As an object determined by the subject of every object (the transcendental ego or "Act in act"), Gentile seeks to save the multiple in the logical passage of a presupposed unification that, instead of annihilating the real, accommodates it. The philosopher affirms: 'Our doctrine, therefore, is the theory of the spirit as an act that places its object in a multiplicity of objects and at the same time resolves their multiplicity and objectivity in the unity of the same subject'¹⁵. It will be this Gentile attempt to dialectically bring together a transcendental unicum and a unified - yet not dissolved - multiplicity that will arm Evolian criticism against a Gentile accused of mysticism.

In this philosophical landscape lies what in Gentile's system appears as a remnant of the Platonic-Hegelian dialectic, taken up through the notion of the triadic unfolding of the spirit. These are the three moments in which the unique category of Gentile's speculative system is articulated: the artistic-objective moment, in which the ideality of art is resolved in the concreteness of the synthetic actuality of thought; the religious-subjective moment, in which the negation of the thinking subject arrives, through the passage from the self-position (autoctysis) to the plane of annulment in the form externalised in hypostasis (heteroctysis); the synthetic-philosophical moment in which the path is consummated culminating in the epiphany of the logos.

It is in the two famous volumes that comprise the System of Logic as Theory of Knowing¹⁶ that Gentile, moving from the identity of being and thought, comes to distinguish between abstract logos (or logic of the thought) and concrete logos (or dialectics of the thinking). In the former is to be identified the analytical logic, founded on the principle of identity ($A=A$) and non-contradiction, which thinks the real in the multiplicity of its determinations not as the abstract thought of a concrete logos, but as endowed with its own aseity. Without therefore going back to the actual thought, which of the subject-object relation (I-not-I) is at the origin, the concrete logos that from the logic of the thought proceeds as from its own objective moment - with respect to which it nevertheless represents the prius - as the abstract to be invested as the condition of the full concept. And to be continually transcended. To clarify: the actor who appears on the philosophical stage is always unique and it is that transcendental subject who sees in the unmediated multiplicity nothing other than his own objectification, already continuously resolved in the thinking activity.

It is always worth remembering, moreover, how, according to Gentile, in order to overcome the abstract conception of analytical logic - proper, Hegelianically speaking, to ordinary intellect or common sense - in the dialectic of thinking it is necessary for the abstract ('necessary error') to be both negated and affirmed: "In order for the concreteness of thought, which is the negation of the immediacy of every abstract position, to be realised, it is necessary that abstractness be not only negated but also affirmed: in the same way that in order to keep the fire burning that destroys fuel, it is necessary that there is always fuel and that this is not taken away from the devouring flames but is actually combusted"¹⁷.

With this famous Gentile philosopher, the brief excursus can bend towards an initial datum, the Evolian review of vol. II of the System of Logic¹⁸.

IV) Evoli's debut: 1923

Evola criticises Gentile's Logica from within and anticipates, albeit through brief hints, what will be the theses of his 'Philosophy of the Absolute Individual', already systematised to a large extent and which he will publish in full in the mid to late 1920s.

In his review, Evola questions Gentile's claim to distinguish between abstract and concrete logos: "If this is true, as G. concedes, there is no way to truly distinguish a logic of the thought, governed by its own laws, from the concrete logos: those laws can only appear as particular articulations of the latter"¹⁹. Starting from this assertion, the Roman philosopher takes the cue to affirm the problematic nature of Gentile's theory, according to which an Ego that distinguishes itself from itself, determining itself, would then be able to recognise itself in the determination itself, and mediate itself.

"But recognition restores the immediate identity, resulting in an infinitely vibrating process. The whole distancing relative to self-synthesis would thus explain the antithetical moment of determination: but the bad thing is that it does not explain itself. G. does not in fact give any foundation for this, because the Ego, in general, distances itself from another, and then also because in this other it does not mirror itself exactly as e. g. according to Attanasio's divine trinity. In other words, of becoming in G. one finds a simple exposition, not a transcendental deduction; it remains a being of fact, not a being of law, and the necessity that is assertorily connected to it is a mere empirical suggestion "Z."⁰

In saying this, Evola can connote the Gentilian 'I' as something necessitated, to which a law is inherent, of which it is not the legislator: 'In nothing different from a plant that, as such, can only vegetate'^{Z1}. Shifting the question from the merely gnoseological plane to that of value, and thus adumbrating a nominalistic vision that would flow throughout his philosophy, Evola can conclude: "One of two : either the 'I' cannot know the elementary law of its process in general, and then the profound meaning of actualism is phenomenalism or the passive unreflective reflection of Bergsonian intuitionism; or the 'I', almost unravelling itself from itself, can know said law, but then the contingency of this is also conceded, for,

objectively in knowing, it can be surpassed, according to a surpassing, of course, which, hypothetically, has nothing to do with the internal surpassings of that law'²².

For Evola, it is a matter of rejecting the Gentile identity of freedom and necessity, in order to recognise the contingent status of every law that, as such, must presuppose a conditioning legislator, that is, an 'I' conceived as a sui norm. For this to be possible, philosophical discourse requires a passage that transcends the logical-discursive consciousness, into the dimension of the spirit. That is where the self-sufficiency of a self-sufficient subject is realised: in 'concrete or magical idealism'²³.

The final remark of Evola's review is particularly eloquent and at the same time severe towards Gentile, who, far from "that activity cosmic agitation that myth has configured in the types of, for example, a Buddha and a Christ", relegated rather "within that discursive category that is uniquely his own, appears hallucinated on a few relatively original concepts [...] monotonously repeated for over twenty years for numerous volumes "²⁴. This is the first manifest Evolian critique of actualism. Criticism that, however, far from having an episodic character, presents itself as a precise choice of field opposed to the theoretical conclusions of Italian actualism and its master.

Again in 1923, Evola dealt idealism in the columns of the daily newspaper *Il Nuovo Paese* ²⁵, while a long essay appeared in *Ultra* in December²⁶ that constituted the first careful examination of the moment of epochal crisis in which western speculation found itself, and which was categorised under the heading of 'a single crisis of the spirit in general'²⁷.

It is not necessary here to make considerations relating *stricto sensu* to Evolian philosophy, except at those points where it is confronted actualism. We will limit ourselves to noting how, starting with the problem around which philosophy ultimately accounts for itself, the gnoseological problem, Evola immediately admits that "the solution given by modern speculation to the gnoseological problem is, in principle idealism or, more precisely, in idealism's conception of the world we have come to recognise the conditionality for a system absolute certainty "²⁸.

What is important to Evola is to demonstrate how, in the history of philosophical systems, there exists a kind of logical path whose markers emerge, albeit in

not entirely conscious form, in Aristotelian immanentism, in Plotinus²⁹ as in Kant and his 'Copernican revolution', up German idealism (Schelling, Fichte, Hegel, Novalis, etc.) and Italian neo-idealism. Evola's reflection, therefore, comes into play where it is possible to benefit from the gains made by idealistic constructs, that is, once the cosmic centrality of the Ego 'creator all reality and all value' has been sanctioned³⁰, in confirmation of which would be both the theories of the ultimate science of the time (Einstein, Cohen, Cassirer, Riemann, Lobatschewsky, etc.) and the initiatory disciplines of the West and the East. Idealism, says Evola, is an inescapable philosophical horizon: 'In the world man there is nothing but crude idealisms that have not yet reached self-consciousness, and a conscious idealism, which is idealism proper, exposed by modern gnoseology'³¹.

And yet the same idealism 'properly so called', however inescapable a term of comparison, is only worth as a mere presupposition beyond which one must go if one does not want it to spill over into 'bankruptcy of every coherence and every certainty'³². This is the case - and this is where the comparison with Gentile comes into the picture - in which idealism in its various declinations ends up resolving the individuality of the empirical 'I' into a transcendental subjectivity that contains it, nullifying it as if it were an illusion.

What then is this subjectivity? Evola answers: the idea (Hegel), God (Royce), the pure Act (Gentile), i.e. the old personal God of the theistic metaphysical tradition that re-enters through the cracks of a theoretical edifice built on the shaky foundations of an incomplete immanentism. The instances on which Evolian speculation is founded, on the contrary, are those of individual realisation that leads the ego onto a plane of autarky and self-sufficiency, and which is based on a praxis of magic. The process of divinization of the Ego begins with the recognition that the subject, once aware that the reality in front of him is a mere concretion of his own insufficiency (or deficiency), can choose whether to oppose it "as [something] over which he has no power"³³, opting for the absolute objectivity in which Ego and non-Ego are invested by that permanent privation that accompanies the circular and passive reality in which reality and possibility merge. Or, in place of an escape from one's own deficiency, the individual can establish 'to be sufficient to one's own insufficiency, [...] to take it upon oneself, and, bearing its full weight, to consist'³⁴. ³⁴ That is, to construct one's own absoluteness by mediating in the form of a process, inwardly as well as outwardly, the series of determinations that the ego faces in its 'cosmic work'. Yes

It is, in the final analysis, the two options that can be traced back to the 'way of other' and the

"way of the Absolute Individual" that Evola will deal with in more detail in *The Theory of the Absolute Individual*³⁶. That is, to use terminology that Evola borrows from Carlo Michelstaedter, it is a matter of choosing between "rhetoric" and "persuasion". In the remaining pages of the essay Evola deals with the inadequacies of occultism 'reaffirmed in modern culture by Blawatsky and further by Steiner and Keyserling'³⁷. A system of metaphysical logic accused by Evola of substantialism, incomplete immanentism andgnoseological neglect. The conclusion of the writing, finished in Cortina d'Ampezzo in August 1923³⁸, is an invitation to "praxis"³⁹, to initiative based on the conception of the absolute Individual to be constructed as terminus ad quem, therefore far from that *bei-uns-sein*, from that already being of the Absolute with us - and by "us" is to be understood the series of empirical I's - that characterises Platonism⁴⁰ or the Christian tradition⁴¹, and that modern idealism has brought to completion in the idea of the being that is not present except in the light of being, whose parousia is, at the same time, terminus a quo and terminus ad quem, beginning and completion.

V) idealism beyond idealism: 1924-1925

The distance between Evola and Gentile already erupts sharply when Evola, in his philosophical beginnings, opens disputes with the entire speculative heritage from which he drew in the claim, which would seem to be all Hegelian and therefore all idealistic, to represent its apex and conclusion. 1923 ends with the provocative and disrespectful intervention of a young 'irregular' philosopher, determined to go beyond idealism. But nothing is left to extemporaneity, and from 1924 onwards Evola's interventions on the subject multiplied, more pertinent, denser and increasingly polemical. In this year Evola published numerous articles with a philosophical background in various journals, to which were added other contributions more inherent to the esoteric disciplines. These include a short essay on the Tantras published in *Logos*, the prestigious philosophical journal directed by Aliotta ⁴².

Often the fields of interest intersect or, rather, never seem to be rigidly separable. More specifically, Evola deals with the philosopher-occultist E. Keyserling, whose teachings in those years attracted a great deal of attention from Italian cultural publicists ⁴³. Meanwhile, the young philosopher continues to define the main theoretical nuclei of his own system. And he returns comment on Gentile philosophy. He did so by publishing a long essay, *La Potenza come valore metafisico* (Power as a Metaphysical Value), in two journals: the aforementioned *Ultra* and *Atanòr*, a tribune of Italic occultism directed by the re-founder of the *Rito Filosofico Italiano*, the Freemason Arturo Reghini. The essay in question would also be included, the following year, in *Essays on Magical Idealism* ⁴⁴. The author resumes the battle by tying his reflection to what he had expounded in the previous essay, *Idealism and Occultism*, from December 1923, i.e. the gains of modern gnoseology and the conquests of ultimate science. The initial aim was to focus on the problem of certainty.

Evola writes that: "[...] an absolute knowledge has as a condition the effective extension of the concrete activity of the Ego over the whole of that world, which is my world; consequently, that the point of unconditional certainty is mutated with that of absolute power, dazzling from a progressive affirmation of the Ego beyond its amorphous and oblique everyday life. The theory of absolute knowledge, carried out consequently, must therefore pass over the magical because, in the other case, it could not retain even one of its positions" ⁴⁵.

We are already in a metaphysical domain, beyond and above speculative reflection, which, indeed, is already being investigated from an extra-philosophical point of view. Once the equation certainty= power has been posited, there follows the need to shift the centre of gravity of philosophical discourse from the order of abstract knowledge to that action. It is of a concrete activity, Evola maintains, that the Ego must promote itself as of a concrete magical activity; without which it disregards the demand for absolute knowledge (which is power), remaining a prisoner of the theoretical moment, in other words, of passive representation: "As a chained and necessitated being, it is in no way allowed - in a normal way - not to perceive or transmute what it perceives, to modify the conditions of representation both with regard to the so-called a priori forms (space, time, causality, etc.) and with regard to the various determinants of the a priori forms (space, time, causality, etc.)."⁴⁶ .

Evola can legitimately place side by side with the gnoseological viewpoint a philosophy of praxis aimed at obliterating every residue of conditionality that envelops the freedom of an Ego that has not yet come to Self. And thus reject the idealists' notion of the transcendental Ego. To which, having recognised the fatuity of every empirical Ego existing sub signo necessitatis, incoherent idealist would demand the attribute of freedom and, in general, the same gnoseological function. Evola then cites Royce, whose doctrine constitutes in his eyes the paradigm of a philosophy impotence according to which 'the "true" will of the ego is its negation'⁴⁷. Together with Royce, it is again Gentile who is taken as an example: the same negative development that would have led Royce to configure the concrete individual as a mere illusion would in fact be found in Gentile's philosophy, 'at the centre of which is the concept of "concrete freedom", i.e. a freedom that is identical with necessity, that is not [is] the sufficient principle of an absolute, arbitrary legislation, but follows the fatality of an "ultimate and unconditional" rational law'.⁴⁸ .

Once again Evola is radical in his opposition to what, with regard to Gentile, he is not afraid to call the 'sloth of the concrete ego'⁴⁹ . Rejecting all forms of conditional freedom - in the Evolian horizon: not coincidentia oppositorum, but dialectical artifice that masks a factual impotence - Evola objects that: "certainty and absolute knowledge are a vain name, where they do not reflect the concrete power of an Ego that, from the height of an unconditional, arbitrary freedom, dominates the whole of all those conditions and energies in which the totality of its experience is moulded. Absolute certainty extends

as far as my power and dominion extends"⁵⁰.

And again: "cognitive process is conditioned by the process of actual transformation and empowerment of the concrete ego, [...] absolute knowledge is a flatus vocis when it is not represented as the flower or the light gushing forth from the one who, by his power, has accomplished himself in the absolute self-realisation of the Vedic rishi, Buddhist arhat, the Taoist phap"⁵¹.

It is here more evident how the reception of certain fundamental motifs of the most significant sapiential disciplines - even if assumed in a form that is not yet methodological - finds space in Evola's philosophical discourse to such an extent as to orientate its organisation in view of the transition from transcendental Idealism to magical Idealism.

In the following pages, Evola further clarifies the opposing attitudes that, in realisation, the ego can assume - the 'way of the other' and the "⁵²Z, which contributes to the definition of a self-assertion of the individual that does not respond to eudemonistic demands. Rather, a cold confirmation of efficacy in one's own volition prevails, if it is co-extensive with the degree of power achieved. Consequential, therefore, is the rejection - influenced by the views of Nietzsche and Stirner - of any morality that denies individual freedom; as is the rejection of an innatist perspective that qualifies the ego as something that cannot be an otherwise of itself, and in relation to which one decision as another is as contingent as the field of reality is in relation to the field of the possible (which, evolianly, must exceed it). Before proceeding further, it will still be right to dwell on a passage concerning the Gentilian dialectic.

Let us allow Evola to speak once again: 'The concept magical idealism may therefore not be denied at all by the admission of a deficiency: it is sufficient that the individual affirms a positive attitude towards it; that is, he must not run away from his own deficiency, but take upon himself the burden and make himself sufficient to it, he must be able to recognise it as an essential moment that falls within the order of what he has freely willed. Just as the flame could resume the existence of the fuel in its profound will to act, to burst forth, so the ego, which wants itself as selfarch, can resume in itself its non-being, and, indeed, as the matter from which alone it will be able to bring forth the

splendour of an absolute life and activity; and just as for the flame the fuel would only be insofar as it is something to be consumed, so the non-being or the antithesis of deficiency and impotence that the Ego sees springing up in itself correlatively and by virtue of its elevation to a certain value, is only insofar as it must be denied: it is only insofar as it is not to be.

Once we have scrutinised Evola's periodic discourse, it is impossible not to refer back to the already cited passage from Gentile's *Logica* in which the philosopher from Castelvetro argues the need for abstractness, although denied in the mediation that brings about the concreteness of thought, to be at the same time affirmed as the fuel by which the fire continues to burn. Now, that Evola quotes Gentile - albeit here without revealing it - is self-evident. But equally evident is that the metaphor in question, in the Evolian horizon, is assumed in its inverse. The reversal lies in the fact that if for Gentile every determination of the manifold (or abstraction) - in this list naturally including the empirical Ego - in so far as it must be burnt in the flame of the thinking actuality (transcendental Ego) For Evola, it is decisively the empirical Ego that, in its own cosmic work, becomes *Einzig*, the One, the absolute ruler, the Persuaded One from which every phenomenon emanates and in which it is consumed, as in the Heraclitean fire "the creative and dissolving blaze, which every reality resolves in the absolute, unnamable splendour of the centre that possesses itself entirely, of he, who is entity of power"⁵⁴. And with respect to this, an undifferentiated transcendental subjectivity presents the same abstractness exhibited by Anaximander's *apeiron*. Once again, however, Evola shows himself to be indebted to actualism, whose theses and presuppositions he takes on, framing them originally in his own architecture of thought of which power, freedom and autarchy will ultimately be the philosophical gems.

The same views can be found punctually expressed in an article by Evola in *L'idealismo realistico*⁵⁵ in December 1924. Evola's intervention was hosted by Vittore Marchi's journal, which defined itself as a voice of anti-Gentilean reaction and of which prominent figures of the Italian cultural intelligentsia were interpreters. Among many: De Sarlo, Varisco, Troilo, Tilgher (with whom Evola knotted a friendship of no small value)⁵⁶. Here the Roman philosopher exhibits increasingly critical considerations towards the theorist of actualism. In his observations as a whole, Evola goes so far as to say: 'We would like to see, however, how much Gentile is sufficient for his rhetoric: e.g. if taken and put to torture in spite of himself, he had enough spirit to declare that his real will that suffers and breaks in vain against violence is

"abstract" and "imagined" and that his true will, his "concrete", "historical" and "rational freedom" is instead that which is relative to the one who, having power, imposes such a situation on him."⁵⁷.

Needless to add that here, although moved by a purely philosophical theme whose implications certainly never fail, the criticism seems to transcend into invective.

VI) The cultural offensive and the search for dialogue: 1925-1926

We can now turn our attention to the two-year period from 1925 to 1926 in which Evola finally published his first organically condensed philosophical works. The young theoretician published *Essays on Magical Idealism* (1925) - collecting and expanding material that had already appeared in several journals - and came into contact with Benedetto Croce⁵⁸, exploring all the possibilities that the cultural climate of the time could offer him. It can be said that Evola had already completed arrangement of his own philosophical summa - *Theory and Phenomenology of the Absolute Individual* were, however, to be published in 1927 and 1930⁵⁹ respectively - and that he therefore had in view in those years the possibility inaugurating a far-reaching personal 'cultural offensive'. He was also (and above all) trying to gain the interest of Gentile's philosophical milieu (and of course of Gentile himself) that he had been so vehemently attacking for some years. As far as the *Essays* are concerned, in addition to what has been noted, we must highlight the fact that Evola dedicates an entire paragraph of the fourth chapter of his book⁶⁰ to Gentile, in which the terms and the assertive tone of the polemic do not change. Gentile's philosophy in Evola's eyes marks the collapse of the concrete individual, a prisoner of a "stupefied phenomenism" and devoid of authentic freedom: "[...The idealistic reduction of nature to a position of the 'I' succeeds, insofar as the 'I' itself is reduced to nature, that is, insofar as nothing is known of that 'I', which is freedom, or rather, it is done as if nothing were known, and, with evident paralogism, the concept of 'I' is borrowed from that of the principle of spontaneity"⁶¹; "[...] is configured as mere spontaneity (which is necessity) contradicting every presupposition of a doctrine of power or magical idealism"⁶².

It appears that Evola sent a copy of the *Essays* directly to Gentile, with this autograph dedication: "In respectful / homage to / Giovanni Gentile / J. Evola". Another copy was sent to Gentile's first pupil, Ugo Spirito, with the author's autograph signature placed under the phrase "to Ugo Spirito in homage of esteem and cordiality". Spirito would reciprocate Evola's cordiality a few years later, with a careful and very severe review that we will see later. In the meantime, it is possible to consider the sending of the book as an explicit signal of Evola's request attention with respect to a work that, to be seriously considered by the Italian academic environment, needed the interest of an established professor. Perhaps Gentile himself⁶³. Moreover, one may recall

such as the publishing house Atanòr, where Evola had published his Essays, although it had already published some of Tilgher's works (from whom Evola had also unsuccessfully demanded an introduction to his book)^{6 4} - was certainly not known as a publishing house of strict philosophical competence, like the better known Treves, Treccani and Tumminelli (of the Gentile 'area') or the Bari-based Laterza where Benedetto Croce's influence was decisive.

It is no coincidence that in 1925, as several letters sent to the Abruzzese philosopher testify, Evola advocated the publication of the long-finished Theory by the publisher Laterza. Nothing came of it, but Evola, throughout his speculative activity, would insistently try to have the works to which he attributed greater consistency published in the Bari publisher's 'modern culture series'^{6 5}. In 1926, Evola first published a small booklet, *L'individuo e il divenire del mondo* (The Individual and the Becoming of the World), which collects the texts of two lectures given at the headquarters of the Theosophical League in Rome - and indeed already published in *Ultra*^{6 6} - then the more substantial *L'uomo come potenza*^{6 7}, a book in which the Hindu doctrine of the Tantras enters overbearingly into Evola's philosophical perspective. In the Evolian text, the figure of Gentile is almost absent, there being only one quotation from the philosopher of Castelvetro, and placed in a marginal context^{6 8}.

VII) Ugo Spirito's reaction. The Four Letters. The Encyclopaedia. Epilogue of the confrontation-clash: 1927-1930

There is no trace of this second book in the Gentile Miscellanea - nor of the first mentioned, *The Individual and the Becoming of the World* - whereas it can be found in Ugo Spirito's library, at the Foundation of the same name. There are no dedications or signatures on it, but the sending of the copy, like that of the *Essays*, will not be long in bearing fruit. It happened in fact that, in March 1927, while the printing of the *Theory* was in progress, the most eminent representative of the Gentile entourage became concerned with Evola's philosophy.

It was not Gentile who officially disregarded Evola's implicit requests for a philosophical confrontation - and who in the meantime had become a member of the Grand Council of Fascism, as president of the Fascist Institute of Culture, which he himself had founded in 1925 (the year in which he had taken over the scientific direction of the *Enciclopedia Italiana*) - but it was Ugo Spirito, to whom task may have been entrusted by Gentile himself or at least not without his consent, who handled Evola's philosophical exuberance. In an article that appeared in the *Giornale critico della filosofia italiana*⁶⁹, a periodical directed by Gentile but in which Spirito occupied the position of "responsible editor", Aretine philosopher briefly reviews *Essays* and *Man as Power*.

The very fact being the subject of an examination by Ugo Spirito in the columns of the official organ actualism, must have already been quite an achievement in Evola's eyes. Even if the investigation in question resulted in a substantial (but argued) critique. In short, Spirito objects to Evola that 'idealism has never dreamed of denying the individual in concrete life, it has only wanted to realise the empirical nature of the limits between individuals considered in their multiplicity'⁷⁰. Then comes the attack on Evola who: "perhaps somewhat in spite of himself he ends up admitting much more than meets the eye, and the transcendental ego thus despised somehow reappears in the very development magical Idealism [...] when Evola tries to specify the characteristics of his longed-for superman, and endeavours to think and depict him, he is forced little by little, and almost without realising it, to construct him according to a logical scheme and a dialectical process, in which the immediacy of arbitrariness is completely dissipated

and the historicist requirement of law and necessity is reaffirmed in the most peremptory manner"⁷¹.

Spirito continues: 'Even his [Evola's] magic man, in short, in order to be something, in order to be in any case conceivable, must rationalise itself and refute the character of absolute arbitrariness. [...] Arbitrariness, then, but up to a certain point: there is, however, a logic to be respected, is a historical process that can be overcome only on the condition of taking note of it and moving from it, is an internal necessity to the very creation of the magic man'⁷².

Spirito insists a great deal on the attempt to retaliate against Evola's philosophical discourse with the same accusation levelled by the Roman thinker against actualism, that is, the survival of that incoherently deduced coincidentia oppositorum (freedom and necessity), which would inform the processuality of the mediations through which the concrete Ego becomes the absolute Ego. The reviewer thus lingers on the inconsistency of Evola's attempt to overcome the paradigms of idealism, to the extent that Evola's Ego, in its process of dialecticised universalisation that proceeds intensively from the abstract to the concrete, finds itself acquiring the features of the transcendental Ego "so much slandered"⁷³. The place, however, where Spirit identifies an irreconcilable gap between the assumptions of actualism and Evola's philosophising is 'in the way of conceiving the finality of the process of the spirit'⁷⁴.

To Evola's concept of value, rightly understood as the central point of the entire system from which Evola deduces the ideas of freedom and immortality as a process of conquest, and not as a given, Spirito replies that "[...] when man has reached absolute sufficiency, that is to say, at the end of the process of conquest, would he not thereby return to being nature? - And if joy is in the conquest, would not the supposed state of bliss be converted into the infinite boredom of having conquered everything?"⁷⁵.

Further on, dwelling on Evola's distinction between domination and love in Man as Power, Spirito makes accusations of an extra-philosophical nature, deriving from this distinction "the fierce hatred for Christianity"⁷⁶, and then moves "[...] from the revolutionary and anarchic need of Futurism and Dadaism - Evola's old passion - to the mythical westernised Orientalism; from Nietzsche's demonic superman to the mysterious practices of theosophy and occultism. It is all a spasmodic striving in search of the exceptional, an overbearing desire to tap into the divine with a magic wand, a desire to

look at all costs with Mephistopheles' mocking grin"⁷⁷.

In conclusion, Gentile's pupil's words become harsher: of the two works of Evola that he received, Spirito speaks of them as 'two volumes that, not being able to be an act of love and an invitation to become men as an absolute power - God is one - could not be explained otherwise than as a colossal mockery the world that Evola is preparing to dominate and subject to his will'⁷⁸.

Since it is not our task to take side of one or the other voice, and since our aim is simply to report on the status quaestionis of the time, we merely refer the reader to an examination already carried out by others on the subject⁷⁹, in order to draw useful conclusions regarding the understanding of the cultural relations we are investigating.

That said, one has to wonder what Evola did while waiting for his own philosophical works to find their due. Meanwhile, once the Theory of the Absolute Individual had been published by Bocca, he took care to send two copies to Gentile and Spirito respectively. On the first we find written: 'to Giovanni Gentile / deferential homage of the author'. On the second, in addition to the handwritten signature, "to Ugo Spirito / Confirming my esteem for him and thanking him for his kind consideration'. The reference is obviously to the not too benevolent review of the philosopher from Arezzo that we have summarised above. We can already anticipate that Evola would continue to send two major exponents of actualism copies of his writings. As far as Gentile is concerned, it is also possible to trace autograph dedications on Imperialismo Pagano⁸⁰ ("in deferential homage to Senator / Giovanni Gentile / J. Evola / Roma 17-3-928"), on Fenomenologia dell'Individuo assoluto ("a S.E. Giovanni Gentile / in respectful homage / of the author / Rome 3-1-930") and on Heidnischer Imperialismus⁸¹ ("to Giovanni Gentile / in respectful homage / J. Evola / Rome 7-XI-33 / XII"). Moreover, although we have not found copy, we know for certain - we learn this from a letter from the author himself, dated 4-1-931⁸² - that Evola asked G. Laterza to send a copy of La Tradizione ermetica⁸³ to Senator Gentile. In the library of the Fondazione Ugo Spirito, on the other hand, it is possible to find, in addition to the books mentioned, an autograph dedication on Phenomenology ("to Ugo Spirito / with all cordiality and / the esteem of / J. Evola"). Added to this is the ironic autograph dedication on Pagan Imperialism, to which Antimo Negri⁸⁴ refers. Now, it is more than evident that the list of dedications has no extra-documentary purpose. In essence it proves nothing, except that Evola, more or

At least until the early 1930s, he considered it useful to submit his own books to the attention of Gentile and Spirito - but to our knowledge also of Senator Balbino Giuliano, De Ruggiero and others with them -: a common practice that characterises every newcomer attempting to break into the cultural landscape of his own country. More interesting, at the very least, may be to note that some of the books mentioned seem not to have even been opened, many of them with no notes at all. But even this verification proves very little, especially more than seventy years after the publication of the texts. We note, however, incidentally that in the Theory, undoubtedly conceived by Evola as the *pars construens* in which to demonstrate his own philosophical system in a stringent and articulate manner, the name of Giovanni Gentile appears only a few times, others being in principle the exponents of idealism - especially German idealism - with whom the author compares himself⁸⁵.

It is worth going back to 1927, then, to recognise how a series of elements would tend to support the hypothesis that the season (if it can be defined as such) of confrontation-conflict between Evola and actualism was drawing to its epilogue⁸⁶ - in reality it would continue, but in one direction, even after Gentile's death (1944) - to give way to other forms of cultural commitment that would see Evola increasingly present on the intellectual scene. 1927 is also the year in which *Ur*, "journal of addresses for a science of the ego" - then "journal of esoteric sciences"⁸⁷, of which Evola took over the editorship and which he led, not without some noisy vicissitudes, until the end of 1929 (the journal was then called *Krur*). It is in this context that a change of sign seems to intervene for the first time in Evola's perspective. A decisive step towards the "integral traditionalism" to which Evola himself, together with René Guénon and a few others, would consider himself a witness. In his own intellectual autobiography, Evola recalls that within the "Group of *Ur*" as a starting point, the existential problem of the ego was once again posed, the crisis of those who no longer believe in current values and everything that habitually gives meaning existence, whether on an intellectual, practical or human level. The further assumption was that in the face of such a crisis one did not discard, did not resort to soothing remedies, but neither did one collapse, that on the basis of the irreversible fact that had now been determined one had instead decided absolutely 'to dispel the fog, to open a way', turning towards "self-knowledge and, in itself Being".

This knowledge was presented as a transcendent apperception, presupposing 'a change of state', and as a realisation "absolutely positive"⁸⁸. Hence the conception of "a unique tradition that

in various forms can be found in all peoples⁹ the step is short, and Evola confirms that "the new element, beyond the speculative overview of Phenomenology, was the absolute realism acting as a premise. It is necessary to recognise no less crudely than materialism and positivism what the 'I' is that each person ascribes to himself, before being able to go further, towards the 'self'"⁹⁰.

Ex post, an implicit passage is outlined in these lines from the "transcendental contingentism" proper Magical Idealism to a "transcendental ontology" that will mediate the first speculative moment in the hive of traditionalist substantialism. It is no coincidence that it is the same "Ea" (Evola) who, in the first issues of Ur, takes up the gnoseological problem⁹ ¹. This time, however, no longer a philosophical point of view, but from an initiatory one: "The criterion [...] therefore remains that of an absolute experimentalism and positivism. A realisation that is objective while remaining absolutely individual is the proper character of initiatory knowledge as opposed to profane knowledge, the objectivity of which, as we have said, is only achieved on condition of transcending all that is life, meaning and individual experience into something abstract, impersonal, problematic, social or even conventional"⁹ ².

We will return to this theme at greater length in our conclusions. In the meantime, it is possible to note how Evola, seriously intent on giving a coherent arrangement to his views on initiatic disciplines, towards the end of 1927 began the well-known polemics on Christianity and paganism. Controversies occasioned by a series of interventions by the "imperialist" philosopher in a number of cultural journals of the time and which constituted an anticipation of the contents of Pagan Imperialism, which was to be published following year. This would be of little importance for the purposes of our discussion, were it not for the fact that, Evola suggests, 'it is in this context that the first descent of the absolute Individual from the rarefied stratosphere of pure "value" into the pure domain of history, traditions and the philosophy of civilisation takes place. An ideal congenial to it was already embodied in the 'paganity' thus interpreted. Finally, with the attempt at pagan imperialism there was a rather chimerical attempt to act on the political and cultural currents of the time'⁹ ³.

It could therefore be said that the absolute Individual descends from the heights of speculative abstraction into the historical-political arena, the result consisting of the first form of hybridisation between the (still clearly nominalistic) philosophical perspective and the traditional horizon: in this, the book increases its importance.

This digression, which, moreover, took us as far back as 1928, may be useful to understand the scope of the most perspicuous encounter between Evola and Gentile. Rendez vous that lies, it is now possible and it is worth emphasising, beyond the philosophical domain.

The Roman thinker actually turned to Gentile - starting in July 1927 - in a crucial phase of his thought, in which he moved from philosophy to sophia and, at the same time, to historical-political commitment. The relationship, historically proven for space of two years, ended in Evola's attempt, only partially successful, to have some of his writings (not philosophical in the strict sense) published, to leave a trace of himself in the editing of the *Enciclopedia Italiana* and to secure a more solid material base. It is not possible, therefore, to consider that somehow there was a meeting between Gentile and Evola that took place within an authentic philosophical confrontation that, we repeat, Gentile personally avoided undertaking.

And yet, in spite of the maturing of his intellectual and metaphysical horizon, Evola did not renounce supporting his theses in the philosophical-academic sphere. We thus discover that, in the context of the 7th National Congress of Philosophy held in Rome from 26 to 29 May 1929 - whose committee honour was chaired by Benito Mussolini, while the promoter committee was chaired by Gentile - Evola, although not on the list of adherents to the Congress (as he was outside the academic environment), took an active part. In fact, he was among the speakers at the afternoon session on 28 May^{9 4} together with Montalto, Saitta, Pavese, Volpicelli, Bontadini, Calogero, Carabellese and others. Browsing through the Acts of the Congress it is possible to find Evola mentioned in discussion that opened, within the framework of the papers in section I, after Saitta's paper on the "Subjectivist Aspects of Plotinus' Gnoseological Doctrines".

Evola 'disputes that Saitta can speak of a subjectivist aspect of Plotinian doctrines, going beyond the human subject'^{9 5}.

And further on, in the debate following Bontadini's communication (in section II) on "Critique of the Antinomy of Transcendence and Immanence", the Roman thinker "argues that every idealism thought through to the end must pass through the solipsistic phase, from the point of view of which the problem of reconciling immanence and transcendence is eliminated, all forms of transcendence being eliminated by reducing everything to a system of subjective representations.

The problem, on the other hand, arises when we move from the purelygnoseological point of view to the point of view of action and freedom, thus coming to the different meanings that can be attributed to the term 'posing'. If the ego can say that it 'poses everything' in the sense of 'representing everything', it must, however, recognise that there are very different modes in this posing of his: he does not, for example, 'pose' the representation of the physical environment in which he finds himself or the words of those who speak to him, in the same way that he poses his own thoughts or the movements he imposes on his body. Among his 'representations', he finds a group that it is he who 'poses', but not freely: the type of activity that corresponds to it cannot be called 'will', but 'spontaneity', and is assimilated to the type of passions and instincts. Such is the only 'transcendence' that idealism can know: that which simply expresses the differential between the kind of activity in general, and the kind of free activity. An 'immanent transcendence', therefore, that resolves itself in the simple ascertainment of a factor of necessity, or of 'spontaneity' within certain forms of activity, which nevertheless always remain of the Ego. The problem of reconciling immanence and transcendence then boils down to that of reconciling freedom and necessity: a reconciliation that is not the responsibility of philosophy, but of action. Which opens the way to philosophical interpretations of magic as a technique of power (magical idealism): the resolution of transcendence can only consist in the resolution of necessity in action in every sense, and, therefore, that in the world of magic"⁹⁶.

It is evident how Evola, in this original and well-reasoned and well-received intervention⁹⁷, raises to his interlocutor the objections he has already in his previous works against actualism, even if Gentile is not mentioned here.

VIII) The Last Sinks. The Retrospective Balance Sheet: 1930-1974

Although busy attempting influence the cultural and political choices of the fascist regime, Evola does not renounce the 'philosophical tussle'. Yet his logomachy tends to move away from the purely philosophical domain. More specifically, the anti-Gentile offensive remains in the background. We can therefore touch on 1930^{9 8}, the year in which the epistolary relationship between Evola and Gentile was definitively broken off. Nevertheless, Evola, in this very year, and from the columns of La Torre (the fortnightly he directed after the closure of Krur) did not fail to mention the Sicilian philosopher⁹⁹ but without particularly polemical tones. Undoubtedly harsher will be the criticism that during the 1930s - and from then on, until the end of his activity - Evola will manifest actualism, especially the social doctrines that stemmed from it. First and foremost, the Gentilian 'Ethical State' and Spirito's 'Proprietary Corporation'.

The latter, for example, no longer the 'friendly' editor of the Italian Encyclopaedia, became the advocate of the abolition of private property and the statehood of corporations, 'the overall result of which is the denial of any real antithesis between socialism and fascism. Fascism as the integration of socialism, indeed of Marxism. Rome, crowning achievement of Moscow'.

Fascism distorted, Evola thinks, by 'a kind of pantheism or mysticism of the absolute ego, in which [...] the barbaric and communistic state of primitive societies would take on new life, where the fetish of the tribe, the totem, unconditionally dominates over beings without ego, without freedom, without true personality'.

Because a system that originates from undifferentiated idealism 'as a spirit, is nothing but a regressive return to this second barbaric, prepersonal and anti-Roman vision: just as the Bolshevik myth of the all-powerful "collective man" is, , a regressive return to this second vision'^{1 .00}

Once the period of the search for dialogue and confrontation is over, albeit undertaken in the impetuous tones of the young philosopher, in Evola the philosophical analysis of Italian idealism^{10 1} ends up inducing a new, decisive lunge against

"the deleterious consequences of hegelian philosophy" ¹⁰ Z. I.e. society

Gentile's transcendentalism^{10 3} and Spirito's communism. Nor did things change in the post-war period, when - fascism having died, and with it Gentile, and Spirito's pro-communist political choices becoming clear - Evola's investigation became technically retrospective. Hence the lapidary judgement on the pan-corporatist filiation of the "smoky and empty idealistic-Gentilian philosophy"^{10 4}permane, indeed, also characterises some places in Evola's works of political inspiration, in which the philosopher tends to search for marked borderline that separates an organic and anagogic conception of the State from its totalitarian declination^{10 5}. Evola thus goes so far as to affirm that if "[...] Gentile's philosophy - bolsa, presumptuous and confused philosophy - is deplorable, as deplorable Gentile's attitudes of authoritarian paternalism and monopolisation during Fascism, it must nevertheless be ascribed positively to Gentile himself as a man that he remained on the side of Fascism when Fascism, representing the losing game, should have been considered by him more or less as "historically outdated""^{10 6}.

Which instead did, according to Evola, Ugo Spirito 'who had already been a slavish follower of that philosophy that can be said to be the greatest mystification of Italian speculation of the last period, that is, of the so-called Gentilian "actualism"'. And whose ideas, Evola had premised, are expounded "[...] in various books, almost all of which, moreover, are abortive and amateurish [...]"^{10 7}. Following this line, Evola would finally say that the consideration recognisable to the philosopher of Castelvetro on the part of an authentic right wing should be reduced to merely "paying dutiful homage to the man Gentile for his behaviour after 25 July"^{10 8}, without prejudice to the summary condemnation of his philosophical theories, as well as the consequent elaboration of a social system considered unacceptable. But we are now beyond any philosophical confrontation.

3. Conclusions

The impression we have gained from the investigations outlined is that, as Antimo Negri also states, Evola had indeed sought to constitute an alternative cultural reference point to the Gentile milieu. That is to say that, although he did not want to leave the path of dialogue untried - which in any case bore some fruit - he intended to leave a profound trace of himself in the academic milieu that was not firmly fixed on topicalist positions.

The relationship with Fascism is different and the unquestionable Evolian strategy to bring the Mussolini regime to aristocratic, organicist and counter-revolutionary positions - but it would be better to say revolutionary-conservative - remained unfulfilled in its claims to counter those philosophical-doctrinal tendencies that were more congenial to Fascism-regime. If only for their intimate search for a rational unity to be realised possibly also through coercion, philosophically deducible and justified teleologically (as well as theologically).

Less interesting instead is Evola's analysis of Gentile and the Gentilians in some sporadic interventions published in the years immediately after the war - excluding, of course, the more articulate reflections present in the more structured works. Even where Evola's discourse goes beyond the attempt to denounce a 'Gentilian infection' within the right wing, the Roman philosopher's analysis remains dominated by a sense of revenge that is found above all in personal criticism and which takes substance away from potentially plausible arguments. Especially to those that concern the domain of political doctrine. It remains, then, to add something to the considerations that have already occupied most of this essay, namely the possible interpretations of the refractoriness of Gentile's academic cultural circles to accept Evolian philosophical theses.

It is Evola himself who addresses us when he states: 'All the extra-philosophical references in which my philosophical system was rich served as a convenient pretext for ostracism. One could dismiss with a shrug of the shoulders a system that accorded a place even to the world initiation, of 'magic' and of

other superstitious relics. That all this was enforced by me in terms of rigorous speculative thinking was of little use. But there was also a misunderstanding on my part, with regard to those to whom, on a practical level, my speculative endeavour might be of some use. It was a philosophical introduction to a non-philosophical world, which could only be of significance in the very rare cases in which ultimate philosophy had given rise to a profound existential crisis. But there was also to be considered (and of this I later became increasingly aware) that philosophical precedents, i.e. the habit of abstract discursive thought, represented the most unfavourable qualification for such a crisis to be overcome in the positive sense I had indicated, with a transition to realising disciplines"¹.⁰⁹

And it is perhaps in the Evolian desire wear philosophical dress to show the deep lacerations and then get rid of it, to go with philosophy beyond philosophy, which urgently needs to be traced the reason for the irreconcilability between Evolian demands and those made their own even by those who had theorised a philosophy praxis still lacking a metaphilosophical outlet. This may also explain the fact that in the final analysis the theorist magical Idealism was offered the chance to deal with one or more entries in the Treccani, undoubtedly concerning a subject on which he was recognised as having an indisputable competence, alchemy or esotericism in general, but who nevertheless did not enjoy greater consideration than those "Scienze curiose"¹⁰ that already in the 17th century, even if they had not been grossly considered (by most) to be the prerogative of the "pernicious magorum societas"¹¹, were nevertheless considered to be of little cultural relevance, almost as if they were a sort of escapist study.

To realise this, it is sufficient to glance at the reviews that Evola earned in the columns of the most important philosophy journals of the time. One will notice how the loyal recognition of the high philosophical depth of Evola's system was countered by a scandalised recoil in the face of the extra-philosophical elements mentioned above. On the other hand, the same review by Ugo Spirito mentioned above is a clear symptom of this allergy. It is not in vain, in this sense, to quote by way of example what one of Gentile's closest and most talented collaborators (as well as editor of the *Enciclopedia Italiana*), Guido Calogero, said of Evola: "As for Evola, Tilgher appropriately quoted a single passage from *L'individuo e il divenire del mondo* (1926): even those who do not otherwise know his thought can, in fact, from these pages, get an adequate idea.

On re-reading them, the writer was once again convinced that he had not too

wrong when, eight years ago, while preparing the *Italian Heft*, composed of writings by Italian idealists, for the journal *Logos*, then directed by Richard Kroner, I included in it, to the surprise of many, an article by Evola¹³. Few like Evola have in fact understood so clearly how the most modern idealist solution to the problem of being and knowing requires the total, integral, unconditional negation of all 'reality' and 'objectivity' in front of or within the ego's awareness, and how therefore within the insurmountable sphere of such awareness that resistance and stability of 'things', which traditionally generates the idea of their reality, no longer holds any ontological or gnoseological significance, and can therefore only be explained in the philosophy of practice, as an obstacle opposed to will, to power, to action. What Evola does not see, however is how this obstacle is then the very basis of action, which is implemented the more it removes this obstacle by modifying reality, but which could never be implemented if it were not always there to provide the basis of power and prevent it from groping in the void: since the only meaning of 'reality' in face of 'ideality' is precisely this, to be what the acting consciousness finds within itself as already done in the face of what it must do, to be the past that eternally and necessarily opposes the future in that eternal present that is the self. Not seeing this, Evola raises as an ideal action that the absolute domination and annihilation of the 'real', and dreams of a human thinking-doing capable of eliminating or promptly modifying, just as ideas move in the imagination, every obstacle of things: hence his interest in magic, and in all those forms, more or less esoteric, of exercising inner power, from which one can hope for help in approaching a similar ideal, which was already vague in Papini's *Finite Man*. And since, then, in the solipsistic solitude of this "absolute individual", the will to recognise the persons of others never intervenes, which, by overcoming the otherwise invincible solipsism, constitutes for that very reason the only concrete foundation of all morality, thus the Evolian ego, destroyer of the world of things, at the same time denies even the world of men. One understands here how, between magic and immoralism, a speculative genius, which had such a robust structure, could be lost in so many sterile and disconcerting experiences"¹⁴.

Leaving the question Evolian "immoralism" untouched - which, moreover, has already been called into question by Spirito, even though he did not have the same knowledge of Evolian thought that Calogero had - it is evident that the conviction of the impossible encounter between the philosopher-magician and the world of philosophers tout-court finds concrete confirmation here. Let us add that Benedict himself

Croce, in whom Evola recognised 'a greater gentility than Gentile'.

¹¹⁵, and which allowed him to publish some important works with the publisher Laterza, in a letter addressed to latter, referring to Evoli's request to edit a new edition of Cesare Della Riviera's *Il Mondo magico degli Heroi*, an alchemic treatise from 1600, he declares: "As for the content of the book, what can I say? If there are people who are interested in this stuff, they will welcome it because it is certainly no more stupid than any other"¹¹⁶. Which leaves little room for doubt as to the negativity of an environment, even that headed by the anti-academic Croce, which frowned upon certain cultural activities as at least heterodox.

If it is true, in conclusion, that Evola did not find an authentic meeting point with the academic environment of his time, this would also seem to be attributable to other factors.

Certainly, the fact that the young and fierce philosopher did not have a university degree made him a sort of cultural outsider¹⁷ viewed with a certain condescension by the academic world. Yet this motivation remains only partially valid and does not fully convince. For Evola was also read, reviewed, sometimes appreciated (or criticised) by eminent philosophers of his time, and this regardless of his academic qualifications¹¹⁸. It may be more plausible, then, that a certain diffidence towards him - as we have verified - might have stemmed from the type of expressly metaphilosophical (when not robustly anti-academic) approach that Evola favoured in his analyses. , we repeat, as well as being able to be summarily dismissed as an attitude of preconceived closure, did not prevent him (and still does not prevent him) from making himself talked about in the hegemonic cultural environment. Throughout his activity, Evola sought to move ideas and make certain inner chords of his interlocutors vibrate. Without any intention of professionalising his message, but he always had in mind the need not to vulgarise the objects of study. It was this position that probably determined a certain disinterest, but also a certain flattering disappointment¹¹⁹ on the part of the intellectuals who knew Evola. Regarding, more specifically, the relationship Gentile and Spirito's environment, the incompatibilities between the different philosophical systems were already evident in terms of the different existential and (why not?) political choices. Differences in age and their respective choices and vicissitudes did the rest.

One final consideration remains. The possibility of analysing, today, in the company

of valiant academics, the breadth and weight of Julius Evola's cultural contacts with the philosophical intelligentsia of the last century obliges us to recognise how his figure is finally gaining deserved recognition in the reconstruction of the Italian cultural worlds of the 20th century.

Alessandro Giuli

¹ Cf. M. Durst, [Il contributo di Julius Evola all'Enciclopedia Italiana](#), in [Il Veltro](#), no. 34, May-August 1998. pp. 335-340. Cf. also, by the same author, [Gli studi di psicologia nell'Enciclopedia Italiana](#), in AA. VV. [Psychology in Italy. I protagonisti e gli aspetti scientifici istituzionali](#), edited by G. Cimino and N. Dazzi, LED, Milan 1998, pp. 609-650. It is also interesting to note, as recently reported on the [Encyclopaedia's website \(treccani.it\)](#), that 'in the course of sorting the [Enciclopedia Italiana di Scienze, lettere e Arti](#) fund, the sub-series "Voci soppresse" was recently catalogued and computerised, within which two manuscripts of entries written by Evola and never published were found: [Baptism \(Magical Interpretation\)](#) and [Apparitions](#), of which the Archive preserves the autograph manuscript'. On the same telematic site, it is possible to view Evola's manuscript of the entry [Baptism](#), the content of which, decidedly dense with esoteric references, is located in a distant horizon, incompatible with the "scientific" pretensions and with certain confessional modesty underlying the drafting of the [Encyclopaedia](#). Evola writes: "According to this interpretation, baptism would be an act of power, determined by the objective and necessitating action that is attributed to the "rite" conducted in the required material and spiritual conditions, through which the "body of life" of the one who undergoes it is placed in relation and magically joined to the "body" of the collective or traditional entity, to which the consecration refers: so much so as to be part of it, willingly or unwillingly, and to be involved, by virtue of invisible laws, in everything that with regard to "spiritual influences" - whether of "blessing" or of "curse" - can proceed from the force that constitutes that entity".

Z Cf. S. Arcella, [L'epistolario Evola-Gentile](#), in [Futuro Presente](#), no. 6, Spring 1995, pp. 79-89. Cf. also [Julius Evola's Letters to Giovanni Gentile](#)

(1927-1929), edited by S. Arcella, Fondazione J. Evola, Rome 2000 (with the reproduction of the letters).

3 This possibility is corroborated by an explicit note or 'communication to the editors' signed by Gentile and found in the files of the Enciclopedia Italiana. It should be added, moreover, that in the event that the entries "Tavola Smaragdina" and "Pietra Filosofale" were actually written by Evola, it would be difficult to understand the greater relevance accorded to the entry "Atanor" (signed G. Ev: Giulio Evola) compared to the other two, if not in the context a more complex situation that we will try to illuminate later. As long as we are on the subject, we can also state that Dr. Durst's thesis about the circumstances that would have led to assignment of the entry "Occultism" to Emilio Servadio instead of Evola, is confirmed by a written request from Servadio himself to Gentile, dated 7 November 1928, in which the psychoanalyst offers himself as editor of the entries concerning metapsychics and occultism.

⁴ Cf. the excellent essay by R. Melchionda, Il volto di Dioniso, filosofia e arte in Julius Evola, Basaia, Rome 1984.

⁵ J. Evola, A proposito di Dada, in L'Impero, 20 April 1923.

⁶Evola's presentation of Laotze's book, Taotêching, published by Carabba in early 1923, can already be considered of strict philosophical relevance. Evola, by the author's own admission, attributed particular value to Laotze's text, in the "pretension at the time to valorise it "critically" in terms of "modern thought", sometimes using certain commonplaces of western idealist philosophy" (cf. J. Evola, Il Cammino del Cinabro, Scheiwiller, Rome 1972, p. 30). Confirming Evola's admission, there is the review by the spiritualist Vittorino Vezzani - which appeared in Ultra, the "Rivista di studi iniziatici" of the Roman Theosophical League, directed by D. Calvari - in which the author writes: "The Tao, for Evola, is the actual principle

of the absolute individual, i.e. that transcendental function whereby the realisation of the 'I', as self-consciousness and self-sufficiency, is transmuted into the elaboration of a cyclical becoming of world determinations [...] E. seeks to claim this philosophy [idealism.] against the usual understanding of the Sinologists as a naturistic pantheism, a socialising quietism and moralism, the value of an immanentist idealism, indeed of a theory of the absolute individual' (cf. V. Vezzani, rec. of Laotze, Il libro della via e della virtù- edited by J. Evola, in Ultra, XVII, no. 3, July 1923, pp. 17980).

⁷ J. Evola, rec. by G. Gentile, Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere, Vol. II, Laterza, Bari 1923. In Ultra, XVII, no. 45, October-November 1923, pp. 270272.

⁸ Evoli's first lunge, by the , appeared in the columns of a journal that did not and probably did not want to have any academic philosophical dignity in the strict sense of the word, even though it had contributors of the value of Tilgher, Zanfognini, Varisco, Keyserling and others.

⁹ R. Melchionda, The Face of Dionysus, cit., p. 40

¹⁰ See G. Gentile, Rosmini e Gioberti, Annali della Scuola Normale Superiore, Pisa 1898, then Sansoni, Florence 1955; and also La filosofia di Marx, Spierri, Pisa 1899, then Sansoni, Florence 1962.

¹¹ This is always through the assumption of the ideality of the real, implying the contradictory nature of the idea a reality extraneous to thought which, by the very fact being the subject of an intellectual operation, corresponds to an operation within which reality is the content of the idea itself.

¹² G. Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, Mariotti, Pisa 1916, I, § 6.

¹³ In the Gentilian system there is evidently no place for matter as such either: precisely because it is the object of thought, it represents only a possible self-referential experience of it.

¹⁴ See G. Gentile, Sommario di pedagogia come scienza filosofica, Laterza, Bari 1913.

¹⁵ G. Gentile, Teoria generale dello spirito come atto puro, cit., p. 230.

¹⁶ G. Gentile, Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere, Spierri, Pisa 1917, vol. I; 2nd ed. Laterza, Bari 1922-1923.

¹⁷ Ibidem, 1, 7, § 9. Perhaps it is not far-fetched to claim that Gentile's philosophy, in its perpetual aspiration to the unity of being and thought, and in which the how of thought is the becoming of thought itself in its own triadic processuality, will increasingly identify with an absolute formalism. In short, with ut sic logic.

¹⁸ See footnote 7.

¹⁹ G. Gentile, Sistema di logica come teoria del conoscere, Laterza, Bari 1923, vol. II, p. 78.

Z⁰ Ibid, pp. 78-79.

Z¹ Ibid.

ZZ Ibid, p. 80.

Z³ Ibid.

Z⁴ Ibid.

Z⁵ J. Evola, Il nuovo idealismo italiano, in Il Nuovo Paese, 11 October 1923.

Z⁶ J. Evola, Idealism and Occultism and the Problem of the Contemporary Spirit, in Ultra, XVIII, no. 6, December 1923, pp. 304-316. The essay in question, revised and expanded, was later included as the first chapter and under the title Il problema dello spirito contemporaneo e il trapasso dell'Idealismo, in Saggi sull'Idealismo magico, Atanòr, Todi Roma, 1925; now Edizioni Mediterranee, Roma 2006.

Z⁷ Ibid, p. 20.

Z⁸ Ibid, p. 22.

2'All reality is but a determination of my knowledge, that (Plotinus) I, rather than being understood by the universe, understand this within myself'.
Ibid, p. 23.

3'Ibid, p. 24.

3¹ Ibid, p. 25.

3² Ibid, p. 26.

3³ Ibid, p. 27.

3⁴ Ibid, p. 28.

3⁵ Ibid, p. 29.

3⁶J. Evola, Theory of the Absolute Individual, Bocca, Milan 1927; now Edizioni Mediterranee,Rome 1998.

3⁷ J. Evola, Idealism and Occultism, cit., p. 30.

3⁸ Ibid, p. 32.

³'The way does not really exist for those who do not want to walk', Ibid.

⁴⁰Cf. Plato, Phaedo, 100 a.; Sophist, 242 a.

⁴¹ Cf. Paul of Tarsus, 1st and 2nd Epistles to the Thessalonians, passim. But also, with regard to relationship between idealism and (neo)Platonism: W. Beierwaltes, Platonismus und Idealismus, Vittorio Klostermann, Frankfurt am Main 1972 [Platonism and Idealism, Il Mulino, Bologna 1987].

⁴² J. Evola, On the System of the Tantras, in Logos, VII, no. 4, October-December 1924, pp. 282-286.

⁴³ Cf. J. Evola, Keyserling's School of Wisdom, in Il Mondo, 4 March 1924; and E. Keyserling and the "School of Wisdom", in Ultra, XVIII, no. 56, December 1924, pp. 280-291, later inserted in Essays on Magical Idealism, cit., pp. 168-176.

⁴⁴ J. Evola, La potenza come valore metafisico, in Ultra, XVIII, no. 3, July 1924, pp. 146-160; and in Atanòr, no. 6, June 1924, pp. 177-186; no. 7, July 1924, pp. 202-209; no. 89, August - September 1924, pp. 237-242; later in Essays on Magical Idealism, cit., pp. 31-63.

⁴⁵ Ibid, p. 148.

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ Ibid, p. 150.

⁴⁸ Ibid. Evola's quoted words, according to the author's footnote, are taken from G. Gentile, Logica, Laterza, Bari 1923, vol. II, p. 68.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Ibid, p. 151.

⁵¹ Ibid.

⁵² Ibid, p. 153.

⁵³ Ibid, p. 159.

⁵⁴ Ibid. p. 160.

⁵⁵ J. Evola, L'idealismo dell'insufficienza, in L'idealismo realistico, no. 2, 15 December 1924, pp. 18. Another article by Evola had already appeared, with the same title, in IlMondo, 26 June 1924. For Vittore Marchi's review, see G.F. Lami's introductory essay to J. Evola, L'idealismo realistico, Fondazione J. Evola, Roma1997.

⁵⁶On this, cf. G.F. Lami, Per una lettura dell'epistolario Evola - Tilgher, in FuturoPresente, no. 6, Spring 1995, pp. 71-79.

⁵⁷J. Evola, The Idealism of Insufficiency, cit. p. 39.

⁵⁸On this subject, see Julius Evola's Letters to Benedetto Croce (1925-1933), edited by S. Arcella, Fondazione J. Evola, Rome 1995.

⁵⁹J. Evola, Phenomenology of the Absolute Individual, Bocca, Milan 1930.

⁶⁰J. Evola, Essays on Magical Idealism, cit. pp. 148-161.

⁶¹Ibid, p. 157.

⁶²Ibid, p. 159.

⁶³It should come as no surprise that Evola sought to gain space in philosophical circles opposed actualism and, at the same time, the attention of Gentile and his entourage, whom he attacked with no little vigour. First of all, this can be explained as an attempt to enter the heart of the Italian cultural debate, by a young intellectually prepared, far from unknown, and moreover characteristically enterprising (sometimes bordering on the unscrupulous). Moreover, it is a well-established custom in the cultural sphere that the most vehement dialectical attacks do not invalidate that 'good' that remain punctually on the level of personal respect. Even Evola - the letters

he sent to Gentile are proof of this - he was bound, like many other intellectuals, to respect the masters of philosophy whom he did not fail to criticise.

⁶⁴ Cf. G.F. Lami, Per una lettura dell'epistolario Evola - Tilgher, cit. p. 77.

⁶⁵ On this, see La Biblioteca esoterica, Evola Croce Laterza, carteggi editoriali 1923-1959, edited by A. Barbera, Fondazione J. Evola Pellicani editore, Rome 1997, passim.

⁶⁶ J. Evola, L'individuo e il divenire del mondo, in Ultra, XIX, no. 56, December 1925, pp. 287-303; later published, under the same title, by Libreria di Scienze e Lettere, Rome 1926.

⁶⁷ J. Evola, Man as Power. The Tantras in their metaphysics and methods of magical self-realisation, Atanòr, Todi-Roma [1926]; now Edizioni Mediterranee, Roma, 1988.

⁶⁸ Ibid, p. 138. Gentile is quoted here, along with Kant, Lachelier and Hamelin, in to the problem of the 'principle that identifies a particular experience', which these philosophers, according to Evola, would leave unsolved. However, philosophical speculation gives way, in the context of the book under review, to esoteric considerations that, as such, are beyond the scope comparison with Gentile idealism.

⁶⁹ U. Spirito, Rassegna di studi sull'idealismo attuale, IV, in Giornale critico della filosofia italiana, XVIII, 2, March 1927, pp. 144-150; then in L'idealismo italiano e i suoi critici, Vallecchi, Florence 1930, p. 205; now in appendix to J. Evola, Saggi sull'idealismo magico, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 2006. The quotations are taken from the Review of Studies.

⁷⁰Ibid, p. 140.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Ibid. It is barely worth noting here how Evola would more explicitly reveal three years later, in his Phenomenology, how the phenomenological iter of the absolute Individual - which proceeds through the three epochs of 'spontaneity', 'personality' and 'domination' - is characterised by the contingency of the different moments, which do not find their raison d'être in their antecedent, but rather situate themselves within the volitional act of the Ego. All of this, although already hinted at in part by Evola in earlier writings - and indeed already well understood by the author since the publication of the Theory, which, as we know, was to be published together with the Phenomenology, the two works having been completed as early as 1924 - was evidently not known to Ugo Spirito.

⁷³ Ibid, p. 141.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ Ibid. p. 148

⁷⁶Ibid, p. 149.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid, p. 150.

⁷⁹Cf. R. Melchionda, I due idealismi di Evola e Spirito, in Intervento, III, no. 16, August - September 1974, pp. 91-108.

⁸⁰J. Evola, Imperialismo pagano. Il Fascismo dinanzi al pericolo EuroCristiano, Atanòr, TodiRoma 1928; now Edizioni Mediterranee (with the added translation of the text revised by Evola and published in German in 1933), Rome 2004.

⁸¹ J. Evola, Heidnischer Imperialismus, ArmanenVerlag, Leipzig 1933; see previous footnote.

⁸² Cf. J. Evola, The Esoteric Library, cit., pp. 52-53

⁸³ J. Evola, La Tradizione, Laterza, Bari 1931; now Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1996.

⁸⁴ Cf. A. Negri, Julius Evola e la filosofia, Spirali Edizioni, Milan 1988, p. 73. Negri, quoting erroneously from an improbable Christian Imperialism, thus states: 'AU. S. in cordial homage and with best wishes for imminent conversion to paganism! J. E.'. Except for the latter, all other dedications are reproduced in Lettera di Julius Evola a Giovanni Gentile, cit.

⁸⁵ See J. Evola, Theory of the Absolute Individual, cit., pp. III, IV, 41, 1412,

223,246, 276. It is noteworthy that in the places where Evola cites Gentile, the critical arguments do not differ in content from those already expressed, and in a more analytical form, in the works we dealt with earlier. Of Ugo Spirito, on the other hand, there is no trace in the Theory.

⁸⁶We will barely, and purposely, touch upon the question of the cultural-historical implications testified by the four letters Evola sent to Gentile (the only ones found) in the time span from 12 July 1927 to 30 July 1929 in respect of which see footnote 2.

⁸⁷ Regarding Evola and the "Group of Ur", cf. R. del Ponte, Julius Evola e il magico Gruppo di Ur, Sear, Borzano 1994. But also, in view of some important corrections that are not entirely unquestionable, cf. A. Perenne, Renato del Ponte, Evola e il magico "Gruppo di Ur", in Politica Romana, n,2, 1995. pp. 139144. Also: La Cittadella, "Evola thirty years later", n.s., April - December 2004; La Cittadella, "Arturo Reghini. La sapienza pagana e pitagorica del '900", nn. 232425, July 2006 March 2007.

⁸⁸ J. Evola, The Cinnabar Path, cit., pp. 83-84.

⁸⁹Ibid.

⁹⁰ Ibid, p. 87.

⁹¹ Ea, Sul problema della conoscenza, in Ur, "Rivista di indirizzi per una Scienza dell'Io", I, Tilopa, Rome 1980, pp. 2029.

⁹² Ibid, p. 24.

⁹³ J. Evola, *The Cinnabar Path*, cit., p. 76.

⁹⁴ Cf. *Atti del VII Congresso Nazionale di Filosofia, Rome, 26-29 May 1929, VII*, Casa Editrice d'Arte Bestetti e Tumminelli, Milan Rome s.d.

⁹⁵ Ibid, p. 354.

⁹⁶ Ibid, p. 357.

⁹⁷ Thus Bontadini, in the account of his reply: '[...] As Evola, he follows with interest his effort to develop modern idealism in the direction of practice and power'; Ibid, p. 358.

⁹⁸ This is the year in which the *Phenomenology of the Absolute Individual* was published, within which, as already mentioned with regard to Theory, Gentile is mentioned marginally. Spirit does not appear.

⁹⁹ Cf. La Torre - *Foglio di espressioni varie e di tradizione una*. We quote from the collection published by Società Editrice Il Falco, Milan 1977. Certainly worthy of note is an article by Evola, which appeared in the column "L'Arco e la Clava" in n. 6 (15 April 1930), in which the author, replying to a polemical article that appeared in *Bibliografia Fascista*, states: "[...] As various collaborators of the review, the director himself, Senator Gentile [...] has personally honoured us with an attitude of cordial understanding, [...]" (cit., p. 241). It is therefore assumed that Evola

referred to the personal relationship to which the few letters mentioned earlier bear witness. It is also worth mentioning another article, which appeared in the same issue of the journal and was signed by euje, in which they mention "[...] the firm conduct and courage that Gentile showed" during a speech to the Senate that echoed the speech he had already given at the VIIth Congress of Philosophy, a speech that conflicted with the positions of the Church, but also with the claims of "a left group of political literatoids, 'spiritualists' and pseudo-religious gazzarra". In addition to above, it is possible to mention another, less relevant reference to Evola in Gentile's correspondence, and found in a letter sent to the Sicilian philosopher by Fortunato Pintor, dated "Rome, November 1928". The sender wrote: "[...] and also the three volumes of Barthelot were found: but in the reading room, at the disposal of Professor Evola; from whom, of course, they cannot be taken away". In G.Gentile, Epistolario, vol. XI, Gentile Pintor, edited by E. Campochiaro, Le Lettere, Florence 1993, pp. 35,53,56. This is the extensive alchemical anthology on which Evola was researching for his essays on Ur and which would later be recast in La Tradizione ermetica (Laterza, Bari 1931).

¹⁰⁰ J. Evola, Fascist Spirituality and the Fascist 'Left', in Il Regime Fascista, 28 May 1933.

¹⁰¹ Cf. J. Evola, In margine al IX Congresso filosofico, in Il Regime Fascista, 1 November 1934; as well as, in the same newspaper, Sorpassamento dell'Idealismo, 18 January 1935; Superamento dell'Idealismo, 2 February 1935, and L'equivoco dell'immanenza, 10 May 1935 (the second and third articles now in: J. Evola, Superamenti, cura by M. Iacona, Fondazione J. Evola, Rome 2005).

¹⁰² J. Evola, Whose precursor is Hegel?, in La Vita italiana, XXII, no. 251, February 1934, pp. 169-181.

¹⁰³ See in particular G. Gentile, Genesis and Structure of Society, Sansoni, Florence 1946.

¹⁰⁴ J. Evola, Radicalist Tendencies. Socializzazione ed economia nuova, in Il Meridiano d'Italia, 25 June 1950.

¹⁰⁵ Cf. J. Evola, Gli uomini e le rovine, Edizioni dell'Ascia, Rome 1953, passim, but especially pp. 100-105; now Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 2002, pp. 123-126.

¹⁰⁶ Ibid, p. 103.

¹⁰⁷ J. Evola, 'New Humanism' and Communism, in Il Conciliatore, XV, 30 November 1966, pp. 221-222.

¹⁰⁸ J. Evola, Il filosofo Giovanni Gentile, in Il Conciliatore, XXI, 1 January 1972, pp. 2829; later included under the title Il caso di Giovanni Gentile, in Ricognizioni. Uomini e Problemi, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome 1974, pp. 199-203. In the context of the debate that opened up within radical right-wing circles after the Second World War about the need to trace a philosophical heritage to be recovered in the most lively cultural currents of Fascism, Evola again intervened harshly against those who saw Gentile as a point of reference. On this subject, see also J. Evola, Gentile is not our philosopher, in Ordine Nuovo, I, n. 45, July - August 1955, pp. 25-30; and later in Tradizione, III, n. 4, September - November 1965. pp. 11-15.

¹⁰⁹ J. Evola, The Cinnabar Path, cit., p. 61.

¹¹⁰ This is how magic was defined, not without a careless disdain,

alchemy, kabbalah and esoteric disciplines in general.

¹¹ See F. Garasse, La doctrine curieuse des beaux esprits de ce temps, ou prétendustels, Paris 1623.

¹² Cf. A. Tilgher, Antologia dei filosofi italiani del dopoguerra, Guanda, Modena 1937.

¹³ J. Evola, Die drei Epochen von Gewissheitsproblemen, in Logos Internationale Zeitschrift für Philosophie der Kultur, Band XX, Heft 3 (Italien Heft), Tübingen, Dezember 1931, pp. 399-413.

¹⁴ G. Calogero, Come si orientare nel pensiero contemporaneo? con un'appendice sulla filosofia italiana del dopoguerra, Biblioteca dei Leonardo, Sansoni, Firenze 1940, pp. 57-59.

¹⁵ J. Evola, The Cinnabar Path, cit., pp. 35-36.

¹⁶ The Esoteric Library, cit., p. 64.


¹⁷ In fairness, it must be said that Evola chose not to take a degree, as he himself states: '[...] as a young man I made a particular point of not wanting to take a degree at all, although I had almost completed corresponding studies. To appear as a 'doctor' or a 'professor' in an authorised capacity and for practical purposes, seemed to me an intolerable thing, although I should afterwards continually have such titles applied to me, which I do not have. Here the

kshatrya would have sympathised with that member of an ancient Piedmontese family who paradoxically said: 'I divide the world into two categories: the nobility and those who have a degree'" (Il Cammino del Cinabro, cit., p. 5). These statements, which, it should be remembered, date back to 1963, are coupled with the following in a letter sent in 1931 to the Romanian historian of religions Mircea Eliade: "[...] The academic environment corresponds to a kind of "psychic current", with the possibility of a subtle deforming and contaminating influence". On the relationship between Evola and Eliade, cf. G. de Turris, L'"Iniziato" e il "Professore". I rapporti "sommersi" tra Julius Evola e Mircea Eliade, in AA.VV., Delle rovine ed oltre saggi su Julius Evola, Pellicani Editore, Rome 1995. pp. 219-251.

¹¹⁸ He also shared his status with Benedetto Croce, who was certainly not marginalised from the cultural debate of the time.

¹¹⁹Thus, for example, Evola recalls: "[...] Tilgher must have regretted that 'I was lost' when I left speculative forms behind me, passing into fields in which, given his intellectualistic mentality, he could not follow me" (Il Cammino del Cinabro, cit., p. 61).

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