

J. Evola | The Maoist infatuation

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A curious phenomenon, worthy of being examined, is the suggestion that "Maoism" has exerted on some European circles , as it is not only a question of groups of declared Marxist profession. In Italy we can even mention certain environments that claim a "legionary" experience and a "fascist" orientation , while opposing the Movimento Sociale as they consider it not "revolutionary", bourgeois, bureaucratic, ensnared by Atlanticism. They too speak of Mao as an example.

Such a phenomenon has led us to take the trouble to read Mao Tse-tung's famous booklet to try to see clearly, to find out what could possibly justify such suggestions. The result was negative. Among other things, it is not even a sort of specially written breviary with a certain systematic nature but a heteroclite set of passages from speeches and various writings included in a long span of time. There is no need to speak of a true, specific Maoist doctrine at all. What is there to think when from the first page of the booklet one reads categorical sentences such as the following: " The theoretical foundation on which all our thought is based is Marxism-Leninism"? This would be enough to set aside the new gospel where, moreover, the usual banned slogans of world subversion – "struggle against imperialism and its minions", "liberation of the people from the exploiters", etc. – they meet at every turn. This being the case, if there are contrasts , divergences and tensions between Russian Soviets and Chinese communists, one must think that these are pure family disputes , internal matters of communism (apart from very prosaic realistic motives: the vast underpopulated territories of Russia who are coveted by overpopulated China), which we should be interested in nothing, if not for what concerns the hope, that the two cronies will eventually mate each other.

Therefore, a pure myth of Maoism can exert a suggestion , from which precise ideological formulations go beyond, with hasty interpretations and above all with emphasis given to the so-called "cultural revolution". Let us examine the main components of this myth. In some of the "pro-Chinese" circles mentioned above, "nationalism" is considered the basis of Maoist doctrine . But apart from the fact that nationalism had already established itself with Tito's "heresy" and seems to be making its way among other satellites of the USSR, the essential point is overlooked, namely that in Maoism it is unequivocally

a question of innationalism communist , the basis is the mass collectivist conception, almost like a horde, of the nation, basically no different from the Jacobin one . When Mao wants to combat the process of the formation of rigid party-bureaucratic structures for a direct connection with the "people", when he speaks of an " army that was one with the people" taking up the well-known formula of "total mobilization", he manifests more or less the same mass spirit, or pathos, of the French Revolution and of the levès des enfants de la Patrie , while the binomial mass-chief(the "cult of personality, fought in post-Stalinist Russia, has risen, strengthened, in the person of Mao, idol of the fanaticized Chinese masses) reproduces one of the most problematic aspects of dictatorial totalitarianisms.

Communism plus nationalism : it is the exact opposite of the superior, articulated and aristocratic conception of the nation. But if it is a formula of this kind that attracts "pro-Chinese" groups who would like not to be Marxists, it is hard to see why they do not refer instead to the doctrine of National Socialism of yesterday, where that binomial was already present in the formula: " Führer-Volksgemeinschaft " (=guide + national community). We say "to the doctrine", because in practice in the Third Reich different elements deriving from Prussianism and the tradition of the Second Reich always made their rectifying force felt .

And also of "voluntarism", another element that would define Maoism, there would have been enough. There would have been no need to wait for Mao for the "active conception of war", as a " means of affirming and making one's truth triumph ", as if before the advent of conscientious objectors, hypocritical pacifism and the twilight of the spirit warrior and military honour, had it been thought differently, in all the great western nations. However, we need to look at things more closely and listen to what the great Mao says, literally: " We fight against unjust wars that put obstacles in the way of progress, but we are not against just wars, that is, against progressive wars ."" . It goes without saying what "progress" means in this context: facilitating the advent of Marxism and Communism in every country. Moreover, we do not see what prevents us too from taking advantage of the "active conception of war", for our " just war", which is the one against world subversion to the bitter end, while also letting the others vent in denouncing the ""imperialism", in exalting the "heroic Viet-Cong", the generous Castroism and so on, all nonsense good only for brains that have undergone a "washing" that has deprived them of any capacity for discernment.

Here are other elements of the Maoist myth. Maoism would trust man as the architect of history , would side against the technocracy in which both the USSR and America converge. The "cultural revolution" would be positively nihilistic, it would aim at a renewal that starts from point zero. All these are but words. First of all, it is not to man that Mao is really addressing, but to the "people" : " the people, the people alone, is the driving force, the creator of universal history ". Contempt for the person, for the

individual, in Maoism is no less violent than in the first Bolshevik ideology. It is known that in Red China the private sphere, family education, every form of life in itself, affections and the same sex (if it is not reduced to the minimum expression and its most primitive forms) are ostracized. The integration (that is, the disintegration) of the individual into the fanaticized "collective" is the watchword. The cultural revolution itself is, properly speaking, an anticultural revolution. Culture in the Western and traditional sense (but also in the traditional Chinese sense: remember the Confucian ideal of jen, which could well be translated as humanitas, and of kiun-tseun, or "integral man", opposite siao-jen, or "vulgar man"), that is, how a self-formation that is not in a collective function is opposed.

Mao declared that as a foothold he took indigence, the poverty of the broad masses, which is, he says, a positive factor "because poverty generates the desire for change, the desire for action, the desire for revolution"; you have like "a sheet of white paper" where you can write everything. That too is trivial, and no one will want to mistake such a situation for a "zero point" spiritual, positive sense. The ingenuous can be impressed by what is precisely in the initial, activist, euphoric phase that Maoism as a revolutionary movement. But such a phase does not constitute a positive solution, it cannot be made eternal. What is interesting is not the starting point, but the end, the direction, the terminus ad quem. Now, Mao's declarations are as innumerable as they are precise, who in the "construction of socialism" indicates such an end. Thus, far from being able to see a regenerative resolution, having only "man" in view, and starting from the anti-cultural zero point, we find a movement on which from the beginning weighs a present mortgage, precisely that of Marxism. No game of dice can change this state of affairs, and then it remains for Mao to tell us how he reconciles the idea that man (we have seen it: the "man-people") is the active subject of history, determining the same economy, with the basic tenet of Marxism, historical materialism, which is exactly the opposite.

Anyone who feels attracted by a revolution that really starts from zero, by a nihilism with respect to all the values of bourgeois society and culture, proves to be really naive if they don't know anyone else to draw inspiration from, other than the great Mao. When more valid points of reference could offer him, for example, the ideas on "heroic realism", formulated without any Marxist exploitation and derivation, by Ernst Jünger already in the period following the Great War! (1).

As for the other element of the "pro-Chinese" myth, the anti-technocratic position which, starting more or less from Marcuse's well-known analyzes of the forms of the most advanced industrial societies, he would like to exploit, is an illusion. Perhaps that Mao does not tend to industrialize his country to the point of securing the atomic bomb and stockpiling all the means necessary for his "just war" in the world, thus taking the same path by which communist Russia finally found itself forced to create technological and technocratic structures analogous to those of advanced bourgeois industrial societies?

Apart from fanaticization, which cannot be maintained as a permanent state, we would really like to know if Mao, if he could assure the mass of his followers and his people, revolutionary because, as he said, is miserable, the proper living conditions to a "civilization of well-being", it would see all of China turned against him, disdainful of the "rotten happiness of imperialist societies". And if, hypothetically, a kind of asceticism could be aroused throughout a nation by values on the level of those proper to Marxism, the only conclusion to be drawn is that we would find ourselves in the midst of an almost unimaginable but very dangerous degree of regression and bastardization of a certain portion of humanity.

The complete inability to conceive of true values as opposed to those of the "civilization of well-being and the "consumer society" is, moreover, the characteristic of all the so-called "protest" movements of our days. With observations like that, it would be easy to continue. But already the considerations made so far indicate that the pro-Chinese infatuation is based on myths that for those who know how to think to the end and for those who refer precisely to Mao's book-gospel appear to be groundless (2). Those who, while believing that they are not Marxists and Communists, are infatuated with Maoism, indeed demonstrate anything but intellectual maturity, the nature of their "total protest" and their ostentatious revolutionary vocations is more than suspect, if they do not know find that similar landmarks.

#### Note

(1) Evola obviously refers to the theses enucleated by Ernst Jünger in his first phase, above all in "Nelle tempeste d'Acciaio" and in the "Arbeiter", "The Worker". For a complete anthology of Evola's writings on Jünger, edited by Righener Azione Evola and published by Passo al Bosco, we refer to the work "Ernst Jünger – the fighter, the worker, the anarchist" (Ed.)

(2) As suggested by Gianfranco De Turre in resuming and commenting on the article by Evola at the bottom of "The Men and the Ruins", to see for yourself what Maoism was and to what point of degradation the "cultural revolution" reached we suggest reading the work by Alberto Pasolini Zanelli, "The forgotten genocide", Ideazione Editrice, Rome, 1996. For an analysis starting from a personal experience, see also Lulu Wang, "The theater of the nymphs", The Assayer, Milan, 1998. (Editor's note)