

Evolan Traditionalism contra Heidegger

<https://evolaasheis.proboards.com/thread/146/philosophical-views-evola>

Amongst Heidegger's Nachlass (the papers left behind after his death) a handwritten note has been found in which the philosopher quotes a passage from Friedrich Bauer's 1935 German translation of *Revolt Against the Modern World* (*Erhebung wider die moderne Welt*). Here is the passage as Heidegger copied it out:

Wenn eine Rasse die Berührung mit dem, was allein Beständigkeit hat und geben kann — mit der Welt des Seyns — verloren hat, dann sinken die von ihr gebildeten kollektiven Organismen, welches immer ihre Größe und Macht sei, schicksalhaft in die Welt der Zufälligkeit herab.

And here is a translation:

When a race has lost contact with what alone has and can give it permanence [or "stability," Beständigkeit] — with the world of Beyng [Seyns] then the collective organisms formed by it, whatever be their greatness and power, are destined to sink down into the world of contingency.

For comparison, here is the entire passage from Bauer's text:

Wenn eine Rasse die Berührung mit dem, was allein Beständigkeit hat und geben kann — mit der Welt des "Seins" — verloren hat, dann sinken die von ihr gebildeten kollektiven Organismen, welches immer ihre Größe und Macht sei, schicksalhaft in die Welt der Zufälligkeit herab: werden Beute des Irrationalen, des Veränderlichen, des "Geschichtlichen," dessen, was von unten und von außen her bedingt ist. [16]

We immediately notice two things when Heidegger's handwritten version is compared to the original. First, Heidegger has rendered Sein as Seyn. [17] Second, Heidegger replaces a colon with a period and omits the last part of the sentence entirely. The part after the colon can be translated as follows: "[to] become prey to the irrational, the changeable, the 'historical,' of what is conditioned from below and from the outside." Why did Heidegger make these changes? Fully answering this question will allow us to see that Heidegger actually rejects Evola's Traditionalism in the most fundamental terms possible.

First of all, it is likely that this undated note comes from sometime in the 1930s. During this time, Heidegger began utilizing *Seyn*, an archaic German spelling of *Sein* (Being). [18] But why? What did this signify? It was not simply eccentricity on Heidegger's part. By *Seyn*, Heidegger meant something distinct from *Sein*, which refers to the Being that beings have ("Being as such"). *Seyn* instead refers to what Heidegger calls elsewhere "the clearing" (*die Lichtung*). This metaphorical expression refers to a clearing in a forest, which allows light to enter in and illuminate what stands within the clearing. Thomas Sheehan describes Heidegger's clearing as "the always already opened-up 'space' that makes the being of things (phenomenologically: the intelligibility of things) possible and necessary." [19] The clearing is what "gives" Being.

Now, by contrast, when Evola speaks of "the world of being" (*Welt des Seins*; *mondo di essere*) in this passage and elsewhere, he is referring to a Platonic realm of timeless essences that are the true beings, in contrast to the changeful, impermanent terrestrial beings we encounter with the five senses. Traditionalism is heavily dependent on this Platonic metaphysics. Consider, for example, Evola's words from the very beginning of *Revolt*:

In order to understand both the spirit of Tradition and its antithesis, modern civilization, it is necessary to begin with the fundamental doctrine of the two natures. According to this doctrine there is a physical order of things and a metaphysical one; there is a mortal nature and an immortal one; there is the superior realm of "being" and the inferior realm of "becoming." Generally speaking, there is a visible and tangible dimension and, prior to and beyond it, an invisible and intangible dimension that is the support, the source, and the true life of the former. [25]

Not only does Heidegger reject this Platonic metaphysics, he sees it as the first major stage in the decline of the West. Its inception is essentially identical with the "forgottenness" of the clearing spoken of a moment ago. All the aspects of modernity Heidegger was quoted earlier as deploring are ultimately traceable, he believes, to Platonic metaphysics. Thus, Heidegger completely rejects the idea that a "race" declines when it has "lost contact" with being, in the Platonic sense of "being" meant by Evola. Quite the reverse: a race — our race — has declined precisely through its turn toward Platonic metaphysics, and its turn away from the clearing. Thus, when Heidegger swaps *Sein* for *Seyn*, he is entirely changing the meaning of what Evola is saying. He is rewriting the passage so that it agrees with his own position: the decline of the West stems from its forgottenness of *Seyn* (the clearing) and its embrace of the Platonic *Sein* of the Western metaphysical tradition.

Heidegger omits the last part of Evola's sentence for similar reasons. Let us look again at those words. Evola tells us that when a race has lost contact with "the world of being" it will "become prey to the

irrational, the changeable, the 'historical,' of what is conditioned from below and from the outside." Heidegger omits these words because he rejects Evola's dichotomy between "being" and "the historical." Heidegger argues, in fact, that Being/the clearing is inherently historical (geschichtlich), and changeable (veränderlich). The Being of things actually changes as culture changes. This is the same thing, fundamentally, as saying that the meaning of things changes over time.

Thus, if the Being or meaning that things have for us changes over the course of history, as culture and circumstances change, then, contra Evola, Being is inescapably "changeable" and "historical." Evola also says that a race which loses contact with his idea of being falls prey to "the irrational" (das Irrational, in the German translation). Would Heidegger endorse this as well? Is his idea of Being "irrational"? Well, Heidegger does argue that historical-cultural shifts in Being/meaning are not fully intelligible to human beings. The reason for this is that it is always within Being/the clearing that things are meaningful or intelligible to us. It therefore follows that Being/the clearing itself is not ultimately intelligible. In a highly qualified sense, we could thus describe it as "irrational." That Evola implicitly endorses the equation of being with "the rational" in this passage is extremely ironic. As we will see in a later installment, Heidegger argues that this equation is a key feature of the modern inflection of the Western metaphysical tradition, and that all the modern maladies Evola decries are ultimately attributable to it.

Heidegger would have regarded Guénon and Evola as philosophically naïve—for several reasons. First, they uncritically appropriate the Western metaphysical tradition in the name of combating modernity. Yet, as I have already mentioned, Heidegger argues that that tradition is implicated in the decline of the West. Second, the Traditionalists naïvely assert that this metaphysical tradition is "perennial" or timeless. They take Platonism as preserving elements of a primordial tradition that antedates Plato by millennia. They hold that the time of Plato belongs to the Kali Yuga (the fourth age, the decadent "Iron Age"), but they take Plato (and other ancient philosophers) to be preserving an older, indeed timeless wisdom. However, this is pure speculation, for which there is no solid scholarly evidence. [26]

A further Heideggerian objection to Traditionalism may be considered at this point, and it is an extremely serious one. Both Heidegger and the Traditionalists decry rootless modern individualism. However, Heidegger's critique goes much further. Recall that for the philosopher Being is inherently historical and changeable. What things are for us, or what they mean, is determined in part by our historical situation. Human Dasein is always embedded in a set of concrete historical, cultural circumstances. Heidegger writes: "Only insofar as the human being exists in a definite history are beings given, is truth given. There is no truth given in itself; rather, truth is decision and fate for human beings; it is something human." [27] This does not, however, mean that truth, as human, is something "subjective" (...)

Let us now consider a couple of objections to this Heideggerian critique of Traditionalism.

First, defenders of Traditionalism might respond that Guénon and Evola are primarily grounded in the Indian tradition, and not in Western metaphysics at all. There are essentially two pieces of evidence for this claim. The first is Guénon and Evola's endorsement of the Hindu cyclical account of time, of the yugas, which is indeed quite ancient. Both seem to accept this teaching in very literal terms, right down to the traditional Hindu calculations of the time span of each yuga (which strike most modern readers as arbitrary inventions). Second is the primacy granted by both thinkers to Vedanta. Both Guénon and Evola regard the teachings of the Upanishads as an expression of a very ancient ur-metaphysics, which constitutes a "perennial philosophy."

The dependence of the Traditionalists on the Indian tradition is very real. The trouble, however, is that they interpret the Indian materials in terms of the categories and terminology of Western metaphysics. Indeed, this is especially true of Guénon, who shows no signs of recognizing that there is anything problematic about understanding the Upanishads in terms derived from Platonic and Aristotelian philosophy. For example, right at the beginning of *The Reign of Quantity*, Guénon discusses the duality of Purusha and Prakriti using the categories of "essence and substance" — then, a page later, he appeals to "form and matter," then to "act and potency." [30] This is all Aristotelian terminology. Moreover, there is no attempt on Guénon's part to recover the "originary" sense of these terms in Aristotle. Instead, he unhesitatingly adopts the medieval scholastic understanding of these distinctions.

It may be that Guénon thought it was valid to discuss Vedanta in Platonic-Aristotelian terms because he regarded the Platonic tradition as itself an expression of the perennial philosophy. Thus, he simply decided a priori that Vedanta and Platonism are two streams flowing from the same source: primordial Tradition. But, again, this is pure speculation. The bottom line is that Guénon and Evola do accord special primacy to the Indian tradition over Western metaphysics — but they see the former almost entirely through the lens of the latter. Thus, despite their interest in Indian thought, they are still thoroughly beholden to Western metaphysics.

It remains to consider a further, much more significant, objection to these Heideggerian critiques of Traditionalism. The primary objection I have raised against Guénon and Evola is that they are thoroughly committed to Western metaphysics. This is a problem because Heidegger argues that the Western tradition is not only a falling away from a more primordial encounter with Being, it actually makes possible the modern decadence that Traditionalists rightly reject. But why we should follow Heidegger in any of this? Why should we accept Heidegger's negative evaluation of Western metaphysics? Why should we accept the thesis that Platonic metaphysics made modernity possible? The next essay in this

series will be devoted to addressing just these questions. It will be the first of several essays offering a compressed summary and commentary on Heidegger's history and critique of metaphysics, demonstrating that the claims he makes are both plausible and profound. Heidegger is right in thinking that Western metaphysics lies at the root of modernity. We will begin with Heidegger's critique of Plato.

What did Heidegger have to say about tradition? In "The Age of the World Picture" (1938) He warns us against "merely negating the age" and writes that "The flight into tradition, out of a combination of humility and presumption, achieves, in itself, nothing, is merely a closing the eyes and blindness towards the historical moment." [31] But Heidegger also argues that the turn toward metaphysics is a turn away from a more authentic way of encountering Being. It is in this latter conception that we find what may be the equivalent of "primordial tradition" in Heidegger's thought. One of the conclusions that will be defended in this series of essays is that while Heidegger is clearly not a Guénonian or Evolian Traditionalist, he is actually more traditionalist than the Traditionalists.

[www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/heidegger-against-traditionalists](http://www.geopolitika.ru/en/article/heidegger-against-traditionalists)

[originally posted by Revolvere]

Last Edit: Nov 28, 2022 at 11:12am by Evola As He Is

Evola As He Is

Administrator

\*\*\*\*\*

Evola As He Is Avatar

Posts: 460Male

Oct 30, 2022 at 5:46amQuotePost OptionsPost by Evola As He Is on Oct 30, 2022 at 5:46am

Exploring in *Ride the Tiger* (p. 109 et sqq.) the intrinsic and extrinsic causes of the dissolution of the « values of the personality », Evola attempts to « restore the original and proper meaning to the term "person." », in order to leave « ambiguity behind ». In this he took up and elaborated on the

considerations he had already made in *L'individuo e il divenire del mondo* (1926) and *Teoria dell'Individuo Assoluto* (1927).

Originally *persona* signified "mask": the mask that ancient actors wore in playing a given part, in incarnating a given personage. Thereby the mask possessed something typical, nonindividual, especially in the case of divine masks and even more clearly when used in many archaic rites. At this point I can resume and apply the ideas of the preceding chapter about the dual structure of the being: the "person" is that which the man presents concretely and sensibly in the world, in the position he occupies, but always signifying a form of expression and manifestation of a higher principle in which the true center of being is to be recognized, and on which falls, or should fall, the accent of the self. A "mask" is something very precise, delineated, and structured. So man as person (= mask) is already differentiated thereby from the mere individual; he has a form, is himself, and belongs to himself. Consequently, whenever a civilization has had a traditional character, the values of the "person" have made of it a world of quality, diversity, and types. And the natural consequence has been a system of organic, differentiated, and hierarchical relationships: something that cannot be ... said of mass regimes, but also not of regimes of individualism, of "values of the personality," or of real or pretended democracy.

A few years ago I criticised this view at

[elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/theatrocratie-2/](http://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2015/07/14/theatrocratie-2/), but at the time I was not aware of the following analyses, mind-blowing ones which amply confirm this criticism.

« In the archaic and classical periods, there is no concept of person - if we are looking for an equivalent to the notion of a singular, self-conscious human being, defined by the awareness of his singularity and uniqueness, and autonomous. Where the modern language speaks of a person, the Greek language speaks of a human being (*anthrôpos* in Greek and *homo* in Latin). It seems, therefore, that there is no room in ancient Greece for a debate that separates human being and person (Gill 1990: 7). Marcel Mauss has done enough to undo the presupposition that the idea of person was 'natural' or 'innate', 'precise in the depths of consciousness' of 'everyone', 'all equipped in the depths of the morality that is deduced from it' (Mauss 1991: 333), and to engage us in a 'more precise view' of its history » Jean-Pierre Vernant (1973) and Marcel Detienne (1973) have established that one could not speak of a "person" in the archaic and classical ages. The Platonic concept of soul itself emerged after a long process. In the Archaic Age, particularly in Homer, the term '*psukhê*', which was to have considerable currency as 'soul', referred to the breath that is exhaled at the moment of death, which is the image (*eidôlon*), like the ghost, of the individual. The term '*sôma*', which was to enjoy a correlative fame as 'body', designated only the corpse, no term bringing together, during the individual's lifetime, the open plurality of its functions and its organic, psychological and affective modifications, which could not as such be 'the support of a self' (Detienne 1973: 48). For Vernant and Detienne, something of the person "begins to

take shape" when the opposition between soul and body is established, in the context of spiritual sects such as Pythagoreanism: these develop, on the fringes of public worship, ascetic practices aiming, by means of certain breathing exercises, such as the contraction of the diaphragm, to bring together an instance that is separated from other functions considered impure, to achieve the unity of the *psukhi*; Plato's *Phaedo* is closely related to these practices. At the same time as the soul 'benefits' (ibid: 47) from this movement of unification, something like the body is determined and immediately depreciated (ibid: 49). Other exercises, exercises of memory, may have allowed for a history of *psukhi*, which is not of the order of an individual past, but rather of an immortal, non-personal soul, permanent in the series of successive incarnations (Vernant 1959: 28). In fact, when Socrates says that he is not addressing Alcibiades' face but his soul, it is not, strictly speaking, his soul that he is addressing, but the soul within him (Vernant 1996b: 227-228). This soul is all the less personal because it is not attached to a single living being: the number of souls being fixed once and for all, each man finds at his birth a soul that pre-existed him, 'which is in no way particular to him' and which, after his death, will be reincarnated in another man or another living being.

Detienne and Vernant have shown the fundamental role of the *daimôn* in the establishment of the opposition soul/body. It is from the moment when certain meanings of the demonic were brought closer to certain meanings of *psukhi* that the soul acquired the conceptual contours that we know. The complex topology associated with this establishment must be emphasised: "Having become in man this demonic being with which the subject seeks to coincide, *psukhi* has all the consistency of an object, of a real being that can exist outside, of a 'double'; but at the same time it is part of man himself, it defines in him a new dimension that he must conquer and deepen ceaselessly by imposing a hard spiritual discipline. At once an objective reality and a lived experience in the intimacy of the subject, *psukhi* constitutes the first framework allowing the inner world to become objectified and to take shape, a starting point for the progressive construction of the structures of the self" (Vernant 1973: 93).

Certain terms, such as 'outline' or 'discovery', need to be discussed, such as the formulation according to which, 'at once an objective reality and an experience lived in the intimacy of the subject, the *psukhi* constitutes [...] a starting point for the progressive construction of the structures of the self'. Any form of submission to the idea of a pre-existence of conceptual objects (implied by the term "discovery") or to a kind of *de facto* teleology, justified by history as it has unfolded ("sketch" or "progressive edification"), is questionable. Meyerson put it clearly: "M. Vernant has shown us in a striking way the different ways in which Greek religious thought could have approached our conception of the person: the historian of today could have the impression that it had indeed approached it, only to move backwards. In fact, the Greeks did not try to construct the notion of the person, their system of ideas and values was otherwise oriented" (Meyerson 1973a: 43).

The strangest thing for us is that the conceptual lines that will be reinvested in the problematisation of the person "are situated at the level of the demonic, of that province of religious thought which is characterised by the indefinite" (Detienne 1973: 51): "The soul, being divine, cannot express the singularity of human subjects; by destination, it overflows, it exceeds the individual"; belonging to the category of the "demonic", it belongs, "paradoxically, to what is in the divine that is less individualised, less 'personal'" (Vernant 1973: 36).

<https://journals.openedition.org/terrain/13577>)

Although the etymology of *persona* is obscure, most of the hypotheses put forward to explain the origin of this word refer to the chthonic deities. The word could come either from a contracted form of a variant of the proper name of the chthonic deity Persephone, namely *Persepona*, or from an archaic adjective relating to the Etruscan proper name *Phersus* (1), which could be either the infernal husband of *Phersipnai* (the Etruscan name of Persephone), or *Perses*, the father of Persephone, or *Perseus*, or finally an agent, a masked "executioner" of Persephone (2). Whatever the case, it should be noted, since we have just been talking about the goddess of the underworld and the mysteries of Arcadia, that during the festivals in honour of one of her daughters, *Despoena*, the faithful wore masks (animal masks) (3) ; Moreover, the priests of the mysteries of *Demeter Kidaria*, mother of Persephone, put on the mask of the goddess for the main ceremony (4); finally, Persephone spends six months of the year on the earth and the other six months underground, i.e. in an invisible, "masked" place.

"The soul has become in man the demonic being with which the subject seeks to identify himself and is part of man himself": the paradox that Vernant states is an indication of a complexity that here again exceeds our representation of the person. To present a separable intellect (*noûs*) within the human soul "goes against a predominant modern image of the person, that of a psychological (and psychophysical) unity that is valued as a unified whole" (Gill 1991: 16). The concept of the person, if it presupposes the idea of a unified whole of the individual and of a relationship within oneself that is exclusively a relationship to oneself, cannot qualify a situation where the individual harbours within himself another instance, such as the intellect or the inner demon. One can well note the way Aristotle, in the *Categories*, circumscribes the singular sentient individual, the *tode ti*, and defines it as the primary substance. This logical and physical circumscription of singularity has no correlate on the ethical level, in proportion to the normative task that dominates there: the important thing is to "seek to identify with", to "aim at" something.

Vernant has shown that "the Greek gods [...] are powers, potencies, not 'persons'. Their figuration testifies to their strength, to their excellence as great, unrestricted powers. It is not intended to circumscribe, to individualise their attributes" (Meyerson 1973b: 474-475). Can the hero's individuality constitute an objection to the absence of the person? Meyerson emphasised that 'for us, action naturally presupposes the agent, and the agent implies the person; the agent is in some way external to the action; the quality of agent is an important attribute of the person and vice versa'. He further states that 'it is the action that interests' ancient Greek and Indian thought: they 'do not tend to individualise the agent, he is "inside" the action' (ibid.: 43). Thus, 'heroes [...] are not the authors of their exploits. They are these very exploits' (ibid.: 475). Vernant notes it in another way: the heroes' exploits "are worth in and for themselves, independently in some way of the one who accomplishes them. [...] The exploit is not the implementation of a personal virtue, but the sign of a divine grace, the manifestation



of a supernatural assistance. The heroic legend does not say that man is a responsible agent, at the centre of his actions, assuming his destiny. It defines types of feats, models of trials, in which the memory of ancient initiations survives, and which stylise, in the form of exemplary human acts, the conditions for acquiring religious qualifications and exceptional social prerogatives' (Vernant 1973: 34-35). Vernant is formal: "There is nothing in all this that even remotely evokes the person."

Do not miss, courtesy of Revolvere, [worldtruthvideos.website/watch/personhood-your-body-as-a-feminine-property-studies-in-anti-jewology\\_z5erB1OImTMXxNA.html](http://worldtruthvideos.website/watch/personhood-your-body-as-a-feminine-property-studies-in-anti-jewology_z5erB1OImTMXxNA.html)

(1) The name 'Phersu' is inscribed on a fresco painted in the tomb of the augurs in the Etruscan necropolis of Monterozzi, near the Italian city of Tarquinia. The inscription is located behind the head of a masked figure holding another figure on a leash. On the Etruscan mask, see Jean-René Jannot, Phersu, Phersuna, Persona, in *Spectacles sportifs et scéniques dans le monde étrusco-italique*. Proceedings of the round table organised by the Etruscan-Italian Research Team of the UMR 126 (CNRS, Paris) and the Ecole Française de Rome. Rome, 3-4 May 1991, Ecole Française de Rome, 1993, p. 281-320.

(2) Maurice Nédoncelle, Prosôpon et persona dans l'antiquité classique. Essai de bilan linguistique, in *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, t. 22, fasc. 3-4, 1948 [pp. 277-99], pp. 288-289).

(3) Martin Nilsson, *Die Geschichte der Griechische Religion*, vol. I, C. H. Beck, 1955, p. 461-2 ; Georg Friedrich Schömann, *Antiquités grecques*, vol. 2, A. Picard, 1887; voir aussi Honoré d'Albert de Luynes, *Etudes numismatiques sur quelques types relatifs au culte d'Hécate*, Firmin-Didot frères, Paris, p. 64.

(4) C. Goudineau, *Ιερὰ Τραπεζαί*, in *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, vol. 79, n° 79-1, 1967 [p. 77-134], p. 100

Deleted

Deleted Member

Deleted Avatar

Posts: 0

Nov 18, 2022 at 3:51pmQuotePost OptionsPost by Deleted on Nov 18, 2022 at 3:51pm

“THROWNNES” IS FIRST used in Being and Time to name DASEIN’s passive coming into being open, and so Dasein’s birth, origin, or ground. Heidegger continues to describe Dasein as thrown in his later thought, closely associating thrownness with ADAPTATION (Ereignis) and identifying the “thrower” of the throw into EXISTENCE as BEING. Especially in Being and Time, the pure throw into Dasein continues as a throw into concretion (FACTICITY), FALLING, and inauthenticity, although it is not entirely clear how these phenomena are both connected to and distinguished from one another.

[www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/throwness-geworfenheit/DD4C5213B1FDE36F0C209329BF88F782](http://www.cambridge.org/core/books/abs/cambridge-heidegger-lexicon/throwness-geworfenheit/DD4C5213B1FDE36F0C209329BF88F782)

If one can allow one’s mind to dwell on a bold hypothesis . . . once the idea of Geworfenheit [Thrownness] is rejected, once it is conceived that living here and now in this world has a sense, because it is always the effect of a choice and a will, one might even believe that one’s own realization of the possibilities I have indicated—far more concealed and less imaginable in other situations that might be more desirable from the merely human point of view, from the point of view of the ‘person’—is the ultimate rationale and significance of a choice made by a ‘being’ that wanted to measure itself against a difficult challenge: that of living in a world contrary to that consistent with is nature.

Ride the Tiger

[...] existence, Dasein, is felt not only as expulsion and as “being flung” (Geworfenheit) irrationally into the world, but also as a “fall” (Heidegger’s Ab-fallen, Verfallen) and even as a debt or a fault (which is the double meaning of the German word Schuld).

Idem

(Emphasis added)

Last Edit: Nov 18, 2022 at 3:53pm by Deleted

Deleted

Deleted Member

Deleted Avatar

Posts: 0

Mar 15, 2023 at 6:34amQuotePost OptionsPost by Deleted on Mar 15, 2023 at 6:34am

Abstract Art

by Julius Evola

"Your works are known to me, and how you have fame alive, and you're dead." JOHN Ap. 3-1.

We see the lightning in the light that is reflected on colored cardboard scenarios, and we do not conceive that lightning could exist otherwise, by itself, outside and unlike that light, in the pure infinite sky: the electric current is, for us, the tram that walks, the electric bulb that illuminates. And we talk about conscience and depth.

What is fundamentally pure in the individual is not known, is not had ; and in the conscience and in the faith and in the will of the practical form every real of the spirit is invariably resolved.

From the peaks, the living current pours into the plains: there it meets a series of transformers and users, so one part of it goes to move turbines, another to irrigate land, another to water the city, and finally to immobilize itself against huge dark dams... For the plain, current means drinking water, hydraulic energy, electricity...

So in me the I is not the I, but I-practice, I-feeling, I-philosophy. Illness has built the transformers, and makes it so that it is never a question of feeling, of possessing the ego, the ego outside the categories, the ego meaning of the inner selfish freedom, the ego infinite wealth for which life of every day it appears strange and unreal bare, incomprehensible swelling and corruption of my nocturnal spheres,

Je est un autre. (1)

Virtually, the current of life exists at all times. But, given that everyday movements are determined by symbols, practical schemes, comfortable orientation conventions, it is not possessed, it is not thought it is as if it did not exist.

Thus the whole life of humanity takes place on earth, on a cooled envelope of an enormous ocean of fire whose distant and pale warmth is not utilized; the fires which illuminate "humanity" and which it only needs are small, domesticated, artificial. For his non-life, the market man does not know what to do with the internal fire: all that he has built and on which he lives, is indolence, cowardice, corruption, a symbolically static element instead of a vital element, and the inner flame that lies abandoned at his feet, if possessed, it would unhinge all its lukewarm cities, it would destroy all its ridiculous ideals, comforts, voluptuous absences, idols: it would annihilate it. But he seeks oblivion, the absence of himself: that is, the practice, the phenomenon, the suffering: and in that of him he drowns, like the brute in the flesh of his female: desperately and Voluptuously.

In practice, there is no need. To affirm the opposite would be tantamount to saying that, due to the fact that all bodies are naturally subject to the force of inertia, it is not possible in the world other than uniform and rectilinear motion. Now the laws of practice / nature and feeling / represent the sole effect of a spiritual inertia. Every truth, in fact, is comfort, as well as every real and every necessary one. The foundation of the validity of fundamental logical principles, as of the postulates of the sciences, as of the ontological elements of morals, lies in their convenience: they accomplish a minimum in the necessary practical activity of the spirit. Wanting space to have dimensions instead of three, that there is no God, that there is no truth, that the principles of identity and cause are not indispensable in logical reasoning, is an entry into another order of possibilities, where however the practical self will have to carry out an activity much larger; if it can be called an error, the preference of one who has a car to make a journey on foot is an error of the same degree. The principle of convenience operates automatically, out of direct consciousness; and the will to believe, the basis of every reality, confirms its constructions and illuminates them with a passionate logic.

At this point some pragmatists / CALDERONI, partly POINCARÉ, VAILATI / finding this reality invariably behind the unconscious of every position, wanted to place it as a regulating principle to be assumed not only in direct consciousness, but also as a spiritual necessity. Now this is radically arbitrary. The law of inertia is always a negative property: "bodies move with uniform and rectilinear motion if there are no causes that modify their movement". But without these causes the same principle of inertia could not have been perceived. And having enunciated the aforementioned theory is a demonstration of having obeyed once again, in a philosophical species, the sweet passivity...

Now I do not want to remove the laws of practice: but I cannot tolerate the transcendental use of this ephemeral necessity in absolutely inadequate fields.

Indeed, all that is human and practical can be overcome...

They do not see because they have eyes, they do not hear because they have ears.

Finding yourself.

It is necessary to feel above all the faculties distinct from psychologies and gnoseologies: it is necessary to feel beyond the atmosphere of humanity and instincts, to place oneself in the life of every day and every hour the indifferently wise engineer who goes among its great motionless machines on the feast day, the surveyor in front of the points, plans and figures of his science. (2)

This is to be found only in intimacy and in solitude, duty and power.

Philosophy can do nothing. It is the method of unconscious superficiality; it, moving in the shape of the market, thinks it is reaching something profound. At best he says how a locomotive could work, and with this he thinks he has also explained the essence of thermal energy. It takes more! But it denies thermal energy itself, it says that it cannot be said that what it said: (3) put the measures, philosophy contradicts the very attitude that lays a foundation of validity in *Kritik der reinen Vernunft*, by KANT, in the *Wissenschaftslehre*, by FICHTE, in the logic of HEGEL, in all metaphysics, in short: it denies itself.

Philosophers present the I, they aspire to it, but they have never succeeded and will never be able to challenge it, to possess it, because they are hallucinating about the forms of coherence and the market. It is necessary to have much more blood in the veins: very different means of knowledge...

As for the constructions of science, they have the same importance in the doctrine of the ego as the researches of the automatic razor and the fountain pen may have had.

Art, as it is understood generically / as feeling or naturalness; as an expression of what is universal and eternal in men /, it is not that it has higher possibilities. Yet, only for an art will perhaps the sign of higher existence be possible. But art is all to be redone, then; in the whole past art there has never been anything really spiritual ... Sentiment and market... infinite aspirocity of spiritual things.

A method of the spirit, in art as elsewhere, if one abstracts the few mystical lights stirred here and there in the dark and illusory story of history and myth, it is still all to be invented: an abstract method, an impractical method, of purity and freedom. (4)

But all research is disease. Those who do not have, look for: hysterical and vain convulsion of the surface that in the consciousness of being such aspires to something outside of itself. Each method is a sign of decadence and corruption: in vain the mad brutes will break their nails against the inexorable smoothness of the tall white granite that holds them.

Freedom, property, is a mystical moment of illumination: a grace : it is, as soon as it is thought of, as soon as it is pronounced, it is already a dead thing, it falls dirty and foreign rind into the land of brutes and merchants. And here, on the threshold, the words fade, incomprehensibly...

The mystical method in itself contradicts itself: but precisely for this reason, because in contradiction with the higher consciousness, and as a method it must necessarily be a practical thing, it does not contradict itself: it is useful, that is, real and because of existence / if accepted / of the representation.

Human, all too human

NIETZSCHE

Art is selfishness and freedom.

I feel art as a disinterested elaboration, posed by a higher consciousness of the individual, transcendent and therefore alien to the crystallizations of passion and vulgar experience.

Aesthetic sentiment must be possessed as a mystical shadow; on the other hand, as a vital Weltanschauung : philosophy, art, morals, vulgar experience, science, all of these must be merged and resolved into one in the indeterminate property of the aesthetic moment. It will be based on the fundamental will / pure will to live /rather than on form and phenomenal agitation.

Sincerity / passionate egoism, humanity or brutality: LEOPARDI, DANTE, DIONISIO / is a category for which art becomes an inferior and practical form; that is non-art. Who is sincere is not original, nor creator; who is sincere is objective , and unreasonable automaton of an unleashed force / inertia / of which he knows nothing.

The human value that can derive from it is, implicitly or explicitly, conventional.

Thus genius is a conventionality: genius is a function of sentimental culture and education, both practical / passionate and utilitarian /; that otherwise the author of the FANTÔMAS and PONSON DU TERRAIL should be genius at the place of MICHELANGELO and WAGNER. Necessity !: to be able to affirm after the practical determinations posed by culture, that DANTE is not a genius, is as absurd as to affirm that the sum of the internal angles of a triangle is different from 180 degrees, after having accepted Euclid's postulate. The universality of the understanding of genius reflects the universality of generic culture, unconsciously passionate and utilitarian: that is, a calcareous encrustation, without any mention of real spiritual necessity.

But non-Euclidean geometries may exist with equal legitimacy. For me, for example, SCHÖNBERG and TZARA are geniuses instead of WAGNER and DANTE.

To be honest, it's cheap: yes! All the effort is to express: that is virtuosity, technical skill. Fatigue and the flag is very waved by the wind!

But it is necessary instead to know not to see, not to find, not to have: to place oneself in nothingness, coldly, under a very lucid and surgical will. And this is creation for the first time : selfishness and freedom!

The new in art!

My friend MARINETTI has the feeling of him, and he expresses it to me in free words . An academic had another impression, from the human side quite identical to the first, but he expresses it in rhetoric and mythological images. Finally, a realist thinks instead of adequately giving this episode of humanity by means of an objective - conventional fidelity.

VERDI wants to give, let's say, a scene of love: he uses the peasant note melody; DEBUSSY, for the same intention uses the most refined harmony; a savage, still for this purpose, will perhaps find convenient gongs and woods instead. Now all these people are all in good faith, they all agree: it could not be better: they think that a certain expressive medium is worth, better than another, to give that element / need / that is in them, and which is common in them: and even in this sincere belief I agree: on that immobile background which has not varied from APELLE to BOCCIONI, from HOMER to RIMBAUD, from ORFEO to STRAWINSKY, and which will affirm all the more its ironic immobility for the more, in good faith, new / more suitable / means of expression will be sought.

The impulse to the new, in this sense, is a demonstration of humanity, of greater self-denial: drowning of the personality to infinity. As long as there is inspiration, sentiment, good faith and sincerity, no one has come out, and never will come out of that circle in which the brute and the hallucinated are also enclosed.

For the new / the individual / it is necessary to agitate the content, the substratum, beyond the illusory waves of the surfaces: that is, the will is needed at the basis of the aesthetic feeling. Beyond man, create the sense of the One . Where art can save itself, and let see - as through silent night flashes, immense and unsuspected white cities - the flow of higher consciousness, it is where art is above naturalness, sentiment, humanity: au dessus de la mêlée : where it is selfish and consciously arbitrary expression and, in one, coldly willed, of a state of extraneousness, of living death.

MARINO is more spiritual than DANTE.

Expression:

1) Necessities of expression.



## 2) Possibility of expression.

1) There is no logical reason in expressing: if you do it, you are hoaxes and prostitutes in the dirty exhibition of your nakedness for the foia of the passion of others. The sincere artist who, shipwrecked in the "divine instant", of inspiration, almost prey to an indomitable fever, creates the "true" work of art, and the dog that jumps on the bitch and mounts her, are the same thing.

Obeying the sweet invitation of the "spirit of nature", the torrid irruption of one's own forces in contrast with external contingencies, the detumescent exhalation of one's pathos more or less voluptuously plagued, to the brutal rhythms of "external reality" matter / I speak of naturalists: GOETHE; of the romantics: HUGO; of the heroics: WAGNER, DANTE; of the pathetic: BEETHOVEN, KEATS; of the sensors; DIONISIO, MATISSE / is obeying a material need - urinating, sweating and eating that paints the illusion of passionate spirituality in gold - with invariable production, in addition to the best disguises / the artist makes art for himself, and of comedians, and horizontals that are often not even paid.

2) Only elements of an inferior art can be expressed: the expressive, symbolic and determined means in any case serve for the market, for the BERGSON practice and are absolutely incapable of translating pure and intimate movements of the individual. Expression would be the transformation of the pure element into a conventional and human element: of electricity into electric light.

Express and kill.

Therefore it cannot and must not be expressed.

That is to say that the work of art can only be conceived as a luxury , as a whim of the will: it will feel dry and dirty crust fallen indifferently and without passion from the live trunk.

Making art as you take a tea...

It is evident that the number of people I can shake and convince with my art is inversely proportional to the degree of purity and originality of this art itself.

It is necessary not to be understood.

Schematizing, a spiritual art must overcome:

1) The state of the conceptual conception of the world / forms of vulgar experience /. Two ways:

a) Mystical aesthetics: making practice a spectacle, an object of contemplation: becoming a stranger, disinterested. The personality must be split into a practical self that acts in inertia, and into the other self that, apathetic spectator, unenthusiastically attends an unreal comedy on which, at a nod from him, the immense black velvet curtain can fall. Thus the bridge leaves the monotonous and colorless passage of the current beneath it.

b) Brutal / anti-spiritual aesthetics /: total abandonment of the practical self to the intensive element inherent in pure / subjective sensation /; thus the determinations of practical experience must be dissolved in the dynamic life of an orgiastic and incoherent rhythm.

Hints of the two methods are: (1) for a) aestheticism and ecstatic mysticism ; for b) sensorism, futurism, RIMBAUD. (2)

2) The state of generic spirituality : overcoming all "superior" feelings, all that is "delicate to feel", "noble passion", "greatness" and "heroism"; in short, everything that in high school, in school of fine arts and among romantic ladies is thought to constitute the fine fleur of internal life and which instead is dirty secretion of disease, cowardice, spiritual femininity; and above all, of unconsciousness. Laughing at the sentimentality and the spirit of nature from German provincials like Werther, at the voluptuous heart blenorrhages like SHELLEY and LEOPARDI, at the clumsy sweaty heroisms like Hugo and BARBUSSE. Feeling away any romanticism, from the classic to the brand new NIETZSCHE or IBSEN type, eternal consequence of the exhaustion of the personality in a lower and superficial consciousness. Finally, to place the aspiration of spiritual things : superior, divine, human, which will see themselves irremediably overcome and which will feel dirty scabs of disease that have fallen forever from the pure body of light.

3) The state of the naturalness of the expression , according to what has been said. The aesthetic feeling will be conceived as a sense of intimate activity, hence the need for expression will fall.

Art will be conceived only as a luxury, as a clear whim of the individual who has found and realized himself, the One, for the first time; and who has everyday life as a single spectator, in the audience, has an immense and yet fragile spectacle that at any moment has the possibility of sinking and melting forever in the ineffable ardent coldness of the superior conscience.

Art must be in bad faith. It is more moral to polish one's nails than to do art; the expression of art, among the healthy individual, can never be as interesting as the choice of silk stockings or a tie.

Obviously, because it is disinterested, art must be devoid of any usual content: as it expresses everything, it must mean nothing: there must be nothing to understand in art...

Art, pure expression... When art has a content, it is a tool: hoe, lathe, fan...

The pure aesthetic feeling is an inner and inexpressible feeling and of the expressive means taken in their infinite abstract possibilities, in their absolute disinterested value / without content or purpose /.

Art is one: to be pure poets, pure painters... Superficiality and poverty of the crystal that feels face, edge, and not substance, crystal ... For those who possess the aesthetic feeling, the means of expression is nothing but an accident. SCHOPENHAUER and NIETZSCHE, in exalting the superiority of music, have shown that they are incapable of understanding the other arts: therefore art itself, perhaps...

Who has only one means of expression, is not an artist...

The very modern art is the closest, although it has hardly been aware of it, to something spiritual. Art, perhaps, begins today.

Psychological elementaries of modern art:

1° Insensitivity to the human: despite the deleterious work of culture, today the possibilities of abandonment and exhaustion of the universal meaning have become rarer; it may have been due, in part, to the immediate increase in practice, positive knowledge and artificial refinement / modernity, science and corruption / in today's vulgar life.

2° Now the classical work of art, stripped of the human element, remains a formal scheme connected to time: therefore it was natural that it was denied, as an out-of-fashion passion, and the elements that claimed to keep it out of fashion were also denied. time / academism, criticism, theory of absolute values, etc./. If we leave the universal, we are in vulgar practice: in practice, for coherence, we have no reason to exhaust ourselves except in the current elements: here is modernolatry / futurism /.

2° Now the classical work of art, stripped of the human element, remains a formal scheme connected to time: therefore it was natural that it was denied, as an out-of-fashion passion, and the elements that claimed to keep it out of fashion were also denied. time / academism, criticism, theory of absolute values, etc./. If we leave the universal, we are in vulgar practice: in practice, for coherence, we have no reason to exhaust ourselves except in the current elements: here is modernolatry / futurism /.

The Sturm und Drang began with a dive into the brutal by way of purification: after which it would be possible to rise again to a new ideal. The chronological contiguity of the realists with the symbolists is significant in this regard.

This beginning is characteristically carried out by painting: impressionism, primitivism, post-impressionism, futurism: humanity moved to the flickering of light around things has implicitly killed all the classical tradition; a little less from music / MUSSORGSKY, up to DEBUSSY, RAVEL, CASELLA, STRAWINSKY /. Here, therefore, the theme of art is placed in the pure reality of the senses / sensorial idealism. Then came the methodical destroyers: in this field, Italian Futurism distinguished itself for audacity and for the violence of the purifying motif; after RIMBAUD, MARINETTI, with the theory of words in freedom / substitution of the brute forces of matter for the literary "I": lyrical session of matter /, STRAWINSKY and BOCCIONI brought the solution of sanity of the problem, abandoned by DIONISIO until today.

The only thing is that, in order to do something truly decisive, humanity had to be overcome also, and first; this is something that the first of these very new Romans did not care at all: now the car instead of

the Nike samotrace is evidently one humanity instead of another; and humanity is not to be overcome, but humanity

But sometimes, in the work, the artist, rather than being interested in the element of new humanity to be expressed, went to become intoxicated by the means of expression taken in himself. Thus, miraculously, he found himself outside the circle, and the new path towards pure art began: because in the absolute sense of form the pure necessity that posits the artist as such is possessed, and therefore the same primary aesthetic...

This evolution took place clearly among the analogists: first the image extends its relationship with the content, and there is analogism proper, expression by means of vague sympathies / VERLAINE, KAHN, GIDE, LAFORGUE, MOSCARDELLI /; then it breaks it and closes its reality in itself. From that point the last two elaborations start. In the first the detached image becomes intoxicated in its sentimental evocative power, so that the poem becomes a pure symphony of the second terms of the analogies, and therefore has reached the abstract passionate spirituality proper to music. This trend started from pre-Raphaelism, then, passing through WILDE, it was totally realized in MAETERLINCK. MAETERLINCK's *Seras chaud* represent the highest degree to which passionate purity in poetry has so far reached. In painting, at the same time, we moved on to expressionism KANDINSKY, BAUER /. Similarly in music it is the harmonic value or sense that takes over until a gradual suppression of all sentimental elements; thus, in part, SCHONBERG, CASELLA, SATIE; less, STRAUSS.

Finally, in the last elaboration, the image / the means of expression / breaks up into the elementary single ones, becomes incoherent and illogical, and, also abandoning its vague sentimental evocative power, is exhausted in its arbitrary necessity. Thus poetry becomes disinterested, non-sentimental, and even in part, inhuman. The element of realistic-conceptual correspondence that, implicitly, remains, is resolved in a total inversion of the classical relationship: " the content is the expression of the form, not the form and expression of the content ". And so, after RIMBAUD's hysterical convulsion of humanity, / *alchimie du verbe* /, MALLARMÉ and APOLLINAIRE go to ajar the doors of this new world; immediately afterwards the light breaks out with TRISTAN TZARA and with the school, which he founded, of Dadaism. And here art has, finally and for the first time, found its spiritual solution: (7) illogical and arbitrary rhythms of lines, colors, sounds and signs that are only a sign of inner freedom and of the deep egoism achieved; that I know no means but to themselves; who do not want to express anything, completely. (8) Here and there the same need for expression is also surpassed. The will and the whim are realized: MARCEL DUCHAMP paints a Dada painting with a reproduction of the Mona Lisa plus a pair of mustaches and a chemical formula; FRANCESCO PICABIA makes a *Sainte Vierge* with the ink stain of an overturned inkwell; another makes a poem with the show of the 24 letters of the alphabet.

The "Manifeste Dada 1918", and the "25 poèmes", by TRISTAN TZARA, the words of HANS ARP represent the expression of the highest state of purity, conscience and ownership of the intimate and profound self, which has ever been had from the beginning of time until today.

Today, after the war / and this also proves the sentimental and practical cause /, on the side, there is the fashion of the return: PICASSO, CARRA, SOFFICI... People incurably intoxicated with humanity, that modern art could only live as a new academy as was necessitated by their fundamental inferiority, he loves to see the Sturm und Drang of the last decades as a merely transitory state, and gives you a value only insofar as it thinks that it has served to lead back to a new humanity, wider and richer for the various experiences acquired. There is a sense of pity when you hear them say: - Oh, but these "attempts", these "sentimental experiences" have already passed, we have already exhausted and overcome them...

One is called spiritual when he comes to understand the humanity of DANTE, MICHELANGELO, WAGNER. Oh, if you have some bread to eat before you get to where we are...

Abstract art cannot be historically eternal and universal: this, a priori - PLOTINO, ECKHART, MAETERLINCK, NOVALIS, RUYSBROECK, SWEDENBORG, TZARA, RIMBAUD.... All this is but a brief, rare and uncertain flash through the great death, the great nocturnal reality of corruption and disease. Likewise, the rarity of the unspeakable gems among the enormous muddy ganges.

Exceptional art, art out of time...

Modern art will soon fall: precisely this will be the sign of its purity; it will fall more than anything else, for having been realized with a method from the outside / for a gradual elevation from the disease on partly passionate reasons / rather than from the inside / mystical /.

But, even today, for an instant, the eternal vault of dark lead and plagued with pure blue infinity has opened.

Notes

(1) Rimbaud.

(2) See SPINOZA.

(3) KANT: "The same I is thought of only as an affection".

(4) NOVALIS: "Poetry is the great art of building transcendental health. The poet is therefore a transcendental physician. The end of the poet's ends is the raising of man above himself.

(5) Cf. Dionysian and Apollonian sentiment in NIETZSCHE's Die Geburt der Tragödie.

(6) "Le poète se fait voyant par un long, immense et raisonné dérèglement de tous les sens".

(7) Strictly speaking, an imperfection of conscience still remains in current Dadaism / 1920 /: the Dada think they have achieved a vital purity while, for the abolition of categories and humanity, they actually went much further beyond. Dadaism lacks mystical interpretation.

(8) "Vous ne comprenez pas, n'est-ce, ce que nous faisons. Eh bien, chers amis nous le comprenons encore moins". / Dada 920 posters /.

[www.centrostudilaruna.it/arte-astratta.html](http://www.centrostudilaruna.it/arte-astratta.html)