

Franz Brentano

ON THE SEVERAL SENSES OF BEING  
IN ARISTOTLE

*Τὸ ὄν λέγεται πολλαχῶς*  
Aristotle, *Metaphysics* Z, 1

*Edited and Translated*  
*by*  
Rolf George

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*Dedicated in veneration and gratitude*

*to*

*DR. ADOLPH TRENDELENBURG*

*Professor of Philosophy at the University of Berlin*

*My most revered teacher,  
the scholar so highly distinguished  
in the advancement of our understanding of Aristotle.*



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# *Editor's Preface*

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This is Brentano's doctoral dissertation and his first book. In it he contemplates the several senses of "being," using Aristotle as his guide. He finds that (in Aristotle's view) being in the sense of the categories, in particular substantial being, is the most basic; all other modes, potential and actual being, being in the sense of the true, etc., stand to it in a relation of well-founded analogy. Many of his mature views are prepared in this work. For example his discussion of being in the sense of being true appears to be the foundation of his later nonpropositional theory of judgment.

Brentano saw himself not merely as a historical scholar of Aristotle, but as his intimate disciple. In a few lines of occasional verse he called himself brother of Eudemus and Theophrastus, but, as the youngest, beloved of the father above the others.<sup>1</sup> In his Aristotelian writings (there are four books) he meditates with Aristotle; he defends him, not his own interpretation; he exults in the sweep and grandeur of his theology. But while he saw the Philosopher as a repository of truth and not only a figure of historical interest, he approached him with an independent mind, fully familiar with the reorientation of science since Aristotle's day. He has only contempt for the Averrhoist view that there is clarity in each subject only to the extent in which Aristotle has dealt with it.<sup>2</sup> All this makes Brentano's Aristotelian writings different from those of his learned contemporaries, Zeller, Bonitz, Prantl, Brandis, etc: He thought about the issues more clearly, more profoundly, and more passionately than they, more concerned with substantive truth and coherence, which, in the investigation of Aristotle, he took to be the best guide to historical accuracy.

It is possible, even likely, that Brentano imputes more systematic coherence to Aristotle's pronouncements than the texts warrant. This is perhaps a reaction to the Kantian view that Aristotle's categories are a haphazard collection, raked to-

gether without guiding principle (C.P.R., A81/B107), and to the general and regrettable tendency to treating the Aristotelian corpus as a collection of disjointed elements. But it is certainly also an expression of Brentano's own esteem for systematicity and coherence, a tendency that manifests itself in his subsequent interpretation of *De anima*. Brentano's style reflects his distrust for vague, even if perhaps profound intuition. Though fluent and sometimes eloquent, it is almost wholly devoid of metaphor and allusion. As in all of his published work, his points are clearly stated, well reasoned, and heavily defended.

Brentano had a most distinguished group of pupils, among them Husserl, Meinong, Twardowski, Masaryk, Stumpf, Marty; Freud took his only nonmedical courses from him.<sup>3</sup> Through them he profoundly influenced the development of philosophy. But it was the fate of this book, published long before he had any students, to make philosophical history in its own way: It was the book that awakened Martin Heidegger's interest in philosophy. He says, "The first philosophical text through which I worked my way, again and again from 1907 on, was Franz Brentano's *Von der mannigfachen Bedeutung des Seienden nach Aristoteles*."<sup>4</sup> It is in this book that he found the quest for the "being of beings in its difference from beings";<sup>5</sup> it is thus the point of departure for the problems treated in his fundamental ontology.

The original version of this book was published in Freiburg im Breisgau in 1862, and reprinted by the *Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft*, Darmstadt, in 1960. There are no variant readings and I made no significant alteration in the text. All Greek, Latin, and French quotations are given in translation. The English versions of Aristotle's words are taken almost without exception from the Oxford Aristotle, edited by W. D. Ross (Oxford University Press); a lengthy quotation from St. Thomas follows the translation of John P. Rowan's *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* (Chicago: Henry Regnery Co., 1961). Thanks are due to both publishers for letting us use these versions.

Brentano's text is liberally laced with Greek words as parts of German speech. In these instances I have usually translated the Greek and inserted transliterated Greek expression in square brackets. Sometimes, when the meaning of a Greek word had been made

sufficiently clear, I have used its transliterated version as part of English speech. I have used square brackets to indicate editorial insertions, and parentheses to indicate Brentano's own parenthetical remarks.

This translation is one of several<sup>6</sup> sponsored by the Brentano Foundation under the general editorship of Professor Roderick M. Chisholm.

Special thanks are due to Richard Goeller, to Manfred Kühn, and to Professor Daniel Sahas for helping with the rather complex Greek of some of the scholiasts.

R. G.



# *Preface*

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Humbly and with reluctance I put this small essay before the public; yet I feel that I deserve rather to be criticized for being too bold than too timid. For if one does what is too daring he must appear overly bold, even if he undertakes it with apprehension. And what is more daring than what I have done here more than once: I have tried to resolve difficulties which experienced men have described as unsolvable. What gave me nonetheless courage were some excellent studies on which I could base the most difficult part of my work. Thus whatever good can be found in it it may be attributed to them, and especially to the meritorious scholar who first introduced me to the study of Aristotle. But if omissions, errors or defects are found here, let my youth and inexperience be cause for forbearance.



# Introduction

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Potentially a beginning is larger than its actual magnitude. What is at first small is often extremely large in the end. And so it happens that whoever deviates only a little from truth in the beginning is led farther and farther afield in the sequel, and to errors which are a thousand times as large.

These considerations, which we meet in the first book of Aristotle's *De caelo*,<sup>1</sup> quite possibly explain the care with which he attempts, in the several books of the *Metaphysics*, to determine the various senses of being. They also justify the close attention which we pay, in this essay, to his deliberations. For being is the first which we grasp intellectually, since it is the most general;<sup>2</sup> in intellectual cognition, the more general is always the prior.<sup>3</sup>

But there is another respect in which the importance of our subject follows from this principle. For first philosophy must begin with a determination of the sense of the name "being", if indeed its object is being *qua* being, as Aristotle claims repeatedly and with great definiteness. In *Metaphysics* IV. 1. 1003a21 he says: "there is one science which considers being as being and the attributes which it has as such. This science differs from all particular sciences."<sup>4</sup> It is general science, the so-called first philosophy, which has being as being as its proper subject (*Metaphysics* VI. 1. 1026a29;<sup>5</sup> XI. 4. 1061b19; 30-37.1064b6). The first philosopher (*ho protos philosophos*; *De anima* I. 1. 403b16), or the philosopher as such, considers being as being, and not any of its parts (*Meta.* XI. 3. 1060b31; 1061b4, 10). Thus, as he himself says (*Meta.* VII. 1. 1028b2), Aristotle researches and investigates in the books of the *Metaphysics* always only one question, namely, what is being?<sup>6</sup> However, every science begins with a definition of its subject. For, according to an old paradox which was much exploited by the Sophists, if somebody strives for knowledge he must know what he wants to know. Thus some of the special

sciences whose subject is particular and capable of definition put this definition itself at the head by presupposing that it has been provided by a higher science (*hypotithemenai*, *Meta.* XI. 7. 1064e8; *hypothesin labousai*, *Meta.* VI. 1. 1025b11); thus, for example, geometry presupposes the concept of a continuous magnitude. It is obvious that this cannot be the case with the general science because, being the highest science, it is not subordinate to any; since it stands above all others and appor-tions their subjects to them, it cannot take over the definition of its subject from any other.<sup>7</sup> Secondly and most importantly this cannot be done because nothing is less capable of definition than its subject. For being in general is not a species in which one can distinguish genus and differentia. Rather, as we shall see, Aristotle does not even want to admit that it should be called a genus.<sup>8</sup> In this case a different form of exposition must be sought, and Aristotle provides it by distinguishing the various senses which he found the name of being to comprise, by separating the proper from the improper senses, and by excluding the latter from metaphysical consideration.<sup>9</sup>

Thus the discussion of the several senses of being form the threshold of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*. This makes clear why these considerations must have had great importance for him, and this importance becomes even more obvious if one considers that in this context there is considerable danger of confounding several concepts which have the same name. For, as he remarks in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*<sup>10</sup>, it becomes more and more difficult to recognize equivocation the higher the degree of abstraction and generality of concepts. Thus the possibility of deception must be greatest with being itself since, as we have already seen, it is the most general predicate.

But we have not yet established the fact that, according to Aristotle, being is asserted with several significations, not only with one (*Categories* 1. 1a1. 6). To begin with we shall establish this through several passages of the *Metaphysics* and show, at the same time, how the various distinctions of the several senses of being can be initially subordinated to four senses of this name; subsequently we shall proceed to a special discussion of each of them.

## CHAPTER I

### *The Fourfold Distinction of Being*

---

Being is a homonym [*homonymon*]. Its several senses fit into the fourfold distinction of accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*], being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*], being [*on*] of the categories, and potential and actual being [*on dynamei kai energeia*].

“Being is said in various ways” [*to de on legetai men pollachos*], says Aristotle in the beginning of the fourth book of his *Metaphysics*.<sup>1</sup> He repeats this in Books VI and VII<sup>2</sup> and several more times in other places. In these passages he enumerates a number of concepts, each of which, in different ways, is called a being. In *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b6 he says “one thing is said to be because it is substance, another because it is an attribute of substance, still another because it is a process toward substance, or corruption of substance, or privation of substantial forms or quality of substance, or because it produces or generates substance or that which is predicated of substance, or because it is a negation of such a thing or of substance itself. For this reason we also say that non-being is non-being.”<sup>3</sup> The various sorts of being which are here enumerated can be reduced to four kinds: (1) Being which has no existence whatever outside the understanding (privation, negation; *stereseis, apophaseis*); (2) The being of movement and of generation and corruption (process toward substance, destruction; *hodos eis ousian, phthora*); for though these are outside the mind, they do not have complete and perfect existence (cf. *Physics* III. 1. 201a9); (3) Being which has complete but dependent existence (affections of substance, qualities, things productive and generative; *pathe ousias, poietika, genetika*); (4) The being of the substances (*ousia*). Another enumeration of concepts to which the appellation “being” is

attached in different ways is given in *Met.* VI. 2. 1026a33. In that passage,<sup>4</sup> one kind of being is said to be accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*], another being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*], whose opposite is non-being in the sense of being false [*me on hos pseudos*]. Besides, there is said to be another kind of being which divides into the categories, and, in addition to all of them, potential and actual [*dynamei kai energeia*] being. It will be noted that this division, too, is fourfold, but does not consistently correspond to that in Book IV. It agrees still less with another compilation of various senses of being given at the beginning of the seventh book. Here, one kind of being is described as “what a thing is” [*ti esti*] and “this” [*tode ti*], another as quality [*poion*] and a third as quantity [*poson*]; others are said to be on a par with them. These are the other categorial figures,<sup>5</sup> which are included in the third member of the second classificatory scheme above; hence the latter is a higher level classification. Indeed it is this classification which is explained and clarified through examples in the book of definitions [*peri ton posachos*], i.e., the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*,<sup>6</sup> to which Aristotle refers in this passage. It is the first and most comprehensive classification of being to which others, as the one in *Met.* IX. 10. 1051a34,<sup>7</sup> being less general or less complete, can be subordinated, or into which they can be included. For, as we shall shortly show, of the four senses of being [*on*] to which we initially reduced the senses given in Book IV, the first corresponds to the second member of the classification of Book VI, the second to part of the fourth, while the third and fourth are united in the third. Similar considerations also hold of the kinds of being mentioned in *Met.* IX. 10, and in other places.

Thus the distinctions of being given in Book VI will provide the organization of our investigation. We shall deal, first of all, with accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*], then with being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*] and non-being in the sense of being false [*me on hos pseudos*], then with potential and actual being [*on dynamei kai energeia*] and finally with the categories. In his *Metaphysics* Aristotle dealt with the last two in opposite order. He first had to acquaint us with substance [*ousia*] and with its form and matter (*Met.* VIII) in order to be

able to speak afterwards of potential and actual being. Since our essay is not intended to become a complete ontology, the first order is more suitable to our purposes, and the subsequent development itself will justify its adoption.

## CHAPTER II

### *Accidental Being*

---

In Latin one usually expresses accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*] as *ens per accidens*. It will be difficult to find a suitable corresponding expression in our German language, though it is generally quite capable of imitating the forms of other languages. Schwegler, in his translation of Aristotle's *Metaphysics*, translates the "by accident" [*kata symbebekos*] as "beziehungsweise"<sup>1</sup> in which he was followed by Brandis and others.<sup>2</sup> It is indeed true that accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*] has its being by virtue of the fact that some being stands in a relation [*Beziehung*] to it; nonetheless, the above designation does not contribute much to clarify its concept. The number 6 is relatively large, for it is twice 3. Yet nobody will say that it has this character by accident [*kata symbebekos*]. Speaking without qualification (*haplos*) and on the whole, man stands above the other living things, though some of them stand relatively higher than he does, since some of them surpass him in life span, others in strength or speed or acuteness of the senses, others because they have wings, which are denied to him, or because of other peculiar advantages which they have. Still, these advantages emanate from their essence, and are by no means by accident [*kata symbebekos, per accidens*], although indeed only relative to something [*secundum quid*]; the two are not to be identified. For this reason I should like to choose the expression, which Schwegler uses later: "*das zufaellige Sein, das Zufaellige*" [accidental being, the accidental],<sup>3</sup> which would then have to be taken in a narrower, specially determined sense. Something has accidental being by virtue of the being of that with which it is accidentally conjoined. By contrast, independent being [*on kath'hauto*] has being because of its peculiar essence. While independent being is as such (*he auto*, cf. *Anal. post.*, I. 4. 73b28), accidental being does not have being in its own right

but it is because something else is accidentally conjoined with it.<sup>4</sup> All this will become clearer shortly. For lack of an adequate German expression I should like to use the Greek designation itself.

As Aristotle says in the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*, no accidental being is prior to that which is in itself,<sup>5</sup> and since even in the order of knowing independent being [*on kath'hauto*] is prior,<sup>6</sup> it is necessary first of all to take a look, if only a brief one, at the things which fall into this domain. Some of these things are substances and have independent being,<sup>7</sup> as for example a tree, a man, etc., while others, which lack it, exist only in and with substances and are called attributes,<sup>8</sup> as for example the white which is found in a body, etc. Indeed, in any substance not merely one attribute exists but many of them, and different kinds. All of them can be truly predicated of substance as well as of each other, as when we say "the body is white," "the white is beautiful," etc. For they are *one* in the subject, even if not in essence, and since being and unity are identical<sup>9</sup> it follows that one is the other, though not always in one and the same way, but sometimes *kath'hauto*, and sometimes also *kata symbebekos*, and the latter is the *on kata symbebekos* of Aristotle, with which we now have to concern ourselves.

Where one thing is found combined with another, the combination of the one with the other is either necessary and universal, even if prevented in individual cases, or it is merely accidental.<sup>10</sup> According to Aristotle's example<sup>11</sup> the triangle's attribute of having three angles which equal two right angles belongs to the triangle in the first manner; for it is necessary and is found in every triangle. In like manner it holds of man that he can laugh, for this is peculiar to his nature; as man he has the ability to laugh, and if he lacks it in a particular case, then some cramp or mutilation or some other reason for this irregularity is at fault. Thus we find here a close affinity which approximates that which holds between genus and specific difference, except that here one element does not belong to the essence of the other (*me en te ousia onta*). But cases where it serves in a definition in the place of the unknown difference are not particularly rare,<sup>12</sup> and it is often of service when we try

to find the latter.<sup>13</sup> The *proprium* (*idion*) of the *Topics* is in this way united with a being. But more than that: for since the *proprium* as such belongs to a thing alone, and is convertible with it in predication,<sup>14</sup> the *proprium* of the genus is not a *proprium* of the species, etc., though it belongs to it *kath'hauto*, in the sense in which we use this term here.

There is proof in the exceptional cases which we just considered, where one thing belonged to another not always, but only in most cases, that there is yet another manner of unification in things.<sup>15</sup> Clover has three leaves in most cases, but not always; hence in individual cases in which it has a different number of leaves the conjunction is accidental. Clover has four leaves *kata symbebekos*, not *kath'hauto*. In the same way upward motion is accidental for a heavy object. Upward motion belongs to a heavy thing *kata symbebekos*. Somebody wants to sail to Athens and a storm drives him to Aegina. The intention of going to Athens and the arrival in Aegina are accidental with respect to each other. Thus it is accidental for a grammarian to be musical, for if he were not musical he could be a grammarian just the same. The two do not inherently or essentially belong together; one property is not a consequence of the other and the two do not stem from a common cause; the one has the other *kata symbebekos*. Aristotle defines *symbebekos* in the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics* as follows: "That is accidental which occurs, but neither always nor necessarily, nor for the most part." In the same way he says in the second chapter of the sixth book "we call accidental what occurs neither always nor for the most part."<sup>16</sup> And here he adds numerous examples for illustration. Similarly, in Book V, chapter 30: "We call accidental that which belongs to the thing and is truthfully attributed to it, but neither with necessity, nor for the most part."<sup>17</sup> We now have to answer the question what this *on kata symbebekos* is. That clover has four leaves happens, as we said, *kata symbebekos*. Is the being of four-leafedness an *on kata symbebekos* in this case? No! Four-leafedness as such has its peculiar being, without which it would not be what it is; but the clover inasmuch as it has the being of four-leafedness is an *on kata symbebekos*. The musical person, as such, *is* by virtue of a being peculiar to himself; he is an *on kath'hauto*, but if the grammarian

has being by virtue of this being of the musical person, he is to that extent only an *on kata symbebekos*. The being of something that presses, considered only as such, is pressing; pressure has being by virtue of the fact that something presses. The being of whatever lives, considered only as such, is life; it is what it is by living. Now if an animal exercises a pressure upon a body upon which it stands or lies, then it is not only true that the pressing object presses, and that the animal lives, but also that the animal exercises pressure and in this respect, too, has being; and that the object exercising pressure lives, and has being in this respect. What exercises pressure does not live by virtue of the being which is peculiar to it as something exercising pressure, and thus if we say: the object exercising pressure has being, we do not mean the being which it has because it is alive, but the being which it has because it exercises pressure, or, if we ever meant the former, we should have described that which exercises pressure as a being *per accidens*, as an *on kata symbebekos*.

This interpretation of the *on kata symbebekos* is supported especially by the examples with which Aristotle illustrates it in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 7: "Something is said to have being *kata symbebekos*," he says, "when one says that the just man is musical, that the man is musical, that the musical person is a man; this is very much like saying that the musical person builds houses, since it is just an accident if a builder is musical or a musical person a builder. For in this case, to say that one thing is another means the same as that the second thing accidentally belongs to the first."<sup>18</sup> He gives one example in particular which serves to illustrate this improper mode of existence which belongs to the *on kata symbebekos*. He says that negative entities, too, such as the non-white, exist *kata symbebekos*, since the objects exist to which they belong accidentally.<sup>19</sup> Negation as such certainly does not have real existence of its own; yet, if a person is black I can say that the black is alive and exists as man; with equal justification I can say that the non-white exists, not merely as something which is non-white, but as man.

What is said in the sixth book agrees with this. He says there that the *on kata symbebekos* stands outside the other

kinds of being, so that neither it nor the being of the copula represents a specific kind of extramental being.<sup>20</sup> And a certain point made earlier now becomes obvious: nothing which has being *kata symbebekos* is prior to that which is in itself. Furthermore, it is now also obvious why one cannot properly say of the *on kata symbebekos* that it has a cause; he states in *Metaphysics* VI. 2: "For other things there are certain faculties productive of them, but for this there is no determinate art and no determinate faculty, for what is or becomes *kata symbebekos* can only have a cause which is also *kata symbebekos*."<sup>21</sup> Similarly, he notes a little earlier in the same chapter that "things that have being in another manner come into being and pass away by a process, but things which are *kata symbebekos* do not."<sup>22</sup> Obviously! The musician-architect does not have *one* genesis as does, for example, risible man. The architect comes about through one genesis and the musician through another, but neither genesis aims at making the *architect* into a musician. One can easily see how sophistry can here find ample opportunity for its deceitful game. Thus Aristotle remarks that "the arguments of the Sophists largely turn on the *on kata symbebekos*."<sup>23</sup> For example, the foundation of one sophism is just this absence of specific genesis.<sup>24</sup> Aristotle indicates another paralogism which belongs into this context;<sup>25</sup> it goes as follows: whoever is a grammarian is something other than a musician; but some musician is a grammarian. Therefore, some musician is something other than he is. The solution is this: *kath'hauto* the musician is something other than the grammarian, and he is a grammarian only *kata symbebekos*. Plato maintained that the object of sophistry is non-being.<sup>26</sup> Aristotle agreed with this claim precisely because the fallacies of the Sophists revolve in the main around the *on kata symbebekos*. This, he says, is closely related to non-being,<sup>27</sup> and has being only in name, as it were.<sup>28</sup> This, too, is clear from what we have said above since because of the identity of being [*on*] and unity [*hen*] (see above), anything has being in the respect in which it is a unity; but if there are two things, one of which is the other *kata symbebekos*, proper unity is lacking. The words "by name only, as it were" can be clarified as follows. We have seen that in the case of the *on kath'hauto* something *is* because

of a being which is peculiar to it, while in the case of the *on kata symbebekos* something *is* because of the being of another, with which it is accidentally united. The musician was a grammarian not because of the being of the musician, but of the grammarian; similarly, the grammarian was musician by being musician, which is not a being that belongs peculiarly to him. Nonetheless, "is a musician" can be truly predicated of the grammarian and thus both partake of the one name of musician, but not of one and the same being and essence. It is a predication according to name [*kata to onoma*] but not according to definition [*kata ton logon*],<sup>29</sup> even if the scope of the latter kind of predication is extended beyond the narrow boundaries which are staked out for it in the *Categories*, so that it includes everything belonging to the essence. For in contrast to what we have remarked above concerning what belongs to a thing *kath' hauto*,<sup>30</sup> it is here impossible to gain knowledge of the nature of the subject through the predicate, to gather insight from this kind of being into the nature of that which is thus said to be. Even the most contrary opposites in the former do not affect and differentiate the latter in any way:<sup>31</sup> we have just considered an example in which the being of a substance, such as that of man, was ascribed *kata symbebekos* even to a negation, which actually lacks all essence and real existence. Thus Aristotle is completely correct when he says in *Posterior analytics* II. 8 that if we know that something is *kata symbebekos*, we do not truly know that it is.<sup>32</sup> Thus whatever something is *kata symbebekos*, it is that thing only by name, as it were.<sup>33</sup> It is for this reason that no science deals with the *on kata symbebekos*, since nothing that belongs to an object *kata symbebekos* can contribute anything to the understanding of its nature, and since it is not possible to have a science of something which happens only accidentally on a few occasions. For science always aims at generality, at that which takes place always or for the most part.<sup>34</sup>

But did we not just follow Aristotle in determining the peculiarities of the *on kata symbebekos*, and have we not thus subjected it to scientific scrutiny? True enough, but one must make careful distinctions. The concept of the *on kata symbebekos* is not *kata symbebekos* relative to that to which it is

attributed, just as the concept of an individual is not itself an individual. Though it is not possible to have a science of individuals,<sup>35</sup> yet the concept of the individual and its relation to species, etc., can be scientifically discussed. An individual in general can be divided into individual substance and individual accident.<sup>36</sup> In the same way the impossibility of scientific scrutiny of *things* which are *kata symbebekos* does not vitiate the possibility of scrutinizing scientifically what *kata symbebekos einai* is. Thus we must not be surprised if various kinds of *on kata symbebekos* are distinguished in the seventh chapter of the fifth book. There he says: "When we call a man a musician and a musician a man or when we call a white [man] a musician, and a musician white, then we do it in the latter case because both belong accidentally to one and the same object; in the former case we do it because it (being a musician) is accidentally present in that which *is*, while of musicianship we say that it is a man, because it is accidental of man that he is a musician."<sup>37</sup> Thus three different types are indicated. Namely, (1) a subject (*suppositum*) is *kata symbebekos* in that respect in which an attribute belongs to it by chance. (2) that which is accidentally present in a *suppositum* is, insofar as it belongs to the latter, an *on kata symbebekos*. Finally, (3) where several entities belong to the same *suppositum kata symbebekos*, one of them can be an *on kata symbebekos* by virtue of the being of the other. Thus the white is a musician and the musician white. These distinctions between the three types of *on kata symbebekos* make sense, though one could have some doubts regarding their completeness. First of all, musicianship seems to be predicated not only of man, but also of musical man, and in this case, it seems, with necessity yet without inner unity.<sup>38</sup> This seems to be yet another manner of *on kata symbebekos* which would greatly multiply their number. We have also seen that negations, too, are sometimes said to be *kata symbebekos*, and we must ask whether they form a special manner of *on kata symbebekos*, or whether they can be reduced to one of the above kinds.

To answer the last question first, Aristotle himself settles the matter in the passage immediately following by saying that negations which are *kata symbebekos* can be reduced to the

second kind of *on kata symbebekos*.<sup>39</sup> Whatever is not, is not white. Hence if there is a non-white which lives and is man, it is merely accidental that it [the non-white] belongs to a *suppositum*, and it exists *kata symbebekos* because the latter exists, in the same manner as the whiteness is man, etc. It stands to reason that Aristotle did not want to exclude a reduction to the third manner altogether; it takes place wherever an accident is attributed to a negated entity, as when we say that the non-white is green, or red, or large, or learned, or whatever. Only the first manner of the *on kata symbebekos* excludes negation, since the denial of substance also denies all accidental being.<sup>40</sup> Thus what is devoid of substance [*nichts der Substanz nach*] cannot have being *kata symbebekos*. But suppose that non-three-leafedness were predicated of clover. This would not be a case where not-being is non-accidental [*symbebekos*]; rather, non-accidental being [*on kath'hauto*] is here not-being by accident [*me on kata symbebekos*], and this can be reduced to the first kind. For it is accidentally *not the case* that the clover is three-leafed. If someone wanted to insist upon the distinction between "not being three-leafed" and "being non-three-leafed,"<sup>41</sup> we should have to reply that the predication of such an "infinite" expression [*onoma aoriston*] would then not constitute an actual *on kata symbebekos*, but a being in the sense of being true which is accidental [*on hos alethes kata symbebekos*],<sup>42</sup> for which we refer to the following chapter.

To the first objection we must reply that calling a musical man musical does not constitute a new manner of *on kata symbebekos*. The assertion that a musical man is musical is only apparently one, while in fact it consists of two, which remain two even if we give a single name to the musical man. One of them is that what is musical is musical, and this is a tautology, and what is musical *qua* musical is an *on kath'hauto*. The universality and necessity of the proposition is rooted in this assertion. The second is that the man is musical and this is obviously an *on kata symbebekos* of the first kind mentioned above. A brief look at what Aristotle says in *De Interpretatione*, chapter 11, will suffice to persuade that this solution is not only of itself clear and obvious, but also corresponds to Aristotle's own opinion.<sup>43</sup>

Thus there only remain, as exhaustive, the above-mentioned three kinds of *on kata symbebekos*, i.e., of that kind of being which is called being because it is accidentally conjoined with a being alien to it. They were: (1) something which has being insofar as another being accidentally inheres in it; (2) something which has being insofar as it inhere accidentally in another being; and finally (3) the *on kata symbebekos* which has being insofar as another being accidentally co-exists with it in the same subject. So much about being in this first and improper sense of that name. first and improper sense of that name.

## CHAPTER III

# *Being in the Sense of Being True*

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We now move on to an explanation of being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*]; Aristotle uses this name to specify a second concept which is subsumed under the multiply ambiguous “being” [*on*]. What is the meaning of “*on hos alethes*” or, in the translation of Bessarion, *ens tanquam verum*? The ‘*hos*’ obviously means the same as “in the sense of” and thus the *on hos alethes* is being which is asserted in the sense of being true. Thus the concepts of truth and falsity will correspond to those of being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*] and its opposite, non-being in the sense of being false [*me on hos pseudos*].

### § 1. Of the true and the false.

Aristotle speaks of the true and the false not only in many passages of the *Metaphysics*, but also in his other works, especially the logical writings, and in the third book of *De anima*. How does he define the true and the false in these other works? Aristotle emphasizes several times that truth and falsity can be found only in affirmative or negative judgments. In *De anima*, III. 8 he says that “the true or the false is a combination of concepts of the understanding.”<sup>1</sup> Similarly, in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics* he says that “the true or false is nothing but affirming or denying.”<sup>2</sup> There is indeed another kind of mental cognizing which is not judging, and through which we grasp the undivided, the simple, and conceptually represent to ourselves the nature [*Wesen*] of things. But neither truth nor falsity belong to it as he consistently claims in the *Categories*, in *De interpretatione*, in the third book of *De anima*<sup>3</sup> and in the sixth book of the *Metaphysics*. In the last mentioned passage he adds that they can also not be found in things outside the mind.<sup>4</sup>

And so it happens that in *De interpretatione* 4, where he wants to give a definition of judgment, he defines it through the characteristic that it has truth and falsity. "It is not the case," he says, "that every utterance is an affirmation, only that of which it holds that it says something true or something false."<sup>5</sup> although in this and other passages Aristotle is very firm in claiming that judgments are the only bearers of truth, and although he firmly denies that things outside the mind as well as isolated concepts partake in any way of truth and falsity, he still seems to assert the exact opposite in other places. Consider the various kinds of falsehood which he enumerates in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*. He begins at once by saying that "in one manner of speaking the false occurs when the thing is called false either, indeed, because a statement by which it is designated combines what is not combined or cannot be combined, as when one says that the diagonal is commensurable with the side of the square or that you are sitting. Of these the first is false always, the second at the moment. In this mode, the false is a kind of non-being. Other entities, though they have being, are called false because they appear not as what they are, or as something which they are not, for example a sketch or a dream. For these are indeed something, but not that of which they create the impression. Thus things are called false either because they are not or because they generate an impression of something which is not."<sup>6</sup> This passage speaks of several ways in which things could be called false and thus, if taken literally, contradicts what we have quoted from Book VI: "The true and the false do not reside in things" (*ou gar esti to pseudo kai to alethes en tois pragmasin*). In *De anima* he teaches that even in the sensory faculties, in imagination and in the outer senses, truth and falsity can be found: "The outer sense," he says in Book III, chapter 3, "is true with respect to its proper object or at least is susceptible to falsehood only rarely. But sense also extends to what attaches to, is an accident of, its proper object of perception, and in this case it can happen that it is false, etc."<sup>7</sup> Similarly in an earlier part of the same chapter on the imagination, "the outer senses are always true, but the ideas of imagination mostly false." "For there are also false imaginings."<sup>8</sup> Finally, chapter 6 of the same book ascribes truth also to the

understanding as it forms representations: "An assertion, e.g., affirmation, says something of something, and each is either true or false. But this does not hold of all thought; a thought is true if it represents a being [*Wesen*] according to its concept, even though it does not assert one thing of another; rather, it is true in the same manner in which the seeing of a proper object (i.e., of color) is true."<sup>9</sup> Still, even among concepts true and false ones are distinguished when *Met.* V. 29 continues as follows: "A concept, however, is false if, insofar as it is false, it represents non-being. Hence, every concept is false of all things other than those of which it is true, just as the true concept of the circle is a false one for the triangle. . . . Still other concepts are false in such a way that nothing at all corresponds to them."<sup>10</sup>

How do we resolve the contradiction between these last and the earlier cited pronouncements of our philosopher? Simply by distinguishing between "true" and "true" and between "false" and "false." Like the name of being, with whose various senses this essay makes us familiar, the word "true" has many senses and can be applied to different things in the manner of a homonym. The senses of truth differ, depending on whether we speak of understanding and judgments, or of the truth of simple representations and definitions, or whether we call things themselves true. It is not the case that the same holds in all three cases, even if all of them stand in a relation to one and the same thing; they are called true not in the same, but in an analogous manner (not *kath'hen*, though perhaps *pros hen kai mian physin*, *Met.* IV. 2. 1003a33; not *kata mian idean*, though *kat'analogian*, *Nichomachean Ethics*, I. 4. 1096b25).<sup>11</sup> To make this clearer it is necessary to pay closer attention once again to what Aristotle actually means by truth. For him, truth is the agreement [*Uebereinstimmung*] between cognition and thing. He stated this clearly enough in the above-quoted passage, *Metaphysics* VI. 4. 1027b20<sup>12</sup>: "The true affirms where there is connection and denies where there is separation; the false, conversely, has in each case the contradictory opposite." The tenth chapter of Book IX states it even more clearly: "He who takes the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined thinks the truth, while he who claims what is opposite to reality is in error."<sup>13</sup> From this follows the distinc-

tion between eternal and necessary truth on one hand, and temporary and changeable truth on the other: "Hence, if some things always exist together and it is impossible to separate them, whereas others are always separated and do not allow combination, while, lastly, still others are capable of either of these, then, concerning the last, the same opinion and the same statement comes to be true and false and it is possible for it to be at one time correct and at another incorrect. But concerning that which cannot be otherwise, opinions cannot be sometimes true, sometimes false, but remain forever true or false."<sup>14</sup> From this tenet concerning the agreement between true thought and the thing which is thought, Aristotle draws the further conclusion that where there is no combination in things they cannot be cognized by the understanding through combination, i.e., through the connection of a predicate with a subject. "What is 'being and non-being,' 'true and false' for the non-composite?" he asks, and answers that in this case grasping and uttering are true (for affirming and uttering—*kataphasis* and *phasis*—are not the same; cf. *De int.* IV. 16b28), and in this case the true is not opposed to error, but to ignorance.<sup>15</sup> Thus Aristotle asserts with respect to ideas which we have of simple substances, i.e., of those which are free from all matter and potentiality, as God, pure forms, absolutely simple acts, that they can in no way be cognized through a thought which combines, but only through simple grasping, so that in their respect no deception but only acquaintance or ignorance are possible. "In relation to incomposite substances," he says, "one cannot be deceived." "Concerning that which is a 'what' and actual, no deception but only acquaintance or ignorance are possible."<sup>16</sup> All this confirms the claim which we made above that, according to Aristotle, truth consists in the agreement of the understanding with the thing, in the conformity of the two.<sup>17</sup> This relation between thought and being, like all other relations, is mutual.<sup>18</sup> But its converse is not obtained in the same way as that of most other relations. While the relation between knowledge and the known has its real basis in that knowledge, the converse relation of the known to knowledge obviously comes about only through the operation of the understanding; hence, the proper basis of the relation remains in that which now has be-

come its relatum; the known in not a relatum [*pros ti*] because it stands in a relation to another, but because another stands in a relation to it.<sup>19</sup>

It is easy to understand the basis of this doctrine, which we find in *Met.* V. 15. The harmony or disharmony between our thought and the thing has no influence whatever upon the existence of the latter; they are independent of our thought and remain untouched by it. He says in *Met.* IX. 10: "you are not white because we believe truthfully that you are white." Conversely, our thought depends upon things, and must agree with them in order to be true: "Rather because you are white, we, who say it, speak the truth."<sup>20</sup> Similarly, in the fifth chapter of the *Categories*: "we say of a statement that it is true or false because something is or is not the case."<sup>21</sup> It is not the case that the things are images of our thoughts, rather, our thoughts are fashioned after them, as the words after the thoughts (*De int.* I. 16a6)<sup>22</sup> and our understanding achieves its aim only if it arrives, through science, at this conformity with things, at truth. Thus, at the very beginning of the first philosophy it is stated that "All men by nature desire to know."

Just as the good is that at which the will aims, so the understanding aims at the true as its goal. But there is this difference between the two: while will is satisfied and achieves what it demands only if the object of its desire exists in reality outside of this will, understanding achieves its aim if the object of its activity acquires existence within this understanding. The aim of the one is at the same time its object, the aim of the other is knowledge of its object and thus is found in the mind itself. Hence the claim "the true and the false are not in things, as if for example the good were true and the bad in itself false, but in the understanding." (*Met.* VI. 4)<sup>23</sup> The good and the bad are in things insofar as they are considered in their relation to the will, and if the concept of good is applied to our desire, it is derivative from the concept which is applied to the desired object. We call a will good if it wills *the good*. By contrast, truth is in the knowing mind.

But mind recognizes the truth only if it *judges*. If truth is the conformity of the understanding [*Erkenntnissvermoegen*] with the object which is thought, then this implies that an

understanding recognizes truth only if it grasps its conformity with reality. but sensation cannot achieve this. The outer senses or the imagination can at best create within themselves images of reality, but they cannot arrive at a cognition of the relation between such a picture and its object. The understanding, too, cannot achieve this so long as it restricts itself to representing and the formation of concepts; only when it judges a thing to be as it is cognized does it recognize the truth. Hence that early definition of judgment (cf. *De int.*IV)<sup>24</sup> as being the mental activity of thinking what is true or what is false.

But if it is thus established that truth in the first and the proper sense can occur only in a judgment of the understanding, it is not denied that in a secondary and analogous manner the name "truth" can also be applied to the faculties of our sensory nature, to the faculty of concept-formation, as well as to things themselves. Just as the epithet "healthy" is initially applied to the healthy body, but is then extended so that some things are called healthy because they keep healthy, others because they make healthy, still others because they are a sign of health, and still others because they are capable of health (cf. *Met.* IV. 2; 1003a35), so the name "truth" applies initially to the true judgment, but then extends to concepts and sensory representations, and to external objects, all of which stand in close relation to it. For reality is that of which we say that the truth of our judgment depend depends upon it; the understanding, when it judges, recognizes concepts to be in conformity or not in conformity with being. At any rate, a concept will conform to one object and fail to conform to another, even if the concept does not contain within itself a recognition of this conformity; similar considerations hold of sensory representations.

Hence, we have a multiple concept of true and false: (1) truth and error in the first and proper sense. It is found only in judgment. It initially also holds that it is impossible for judgments to be true and false at the same time. (2) True and false as it applies to the simple perception of the understanding, to definition and the senses. This occurs in two ways. First, a representation or a thought is called false when there is nothing

at all in reality which corresponds to it; all others are called true in this respect. Secondly, any perception and definition is false if it is applied to something other than that of which it is the definition or image, while it is called true in the opposite case. Thus, as we said above, every definition which is the true definition of one thing is a false definition of another, e.g., the true definition of a circle is a false one for the triangle (see above). Thus, in a way, a concept can be true and false at the same time. What is in itself true can be false by virtue of a relation to something alien to it, and what is in itself false can be true through attribution, as when somebody says that centaurs are mythological monsters. (3) Truth and falsity in things. This mode of the true and false is related to the two considered earlier, but is neither identical nor synonymous with either of them. We have seen that, according to Aristotle, the good and the bad are initially in things, but that subsequently a will, too, is called good or bad if it desires something that is good or bad. Now if the true and the false are initially found in the judging mind, how is it that a thing can be called true or false? Obviously only insofar as it forms the object of a true or a false judgment. Thus things are called true or false with respect to our judgment. This occurs in two ways. First, they are or are not, because (a) they could be, but are not (hence the assertion of their existence would be false), or (b) the assertion of their existence embodies a contradiction, as is the case, for example, with a side of a square commensurable with the diagonal, which is adduced in *Met.* V. 29 as an example of a thing which is false in this manner. We can also apply here what is said in *Met.* II, that every thing partakes of truth to the extent to which it partakes of being.<sup>25</sup> Accordingly, what embodies contradictory attributes, which is impossible, is always false and is the most false. What is accidental being is sometimes true and sometimes false, and the necessary being, which is free from all potentiality, is eternally true and the most true.<sup>26</sup> Secondly, things are true or false if they are of the sort that produces a true or false opinion of itself; thus a picture which is produced by a magic lantern and is easily mistaken for the person itself, or a dream, or a piece of lead which is mistaken for a silver coin, are said to be false in this way. One could also say that what is not

composed of substance and accident, genus and differentia (see above, note 16) and which therefore, if it is somehow grasped in its being, excludes not only all deception, but all possibility of the admixture of error, is the farthest removed from the false. (4) Finally, truth and falsity are especially applied to man. Someone is called false either because he delights in false speech and likes to speak untruth even if he has no advantage from it (the liar), or because he invokes false opinions in others, in which case he is like the things that create a false appearance. Opposed to this is the concept of the truthful man; for Plato is wrong when he sophistically argues in the *Lesser Hippias* that the true and the false are one and the same. His argument depends on identifying a person capable of lying with a liar, and thus of confounding him who can lie with him who loves to lie.<sup>27</sup>

The analogy of the various concepts which are designated true and false allows us to see that Aristotle in no way contradicted himself in the various passages quoted above. The basic concept of truth is always the agreement of the cognizing mind with the cognized object.

§ 2. Of the true and the false when considered in relation to the concept of being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*] and of non-being in the sense of being false [*me on hos pseudos*].

The preceding investigation has shown that Aristotle uses the words "true" and "false" in several senses; hence it will now be important to determine in which of these meanings it is employed when he deals with being in the sense of being true and non-being in the sense of being false.

It does not seem difficult to decide this question since, in *Met.* VI. 4<sup>28</sup> Aristotle explains himself with a clarity that leaves nothing to be desired by saying that the *on hos alethes* and the *me on hos pseudos* occur only in judgments, either affirmative or negative. "Being as the true and non-being as the false are found in combination and separation, and both together in the division into contradictories, since the truth has affirmation when there is combination, and negation when there is separation, while the false in each case has the contradictory opposite. . . .

For the true and the false are not in things . . . but in the understanding, and not even in the understanding where simple concepts are concerned." Obviously, it is the judgment which is here called true and false, hence to be or not to be; judgment itself is the subject to which being belongs as a predicate. Hence the being of which he here speaks is not the copula which connects subject and predicate in the sentence itself, especially since a negative judgment, too, is said to have being, and an affirmative one non-being. Rather we are concerned with a being which is predicated of the entire, fully articulated judgment. This may be clarified through an example. Let us suppose somebody wanted to demonstrate to someone else that the sum of the angles in a triangle is equal to two right angles, and that he requires as a starting point of the proof the assumption that the exterior angles are equal to the opposing interior angles. The question now is whether this is or is not [the case], i.e., is it true or is it false? It is! i.e., it is true. In this sense the *Posterior Analytics* requires that the "that it is" [*hoti esti*] of the principles of a science must have been recognized already.<sup>29</sup>

Let us compare this with another passage from the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*. There he says in the seventh chapter: "Again, 'to be' and 'is' indicate that something is true, but not-being that it is not true but false, and this holds for affirmative as well as negative expressions as, for example, 'Socrates is musical', i.e., this is true, or 'Socrates is non-white', i.e., it is true; by contrast, 'the diagonal is not commensurable', i.e., it is false."<sup>30</sup> Here again we have the true and false in that proper sense in which it is found in judgments; yet one can note a difference between the two passages which is not without interest. In the first of them the "is" was used like a predicative determination of the judgment which was described as true. The judgment in turn occupied the position of the subject: (the judgment) "a is b" is (true). In the second passage, by contrast, the "is" was a component of the proposition which was claimed to be true, being the copula which connects subject and predicate: a is b. In the first case, the "is" declares a given judgment to be in agreement with reality; in the latter case, it is itself constitutive of the judgment. In the former case, true and false were predicated of affirmative as well as negative assertion; in

the latter, the 'true' is on the side of affirmation (though a positive as well as negative determination may be attributed), while the 'false' is always on the side of negation, "and thus is the true in affirmation, the false in negation," says Alexander in his commentary upon this passage.<sup>31</sup> Similarly Schwegler, when he argues against Bekker's text, "the diagonal is incommensurable [*he diametros asymmetros*]," "that the diagonal is not incommensurable, i.e., that it is commensurable: this is indeed a false assertion; in other words, the above contains a false statement. But this is not the point in this context."<sup>32</sup> The difference is clear and Aristotle himself states it clearly when he attempts to prove, in *Met.* IV. that whoever admits that one particular proposition is true or false must also accept innumerable others: "If they make an exception, one (who declares everything to be true) with respect to the opposite assertion, claiming that it alone is not true, while the other (who holds everything to be false) with respect to his own assertion that it alone is not false, then they always presuppose innumerable true and false propositions; for a proposition which calls a true proposition true is itself true, and this continues *ad infinitum*."<sup>33</sup> Nonetheless it is doubtless true that whoever forms the first judgment executes a comparison between the understanding, in particular the representations found in it, and the things just as much as someone who, using a second judgment, declares the first judgment to be in agreement with the facts. It is also certain that the "to be" of the copula does not designate an actualization [*Energie*] of being, a real attribute, since we make affirmative statements concerning negations and privations, purely fictitious relations and other altogether arbitrary mental constructions, as Aristotle points out in the above quoted passage from *Met.* IV. 2: "hence we say that non-being is a non-being."<sup>34</sup> We also say such things as "every magnitude is equal to itself," though we can certainly not find a relation [*pros ti*] like equality in the nature of things. Or we say "centaurs are mythological monsters, Jupiter is a false God," etc. It stands to reason that we do not concede any kind of reality by making these affirmations. Here, too, the "is" designates nothing but "it is true." Alexander says, *loc. cit.*, "whoever utters the affirmation says that it is true, but who denies with-

draws being as something false.” Thus, the being of the copula is nothing but being in the sense of the true [*einai hos alethes*] and the passage quoted in the first instance (VI. 4), though it does not clearly include this interpretation, certainly does not wish to exclude it.

From this follows at once a wider extent for being as truth: now not only judgments belong to it, but concepts, too, are drawn into its domain whenever an affirmative assertion can be formed about them, and the being of the copula can be attributed to them. In this manner, even non-being, since it is a non-being, “is a non-being,”<sup>35</sup> hence an *on hos alethes*, and similarly every mental construct, i.e., everything which in our mind can objectively become the subject of a true affirmative assertion, will belong to it. Nothing we can form in our mind is so denuded of all reality that it is altogether excluded from the domain of the *on hos alethes*. Aristotle attests to this when he says in *Met.* V. 12. 1019b6, “in a manner of speaking, privation (*steresis*) too is a property (*hexis*). If this is so, then everything will be something by virtue of the fact that something positive belongs to it. But ‘being’ is used equivocally.”<sup>36</sup> He wants to say that in a certain respect privation, too, can be envisaged as a state [*hexis*], hence a positive state, from which it follows that being deprived is also a kind of having, namely of privation. Hence, everything is what it is by virtue of having something, by virtue of a positive attribute.<sup>37</sup> But that a privation can be described as a state [*hexis*], and as something which one has, is due to the fact that “being” [*on*] is used equivocally, where in one mode even privation and negation are said to be things. This is precisely the mode of our *on hos alethes*. It will always have equivocally the same name as real being even where being in the sense of truth, the being of the copula, is applied to things which have real existence outside the mind; even then it must be distinguished as something accidental from their essential being since, as was said above, it is accidental to each thing whether a true assertion is made about it.<sup>38</sup>

Thus, even where the subject of a proposition is a real [i.e. non-empty] concept, the copula “to be” and in the sense of being true revolve around the remaining species of being (*peri to loipon genos tou ontos*) in such a way that they do not disclose a special

extramentally existing nature of being (*ouk exo ousan tina physin ontos delousin*).<sup>39</sup> The reason for this lies in the operations of the human understanding, which combines and separates, affirms and negates,<sup>40</sup> and not in the highest principles of reality [*Real-principien*] from which metaphysics attempts to gain an understanding of being as being [*on he on*]. Hence, together with accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*], it is to be excluded from metaphysical inquiry.<sup>41</sup> But this does not mean that, like the latter, it is incapable of scientific treatment; on the contrary, says Aristotle, it should be the subject of inquiry, but it does not belong to metaphysics.<sup>42</sup> Unless we are mistaken, all of logic has no other object, regardless of whether it deals with genus, species and difference, definition, judgment, or argument. In any case, none of these has any sort of being outside the mind;<sup>43</sup> thus they can only have being in the sense of being true; hence logic as a purely formal science is distinguished from the other, real, parts of philosophy.<sup>44</sup>

## CHAPTER IV

### *Potential and Actual Being*

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The two senses of being with which we still have to deal, namely, being which is divided into the categories and potential and actual being, belong together and are intimately connected with each other.<sup>1</sup> Thus they have in common that the science of being, metaphysics, is concerned in the same way with one as with the other,<sup>2</sup> while, as we saw, both accidental being and being in the sense of being true were excluded from it. Since being, as the most general, is asserted of everything,<sup>3</sup> it follows for the subject of metaphysics that it comprises everything insofar as it has extramental being which is one with it and belongs to it essentially. Hence it follows that, just as the being which divides into the categories, being in the sense now under discussion is being that is independent and outside the mind [*on kath' hauto exo tes dianoias*].

- § 1. The kind of being which is divided into actual [*on energeia*] and potential [*on dunamei*] is being in the sense in which this name is applied not only to that which is realized, that which exists, the really-being, but also to the mere real possibility of being.

Potential being [*on dunamei*] plays a large role in the philosophy of Aristotle, as does the concept of matter [*hyle*]. Indeed, these two concepts are coextensive,<sup>4</sup> while actual being [*on energeia*] is either pure form or is actualized by form.

There is a great difference between what we here mean by the potential [the *dynaton* or *dunamei on*] and what in more recent times is meant by calling something possible in contrast with real, where the necessary is added as a third thing. This is

a possibility which completely abstracts from the reality of that which is called possible, and merely claims that something could exist if its existence did not involve a contradiction. It does not exist in things but in the objective concepts and combinations of concepts of the thinking mind; it is a merely rational thing.

Aristotle was quite familiar with the concept of possibility so understood, as we can see from *De interpretatione*, but it bears no relation to what he calls potential being, since otherwise it would have to be excluded from the subject of metaphysics along with being as being true. So that no doubt may remain, he mentions in *Met.* V. 12, as well as in IX. 1, the impossible whose contrary is necessarily true [*adynaton hou to enantion ex anankes alethes*] (*Met.* V. 12. 1019b23). The possible object [*dynaton*] which is associated with this impossibility is distinguished from the potential object [*dynaton*] which bears this name because it stands in relation to a power [*dynamis*]. It is the same only in name<sup>5</sup> and must be distinguished from this potentiality along with the powers of mathematics,  $a^2$ ,  $b^3$ , etc., which are powers only in a metaphorical sense [*kata metaphoran*].<sup>6</sup> Thus he speaks here of something which really has potential being. This is based upon his peculiar view that a non-real, something which has, properly speaking, non-being (*me on*)<sup>7</sup>, in a manner or speaking exists insofar as it is potentially, and it is this which leads him to a special wide sense of real being, which comprises as well that which potentially is.

Now, what is this potential thing which, being real, belongs to the object of metaphysics, and which has potential being as opposed to actual being? Aristotle defines it in the third chapter of the ninth book as follows: "a thing is possible if there is nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the potentiality."<sup>8</sup> Two things are to be noted about this definition: (1) that Aristotle seems to define a thing through itself, since he defines the possible in terms of the impossible, and (2) the definition is based upon the concept of actuality whose understanding is therefore presupposed.

The first difficulty can be resolved as follows: the impossible [*adynaton*] in question is the contradictory. It is opposed to the possible in the logical sense which we have just discussed

and not to the potential [*dynaton*] which we are now trying to comprehend.

The second difficulty forces us to direct our attention initially to actuality [*energeia*]. Potential being cannot be defined except with the aid of the concept of actuality, for the latter is prior in both concept and substance, as we are told in *Met.* IX. 8: "Actuality," he says, "is prior to potentiality both in concept and in essence." Further on he continues, "It is necessary that concept and cognition of the former precede that of the latter."<sup>9</sup> "Actuality" [*energeia*, *Wirklichkeit*] derives from "to act" (*ergo*, *wirken*), a verb having to do with motion, since, as he says, it is especially motion which seems to be an actuality.<sup>10</sup> But the extension of the concept does not stop here.<sup>11</sup> What then is actuality? Aristotle does not give us a definition and declares explicitly that we should not demand one, since the concept of actuality is so basic and simple that it does not permit definition but can be clarified only inductively through examples.<sup>12</sup> As one of these he adduces the knower, if we mean by this expression a person who is presently engaged in an act of cognition; hence, this person is *actually* cognizing. Furthermore, a statue of Hermes is actual if it is completely sculpted, finished, and not raw wood or a marble block to which the artist has not yet put his hand. If someone knows something but is not presently engaged in the act of cognition, or if a block is rough and unsculpted, then the former is not actually cognizing, even if he could perform the act of cognition, and the latter is not actually a statue, even if it is one potentially.<sup>13</sup> Thus we see that we are led back to potential being; it is best to clarify the concept of actuality through the relation between actuality and potentiality. They are related "as that which is actually building to that which is capable of building, as that which is awake to that which is asleep, as that which is seeing to that which has eyes shut, but has the power of sight, and as that which is formed from matter is to matter, and as the finished article to the raw material. In this contrast let one member be assigned to actuality, the other to potentiality."<sup>14</sup> We can see from this collection of examples that something is actual if it exists in complete reality; potential being lacks this reality, although "nothing impossible will result

if potential being achieves the actuality of which it is said to be capable." (see above). Thus Aristotle often uses the designation "actuality" [*energeia*] and "entelechy" [*entelecheia*] interchangeably<sup>15</sup> where the latter means the same as consummation (*teleiotes*),<sup>16</sup> as was correctly noted by Alexander and Simplicius.<sup>17</sup> But how? A mere potentiality in things, a merely potential thing which exists, is that not a thing which exists and yet does not have existence? Is this not a contradiction and impossibility? The Megarians did indeed see a contradiction here, as often happens if one withdraws the basis of being from contradictions which ought to be resolved. Thus they denied the merely potential, and that a thing is capable of something which is not already actual in the thing. But it is not difficult, says Aristotle,<sup>18</sup> to reduce such an assertion to absurdity. For then there would not be a builder who is not presently engaged in building, and no one would have an enduring ability. But it is certain that a person who has exercised an art does not at once lose his knowledge and his capability, and that he does not have to learn and acquire them for every new use, and it is equally certain that the artist remains an artist, even if he rests from his activity. Furthermore, nothing would be cold or hot, and Protagoras would be correct in his claim that all truth depends upon subjective sensation and opinion.<sup>19</sup> Furthermore, the man with healthy eyes and ears would often become blind and deaf during a day since, when he closes his eyes and ceases actually to see he would, on this theory, no longer see potentiality, i.e., he would have lost the very capacity to see.<sup>20</sup> Finally, all coming to be and passing away of things would have become a complete impossibility, for everything would be what it can be, and what it cannot be it could never become, and whatever one might say of past and future things would be a lie.<sup>21</sup>

In this way, Aristotle rebuts the Megarians and clarifies for us the existence and justification of his potential being. The additional examples which he adduces in this context serve to remove all doubt about the meaning of "potential being." But perhaps it is possible to employ in addition a manner of illucidation which we have used above in the determination of accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*]. I have in mind the enumeration of the different kinds of potential being, or rather

of the different ways in which various things participate in this name. This can be done since "potential being" is not used univocally, but applies to the concepts which fall under it merely with a certain unity of analogy. In *Met.* V. 12. four modes are indicated in which something can be called potential. They all agree in that they are origins of something,<sup>22</sup> and all of them are reduced to a single principle from which they receive the name, and therein consists their analogy.<sup>23</sup> The first mode of potentiality which Aristotle distinguishes is the origin of motion or change in another, insofar as it is another.<sup>24</sup> The last clause is added on since the active principle could possibly be contained in the subject, as when something moves itself. Even then it is not moving and moved, active and passive, in one and the same respect; one and the same thing acts and receives action, but not insofar as it is the same, but insofar as it is another.<sup>25</sup> The second mode is the passive capacity, which is the principle whereby something is moved by another insofar as it is another.<sup>26</sup> Again, the last clause is added for similar reasons, since if something is passive with respect to itself, it is active not insofar as it is the same thing but insofar as it is another. The third mode of potentiality is impassivity [*hexis apatheias*], as he calls it in *Met.* IX. 1. 1046a11. This is the disposition of a thing which makes it altogether incapable of suffering or change, or at least which makes it difficult for it to change for the worse. It is the so-called capacity of resisting.<sup>27</sup> Finally, the fourth mode in which something is called a potentiality is the principle not just of doing or suffering something, but of doing it well and according to desire. Thus, for example, if somebody limps or stutters we do not describe him as one who can walk or talk; rather, we use these words for those who can do these things without stumbling and error. Similarly, green wood is called non-flammable, while dry wood is called flammable, etc.<sup>28</sup>

Corresponding to these four modes of potentiality, there are four kinds of things capable,<sup>29</sup> which are most adequately described not as "possible" [*moeglich*] nor as "powerful" [*maechtig*], but rather as "capable" [*vermoegend*] or "able" [*faehig*]. All of these are called capable relative to a capacity [*kata dynamin*], which does not hold for the concept which logicians connect with the word "possible" [*dynaton*].<sup>30</sup> As

analogous concepts all of them can be reduced to the first mode of things capable and of potentiality, to the source of change in another insofar as it is another [*arche metaboles en hetero he heteron*], from which they also receive their name.<sup>31</sup> It is a question whether the here-indicated modes of potentiality [*dynamis*] and of things capable [*dynaton*] will attain our purpose, which was to ascertain the various modes of potential being. Is it perhaps the case that our potential being [*dynamei on*] is one and the same as the thing capable [*dynaton*] which was just mentioned? We must deny this if we wish to retain the concept of potential being [*dynamei on*], which was introduced with sufficient clarity above. Both physics and metaphysics agree that the first principle of motion is to be sought in God, but God, though certainly a thing capable [*dynaton*], is in no way a potential being, since he is an actual being [*on energeia*] in the fullest sense of the word.<sup>32</sup> Hence this kind of thing capable [*dynaton*], which occupies the third position in the above order, shows us that we should not seek the modes of potential being [*dynamei on*] in those of the things capable [*dynaton*]. But how? Is there only one mode of potential being [*dynamei on*] and is this the concept of a genus in which all things designated by that name participate in the same manner? What will be the method by which we gain knowledge of the various modes of potential being?

The third chapter of the ninth book speaks of a thing capable [*dynaton*]; the entire context and the examples themselves show clearly that in this case it is identical with potential being [*dynamei on*], and it is said that it is found in every category.<sup>33</sup> The same holds, of course, also of actual being [*on energeia*]; thus the tenth chapter of the same book and the seventh chapter of the fifth claim that in every category some objects are said to be in actuality, others in potentiality.<sup>34</sup> If this is so, then it is clear that potential as well as actual being is said in many ways and can be called one only by analogy. This is necessarily the case with everything that reaches beyond the extension of any one category, as Aristotle clearly indicates in *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096a19 and other places. We, too, shall give a detailed demonstration of this point, and shall recognize the principles upon which it rests.<sup>35</sup> Consequently, Aristotle also

asserts explicitly of actual being that "not everything is said to have actual being in the same, but only in an analogous way: as one is in or to a second, so a third is in or to a fourth; for some are related as operation to potency, others as form to some sort of matter."<sup>36</sup> And with respect to potential being [*dynamei on*] it is a major objection to Plato and the Platonists that they did not realize how every category presupposes as a different mode of being a certain determination and mode of potentiality.<sup>37</sup> We have already touched upon the close relation between potential and actual and being which is divided into the categories,<sup>38</sup> and we shall encounter a consequence of this fact, viz. the variegation of the concepts of potential as well as actual being. There are as many modes of potential being and actual being as there are categories; through the latter we shall understand the number of, and differences between, the former.

But something remains to be done for the complete determination of potential being [*dynamei on*]. The question is *at what time* is something potentially; the analogous question with respect to actual being does not occasion any doubts. It would certainly be incorrect to say of a newborn child that he is capable of speaking, of walking, or even of investigating the deepest principles of science. It is necessary that he should first grow in strength, that the germ of his talent should unfold so that he may acquire the ability, which he still lacks, to do all these things. Thus it is not correct to say that earth is a potential statue, for one cannot make such a statue of it until its nature has been changed, and it has become, for example, ore.<sup>39</sup> But how, in general, can one determine when something is a potential being?

Anything which is potentially something else does not in reality become this thing except through the influence of an efficient cause. Thus to every potential being there corresponds a certain efficient cause and its activity, whether it be artificial, where the principle of realization is external to the potential being, or natural, where it resides within the latter. Anything has potential being if either nature or art can make it actual through a single action. It is potential through art if the artist can actualize it whenever he wants to, provided only that there is no external hindrance; thus, for example, something is called

potentially healthy (curable) if it can become healthy through one application of medical art. Something is potential through nature if it can be lead to actuality by its peculiar active principle or its inherent natural power, provided only that no external hindrance stands in the way. In this manner, something is potentially healthy if there is nothing in the sick body which must be removed before nature can exercise her healing force. But wherever other changes are presupposed before the proper process of actualization can begin, there is no potential being. Trees which must first be felled and dressed, or the stuff which must first transform itself into a tree, these are not potentially a house; but when the beams from which it can be erected are finished, then one can say that the house has potential being. Thus the earth is not potentially a man, and even the semen is not, but if the foetus can become an actual man through its peculiar active principle, then it is already potentially a man.<sup>40</sup>

All this confirms anew the determinations given above of the concepts of actual being [*on energeia*] and potential being [*on dynamei*] so that there can be no further doubt about the sense which Aristotle connects with the word 'being' [*on*], insofar as he comprehends under it not only fully actualized, but also unactualized being, which is only potentially whatever it is, and strives toward and desires its form, as it were.<sup>41</sup>

§ 2. Connections between states of potentiality and actuality. Movement [*kinesis*] as actuality which constitutes a thing as being in a state of potentiality.

In the previous section we have considered what Aristotle meant by actual being [*on energeia*] and potential being [*on dynamis*]. The latter appeared as being which was as such incomplete, and this is the reason why the perfect separate substance, God, does not in any way partake of potential being, but is pure actuality. On the other hand, if a thing is composed of substance and accident, matter and form, then this imperfection results in its not being free of potentiality; for such a thing actual being consists of a union of potential being with actuality.<sup>42</sup> This is not inconsistent, as can be seen from the definition of potential being itself.

But aside from the *what* of potential and actual being we have also noted a *when* for both. For potential being we did so following Aristotle, while it is of itself clear that for actual being the state of its actualization through form must correspond to its completion. But while there is no doubt that this union of potential and actual being actually occurs, a union of the *states* which correspond to one or the other does not seem possible since the state corresponding to unactualized potential being is a state prior to actualization which, however, can be brought about through a single process of becoming (cf. § 1). Yet even their union is in a sense not inconsistent; of course, we do not here speak of a simultaneous union, for if a body is now potentially and later actually white, then this union in the subject is not properly called a union of states, and there are no problems with respect to this matter. A simultaneous union, however, is possible in this way: something which is actually ore is in a state of potentiality with respect to a certain figure, etc. This is a union no different from those occurring between something that has actual being with a second and a third thing which has actual being, as when one and the same subject is actually a body, actually large, actually green, etc. In this case, the actuality of that which actually is does not belong to the potential object as such; for example, the actuality of the ore belongs to the ore as ore but not as a potential statue.<sup>43</sup> In the same manner we can explain the union of something actually alive with the potential corpse, etc. But there is a second manner in which both states can be united, and this occurs in the state of becoming, *on kinesei*, as Aristotle calls it.

In *Met.* XI. 9 he gives the following remarkable definition of motion [*kinesis*], which is not easily comprehensible in spite of everything he has already taught us about potentiality and actuality. He says this: "The actuality (*energeia*) of the potential (*tou dynamei ontos*) as such I call movement." Similarly, in the first chapter of Book III of the *Physics*: "Since being of every kind is divided into actual and potential being, the actuality (*entelecheia*) of potential being as such is motion." And farther down: "It is obvious that the actuality of what is potential as potential is movement."<sup>44</sup>

This definition makes it clear, first of all, that by potential being or the potential (*dynamei on, dynaton*), we are to understand that which is in a state of potentiality; for if we were to take it in the sense in which all matter as such, even after its union with form, is to be called something merely potential, then aside from the separate substances, every form would have to be called an actuality of a potential being, and nothing peculiar to movement would have been indicated.

But there is something else which causes problems: the words "the actuality of potential being" can be interpreted in two ways, as can be seen in the following: every form or actuality which is not a separate substance can be called an actuality of something in two ways: (1) as the actuality of the substratum, for example when we say of the soul that it is the actuality of the physical body which is potentially alive;<sup>45</sup> and (2) as the actuality of the composite which was formed from matter through its union with form, for example when we say of the soul that it is the actuality of the living being. Since in our definition movement was described as the actuality of something, viz., of potential being, the question is whether this potential being is to be construed as subject or as something which is constituted through movement. Each interpretation, despite the difference, gives a true sense which agrees with what has been said so far, and which therefore ultimately coincides with the other. Let us show this by looking at both of them more closely. According to the first interpretation, which is adopted by most commentators,<sup>46</sup> our definition would determine movement to be a form which has the following characteristics: as it brings its subject from the corresponding state of potentiality to [the] actuality [of movement], it leaves it in a state of potentiality to another thing. This other thing is such that the subject was in a state of potentiality to it by virtue of being in a state of potentiality to the actuality of the movement itself.

To understand this, we must remember what was said in the preceding section in answer to the question at what time something is a potential being. Something has potentiality if nature or art can make it an actuality through a single action, hence if it can be actualized through a single becoming. But this be-

coming, even if it must be single, does not have to be momentary. If a black body becomes white through a single change, it does not follow that it changes suddenly. Thus becoming and consummation do not coincide here; first the subject partakes in becoming, and then achieves its completion. Hence, here the subject has a double potentiality, viz. (1) to the becoming of the form, and (2) to the form itself. Yet this double state of potentiality is in itself and in its concept only a single one. For if a black body is capable of becoming white through a single becoming (hence as a potentiality to the becoming-of-the-form), it is obviously in a state of potentiality to whiteness. Now, if a subject is transferred from this state of potentiality to actuality with respect to becoming, then it is also transferred to a new and heightened state of potentiality with respect to the form which is the consummation of becoming.<sup>47</sup> It is a heightened state insofar as the state of becoming is that from which the subject immediately achieves complete actuality, while the state before the state of becoming must first be changed into the state of becoming so that the subject may thereafter be transferred into a state of consummate actuality. Hence commentators have described this state as a third, intervening, state between mere potentiality and actuality;<sup>48</sup> this state of an actual tendency after the act is being qua movement [*on kinesei*], while movement [*kinesis*] is that becoming which actualizes but does not completely exhaust potentiality.

Thus there are no further difficulties in understanding the definition. The kind of thing something is [*he toiouton esti*] distinguishes this kind of union between states of potentiality and actuality from the one mentioned above in which, for example, the actuality of the ore as ore coexisted with the potentiality of being a statue.<sup>49</sup>

The authority of almost all commentators speaks for this interpretation; yet, as mentioned above, there is still another possible interpretation which has its own advantages. The first interpretation made good sense with respect to movement [*kinesis*], yet it does not seem free of inaccuracies. For if the double potentiality of the subject were really only *one*, both in itself and according to the concept (*haplos kai kata ton logon*, *Physics* III. 1. 201a32), then it would be impossible for

this state to be terminated with respect to one of them, and to continue with respect to the other. For if it is terminated with respect to whatever, then it is completely terminated, hence for both. And if only the becoming of the form has become actual, while the form itself is still potentiality, it has not remained in the previous, but in a new and more advanced state of potentiality, viz. precisely its state of becoming. Thus in a sense a subject has remained in a state of potentiality, just as I can say of something which is now white and then red that it has remained in a state of actuality with respect to color, although it is now colored by virtue of a different state of actuality than before; but in the strict sense the subject has not *remained* in a state of potentiality; rather, it has been transferred from one state of potentiality to a second state which aims at the same form, i.e., it is in a state of becoming, which is constituted by movement.

Thus, if the great authority of the men who maintained the first interpretation did not make me hesitate, I would unquestionably prefer the second, according to which the definition determines as follows: Movement is the actuality of the potential as such, just as the form of the ore is the actuality of the ore as such, i.e., it is the actuality (*energeia*) which makes something that is potentially (*tou dynamei ontos*) into that which it is (*he toiouton esti*), viz. into this potential being. In other words, it constitutes and forms a potential (it constitutes and forms something which is in a state of potentiality as being in this state). After what has been said, the definition when put this way has no further difficulties. This interpretation has the advantage that it makes the definition not only more precise, but also simpler. Let the following contribute to its comprehensibility, where we make constant reference to the appropriate passages in Aristotle to show that our argumentation agrees with his meaning. We shall show (1) that there are potentialities which are constituted as such through some actuality, (2) that this is not the case with all potential states, and (3) that where it is the case, the constituting actuality is a movement.

The first point is likely to provoke the most doubt and opposition, hence we want to treat it with special care. Thus we shall conduct our proof as follows: we shall show (1) that

in many cases there are two different states of potentiality which are related to the same state of actuality; and (2) that, where there is such a multiplicity of potential states, at least one of them must be constituted (or formed) by some actuality. We begin by referring back to the previous section, in which we saw that aside from that which is in a state of actuality [the *energeia on*], there is also being in the state of potentiality [*on dynamei*].<sup>50</sup> But in virtue of what is something constituted an actual being [*on energeia*]? Obviously, through a form or actuality. But what about a potential being? Is it, too, constituted (formed) as such by something? It is indeed difficult to believe that a state of potentiality as such can be constituted through a form, which is, after all, an actuality;<sup>51</sup> yet this is the case, provided only that there is a double state of potentiality with respect to the same form, as we have just said (see above p. 38).

Let us again consider and confirm this fact. We have said that there is often a double state of potentiality with respect to the same actuality, and this was derived from another truth which was proved earlier (p. 37), viz. that there are double states of potentiality, i.e., that there are things which, by virtue of one and the same state (one and the same in itself and in concept (*haplos kai kata ton logon*)), have potentiality to two different actualities. For example, something which is potentially white has potentiality for whiteness and also for becoming-white by virtue of one and the same state, since a single operation, namely white-making, actualizes both (see above). From this we have concluded that if both actualities could occur only one after the other, the first of them would have to terminate the state of potentiality with respect to the second, for the two states of potentiality are one and the same. But since the subject maintained the potentiality to the second form, it could do so only by virtue of a second, new state of potentiality to this form (cf. p. 38). It follows from this that there are two states of potentiality corresponding to this actuality. Hence there is a double state of potentiality with respect to the same actuality.

We can support this argument by a second one. If there is a state of potentiality with respect to a form from which and

by virtue of which the subject can immediately attain possession of actuality, and if there is a state of potentiality with respect to the same form, from which and by virtue of which the subject cannot immediately attain possession of actuality, then these two states are distinct and there is a double state of potentiality with respect to one and the same form. But the antecedent of this conditional proposition is true, hence also the consequent. For it is true that a stone which is thrown is capable (has potentiality) of reaching a certain location toward which it has been thrown, and that from the state in which it is now, viz. the state of a-thing-being-thrown, it immediately attains a state of rest having reached its target. And it is true that a stone which rests in a certain location is capable of attaining another location since it can get there through a single throw, and yet it cannot immediately get there from the state in which it is before the throw; it must first attain the state of being-thrown. Here we have an example of two states of potentiality with respect to the same actuality. We take this argument from Aristotle himself when he says, in the second book of the *Metaphysics*, that there is a double way in which something comes from something, as a man from a boy who matured to manhood, or the air from water; in the first case, that which is becoming changes into that which has become, out of that which is in the process of completion (actualization) there arises the completed (the actual). "For," he says, "there is always an intermediate: just as becoming is between being and non-being, so that which is becoming is between what is and what is not."<sup>52</sup>

We take a further confirmation of our claim from the same passage: that we have here two different states follows from the fact that there is a characteristic which is peculiar to one of them, but which the other lacks. Something can pass from a state of becoming into a state of actuality, but not vice versa; for what is already white cannot become white. But from the state of potentiality prior to becoming, a thing attains the state of actuality, and conversely; for the black is potentially white, and after it has actually become white, it is potentially black and can therefore return to this state.<sup>53</sup>

But wherever such a multiplicity of potential states is found,

at least *one* must as such be constituted (formed) through an actuality. This is perfectly clear and certain. For privation as such does not constitute anything. It is itself only accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*] and, taken by itself, has no existence at all;<sup>54</sup> while matter, as such, is undifferentiated, and since it receives all its determinations from the form through which it is what it is, there can be only *one* matter with respect to one and the same form.<sup>55</sup> Hence, how could this matter produce the difference between the state of becoming and the state of the potentiality to the same form prior to becoming? Impossible! Rather, only one thing is possible, viz. that the difference between the two states of potentiality is produced by a form, so that at least one of the two states as such is constituted (formed) through an actuality. And this is what we had wanted to prove in the first place, and what at first sight is liable to occasion considerable doubt, i.e., that there are states of potentiality which are constituted as such through an actuality.

One can also show this in another way once the above established proposition has been secured, i.e., that one and the same state of potentiality (one and the same both in itself and in concept, see above p. 37) is a state of potentiality with respect to two actualities. For if the two actualities considered by themselves are two, then they must be one in their relation [*in der Ordnung*] to this state of potentiality, and so one of them must be a function of the other [*zur andern hingeordnet sein*], hence must give the subject an actual tendency toward itself, i.e., toward a new state of potentiality which is closer to it, an intermediate state between the first and actuality.<sup>56</sup>

Now we come to the second point. If the preceding investigation has made it clear that many things which are in a state of potentiality are constituted as such through a form, this is not to say that this must be the case with everything that is in a state of potentiality. On the contrary, this, too, would be an error; consequently, we find Aristotle opposing it in the third book of the *Physics* and the corresponding part of the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*. Let us now give a somewhat more complete version of his argumentation. If something is in a state of potentiality, and is constituted as such by an actuality, then (1) it must be in a state of actuality, and (2) it must,

as such, have a form, and therefore an essence and a concept which determines this form, for each form issues in an essence. From this it follows, for instance, that a motionless waxen ball, which is potentially a cube, is not constituted by an actuality as being in that particular state [of potentiality]. For, of all the forms which are in a wax ball, it can only be the actuality of the wax as wax, or the softness of the wax, which lend it a certain disposition that facilitates reshaping it. But when the wax ball has become a cube, the form of the wax as wax, hence also its softness, hence everything through which the wax was formerly constituted remains; now, if this were a state of potentiality, hence a state prior to actuality, then the cube which has come about would not yet be a cube, which is contradictory. Hence, one would have to believe that it is the form of the wax ball as a sphere which constitutes the potentiality of becoming a cube; for it is indeed true that whatever has the shape of a sphere cannot at the same time be a cube. But against this a second argument can be advanced which is also decisive with respect to the previously mentioned form of the wax. The wax ball is a potentiality not only to the form of the cube but to a thousand other shapes as well. Hence, all these states of potentiality would have to be constituted through the form of the ball (or the wax) if the wax ball as sphere (or as wax) were indeed presently in a state of potentiality, and hence they would have to be identical with the sphere (with the wax) as such (i.e., in themselves and in this essence and concept). But this is impossible; for if two are identical with the same third thing, then they are identical with each other, and hence the innumerable different states of potentiality to become a cube, a tetrahedron, a dodecahedron, a icosahedron and other regular and irregular forms would have to be both in themselves and in concept [*haplos kai kata ton logon*] identical, although they are as different as these forms themselves which diverge from each other in a number of directions. Hence, it has been established that the wax ball by being constituted as wax through the actuality of the wax, and as a sphere through the spherical figure, is not constituted through any of its actualities as having a state of potentiality to become a cube. Hence it has a potentiality to be in this state without being consti-

tuted in this respect by any of its actualities.<sup>57</sup>

We come to the third point. Having seen that there are two kinds of states of potentiality, one of which is constituted as such by an actuality while the other is not, the question now is which states of potentiality are constituted by an actuality or, what comes to the same, which actualities constitute potential states as such.

All potential being as such stands in a relation to an active principle; for the subject is potentially something if it can become an actuality through a single act of an active principle. Thus we must also examine those states of potentiality which are constituted as such through an actuality in their relation to an active principle and its operation. Thus a state of potentiality to become something exists in a subject either before the operation, or during the operation, or after the operation of the force through whose activity it is transformed into a state of actuality. But it can obviously not exist *after* the activity, for if the activity has passed nothing remains that can be realized through this activity; what this activity was capable of actualizing either exists now or has existed in actuality. With respect to this activity at least it does certainly not exist in potentiality, whether or not the latter be constituted through a form. Hence, it remains to consider the states of the subject prior to and during the activity. But the state of potentiality which exists in the subject *prior to* the activity cannot be constituted through an actuality. For at that point there are only three forms in the subject which must be considered. One is to be envisaged as the *terminus a quo* for the change, as for example the spherical figure of the wax which is to be transformed into a cube. A second, which is the most deceptive and is therefore the only one considered by Aristotle, is the form which constitutes the subject as that which it actually is. In the case of the wax ball, this is the actuality which constitutes the wax as wax. Finally, there is a third form, in the case of the wax it is softness, which lends a certain disposition to the subject.<sup>58</sup> But in considering the second point we have already shown that none of these forms constitutes a potential being as such. Hence the latter, as such, does not possess any actuality. On the other hand, the state of potentiality in which the subject is *during* the

activity of the active principle is indeed a state which is constituted, as such, through an actuality. For the principle acts only to the extent in which the subject receives an influence, i.e., something actual. Now, if the subject is still in a state of potentiality with respect to this force and its activity, then this is due to a further state of potentiality: we have shown this above when we discussed the first point, and everything else said there applies here as well.

The only remaining question is what we should call those states of potentiality which exist during the activity of the acting principle and what to call those actualities which potentialize the subject, as it were. We commonly call them states of becoming or movement,<sup>59</sup> and as movement they must be considered actualities which constitute a potential thing as potential. Induction shows this. While the builder builds, that with which he builds is in a state of potentiality which is constituted by actuality, but the building material as such was only a potentiality with respect to house construction and to the edifice. Either the actuality of constructing or the actuality of the edifice must therefore be that which constitutes that higher state of potentiality. But not that of the edifice, for the edifice as such is no longer a potentiality with respect to the builder and this building activity of his; hence, the actuality in question must be the building activity (*oikodomesis*), and this is indeed a movement (*kinesis*). One can give a similar demonstration with respect to all other movements.<sup>60</sup> If that which is potentially a building is constituted as such through an actuality, then it is presently in the process of being erected, and just this is house construction, hence movement. The same occurs when something heals, when there is a revolution, a jump, etc.<sup>61</sup> Hence, movement is the actuality of that which is in a state of potentiality as such, the actuality of the potential as potential. For example, the movement toward a quality (*alloiosis*) constitutes that which is becoming a *quale* (*poion*) in this state of potentiality toward a quality; similarly, the movement toward quantity (*auxesis kai phthisis*) constitutes that which is about to become a quantum (*poson*) in this state of potentiality toward a quantity; furthermore, locomotion (*phora*) constitutes that which moves toward a goal in this state of

potentiality for a location. Now, if there is such an intermediate state of potentiality also in the domain of the substantial, then the state of substantial becoming and passing away through generation and corruption (*genesis kai phthora*) must be formally constituted in the same way, and these, too, will be movements.<sup>62</sup>

Aristotle, after he has advanced and positively supported his view of movement, seeks to support it further by a polemic against definitions of earlier philosophers, which seems to be aimed especially at Plato;<sup>63</sup> he does so in the *Physics* III. 2. and the corresponding part of the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*. Here as elsewhere his polemic is never unfruitful, since it always manages to find and isolate what is correct in a mistaken position. He notes that earlier attempts had defined movement as otherness, as inequality, and as non-being. None of these definitions describe the essence of movement, for none of these need to be moved, neither that which is other, nor that which is unequal, nor that which has non-being. It is peculiar to the state of becoming that that which is in the state of becoming has a potentiality to acquire the state of that which has become, while that which has become does not have a state of potentiality to acquire that particular state of becoming from which it arose, as we have seen above,<sup>64</sup> while, on the other hand, the equal passes into the unequal, as well as the unequal into the equal, and being into non-being, as well as non-being into being, etc.<sup>65</sup> But what occasioned these mistaken definitions? There is indeed something in the nature of movement which could lead one to put it into the order<sup>66</sup> of privation. Since becoming does not form a special species of things, but must be reduced to the species of accomplished being,<sup>67</sup> as that which is growing large to largeness, and that which is in the process of acquiring a certain characteristic to that characteristic, one is inclined to take it for something indeterminate, something lacking form. What else is one to make of movement? The potentiality (*dynamis*) by virtue of which something is potentially is not movement, and what is actually [*energeia*] something is also not in motion; thus the only thing left seems to declare motion to be an unfinished actuality [*energeia*], an accomplished reality [*entelecheia*] for which there is no com-

pletion, which, unless we envisage it as a privation, seems to be a contradiction. But the puzzle is resolved in this way: as actualization [*energeia*], movement constitutes something as being in a state of potentiality as such, and the potential is of course incomplete;<sup>68</sup> hence, that which completes [*vollendet*] is indeed a state of incompleteness;<sup>69</sup> it actualizes a state which is prior to actuality. "Therefore," says Aristotle, "it is difficult to grasp what movement is, for one either thinks that it either has to be defined as a privation or as a potentiality, or simply as an actuality; yet none of these seem possible. Hence the indicated way is the only one that remains, namely that it is an actuality, but the kind we have described, which is difficult to grasp, but nonetheless possible."<sup>70</sup>

Thus it becomes clear how, under this interpretation of the definition, everything Aristotle teaches about movement agrees. For what we have just touched upon, viz. that movement does not form a special species of being, but follows the various species as does actuality as such, and potentiality as well, is also fully consonant with this. Movement as actuality constitutes a state of potentiality. Since the states of potentiality belong to the same genus as the corresponding states of actuality, just as the possible body belongs, with the actual body, to the genus of substance, and the potentially white belongs, with the actually white, to the genus of color and of quality, etc., in the same way the thing-in-motion [*on kinesei*] and motion [*kinesis*] must be reduced to the particular species of that which comes about through this motion, and must belong to the same genera as the complete being. This is not to say that there is a motion [*kinesis*] in every species of being, as there is a potentiality [*dynamis*] and an actuality [*energeia*]. A state of becoming, i.e., a second state of potentiality which is to be formed by the proper movement, can occur only where there is gradual, continuous becoming, and this can be found only where there are contrary concepts, and hence intermediate states, which are absent where there is an opposition of contradictories. The transformation from non-being to being can only be sudden and momentary. After having declared in *Physics* III. 1 and *Met.* XI.9<sup>71</sup> that "there are as many kinds of movement and change as there are kinds of being," Aristotle delineates these matters at

some length in the third book of the *Physics* (and the corresponding part of the eleventh book of the *Metaphysics*<sup>72</sup>) and makes the qualification that proper movement is to be restricted to the three categories of quality, quantity and location, where alone the requisite conditions are satisfied, as he shows by a careful investigation.<sup>73</sup>

Still and all, we do not actually wish to contest the first interpretation; despite the considerable formal difference of the two interpretations they do not, in the end, differ essentially, as we have already pointed out. We note that according to both of them the thing in motion [*on kinesei*] exemplifies a peculiar mode of union of a potential and an actual state. The second interpretation allows this union to be very clearly indicated in the definition of motion, by saying that motion is an actuality which, by producing its actual state, constitutes a state of potentiality, i.e., constitutes the potential as potential. We see that here, too, the subject which is in the state of becoming occupies an intermediate state between a more distant potentiality and actuality; but by being in this one state, it has simultaneously a state of actuality with respect to becoming, movement; it has potentiality with respect to the form which is approached through movement.

This middle state is also attained by potentialities which have the peculiar characteristic that there cannot be a complete reality corresponding to the potentiality. Just as the concept of movement has something in it which is difficult to grasp, and which at first occasions astonishment and doubts concerning the correctness of the definition (cf. *Met.* I. 2; 983a14), many will find it difficult to admit, initially, that there can be a potentiality to which no actuality corresponds, at least not one which exists *in rebus* though perhaps one which is thought and comprised within its concept since, they will say, something is called potential only in relation to an actuality. Yet such is the case, as the example of any line and of any solid clearly shows. The line, which in actuality is one, can be halved, and thus is potentially two, and since the half is capable of further division, it is potentially four; hence, it is potentially two, four, eight, sixteen, etc. But what is the limit of this potentiality? It does not have a limit; while it is in actuality one, it is potentially

infinitely many. But this potentiality is never exhausted by an actuality. The infinitely many lines which are now contained as parts in one line will never actually exist as infinitely many actual lines. Here, and wherever else we are concerned with bodies,<sup>74</sup> the infinite exists always only in a state of potentiality, either as a state of potentiality prior to movement (one line has infinitely many parts), or as thing in motion (*on kinesei*), when a division into infinity is attempted. Similar considerations hold for surfaces, bodies, and other things.<sup>75</sup>

So much for being insofar as it comprises real potentiality, becoming, and that which is in a state of complete being, being in the sense of potential and actual being [*on dynamei kai energeia*].

## CHAPTER V

# *Being According to the Figures of the Categories*

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§ 1. Introductory Remarks. Aristotle introduces a definite number of categories. Differing interpretations of Aristotle's categories by recent commentators.

We have become acquainted with three senses of being, but the most difficult part of our work has not yet been accomplished, for the fourth sense of being, the sense in which it is described as *being according to the figures of the categories* [*to on kata ta schemata ton kategorion*, *Met.* IX. 10. 1051a32], is the most important of all. We shall see in detail that it, in turn, comprises a great multiplicity of senses, and so it is this sense, in particular, which will be rich in difficulties as well as results. We shall, however, find considerable help in the work of recent researchers, and particularly in Trendelenburg's meritorious *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, to which we owe a great debt of gratitude. We shall frequently refer to his thorough exposition in cases where we do not wish to pursue a question which would lead us too far astray.

Aristotle divides the type of being now under consideration according to the various categories. So the following question becomes important above others: does the number of categories which he lists exhaust the entire extent of this type of being as well as the variety of categories, or does he only give us, as it were, examples of categories which can easily be augmented? Now, Aristotle lists different numbers of categories in different places (in one place, *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089b20, he even seems to assume no more than three: substances [*ousiai*], passions [*pathe*] and relations [*pros ti*]).<sup>1</sup> Prantl, in his *History of Logic*,<sup>2</sup> thinks that he should conclude from this that Aristotle was not

serious about the number ten, and in general, about any determinate number [of categories]; he even claims that “any reasonable person would be just as satisfied with the reduction to these three, as he would be with those seven or eight,”<sup>3</sup> where a previous reduction of action [*poiein*], affection [*paschein*], posture [*keisthai*], and having [*echein*] to the first two, or to a single category, movement [*kinesis*], is already presupposed. For in the *Categories* Aristotle enumerates ten of them: “Expressions which are in no way composite signify either substance (*ousia*), or a quantity (*poson*), or a thing having quality (*poion*), or a thing having relation (*pros ti*), or a where (*pou*), or a when (*pote*), or a posture (*keisthai*), or a having (*echein*), or a doing (*poiein*), or a being affected (*paschein*).”<sup>4</sup> And if someone doubts the authenticity of the *Categories*,<sup>5</sup> the indubitably authentic first book of the *Topics* has the same number. In Prantl’s view, this number could be decreased and reduced to a very few; these, however, would continue to encompass the entire domain of being because of their greater generality (for Prantl continues to maintain this desideratum). In like manner, he thinks that they could easily be increased and that “for every reasonable interpretation of what Aristotle means by categories it is a matter of complete indifference if the number is seventeen or eighteen individually enumerated categories.”<sup>6</sup> But neither among the older commentators on the Stagirite, nor among modern researchers do we find anyone who follows Prantl’s view. On the contrary, both Brandis (*Uebersicht über des Aristoteles Lehrgebäude*) and Zeller (*Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 2) try to show that such a reduction or extension in no way meets Aristotle’s intention.<sup>7</sup> I must admit that I take them to be wholly convincing. They cite such a large number of passages in which our philosopher makes it very clear that he has put forth a determinate number of categories which he took to be complete, so that no further doubt can be justified.<sup>8</sup> On the other hand, it has been widely accepted that Aristotle quietly abandoned two of the original ten categories, namely posture [*keisthai*] and having [*echein*], which were originally introduced only because of the old Pythagorean and Platonic preference for the number ten. (E.g. by Zeller in his *Philosophie der Griechen* and Brandis in his *Geschichte der*

*griechisch-römischen Philosophie*, III. Bonitz, too, does not seem averse to this opinion in his *Ueber die Kategorien des Aristoteles*, and neither is Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*.<sup>9</sup>) We shall later on have to test this view, which is indeed quite plausible. It suffices, for the moment, that Aristotle maintained that this number (eight) is complete and certain.

But if it cannot be denied that Aristotle was convinced of the validity and completeness of his table of categories, the question arises whence he could have derived this conviction. In more recent times this led to investigations concerning the way in which Aristotle might have arrived at them. Trendelenburg's hypothesis, especially, achieved great fame, even if it was attacked more than defended. In order to gain a secure basis for deciding these questions, one began to investigate the actual nature and meaning of the categories, and here we can in the main distinguish three views, all of which agree that the categories cannot be merely subjectively valid concepts [*Begriffsbestimmungen*], and indeed such a position was completely alien to Aristotle's realism.<sup>10</sup>

The first of these opinions holds that the categories are not real concepts, but only the framework in which all real concepts are to be placed, that they merely generate points of view, according to which concepts are to be classified when the objects of thought are discriminated. Brandis seems to favor this opinion when he says, for example, "the table of categories was meant merely to be a complete collection of all the general determinations and questions which we have to apply in order to take up into thought any and every object, and to arrive at a concept [definition, *Begriffsbestimmung*] thereof. They occur outside and separate from the context of the proposition and are the *forms* or species of statements, i.e., they are not themselves determinate real concepts of species."<sup>11</sup> And immediately afterward, "the categories are merely to introduce the points of view which are to be taken into account in a complete discussion of the points in question."<sup>12</sup> Similarly Zeller: "the categories are not to describe things according to their actual character, and they are not meant to introduce the general concepts which would be required for this; rather, they are merely to indicate the various aspects which can be taken into

account in such a description; it was *not* Aristotle's intention that they should give us *real concepts*, but merely the *framework* in which all real concepts are to be placed."<sup>13</sup> "The categories are not immediately themselves predicates, but they merely designate the location of certain predicates."<sup>14</sup> Zeller cites Strümpell who, in his *Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie*, describes the categories as kinds of predication, hence not as the predicated.<sup>15</sup>

The second opinion describes categories not as forms of statement, as manners of predicating concepts, but *as concepts*, though not as regarded in and by themselves and as describing simple mental representations, but as concepts envisaged in their relation to a judgment, i.e., insofar as they are part of the judgment, viz. the *predicate*. According to this view the categories arose from a dissolution of the propositional context; they are isolated predicates, most general predicates. Their classification derives not from real observation, but from the differences between grammatical relations where a corresponding difference of logical relations seems to be presupposed. This, briefly, seems to be the opinion of Trendelenburg. In his essay *De Categoriis*, Berlin 1833, he undertook to derive the origin of the categories from grammatical relations. He later developed this more explicitly in his *Elementis Logices Aristoteleae*, and especially in his excellent *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, 1846. Here he says (p. 20): "accordingly, the categories appear to be the general *concepts* under which the predicates of simple sentences fall . . . categories are the most general predicates." And farther on: "The final categories show by their very form that they are predicates; in like manner the remainder are to be envisaged as predicates if one generates the statement by means of the copula, which belongs to combination [*symploke*]."<sup>16</sup> According to this theory the first category, substance, would also belong among the predicates even though it can properly be only subject.<sup>17</sup> Trendelenburg seeks to make sense of this fact by pointing out that it is sometimes improperly predicated.<sup>18</sup> He refers to *Anal. prior.* 1. 27: "we sometimes say: that white object is Socrates, that which approaches is Callias."<sup>19</sup> Biese joined him in this opinion in his *Philosophie des Aristoteles*,<sup>20</sup> and Waitz, in his edition of the *Organon* does not seem averse

to it since he at least acknowledges their origin from grammatical relations.<sup>21</sup> One could also think that the early translators of Aristotle were favourably inclined toward this view since they translated *kategoriai* by *praedicamenta*, and Trendelenburg thinks that the pronouncements of the scholiasts show that they took the concept of a category in a similar way<sup>22</sup> (e.g., in Alexander Aphrodisiensis, Alexander Aegus, Porphyrius, “the expression *kategoria* is used in order to indicate that they are predicated of a thing”).<sup>23</sup>

The third view, finally, agrees with the second by taking the categories to be not a mere framework for concepts, but real concepts; it denies, however, more decisively than the first, that they are merely predicates or that the table of categories was designed merely in view of logical and grammatical relations. It takes the categories to be the various highest concepts which are designated by the common name being [*on*]. This view was supported and developed especially by Bonitz in his essay *Ueber die Kategorien des Aristoteles*. He says: “According to Aristotle the categories indicate the various *senses* in which we assert [*aussprechen*] the *concept* of being. They designate the highest genera under which everything that has being must be subsumable. Thus they serve for orientation in the domain of that which is given through experience.”<sup>24</sup> Elsewhere he says: “Thus category [*kategoria*] does not merely and exclusively mean that a concept is attributed to another as a predicate, but, in general, that a concept with a definite sense is asserted or stated and that this does not amount to thinking its relation to some other concept. Thus the plural ‘categories’ [*kategoriai*], according to this theory, can designate the various ways in which a concept is stated, the various senses which are connected with its assertion, hence ‘the categories of being’ [*kategoriai tou ontos*] designates the various senses which are connected with the assertion of the concept being [*on*]; this comes to the same as ‘being is said in many ways, being is said in so many ways, . . . [*pollachos legetai to on, posachos legetai to on . . .*]. This expression ‘the categories of being . . .’ [*kategoriai tou ontos*] is obviously the proper and complete name for the categories as the highest genera of being.”<sup>25</sup> What Ritter says in the third volume of his *Geschichte der Philosophie*

agrees with this view: "Aristotle understands by categories the most general kinds of that which is designated by the simple word."<sup>26</sup> Hegel, too, calls categories in the sense of Aristotle "the simple essences, the most general determinations."<sup>27</sup>

We have now become acquainted with greatly divergent opinions, and it is time to decide for one or the other. Let us not, for the moment, pay any attention to such questions as how Aristotle discovered the categories, etc., and the possibility of a multiplicity of answers to this question, no matter how closely they may be connected with the problem at hand. If we concentrate merely upon the differences between the basic views, I mean the determination of the meanings of the categories, it seems that the opinions which have been reviewed exhaust the entire extent of possible variation, so that there is no room left for a new opinion which differs from all three. It is clear from everything that has been said about our categories<sup>28</sup> that they are not some form of composite thought (*katēgoria* = *kataphasis*),<sup>29</sup> like judgments, but simple concepts. Aristotle, moreover, explicitly assures us of this (*Cat.* IV. 1b25).<sup>30</sup> Hence the following are the only possibilities: either the categories are conceived as the various forms of conceptual propositions [*Aussage*], or as the various highest concepts themselves. If the first, then we arrive at the first view; if the latter, then we may take the categories to be concepts in the sense in which every concept is complete in itself, a fully accomplished thought.<sup>31</sup> In this case we arrive at the view propounded by the proponents of the third opinion. Or else, we take them to be concepts, not considered in and by themselves, but insofar as a concept occupies a position in a proposition or judgment, i.e., is a part, in this case the predicate, of a judgment. If we held this we would declare for the second view. There is yet a final possibility, where concepts are viewed as terms from which a syllogistic pattern can be formed. But it must be obvious to everyone that this is not a viable alternative, since there is never any mention of a direct connection between the syllogism and the Aristotelian categories.

Since all possibilities concerning this point are exhausted by already existing, clearly separated and contrasting opinions, and since there can be no further, novel attempt, we must declare

without qualification that the third opinion seems to us to be preferable to the other two. We hasten to add that we cannot agree with every detail of its articulation, with all the additional determinations (which are admittedly not altogether independent of the solution of this problem) as they were advanced, especially in Bonitz' meritorius essay. We find legitimate elements in the other opinions as well, which seem to us quite compatible with the third opinion. It also seems to us that the proponents of the first two views do not appear to hold them in a manner quite as stubborn and one-sided as a few of their pronouncements would appear to indicate. Perhaps these passages were merely to emphasize what they did not, in the end, take to be the only, but merely a main element in the meaning of the categories. Thus when Brandis does not allow the categories to be more than *points of view* in the division of species, and Zeller takes them to be only *locations* for certain predicates, it is likely that they merely expressed themselves in a figurative way. Prantl, as another example, does not hesitate to say, in his *History of Logic*: "But insofar as the categories are categories, they form themselves—to put it bluntly—into regions [*topoi*] of discourse [*logos*], and this proper meaning of the categories we must now discuss."<sup>32</sup> Just previously he had explicitly said, "thus Aristotle himself explicitly called those determinations (the categories) . . . 'common predicates' (*koine kategoroumena*) and they are the same as what he calls genera (*gene*)."<sup>33</sup> Zeller even begins the appropriate section of his exposition of Aristotelian philosophy with the words "all objects of our thought fall, according to Aristotle, under one of the following ten *concepts*: substance [*Wesenheit*], magnitude, etc. These *highest concepts or categories*, etc."<sup>34</sup> Brandis, too, calls categories in many places "general and first concepts of genera, highest genera of being, etc." On the other hand, Trendelenburg, though he emphasizes the logical relations in the division of the categories, nonetheless admits that in their conception there is a conflict between "logical subsumption" and "real genesis",<sup>35</sup> and that Aristotle "treats as real the categories which were discovered in a formal manner."<sup>36</sup> In general, we believe that the interpretation of his opinion which we gave above, and which frequently appeared in the polemic directed against him, does

not altogether meet his meaning. The assertion that the categories differ from each other according to the various modes of predication, and were discovered with a view to the predicates of judgments and propositions, can easily co-exist with the other view, viz. that they are to indicate the differences between concepts taken absolutely, as we shall see in detail. If one were to put the following questions to Trendelenburg: of what do the categories give us a classification, of predicates or of being? To what are substance [*ousia*], quality [*poion*], quantity [*poson*], etc., subordinated, is it the concept "predicate," or is it being [*on*]? He would, we are quite sure, join us in opting for the latter. But since the subject is beset with great difficulties, we want to give reasons for, and carefully expound, step by step, the view which seems to us the most secure.

- § 2. Thesis I: The categories are not merely a framework for concepts, but they are themselves real concepts, extramental independent beings (*onta kath' hauto exo tes dianoias*).

This is Aristotle's opinion which he states clearly and repeatedly, so much so that, as I said, I cannot believe that there are more than verbal differences between his interpreters. If, to begin with, there is no doubt that being [*on*] itself, of which the metaphysician must treat, is a concept, indeed a real concept, since what merely exists objectively in the mind was previously set aside, there can also be no doubt with respect to the categories. For example, *Met.* VII. 4. 1030b11 says this clearly enough: "being in one sense means a substance (*tode ti*), in another a quantum (*poson*), and in still another a quale (*poion*)."<sup>37</sup> The same is said in *De anima* II. 1. 412a6; in *Met.* V. 7. 1017a22; VIII. 6. 1045a36; IX. 1. 1045b32, and in a great many other passages, some of which we shall presently cite when we undertake a more careful investigation of the relation between unqualified being [*on*] and the categories.

Furthermore, the truth of our claim follows from the expressions which Aristotle chose to describe the categories. He calls them, for example, common concepts (*koina*), as in the third book of the *Physics*. "We say that one cannot find a

common concept [*koinon*] for these, which is not either a substance or a quantum or a quale or another of the categories.” Cf. *Anal. post.* II. 13 and *Met.* XII. 4.<sup>39</sup> We shall return later to this point.<sup>40</sup> The categories are also called genera (*gene*) as in the first book of *De anima*: “it is, above all, necessary to investigate in which of the genera the soul is, and what it is; I mean whether it is a single being and a substance, or a quale or a quantum, or perhaps one of the other categories which we have distinguished.” Yet other passages will be cited later.<sup>41</sup> In some passages, however, the categories are not simply called genera [*gene*], but genera of predication [*ta gene ton kategorion*].<sup>42</sup> Bonitz, *loc. cit.*, explains this genitive as a genitive of apposition, so that these passages would have the same meaning as the previously cited ones. But even if someone wanted to interpret it as “the genera of the predicate,” this would not invalidate our present point, since the genera of what is predicated must also be genera, hence concepts. Finally, whether one follows the interpretation of Trendelenburg, or that of Bonitz<sup>43</sup> the name categories [*kategoriai*] itself indicates that in the categories we have concepts, and not merely locations for concepts. This is clear especially in the expressions which sometimes replace the expression *kategoria*, viz. *kategoremata*, *kategoroumena* (cf. *Physics* III. 1. 201a1. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a33. XII. 4. 1070b1, and other places) as well as *legomena* (*De Coelo* III. 1. 298a28. *Cat.* 4. 1b25. and other places). When the categories are called “divisions” [*diareseis*], as in *Topics* IV. 1. 120b36, then this merely means that they are the things classified [*diairethenta*; cf. *Anal. prior.* I. 37. 49a7; *Physics* V. 1. 225b5], i.e., they are the concepts into which being is classified (*diaretai to on*).<sup>44</sup> But they are also called cases [*ptoseis*].<sup>45</sup> How are we to explain this name? Bonitz points out, justifiably, “that the word *ptoseis* is used as a designation for the categories not in isolation but only in connection with *on* and *me on* (*to kata tas ptoseis me on*: non-being in its cases).” Thus, he says, we may assume that Aristotle did not take the word to be determinate enough by itself to serve as a name for the categories, unlike ‘genus’ [*gene*] and ‘the primitives’ [*ta prota*].”<sup>46</sup> In the *Eudemian Ethics*<sup>47</sup> he does, however, use “case” [*ptosis*] by itself in the same sense as “category” [*kategoria*], but this work must be

ascribed to a disciple of Aristotle, not to himself. His expression "being in its cases" [*to kata ptoseis on*] makes the categories again appear as beings [*onta*], consequently as concepts and not as mere pigeonholes for concepts.

We say not *merely* as pigeonholes for concepts, and thus we do not deny that they really provide a framework into which the other real concepts can be entered and that they thus determine the various locations into which the latter distribute themselves. Rather, if the categories really are general concepts of genera, it will necessarily follow that this is true; for each genus includes within a single name all its subordinate kinds and individuals, and they are within it, and it is, so to speak, the location for them. But the converse also seems to be necessary, namely, that the common location for concepts be determined by means of a genus or analogous general concept. Thus it becomes apparent, merely through a rational inquiry, that if the categories are the framework for concepts, as has been claimed, then they cannot be *merely* a framework for them, but must at the same time themselves be concepts.

- § 3. Thesis II: The categories are several senses of being [*on*] which is asserted of them analogically (*kat analogian*), indeed in a twofold manner, i.e., as analogy of proportionality, and as analogy to the same terminus.

This sentence contains a further confirmation of the preceding one. It contains three assertions: (1) that being [*on*] which is divided according to the schema of the categories [*kata ta schemata tes kategorias*] is divided not like a univocal concept, i.e., as a genus into its species, but rather in the manner of a homonym [*homonymon*] which is differentiated according to its various senses; (2) that the use of 'being' [*on*] for the different categories, even though a homonym, is not a mere accidental likeness of names [*apo tyches homonymon*]; rather, that there is among them a unity of analogy; and, finally (3) that this analogy among them is a twofold one, namely, not only an analogy of proportionality, but also an analogy to the same terminus. We hope to secure this result fully by establishing

it, point by point, from the various utterances of our philosopher.

Concerning the first point, we remember that our main concern at the beginning of our investigation was to establish as Aristotle's opinion that being has a multiplicity of senses. We found this expressed in the words "being is said in various ways". Thus the 'in various ways' [*pollachos*] does not only point out that something is asserted many times, i.e., frequently, and of many things, but also that it is asserted in several senses. But the phrase "being is said in various ways" we find not only in connection with the first division of being, which forms the basis of our discussion, but also where the being of the categories is divided into the categories. Thus at the beginning of the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* he says: "being is said in various ways; for in one sense it means a substance and an individual being, in another a quality or a quantity or one of the other things that are predicated in this manner."<sup>48</sup> Similarly in the fifth book: "something is called being as such [*kath auta*] if it indicates the figures of the category; for being has as many senses as there are ways of stating. Now since some predicates designate a substance, others a quality, others a quantity, others a relation, others activity or passivity, others a where, others a when, there is a sense of 'being' for each one of these."<sup>49</sup> In the second chapter of the fourteenth book, the sense of 'in various ways' [*pollachos*] becomes particularly clear through the context. He says there: "But first of all being is said in various ways. It designates sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes a quantity, and so for the other categories . . ."<sup>50</sup>

In keeping with this he denies in this chapter (as against the Platonists) that potential being [*dynamei on*] is a single concept, since it can be found in every category of the ambiguous "being".<sup>51</sup> We have already touched upon this in the previous chapter.

When we discussed movement [*kinesis*], we said that it is found in several categories; hence it is claimed that there could not be *one* movement for all categories, since it holds generally that no common concepts can be found for them.<sup>52</sup> Thus *Met.* V. 10 claims that, since being is said in several ways, the same follows for all other concepts which are attributed to it, so that the identical, the different and the opposite ought

to be recognized as something different for each category.<sup>53</sup> This is very clearly expressed in the passage of the *Nicomachean Ethics* which Trendelenburg cites in support of this contention: “the good is said in as many ways as being, (it is used [in the category] of substance, e.g., of God and reason, as well as [in the category] of quality, e.g., the virtues, of quantity, e.g., the right amount, and of relation, e.g., the useful; with respect to time, it is favorable opportunity, to space a suitable dwelling, and so forth). Thus it is obvious that it cannot be a single concept which is common to all, for then it would not be said in all categories, but only in a single one.”<sup>54</sup>

Similarly *Met.* V. 28 states peremptorily that whatever belongs to different categories does not have a common genus and that the categories can be reduced neither to one another nor to a single higher entity.<sup>55</sup> Accordingly Aristotle denies of being that it is a single genus; so, for example, in the third book of the *Metaphysics*: “neither the one nor being [*das Seiende*] can be the genus of all being [*für die Seienden*].”<sup>56</sup> Cf. *Topics* IV. 6. 127a28. Similarly the eighth book of the *Metaphysics* teaches that being is not subdivided through differences in the manner of a genus which divides into species. Rather, according to its particular meaning, one is directly substance, another quale, another quantum,<sup>57</sup> etc., and in the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* ‘being’ is described as an indefinite expression which receives definiteness only through the categories.<sup>58</sup>

Now we come to what has been claimed in the second place, viz. that Aristotle ascribed to being as it applies to the different categories, not the stricter unity of the genus, but the unity of analogy, which extends farther and includes homonyms as well. We find that in chapter 6 of the book “On Definitions” [Book V of the *Metaphysics*], this unity of analogy is differentiated from general unity and ranked above it: “some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy. Whatever is of one matter, is one in number. Whatever agrees in definition is of one species, whatever is of the same figure of category is of one genus, and whatever is related as a certain thing to another, is one by analogy. The latter kinds are always found where the former are, so whenever

something is numerically one, it is also of one species, but whatever is of one species is not therefore numerically one; whatever is of one species is also of one genus, but it is not the case that whatever is of one genus is of one species, yet it is always one by analogy, while that which is one by analogy is not always of one genus.”<sup>59</sup> (Cf. *De part. anim.* I. 5. 645b26. *Met.* XIV. 6. 1093b19.) Since the concepts which belong to the several categories are all called beings [*onta*], the correctness of Aristotle’s last remark becomes at once apparent if one admits that being has the unity of analogy. Aristotle explicitly does so, for example, in the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*: “there are indeed many senses in which things are said to be, but in relation to one thing and to one nature, and not just equivocally. In the same way the healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another because it brings it about, another, by being a sign of health, another because it is capable of it; another example is the relation between the medical and medical art, etc.”<sup>60</sup> So also in the fourth chapter of the seventh and the third of the eleventh book.

In the beginning of the *Categories* Aristotle had divided all things which had a common name into things equivocally named [*homonyma*] and things univocally named [*synonyma*]. His manner of dividing them excludes any third possibility, for he says: “We call equivocally named things which only have a common name, while the concept designated thereby is different, in the same way in which both a horse [*sic*] and a picture of a horse [*sic*] are animals . . . we call univocally named that which is the same not only in name, but also in concept, in the same way in which both the horse [*sic*] and the ox are animals.”<sup>61</sup>

According to these definitions, being [*on*] which is divided into the various categories must necessarily be equivocally named since, as we saw, it is not univocally named. Thus, if Aristotle in the passages quoted from the *Metaphysics* seems to assign to it an intermediate position between one and the other, he uses the word “equivocally named” [*homonymon*] in a narrower sense in which it comprises only what he elsewhere calls equivocally named by accident (*apo tyches homonymon*), which is opposed to that which is equivocally named by analogy (*homonymon kat’analogia*).<sup>62</sup> Thus, with respect to the categories,

being is not equivocally named by accident, but applies to them in an analogous manner.

Yet to understand what this means, one must know what Aristotle means by an analogy, in this context as well as in general. This is the third point, which we now want to discuss. In his *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, Trendelenburg has advanced detailed investigations concerning the meaning of analogy.<sup>63</sup> He tells us the following:

Analogy in its first and original sense is something quantitative: it is mathematical proportion, and its essence consists in the identity of relations [*isotes logon*].<sup>64</sup> But in the domain of qualities, too, proportion is possible; the just-cited passage from the *Nicomachean Ethics* is a case in point: just as the power of sight is in the body, understanding is in the soul.<sup>65</sup> Such a qualitative proportion takes place in a twofold way. (Though Trendelenburg does not emphasize it, this is born out by two passages which he quotes):

(1) *One and the same* quality belongs to different subjects *in the same or different degrees* (for quality allows of more and less [*to mallon kai hetton*]),<sup>66</sup> e.g., body A is warmer than body B [to the same degree] as B is warmer than body C. This is still, in a manner of speaking, a comparison according to quantity, according to measure, though not according to quantity *qua* quantity [*kata to poson he poson*], but according to quantity of potentiality (*he dynantai ti*), or something like it.

(2) *Different* qualities are related in the same way to several subjects, for example when we say that just as this is warm so that is white.<sup>67</sup> Aristotle uses the name “analogy” exclusively for the latter kind.<sup>68</sup> Thus analogousness [*analogon*] is more general than communality [*koinon*] of attributes when they occur in the same category,<sup>69</sup> and it can thus create unity among the various categories. In the fourteenth book of the *Metaphysics*<sup>70</sup> he says that “analogy permeates all categories of being: as the straight is in length, so is the level in breadth, perhaps the even in number, and the white in color.” Cf. also V. 6. 1016b31; *Met.* XII. 4. 1070a31, b16, and b26; XII. 5. 1071a30, etc. Trendelenburg concludes: “this is the way in which the categories appear in Aristotle if one considers what they could have in common.”<sup>71</sup>

It is easy to understand how among things equivocally named [*homonyma*], i.e., things alike in name but not in concept, those equivocally named by accident [*apo tyches homonyma*] are distinguished from analoga [*analoga*]. In a somewhat narrower use of the expression "equivocally named" [*homonymon*], the latter, being less "equivocal," are completely excluded from this expression. They are somewhat closer to things univocally named, for in addition to the common name they have, if not a communality, then at least a kinship of concepts, if not identity, then at least similarity, and if not sameness of essence, then at least sameness of relation. Thus when the name Mars is applied to both the star and the god of war, a different type of homonymy is present than when among men a prince, among birds the eagle, and on the chessboard the king, etc., are all called "King".

One can also easily understand how being [*on*], if it cannot be univocally named for the various categories, does at least not lack this proportional similarity for them. For just as man is related to his substantial being, to *ousia*, so, e.g., is the white related to quality [*poion*] as the being [*on*] which corresponds to it, and the number seven to quantity [*poson*], etc. Hence there is here an equality of relations, an analogy in the sense explained by Trendelenburg, which Aristotle claims his categories to have.<sup>72</sup>

But it seems to us that these considerations do not fully indicate Aristotle's thought and the reasons why he wanted to distinguish the being of the categories from homonyms properly so called. In the above quoted passages he did not claim that the categories were all called being [*on*] because what belonged to one of them had the same relation to one concept of being as what was contained in another had to another concept of being; he said, rather, "being is said in several senses, but in relation to *one* and to *one* single nature."<sup>73</sup> Now this *one*, this single nature, is substance, as we learn from the following: "some things are called being because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, etc."<sup>74</sup> Similarly he says in the first chapter of Book VII<sup>75</sup>: "being is said in several ways . . . for in one sense it means substance, in another a thing having quality, or a thing having magnitude, etc. But since being

is asserted in so many ways it is clear that the first being among them is the essence [*Wesenheit*], which designates the substance . . . the remainder are called being because of that which has being in the first sense; some of them are qualities, others quantities, others affections and such like things." Cf. *Met.* IX. 1. 1045b28 and XI. 3. 1061a8. Thus the examples to which Trendelenburg refers (see above) do indeed represent analogy as a qualitative proportion; but the examples which Aristotle adduces in order to clarify the manner in which being applies to the categories by analogy [*kat' analogian*] do not show any thing of the sort. If a diet is called healthy because it keeps healthy, then the reason why both have the same name is obviously not in the narrow sense a proportion to a body which is called healthy in the immediate and first sense, though the reason must indeed be sought in some relation or connection to this body. The same holds for a medicine which is called healthy because it causes health, a complexion because it is a sign of health. All of them stand in relation to each other because they have a relation to health without yet being members of a proportion. For in every genuine proportion the first member must be equal to the third if the second is equal to the fourth, i.e., if  $a:b = c:d$ , then  $a = c$ . Thus a health-producing agent and a health-indicator cannot form a proportion with health unless the concept "health producing" and "health indicating" mean one and the same thing, which is obviously not true. The same holds of the other example. The body which is the subject of medical art, the task which this art performs, the means which it uses, and so forth, are all called healthy [*iatrikon*] in relation to the same health [*iatrike*]. But they do not form a proportion with respect to it.

We believe, for these reasons, that we must assume a second type of analogy in addition to the one discussed by Trendelenburg, which occupies, together with the first kind, an intermediate position between the univocal and the merely equivocal. Here, too, heterogeneous things are related; in this case, too, they were not given a common name by chance [*apo tyches*] but by virtue of an analogy [*kat' analogian*]. Nonetheless, the relation between them is entirely different from the one discussed above. While the analoga discussed in the first place dis-

played an equality of relations together with a difference of concepts, we here find an entirely different connection, but a connection to the same concept as a *terminus*, a relation to the same origin [*arche*] (*hapan pros mian archen*, *Met.* IV. 2). Aristotle expresses the distinction between these analoga and things univocally named by saying that the latter are in the narrow sense “under one” [*kath’ hen*], but the former only “toward one” [*pros hen*], or at least “under one” [*kath’ hen*] only improperly speaking.<sup>76</sup>

In many cases language has paid attention to this manner of relation in things, so that of them we call some by the same, and some by different names, but still others in such a way that the words are different but seem to stem from the same root, e.g., when we call some things curable, others curative, etc. But Language does not always proceed with such precision. She finds it sufficient that everything which belongs together and which is grouped around one is called by the same family name as it were, regardless of *how* each belongs in this assembly. Thus we call royal not only the royal sovereign who bears the royal power, but we also speak of a royal sceptre and a royal dress, of royal honor, of a royal order, of royal blood, etc.; similarly, the names of the healthy [*hygieinon*] and the medical [*iatrikon*] were used in several senses above, and it would be easy to multiply the examples many times.<sup>77</sup>

Being which belongs to the categories is also analogous in this way, according to Aristotle. It is not only the equality of relations which hold for the various senses of being, and which distinguishes them from chance homonyms, but also the analogy with respect to one and the same *terminus*. Aristotle particularly stresses the latter in the cited passages, and he takes it to hold in general for the manner of analogous naming which is more closely related to things univocally named and farther removed from things which are homonyms in the stricter sense of the word.<sup>78</sup> He also uses it to prove that there is a single science which deals with being in its various senses.<sup>79</sup> Lastly, he concludes from it that there is one among the categories which bears the name of being in a more proper sense than the rest, as is always the case with things which, being analoga of this sort, bear the same name. Thus, the healthy when it is asserted

of the healthy body is healthy in the most proper sense, for it, as such, is constituted by health as form; all other concepts depend upon it, and in relation to it everything which is called healthy in some fashion has received its name.<sup>80</sup> Among the categories it is substance [*ousia*] which is being in the first and proper sense. "The remainder", says Aristotle, "are called being since of that which has being in this proper sense some are quantities, others qualities, others affections, others something else of the same kind."<sup>81</sup> Above we have quoted a similar passage from the fourth book.

Thus it is clear that "being" is a homonym for the various categories, and that they are not equivocally named by chance, [*homonyma apo tyches*] but by analogy [*kat' analogian*]. They bear, indeed, a double kind of analogy, namely, an analogy of the equality of relations and an analogy with respect to the same *terminus*. For the being of substance does not only have the same relation to everything that is substantial as the being of quality has to that which is qualitative, etc., but the categories are called being with respect to one and the same nature [*pros hen kai mian tina physin*] with respect to the *one* being of substance [*ousia*].<sup>82</sup>

#### § 4. Thesis III: The categories are the highest univocal general concepts, the highest genera of being.

In the previous section we have considered the categories in relation to being, which is superordinate to them and designates them jointly, though it is not, properly speaking, common to them. Their unity was a unity of analogy; nothing applied to them in one and the same way (*hosautos*, *Met.* VII. 4. 1030a32), i.e., univocally. It has already been shown that there is no higher univocal concept. We now turn to a consideration of the relation between the categories and the things subordinate to them, and here we find, by contrast, that all things belonging to the same category are things univocally named. The categories are general concepts (*koina*) in the proper sense, and genera (*gene*) of things.

It is easy to give a proof of this, since there are numerous passages where Aristotle states one or the other. In Aristotle "the common" [*koinon*] has a wider and a narrower sense. What is

common by analogy [*koinon kat' analogian*]<sup>83</sup> also belongs to the common [*koina*] in the wider sense. In *Met.* VII. 16 and X. 2 he describes *being* and the *one*, which is convertible with being, as things common [*koina*].<sup>84</sup> But Aristotle much more commonly uses “things common” [*koina*] only for things univocally named, where “common” [*koinon*] receives the sense of “general concept.”<sup>85</sup> It is in this narrower sense that the categories are called common as, for example, in the third book of the *Physics*, and in *Met.* IV. 12.<sup>86</sup> *Anal. post.* II. 13 shows with particular clarity that what is meant is the “common” in the narrower sense, and not that according to which being [*on*] and one [*hen*] and the like are called commons by virtue of analogy. In that passage Aristotle describes the categories as “first commons” [*protā koina*].<sup>87</sup> In *Met.* XI. 3 he applies the predicate “common” to the category of substance [*ousia*], thereby contrasting it with being [*on*].<sup>88</sup>

Aristotle states his view even more definitely when he describes the categories as genera (*gene*). For the fourth book of the *Topics* teaches explicitly that a genus is always univocal.<sup>89</sup> We have seen above that for this reason being [*on*] and one [*hen*] must not be called genera, and how that which belongs to different categories cannot have a common genus.<sup>90</sup> These same passages indicate rather clearly that the categories are the genera for everything that falls under them, since they persistently emphasize that whatever does not belong to the same category also does not belong to the same genus; but the point is made explicitly in *Met.* X. 3. He says there: “Some are different in genus, but others belong to the same category.”<sup>91</sup> This point is confirmed by a host of other passages where the categories are called “genera of predication” [*gene ton kategorion*] or simply “genera” [*gene*]. Examples for the former are found in *Anal. post.* I. 22; *Soph. elench.* 22; *Topics* I. 9; I. 15; VII. 1, and other places.<sup>92</sup> Examples for the latter are: *Cat.* 8; 10; *Anal. post.* II. 13; *Physics* III. 1; *De anima* I. 1; II. 1; *Met.* X. 1; XII. 5; XIV. 2, and elsewhere.<sup>93</sup>

Porphyrius reports<sup>94</sup> that some ancient commentators wanted to call the book of the *Categories* “On Genera” [*peri ton genon*]. The above shows that they were not so far off the mark though, as we shall later see, the name “Categories” is by

far more significant. The Stoics subsequently used the name "highest genera" [*ta genikotata*] for the categories. Trendelenburg thinks that this might already indicate a treatment of the categories which differs from that of Aristotle.<sup>95</sup> But perhaps the difference in treatment is indicated less by their using this new name, than by their giving up the old one (*kategoria*), whose significance will be explained later. For even though we do not find the expression "highest genera" [*ta genikotata*] in Aristotle, he calls them in exactly the same sense "the first" [*ta prota*] in *Met.* VII. 9.<sup>96</sup>

§ 5. Thesis IV: The categories are the highest predicates of first substance.

An individual from the genus substance Aristotle calls first substance (*prote ousia*).<sup>97</sup> Thus our assertion amounts only to this, that all categories are predicated of individual substances, indeed that they are their highest predicates. The proof easily follows from the preceding claim, which maintained that the categories are the highest genera of things. For as genera they are chiefly predicated of the species which are immediately subordinate to them,<sup>98</sup> and if these are also genera, then also of their species, and of the species of the species down to the individual.<sup>99</sup> For as we are taught in the third chapter of the *Categories* "if one thing is predicated of another as its subject, then whatever is asserted of the predicate is also asserted of the subject."<sup>100</sup> Hence it goes without saying that the first category [*ousia*], whose individuals are the primary substances, can also be predicated of them.

What has been said also implies the same for the other categories. For everything which is not itself substance belongs to a substance as an accident, and has being only because it belongs to a substance, as we have stated above.<sup>101</sup> Hence whatever belongs to another category is also predicated of a substance, as the book of *Categories*, the first book of the *Posterior Analytics*, the seventh book of the *Metaphysics*<sup>102</sup> and other passages teach. But if of any arbitrary substance, then also of a first substance, of which all the other substances are predicates.

since he introduced substance [*ousia*] as his first and most important category, and since he described individual substance [*tade ti*] as first substance and substance in the narrowest sense, so that universal substances are more worthy of the name substance [*ousia*] the closer they are to the individual.<sup>110</sup> But this individual substance, according to Aristotle's explicit teaching, can never become a predicate in a properly formulated proposition<sup>111</sup> : if it occasionally occupies this position, then such predication no longer deserves the name of predication.<sup>112</sup> Hence if Aristotle took the names of the categories from *kategorein* in the sense of predication, then either he committed an awkwardness by giving the categories a name which is not suitable for the most important one among them, or else he took the name category from a sense of "to predicate" [*kategorein*] which does not deserve this name. For this reason Bonitz, in the already cited dissertation about the categories, has interpreted the name "category" simply as "statement" [*Aussage*]. He can show that on a great many occasions Aristotle himself has used the word in this more general sense.<sup>113</sup> Zeller, in the second edition of his *Philosophy der Griechen*, has joined him in this opinion.<sup>114</sup>

Bonitz is justified in asking us to pay attention to the fact that Aristotle has coined the name "category" in the first instance in order to describe the concept according to which being is divided into the figures of the categories.<sup>115</sup> But if this is so, is it not much more probable that he had in mind the more narrow and far more common sense of *kategorein*, namely predicating? Thus I find that even Brandis, after first explaining the name "categories" in the same way as Bonitz,<sup>116</sup> recently sought a way of using as a basis "category" in the narrower and more proper sense.<sup>117</sup> (Cf. his last publication *Uebersicht über das Aristotelische Lehrgebäude*.) It seems to us that this can be done without any difficulties whatever. For, given that not everything which is comprised under the categories can become predicate (we shall deal with this point later), it holds in any case that the categories themselves are predicates. This last point is in no way invalidated by the first, just as it does not follow in any way from the fact that they are, as we have seen, genera (*gene*) and highest genera (*prote gene*), that everything comprised

There is, however, a difference between on the one hand, predicating the category of substance [*ousia*], or in general, predicating secondary substances (as Aristotle calls the kinds and genera which belong to the first category<sup>103</sup>) and, on the other hand, predicating the other categories of first substance. The former are applied to first substance in concept as well as name; the latter, however, are not essential to the substance but are found in it only as accidents and hence cannot be conceptually identified with it.<sup>104</sup> Still, the predication even of these categories of first substance is a proper and natural [*naturgemaesse*] predication, not one of the kind (which occur sometimes) when first substance assumes the position of predicate vis-a-vis secondary substance, or when any substance assumes the position of predicate relative to an accident. Aristotle does not want to apply the name of predication to such a twisted form of judgment.<sup>105</sup>

Thus it is clear how the highest genera are at the same time the highest predicates of first substance, since they are the highest predicates in general. Only being [*on*] and one [*hen*] and that which has merely analogous unity can be called an even more general predicate in the same imprecise sense in which it is called "a common" [*koinon*]. For example, in *Topics* IV. 6. 127a28 it is stated that being is predicated of everything, and in *Met.* X it is claimed that being and the one are the most general predicates.<sup>106</sup> On the other hand, the first book of the *Prior Analytics* says of categories in the narrower sense "they are asserted of other things, and there is nothing more primary which can be asserted of them."<sup>107</sup> Similarly, *Met.* III. 3 contrasts highest and lowest predicates in the same way as highest genera and lowest species.<sup>108</sup>

In very recent times it has been a matter of frequent controversy in what sense we are to understand the name "categories" [*kategoriai*] with which Aristotle designates the highest genera. Trendelenburg declared<sup>109</sup> that it has the same sense as "predicate", since *kategorein*, which originally meant "to accuse", is for Aristotle a fixed term which describes predication in judgment and sentence (more narrowly affirmation). Others have opposed this view. It could not possibly have been Aristotle's opinion, they say, that categories merely comprise predicates,

under them must also be highest genus, which would be ridiculous. Hence the categories themselves are, without doubt, capable of being predicates; nay, they have this capability above all other concepts in that nothing can be found, be it individual, species, or genus, which could not become the subject of one or the other of them, while a predicate higher than they cannot in turn be sought for them. We shall see later whether this is the only reason why they have received the name "categories."<sup>118</sup> So far we were interested only in establishing that they are the highest predicates of all being, hence also the highest predicates of first substance which underlies all other being.

§ 6. Thesis V: The categories differ from each other because of the different relations they have to first substance.

We saw above that if things bear a common name, then it is either because they are namesakes merely by accident [*homonyma apo tyches*], or else because they participate in a concept and consequently also in the name which designates it, i.e., they are things univocally named [*synonyma*] or, finally, because they have, though different, an essential kinship, i.e., they are namesakes by analogy [*homonyma kat analogian*]. Now namesakes by accident have unity in a different sense than namesakes by analogy, and the latter in a different sense than things univocally named; it follows that the division into subordinate concepts must be different depending on whether something is predicated of different things univocally, equivocally, or in the manner of analogy. This division is clear in the case of equivocally and univocally named things. The former are obviously classified according to the different representations which are accidentally connected with the same name. For example the name ball, which is applied to the well-known toy as well as to a dancing party, will have to be divided according to the difference between these two representations. Things univocally named, on the other hand, are distinguished according to the specific differences which produce the contrast among their various species, as, for example, animals can be divided into biped and

quadruped, etc. But how do we deal with things analogously named? What manner of division will be proper for them and will do justice to their imperfect unity, which makes them more than mere namesakes, and will correspond to their intermediate position between equivocally and univocally named things?

We have become acquainted with two kinds of analogous predicates, namely, analoga of similarity or proportion, and analoga with respect to the same terminus. Now, Aristotle sometimes reckons the former with the predicates which are equivocal predicates in the full sense,<sup>119</sup> and I am at a loss to indicate an essential difference between them with respect to the classification of objects comprised under them. For that which is one by virtue of similarity is properly and simply speaking different, and is one and the same only with respect to proportion. Thus if I pay attention simply to the difference between the concepts which form the matter of one or the other part of these qualitative proportions, I can easily find the differentiation of the common name according to its various meanings, in the same way as with pure homonyms, as, for example, when I distinguish the soul of an animal from the soul of an enterprise.

Things are altogether different where there is analogy with respect to the same terminus. These analoga are truly directed toward one and the same nature [*pros hen kai mian physin*], even if not in the same respect [*kath'hen*]. This unity [*hen*] is a true unit; it is truly one in concept and essence, and one could thus define these analoga as one and the same with respect to the terminus, and differing only in the manner in which they are related to it. From this follows immediately the manner in which they should be classified; for it is obvious that we have to divide them according to the differences in these relations. A glance at Aristotle's examples which were given above will suffice to make this clear.

We have seen that being [*on*] is predicated of the highest genera not only according to the analogy of proportion, but also—and Aristotle emphasizes this—according to the analogy of the same terminus. Thus it must be divided according to the different relations to one and the same terminus. The terminus itself is that being with respect to which they are all called beings, being in the first and narrowest sense. We have already

seen that above all others, substance [*ousia*] is being in this narrowest sense; but substance in the first and narrowest sense is first substance [*prote ousia*], individual substance. Whatever else is,<sup>120</sup> is because it is somehow found in this substance.<sup>121</sup> Thus it is the terminus for all being regardless of the category to which it belongs.<sup>122</sup> We shall have to distinguish one kind of being from another depending on the different types of relation which they have to this terminus, i.e., depending on the manner in which they relate to first substance; in this way we shall have to determine the differences between the highest concepts of being, the categories.

These distinctions between the categories, which we have derived from the peculiar nature of the analogy to the same terminus, can be displayed in yet another way. So far we have relied on the truth that the categories are different, but related, *meanings of being*, [*Bedeutungen des Seinden*], as was stated in sections 3 and 4. Now we hope to derive the same result from the concept of the categories as *highest genera*. We shall start from the Aristotelian doctrine of the relation between genus and difference on the one hand, and matter and form on the other. It is Aristotle's frequently stated view that a definition which is composed of genus and difference can be given only where a thing is composed of matter and form,<sup>123</sup> and that, where this is the case, genus, species, and difference are proportional to matter, form and compositum.<sup>124</sup> Hence genus is related to matter, and is derived from it.<sup>125</sup> Thus if things differ in their highest genus, then they do not just have formal differences, but the matter, as such, of one must be different from the matter of the other. It is for this reason that we are told in the passages quoted above from *Met. XIV* that every category presupposes a special manner of potentiality, a special potential being [*dynamei on*].<sup>126</sup> This is obvious at first sight if one simply attends to the difference between substance and the accidental categories. For, after all, the matter of substance is the so-called first matter [*prote hyle*]<sup>127</sup> which underlies substantial form, while the accidents require as a substrate a substance which is composed of both of them.<sup>128</sup> One could now think that the accidental categories do not actually differ according to matter since they are all founded upon substance.

But if this were the case then we should have only two highest genera, namely, substance and accident, and the latter would be a univocal general concept for all accidental being. But substance does not have being insofar as it is actually substance, but insofar as it is potentiality for accidental form,<sup>129</sup> insofar as it is the matter of the accidents. Substance as substance could conceivably be the same, but so long as it differs *qua* subject of the accidents, the latter will have different kinds of matter. It is of course true that we can speak of different substantial forms because of the specific difference between the forms. But this kind of difference between matters is also found within one and the same genus; hence it will not suffice in this case; rather, there must be a difference in matter as matter, i.e., the entire relation between matter and form, potentiality and actuality, must be different; the subject must not only be the subject of different forms, but it must be subject in a different manner; form must not only be different form, but it must be taken up in a different way into the subject, it must affect the subject in different ways. Hence if it is first substance which underlies all accidents, it is clear that the highest genera of accidents must each display a different manner of inherence, a special relation to first substance. It is also clear that the different relations to first substance generate a difference not only between substance and accident, but also among the accidental categories themselves.

Thus we have come to the same end result in an entirely different way, and we admire here, too, the internal coherence which the entire Aristotelian system possesses to such a high degree. The following sections will mostly serve to confirm what has here been discussed and has opened up to us the actual principle of the Aristotelian table of categories. Aristotle indicates this in a fairly clear way in *Prior Analytics* I. 37: "the statement that one thing applies to another must be understood in as many different senses as there are distinct categories,"<sup>130</sup> for this sentence can be reversed: "there are as many categories as there are manners in which things exist in their subject," i.e., in which they are related to first substance, which is the ultimate subject of all being.

§ 7. Thesis VI: The categories differ from each other according to the different manners of predication.

We discussed above what is to be meant by “to predicate” [*kategoroin*] in the proper sense. If the species is predicated of its genus or of its difference, or a substance of its accident, etc., then such predication does not belong to the proper kinds of predication, and it is only of the latter that we here speak when we say that the differences between the categories correspond to the differences in manners of predication.

The previous section has shown that the categories differ from each other according to the differences in their relation to first substance, i.e., in the different ways in which they exist within first substance, which in turn does not inhere in any other thing and exists in and by itself,<sup>131</sup> but in which all other things have existence. What belongs to different categories exists in different ways in first substance. Conversely, everything which belongs to the same category inheres in substance in the same way, in a way which is determined by this category as highest genus. Every deviation would destroy the univocity of the general concept; the highest genus would not truly be a genus; rather, the concepts which would come to be differentiated under these circumstances would have to be envisaged as highest genera, unless indeed they themselves were to comprehend a difference in matter as well. From this it follows at once that the number of, and distinctions between, categories is the same as the number and distinctions of ways in which something is predicated of first substance. For something is asserted of first substance in the same way in which it exists in it, since predication (in the proper sense) does not assert anything other than that the predicate is somehow in the subject either as the genus is in the species, or the species in the individual, etc., or as the accident is in its substance.

It follows furthermore from what has been said that the differences of the (proper) manners of predication in general correspond to the differences between the categories. It is true that of secondary substances, too, things are predicated in the proper sense, as, for example, when it is said of man that he has reason, or that he is a body, that he is beautiful, tall, white, etc.;

but nothing is said of them which could not also be said in the same way of a singular substance, thus for example of a singular man, of Socrates, or Plato, or others. Thus this is not a new manner of predication which must be introduced in addition to those which allowed us to distinguish the categories. Nor is a new manner of predication needed when one accident is predicated of another. For Aristotle declares in *Anal. post.* I. 22 that no accident is substrate of another accident,<sup>132</sup> and it is not the case that one of them is a quality of the other and that there is a further thing which is a quality of the second, and thus a quality of a quality.<sup>133</sup> It does hold, however, that the universal accident is predicated of the individual or the less universal, since it belongs to the essence of the latter as, for example, when color is predicated of the white, figure of the triangle, etc.<sup>134</sup> But what is the relation between subject and predicate in this case? Obviously that of real identity; one belongs to the essence of the other. Thus even here no new manner of predication need be supposed; for just as the accidental universals are identical with the particular accident, so the secondary substances are identical with first substance. Hence we have already observed, in the case of the latter, the very same relation, and the very same manner of predication. Hence it is the same interrogative pronoun which corresponds to one as well as the other assertion. We ask "what is this white?"—"It is color." "What is Aristotle?"—"He is man, substance, etc."<sup>135</sup>

Hence, so long as one is predicated of another in the strict sense (*Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a22), there is no distinction in the manner of predication which does not correspond to a difference in the classification of the categories. Thus Aristotle could rightly say that "being" has as many meanings as there are manners of assertion, i.e., manners in which one thing can be predicated of another, and that the highest genera must be distinguished in the same way in which being is divided.<sup>136</sup> Thus he says in the passage from the *Prior Analytics* which we have already quoted: "that one is in another and that one is truly asserted of another must be understood in as many ways as different categories have been distinguished."<sup>137</sup> But one must pay careful attention to what has here been asserted. We have

not said that the categories are “manners of predication;” rather, we have already opposed this view (see above p. 55). Even if these manners of predication are called categories [*kategoriai*], they are not categories in the sense in which we have dealt with them, and in which they are the highest genera of things and the various senses of being. We have already rejected this view because it leads to a number of discrepancies, for example that the categories are not concepts, etc. In addition, all accidents would doubtlessly fall under the category of substance to the extent in which they can be asserted of accidents of the same category (whether they of themselves, or the higher of the lower). Hence we cannot possibly suppose that this is so. Nonetheless, we maintain that it was the view of Aristotle that the number and the difference of the highest genera correspond to the number and the differences between the manners of predication, since all categories are asserted of first substance, each in a particular manner of predication, in such a way that all possible manners of predication are represented. In this specificity of the manner of predication the peculiar relation of each category to first substance, and hence the peculiar being of the category, finds its clearest expression.

Now since there is a correspondence between the different kinds of asserting and different kinds of asking, we can also say that the differences in the division of the categories are signified not only by the different kinds of assertion, but also by the different kinds of question. Hence we completely agree with the remark of Brandis’ when he says that “the table of categories is a complete collection of the general questions we have to apply in order to take up in thought any and every object.”<sup>138</sup>

Looking back upon what has been said, and in order to prevent any misunderstanding, and to take account of each of the views concerning the categories, we summarize as follows:

For Aristotle there is a three-fold sense in which one can speak of ten (or, as the case may be, eight) categories: (1) of categories as the most general predicates of first substance;<sup>139</sup> (2) of categories as series of things predicable of first substance which are severally subordinated under a higher genus and are asserted of first substance in the same manner as this genus.<sup>140</sup> This sense is related to the first in the same way as, for example,

the concept of the class of all men, meaning the sum of all individual men, is related to the concept of man as it is expressed in its definition. (3) One can also speak of the ten (or eight) Aristotelian categories as being as many manners of predication in which one is asserted of another (*Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a22) and in the proper way (*haplos*; *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a20). In this way the manners of essential, quantitative, qualitative, etc., predication are distinguished.<sup>141</sup> The first takes place when within the same category something is predicated of substance, the others if something is predicated of substance which belongs to the corresponding accidental category. Probably the former has received the name "category" from the categories in the latter sense.

Still, it is the first mentioned categories with which we have to deal first and foremost. They in turn are considered by Aristotle in three respects. But, to be sure, it is one and the same thought that is brought into view from different sides. They are taken (1) as the various senses of being [*on*]<sup>142</sup>; they are as we saw, differentiated according to the different modes of existence in the being in which everything has being, namely first substance; (2) as the highest genera in one of which everything must be contained which has being in the strict sense;<sup>143</sup> (3) as the highest predicates of first substance<sup>144</sup> whose manners of predication are determinative for all classes of things comprehended under them. In the last sense all categories, even the accidental one, are envisaged as concreta, while the second definition does not pay any attention to their inherence in first substance, but rather abstracts from it and takes account only of the relation of the genera, species, and individuals which are subordinated to it. Hence if the categories and their subordinate concepts are envisaged as predicates of first substance, the concrete forms of language seem appropriate, while if they are envisaged as genera, the abstract forms seem in order for the accidental categories. Thus in the third book of the *Topics* it is claimed that not the just, but justice is genus.<sup>145</sup>

But when Aristotle had to choose a suggestive name for the categories he justly preferred one which characterizes them according to characteristics that emerge when they are confronted from the third point of view. He only rarely calls them

genera [*gene*] compared with the designation categories [*kategoriai*], which occurs much more often. They are not merely some predicates among others but in every order they are the highest predicates, the predicates *par excellence* [*kat' exochen*] which cannot become the subjects of higher predicates. But they are not only this, they are also predicates in which the whole range of manners of predication is exhaustively compiled. They are the predicates which decide the manner of predication for the totality of predicable things; and they are predicates the content and distinctiveness of whose entire concept is indicated in their relation to first substance, and this shows itself in the specific manners in which they are predicated of this substance. Thus the entire ontological differentiation of the highest genera and their conceptual significance now comes to light in the manner in which they are predicates of first substance.

It is possible that in this remark we are not far removed from Prantl's view, voiced in the first volume of his *History of Logic*, from which we want to quote a few passages for the sake of comparison. He says: "In Aristotle the concrete genus-determination of objective being, and the incontrovertible definiteness of human assertion, which is opposed to a confused sensualism, meet in this "communality" [*in diesem "Gemeinsamen"*]. In this way I have stated the principle of the Aristotelian categories."<sup>146</sup> Later he continues: "It remains the guiding point of view that each highest genus must rest upon a common concrete determination which has as its substrate the concrete being it comprises, and which is asserted in a predicative manner of it as a subject. For this reason not every genus nor every predicate is a category, but only the most common genus-predicates are categories, i.e., the determinations of genera which can no longer be envisaged as subjects of higher predicates, but which predicatively assert a common and comprehensive determination."<sup>147</sup> "The ontological basis of the categories is the process of realization of determination which leads to concretion."<sup>148</sup> "The distinctiveness of the names which designate the genus-predicates is to be the expression of, and is to comprehend, the concrete determinations into which the process of realization proceeds down to the multiplicity of being."<sup>149</sup> The last remarks seem to have a certain affinity to what we have

said in the preceding section about the difference in the relation of potentiality and actuality, which is the standard for the distinction between the highest genera. But the agreement is not perfect and the deviation between the two views is clearly apparent in the fact that Prantl, as we saw, is led by his view to deny that there is a determinate number of categories, while our view necessarily demands it.

In this respect we are closer to the views of Brandis, Bonitz, Trendelenburg, and others. With the latter we share the assertion that all things which are comprised under a category are predicable in the same manner as categories; hence we spoke of ten or eight "series of predicable things." This makes it necessary briefly to reply to the objection which was raised in connection with first substance, which obviously belongs to the first genus, and which therefore should also be predicable. We can easily meet it by simply admitting this to the extent to which our assertion makes it necessary. For we have spoken of predication even in the case where the subject is first substance itself, and nobody will want to deny that first substance can be predicated of itself. Aristotle does not deny this either. He explicitly excludes only the possibility of a predication of another in *Anal. prior.* I. 27; *Physics* I. 7; and *Met.* VII. 3.<sup>150</sup> In *Met.* VII. 13 he only says, "none of that which is predicated in general is an individual substance."<sup>151</sup> The predication of the thing of itself is neither accidental attribution [*kategorein kata symbebekos*] nor the predication of a higher concept of a lower one; this is quite clear in itself; that it was also Aristotle's view can be seen from passages such as *Topics* I. 9 and *Anal. post.* I. 22.<sup>152</sup> First substance [*prote ousia*] is independent being [*on kath' auto*]; it is also predicable of itself [*kategoroumenon kath' auto*].

- § 8. Thesis VII: The categories differ according to the different manners of predication. This does not amalgamate the division into categories with the division into the five universals with Aristotle called "those which are predicated of something" [*ta peri tinos kategoroumena*] *Top.* I. 8. 103b7; these are differentiated according to the degree

of the defining power which the predicate has for the determination of the subject; they are differentiated according as they are more or less "defining" [*horikon*].

Since our investigation has shown that the categories are to be differentiated according to the kinds of predication, one could fear that this would obscure the distinction between the two divisions which are successively made in Aristotle's *Topics* (I. 4-8; I. 9), the distinction which divides everything that is predicated of something [*pan to peri tinou kategoroumenon*, 103b7] into definition, property, genus, and accident [*horos, idion, genos, symbebekos*, *Topics* I. 4. 101b17] and that in which the categories [*ta kategoroumena*, *Met.* V. 7. 1017a25] are divided in substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, etc. (*Topics* I. 9). One could connect with this the embarrassment which Aristotle seems to display where the two divisions meet each other and where they must be interrelated, which is especially apparent in the treatment of the category of substance where the subsumption of the differentia [*diaphora*] occasions doubt and difficulties.<sup>153</sup>

But the principal distinction between the two divisions, which is apparent at first sight, is not at all obscured. For, especially if we take the categories in the sense in which they are the highest genera of things, it is not category [*kategoria*] or predicate [*kategoroumenon*] but being [*on*] which is classified by this division. It could certainly not simply be that which is predicable of something [*peri tinou kategoroumenon*], but more likely that which is predicable of first substance [*peri proteousias kategoroumenon*]. Thus the members of the division into categories are real concepts (see above); the various questions which are put to primary substance, and whose varying aims correspond to the distinctions between the categories (see above), are real questions. For example, I ask "What is Socrates?"—"A man." "How tall is he?"—"Five feet." "What is he like?"—"White," etc. Here question and answer have real content, for the being of man, of five-footedness, of the white, is real being. By contrast, the members of the second classification are all second intentions, hence they are merely being in the sense of being true [*onta hos alethes*]<sup>154</sup> of which one can

indeed make a true affirmative assertion, but which does not have any reality [*Bestand*] in the things themselves outside of the thinking mind. In this case, too, there is a distinction among questions. But it is a distinction between merely rational questions as, for example, when I ask: what is the definition of man? What is his genus? Is this his property? his difference? his accident?<sup>155</sup> Suppose someone asked for the definition of man, and is given the answer that man is a two-footed animal. Now since this is something real he could think that in this case, as in the above cases, question and answer concern something real. But one must pay attention to the fact that the answer is this: two-footed animal is the definition of man. The definition as definition, the genus as genus, in general, the universal as such do not exist outside the abstracting understanding and so the two-footed animal *as definition* does not exist in things and is as such second intention, and all of them merely have being in the sense of being true.

According to what has been said above, the classification of predicates [*kategoria*] into the various manners of predication (schemata of categories, *schemata tes kategorias*) corresponds to the classification of being [*on*] into the various categories. This also must be distinguished in principle from the classification of the predicables (*kategoroumena*) into definition, genus, property, etc. Here, too, the difference is not difficult to discern. Since anything can be predicated of the subject only insofar as it is identical with it, either because it belongs to its essence (essential), or because it somehow exists within it as its substrate (identity of suppositum), we shall have to distinguish as many figures of predication as relations between predicate and subject are possible, by virtue of which a predication in the proper sense can take place. By contrast, the principle of distinction in the other classification into genus, definition, etc., is the degree in which a concept is definitional [*horikos*, *Topics* I. 6. 102b34], i.e., the degree in which one concept determines another when it is asserted of it, as it is most perfectly achieved in species and definition; in all other cases it is the degree of proximity to the definition [*horos*]. The difficulty or ease of procedure in proof and counter argument also depends upon this degree. The determining force of all the others is united in the definition;

it is thus the essence itself, and indicates it completely. For this reason the easiest thing to show is that something is not the definition of a thing, and the most difficult that it is the definition.<sup>156</sup> Three things are required in order that something can be predicated of another as the definiens of a definitum: (1) that it can be truly predicated of it at all; (2) that it contains something which belongs to the essence of the subject (*en to ti esti*),<sup>157</sup> that it is predicated not only in name [*kata tounoma*], but also by definition [*kata ton logon*];<sup>158</sup> (3) that it is convertible with this subject. If a predicate has only the first of these properties, then it is *accidental*. If, in addition to predicability, it also has essentiality, but not convertibility, then it belongs to the genus, it is *genikon* or *genos* in the sense in which it includes also the difference.<sup>159</sup> On the other hand, if it has predicability and is convertible with the subject without being essential, then it is a property [*idion*]. If it lacks none of these attributes, then it is definition.<sup>160</sup>

§ 9. Thesis VIII: The categories must be different in concept, i.e., one and the same concept cannot directly fall under two different categories.

We have now become acquainted with the principle of differentiation of the categories. Let us summarize in a few sentences the consequences which follow from this for the kind and magnitude of difference between things that belong to different categories. But it is well known that there are two ways in which something can be one with another, or different from it. One is factual, the other conceptual identity or difference. Aristotle, too, knows both. In the fourth book of the *Metaphysics*, for example, he investigates the relation between being [*on*] and one [*hen*]. He claims that the relation is this: factually they are one and the same, but conceptually they are different.<sup>161</sup> It would be easy to adduce other examples where the concepts remain different despite factual identity.<sup>162</sup> Conversely there are innumerable cases where two things are identical in concept, and are yet different realities. This is the case because under every common concept [*koine kategoroumenon*] fall a great many things which are merely conceptually identical,

but different in reality; for example, Socrates and Plato are identical as men, etc.

Hence we say above all: the difference between the categories must be conceptual. It cannot be the case that one and the same thing according to one and the same concept, or that several things, insofar as one and the same concept applies to them, can come to stand directly in the order of several category-lineages.

It is easy to give a proof on Aristotelian principles. First of all, it is evident that every category is a different concept from the rest of the highest genera; otherwise they would not be different genera. The two identical concepts would be one genus, merely with different names as, for example, something [*ti esti*] and substance [*ousia*]. Aside from this, each one has its own mode of being, its special relation to first substance.

From this it follows immediately that it is impossible that things can come to stand in the lineage of different categories with respect to one and the same concept. For it is impossible that one and the same concept should have two coordinated (i.e., not subordinate or superordinate) genera. The categories, being the highest genera, are coordinated; hence none of them can be reduced to a higher concept, much less can any of them be reduced to another.<sup>163</sup>

There are, however, a few passages in the *Topics* where Aristotle does not seem to want to agree fully with the major premise of our argument.<sup>164</sup> But, in the first place, what Aristotle maintains in these passages suffices to show the impossibility of what we have denied, namely that one concept can be subordinated under two categories. For in these passages he allows the possibility of subsumption under two disparate genera only in the extreme case where the two genera appear united again in a higher genus. But in the case of the categories this is impossible, since they themselves are the highest genera.

Furthermore, there are other passages in which Aristotle has given explicit expression to the view which he here merely intimates. Thus, in *Topics* I. 15, he says: "Thus the two genera and their concept are predicated of the raven, which does not occur in the case of genera that are not subordinated to each other." In *Topics* IV. 2 this supposition is again treated as

incoherent.<sup>165</sup> But his view becomes most clear where he teaches that distinct genera have distinct differentiae. For if distinct genera do not agree in the differentiae, then they do of course also not contain the same species which, after all, come about by adding differentia to genus.<sup>166</sup> This doctrine is found in the third chapter of the *Categories*: “distinct genera which are not subordinate to each other have differentiae of distinct kinds, for example, the genus animal, and the genus science. For the differentiae of animal are, for example, walking on legs, having two feet, having feathers, living in water, etc., but none of these is a differentia of science. For no science differs from another by being two-legged.”<sup>167</sup> Similarly in the second book of the *Posterior Analytics*, where he treats of the correct order of the parts of a definition.<sup>168</sup> Hence the differentia is not found outside the genus to which it properly belongs, since it must be essential of the differentia and not merely accidental that it divides this particular genus. If this is so then the same holds necessarily also of the species (cf. *Met.* V. 6).<sup>169</sup> Generally speaking, species and differentia are concepts which stand and fall together, which is made clear particularly in *Met.* VII. 12, which seeks to answer the question which is raised in the *Analytics*, namely, how the defined object can be one when there is a multiplicity of defining characteristics. He explains there that the differentiae become one with the species when the division arrives at the final differentiae.<sup>170</sup> Definition is claimed to be a proposition which consists of these differentiae, in which thus the entire essence of the definition is comprised, as it were.<sup>171</sup> What is thus taught in the seventh book is given a foundation in the eighth. Aristotle remarks there that “definition by means of differentiae seems to be of form [*eidōs*] and of actuality [*energeia*] (i.e., form).”<sup>172</sup> This is a natural remark if differentia corresponds to form, as he claims in the same context (see n. 124). But different matters have different forms<sup>173</sup> and are thus made into what they are in actuality. Hence it follows from the correspondence of differentia and form that, depending upon the differentia, the entire essence of the thing will have these or other determinations, and conversely.<sup>174</sup>

§ 10. Thesis IX: The difference between the categories is not necessarily a real difference.

We have mentioned in the previous section that often a conceptual distinction is not correlated with a real one. For the understanding, in considering something, often divides into different concepts what is in itself one. Hence it also holds for the categories that from the necessity of a conceptual difference no factual difference follows. It appears to be the case, however, that Aristotle meant to claim more than a merely rational distinction in the division of the categories. After all, he undertakes a distinction between kinds of being, even of things outside the understanding [*exotes dianoias*, *Met.* VI. 4. 1027b31]. However, when Aristotle distinguishes one thing from another as a different being, he does not thereby maintain any sort of real distinction. One can see this clearly from the seventh chapter of *On Interpretation*, where the universal and the particular, man and Callias, are contrasted as one thing with another.<sup>175</sup> If one keeps in mind Aristotle's polemics against the Platonists it becomes clear that he did not wish to contrast them as factually distinct realities, since the universal as thing [*pragma*], as outside the thought, has for him existence only in the existence of the individual thing. We also note that in the *Categories* substance is divided into primary and secondary substance as if both comprised different things. But again, it is not his opinion that they are factually distinct things. First and second substance [*ousia*] are not meant to be two kinds of substance since, rather, the second substances are the kinds of first substance.<sup>176</sup> Hence the distinction is similar to the one just discussed; it is a merely rational distinction. The manner in which these distinctions occur demonstrates how far Aristotle is removed from the errors of nominalism which some have attempted to attribute to him,<sup>177</sup> though his opposition to a false realism is equally strong.

This in turn explains the manner in which he speaks of the distinction between the categories. For it is in no way his view that there is a real difference between all highest genera which he introduces, and between all the things that belong to the differences in categories. Nonetheless he envisages them as

different things, which they are, since they are conceptually so different that they do not even participate in the concept of being [*on*] in the same way, as we saw above, quite aside from the fact that between most categories there cannot even be any real identity. We shall, first of all, cite some examples from Aristotle himself in order to show that it is possible, as a matter of fact, that things belonging to different categories are nonetheless really identical. Afterwards we shall show to what extent this can be explained from the previously cited principle of Aristotle's classification of categories.

The most noteworthy example is that of the categories of action and affection. In the third book of the *Physics* and in the corresponding section of Book XI of the *Metaphysics* Aristotle teaches us<sup>178</sup> that the categories of action [*poiein*] and affection [*paschein*] and all concepts which belong to one or the other of these categories are factually identical. One can see from these passages that there is a motion [*kinesis*] which is factually identical with an action as well as an affection (for this reason these categories do not each have a proper motion, *Met.* XI. 12. 1068a14). It is less surprising that this motion is also assigned to the categories of quantity, quality and place (see chap. 4). For it is not placed directly into them, but is reduced to them because it constitutes a state of possibility for a being which belongs to these categories.

Another example concerns the categories of quantity, [*poson*] and location [*pou*], for in the sixth chapter of the *Categories* Aristotle lists location among the kinds of continuous quantity.<sup>179</sup> Nonetheless, location forms a distinct category. We can see from the illustrative examples (*Categories* IV. 2a1, and XI. 11b13) and also from the use he makes of this category that it is undoubtedly factually the same as area [*topos*] which belongs to quantity, though the two are, of course, conceptually distinct. For area [*topos*], according to Aristotle, belongs to that which spatially encloses, and is its limit.<sup>180</sup> Hence it is a surface, and thus a species of quantity.<sup>181</sup> By contrast, that which belongs to the category of location [*pou*] as such, belongs to that which is enclosed by this limit, derives its designation from it, and is spatially determined by it.<sup>182</sup> It is similar to the relation between action and affection, for insofar as place is

predicated of the enclosing and spatially determining it is assigned to quantity as its genus, but insofar as it is predicated of that which is spatially determined, it constitutes the category of location [*pou*].

The category of time [*pote*] seems to connect with the category of quantity [*poson*] in a similar way, since the sixth chapter of the *categories*, in the passage cited above, mentions time along with area as a kind of quantity. But the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* is more specific in teaching us that time must not be reckoned among the quanta in and by itself, but only reductively and by accident [*kata symbebekos*].<sup>183</sup> On the other hand, since Aristotle defines it as the “number of motion relative to the earlier and later”<sup>184</sup> it seems factually identical with a locomotion,<sup>185</sup> namely with that of the first moved.<sup>186</sup> Thus, it will belong to the category of affection [*paschein*] while, simultaneously, since it is predicated of things that are temporally determined, which are in time, it constitutes a special category of time [*pote*].

I think that the indicated examples suffice to remove all doubt concerning Aristotle’s opinion. It is not the case that there is always a factual distinction between things in one and another category since there are numerous cases of factual identity. It remains to show how this striking phenomenon agrees with the principle of the entire classification which we have indicated above. We have seen that the classification of the categories is not a classification of a univocally, but of an analogously named unity. Consequently, the individual members are determined not by specific differentiae, but by distinct modes of existence, by relations to first substance of which the categories are predicated. Thus the distinction between the categories will seem to correspond to the different manners of their predication of first substance. Now it is clear that something which is factually identical permits nonetheless a distinction in the relation to first substance. Since, even if it enters a relation to one substance, it does not forego the possibility of entering into such a relation to another one as well, so that it can now be asserted of two different substances. This was the case with action and affection where the motion constituted two different categories since it belonged

to two different subjects depending on whether it was related to the substance which was its terminus, or the one which was its origin. Prantl attempted to unite both in the higher genus of movement.<sup>187</sup> But this is as little Aristotelian as the even more daring reduction of all categories to substance [*ousia*], affection [*pathos*], and relation [*pros ti*]. In opposition to his procedure we cannot sufficiently emphasize a passage in *Met.* V. 28. 1024b10, according to which the categories can neither be reduced to each other, nor to a higher species (cf. Brandis in his survey of Aristotle's system).<sup>188</sup> We found a similar case where a body is surrounded by the surface of some other body. According to Aristotle, this surface is the location of the first body. But this location, when considered as the surface of the surrounding body and predicated of it, belongs of course to the category of quantity. But if it is predicated of something which it contains, and determines its location, for example, if I say "this is in the market [*en agora*], it is in the lyceum,"<sup>189</sup> it cannot be its quantity. It belongs to it in an external manner, in a manner of predication whose peculiarity distinguishes the category of location [*pou*] from the other genera. Similar considerations hold for time and wherever else there exists factual identity between things of different categories. Hence the principle of classification which has been found shows itself to be completely sufficient to explain such obvious and remarkable phenomena as identity in different categories, and even the identity of entire categories. Objections which may have appeared as insoluble contradictions are resolved with ease.

§ 11. Thesis X: Not every real and independent being [*on kath'hauto*] stands directly in one of the categories. The differentiae and the things in which the concept does not exist in its completeness are, as it were, reckoned as belonging only marginally to the appropriate genus.

There is a difference between what belongs under the genus animal and what stands directly under this genus, for example, horse and the individual horse. For even that which belongs to the horse as principle or part or attribute is to be subordinated, as it were, to the genus horse, as for example the mane of the

horse, the hoof of the horse, etc. Now suppose that something belongs under a genus only incidentally as, for example, a property [*idion*]; this does not mean that it cannot stand directly under some other genus. For example, the property of some substance could be the species of a quality, etc. Thus the question arises whether this is generally the case. Perhaps everything that belongs to real being (which has being not only accidentally) must stand directly under at least one of the categories. Aristotle's commentators are fairly unanimous in denying this question.<sup>190</sup> It did not seem possible to incorporate the concept of potentiality and actuality directly<sup>191</sup> into the categories since potential and actual being seems on the same level as the being divided into the figures of the categories. We, too, do not think that all real things can be directly subordinated to the categories. What matters most is to determine from general grounds in which cases such a subordination is possible, and where it is not.

In order for something to belong under a genus it is necessary (1) that it really be subordinate to it. It is clear, therefore, that if anything transcends the boundaries of any category and is found in all or at least several of them by belonging to things in one and another genus in an analogous way, that such a thing cannot belong directly under any category. This is the case, for example, with the good (*Nicomachean Ethics* I. 4. 1096a19), with being [*on*], with one [*hen*], with accident [*symbebekos*], form [*eidos*] and matter [*hyle*], (*Met.* V. 28. 1024b9), with potentiality [*dynamis*] and actuality [*energeia*] and others. In particular, there seems to be a connection with the post-predicaments which all occur in several categories. (Wherever we must distinguish several senses, they occur so in at least one of their senses.) Thus none of these is subordinate to any category; much less do they stand directly under any of them, like species or individual.

Whatever belongs directly under a genus must be either species or individual, and for this reason we must lay down (2) that those concepts which assume the position of a differentia in the definition of a thing belong to the actual lineage of the category only incidentally (unless it is the true and essential differentia of the thing which is used for the purpose of defini-

tion, not merely from ignorance of the actual differentia (see n. 174). For, according to *Topics* IV. 2, differentiae are not species of individuals and thus do not directly belong under the genus.<sup>192</sup>

(3) Things belong only reductively under a genus if they do not fully contain the concept of the genus. We said above that the horse's hoof, for example, does not belong directly under the genus animal. The reason is that, unlike the concept horse, it does not contain the concept animal completely. The same will also hold for the categories. They are nothing but certain determinate modes of being, and that which does not wholly and completely contain a being will belong to a category only reductively. Thus the partial substances head, foot, etc., must be subordinated to the category of substance,<sup>193</sup> but unlike the animal, they must not be incorporated into the lineage of the category. According to the seventh book of the *Metaphysics* one can distinguish three kinds of corporeal substance: the matter of a body, its form, and the bodily substance which is composed from both.<sup>194</sup> For the very same reason, only the third of these can find a place directly in the category, while the others belong to it only reductively: the soul because the living being forms a species of substance, the form of metal because the metal forms such a species. Doubts might be raised with respect to form; should we not perhaps consider it to be a species of the thing, and thus reckon the substantial forms among secondary substances [*deuterai ousiai*] which in the direct lineage of the category assume a middle position between the generic concept substance [*ousia*] and a "this" [*tode ti*]. Indeed, form is frequently designated by the names *eidos* and *to ti en einai*, which are also expressions for the generic concepts. But one should not be deceived by this equality of names. Since it is the form which gives being to the thing, as a consequence of which it partakes in one or the other species and definition, it is also called species (*eidos*) but in an improper sense, and the same holds of the names "essence" [*to ti en einai*] and "definition" [*logos*]. Thus the definition of bodily substances does indeed abstract from the individual matter, but not at all from the universal matter of the thing defined. Thus it is clear that in this case, form and species are not to be identified. Hence he

states in *Met.* VIII<sup>195</sup> that man and soul are not one and the same. One can also clearly see this difference between form and species in the third chapter of the seventh book, where he speaks of an individual form in the same way as of an individual matter, and of an individual which is composed of both.<sup>196</sup> Thus the form is to be envisaged as a physical, not logical part of the thing. For this reason it is not to be incorporated directly into any of the categories, no more than matter and other parts of the being. If form or matter, side by side with the composite, were to stand directly in the category, one consequence, aside from other incoherencies, would be a disruption of the univocity of the generic concept. For "matter is called first substance in *one way*, form *in another*, and that which is composed of both in *a third*."<sup>197</sup>

But what holds of the parts of a being, namely, that the concept of the category is not completely contained in them, obviously holds even more of that which is, as such, in a state of potentiality. For if matter in general, being part of the real thing, belongs to the category of that thing only reductively, it will certainly not possess sufficient completeness of being to be subordinated directly under a genus so long as it is merely in a state of preparation toward form. As the fourteenth book of the *Metaphysics* says, that which is only potentially man is, properly speaking, not man, and thus does not directly belong under the category of man. Whatever is potentially, insofar as it is potentially, is actually a non-being; only the actual has being in the proper sense. Since the merely potential does not have an essence, it also does not have a concept, and matter by itself alone is not cognizable.<sup>198</sup>

But wherever, as with motion [*kinesis*], something which is in a state of potentiality is, as such, constituted by some form, two states are really and conceptually one, a state of potentiality with respect to a prospective form, and a state of actuality with respect to the form through which it is constituted. Thus in this case a double subordination will have to take place, a direct one under the category of that which has actuality through the form (and this is the category of affection [*paschein*] and action [*poiein*]), and a reductive subordination under the category of that particular form which is the terminus

of the motion, i.e., according to what has been said above, under the categories of quality, quantity, and location.

Thus we see that the [kind of] being which was considered in the previous chapter is wider than consummate being, and thus also wider than the [kind of] being which is divided into the genera of the categories. Actual being [*on energeia*], as one member of this dichotomy, alone comprises all the highest genera and everything that stands directly under them. Thus, like Brandis,<sup>199</sup> we can agree with Prantl when he says "it is the type of being which occurs in the process of development of the potential to the actual, which thereby acquires the determinateness of the kind of being which is designated by the forms of assertion."<sup>200</sup> But there still seems to be a rational distinction between being insofar as it is described as actual being and insofar as it is said to be divided into the being of the categories. In the one case something is considered insofar as it has a form (*energeia*), in the other insofar as it has an essence and permits definition.<sup>201</sup>

(4) Finally, it seems to follow necessarily from the fact that the categories are genera that only things which allow of definition, where the logical parts divide into genus and differentia, can be subsumed under a category. As a consequence all pure intelligences would have to be excluded from the domain of the categories. In their case there is no physical combination of form and matter, hence also no logical combination of genus and difference, as we have already mentioned several times (see chap. 3, sect. 1, p. 18; and chap. 5, sect. 6, p. 73). Aristotle did not see this consequence even though he seems to have intimated it.<sup>202</sup> He has no scruples in dividing, in the twelfth book of the *Metaphysics*, substance into three species, i.e., sensible-corruptible, sensible-incorruptible, and separate,<sup>203</sup> and in the first book of the *Nicomachean Ethics* he adduces God as an example of a good in the genus of substance.<sup>204</sup> In general, Aristotle's theology is not well-developed in this respect, and in this particular, too, a certain incompleteness of the system cannot be denied. Thus Plotinus<sup>205</sup> objects that "Aristotle's categories are incomplete since they do not touch upon the intelligible (*ta noeta*), for it cannot be the case that the same substance [*ousia*] is had in common by the intelligible and the

sensible.” This is to some extent justified, since there cannot be a common genus for both God and the bodily substances. He says in the third chapter of the sixth book of the *Enneades*<sup>206</sup> that “one can consider them one and the same only in an analogous and equivocal manner,” and in this we agree with him without reservation. But it seems to us that he, too, is misguided when he introduces categories for the pure acts, for the *noeta*, even if they are different from the categories of sensible things. The reason is that God cannot be comprehended under any definition, and cannot be subordinated under any genus; all this would contradict the simplicity and pure actuality of his essence. Nonetheless, God will have to be associated with the category of substance as that which has being in the first and highest degree, but his association will be by analogy and not by subsumption. The development of these thoughts is no longer Aristotelian, although their germ is doubtlessly contained in his doctrine; they even follow immediately from his principles. We do not contradict them, in fact we even remain more true to them than Aristotle himself seems to have been if we raise God’s essence above all categories (as Augustine did later), since it cannot be exhausted by any of them.<sup>207</sup>

So much of things which cannot be directly subordinated under any of the categories.

- § 12. Thesis XI: Being which is divided into the categories is asserted in relation to some one thing [*pros hen*]; now since the categories are distinguished according to their manner of existence within primary substance, a deduction of the classification of categories will not be impossible.

Simplicius reports that Aristotle never gave a reason for the sequence of genera and that he consequently gives them in different orders on different occasions. He also reports that Archytas<sup>208</sup> gave a reason for the ordering of the categories and generally abided by one particular order.<sup>209</sup> It has been thought proper to conclude from this that Aristotle never thought of a justification for the natural order of the categories and, since there seems to be a connection between the two, that he never attempted to derive them from one principle. The possibility of

such a derivation has even been denied, since Aristotle's own conditions for such derivations are not satisfied. Thus Brandis says: "It follows from his deliberations concerning being and unity that he could not even have attempted to derive them from a supreme principle."<sup>210</sup> Bonitz, too, asserts that Aristotle could not possibly have undertaken a proof for his derivation in accordance with the requirements for demonstration [*apodeixis*] which he himself had developed. For such a demonstration to be possible, being [*on*] would have to be a genus,<sup>211</sup> which is not the case, according to Aristotle.<sup>212</sup> Nonetheless Aristotle seems to have been convinced of the correctness and completeness of his classification; one has sought to explain this from the fact that a kind of experiential confirmation is possible even though a deduction is not.<sup>213</sup>

But Brandis himself notes that the expression "the divisions of the categories" [*hai diairetheisai kategoriai*] (*Anal. prior.* I. 37; *Topics* IV. 1; *De anima* I. 1. 402a24; 410a14) makes reference to a classification without in any way indicating the principle of such a classification.<sup>214</sup> Bonitz also does not neglect this sense of "division" [*diairesis*], namely the division of a conceptual domain into its genera [*gene*] and forms [*eide*] (cf. *Anal. prior.* I. 31; *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96b25) and interprets the expression "division" [*diairesis*] (*Topics* IV. 1. 120b36; 121a6) as division of being [*diairesis tou ontos*]. We have attempted to describe the principle of division, whose absence Brandis notes, as a different mode of existence in primary substance. We have done so on the basis of principles and some scattered hints which Aristotle himself introduced. Indeed, the unity which occurs when there is an analogy toward the same terminus seems to suffice completely, at least in this case, to occupy the position of genus even if it is weaker than the unity which obtains for all the species of a univocal concept. Aristotle himself has said this. He does indeed say in the beginning of the *Posterior Analytics* (I. 28) "a science is *one* if it is about *one* genus . . . sciences are different if there are no common principles from which their principles follow, and if the principles of one do not follow from those of the other."<sup>215</sup> And in the third book of the *Metaphysics* he says "that the same science studies the same genus, and the attributes which belong to it as such, from

the same principles.”<sup>216</sup> If one takes genus in the strict sense of the word then the difficulties for the object of metaphysics are considerable, and Aristotle does not neglect to emphasize them; after all, metaphysics is the science which considers being *qua* being and the attributes which accrue to it as such.<sup>217</sup> But the manner in which Aristotle resolves this difficulty does not allow any doubt that in this case he did not insist upon strict univocity. He thought it sufficient if unity in relation to one thing, as it occurs in the analogy toward the same terminus, is maintained. For these are his words: “For there should be *one* science not only of those things which univocally partake in one name, but also . . . those which have a name in relation to one nature; for the latter, too, in a sense asserts a common thing [*kath hen*]. Hence it is clear that it is the concern of one science to investigate being *qua* being.”<sup>218</sup> Here again he speaks of the kinds of being and the corresponding kinds of the one as if being were a genus; and these so-called kinds are, of course, the categories.<sup>219</sup> Hence the fact that being is not univocal does not furnish a reason why the possibility of a reduction of the highest generic concepts should be denied. On the contrary, it seems to me that there is no doubt that Aristotle could have arrived at a certain a priori proof, a deductive argument [*pistis dia syllogismou*] for the completeness of the distinction of categories by focusing upon the various possibilities relative to the mode of existence of the predicate in the subject.

We do not possess any such deduction of the highest genera in Aristotle’s writings comparable to what he gives for the concepts which determine the difference in method (*Topics* I. 8. 103b7). Nonetheless, it does not seem plausible to suppose that he should have been satisfied with a proof by induction [*pistis dia tes epagoges*], despite the possibility of a deductive proof [*pistis dia syllogismou*]. In addition to the expression “division of the categories” noticed by Brandis [*hai diairethesai kategoriai*], Aristotle’s conscious certainty concerning the completeness of his table of categories points to a more than merely inductive confirmation through experience. The latter, always incomplete, would provide only an insecure warrant, especially in the case of such a multi-membered classification with so comprehensive a meaning which extends over the whole of reality. In connec-

tion with the question whether Aristotle justified the completeness of the table of categories syllogistically, derivation of the categories from the modes of being would be of the greatest significance. We shall undertake such a derivation in the following section. We shall proceed in every case from Aristotle's own views. Above, when determining the principle of division, we could find confirmation of our views in Aristotle's own occasional remarks. It will be possible similarly to confirm the analogous intermediate steps through which we shall move from general being [*on*] to the highest genera.

- § 13. Thesis XII: The deductive proof for the division of the categories must begin with the distinction between substance and accident. Substance will not allow of further division, but the latter can be divided initially into the two classes of absolute accidents and relations, and absolute accidents further into inherence, affection, and external circumstances.

Aristotle takes a step toward a deduction of the categories with a well-known, profound ontological division, which was respected even by Spinoza, when he says that whatever is is either in itself or in another [*Omne quod est, aut in se aut in alio est.*]. The division into substance [*ousia*] and accident [*symbebekos*] is a division which in these two members comprises all being which belongs to the categories.<sup>220</sup> It is a division which rests upon distinctions between kinds of existence in first substance, on a difference of predication, and thus corresponds to the indicated principle of classification.<sup>221</sup> For whatever is substance exists in first substance as identical in essence with it; whatever is accident exists in it, not as belonging to its essence but as something which is met with in it, or inheres in it in the widest sense of the word. Hence, following Trendelenburg, we have above described the category of substance [*ousia*] as the category of the subject. The reason is this: first substance is conceived as the subject for all categories (see above). Wherever it moves into predicate position it is not merely named but determined in its concept, so that only in this case the essential unity of subject and predicate occurs.

This difference between substance [*ousia*] and accident [*symbebekos*] is greater than any difference that can occur between accidents. It is the most obvious and is therefore justly placed at the beginning.<sup>222</sup>

Of course the identity of essence is a real absence of distinctions and does not allow any further discrimination within it. Thus we here encounter a genus, and further real divisions of substance [*ousia*] will have to take the form of divisions of a univocal concept through added differentiae [*diaphorai*] in the manner of a specification in the narrower sense. Thus, in *Met.* XII. 1, Aristotle divides substance into sensory corruptible and incorruptible on the one hand, and immovable separate substance on the other (see above).

One could still make a distinction in the relation between predicate and subject even for predicates which are asserted of primary substance in the manner of essential identity. This distinction would lie in the fact that one of them, while factually identical with the subject, is nonetheless distinct from it by virtue of its more general conceptual formulation, as for example when I say "Socrates is a man," while the other is both factually and rationally altogether identical with it, as when I say "Socrates is Socrates." In this manner Aristotle does indeed arrive, in the *Categories*, at the distinction between present particular [*tode ti*] or first substance [*prote ousia*] and secondary substances [*deuterai ousiai*] (*Cat.* V. 1). But it is impossible that there should be a more essential predication than essential predication. In both cases the factual relation between subject and predicate is the same. If we based a further distinction on this difference between conceptual conditions, we would go too far on the path required to reach generic determinations in the classification of being [*on*] as equivocal but analogical [*homonymon kat' analogian*]; we would arrive at a point where there is no longer any difference in extramental relations. By distinguishing first and second substances Aristotle does not give us species into which a genus is divided; neither does he give us genera into which an analogon is separated. Nonetheless, it is an extension of the classification of the categories, and a welcome sign of the direction in which it moves.

Thus while essential predication produces only a single kind of predication and category, non-essential predication, which has generally been described as accidental [*symbainein*], shows great differences even at first glance. Even the accidental [*symbebekos*] itself is only one by analogy [an *analogon*] which will again divide into several classes depending on the manner in which it is predicated of primary substance. To begin with, whatever can be asserted of the subject, without itself being the subject, can be attributed to it either absolutely or merely in relation to another. The accidents are either absolute accidents or relations. By the latter we mean the kind of accidental being which consists in nothing but a certain attitude toward something.<sup>223</sup> Here the substance of which it is predicated is oriented toward some other thing, as for example when I say "Socrates is wiser than Hippias," "Philip is the father of Alexander." These relations have a different mode of existence in substance than the other accidents, a different type of dependence upon it (*Met.* IV. 2. 1003b16). But these two points are really identical with each other. For substance, in the manner in which it subsists, holds and bears the accident; and the accident depends upon the substance in the way it attaches to it. Aristotle takes the difference in the way absolute and relative accidents exist in substance to be the greatest difference in modes of existence after the distinction between substance [*ousia*] and accident [*symbebekos*]. He stresses this particularly where he wants to make clear to the Platonists the material distinction between the various modes of being, i.e., the distinction in the relation between subject and form. Relations which are only loosely tied to the subject and merely touch it without modifying it, as it were, are distinguished from the other accidents which properly affect the substance. Thus it appears that the total domain of the being of the categories is divided into three classes: "one consists of substances . . . (*ousiai*), another of affections (*pathe*) and another of relations. . . (*pros ti*)." (*Met.* XIV. 2).<sup>224</sup> Brandis notes the following with respect to this passage: "He had to exclude substances and relations from the class of the remaining categories, and chose the expression 'affection' for the latter in order to designate their dependence upon substances, which does not occur in the same way with

relations.”<sup>225</sup> This becomes particularly obvious where Aristotle speaks of movement and of coming to be and passing away of relative things. Neither movement in the narrower sense, nor proper becoming, which is not excluded from any other category, properly applies to them, because a relation to something can be asserted, now truly and now falsely, of a subject even if it has not changed in any way. This is taught in *Physics*, V. 2 and the corresponding part of *Met.* XI also, in *Met.* XIV. 1; it can also be documented from the *Categories*.

Since this kind of predicate<sup>227</sup> is so loosely tied to the subject and since it is the least substance-like category, it has to be moved to the end of the entire series of categories, while substance must occupy the first position.<sup>228</sup> Let us separate it from the remaining accidents, which are affections; then these absolute accidents also do not all seem to be predicated of substance in the same way. Let us remember that movement was attributed not only to that from which it proceeded but also to the substance which was prepared by the movement to receive the form, though of course in an entirely different respect. We have also seen that there is a sense in which a place (i.e., an area) belongs to a body; in a sense this place is properly and immediately “in” the body. Now if this first body spatially determines a second body, then the place can also be asserted of the second body (of which we say that it is in the place), but in an entirely different way. For there is certainly a great difference in the manner in which “plain” or “market place” are predicated of something when I say: “this field is a plain” rather than “this stone lies in the plain”; or else “these houses, etc., are or form the market place” [*agora*] rather than “these baskets, fruits, etc., are in the market” [*en agora*].

In these examples we can discern, in particular, three classes of predicates which are attributed to substance absolutely though not univocally [*synonymos*]<sup>229</sup> into which these affections or *pathe* are initially divided in such a way that this division exhausts all possibilities. (Aristotle uses the expression “affection” [*pathe*] in wider, narrower, and multiply modified senses;<sup>230</sup> we use it here in its widest sense.) Thus there is being in a first and most narrow sense, being of which all else is predicated. Then there is relation which is virtually without

being, only the shadow of a being, rather accompanying the act of another thing than itself a thing; and what is neither one nor the other will be attributable to the substance of which it is predicated as either in the substance, or outside it in another, or, finally, partly within it and partly outside of it. A fourth case cannot be conceived. The first is inherence [*eneinai*] in the proper sense. This is the case which comes closest to the relation between substantial form and primary matter [*prote hyle*]. These accidents, as for example color, extension, etc., can be called *inherences*. By contrast, if the predicate exists initially altogether outside the subject, as for example place is outside of that which is in the place, so that the subject, for some special reason, is externally determined by it, then we can call such accidents external determinations or circumstances of the substance. Aristotle characterizes these external determinations clearly in the examples which he has chosen for the “where” [*pou*], namely “in the market” [*en agora*], and in the lyceum [*en lykeio*] (*Categories* IV. 2a1). In *Topics* IV. 6. 144b31 and *Physics* IV. 12. 221a28, he calls predicates which belong to this class simply “those which are in something” [*ta en tini*]. Finally, if the predicate derives partly from within and partly from without, as when it is to the subject not as form is to matter, but as activity is to the potency which it actualizes,<sup>231</sup> then it should be called an operation or, to use Aristotle’s expression, a movement [*kinesis*].<sup>232</sup> In this case either the origin or the terminus of the predicate is within or outside the subject; for, in Aristotle’s words, the operation is intermediate between that which operates and that which suffers the operation.<sup>233</sup>

Let us, to begin with, consider the first of the three classes, i.e., inherent accidents. Will it also be one class by analogy only, or ought we to maintain inherence as genus and category? We must initially rely upon sensory substances; they are more recognizable and certain to us;<sup>234</sup> indeed, in the strict sense they are the only things contained in a genus.<sup>235</sup> In Aristotle’s view they are not simple substances, but their essence is formed by a composition of matter and form, where the latter actualizes the former, and gives it being and essence. Each of these principles has a distinct position vis-à-vis the compositum; one is its potentiality [*dynamis*], the other its actuality [*entelecheia*].<sup>236</sup>

From this it follows that the accidents of substance which properly inhere in it still have different relations to substance, i.e., they will be inherent in it in different ways depending upon whether they attach to it by virtue of its matter or by virtue of its form.

Quantity (*poson*) derives from the matter of substance which, in conformity with the character of potentiality of the material principle, is explained as follows: "We call something a quantum if it can be divided into wholes that exist within it and are capable of being individual substances."<sup>237</sup> This connection with the material principle is especially clear in *Met.* VII. 3. Just as matter is the ultimate element of substance, of which the latter is in a sense predicated (*Met.* VII. 3. 1029a24), so quantity here appears as that which belongs to substance initially, and which is subtracted last when the accidents are abstracted from the subject. For those who do not know the principle of substantial forms, only matter [*hyle*] seems to remain in such a case.<sup>238</sup>

On the other side stand the qualities, which are related to form as quantity is related to matter. For a quality amounts to an attribute, a manner and mode of a substance, i.e., a determination or differentiation in some respect or other. This determination occurs (1) because of substantial being; thus the species is determined by the substantial difference, which is proportional to form, as we have already seen. Thus in *Met.* V substantial difference is described as substantial quality, as first quality.<sup>239</sup> (2) A determination and modification of the subject occurs also because of accidental being, and this is the category of quality with which we are presently concerned, and this, too, is a difference. For it determines and differentiates the subject either by quantity, and such qualities are figures,<sup>240</sup> or it differentiates the subject with respect to the essence of the thing; in this case it will be an attribute of the thing which is either appropriate or inappropriate to the thing. Thus, for example, a body which is healthy and a body which is ill are differentiated in their nature by these attributes, and are well and ill disposed, respectively; these are the states [*hexeis*] and dispositions [*diatheseis*] of the categories.<sup>241</sup> Or else a quality differentiates a subject by virtue of an operation, as for example

heat, etc. In short, no matter how different the species of quality, in order to belong to this category they must always have the character of something that determines and differentiates, and which therefore has a certain kinship with form, which distinguishes this category from quantity.<sup>242</sup> Thus Trendelenburg says, "Just as quantity results from the matter of substance, so quality from form."<sup>243</sup> He points out that one can thus, in a sense, give priority to the *quale* over the *quantum*, according to *Met.* XII. 1: "Thus the first is substance, followed by quality and then by quantity,"<sup>244</sup> even if the opposite order is usually more appropriate. Aristotle gives precedence almost always to quality,<sup>245</sup> perhaps because form, from which it derives, is the more powerful principle, and is more substance than matter [is substance]. Still, both orders have a justifiable motivation, and much can be said for the order preferred by Trendelenburg for the reasons developed by him on pages 77 f. We are here merely concerned with showing that a properly inherent accident may have either of two manners of inherence, and that therefore two manners of predication can be distinguished. Hence just as accident was not a genus, neither is inherence; it is only analogically common [*koinon kat' analogian*] to the genera of *quantity* and *quality*.<sup>246</sup>

If one wants to take account of ontological significance,<sup>247</sup> and wants to descend step by step from the internal to the external modes of predication, then the class of inherent accidents must be followed by the class of motions [*kinesis*]. In the first class, the predicate was applied to the subject on the basis of inherence. In the present case, predicating one of the other will be made possible by causality. Only the connection which causality establishes between individual substances satisfies the condition that was offered as the differentia for this second class of predicates, viz., that that from which the predicate derives stands in relation to something in the subject as well as to something outside the subject, being intermediate between them.<sup>248</sup> With respect to origin, beating is in the one who beats; with respect to the terminus it is in the one who is beaten. Since it is thus intermediate between them, as it were, it can be predicated of one as well as the other. It is not so much in something [*en tode*] as toward something [*pros tode*],

as Aristotle not unfittingly describes it (*Met.* IX. 6. 1048b6). It will not do to reply that Aristotle himself said that motion is in the moved (e.g., in *Physics* III. 3. 202a13 and other passages considered earlier). For in these cases motion did not form determinate categories; rather, just like potentiality and actuality it occurred in the several categories; this could take place only by reducing it to the genus of the terminus, which we discussed above. This terminus, however, does not exist in the moving agent, but in the moved; for example, in the movement from black to white both of the termini as well as all colors which are actualized during the motion are to be envisaged as termini of parts of this motion, and they are all present in that which is turning white. But insofar as motion is supposed to form special genera of being, we cannot attribute to it any kind of being-in [*en tode einai*], not even in that which is in motion, but only a direction [*pros tode*], or more precisely, a "being toward something" [*epi tode einai*].

Two kinds of predication result directly. The operation is predicated either of that wherein is found<sup>249</sup> the origin of the operation and from which it proceeds (*hyph' hou estin*),<sup>250</sup> the agent, or else of that which contains the terminus of the operation (*eph ho he kinesis*),<sup>251</sup> that which is affected. On one hand there will emerge doing (*poiein*), and on the other suffering (*paschein*), and this will exhaust the number of categories possible in this case.

We must now touch briefly upon an objection which could be urged against this. Aristotle distinguishes two kinds of doing, action in the proper sense (*facere, poiein*) and activity (*agere, pratein*). Action in the narrow sense is an act which is directed toward some external matter, such as building, cutting, etc. Activity, on the other hand, is a doing which remains within the agent himself, such as seeing, willing, etc.<sup>252</sup> Hence the relation between an acting subject and his action seems to be entirely different from the relation between a subject who is engaged in activity, and his activity. One may be able to say of action that it stands in relation both to something in and to something outside the subject; but activity seems to lie wholly within the subject. Hence it demands its own special mode of predication and thus constitutes a special category of intransitive activity.

When we consider it more closely the plausibility of this objection is merely apparent, and it remains true that acting, being engaged in activity, and being affected can form only two categories. To see this clearly it is necessary first of all to observe that there is no motion whatever where the moving agent is identical with the thing moved. For whatever is active must be actual [*energeia*] insofar as it is active; this is the reason why, simply speaking, actuality precedes potentiality.<sup>253</sup> Nothing comes from nothing. On the other hand that which is affected, and upon which the action is directed, insofar as it is to undergo something, must contain potentially [*dynamei*] what it will be. Hence it is clear that nothing is a moving agent by virtue of that relative to which it is moved, even if one takes motion in the widest sense.

Let us now consider the activities of which it is said that through them something moves itself. They divide into two classes: (1) those which are only apparently intransitive, where something does not properly move itself, but one part moves another (*Physics* VII. 1. 241b27). Aristotle says in the beginning of the seventh book of the *Physics* that this is the case with all motions in the narrow sense, e.g., locomotion,<sup>254</sup> which were described by him as incomplete actuality [*energeiai atelous*], actuality of potential being [*energeiai tou dynamei ontos*] (*Physics* VII. 1. 241b33). Hence [we may suppose that] Aristotle does not allow activities such as walking about [*peripatein*] and running [*trechein*] to be intransitive in the narrow sense.

(2) The second kind are the genuinely intransitive movements. They are not part of what is narrowly called motion, which is discussed in the *Physics*. But there is another kind of movement, since one can speak of movement in a wider sense wherever there is a transition from potentiality to actuality.<sup>255</sup> Such an intransitive activity takes place, for example, in willing. The will really moves itself. But, according to what we have just noticed, even the will cannot be mover and moved, active and affected with respect to one and the same thing. One act of will calls forth another, none calls forth itself. Insofar as the will actually [*energeia*] wills the end, it reduces itself from potentiality to actuality with regard to that which, through deliberation, it recognizes as suitable to that end. In this way

an entire series of resolutions and acts of will can proceed from one another, in which the preceding always is the cause of the following as, for example, when someone who wants to travel to Rome decides to ship across the Mediterranean, to stop at Marseilles and a number of cities, to enter a carriage, etc. But this series must have a beginning. We cannot always presuppose another act of will. One of them must be the first; this, too, did not exist from eternity, and thus we are forced to assume an external mover upon whose impulse the first motion of the will takes place. Just as in physical motion the first principle which moves nature comes from outside, so also in the case of movements of will, although the will itself can contain the next following principle of an act of will.<sup>256</sup> Thus every intransitive movement appears to be secondary movement.

It is now no longer difficult to take care of the question raised above. The intransitive entities of the first type, which are actually not intransitive at all, divide themselves into an acting [*poiein*] and a being affected [*paschein*] since the motion as acting, and the motion as being affected do not belong to the same part. Thus, depending on the aspect from which they are viewed, they belong to one or the other of these two categories. The principle and the terminus are clearly separated from each other. Under careful scrutiny the properly imminent acts also divide into two concepts which belong to these two genera. It is indeed the case that one and the same subject is both active and passive, i.e., principle and terminus of the activity lie within it; yet an actual difference between the two persists. That *through which* something is realized is not the same as *that which* is realized. Thus the operation stands in two different relations to the subject and is asserted of it in two different modes of predication, and one obtains two concepts which differ precisely according to the requirements of the two categories. In one respect the principle of the activity is found in the subject, but in this respect it does not contain the terminus; on the other hand, in the respect in which it contains the terminus it does not contain the principle.<sup>257</sup> Thus the first act of will which, as we saw, was occasioned by an external mover, is not intransitive. From the side of the will it is a mere affection [*paschein*]. Nonetheless it is obviously of the exact

same nature as the following acts of will, and as an affection it will have to be placed into one and the same genus with them. Thus it is impossible that Aristotle could assume a special category, different from action and affection for the intransitive movements, as Trendelenburg seems to suppose.<sup>258</sup> This would amount to the following: in the course of the constitution of a category two relations of the thing to primary substance would be apprehended simultaneously, two types of existence-in, two types of "to be" [*einai*] and being [*on*] would be alloyed in one concept. But this concept would then not be properly *one*, and not a simple predicate, as is required for categories. Thus Aristotle proceeds correctly, and in accordance with the principle of the division of the categories when he acknowledges both of them to be contained in one genus.<sup>259</sup>

Thus in this second class only two categories seem to be possible, namely, action and affection. Yet it would not be inexplicable if we saw the number of these categories increase further. Activity was intermediate between two things. But on some occasions two objects appear related to each other in such a way that an intermediate entity enters between them in the mode of action, without yet being activity. In the one of them is found an analogon of the principle of the activity, in the other the analogon of the terminus of the activity. Such quasi-activity exists, as Aristotle teaches in *Met.* V. 20, for example between a dress and the person who is dressed in it.<sup>260</sup> The dress protects or adorns, the person dressed is thereby protected or adorned. Yet protecting or adorning is not an action in the narrow sense; hence we cannot here speak in the same way of principle and terminus. Now if one looks upon the matter in this way, one must in the end come to the point of constituting a special category for being dressed, and Aristotle has done exactly this. In the fourth chapter of the *Categories* he enumerates among the highest genera also "having" [*echein*]<sup>261</sup> and illustrates it by the examples "is shod, is armed."<sup>262</sup> The commentators, too, take this concept very narrowly as the having on or wearing of an item of apparel,<sup>263</sup> and I must confess that it seems hardly possible to doubt the correctness of this interpretation, since Aristotle, in the ninth chapter, repeats

the very same examples. Hence it seems that he believes he has precisely fixed the meaning of the term “having” [*echein*], so that a further explanation is not necessary.<sup>264</sup> Bonitz thinks that “the examples do not nearly suffice as the basis for an induction.”<sup>265</sup> Indeed, they suffice only in case the limits of “having” are drawn so narrowly that the concepts “to be armed” [*hoplistai*] and “to be shod” [*hypodedetai*] satisfactorily represent the total domain of having, i.e., if we take as the generic concept the narrowest concept common to both of them. An already quoted passage from the fifth book of the *Metaphysics* gives us an explanation of this phenomenon which seems surprising at first sight, viz. that something so very specific should be reckoned among the highest genera. This passage also shows that he really included this mode of predication in the class of motions [*kineseis*]. If such an actuality [*energeia*], which is akin to an activity, did in fact proceed from one of them and affected the other, if the armour which protects me had a real positive influence upon me, then, without doubt, this influence would require a new type of accidentality and predication of primary substance, and consequently a new category would have to be acknowledged for it. On the other hand, if nothing occurs between them but a relation which is merely mistaken for a kind of actual activity, as the form of words itself implies, i.e., if the active influences are only a fiction and the difference between this and activity proper is the difference between a fiction and an actuality, then no new category is to be constituted. In this case the having [*echein*], according to its actual content, is to be placed among the relations. On the other hand, the first mentioned improper mode of representation requires that it should be placed under the categories of movement proper, though not directly but rather as mere being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*], hence only reductively in the same way in which fictional relations are reduced to the category of relation [*pros ti*], etc.

We have no doubt that only a true action [*poiein*] or affection [*paschein*] can claim a rightful place in the class of movements [*kineseis*]. Upon closer examination the actual content will always be reduced to that of a relation. According to the most eminent recent scholars, Aristotle himself seems to

have deleted having [*echein*] as well as posture [*keisthai*] from the categories, where the latter occupies a similar position and adds, in its real content, only a certain relation of parts to the "where" [*pou*].<sup>266</sup> (For this reason it belongs, as position [*thesis*], to the relations. As "being disposed" [*keisthai*] an appearance of motion [*kinesis*] is bestowed upon it, and thus it seems to form a special category.)<sup>267</sup> When Aristotle deleted these two he probably subsumed and reduced them in the way we have indicated.<sup>268</sup> There is no active category which contrasts with the category of being clothed, as would have to be the case if there were an actuality which proceeded, as an influence, from the dress to the person clothed.<sup>269</sup> Aristotle indicates thereby that in actuality we have here only a relation which, of course, cannot possess two different genera of existence-in with respect to one or the other terminus. Aristotle does not specifically mention having and posture where he discusses the difference of movement in the various categories.<sup>270</sup> This indicates that they themselves claim to be something related to movement,<sup>271</sup> and there is one occasion (*Met.* VII. 4. 1029b24) where he simply puts movement for action, affection, posture and having; these passages say something that becomes even more evident elsewhere (e.g., in *Anal. post.* I. 2. 83a21 and 83b15 where the purpose of the enumeration of the categories obviously requires a complete list), viz. that having and posture are not properly separate categories. The passage in *Met.* V. 7 is decisive; the first chapter of book VII refers to it as a place where a complete enumeration of the categories is given,<sup>272</sup> and it does, in fact, list only eight categories.<sup>273</sup>

So much about the class of operations or movements, which thus remains limited to two genera, namely, action and affection.

We now come to the final class of absolute accidents, the *circumstances*. The predicate is here taken from outside, as inhering in the subject to a minimal degree; thus they must be called being in the least degree. Here, too, we notice at once a distinction among the predicates which allows only a unity by analogy for this mode of predication. There are two measures through which all finite things are measured and determined from outside, viz. place and time, and each determines in an

entirely different manner.<sup>274</sup> Thus there will necessarily be two types of predication, one for temporal, the other for local determination, and thus at least two categories. We say "at least;" for it remains to investigate (1) whether there are other circumstances under which such a predication from outside takes place and (2) whether these modes of predication show further internal distinctions.

Concerning the first point, the addition of a new class of circumstances does not seem conceivable. On the one hand, the various possibilities of determination by external measures are exhausted by place and time (the internal measures of the thing, such as length, breadth and height do not belong in this class since they are inherent); on the other hand, a real predication of something external (which must yet in some way determine the subject in order to have for it a genuine mode of being and accidentality) will not be possible without the determination which is given through the measure. If an altogether external thing does not even provide a measure for that which is determined, then it will not be relevant to the determined thing; the latter will not be determined by it.

The other question was whether the two indicated modes of predication do not, perhaps because of a further analogy, constitute more than two categories. But this, too, seems impossible. In the case of time this is immediately obvious; for everything which is temporally measured relates in the same way to the time span which corresponds to it as its measure; what is today does not differ in this respect from what was yesterday and what was last year. It is different in the case of place. A substance cannot only have spatial determinations by occupying this or that place, it can also occupy one and the same place in different ways, i.e., with a varying order of parts in this place. In time, too, there is an order of parts, but this is only an arrangement [*taxis*] not a posture [*thesis*], as Aristotle teaches in the sixth chapter of the *Categories*,<sup>275</sup> and this arrangement is contained in the concept of time itself,<sup>276</sup> while in a place there is also a posture. Now if I say that the staff is here, and that it is vertical, then each of these predicates seems to be a circumstance, a determination from outside by means of place [*topos*]; yet the mode of predication seems

nonetheless different. Thus, posture [*keisthai*], once again, demands to be treated as a special category.

What is posture? Obviously nothing but the order of the thing which has parts, with respect to place.<sup>277</sup> Hence if I also know of something which is in a certain place that it is, for example, in a vertical position, then I know in addition to the place of the thing merely the relation of its parts to each other with respect to their place determination. Hence Aristotle is correct when he mentions posture as a species of relation (*Cat.* 7. 6b11).<sup>278</sup> For this reason it also does not have an independent coming to be and passing away; for as soon as each of the parts has occupied a determinate place<sup>279</sup> the relation among them is automatically given. Initially this relation is obviously only an accident of the parts; the upper part is above the lower by virtue of posture, the back one behind the front one, etc.<sup>280</sup> But the accidents of the parts are also predicated of the whole to which they belong. The hair is blond, hence the person is blond, i.e., of hair; the hand is wounded, hence the man is wounded, i.e., in his hand; the head is here, the foot is there, hence the man is here and there. Thus the relation of the parts is also predicated of the whole. If an egg shows different colors in different parts, then the relation of the parts with respect to their colors is also predicated of the whole, and I say that the egg is motley. Similarly if a man's head is related to the other parts of his body in such a way that it is below and they are above, then I say of the whole man that he is head-down, etc. The relation is now no longer evident in the linguistic expression, as it was before when the higher was claimed to be higher than a lower, and the lower was lower than a higher. But to the "head-down" I cannot add "with respect to" [*tinós*], which normally is the linguistic mark of a relation.<sup>281</sup> But obviously, as far as being is concerned, this does not make any difference. The predicate "motley" belongs to relation just as much as the contrastingly colored, whose color differs from the color of another thing; likewise posture [*thesis*] will not have more substantial being for the whole than the weak being of the relation in which the parts stand to each other, which is now transferred to the whole. The existence in the whole is obviously not added to that found in the parts; rather, as a consequence

of the latter, and with respect to the parts, the same accident is attributed to the whole.

In this way the whole appears to undergo a determination by its parts which appears like affection, and the opportunity arises to feign a quasi-action, a kind of positive influence between the parts and the whole to which the parts give posture. Thus it happens that “being disposed” [*keisthai*] appears to be more than mere posture [*thesis*] and aspires to the same class as movement [*kinesis*], in the same way as having [*echein*] (see above). But the more strict version of the categories, which does not give a place in the direct lineage to anything which exists only in the understanding, does not permit this, as we saw above.

Thus the third class, too, contains only two categories: (1) the where [*pou*], where place is predicated of that which is in it, and (2) the when [*pote*], where time is predicated of that which it determines as a measure. A few passages from the fourth book of the *Physics* will confirm that this version of the two concepts where and when is indeed that of Aristotle.

(1) *Concerning the category “where”*. Aristotle explains the where in the *Categories* by “in the market, in the Lyceum.” This agrees completely with what we read in *Physics* IV. 5. There it is shown how something can be located in a place, and in 212a31 he says: “If then a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place, and if not, not.”<sup>282</sup> And this being in a place is defined as being somewhere (*ibid.*, b14): “For what is somewhere is itself something, and there must be alongside it some other thing wherein it is and which contains it.” Similarly in a passage immediately preceding, the where is used synonymously with “in place” (*ibid.*, b8): “not anywhere . . . nor in any place.” Cf. *ibid.*, 6. 213b7, etc. Similarly also in *Physics* III. 5. 206a2: “what is in a special place is in place, and what is in place is in a special place.” Thus it cannot be doubted that this means the category “where”, and this is confirmed by *Topics* VI. 6. 144b31: “See, too, if he has rendered ‘existence in’ something as the differentia of a thing’s essence; for the general view is that locality cannot differentiate between one essence and another.” Finally, a particular confirmation is *Physics* VIII. 7. 261a20: “A thing that is in motion loses its

essential character less in the process of locomotion than in any other kind of motion; it is the only motion that does not involve a change of being in the sense in which there is a change in quality when a thing is altered, and a change in quantity when a thing is increased or decreased." We have seen above that movements are divided according to the three categories in which they occur, and locomotion [*phora*] is movement in the category of place [*pou*]. Hence this category is something whose change does not cause inner variation in substance. Hence, the "where" of the categories is an external predicate and it is the "in a place" [*en topo*] as which we have described it.

(2) Concerning the category "when" [*pote*]. "Where" corresponds to "in a place", and in the same way "when" corresponds to "in time" [*en chrono*].<sup>283</sup> Aristotle discusses this in the same book, chapter 12. In 221a7 he determines being in time [*en chrono einai*] in the following manner: "Clearly then 'to be in time' has the same meaning for other things also, namely, that their being should be measured by time." Thus, in the case of time, the "in time" corresponds exactly to what we have found as "in place" or "where" with respect to place (*ibid.*, a17): "Things are in time as they are in number. If this is so, they are contained by time as things in place are contained by place, etc." and *ibid.*, a28: "So it is necessary that all the things in time should be contained by time, just like other things also which are 'in anything', e.g., the things 'in place' by place." This agrees completely with the examples in *Cat.* 4. 2a2: "'Yesterday', 'last year', [fall under the category of] time." Since both examples concern the past, one could come to believe that the category "when" is restricted in its extension to the past and the future, that it is that which is defined in *Physics* IV. 13. 222a24: "'At some time' means a time determined in relation to the first of the two types of 'now', e.g., 'at some time' Troy was conquered, and 'at some time' there will be a flood; for it must be determined with reference to the 'now'. There will thus be a determinate time from this 'now' to that." But, as Trendelenburg correctly remarks,<sup>284</sup> the category of the "when" also includes the present. The second "now" [*nun*], as well as the "at some time", "already", "at present", "long ago" [*pote, ede, arti, palai*], are

subject to the “in time” [*en chrono*]. This, as the “in something” [*en tini*], as Aristotle calls the predicates for which we use the name “circumstance”, is the “when” [*pote*] of the categories which is analogous to the “where” [*pou*]. The latter contains every answer to the question “where?”, the former to the question “when?” which is directed to the present particular [*tode ti*]. “When do you walk?—Presently.” “When did you arrive?—Just now” (*Ibid.* 13. 222b8, b13).<sup>285</sup>


Thus, through a determination of the different modes of predication we have arrived at a determinate number of highest genera, which have found unity by analogy through being. Let us, in conclusion, give a concise version of the entire course of the deduction, since the individual investigations which were inserted make it difficult to achieve a purview of it.

The kind of being which is our present concern excludes accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*] as well as being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*], which exists only in the understanding; it also excludes the kind of being which lacks actuality and consummation, such as potential being [*on dynamei*].

Being in the narrow sense includes all classes and genera of things, and initially divides into *substance* and *accident*. The concept of substance turned out to be univocal so far as the lower genera are concerned; it formed the first category. Accident, on the other hand, appeared as an analogous concept which was divided into *absolute accidents* and *relations* in accordance with the manner in which the predicates applied to the subject, viz. absolutely or with respect to another thing. Relation, or *pros ti*, whose tie with substance is weakest, and which thus has being in the least degree, formed the final category. But absolute accident, too, allowed us to recognize great differences in its relation to first substance and in the manner in which things were predicated of the latter; consequently three classes had to be distinguished. The first included those accidental predicates of primary being [*protos on*] which were attributed to it as properly existing within it, whose being [*einai*] was properly a being-in [*eneinai*]. They were *inherent accidents*, and they formed as many categories as there are inner principles of substance, namely, two: *quantity* [*poson*] which comes to substance from the side of matter, and *quality*

[*poion*] which comes to it from the side of form. The second class contained those predicates which belong to it partly from within and partly from without, which are more in relation to substance [*pros to hypokeimenon*] than in substance [*en to hypokeimeno*], and which were usually called operations [*kineseis*]. It, too, contained two categories, viz. action [*poiein*] and affection [*paschein*]. In the first case the predicate is taken from something contained in the subject as a principle, in the second case from something contained in the subject as terminus. Finally, the third class of absolute accidents, where the predicate was borrowed from something *outside* the subject, was divided into the where [*pou*] and the when [*pote*], and this seemed to exhaust the number of possible modes of predication, if they are to contain only real concepts.

GRAPH 1



Thus we seem to have arrived at the only eight categories which Aristotle appears to have persistently maintained. There also was a tempting branch to having [*echein*] and posture [*keisthai*] from the path of division which we have followed. We have sought to follow Aristotle's principles in determining the relations to first substance, and thus in the distinction between the individual classes. The division of the inner attri-

butes proceeded according to the inner principles of substance, matter [*hyle*] and form [*morphe*], the distinction of the mediating attributes according to the relation of actual and potential being [*energeia* and *dynamei on*] which, according to his doctrine, occurs in all movement. Finally in the constitution of the external categories we followed the views concerning place and time, *topos* and *en topos*, *chronos* and *en chrono*, which are put forth in the fourth book of the *Physics*. Why should we not believe that Aristotle followed this deductive argumentation [*pistis dia syllogismou*] and thus attained his great trust in the validity and the completeness of his categories, which mere induction even under more favourable circumstances could not have afforded him, as it did not in the division of quality: he did not take it as established that the divisions of quality were exhausted in spite of the narrower compass, smaller number and greater conformity of its univocal members.<sup>286</sup> If certainty derived from induction it obviously would be greater in the case of the qualities.

The plausibility of such a deduction is made complete by the following fact: if we collect together the various passages in his writings where he designates several categories with one name, either because he notices a special kinship between them or something that they have in common in their mode of predication of first substance, and if we subordinate them to each other in the proper fashion, we can construct the missing family tree of the categories without gap. Prantl already noticed this and justly placed great emphasis upon it. We cannot, however, agree with his talk of reduction of categories to categories.<sup>287</sup> Brandis notes correctly that this would destroy the entire significance of the categories.<sup>288</sup> This approach leads Prantl to postulate higher as well as lower categories than those ten or eight. At that point one no longer knows what is so extraordinary about the latter. A procedure which is not properly analysis but only similar to it will reduce the categories neither to each other nor to a higher genus (see Ch. V, note 55, p. 169) but to analogous unities and finally to being itself as the highest analogous concept (*malista katholon legetai*, see above).

The most important passages from Aristotle which belong in this context are probably the following:

GRAPH 2

Being according to the categories  
[to kata tas ptoseis on]

*Met.* XIV. 2.  
1089a26<sup>289</sup>

*Anal. post.* I. 4.  
73b5, etc.

*Met.* XIV. 2.  
1089b23

*Met.* IX. 6.  
1048b7


*Physics* IV. 12.  
221a29

*Met.* VII. 4.  
1029b23

*Met.* V. 20.  
1022b7

*Anal. post.* I. 2.  
83b16  
*Physics* V. 1.  
225b5, etc.

*Cat.* 4. 1b25  
*Topics* 1. 9.  
103b21



This, chart, which collects together most of the passages that were used separately above, shows how all groups of categories which we distinguished, as well as the means which we employed for their distinction, i.e., the various modes of existence in primary substance, can be found in Aristotle himself. Indeed, anyone who wants to share fully Aristotle's position and wants to adopt Aristotle's view regarding the analogous unity of being in relation to the inner principle of substance and the mode of its external activity, as well as regarding the spatial and temporal determinations, will hardly find significant reservations against the validity and completeness of a table of categories grounded in this manner. If I were permitted to base myself upon this deduction as a firm foundation, I should dare to defend the entire doctrine of categories as a valid consequence. I shall try, in the course of this essay, to justify it against objections by Trendelenburg and others. It is true, however, that I should prefer to follow the eight-fold division rather than the ten-fold one which is advanced in the *Categories* and in the *Topics*.

§ 14. Thesis XIII: This deductive demonstration [*pistis dia syllogismou*] has been developed in ancient and recent times in a similar way by various interpreters of Aristotle.

If the various links of a deductive demonstration [*pistis dia syllogismou*] for the division of being into highest genera can be found in this way in Aristotle himself, it would be surprising if none of his interpreters had noticed them, or, having noticed them, had neglected to collect them together. In fact, various kinds of attempt have been made to find the missing deduction of the categories. Often, however, these attempts were quite unrelated to the hints and principles which Aristotle himself gives, and often in direct contradiction to them. For example, Ammonius attempted the following kind of reduction of the categories, in which he supposes that some of them are simple and others are generated from a combination of the simple [now attributed to Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*,

Vol. XIII, pt. 1 [Berlin, 1898], p. 163]:

Of the categories, some are simple, others have their being as pairings and combinations of simples. And the simples are the four mentioned, substance, quantity, quality, and relation. By combination of substance with one of these or with itself the remaining six are generated. Thus from substance and quantity come the where and the when, from substance and quality come action and affection, from substance and relation come having and posture.

The first four he calls (*ibid.*) the dominant categories [*hai kyrios kategoriai*]. One is indeed inclined to believe that they are not only the most eminent, nay the only, categories among the ten, but also the only proper beings [*onta*] among them, while the others, having no genuine unity and thus no genuine being, deserve perhaps the name of accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*]. Still, Ammonius does not stand alone. David gives the following account of the completeness of the table of categories [now attributed to Elia, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*, Vol. XVIII, pt. 1 [Berlin, 1900], p. 159]:

Since Aristotle has merely enumerated the categories, saying that there are ten, and has not put forth the reason why there are ten, let us supply the reason. We demonstrate this from a corresponding division. Being is either in a subject, or not in a subject. And if it is not in a subject, it constitutes substance; if it is in a subject, then either in virtue of itself [*kath' heauto*] or not in virtue of itself. And if in virtue of itself it is either divisible or indivisible. And if divisible it constitutes quantity, and if indivisible it constitutes quality. And if one believes quality to be divisible, it is because the matter [*hyle*] is divisible. And if not in virtue of itself, its nature [*schesis*] is set apart [*mone*] and constitutes relation.

Up to this point little can be said against the derivation, but now he, too, continues:

Or it is understood according to the nature of something else and constitutes the remaining six categories. The simple categories being four, substance, quantity, quality, relation, from a combination of these the remaining ones issue: from substance and quantity the where and the when, etc.,

just like Ammonius above. However, he claims not to have supposed a proper synthesis [*synthesis*], but only an appearance of synthesis [*emphasis syntheseos*] (*ibid.*, p. 44).

But not all attempts to find the basis of the completeness of the table of categories were undertaken with such a mis-

understanding of Aristotle's basic thought. Some of them even came to be clearly conscious of the principle which governs the division. Thus there is a medieval tract, erroneously attributed to St. Augustine, *Categoriae decem ex Aristotele decerptae*;<sup>290</sup> it contained the kind of deduction, or at least classification of the categories, which, though not quite satisfactory, is distinguished by being based upon the various relations to substance:

These are [the] ten categories, of which the first is *ousia* which, of course, supports the other nine. The remaining nine are *symbebekota*, i.e., accidents. Of these nine some are in *ousia* itself, others outside it, and still others both inside and out. Quality, quantity and position are in *ousia* itself. Indeed, for example, in order that we may call either man or horse *ousia*, it is necessary for us to perceive them as biped and quadruped [respectively], as either light or dark, either standing or lying. These are in *ousia*, and without it they cannot exist. The others are outside *ousia*: where, when, having. Neither location, nor time, nor being clothed, nor being armed belong to *ousia*, but are separate from it. Still others are in common, i.e., both in and outside *ousia*: relation, action and affection. Relation: e.g., something is greater or smaller; for neither of them can be asserted unless they are conjoined to another than which they are greater or smaller; hence they have one in themselves, the other outside them. Just so action is both inside and out, so that one thing cannot be said to cut unless it cuts another, nor that something reads, unless the thing is in a state of reading something else, something which it reads. Thus this is in *ousia* as well as outside. Similarly with affection, for nothing can be killed or burnt unless it suffers from another. Hence this also is in *ousia* as well as outside it.

Due to the reputation of Augustine not only the text, but the deduction too, were widely respected. Thus we find it adopted, for example, by Isidorus Hispalensis in his *Originum sive Etymologiarum libri XX*, though for him "having" [*echein*] has a different and more general meaning:

Genus and species of the subject are accidents within it. Of these nine accidents three are in substance, i.e., quantity, quality, and position, because without substance they cannot exist. By contrast, place, time, and having are outside substance. Both inside and out are relation, action, and affection. [Book II, chap. 26.13)

Aristotle's unshakeable reputation in the schools was founded upon the work of the great Aristotelian of the thirteenth century, of whom Pico de la Mirandola said, "without Thomas Aristotle would be mute." We notice that

Thomas formulated and applied with perfect clarity the principle which has to govern the division of being into the categories in order to undertake their foundation and deduction. In his *Commentary on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, Book V, lect. 9 [translation by John P. Rowan, 2 vols. [Chicago, 1961], I, 345 f.] he writes as follows:

For it must be noted that being cannot be narrowed down to some definite thing in the way in which a genus is narrowed down to a species by means of differences. For since a difference does not participate in a genus, it lies outside the essence of a genus. But there could be nothing outside the essence of being which could constitute a particular species of being by adding to being; for what is outside of being is nothing, and this cannot be a difference. Hence in Book III of this work the Philosopher proved that being cannot be a genus.

890. Being must then be narrowed down to diverse genera on the basis of a different mode of predication, which flows from a different mode of being; for "being is signified," i.e., something is signified to be, "in just as many ways" (or in as many senses) as we can make predications. And for this reason the classes into which being is first divided are called predicaments, because they are distinguished on the basis of different ways of predicating. Therefore, since some predicates signify what (i.e., substance); some, of what kind; some, how much; and so on; there must be a mode of being corresponding to each type of predication. For example, when it is said that a man is an animal, *is* signifies substance; and when it is said that a man is white, *is* signifies quality; and so on.

891. For it should be noted that a predicate can be referred to a subject in three ways. This occurs in one way when the predicate states what the subject is, as when I say that Socrates is an animal; for Socrates is the thing which is an animal. And this predicate is said to signify first substance, i.e., a particular substance, of which all attributes are predicated.

892. A predicate is referred to a subject in a second way when the predicate is taken as being in the subject, and this predicate is in the subject either essentially and absolutely and as something flowing from its matter, and then it is quantity; or as something flowing from its form, and then it is quality; or it is not present in the subject absolutely but with reference to something else, and then it is relation. A predicate is referred to a subject in a third way when the predicate is taken from something extrinsic to the subject, and this occurs in two ways. In one way, that from which the predicate is taken is totally extrinsic to the subject; and if this is not a measure of the subject, it is predicated after the manner of attire, as when it is said that Socrates is shod or clothed. But if it is a measure of the subject, then, since an extrinsic measure is either time or place, the predicament is taken either in reference to time, and so it will be *when*; or if it is taken in reference to place and the order of parts in place is not considered, it will be *where*; but if this order is considered, it

will be position. In another way, that from which the predicate is taken, though outside the subject, is nevertheless from a certain point of view in the subject of which it is predicated. And if it is from the viewpoint of the principle, then it is predicated as an action; for the principle of action is in the subject. But if it is from the viewpoint of its terminus, then it will be predicated as a passion; for a passion is terminated in the subject which is being acted upon. . . .

It is clear, then, that "being" is used in as many ways as we make predications.

Truly, this commentary does not itself require a commentary, for the definitions are given with admirable clarity and precision. It should also be compared with St. Thomas' remarks in his commentary to the *Auscultationes Physicae*, lib. III, lectio 5, p. 9. Both passages essentially agree with our entire previous discussion.

In more recent times it was especially Prantl who spoke of a reduction of the categories. He also made reference to the names of classes of being which we find in Aristotle, and which mediate, as it were, the ascension from the eight or ten genera of being to all embracing being [*on*]. The reconstruction of the deduction of Aristotle's categories became impossible for him only because he did not pay enough attention to the fact that the unity of being is not univocal, but only through analogy. Trendelenburg, who placed all categories under the viewpoint of predicates of first substance was, we are inclined to say, only one step away from finding the actual principle of the division of the categories. But it was especially Zeller who gave a deduction of the categories in the second edition of his *Philosophie der Griechen* which completely agrees with ours, if one sets aside a few unimportant differences; however, he does not give a definite account of the principle which guided Aristotle, and even doubts that there is such a determinate principle.<sup>291</sup> He says (p. 196):

In everything we distinguish at the outset between what is original in it, its unchangeable essence or substance, and all that is derivative. The latter divides into attributes, activity and external circumstances. Some attributes belong to things in themselves, and in this case they express sometimes a quantitative, sometimes a qualitative determination, i.e., they relate either to the substrate or to the form. Other attributes belong to things only in relation to other things, and they are of a relational nature.<sup>292</sup> With respect to activities the most important contrast is between action and affection,

while the categories of having and posture have only a dubious status; eventually Aristotle himself quietly dropped them. Finally, concerning external circumstances, there are spatial as well as temporal relations, the where and the when.

Thus the agreement of older and more recent commentators secures us against the suspicion that, for the sake of our principle, we assessed the distinction between the categories according to an inappropriate standard, and channeled them through canals which we dug ourselves, rather than letting them flow from the common source of being in their natural and original bed.

§ 15. Thesis XIV: There is a harmony between the categories of Aristotle and the grammatical differences of noun and adjective, verb and adverb.

When Trendelenburg advanced his now famous hypothesis about the grammatical origin of Aristotle's categories he wanted to find, to begin with, something which could have guided Aristotle in the determination of the highest genera. He was concerned with rejecting the objection of Kant and Hegel that Aristotle haphazardly raked together a round number of general concepts. We hope to have met this objection in a different way. It must be admitted that a procedure which lacks an ontological principle and thus has to rely on mere agreement with grammatical relations as a guarantee for the validity of this important division cannot escape being reproached for its superficiality.

Still it is a phenomenon welcome to sound philosophy to find itself in agreement with common sense and with the general consciousness which is exhibited particularly also in language. Thus it is a recommendation for Aristotle's categories that there is a considerable kinship between his categories and certain linguistic forms. It seems to me that Trendelenburg has shown that this is undeniable, no matter how many objections have been raised. He has also shown that Aristotle was well aware of this agreement with grammar. Here as everywhere he knew how to make use of the speculations of earlier thinkers and the speculative content of common opinions. He noticed, above all, that if one thing is essentially predicated of another

so that name and concept of the predicate applies to it, then this occurs in a grammatically different form than if the predicate merely gives its name to the subject without being of the essence of the subject. I say: "white is a color," "wood is colored"; "walking is a motion," "man is in motion." In essential predication it is regularly the case that subject and predicate have the same grammatical form, so that noun is asserted of noun, infinitive of infinitive, etc. It is also the case that in accidental predication the predicate, as a rule, differs in grammatical form from the subject, and that it is only a derivative [*paronymon*] of the word which has the same grammatical form as the subject. It is for this reason that Aristotle calls accidental predication "predicating derivatively" [*paronymos kategoreisthai*] in contrast to "predicating synonymously" [*synonymos kategoreisthai*] in the case of essential predication. This explains the care with which he shows that the predication of the specific difference is also an essential predication and that the differentiae [*diaphorai*] of the substances, even though they do not directly fall under the predicament, must yet be considered to belong to it.<sup>294</sup> For this is an exception to our rule; the differentia is attributed to the noun by way of an adjective, and one could be misled into thinking that it is an accident, perhaps even a quality.

As a rule, the subject of a sentence is a noun. Now since the subject for the categories as such, i.e., as predicates of first substance, is itself substance, the regular grammatical form of the subject, of the substantive noun, will be found in the predicate as a rule only if substances are predicated of this subject [*hypokeimenon*], and the substantive noun will be the distinctive grammatical form for the first category. The accidents will have to divide the other forms among themselves. It is almost always the case, however, that accidents, when taken abstractly, occur in substantival form; so this can hardly be called an exception. But it does not matter in this context; in the determination of the categories we need to pay attention only to those words which are predicable of first substance. Thus, *abstracta* are of no more relevance than conjunctions, interjections and prepositions.<sup>295</sup> This is nicely shown by the concrete form of the examples which Aristotle adds for the

explanation of each category: “grammatical” [*grammatikon*] not “grammar” [*grammatike*], “half” [*hemisu*] not “the half” [*hemiseia*], “he cut” [*temnei*] not “to cut” [*temnein*], “he is cut” [*temnetai*] not “to be cut” [*temnesthai*] and the rest.<sup>296</sup> Trendelenburg already noted that some of these examples clearly show themselves to be predicates.

If one compares the linguistic forms of those words which can really be asserted of first substance with the respective categories of concepts which are designated by them, then it becomes undeniable that every rule which one could introduce will suffer exceptions. But since every grammatical rule allows of exceptions without therefore ceasing to be a rule, this could not mislead Aristotle and cannot mislead us. If one can recognize an exception as an exception, then he must be conscious of the rule itself, and if he warns that we should not be misled by an individual case, then he acknowledges that the rule can be a general guide and that it has a claim to be trusted even in the exceptional cases in which this trust is disappointed. Trendelenburg has shown<sup>297</sup> that Aristotle makes both of these points in several passages where he warns against the deceptions of the Sophists (*Soph. elench.* 4. 162b10; *ibid.*, 22. 178a9; 11;18).

Referring to Trendelenburg, we will briefly indicate the parts of speech which correspond to the several categories. We have already noted that the substantive noun corresponds to substance [*ousia*]. The adjective corresponds to quantity [*poson*] and quality [*poion*], quantity being represented by a numeral, either by itself or as a compound with an adjectival ending, while the remaining adjectives represent quality. That Aristotle took them to have different forms is shown by *Soph. elench.* 4. 162b10, and it is obvious that only this difference can account for the distinction. Just as the quantities do not allow more [*mallon*] and less [*hetton*, *Cat.* 6. 6a19] so it is not possible to form a comparative for numerals. Aristotle generally objects to placing the predicate “large” in the category of quantity (*ibid.*, 5b11); it does, as a matter of fact, belong in this category, but its form obviously is an exception.

The verb corresponds to action [*poiein*] and affection [*paschein*], the active voice to the former, the passive to the latter. There are no special grammatical forms which correspond

to having [*echein*] and posture [*keisthai*]; they too are expressed by the verb. But it is this very fact which explains their origin,<sup>298</sup> for they are subordinate to movement [*kinesis*] because of their expression as verb, while a conceptual consideration showed them to be something different from ordinary and proper movement, and thus to constitute special categories. The adverbs correspond to the where [*pou*] and when [*pote*]. In *Physics* IV. 13. 222, Aristotle lists a number of adverbs and explains them individually: now, at some time, already, at present, long ago [*nun, pote, ede, arti, palai*]. Since several objections have been raised against Trendelenburg in this connection, it is necessary to state a few rebuttals.

It was noted, to begin with, that time determinations also occur in other than adverbial forms. This is correct. But (1) for most of them we must refer to what has already been said, namely, that these forms are abstracta or otherwise unsuitable for concrete predication of first substance. Thus, for example, time [*chronos*] and year [*etos*] do not, as such, belong in the category "when."<sup>299</sup> (2) We should not be astonished that here as in the other categorial forms there are exceptions to the general rule. Thus it is noteworthy that, for example, the word "yesterday" [*chthidzos*], which Zeller cites as such an exception,<sup>300</sup> usually takes the place of an adverb: *Iliad* I. 424: "he went yesterday" (*chthidzos ebe*); *Odyssey* VI. 170: "Yesterday, on the twentieth day, I escaped from the wine-dark sea." Similarly "chthizon" (*Iliad* XIX. 195, and elsewhere). The same with "on the next day" [*deuteraios*];<sup>301</sup> one not only says "He was in Sparta on the day after quitting Athens" (Herodotus, *Persian Wars* VI. 106), but also, e.g., "On the next day he arrived" Xenophon, (*Education of Cyrus* 5, 2, 1 [?]). Hence here too the adverbial character is maintained, since the adverbs derive their names from the fact that they generally stand with the verb.

Another objection is raised by Bonitz (*loc. cit.*). If, he says, various types of adverbs, such as the adverbs of place and of time, had been the occasion for the introduction of categories, then the adverb ought to have produced still other categories. We reply: it is indeed true that there are many other adverbs which contain determinations neither of place nor of

time, adverbs of comparison, of interrogation, affirmation and negation and others. But only the adverbs of place and time can be asserted of primary substance as predicates. The remainder, with few exceptions, serve for the narrower determination of their predicate, conforming to the actual character of the adverb. For example, "Socrates speaks well," "Socrates is truly honest." Only the adverbs of place and time have the remarkable feature of being predicated of primary substance in the manner of nouns (*onomata*, *De int.* 2): "Socrates is there," "It is today." It is remarkable that language here chooses a form which initially modified something other than the subject (i.e., the predicate), which thereby becomes an indirect determination of the subject.<sup>302</sup> It is almost as if language wanted to express that something which initially is the accident of something else is being predicated of a thing. Thus it is clear that the adverb can represent only two, and only those two, categories.

We now come to the final category, relation [*pros ti*]. Language does not exhibit a uniform pattern for it, and critics have not failed to raise this objection against Trendelenburg. But here, too, language employs proper tact. The lack of a special form for relation is characteristic of this category. We say that it has the lowest degree of being, and that it does not have a special coming into being [*gignesthai*] and passing away [*phtheiresthai*], but always follows the other types of being and adjusts itself to their nature, and depending on these it attaches to substance in either a more internal or more external manner.<sup>303</sup> Thus it is altogether appropriate that language should unite in this category adjectival, verbal as well as adverbial forms of words. Here are some examples: "double" [*diplosion*] (quantity); "more beautiful" [*kallion*] (quality); "it is heating" [*thermainon*] (Trendelenburg remarks correctly<sup>304</sup> that this can be an expression for a relation (*Met.* V. 15. 1021a17). But this does not mean, as he supposes, that it cannot also stand for a concept from the category of action; for, "it is heating" [*thermainei*] is, after all the same as "it is heating" [*esti thermainon*], cf. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a28); the same holds for affection: "it is being heated" [*thermainomenon*]. Further examples are: "nearer with respect to place" [*egguteron kata topon*, *Met.* V. 11. 1018b12]—before, after [*proteron, hysteron*]

(where, when). It stands to reason that here the exceptions will become more frequent, and it is a special irregularity that relations frequently become predicates in the form of nouns; for example, Socrates is a father, a son, a subject,<sup>305</sup> a teacher, etc., etc., even though relations are the least of being [*hekista ousiai*, see above]. But here more than elsewhere one can clearly see that Aristotle did not lose sight of language. She has authority for him, though this authority is no more binding than other probable opinions and views of earlier thinkers from which he argues dialectically, and with which he prefaces his actual scientific investigations. Hence he forthwith points his finger to these irregularities, and we find explicit protestations that relations have no substantival being (*Cat.* 7. 8a13; b24, and especially *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088a21; b2).<sup>306</sup> There is probably no other accident where this case of substantival predication of substance is so widespread. When I say "this person is a beautiful figure" then this is obviously a poetic expression for "he is beautifully formed." This is not unlike the case in which I say "this man is a brain, he is wisdom itself," in order to indicate that he is intelligent or wise.

These considerations show that Aristotle could indeed find help and a hold in language in his preliminary dialectical investigations concerning the kind and number of categories, but it also follows that he could not possibly have arrived at a secure or even subjectively certain result on this kind of foundation. Still, he might have become aware of the absolute categories through the difference in forms of words, and aware of relation through the need for an auxiliary notion which arises already within language itself (*Cat.* 7. 6a36; cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 30 f.).

Let us add that there are yet other linguistic distinctions in which the differences between the categories appear. They occur in the modifications of questions which are asked about first substance, and depend upon whether a predicate of one or the other category is required as an answer. Aristotle calls the category of substance [*ousia*] also the category "what it is" [*ti esti*] (e.g., *Topics* I. 9. 103b20; *Met.* V. 7. 1017a25; *Nicomachean Ethics* I. 4. 1096a24). He thus indicates that all questions concerning a substance [*ousia*] which are introduced by a

“what is it?” [*ti esti*] belong in the first category. There is also a special way of introducing a question which corresponds to the second category: “how much is it?” [*poson esti;*]; similarly for the third: “of what quality is this?” [*poion esti tode;*]. Also, each of the two movements [*kineseis*] has its own type of question. But in this case we must add to the “what” some word other than the simple copula “to be” [*esti*]; in the one case, if the question is to be very general, I use “to do” [*poiein*], in the other “to suffer” [*paschein*]: “What does this do?” “What does it suffer?” Otherwise we should be given information about nearly anything except what we want to know. Similar points hold about posture and having. The “how is it positioned?” [*pos keitai;*], and “what does it have?” [*ti echei;*] would reduce neither to “what does it do?” [*ti poiei;*] nor “what does it suffer?” [*ti paschei;*], and might thus lead to the introduction of a special category. Furthermore, of the two categories of circumstance each has its own form of question, i.e., “where is it?” [*pou esti tode;*], “when is it?” [*pote esti;*]. Finally, questions concerning relations reveal the peculiar nature of the latter. I cannot simply ask “how much is that?” [*poson esti tode;*], but rather “how much is that in relation to the other?”—“Double” [*poson esti tode pros tode;—diplasion*]. Or “when is this in relation to that?”—“Later,” etc.<sup>307</sup>

The nominalist Occam (in his *Logic* I. chapter 42; cf. *Quodlib*, 5, q. 22), by proceeding in the above manner, i.e., from the number of questions which can be asked about primary substance, attempted to show that there are ten predicaments. He begins with the correct assumption that the number of things must be determined from their relation to first substance, and continues: “Either we ask of first substance what it is, and in this case it is substance, or how large or how constituted or to what it relates, what it does, what it suffers, where it is and how (*the keisthai*), of what duration, and finally how it is clad?” In the end the entire proof turns into an induction in which language merely facilitates the overview, and many objections can be made against the details as well as the reliability of the result which is derived from the whole. If one follows this method, language can assume the responsibility for the validity and completeness of the categories even less than before.

§ 16. Thesis XV: The preceding investigation concerning the principle and meaning of the categories resolves objection raised from various quarters against the division of the categories.

Aristotle's division of categories has withstood the passage of time in an admirable way. If one follows the history of the doctrine of categories he can see that even its opponents pay unconscious tribute to it, and one is often inclined to smile on discovering that those who consider themselves its decided opponents are essentially guided by it.

The present era no longer has an Aristotelian doctrine of categories. When we now speak of categories we do not think of the what, how, how much, in relation to what. But none of the more recent systems has been able to establish a lasting reputation. More recent theories which investigate categories no longer pursue the same goal as Aristotle, and one cannot possibly claim that they have put anything into the place of the old categories.

The question is now whether one can suppose that something which has lived so long can lack all vitality, or whether it is rather the case that it meet its purpose, *the true purpose of the table of categories*. We hardly need to say that our opinion inclines toward a favourable judgment, and in our investigation we have generally attempted to let the doctrine of categories develop with a kind of internal necessity—presupposing the correctness of other Aristotelian doctrines. But since other imposing scholars and friends of our philosopher are of a different opinion, it becomes our task to attempt, as best we can, to remove their objections and repel their attacks.

Trendelenburg, especially, has shown that though he is a friend of Aristotle, he is a greater friend of truth. Brandis and others have formed a milder judgment, perhaps in part because their standard was more just. So also Zeller, one of whose objections we must nonetheless answer.

(1) Kant<sup>308</sup> and Hegel<sup>309</sup> have called the lack of a principle the fundamental mistake of the entire division. Trendelenburg finds this basic mistake in a lack of unity, an inconsistency of principles.<sup>310</sup> We hope that after what has been said this objec-

tion will no longer appear to be founded. It is true that both logic and metaphysics are interested in the division of the categories, but not as if they were in a contest for the right to govern, as if they were pushing their own differing claims, which are sometimes heard and sometimes ignored, and as if they neither found satisfaction for themselves nor gave justice to the demands of the other. The modes of predication naturally correspond to the modes of being if one makes the subject [*hypokeimenon*] of all being into the subject of the sentence. “‘To be’ signifies as many different things as there are different ways of using it” (*Met.* V. 7. 1017a23). Thus, when Trendelenburg says (*Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*) that all deficiencies spring from this mistake, we can only take this as an encouragement.

(2) Trendelenburg admits openly that there would be another objection against the division of the categories if it merely followed a grammatical guideline and did not seek its principle more deeply in the subject itself.<sup>311</sup> But this is only a hypothetical objection, indeed an argument against the hypothesis with whose fall it becomes itself pointless. The great harmony with grammar, which we, too, had to admit, is not in itself an objection, but rather a commendation. A just objection could be advanced only against purchasing the agreement with grammatical form at the expense of the harmony with the form and nature of things themselves, or against an unphilosophical satisfaction with merely ascertaining the former kind of agreement.

(3) But there is another remark which concerns us more intimately. Trendelenburg thinks that if the categories are envisaged as real, it follows that we must seek the root of the categories in the four grounds or origins of things, since the latter are the first in order of nature.<sup>312</sup> It is indeed the case that we have given not only a logical but also a metaphysical sense to the division into categories by distinguishing the highest genera according to the various modes of existence in first substance and the various relations of potentiality and actuality; yet we have not tried to connect them with the grounds or origins of things. Do we therefore deserve Trendelenburg’s reproof? We believe, together with Brandis, Bonitz, and others

that we must definitely reject this objection. The quest for the categories in the sense in which Aristotle speaks of categories and in which they became more and more clear to us in the course of this essay has nothing to do with the quest for the origins which occur analogously in all of the categories. There is indeed a certain similarity between the highest grounds and the highest genera of things, since both are of most general import. But, as Trendelenburg himself correctly notes,<sup>313</sup> there is a great difference between “generality by abstraction” and “original generality.” What is most general with respect to causality is less knowable to us [*kath'hemas*] and more knowable in its own nature [*te physei*] while the most general with respect to predication is, in a sense, more knowable to us [*kath'hemas*] than the less general, though not more knowable than the singular, since sensory cognition, which is directed to the individual, precedes intellectual cognition which is directed toward the general.<sup>314</sup>

Thus, it emerges clearly from the meaning of the Aristotelian categories that they are not “to represent in their sequence the origin of the concepts in the order in which they come about.”<sup>315</sup> Hence they are not the “regulating viewpoint which infallibly pushes the categories back to the four grounds or origins, which are first in the order of nature, etc.”<sup>316</sup> Trendelenburg notes that there is a certain relationship of dependency of being between the accidental, i.e., later, categories, and substance as the first category. He thinks that this could lead one to surmise that a similar relation between preceding and following members holds throughout the entire series, but that this was not developed. But this is completely explained through what we have said above in connection with the analogy with respect to the same terminus. For there will always be one thing which in a primary and narrower sense carries the name and upon which all others are dependent, and in this case it is substance, as Aristotle himself points out in the fourth book.<sup>317</sup> All the others are thus determined by this one and differ in their relation to it, but it is not necessary that they should also stand in a relation of dependency with respect to each other, for they are not distinguished by virtue of direct relations to each other, but by virtue of their relation to this one.

In several passages already cited, Aristotle speaks of a natural order of the categories. Though he has failed to tell us precisely what this order is, and has made no great effort to preserve it in each enumeration of the categories, the question is what this order might be, and, since in every order there is a before and after, what the ordering relation is that places the members one after the other. It is not difficult to answer this question. If being were a genus, then the species would have to be ordered according to the differences in perfection which they obtain through one or the other differentia, i.e., according to higher degree of being [*ousia proteron*]. For the various species of a genus are distinguished in this manner.<sup>318</sup> We can say only of individuals that among them a before and after no longer occurs.<sup>319</sup> But if the kinds into which the genus is divided are ordered according to the perfection of their being, the same must hold even more for the highest genera into which being is divided, and which are themselves meanings of being. They are to be ordered according to the degree of being [*proteron ousia*], according to the greater or lesser perfection of their being, i.e., according to their more or less intimate relation to first substance, relative to which they are all said to have being. Aristotle's intimations concerning the order agree with this interpretation. For relation is relegated to the end of the entire sequence as "least being" [*hekista ousia*], and substance to the beginning, and in *Met.* XII. 1 he wanted to position quality in the second and quantity in the third place since both, because of their internal existence in substance, surpass the other accidents in substance-like being. Quality was to precede quantity because it is related to form, and because form is more substance than is matter.<sup>320</sup> If we carry this order through, then the class of movements attain the fourth and fifth positions, such that action precedes affection. The reason is that the origin of the operation is in the active element, which must as such be actuality. The terminus of the operation, on the other hand, is in that which is affected; so long as there is becoming, the latter is only a potentiality. The "where" and "when" occupy the sixth and seventh positions. Here the "where" precedes, since place belongs to quantity, while in the case of the "when" a movement

serves as measure. Finally, relation forms the conclusion of the entire series.<sup>321</sup>

Thus we see that the origins [*archai*] as such are in no way responsible for the schema of the highest genera. They can obtain a certain influence because a certain mode of predication of first substance is founded upon them. We saw that this was the case only with efficient cause. For, of the four genera of causes, two, matter and form, are part of the essence; hence predication which could take place in accordance with them belongs to the category of substance. The predication of genus belongs to matter, the predication of difference to form (see above). Final cause does not in and by itself bring forth anything without an efficient cause, since it becomes causative only to the extent to which it moves an efficient cause. Thus, efficient cause alone is capable of generating a special mode of predication, and it does so in a twofold manner: a substance which acts upon another is named after it, and the same holds, *mutatis mutandis*, for a substance which receives influence from a second.

(4) There is another main objection which is advanced against Aristotle's doctrine of the categories, namely, that it does not show any continuity of division (Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 144, 187; Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, p. 401). Trendelenburg says that Aristotle himself requires that the principle of division must continue to operate and must employ the differentiae which are peculiar to it to generate new kinds. Here [Trendelenburg says] the various kinds are determined by the nature of things, while the division into the categories proceeded from grammatical relations (p. 144). The simplest reply would be this: the presupposition is false. The division into categories does not rest upon grammatical relations (though they may correspond to it), but upon the various modes of being, of being as such [*einai haplos*] and of in-being [*eneinai*] in that which has being in the narrow sense. But this is not the end of the matter, for it is still not possible to have a continuity of division. Nonetheless, the division is completely justified. One should not forget that the division is not a division of a genus into its species, where the species are constituted through differentiae, differentiae of differentiae,

down to the concrete. Being [*on*] is not a genus, it is an analogous concept whose senses must first be determined in order later to branch out into genera. The categories themselves are the highest genera, and their differentiation does not continue, but actually only begins proper division [*diairesis*] in the sense in which it holds for synonymous concepts. Being as such does not have differentiae through which it is divided into categories, and where there are no differentiae it is no objection that they are not used for the subdivisions.

Trendelenburg also remarks that the division of substance [*ousia*] into first and second substance is more real than the division of being [*on*] into the categories. In this connection we refer to what we have said above: if the division into first and second substance is to be envisaged as a division into kinds, the opposite objection should be raised, namely, that here the principle of division of analogous being [*on*] is too wide and is pursued, as it were, beyond the goal and thus does not lead to a division into factually different things, but into things which possess a difference merely in second intension, merely because they have being in the sense of being true.<sup>322</sup>

(5) It is immediately clear from what has just been said what we would have to reply to another objection, namely, that one and the same category cannot comprehend both first and second substance.<sup>323</sup> Yet this must undoubtedly be the case; for what could be the genus of the individual if it is not the genus of its species? Socrates is first, man is second substance; both are in the genus animal and in every higher genus, hence also in the highest, i.e., in the category of substance.<sup>324</sup> The concepts "first" and "second" substance of course do not meet in the concept of substance in the same way as several species are united in one genus. After all, they themselves are not in the category of substance, they are not real concepts but, like "genus," "species," etc., merely differences in second intension which can have existence only in the understanding; they can merely have being in the sense of being true.<sup>325</sup>

Comments similar to those about second substance can also be made about differentiae, with which Brandis seems to have had certain difficulties.<sup>326</sup> But there is no doubt that the differentiae of substance (if indeed the truly essential differentiae

of substance are referred to) belong to the first category; for they are identical in essence with the genera which they restrict. One can say of them that they are not substances, but only in the sense that they come to stand in this category only reductively and not directly, even though they participate univocally in the concept of substance [*ousia*], as we have shown above in sect. 11.<sup>327</sup>

(6) Trendelenburg continues: "Figure, which generates the various kinds of spatial quanta is included in the category of quality; thus in this example the differentia [i.e., figure] does not reside in the substance [i.e., *quantity*] which it differentiates."<sup>328</sup> Against this we must note that this does not concern a differentia of substance, for quantity is not substance. The seventh book of the *Metaphysics* teaches us that there is a great difference between substance and accidents: Aristotle admits definability for the latter only in a manner of speaking. He says that it is just as true to say that they do not have a definition as that they do, depending on whether one takes this concept in a more or less precise sense.<sup>329</sup> It does indeed often happen, because of their dependent and deficient being, that differentiae of one category are taken from another category. This happens because they are derived from the characteristics of the principles [origins] of the accident. Thus, for example, when I say that blond is the yellow color of hair, etc., the position of differentia is occupied by substance. But accidents, too, are principles of other accidents, for example, quantity is the principle of the relation of the larger to the smaller, and affection is the principle of the relation of the affected to the active, etc., etc. Furthermore, where Aristotle determines the types of movement, he determines three kinds, locomotion, growth and diminution, and change (qualitative change). If we ask for the affection<sup>330</sup> of that which is moved in space it becomes obvious that being transported will have to be defined as a movement toward a place; similarly, quantitative movement as a movement toward a quantity, and alteration as a movement toward a quality. The terminus of affection which itself belongs to a different category nonetheless specifies the kind of affection by being added to it as its difference. Similarly, the origin of movement will differentiate the action, for example, warming in

the active sense will have to be defined as a movement which proceeds from warmth. It is for this reason that Aristotle says of the qualities of that species which he calls affection that they are differentiae of movement.<sup>331</sup> Thus it can be neither surprising nor objectionable that in the case of accidents the differentia is borrowed from another nature. This is not a deficiency in Aristotle, but a deficiency in the being of the categories other than substance.

However, figure seems to form a special case. It appears that figures were really explained as substantial differentiae; for in *Met.* V. 14 Aristotle, in the reduction of the four senses of "quality" [*poiotes*], lists only figure among the differentiae of substance [*diaphora tes ousias*],<sup>332</sup> but not the qualities of movement. The reason for this is that quantity, more than other accidents, is spoken of as if it were substance. Since it inheres in matter it can be envisaged, in a sense, as the substrate of other accidents,<sup>333</sup> for example, when I say that the surface is blue, etc. Similarly thus one also says that this yellow is more or less yellow than that; by contrast, this line is a longer or shorter line than that, etc. But that Aristotle did not consider quantity to be a substance does not require proof.

(7) The purpose of the categories and indeed the purpose of any classification whatever is sorting. Thus the most severe objection which Trendelenburg<sup>334</sup> and others were able to raise against the division into categories is that it created a confusion among subordinate things. It is a just demand that the basic concepts should be delineated from each other through sharp boundaries so that one can determine with certainty under which of them an individual concept is to be directly subordinated.<sup>335</sup> This is a just demand, but one should take care not to demand more than this, i.e., to extend this demand to everything which in one way or other belongs under a category, or to demand factual division in addition to conceptual division, which is by no means necessary.<sup>336</sup>

We have already seen that the requirement cannot in general be extended to the differentiae of the accidents since they do not stand in the direct lineage of a category. There remain only individuals, kinds and genera. The success or failure of the classification will show itself in their case; for nothing

can belong to two different genera by virtue of direct subordination.<sup>337</sup>

On this point the objections against Aristotle are numerous. We shall set aside the objections which are directed against the categories of posture and having, since they did not appear to be real categories on the same level with the others, and shall try to say a few things in his defense.

(a) The kind of objection which is most easily defeated turns on the point that most doing is also a being affected, as the teaching of the teacher is identical with the learning of the pupil, etc.<sup>338</sup> But it does not only hold for most doing, but for *all* doing that it is a being affected. But since for the distinction between the categories factual difference is not required, and since a conceptual difference is obviously present, there is nothing in the case which provides any difficulty. Thus Brandis points out that it is a perfectly justified demand to permit the subsumption of things under different categories, depending on the particular point of view of the discussion.<sup>339</sup> In the same way a great many other criticisms must be rejected, all of which demand real instead of conceptual separation. Thus, for example, where and when constitute separate categories, and this does not contradict the fact that area [*topos*]<sup>340</sup> and duration [*chronos*] occur in yet other categories. But area [*topos*] and duration [*chronos*] are not separate species of quantity since area belongs to the kind *surface*, and duration (as is explicitly claimed in *Met.* V. 13. 1020a29) can be called a quantity [*poson*] only by accident [*kata symbebekos*]. For since space, wherein the prime mobile moves, is a quantity, movement also belongs under quantity, and since movement, therefore also time-[span].

(b) One can see from this example that Aristotle was not always concerned, in the *Categories*, to give exact indications what the proper species of genera are.<sup>341</sup> He often proceeds merely dialectically in this matter.<sup>342</sup> For example he gives posture [*thesis*] as a differentia of quantity [*poson*]. The context makes it clear that this posture is not the same as that which apparently demands the status of a category, i.e., the order of that which has parts in space (*Met.* V. 19. 1022b1). Rather, what is meant is nothing but an order of parts with respect to the whole [*kath holon*],<sup>343</sup> hence only a relation. But this relation

is a property (*proprium*) of continuous quantities which are *quanta* not merely by accident, and not a differentia between them, and this is the reason why *Met.* V. 13. 1020a8 gives a different kind of classification. But that a property [*idion*] belongs in a different category than its species does not offer further difficulties.<sup>344</sup>

(c) But relation [*pros ti*] provides difficulties in other respects as well and seems to conflate with several categories. The least conspicuous and most easily resolved problem is its conflation with action and affection.<sup>345</sup> It is clear that the active thing, precisely because it acts, stands in relation to the affected thing. The puncher punches a punch, and punches a punched, i.e., a body which receives a punch. Both are inseparable in reality. Understanding, however, which grasps the double concept of doing, as well as the relation between two substances which is posited by this doing, subordinates them to two different categories, even if language does not allow separate expressions.<sup>346</sup> Of course the same also holds of the affected; it is affected by the origin of the affection, and by that in which the origin is found. Where this is a substance which differs from the affected substance, a relation must obtain between some one substance and another. Only in intransitive acts in the narrow sense<sup>347</sup> do action and affection occur without a real relation, since there is neither actually [*energeia*], nor potentially [*dynamis*] a multiplicity of substances between which such a relation could occur. For this relation can only be conceptual, as when I say that a thing is the same as itself. Simplicius justly emphasizes this special case in order to show the distinction between action and affection on the one hand, and the category of mere relation, which is most evident in this case though not hidden from careful scrutiny in other cases, on the other.<sup>348</sup>

(d) In a similar way we can explain related phenomena. For example, several things may be subordinated under posture [*thesis*] (which consists in a relation of parts with respect to the whole<sup>349</sup>), and these same things may also occur in yet other categories. Compact [*pyknon*] and open-textured [*manu*], smooth [*leion*] and rough [*trachu*] are expressions for relations which obtain between parts, which are potentially separate terms of relations, and consequently permit a real relation to

hold. Thus we find them described as postures [*theseis*] in *Cat.* 8. 10a19, and yet elsewhere they are assigned to the third genus, viz., quality (*Physics* VII. 2. 244b7; cf. also b18 and b20; *De gen. et corr.* II. 2. 329b20). But here the concept is certainly a different one. We are here concerned not with an order of parts, but with the discrimination between sensory perceptions (cf. *Cat.* 8. 9b5. See above sects. 13 and 16.6).

(e) But the most striking criticism is that there is a conflation of relation [*pros ti*] and substance [*ousia*], of the highest and the lowest degree of being [*malista* and *heskista on*]. It seems hardly possible that there can be real identity between substance and another category, hence how could there be conceptual identity? Aristotle is completely convinced that this could never occur. Neither a whole substance, nor part of one, neither an actual, nor a potential substance<sup>350</sup> can belong to relation. How indeed could a substance be composed of relations? Still, Trendelenburg thinks that Aristotle placed both matter and form under the category of relation<sup>351</sup> and upbraids him for it, which would be just if the supposition were correct. Trendelenburg's other objections, viz. that Aristotle kept the substance-components within the category of substance and did not move them into the category of relation seems to me to be less justified.<sup>352</sup> But Trendelenburg himself testifies that this is not done altogether "arbitrarily"; he says in a previously quoted passage that it would prove nothing if matter and form were placed under the category of relation, "For origin and content, and, in general, the categories of matter and form are not described in this way."<sup>353</sup>

Aristotle seems to claim in *Physics* II. 2 that matter [*hyle*] is [an element of] a relation,<sup>354</sup> but *Met.* XIV. 1 proves decisively that he thought exactly as Trendelenburg. He says there:

It is necessary that the matter of everything is that which is potentially such a thing; hence this also holds for substance. But relation is neither potentially nor actually substance. Hence it is absurd, or rather impossible, to suppose that there is a non-substance which is an element of substance and prior to it, for all other categories are posterior to it.<sup>355</sup>

Hence the sense of the above passage from the second book of the *Physics* can only be that to every form corresponds a special matter,<sup>356</sup> but not that matter belongs under the category of

relation. One can see this clearly from the explanatory words which follow immediately afterward (*allo gar eidei alle hyle*—if form is different, matter is). This allows him to prove what he wants. For if every form determines its own matter, then the conclusion which Aristotle wants to draw is clear, namely, that physics will discuss both matter and form at the same time.

But what is it that matter and form lack, and which all substance-components lack so that they cannot belong to relation? What is missing is (1) what all accidents have in common, namely, that they are outside the essence of the substance to which they belong and of which they are predicated. (2) Furthermore they do not consist in a relation between one substance and another, i.e., they lack the very thing which constitutes the essence of a relation. Head, hand, etc. are obviously not relations between substances but themselves substance.

But if there is such a great difference, what is it that constitutes the similarity between substance-components and relations so that even Brandis could agree: "Aristotle did not succeed in excluding all substances (*Wesenheiten*) from the domain of relations."<sup>357</sup> The similarity seems to be twofold: (1) it is a peculiarity of relations that neither term of a relation can exist or be cognized without the other; they demand and define each other, e.g., ruler and ruled, the larger and the smaller, etc.; the ruler requires the ruled and the larger requires the smaller, and conversely. The ruling of the one is not just factually identical with the being ruled of the other, nor the being larger of the one with the being smaller of the other.<sup>358</sup> It is also the case that one depends conceptually upon the other since the referent is constituted with respect to the relatum, and the relatum with respect to the referent. Now this shows great similarity with substance-components, and especially matter and form, which, since each cannot for itself have complete being [*einai teleion*], also depend upon each other in the order of knowing. Though they are not one and the same, they form together *one* being, and in the determination and definition of one of them the other is posited and there is regard for it. For example, in the definition of the soul, which is form, its matter is also posited (*De anima* II. 2. 412a19); a fortiori, matter cannot be defined without reference to form.

This accounts for the similarity with relations, and it is because of this that they are described as relations [*pros ti*] in the above-quoted passage from the *Physics*.

But there is a second respect in which substance-components seem to be akin to relations; in both cases parts are predicated of the whole. We have already noted<sup>359</sup> that the part can be predicated of the whole in a derivative but not in an absolute form. I cannot say "the bird is wing," but "the bird is winged," etc. If I now ask "what is it that makes the bird winged?" I must answer "he is winged by virtue of the wings," and if I ask "whose are the wings?" I must say "they are the wings of the winged." There is a deceptive similarity here with correlative things, where the ruled is ruled by the ruler, and the ruler is ruler of the ruled, etc. This difficulty is emphasized in the *Categories*.<sup>360</sup> It is resolved in the following way: the winged as winged is not different from the wing as the just as just is not different from justice. They differ from each other only as absolute and concrete form; the latter indicates in the one case that it is not an independent complete substance, and in the other case that it is an accident. Thus in this form both can be predicated of the whole substance. But in the absolute form this cannot be done since one would take the predicate to designate the essence, indeed the entire essence, of the subject. For the genus *animal*, too, designates the entire lion, etc., though in a less determinate way than the species. But this designation of the substance which employs one of its parts or an accident does not constitute a relation. For if the ruled were ruled only by "being ruled," this would not make it a term of relation, any more than the round which is round by virtue of roundness; for where are here the two substances between which the relation obtains? Rather, the ruled is ruled by a ruler, and this constitutes his relational character. For the ruled as ruled is not the same with the ruler, rather nothing is ruler insofar as it is ruled.

But why has Aristotle emphasized this difficulty only in relation to the parts of substance and not in relation to the accidents, though here the exact same case seems to obtain?<sup>361</sup> He probably did it because error is far more likely in connection with the parts of substance. In the case of an accident the lack

of correlated substance allows one to see the impossibility of a real relation at once. For example, if one says that justice is the justice of the just man, then the only substance is the substance of the just man. By contrast, with the other apparent relational terms we really find two substances which can stand in a relation to each other, namely, the substance and its part. This can indeed be momentarily confusing, even though it is certain that head, foot, hand and the other members are not merely relations of substances which in the end produce the whole substance by composition; this, as Aristotle justly says in *Met.* XIV. 2, would be a ridiculous, even impossible, assumption.

But there is a sense in which the parts of substance are in truth relations, namely, the sense which Aristotle designates as relation by accident [*pros ti kata symbebekos*] (*Met.* V. 15. 1021b8). In this sense the head, for example, can be called an element in a relation [*pros ti*] because it is a part. The concept "part" is indeed a relation and an accident from the category of relation [*pros ti*]. But that which is a part is an element of a relation insofar as it is a part, but not in its essence. The penny is the twelfth part of the shilling, but that does not make the penny a relation; the line is a part of the triangle, but in and by itself it is not an element of a relation, but a quantity, etc. There is no contradiction in the fact that a substance is the basis of a relation,<sup>362</sup> but it cannot itself be the relation which is founded upon it. Thus, for example, there is an equality between Socrates and Plato insofar as they are both men, and they are men by virtue of their substance. But it does not follow from this that either Socrates or Plato is something relative. They are also not factually identical with the relation which obtains between them, for if we let Socrates die, the relation ceases, yet Plato remains the same without change. So much for the justification of the Philosopher in this particular.

(f) But there is still another difficulty which arises from the category of relation. It is said that there are some kinds which fall under the category of quality [*poion*] whose genera fall under relation [*pros ti*].<sup>363</sup> There seems to be an agreement on this point between *Met.* V. 15 and the *Categories* in that they distinguish a kind of relation which is so called because its genera

belong to this category.<sup>364</sup> Trendelenburg did not fail to call attention to this remarkable assertion.<sup>365</sup>

But even here it does not seem impossible to untie the knot. Let us remember from what has been said before that one and the same concept cannot stand directly in two different genera.<sup>366</sup> Hence it is impossible that it is the opinion of Aristotle that one and the same concept could fall, as a species, under both quality and relation,<sup>367</sup> or that a species could fall under quality and its genus under relation. For in this case the genus would belong to both categories, hence also the species. There can only be a nominal, or at most a nominal and real, identity if something is referred to two categories. Above, the warming agent, which belongs to the category of action, was nominally and even really identical with the warming agent from the category of relation. For the principle of the one was the foundation of the other and both demanded the same terminus, which had to be sought in another subject. Furthermore, warmth at least nominally seems to belong to both quality, as quality of affection [*poiotes pathetike*], and also to relation, for that which can be warmed, is warmable through warmth, but they are not really identical, since the quality warmth continues to exist even if the warmable has ceased to exist. On the other hand, the relation "knowledge" as the relation between the knower and the known seems indeed really identical with the quality [*hexis*] of knowing, i.e., with knowledge as an attribute which bestows a perfection upon the knowing subject and differentiates and determines it in its nature in a certain way.<sup>368</sup> For, according to the famous sentence with which the first book of the *Metaphysics* begins, "all men by nature desire to know." What holds of knowledge in general, also holds of its particular kind. Thus there is both real and nominal identity, and the distinction, in each case between quality [*hexis*] and relation [*pros ti*], is merely conceptual. Still, a linguistic difference obtains. The linguistic sign of a relation, the requirement or at least possibility of adding a supplementing word, is no longer present in the case of the special kinds of knowledge, so that while the expression for the genus was equally suitable for the concept which belonged to quality as for that of relation, the more special expressions all seem to

correspond to quality [*hexis*] only.<sup>369</sup> We say knowledge is knowledge of the known, but we do not say mathematics is mathematics of the mathematical, or medicine is medicine of the medicinal, etc., but at most: it is the knowledge of the medicinal. Thus the species of the relation “knowledge” are not indeed relations by accident,<sup>370</sup> but because language does not express the relation, they are linguistically relative merely by virtue of the genus. Thus they fall into the same class as several of the abstract forms of relations which Aristotle in the same passage in a sense excludes from relation, such as sameness and similarity, while he allows the same and the similar as things that are *called* relative [*pros ti legomena*].<sup>371</sup> The only reason is that one cannot say of equality that it has equality, but only of the equal that it is equal. But no one will assert that these concepts, which are rendered in abstract form, are species of a different genus than the preceding ones, which were given in concrete form.

(8) So much concerning relation. It seemed that because of its deficient, almost less than accidental, being it was going to involve us in more difficulty than all other kinds of being. It did so by proving that the least beings [*hetton onta*] are also the least well known things [*hetton gnorima*], as we saw above. But does it follow, as Trendelenburg seems to fear,<sup>372</sup> that relation might be forced out of the series of the ten or eight coordinate categories because of its low level of being? Certainly not, for, if the other accidents can be categories side by side with substance, then also relation side by side with the other accidents. This coordination is not equalization, not even a common participation in a superordinate, whose extension they divide; for the concept “being” is not a genus, as we have often said, but only a unity by analogy [*hen kat’ analogian*].

(9) We now come to the last question whose answer is necessary for the justification of Aristotle’s doctrine of categories. We undertake this answer, as always, by presupposing the validity of other Aristotelian theories concerning matter and form, mover and moved, time and place, etc., since a demonstration of these doctrines would lead us too far afield. What we have in mind is the question whether some categories should be subordinated to others, or whether there are some other concepts

which are to be coordinated with them. Concerning the first problem the question is whether the where and when should be placed under relation; with respect to the second problem the question is whether potentiality and actuality are to be added to the categories.

(a) Zeller, in his *Philosophie der Griechen*, has answered the first question in the affirmative.<sup>373</sup> If this were true, then Aristotle would obviously have committed an error, for this was not his opinion. On the contrary, he says in a passage which has been quoted a number of times (*Met.* III. 28. 1024b15) that the categories in the classification which is given in the same book, chapter 7, can be reduced neither to each other nor to a higher genus. And we do not think that Aristotle made a mistake here; indeed he can speak in his own defense. The linguistic sign of a relation, i.e., the need for a complementing word, is not present in local and temporal determinations, for example with "in the market" or "yesterday." But we have seen a number of times that such a sign can be deceptive, and if we were to use it as the basis of our judgment, posture would also turn out not to be a relation but a special category, and all the other anomalies which are commensurate with the irregularity of language but not with the requirements of thought would arise. By contrast it is a sure sign of a relation that it has an attenuated kind of being which is altogether dependent upon other modes of being, and of which we cannot assert movement nor even, properly speaking, generation and decay. As an absolute thing comes into being, a relation creeps in, and as the former decays the latter disappears, often without the least change in the subject. Hence this is a general sign of a relation. A thing which has its own generation and decay is not a relation. There is no exception to this, even where the relation pertains to substance without the mediation of any other accident, as in the case of the similarity of essence between two individuals of one and the same kind (see above). It necessarily follows from this that where and when are not mere relations. This becomes particularly obvious in the case of the where, which even has its own proper movement.<sup>374</sup> But whatever holds of one of the two concepts also holds of the other because of the close kinship of the two categories. Thus we shall have to con-

sider the where and the when to be higher modes of being than relation, and not to be subordinated to it.

(b) We now come to the other part of the question, namely, whether the concepts of potentiality and actuality are to be added to the remainder as either the eleventh and twelfth or ninth and tenth categories. In order to explain Aristotle's negative answer to this question, Trendelenburg assumes that they are modal concepts<sup>375</sup> which do not belong to the predicate but to the copula.<sup>376</sup> If this were so, then the outcome would be perfectly satisfactory for us, since we have followed Trendelenburg in the assumption that the categories are all predicated of first substance. However, he himself voices a reservation which seems to us to be only too well grounded: "This separation can hardly be maintained once we realize that potentiality and actuality in a very real sense govern all Aristotelian concepts."<sup>377</sup> Thus neither Brandis nor any other recent investigator wants to agree with the above-mentioned opinion.<sup>378</sup> We refer back to what we have said about this point in sect. 11.<sup>379</sup> On that occasion actual being turned out to be factually identical with being as it is divided into the categories. They differed conceptually only insofar as actual being demanded a kind of being which was consummated by form, while the being of the categories demanded an essential, definable kind of being which was subsumable under a genus. In order for this to be the case, this being must of course be formed, and so both are identical. Of potential being we have seen above how, as incomplete being [*on ateles*], it is to be reduced in each case to the respective category of completed being [*on teleion*]. Thus it is easy to explain how the categories, according to Trendelenburg's remark, are in a real sense everywhere governed by potential and actual being, which would otherwise be impossible; for the modal determinations of the copula are, as this kind of being itself, merely entities of the understanding which do not exist outside the mind. Thus *Met.* V. 12 emphasizes the distinction between this modal possibility which is not potentiality, and the four above-mentioned modes of potential being [*dynaton*] which are called possible in the sense of potentiality [*kata dynamin dynata*].<sup>380</sup>

So much then for our answers to the objections against

Aristotle's doctrine of categories. We are aware that none has been intentionally omitted. Whether and to what extent this defense has been successful in every point must await the judgment of those who are more expert than we, and especially of those men who have articulated all these difficulties with so much penetration and clarity. By fixing the points at issue with precision they deserve most of the credit for the success of our attempts at solving them. If I had to contradict them on occasion, then not in order to attack, but to defend. I should not have dared to speak against them had I not thereby spoken for Aristotle; thus I will appear less ungrateful because I am grateful to the man to whom they too believe themselves indebted.

This now completes the domain of our inquiry. Step by step we have ascended from what has been called being in a lesser sense to proper being. Of the four senses into which being is initially divided, being in the figures of the categories was the most distinguished. The course of this chapter has shown that the categories bear the name "being" all with respect to one being, namely, with respect to the being of the first category. It would be more proper to say of every other category that it is *of a being* than that it is *a being*.<sup>381</sup> Hence it is substance which has being in the preeminent sense, i.e., which is not only something, but simply is. There are many senses in which something can be first, but substance is among all being the first in every sense, in concept, in cognition, as well as in time.<sup>382</sup> Its being is the terminus to which all stand in analogy, just as health is the terminus with respect to which everything that is healthful is called healthful, either because it has it, or because it brings it about, or shows it, etc. If now metaphysics is the science of being as such, then it is clear that its main object is substance. For in all cases of such analogies science treats mainly of the first, upon which the others depend, and from which they receive their name. Hence the first philosopher must research the principles and grounds of substance.<sup>383</sup> His primary, most distinguished, and in a sense only, task is to consider what it is.<sup>384</sup>

# Notes

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## PREFACE

1. *Aristoteles und seine Weltanschauung* (Leipzig, 1911), p. IV f.
2. *Die Psychologie des Aristoteles* (Mainz, 1867), p. 14, n. 34.
3. Antos C. Rancurello, *A Study of Franz Brentano* (New York, 1968), p. 6.
4. Heidegger's Preface to *Heidegger*, by William J. Richardson, S.J. (The Hague, 1963), p. XI f. *Unterwegs zur Sprache* (1959), p. 93.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 631.
6. So far the following translations have been published under the auspices of the Brentano Foundation:

*The True and the Evident*, ed. O. Kraus, English ed. R. M. Chisholm, tr. R. M. Chisholm, Ilse politzer, and K. R. Fischer (London, 1966).

*The Origin of Our Knowledge of Right and Wrong*, ed. Oskar Kraus, English ed. R. M. Chisholm, tr. R. M. Chisholm and E. Schneewind (London, 1969).

*The Foundations and Construction of Ethics*, ed. Franziska Mayer Hillebrand, tr. Elizabeth Schneewind (London and New York, 1973).

*Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint*, ed. O. Kraus, tr. Antos C. Rancurello, D. B. Terrel, and Linda McAlister; English ed. Linda McAlister (London and New York, 1973).

Forthcoming:

*The Psychology of Aristotle*, tr. R. George.

*Aristotle and His World View*, tr. R. George and R. M. Chisholm.

## INTRODUCTION

1. *De caelo* I. 5. 271b8: "... since the least initial deviation from the truth is multiplied later a thousand-fold. Admit, for instance, the existence of a minimum magnitude, and you will find that the minimum which you have introduced, small as it is, causes the greatest truths of mathematics to totter. The reason is that a principle is great rather in power than in extent; hence that which was small at the start turns out a giant at the end."

2. *Met.* XI. 2. 1060b4: "Being is predicated of all things." *Topics* IV. 6. 127a28: "If, therefore, he has rendered 'Being' as a genus, clearly it would be the genus of everything, seeing that it is predicated of everything." Cf. *Met.* III. 3. 998b20; *ibid.*, I. 2. 1053b20.

3. *Met.* V. 11. 1018b32: "For in definition universals are prior, in relation to perception individuals."

4. *Met.* IV. 1. 1003a21: "There is a science which investigates being and the attributes which belong to this in virtue of its own nature. Now this is not the same as any of the so-called special sciences." Cf. *ibid.*, 2. 1003b21.

5. *Met.* VI. 1. 1026a29: "If there is an immovable substance, the science of this must be prior and must be first philosophy, and universal in this way, because it is first. And it will belong to this to consider being *qua* being—both what it is and the attributes that belong to it *qua* being."

6. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028b2: "And indeed the question which was raised of old and is raised now and always, and is always the subject of doubt, viz. what being is . . ." Still and all we find passages in which Aristotle seems to assign a different object to metaphysics, by defining it, for example in *Met.* I. 1. 981b28, as the science which deals with first principles: "All men suppose what is called wisdom to deal with the first causes and the principles of things" Cf. *Met.* XI. 7. 1064b4, and elsewhere. The names "first philosophy" and "theology," which Aristotle gives elsewhere (*Met.* VI. 1. 1026a19; XI. 7. 1064b3) seem to point to the same fact, while, as everybody knows, the name (Metaphysics) does not yet occur in Aristotle himself. Many earlier and recent commentators have been misled by this, but it is not difficult to bring these passages into agreement with the previous quotations. (Those who want to gather historical information concerning the various opinions of different Aristotelians, especially in the middle ages, cf. Francis Suarez, *Disputationes Metaphysicae*, pt I, I, 2. Metaphysics is a branch of knowledge [*Wissenschaft*]. What is knowledge for Aristotle? In *Anal. post.* I. 2. 71b9 he says: "We suppose ourselves to possess unqualified scientific knowledge of a thing, as opposed to knowing it in the accidental way in which the Sophist knows, when we think that we know the cause on which the fact depends, as the cause of that fact and of no other, and, further, that the fact could not be other than it is." Thus knowledge includes not only (1) cognition of the object, but also (2) cognition of the grounds of the object. Thus with an investigation of an object the sciences will combine an investigation of its grounds, and it will be possible to distinguish them from each other in both these respects and thus to define and differentiate them. Cf. *Anal. post.* 1. 28. 87a38. Thus when Aristotle defines wisdom [*sophia*, *Met.* I. 1] as concerned with a consideration of first principles he determines its differentia with respect to the grounds of the object, which is particularly suitable to his purpose, since he started from a distinction between empirical and scientific knowledge and had just defined the latter as cognition from principles; thus this definition of the species ties in best with the definition of the genus. (cf. *Met.* I. 1. 981a28: "Men of experience know that the thing is so but do not know why, while the others (i.e., the artists) know the "why" and the cause." By uniting both definitions we can say that first philosophy is cognition of being in general from its general principles. As a matter of fact, Aristotle unites them in just this way where he proves that the various attributes which are generally applied to the wise coincide in the first philosopher. *Met.* I. 2. 982a22: "Now of these characteristics that of knowing all things must belong to him who has in the highest degree universal knowledge . . . but the science which

investigates causes is also *instructive* in a higher degree, for the people who instruct us are those who tell the causes of each thing." See also *Met.* IV. 1. 1003a26: "Now since we are seeking the first principles and the highest causes, clearly there must be something to which these belong in virtue of its own nature. . . . Therefore it is of being as being that we must grasp the first causes." And *Met.* VI. 1. 1025b3: "We are seeking the principles and the causes of the things that are, and obviously of them *qua* being. . . . Every science deals with causes and principles. . . . All these sciences mark off some particular thing—some genus, and inquire into this, but not into being simply nor *qua* being . . . nor do they offer any discussion of the essence." Thus not only metaphysics but all sciences discuss principles. But neither metaphysics nor the other sciences have as their object these grounds, rather that of which they are grounds. Cf. also Brandis, *Griechisch-romische Philosophie* II, 2, 1, p. 451; Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre* p. 18, and others who agree in the view that being as being is the subject of metaphysics.

7. Cf. *Met.* VI. 1. 1025b7, and XI. 7. 1064a4. Metaphysics also deals with the highest and most general principles from which the lower sciences derive their proofs. *Met.* IV. 3. 1005a19.

8. See below, chap. 5.

9. Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 167.

10. *Anal. post.* II. 13. 97b29: "Equivocation is less readily detected in genera than in *infimae species*."

## CHAPTER I

1. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003a33.

2. *Met.* VI. 2. 1026a33: "But since the unqualified term 'being' has several meanings," etc. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a10: "There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be'."

3. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b6: "Some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, others because they are a process toward substance, or destructions or privations or qualities of substance, or productive or generative of substance, or of things which are relative to substance, or negations of one of these things or of substance itself. It is for this reason that we say even of non-being that it is non-being."

4. *Met.* VI. 2. 1026a34: "The unqualified term 'being' has several meanings, of which one was seen to be the accidental, and another the true ('non-being' being the false), while besides these there are the figures of predication (e.g., the 'what', quality, quantity, place, time, and any similar meanings which 'being' may have), and again besides all these there is that which 'is' potentially or actually."

5. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a10: "There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words: for in a sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are."

6. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a7.

7. *Met.* IX. 10. 1051a34: "The terms 'being' and 'nonbeing' are

employed firstly with reference to the categories, and secondly with reference to the potency or actuality of these or their non-potency or non-actuality, and thirdly in the sense of true and false.”

## CHAPTER II

1. A. Schwegler, *Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, II, 80.
2. Brandis, *Griechisch - roemische Philosophie*, II, 2, 1, p. 474 ff; in place of “*on kata symbebekos*” he writes “*Beziehungsweises*.”
3. A. Schwegler, *op. cit.*, pp. 104 ff.
4. *Met.* V. 30. 1025a28: “The accident has happened or exists—not in virtue of the subject’s nature, however, but of something else.”
5. *Met.* XI. 8. 1065b2: “Nothing accidental is prior to the essential.”
6. One can also gather this from *Metaphysics* V. 11. 1018b34: “In definition also the accident is prior to the whole, e.g., ‘musical’ to ‘musical man’, for the definition cannot exist as a whole without the part.”
7. *Cat.* 5.3a7.
8. *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a25.
9. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b22: “If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are employed in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition . . . for ‘one man’ and ‘man’ are the same thing, and so are ‘existent man’ and ‘man’, and the doubling of words in ‘one man and one existent man’ does not express anything different . . . all this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity.” Cf. *Met.* VII. 4. 1030b10; XI. 3. 1061a17.
10. *Met.* V. 30. 1025a14: “‘Accident’ means (1) that which attaches to something and can be truly asserted, but neither of necessity nor usually.” 1025a30: “‘Accident’ has also (2) another meaning, i.e., all that attaches to each thing in virtue of itself but is not in its essence, as having its angles equal to two right angles attaches to the triangle. And accidents of this sort may be eternal, but no accident of the other sort is.”
11. *Ibid.*
12. Cf. below, chap. V, n. 384.
13. Cf. *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96b19.
14. *Top.* I. 5. 1028a18.
15. *Met.* VI. 2. 1027a8: “Therefore, since not all things either are or come to be of necessity and always, but the majority of things are *for the most part*, the accidental must exist.” He says the same in a passage just preceding: “Since, among things which are, some are always in the same state and are of necessity (not necessity in the sense of compulsion but that which we assert of things because they cannot be otherwise), and some are not of necessity nor always, but for the most part, this is the principle and this the cause of the existence of the accidental.”
16. *Met.* XI. 8. 1065a1: “The accidental, then, is what occurs, but not always nor of necessity nor for the most part.” *Met.* VI. 2. 1026b31: “For that which is neither always nor for the most part, we call accidental. For instance, if in the dog-days there is wintry and cold weather, we say this is an accident, but not if there is sultry heat, because the latter is always or for the most part so, but not the former. And it is an accident that a

man is pale (for this is neither always nor for the most part so), but it is not by accident that he is an animal. And that the builder produces health is an accident, because it is the nature not of the builder but of the doctor to do this, but the builder happened to be a doctor, etc.”

17. See above, n. 10.

18. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a8: “In an accidental sense, e.g., we say ‘the righteous doer is musical’, and ‘the man is musical’, and ‘the musician is a man’, just as we say ‘the musician builds’, because the builder happens to be musical or the musician to be a builder; for here ‘one thing is another’ means ‘one is an accident of another’. So in the cases we have mentioned.”

19. *Ibid.*, 1017a18: “In this sense, too, the not pale is said to *be*, because that of which it is an accident *is*.” Concerning the punctuation cf. Schwegler, *op. cit.*, III, 212.

20. *Met.* VI. 4. 1028a1: “And both are related to the remaining genus of being, and do not indicate the existence of any separate class of being.”

21. *Ibid.*, 1027a5: “For to other things answer faculties productive of them, but to accidental results there corresponds no determinate art or faculty.” Cf. *ibid.*, b34 and the parallel passage XI. 8.

22. *Ibid.*, VI. 2. 1026b22: “Things which are in another sense come into being and pass out of being by a process, but things which are accidental do not.”

23. *Ibid.*, 1026b15: “For the arguments of the Sophists deal, we may say, above all with the accidental.” Cf. XI. 8. 1064b28. The fallacy of accident [*fallacia per accidens*] is the most effective; cf. Book I of the *Sophistical Refutations*.

24. *Ibid.*, VI. 2. 1026b18: “And whether ‘everything which is, but is not eternal, has come to be’, with the paradoxical conclusion that if one who was musical has come to be lettered, he must also have been lettered and have come to be musical.” Cf. *Topics* I. 11. 104b25 and Zell’s remarks to this passage in his translation of the *Organon*.

25. *Ibid.*, b16: “Whether ‘musical’ and ‘lettered’ are different or the same, and whether ‘musical coriscus’ and ‘coriscus’ are the same.”

26. *Ibid.*, b14, and XI. 8. 1064b29. Cf. Plato’s *Sophist*, especially 235a and 240c.

27. *Met.* VI. 2. 1026b21: “The accidental is obviously akin to non-being.”

28. *Ibid.*, b13: “For the accidental is practically a mere name.”

29. Cf. *Cat.* V. 2a27: “With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used. For instance, ‘white’ being present in a body is predicated of that in which it is present, for a body is called white: the definition, however, of the color ‘white’ is never predicable of the body.”

30. Cf. above, p. 7.

31. *Met.* X. 9. 1058b3: “Paleness in a man or darkness does not make one, nor is there a difference in species between the pale man and the dark man, not even if each of them be denoted by one word.”

32. *Anal. post.* II. 8. 93a24: "As often as we have accidental knowledge that the thing exists, we must be in a wholly negative state as regards awareness of its essential natures; for we have not got genuine knowledge even of its existence, and to search for a thing's essential nature when we are unaware that it exists is to search for nothing."

33. One could be tempted to interpret the "is in name only" [*onomati monon estin*] in a different way, by connecting it with the "is one not even if one term is assigned to each" [*oud'an onoma hen tethe*] in the passage which we just quoted from *Metaphysics* X (n. 31). Thus *Metaphysics* VII. 4. 1029b25 describes how two things, one of which belongs to the other by accident [*kata symbebekos*] are often named by a single name ("let the compound be denoted by 'cloak'": *esto de onoma auto himation*), as, for example, when a brown horse is called a bay. Now one might be inclined to think that the definition of a bay is brown horse, and since the definition expresses the essence, that a bay or a brown horse is an essence [*Wesen*]. But this would be a mistake, for a mere explanation of a name does not provide a real definition. A single name does not produce the unity of the thing. Thus, this unity is "by name only" [*onomati monon*]. To begin with there are only very few cases where such a single name exists, and in these cases accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*] would have no manner of existence, which is obviously not Aristotle's opinion. Secondly, the expression "a bay is a brown horse" is not a being by accident. Here the "is" is not the same as "happens to be the case" [*symbebeke*], but the same as "signifies" [*semainei*].

34. *Met.* V. 2. 1026b3: "We must first say about the accidental that there can be no scientific treatment of it, etc." b12: "And this happens naturally enough; for the accidental is practically a mere name." *Ibid.*, 1027a19: "That there is no science of the accidental is obvious; for all science is either of that which is always or of that which is for the most part, etc."

35. *Anal. post.* I. 18. 81b6: "For it is sense-perception alone which is adequate for grasping the particulars: they cannot be the object of scientific knowledge."

36. *Cat.* 2. 1b6.

37. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a13: "For when we say 'the man is musical' and 'the musician is a man', or 'he who is pale is musical' or 'the musician is pale', the last two mean that both attributes are accidents of the same thing; the first that the attribute is an accident of that which *is*; while 'the musical is a man' means that 'musical' is an accident of a man."

38. Cf. what is said of the "one by accident" [*hen kata symbebekos*] and of "the same by accident" [*to auto kata symbebekos*] in the beginning of *Met.* V. 6. and of V. 9.

39. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a18: "In this sense, too, the not-pale is said to *be*, because that of which it is an accident *is*."

40. *Cat.* V. 2b5: "If [first substance] did not exist, it would be impossible for anything else to exist." Cf. chap. 5, sect. 6.

41. In a passage of the *Posterior Analytics* Aristotle clarifies this distinction in the following way: Just as there is a difference between "I do not know a white man" and "I know a non-white man", so, strictly speaking, there is a difference between "I am not a white man" and I am a non-white man."

42. Cf. *De int.* 13.23b15.

43. *De int.* 11.20b13: "There is no unity about an affirmation or denial which, either positively or negatively, predicates one thing of many subjects, or many things of the same subject, unless that which is indicated by the many is really some one thing. I do not apply this work 'one' to those things which, though they have a single recognized name, yet do not combine to form a unity. Thus, man may be an animal, and biped, and domesticated, but these three predicates combine to form a unity. On the other hand, the predicates 'white', 'man', 'walking' do not thus combine. Neither, therefore, if these three form the subject of an affirmation, nor if they form its predicate, is there any unity about that affirmation. In both cases the unity is linguistic, but not real."

### CHAPTER III

1. *De anima*, III.8.432a11: "For what is true or false involves a synthesis of concepts."

2. *Met.* IV.8.1012b8: (This follows the emendation of Bonitz, *Observationes Criticae in Arist. Libros Met.* [Berlin, 1842], p. 117f). "But if asserting or denying is nothing but truth or falsity . . . "[*ei de methen allo e phanai e apophanai to alethes e pseudos estin . . .*]. Alexander renders the passage as follows: "If truth is nothing but asserting that a thing is what it is, while, conversely, to deny its being so is falsehood . . ." [*ei methen allo to alethes estin e houtos echon phanai houtos echein, kai palin to houtos echon apophanai pseudos . . .*] Alexander Aphrodisiensis. In *Aristotelis Metaphysica commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck, *Com. in Aristo. Gr.*, I (Berlin, 1891) 339.

3. *De anima*, III.6.430a26: "The thinking then of the simple objects of thought is found in those cases where falsehood is impossible: where the alternative of true or false applies, there we always find a putting together of objects of thought in a quasi-unity." 430b1: "For falsehood always involves a synthesis; for even if you assert that what is white is not white you have included not-white in a synthesis. It is possible also to call all these cases division as well as combination." Cf. *Cat.* 4.2a7. *De int.* 1.16a12.

4. *Met.* VI.4.1027b20: "For the true judgment affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgment has the opposite of this allocation . . . for falsity and truth are not in things—it is not as if the good were true, and the bad were in itself false—but in thought; while with regard to simple concepts and 'whats' falsity and truth do not exist even in thought."

5. *De int.* 4.17a2: "Yet every sentence is not a proposition; only such are propositions as have in them either truth or falsity."

6. *Met.* V.29.1024b17: "'The false' means (1) that which is false as a thing, and that (a) because it is not put together or cannot be put together, e.g. 'that the diagonal of a square is commensurate with the side' or 'that you are sitting'; for for one of these is false always, and the other sometimes; it is in these two senses that they are non-existent. (b) There are things which exist, but whose nature it is to appear either not to be such as they are or to be things that do not exist, e.g., a sketch or a dream;

for these are something, but are not the things the appearance of which they produce in us. We call things false in this way, then,—either because they themselves do not exist, or because the appearance which results from them is that of something that does not exist.”

7. *De anim.* III. 3. 428b18: “Perception (1) of the special objects of sense is never in error or admits the least possible amount of falsehood. (2) that of the concomitance of the objects concomitant with the sensible qualities comes next: in this case certainly we may be deceived; . . . (3) third comes the perception of the universal attributes which accompany the concomitant objects to which the special sensibles attach . . . it is in respect of these that the greatest amount of sense-illustration is possible.” Cf. *ibid.*, 427b11.

8. *Ibid.*, 428a11: “Again, sensations are always true, imaginations are for the most part false.” 428a18: “for imagination may be false.” Cf. *Met.* IV. 5. 1010b1.

9. *De anima.* III. 6. 430b26: “Assertion is the saying of something concerning something, e.g., affirmation, and is in every case either a true or false: this is not always the case with mind: the thinking of the definition in the sense of the constitutive essence is never in error nor is it the assertion of something concerning something, but, just as . . . the seeing of the special object of sight, can never be in error.”

10. *Met.* V. 29. 1024b26: “A false *account* is the account of non-existent objects insofar as it is false. Hence every account is false when applied to something other than that of which it is true; e.g., the account of a circle is false when applied to a triangle. . . . A false account is not the account of anything, except in a qualified sense.” [“Account” [*logos*] is here the concept of the definition of something, Ed.].

11. Concerning the concept of analogy, cf. chap. V, sect. 3.

12. See above n. 4.

13. *Met.* IX. 10. 1051b3: “So that he who thinks the separated to be separated and the combined to be combined has the truth, while he whose thought is in a state contrary to that of the objects is in error.”

14. *Ibid.*, b9: “If, then, some things are always combined and cannot be separated, and others are always separated and cannot be combined, while others are capable either of combination or separation . . . regarding contingent facts, then the same opinion or the same statement comes to be false and true, and it is possible for it to be at one time correct and at another erroneous; but regarding things that cannot be otherwise, opinions are not at one time true and at another false, but the same opinions are always true or always false.”

15. *Met.* IX. 10. 1051b17: “But with regard to *incomposites*, what is being or not-being, and truth or falsity? It is as follows—contact and assertion are truth (assertion not being the same as affirmation), and ignorance is non-contact.”

16. *Ibid.*, b26: “And the same holds good regarding non-composite substances (for it is not possible to be in error about them). And they all exist actually, not potentially; for otherwise they would have come to be and cease to be; but, as it is, being itself does not come to be (nor cease to be); for if it had done so it would have had to come out of something. About the things, then, which are essences and actualities, it is not possible

to be in error, but only to know them or not to know them." It is here noted, in conformity with the third book of *De anim.*, that error concerning the essence [*ti esti*] is possible only by accident [*kata symbebekos*]. Hence this also holds of simple substances, in which, according to the doctrine developed in the seventh and eighth book of the *Metaphysics*, being and essence [*ti en einai*] are identical. But in the case of the essences [*ti esti*] of composites error occurs in a twofold way (cf. above p. 16). It occurs not only when a definition is applied to the thing defined, but especially also when it is formed of parts that contradict each other. For example if one were to say that three is a continuous magnitude of number. This kind of error is also impossible in the case of simple substances the determination of whose essence cannot be composed of genus and difference. Their essence does not have parts, hence also not their concept. We do not possess an idea of God which is in this way complete in its simplicity and corresponds to divine substance. In *Met.* 1052a1 Aristotle says "truth means knowing these objects, and falsity does not exist, nor error, but only ignorance—and not an ignorance that is like blindness; for blindness is akin to a total absence of the faculty of thinking." If, in this passage, Aristotle meant to attribute to us the capacity for this kind of knowledge, too, he would at the same time have allowed the possibility of an ontological proof. From the thus grasped nature of a being necessary in itself, its existence could be immediately deduced.

17. Cf. also *Cat.* 5.4a37, *De. int.* 9, etc.

18. *Cat.* 7.6b28: "All relatives have correlatives: by the term 'slave' we mean the slave of a master: by the term 'master', the master of a slave, etc." Cf. *ibid.*, 7b12.

19. *Met.* V.15.1021a26: "Relative terms which imply number or potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else, not because something else involves a reference to it; but that which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it. For 'that which is thinkable' implies that the thought of it is possible but the thought is not relative to 'that of which it is the thought'; for we should then have said the same thing twice." What is here said to hold of the thinkable [*dianoeton*] and of thought [*dianoia*] as potency holds, of course, also of that which is really known, and of the act of knowledge, just as above, a17, that which heats [*to thermainon*] and that which is heated [*to thermainomenon*] corresponded to each other in the same way as that which is capable of heating [*to thermantikon*] and that which is capable of being heated [*to thermanton*]. Cf. *et.* X.6.1056b34; 1057a9

20. *Met.* IX.10.1051b6: "It is not because we think truly that you are pale, that you are pale, but because you are pale we who say this have the truth."

21. *Cat.* 5.4b8: "For it is because the actual thing exists or does not exist that the statement is said to be true or false." (J. L. Ackrill, *Aristotle's Categories and de Interpretatione* [Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1963].)

22. *De int.* 1.16a6: "The mental experiences, which these [speech sounds] directly symbolize, are the same for all, as also are those things of which our experiences are the images."

23. *Met.* VI. 4. 1027b20. See above n. 4.

24. *De int.* 4. 17a2. See above n. 5.

25. *Met.* II. 1. 993b30: "As each thing is in respect of being, so is it in respect of truth."

26. *Ibid.*, b28. Cf. b11.

27. *Met.* V. 29. 1025a1: "These things, then, are called false in the senses, but a false *man* is one who is ready at and fond of such accounts, not for any other reason but for their own sake, and one who is good at impressing such accounts on other people, just as we say *things* are false which produce a false appearance. This is why the proof in the *Hippias* that the same man is false and true is misleading. For it assumes that he is false who can deceive (i.e., the man who knows and is wise); then further that he who is *willingly* bad is better, etc."

28. *Met.* VI. 4. 1027b18: "But since that which *is* in the sense of being true, or is *not* in the sense of being false, depends on combination and separation, and truth and falsity together depend on the allocation of a pair of contradictory judgments (for the true judgment affirms where the subject and predicate really are combined, and denies where they are separated, while the false judgment has the opposite of this allocation . . . for falsity and truth are not in things . . . but in thought; while with regard to simple concepts and 'whats' falsity and truth do not exist even in thought."

29. *Anal. post.* I. 1. 71a11: "The pre-existent knowledge required is of two kinds. In some cases admission of the fact must be assumed, in others comprehension of the meaning of the term used, and sometimes both assumptions are essential, etc." The former are principles of which, of course, no definition is demanded. The second are the attributes which are to be established, the third that which is the subject [*hypokeimenon*] of the science.

30. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a31: "Again, 'being' and 'is' mean that a statement is true, 'not-being' that it is not true but false,—and this alike in the case of affirmation and of negation; e.g., 'Socrates *is* musical' means that this is true, or 'Socrates *is* not-pale' means that this is true; but 'the diagonal of the square *is not* commensurate with the side' means that it is false to say it is." (This follows an emendation of this passage by Bonitz, *Observationes criticae in Arist. libros Met.* [Berlin, 1842].) Alexander, too, read "commensurable" [*symmetros*]. Cf. the following note.

31. Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria*, ed. Michael Hayduck, *Commentarii in Aristotelem Graeca*, I. (Berlin, 1891), 371 f. "Moreover he says 'is' and 'to be' and 'being' signify truth, 'not to be' and 'not-being' signify falsity. For we say that truth is to be as well as being, and that falsity is to be not as well as not-being; the same holds in the case of affirmation and negation, i.e., if one states something affirmatively or negatively. For one who says 'Socrates is musical' claims that what he says is true, using 'is' for truth. In the same way, one who says 'Socrates is not-white' states negatively the not-white; he says 'Socrates is not white' is truth. And in this way is truth in affirmation and falsity in negation, as when someone says 'the diagonal is not commensurable with the side.' Conjoining 'the diagonal commensurable with the side' with 'to be not', he claims that this 'to be' is false. When one says

that an affirmation is true he declares the 'to be' to be, and when a negation, he takes away the 'to be', as false being."

32. Schwegler, *op. cit.*, III. 213.

33. *Met.* IV. 8. 1012b18: "And if the former person accepts the contrary statement, saying it alone is not true, while the latter accepts his own as being not false, nonetheless they are driven to postulate the truth or falsity of an infinite number of statements; for that which says the true statement is true is true, and this process will go on to infinity."

34. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b6. Cf. above p. 3.

35. Above, when we dealt with accidental being [*on kata symbebekos*], we became familiar with a way in which a negation can be called a being; see above p. . . . The manner we have here in mind is different but is also apparent in that other passage. For there it was said that the non-white is, since that has being to which the non-white belongs (to which it accidentally belongs) [*symbebeke*; cf. *De int.* 13. 23b16]. This belonging is already a being; but not real being, it is being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*] since it is true that the man is non-white.

36. *Met.* VI. 12. 1019b6: "But if privation is in a sense 'having' or 'habit', everything will be capable by having something. But 'being' is used equivocally." [The last sentence not in Ross, but included in Bekker] Cf. IV. 2. 1003b6.

37. Cf. Schwegler, *op. cit.*, III. 225.

38. Thus he says in *Met.* X. 6. 1056b33: "And these are opposed as are the relatives which are not from their very nature relatives. We have distinguished elsewhere the two senses in which relatives are so-called: (1) as contrary; (2) as knowledge to thing known, a term being called relative because another is relative to it."

39. *Met.* VI. 4. 1028a1. See above Ch. II, n. 20. Cf. *ibid.*, 1027b31.

40. *Met.* VI. 4. 1027b34: "For the cause . . . is some affection of the thought." XI. 8. 1065a22: [being in the sense of being true] depends on a combination in thought and is an affection of thought."

41. *Ibid.*, 1028a2: "Therefore let these be dismissed, and let us consider the causes and the principles of being itself *qua* being."

42. *Ibid.*, 1027b28: "We must consider later what has to be discussed with regard to that which is or is not in this sense."

43. Genera, species, etc., and universals in general exist indeed outside the mind and are things (cf. *De int.* 7. 17a38), but no universal exists as universal, but only insofar as an individual exists which falls under it. The proposition: "Man is a species" considers man merely as a being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*].

44. Logic belongs to the theoretical, not to the practical or technical, sciences (cf. Brandis, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 1, p. 139). Nonetheless it is not assigned any place in the division of the theoretical sciences into physics, mathematics, and first philosophy. This striking phenomenon is explained by the fact that only the latter consider real being. They differ according to the three degrees of abstraction of their viewpoint and are distinguished accordingly, while logic treats only of merely rational being [*on hos alethes*]. Thus *Met.* IV. 3. 1005b3 calls it that which undertakes investigations concerning truth [*peri tes aletheias*]. When Brandis remarks (*op. cit.*, p. 41) that there does not seem to be any essential difference

in subject between logic and the other sciences, then this can be explained from what has been said above concerning being in the sense of being true [*on hos alethes*], namely, that it revolves around the remaining species of being [*peri to liopon genos tou ontos*]. *Met.* VI. 4. 1028a1.

#### CHAPTER IV

1. Cf. Brandis, *op. cit.*, III, 1, 46, n. 85 and the passage from Prantl quoted there.

2. Books VII and VIII deal with the being [*on*] of the categories and of substance [*ousia*] respectively, Book IX of potential and actual being [*dynamei kai energeia on*].

3. See above p. 1.

4. Cf. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, II, 2, p. 238, n. 5. Matter [*hyle*] must of course be taken in a wider sense in which it includes, in addition to primary matter [*prote hyle*], also the subjects of the accidents. Then Zeller's remark is correct that "a thing is potentially [*dynamei*] only insofar as it has matter [*hyle*] within itself." *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088b1: "The matter of each thing must be that which is potentially of the nature in question."

5. *Met.* V. 12. 1019b21: "Some things, then, are called *adynata* [not potent] in virtue of this kind of incapacity, while others are so in another sense; i.e., both *dynaton* and *adynaton* are used as follows, etc." As belonging to this merely rational possibility [*dynaton*] he enumerates: "The possible, then, in one sense, means that which is not of necessity false; in one that which is true; in one, that which may be true." Cf. *Met.* IX. 1. 1046a8.

6. *Met.* V. 12. 1019b33: "A 'potency' or 'power' in geometry is so-called by a change of meaning." Cf. *Met.* IX. 1. 1046a7: "Some are called so by analogy." The similarity consists in this: that just as potential being turns into actual being, so from the multiplication of the root with itself is generated the magnitude whose root it is.

7. *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089a28.

8. *Met.* IX. 3. 1047a24: "And a thing is capable of doing something if there will be nothing impossible in its having the actuality of that of which it is said to have the capacity. I mean, for instance, if a thing is capable of sitting and it is open to it to sit, there will be nothing impossible in its actually sitting; and similarly if it is capable of being moved or moving, or of standing or of making to stand, or of being or coming to be, or of not-being or not coming to be."

9. *Met.* IX. 8. 1049b10: "To all such potency, then, actuality is prior both in formula and in substantiality . . . so that the formula and the knowledge of the one must precede the knowledge of the other."

10. *Met.* IX. 3. 1047a30: "The word 'actuality', which we connect with 'complete reality', has, in the main, been extended from movements to other things; for actuality in the strict sense is thought to be identical with movement."

11. *Ibid.*, 6. 1048a25.

12. *Ibid.*, a35: "Our meaning can be seen in the particular cases by induction, and we must not seek a definition of everything."

13. *Ibid.*, a30: "Actuality, then, is the existence of a thing not in the way which we express by 'potentially'; we say that potentially, for instance, a statue of Hermes is in the block of wood and the half-line is in the whole, because it might be separated out, and we call even the man who is not studying a man of science, if he is capable of studying; the thing that stands in contrast to each of these exists actually."

14. *Met.* IX. 6. 1048a36: "And we must not seek a definition of everything but be content to grasp the analogy, that it is as that which is building is to that which is capable of building, and the waking to the sleeping, and that which is seeing to that which has its eyes shut but has sight, and that which has been shaped out of the matter to the matter, and that which has been wrought up to the unwrought. Let actuality be defined by one member of this antithesis, and the potential by the other." Cf. Schwegler concerning the reading of this passage.

15. Cf. Schwegler, *Metaphysik des Aristoteles*, 4, 222.

16. Ancient as well as recent commentators are in disagreement concerning the distinction between "*energeia*" and "*entelecheia*", but the difference between their opinions is much larger than the difference between the concepts that are designated by these two names. They are indeed applied to different things. It is not so much the case that they differ from one another, but that each differs from itself in different uses [contexts]; for "actual being" [*on energeia*] is not a univocally, but an analogously used name, as we shall see when the categories are discussed. Thus it could happen that commentators came to opposing views depending on the passage upon which they focussed. Many attribute more consummate reality to *entelecheia* than to *energeia*, while Schwegler claims (*op. cit.*) "*energeia* is the activity (self-employment) in consummate being, while *entelecheia* is striving activity connected with *dynamis*." *On energeia* as well as *on entelecheia* mean that which is realized and completed through form. But while the designation "*entelecheia*" expresses this through the very word, the name "*energeia*" is taken from movements (as Aristotle teaches, cf. above, n. 10) not because that which is in motion is *energeia* in the fullest sense, but of all realities movement strikes our eye first. Movement is not asserted of anything that is not real, while other predicates, such as thinkable and desirable, also apply to non-being (Arist., *ibid.*).

17. In connection with *Physics* 358a19 ff.

18. *Met.* IX. 3. 1046b29: "There are some who say, as the Megaric school does, that a thing 'can' act only when it is acting and when it is not acting it 'cannot' act, e.g., that he who is not building cannot build, but only he who is building, when he is building; and so in all other cases. It is not hard to see the absurdities that attend this view. For it is clear that on this view a man will not be a builder unless he is building (for to be a builder is to be able to build)."

19. *Met.* IX. 3. 1047a4.

20. *Ibid.*, a7.

21. *Ibid.*, a10.

22. *Met.* IX. 1. 1046a9: "All are originative sources of some kind."

23. See below chap. 5, sect. 3.

24. *Met.* V. 12. 1019a15: "'potency' means a source of movement or change, which is in another thing than the thing moved or in the same thing *qua* other, etc."

25. Cf. below chap. 5, sect. 13.

26. *Met.* V. 12. 1019a20. "‘Potency’ then means the source of change or movement by another thing or by itself qua other."

27. *Ibid.*, a26: "The states in virtue of which things are absolutely impassive or unchangeable, or not easily changed for the worse, are called potencies; for things are broken and crushed and bent and in general destroyed, not by having a potency but by not having one and by lacking something, and things are impassive with respect to such processes if they are scarcely and slightly affected by them because of a ‘potency’ and because they ‘can’ do something and are in some positive state."

28. *Met.* V. 12. 1019a23: "The capacity of performing this well or according to intention . . . so too, in the case of passivity." This kind of potentiality [*dynamis*] is here actually mentioned in the third place. According to the order which is used in IX. 1, which we have followed, and which corresponds to the order of things capable [*dynata*], we have introduced it as the fourth.

29. *Ibid.*, a32 ff.

30. See above, n. 5.

31. *Ibid.*, b35: "But the senses which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary kind of potency; and this is a source of change in another thing or in the same thing *qua* other. For other things are called ‘capable’, because something else has such a potency over them, some because it has not, some because it has it in a particular way, etc."

32. In order for something to be a potential being [*dynamei on*] it does not suffice that the principle of an activity should be found in it; doing [*poiein*] must also belong to it as a proper accident (see below, chap. 5, sect. 13). This is not the case with God.

33. *Met.* IX. 3. 1047a20: "So that it is possible that a thing may be capable of being and not *be*, and capable of not-being and yet *be*, and similarly with the other kinds of predicates; it may be capable of walking and yet not walk or capable of not walking and yet walk."

34. *Met.* IX. 10. 1051a34: "The terms ‘being’ and ‘non-being’ are employed firstly with reference to the categories, and secondly with reference to the potency or actuality of these or their non-potency or non-actuality." V. 7. 1017a35: "Again, ‘being’ and ‘that which is’ mean that some of the things we have mentioned ‘are’ potentially, others in complete reality." (At this point he has already discussed the categories.) Cf. also *De anima* II. 1. 412a6.

35. See below chap. 5, sect. 3.

36. *Met.* IX. 6. 1048b6: "But all things are not said in the *same sense* to exist actually, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; (for this reading cf. Bonitz, *Observationes criticae in Aristotelis libros Metaphysicae* [Berlin, 1842]). Some are as movement to potency, and the others as substance to some sort of matter." Cf. below, chap. 5, sect. 13.

37. *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089a34: "Now it is strange to enquire how being in the sense of ‘what’ is many, and not how either qualities or quantities are many." b15: "What is the reason, then, why there is a plurality of these? It is necessary, then, as we say, to presuppose for each thing that which it is potentially." See *Met.* X. 3. 1054b28.

38. Cf. the beginning of this chapter.

39. *Met.* IX. 7. 1049a17: "Just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order to become brass)."

40. *Met.* IX. 7. 1049a3: "Just as not everything can be healed by the medical art or by luck, but there is a certain kind of thing which is capable of it, and only this is potentially healthy. And (1) the delimiting mark of that which as a result of *thought* comes to exist in complete reality from having existed potentially is that if the agent has willed it it comes to pass if nothing external hinders, while the condition on the other side—viz. in that which is healed—is that nothing in it hinders the result. It is on similar terms that we have what is potentially a house; if nothing in the thing acted on—i.e., in the matter—prevents it from becoming a house, and if there is nothing which must be added or taken away or changed, this is potentially a house; and the same is true of all other things the source of whose becoming is external. And (2) in the cases in which the source of the becoming is in the very thing which comes to be, a thing is potentially all those things which it will be of itself if nothing external hinders it. E.g., the seed is not yet potentially a man; for it must be deposited in something other than itself and undergo a change. But when through its own motive principle it has already got such and such attributes, in this state it is already potentially a man; while in the former state it needs another motive principle, just as earth is not yet potentially a statue (for it must first change in order for it to become brass)."

41. Cf. *Physics* I. 9. 192b16.

42. E.g., *De anima*, II. 1. 412a6: "We are in the habit of recognizing, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and that in several senses, (a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this', and (b) in the sense of form or essence which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this', and thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both (a) and (b). Now matter is potentiality, form, actuality."

43. Cf. *Physics* III. 1. 201a29. *Ibid.*, 21.

44. *Met.* XI. 9. 1065b16: "I call the actuality of the potential as such, movement." *Physics* III. 1. 201a9: "We have now before us the distinctions in the various classes of being between what is fully real and what is potential. *The fulfillment of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is motion.*" *Ibid.* b4: "Clearly it is the fulfillment of what is potential as potential that is motion."

45. *De anima*, II. 1. 412a19: "Hence this soul must be a substance in the sense of the form of a natural body having life potentially within it. But substance is actuality, and thus soul is the actuality of a body as above characterized."

46. E.g., Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Physicorum commentarium*, ed. Hermann Diels, *Com. in Arist. Gr.*, IX (Berlin 1882), 414: "Whenever a thing changes from potentiality to actuality, with the potentiality remaining in the thing, we say it moves." Similarly Themistius and the other.

47. Philoponus, *In Aristotelis Physicorum libros tres priores commentaria*, ed. Hieronymus Vitelli, *Com. in Arist. Gr.* 16 (Berlin 1887), 351: "They explain motion (Themistius changed this somewhat) as the first entelechy of potential being as such; for the final entelechy is the transition to the form in which it remains thereafter; by contrast, the first entelechy is the passage toward the form; and this is motion."

48. *Simplicius*, *loc. cit.*: "Therefore, insofar as something is in actuality,

it moves not at all. Also insofar as something potential remains potential and merely capacity, we would not say that it moves. But when it changes from potentiality to actuality, and the potentiality remains in it, then we say it moves."

49. *Physics* III. 1. 201a29. Also *Met.* XI. 9.

50. *Physics* III. 1. 201a9: "The distinctions in the various classes of being between what is fully real and what is potential. . . ." Similarly *Met.* XI. 9.

51. *De anima*, II. 1. 412a8: "Now matter is potentiality, form actuality." *Met.* VIII. 2. 1043a27: "One kind of it [is substance] as matter, another as form or actuality."

52. *Met.* II. 2. 994a22: "For one thing comes *from* another in two ways—not in the sense in which 'from' means 'after' (as we say 'from the Isthmian games come the Olympian'), but either (1) as the man comes from the boy, by the boy's changing or (2) as air comes from water. By 'as the man comes from the boy' we mean 'as that which has come to be from that which is coming to be. Or as that which is finished from that which is being achieved' (for as becoming is between being and not being, so that which is becoming is always between that which is and that which is not; for the learner is a man of science in the making, and this is what is meant when we say that *from* a learner a man of science is being made); on the other hand, coming from another thing as water comes from air implies the destruction of the other thing."

53. *Met.* II. 2. 994a31: "This is why changes of the former kind are not reversible, and the boy does not come from the man (for it is not that which comes to be something that comes to be as a result of coming to be, but that which exists after the coming to be; for it is thus that the day, too, comes from the morning—in the sense that it comes after the morning; which is the reason why the morning cannot come from the day); but changes of the other kind are reversible."

54. See above, pp. 8f.

55. *Met.* VIII. 2. 1043a12: "The actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different."

56. *Met.* II. 2. See above, n. 52.

57. *Physics* III. 1. 201a31: "For 'to be bronze' and 'to be a certain potentiality [for motion]' are not the same. . . . (This is obvious in contraries. 'To be capable of health' and 'to be capable of illness' are not the same, for if they were there would be no difference between being ill and being well. Yet the *subject* both of health and of sickness—whether it is humor or blood—is one and the same.) We can distinguish, then, between the two just as, to give another example, 'color' and 'visible' are different, and clearly it is the fulfillment of what is potential *as* potential that is motion."

58. *Physics* III. 1. Cf. the preceding note.

59. *Physics* III. 1. 201a27: "[the fulfillment of] a potential thing, as thing moved, is motion, whenever this fully real being is in the process of bringing about (either itself or another)." [Brentano relies on a different reading than Ross for this difficult passage. We translate the Brentano version. The quotation continues:] "what I mean by 'as' is this: bronze is potentially a statue. But it is not the fulfillment of bronze as *bronze* which

is motion. For 'to be bronze' and 'to be a certain potentiality' are not the same."

60. *Physics* III. 1. 201b5: "further it is evident that motion is an attribute of a thing just *when* it is fully real in this way, and neither before nor after. For each thing of this kind is capable of being at one time actual, at another not. Take for instance the buildable as buildable. The actuality of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality of the buildable must be either this or the house. But when there is a house, the buildable is no longer buildable. On the other hand it *is* the buildable which is *being* built. The process then of being built must be the kind of actuality required. But building is a kind of motion, and the same account will apply to the other kinds also."

61. *Ibid.*, a15: "Examples will illucidate this definition of motion. When the buildable, insofar as it is just *that*, is fully real, it is *being built*, and this is *building*. Similarly, learning, doctoring, rolling, leaping, ripening, aging."

62. *Physics* III. 1. 201b4: "Clearly it is the fulfillment of what is potential *as* potential that is motion." *Ibid.* a10: "The fulfillment of what exists potentially, insofar as it exists potentially, is motion—namely, of what is alterable *qua* alterable, *alteration*: of what can be increased and its opposite what can be decreased (there is no common name), *increase* and *decrease*: of what can come to be and can pass away, *coming to be* and *passing away*: of what can be carried along, *locomotion*."

63. Cf. Alexander Aphrodisiensis, *In Aristotelis Metaphysica Commentaria, Com. in Arist. Gr.*, I (Berlin 1891), 396.

64. *Met.* II. 2; See above, n. 53.

65. *Physics* III. 2. 201b19: "This is plain if we consider where some people put it; they identify motion with 'difference' or 'inequality' or 'not being'; but such things are not necessarily moved, whether they are 'different' or 'unequal' or 'non-existent'; nor is change either *to* or from *these*, rather *to* or from their opposites."

66. According to the order of the Pythagoreans; cf. C. A. Brandis, ed. *Scholia in Aristotelem* (Berlin 1836), pp. 360a8 and 360a15.

67. *Physics* III. 2. 201b24: "The reason why I put motion into these genera is that it is thought to be something indefinite, and the principles in the second column are indefinite because they are privative: none of them is either 'this' or 'such' or comes under any of the other modes of predication." *Ibid.*, 1. 200b32: "There is no such thing as motion *over and above* the things. It is always with respect to substance or to quantity or to quality or to place that what changes changes. But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything *common* to these which is neither 'this' nor *quantum* nor *quale* nor any of the other predicates. Hence neither will motion and change have reference to something over and above the things mentioned, for there is nothing over and above them."

68. *Physics* III. 2. 201b27: "The reason in turn why motion is thought to be indefinite is that it cannot be classed simply as a potentiality or as an actuality—a thing that is merely *capable* of having a certain size is not undergoing change, nor yet a thing that is *actually* of a certain size, and motion is thought to be a source of *actuality*, but incomplete, the reason for this view being that the potential whose actuality it is is incomplete."

*De anima* III. 7. 431a6: "Movement, is as we saw, an activity of what is imperfect."

69. In following the first interpretation one encounters the difficulty (cf. Brandis, *op. cit.*, p. 358a19) that Aristotle describes movement [*kinesis*] not only as actuality [*energeia*] but also as consummate reality [*entelecheia*] which implies a consummation [*teleiotes*, see above sect. 1]. It is easy for us to explain this. Just as motion [*kinesis*] constitutes a state of becoming, and realizes this state, for which reason it is actuality [*energeia*], so it also consummates it *as such* and is therefore called a consummate reality [*entelecheia*]. It thus produces a more advanced, higher, and as it were, more consummate state of potentiality.

70. *Physics* III. 2. 201b33: "This is why it is hard to grasp what motion is. It is necessary to class it with privation or with potentiality or with sheer actuality, yet none of this seems possible. There remains then the suggested mode of definition, namely, that it is a sort of actuality, or actuality of the kind described, hard to grasp, but not incapable of existing."

71. *Physics* III. 1. 201a8: "Hence there are as many types of motion or change as there are meanings of the word 'is'." See also *Met.* XI. 9.

72. Cf. *Met.* XI. 11. 1067b14ff. Likewise *Physics* III.

73. *Met.* XI. 12. 1068a8: "If the categories are classified as substance, quality, place, acting or being acted on, relation, quantity, there must be three kinds of movement—of quality, of quantity, of place." Similarly *Physics* III. For those things which do not allow an intermediate state between the state prior to becoming and actuality and for which consequently there is not motion [*kinesis*], (hence, as we are told, for all categories outside of quality, quantity, and place [*poion, poson, and pou*]) the state of potentiality prior to becoming, which is not constituted by any form as such, is to be described as a state of most proximate potentiality. The state of their becoming is the state of actuality at the first moment.

74. Cf. *Physics* III. 5. 204a8.

75. *Met.* IX. 6. 1048b9: "But also the infinite and the void and all similar things are said to exist potentially and actually in a different sense from that which applies to many other things, e.g., to that which sees or walks or is seen. For of the latter class these predicates can at some time be also truly asserted without qualification; for the seen is so called sometimes because it is being seen, sometimes because it is capable of being seen. But the infinite does not exist potentially in the sense that it will ever actually have separate existence; it exists potentially only for knowledge. For the fact that the process of dividing never comes to an end ensures that this activity exists potentially, but not that the infinite exists separately."

## CHAPTER V

1. Cf. Brandis, *Uebersicht des Aristotelischen Lehrgebäudes*, pp. 41 f.
2. Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik im Abendlande*, I, 205 ff.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 206.
4. *Cat.* 4. 1b25: "Expressions which are in no way composite signify

substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time, position, state, action, or affection." Cf. *Topics* I. 9. 103b21: "These are ten in number, etc."

5. Cf. however Brandis, who repeatedly and decisively has said that they are genuine: the most recent time in his *Uebersicht des Aristotelischen Lehrgebäudes*, p. 47 n. 86.

6. Prantl, *op. cit.*, I, 206.

7. Brandis, *Griechisch-Römische Philosophie*, III. 1. 41 ff. Zeller, *Philosophie der Griechen*, 2d ed., II, 2, 189 n. 2.

8. Thus Aristotle says in *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83b15: "[The number of] the widest kinds under which predications fall is also limited", and in *Soph. elench.* 22. 178a6: "Seeing that we are in possession of the kinds of predications." In the *Topics* I. 9. 103b39, he says, after enumerating the categories: "Such, then, and so many, [they] are", and he frequently calls them "the predications which have been distinguished" [*hai diairetheisai kategoriai*], as for example in *De anima* I. 1. 402a24, and *ibid.*, 5. 410a14. A comparison ought to be made with other passages such as *Anal. prior.* I. 37. 49a7: "In as many ways as predications have been distinguished." [Ed.] In other places, where he has enumerated some categories, he calls the ones not enumerated "the other predications," which obviously implies that there is a table of categories which is determined once and for all.

9. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 191 f. Brandis, *Uebersicht des Aristotelischen Lehrgebäudes*, III, 1, 43. Bonitz, *Sitzungsberichte der Königlichen Akademie der Wissenschaften*, Philosophisch-historische Klasse, X, 5, 1853; 643. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 142.

10. Cf. above, chap. 3, sect. 2, toward the end, where everything which is not outside the mind is excluded from the subject matter of metaphysics, while the categories are included in it.

11. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 394.

12. *Ibid.*

13. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 188.

14. *Ibid.*, p. 189 n. 1.

15. Strumpell, *Geschichte der theoretischen Philosophie*, p. 211.

16. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 23.

17. Cf. *Cat.* 5. 2a11.

18. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 6.

19. *Anal. prior.* I. 27. 43a35: "For we sometimes say that the white object is Socrates, or that that which approaches is Callias."

20. Biese, *Philosophie des Aristoteles*, I, 49: "The categories, these basic concepts of thought . . . (p. 53) are not themselves generic concepts which indicate what is essential in an object, but they are the most general kinds of statement [*Aussage*] (*ta gene ton kategorion*, *Topics* I. 9)."

21. Waitz, *Aristotelis organon*, I, 268.

22. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias commentarium* (Basle, 1551), fol. 3a (*Commentaria in Aristotelem Graeca*, VIII, ed. C. Kalbfleisch [Berlin, 1907], p. 11).

23. Trendelenburg, *De categoriis*.

24. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 623.

25. *Ibid.*, p. 621.

26. Ritter, *Geschichte der Philosophie*, III, 77.

27. *Hegels Werke*, XIV, 402.

28. Cf. for example the passages cited in chap. 1.
29. For example in *Anal. prior.* I. 46. 52a15, the name *kategoria* is used synonymously with *kataphasis*: "Privative terms are similarly related to positive terms [*kategorias*] in respect of this arrangement. Let A stand for 'equal', B for 'not equal', C for 'unequal', D for 'not unequal'."
30. *Cat.* 4. 1b25: "Expressions which are in no way composite signify substance, quantity, quality, etc."
31. *De int.* 3. 16b20: "For he who uses such expressions arrests the hearer's mind, and fixes his attention."
32. Prantl, *op. cit.*, p. 196.
33. *Ibid.*
34. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2; 186.
35. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 189.
36. *Ibid.*, p. 210.
37. *Met.* VII. 4. 1030b11: "'That which is' in one sense denotes a 'this', in another a quantity, in another a quality."
38. See sect. 3.
39. *Physics* III. 1. 200b34: "But it is impossible, as we assert, to find anything *common* to these which is neither 'this' nor *quantum* nor *quale* nor any of the other predicates." *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96b20; *Met.* XII. 4. 1070b1.
40. See sect. 4.
41. *De anima* I. 1. 402a22: "First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the *summa genera* soul lies, what it *is*; is it 'a this-somewhat', a substance, or is it a *quale* or a *quantum*, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished?" Cf. p. 67.
42. *Topics* I. 15. 107a3; *ibid.* 9. 103b20; *Soph. elench.* 22. 178a5; *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83b15, and elsewhere.
43. Cf. pp. 52 and 53, and sect. 5.
44. Concerning the meaning of *diairesis*, cf. *Anal. prior.* I. 31; *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96b25.
45. *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089a26: "'Non-being' taken in its various cases has as many senses as there are categories."
46. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 614.
47. *Eth. Eudem.* I. 8. 1217b29.
48. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a10: "There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words; for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are."
49. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a22: "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these."
50. *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089a7: "But, first, its 'being' has many senses (for it means sometimes substance, sometimes that it is of a certain quality, sometimes that it is of a certain quantity, and at other times the other categories) . . ."
51. See above, n. 37, to ch. IV.

52. *Physics* III. 1. 200b34, and *Met.* XI.

53. *Met.* V. 10. 1018a35: "Since 'one' and 'being' have many senses, the other terms which are derived from these, and therefore 'same', 'other', and 'contrary', must correspond, so that they must be different for each category."

54. *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096a23: "Further, since 'good' has as many senses as 'being' (for it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason, and in quality, i.e., of the virtues, and in quantity, i.e., of that which is moderate, and in relation, i.e., of the useful, and in time, i.e., of the right opportunity, and in place, i.e., of the right locality and the like), clearly it cannot be something universally present in all cases and single; for then it could not have been predicated in all the categories but in one only."

55. *Met.* V. 28. 1024b9: "Those things are said to be 'other in genus' whose proximate substratum is different, and which are not analyzed the one into the other nor both into the same thing, e.g., . . . ; and things which belong to different categories of being (for some of the things that are said to 'be' signify essence, others a quality, others the other categories we have before distinguished); these also are not analyzed either into one another or into some one thing." Cf. *Anal. prior.* I. 27. 43a29, and *Met.* X. 3. 1054b27.

56. *Met.* III. 3. 998b22: "But it is not possible that either unity or being should be a single genus of things."

57. *Met.* VIII. 6. 1045a36. Aristotle explains in what way separate substances which do not consist of form and matter are one: "But of the things which have no matter, either intelligible or perceptible, each is by its nature essentially a kind of unity." He explains this through the example of being [*on*] which divides immediately into the categories without requiring some other thing as a difference, so that they should turn out to be this or that category: "As it is essentially a kind of being—individual substance, quality, or quantity (and so neither 'existent' nor 'one' is present in their definitions), and the essence of each of them is by its very nature a kind of unity as it is a kind of being."

58. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a20: "By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined."

59. *Met.* V. 6. 1016b31: "Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related as a third thing is to a fourth. The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former are; e.g., things that are one in number are also one in species, while things that are one in species are not all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus, while things that are so in genus are not all one in species but are all one by analogy; while things that are one by analogy are not all one in genus." *De part. anim.* I. 5. 645b26: "In the first case the common attributes may be called analogous, in the second generic, in the third specific." *Met.* XIV. 6. 1093b19: "For in each category of being an analogous term is found."

60. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003a33: "There are many senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', but all that 'is' is related to one central point, one definite kind of thing, and is not said to 'be' by a mere ambiguity. Everything which is healthy is related to health, one thing in the sense that it preserves health, another in the sense that it produces it, another in the sense that it is a symptom of health, another because it is capable of it. And that which is medical is relative to the medical art, one thing being called medical because it possesses it, another because it is naturally adapted to it, another because it is a function of the medical art. And we shall find other words used similarly to these. So, too, there are many senses in which a thing is said to be, but all refer to one starting point; some things are said to be because they are substances, others because they are affections of substance, etc." *Met.* VII. 4. 1030a32: "For it must be either by an equivocation that we say these *are*, or by adding to or taking from the meaning of 'are' (in the way in which that which is not known may be said to be known), the truth being that we use the word neither ambiguously nor in the same sense, but just as we apply the word 'medical' by virtue of a *reference* to one and the same thing, not *meaning* one and the same thing, nor yet speaking ambiguously; for a patient and an operation and an instrument are all called medical neither by an ambiguity nor with a single meaning, but with reference to a common end." Cf. *Met.* XI. 3. 1060b32.

61. *Cat.* 1. 1a1: "Things are said to be named 'equivocally' when, though they have a common name, the definition corresponding with the name differs for each. Thus, a real man and a figure in a picture. . . . Things are said to be named 'univocally' which have both the name and the definition answering to the name in common. A man and an ox are both 'animal'."

62. *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096b25: "The good, therefore, is not some common element answering to one Idea. But what then do we mean by the good? It is surely not like the things that only chance to have the same name. Are goods one, then, by being derived from one good or by all contributing to one good, or are they rather one by analogy? Certainly as sight is in the body, so is reason in the soul, and so on in other cases."

63. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 152 ff.

64. *Eth. Nic.* V. 6. 1131a31.

65. Cf. n. 62. Other examples are given in *Topics* I. 17. 108a7: "Likeness should be studied, first, in the case of things belonging to different genera, the formulae being 'A:B = C:D' (e.g., as knowledge stands to the object of knowledge, so is sensation related to the object of sensation), and 'as A is in B, so is C in D' (e.g., as sight is in the eye, so is reason in the soul, and as is a calm in the sea, so is windlessness in the air)." Also *Anal. prior.* I. 46. 51b22. *Physics* I. 7. 191a7. *De part. anim.* I. 5. 645b6, 9. *Met.* IX. 6. 1048b5.

66. *Cat.* 8. 10b26: "Qualities admit of variation of degree."

67. *De gen. et corr.* II. 6. 333a23: "They are not 'comparable in their amount' in the sense that so-much of the one yields so-much of the other, but comparable in 'power of actions' (a pint of water, e.g., having a power of cooling equal to that of ten pints of air); even so, they *are* 'comparable in their amount', though not *qua* 'amount' but *qua* 'so-much power'. There

is also a third possibility. Instead of comparing their powers by the measure of their amount, they might be compared as terms in a 'correspondence': e.g., 'as x is hot, so correspondingly y is white'. But 'correspondence', though it means equality in the *quantum*, means similarity in a *quale*."

68. *De part. anim.* I. 4. 644a16: "Groups that only differ in degree, and in the more or less of an identical element that they possess, are aggregated under a single class; groups whose attributes are not identical but analogous are separated. For instance, bird differs from bird by gradation, or by excess and defect; some birds have long feathers, others short ones, but all are feathered. Bird and fish are more remote and only agree in having analogous organs; for what in the bird is feather, in the fish is scale."

69. This is the '*koinon*' in the strict sense of the word. Cf. above, n. 39, where a passage from *Physics* III. 1 is quoted. For another use cf. below, sect. 4.

70. *Met.* XIV. 6. 1093b18: "For in each category of being an analogous term is found—as the straight is in length, so is the level in surface, perhaps the odd in number, and the white in color." [Brentano translates *peritton* as 'even'; it should be 'odd'.]

71. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 157.

72. For example, *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a36 shows this clearly: "And we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g., what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity, or its place; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know *what* the quantity or the quality is.

73. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003a33. See above, n. 60.

74. *Ibid.*

75. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a10: "There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be' . . . for in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing . . . and all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which *is* in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it."

76. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b13. Cf. n. 79.

77. In *Met.* V. 10. 1018a31, he declares the contrary [*enantion*] to be analogous in this way: "The other things that are called contrary are so called, some because they possess contraries of the above kind, some because they are receptive of such, some because they are productive of or susceptible to such, or are producing or suffering them, or are losses or acquisitions or possessions or privations of such." Similarly with the "thing capable" [*dynaton*] in *Met.* V. 12. 1019b35: "But the senses which involve a reference to potency all refer to the primary kind of potency; and this is a source of change in another thing or in the same thing *qua* other. For other things are called 'capable', some because something else has such a potency over them, some because it has not, some because it has it in a particular way. The same is true of the things that are incapable. Therefore the proper definition of the primary kind of potency will be

'a source of change in another thing or in the same thing *qua* other'." By contrast one speaks in geometry and in logic also of potentiality [*dynamis*] and of a "thing capable" [*dynaton*], but here we only find analogy of proportionality. See above, ch. IV, n. 5-6.

78. Thus in *Met.* IX. 1. 1046a6, he distinguishes equivocal names which are united in an analogy of the identity of *terminus*, from homonyms, while the analoga of proportionality are counted among the latter: "Of these we may neglect all the potencies that are so called by an equivocation. . . . But all conform to the same type."

79. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b11: "As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, *qua* being."

80. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b16: "(The primary) on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names."

81. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a18. See above, n. 75; cf. n. 60.

82. This double analogy of being did not escape F. Ravaisson in his *Essai sur la metaphysique d'Aristote*, I, 357 ff., which was crowned by the Academy of Paris: "It is not, therefore, in a superior genus that the categories are united, nor is it in a common participation in a single principle or a single idea. They are united as are the four causes *in a common relation to a single term*, and it is this relation which makes [the categories] the objects of a single science. . . . But there are relations of *a completely different nature* which establish between the different categories a kind of parental bond; these are the oppositions of being. . . ." P. 363: "The two contrary members of each opposition are therefore necessarily different in each of the categories, as is being itself within each of its genera. But in the same way that it is everywhere being, it is the same opposition everywhere: the terms are different but the relationship identical. . . . The oppositions established therefore between the ten genera of being *equality of relationship, proportions, analogies: three synonymous terms.*"

83. *De part. anim.* I. 5. 645b26. See above, n. 59. Cf. *Anal. post.* I. 10. 76a38.

84. *Met.* VII. 16. 1040b21. X. 2. 1053b19.

85. Or, on other occasions, of a general principle, etc.

86. *Physics* III. 1. 200b34. See above, n. 39. *Met.* XII. 4. 1070b1: "There is nothing common to and distinct from substance and the other categories."

87. *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96b19: "After that, having established what the category is to which the subaltern genus belongs—quantity or quality, for instance—he should examine the properties 'peculiar' to the species, working through the proximate common differentiae."

88. *Met.* XI. 3. 1061b11: "Since all that is said to 'be' in virtue of something single and common, though the term has many meanings. . . ." Similarly *ibid.* 1060b35. It will be clear from the preceding section that this common [*koinon*] is substance [*ousia*].

89. *Topics* IV. 6. 127b6: "For the genus is always predicated of its species synonymously." Cf. *Topics* IV. 3. 123a28.

90. *Met.* V. 28. 1024b12, etc. See above, n. 55-56.

91. *Met.* X. 3. 1054b35: "But some are other in genus, and others are in the same line of predication." He makes the same point equally clearly in the passage cited above, n. 59, from *Met.* V. 6. 1016b31.

92. *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83b16: "The widest kinds under which predications fall." *Soph. elench.* 22. 178a5: "We are in possession of the kinds of predication." *Topics* I. 9. 103b20: "The classes of predicates." *Topics* I. 15. 107a3: "The classes of the predicates signified by the term." *Topics* VII. 1. 152a38: "In one class of predicates." Concerning the explanation of the genitive, see above, p. 57.

93. *Cat.* 8. 11a37: "Further, if anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads." *Ibid.*, 10. 11b15: "The proposed categories [*protethenton genon*] have, then, been adequately dealt with." *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96b19: "After that, having established what the category [*genos*] is to which the subaltern genus belongs—quantity or quality, for instance. . . ." [The words "to which the subaltern genus belongs" are interpolated by Ross.] *Physics* III. 1. 201a9. See above, ch. IV, n. 50. Likewise *Met.* XI. 9. *De anim.* I. 1. 402a22: "First, no doubt, it is necessary to determine in which of the *summa genera* soul lies, what it is; is it 'a this-somewhat', a substance, or is it a *quale* or a *quantum*, or some other of the remaining kinds of predicates which we have distinguished?" *De anim.* II. 1. 412a6: "We are in the habit of recognizing [*legomen*], as one determinate kind [*genos*] of what is, substance, etc." *Met.* X. 1. 1052b18: ". . . It means especially 'to be the first measure of a kind', and most strictly of quantity; for it is from this that it has been extended to the other categories." *Met.* XII. 5. 1071a24: "Different things have different causes and elements, as was said; the causes of things that are not in the same class [*en tauto genei*], e.g., of colors and sounds, of substances and quantities, are different except in an analogical sense." *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089b27: "Yet there ought to be a matter for each category [*genei*]; only it cannot be separable from substances."

94. Cf. Porphyry, *In Aristotelis Categorias*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*, IV, pt. 1 (Berlin, 1887), 56: "Some of them 'On the Genera of Being', others 'On The Ten Genera'."

95. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 219.

96. *Met.* VII. 9. 1034b7: "But not only regarding substance does our argument prove that its form does not come to be, but the argument applies to all the primary classes [*proton koinos*] alike, i.e., quantity, quality, and the other categories." Cf. also the passage from *Anal. post.* II. 13, quoted in n. 87.

97. *Cat.* 5. 2a11: "Substance, in the truest and primary and most definite sense of the word, is that which is neither predicable of a subject nor present in a subject; for instance, the individual man or horse."

98. *Topics* I. 5. 102a31: "A 'genus' is what is predicated in the category of essence of a number of things exhibiting differences in kind." *Cat.* 3. 1b22: "The greater class is predicated of the lesser."

99. *Cat.* 5. 3a38: "The species is predicated of the individual, the genus both of the species and of the individual."

100. *Cat.* 3. 1b10: "when one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, 'man' is predicated of the individual man; but 'animal' is predicated of 'man'; it will, therefore, be predicable of the individual man also: for the individual man is both 'man' and 'animal'."

101. See above n. 75. *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a25: "Predicates not signifying substance . . . are accidental."

102. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a23: "For the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance." *Cat.* 5. 2b37: "Further, primary substances are most properly so called, because they underlie and are the subjects of everything else. Now the same relation that subsists between primary substance and everything else subsists also between the species and the genus to which the primary substance belongs, on the one hand, and every attribute which is not included within these, on the other. For these are the subjects of all such." *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a30: "These predicates which do not signify substance must be predicates of some other subject, and nothing can be white which is not also other than white." Cf. *ibid.*, b20.

103. *Cat.* 5. 2b30: "We concede to species and genera alone the name 'secondary substance'." *Ibid.*, a15.

104. *Cat.* 5. 3a15: "Again, when a thing is present in a subject, though the name may quite well be applied to that in which it is present, the definition cannot be applied. Yet of secondary substances, not only the name, but also the definition, applies to the subject: we should use both the definition of the species and that of the genus with reference to the individual man. Thus substance cannot be present in a subject." Cf. *ibid.*, 2a19. He speaks here only of predication in particular cases (*kategoreisthai pote*). In *Cat.* 5. 2a27, he even denies that all accidents are predicable of first substance: "With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used." This seems to contradict the passages quoted in note 102 but commentators frequently explain this as follows: There are concrete and abstract names of accidents, as virtue and virtuous, tallness and tall, etc., where the former are derivative [*paronyma*; cf. *Cat.* 1. 1a11] from the latter. Hence Aristotle speaks here of the two names of the accident in an imprecise manner as if they were two accidents, from which it would follow that there are a great many accidents which cannot be predicated of substance. For I cannot say that man is virtue, but only that he is virtuous. Ammonius calls our attention to the fact that there are a great many abstract names of accidents for which there exists no concrete form so that they cannot be predicated of substance in any way, not even by way of a related paronym.

105. *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a4: "When I affirm 'the white is a log', I mean that something which happens to be white is a log—not that white is the substratum in which log inheres. . . . On the other hand, when I affirm 'the log is white', I do not mean that something else, which happens also to be a log, is white. . . . On the contrary, the log is here the substratum—the substratum which actually came to be white, and did so *qua* wood or *qua* a species of wood and *qua* nothing else.

"If we must lay down a rule, let us entitle the latter kind of statement predication, and the former not predication at all, or not strict but accidental predication. 'White' and 'log' will thus serve as types respectively of predicate and subject." Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 15.

106. *Met.* X. 2. 1053b20: "For being and unity are the most universal of all predicates." Cf. above, ch. I, n. 2.

107. *Anal. prior.* I. 27. 43a29: "Some things are themselves predicated of others, but nothing prior is predicated of them."

108. *Met.* III. 3. 998b14: "Besides this, even if the genera are in the highest degree principles, should one regard the first of the genera as principles, or those which are predicated directly of the individual?"

109. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 6.

110. *Cat.* 5. 2a11. See above, n. 97. Cf. *ibid.*, b21: "The species is more truly substance than the genus."

111. *Cat.* 2. 1b3: "There is, lastly, a class of things which are neither present in a subject nor predicable of a subject such as the individual man or the individual horse." *Ibid.*, 5. 3a36: "Inasmuch as primary substance is not predicable of anything, it can never form the predicate of any proposition." Cf. *ibid.*, 2b17. *Anal. prior.* I. 27. 43a25. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a21: "... or because that to which the attribute belongs is." (I.e., whose natural predicate it is; cf. Bonitz' note concerning this passage.)

112. See above, n. 105.

113. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 621. Such passages are: *Soph. elench.* 31. 181b27. *Met.* IV. 2. 1004a28. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a28.

114. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 187 n. 1.

115. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 612.

116. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 376.

117. *Op. cit.*, III, 1, 39: "Essence could be envisaged as predicate at most insofar as through it the indeterminateness of matter achieves determinateness."

118. The earlier commentators have frequently emphasized this. Thus Philoponus [Busse attributes this passage to Ammonius. *Ammonii in Categorias proemium*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*, IV (Berlin, 1895), 13]: "Thus since the ten most general terms can only be predicated [*monon kategorountai*] and can never function as subjects, he labels them 'categories'." Similarly in C. A. Brandis, ed., *Scholia in Aristotelum* (Berlin, 1836), p. 31a6: "'Categories' does not mean criminal accusations, but the most general terms, since they are always predicates and never subjects." Similarly Alexander Aphrodisias, who is quoted by Trendelenburg, *De categoriis*. Among the more recent commentators Prantl, *Geschichte der Logik*, I, 198: "The common generic predicates are the categories, i.e., the determinations of the genera, which can no longer function as the subjects of higher predicates, but which predicatively assert the determination as one that applies in common."

119. See above, n. 78.

120. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a1: "For that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance."

121. Cf. the passages quoted in n. 80-81 and n. 102, above.

122. For this reason the other categories are called in *Met.* IV. 1003b9

"things which are relative to substance." *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a25: "Now these (the concrete forms of the accidents [Brentano]) are seen to be more real because there is something definite which underlies them (i.e., the substance or individual), which is implied in such a predicate; for we never use the word 'good' or 'sitting' without implying this. Clearly then it is in virtue of this category that each of the others also *is*." Hence *Cat.* 5. 2b5: "If these last did not exist it would be impossible for anything else to exist."

123. *Met.* VIII. 3. 1043b28: "Therefore one kind of substance can be defined and formulated, i.e., the composite kind, whether it be perceptible or intelligible; but the primary parts of which this consists cannot be defined, since a definitory formula predicates something of something, and one part of the definition must play the part of matter and the other that of form."

124. *Met.* VIII. 6. 1045a20: "Clearly, then, if people (i.e., the Platonists [Brentano]) proceed thus in their usual manner of definition and speech, they cannot explain and solve the difficulty" (i.e., "what the cause is of the unity with respect both to definitions and to numbers," *ibid.*, a8). "But if, as we say, one element is matter and another is form, and one is potentially and the other actually, the question will no longer be thought a difficulty. For this difficulty is the same as would arise if 'round bronze' were the definition of 'cloak'; for this word would be a sign of the definitory formula, so that the question is, what is the cause of the unity of 'round' and 'bronze'? The difficulty disappears, because the one is matter, the other form." Cf. *Met.* VII. 12. 1037b8. *De part. anim.* I. 3. 643a24: "A species is constituted by the combination of differentia and matter." Cf. above concerning the conformity of thinking and being, p. 18.

125. *Met.* V. 28. 1024b6: "'Genus' then is used in all these ways, (1) in reference to continuous generation of the same kind, (2) in reference to the first mover which is of the same kind as the things it moves, (3) as matter." *Met.* X. 8. 1058a23: "The genus is the matter of that of which it is called the genus, not in the sense in which we speak of the genus or family of the Heraclidae, but in that in which the genus is an element in a thing's nature." Cf. the preceding note.

126. Cf. above, ch. IV n. 37. Also *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089b27 states: "Yet there ought to be a matter for each category; only it cannot be separable from substances."

127. *Met.* V. 4. 1015a7, and elsewhere.

128. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a20: "By matter I mean that which in itself is neither a particular thing nor of a certain quantity nor assigned to any other of the categories by which being is determined. For there is something of which each of these is predicated, whose being is different from that of each of the predicates (for the predicates other than substance are predicated of substance, while substance is predicated of matter). Therefore the ultimate substratum is of itself neither a particular thing nor of a particular quantity nor otherwise positively characterized."

129. See above, ch. IV sect. 2.

130. *Anal. prior.* I. 37. 49a6.

131. *Anal. post.* I. 4. 73b5: "Further (*a*) that is essential which is not predicated of a subject other than itself: e.g., 'the walking [thing] walks

and is white in virtue of being something else besides; whereas substance, in the sense of whatever signifies a 'this somewhat', is not what it is in virtue of being something else besides. Things, then, not predicated of a subject I call essential; things predicated of a subject I call accidental or 'coincidental'."

132. *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83b20: "Yet we maintain that all of them alike are predicated of some substratum and that a coincident is never a substratum."

133. *Ibid.* 83a36: "If *A* is a quality of *B*, *B* cannot be a quality of *A*—a quality of a quality."

134. *Cat.* 2. 1a29: "Other things, again, are both predicable of a subject and present in a subject. Thus while knowledge is present in the human mind, it is predicable of grammar."

135. *Topics* I. 9. 103b27: "It is clear, too, on the face of it that the man who signifies something's essence signifies sometimes a substance, sometimes a quality, sometimes some of the other types of predicate. For when a man is set before him and he says that what is set there is 'a man' or 'an animal', he states its essence and signifies a substance; but when a white color is set before him and he says that what is set there is 'white' or is 'a color', he states its essence and signifies a quality. Likewise, also, if a magnitude of a cubit be set before him and he says that what is set there is a magnitude of a cubit, he will be describing its essence and signifying a quantity. Likewise, also, in the other cases." *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a36: "And we think we know each thing most fully, when we know what it is, e.g., what man is or what fire is, rather than when we know its quality, its quantity or its place; since we know each of these predicates also, only when we know *what* the quantity or the quality *is*." Cf. *ibid.* 4. 1030a22.

136. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a22: "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures. Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these."

137. *Anal. prior.* I. 37. 49a6: "The expressions 'this belongs to that' and 'this holds true of that' must be understood in as many ways as there are different categories."

138. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 397. Julius Pacius, too, translates *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a21 probably correctly as: "Hence it is attributed either in respect of what it is, or that it is of such quality or quantity" [*itaque attribuitur vel in questione quid est, vel quia est quale aut quantum*].

139. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 209 and elsewhere: "They are always the most general predicates."

140. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 189 n. 1: "The categories are not themselves immediately predicates, but merely describe the locus for certain predicates."

141. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 394: "They are the most general forms or species of propositions which are removed and dissociated from sentential contexts." (*Topics* I. 9. 103b20. *Met.* VI. 2. 1026a36. XIV. 2. 1089a26.)

142. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 623: "In Aristotle's sense the categories indicate

the various senses in which we say the concept of being." Similarly p. 599.

143. *Ibid.*, p. 599: "They are the highest genera." p. 623: "They designate the highest genera to one of which each thing which has being must be capable of being subordinated." Similarly Prantl, *op. cit.*, p. 167, and others.

144. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 209: "They are the most general predicates." P. 21: "Substance [*ousia*] is the actual category of the subject." Prantl, *op. cit.*, p. 198: "If it is genera in the first place, which occur as predicates (*kategoroumena*), then the most general and most comprehensive predicates will be those highest genera."

145. *Topics* III. 1. 116a23: "In the second place, that which is known as 'an x' is more desirable than that which does not come within the genus 'x'—e.g., justice than a just man; for the former falls within the genus 'good', whereas the other does not, and the former is called 'a good', whereas the latter is not."

146. Prantl, *op. cit.*, p. 196.

147. *Ibid.*, p. 198.

148. *Ibid.*, p. 208.

149. *Ibid.*, p. 209.

150. *Anal. prior.* I. 27. 43a25: "Of all the things which exist some are such that they cannot be predicated of anything else truly and universally, e.g., Cleon and Callias, i.e., the individual and sensible, but other things may be predicated of them, etc." *Met.* VII. 3. 1028b36: "Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else." Cf. *Physics* I. 7. 190a34.

151. *Met.* VII. 13. 1039a1: "No common predicate indicates a 'this'."

152. *Topics* I. 9. 103b35: "For each of these kinds of predicate, if either it be asserted of itself, or its genus be asserted of it, signifies an essence: if, on the other hand, one kind of predicate is asserted of another kind, it does not signify an essence." *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a24: "Predicates which signify substance signify that the subject is identical with the predicate or with a species of the predicate."

153. Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 56 ff. and 93 ff.

154. See above, ch. III, sect. 2, pp. 25f.

155. *Topics* I. 4. 101b30: "'An animal that walks on two feet' is the definition of man, is it not?" Or "'animal' is the genus of man, is it not?'"

156. *Topics* VII. 5. 155a3: "It is clear also that the easiest thing of all is to overthrow a definition. For on account of the number of statements involved we are presented in the definition with the greatest number of points for attack . . . for if either the formula be not peculiar, or the genus rendered be the wrong one, or something included in the formula failed to belong, the definition is thereby demolished. . . ." a17: "Clearly, then, it is the easiest of all things to demolish a definition, while to establish one is the hardest. For there one both has to establish all those other points by reasoning (i.e., that the attributes stated belong, and that the genus rendered is the true genus, and that the formula is peculiar to the term), and moreover, besides this, that the formula indicates the essence of the thing; and this has to be done correctly." *Topics*, I. 6. 102b27: "We must not fail to observe that all remarks made in criticism of a

'property' and 'genus' and 'accident' will be applicable to 'definition' as well. For when we have shown that the attribute in question fails to belong only to the term defined, as we do also in the case of a property, or that the genus rendered in the definition is not the true genus, or that any of the things mentioned in the phrase used does not belong, as would be remarked also in the case of an accident, we shall have demolished the definition; so that, to use the phrase previously employed (*Topics*, I. 5.) all the points we have enumerated might in a certain sense be called 'definitory'. But we must not on this account expect to find a single line of inquiry which will apply universally to them all."

157. *Topics* I. 5. 102a32. Cf. *Topics* IV. 2. 122a5.

158. *Cat.* 5. 2a20.

159. *Topics* I. 4. 101b18: "For the differentia too, applying as it does to a class (or genus), should be ranked together with the genus."

160. *Topics* I. 8. 103b7: "For every predicate of a subject must of necessity be either convertible with its subject or not: and if it is convertible, it would be its definition or property, for if it signifies the essence, it is the definition; if not, it is a property: for this was what a property is, viz. what is predicated convertibly, but does not signify the essence. If, on the other hand, it is not predicated convertibly of the thing, it either is or is not one of the terms contained in the definition of the subject: and if it be one of those terms, then it will be the genus or the differentia, inasmuch as the definition consists of genus and differentiae; whereas, if it be not one of those terms, clearly it would be an accident, for accident was said to be what belongs as an attribute to a subject without being either its definition or its genus or property."

161. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b31: "And unity is nothing apart from being"; b22: "If, now, being and unity are the same and are one thing in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not in the sense that they are explained by the same definition."

162. For example, *Physics* III. 3. 202a18: ". . . Hence there is a single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one—for these are one and the same although they can be described in different ways."

163. *Met.* V. 28. 1024b15: "These also are not analyzed either into one another or into some one thing."

164. *Topics* IV. 2. 121b29: "For it is generally accepted that whenever one species falls under two genera, the one is embraced by the other. Yet a principle of this kind gives rise to a difficulty in some cases. For some people hold that prudence is both virtue and knowledge, and that neither of its genera is embraced by the other: although certainly not everybody admits that prudence is knowledge. If, however, anyone were to admit the truth of this assertion, yet it would still be generally agreed to be necessary that the genera of the same object must at any rate be subordinate either the one to the other or both to the same, as actually is the case with virtue and knowledge. For both fall under the same genus; for each of them is a state and a disposition. You should look, therefore, and see whether neither of these things is true of the genus rendered; for if the genera be subordinate neither the one to the other nor both to the same, then what is rendered could not be the true genus." Cf. *Topics* VI. 6. 144b14.

165. *Topics* I. 15. 107a27: "In this way, then, as well, both the genera are predicated of raven, and also their definition. But in the case of genera that are not subaltern this does not happen." *Topics* IV. 2. 122b1: "Genus and the species will be predicated of the same object in the category of essence, so that the same object falls under two genera: the genera must therefore of necessity be subordinate one to the other."

166. *Met.* X. 7. 1057b7: "For species are composed of the genus and the differentiae."

167. *Cat.* 3. 1b16: "If genera are different and co-ordinate, the differentiae are themselves different in kind. Take as an instance the genus 'animal' and the genus 'knowledge'. 'With feet', 'two-footed', 'winged', 'aquatic', are differentiae of 'animal'; the species of knowledge are not distinguished by the same differentiae. One species of knowledge does not differ from another in being 'two-footed'."

168. *Anal. post.* II. 13. 97a28: "The right order will be achieved if the right term is assumed as primary, and this will be ensured if the term selected is predicable of all the others but not all they of it; since there must be one such term."

169. *Met.* V. 6. 1016b31: "Again, some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, . . . in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, . . . The latter kinds of unity are always found when the former are; e.g., things that are one in number are also one in species, while things that are one in species are not all one in number; but things that are one in species are all one in genus." The above quoted passage, *Topics* VI. 6, also did not want to permit the possibility of a double genus, at least not for the species, which would threaten to arise from its relation to the difference, if it were permitted in the latter. Cf. 144b26.

170. *Met.* VII. 12. 1038a15: "And the process wants always to go on so till it reaches the species that contain no differences. And then there will be as many kinds of foot as there are differentiae, and the kinds of animals endowed with feet will be equal in number to the differentiae. If then this is so, clearly the *last* differentia will be the substance of the thing and its definition, since it is not right to state the same things more than once in our definitions; for it is superfluous, etc."

171. *Met.* VII. 12. 1038a8: "Clearly the definition is the formula which comprises the differentiae." *Ibid.*, a28: "Therefore it is plain that the definition is the formula which contains the differentiae, or, according to the right method, the last of these."

172. *Met.* VIII. 2. 1043a19: "For the formula that gives the differentiae seems to be an account of the form or actuality."

173. *Ibid.*, a12: "The actuality or the formula is different when the matter is different."

174. The seventh book of the *Metaphysics* gives an indication how it is to be explained that Aristotle in some passages of his logical writing allots to the differentia no less than the genus a greater universality than to the species. He does so, in particular, in several passages of the *Topics*. For example, *Topics* IV. 2. 122b39: "for always the differentia has an equal or a wider denotation than the species." Cf. *Topics* I. 8. 103b14 and in *Anal. post.* II. 13. 96a33 (the attributes in the essential nature) "are severally

of wider extent than the subject but collectively co-extensive with it; for this synthesis must be the substance of the thing." For this reason the differentia given in the definition has often a wider extension than the definitum, since in giving a definition we cannot always find the proper differentia which would disclose the substantial form of the species itself. Now if the essential forms are not as such known, then they must be replaced by an indication of accidents, which are signs of that form and can therefore be called essential differentiae since they serve as an explanation of essential form. These now will also be found outside the thing defined; for the peculiar accidents (the idia) of the species must first be displayed by means of the definition of the species. *Met.* VII. 12. 1038a8: "Clearly the definition is the formula which comprises the differentiae. But it is also necessary that the division be by the differentia of the differentia; e.g., 'endowed with feet' is a differentia of 'animal'; again the differentia of 'animal endowed with feet' must be of it *qua* endowed with feet. Therefore we must not say, if we are to speak rightly, that of that which is endowed with feet one part has feathers and one is featherless (if we do this we do it through incapacity); we must divide it only into cloven-footed and not-cloven; for these are differentiae in the foot; cloven-footedness is a form of footedness." Cf. the above passage, *Topics* VI. 6. 144b14.

175. *De interpret.* 7. 17a38: "Some things are universal, others individual. By the term 'universal' I mean that which is of such a nature as to be predicated of many subjects, by 'individual', that which is not thus predicated. Thus 'man' is a universal, 'Callias' an individual."

176. *Cat.* 5. 2a14: "But in a secondary sense those things are called substances within which, as species, the primary substances are included."

177. Thus, for example, B. Hauréau in his book *De la philosophie scolastique* (Paris, 1850), which was crowned by the Paris Academy.

178. *Physics* III. 3. 202a13: "The solution of the difficulty that is raised about the motion—whether it is in the *movable*—is plain. It is the fulfillment of this potentiality, and by the action of that which has the power of causing motion; and the actuality of that which has the power of causing motion is not other than the actuality of the movable, for it must be the fulfillment of *both*. A thing is capable of causing motion because it *can* do this, it is a mover because it actually *does* it. But it is on the movable that it is capable of acting. Hence there is a single actuality of both alike, just as one to two and two to one are the same interval, and the steep ascent and the steep descent are one—for these are one and the same, although they can be described in different ways. So it is with the mover and the moved." (Cf. *Met.* XI. 9. 1066a30.) Now he raises objections against the doctrine just introduced: a21-b5. These objections are resolved in the sequel, b5-b22. The basic thought always remains that, in spite of all real identity of teaching and learning, of doing and suffering, the concepts remain entirely distinct: b14: "For it is not things which are in a way the same that have all their attributes the same, but only such as have the same definition." (Cf. *Physics* IV. 11. 219a21.) An identity of all attributes takes place only where things are factually and conceptually identical. b19: "To generalize, teaching is not the same as learning, or agency as patency, in the full sense, though they belong to the same

*subject*, the motion; for the 'actualization of X in Y' and the 'actualization of Y through the action of X' differ in *definition*."

179. *Cat.* 6.4b22: "Instances of discrete quantities are number and speech; of continuous, lines, surfaces, solids, and, besides these, time and place." Cf. *ibid.*, 5b8.

180. *Physics* IV.4.212a20: "Hence we conclude that *the innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place*." Cf. *ibid.*, 5.212b27.

181. *Ibid.*, a28: "For this reason, too, place is thought to be a kind of surface."

182. *Physics* IV.5.212a31: "If then a body has another body outside it and containing it, it is in place."

183. *Met.* V.13.1020a26.

184. *Physics* IV.11.220a25: "Time is 'number of movement in respect of the before and after'."

185. *Ibid.*, 219a19: "The 'before' and 'after' in motion is identical in substratum with motion yet differs from it in definition, and is not identical with motion."

186. Cf. *Physics* IV.14.223b10-21 and b32-a2; also *Physics* VIII.8 ff.

187. Prantl, *op. cit.*, I, 206.

188. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 43.

189. *Cat.* 4.2a1.

190. Cf. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 396; III, 1, 40; Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 157; Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 187.

191. Cf. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 46.

192. *Topics* IV.2.122b18: "Also, see whether he has placed the differentia inside the genus, e.g., by taking 'odd' as 'a number'. For 'odd' is a differentia of number, not a species. Nor is the differentia generally thought to partake of the genus: for what partakes of the genus is always either a species or an individual, whereas the differentia is neither a species nor an individual. Clearly, therefore, the differentia does not partake of the genus, so that 'odd', too, is not species but a differentia, seeing that it does not partake of the genus." *Met.* XI.1.1059b33: "And no genus is predicable of any of its differentiae." *Met.* III.3.998b24: "But it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae."

193. Thus they, too, are called substances, e.g., *Cat.* 5.3a29 and *Met.* VII.2.1028b11.

194. *Met.* VII.3.1029a2: "And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third the compound of these." *De anima* II.1.412a6: "We are in the habit of recognizing, as one determinate kind of what is, substance, and that in several senses, (a) in the sense of matter or that which in itself is not 'a this', and (b) in the sense of form or essence, which is that precisely in virtue of which a thing is called 'a this', and thirdly (c) in the sense of that which is compounded of both."

195. *Met.* VIII.3.1043b2: "For 'soul' and 'to be soul' are the same, but 'to be man' and 'man' are not the same, unless even the bare soul is to be called man." Cf. *De anima* II.1.412a17. *Ibid.*, 2.414a20.

196. *Met.* VII.3.1028b33: "The word 'substance' is applied, if not in more senses, still at least to four main objects; for both the essence and the

universal and the genus are thought to be the substance of each thing, and fourthly the substratum. Now the substratum is that of which everything else is predicated, while it is itself not predicated of anything else." (Thus the *hypokeimenon* is the individual substance.) "And so we must first determine the nature of this; for that which underlies a thing primarily is thought to be in the truest sense its substance. And in one sense matter is said to be of the nature of substratum, in another, shape, and in a third the compound of these."

197. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a2: cf. the preceding note. *De anima* II. 2. 414a14: "For, as we said [412a6], the word substance has three meanings—form, matter, and the complex of both." *Met.* VIII. 1. 1042a25: "These are the sensible substances, and sensible substances all have matter. The substratum is substance, and this is in one sense the matter (and by matter I mean that which, not being a 'this' actually, is potentially a 'this'), and in another sense the formula or shape (that which being a 'this' can be separately formulated), and thirdly the complex of these two."

198. *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089a26: "But since 'non-being' taken in its various cases has as many senses as there are categories, and besides this the false is said not to be, and so is the potential, it is from this that generation proceeds, man from that which is not man but potentially man, and white from that which is not white but potentially white, and this whether it is some one thing that is generated or many." *De anima* II. 1. 412b8: "Unity has many senses (as many as 'is' has), but the most proper and fundamental sense [cf. *Met.* VI. 4. 1027b31] . . . is actuality." *Met.* VII. 10. 1036a8: "But matter is unknowable in itself."

199. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 46 n. 85.

200. Prantl, *op. cit.*, p. 186.

201. Note: According to what has been said, the parts of a being cannot come to stand directly under one of the categories. Accordingly, in order to predicate the parts of the whole being, we form derivatives. For I cannot say "the bird is a wing, it is a feather", but only "it is winged, it is feathered". I cannot say "the ox is a tail" but only "he is tailed", etc. But these derivative forms do not change what holds of the parts of the being when they are expressed in the other, in a sense more abstract, form. Here too, the completeness of being which is necessary for direct subordination under a category is lacking. The just as just is nothing other than justice; similarly the tailed as tailed is nothing but his tail; for, as the just becomes just through justice, so the tailed becomes tailed through the tail.

202. So, for example, in *Met.* VII. 11. 1037a1, where the separate substance is not reckoned among the individuals from the species' substance, but is contrasted with the "this" [*tode ti*]: "Indeed there is some matter in everything which is not an essence and a bare form but a 'this'."

203. *Met.* XII. 1. 1069a30: "There are three kinds of substance—one that is sensible (of which one subdivision is eternal and the other is perishable) . . . and another that is immovable." XII. 6. 1071b3: "Since there were three kinds of substance, two of them physical and one unmovable, regarding the latter we must assert that it is necessary that there should be an external unmovable substance."

204. *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096a24: "For it is predicated both in the category of substance, as of God and of reason. . . ." Cf. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a18.

205. *Ennead* VI. 1. 1.

206. *Ennead* VI. 3. 1. 1130. 13: "*dei mentoi to tauta analogia kai homonymia lambanein.*"

207. Augustine, *De trinitate* V, 1 and 2: "Thus we may understand God, if we are able, as being good without quality, great without quantity, as creator who lacks nothing, present without position, sustaining things but not having them, being everywhere wholly present but without location, eternal without time, as making mutable things without himself changing, and suffering nothing. Whoever thinks thus, while he cannot yet discover in all ways what He is, nonetheless piously takes heed, so far as possible, to think nothing of this that He is not. Still, without doubt, He is substance, or, to put it better, essence."

208. Not the Pythagorean Archytas, but a later philosopher, who was a Peripatetic.

209. Cf. Brandis, ed., *Scholia in Aristotelem* (Berlin, 1836), p. 79a44.

210. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 45; cf. II, 2, 1, 377.

211. *Anal. post.* I. 7. 75a39: "For there are three elements in demonstration . . . (3) the subject-genus whose attributes, i.e., essential properties, are revealed by the demonstration."

212. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 643.

213. *Ibid.*

214. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 397.

215. *Anal. post.* I. 28. 87a37: "A single science is one whose domain is a single genus. . . . One science differs from another when their basic truths have neither a common source nor are derived those of the one science from those of the other."

216. *Met.* III. 2. 997a21: "Therefore to investigate the essential attributes of one class of things, starting from one set of beliefs, is the business of one science."

217. *Met.* IV. 1. 1003a21.

218. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b12: "For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, *qua* being."

219. *Ibid.*, b21: "Hence to investigate all the species of being *qua* being is the work of a science which is generically one, and to investigate the several species is the work of the specific parts of the science." And *ibid.*, b33: "All this being so, there must be exactly as many species of being as of unity. And to investigate the essence of these is the work of a science which is generically one—I mean, for instance, the discussion of the same (substantial unity) and the similar (qualitative unity) and the other concepts of this sort."

220. *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83b19: "Predicates are all coincidents (unless they are substantial)." *Ibid.*, a25: "Predicates not signifying substance which are predicated of a subject not identical with themselves or with a species of themselves are accidental or coincidental." *Ibid.*, 4. 73b8: "Things, then, not predicated of a subject I call essential; things predicated

of a subject I call accidental or 'coincidental'." Cf. *Cat.* 2. 1a20. *Cat.* 5. 2a34.

221. Cf. the preceding note. *Cat.* 5. 2a19: "It is plain from what has been said that both the name and the definition of the predicate must be predicable of the subject, etc." *Ibid.*, a27: "With regard, on the other hand, to those things which are present in a subject, it is generally the case that neither their name nor their definition is predicable of that in which they are present. Though, however, the definition is never predicable, there is nothing in certain cases to prevent the name being used." Cf. b30.

222. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a11 clearly introduces the distinction between substance [*ousia*] and the other categories as the first and most important distinction by arranging all other categories on one side, and substance on the other: "For in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are." The entire chapter confirms this.

223. *Cat.* 7. 8a31: "Those things only are properly called relative in the case of which relation to an external object is a necessary condition of existence."

224. *Met.* XIV. 2. 1089b20: "And it was much *more* necessary, as we said, if he was inquiring how beings are many, not to inquire about those in the same category—how there are many substances or many qualities—but how beings as a whole are many; for some are substances, some modifications, some relations."

225. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 42.

226. *Physics* V. 2. 225b11: "Nor is there motion in respect of relation: for it may happen that when one correlative changes, the other, although this does not itself change, is no longer applicable, so that in these cases the motion is accidental." Cf. *Met.* XI, *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088a29: "A sign that the relative is least of all a substance and a real thing is the fact that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or movement, as in respect of quantity there is increase and diminution, in respect of quality alteration, in respect of place locomotion, in respect of substance simple generation and destruction. In respect of relation there is no proper change; for, without changing, a thing will be now greater and now less or equal, if that with which it is compared has changed in quantity." Cf. *Cat.* 5. 4b4.

227. *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096a21: "For the latter is like an offshoot and accident of being."

228. *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088a22: "But what is relative is least of all things a kind of entity or substance, and is posterior to quality and quantity; and the relative is an accident of quantity, as was said, not its matter, since something with a distinct nature of its own. . . ." *Ibid.*, b1: "And the matter of each thing, and therefore of substance, must be that which is potentially of the nature in question; but the relative is neither potentially nor actually substance." Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 76 and 117. In *Met.* VII. 4. 1029b22 Aristotle deals with those things which have an essence [*to ti en einai*] and mentions all other compositions of substance, but not relation [*pros ti*]. The reason for this is probably that among the categories relation has the weakest being, and is farthest removed from having, being capable of constituting, an essence.

229. *Cat.* 5. 3a34. *Topics* I. 2. 109b6.

230. It is frequently used simply for movement, e.g., *Topics* VI. 6. 145a3. In *Cat.* 8. 9a28 it simply stands for a species of quality.

231. *Met.* IX. 6. 1048b6: "But all things are not said in the *same sense* to exist actually, but only by analogy—as A is in B or to B, C is in D or to D; for some are as movement to potency, and the others as substance to some sort of matter." Cf. *De anima* II. 1. 412a9.

232. *Met.* VII. 4. 1029b23: "For there is a substratum for each category, e.g., for quality, quantity, time, place, and motion." Cf. *Met.* XII. 1. 1069a22 and the preceding note. There are other passages in which Aristotle, while enumerating the categories, indicates a special kinship among the ones comprised in this class, as, for instance, *Physics* V. 1. 225b5. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a26. *Ibid.*, XI. 12. 1068a9.

233. *Met.* V. 20. 1022b5: "'Having' [*hexis*] means something like an action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between them there is making." Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categoriae Commentarium*, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*, VIII (Berlin, 1907), 303: "Motion is separated from both the agent and the patient since it is between these two and proceeds from the agent to the patient, completing the affection."

234. *Met.* VII. 2. 1028b8: "Substance is thought to belong most obviously to bodies; and so we say that not only animals and plants and their parts are substances, but also natural bodies." Cf. *ibid.* 3. 1029a33.

235. Cf. chap. V, sect. 11.

236. *De anima* II. 1. 412a9: "Matter is potentiality, form actuality."

237. *Met.* V. 13. 1020a7: "'Quantum' means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'."

238. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a10: "Matter becomes substance. For if this is not substance, it baffles us to say what else is. When all else is stripped off evidently nothing but matter remains. For while the rest are affections, products, and potencies of bodies, lengths, breadths, and depths are quantities and not substances (for a quantity is not a substance), but the substance is rather that to which these belong primarily. But when length and breadth and depth are taken away we see nothing left unless there is something that is bounded by these; so that to those who consider the question this matter alone must seem to be substance." Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 77.

239. *Met.* V. 14. 1020a33: "'Quality' means the differentia of the essence, e.g., man is an animal of a certain quality because he is two-footed, and the horse is so because it is four-footed; and a circle is a figure of a particular quality because it is without angles, which shows that the essential differentia is a quality. This, then, is one meaning of quality—the differentia of the essence."

240. Cf. chap. V, sect. 16.

241. *Cat.* 8. 8b26. For this reason *Met.* V. 14. 1020b12 characterizes this species of quality as "in respect of virtue and vice and, in general, of evil and good."

242. *Met.* V. 14. 1020b13, where Aristotle wants to draw together into two types the various modes of quality [*poion*], he says: "Quality, then,

seems to have practically two meanings, and one of these is the more proper. The primary quality is the differentia of the essence, and of this the quality in numbers is a part; for it is a differentia of essences, but either not of things that move or not of them *qua* moving. Secondly there are the modifications of things that move, *qua* moving, and the differentiae of movement. Virtue and vice fall among these modifications; for they indicate differentiae of the movement or activity, according to which the things in motion act or are acted on well or badly."

243. *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 78. Cf. also p. 103, and Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 196 n. 3, and the passages quoted by him.

244. *Met.* XII. 1. 1069a20: "On this view also substance is first, and is succeeded by quality, and then by quantity."

245. Thus, for example, *Anal. post.* I. 22. 83a21, and b16. *Topics* I. 9. 103b20. *Physics* V. 1. 225b5. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a24, VII. 1. 1028a12, and 4. 1029b24. *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096a25 and elsewhere.

246. Concerning the most appropriate order of the categories, see ch. V, sect. 16.3.

247. The categories other than substance form a series of co-ordinated members, even though in their ontological sense they all stand to substance in the relation of accident [*symbebekota*]. Bonitz, *loc. cit.*, p. 607, concludes from this "that in the categories as such we are not concerned with the solution of metaphysical questions, but with a synoptical division of the field of representations which are given in experience." Quite the contrary! From the fact that the deduction of the categories begins with an ontological distinction, it follows that all subdivisions also rest on such differences, and from the fact that the categories are placed in a sequence it follows that the more general concepts which are used in this deduction all have only unity by analogy, hence that they contain within themselves ontological distinctions. All other concepts descend from the categories in regular steps of subordination under univocal concepts down to the individual thing in ontological uniformity, i.e., uniformity in the concept of being.

248. *Met.* V. 20. 1022b5: "For when one thing makes and one is made, between them there is making."

249. *De gen. et corr.* I. 7. 324a26: "That which contains the originative source of motion is thought to 'impart motion'."

250. *Physics* III. 3. 202a16, b21. Also the beginning of VII. 1.

251. *Met.* V. 17. 1022a7: "('Limit' means) that towards which the movement and the action are."

252. *Met.* IX. 8. 1050a23: "And while in some cases the exercise is the ultimate thing (e.g., in sight the ultimate thing is seeing, and no other product besides this results from sight), but from some things a product follows (e.g., from the art of building there results a house as well as the act of building), yet nonetheless the act is in the former case the end and in the latter more of an end than the potency is. For the act of building is realized in the thing that is being built, and comes to be, and is, at the same time as the house.

Where, then, the result is something apart from the exercise, the actuality is in the thing that is being made, e.g., the act of building is in the thing that is being built and that of weaving in the thing that is being

woven, and similarly in all other cases, and in general the movement is in the thing that is being moved; but where there is no product apart from the actuality, the actuality is present in the agents, e.g., the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of the theorizing in the theorizing subject and life is in the soul."

253. *Met.* IX. 8. 1049b5: "It is clear that actuality is prior to potency . . ." *Ibid.*, b24: "For from the potentially existing the actually existing is always produced by an actually existing thing, e.g., man from man, musician by musician; there is always a first mover, and the mover already exists actually."

254. *Physics* VII. 1. 242a16: "Everything that is in motion must be moved by something."

255. *De anima* III. 7. 431a4: "In the case of sense clearly the sensitive faculty already was potentially what the object makes it to be actually; the faculty is not affected or altered. This must therefore be a different kind from movement" (than that which is treated in physics) "for movement is, as we saw, an activity of what is imperfect, activity in the unqualified sense, i.e., that of what has been perfected, is different from movement."

256. *Eth. Eudem.* VII. 14. 1248a15: "This, however, one might question: whether fortune is the cause of just this, viz. desiring what and when one ought. But will it not in this case be the cause of everything, even of thought and deliberation? For one does not deliberate after previous deliberation which itself presupposed deliberation, but there is some starting-point; nor does one think after thinking previously to thinking, and so *ad infinitum*. Thought, then, is not the starting point of thinking nor deliberation of deliberation. . . . The object of our search is this—what is the commencement of movement in the soul? The answer is clear: as in the universe, so in the soul, God moves everything. For in a sense the divine element in us moves everything."

257. Cf. above, p. 31. *Met.* V. 12. 1019a15.

258. *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 24: "The active and passive are conceptualized through the *poiein* [action] and the *paschein* [affection], at least part of the intransitive through *keisthai* [position], and the peculiarity of the Greek perfect tense, inasmuch as it indicates possession of an effect, through *echein* [having]." Cf. *ibid.*, p. 140.

259. In *Physics* II. 1. 192b20 Aristotle teaches that a nature is an origin of movement not in another, but in that in which it is, and he says, for example, in *Met.* IX. 8. 1049b8 that it belongs in the same genus with potency, which generates movement in another: "For nature also is in the same genus as potency; for it is a principle of movement—not, however, in something else but in the thing itself *qua* itself."

260. *Met.* V. 20. 1022b4: "'Having' means a kind of activity of the haver and of what he has—something like an action or movement. For when one thing makes and one is made, between them there is making; so too between him who has a garment and the garment which he has there is having."

261. *Cat.* 4. 1b27.

262. *Ibid.*, 2a3: "'Shod', 'armed' [indicate] state."

263. Simplicius, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Karl Kalbfleisch, *Com. in Arist. Graecae*, VIII (Berlin, 1907), 365 f. "If something

is acquired which is separate from the substance, and does not itself change the substance, and is not named after what it does to it, and if it envelopes the same, then the participation is called 'having'."

264. *Cat.* 9. 11b11: "As for the rest . . . since they are easily intelligible, I say no more about them than what was said at the beginning, that in the category of state are included such states as 'shod', 'armed'."

265. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 643.

266. We can view the explanation of the first kind of disposition [*diathesis*] as an explanation of the real content of posture [*keisthai*]: *Met.* V. 19. 1022b1: "'Disposition' means the arrangement of that which has parts—in respect of place." The other dispositions which he mentions are species of quality. Cf. also VIII. 2. 1042b14 and 19. A change of position [*thesis*] occurs as a kind of locomotion, since relations do not have a coming to be and passing away peculiar to them. See above.

267. *Cat.* 7. 6b11: "It is to be noted that lying and standing and sitting are particular attitudes, but attitude is itself a relative term. To lie, to stand, to be seated, are not themselves attitudes, but take their name from the aforesaid attitudes." Cf. *ibid.* 9. 11b8. Cf. also Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 140 and 215.

268. Cf. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 140 and 142.

269. This caught the attention of commentators very early, as is shown by Elia, *In Aristotelis Categorias Commentarium*, ed. Adolf Busse, *Com. in Arist. Graeca*, XVIII, 1 (Berlin, 1900), 160: "Therefore some of those who are concerned with the incompleteness [of the list] wonder why there are not eleven categories, since one could add [the category] "being had" [*echesthai*]. For why did he contrast action and affection, and not having [*echein*] and being had [*echesthai*]? Syrianus resolves this problem by saying that "being had" is a case of posture [*keisthai*], and we have one category, *keisthai*. For what is had is positioned [*keitai*] upon him who has it. In just this way one has a ring, a cloak or shoes. These are positioned upon him who has them [on]."

270. *Physics* I. 7. 190a34.

271. For, obviously, there cannot be a movement of movement. Cf. *Physics* V. 2. 225b15.

272. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a10: "There are several senses in which a thing may be said to 'be', as we have pointed out previously in our book on the various senses of words" (i.e., in the fifth book of the *Metaphysics*). "For in one sense the 'being' meant is 'what a thing is' or a 'this', and in another sense it means a quality or quantity or one of the other things that are predicated as these are. While 'being' has all these senses, obviously that which 'is' primarily is the 'what', which indicates the substance of the thing."

273. *Met.* V. 7. 1017a24: "Since, then, some predicates indicate what the subject is, others its quality, others quantity, others relation, others activity or passivity, others its 'where', others its 'when', 'being' has a meaning answering to each of these." Cf. also *Physics* V. 1. 225b5. Accordingly, Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 42, says: "We do not want to deny that Aristotle later on dropped the determinations having and position which he had mentioned earlier, etc." And Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 142: "Posture [*keisthai*] and having [*echein*] clearly

move into the background in some other passages in Aristotle . . . for example, *Anal. post.* I. 22 where the point was a complete enumeration of the types of predication by means of the categories, and where posture [*keisthai*] and having [*echein*] are absent. Here one could surmise that from another point of view these categories could be seen as given through others, such as action [*poiein*] and affection [*paschein*], if they are taken as active and passive in a wider sense. But in *Metaphysics* 1029b24 the verbal categories action, affection, position, and having [*poiein, paschein, keisthai, echein*] are simply replaced by movement [*kinesis*], yet it is difficult to comprehend position and having under movement." Cf. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, p. 643, and Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 191 and 197.

274. Of place he says in *Physics* IV. 4. 212a20: "Hence we conclude that the innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place. . . ." *Ibid.*, 28: "For this reason, too, place is thought to be a kind of surface, and as it were a vessel, i.e., a container of the thing." Of time in *Physics* IV. 12. 221b16: "But time will measure what is moved and what is at rest, the one *qua* moved, the other *qua* at rest; for it will measure their motion and rest respectively. Hence what is moved will not be measurable by the time simply in so far as it has quantity, but in so far as its *motion* has quantity." *Ibid.*, 223b10: "The time is everywhere the same."

275. *Cat.* 6. 5a26: "Nor could this be done in the case of time (i.e., showing the relations among the parts) for none of the parts of time has an abiding existence, and that which does not abide can hardly have position. It would be better to say that such parts had a relative order, in virtue of one being prior to another."

276. *Physics* IV. 11. 220a24: "It is clear, then, that time is 'number of movement in respect of the before and after', and is continuous since it is an attribute of what is continuous."

277. *Met.* V. 19. 1022b1. See above, n. 266.

278. See above, n. 267.

279. That parts, too, have a place is shown by *Physics* IV. 5. 212b12: "For, in a way, all its parts are in place."

280. Thus in *Met.* VIII. 2. 1042b19: "[some things are characterized by position] e.g., threshold and lintel (for these differ by being placed in a certain way)."

281. *Cat.* 7. 6a36. See ch. V, sect. 15.

282. The definition of place [*topos*], see above, n. 274.

283. The definition of time [*chronos*], see n. 276.

284. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 142.

285. Occasionally, the names where [*pou*] and when [*pote*] are replaced by place [*topos*] and time [*chronos*], as for example in *Eth. Nic.* I. 4. 1096a24 and *Met.* XI. 12. 1068a10.

286. *Cat.* 8. 10a25: "There may be other sorts of quality, but those that are most properly so called have, we may safely say, been enumerated."

287. Prantl, *op. cit.*, I. 206 and 190, etc.

288. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, III, 1, 43.

289. Being [*on*] is divided into the categories not according to specific differences, but according to different modes of being (i.e., as we saw above, according to different kinds of relation to substance [*ousia*] as a common terminus). Concerning the expression *ptosis* Bonitz remarks,

*op. cit.*, p. 614: "With Aristotle, '*ptosis*' has roughly the sense in which we speak of modification, in order to indicate that something has remained essentially the same, while change has occurred in less important and special respects." This agrees fully with our principle of the division of categories whereby these highest concepts of being are identical with respect to the terminus, but differ from each other in the mode of relation to this terminus. We have already discussed the expression "the schemata of the categories" [*ta schemata tes kategorias*].

290. *Categoriae decem ex Aristotele decerptae*, in Augustini, *Opera*, ed. Migne, *Patrologia Latina*, XXXII (Paris, 1861), 1425. The author calls himself a disciple of Themistius (chapter 22).

291. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 190 f.

292. Above, we have first carried out a division into absolute and relative accidents, and only after this have we divided the absolute accidents into properties, etc., so that in our scheme relations do not belong to the properties or properly inherent accidents. Indeed it does not seem proper to us to say that the earlier and later properly inheres in substance, unless "yesterday" and "today" are also inherent accidents, since one of them is the basis, the other the terminus of the earlier-and-later. Thus we already saw that Aristotle, too, separated relation [*pros ti*] earlier on. In a manner of speaking, it is more the case that relations attach to a being, which is their foundation, than that they are themselves a being; at the very least, they are the weakest kind of being. Thus, being larger attaches to a quantity, being similar to a quality; even an operation or an external circumstance can be a basis, and in this case the relation does not even attach necessarily; but in no case will it inhere, since it can disappear by virtue of a change which takes place altogether outside the substance in question. See above.

293. *Topics* II. 2. 109b5.

294. *Cat.* 5. 3a21-b9.

295. Thus two of the main objections against the comparison between categories and grammatical forms fall away; viz. (1) that other parts of speech, the indicated particles, should also have produced categories. Bonitz was quite correct with his assertion that Aristotle did not attend to the entire stock of words in the language, and Trendelenburg did not claim this (cf. *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 24); only the grammatical forms of the predicates of primary substance were taken into account. (2) That accidents, such as quantity, quality (whiteness, heat [*leukotes*, *thermotes*], *Cat.* 8, 9), activity and passivity (*praxis*, *pathos*) can equally well be expressed through nouns as through the forms of speech that are said to be peculiar to them. (Cf. Bonitz, *op. cit.*, pp. 635 ff. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 190 n. 2.)

296. *Cat.* 4. 1b28. Cf. *Topics* I. 9. 103b35.

297. *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 24 ff.

298. See chap. V, sect. 13.

299. See chap. V, sect. 13.

300. Zeller, *op. cit.*, p. 190 n. 2.

301. *Ibid.*

302. The same holds for the [grammatical] cases of the nouns (*ptoseis onomatos*), which also are not nouns [*onomata*] (*De interpret.* 2. 16a33:

“The expressions ‘of Philo’, ‘to Philo’, and so on, constitute not nouns, but cases of a noun”), and neither are they adverbs. Nonetheless, just as adverbs, they occur here as predicates of first substance, like “by night”, “in the market”, “in the Lyceum” [*nyktos, en agora, en Lykeio*].

303. See n. 292.

304. *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 140.

305. The slave [*doulos*] is not substance, not even according to Aristotle, as Trendelenburg seems to think (*Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 125 and 186). Rather, the slave as slave is always something related to the master [*despotes*], a relative thing [*pros ti*].

306. Not only accidental being, but also substance [*ousia*] can become the basis of a relation. For example, the relation of having sameness of substance between Socrates, as man, and Plato has as its basis the humanity of Socrates. In this case, language does not use a noun but (significantly) a pronoun: Socrates is the same as Plato [*Sokrates estin tauto to Platoni*]. The substantive noun would not be an appropriate form for the relation in any case, even where the basis is substance. Where the base is other than substance, the (regular) form of the relation [expression] derives from the base. But this does not work in the present case since the accidental character [of relations] needs to be maintained [in the expression].

307. Questions which require entire sentences for an answer, such as “for what reason?” (*ti depote*), etc., must of course be left out of consideration.

308. Kant, *Critique of Pure Reason*, B 107.

309. Hegel, *Vorlesungen über Geschichte der Philosophie, Sämtliche Werke*, ed. Hermann Glockner, 4th ed. (Stuttgart, 1965), XVII, 265.

310. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 189.

311. *Ibid.*, p. 180.

312. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

313. *Ibid.*, p. 188.

314. We say that in a certain way the more general is more knowable for us [*kath' hemas*] than the less general. We understand this as follows: something can be known either through simple grasping, or through the scientific knowledge of the thing in relation to the characteristics and grounds which belong to it as such. The latter knowledge becomes more difficult the more general the object of knowledge, and this is why metaphysics, which deals with the most general, i.e., being [*on*], is the most difficult of sciences (cf. *Met.* I. 2. 982a23) while, by contrast, the former kind of knowledge becomes simpler the more general its object. Thus we have already heard that being [*on*] is the first we grasp mentally, and *Physics* I. 1. 184a18 teaches that the less general is more understandable and knowable in itself [*te physei saphesteron kai gnorimoteron*], while the more general is so for us [*hemin*]. Whoever does not have the concept of a genus can a fortiori also not have the concept of the species, which presupposes the former.

But *Anal. post.* I. 2. 72a1 does not seem to be consonant with this, and so we have to add the following. Everything is knowable in so far as it has being, thus everything is in and by itself, and according to its nature more knowable the more being it has, and the separate substances, being pure acts and most accomplished being, are in themselves most knowable

(*Met.* II. 1. 993b11). But since our knowledge arises through the mediation of the senses, material objects are for us more knowable, in spite of the potentiality which attaches to them. It is by their means that we rise to the knowledge of immaterial beings. Thus in this case the "more knowable for us" [*gnorimoteron kath' hemas*] is contrasted with the "more knowable in itself" [*gnorimoteron te physei*].

But even in relation to the knowledge of the physical there is a similar contrast between one and the other. Because of its incomplete being, which attaches to the potentiality of matter, the physical can be intellectually known only in general, in its particularity it is grasped by sense. Now intellectual knowledge is more perfect than sensory, and so in this case the general is simply more knowable [*haplos gnorimoteron*], and the particular is simply [*haplos*] less knowable. But since in our case sensory knowledge precedes intellectual knowledge the particular is more knowable for us [*kath' hemas*]. And this is the teaching of *Anal. post.* I. 2.

But the general, which alone is intellectually knowable, itself displays several levels of generality, from the highest genera to the most special species. Here again we find the same contrast between what is more knowable in itself [*gnorimoteron te physei*], and what is more knowable for us [*kath' hemas*]. For the species is more knowable in itself [*te physei*] than the genus which, as we saw, corresponds to matter, while the differentia follows the form. Whoever knows a thing in its species knows it in a more complete and determinate way according to its entire being than he who has only knowledge of the genus. However, for us [*kath' hemas*] the genus is more knowable than the species since, in learning, we gradually move from potential knowledge to complete real knowledge and acquire, first the genus, and then the entire definition through which we know the species. As in other cases the genetically prior [*genesei proteron*] is here contrasted with that which is prior in essence [*ousia proteron*]. (*Met.* XIII. 2. 1077a19, 26. *De gen. an.* II. 6. 742a21. *Met.* XIII. 8. 1084b10, and elsewhere.) And this is what *Physics* I. 1 teaches. Thus the two passages do not clash.

315. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 148.

316. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

317. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b12: "As, then, there is one science which deals with all healthy things, the same applies in the other cases also. For not only in the case of things which have one common notion does the investigation belong to one science, but also in the case of things which are related to one common nature; for even these in a sense have one common notion. It is clear then that it is the work of one science also to study the things that are, *qua* being.—But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names. If, then, this is substance, etc."

318. E.g., *De coelo* II. 4. 286b22: "If then the complete is prior to the incomplete, it follows on this ground also that the circle is primary among figures."

319. *Met.* III. 3. 999a12: "But among the individuals one is not prior and the other posterior."

320. *Met.* VII. 3. 1029a29: "And so form and the compound of form and matter would be thought to be substance, rather than matter."

321. In this order we have given the where [*pou*] a very inferior place. Thus the objection which Trendelenburg makes on p. 188 could be directed against us in a somewhat changed form, i.e., that locomotion [*phora*], as the movement [*kinesis*] specific to this inferior category, is in essence [*kat'ousian*] the first among the movements [*kineseis*]; for Aristotle agrees with this when he says in *Physics* VIII. 7. 261a19 that "This motion must be prior to all others in respect of perfection of existence." But one should pay close attention to the reasons which he lists, and then the difficulty will easily be resolved. The first reason is that locomotion belongs to the more perfect kinds of animals from which it follows that locomotion is the first according to the perfection of the subject; for this reason it itself appears to be more perfect. The second reason is that the less a movement changes a moved, the more perfect is its subject, and, in a sense, the more perfect is the movement itself. But locomotion changes its subject least of all, simply because place is an external determination, while quantity and quality inhere in, while substance is even identical with, the subject. Hence substantial change (*alloiosis*) will be inferior to quantitative change, and the latter inferior to locomotion. One sees that the argumentation is not based upon the perfection of the category "where" [*pou*]. On the contrary the movement is more perfect if what is changed is less important. Hence the perfection of locomotion argues for the inferiority of the category of the terminus.

322. See chap. V, sect. 13.

323. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 182.

324. *Cat.* 3. 1b10: "When one thing is predicated of another, all that which is predicable of the predicate will be predicable also of the subject. Thus, etc."

325. See chap. III, sect. 2.

326. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 401.

327. But even if they were called substances by analogy [*kat'analogian*], this would not prevent their reduction to substance [*ousia*] as the corresponding category, just as it did not prevent such reduction in the case of potential being [*on dynamei*], which is found in every category, and of matter [*hyle*] and form [*morphe*], etc. (see above, sect. 11). Only between those things which fall directly under a genus can there be no analogy in the participation of the generic concept.

328. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 182.

329. *Met.* VII. 5. 1031a10.

330. Affection [*paschein*] is not only in reality, but also conceptually identical with being moved [*kineisthai*], and it differs only depending on the reduction to one or the other category. See chap. IV, sect. 2.

331. *Met.* V. 14. 1020b17: "There are the modifications of things that move, *qua* moving, and the differentiae of movements."

332. *Met.* V. 14. 1020b15: "The primary quality is the differentia of the essence, and of this the quality in numbers is a part; for it is a differentia of essences, but either not of things that move or not of them *qua* moving."

333. Cf. *Met.* V. 13. 1020a19.

334. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 181 and elsewhere.

335. *Ibid.*, p. 179.

336. See chap. V, sect. 10.

337. See chap. V, sect. 9.

338. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 139, 184.

339. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 404.

340. In connection with region [*topos*] we also speak of a high and low, which seems to belong initially into the category "where" [*pou*]. (Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 183, Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 401.) But in this case we obviously speak of a different, analogous, high and low. We are not saying that this thing, which is somewhere, is high, but that this region, which determines the where [*pou*] for something or other, is high, i.e., that it determines that thing in such a way that it is high. Aristotle says: "We call the region toward the centre 'below'." [*ten pros to meson chorān kato legontes*], whereas that which is properly called "below" would be that which is *in* the region toward the centre [*to en te pros to meson chora*]. Thus what he here calls "below" is that which constitutes the "below". Conversely, he sometimes calls region that which is determined by a region, e.g., *Met.* XI. 12. 1068a10, where he writes "region" [*topos*] instead of "where" [*pou*].

341. Thus chapter 6.4b24 names region [*topos*] and time [*chronos*] as if they were special species of quantity, which are not recognized in *Met.* V. 13. 1020a28 since here he calls time [*chronos*] "incidental quantity" [*kata symbebekos poson*].

342. *Cat.* 7. 8b21: "It is perhaps a difficult matter, in such cases, to make a positive statement without more exhaustive examination, but to have raised questions with regard to details is not without advantage."

343. Cf. *Cat.* 8. 10a19.

344. This in relation to the objection stated in Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 184.

345. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 131 f.

346. See chap. V, sect. 15.

347. See chap. V, sect. 13.

348. Simplicius, *op. cit.* [in n. 22], fol. 76a, sect. 11.

349. Relation [*pros ti*] is here in conflict more with quality than with quantity (Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 183, already called attention to the latter, see above) in which it [quality?] could only have taken the position of a difference. And not only with the fourth species of quality which Aristotle seems definitely to exclude (*Cat.* 8. 10a18), but also with the third, as we shall presently show.

350. *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088b2: "But the relative is neither potentially nor actually substance."

351. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 187.

352. *Ibid.*, p. 181.

353. *Ibid.*, p. 187.

354. *Physics* II. 2. 194b8: "Matter is a relative term."

355. *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088b1: "And the matter of each thing, and therefore of substance, must be that which is potentially of the nature in question; but the relative is neither potentially nor actually substance. It is strange, then, or rather impossible, to make not-substance an element in, and prior to, substance; for all the categories are posterior to substance."

356. *De anima* II. 2. 414a25: "The actuality of any given thing can only be realized in what is already potentially that thing, i.e., in a matter of its own appropriate to it."

357. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*

358. Cf. *Physics* III. 3. 202a18, and b17.

359. See chap. V, sect. 11.

360. *Cat.* 7. 8a25.

361. He touches upon these only in *Met.* V. 15. 1021a31: "For 'that which is thinkable' implies that the thought of it is possible, but the thought is not relative to 'that of which it is the thought'; for we should then have said the same thing twice. Similarly sight is the sight of something, not 'of that of which it is the sight' (though of course it is true to say this); in fact it is relative to color or to something else of the sort."

362. See chap. V, sect. 15.

363. *Cat.* 8. 11a23: "We did say that habit and disposition were relative. In practically all such cases the genus is relative, the individual not. Thus knowledge, as a genus, is explained by reference to something else, for we mean a knowledge of something. But particular branches of knowledge are not thus explained. The knowledge of grammar is not relative to anything external, nor is the knowledge of music, but these, if relative at all, are relative only in virtue of their genera; thus grammar is said to be the knowledge of something, not the grammar of something; similarly music is the knowledge of something, not the music of something.

Thus individual branches of knowledge are not relative. And it is because we possess these individual branches of knowledge that we are said to be such and such, etc."

364. *Met.* V. 15. 1021b3: "Things that are by their own nature called relative are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes if the classes that include them are of this sort; e.g., medicine is a relative term because its genus, science, is thought to be a relative term."

365. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 183.

366. See chap. V, sect. 9.

367. *Cat.* 8. 11a37: "If anything should happen to fall within both the category of quality and that of relation, there would be nothing extraordinary in classing it under both these heads."

368. See chap. V, sect. 13.

369. See above, n. 363.

370. *Met.* V. 15. 1021b3: "Things that are by their own nature called relative are called so sometimes in these senses, sometimes if the classes that include them are of the sort. . . ." *Ibid.*, b8: "Other things are relative by accident, etc."

371. *Ibid.*, b6: "Further, there are the properties in virtue of which the things that have them are called relative, e.g., equality is relative because the equal is, and likeness because the like is."

372. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 184.

373. Zeller, *op. cit.*, II, 2, 197: "Strictly speaking, both (the where and the when) ought to have been placed under the category of relation."

374. *Met.* XIV. 1. 1088a29: "A sign that the relative is least of all a substance and a real thing is the fact that it alone has no proper generation or destruction or movement, as in respect of quantity there is increase and

diminution, in respect of quality alternation, in respect of place locomotion, in respect of substance simple generation and destruction. In respect of relation there is no proper change; for, without changing, a thing will be now greater and now less or equal, if that with which it is compared has changed in quantity."

375. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, pp. 165 f.

376. *De interpret.* 12;21b30.

377. Trendelenburg, *Geschichte der Kategorienlehre*, p. 181.

378. Brandis, *Gr.-Röm. Philos.*, II, 2, 1, 163.

379. See chap. V, sect. 11.3. In this section the relation between movement [*kinesis*] and the categories was discussed, as well as the transcendental concepts.

380. *Met.* V. 12. 1019b21. Cf. IX. 1. 1046a6.

381. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028a18: "And all other things are said to be because they are, some of them, quantities of that which *is* in this primary sense, others qualities of it, others affections of it, and others some other determination of it."

382. *Ibid.*, a30: "Therefore that which is primarily, i.e., not in a qualified sense but without qualification, must be substance. Now there are several senses in which a thing is said to be first; yet substance is first in every sense—in definition, in order of knowledge, in time."

383. *Met.* IV. 2. 1003b16: "But everywhere science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their name. If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and the causes."

384. *Met.* VII. 1. 1028b6: "And so we also must consider chiefly and primarily and almost exclusively what that is which *is* in *this* sense."