

Ancient
Commentators
on Aristotle

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PROCLUS:
On Plato Cratylus

Translated by
Brian Duvick

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Guest editor: Harold Tarrant

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Conventions

[...] Square brackets enclose words or phrases that have been added to the translation or the lemmata for purposes of clarity.

<...> Angle brackets enclose conjectures relating to the Greek text, i.e. additions to the transmitted text deriving from parallel sources and editorial conjecture, and transposition of words or phrases. Accompanying notes provide further details.

(...) Round brackets, besides being used for ordinary parentheses, contain transliterated Greek words.

Preface

Harold Tarrant

Proclus' *Commentary on Plato's Cratylus* is the only ancient commentary on this work to have come down to us, and is particularly useful for fleshing out our picture of Neoplatonist commentary activity. It is illuminating in two special ways. Firstly, it is actually the work of *two* Neoplatonists. The majority of the material is supplied by the Athens-based Proclus (c. 411-85 AD), who is well known for his magisterial commentaries on Plato's *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*, as well as for a host of other works involving the study of Plato. This material has been edited and abridged by another figure who appears to be an Alexandria-based Platonist working somewhat later. Consequently it contains insights into the philosophy of both of the principal late antique centres of Platonism. Secondly the material is divided between the grittier issues of language-theory, on which it engages freely with other ancient philosophies, and theological discussion mostly involved with the etymologies of the names of Greek gods, in which Proclus is more concerned to relate his own brand of Platonism to the 'Orphic' and 'Chaldaean' theological systems, and also to Homer. So there is also a blend of the mundane with the ethereal. Duvick's notes bring out all these facets of the ancient text.

While Proclus has previously been represented in the series only by his work *On the Existence of Evils*, the work is particularly well suited to inclusion because it offers insights into the Alexandrian School that has been well represented through volumes on Ammonius, Simplicius, and Philoponus. These are usually offering insights into the interpretation of Aristotle rather than Plato, and even in Philoponus' great work *Against Proclus' On the Eternity of the World* there is a wider range of Aristotelian than Platonic references. Here in the Excerptor's comments we may see the School's approach to Plato. It is particularly illuminating to compare Proclus' work on the language-theory of the *Cratylus* with the commentaries on Aristotelian logic. Relevant here are not only the commentaries on the *Categories* but also, and perhaps especially, Ammonius' *Commentary on Aristotle's On Interpretation*. An obvious difference of the *Cratylus* commentary is the regularity and esoteric nature of theological material (invited, though not necessitated, by

Plato's work), which may explain why Athenian Neoplatonism seems to have fared worse than its Alexandrian counterpart under the Byzantine emperor Justinian. The commentary is here available in English translation for the first time.

Introduction

While Proclus' *Commentary on the Cratylus* has been the most neglected of his works, it is our most important source of information on his language theory – that is, the method by which he formulated his own epistemology and the means by which the Athenian and Alexandrian Academies harmonized the epistemologies of Plato and Aristotle.¹ Scholars have long associated the Alexandrians with Aristotle and formal logic, the Athenians with Plato and the more theologically oriented tradition of Iamblichus. In fact, however, it was the Athenians Syrianus and Proclus that guided the Alexandrian school on Aristotle's theory of meaning.²

In the fourth century, Iamblichus organized two Neoplatonic introductory courses to Platonic philosophy. The first programme consisted of ten dialogues. Together with his teacher (*hêgemôn*) the student first read the *Alcibiades*, which served as a general introduction, and the *Gorgias* and the *Phaedo*. These were considered ethical dialogues, were used to teach the student about names and the thoughts (*noêmata*) on which names are modelled. The student was then ready to apply his knowledge of language and thought to the study of Reality itself (*pragmata*). Working from particulars to universals, he first examined the *Sophist* and *Statesman* for Plato's doctrine on the natural world (*phusika*). He then graduated to the theological dialogues, the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*, and completed the first course by examining the nature of the Good itself, as it is treated in the *Philebus*. The second course was comprised of the *Timaeus* and *Parmenides*, which were believed to describe the universe in its entirety, from the creation of the lowest cosmic world on the one hand all the way up to the nature of the One itself on the other.³

We also know, however, that, before his initiation into the Greater Mysteries of Plato, Proclus was systematically lead by Syrianus through Aristotle's works on logic, ethics, politics, physics and theology.⁴ This system, of course, reflects that of the traditional Neoplatonic introduction to Plato. Proclus and Syrianus are apparently responsible for developing a programme wherein Aristotle was used to prepare new students for Plato. But it was probably popularized by Hermias, who was a fellow student of Proclus under Syrianus and taught at Alexandria.⁵ Although only Hermias' commentary on the *Phaedrus* survives, a

number of texts attributed to his son, Ammonius, are extant. In these as well as in later writings of the Alexandrian school Proclus is cited as the primary authority on Aristotelian language theory.⁶

The systematic approaches to Aristotle which the Alexandrians professed as a preparation for the study of Plato is nearly identical in the works of Ammonius, Olympiodorus, Elias, Philoponus, and Simplicius.⁷ All of these writers begin their introduction to Aristotle with a history of the various philosophical schools. They then classify Aristotle's works into various categories.⁸ We shall here concentrate on their description of his esoteric works (*akroamatika*), since these constituted the bulk of the student's Aristotelian training. The lectures on Aristotle were divided into three main branches – theoretical philosophy (i.e. theology, mathematics, and physics), practical philosophy (ethics, economics and politics) and an introductory course on the *Organon*, which consists of Aristotle's logical works: the student first studied the elements of language in the *Categories*, *de Interpretatione*, and *Prior Analytics*, then learned how to apply these elements according to the method described in the *Posterior Analytics*. The *Topics* and *Sophistic Refutations* were considered complementary to the earlier treatises.⁹ As in Iamblichus' introduction to Platonic philosophy, the student here begins with a study of the elements of speech, then works up to the thoughts composed thereof and finally uses this method as a means of examining Reality itself. In both systems ethical studies serve only as a practical means of purifying the student before he turns to the theoretical examination of language. While his ultimate goal in both cases is knowledge of God, the first principle, he first applies his logical method to the physical world, then to mathematics and finally to theology.

Although the Alexandrian interest in Aristotelian logic can be traced back to Proclus and Syrianus, the Athenian school never devoted as much time and effort to the *Organon* as did the Alexandrians.¹⁰ In his own works Proclus only rarely uses the formal logical schemata which were developed by the Stoics and adopted by the Alexandrians in their study of Aristotelian logic.¹¹ He even considered the hypothetical arguments of the *Parmenides* foreign enough to the Athenian school's methodology to warrant an elaborate demonstration and analysis in his commentary on the dialogue.¹² In fact, the prominence of formal logical schemata in the *in Crat.* is one of the outstanding features suggesting that it is an Alexandrian summary of Proclus' original commentary on the *Cratylus*.¹³

It was common practice in both the Athenian and Alexandrian academies for students to write up the lecture notes of their teachers. Proclus seems either to have enjoyed writing or to have recognized its importance more than Ammonius did. For while the former wrote a great deal himself and even took the trouble to edit his students' notes on his lectures, Ammonius wrote relatively little and, judging from the mistakes which appear in his students' accounts of his lectures, did not edit

their work.¹⁴ The most obvious sign that, in its present form, the *in Crat.* was not written by Proclus is that the majority of its chapters begin with *hoti*, which functions like quotation marks and indicates that the student is reporting the doctrine of his master as taken either from his notes or his lectures. This practice is particularly common in the Alexandrian school of the late fifth and sixth centuries.¹⁵ Thus, in light of passages such as *in Crat.* 113, which begins '[*hoti*] Proclus now seems to arrange the supercelestial region ...', it is likely that the *in Crat.* is a series of excerpts taken from the notes of a student on Proclus' original commentary on the *Cratylus*.¹⁶ While it is currently impossible to verify that any chapter is purely Proclan or, on the contrary, that any is completely devoid of excerptor influence, the excerptor's voice has been recognized in the following chapters: 27, 30, 38, 46-7, 58-9, 61-3, 71a, and 113; but the source of the following non-*hoti* chapters is uncertain: 9, 45, 48, 70, 71b, 99, 104, 105, 128, and 171.¹⁷ For the sake of consistency in the translation, I attribute all non-*hoti* chapters to the excerptor but indicate uncertain authorship by '(Exc.?)'. It should be noted that the relation between the thought of Proclus and that of his excerptor is complex.

In his Preface to the *in Crat.* Pasquali notes that there are a number of features of language usage in the treatise that are both similar to and different from that in the *in Tim.*, *in Parm.*, and *in Alc.* While the vocabulary used in the *in Crat.* generally agrees with that in the other commentaries, a number of grammatical constructions which are characteristic of Proclus' other work also appear in the *in Crat.* These include anacolutha (45,16; 77,10; 106,28), the improper use of case endings by attraction (the genitive for the accusative at 11,13 and 33,26), inconsistent vowel contractions (*to enthoun* at 29,20 but otherwise *entheos*), the inconsistent declension of *nous* (*noes* at 93,21, *nous* at 50,20, but *noas* at 109,11), ellipsis (the verb is omitted in the conjunction of *to d'aition*, *hoti* at 50,13; 64,17), *mê* is used in its less common function as a negation for individual words (*ta mê phusei* at 4,8), *an* is used with the indicative (38,11; 56,13), and so on.

Yet, there are also grammatical features in the *in Crat.* that lead Pasquali to the view that the excerptor or student who wrote the *in Crat.* is not the same one that edited the other commentaries which he composed from his own notes.¹⁸ In the *in Tim.*, for example, the neuter plural subject is followed by a plural verb only twice. In the *in Crat.*, which is less than a tenth the length of the *in Tim.*, this construction occurs more than thirty times.¹⁹ The important point here is that the agreement of neuter plural subjects and their verbs only becomes common in the late fifth and sixth centuries and is usual in Ammonius. Because the majority of Ammonius' work too, however, is handed down by students, it is more likely that both the *in Crat.* and Ammonius' treatises stem from the same late Alexandrian tradition than that Ammonius is the author of the *in Crat.* Since Ammonius cites Proclus

as his main authority on the *Organon*, he probably also depended on him for his theory on the *Cratylus*.²⁰

Translation

In my translation of the *in Crat.* I have attempted to render the Greek as accurately as possible into English without significantly changing the original Greek sentence structure. I reformulate Proclus' or the excerptor's thought only when it is stated unclearly or will not, due to the nature of the Greek construction, translate smoothly into English. In translating the technical Neoplatonic terminology, I have for the most part used English terms which are slowly being recognized as standard. When I depart from the language used by Morrow, Dillon, Westerink, and Dodds, I account for the changes in my analysis of the passage in question and in the Glossary.

Pasquali has divided the excerpts of the *in Crat.* into 185 chapters which are marked off with Roman numerals. As we shall see in our analysis of the *in Crat.*, each of these excerpts in fact presents a theme or idea which is distinct enough from both that which follows and that which precedes it to be considered a chapter in and of itself. I thus have retained Pasquali's numbering, though I have changed the Roman to Arabic numerals for the sake of simplicity. Because chs 117-120 include comments on the Platonic text from 398D-400C, I have inserted these chapters between chs 131 and 132, which treat of the *Cratylus* prior to 398D and subsequent to 400C, respectively.

Unlike Proclus' other Platonic commentaries, the *in Crat.* does not include quotations of the passages which it discusses. This is probably due to the fact that the *in Crat.* is only a series of excerpts and not a full, running commentary, or because Proclus and the excerptor do not always discuss the different themes of the *Cratylus* in the same order in which they are presented in the dialogue itself. To facilitate the reading of my translation of the *in Crat.* I have inserted translations of the relevant Platonic passages just before the chapters of the *in Crat.* that analyze them. Because the *in Crat.* breaks off at its discussion of Athena at *Crat.* 407B-C, however, my translation of the *Cratylus* extends only this far.

All five of the manuscripts from which Pasquali compiled the Teubner edition of the *in Crat.* terminate within a few pages of one another.²¹ The reason for the incomplete text of the *in Crat.* is unknown. It may be due to chance or scribal fatigue, as Sheppard suggests,²² or to the fact that the scribes were most interested in Socrates' etymologies of the divine names. The analysis of Athena is close to the conclusion of the section on the names of the Gods. Only the etymologies of Hephaestus, Ares, Hermes and Pan remain in Socrates' discussion of the Gods which ends at 408D. At this point he takes up the divine celestial bodies. Hephaestus and Ares are in fact introduced at *in Crat.* 184, but they are

mentioned only in relation to Athena. Hermes is discussed both etymologically and for his various powers and activities at several points in the *in Crat.* (chs 21, 25, 66, 117). Since three of the five manuscripts stop in the middle of the discussion of Athena, it seems likely that the scribes of A, F, and P considered Proclus' analysis of her name the logical conclusion of the section on the Principal triad which runs from *in Crat.* 138-86.²³ Manuscripts B and M terminate at the conclusion of *in Crat.* 184, where Athena is associated with Hephaestus and Ares. Since these three Gods belong to the first two triads of the Independent dodecad, the scribes of B and M may have stopped at ch. 184 because they too thought that they had reached the conclusion of Proclus' discussion of the Principal triad.²⁴

Notes

Each of the 185 surviving chapters of the *in Crat.* deals with a specific topic discussed in the Platonic dialogue. For each chapter wherein it is relevant I identify the Platonic passage under consideration, then explain how Proclus' comments relate both to the Platonic passage and to the preceding and subsequent chapters of the *in Crat.* We in fact shall see that, like Proclus' other commentaries, the *in Crat.* has an internal organization that does not depend entirely on the presentation of themes in the *Cratylus*. Rather, it reconstructs the structure of the dialogue in such a way that, through Proclus' commentary, the *Cratylus* becomes a perfect description of the entire universe, where its arguments correspond to soul, the problems around which the arguments revolve to intellect, and the good at which the dialogue aims to the Good itself.

In addition to establishing the relationship between the Platonic passage and its commentary as well as the general structure of the commentary, I discuss important Neoplatonic terms, themes, and concepts. To focus on those passages that seem to warrant the most discussion and to save the reader the trouble of having to refer constantly to relevant passages of Proclus' various philosophical sources, including the *Cratylus* and the *in Crat.*, I often quote the pertinent lines in my notes. I also explain in some detail Proclus' references to and quotations of the *Chaldean Oracles*, the *Orphic Hymns*, and the Homeric poems. As we shall see, these are the primary non-philosophical authorities that Proclus cites in support of his philosophical interpretation of Plato. Although they represent the relatively low forms of mystical, mythic, and poetic understanding, Proclus considers them all sources of inspired communication between the divine and mortal. What is more, they are all supported by supposedly ancient and incontestable pagan traditions.²⁵

When it is relevant, I support my exegesis with a discussion of how the topic at hand relates to its treatment in other works by Proclus

and/or other Neoplatonists. The notes also include detailed discussions of technical Neoplatonic terminology as well as syntactical and stylistic techniques which are employed for clarification and emphasis. Also, since most of the modern literature on Proclus and the *in Crat.* is explanatory in nature, I have cited it mainly as support for and supplementary to my own analysis.

*

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Notes to Introduction

1. The best source for Proclus' epistemology itself is Proclus' *Elements of Theology*.

2. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, xxxii.

3. *ibid.* xxxvii-xli.

4. Marinus, *Proclus sive de Felicitate*, in Cousin, *Procli Philosophi Platonici Opera Inedita*, 13.

5. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, x.

6. For Proclus' theory on Porphyry's *Isagoge* see Asclepius *in Metaph.* 142,36-7; for that on the *Categorios* see Elias *in Cat.* 107,24-6; for that on the *de Interpretatione* see Ammonius *in Int.* 1,6-11 and Stephanus *in Int.* 46,25-47; for that on the *Prior Analytics* see Philoponus *in An. Pr.* 40,30-1; for that on the *Posterior Analytics* see Philoponus *in An. Post.* 111,31-112,36.

7. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, xxv-xxvi. For comparison see the *in Cat.* of Ammonius (CAG 4.4), Philoponus (CAG 13.1), Olympiodorus (CAG 12.1), Elias (CAG 18.1), and Simplicius (CAG 8).

8. The complete classification of Aristotle's writings include (1) the particular (i.e. his letters), (2) the intermediate (the *Politeiai*), and (3) the universal, which are comprised of notes for personal use (*hupomnêmatika*) and compositions (*suntagmatika*). This last group includes the exoteric dialogues as well as the esoteric lecture notes (*akroamatika*). See Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, xxvi.

9. *ibid.* xxvi.

10. Syrianus' commentary on the *Metaphysics* survives, and Proclus may have written a commentary on the *de Interpretatione*. But virtually all the surviving Neoplatonic commentaries on the *Organon* come from the Alexandrian school.

11. The Stoics recognized five types of indemonstrable argument. They were

so named because they had no need of demonstration, since their validity is immediately clear (Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* 8.223). In the *in Crat.* the first two types appear uncommonly often for a treatise of Proclus (chs 30, 38, 46, 58). An example of the first type is, 'If it is day, then it is light. It is day. Therefore, it is light.' The schema in which this type appears is, 'If the first, then the second. The first. Therefore, the second.' The type two indemonstrable is basically a negative form of the first and runs, 'If it is day, then it is light. It is not light. Therefore, it is not day.' Its schema is, 'If the first, then the second. Not the second. Therefore, not the first.' For more information on Stoic logic and the indemonstrable see Mates, *Stoic Logic*, 67-74.

12. See *in Parm.* 1002ff.

13. See *in Crat.* 46 for examples of the type one indemonstrable and *in Crat.* 33 for an example of the second type.

14. Westerink, *Anonymous Prolegomena to Platonic Philosophy*, xxxii.

15. See Damascius *in Phlb.* and Buresch, *Theosophia Tubingensis*.

16. For other references to Proclus in the *in Crat.* see chs 30, 49, 58, 154.

17. Harold Tarrant, unpublished correspondence, May 2005.

18. Proclus *in Crat.* 6.

19. For examples see Pasquali, pp. 3,10; 5,6; 6,22; 7,17; 11,20; 12,25; 17,6; 18,22; 25,8; 30,22; 34,15; 38,27.

20. For the many parallels between the *in Crat.* and Ammonius' *in Int.* see Sheppard, 'Proclus' Philosophical Method of Exegesis'; van den Berg, 'Smoothing over the Differences: Proclus and Ammonius on Plato's *Cratylus* and Aristotle's *De Interpretatione*'.

21. The manuscripts from which Pasquali worked are: (1) A = Ambrosianus D222 inf., chart., saeculo XVI, a Manuele Moro Cretensi exaratus; (2) B = Barberinianus 42, chart., anno 1526 Lupiis a Constantio Sebastiano monacho Montolivetano conscriptus; (3) F = Laurentianus LVIII 2 chart., saec. XV-XVI; (4) M = Monacensis 29, chart., saec. XVI; (5) P = Ambrosianus R25 sup., membr., saec. XV. For Pasquali's discussion of the textual tradition of the *in Crat.* see his 'Praefatio', ix.

22. Sheppard, 'Proclus' Philosophical Method of Exegesis', 139.

23. Manuscript A appears to continue for another page and a half in an illegible form. In fact, however, this is only a mirror image of the last page and a half of the manuscript which has stained the lower half of the last page and all the subsequent blank page.

24. For more information on the structure of Proclus' divine hierarchy see the Appendix.

25. The Homeric poems, of course, date back at least to the eighth century BC. Despite Neoplatonic belief to the contrary, however, both the *Orphic Poems* and *Chaldean Oracles* were composed relatively late. Though he claimed that his knowledge was ancient, Julian and his son composed the Oracles in the second century AD (Lewy, *Chaldean Oracles and Theurgy*, 4). Some of the Orphic material may date back as far as the fourth or fifth centuries BC, but most of that used by the Neoplatonists was probably written during the second century AD as well (West, *The Orphic Poems*, 229).

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PROCLUS
On Plato Cratylus

Translation

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Useful Extracts on Plato's *Cratylus* from the Scholia of Proclus

The Subject Matter of the Dialogue

1. The purpose¹ of the *Cratylus* is to describe the generative activity of 1,1
souls among the lowest entities² and the ability to produce likenesses³
which souls, since they received it as part of their essential lot, demon-
strate through the correctness of names. Yet, since the divided activity of
souls in many places fails of its proper ends,⁴ as does their divided nature,⁵ 5
names that are undefined and circulate accidentally and by chance are also
likely to occur. Not all are products of intellectual knowledge and aim for
a close relationship with the objects that they signify.

The Forms of Discussion: Logic and Dialectic⁶

2. 'The *Cratylus* is both logical (*logikos*)⁷ and dialectical, not using the 10
dialectical methods of the Peripatetic school,⁸ which are abstracted from
the objects of analysis, but following the great Plato, because he knows
that the dialectical technique is suited only to those who have been
completely purified in thought, educated by mathematical studies, pu-
rified, through the virtues, of the immature aspect of their character, 15
and, in short, after genuine philosophical study. For this technique is
the "coping stone of mathematical studies" (*Rep.* 534E), elevates us to
the one cause of all things, the Good,⁹ and is said by Plato "to have come
with the most brilliant fire from the gods to men by way of Prometheus" 2,1
(*Phlb.* 16C). The analytical method of the Peripatetic school and its aim,
deductive proof,¹⁰ is easily grasped and clear to all those who are not
utterly whirled about in darkness and are too full of the Water of
Forgetfulness.'¹¹

Dialectic and Rhetoric

3. 'The projector of the dialectical technique is Intellect, since it gener- 5
ates dialectic as a whole from itself as a whole.¹² Just as all things
proceed from one, it institutes the art of division. As each thing is
synthesized into a single circumscription of its identity, it institutes
that of definition. As the Forms are mutually present to each other, and
each thing therefore both is what it is and partakes of the rest of the 10

Forms, Intellect institutes the technique of deductive proof. And as all things revert to the One itself and their proper principles, it produces the art of analytical reduction.'

4. 'Aristotle says that there are a single rhetorical and a single dialectical technique, which can both be used in two ways, to persuade 15 or to refute, as one wishes (*Rhet.* 1355a34-b25), but Plato says more accurately that there are two rhetorical and two dialectical techniques. While the one oratory is "flattery" and without art – and this he denounces in the *Gorgias* (463B) – the other is knowledge of what is good and just – and this he praises in the *Phaedrus* (260E). And again 20 Aristotle's dialectic he dismisses as eristic,¹³ but that which observes the principles of real entities he esteems as a part of philosophy.'

5. 'If it is impossible that knowledge and ignorance of the same thing occur at the same time, it is also impossible that the two rhetorical techniques do so. For the one is ignorant of what is good, but the other knows it.'

25 6. 'The present dialogue makes us understand the correctness of names, and one must, if one is going to be a dialectician, begin from this theoretical examination.'¹⁴

3,1 7. 'Just as in the *Parmenides* Plato presented the whole dialectical art, not in an abstract form, but along with the theoretical examination of real entities, so too he now presents the correctness of names along with the scientific knowledge of their real objects.'

5 8. 'Plato now wishes to present the first principles of real entities and of the art of dialectic, inasmuch as he is presenting the names together with the things of which they are names.'

The Excerptor's Comment (Exc.?)

9. Why does Plato say that those of us who despise names 'shall appear wealthier in wisdom in our old age' (*Pol.* 261E), yet now he himself makes names his main topic of study? Perhaps the answer is that he is asking not how they are used but how they are images of their objects. 10 For the art of definition is three-fold: (1) beginning from the highest genus it proceeds through all the middle ones to the last differentiae, which the Eleatic stranger does when he defines both the sophist (*Soph.* 15 268C-D) and the statesman (*Pol.* 267B-C); (2) or taking the close and familiar genus it proceeds through the successive differentiae, as in the case that 'man is an animal that walks on two feet' and the like (*Top.* 103a27), (3) or it uses a single name such as ' "fine" is what is proper' and ' "soul" is nature-bearing essence' and the like (*Crat.* 400B). This 20 third type of definition is the most precarious. For if from the beginning a name-giver happened to be without knowledge, anyone that used the name laid down by him for the definition is bound to fail. This, then, is why Plato now makes such names his main topic of study and uses them as his medium to reach up to their real objects.

This method, however, contributes to deductive proof as well, as when in the *Phaedrus* Plato attempted to demonstrate by the name that ‘the art of prophecy is greater than that of augury’ (244D); but also to analytical reduction, as when in the *Phaedrus* he called the desire (*erôs*) in which mortals participate ‘winged’ (*potēnos*) but that which is unparticipated and divine ‘feathered’ (*pterôs*) because of the synthesis of both the God’s essence and activity into one thing (252C). And thus Plato evidently ascends by analytically reducing [these names].¹⁵ But this method is often necessary for division as well. This is how Socrates distinguished that the pleasant is one thing and the Good another, because there are also the two names (*Gorg.* 497D).

The Characters¹⁶

10. ‘The characters [of the dialogue] are as follows: Cratylus the Heraclitean, a man whose lectures Plato actually attended and who used to say that all names are natural, since those that are not natural are not names at all, just as we say that when a man speaks falsely he “says nothing”¹⁷ (383A); Hermogenes the Socratic, who held the opposite view that no name is natural but all are conventional (383D); and, thirdly, Socrates, who arbitrated between them and demonstrated that some names are natural, but others conventional, as if they had originated arbitrarily. For, while names assigned to eternal entities partake more of the natural, those assigned to corruptible ones partake more of the arbitrary.¹⁸ Indeed, anyone that has called his son “Athanasius” demonstrates the error that involves the latter type of name. But, still, since names have form and matter, by the former they partake more of the natural, by the latter more of the conventional. And addressing himself to Hermogenes, he distinguishes both the names that are firmly established among gods, names like “Murine” and such, and those among souls, like “Batieia”.¹⁹ Speaking with Cratylus, however, he accepts the reference of names to their objects, but also shows that there is a good deal that is arbitrary in names and, at the same time, that not all objects are moved.’²⁰

11. ‘The heaven, while having a greater degree of motion, also has stationariness in a certain way, as at the poles and such. But the earth, which has more stationariness, also has motion through alteration.’²¹

12. ‘Regarding names, those that have something natural partake of the conventional, and those that are conventional have participated in the natural as well. In this way all names are natural and all conventional; and some are natural, others conventional.’²²

13. ‘These two young men, though they held opposite opinions and refuted each other on particular points, were unable to establish their own position as a whole.²³ For while the universal proposition is refuted by the particular, it is no longer the particular but the universal that establishes the opposite opinion.²⁴ When Socrates then happened upon them and played arbiter, he articulated the matters in a scientific way.’

14. ‘Cratylus, who is scientifically minded and very terse (the Heracleiteans especially valued the latter quality, because they wanted to apprehend a given object before their own unstable nature changed it)²⁵ evidently responds with the minimum number of syllables and phrases throughout the dialogue as a whole. Thus, Plato, who imitates character very well,²⁶ addressed to him the question, “Do you wish?” right at the beginning (383A). But Hermogenes, who is a man of opinion (*doxastikos*) and is much influenced by the opinions of the majority, introduced the conventional aspect of names and most suitably received the response, 20 “If you fancy”, from Cratylus. For fancy (*dokêsis*) is often for things unwished for and unintended, just as wish (*boulêsis*) is for good things alone.’²⁷

15. ‘All the Apollonian series²⁸ depends on the demiurgic hegemony of Zeus.’

25 16. ‘Both Pythagoras and Epicurus were of Cratylus’ opinion. Democritus and Aristotle were of Hermogenes’.²⁹ Pythagoras, for instance, 6,1 when asked what is the wisest being of all, said, “Number”. What is second in wisdom? “He that puts the names to things”.³⁰ By “Number” he hinted at the intelligible order encompassing the multitude of the 5 intellectual Forms.³¹ For there the Number that exists primarily and authentically³² was instituted after the superessential One itself. This Number also conducts the measures of essence for all that exists, and in it real Wisdom and Knowledge exist, since this Wisdom exists of itself, has turned back to itself and perfects itself.³³ Moreover, just as intelligible, intellect and intellection are the same in the intelligible 10 order, so too Number and Wisdom are there the same.³⁴ By “He that puts the names” Pythagoras hinted at the Soul which was instituted from Intellect. The objects themselves do not exist as Intellect does in its primary way, but it contains their images and essential processional formulae like statues of the real entities, just as names imitate the 15 intellectual Forms, that is, the Numbers.³⁵ The being of all things therefore comes from Intellect that knows itself and is wise, but naming from Soul that imitates Intellect.³⁶ The activity of naming, then, according to Pythagoras, belongs not to any random individual but to one who sees the Intellect and the nature of the real entities.³⁷ Names are therefore natural.

20 Democritus who said that names are conventional formulated this idea in four dialectical proofs. First, from homonymy: different things are called by the same name; therefore, the name is not natural. Second, from polyonymy: for if different names suit one and the same thing, they 25 suit one another as well, which is impossible. Third, from the changing of names: if names are natural, why did we change the name of Aristotle to “Plato”, but Tyrtamus to “Theophrastus”?³⁸ Fourth, from the 7,1 deficiency of similar [derivative] terms: why from “thought” do we say “to think”, but from “justice” we do not also derive a verb? Therefore, names are arbitrary, not natural. Democritus himself calls the first

type “polysemantic” (*polusêmon*), the second “equiposed” (*isorhupon*), the third “metonymous” (*metônumon*), and the fourth “nameless” (*nônumon*).³⁹

To confute the above arguments, some respond in reply to the first that there is nothing strange if one name signifies more than one thing, as “desire” (*erôs*) indicates different things when derived from both “strength” (*romê*) and “winged” (*pterôs*);⁴⁰ in reply to the second, that nothing prevents different names from indicating the same thing in one quality or another, like *merops* and *anthrôpos* [which both signify man], the former in that he has a divided form of life (*memerismenê*), the latter in that he looks up at what he has seen (*anathrein ha opôpen*) in reply to the third, they respond that this very argument is a proof that names are natural, because we exchange those laid down without authority and outside of nature for others that accord with nature;⁴¹ in reply to the fourth, that there is nothing remarkable if names laid down of old fell out of use after a long time.’

17. ‘The term “natural” can be understood in four ways: (1) as both the whole essences of the animals and plants and their parts; (2) as their activities and powers, like the lightness of fire and its heat; (3) as the shadows and reflections in mirrors; or (4) as fabricated images which are similar to their archetypes. Epicurus, in accordance with the second sense, thought that names are natural like the principal functions of nature, i.e. the faculty of speech and sight, and as is the activity of seeing and hearing so too is that of naming.⁴² Thus the name is natural as a function of nature. Adopting the fourth sense, Cratylus says that the name of each thing is proper, because it was appropriately put by those who first put names skilfully and knowledgeably. For Epicurus used to say that these men put names not knowledgeably but when they were naturally moved like those who cough, sneeze, moo, bark and sigh. Socrates says, in accordance with the fourth sense, that, while names are natural as products of knowledgeable thought and not of natural appetite, but of the imagining soul, they are assigned to objects as properly as possible at the beginning.⁴³ In terms of Form all names are the same, have one power and are natural; but in terms of matter they differ from each other and are conventional.⁴⁴ For in form they are like their objects, but in matter they differ from each other.’⁴⁵

Etymology of the Characters’ Names

18. ‘It is likely that the name “Cratylus” is based on the fact that he has a full command of Heraclitus’ teachings (*perikratêsai ... tôn Herakleitou dogmatôn*) and therefore disdains things in flux because he believes that they do not even exist in the proper sense of the word. But “Socrates” is based on the fact that he is a saviour of the power of the soul (*sôtêra ... tou kratous tês psukhês*) – that is, of reason – and is not drawn down by the senses.’

19. 'Eternal entities were allotted their nomenclature from their powers or activities,⁴⁶ but engendered beings were allotted theirs from their use and association.'⁴⁷

20. 'Anyone who wishes to imitate something must have knowledge
25 of two things,⁴⁸ its archetype and the appropriate productive craft (*hê demiurgikê tekhnê*).'⁴⁹

384A8-C8 SOC: My good Hermogenes, son of Hipponicus, there is an ancient proverb that fine things are troublesome to know. And what is more, knowledge of names happens to be no small matter. So if I had already heard Prodicus' fifty-drachma lecture (whoever hears it can learn about this matter, as he says), nothing would prevent you from immediately learning the truth about the correctness of names. I have not yet heard this one, but only his drachma lecture. So I don't know the truth about such matters. Still, I am ready to assist both you and Cratylus in examining them. When he says that your name is not really Hermogenes, I suspect that he is teasing you. For he probably thinks that you are always trying to make money but never succeed. But, as I was just saying, while it is troublesome to know such things, we should discuss it together and see whether you or Cratylus is right.

21. 'Aeschines satirizes Hermogenes as a slave of possessions.⁵⁰ And of course he neglected to take care of Telauges, who was his companion and an elegant youth.⁵¹ The name "Hermogenes" is based on the fact that his profit was "a gift of Hermes" (*to hermaion ... genesthai*), or
9,1 rather that Hermes is guardian God of profits. Yet Hermogenes was unfortunate in his profiteering.'

Criticism of the Heracliteans

22. 'In the *Theaetetus* (179E) Theodorus attacks the Heracliteans as quacks, as dissemblers and as conceited. Hermogenes now attacks them
5 (384A), but philosophers do not. For Theodorus is a geometer, Hermogenes an adolescent; the true philosopher does not have the leisure to waste his time on such matters.'⁵²

23. 'Socrates does not consider the study of the correctness of names
10 despicable, but praises it with the maxim that "fine things are troublesome [to know]" (384B).'⁵³

24. 'Now feigning ignorance (384B-C), Socrates attacks the sophist Prodicus.⁵⁴ For from the drachma lecture, it seems, he condemned the
15 fifty-drachma as well because it is deceptive and practised for the sake of profit. For those that deemed it worth hearing paid fifty drachmas. But we must recognize the maleficence of the sophist by these three facts: he valued more and less perfect understanding in terms of
20 money,⁵⁵ he claimed to instil understanding from a single lecture, and

not by the witness of others but by his own assertion does the sophist claim that such understanding arises.'

25. 'Inquiry is instilled in souls from Hermes' mother, Maia, but discovery from the Hermaic series.⁵⁶ For the more universal genera of the gods operate before the more particular, with them and beyond them.⁵⁷ This is why our ability to inquire also is imperfect, and we see matter, as it were, predisposed from the distribution of the superior causes to the entities participating in them, just as we see its shape and form arising from the inferior causes.'

26. 'The sophists revel in epideictic arguments, but the philosophers in dialectical ones.⁵⁸ Moreover, as composers of fictive images, sophists [only] put on the mask of the dialectician, and this is how their eristic becomes an annoyance.'⁵⁹

Socrates' Ignorance and Understanding

27. If the dissimulations of Socrates ought not to lack truth,⁶⁰ how does he now (384B-C) say that he does not know what is true? Perhaps he says this because, though he possesses the knowledge, he does not have it ready at hand.⁶¹ Or because in names there is a good deal that is not real and without definition due to the error of generation.⁶²

28. 'Of the gifts of Hermes some are intellectual and primary goods, others are secondary and perfective of discursive thought, others are tertiary and purify us from irrationality and in particular moderate the motions of imagination, others institute the reason-principles of nature and others even conduct the powers of external advantages and profits. For these are the last and material gifts of the God, which, as the astrologers say, he gives "in the obscure astral dispositions at birth".'⁶³

29. 'It is not at all proper for the philosopher to conduct discussions about particulars, says Plato, but rather to rise to the theoretical examination of the universal and the general.'

384C9-E2 HERM: Though I have indeed, Socrates, often spoken with both Cratylus and many others on the subject, I cannot be persuaded that there is any other correctness of name than convention and agreement. For it seems to me that, when one puts a name to something, that is the correct one. And if again one substitutes another but no longer uses the first, the later one is no less correct than the earlier. For example, when we change the names of our servants, the substitute name is not less correct than that first given. For no name is related to its object by nature, but by convention and the habit of those who regularly use it. But if the case is otherwise, I am certainly ready both to listen and to learn not only from Cratylus but from any other as well.

The Excerptor's Comments on Hermogenes

30. Hermogenes' syllogism (384D) is as follows: if a change of names is possible, they are conventional and symbols of their objects. But the first; and therefore the second. The syllogism of Proclus goes as follows: if names are symbols of their objects and conventional, we no longer need to change names. But the first; and therefore the second. So an inference can be drawn in the First Figure: if there is a change of names, there is not a change of names. Therefore, all who agree with Hermogenes are incorrect.⁶⁴ For they used to look only to the particulars but not further to the eternal entities as well. But of eternal entities even the names are divine and revered as sacred objects of the gods, since they represent both the powers and activities of the gods.⁶⁵ These are the names, of course, which in the *Philebus* (12B-C) Socrates reveres and respects 'beyond the greatest fear'.⁶⁶

31. 'Hermogenes (385D) thinks that there is a certain correctness of names, but that this depends on convention, just as if one should say that justice is correct, but only conventionally, since the concept is different among different peoples. What, then, would he say about names laid down among the eternal entities?'

32. From what he says himself (384D-E) Hermogenes' character is presented as one attached to learning, language and truth.

385A1-B1 SOC: You probably have a point, Hermogenes. But let us examine the issue. You are saying that what anyone calls an object is that object's name?

HERM: It seems so.

SOC: Both if a private citizen and if a state does the naming?

HERM: That is what I am saying.

SOC: How is this? If I name anything that exists – for example, what we now call a man, if I name this a horse, will the same creature have the public name 'man' but for me the private name 'horse'? Or again, what we now call a horse, if I name it a man, will it have for me the private name 'man' but the public name 'horse'?

Is this your meaning?

HERM: It seems so.

33.⁶⁷ 'Socrates refutes Hermogenes' position in three dialectical proofs, of which the first commands respect, the second is compelling and the third is cause of the most perfect persuasion. The first is as follows: if names are conventional, both private citizen and state will be similarly responsible for the naming of things, objects will be called in one way here, in another way there and will be multifariously changed, because the contingent nature of particular entities is indefinite,⁶⁸ adopted without knowledge and based only on opinion. But the consequent is not the case, and so neither is the antecedent.⁶⁹

34. 'In the *Republic* (563E9-564A4) Socrates says that the insatiate 25
enjoyment of every thing destroys even itself as a whole.'⁷⁰

35. 'Before falling into generation the souls had all things clear and
known to them; the one soul was known to all and all to the one.'⁷¹

385B2-C9 SOC: Come, then, tell me this: do you say that there is
true and false speech?

HERM: I do.

SOC: So one proposition may be true, another one false?

HERM: Certainly.

SOC: And one that states things as they are is true; but one, as they
are not is false?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: Is it possible, then, to state in speech both what is and what
is not the case?

HERM: Certainly.

SOC: The true proposition – is it true as a whole, but its parts
untrue?

HERM: No, its parts are true as well.

SOC: Are the large parts true but not the small, or are all true?

HERM: All are true, I think.

SOC: Do you say that any part of a proposition is smaller than a
name?

HERM: No, this is the smallest.

Criticism of Aristotle

36. 'Aristotle's conception of the truth of an assertoric statement is 30
intended to illustrate one thing, and that which Plato here states 12,1
(385B-C) illustrates another. According to this conception of truth, the
latter says, even the names stated in and of themselves express the
truth. Aristotle's conception of truth claims that the synthesis and
division of the predicate and subject hold both falsity and truth.⁷² But 5
the great Plato knows how to use the sense of truth and falsity in four
ways: (1) applied to the reality-states of things, as whenever he says
that what really exists truly exists, but that what does not really exist
falsely exists;⁷³ (2) applied to the passions following the primary motions 10
of the soul, just as Socrates distinguished true and false pleasure in the
Philebus (36C-40D),⁷⁴ (3) applied to our decisions, as whenever he
defines false and true opinions; and (4) applied to the instruments of
cognitive life, like words, names and the alphabet.⁷⁵ For in these he sees 15
truth and falsity in terms of their harmony and concordance with the
objects [that they describe]. The orators too have a certain form of
discourse that they call "truth".⁷⁶

37. 'Antisthenes used to say that <it is impossible to contradict>,⁷⁷

20 because every statement, he says, expresses the truth (*Metaph.* 1024b32-4). For when a man speaks he speaks something. When he speaks something he speaks what is. And when he speaks what is he expresses the truth. Our response to Antisthenes must be that falsity too exists and nothing precludes one, who speaks what is, from speaking a falsity. Moreover, when a man speaks he speaks about something,⁷⁸ and he does not actually “speak something”.

385E4-386D7 SOC: Come, then, Hermogenes, let’s see whether entities seem to you to be disposed like this – that their essence is a private matter for each individual – as Protagoras claimed when he said that man is the ‘measure of all things’. So, things are for me however they appear to me, and for you however they appear to you. Or do they seem to you to have some stable essence of their own?

HERM: Occasionally, Socrates, when confounded, I have been carried away to this view of Protagoras. But he doesn’t seem to me to be entirely right.

SOC: What, then? Were you carried away so far that no man seems to you to be bad?

HERM: No, by Zeus! But many times I have felt that certain men are quite bad, very many indeed.

SOC: What, then? Haven’t any seemed to you quite good?

HERM: Very few indeed.

SOC: So they did seem good?

HERM: Yes, they did.

SOC: How, then, do you assert this? As follows, that the very good are the very wise, but the very bad are the very foolish?

HERM: It seems so.

SOC: So, if Protagoras was speaking the truth, and it is true that things really are as they seem to each of us, is it possible that some of us be wise but others foolish?

HERM: Of course not.

SOC: And, as I see it, at least this seems certain to you, that, since there is wisdom and foolishness, it is not at all possible that Protagoras is speaking the truth. For I suppose, one would really be no wiser than another, if whatever seems so for each person is true for each.

HERM: This is so.

SOC: But surely you don’t think like Euthydemus that all things exist equally, at once and forever for all men. For thus there would neither be good men nor bad, if both virtue and evil should exist equally for all and forever.

HERM: What you say is true.

The Excerptor's Comment on Protagoras

38. The dialectical argument against Protagoras is as follows (386A-D):⁷⁹ if things are such as they appear to each person, there will not be wise men on the one hand or ignorant on the other. But not the second; and therefore not the first.⁸⁰ 25

Ignorance as the Cause of Human Evil

39. 'Every bad man suffers from this sickness (i.e. being bad) because of his ignorance of what is truly good, and is such unwillingly. For nothing chooses its own special evil.'⁸¹ 30

40. 'Evil men are more readily recognized by good men than the virtue of the good is apparent to the evil, because evil is something blind and ignorant first of itself, then of others as well'. He also says that 'because of their folly the evil are not so much able to enjoy the good works of the noble, whereas the noble much rather suffer and are corrupted by the bad. For "the worse", they say, "prevails" (*Il.* 1.576).⁸² And Socrates was affected more by the maleficence of Anytus than Anytus enjoyed the goodness of Socrates.' 30,1 5

Criticism of Protagoras and Euthydemus

41. 'The teaching of Protagoras (386C) is one thing and that of Euthydemus (386D) another. For the former states that, through the interplay of that which acts and that which is acted upon,⁸³ the object, which is actually nothing,⁸⁴ is imagined as such or such a thing by those who perceive it. That of Euthydemus makes each thing be at once and forever all things. It also makes all (statements) express the truth, as when one says that wood is white and black, small and great and dry and wet, and it makes all negations of these qualities express the truth. Therefore, although these sophists begin from different principles, they arrive at the same conclusion.'⁸⁵ 10 15

42. 'The power of the primary Unlimited gives procession from itself to all the things that are able to exist in any way, but Limit defines, circumscribes and sets each thing in its proper bounds, just as even in the case of numbers the form has come to all things from the Monad and the Limit, but the endless aspect of procession has come from the generative Dyad. The result is that on account of the primary Limit everything that exists has a certain nature, definition, identity and proper class.⁸⁶ So contradiction too exists, distinctly presenting the falsity and truth in statements.' 20 25

386E6-387C5 SOC: Well, then, may things be natural in this way, but not actions involving them? Aren't actions too a form of being?

HERM: They certainly are.

SOC: Then actions also are acted according to their own nature, not according to our opinion. For example, if we undertake to cut an object, should we cut every one however we will and with whatever instrument we will? If we wish to cut every object according to the nature of cutting and being cut and with the natural instrument, won't we cut and be more successful at it and do it correctly? But if we do it unnaturally, won't we fail and accomplish nothing?

HERM: It seems so.

SOC: So too, if we undertake to burn something, we should not burn it according to everyone's opinion but according to the correct one? And it is this by which each thing is naturally burned and burns and is a natural instrument?

HERM: This is so.

SOC: Then it is so for other actions as well?

HERM: Of course.

SOC: And isn't speaking too an action?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: So will a man speak correctly when he speaks as it seems to him that he should? Or if he speaks as it is natural to state things, as it is natural that they be stated and with the natural instrument, won't he accomplish more and make more sense? But if he doesn't, won't he fail and accomplish nothing?

HERM: It seems as you say.

Acting, Doing, Speaking, and Naming

43.⁸⁷ "Acting" (*to prattein*) is used only for things that operate by discursive thought; for other things "doing" (*to poiain*) is the proper term
30 (387C).⁸⁸ Thus both actions and deeds have their own definitions, in-
14,1 struments, and appropriate times, and it is not the case that anything
whatever can do or act upon anything whatever.'

44. That "speaking" (*to legein*) is categorized under "acting" (*to prat-*
10 *tein*) is demonstrated by division, as follows (387B-C): every activity of
5 soul occurs either without body – and this is imagination, opinion, and
intellection – or with body – and this is two-fold: for it is either involun-
tary – and this is perception and unwilling motion – or voluntary – and
this is action, under which falls discourse.'

387C6-D3 SOC: Then, is naming a part of speaking? For it is by using names, I suppose, that people say things.

HERM: Of course.

SOC: So, if speaking was an action, naming also is an action concerning its objects?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: But actions appeared to us not to be relative to us but to have their own proper nature?

HERM: This is so.

The Excerptor's Argument (Exc.?)

45. The problem here (387C) is how 'naming' is 'speaking'. For if the name is not speech (*logos*), neither may naming be speaking. First, did Socrates not say that naming is a part of speaking and *not* speaking, just as the name too is a part of speech but not speech? Yet if a part of action is action, but a part of speech is not speech, there is nothing strange in that. For while a part of the body is a body, a part of the face is not a face. And yet this too is a body, just as speaking is also an action. But some things are of like parts, others are of unlike. The second point is that it is not necessary to maintain the same conclusion in the case of both Forms and motions. While speech and the name are forms and complete and whole, the motions subsist as particulars and, therefore, naming too is a sort of speaking. For speaking proceeds through naming. The third point is that speaking and speech have two senses: the one type is applied to the whole that consists of individual names, the other to every meaningful sound. Thus in the *Categories* (4a22-b13) even Aristotle calls opinion 'speech' [which is an example of the first type]. And common usage describes as speaking even those who employ a simple name [which is an example of the second]. For we commonly bid certain people to speak their own name or that of others, and they carry out this command. 15
20
25
30

Correctness of Names by Nature: the Excerptor's Argument

46.⁸⁹ Let us propose to demonstrate that the correct name was allotted its correctness by nature and not by convention. The first argument runs as follows: if naming is correct insofar as it occurs in accordance with the nature of its objects, the name achieves its correctness by nature. But the first; and therefore the second.⁹⁰ 15,1

Here is a second argument which reduces the preceding minor premise:⁹¹ if speaking possesses correctness through its objects, so too naming is correct insofar as it occurs in accordance with its objects. But the first; and therefore the second.⁹² 5

The third argument which reduces the minor premise of the second: if every action (*praxis*) is well acted (*eu prattein*) when it is proper to its objects (*ta pragmata*), speaking too has correctness through its objects. But the first; and therefore the second.⁹³ 10

A fourth argument reduces the minor premise of the third: if objects all have a certain proper nature and actions are not conventional, they

are well performed when they are proper to their objects. But the first;
15 and therefore the second.⁹⁴

A fifth argument which reduces the minor premise of the fourth: if neither all things exist in a similar way to all and forever, nor each in a unique way to each, objects have a certain nature proper to each of them. But the first; and therefore the second.⁹⁵

A sixth argument which reduces the minor premise of the fifth: if
20 some men are very intelligent and others very ignorant, neither do all things exist in a similar way to all and forever, nor each in a unique way to each thing that exists. But the first; and therefore the second.⁹⁶

A seventh argument which develops the minor premise of the sixth:
25 if some men are very good and others very bad, some men are very intelligent and others very ignorant. But the first; and therefore the second.⁹⁷

An Excerptor Comment on Aristotle

47. If names, as Aristotle maintains (*Int.* 16a3-8), are conventional and symbols of things and of intellections, it follows necessarily that he
30 himself should not say that the assertoric statements composed from
16,1 them, seeing as they are conventional, are like composite intellections, and that in and of themselves they are not receptive of truth or falsity (16a9-15).⁹⁸ But in fact assertoric statements, since they possess true or false expression in an essential manner, do so not by convention; nor therefore are names conventional.

387D4-388C2 SOC: Therefore, should we also give names as it is natural both to name and be named and with the natural instrument, but not as we will, if we are to remain consistent with our previous reasoning? And thus we may accomplish more and name things better, but otherwise not?

HERM: So it seems to me.

SOC: Come, then, what has to be cut, as we said, does it have to be cut with something?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: And what has to be woven, does it have to be woven with something? And what has to be pierced, does it have to be pierced with something?

HERM: Of course.

SOC: And what has to be named, does it have to be named with something?

HERM: So it does.

SOC: What is that with which one should pierce?

HERM: An awl.

SOC: What is that with which one should weave?

HERM: A shuttle.

SOC: What is that with which one should name?

HERM: A name.

SOC: Well said. Then the name too is an instrument.

HERM: Of course.

SOC: Then, if I should ask, 'What kind of instrument is the shuttle?'

Isn't it that with which we weave?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: But what do we do when we weave? Don't we distinguish the confused threads of warp and woof?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: And you will be able to say this about the awl and other instruments as well?

HERM: Of course.

SOC: Can you also say this about the name? If the name is an instrument, what do we accomplish when we name things with it?

HERM: I cannot say.

SOC: Don't we instruct one another and distinguish things according to their disposition?

HERM: Of course.

SOC: Therefore, the name is an instrument that instructs and distinguishes essence as the shuttle does the web.

HERM: Yes.

The Name as Instrument: the Excerptor's Argument (Exc.?)

48. If every one that names performs an act (387C), and one that 5
performs an act does so with an instrument (387E), then the one that
names too, naming as he does with an instrument, uses the name as his
instrument. Now, of instruments some are by nature, as a hand or foot,
and others by imposition, as a bridle and the name (for such it is). Of
these artificial instruments some have been made for doing something, 10
like the adze, others for indicating and instructing: such then is the
name. For it is 'an instrument that is instructive and revelatory⁹⁹ of the
essence' of things (388B-C). And the first element in this definition (i.e.
instruction) derives from the one that uses the instrument, while the
'revelatory' element derives from the model being followed.¹⁰⁰ As an 15
instrument it needs one to use it, and as an image it needs to be referred
to its model. From this reasoning, it is clear that the name is neither a
symbol nor a function of arbitrary imposition, but related to its objects
and belonging to them naturally. For every instrument has been de-
signed in relation to its proper function, and may not be suited to any 20
other thing than that for which it has been produced. So also the name,
because an instrument, has a certain connate power that is adapted to
the objects that it signifies. Since it instructs it has a task of revealing

the objects of intellection;¹⁰¹ and, since it discriminates essence, it implants in us an understanding of things. The argument from the form of the name is the same, just as the preceding (386D8-387D9) was from the model, that is, the object.

388D6-389A4 SOC: Very well. But whose work will the instructor use when he uses the name?

HERM: I can't say.

SOC: Can't you say who gives us the names that we use?

HERM: I really can't.

SOC: Doesn't it seem to you that they are given by law?

HERM: It is likely.

SOC: Then the instructor will use the work of the lawgiver when he uses the name?

HERM: It seems so.

SOC: Does every man seem to you to be a lawgiver or is it whoever has the skill?

HERM: The skilled.

SOC: So, not every man, Hermogenes, is able to give a name, but only a name-giver (*onomatourgos*). And this, it seems, is the lawgiver, who is the rarest of all demiurges (*demiourgos*) among men.

HERM: It is likely.

49. 'Aristotle says that speech signifies, not as an instrument (*organon*)
 30 but conventionally (*Int.* 17a1-2), for it is not remarkable, he says, that,
 whereas sound is natural like corporeal motion, names are conven-
 17,1 tional, like dancing. Proclus contradicts him as follows: the name is not
 a product of the natural organs (*organa*). Insofar as it is a name, every
 name indicates something. For a name and an uttered sound are not the
 5 same thing. The natural organs, therefore, like the tongue, trachea,
 lungs and such, produce the sound. Yet, while these too help to fur-
 nish¹⁰² the name with matter,¹⁰³ it is the intellectual activity of the
 name-giver that most particularly produces it. This thought fits the
 matter to the form and model in a proper way.¹⁰⁴ The dialectician, in
 10 turn, uses the name once it has been laid down. For every instrument
 has both a user and a creator, and everything that uses possesses the
 creative cause as well;¹⁰⁵ and everything that possesses the creative
 cause assists something toward actuality, unless it be self-producing
 and self-substantial.¹⁰⁶ If then the name too is such an instrument, there
 is a creator of it, but another uses it once it has been produced; and it is
 15 the work of the one, but the instrument of the other. Also, it is natural
 not because it is a product of nature, and an instrument not because
 some natural power uses it; in fact, that which creates it and that which
 uses it are each a skill.¹⁰⁷ Yet, since that which creates it does so while
 20 looking to its objects, and that which uses it does so for the discrimina-
 tion of its objects, it is for this reason that, both as a product and as an

instrument, it is said to be “by nature”. For it is produced as an image of its objects and makes them known through the medium of intellections. Thus, the name is fairly called an “instructive instrument” (388B), while a little later it will be called a legislative product as well (388D). 25 This latter role is for the sake of the dialectician, for revealing the real state of affairs is his purpose and his good. Socrates therefore is more inclined to call it an instrument (388A), dignifying it with this term *a fortiori*. Thus, this instrument is a medium between teacher and learner. There is not therefore one single activity of agent and patient, 18,1 as Aristotle says (*Phys.* 202a13-b22), but at least three motions – that of the agent, that of the patient, and that of the instrument in between them.’

50. ‘The shuttle and the awl are paradigms suited to the name (387E). 5 For the name too distinguishes things from each other, and it enters the one that perceives it through the depth of his intuition.’

Naming and Demiurgy

51. ‘Just as, when in the *Gorgias* Callicles distinguished the just by convention from that by nature (482E),¹⁰⁸ Socrates demonstrated (489A) that convention and nature concur with each other in the case of justice (and he makes the same argument in the *Minos* as well (316B, 317C)), so here too we should understand that names are both by law and nature, not however by any law whatever but by that which is everlasting and has been instituted according to eternal formulae. So then, the 15 name is by law and convention in virtue of its creative cause which is endowed with scientific knowledge, but natural in virtue of its paradigmatic cause. Still, if these things are so, how will Socrates prove, when later speaking to Cratylus (429B), that we must call “a name” not only the one that is correctly assigned but also the one that is not so? Our 20 response to this must be that law looks to the universal.¹⁰⁹ Thus all the names that are applied to eternal entities are laid down by law. But since there are names of perishable objects as well, it is no wonder if universal law does not control them, but there is a good deal of the arbitrary in them, as in the case of people who are called “Ambrosius”, 25 “Athanasius”, “Polychronius” and the like.¹¹⁰

Let us briefly discuss what the art that creates names is, for it does not include every form of the art of legislation. That there is a certain power of representation in the soul is clear (indeed, painting and other 19,1 such skills depend on it), since it assimilates subsequent things (*ta deuterata*) to their superiors, and the forms carried in composition to those that are simpler.¹¹¹ Moreover, by the same power the soul can liken itself to its superiors – gods, angels and daemons. But through the same 5 power it likens even the beings descending (*ta deuterata*) from itself to itself and, further, to those superior to itself. It therefore fashions images of both gods and daemons. But wishing to institute likenesses of

10 real beings, similitudes which are in a certain way immaterial and products of only the essence of reason (*logikê*), and using linguistic imagination (*lektikê*)¹¹² as an aid, it brought forth from itself the essence of names. And as the art of “teletic” consecration through certain symbols and ineffable signs fashions the statues which are in this way like the gods and makes these statues suitable for the reception of divine illumination,¹¹³ so too by the same power of assimilation the art of legislation institutes names as effigies of their objects, when it represents through echoes of this sort or that the nature of real beings; and having instituted them it handed them on to men for use.

For this reason, the lawgiver is said to be an authority on the generation of names, and just as it is not reverent to transgress against the statues of the gods, so it is not holy to do wrong regarding names. For the legislative demiurge of names is Intellect which instils images of their models in them. And we must revere them (sc., the names) because of their (sc., the models’) kinship to gods. Now, it seems to me that Plato sets up the lawgiver as a figure analogous¹¹⁴ to the universal Demiurge (for, according to Timaeus, it is the Demiurge who sets the “allotted laws” (41E) and “ordains all things” (42D), and “who is attended by Dike, the nemesis of anyone who departs from the divine law”, as the Athenian Stranger says (*Laws* 716A)).¹¹⁵ It thus seems to me that Plato reasonably grants the lawgiver the creation of names as well, since the universal Demiurge, he says, is also the primal name-giver. It therefore is He, as Timaeus says (36C), that named one of the revolutions “the Same” and one “the Other”.¹¹⁶ If, then, the lawgiver is analogous to the Demiurge, is it not necessary that he also be master of conferring names? This is why Plato here (389A) called the lawgiver a demiurge, even the “rarest of the demiurges”. So also in the *Phaedrus* (255C) Socrates says that “desire” (*himeros*) is a name put by Zeus “out of his love (*erôs*) for Ganymede”. Therefore, some names are products of the gods and have come all the way down to Soul, others are products of particular souls which are able to fashion them through intellect and knowledge, and others are instituted through the intermediary genera. For certain men who have become involved with daemons and angels were taught by them names that are better fit to their objects than those which men generally put. We must recognize their differences which have been given from their creative causes, and refer all names to the one Demiurge, the intellectual God. For this reason, indeed, the name has two-fold powers – it is the cause that teaches one concepts and communication, but also the cause that discriminates the essence – as the Demiurge too has two-fold powers – the capacity for the production both of sameness and otherness.¹¹⁷

389A5-9 SOC: Come, then, consider where the lawgiver looks when he gives names. Think in terms of our previous discussion. To what

does the carpenter look when he makes the shuttle? Isn't it to something naturally disposed to weave?

HERM: Of course.

52. 'The assimilative activity of the demiurgic Intellect is two-fold (389A): there is the one with which the Intellect, looking to the intelligible model, institutes the whole cosmos; and the other with which it assigns names proper to each object. Timaeus gave a brief exposition of these matters (36C), but the theurgists and the utterances from the gods themselves teach us more distinctly:¹¹⁸

But the holy name even with unresting whirl
lept into the stellar sphere because of the rushing command of the
Father (*Or. Chald.* 87), 30

and another oracle says,

The paternal Intellect sowed symbols in the cosmos,
By which it contemplates the intelligible things and is made one
with ineffable Beauty (*Or. Chald.* 108).¹¹⁹ 21,1

The lawgiver too, as he looks to the whole cosmos, both transmits the best polity and puts the names that resemble real beings.' 5

389B1-7 SOC: But what does this mean? If he breaks the shuttle while making it, will he make another by looking to the broken one or to the Form after which he was making the one that he broke?

HERM: By looking to the Form, it seems.

SOC: May we not quite justifiably call that 'the Shuttle itself'?

HERM: It seems so.

53. 'It is intolerable to omit determinate causes and paradigms of artificial things here below (389B-C). For the products¹²⁰ of these [causes and paradigms] are both essences and proper measures, and they have both a reference back to the totality and proceed to existence through nature. All artificial objects, however, are without essence and are altered in all sorts of ways for our use and circumstances. They have no limit of parts or of their arrangement in them, and are separated from the things that are formed naturally. But if one should call the actual creative and generative powers of the gods, which they project into the universe, demiurgic, intellectual, productive and perfective skills, we would not reject such nomenclature, since we find that the theologians¹²¹ also set out the divine creations in these terms: they call the Cyclopes causes of all artificial creation,¹²² and these instructed even Zeus, Athena and Hephaestus – and [they say that] Athena presides over various skills, and especially weaving, and Hephaestus as guard-

ian over another skill of his own. The universal art of weaving actually originates from our lady Athena,

25 For this Goddess is the foremost of all immortals to weave
On the loom, to teach the works of weaving (*Orph. fr.* 178),

22,1 says Orpheus, but it proceeds to the life-bearing series of Core.¹²³ For
this [Goddess] and all her chorus, as she remains above, are said to
weave the order of life. Yet that weaving is participated in by all the
5 gods in the cosmos – for the one Demiurge bids the young demiurges¹²⁴
to interweave “the mortal” form of life “with the immortal” (*Tim.* 41D) –
and finds its ultimate development among the gods in charge of genera-
tion. Included among these is Homer’s Circe, who weaves all of life in
10 the four classes and at the same time makes the region under the moon
harmonious with songs.¹²⁵ Thus, to these weaving deities, Circe too –
indeed, “golden” Circe, as they say – is assigned by the theologians, who
thereby indicate her intellectual and immaculate essence, both imma-
terial and unmingled with generation. Her function is to discriminate
the things that are at rest from those that are in motion, and to separate
15 them according to divine difference.¹²⁶

If, then, in pursuing these analogies, as I was saying, a person were
to call the powers of the gods causes of these skills, but their products
illuminations of these powers that range throughout the cosmos as a
whole, he would speak correctly. For one must connect not only the
20 weaving at our level with Athena, but, prior to this, that which operates
through nature and attaches the generated to the eternal, the mortal to
the immortal, bodies to the incorporeal, and the perceptible to the
intellectual; and one must first view carpentry as a whole at the level of
the natural species, as well as each of the other arts. As a result, the
25 shuttle too will have analogues on every level, since it discriminates the
genera which compose the things that exist in order that, along with
their interweaving, their distinction too may remain, and preserve their
own unadulterated subsistence.

On this account, even the artisans at our level act under the guidance
of gods as guardians and protectors, without this leading to their
30 contemplating the intelligibles [directly]. For they create looking not to
the latter, but to the forms at their own level and to the formulae
23,1 (*logoi*)¹²⁷ which they possess of artificial things, whether they discovered
these formulae or received them from others. For the first creator of the
bed or the shuttle considered what sort of shuttle there should be, by
5 looking to its use and being guided thereby, and composed a formula of
shuttle on his own. But the others got to know the Form by learning it
from him, and they create a particular image of the shuttle in accord-
ance with that one. So you should not wonder if they recalled [the Form],
whether they happened to learn it in another life, perhaps, or discovered
it at that time either as a result of the reflective power of the soul,¹²⁸ or

of recollection once again. Each artisan, then, possesses the formula of the shuttle, that it is of such and such a type, that it exists for a particular purpose, and moulds the external material after this model. For what else is art than the artefact, excluding the matter, in the soul of the artisan?¹²⁹

You see, then, how these are imitations of the demiurgic art and the intellectual Forms. For it is in virtue of the fact that the latter always exist in the same manner and circumstances that the perishable objects in the cosmos are preserved and renewed through the stable identity of those Forms. For corruption belongs to matter, but stable identity comes through the eternal Form, just as also in the case of the shuttles here below corruption is proper to their matter, but regeneration occurs through the formula residing in the artisan. Therefore, what the shuttle is to the carpenter, names are to the lawgiver and all the encosmic things are to the Demiurge.¹³⁰ Thus, the Forms exist at three levels: that of intellect, that of knowledge and that of opinion. All perceptible forms are imitations of the intellectual Forms, names of those at the level of knowledge, and shuttles of those of opinion.’

389B8-D3 SOC: So, whenever he has to make a shuttle for a garment, whether thin or thick, linen, wool or any other sort, must they all contain the Form of the shuttle, and must he instil in each product the nature that is naturally the finest for each?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: And the same method also applies for the other instruments. The craftsman must discover the instrument natural to each sort of work and instil that in the material from which he makes the instrument, not as he himself wishes but as it is natural. For the awl that is natural to each sort of work, it seems, he should know how to put into iron.

HERM: Of course.

SOC: ... and the shuttle that is natural to each work, into materials.

HERM: This is so.

SOC: For each type of shuttle, it seems, is naturally disposed to each type of web. And this reasoning applies to other instruments as well.

HERM: Yes.

54. ‘All the forms of instruments must have receptive matter which is proper to them and fit to the work for which we need the instrument. For that which is the model of the art, Nature,¹³¹ takes care of not only the form of the instruments but also the most appropriate type of matter.’

389D4-390A3 SOC: So, my good man, mustn't the lawgiver also know how to put the name which is natural to each object into sounds and syllables and, looking to what is Name itself, both

create and assign all names, if he is going to be an authoritative name-giver? But if each lawgiver does not put the name into the same syllables, we must not be unaware of this Form. For every smith does not put things into the same iron, even if they make identical instruments for the same purpose. But as long as they render the same Form, though it be in different iron, their instrument is correctly disposed, whether one makes it in Greece or in a foreign land. Am I right?

HERM: Of course.

24,1 55. ‘The creation of the universe is two-fold: the one institutes [both] the formulae (*logoi*) that extend to all things and the Forms that are disposed in the same way and admit of no change, while the other adds individual features to the things that are produced. For example, the
5 Form of Man has come from above out of the one and whole intellectual creation through the medium of the stars – and for this reason it also exists forever because it is produced from an unmoved cause.¹³² But since men differ from each other in size, complexion and such, it is clear
10 that these features are woven in from the secondary creation of the “young gods”¹³³ and are subject to a good deal of change because they are produced from causes that are in motion. But this happens so that the variety of existing things may be produced and the eternal generation of particular creatures may multiply. For the heavenly revolutions fulfil some things for some things, others for others, and bring forth some things at some times, others at others, and they bring to completion one
15 fabric from all entities, which contributes to the fulfilment of the universe.’¹³⁴

56. ‘The shuttle is an image of the gods’ power of discriminating universal and particular things.¹³⁵ For it imposes a representation of the activity of that power on its threads and bears the sign of the order of
20 the discriminating gods.¹³⁶ Whenever the theologians¹³⁷ adopt shuttles to signify those gods, they neither speak of a Form of shuttle nor use the name only by convention and symbolically. For why do they say “shuttle” and not some other name? Is it not strange that science would use
25 names arbitrarily, especially for gods? Rather, they seem to me to employ such terms by analogy.¹³⁸ For what the shuttle is to the art of weaving, discrimination is to the creation of the Forms. But analogy is neither a relation of Form to image, nor a purely conventional one: when
30 Plato calls this or that power of the soul “horses” (*Phdr.* 246A), for instance, he does so neither arbitrarily nor as identifying those powers
25,1 as Forms of perceptible horses, but as making use of analogy. Whence even initiates into the mysteries, when they ensure by such an [analogical] relationship that things here are sympathetic with the gods,¹³⁹ use these instruments as signs of the divine powers – for example, the shuttle as a sign of the discriminating powers, the mixing-bowl as that
5 of the life-bearing, the sceptre as that of the governing, and the key as

that of the guardian – and they use analogy in the same way for the different powers on whom they call.’

390A4-8 SOC: Then, you will esteem both the Greek and the foreign lawgiver, as long as he renders the Form of the name that is proper to each object in whatever sort of syllables he may use, and you will judge that the Greek lawgiver is in no way inferior to that anywhere else?

HERM: Of course.

57. ‘By analogy, as things are disposed to one another, so too the names attributed to them are disposed to each other according to both their honour and their power. For this reason, indeed, the names of the gods are honoured, revered, and esteemed by the wise “beyond the greatest fear” (*Phlb.* 12C), and those of men or daemons are treated analogously. On that account, they say, the Greeks need not use Egyptian, Scythian or Persian but Greek names of the gods. For the rulers of the [various] regions rejoice when named in the languages of their proper lands.’¹⁴⁰ 10 15

Naming and Dialectic: an Excerptor Comment

58. To the syllogism of Aristotle which goes as follows:¹⁴¹ ‘things that are natural are the same for all men, but names are not the same for all men, so things that are natural are not names and names are not natural’,¹⁴² Proclus objects to the major premise as follows: ‘if the name is a Form observed in different matter, because it is a Form it is the same for all men;¹⁴³ but the first, and therefore the second’. He objects to the minor thus: ‘the eye is natural, as is voice and colour and sizes, but these are not the same for all men because intensity and weakness vary in degree.’¹⁴⁴ Therefore, not everything that is natural is the same for all men.’ Yet, even if one should agree with the above premises, the conclusion is not more Aristotelian than Platonic. For Plato too would say that the name is not natural, as emerges from the discussion which Socrates later has with Cratylus (435A): for that which is natural, just as that too which is conventional, turns out to be two-fold.¹⁴⁵ 20 25 26,1

390B1-D6 SOC: Who will know if the proper Form of shuttle lies in any sort of wood? The carpenter who has made it or the weaver who will use it?

HERM: Probably the one who will use it, Socrates.

SOC: Who then will use the work of the lyre-maker? Isn’t he the one who would know how to direct the work best and would recognize whether the work has been well done or not?

HERM: Of course.

SOC: Who is he?

HERM: The lyre player.

SOC: And who would know the work of the shipbuilder?

HERM: The steersman.

SOC: And who would best direct the work of the lawgiver and evaluate what has been done, both in Greece and abroad? Isn't it whoever will use it?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: And isn't this whoever knows how to inquire?

HERM: Of course.

SOC: ... but the same person also knows how to respond?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: And the person who knows how to inquire and respond, do you call him anything but a dialectician?

HERM: No, this is right.

SOC: Then, the work of the carpenter is to make a rudder under the direction of the steersman, that is, if the rudder is to be a good one.

HERM: Apparently.

SOC: And that of the lawgiver, it seems, is to make the name under the direction of a dialectician, that is, if he is going to put them correctly.

HERM: This is so.

A Comment by the Excerptor: the Dialectician as Namegiver and Guide of the Lawgiver

59. If the dialectician is instructive (390C), and it is he who uses the name as an instrument, may best evaluate the one who creates the name, and is guide of the lawgiver; then the dialectician, as guide of the lawgiver, does not permit him to impose names randomly and arbitrarily, but will compel him to carry out this activity by aiming for the nature of things.

60. 'Aristotle (*Pol.* 3, 1282a18ff.) determines that the craftsman who serves knows the material better, but the one who uses knows the Form better. Plato now distinguishes the servant by his relation with the Beautiful, but the chief-artificer and user by that with the Good.¹⁴⁶ For the great Plato does not believe, as Aristotle does, that there is nothing more noble than the form,¹⁴⁷ but he knows both that the Good is beyond the Beautiful and that the God is beyond the essence of the Forms.¹⁴⁸

61. If he has now called the name both an 'instructive' (388B-C) and a 'dialectical' (390D) instrument, it is clear that the dialectician may be instructive as well. What, then, does Socrates mean by saying that he is himself a dialectician but not also instructive (391A)? Perhaps the answer is that 'instructing' has two senses: the one consists of as much as a person who speaks from without instills in the person who is learning – for example, in dancing or painting; the other consists of as

much as is summoned to knowledge through recollection in the soul 25
 which is purified. For the soul is not like a slate without writing,¹⁴⁹ and
 it holds things buried not potentially but actually.¹⁵⁰ Why, then, is the
 name an instrument for only the dialectician rather than for all men as
 well? As they say that one may cut a vine even with a dinner knife (*Rep.*
 1, 353A), but the correct way is to do it with a pruning-shears, so too the 30
 correct usage of names is fit only to the one that uses them correctly. 27,1
 This is the dialectician.

62. If the one who uses an instrument is superior to the one who
 fashioned it, because he has a more essential skill, how does the particu- 5
 lar soul use both the irrational [soul] and the testacious body (cf. *Phlb.* 5
 21C8) which are fashioned by the ‘young gods’ (*Tim.* 42E7 ff.)? Does the
 soul too contribute to their creation? Do the ‘young gods’ use them as
 instruments? Should we understand them in a corresponding manner –
 the universal creation corresponding to the use of the universal [instru-
 ment], but the particular to the particular?¹⁵¹ 10

63. It seems strange if both the dialectician as a superior but also the
 judge as an inferior use the work of the lawgiver.¹⁵² Does the former use
 it as an instrument, but the latter as principle and hypothesis? For the
 particular soul uses the daemon as leading principle and guardian, but
 the body as instrument. Indeed, even among their models Cronus is the 15
 Father of Zeus, but Dike is [Zeus’] child. While the lawgiver is analogous
 to the Demiurge Zeus, who proposes ‘the allotted laws’ to souls (*Tim.*
 41E) and assigns names to the universal revolutions (36C), the dialecti- 20
 cian is analogous to the Cronian monad.¹⁵³ The supreme Cronus too
 instils from above the principles of the intellectual thoughts¹⁵⁴ in the
 Demiurge and governs the whole demiurgy. For this reason, according
 to Orpheus, Zeus even calls him a daemon:

Direct our generation, most renowned daemon (fr. 155). 25

It is likely that Cronus holds at his own level the highest causes of
 combinations and discriminations: for through the various sections of
 the heavens he leads forth into partition the wholeness of the intellect,
 becomes cause of generative processions and multiplications, and in
 general forms the dominant principle of the Titan generation, from 28,1
 which derives the division of real beings. But through his swallowings
 he leads his offspring back together, unifies them with himself and
 restores them to the uniform and indivisible cause of himself. Indeed,
 the Demiurge Zeus proximately receives from him the truth of what is 5
 real and primarily contemplates what is in him. For Night too prophe-
 cies to him,¹⁵⁵ but his Father does so proximately and instils in him all
 the measures of the universal creation.

Yet Plato himself says that, living happily in the time of Cronus, even
 the God’s ‘nurslings’ operate by dialectic. They converse with both each 10
 other ‘and the beasts’ (for all things there are intellectual) ‘through

discussions on philosophy’, associate and ‘seek to learn from every nature if any know of one possessing a particular power for the common pool of wisdom’ (*Polit.* 272B-C). But those who revolve (*anakuklein*) the life that is under the dispensation of Zeus require the art of legislation and the measures derived from it for the organization of their states. This is why there are double revolutions (*anakukleseis*) in the universe as well,¹⁵⁶ the one being uplifting and Cronian, the other being providential and dependent on Zeus. For the king Cronus uses all the products of Zeus according to his transcendent superiority, and, through them as
 20 images, extends the upward path to particular souls.¹⁵⁷

390D7-391B3 SOC: So, it is likely, Hermogenes, that the giving of names may not be as trivial a matter as you think, nor the work of trivial or arbitrary men. And Cratylus speaks the truth when he says that things have natural names and not every man is a creator of names, but only the one that looks to the name belonging by nature to each object and is able to put its Form into both letters and syllables.

HERM: I do not know how to counter what you are saying, Socrates. Still, it is not easy to be convinced so suddenly. But I think that I would be better convinced if you should demonstrate for me what you consider the natural correctness of a name.

SOC: My dear Hermogenes, I am not saying that there is any. You forget what I was saying a little earlier – that I knew nothing, but would examine the problem with you. As we now examine it, to both of us, you and I together, this much more is already apparent: the name has a certain natural correctness, and not every man knows how to give it properly to any object. Isn’t this so?

HERM: Certainly.

Intellect, Imagination, and Opinion

64.¹⁵⁸ ‘The essential Intellect contains as a whole, all together and in actuality the true understanding of reality. The intellect of the philosopher, however, since it is not essential but an illumination of Intellect
 25 and, as it were, an image of Intellect, thinks on the particular level and comprehends the truth only intermittently.’

65. ‘Among men there are five conditions of knowing or not knowing: double ignorance, simple ignorance, desire [to know], inquiry and discovery.’¹⁵⁹

391B4-C7 SOC: Then, we must next ask, if you wish to know, what precisely is the name’s correctness.

HERM: But I certainly do wish to know.

SOC: Then examine the matter.

HERM: How should I?

SOC: The most correct way to examine a problem, my friend, is with those who know something about it, and you pay them in both money and favours. These are the sophists to whom even your brother Callias has paid a good deal of money, and thus has gained a reputation for wisdom. But since you have not yet received your inheritance, you must press your brother and ask him to teach you the correctness about such matters that he learned from Protagoras.

HERM: But my request would certainly be strange, Socrates, if I wholly reject Protagoras' *Truth*, but should still value the teachings in such a truth as worth anything at all.

66. 'The man of knowledge demonstrates the methods of discovery to the learner, thereby imitating Hermes the Guide.'

30

67. 'Socrates is analogous to the intellect, Hermogenes to irrational opinion desiring the Good and Callias to corporeal and material imagination.¹⁶⁰ This is why the sophists cheat him (i.e. Callias) like a slave.¹⁶¹ But opinion and imagination are pretty much sister faculties, like next-door neighbours.'¹⁶²

29,1

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391C8-392E8 SOC: Well, if dissatisfied with Protagoras' teachings, you should learn from Homer and the other poets.

HERM: What does Homer say about names, Socrates, and where?

SOC: In many places. But the finest and best examples are where he distinguishes between the names by which men and the gods call the same things. Don't you think he says something great and marvellous here about the correctness of names? For it is clear that the gods call things by their correct names, that is, their natural ones. Don't you think so?

HERM: I know very well that, if they name things, they do so correctly. But what sorts of names do you mean?

SOC: Don't you know that, about the river near Troy which fought Hephaestus in single combat, he says, 'the gods call him "Xanthus", but men call him "Scamander"' (*Il.* 20.74)?

HERM: I do, indeed.

SOC: Well, then, don't you think it important to know how it is correct to call this river 'Xanthus' rather than 'Scamander'? And, if you wish, consider the bird which he says, 'the gods call "chalcis", but men "cymindis"' (*Il.* 14.291). Do you think it trivial to learn how much more correct it is to call the same bird 'chalcis' rather than 'cymindis'? Think also of 'Batieia' and 'Myrine' (*Il.* 2.813) and the many other examples that can be found in Homer and other poets. To discover the meaning of these terms is probably beyond the capacity of either you or me. I think it may be easier and more

humanly possible to examine the names ‘Scamandrius’ and ‘Astyanax’, which, Homer says, are names of Hector’s son, to determine what he means by their correctness. For you certainly know the lines where these names occur.

HERM: Of course.

SOC: Of the names attributed to the child, which do you think Homer considers the more correct – ‘Astyanax’ or ‘Scamandrius’?

HERM: I cannot say.

SOC: Look at it like this: what if someone should ask you whether you think the relatively wise or the relatively foolish assign names more correctly?

HERM: It is clear that wiser people do, I would say.

SOC: Then, do the women in our city-states seem to you to be wiser, or do the men, that is, speaking in terms of the entire gender?

HERM: The men do.

SOC: Do you know that, according to Homer, the Trojans called the son of Hektor ‘Astyanax’, but evidently the women called him ‘Scamandrius’, since the men called him ‘Astyanax’?

HERM: It seems so.

SOC: Then Homer too believed that the Trojan men were wiser than their women?

HERM: I believe so.

SOC: He therefore thought that the name ‘Astyanax’ was attributed to the boy more correctly than ‘Scamandrius’?

HERM: It appears so.

SOC: Let’s examine the reason for this. Doesn’t he himself offer us the finest explanation? For he says, ‘He alone defended their city and long walls’ (*Il.* 22.507). It therefore seems right to call the son of the saviour ‘Astyanax’, ‘king of the city’ that his father was saving, as Homer says.

HERM: It appears so.

SOC: What? I myself do not yet understand, Hermogenes, but you do?

HERM: Not I, by Zeus.

Names Assigned by Sophists and Poets

68. ‘Since names are imitations of the essence of things, since they are images and coordinated with the imitators, Socrates has good reason to mention both [sophists and poets] for his examination of names. In the case of the former, he condemns their fanciful opinion and the emptiness
10 of their imagination; of the latter, he reveals their inspiration and demonstrative power concerning the objects of inquiry, that power which they extend by inspiration to anyone who can understand.’

69. ‘Nothing that follows the things greater than itself fails to achieve its proper perfection.’¹⁶³

70. (Exc.?) Why does Plato, who throws Homer and the poets who followed him out of his republic as imitators,¹⁶⁴ now (391D) introduce them as inspired guides of the correctness of names?¹⁶⁵ Is it that in the *Republic* the variegated nature of imitation was unsuited to simple and undistorted characters, but here and everywhere Plato loves and embraces the inspiration of these poets?¹⁶⁶

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393A1-B6 SOC: Well, then, my friend, did Homer himself also name Hektor?

HERM: Why do you ask that?

SOC: Because it seems to me that his name is much like ‘Astyanax’ and both are like Greek names. For ‘lord’ (*anax*) and ‘keeper’ (*hektor*) mean nearly the same thing, that both belong to kings. Of what one is ‘lord’ one is surely also ‘keeper’. And he clearly rules, possesses and keeps (*ekhei*) it. Or do you think that I am speaking nonsense and that I’m fooling even myself if I think that I have found a trace of Homer’s opinion about the correctness of names?

HERM: By Zeus, you’re not wrong, it seems to me, but probably have something there.

Divine Names

71.¹⁶⁷ Since the present discussion is about divine names (391D-E), we should go through them in a little detail. First let us speak about the names occultly established among the gods themselves. While certain ancients say that these names originate from the greater genera but that the gods are established beyond such means of indication, others agree that names exist among the gods themselves, even among those allotted the highest order. Moreover, the gods have a uniform and ineffable form of existence,¹⁶⁸ a power of generating all things, and an intellect which is perfect and replete with intellections, and by virtue of this triad they institute all things. It therefore is necessary, I suppose, that the participations in the beings that are always higher and ranked nearer the Good take place triadically throughout the entire range of instituted creatures, and that the participations therein be more ineffable which are defined by the existence of the first beings, whereas those are more apparent and more distinct which are illuminated by the intellect of the transcendent causes, and that there be others in between, such as those that flow from the generative powers. For, in instituting everything, the Fathers of all things sowed signs and traces of their own triadic substance in everything.¹⁶⁹ Since even nature instils a spark of its proper identity in bodies, a spark through which it both moves bodies and, if you will, ‘steers from the stern’, the Demiurge too established an image of his own monadic superiority in the universe, an image through which he guides the cosmos like a ‘captain’, says Plato,

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15 grasping ‘rudders and tiller’ (*Polit.* 272E).¹⁷⁰ In fact, these rudders and the tiller of the universe, by manning which the Demiurge organizes the universe, should be considered nothing else but symbols of the creation-process as a whole, which are difficult for us to comprehend but known and apparent to the gods themselves. But why discuss these matters?

20 Of the abstract cause, however, which is ineffable and beyond the intelligible realm, everything that exists even down to the lowest region possesses a sign, through which all things are attached to that cause – some further, some closer, according to the distinctness and the obscurity of the sign in them.¹⁷¹ And this is what moves everything to the

25 longing for the Good and presents beings with this desire which cannot be quenched. While the sign is unknowable (for it has come down even to those who are unable to know it), it is greater than life (for it is present even to things without souls) and does not have the power of intellect (for it is innate in objects not endowed with thinking). Thus, just as Nature, the

30 demiurgic Monad and the absolute Father¹⁷² who is removed from all

31,1 things sowed signs of their proper identity in beings subsequent to them, and through these signs turn everything back to themselves, so too all the gods instil in the entities produced from themselves symbols of their cause, and through these they settle all creatures in themselves.

5 Therefore, the signs of the existence of the higher beings which are sown into subsequent ones are ineffable and unknowable, and their active and kinetic force surpasses all intellection.

Such, then, are the characteristics of the light through which the gods appear to their own offspring.¹⁷³ These characteristics exist in a unified

10 way in the gods themselves, reveal the gods in the genera greater than ours¹⁷⁴ and reach us in a particular and shapen mode. This is why the gods advise us to contemplate ‘the extended shape of light’ (*Or. Chald.* 145).¹⁷⁵ For though it exists above without shape, it became shaped

15 through its procession. And while there it is established occultly and uniformly, it manifests itself to us in motion from the gods themselves. This light has its active force because of its divine cause, but its figured aspect because of the essence which receives it. But the things, in turn, which are illuminated from their powers are somehow intermediary between the ineffable and the effable. For they have come themselves

20 through all the genera between (indeed it was not possible that the primordial gifts of the gods reached us, without the genera greater than ours much earlier participating in the illumination thence), they exist in a manner proper to each level of being and reveal in a manner coordinate to everything the powers of the entities that instituted them. Such are the

25 so-called symbols of the gods. They are uniform in the superior orders, but multiform in the inferior. Imitating these symbols, theurgy too produces them through uttered, though inarticulate, expressions.¹⁷⁶

The third type of property that has come from the intellectual level

30 of being to all things and proceeds all the way to us is the divine names,

32,1 through which we call upon the gods and by which they are praised.

They have been revealed by the gods themselves, cause reversion back to them and, to the extent that there is something luminous in them, lead to human understanding. For through these names we are able both to indicate something to each other concerning the gods and to converse with ourselves. Different peoples partake of these names in different ways: the Egyptians, for instance, have taken such names from the gods in accordance with their native tongue, but the Chaldaeans and Indians have taken their own differently in accordance with their own languages, and in the same way the Greeks have taken theirs in accordance with their own idiom.¹⁷⁷ Thus, even if the Greeks, with divine guidance, call a certain God 'Briareos' while the Chaldaeans call him something else, we must suppose that both names are products of the gods and indicate the [same] essence. And it is no wonder if some names are more effective, and others are less so, since the daemonic and the angelic names are more effective than those that have become known to us, and in general those that are closer to the things named are more perfect than those ranked further away.¹⁷⁸ That, then, is what we have to say about how names range throughout all things and what essence they have been allotted.

Not every class of the gods, however, is nameable. For Parmenides too had reminded us that He who is beyond the things as a whole is ineffable.¹⁷⁹ Indeed, there are neither names of him, he says, nor any speech (*Parm.* 142A).¹⁸⁰ Of the intelligible gods the foremost genera, which are both united to the One itself and are called occult, have a high degree of unknowability and ineffability. For what is fully apparent and effable is not immediately attached to what is perfectly ineffable,¹⁸¹ but it was necessary that the procession of the Intelligibles terminate at this order. So the first thing that is effable and called by proper names exists at that level. For it is there that the intellectual nature of the intelligible entities shone forth in the primal Forms. All the beings which before that nature are secret and occult are knowable only to intelligence.¹⁸² This is why all mystical art ascends as far as this order by theurgic activity. Indeed, even Orpheus says that this is the first order that the other gods call by name. For the light proceeding from that order revealed it and made it nameable and comprehensible to the intellectual entities. He says:

Metis bore the famous seed of gods, which
The blessed on tall Olympus called Phanes¹⁸³ the first born
(Orph. fr. 85).

In the case of the gods, however, this naming and contemplating are unified, and both activities belong to them through participation in the light which the supreme Phanes projects to all beings. But in the case of our souls they are divided, and the thought is one thing, the name another; the latter has the nature of image, the former of paradigm.¹⁸⁴

In the median genera, there is also a certain distinction, but in turn a unification of both noetic activity and that of naming as well. It seems to me that something like this is meant by the mediating¹⁸⁵ name of the
 15 [Chaldaean] Iunges¹⁸⁶ which is said to support all the 'founts'; something similar is also signified by the name of the teletarchic principle¹⁸⁷ which, one of the gods says, 'leaps into the stellar sphere because of the rushing command of the Father' (*Or. Chald.* 87).¹⁸⁸

For all of these names exist occultly with the gods, but in the second and third processions they are revealed also to the human beings who
 20 are of the same descent as the gods.¹⁸⁹ There exist some names, then, that are established permanently at the level of the gods – and these are the names by which the inferior gods call those prior to them, as Orpheus says in the case of Phanes (fr. 85), or by which the greater gods name their subordinates, as Plato says that Zeus put names to the
 25 invisible revolutions of the souls¹⁹⁰ (*Tim.* 36C). For Fathers define the activities of their offspring for them, and those who have proceeded get to know their own causes by the intellectual signs which they received. Such, then, are the primal names which have been revealed by the gods
 34,1 and through the median genera have reached our rational-communicative (*logikos*) essence.¹⁹¹

But let us now consider other names of the second and third orders which particular souls introduced, at times acting under inspiration concerning the gods, at times operating by [human] knowledge, once
 5 they either associated their own intellectual thought with the divine light and were perfected from that source, or entrusted the creation of names to the rational power of speech. For it is thus that artisans such as geometers, doctors and orators put names to the various aspects of their art, the aspects whose properties they thoroughly knew. And so
 10 too the poets possessed by Phoebus (sc. Apollo) referred many names to gods and distinguished human names from these, assuming some names by inspiration, others from sense-perception and opinion.¹⁹²

It is regarding these names that Socrates now (392D) says that Homer, in referring some names to gods but others to men, demonstrates that the God-given names are smooth, mellifluous and of fewer
 15 syllables than those given by men. Compare, for instance, 'Xanthus' with 'Scamander'¹⁹³ and 'Chalcis' with 'Cymindis'¹⁹⁴ and 'Myrine' with 'Batieia'.¹⁹⁵ The first example probably shows how the gods both have
 20 anticipated and name all fluid essence by a definite cause, the second how the gods determine by intellectual proportions the life borne along in generation, and the third how the gods transcendently both know and administer even the life which transcends generation. Regarding 'Xanthus', the gods who both engender and know the causes of all things
 25 perhaps so name it, as Aristotle reports (*Hist. An.* 3.12, 519a18), because creatures that drink from it develop a more tawny (*xanthotera*) skin tone.¹⁹⁶ But regarding its manifest name, it perhaps was called
 35,1 'Scamander' by men who were thinking superficially, because its water

passes through a sort of hand-made basin (*skapḗ*). The bird ‘chalcis’ was so named after its clear and tuneful singing that sounds like echoing bronze (*khalkos*).¹⁹⁷ The Chaldaeans too, of course, call it in this way because they heard it from the gods, while it is called ‘cymindis’ because the bird is nearly as small [as cummin]. ‘Myrine’ is derived from the soul that was allotted this location from the gods,¹⁹⁸ but perhaps it is called ‘Batieia’ because of the plant [of that name (*batos*)] which abounds on it. In these examples, then, we have three differences between the divine and human levels of understanding: the active and passive in the case of Xanthus and Scamander,¹⁹⁹ the rational and natural in that of Myrine and Batieia and the harmonious and inharmonious in that of chalcis and cymindis. He does not compare (cf. *Crat.* 392B3-D10) the nomenclature of simply all men with that of the gods, but [only] that of the manly and wise and those analogous to the paternal causes.

393C8-D5 SOC: That is fine. Yet be careful lest I trick you. For by the same reasoning, any child born of a king should be called a king. But it makes no difference if the same thing is indicated with some syllables or others, and no matter if any letter is added or subtracted, so long as the thing’s essence which is indicated in the name is retained.

HERM: What do you mean?

72.²⁰⁰ If the nature of the gods is ‘formless’ and ‘colourless’ and ‘intangible’ (*Phdr.* 247C), the dialectical function does not exist at their level, but such a thing is involved with the creatures below and the realm of generation.²⁰¹

Discrimination of the Forms of the Gods

73. ‘Of the gods some are incorporeal but others use bodies, and these are spherical bodies. For the spherical figure is characteristic of the entities that have turned back upon themselves. Of the daemons, those that are good and divine have vehicles that are spherical, but material ones have vehicles that proceed in straight lines.²⁰² Both the gods and the daemons hear our prayers not from without, but anticipating our purpose and knowing our activities.’

74. ‘There are both goat-shanked Pans – such was the one that appeared to the courier Philippides as he passed Mt. Parthenion (Herod. 6.105) – and Athenaic souls that use various figures and administer [the world] immediately above men – such was the Athena that appeared to Odysseus and Telemachus (cf. Homer *Od.* 1.113ff., 16.155ff.). But the Panian and the Athenaic daemons and, much more, the gods themselves are removed from all such variation.’

75. ‘It is not because the daemons have shapes of one sort or another

that the men too who are protected by them have both commonly and
 10 individually acquired different forms – for instance, the Scythians
 compared with the Ethiopians and each individual compared with
 each.²⁰³ But the daemons who have been allotted men encompass all
 variation of character in simplicity, all change of figure in identity and
 all difference of motion in stable power.²⁰⁴

Knowledge and Communication among Gods, Daemons, and Mortals

- 15 76.²⁰⁵ ‘There are names used by gods as well, and not only by daemons,
 that have been passed down among the theologians – the names by which
 the gods call things.²⁰⁶ For the rites performed in the mysteries are directed
 at the gods themselves, not at the daemons suspended from them.’
- 20 77. ‘The gods indicate things to men, not with any need of corporeal
 organs, but by shaping the air according to their own will.²⁰⁷ For since
 it is more malleable than wax, air receives stamps of the divine
 thoughts, stamps which proceed from the gods without motion, but
 25 reach us through sound, voice and modulation. In fact, we say that
 oracular voices too are instilled in this way from gods, though the gods
 37,1 do not [actually] utter them but use airy figures as instruments and,
 without stimulation and without contact, fill the sense of hearing with
 the proper understanding. For we say that the gods associate with one
 another through their intellectual thoughts and know each other’s
 5 thoughts intellectually, but not perceptually.’
78. ‘As Homer says, so it is:

Helios, you who see all and hear all (*Il.* 3.277).

- 10 The visible gods have both visual and auditory perception, but not for
 external impressions. For they have in themselves prior to the world as
 a whole the roots and the causes of all beings. Even the face on the moon
 which bears images of the sun reveals ears and eyes, but not also a nose
 and mouth.²⁰⁸ For there also is not in these gods the faculty of smell or
 taste.²⁰⁹
- 15 79. ‘Our knowledge [of the divine] descends from above not in an
 unmediated way, but through certain intermediaries. For as in Homer
 knowledge of the conversation between Zeus and Helios came down as
 far as Odysseus through the medium of both the archangel Hermes and
 20 Calypso (*Od.* 12.374-90),²¹⁰ so also Helenus learned the will of Apollo
 and Athena not from the highest levels but from those proximate to him
 and daemonic (*Il.* 7.44).²¹¹

393D6-394D10 SOC: It’s not complicated. As you know, when we
 talk about the letters of the alphabet, we use their names, not the

letters themselves, with the exception of the four vowels – *e*, *u*, *o* and *ô*. To the other vowels and consonants we add different letters and, thereby, create names for them. But so long as we instil the letter's indicated force, it is correct to call it by the name that will indicate the letter to us. Take 'bêta', for instance: you see that the addition of the 'êta', 'tau' and 'alpha' causes no harm and indicates with the entire name the nature of the letter that the lawgiver intended. He thus knew well how to put names to the letters.

HERM: What you say seems to be true.

SOC: Does the same reasoning hold true for the king? For a king will be born of a king, a good man of a good man, a handsome man of a handsome man and so on for all other living creatures, the proper offspring will be born of each species, unless a sort of monster is engendered, and should be called by the same names. But it is possible that the syllables become so varied that things which are really the same seem different from each other to an uninformed (*ekhein idiôtikos*) observer. For example, medicines which are varied in colour and aroma, though really the same, seem different to us but the same to the doctor, because he examines the medicines' power and is not deceived by its additional qualities. So too one that knows about names probably considers their power and is not deceived if a certain letter is added, transposed, removed or the power of the name lies in entirely different letters. As we were just saying, 'Astyanax' and 'Hektor' contain none of the same letters except 't', but still mean the same thing. And what letters does 'Archeopolis' (leader of the city) share with their names? Yet it still indicates the same thing. And there are many other names that have none other than the meaning 'king'. And there are others, like 'Agis' (leader), 'Polemarchus' (war chief) and 'Eupolemus' (good warrior), that mean general. Still others, such as 'Iatrocles' (famous physician) and 'Acesimbrotus' (healer of mortals), are used for doctors. And we could probably find many others that are expressed by different syllables and letters but whose force has the same meaning. Does this seem so or not?

HERM: It certainly does.

SOC: The same names, then, should be given to creatures that are born in the natural way.

HERM: Of course.

SOC: What about creatures born unnaturally, in the form of a monster? For example, when an irreligious son is born of a good and religious man, as in the previous example, if a horse bears the offspring of a cow, so too the child should not be named after its parent, but after the species to which it belongs?

HERM: Of course.

**Lower Order Interference in Intra-cosmic Communication:
Etymologies of ‘Hector’ and ‘Astyanax’**

80. ‘Concerning the names “Astyanax” and “Hector” (393A4-394B1), the philosopher who looks to the form and the object of signification describes them as nearly the same, but the grammarians,²¹² who are drawn down to the matter and the syllables,²¹³ would say that they are
25 very dissimilar.’²¹⁴

81. ‘The name-giver should perform his function when looking to the forms of the things that are being named (393B). But this function becomes clear to one that looks to the universe as well.²¹⁵ For while many descents of souls to the region around the earth occur in each
30 revolution, and different souls are sown in different lots and select
38,1 different lives – some choosing lives befitting their own chiefs and
5 shepherds, but others being sown into an alien form of life – those that
5 preferred the lives that match and are dedicated to their leaders seem to pride themselves particularly on their leaders’ names.²¹⁶ I mean, for instance, that some souls, who proceed from the Athenaic series and keep unchanged the form of the life proper to this order, ascribe to
10 themselves a name too that befits both the goddess together with her activity (and likewise, I think, there are Dionysuses, Asclepiuses, Her-
meses and Heracleses, homonymous with their guardian gods, who have proceeded with an escort from the gods²¹⁷ for the benefit of the mundane regions). Yet other souls, who descend from this order but choose a life in no way appropriate to it, also use foreign and arbitrary
15 names, and they exchange neither the form of their life nor the names of their proper leaders.²¹⁸ For instance, the hero named “Alceides” by his mortal parents the Pythia, it is said, called “Heracles” by reason of his relation to the Heracleian order and divinity. For when a God shares his
20 name with a man, he assigns the appropriate name by looking to his whole “series” and the life which he has proposed to live.’

393B7-C7 SOC: It is fair, I think, to call the offspring of a lion a lion and that of a horse a horse. I don’t mean when something other than a horse is born, like a monster, of a horse but when the offspring belongs to its natural species. If a horse unnaturally bears a calf, which is the natural offspring of a cow, it should not be called a foal but a calf. And if inhuman offspring be born of a human, it should not be called a human. And the same reasoning applies to trees and all other living beings. Don’t you agree?

HERM: I do.

82. ‘One should adopt designations of the forms borne in the realm of generation by looking either to all the causes, both the universal and the particular, both the distant and those proximate to generated things,
25 like both the universal horse and that which is proximate and corrupt-

ible; or to only the causes that are greater, more perfect, are always accurate and control matter in every way, such as the universals are. For whenever a cow is born of a horse, the particular nature is overcome, and hence a horse is not born; but the universal nature prevails, and hence a cow is born. Indeed, whence comes the form of a cow, if nature 30 in the overall sense does not prevail? For this reason Plato now (393B) 39,1 calls such creatures not simply “monsters” but “monsters of a sort”, because they are not in every way contrary to nature.’

83. ‘Nature (cf. 393C5-6) prevails more completely in plants, since they are rooted. The influence of even a little skill can therefore make 5 changes, as whenever shoots are budded or grafted and an olive tree is generated instead of an oak. But it prevails in animals less, and in men still much less.’

Introduction to Etymological Studies

84.²¹⁹ ‘People named out of hope and in memory of certain others are excluded from etymological convention²²⁰ – and of these especially the 10 people named in memory of others.’²²¹

85.²²² ‘One intending to perform etymological studies should know the differences between the dialects. The Aeolians, for example, call teeth (*odontes*) *edontes*.²²³ Second, he should know the usage of the poets as well. For one of them (Theocritus, 16.33) calls labourers *akhênes* because of their lack of personal property (*ekhein*).²²⁴ Third, he should know how to distinguish both simple and compound names, lest he say that the form *dakruophin* (of tears) is compound, but *pholkos* (bandy-legged) is simple.²²⁵ Fourth, he should construct his explanations of names appropriately to the things as well, lest he like Euripides wrongly 20 analyse the name “Meleager” from “the black hunt” (*melea agra*).²²⁶ For it is not likely that the father gave his son an ill-omened name. A better etymology is “he who is concerned with matters of the hunt” (*melei ta tês 40,1 agras*). Such too are those of Dionysius (of Thrace), as when he calls the maiden (*parthenos*) *menandros* (one awaiting a man). Fifth, one should observe different usage as well, as the people of Attica say *noumênia* for the new moon, but the Cretans *neomênia*.²²⁷ Sixth, he should also know the modifications of words, such as apocope, syncope, ellipsis, pleonasm, 5 running words together (*sunaloiphê*), removing initial letters (*aphairesis*), synizesis and such.²²⁸ Seventh, he ought to know the properties of the letters of the alphabet.²²⁹ For from these lowest elements the correctness of names and their relation to objects is demonstrated. Eighth, he should distinguish ambiguities and homonyms. For through these 10 the truth of names is concealed.²³⁰ Indeed, both that which quenches (*marainon*) and that which is quenched (*marainomenon*) are called fiery *maleron*, and Plato calls *ekmageion* (mould) both that which molds (*ekmasson*) and that which is molded (*ekmassomenon*) to the form of something else.

15 He should know that word formation occurs not always by the same method. For one hunting with a rod is called an “angler” (*kalamothêras*) in one way, and one hunting for fugitives a “bounty hunter” (*phugadothêras*) in another.²³¹ Moreover, he should know the words that are formed from a different root. There is not an “excellentuous” (*aretaios*), for example, derived from excellence (*aretê*) but the form “zealous” (*spoudaios*) does exist [from “zeal” (*spoudê*)], and so on. Nor
 20 should he be ignorant of foreign terms, lest we use them wrongly, as with the names for the Persian short sword (*akinakês*) and the Median shirt (*kandus*).²³² One who is going to practise etymology should have a discriminating mind of this sort.

Of the terms themselves that are etymologically analysed, some are stated in imitation, as “to hiss”;²³³ others in reference to something else,
 41,1 as a shoot (*thallos*) is so called from “running up” (*thein anô*) and one who goes unpunished (*azêmios*) is called “scot-free” (*athoios*). Some terms are used improperly, such as “evil-minded”, and yet activity of the mind is good. Some are used improperly when their material has undergone change, as with a “wooden box” (*puxis*) of silver. Some are
 5 used for historical reasons, such as “obol” and “drachma”, for the ancients used to use sharp iron spits which they called *oboloi*. Since in transactions six obols filled the hand (*drax*), they were called a *drakhma*.²³⁴ Some have acquired an extended meaning, as when even one that paints plants is called a *zôgraphos* (painter of animals). Others are
 10 used by hyperbole, as “speechless” and “heartless”. Some by euphemism, as “sweet bile”. Others by analogy, as “head” of a mountain. Some by reason of similarity, as when one calls character “sharp” and “harsh”. Others by derivation, as “greave” (*knêmis*) [comes from “leg” (*knêmê*)] and “upper head” (*kranion*) [from the head proper (*kara*)]. Others by omission, as *trapeza* (table) which is really *tetrapeza* (four-footed). Some
 15 from those who made the discovery, as wine is “Dionysus”. Others from the discoveries, as Hephaestus is “fire”. Some from periphrasis, as the jar is “pottery” and the doctor a “hand-worker”. For both the pot and the pitcher are no less pottery, and both the painter and the carpenter no less hand-workers.²³⁵
 20 86.²³⁶ The ancients used to use fewer letters for the expression of phonemes. For example, they used an *e* instead of a long *ê* in the pronunciation of the name *Helenê* just as they used *xeron* for *xêron* and *e* was also used in place of the diphthong *ei*, as when they called rowing (*eiresia*) *eresia*. Similarly, the short *o* used to indicate for them what it
 5 still indicates, as well as the diphthong *ou* (for they said *boletai* [he wishes] rather than *bouletai* and *oranos* [heaven] instead of *ouranos* and the long *ô* (for they also called the seasons [*hôrai*] *horai*) (410C). Thus, when Plato says that *e* and *o* have the same names as their powers (393D), it should be specified that he is referring to the diphthongs,
 10 which long ago were not regarded as diphthongs, but the pronunciation of one lengthened vowel. For as it is now possible to expand and contract

the double-length vowels [i.e. *e/long ê* and *o/long ô*] and each is unique, so too it seemed to the ancients to be the case with these diphthongs.²³⁷ That this is so, Plato himself will show in what follows: for when analysing the name “day” (*hêméra*) he will say (418C) that the ancients call it *himera* with a long *i* but later people *heimera* with a long *ê* because the letter *ê* indicates the diphthong as well.’ 15

394E1-7 SOC: So the name of his type should be given to the irreligious son of the religious father.

HERM: This is so.

SOC: Apparently, he should not be called ‘Theophilus’ (lover of God), ‘Mnesitheus’ (mindful of God) or anything of the sort, but something that indicates the opposite of these names, that is, if names have a correctness.

HERM: Absolutely, Socrates.

Analyses of Mortal Names: Orestes, Pelops and Tantalus

87.²³⁸ ‘It is appropriate that Plato should now (394E) employ the names “Theophilus” (lover of God) and “Mnesitheus” (mindful of God), more or less paraphrasing his words in the *Phaedrus*: “only the thought of the philosopher is winged. For he is always in communion with those things through memory” (249C). For the kinship of the souls to what is divine is generated by their desire for it and by their recollection of the real existence of God; and it belongs only to such human beings to have paternal and intellectual names, but those who embrace the unbounded and material life have the names involved with generation.’²³⁹ 20 25

394E8-395A1 SOC: Even as the name ‘Orestes’, Hermogenes, would be correct, whether he was named by chance or a poet who indicated therein the beastliness of his nature, his wildness or ‘montane’ (*oreinos*) character.

HERM: It appears so, Socrates.

88. ‘Names are two-fold: some are attached to eternal entities and are clearly laid down scientifically, but others are put to corruptible ones, and these create a problem. For it is not likely that fathers give their own children ill-omened names, as in the case of “Orestes”, “Atreus” and “Tantalus”,²⁴⁰ nor is it likely that they foresaw the future life of their children. For physiognomy is an unclear form of reasoning, especially in the case of newborns. Thus, for all such problems Socrates passes on to us clear standards of explanation (394E). For men do not know the unapparent revolutions of souls nor their appetites before generation, the appetites in which nearly the whole of their deeds is encompassed.’²⁴¹ 43,1 5

10 For this reason, they are not judges of the correctness of the names corresponding to each form of life. But gods and daemons, who have prior knowledge of both the powers of the souls and their activities, clearly know how to attach names properly to ways of life. Just as they
 15 distribute different lots to these souls depending on their deserts, so too they distribute their names.

Since we allege that fortune²⁴² is the cause of the order everywhere among things that seem to be disordered and undetermined, perhaps this should be accepted as the most authoritative principle in this sphere as well. For while parents put names to their children looking to
 20 commemoration or hope or some such thing, fortune validates that which was imposed on other principles by the parents – through the degree of concordance of the names with the children’s lifestyle. So let us suppose that Agamemnon calls his son “Orestes” not for his wildness of character but for his vigour (*hormê*) and quickness of movement deriving his name from *oreuein* (to rush forward), whether Agamemnon
 25 saw such indications of nature in his son or hoped that he become such. Yet fortune allotted Orestes his name in a different way, a more truthful way, for it reveals his life as a whole. This is why Socrates here deems
 44,1 it correct to analyse²⁴³ his name on this basis but not on the more human one (394E), for he saw that this was more concordant with the reality.²⁴⁴ Therefore, when the proximate cause of names assigns them correctly, fortune plays a more predominant role as the creative agent of the names being assigned. But when this (proximate) cause errs, nothing prohibits the universal cause of fortune from being correct, since the
 5 same thing occurs in nature as well. For when the particular nature performs correctly, the universal one does so that much more, whereas, when the former fails, the latter is able to perform correctly. Then, let no one think that this chance is an irrational and unbounded cause (for
 10 its work looks to intellect), but rather a “divine” and “daemoniac” power, which allows nothing to be deprived of its authority, but directs all aspects, even the last details of our activities, toward what is for the best and toward the order of the universe. For it is in accordance with this order that we do many things correctly, speak on the mark and think straight, as in the example:

15 First a daemon inspired me to weave a great cloak (*Od.* 19.138),²⁴⁵

and

May the daemon not turn you in that direction, friend (*Il.* 9.600),²⁴⁶

for we are moved by the greater causes above, which are able to steer
 20 our affairs, as it were, from the stern of our essence²⁴⁷ (*Crit.* 109C). So Plato introduced this as one cause of the correct application of names, but the other is that of poets who in their inspiration assign names truly

by observing the results of actions and, on the basis of these, make accurate analyses, and thus discover suitable names. So, what prevents the poets, who observed the deed that the hero dared to do against his mother, from thus calling him “Orestes” as a “montane” (*oreios*), wild, and sterile man because he cut the source of his own birth? What prevents them from passing this name on to the Greeks, and these in turn who received it from confirming by common usage that which was accurately imposed?

Proceeding through the single series of this family, Socrates demonstrates by etymology (395A) that this correspondence does not chance to occur artificially from a selection of men scattered here and there, but it is rather seen to happen within the bounds of any one given family. This reasoning must therefore hold true in general as well. Names are laid down for people from the same stock according to their forms of life and not by reason of natural succession. For, just as the characters of Orestes and Agamemnon are entirely unconnected with and alien to one another, so also is their naming.’

395A2-C2 SOC: It is likely that his father’s name is also natural.

HERM: It seems so.

SOC: For ‘Agamemnon’ (remarkable in remaining) would be the kind of man that would decide to work to the end and remain firm, effecting the end of his plans through excellence. His resistance of the horde at Troy and his perseverance are a sign of his character. The name ‘Agamemnon’ signifies that this man is remarkable (*agastos*) for his persistence (*epimonê*). The name ‘Atreus’ is also probably correct. For his murder of Chrysippus and his cruelties against Thyestes are detrimental and ruinous (*atera*) to his virtue. The form of the name is a little skewed and obscured, so the man’s nature is not clear to everyone. To those that understand names, however, the meaning of ‘Atreus’ is clear enough. For given his stubborn (*ateirês*), fearless (*atrestos*) and mischievous character (*atêros*), the name is applied to him correctly in every sense.

89. ‘In his etymologies (cf. 394E10), Plato always first demonstrates the thing under consideration in itself and then, thus, the trace which resembles it and which exists in the syllables of its name. In the case of “Orestes” (394E), for instance, having first mentioned the hero’s beastly and wild qualities, he later has added the “montane” (*oreios*), which lies in the syllables. In the case of “Agamemnon” (395A-B), having first spoken of his toiling and steadfastness, Plato added that “he is an admirable man because of his persistence” (*agastos anêr dia tên epimonên*); and so it goes with the names that follow.’

90. ‘In his etymologies Plato, who despises matter but adheres most to the Form, says (395A) that the name “Agamemnon” is derived from his “admirable” (*agastos*) qualities, not from his “vehement” (*agan*) ones.

The grammarians, however, because they adhere most particularly to the matter but do not observe the form of life, may be expected to analyse the name from the opposite point of view.'

91. 'In this passage as well (395B6) Plato demonstrates that our essence exists in soul and not in body, inasmuch as he sees that names too are from psychic and not from corporeal properties.'

5 92. 'In this passage (394E-395C) the divine Plato benefits us even in character,²⁴⁸ inasmuch as he is portraying such figures as Orestes, Agamemnon and Atreus as types of vehement, passionate and vengeful men. And yet the first and third are properly blamed – Orestes because he sinned against his mother, Atreus against his children. Agamemnon, 10 however, because he displayed vehemence against a natural enemy in the shape of barbarians, is portrayed as admirable and praiseworthy.'

395C2-D3 [...] It seems to me that his name is appropriately assigned to Pelops as well. For this name indicates that only the short-sighted deserves this tag.

HERM: How so?

SOC: It is said against this man, I think, that in his murder of Myrtilus²⁴⁹ he had no forethought of what could happen or foresight of the effects it would have on all his descendants, that is, how much misfortune the deed contained, because he only looked to the present and what was at hand, that is, *nearby* (*pelas*), in his desire to win the marriage of Hippodameia by any means necessary.

93. 'The passage on Pelops (395C) teaches us first to disdain things that are apparent and to look to the universal revolutions of our souls, not 15 wholly to adhere to human affairs, but that we ought to slacken in our attention to them, and to be intensely involved with divine affairs and virtue. It also teaches that children partake of the punishment for their ancestors' sins. For children's souls become participants in injustice through their association with unjust persons, while their bodies are 20 instituted from bad seeds and their external goods had their source in sinful conduct. Initiatory rites, says Socrates in the *Phaedrus* (244D-E), can purify them of these things, since it gives release from present evils through service concerning the divine.'²⁵⁰

395D3-396A1 [...] And everyone would believe that Tantalus' name was correctly and naturally assigned, if what is said about him is true.

HERM: What kinds of things?

SOC: When he was still alive, he suffered many dreadful misfortunes, the last of which was the destruction of his entire country. Then after he died, in Hades a stone was balanced (*talanteia*) over his head, in a way amazingly consistent with his name. And it

really seems as if someone wanted to call him ‘Talantatos’ (most unfortunate) but disguised the name and called him ‘Tantalus’ instead. The fortune of our oral tradition seems to have named him like this. It appears that his alleged Father, Zeus, was also named in a perfectly beautiful way, but this is not easy to understand.

94. ‘The story of Tantalus (395D-E) hints that a certain soul, which was 25
elevated by contemplation into the Intelligible (for the Intelligible is the
sustenance of the gods) but then fell away from the Intelligible region,
was carried down into the realm of generation and communicated its
intellectual life, which was newly perfected, to the multitude of irration-
ality. (And this is why Tantalus is called a son of Zeus. For every newly
perfected soul descends into the realm of generation from the hall of 30
Zeus, who hence is “Father of both men and gods”.) But this soul, 47,1
because it associated with images instead of true things and was filled
with the evil here below, pays the penalty in Hades. For because it has
much that is earthy, heavy and material hanging over it, by which its
intellectual aspect has been buried, this soul is deprived of all the divine 5
fruits: though it does have bare representations of these fruits, it falls
short of the true and clear apprehension of them.’²⁵¹

95.²⁵² ‘That such a name was allotted to such a life as this is a function
of fortune, but that it endured with all peoples is a function of reputation
(395E4-5). For, according to Homer, reputation is “the messenger (*an-* 10
gelos) of Zeus”’ (*Il.* 2.94).²⁵³

Introduction to the Etymological Analysis of the Divine Kings and Fathers: Zeus, Cronus and Uranus

396A2-B3 [...] For the name of Zeus is really like a sentence; and
dividing it into two parts, some of us use one and some the other.
For some call him *Zêna*, others *Dia*. When united they indicate the
nature of the god, which is what we say a name should be able to
do. Indeed, no one is more responsible for our life (*zên*) and that of
all other creatures than the Lord and King of all. It therefore
follows that this god through whom all creatures always have their
life (*di’ hon zên*) is named correctly. Although it is really one name,
as I say, it has been divided into two, *Dia* and *Zêna*.

96.²⁵⁴ ‘Socrates ascends in a reductive manner from the divine names,
since they are images of the gods, to their powers and activities. He
neglects to examine their essences because he believes that they are
ineffable and incomprehensible except to “the flower of the intellect”.²⁵⁵ 15
So Zeus’ demiurgic creation, the heaven and its name,²⁵⁶ is all-beautiful
(396B-C). But while the creation of its essence is instituted through soul
as a whole and nature, that of its understanding is engendered through
the particular soul.’

- 20 97. 'Of those like Heracles and the Dioscuri who kept the Zeusian form of life undefiled, Zeus is not (merely) called, but is the Father. Yet of those never able to return to the divine, in no way may he be called Father, either on the grounds that he is or is said to be so. Yet of those who partook of some activity above the mortal nature, but were carried
- 25 back into "the sea of dissimilarity" (*Pol.* 273D6) and have bought honour among men at the price of sin against the gods, Zeus is Father, but he merits the entire phrase "a father so-called".'
- 48,1 98. 'The paternal Cause originates above from the intelligible and occult gods (for the most primal Fathers of the universe exist there), but it proceeds through all the intellectual gods into the demiurgic order.²⁵⁷
- 5 Indeed, Timaeus praises this [last] order as at once both creative and paternal when he speaks of "the Demiurge and Father of works" (*Tim.* 41A). In the case of the entities above the creation as a whole, however, the Fathers are called "gods of gods" (*ibid.*), but the Demiurge is called "Father of both men and gods" because he institutes both gods and men. Yet even in certain cases of men he is called Father individually, as with
- 10 characters like Heracles who unswervingly maintained the Zeusian and hegemonic lifestyle throughout their life in the realm of generation. Therefore, Zeus is Father in three ways – of gods, of souls, and of particular souls which chose an intellectual and Zeusian way of life.'

The Etymology of 'Zeus'

- 99.²⁵⁸ Now, the intellectual order of the gods is bordered from above by
- 15 the King of the universal divine genera who also holds the paternal prominence in relation to all the intellectual gods – the King 'whom the blessed on tall Olympus', says Orpheus, 'called Phanes, the first born' (fr. 85) – whereas it proceeds through both the three Nights and the
- 20 celestial substances into the Titanic generation, which first discriminated itself from the Fathers and received the authority of distinguishing the whole universe in exchange for the domain of connection.²⁵⁹ Thus, all the demiurgic genus of the gods comes to manifestation from all the aforesaid principal and regal causes, but Zeus appears proximately from the single Leader of the Titanic orders and before the other
- 25 demiurges, since he is allotted the unified power of the whole demiurgic series and introduces and institutes both all invisible and visible things.²⁶⁰ And while he himself is intellectual in his rank, he leads forth
- 5 the Forms of real beings and their genera into the order of perceptible objects; and while he is filled with the gods above him, from himself he provides all the encosmic creatures with the procession to Being. It is on this account, then, that Orpheus portrays him (1) as the Demiurge of all the celestial generation together, the one who creates the sun, moon and the other astral gods (fr. 85), but (2) also as the Demiurge of
- 10 the elements under the moon, which he discriminates by means of Forms from their previous disorderly state, (3) as the one who institutes

series, which depend on him, of gods around the cosmos as a whole, and (4) as the one who decrees to all the encosmic gods the distributions, according to desert, of providence in the universe. Following Orpheus, 15
Homer too commonly praises him as 'Father of both gods and men', as 'Leader', 'King' and 'highest of Lords'.²⁶¹ He says that all the multitude of the encosmic gods is gathered around him, remains in him and is perfected by him. For, he adds, all the gods return to Zeus through Themis: 20

But Zeus bade Themis call the gods to assembly ...
Thus she, having gone everywhere,
Bade them go to the house of Zeus (*Il.* 20.4).

All of the gods are gathered by the one will of Zeus and are generated 25
'within the house of Zeus', as the verse says (*Il.* 20.13). He discriminates them, again, back within in two coordinate series²⁶² and awakens them to the providential care of subsequent creatures, while he himself 'remains in his own accustomed character', as Timaeus says (42E).²⁶³

So the son of Cronus spoke, and awoke unabating war (*Il.* 20.31). 30

But Zeus is separate and transcendent over the encosmic realm as a 50,1
whole. For this reason, even the most universal and lordly of the other gods, though they seem in a sense to be as equally worthy as Zeus because of their procession from the same causes, call him Father. For both Poseidon and Hera address him by this honorific title. Yet, Hera justifies 5
herself to him on the grounds that she is of the same rank as he,

For I too am a God, my lineage is from the same source as yours,
And Cronus sired me, his eldest daughter (*Il.* 4.58-9).²⁶⁴

And Poseidon too claims, 10

For we are three brothers, sons of Cronus and born of Rhea,
Zeus and I and Hades the third (*Il.* 15.187).

Yet both nevertheless address Zeus as Father.²⁶⁵ The reason is that he anticipates the one and undivided Cause of all creation, he is prior to the Cronian triad and connector of the three Fathers and encompasses 15
from all sides the life-producing function of Hera.²⁶⁶ For this reason, while she ensouls the universe, he institutes, along with everything else, the souls as well. It is therefore reasonable for us to claim that the Demiurge in the *Timaeus* is the supreme Zeus. For it is he that introduces both the encosmic intellects and the souls. It is also this God that 20
orders all the bodies with both figures and numbers²⁶⁷ and instils in them a single unity, an indissoluble friendship and bond (*Tim.* 32C). For

such is the advice, according to Orpheus as well, that Night gives Zeus
25 about the creation of the universe:

Then when you stretch a strong bond around all things (fr. 122).²⁶⁸

The bond of encosmic creatures is proximately that by proportion, but
51,1 the more perfect one derives from the intellect and the soul. It is on that
account that Timaeus has called the association of the elements by
proportion as well as the indissoluble unity deriving from life a ‘bond’
(*Tim.* 31C). For ‘animals were generated bound by ensouled bonds’, he
5 says (ibid. 38E). But a still holier bond than these originates from the
demiurgic Will. ‘In my Will’, says Zeus, ‘you were allotted a still greater
and more lordly bond than those [with which you were bound at birth]’
(ibid. 41B). Since we hold to this notion about the supreme Zeus, as if
‘clinging to a safe cable’ (*Laws* 10, 893B3), that he is Demiurge and
10 Father of this universe, that he is unparticipated and all-perfect intel-
lect and that he fills all creatures with all goods and particularly with
life, let us examine how Socrates reveals from names the mystical truth
concerning this God.

100.²⁶⁹ ‘Timaeus says (*Tim.* 28C) that understanding of the essence of
15 the Demiurge is a troublesome task. Socrates, however, now (396A) says
that it is not easy to apprehend his name (Zeus), which makes his power
and activity apparent.’

101.²⁷⁰ ‘Our soul recognizes in a divided way the indivisible quality of
the activity of the gods, and in a manifold way its unitary quality. This
20 most occurs in respect of the Demiurge, of whom we offer even the single
name as a proposition, because he unpacks the intellectual Forms, calls
forth the intelligible Causes and unfolds them toward the creation of the
universe. Even Parmenides characterizes this God by sameness and
25 otherness (146A),²⁷¹ there are two jars beside him in the poem (*Il.*
24.527), and the most mystical tradition and the oracles from the gods
say that “the dyad is seated beside him”. And they add,

30 He has both powers: to hold the intelligible beings by intellect
Yet [also] to bring perception to the regions of the world

(*Or. Chald.* 8).

52,1 Need we say more? For in this very passage they address him as “doubly
transcendent” and “doubly there” and in general honour him with the
title of the dyad.²⁷² For the Demiurge has uniformly anticipated all the
generative and substantiating activities of the encosmic gods. It is
5 therefore proper that his name is two-fold: while *Dia* reveals the cause
“through which” (*di’ hou*) [everything is created] – and this is his
paternal Goodness – *Zēna* indicates his generation of living things
(*zôogonia*).²⁷³ The Demiurge has uniformly anticipated the first Causes
of these functions in the universe. The first name is a symbol of the

Cronian and paternal series, the second of the life-generating Rhea and maternal series. Also, because he has taken Cronus as a whole into himself, Zeus is creator of the triple essence – undivided, intermediary and divided – while by the Rhea in himself he gushes forth three-fold life – intellectual, psychic and corporeal. By virtue of his own demiurgic powers and activities, he informs these things and distinguishes them.²⁷⁴ He is Lord and King of all things and is transcendent over the three Demiurges. For these divided the principle of the Father, as Socrates says in the *Gorgias* (523A).²⁷⁵ But this Zeus undividedly rules and unitarily governs the three at once. He is therefore Cause of the paternal triad and of creation as a whole,²⁷⁶ Connector of the three Demiurges and King because he is aligned with the Fathers, and Lord because he presides proximately over the demiurgic triad and encompasses its uniform Cause.

The fact, then, that the name of Zeus is determined in two forms shows that images dividedly admit the unitary causes of their paradigms, and that this name exhibits a kinship to him who has pre-established the intellectual dyad in himself. For he institutes a double order of existence – the celestial and the supercelestial, whence the theologian says that even his sceptre is

Of four and twenty measures (*Orph. fr.* 157),²⁷⁷

because he rules over two sets of twelve.²⁷⁸

102. ‘The Soul of the Cosmos gives life to the beings that are moved by something else.²⁷⁹ For to these it becomes a fount and principle of motion, as Plato says in both the *Phaedrus* (245E) and in the *Laws* (892A). But the Demiurge provides all creatures in a simple manner with life: divine or intellectual or psychic or subject to division amongst bodies.’²⁸⁰

103. ‘The etymology [of Zeus] has been properly performed in the accusative case (*aitiatikê ptôsis*) (396A4).²⁸¹ For Zeus is cause (*aitios*) of all things in a simple manner.’²⁸²

104.²⁸³ Let no one think (1) that the gods are diminished in their generations of subsequent entities, nor (2) that they suffer a fragmentation of their proper essence into the production of creatures inferior [to them], nor (3) that they expel their offspring somehow out of themselves, as do those who cause mortal children, nor (4) that they reproduce while being moved or changing, but that it is while remaining in themselves, by virtue of their very being, that they introduce the entities after this [order of theirs], encompass on all sides the entities produced, and perfect from above all their creations and activities.²⁸⁴ Nor, in turn, let any believe that the so-called children of the more universal gods are removed from their elders and sever their unity with them, nor that they receive the property of their subsistence through motion and Infinity which returns to the Limit. For nothing is without

reason or without measure in the entities greater than us. Rather, let him believe that the processions are produced through similarity and that there is one association of essence and an indivisible connection of the powers and the activities among both the children and their fathers, 25 since subsequent entities are established as wholes in their elders,²⁸⁵ while these in turn share their perfection, vigour and active productivity with the entities that are inferior [to them]. According, then, to these further distinctions, let us accept that Zeus is also called 'son of Cronus' 30 (396B). For since he is demiurgic Intellect, Zeus proceeds from another higher and more uniform Intellect, which on the one hand increases the number of its proper intellectual thoughts,²⁸⁶ but on the other turns the 54,1 multitude back into unity, and multiplies the intellectual powers but draws their multifarious developments back up to undivided identity. Having established immediate communion with Cronus, and being 5 filled by him with every sort of intellectual good, Zeus is also properly called 'son of Cronus' both in hymns and in invocations, for he reveals what is occult, unfolds what has been sown and discriminates the undivided aspect of the Cronian monad. He also projects a subsequent and more particular rule in place of that which is more universal, a 10 demiurgic in place of the paternal, and one which proceeds in all directions in place of that which remains stably in itself.

396B3-7 [...] That this God is the son of Cronus may seem outrageous when someone first hears it, but it is reasonable that Zeus (*Dia*) be the offspring of some great intelligence (*dianoia*). For 'Cronus' is derived from *koros*, not in its meaning as 'child' (*paida*), but because of his purity (*katharon*) and the untaintedness (*akêranton*) of his intellect.

The Etymology of 'Cronus'

105.²⁸⁷ Why did Socrates suppose that the name of the king Cronus was outrageous, and what was in his mind when he made this statement? 15 Do the poets not say that 'satiety' (*koros*) is a cause of outrage,²⁸⁸ when they speak of immoderacy and surfeit in this way, for 'satiety', they say, 'spawns outrage'? Therefore, if one should consider the name 'Cronus' superficially, it will seem outrageous. For when one first hears the name, it makes him sound 'satiated' (*kekorêmenon*) and replete.²⁸⁹ Why, 20 then, if such a name was indeed outrageous, did we not by-pass it reverently and with the silence befitting gods? Presumably because, while the regal series of the gods originates from Phanes, but extends as far as our lord Dionysus and hands down the same sceptre from above all the way to the lowest kingdom (*Orph. fr.* 154), among all the other 25 divine Kings only Cronus, who has been allotted the fourth regal order, is represented, according to the mythic account, as both receiving the

sceptre from Uranus and imparting it to Zeus in an outrageous way.²⁹⁰ 55,1
 For Night takes it from Phanes who gives it willingly:

He put the famous sceptre in the hands of the Goddess Night,
 So she might have royal honour (*Orph. fr.* 101).

And Uranus receives the sovereignty of the universe from Night who
 gives it willingly. Also, Dionysus, the last King of the gods, receives it 5
 thus from Zeus. For the Father seats him on the regal throne, puts the
 sceptre in his hand and makes him King of all the encosmic gods
 together.

Listen, gods: I give you this King (*Orph. fr.* 208), 10

says Zeus to the ‘young gods’. Yet, only Cronus both strips Uranus of the
 kingdom completely and yields the hegemony to Zeus, since he ‘cuts and
 is cut’, as the myth states (*Orph. fr.* 137). Now, when Plato perceived 15
 that such a succession as that which the theologians attributed to
 Cronus was outrageous, he considered even the appearance of outrage
 in the name worthy of mention, so that in this way too he might reveal
 the name proper to the God, though it also bears an image of mytholog-
 ized outrage about him, and also thought it worth mentioning so he
 might instruct us to follow even the mythic figures to the truth, as it is 20
 fitting with gods, and to elevate the apparent miracle tale to scientific
 thinking.²⁹¹

106. ‘What is “great” in the case of the gods (396B5) should be
 understood not in an extended, but in an intellectual sense, and in
 virtue of its causative power, not in virtue of outstanding divisible 25
 magnitude.²⁹² Yet why does Plato now (*ibid.*) call Cronus “discursive
 thought”? Is he looking to the multitude of the intellectual thoughts in
 him, the orders of the intelligible beings, which are encompassed by
 him, and the unfolding of the Forms, since he says in other places as
 well that the demiurgic Intellect reckons (*Tim.* 30B1, 34A8-B1) and
 thinks discursively (39E9) as it creates the Cosmos? Is he looking to 56,1
 Cronus’ particular and distinct intellectual thoughts, by which the God
 fashions not only things as a whole but also their parts? So whenever
 Cronus is called Intellect, Zeus assumes the rank of discursive thought,
 but whenever Cronus, in turn, is identified as discursive thought, we
 shall say, I suppose, that he is so called entirely by way of analogy, in 5
 relation to some other higher Intellect.²⁹³ Whether, then, you should
 wish to speak of the intelligible and occult Intellect – or the revelational,
 or the connecting, or the perfective – Cronus would be discursive
 thought in relation to all of these. For he leads forth the unified
 intellectual thought into multiplicity, and has filled himself with intel- 10
 ligible entities, which are instigated to issue into the universe.²⁹⁴ Hence,
 he is said to be Lord as well of the Titan race and Leader of every sort

of discrimination and of the power of creating difference. In these lines, perhaps, Plato transmits to us two basic interpretations of the name of the Titans, which Iamblichus and Amelius have recorded: for the one says that the Titans have been named after the idea of “extending” (*diateinein*) their own powers to all things, the other, after a “certain uncut” aspect (*ti atomon*), because that which is divided and the distinction of wholes into parts takes its first beginning from them. In any case, Socrates now (396B) demonstrates both of these ideas, when he describes the discursive thought of the King of the Titans as “something great”. For the “great” belongs to the power which has come to all things, but the “something” (*ti*) to that which proceeds all the way to the most particular things.²⁹⁵

107. “The name Cronus is today analysed in three ways: the first, which says that he is the plenitude of intellectual goods and is “satiety” (cf. *Crat.* 396B6) of divine intellect is rejected as “outrageous” because it carries with it the impression of the sort of satiety and surfeit which ordinary people condemn. The second, which would portray him as imperfect and puerile,²⁹⁶ is rejected in the same manner. But the third, which praises him as replete with purity and immaculate thought and as the champion of implacable life,²⁹⁷ is approved. For the King Cronus is Intellect and institutor of all intellectual life, but Intellect which transcends any relation to perceptible things and is immaterial and separate. It is turned back upon itself, seeing as it turns even those that have proceeded forth from it back to itself, embraces them and establishes them stably in itself. For the Demiurge of the universe, although himself a divine Intellect, nevertheless organizes perceptible creatures and has forethought for inferior creatures. The supreme Cronus, however, is essentially constituted in intellectual thoughts separate from and superior to the totality of existents,

For not to Matter

15 Does the Primal Fire Beyond incline its power (*Or. Chald.* 5),

says the oracle. The Demiurge is dependent upon this [God] and proceeds out from him, being an Intellect in motion around the immaterial Intellect, operating around him as the object of his intellection, and leading forth his occult aspect into visibility. For the Creator of the cosmos is an “Intellect from an Intellect”. And Cronus, who is highest of the gods properly called intellectual, seems to me to be Intellect in relation to the intelligible genus of the gods. For all the intellectual gods cling to the intelligible and are attached to them through their thoughts:

25 You who by contemplating know the supercosmic paternal depth,

says the hymn to them (*Or. Chald.* 18). Yet Cronus is intelligible in relation to all the intellectual gods. It is, then, this undivided and

unparticipated eminence of his that is indicated by his “purity”. For it is his freedom from contact with matter, his undividedness and his unrelatedness that is indicated by the term “pure”. Such is the superiority of this God in relation to any coordination with inferior things, such his immaculate unity in relation to the Intelligible, that he does not need the protection of the Curetes, as do Rhea, Zeus, and Core.²⁹⁸ For by reason of their processions into what is subsequent to them, all of these require the constant protection of the Curetes.²⁹⁹ But Cronus, being stably situated in himself and having “removed himself” from all things secondary to him, transcends any need for a guard from the Curetes, but uniformly contains even their cause. For this pure and this untainted aspect of his provides subsistence to all the processions of the Curetes. This is why in the Oracles too he is said to encompass the foremost fount of the implacable gods, but he is also said to ride over all the others:

The Intellect of the Father is conducted by adamant guides,
Channels of implacable fire that flash straight (*Or. Chald.* 36). 15

He is pure Intellect, then, as both Institutor of the untainted order and Leader of the whole intellectual order:

For from this [Intellect] spring both the implacable bolts and the
fire-receiving wombs ... 20
Of Father-born Hecate, also the flower of fire girded beneath,
and the mighty spirit beyond the fiery poles (*Or. Chald.* 35).³⁰⁰

In fact, he enfolds all the hebdomad of the founts and brings them to subsistence from his unitary and intelligible pinnacle.³⁰¹ For he is, as the oracle says, “unfragmented”³⁰² (*Or. Chald.* 152), uniform, undiscriminated and “Connector of all the founts” (*Or. Chald.* 207), who turns them all back to himself, unifies them and is separate from them all without any mixing. For this reason, Cronus is both *koronous*³⁰³ – because he is immaterial and pure (*katharos*) intellect (*nous*) and has situated himself in the paternal silence³⁰⁴ – and praised as “Father of Fathers”. Cronus therefore is Father and intelligible in relation to the intellectual gods.’

396B7 [...] According to tradition, Cronus is the son of Uranus.

108. ‘Every Intellect is either at rest and therefore is intelligible because superior to motion, or it is in motion, and then it is intellectual, or it is both, and then is intelligible and intellectual at once. The first is Phanes, the second (that which is both in motion and at rest) is Uranus, and the one that is only in motion is Cronus.’

109. ‘Because of his undivided, unitary, paternal and beneficial aspect in relation to the intellectual realm, some consider Cronus to be the same as the one Cause of all things, but they are not correct in this. For

he is only analogous to that Cause, as Orpheus too calls the first Cause of all things “Khronos” (Time), almost equivocally with Cronus (fr. 68). The oracles handed down by the gods, however, characterize this divinity by the term “unitarily” (*hapax*) when they say “unitarily transcendental” (*Or. Chald.* 169).³⁰⁵ For “unitarily” is related to the One itself.’

396B8-D1 [...] And it is right that his [Cronus’] upward gaze is called ‘heavenly’ (*ourania*), since it ‘views what is above’ (*horōsa ta anō*). Observers of the heavens claim, Hermogenes, that one thus obtains a pure intellect, and that this name is correctly assigned to the heaven. If I recalled Hesiod’s genealogy – that is, who he says are our ancestors even higher than these – I wouldn’t stop describing how their names are correctly assigned to them, until I tested this wisdom, which has just now befallen me so suddenly from I know not where, to see what it could do, and whether it would fail or not.

The Etymology of ‘Uranus’

110. ‘The Father of Cronus, Uranus, is Intellect that thinks itself on the one hand, but is also unified with the primary Intelligibles, is firmly established in them and is Connector of all the intellectual orders by
 25 remaining in the intelligible unity. Also, this God connects, just as Cronus discriminates, and therefore is a Father. For the connecting Causes precede those that discriminate, and the Causes that are at once intelligible and intellectual precede those that are simply intellectual.³⁰⁶ Whence Uranus too, as Connector of the universe in a single unity,
 60,1 institutes the Titanic series and, prior to this, other orders of gods. Some remain only in him, which he retains within himself; others, which he is said to conceal after manifestation, both remain and proceed forth,
 5 while after these there are all the orders which proceed into the universe and are discriminated from the Father. For he produces two sets of monads, and triads of equal number to the monads, and hebdomads.³⁰⁷ But these topics have been more fully discussed in other places.

Uranus has been so named in virtue of his similarity to the visible
 10 heaven. For both of them bind and connect all the beings encompassed in them, and they produce a single sympathy and continuity in the whole cosmos.³⁰⁸ For the power of continuity is secondary to the unifying power, and proceeds from it. Thus in the *Phaedrus* (246B) Plato describes the creative activity of Uranus in relation to all subsequent things, how through ascending he leads all creatures up and causes them to converge in the Intelligible. He describes what is the summit in him (247A8, B7), what is the lowest point of his whole order (247E4), and what is the limit of all his procession. But here below, pursuing the

truth in objects from their names, Plato expounds on the God's activity 20
 in relation to the beings that are higher and simpler and are ranked
 closer to the One, and in the process he seems to clearly explain the rank
 of Uranus, which is intelligible and intellectual. For if Uranus observes
 the beings above (*horai ta anô*) (cf. 247C2), he operates intellectually,
 and before him exists the intelligible genus of the gods, to which he looks
 and thereby is intellectual, just as to those that proceed from him he is 25
 intelligible. What beings, then, are "above" him? Is it not clear that his
 are "the supercelestial region" and the "colourless, formless, and intan-
 gible" essence (*Phdr.* 247C) and all the intelligible dimension of things,
 "which encompasses the intelligible animals", as Plato would say (*Tim.*
 31A), and the single Cause of all the eternal Beings and their occult 61,1
 Principles, as the Orphics would say (fr. 90), since he is bordered from
 above by Aether but from below by Phanes (for all the beings in between
 these comprise the intelligible order)?³⁰⁹ Plato now speaks of this place
 in both the singular (396B8) and the plural (396C1), since all beings 5
 there are united, and at the same time each is discriminated particu-
 larly, according to the highest degree of both unity and discrimination.

Now *meteôrologoi* (observers of the heavens) (396C) should be prop-
 erly understood as those that have chosen an elevated lifestyle, live
 intellectually, and are not "weighed down" and "bottom-heavy" (*Or.* 10
Chald. 155),³¹⁰ but are "exalted" (*meteôrizomenoi*) on the ascending scale
 of the theoretical life.³¹¹ For the Goddess there³¹² called Ge institutes
 maternally all the things that Uranus, who is coordinate with her,
 institutes paternally,³¹³ and he who operates there may be properly
 called a *meteôrologos*.

In any case, Uranus, being of a connecting nature, surpasses in 15
 simplicity both the Cronian orders and the whole of intellectual reality.
 He also produces from himself both all the Titanic generation and, prior
 to this, the perfective and the guardian generations, and in general he
 apportions all the goods to the intellectual gods. While Plato praised
 Cronus for his intellection which is unrelated to encosmic beings 20
 (396B6-7) and for his life which is turned back in contemplation of
 himself, he commends Uranus for another, more perfect activity (396C).
 For being attached to beings that are higher is a greater good than being
 turned back to oneself. 25

Yet let no one think on that account that the forementioned activities
 are [exclusively] distributed among the gods – for example, only fore-
 thought in Zeus, only reversion to oneself in Cronus, and only extension
 toward the Intelligible in Uranus.³¹⁴ For, indeed, Zeus has forethought 30
 for encosmic entities in no other way than by looking to the intelligible: 62,1
 "thus Intellect observes the Forms existing in the Living Being –
 namely, how many they are and of what sort", says Timaeus (39E). And,
 as Orpheus says with inspired tongue, Zeus consumes his forefather
 Phanes, embraces all of his powers, and becomes all things intellectu- 5
 ally that Phanes was intelligibly (fr. 129).³¹⁵ Moreover, Cronus instils in

Zeus the first principles of all creation and of his providence toward the sensible realm while, by contemplating himself, Cronus is unified with the primary Intelligibles and is filled with the goods from that source.
 10 This is why the theologian says that the God “was even nurtured by Night”:

From all things Night nurtured and reared Cronus (*Orph. fr.* 131).

If, then, the Intelligible is nourishment, Cronus is satiated not only with
 15 the objects of intellection coordinate to him but also with the nourishment of the highest and occult thoughts. Indeed, while Uranus himself fills all subsequent entities with their proper goods, he also preserves everything with his loftiest powers, and the Father from above permitted him to connect and guard the ever-living rays of light.³¹⁶ Yet he
 20 contemplates himself and has turned toward the intelligible objects in himself, and Plato in the *Phaedrus* (247C1, 248A4) has called this thought of his “revolution”. For as that which is moved in a circle is moved around the centre of itself, so too Uranus activates himself around the intelligible aspect of himself by intellectual revolution. But
 25 while all of these gods exist in all and each possesses all the others’ activities, one God is pre-eminent in one activity, another in another, and is characterized differently in virtue of this – Zeus, in virtue of providence, and this is why his name has been so analysed here (396B);
 63,1 Cronus, in virtue of turning back to himself (whence he is also termed “crooked-minded”) (*Il.* 2.205), and this is why we so construed the correctness of his name (cf. 59,5-8); and Uranus, in virtue of his relation to beings greater than him, and it is from this that he got his designation, since his production of the pure and Cronian Intellect reveals the
 5 other aspect of his activity. Yet, while there are many powers in Uranus, such as those that connect, guard and revert, you may find that this name is properly fit to all of them: the connective power is represented by his “defining” (*horizein*) the intellectual gods (indeed, his connecting
 10 aspect is what defines the multitude in him),³¹⁷ that which guards things as a whole by the fact that he is “guardian” (*ouros*) and security of intellectual essence, and the reversionary because he turns back the creatures that look to and contemplate the beings above (*horônta ta anô*).³¹⁸ All of these aspects are proper to Uranus.

There is no fear, however, that the gods will be dispersed, so that they
 15 would need the connecting Causes, or undergo change, so that they would have to be saved by the guardian Causes. But by mentioning the reversionary activity, Socrates here (396B-C) reveals all these functions at once. For “to view the beings above” is to be turned toward them and, thereby, to be connected and guarded. And indeed it seems to me that
 20 Uranus possesses this property as well by analogy with the intelligible Eternity and the intelligible Totality. For Timaeus especially characterized Eternity (37D) by the fact that it remains in the One prior to it

and is situated at the pinnacle of the intelligible realm. And Socrates characterized Uranus by the fact that he “observes the beings above” 25 (396B-C), that is, the supercelestial region and what is included in the “divinely maintained silence” of the Fathers (*Or. Chald.* 16).³¹⁹ So, just as Parmenides (142D) indicated each of these two orders by the term “Totality” – the one through the intelligible, the other through the intellectual Totality – so too both Timaeus and Socrates reveal the nature of Uranus through his reverting toward the beings superior to 64,1 him. But reversion, like totality, is differentiated. For that of Eternity is intelligible, and therefore Timaeus (37D) said that Eternity does not look upon the object of intellect prior to itself, but merely “remains” 5 firmly. The reversion of Uranus, however, is intellectual, and Socrates therefore says that the God “looks upon the beings above” by reverting back, and by guarding and connecting all the creatures after him as well. Whence also in the *Phaedrus* (247C) he is said to lead, by his own revolution, all things around into the supercelestial region and the 10 contemplation of the primary Intelligibles.³²⁰

The Demiurgic Triad

111. ‘Of these three gods that are both Fathers and Kings, whom Socrates has mentioned in this passage (396A-C), only Cronus seems both to take the rule from his Father and to give it to his successor by 15 force. At any rate, the myth-makers babble when they talk about of the castrations of Uranus and Cronus. The reason for this is that Uranus belongs to the connecting order, Cronus to the Titanic and Zeus to the demiurgic. The Titanic class, for its part, takes pleasure in discriminations and differences, processions and multiplications of powers. Indeed, 20 as a God of division, Cronus separates his own kingdom from that of Uranus, but as pure Intellect he distances himself from the creation in matter. This is why the demiurgic class in its turn is distinguished from him. In either case, then, the “castration” (*tomê*) has the following significance: insofar as he is a Titan, Cronus is cut from the connecting 25 Causes; but insofar as he does not give himself over to creation in matter, he is cut from the Demiurge Zeus.³²¹

112. ‘Uranus should be understood here (396B-C) as the middle triad of the universal gods which is at once intelligible and intellectual. Of this triad the highest aspect is called the “supercelestial region” (*Phdr.* 65,1 247C3) and primary number (the generative and feminine class of the gods is located here, as is the guardian class).³²² The intermediary aspect is called the “revolution of heaven” (*Phdr.* 247C1) and intellectual Totality, and this is where the connecting class of gods is located. 5 The last aspect is called the “subcelestial vault” (*Phdr.* 247B1), and in this exists the perfective and reversionary class of gods.³²⁴

On Literary Depiction of the Ineffable and Incomprehensible Gods

113.³²⁵ ‘Proclus here (396C3-D1) seems to rank the supercelestial region in two realms different in type – in that of the guardian Intellect, and among the solely intelligible gods. Perhaps the limit of the Intelligibles, which is attached to the summit of the intellectual-intelligible realm, since it is in a way the same in essence, is deemed worthy of the same designation as well, just as if one should call irrational opinion imagination, or intellect discursive thought, when referring to one aspect and another.’³²⁶

Thus the supercelestial region, to which even Uranus extends his own intellectual life, some characterize with ineffable symbols,³²⁷ while others, though they have in fact named it, have nonetheless left it unknown, since they were able to speak neither of its form nor of its figure and shape.³²⁸ And proceeding even higher than this [region], they have been able to reveal the limit of the intelligible gods only by name and indicate the beings beyond, since they are ineffable and incomprehensible, by analogy alone. This is because even at the intelligible level itself of the gods only this God who encompasses the paternal order is said by wise men to be nameable, and theurgy ascends all the way to this order.³²⁹ Because, then, the entities prior to heaven were allotted such an eminence of unitary subsistence that they are both effable and at the same time ineffable, spoken and unspoken, and comprehensible and incomprehensible through their kinship to the One, Socrates properly suspends discussion about them (396C-E). For surely names cannot entirely comprehend the essence of these beings, and in general the discrimination of their essence or power in terms of the effable and the ineffable requires a truly remarkable kind of effort. Indeed, Socrates blames [human] memory, not because he disbelieves the myths which set beyond the heaven certain more exalted causes, and considers them worthy of recalling in no way at all (for he himself in the *Phaedrus* (247C) celebrates the supercelestial region), but because the most primitive level of existence may not be called to mind and known through imagination, opinion or discursive thought. For we are naturally empowered to be connected with them by “the flower of the intellect”³³⁰ and by the reality of our essence, and we achieve perception of their unknowable nature through these [faculties]. So, that very aspect of them that transcends both our cognitive and recollective life, says Socrates, is the reason for not naming them by means of a set of names. For they are naturally disposed to be known not through names, but the theologians indicate them from a distance by analogy with the visible entities related to them.³³¹ If they were nameable and comprehensible by understanding, we would have constructed a theory of nomenclature concerning them as well.’

114. ‘Homer does not ascend beyond the Cronian order but, when he

mentions the causal Principle of the Demiurge, which is immediately subsequent to Cronus, he calls him “son of Cronus” (*Il.* 1.498, 2.111, etc.). Zeus’ coordinates are Hera, Poseidon, and Hades; to his subordinates, says Homer, he is “Father of both men and gods” (*Il.* 1.544, 4.68, 5.426, etc.); and the poet introduces Cronus as neither operating nor saying anything, but truly “crooked-minded”, because he has turned back upon himself.’ 25

115. ‘Orpheus (fr. 68) has taken much advantage of the licence allowed to myths and has assigned names to all the entities prior to heaven all the way up to the First Cause. That which is ineffable itself and has proceeded forth from the intelligible henads he calls “Time” (*Khronos*), either because it is a pre-existing cause of all generation or [because] he is portraying the things that really exist as being generated in order to show their organization and the primacy of the more universal entities in relation to the more particular, and so that temporal succession should be identified with causal succession, just as generation is identified with ordered procession. Hesiod honours many subjects with silence and does not name the First Principle at all. But that what comes after the First proceeded from something else, he shows in these words: “Then verily first of all Chaos was generated” (*Theogony* 116) – it is impossible, after all, for anything to have generation without a cause. He does not say, however, who is the Institutor of Chaos, and is silent about both Fathers of the Intelligibles – the transcendent as well as the coordinate one; for they are entirely ineffable. But even as regards the successions of the two corresponding orders, he transmits without comment those corresponding with the One, and reveals by genealogy only those corresponding with the Indefinite Dyad. For these reasons, Socrates now (396C) thinks fit to mention that Hesiod has by-passed the entities prior to Uranus as being ineffable. Indeed, even the [Chaldaean] Oracles made mention of these entities as being ineffable (fr. 191), and add the words “hold your peace, initiate” (fr. 132). Moreover, in the *Phaedrus* (250C) Plato has himself termed the contemplation of those entities “initiation” and “revelation”, the entities in whom much and nearly all the work is ineffable and unknowable.³³² 67,1 5 10 15 20

396D2-397D7 HERM: You really seem to me, Socrates, like an inspired seer suddenly breaking into prophecy.

SOC: And I contend, Hermogenes, that Euthyphron the Prospaltian is its source. For early this morning I conversed with him for a long time and gave him my ear. So it is likely that because of his own inspiration he not only filled my ears with daemonic wisdom but even took possession of my soul. So it seems that we should do the following: today we should use this wisdom and examine the remaining issues concerning names. But tomorrow, if you agree, we shall conjure it away and purify ourselves, that is, if we have

found someone that is skilled at such purifications, whether he be a priest or a sophist.

HERM: But I do agree, for I would very much like to hear the rest of your discussion of names.

SOC: Then we must do as we said. Where would you like us to begin our inquiry, now that we have adopted a certain plan? Shall we try to find out if names themselves support our claim that they are not given arbitrarily but have a certain correctness? Now, the commonly used names of heroes and men would probably deceive us, for many of them are coined after the name of an ancestor, though in some cases they are completely inappropriate, as we were saying at the beginning. And many others they assign like a prayer – names, for example, like ‘Eutyichides’ (son of good fortune), ‘Sosias’ (saviour), ‘Theophilus’ (beloved of God) and many others. It seems to me that such cases should be dropped. We are much more likely to find that names are correctly assigned about entities that always exist and are natural. In fact, it is appropriate that the most attention be paid to the assigning of names at this level. Some of them were probably assigned by a power even more divine than that of humans.

HERM: You seem to me to be right, Socrates.

SOC: Isn’t it fair, then, to begin with the gods and examine how this very name ‘gods’ was correctly assigned?

HERM: This is reasonable.

SOC: I suspect that it goes something like this: the first men of Greece seem to have believed, like many foreigners today, that only the sun, moon, earth, stars and heaven were gods. Therefore, because they saw them all forever following their courses and running, they named them ‘gods’ (*theoi*) after this natural disposition to run (*thein*). And when men later recognized all the other gods, they called them by this pre-existing name. Does any of what I am saying seem like the truth, or not at all?

HERM: Very much so.

116. ‘There are three types of reasoning about gods: the impressionistic, as exemplified by Euthyphro when he irrationally imagined battles and conspiracies of gods, the scientific, as was Socrates, and the opinionative in between these, which on the one hand ascends by scientific means even from the opinion of the name-giver to the essences of the gods, while on the other it has a certain association on the impressionistic level with Euthyphro as well, who is wise in his own conceit.³³³ Now, 68,1 seeing many men like Euthyphro who hold bestial thoughts about gods, Socrates himself descends from the scientific level of activity to an inferior one, but elevates those restricted by impressionistic thought to 5 the middle state of conception about gods. He therefore blames Euthyphro (396D) for this, not because the latter is a leader of this [type of]

understanding, but because he rouses Socrates to the pursuit of the truth by his impressionistic absurdities.'

**On the Relation between Encosmic Cause and
Communication: The Roles of Heroes,
Daemons, and Angels**

397D8-398C12 SOC: Well, then, what should we examine next?

HERM: Clearly the daemons.

SOC: And what really, Hermogenes, does the name 'daemons' mean? Consider what you think of my explanation.

HERM: You need only speak.

SOC: Do you know who Hesiod says the daemons are?

HERM: No, I do not.

SOC: Nor that he says the first race of men was golden?

HERM: Yes, this I know.

SOC: In fact, he says of it, 'But since fate engulfed this race, They are called the holy daemons of the underworld, Good, protectors from evil, the guardians of mortal men' (*Op.* 121).

HERM: What is your point?

SOC: I think he is saying that the golden race does not stem naturally from gold but is good and noble. My evidence of this is that he also says we are an 'iron' race.

HERM: What you say is true.

SOC: So do you think that of the men today, according to Hesiod, anyone who is good belongs to that golden race?

HERM: Probably.

SOC: Are the good anything but the wise?

HERM: No, they are the wise.

SOC: More than anything else *this*, it seems, is what he says of the daemons: it is because they were wise and 'knowing' (*daimones*) that he named them 'daemons'. In any case, this very name occurs in our ancient dialect. Thus both Hesiod and all the other poets are right who say that, when a good man dies, he receives a great destiny and honour and becomes a 'daemon', a name given to indicate his wisdom. So, I too say that every man who is good, both living and dead, is daemonic and is correctly called a 'daemon'.

HERM: I think, Socrates, that on this point I cast my vote with you. But the hero, what would it be?

SOC: This is not at all difficult to understand. For their name has been little changed and shows that it originates from love (*erôs*).

HERM: How so?

SOC: Don't you know that the heroes are demigods?

HERM: What do you mean?

Angelic and Daemonic, Priestly and Sophistic Purification

121.³³⁴ ‘Just as in the universe angels purify souls by excising their “stains” (*Or. Chald.* 196) resulting from generation and by leading them up to the gods,³³⁵ so too certain daemons connected with matter purify by torturing souls that look to matter and by “bending them onto thorny shrubs”, which is what they are described as doing to such figures as Ardiaeus in the *Republic* (616A). Thus the priests, acting like angels, remove all that obstructs us in our perception of higher reality, while the sophists,³³⁶ by exercising us in contradictory refutations, excise in the fashion of daemons the injury caused by the false conceit of knowledge – though they do not do this in order to benefit those they refute by the impasse, but in the interests of the life of imagination and the life that imitates semblance [rather than reality] – for they only assume the mask of truly knowledgeable and dialectical men. And, similarly, the lowest level of daemons too oppress souls not to make them love true reality, but because these daemons were allotted such a nature, one that guards the material and image-creating “wombs”, and punishes the souls that fall into that region.’

Divine Revelation of Names

122. ‘Many gods and daemons have deigned to reveal the nature of the gods, and so have passed down the names that belong to them (397A-C).³³⁷ And so, when the gods revealed both the intelligible and intellectual orders to the theurgists during the reign of Marcus (*Or. Chald.* 71),³³⁸ they passed down names of the divine orders, names which announce their property and by means of which, when they called upon the gods in their proper services, they obtained ready hearing from them.³³⁹ Also, many epiphanies of daemons have revealed to the more fortunate of men names that have a natural relation to reality, names through which these daemons made the truth about beings more distinct.’

Classification of Names

20 123. ‘Some names are related to eternal beings, others to perishable ones. Of those related to the eternal some are fashioned by men, others by more divine causes (397C2). Of those fashioned by a more divine cause than the human, some were established by gods themselves, others by daemons; and of those by men, some with the help of scientific knowledge, others without it. Of those assigned to perishable creatures, some were formulated with technical skill, others without it. Of those composed without technical skill or deliberation, some are due to a divine cause which is unknown – and this is chance, as in the case of “Orestes” – others are without such a cause. Of those devoid of any such

cause, some are composed on the basis of hope, others in memory of another (cf. 5,84 above), and still others on neither basis. Of the names assigned with skill, some are related to how things are, others to how things were, others to how things will be. An example of a name laid down for current realities is the change of "Aristocles" to "Plato";³⁴⁰ for those that have already occurred, the change of "Antilochus" to "Philopater" because he braved danger for his father; and for future ones, if one who knows in advance through astrology that his son will become famous should call him "Pericles".

But there is also a genus of names that results from the mixture of chance and skill, and this is two-fold. One type is where one knows the meaning of the name, but is ignorant of the nature of its object. For Xanthippos knew that the name "Pericles" indicated remarkable fame, but he did not know that his son Pericles would be so famous that he might name him thus. The other type is where a person is ignorant of the meaning of the name, but knows the essence of its object – as in the case of the person who called Theseus "Heracles" (Plutarch *Theseus* 29). For he knew that Theseus was akin to Heracles in nature, but did not know that the name "Heracles" was suited to Heracles alone, because Hera was the cause of so many trials for him and of his later fame as a result of those trials.'

124. 'Of the intellections of soul, some remain fixed on the universal level of things and comprehend them, others operate exclusively upon the more particular genera, and still others are occupied with individual things. An example of the first sort are those who observe the Cronian and guardian series [of gods]; of the second, those who contemplate the supercelestial realm and "Zeus driving his winged chariot there" (*Phdr.* 246E); and of the third, those who observantly distinguish the creative influences proceeding from the sun and moon into the realm of generation.'³⁴¹

Encosmic Cause and Communication Continued: the Roles of the Gods

125.³⁴² 'It belongs only to men who have been removed from our Hellenic world³⁴³ to suppose that neither the sun nor moon are gods and not to worship the other celestial [bodies] which are our saviours and lords, who bring about the elevation of immortal souls, but are also creators and maintainers of mortal creatures. If it is impossible, however, that there be men who are somehow outside the inhabited world, I would say that such impudence and this belief, this irrational belief shamefully directed against the celestial gods, belongs to souls that are driven to Tartarus itself and the darkest and most disordered realm of the universe. But let these men go even where they have been sentenced to reside by the Goddess Justice (*Dike*).'

Etymology of the Name ‘God’

126. “The term “God” (*theos*) is reasonably applied not only to visible entities but to supercelestial, intellectual and intelligible Causes as well (397C-D). For true swiftness and true slowness, says Socrates in the
 20 *Republic* (529D), exist among the intelligible numbers.³⁴⁴ Thus we were initiated in the *Phaedrus* (246E4) into the fact that even the transcendent leaders of the universe, who are supercosmic, “drive the winged chariot”, and prior to these, according to the theologians (*Or. Chald.* 191), the intellectual gods drive such chariots.³⁴⁵ And Uranus himself,
 25 the Connector of the intellectual gods and a connective God, performs his intellectual thought in a process of revolution; and prior to him the intellectual Causes – and these are unspeakable – have a motion which is swift and timeless.³⁴⁶ For indeed the Oracles describe them as “rapid” (*thoai*) and declare that, though proceeding from the Father, they “run” (*theein*) to him (*Or. Chald.* in Kroll, p. 40). And Orpheus spoke thus
 30 about the secret order of the gods:

75,1 It was unwearyingly borne along in an endless circle (fr. 71).³⁴⁷

But it is possible to interpret the name *theos* in another way as well, as indicating the creative and demiurgic Causes of all things. Indeed, “putting” (*theinai*) and “I shall put” (*thesō*) can be understood to mean “create.”
 5

127. ‘Among the gods nothing is strengthless or powerless, but all beings in that realm are active, and their lives (*zōai*) are fervid (*zeousai*) and eternally active.’

Angels, Daemons, and Heroes

128. (Exc.?) Now, of the classes of being inferior to the gods, which
 10 always follow them, but at the same time assist in the creation of all things in the cosmos from the highest all the way down to the lowest, some are revelatory of unity, others are conveyors of power and still others call forth knowledge of the gods and of intellectual essence.³⁴⁸
 15 Those who are expert in theology call some of these angelic, because they are established according to the very essence of the gods and make the uniform aspect of their nature concordant with subsequent entities. On that account, the angelic class is boniform, in that it reveals the occult goodness of the gods.

They call others daemonic because they bind together (*sundeonta*)
 20 the median aspect of the universe, divide the divine power and lead it forth all the way to the lowest level of things. For to divide is to ‘sunder’ (*daisai*). This genus is polyvalent and manifold, with the result that it embraces as its lowest class even the material daemons that lead souls down [into the realm of generation], and proceeds to the most particular and materially connected form of activity.

They call others heroic (*hêrôïka*) because they raise (*aironta*) human souls on high and elevate them through love (*erôs*). They are also guides of intellectual life, both magnificent and magnanimous, and in general they are allotted the order of reversion, of providential care and kinship with the divine Intellect, to which they cause secondary entities to revert. Thus, the heroic have been allotted this name because they are able to 'raise' (*airein*) and extend souls toward the gods. 25 76,1

These three genera subsequent to the gods have always been dependent upon them, but have been distinguished from each other. While some of them are intellectual in essence, others have their essence in rational souls, while still others have been established in irrational lives subject to imagination. It is clear that the intellectual genera have been allotted a wisdom which rises above human nature and is eternally connected with the objects of thought, the rational genera operate discursively through wisdom, and the irrational have no share of it; for these latter settle in matter and the most obscure area of the universe, bind the souls to the form-creating wombs and constrict those that have been drawn down into that region until they pay the appropriate penalty. These three genera which are greater than us Socrates here calls 'daemons' (397D-E). But do not wonder if the material class of daemons does not accord with his etymological explanation. For this too is superior, and perhaps like *daiô* (sunder) *merizô* (divide) applies to it as taking pleasure in discrimination (*merismos*). 5 10 15

129. 'Since the essence of the genera greater than us is threefold – intellectual, rational and imaginative – the golden race is analogous to the intellectual. For gold applies to the foremost of the orders which is both "empyrean" and "intellectual", as the theologians say; the silver race to the rational, for silver is analogous to the middle and aethereal cosmos; and the bronze to the irrational and imaginative, for imagination is intellect which is figurative, but not pure, just as bronze, while seeming to have the colour of gold, has much that is earthy, rigid and related to solid and perceptible objects.³⁴⁹ For this reason, [this last race] is also analogous to the "all-bronze" (*Il.* 5.504) and "brazen heaven" (*Il.* 17.425) – that is, the perceptible heaven, of which the proximate Demiurge has been portrayed as the bronze-smith. These are the three genera of daemons, to which the golden, silver and bronze races are analogous. The fourth and heroic race is inferior to some of those who go to make up the three genera discussed above, but is greater than others. For the heroic race is linked to action, and, even if it is subject to the providential care of secondary beings and to a life unrelated to what is below it, it still has the power to perform great acts, and it reveals the noble aspect of its proper virtue. The fifth and much-suffering human race, which is likened to "much-worked" (*Il.* 6.48) and black iron because of the material and obscure aspect of its life, manifests actions which are errant, distorted and irrational.' 20 25 77,1 5 10

130. 'Plato now (398A8) reflects about daemons and about heroes, not

15 as they are in their transient condition but as they are beyond our essence. By analogy, however, he ascends from them in their transient condition up to their exalted state, but by-passes the material class of the daemons.’

20 131. ‘That in the ancient dialect daemons (*daimones*) were called *damonēs* shows that they used the long letter *a* for the diphthong *ai* (cf. 398B5-8).’

Daemons and Heroes

68,10 117. ‘It would seem that the lowest aspect of each prior order links onto the primal aspect of the subsequent order. Our lord Hermes, for instance, who is an archangelic monad, is celebrated as a God. Plato calls the whole extent of beings between gods and men “daemons”. These are 15 such by nature, but the “daemons from the golden race”, who are mentioned here (397E), and the semi-divine heroes are not daemons and heroes by nature (for they do not always follow gods) but by condition, since they are souls in nature that give themselves to the realm of 20 generation,³⁵⁰ as was the great Heracles and such as he. Magnificence, loftiness and grandeur are characteristic of these heroic souls, and one must honour such heroes and sacrifice to them according to the commands of the Athenian Stranger: “For after gods”, he says, “the wise man would pay service to the daemons as well, and after these to heroes” 25 (*Laws* 717B). In any case, this heroic class of souls, while it does not always follow the gods, is still undefiled and more intellectual than the other souls. It descends for the benefit of the life of men, since it partakes of a destiny which weighs it down, but heroic souls also have much that elevates them and is easily freed of matter. This is why they 69,1 are also easily restored to the intelligible realm and pass many revolutions there, even as the more irrational genera of souls are either not at all, or with difficulty or only minimally restored to the Intelligible.’

398D1-400C9 SOC: They undoubtedly have all been born either of a God in love with a mortal woman or of a mortal man in love with a Goddess. If you consider the name in the ancient Attic dialect, you will better understand. For it will be clear to you that to make the name there has been little deviation from the word ‘love’ (*erôs*), from which the heroes were born. It is either this explanation that describes the heroes or that they were wise and skilful orators and dialecticians, that is, good at asking questions (*erôtan*). For *eirein* means to speak. Therefore, as we just said, in Attic the heroes happen to be called orators and inquirers of a sort, so the heroic breed becomes a species of orators and sophists. This is not difficult to understand, but the analysis of men is more so, that is, why they are called ‘men’. Can you say?

HERM: How can I? And if I could find out, I wouldn't even try, because I believe that you will be more successful than I.

SOC: You trust the inspiration of Euthyphron, it seems.

HERM: Certainly.

SOC: And correctly so. For even now I seem to have an ingenious idea; and I may, if I am not careful, become wiser today than I should be. Consider my reasoning: first we must understand that, when we assign a name, we often add and subtract letters that make it deviate from our meaning, and also change its accent. Take 'dear to Zeus', for example: to obtain a name from the phrase, we subtracted the second iota, and for the acute middle syllable we substituted a grave. But in other instances, we add letters and pronounce grave syllables acute.

HERM: What you say is true.

SOC: Then, it seems to me the name for men has undergone one of these changes. For it originated from a phrase when a single letter, an alpha, was subtracted and its last syllable became grave.

HERM: What do you mean?

SOC: It's like this: the name 'man' (*anthrôpos*) indicates that other animals do not examine, reflect upon or 'look up at' (*anathrei*) what they see, but man, at the same time he has seen – that is, has viewed (*opope*) – something, also looks up at (*anathrei*) and reflects upon what he has viewed. As a result, of all animals only man was correctly called 'man', because he 'looks up at what he has seen' (*anathrôn ha opope*).

HERM: So what now? May I tell you what I would like to hear next?

SOC: Of course.

HERM: It seems to me that there is a matter that follows our previous topics in order. For I suppose we speak of a soul and a body of man.

SOC: How couldn't we?

HERM: Then, let's attempt to analyse these too like our previous topics.

SOC: Do you mean that you would like to examine how the soul is suited to its name, and likewise with the body?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: Off the top of my head, I think that those who named the soul considered it, when united with the body, the cause of the body's life, since it provides the power of respiration and revitalizes (*anapsukhôn*), but at the same time this revitalizing agent departs, the body decays and perishes. It is for this reason, it seems, that they call it the 'soul' (*psukhê*). But if you wish – wait a moment. For I think I see a more persuasive argument than this for the followers of Euthyphron. This first one, I think, they would disdain and probably think crude. But see how you like it.

HERM: Speak on.

SOC: Does anything other than the soul seem to you to contain and conduct the nature of every body so it may live and move about?

HERM: No, nothing else.

SOC: What! Don't you believe Anaxagoras that it is intellect and soul that order and contain the nature of all the other creatures?

HERM: I do.

SOC: So the correct name of this power that conducts and contains nature would be 'nature-bearing' (*phusekhês*). And with some modification it is also possible to call it 'soul' (*psukhê*).

HERM: Certainly, and this analysis seems to me to be more skillfully performed than the former.

SOC: And indeed it is. Yet it seems ridiculous that the name was assigned so truthfully.

HERM: But how do we say the next name is disposed?

SOC: Do you mean body?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: There are many ways, I think, to look at this word, whether one deviates a little or not at all from its original form. For some say it is the 'tomb' (*sêma*) of the soul which, they believe, is buried in the here and now. And because the soul uses the body to indicate (*sêmainei*) what it indicates, so too the body (*sôma*) is correctly called 'sign' (*sêma*). It is most likely that the followers of Orpheus assigned this name, because they believed that the soul pays a penalty for its crimes, and thought of the body (*sôma*) as an enclosure to keep (*sôizetai*) the soul, like a prison. So, just as it is named, the body is the soul's lot until it pays its dues; and nothing, not a single letter, need be changed in this analysis.

118. 'Each of the gods himself untaintedly transcends all subsequent
 5 classes, and the primary and more universal of the daemons are also situated above such a condition as ours, but they do take on spirits which dwell close to the earth and are particular for the generation of certain creatures. Still, these spirits do not indulge in physical coupling with mortal beings, but move nature and perfect its generative power,
 10 unfold the course of generation and diminish all obstacles [to it].³⁵¹ The myths, then, obscure the real state of affairs by employing homonymy. For such spirits have the same names as the principal causal gods of their own series. This is why they say that either gods have coupled with mortal women or mortal men with Goddesses. But if they had wished to
 15 speak clearly and explicitly, they would have said that Aphrodite, Ares, Thetis, and the other gods, each beginning from above, leads his proper series all the way to the lowest level, and this encompasses many causes differing from one another in their very essence – for instance, the classes of angels, daemons, heroes, nymphs, and such like. Now, the
 20 lower powers of these orders established a good deal of communication with the human race. For the lowest elements of primary classes are

naturally linked to the first principles of secondary ones, and they bring about, along with other natural modes of existence, also instances of generation. It therefore often appears that heroes, who seem to have a certain superiority over human nature, are born from the intercourse of these beings with humans. Not only is such a daemonic genus in natural sympathy with men, but certain [other] classes relate specifically with some things and others with others – for example, certain nymphs are associated with trees, others with springs and others with deer or snakes.

Yet how is it that gods are sometimes said to have intercourse with mortal women, but at others mortal men with Goddesses (398D1-2)?³⁵² Relations of gods with Goddesses produce gods or eternal Daemons. But since the souls of the heroic class have two forms of life, revealing the power befitting a God now by the masculine aspect in themselves and the cycle of the Same, now by the feminine and the revolution of the Other,³⁵³ when both elements are performing perfectly, these [souls] exist unrelated to generation, contemplating the entities prior to themselves and unrelatedly exercising providence over those subsequent to them. But when both elements are defective, these [souls] will not differ at all from the common run of souls, among which both the cycle of the Same is restricted and that of the Other endures all sorts of both fractures and distortions. It therefore is necessary that one cycle be in accord with nature, but that the other be impeded in its proper activity, and this is why there are demigods, because one or the other of their cycles is illuminated from the gods. Thus all of them that have their cycle of the Same running smoothly, and have been awakened to the transcendental life and are inspired by it, are said to be endowed with a father who is a God, but a mortal mother because of their deficiency in the other side of their life. Such, on the other hand, as have the revolution of their Other running well, and are successful and inspired in action, these have a mortal father but a mother who is a Goddess. To put it briefly, what is successful in either aspect is ascribed to a divine cause, and when the cycle of the Same is dominant, the divine element is said to be masculine and paternal, but when that of the Other is, it is said to be maternal. And this, for example, is why Achilles, as son of a Goddess, is successful in actions. He demonstrates this by his passion for actions and, when in Hades, by his longing for the life with the body so that he may defend his father (*Od.* 11.501-3). But Minos and Rhadamanthus are reckoned as sons of Zeus, since they turn themselves away from the realm of generation to what really exists, and adhere to the order of mortal creatures [only] to the extent necessary.'

119. 'It is reasonable that the heroes (*hêrôes*) should be named after Eros (*erôs*) (398D4), inasmuch as Eros is a "great daemon" (*Symp.* 202D13), and the heroes are engendered through the cooperation of daemons. Since, then, he is engendered from Poros, who is superior, and Penia, who is a receptacle and inferior,³⁵⁴ Eros also brings the heroes to mind by analogy, for they too are born from different classes of being.'

120. 'For Plato the term "ingenious" (*kompson*) (399A4) has two meanings – (1) refined and proper, and again (2) plausible and deceptive. And the expression "cleverly refined" (*kekompseumenon*) (400B3) means skilfully devised.'

77,21 132. 'The syllables and the letters seem to play the role of essence in names, while the acute and grave accents seem like potencies (*du-nameis*), as it were, of names (cf. 399A-B).'

400D1-5 HERM: I think that these terms (i.e. 'body' and 'soul') have been sufficiently explained, Socrates. I suppose we could examine the names of the gods in the same way we were just talking about Zeus, and see with what correctness their names were assigned?

The Human Intellect

25 133. 'The intellect in us is Dionysian and truly an image of Dionysus.
78,1 Therefore, anyone that transgresses against it and, like the Titans, scatters its undivided nature by fragmented falsehood, this person clearly sins against Dionysus himself, even more than those who transgress against external images of the God, to the extent that the intellect more than other things is akin to the God.'

5 134. 'We are better able to know the more universal genera of the gods than the more particular ones. For by reason of the universal quality of their substance, that quality extending to all things, we attain a clearer understanding of the leading and ruling gods than of the independent gods. And we learn more easily that the supreme Zeus is
10 Conductor of living for all creatures and Demiurge than that he offers living to the celestial beings alone. It is clear to all that the universal Demiurge is one, but troublesome to grasp that the more particular demiurges are three.'³⁵⁵

15 135. 'To the extent that he knows himself and all the other divine genera together, partakes of them all, and is distinguished by his own particular substance, each of the gods (400D8-9) supplies subsistence to the divine names, which are incomprehensible and ineffable to us, inasmuch as all of the intellectual and the divine entities exist in us spiritually. Yet, if intellections³⁵⁶ exist in the soul not in a mode corresponding to the intellect, but like an image and in subordination, the
20 soul will become all the dizzier by thinking purely about gods, but it is only on the level of imaging that it can entertain its intuitions about the essence and about the nomenclature of God.'

25 136. 'Just as the one that directs all the encosmic light from himself is called Helios, so too the one that directs the truth from himself is called Apollo.'

400D6-401A7 SOC: Yes, by Zeus, Hermogenes, if we had any sense, we would follow one very good principle – that we know nothing about the gods, neither about them nor about the names by which they call themselves. For it is clear that they call themselves by their *true* names. But there is a second type of correctness, that we name the gods as we customarily pray to them, using the names and patronymics that please them, since we know no others. And this seems to me a fine custom. So if you wish, let's conduct our inquiry as if we had first announced to the gods that we will make no inquiries about *them* – for we do not consider ourselves capable of that – but about *men*, that is, what notions (*doxai*) they held when they assigned names to the gods. For this will not excite their wrath.

HERM: You seem to be speaking reasonably, Socrates, so let's do as you say.

The Transformation of Divine Names

137. 'The degree of alteration in divine names among gods, angels, daemons and souls (400E) occurs analogously to their essences and cognitive powers. For angels do not name both gods and themselves as the inferior natures of daemons, heroes, or souls do, but they do it more majestically and more intellectually.' 79,1

401B1-E5 SOC: Shall we begin with any other but Hestia, as is customary?

HERM: That is fair.

SOC: What would one say that the person who named Hestia was thinking at the time?

HERM: This too, by Zeus, is no easy question.

SOC: The first men to assign names, my good Hermogenes, probably were not common but elevated and subtle minds.

HERM: So what is your point?

SOC: It is apparent to me that the assigning of names is suited to men of this sort. And if we examine foreign names, we find no less what is intended by each word. For example, in the case of the name that we pronounce *ousia* (essence), there are some that pronounce it *essia* others that say *ôsia*. First, as to the form 'essia', it is reasonable that the essence of things be called 'Hestia', and it is also correct to derive the name from the fact that we Athenians say that what partakes of essence 'exists' (*estin*). In fact, we too seem to have called essence 'essia'. Also, if a person thought about it in terms of sacrifice, he would believe that whoever assigned these names was thinking along the same lines. For it would be

reasonable to sacrifice to Hestia first before all the gods for those who named the essence of all things 'essia'. But those who call it *ôsia* would believe almost like Heraclitus that all beings pass away and nothing remains stable. So the cause and principle of these men is 'drive' (to *ôthoun*), from which it has rightly been named *ôsia*. It is understood, however, that we make this explanation as men who really know nothing. Now, after Hestia, it is fair to examine 'Rhea' and 'Cronus'. And yet we have already discussed the name 'Cronus'. But I am probably talking nonsense.

HERM: What do you mean, Socrates?

Discrimination of Fontal and Principal Gods: The Etymology of Hestia

138.³⁵⁷ 'Celebrate Hestia, eldest of gods, boys' (401B1)! For in their
5 prayers they were bidden to sing Hestia before the other gods.³⁵⁸

139. 'Cronus with Rhea produces both Hestia and Hera,³⁵⁹ who are of
the same rank as the demiurgic Causes. From herself Hestia provides
10 unabating permanence, the establishment [of beings] in themselves and
indissoluble essence, while Hera provides procession and multiplication
into lower levels of being, and is the life-creating spring of the reason-
principles and mother of the generative powers. This is why she is also
said to cooperate with the demiurgic Zeus, since through their associa-
15 tion she bears maternally what Zeus engenders paternally, but Hestia
is said to remain in herself, since she keeps her virginity immaculate
and is the cause of identity for all things. With their proper perfection
each of these two Goddesses has obtained by participation the power of
rationality as well. As a result, then, those that have looked to the mode
of subsistence proper to her say that Hestia has been named from
20 *essia*,³⁶⁰ while those that have looked to her power of motion and bearing
life, the power which exists in her from Hera, give her the name *ôsia*
because she is cause of drive (*ôsis*). For all the divine beings exist in all,
and coordinate entities especially participate in each other and have
their subsistence in each other. Therefore, each of both the demiurgic
25 and life-bearing orders possesses its very essence, which comes from
Hestia, by participation; the revolutions of the planets in heaven derive
their constancy from her; and the poles and the cardinal points are
allotted their eternal fixedness from her.'³⁶¹

80,1 140. 'The name "Hestia" does not indicate essence as such, but rather
the permanent and stable fixity of essence in itself. This is why this
Goddess proceeds later than the great Cronus. For the entities prior to
Cronus do not possess the qualities of "being-in-oneself" and "being-in-
5 another", but this begins from Cronus. The quality of "being-in-oneself"
belongs to Hestia, that of "being-in-another" to Hera.'

141. 'From Rhea as monad the theology of Hesiod (*Theogony* 453ff.)
introduces Hestia at the higher level of the coordinate series, Hera at

the lower level, and Demeter at that in between. Orpheus says (fr. 145) 10 that in one way Demeter is the same as the whole generation of life, but in another way she is not the same. For above she is Rhea, but below, with Zeus, she is Demeter; for products are similar to and almost the same as the forces that produce them.³⁶²

401E6-402C3 SOC: My good man, I have discovered a hive of wisdom.

HERM: Of what sort?

SOC: It's quite ridiculous to say, yet I think there is also some plausibility in it.

HERM: What is it?

SOC: I can almost see Heraclitus proclaiming ancient wisdom, dating back to the reign of Cronus and Rhea, of which Homer too spoke.

HERM: What do you mean?

SOC: Heraclitus, I think, says that 'all things proceed and nothing remains constant'. And comparing beings with the flow of a river, he says that 'you may not step into the same river twice'.

HERM: This is so.

SOC: So what does this mean? Do you think that the one who called the ancestors of the gods 'Rhea' and 'Cronus' thinks any differently from Heraclitus? Do you believe that he gave them the names of streams arbitrarily? Similarly, Homer says that 'Ocean is the origin of the gods and Tethys their mother' (*Il.* 14.302). And I think Hesiod too says this. But Orpheus, I believe, also says that 'Fair-flowing Ocean first entered into marriage, And wed Tethys, his sister by the same mother' (fr. 15). Now examine these views; you see that they all both agree with each other and tend toward the teachings of Heraclitus.

Introduction to the Fontal Gods: the Etymology of 'Rhea'

142. 'We must now listen carefully to the discussion of streams and motions. For Socrates does not descend to the material stream of Heraclitus (indeed, that would be false and unworthy of Plato's thought). But since it is lawful to interpret the divine by analogy through proper images, Socrates, who in this passage is at once playful and earnest, appropriately compares the fontal and Cronian divinities 20 with streams because they always conduct good things from the realms above to those below.³⁶³ This is why, in accordance with the river image, after the fontal divinities which perpetually bubble over with good things, we find celebration of the principal divinities. For it is following on the source that the origin is brought into consideration.' 25

143. ‘The universal gods who are properly called intellectual – those of whom the great Cronus is Father (402B4) – are properly called fontal.

81,1 For implacable thunderbolts leap forth from this God,

says the oracle about Cronus (*Or. Chald.* 35.1). But about the life-bearing source Rhea, from whom all life – divine, intellectual, spiritual, and
5 encosmic – is generated, the Oracles speak thus (fr. 56):

Rhea, mark you, is both source and stream of blessed intellectual entities:

For she first of all received powers in her ineffable wombs
And pours forth generation which runs upon everything.

For this Goddess herself produces both the unbounded flood of all life and
10 all unceasing powers, sets all things in motion according to the measures of the divine motions, and turns back all creatures to herself, establishing them in herself as coordinate to Cronus. She is thus called “Rhea” both because she always “flows” (*epirrhein*) with good things and because she is cause of divine ease (*rhastônê*), for “the gods live at ease” (*Il.* 6.138, etc.).
15 Water and all the things that produce water are dedicated to her.’

402C4-D3 HERM: You seem to be making sense, Socrates, but I don’t understand what the name ‘Tethys’ means.

SOC: The name itself nearly states outright that it is the disguised name of a spring. For something that sifts (*diattômenon*) and filters (*êthoumenon*) is like a spring. The name ‘Tethys’ is composed from these two words.

HERM: This is clever, Socrates.

Ocean and Tethys

144. ‘Ocean is cause of acute and very vigorous activity to all the gods and defines the divisions of the first, middle and last orders. For, by the swiftness of his intellect, he turns back upon himself and his proper
20 principles, but at the same time he moves all beings from himself to the activities proper to them, perfects their powers and makes them inexhaustible. Tethys, however, instils permanence into the entities moved by Ocean, and provides stability to those aroused by him to the generation
25 of subsequent creatures, and purity of essence to the entities aroused in their prime to produce all creatures, inasmuch as she supports everything of the divine substances that is sifted (*diattômenon*)
82,1 and filtered through (*diêthoumenon*) (402C7-D1). Indeed, each of the primal Causes, even if it offers participation in the good things to what is subsequent to it, still retains for itself the immaculate, undefiled, and

pure aspect of the participation in such things as life, being, or intellection. The intellect is filled and, in turn, fills the soul, but only having established in itself the undefiled and transcendent aspect of each of these goods, does it reveal also to what is subsequent to itself the inferior measures of them. And the vigour of the elder beings' activities comes about through Ocean, but what is sifted and filtered comes about through Tethys. For all that is instilled in what is subsequent from superior levels, whether essences, lives, or intellectual thoughts, is filtered. And as many of these as are primary are established in the higher, but what may be the more imperfect aspects are released to their subordinates, just as running waters, too, that are nearer the source are purer, but those further away are muddier. 5 10 15

In virtue of their primary essence, both Ocean and Tethys are fontal gods. For this reason, Socrates now (402B) calls them "Fathers" of the streams.³⁶⁴ Yet they proceed to the other orders of the gods as well, as they demonstrate the same powers in each [of the orders] at the primal, transcendent, and heavenly levels in turn. Timaeus celebrated their sublunar orders as well, when he called them Fathers of Cronus and Rhea on the one hand, but offspring of Uranus and Gaia on the other (*Tim.* 40E). Their particular lots around the earth are their lowest manifestations – the lots that appear above and those under the earth which distinguish the kingdom of Hades from the realm of Poseidon.' 20 25

145. 'Cronus is coordinate with both Rhea and Zeus – with her as Father to generative power, with him as Intelligible to Intellect.'

146. 'Ocean is said (402B) to "marry Tethys"; and Zeus, to "marry" Hera, and the like, because the God entered into communion with the Goddess for the generation of subordinate entities.³⁶⁵ For the gods' common intelligible coordination and their conatural cooperation for the purpose of creation is called "marriage" by the theologians' (*Orph. fr.* 112). 83,1 5

147. 'Tethys has been named after what is "sifted through" (*diatômenon*) and "filtered" (*êthoumenon*) – that is, she is called "Diattethys" and, with the subtraction of the first two syllables, "Tethys".'³⁶⁶

402D4-403B1 SOC: Why not? But what is our next topic? We have discussed Zeus.

HERM: Yes.

SOC: Then, let's talk about his brothers Poseidon and Pluto and the other name by which they call the latter.

HERM: By all means.

SOC: Poseidon's name appears to have been assigned by the man who named him because the nature of the sea restrained him from walking and no longer permitted him to proceed but was an impediment, as it were, to his feet (*desmos tôn podôn*). So the lord of this power he named 'Poseidon' (*poseidôna*) because he 'restrains the feet' (*posidesmon*). The 'e' is probably inserted for

ornamentation. Yet one may perhaps reject this analysis and claim that it was first pronounced with a double 'l' instead of an 's' because this God 'knows many things' (*polla eidotos*). But perhaps he has been named the 'Shaker' (*ho seion*) because of his shaking (*seiein*), with the addition of the 'p' and 'd'. Now, Pluto was named after his gift of wealth (*ploutos*), because wealth arises from below out of the earth. And 'Hades' – many seem to suppose that this name was derived from the invisible (*aïdês*), and because they fear the name they call him 'Pluto'.

HERM: But how does it appear to you, Socrates?

The First Principal Triad: Zeus, Poseidon and Hades

10 148. 'Cronus is monad of the Titanic order of the gods, Zeus of the
demiurgic. The latter, however, is two-fold: while the one is transcendent
and coordinate with Cronus, since he is fontal, wholly perfects the
triad of the intellectual Fathers and envelops their limits, the other is
15 numbered among the sons of Cronus and has been allotted the highest
Cronian rank and command in this triad.³⁶⁷ It is about him that Homer's
Poseidon says:

For we are three brothers sired by Cronus (*Il.* 15.187).

The primal Zeus, because he is Demiurge of the whole universe, is King
20 at the first, middle and last order. It is of him that Socrates was just
saying (396A-B) that he is both Ruler and King of all and that through
him there is life and salvation for all. For what stands at the head of
everything refers to the Zeus before the three. But the Zeus who is
ruling principle and a coordinate member of the three sons of Cronus
25 administers the third part of the whole universe, according to the
principle that "all things are distributed three ways" (*Il.* 15.189). He is
the highest of the three, synonymous with the fontal Zeus, unified with
him, and called by the single name of Zeus; the second is given two titles,
"Zeus of the sea" and "Poseidon"; and the third has three titles, "Zeus of
84,1 the underworld", "Pluto" and "Hades". The first preserves, creates and
engenders life at the highest level; the second performs the same
functions at the second order; and the third, with third order creatures.
This is why the third is said to abduct Core, in order to animate with
5 her the lower limits of the universe.'

The Titans

149. 'As the Titanic order distinguishes itself from the connective order of Uranus, yet has something that both remains in that order and is conatural with it, Cronus is leader of the division and therefore arms

the other [Titans] as well against their Father, and he himself receives 10
the scythe from his mother by which he demarcates his own kingdom
from that of Uranus. But Ocean is aligned with what remains in the
abode of their Father and guards the mid-point of the two orders, since
he is counted a Titan among the gods with Cronus, but also cherishes
the order related to Uranus and attaches himself to the connective 15
gods.³⁶⁸ For it befits the being that discriminates the first and second
orders to be set between the entities that it distinguishes. But it is this
God who has been allotted such power everywhere and who discrimi-
nates the genera of the gods – the Titanic from the connecting and the 20
life-bearing from the demiurgic. Whence even the ancient oracle calls
the one that distinguishes the visible from the invisible aspect of Uranus
“Ocean”, and this is why the poets say that both the sun and the other
stars rise from Ocean. Through these two connections, then, the account 25
comprehends all the Titanic order as at once both remaining and
proceeding: through the Cronian order, it comprehends all that is
discriminated from the Fathers; but through the Oceanic, all that is
attached to the connective gods. Or, if you wish to put it this way,
through the Cronian order it comprehends the whole maternal Cause; 85,1
while through the remaining order, all that obeys the paternal Cause.
For the feminine is cause of procession and discrimination, while the
masculine is cause of unity and stable persistence.’

Zeus, Poseidon, and Pluto

150. ‘Of the demiurgic triad which divides up all the cosmos and 5
distributes the indivisible, single and universal creation of the primal
Zeus, the aspect which is highest and fulfils the role of Father is Zeus,
who by reason of his unity with the universal demiurgic Intellect
acquired the same name as it, and for this very reason has now (402D)
been passed over by Plato. Poseidon, however, has been allotted 10
the median aspect, which binds together the two extremes, and while he is
filled from the essence of Zeus he himself fills Pluto. For Zeus is Father
of this whole triad, Poseidon is its power and Pluto its intellect – all
aspects existing in all, of course, but each one taking on a particular
essential characteristic, for Zeus subsists in accordance with being, 15
Poseidon with power and Pluto with intellect; and yet they are all causes
of the life of all creatures, but the one is so in being, the other by life
itself, and the other intellectually.³⁶⁹ Whence, indeed, the theologian
says (*Orph. fr.* 186) that it is with Core that gods at either extreme
demiurgically create the first and the last creatures, but the middle God 20
creates without her, since he coordinates the generative cause from his
own lot. This is why they say that Core is raped by Zeus,³⁷⁰ and abducted
by Pluto. The middle God in turn, they say, is cause of motion for all
things, since they are of themselves immobile. For this reason, he is
called “Ennosigaios” [the Earth-shaker], as origin of motion, and among 25

those allotted the kingdom of Cronus the middle lot and the easily-moved sea are dedicated to him. Thus in the whole process of division the highest element is Zeusian, the middle Poseidonian, and the lowest
 30 Plutonian. And this is true even if you should look to the cardinal points like the sunrise, the midday and the sunset; or if you should divide the whole cosmos, for instance, into the sphere of the fixed stars, the
 86,1 planetary and the sublunar; or the generated realm into that which is fiery, that which is chthonic and that in between; or the earth into its heights, the hollow middle regions and the underworld.³⁷¹ For this same triad has everywhere distributed the first, middle and lowest differ-
 5 tiae of creatures into their proper demiurgic boundaries.'

The Etymology of 'Poseidon'

151. "The name "Poseidon" is here (402E) etymologized in three ways: for Poseidon is trident-bearer, and both the Tritons and Amphitrite are related to him. The first etymology (sc. from *Posidesmos*) is based on the lot with which he is entrusted, that of guarding the souls coming into
 10 generation whose revolution of the Same has been impeded, if indeed the sea is analogous to generation.³⁷² The second (from *polla eidôs*) is based on his association with the primal divinity, in relation to which it has been said, comparing him with Zeus:

But Zeus was born earlier and knew more (*Il.* 13.355).

15 For this particular Zeus is the object of intellection proximate to Poseidon. The third etymology (from *seiô*) is based on his activity in relation to the external world and on his association with Pluto. For this latter too is a motive principle of nature and that which gives life to the lowest level of things. He governs the earth itself and rouses it to generative acts.'

The Etymology of 'Hades-Pluto'

20 152. 'Poseidon is an intellectual and demiurgic God who receives the souls descending into generation. Hades is an intellectual and demiurgic God who releases souls from generation. Since the whole circuit of our lives is divided into three – into the life before generation, which is presided over by Zeus; into that in generation, presided over by Posei-
 25 don; and into that after generation, which is Pluto's responsibility. Pluto, who is characterized by intellect, appropriately turns the ends back to the beginnings, bringing about a cycle without beginning or end not only for souls but for the entire creation both of bodies and of all
 87,1 cycles in general; and he performs this circular movement forever – producing, for instance, the circuits of both astral souls and of creatures in the realm of generation, and so on. Zeus, of course, governs the life of souls before their entry into the realm of generation.³⁷³

403B2-9 SOC: People seem to me to have many mistaken ideas about the power of this God and fear him though he doesn't deserve it. For they fear that once we are dead we are there forever, and that the soul goes to him stripped of its body. But it seems to me that all this, including both the function and name of the God, tends to mean the same thing.

HERM: How so?

153. "There are some who badly etymologize the name "Pluto" by refer- 5
ence to wealth (*ploutos*) from the earth in both fruits and metals, and
"Hades" by reference to what is invisible (*aïdês*), dark and frightening.
Socrates here repudiates these people, and instead reduces the two
names to the same meaning: he relates "Pluto" as Intellect to the wealth 10
of wisdom, and "Hades" to the Intellect that knows all. For "this God is
a sophist" (403E) and, by purifying souls after death, frees them from
generation. For the invisible (*aïdês*) is not, as some incorrectly interpret
it, an evil thing. Nor is death an evil, even if some people believe that it
is a passively invisible state. It is in fact invisible and superior to the 15
state of visibility, as is everything that is intelligible. On the model of a
circle, then, the intellect in each triad of existents draws itself back into
being and the paternal cause.'

154. "The divine Proclus is prepared to accept those too that etymolo- 20
gize "Pluto" by wealth (*ploutos*) from the earth in fruits and metals and
understand the word in this way.'³⁷⁴

155. 'Because they erroneously make themselves the point of refer-
ence for the experiences of life, men who are lovers of the body
(*philosômatoi*) believe that death, as a cause of corporeal dissolution, is
a fearful thing. But in truth, it is much better for a man to die and live 25
naturally in Hades than to live unnaturally in conjunction with the body
and hindered from operating intellectually.'³⁷⁵ For this reason, he should
be stripped of the flesh with which he has been clothed, as Odysseus was
stripped of his rags (*Od.* 22.1), and no longer be "like a wretched beggar"
(*Od.* 16.273), "throwing his rags about himself" (*Od.* 14.512) out of the
needs of the body.'³⁷⁶ 88,1

For the divine is not accessible to mortals who think in bodily terms,
But such as have stripped themselves hasten up on high, 5

as the Oracle says (*Or. Chald.* 116).'

403C1-D6 SOC: I shall tell you what seems to me to be the case.
But tell me which bond is the stronger for restraining an animal
in any given place – necessity or desire?

HERM: Desire, Socrates, is much stronger.

SOC: Then don't you think that many would flee Hades, if he didn't bind whoever went there, with the strongest bond?

HERM: Clearly they would.

SOC: Then it is by a sort of desire that he binds them, it seems, if in fact he binds them by the strongest bond, and this is not necessity.

HERM: It appears so.

SOC: Well then, are there many desires?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: So it is by the greatest desire of all that he binds them, if in fact he is going to restrain them with the greatest bond.

HERM: Yes.

SOC: Is there any greater desire than when a man believes that by associating with another he will become better?

HERM: By Zeus, Socrates, there is not.

156. 'Plato studies the appetite corresponding to each part of the soul (403C-D). For the passionate man yearns for honour or victory, and the rational for excellence (cf. *Rep.* 9, 583A). In like manner he wishes to study courage, helpfulness, pleasure, and their opposites concerning each part of the soul.'

157.³⁷⁷ 'Among the gods, love and will concur with necessity, against which "not even a God struggles"' (*Prot.* 345D5).³⁷⁸

403D7-404A7 SOC: Then, let us say, Hermogenes, that this is why no one in Hades, not the Sirens themselves, have wished to return here, but that they and all other creatures are spell-bound, so beautiful, it seems, are the words that Hades knows how to speak, and therefore this God is the perfect sophist and a great benefactor of those around him, but also sends up to us on earth goods of equal value. In fact, there are so many goods surrounding him there that he received the name 'Pluto' (wealthy). Then, not wishing to associate with men while still in possession of their bodies, but to relate to them only when their souls are purified of all the evils and desires involving the body, doesn't this seem to you to be characteristic of the philosopher and one who has well understood that he might restrain them by binding them with the desire for virtue, but those who are excited and mad about the body not even Father Cronus could hold by binding them in his legendary chains?

HERM: You may have a point, Socrates.

- 15 158. 'The great Plato knows three genera of Sirens: the celestial which is under the kingdom of Zeus, the generative which is under Poseidon, and the purificatory which is under Hades. It is common to them all to subject all things to their own commanding-gods by way of harmonious motion.'³⁷⁹
- 20 This is why they wish to unite the soul, when it is in heaven, with the ways

of life there. But it is fitting that those souls living in generation should “sail past them” (*Phdr.* 259A7), just like the Homeric Odysseus, if indeed the sea is an image of generation, lest they be lured astray by generation. But it is also fitting that, when they have come to Hades, they be attached to this God through their intellectual thoughts. As a result, Plato knows about classes of gods, daemons, and souls in the kingdom of Hades, souls that dance around the God, charmed by the Sirens there.’ 25

159. ‘Plato knows what he is doing when he assigns the name “sophist” to a sacred subject (403E2-5). For this is how he calls anyone capable of turning other beings back (*epistrephein*) to himself, as is Zeus, Hades and Eros (*Symp.* 203D8).’ 89,1

160. ‘Not all souls after release from the body are deemed worthy of association with Pluto, but only the zealous. For whoever is too attached to the body is released from evil only with effort and pain by certain daemons or purificatory angels.’ 5

161. ‘Wishing that the whole series of the demiurges be dependent on the Titanic series, the demiurgic Zeus and Lord of all the demiurges is properly said to bind Cronus (404A6),³⁸⁰ because he has turned back to Cronus, is dependent upon him, contemplates the lengths and widths of the Cronian “observatory”, and situates Cronus in himself. For Zeus too holds Cronus in himself in a Zeusian mode. So Zeus binds Cronus in himself firmly and permanently, and Zeus is bound to Cronus in like manner.’ 10
15
90,1

The Ascent of the Soul After Death

162. ‘The soul’s mode of ascent is two-fold: one occurs by ascension to what exists and by purification from the realm of generation – and this is the mode provided by the bonds of Pluto after death. The other is achieved by elevation prior [to death] through the purification of Hades and by the soul’s abiding by the life there and transmission of intellectual thoughts – and this is the way perfected by the bonds of Cronus through the connection of Zeus. Having left a trace, as it were, in the intelligible realm, the soul there passes through the extent of the intelligible realm and observes those blessed sights, as Socrates teaches in the *Phaedrus* (247D).³⁸¹ This latter mode of ascension is greater and more perfect than the former. On the other hand, not only are the bonds of Hades unable to restrain the “souls that have been excited by the body” (404A4) and lead them up to the realm of Zeus, but neither are those of Cronus which, obviously because those of the Father, are also stronger.’ 20
25
90,1

404B1-4 SOC: And the name ‘Hades’, Hermogenes, certainly has not been assigned because the God is ‘invisible’ (*aïdês*), but rather because he ‘knows’ (*eidenai*) all that is fine – this is why the lawgiver called him ‘Hades’.

Another Comment on Hades and Pluto

- 5 163. ‘Poseidon is said (403A1) to “know many things”, as compared with Zeus, but Hades “all things” (404B3), judged by comparison with the souls to which he provides understanding. And yet Poseidon is more universal than Hades.’

404B5-9 HERM: Very good. But what about Demeter, Hera, Apollo, Athena, Hephaestus, Ares and the other gods, how do we explain them?

SOC: Demeter seems to have been called ‘Demeter’ because, like a mother, she gives the gift of nourishment (*didousa mêtêr*).

The Second Principal Triad: Demeter, Hera and Persephone

The Etymology of ‘Demeter’

- 10 164.³⁸² ‘Even as one must etymologize “Pluto” not only in relation to the obvious – that is, the wealth from the earth (403A4) – but also to the wealth of wisdom, so too the name “Demeter” should be related not only to corporeal nourishment, but, beginning from the gods themselves, one must consider her as conductor of nourishment, first for the gods
15 themselves, and then for those after them, and that the series of this beneficence should extend all the way down to corporeal nourishment.³⁸³ For even the particular nature of Eros shines upon the gods first, as do both the prophetic and medical properties of Apollo and those of the other gods in like manner.’

- 20 165. ‘At the level of the gods, “nourishment” is the intellectual fulfilment of subsequent entities by loftier ones. Thus, the gods are nourished whenever they contemplate the gods prior to themselves, are perfected and behold the intelligible Beauties like “Justice itself”, “Moderation itself”, and such things as are discussed in the *Phaedrus* (247D).’

- 25 166. ‘In the *Cratylus* the great Plato aims to celebrate not the foremost, middle and last orders of the gods, but only the properties revealed in their names.’³⁸⁴

- 91,1 167. ‘When Orpheus says that Demeter is the same as Rhea, he means that when above with Cronus and non-processive she is Rhea, but when projecting herself and generating Zeus she is Demeter. For he says:

Though Rhea before, when she came to be the mother of Zeus,
She became Demeter (fr. 145).

- 5 Hesiod says that Demeter is a daughter of Rhea (*Theogony* 454), and the theologians clearly agree. For whether she proceeded from the Cronian

unity to the subsequent order or she is even the foremost child of Rhea, the result is the same. Therefore, since Demeter is such as this, and has been allotted the eldest and most authoritative order from the universal life-bearing Rhea and connects the middle points of the universal generation of life, she fills all the supercelestial realm with the channels of perfect life and indivisibly, uniformly and undividedly pours the gift of life on all creatures. Prior to these [functions] she reveals to us the demiurgic Intellect itself and instils in it the power of creating life for all creatures. For just as from above Cronus provides him (sc. Demiurgic Intellect) with the cause of being and of essence, so from her generative wombs above Demeter too pours the ability to generate life down to the Demiurge. And since she holds the middle portion of all life-bearing divinity, she governs the universal springs in that divinity and encompasses the one bond of both the foremost and the last powers of life. And while she enfolds the subsequent springs and connects them stably, she also leads forth the uniform causes of prior beings into the generation of all creatures. In this way the whole life-bearing [Cause] is both one and hebdomadic.³⁸⁵ In virtue of her transcendent unity she pre-exists the hebdomad, but in virtue of her coordinate unity she brings together the triadic springs in it into one intellectual point and encompasses Hestia and Hera, the latter as she pours forth from the right hand the whole order of the souls, the former as she sends forth from the left all the light of virtue. For this reason, Plato properly calls her both mother and at the same time provider of sustenance (404B8-9), because as mother she encompasses the cause of Hera, but as provider of sustenance she has anticipated Hestia in herself.

168. 'Demeter, just as she pours forth all life, so too pours forth all nourishment. And for this she has Night as a model, who is called "the immortal nurse of gods" (*Orph. fr.* 106); but Night is so on the intelligible level. For, according to the Oracle, the intelligible is nourishment for the intellectual orders of the gods (*Or. Chald.* 17). It was Demeter who first distributed the two types of nourishment among the gods. As Orpheus says,

She devised attendants and servants and followers,
 She devised ambrosia and the flow of red nectar,
 She devised the illustrious works of loud-buzzing bees (fr. 189).

Thus our lady Demeter bears not only life, but also the perfection of life from the beings above all the way to the last ones. For, indeed, her excellence is perfection of the souls.³⁸⁶ So, in imitation of this eternal double generation, even mothers who give birth temporally at once both bear their infant and naturally supply the child with milk as nourishment, but do this neither before nor after.'

404B9-C4 [...] And Hera is a lovely (*eratê*) Goddess, as even Zeus is said to marry her out of love (*erastheis*). But perhaps when speaking about the heavens, the lawgiver named the air (*âêr*) ‘Hera’, disguising it by putting the first letter of ‘air’ at the end of her name. You would recognize the similarity if you repeated the name ‘Hera’ a few times.

The Etymology of ‘Hera’

169. ‘The connection of the demiurgic Intellect with the life-bearing Causes is three-fold: it is attached to the springs prior to it; it communes with its coordinate orders by way of their common nature; and it cooperates with those inferior to it. For it communes with Demeter, who is prior to it, through reversion; with Core, who is later, by exercising providential care over her; and with Hera, who is coordinate, by indulging in love with her. For this reason, Zeus is actually said to desire Hera erotically,

As I now desire you (*Il.* 14.328).

5 And she is his lawful wife, but the other two seem unlawful. With the cooperation of the Demiurge and Father, then, this same Goddess produces from herself all the classes of souls – the supercosmic and encosmic, the celestial and the sublunar, the divine and the angelic, and daemonic and particular [human]. And though in one way she is separate from the Demiurge, in another she is unified with him, for in the *Philebus* (30D) Zeus is said to have “a regal intellect”, because Hera too is joined with him or is encompassed by him.³⁸⁷ For this reason it is said,

You sleep in the arms of Zeus the supreme (*Il.* 14.213).

15 For Zeus uniformly contains the paternal as well as the maternal cause of the cosmos, and the spring of the souls is said to reside in Zeus, just as again the intellectual thought of Zeus is said to be participated in first by Hera. For “no other God”, says Homer’s Zeus, “knows my mind before
20 Hera does” (*Il.* 1.547). Thus, through this ineffable communion of gods, the cosmos partakes of intellectual souls, and intellects were instituted to preside over souls,³⁸⁸ and to bring the whole creation to completion with them.’

170. ‘Beginning from above, the series (*seira*) of our lady [Hera] extends all the way down to the lowest realm, and the air (*âêr*) under the moon is her portion. For the air is a symbol of soul, in accordance with which soul is also termed “spirit”, just as fire, indeed, is an image of intellect; water, through which all nourishment and increase occurs,

is an image of the nature that nourishes the cosmos; and the earth is an image of body because of its dense and material aspect. It is to symbolize this that Homer depicts Hera suspended with two anvils under her feet (Il. 15.18). For the air has been assigned a position with the two heaviest elements below it. But he also says, 94,1

Hera spread deep mist (*êera*) before them (Il. 6), 5

and the following verses too have the same meaning:

Lady Hera sent untiring Helios/ to the streams of Ocean
(Il. 18.239-40),

for he calls the thickest fog, which arises through Hera, “sunset”. And the remark about attaching the end of her name to the beginning – if one should say the name of the Goddess several times (407C4) – indicates her role in the reversion of rational souls upon themselves. Also, because voice is a “percussion of air”, the voice of rational souls is dedicated particularly to this Goddess, who made even the horse of Achilles “able to speak” (Il. 19.407). 10 15

The Etymology of ‘Persephone-Core’

171.³⁸⁹ (Exc.?) Socrates now (404B-C) presents these three life-bearing monads in order – Demeter, Hera, and Persephone – the first of whom is called the mother of the Demiurge, the second his sister, and the third his daughter. Yet all three are participants in the whole creation, the first transcendently and intellectually, the second in a principal and authoritative mode and the third in both a fontal and principal mode. Of these Goddesses the last has been allotted triple powers and encompasses indivisibly and uniformly three monads of gods. By reason of the purity of her essence and her immaculate transcendence in relation to the processes of generation, she is called Core as well. She holds the first, middle, and last hegemony, and Orpheus calls her Artemis at her pinnacle, Persephone at the midpoint, and Athena at the lower limit of her order (*Orph. fr.* 188). The rule of Hecate is established in accordance with the level of reality superior to the other powers of this triple life-bearing order, the psychic realm is established in accordance with the power which is intermediary and generates beings as a whole, and that of virtue is established in accordance with intellectual return. Even above, then, in the supercosmic realm, Core uniformly extends this triple order of the gods, and with Zeus she bears Dionysus, who indivisibly presides over the creation of individuals. But below with Pluto she is viewed predominantly according to her median property; for this is both what proceeds everywhere and provides life to the lowest creatures. She is therefore called Persephone especially when she associates 20 25 95,1 5 10

with Pluto and orders the lowest elements of the universe with him. At her extremes she is said to be a virgin and remain immaculate, but at her middle region she is said to be joined to Hades and with him to bear
 15 the Eumenides in the region of the underworld. The same Goddess is therefore called Core as well but in a different way from her supercosmic and leading aspect. For she is the connecting head of the three life-bearing principles, yet the middle in her possesses the properties of her extremes. As a result, you may find the property of Hecate as well (so
 20 then that too of Athena) in the Persephone with Pluto. But while the extremes in her exist occultly, the proper aspect of her mean shines forth as does the delimiting aspect of her ruling soul, which is there above in a leading capacity, but here below in an encosmic one.

404C5-D8 [...] Now, ‘Pherrephatta’ – many fear both this name and ‘Apollo’ due to their ignorance, it seems, of the correctness of names. For they change the name, behold ‘Phersephone’, and it seems dreadful to them; but it actually indicates that the Goddess is wise (*sophê*). For, given that things are in constant motion, what touches, grasps and is able to follow them would be wisdom. Therefore, because she is wise and ‘in touch with things in motion’ (*epaphên tou pheromenou*), the Goddess would be correctly named ‘Pherepapha’ or something like it. This is why Hades, who is wise, is her mate, because she has this same quality. But people today change her name because they care more for euphony than the truth, and thus call her ‘Pherrephatta’.

172. ‘The lover of piety toward the gods should eagerly cleave to the
 25 correctness of the divine names lest he, like those who sin against Persephone and Apollo through ignorance of the etymology of their names, be reproached by Socrates.’

173. ‘Persephone (404D) has been so named either because she
 96,1 discriminates the Forms and separates them from one another – since “murder” (*phonos*) hints at destruction by division – or because she separates the souls perfectly from their bodies by turning them back (*epistrophê*) to what is above – and this is the most fortunate sort of
 5 “murder” and death for those that are worthy of it. The title “Pherephatta” fits the second etymology [Pherepapha] (404D3-4)³⁹⁰ by her connection (*epaphê*) with generation, and to the third by her wisdom (*sophia*) and her understanding.³⁹¹ Nonetheless all the significations of her are related to the perfection of the soul. This in fact is why she is called Persephone, and not by the names of her extremes, since it is this
 10 aspect, the mean between the extremes which is stably established on its own, that is abducted by Pluto. And it is in this respect that Core is said to remain a virgin.’

404D8-406A3 [...] Yet many have feared the same thing even about Apollo, as I say, about the God's name, as if it indicated something dreadful. Haven't you noticed?

HERM: Of course, and you speak the truth.

SOC: Yet, as it seems to me, the name is very consistent with the God's power.

HERM: How so?

SOC: I shall try to describe it as it appears to me. In fact, it's impossible that a single name be better fit to comprehend all four powers of the God and somehow indicate his particular skills of music, prophecy, medicine, and archery.

HERM: Speak on, for what you say of this name is strange to me.

SOC: It's actually harmonious, since Apollo is the God of music. For in the first place cleansing and purifications both by medicine and prophecy, fumigations with medicinal drugs, and divine rite as well as the lustral washings and sprinklings therein probably all have the same power – to purify man in both body and soul. Is this not so?

HERM: Most certainly.

SOC: And the God that purifies, cleanses (*apolouôn*) and absolves (*apoluôn*) men from such evils would be Apollo?

HERM: Most certainly.

SOC: Now, by virtue of his absolutions and ritual cleansings, because he is a healer by such means, he would be correctly called 'Apolouôn'. But by virtue of his prophetic art, his truth and simplicity (*haploun*) – in fact, these qualities are the same – he would most correctly be called by the Thessalian name 'Aploun'. For all the Thessalians call the God 'Aplous'. And because he is the eternal Lord of arrows (*aei bolôn enkratês*) in archery, he is called 'Aeiballon'. And by virtue of his musical ability, we must suppose that [as in *akolouthos* (attendant) and *akoitis* (wife)] the 'a' often indicates simultaneity, so here it indicates 'simultaneous movement' (*homou polêsis*) both around the heavens, which they call the poles (*poloi*), and involving the harmony of song, which is called 'concord', because all these things, as experts in music and astronomy say, 'move at once' (*polei hama*) in a certain harmony. This God is the Lord of harmony for he 'moves' all things 'together' (*homopolôn*) at the level of both the gods and men. Thus, just as we named the attendant (*homokeleuthos*) and wife (*homokoitis*) 'akolouthos' and 'akoitis', by substituting an 'a' for the 'homo', so too we changed 'Homopolon' to 'Apollon' with the addition of the second 'l', because otherwise it was homonymous with a disturbing name – ['Apolon', the destructor]. Even today people are suspicious because they don't see the correct force of his name and fear it, assuming that it indicates a kind of ruin. But as we were just

saying, he is assigned a name that comprehends all of the God's powers – that he is simple (*haplous*), eternally projects (*aei ballôn*), cleanses (*apolouôn*), and moves together (*homopolôn*).

The Third Principal Triad: Apollo

174.³⁹² 'It is with good reason that he now (404E) etymologizes "Apollo" after "Persephone"; for there is a good deal in common between these two series, I mean that of Core and that of Apollo. The former, after all, is henad of the middle triad of the Principles and projects life-bearing powers from herself, while the latter turns the solar Principles back to one unity, and "contains the triple-winged Principle", as the Oracle says (*Or. Chald.* 168). The solar Principles, however, have been allotted their subsistence in the rank just following those that bear life. This is why, according to Orpheus, Demeter says the following, as she hands over the kingdom to Core,³⁹³

But going up to the stout bed of Apollo
 You shall bear illustrious children burning with fire in their faces
 (fr. 194).

But how could this happen if there were not a good deal of association between these gods?

Concerning Apollo, one should know this much: according to (one's) first and spontaneous intuition (of it), the name "Apollo" signifies one who is the cause of unity and who leads multiplicity up to the One, and this line of theorizing about his name applies to all the orders of the God.

97,1 But Socrates is concerned here only with his more particular powers; for the entire multitude of Apollo's powers is incomprehensible to us and indescribable. Indeed, how could human reason ever become able to grasp all the properties together, not only of Apollo, but of any God at all?

The theologians have presented to us a great multitude of Apollo's properties; but Socrates now (405D) presents only four. For the cosmos is like a sort of decad which is filled with all the Formulae,³⁹⁴ which has embraced all things in itself and turned them back to the proper Principle of the decad, the cause of which is proximately comprised by the tetrad, but transcendentally by the monad.³⁹⁵ The latter exists indivisibly and occultly, the former in a discriminated mode, just as Apollo too unifies the multitude of the encosmic entities proximately, while the demiurgic Intellect does so transcendentally. Why, then, has Socrates presented the etymologies in such an order? He begins after all with the art of medicine, proceeds through those of divination and archery, and ends with music. Our response must be that all the activities of this God exist in all the orders of existing things; while beginning from the highest and proceeding all the way to the lowest, some activities seem

more or less to prevail on some levels, others on others.³⁹⁶ For example, the medical activity of the God prevails more in the realm beneath the moon, where

There is wrath and murder and tribes of other banes,
Squalid sicknesses and putrefactions, works in flux (Empedocles,
DK 31 B 121,2-3).

25

For these things which are subject to random movement need to return from what is contrary to nature to what is in accordance with nature, from asymmetry and diffuseness to symmetry and unity.

The prophetic activity, in contrast, prevails in heaven. For there especially the revelatory power of the God shines through as it reveals intelligible goods to the celestial entities. For that reason, Apollo revolves in company with the sun, and the same intellect is displayed in both, since the sun too transmits light to the beings in heaven as it illuminates and provides all things with the power of unification. 98,1

The activity of archery, in turn, prevails on the level of the independent (*apolutoi*) gods. For there instilling essence into things as a whole, he activates his own motions, which they liken to projectiles in every sense; and he removes all disorder, while he fills all beings with the gifts of creation, which is why he is called “Hekatê-beletês” [fardarter (*Il.* 1.75)], because, though separate and transcendent, he extends to all things with his activities. His musical activity is more prevalent at the leading and principal order. For it is this God who harmonizes even the whole cosmos into a single unity, establishing the chorus of the Muses around himself, 5 10

Taking pride in the harmony of light,

as one of the theurgists says (*Or. Chald.* 71).

15

Thus, as we have said, both the musical and the other Apollos exist both on earth and in other places, but is manifested more on one level, less on another. In the God himself these same powers subsist unitarily and transcendently, while in the classes of being that follow the God and are greater than us, they exist by participation and particularly. For example, there are many classes of medical angels, daemons, and heroes who are dependent upon Apollo, and many classes of different spirits of prophecy, music, and archery who distribute the unitary powers of the God in a particular and discriminate mode. 20

We must examine each of these powers in terms of one distinct property – for example, the musical in terms of the property that binds the dispersed multitude, that of archery in terms of the property that destroys disordered nature, the prophetic in terms of the revelatory, and the medical in terms of the perfective, and we must also view these properties in different ways respectively in the case of the gods them- 25 99,1

selves, and in the case of the angelic, daemonic, and heroic orders, and differently again for men, animals, and plants. For the powers of the
 5 gods descend from above all the way down to the lowest realm, being appropriately manifested at each level, all of which, indeed, theurgy undertakes to link to the gods by way of a sympathetic relationship.³⁹⁷ But throughout all the orders the following principle should be maintained, that this God is unifier of what has suffered multiplication. For instance, the power of medicine eliminates the disparate aspect of
 10 illnesses, and bestows the gift of unitary health. For health is symmetry and accords with nature, whereas what is variegated is unnatural. And again, the power of prophecy, in revealing the simplicity of truth, destroys the variety of falsehood. And that of archery, as it destroys everything errant and beastly, and gives control to discipline and refine-
 15 ment, cleaves to unity and dissolves the disordered nature which is carried into multiplicity. And as for music, through rhythm and harmony it instils a bond, friendship and unity in the universe, and everything opposite to these it removes.

So, then, the Creator of the universe, too, when he makes it both
 20 ageless and incorruptible (*Tim.* 33A) with the intellectual power of medicine which restrains in advance all that is unnatural and does not permit it to subsist; when he leads what is errant and disordered into order by his divine power of archery, binds together the inharmonic aspect of matter with harmonies and harmonizes souls with the divine power of music; when by the intellectual power of divination in him, which generates events at the same time as the prophecies of them, he
 25 predicts to souls what will be, he reveals the truth. All these powers exist primarily, transcendently, and uniformly in the Demiurge of the universe, but secondarily and in a discriminated mode in Apollo. So
 30 Apollo will not therefore be the same as the demiurgic Intellect, but rather, while the latter encompasses these powers wholly and paternally, Apollo does so on a lower level, as he imitates his own Father. For
 100,1 all the activities of the secondary gods and their powers are causally
 5 contained in the Demiurge. While he creates and organizes the universe by means of all of these at once and together, the other gods who have proceeded from him cooperate with their Father according to their different powers.'

175. 'When Hermogenes says that the name of the God Apollo is "strange" (*atopos*), Socrates says that it is "harmonious" (*euarmostos*),
 10 thus avoiding blasphemy (405A).'

176. 'That purification is a function not only of medicine but also of divination shows that Apollo's power of purification generically includes these two. For with flashes of light he illuminates the cosmos, and with
 15 healing activities he purifies all material disproportion – activities which even doctors and seers here on earth imitate, the former by purifying bodies, the latter by sanctifying themselves and those with them by lustral sprinklings and fumigations. For, as Timaeus says

(22C), the gods purify the universe with either fire or water – and seers 20
 too imitate these [acts]. This is also why theurgical procedures prescribe
 that one first purify the oracular “summoners” and “receptors” by these
 means,³⁹⁸ and purificatory rites are performed before initiations not only
 for seers but also for initiates, thereby removing everything foreign to 25
 the initiation at hand.³⁹⁹ Moreover, referring the manifold purifications
 back to the one purificatory power of the God is certainly proper to him.
 For Apollo is everywhere unifier and synthesizer of multiplicity, and,
 since he purifies the whole heaven, generation and all encosmic lives 101,1
 and separates particular souls from the densifications of matter, he
 uniformly anticipates all methods of purification as well. This is why the
 theurgist too, when directing the initiation proper to this God, begins
 from purifications and lustral sprinklings: 5

Let the priest himself, when first directing the works of fire,
 Be sprinkled with a cold douse of deeply-echoing brine,

as the oracle says about him (*Or. Chald.* 133).

That Apollo is lord of simplicity in understanding and reveals the
 truth is demonstrated by his analogy to the Good, which Socrates 10
 celebrates in the *Republic* as well, when he says that the sun is the
 offspring of the Good and analogous to it (517C). Since, then, he is
 unificatory and, in this sense, is ranked as analogous to the Good in
 comparison with the encosmic gods, by revealing the truth to us Apollo
 also reveals his similarity, if we may venture to say so, to the One. For 15
 what is “simple” (*haploun*) is a manifestation of the One, and truth in
 understanding is a manifestation of the superessential and primary
 understanding which proceeds from the Good.

That this God is “eternal lord of darts” (405C) demonstrates that his
 sovereignty prevails over all things in the cosmos. From the superceles- 20
 tial order above he sows all the cosmos with channels and the rays of
 light from Zeus; for his “darts” symbolize his rays of light. That he is God
 of music (406A) demonstrates that Apollo is cause of all harmony, both
 invisible and visible, through his directive powers, by which with 25
 Mnemosyne and Zeus he engenders the Muses, and he cooperates in
 organizing the perceptible universe with his demiurgic powers, which
 the sons of the theurgists call “hands”, since indeed the activity of
 harmony is dependent upon the motion of the hands.⁴⁰⁰ But he also puts
 both souls and bodies in order through the harmonic ratios, as when he 102,1
 employs their different powers in the form of sounds, and moves all
 things harmoniously and rhythmically by his demiurgic motions. Fur-
 thermore, the whole celestial order and its motion demonstrates the 5
 harmonic work of the God. This is why individual souls as well, once
 they have removed the disharmony that results from generation, are
 perfected in no other way than by harmonic assimilation to the uni-

verse. For then they achieve the best life that is offered them by the God.'

406A3-5 [...] The Muses and music in general, it seems, were named after pursuit (*môsthai*), inquiry, and philosophy.

The Analysis of 'Apollo' and the 'Muses'⁴⁰¹

- 10 Plato now (406B) moves from the discussion of Apollo the King to the Muses and the name of music. For Apollo is celebrated as *Mousêgetês* [the leader of the Muses]. And while he is a monad in respect of the harmony in the universe, the chorus of the Muses [is receptive] of the ennead, which is the number of the universe. Yet from both, the cosmos
- 15 as a whole is 'bound with unbreakable chains' (*Tim.* 43A) and is both one and all-perfect: it has the former quality through the Apollonian monad, but that of total perfection through the number of the Muses. For the number nine, which has arisen from the first perfect number through similarity and identity, is related to the multiform causes of
- 20 cosmic order and harmony, but also to all the causes focused into a single perfection.⁴⁰² For these generate the variety of the ratios,⁴⁰³ but he connects all their multitude in unity; they institute spiritual harmony, but he is conductor of intellectual and indivisible harmony;⁴⁰⁴ and
- 25 they divide that which is visible in accordance with the harmonic ratios, but he connects up the invisible and separate harmony. Both are institutors of the same [ratios], but they by number, he by unity. And
- 103,1 they discriminate the unicity of Apollo, but he unifies the musical multiplicity as he turns it back and connects it together. For the multitude of the Muses is something that comes from the unitary and separate existence of the *Mousêgetês*. It is the number that has pro-
- 5 ceeded from and unfolded the one and primal cause of the harmony of the universe.

The Muses

177. 'The true etymology of the name of the Muses is as follows (406A). Plato calls philosophy "the greatest music" (*Phd.* 61A), because it makes our spiritual powers move harmoniously and concordantly in relation to
- 10 reality and to the ordered motions of the cycles in the soul.⁴⁰⁵ The search for both our essence and that of the universe leads us to this skill by turning us back to both ourselves and the entities greater than us. Likening the revolutions in ourselves to those of the universe, we become concordant with it. We therefore name the Muses from the
- 15 process of search. For the *Mousêgetês* himself reveals the truth to souls through a single intellectual simplicity, but the Muses perfect our various activities which lead up to the one intellectual unity. For the

processes of search hold the rank of matter in relation to the end resulting from the discovery, just as multiplicity too is related to the One, and variety to simplicity. We therefore know that the Muses instil in souls the pursuit of truth, in bodies the multiplicity of their faculties and everywhere the variety of harmonies.’ 20

406A6-B1 [...] ‘Leto’ was derived from the Goddess’ gentleness, since she is willing (*ethelêmôn*) to grant whatever one asks. But perhaps as foreigners call her – for many of them say ‘Letho’ – perhaps she has been named after that aspect of her disposition (*êthos*) that is not harsh but soft and smooth (*leion*).⁴⁰⁶

The Etymology of ‘Leto’

178. ‘Leto (406A) is a life-bearing spring encompassed in Demeter. This is why our ancestral traditions honour the same Goddess as both Demeter and Leto, demonstrating the unity of these Goddesses. This Goddess sends forth all life-bearing light, illuminating both the intellectual essences of the gods and the orders of souls, and ultimately lights up the whole perceptible heaven, since she has generated the light around the cosmos, and established its cause in her children, Apollo and Artemis, and flashes like lightning her intellectual and life-bearing light into all things.⁴⁰⁷ But in souls as well she instils the perfection of virtue and the enlightenment that leads them up to the intellectual aspect of the Father, as she rescues them from the crooked paths of matter, the tangles of evil, and the harshness in generation. It is with regard to these facts, it seems to me, that the theologians call her “Leto”, because she conveys to souls the “smooth” aspect (*leion*) of their character and what facilitates the life of free will and is conducive to divine ease. For these qualities instil in those who strive toward her an ineffable degree of activity, painless life, gentleness, lack of disturbance, and intellectual stillness.⁴⁰⁸ So, whether the Goddess has been named “Leto” after the “voluntary” (for *lô* is an expression meaning “I wish” [*boulomai*]) or something like *Leêtô* after her “smoothness” (*leion*), the name in any event indicates the powers of the Goddess through both [etymologies]. For the activities of the soul, which have been forced upon it through the harshness of matter, and the twisted nature of life in generation diminish the voluntary life of souls. The ascent to the gods, however, offers them a smooth and refined life instead of a hard and harsh one, a voluntary instead of a constrained one, and the Goddess who brings this about is therefore named “Leto”. 104,1 5 10 15 20

Can there be any question of calling matter “Leto”, since it is changeable and a matrix present to all the Forms, receives like a mirror the appearances of all things and is cause of forgetfulness (*lêthê*) for those who look to it?⁴⁰⁹ Any question of calling Apollo “harmony” (cf. 405D4), 25

because he received his being from Leto and Zeus? For thus this God too
 105,1 would be inseparable from matter and no longer cause of the harmony
 in the universe. Furthermore, how is it possible to make him now the
 same as the Demiurge, now inseparable from matter? It therefore is
 better to say that Leto is not the receptacle of Apollo, but to consider her
 his mother and the very spring of all life-bearing light that preserves all
 5 creatures by its heat;⁴¹⁰ and that Apollo, from a transcendent perspective,
 is conductor of all harmonic life and all the encosmic ratios, by
 which the universe is “indissolubly bound together” (*Tim.* 32C3-4). Since
 10 it was perhaps by reason of the immaturity of [Hermogenes] youth that
 Socrates forebore to derive this great Goddess’ name “Leto” from “for-
 getfulness” (*lêthê*)⁴¹¹ one might attribute this name to her correctly, on
 the grounds that she makes souls forget the evil, the turmoil, and the
 “deluge” (*Tim.* 23B)⁴¹² involved in generation, for it is impossible that a
 soul that still bears the memory of these things be situated in the
 intelligible realm. Indeed, “memory leads to the object of the memory”,
 15 as Plotinus says; and just as Mnemosyne awakens our memory of the
 Intelligibles, so Leto grants forgetfulness of the material.’

406B1-6 [...] Artemis seems to have been named because of her
 ‘sound’ (*artemes*) and orderly disposition, because of her desire for
 virginity. Yet perhaps the Goddess was named as the protectress
 of virtue (*aretês histora*), but maybe because she despises a man’s
 ‘sowing’ (*aroton misêsasa*) on a woman. It was for one or all of these
 reasons that the name-giver assigned this name to the Goddess.

The Etymology of ‘Artemis’

179. ‘Plato (406B) presents here three properties of our lady Artemis:
 20 that of immaculateness, that of ordering and that of elevating. By virtue
 of the first the Goddess is said to desire virginity; by the second,
 according to which she is perfective, she is said to be protectress of
 virtue; and by the third, according to which she <is reflexive>,⁴¹³ she is
 said to despise the procreative impulses. Of the three the first is
 especially fit to the procession of the Goddess, according to which she is
 25 allotted the role of essence in the life-bearing triad of the Principles,
 whether she is addressed as a Hecatic divinity, as the theurgists say, or
 as Artemis, as Orpheus says (fr. 188). For in that situation she is filled
 with pure powers from the implacable gods, yet she also looks to the
 106,1 fount of virtue and welcomes its virginity.⁴¹⁴ For that spring “does not
 lose its virginity”, as the Oracle says (fr. 52). But as she contemplates
 that spring she herself establishes archetypal virtue, and she trans-
 scends all intercourse, coupling and procession into generation. Whence
 5 Core too is said to remain a virgin by virtue of the Artemis and the
 Athena in herself, while by the generative power of Persephone she is

said to approach and to be attached to the third Demiurge and, as Orpheus says, to bear

Nine grey-eyed daughters who create flowers (fr. 197),

whereas the Artemis and the Athena in her always preserve an un- 10
 changing virginity; for the former is characterized by her quality of
 stability, the latter by that of reversion, while the generative aspect is
 allotted the middle order in her. But they say that [Core] desires
 virginity, because her Form is encompassed in the life-bearing spring. 15
 She contemplates the excellence of her fount and establishes the princi-
 pal and transcendental virtue, and rejects all mingling with matter,
 although she oversees the fruits of such material mingling:

Though lacking the experience and fulfilment of marriage,
 She loses the bonds of all childbirth,

says Orpheus (fr. 187). It seems that she rejects the generations and the 20
 processions of things, but brings their perfections to them and completes
 souls through the life in accordance with virtue, and she arranges for
 mortal beings to be restored to their Form.

That Artemis is closely united both with the encosmic Hecate and 25
 with Core is apparent to those who have consulted even superficially the
 works of Orpheus, from which it is clear that Leto is encompassed within
 the Demeter who has created in cooperation with Zeus both Core and the
 encosmic Hecate, seeing as Orpheus has actually called Artemis “Hecate”: 107,1

Thus the divine Hecate, the daughter of well-tressed Leto,
 Left the limbs of her son and ascended Olympus (fr. 188).

So it is no wonder if elsewhere we too have called the Artemis in Core 5
 “Hecate”. And Plato, having celebrated the Goddesses in this passage
 with three epithets, would say that one name indicates a certain quality,
 another all her qualities. For the first extends through all her qualities,
 but those following, inasmuch as they were allotted a more particular
 rank, may so be said to have been given “because of one certain quality” 10
 by which they are especially characterized (406B).’

406B7-C6 HERM: What about Dionysus and Aphrodite?

SOC: You are asking about important matters, son of Hipponicus.
 There is both a serious explanation of the names of these gods and
 a playful one. Ask others for the serious one, but nothing prevents
 us from discussing the playful. For even the gods love to play.
 Indeed, Dionysus, the ‘giver of wine’ (*ho didous ton oinon*), might
 be called ‘Didoinysus’ in jest; and wine, because it makes many

drinkers think they are wise (*oiesthai noun*) when they really are not, might quite fairly be called ‘oionous’.

The Etymology of ‘Dionysus’

180.⁴¹⁵ ‘He has ranked the encosmic Dionysus with the encosmic Aphrodite because she loves him and forms a likeness of him, Adonis, who was much honoured among the Cilicians and Cypriotes (404B).⁴¹⁶ It is clear
15 that such a love on the part of Aphrodite should be understood as boniform and providential, because it is fulfilled from a greater God in relation to an inferior one.’

181. ‘The youth seems to pose questions about the lord Dionysus as
20 if about a trifling matter, and this is why he is reprimanded by Socrates (406B), and does learn from him about the occult processions of the gods, but only about the lowest, encosmic ones. Of course, the wise man takes these things seriously as well, although they are playthings (406C), as he says, since “these gods are playful”. For as he says that the limits of
25 the other gods, though they are frightening, vengeful, and punitive, perfect particular souls (he says, for instance, that “justice attends upon Zeus, as avenger of transgressions against divine law” (*Laws* 716A) and that this same Goddess is mild to those who are cultivated and live
108,1 intellectually, but makes sinners and those who confound their life with a lack of learning pay the price, until she utterly annihilates them, their homes, and their cities); in the same way he glorifies the limits of Dionysus and Aphrodite which produce spiritual delight, as he every-
5 where purifies our conceptions of the gods and prepares us to think that all things, of whatever sort they may be, look toward the best end. In fact, it is because he fortifies anew the weakness of mortal nature and relieves the difficulty of corporeal life that the gods who are responsible for these things are playful. Whence, no doubt, they make the one class
10 of statues laughing, unrestrained, and dancing, but the other harsh, daunting to those that view them, and fierce,⁴¹⁷ by analogy to the encosmic lots of the respective gods.’

182. ‘The theologians often call our lord Dionysus “wine” (*oinos*)
15 specifically after his lowest gifts. Orpheus says, for example,

Instead of one, they imposed a triple root on Wine (fr. 216),

and again,

Take all parts of Wine in the cosmos and bring them to me (*ibid.*),

and in turn,

20 She was indignant with Wine, the son of Zeus (*ibid.*).

If the God himself is so called, it is clear that both his first and his median activities may be given the same name as his ultimate one. Now (406C) referring to that, Socrates calls the God “Didoynsos”, deriving the name from wine (*oinos*), which, as we have stated, reveals all the powers of the God, just as in the *Phaedrus* he calls the great Eros indiscriminately both divine and a lover of the body. So wine, as commonly used in the vernacular, provides us with the property of the particular intellect (*nous*). For the *oionous* (406C5-6) is nothing else than the intellectual form which is separated off from the whole, and is already participated in [e.g. by soul], and has become single and “specific” (*hoion*). The altogether perfect Intellect is all things and operates in accordance with all things in the same way, while the particular and participated intellect is all things, but in one form which has been assigned to it out of all – for example, the form of Sun, Moon, or Mercury (*Hermes*). It is this property which is distinguished from the rest that is indicated by “wine”, since it indicates a “specific” and a “particular” intellect (*ton hoion kai tina nous*). Therefore, because all particular creation depends upon the Dionysian monad – distinguishing the participated intellects in the cosmos from the universal Intellect, the many souls from the one Soul and all the perceptible forms from their proper universals – this is why the theologians call the God himself “wine”, both himself and all his creations. For they are all products of the Intellect, though some participate more remotely, others more immediately in the particular dispensation of the Intellect. Thus wine operates analogously at the various levels of being – in the body it operates like an image through belief and false imagination, while in the intellectual realm activity and creation take place intellectually; which is why, when the Titans tore Dionysus apart, only his heart is said to have remained undivided, that is, the indivisible essence of his intellect.⁴¹⁸

406C7-D2 [...] Regarding Aphrodite, we should not challenge Hesiod, but agree with him that she was named after her birth out of foam (*aphros*).

183. It is possible to be inspired even by childish conceptions about gods, if one approaches things in a properly intellectual way. Consider that, according to the materialist interpretations of the common people, Aphrodite is she that is generated from the “foam” (*aphros*). And while the foam is the excretion of sperm, the pleasure created from this excretion in intercourse is Aphrodite. Who then is so simple-minded that he would not examine the primal and eternal Causes before the ultimate, corruptible ones? This is why Socrates calls Hesiod to witness (*Theogony* 196), to remind us of his inspired interpretation, once we have discarded the vulgar one (406C).

Let us then discuss what such a divine interpretation is. They say that the primal Aphrodite is generated from two-fold causes – the one

as instrumental and the other as generative. While Cronus, as her instrumental Cause, is said to cooperate with procession because he calls <forth> the generative power of the Father and bestows it upon the intellectual realms, Uranus, being her Creator, is also said to be her Cause, since he reveals this Goddess from his own generative abundance.⁴¹⁹ From what other source, after all, could one derive the substance that synthesizes the different genera into a single desire for Beauty than from the connective power of Uranus? Thus Uranus produces Aphrodite from the foam of his own productive parts which was cast into the sea,⁴²⁰ as Orpheus says:

His parts fell from above into the sea; the white foam
 Enfolded them about on all sides as they floated.
 20 But with the passing seasons, a year brought forth
 A modest maiden, whom in their hands
 Jealousy and Deception together first received (fr. 127).

The second Aphrodite is produced by Zeus from his own generative powers, but Dione assists him in her production. This Goddess proceeds from the foam in the same way as her elder. The same theologian so speaks of her too as follows:

111,1 Desire seized him more strongly, but from the genitals
 Of the supreme Father sprang forth the foamy seed,
 And the sea received the seed of great Zeus.
 When a year passed with its lovely-leaved seasons,
 5 It bore laughter-stirring Aphrodite, born of the foam (fr. 183).

These Goddesses therefore differ from each other in their causes, their orders of being, and their powers. For the one derived from Uranus is supercosmic, a guide to the intelligible Beauty and a conductor toward immaculate life; she also separates one from generation. The Dionian, however, administers all the coordinations in the Uranian cosmos and earth, binds them to one another and perfects their generative processions with a common intelligible conjunction. Yet, the Goddesses are unified with each other by the similarity of their substance. For they proceed from the generative powers, one from the Connector, the other from the Demiurge. The sea represents the dispersed and unbounded life and its depth which proceeds to every level; but the foam, what is purest and filled with generative light and power and floats upon all of life, even like a bloom (*anthos*) on the pinnacle of life. Aphrodite therefore reveals herself as the most uniform and purest aspect of all life.'

406D3-407C2 HERM: But you will certainly not forget Athena, since you are an Athenian, Socrates, nor Hephaestus and Ares.

SOC: That is unlikely.

HERM: Of course.

SOC: Now, why one of her names was assigned is not difficult to say.

HERM: What is that?

SOC: We call her 'Pallas', I think.

HERM: So we do.

SOC: If we believe that this was assigned from her dancing in arms, I think we would be correct. For raising ourselves or anything else either from the earth or in our hands we call 'shaking' (*pallein*) and 'being shaken' (*pallesthai*) and 'dancing' and 'being danced'.

HERM: Most certainly.

SOC: 'Pallas' then was derived in this way.

HERM: And correctly so. But how do you explain her other name?

SOC: Do you mean 'Athena'?

HERM: Yes.

SOC: This is a weightier matter, my friend. And the ancients seem to have thought about Athena as do contemporary authorities on Homer. For many interpreters of the poet say that by Athena he means intellect and discursive thought, and the name-giver seems to have understood something similar about her. Calling her the even greater name, 'divine intelligence', he seems to say that she is '*ha theonoa*' (the intelligence of God), using the '*α*' instead of long '*ε*' in foreign fashion and removing the '*ι*' and '*ς*'. But perhaps it was not for this reason, but because she more than any other God contemplates the divine (*theia noousa*) that he called her 'Theonoê'. Nor would we be far off in saying that 'Êthonoê' is intended to indicate that this Goddess is also 'ethical intelligence' (*en tōi êthei noêsis*). But either the name-giver himself or others later changed it to a form they considered more beautiful and called her Athena.

The Etymology of 'Athena'

184.⁴²¹ 'Plato has combined his treatment of Athena, Hephaestus and Ares (406D) because of their common relation to matters of war, because of the technical prowess of Athena which is common to both the others, and because both gods desire the same Aphrodite and both were born of Hera and Zeus.'⁴²²

25

185. 'The theologians praise two powers in particular of our lady Athena – the guardian, which keeps the order of the things as a whole untainted and unconquerable by matter, and the perfective, which fills all creatures with intellectual light and turns them back to their own cause. This is why in the *Timaeus* (24C) Plato analogously praises Athena as both a "lover of war" and a "lover of wisdom".'⁴²³

112,1

5

Her orders are described as three: the first is fontal and intellectual,

and by this she established herself in her Father and exists there without procession. The second is principal, and by this she exists with
 10 Core, limits all her procession and turns her back to herself. The third is independent, and by this she perfects, guards, and covers all the cosmos with her own powers, since she connects all the encosmic heights and, herself, institutes all the lots in heaven as well as those that have
 15 proceeded under the moon.⁴²⁴ Here, then, Socrates celebrates the guardian power with the name of Pallas, and the perfective with that of Athena. She thus reveals rhythmic dance by the motion which she also shares first of all with the Curetic order, but secondly with the other gods as well. For by this power, says Orpheus, Athena is leader of the
 20 Curetes (fr. 185).⁴²⁵ And for this reason she is equipped with empyrean arms, just like the Curetes, by means of which she repels all disorder, keeps the demiurgic order unmovable and reveals the dance through rhythmic motion. Yet she also preserves the reason-principle that proceeds from Intellect and governs matter through her. For “the universe”,
 25 says Timaeus (47E), is “mixed from Intellect and Necessity”, though Necessity obeys Intellect,⁴²⁶ and all material causes together are subject to the Will of the Father. It is therefore this same Goddess that subjects
 113,1 Necessity to the creative activity of the Intellect, raises the universe to participation in God, awakens and situates it in the “harbour” of the Father and guards it eternally. And if the universe is ever said to be “indissoluble” (*Tim.* 41A), she is bestower of its permanence; and if it is said to dance for all time, she is leader of the chorus by a single
 5 reason-principle and a single order.⁴²⁷ She therefore watches over all the creation of her Father, holds it together and turns it back to him, and conquers all material indefiniteness. This is why she is called both “Victory” and “Health” – the former because she makes Intellect and
 10 Form govern Necessity and matter, respectively; the latter because she keeps <the cosmos>⁴²⁸ forever whole, perfect, ageless and incorruptible.⁴²⁹ It therefore is a property of this Goddess to elevate, divide and, through intellectual dancing, join to the more divine realm, to establish and preserve in’

Notes

1. Proclus begins all of his Platonic commentaries with a description of the purpose of the dialogue under consideration. See also Proclus in *Parm.* in *Opera Inedita* 630.22ff.; *ibid.* in *Tim.* 1.1ff.; *ibid.* in *Remp.* 7.5ff.

2. The lowest entities (*eskhata*) which Proclus mentions here refer to the intracosmic region which belongs to soul. Proclus uses the terms *arkhê-meson-telos* or *proton-meson-eskhaton* (first-middle-last/lowest) to describe the relations between both *huparxes* and entire orders (*diakosmoi*) within the universe. That is, just as each *huparxis* has a beginning, middle and end, yet all three are one, so too the universe-in-procession is generally composed of an intelligible origin (*prôton*), an intellectual middle region (*meson*) and a spiritual extreme (*eskhaton*) which reverts back to its intelligible source. See Beierwaltes, *Proklos, Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*, 72-88.

3. In the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus explains that the *dunamis aphomoiôtikê* (ability to produce likenesses, power of assimilation) is a consequence of the reversion of all things first to their proper monad but ultimately to the Good and to the transcendent One. The ability extends through all superessential, essential, psychical, incorporeal and corporeal genera and was 'unfolded into light' along with the Being (*huparxis*) of the gods. The *dunamis aphomoiôtikê* includes (1) those that reveal the intellectual creation of the Father, (2) those that connect universal things and preserve one chain and indissoluble fabric of the divine process, (3) the primary leaders of perfection for all subsequent entities, which also turn things back perfectly to their principles, (4) those that extend all proceeding genera of the gods to individual monads and are the first collectors of particular beings, (5) others institute the divine genera and supply both existence and essence to first and last things, (6) others are the cause of undefiled distribution and eternally stable perfection, (7) the leaders of generative production, and (8) those that elevate subsequent beings and cut out everything material and errant (*Theol. Plat.* 6.4.5-26).

4. Activity (*energeia*), according to Proclus, is the actualization of potential (*dunamis*). Like all things, both power and activity ultimately emanate from the transcendent One, but they first become manifest in the superessential henads prior to being itself (see the Appendix). As this universal power and activity descend into the third monad of the intelligible sphere, which is also intellectual in nature, it is discriminated into the various divine powers and activities which are associated with the different gods. In the intelligible sphere, the gods thus both participate in and are discriminated from one another. The divine activities and powers are conducted into the intellectual order by the light of Phanes (see in *Crat.* 71.33.5ff.). They are protected from all lower order corruption by the Hundred-handers in the intelligible-intellectual sphere and the Curetes in the intellectual region (see in *Crat.* 107.58.3ff.). As they enter into the cosmic sphere, however, they become prone to the interference of the process of

generation. While the generative activity of the soul, then, is derived from the gods and ultimately the One itself, it is also subject to the corruption of the things that pass away. For an accurate representation of Reality through names, it must rely on its power of assimilation, which is derived from the Assimilative gods and assists in the successful imitation of stable, intelligible Reality by lower order creatures. See Appendix 1 for the cosmic location of the Assimilative gods. Also see the ensuing discussion of Neoplatonic assimilation. Gersh, *Kinesis Akinetos: A Study of Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus* is a reliable source for information on Power (pp. 27-48) and Activity (pp. 81-102) in the works of Proclus.

5. In the *Platonic Theology*, Proclus explains that there are three types of soul which transmit the activity of the gods: the first and most divine are celestial and subsist in simple and eternal bodies; others are clothed with aetherial garments and govern the universal elements which are eternal and simple but also material and susceptible to generation and passing away; and others proximately inspire life in vehicles of light, drawing material garments from the simple elements and pouring secondary life into them (3.18.24-19.15). It is through these 'material garments' that these souls communicate with composite and manifold bodies and undergo the third type of participation in divine activity. These three kinds of soul, descending from coordination with the gods to that with composite bodies, comprise the first level in the spiritual hierarchy of universal, intellectual and particular souls. The second level, that of intellectual souls, is composed of angels, who are attendants of the gods, daemons, who may be divine, intellectual, spiritual, physical, corporeal or material, and human souls that are heroic. The third level is comprised of all remaining human souls (cf. Brisson, 'Proclus et l'Orphisme', 87). According to Proclus, as the universal activity of these souls descends and becomes more particular, its contact with the eternal Forms diminishes, it becomes more and more clouded by the influence of matter and consequently produces names less and less similar to the objects themselves (cf. *in Crat.* 137).

6. Chapters 2-9 of the *in Crat.* deal with the form of the discussions used in the *Cratylus*. See the Introduction for a discussion of the standard structure of Proclus' commentaries.

7. Sheppard points out that 'logical' here refers to both philosophical logic and philosophy of language. In the *in Int.* Ammonius explains that 'Logical argumentation aims at the discovery of deductive proof, but this is preceded by knowledge of deductive reasoning in general (*haplos*), and this in turn is preceded by a theoretical understanding of the simple (*haploi*) words that comprise the deductive argument, and this is preceded by direct apprehension of all the simple phonemes, by type, from which the simple word is generated' (1,24-2,4). In the introduction of his commentary, Ammonius cites Proclus as the source of his ideas on *Int.* (1,8). Since in the *Cratylus* Socrates too argues that the truth of an argument depends on the truth of even the smallest parts of the argument (*Crat.* 385C; *in Crat.* 86) it is likely that Ammonius' definition of *logikê* is related to that of Proclus in the *in Crat.* (For more information on the relation between the language theory of Proclus and Ammonius, see van den Berg, 'Smoothing over the Differences', 191-201.) Sheppard adds that the standard Thrasyllan classification of the *Cratylus* was as *logikos* (Sheppard, 'Proclus' Philosophical Method of Exegesis', 138). Diogenes Laertius reports that the *Sophist*, *Statesman* and *Parmenides* were also treated as logical in the philosophical sense, whereas the *Cratylus* deals more with language theory. The *Parmenides* is concerned with both argumentation and the use of language (Diog. Laert. 3.58). See also Albinus Didaskalikos, 6 and Eusebius, *Praep.*

Evang. 11.5.6. Proclus considers both the *Sophist* and *Parmenides*, like the *Cratylus*, as dialectical works (*Theol. Plat.* 1.4.13, 20).

8. In the *Topics*, Aristotle defines two types of dialectical argumentation: inductive, which works from particulars to universals, and calculative (*sullogismos*), which reasons from generally accepted opinions (105a10). Deductive proof is a form of calculation which reasons from true and primary premises (*Top.* 100a25). It is this form of calculation that Proclus describes as 'abstracted from the objects of analysis'.

9. For another Platonic parallel between mathematics and dialectic, see *Meno* 86Dff. For Proclus, the relationship among mathematics, dialectic and the knowledge of Reality is even closer and more complicated than that for Socrates. At *in Euc.* 42,9-43,6 Proclus explains what Plato means by calling dialectic 'the coping stone of mathematical studies', and what the bond is which, according to the *Epinomis*, unifies them: 'just as intellect presides over discursive thought and provides it with principles from above and perfects it from itself, so too dialectic, which is the purest part of philosophy, proximately unifies the mathematical studies and encompasses the whole of their unfolding and from itself gives to their sciences various perfective, discriminatory and intellectual powers – that is, the arts of analysis, discrimination, definition and deductive proof'. At *in Crat.* 3 Proclus similarly notes that intellect projects the dialectical technique as a whole, as parts of which it also institutes discrimination, definition, deductive proof and analytical reduction. For additional information on Proclus' theory of the value of mathematics in the education of the philosopher, see *in Euc.* 20,14-22; 21,5-14; 21,21-4. For a full analysis of the theme, see Duvick, *A Translation and Analysis of Proclus' In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria*, 183-93.

10. The degree to which formal Aristotelian and Stoic logic is employed in the presentation of Proclus' thought suggests that the excerptor and/or Proclus' commentator were from Alexandria. See the Introduction and *in Crat.* 46 and 58 for a more complete analysis of the role of logic in the *in Crat.*

11. The *Anon. Proleg.* begins with a similar reference to the blindness of the Peripatetics: according to Aristotle, we are told, men love to use their senses because they want to know things. 'I should say, however, that this really applies to Plato's philosophy, for we can see that all men want to draw from this spring as much as each thinks may be useful to him; all men, that is to say, the normal, not those whose faculties are blunted, people who, like bats, are unable to face the sunlight and considering as real only what can be apprehended by the senses, are indifferent to intelligible reality' (*Anon. Proleg.* 2).

12. The techniques of dialectic follow the circular motion of the intellectual *huparxis* itself. Discrimination and analytical reduction account for its downward and upward activity. Definition and deductive proof reflect the way in which the Forms are both distinct and unified. See *in Crat.* 71 for the theological description of this process.

13. According to Aristotle, eristic reasoning starts from opinions that only seem to be the case (*Top.* 100b23). Such arguments based on false premises will also lead to false conclusions. The problem with Aristotelian dialectic, as Proclus sees it, is two-fold: first, because Aristotle believes that language is conventional, he must also deny that statements are like composite thoughts and are receptive of truth or falsity in and of themselves (*in Crat.* 47); second, because Aristotle believes that 'nothing is more sacred than the Form' and does not realize that 'both the Good and God are beyond the essence of the Forms' (*in Crat.* 60), he looks no higher than the Forms for the identity of any given object. According to Proclus, the Good and God pre-exist the Forms, which are distinct intellectual entities, in a state of perfect unification where thought and naming

are not distinct. Unless the dialectician begins from the theoretical observation of the Good, which is identical to the One, and Reality itself, he must necessarily begin from false opinions, for the principles of all spoken and written names are located beyond the Forms in the intelligible region and are inseparably bound to their objects.

14. *in Crat.* 6-8 summarize Proclus' position on the relationship between language, Reality and the dialectical technique: if one is going to be a dialectician, one must understand the correctness of names (6). If one is going to understand the correctness of names, one must know their objects (7). If one knows both names and their objects, one will also understand both dialectic and the principles of real beings (8). The implication is that Aristotle uses a bald form of dialectic, which does not theoretically examine real beings (*in Crat.* 7) because he does not understand the natural relation of names to the objects that they signify. And he does not recognize this relation because he does not understand dialectic and the principles of real beings, which the philosopher uses as media in the pursuit of Reality itself. The hypothetical syllogism 'if a then b, if b then c, if b and c then a and c' is a variation on the form, 'if a then b, if b then c, if c then a'. See *in Crat.* 46 for more information on the excerptor's use of formal logic in the *in Crat.*

15. See *in Crat.* 3 for more information on the philosophical technique of analytical reduction.

16. In chs 10-32 of the *in Crat.* Proclus follows the standard format of Platonic commentaries and examines Plato's use of character in the *Cratylus*. See also *in Tim.* 1,1,8; 1,7,19; 1,13,12 and *in Parm.* 628; 661 for allegorical interpretations of the Platonic characters.

17. Compare *Anon. Proleg.* 4.4: 'He (Plato) frequented both Cratylus the Heraclitean and Hermippus the Parmenidean, when he wanted to learn the doctrine of Heraclitus and Parmenides'.

18. See *in Crat.* 123 for an outline of the different types of names that Proclus recognizes as being laid down after eternal and corruptible entities. Proclus considers fortune, or the arbitrary, a purposeful (*in Crat.* 84) and divine (*in Crat.* 123) cause, which is able to allot names more accurately than men do (*in Crat.* 88).

19. See *in Crat.* 71 for a detailed description of the relation between divine and mortal names, how mortal names may be superficial and how one may improve one's perception of the divine by viewing 'the signs of the existence of the higher beings which are sown into subsequent ones'.

20. The Neoplatonic belief that the higher spheres are composed of eternal, stationary entities which are the source of human knowledge is based on common Platonic imagery. In the *Meno*, for instance, Socrates argues that right opinion cannot be relied upon to lead to right action. For, like the statues of Daedalus, opinions are likely to run away unless tied down (97B-98A). They can be grasped, he argues, through the process of recollection, which is a revelation of knowledge obtained in another life (see *in Crat.* 61 and 87). In the *Theaetetus*, Socrates discusses in detail the problem of how stability and change in the cosmos affect both our knowledge and naming of things. To *Theaetetus*' definition of knowledge as perception Socrates responds that, according to this theory, which is also held by Protagoras, Heraclitus and Empedocles, 'nothing is one by itself, nor can anything be called by a definite name. All things in fact are in the act of becoming' (152D). The basis of this theory, Socrates continues, is that Being and becoming are produced from motion, not-being and perishing by rest. Thus, when one sees a colour, the object perceived is produced by the meeting of the eyes and the appropriate motion. 'What one says is this or that colour will

be neither the eye nor the motion which is encountered, but something which is between the two and peculiar to each perceiver' (154A). In fact, objects do not appear the same even to the same perceiver, for he himself is in motion. An even subtler theory is that the universe is composed of two kinds of motion – active and passive – and the offspring of their interaction is both the object of perception (colour, sound, etc.) and the perception itself (seeing, hearing, etc.) (156A).

21. At *Th.* 181D we are told that there are two types of change: alteration (*alloiôsis*) and local movement (*phora*). While the heavens participate in the latter by revolution, the earth participates in the former through the changing of seasons, erosion, fires, etc. At *Metaph.* 1063a15, Aristotle discusses the role of motion in epistemologies based on the theory of eternal flux.

22. Taken together, chs 10-12 suggest that natural names belong to things with the least motion, conventional to those with the most. Names laid down among eternal entities or the gods, the Form of names and those related to Realities (*pragmata*) correspond to things with the least motion; those laid down among the corruptible and souls, the matter of names and what is arbitrary in them correspond to those with the most motion.

23. In the *in Tim.* (1,247,10-17), Proclus explains that 'the soul is able to use its universal intellect to perceive what exists only when the intellect departs from imagination and opinion and varied and indefinite knowledge but returns to its own partlessness, by which it is rooted in a particular intellect, and attaches itself to its own activity with the intellection of that intellect. For its activity is both mono- and biformal [i.e. *doxastic* and *dianoetic*, see *in Tim.* 2,159] and its identity and discrimination exist in its intellections'. Until the soul departs from opinion, however, it is bound to function particularly.

24. In the *Prior Analytics* (43a1), Aristotle explains that the universal affirmative is the most difficult argument to establish and the easiest to refute, whereas the particular negative is the easiest to establish.

25. The reflexive pronoun (*hêauton*) normally refers back to the subject of the main clause – i.e. the Heracliteans, in this parenthetical statement. It is possible, however, that the pronoun modifies *pragmata*, thus giving, 'because they wanted to apprehend a given object before its own unstable nature changed it'. Since the Heracliteans considered the nature of the subject, that of the object and the act of apprehension itself unstable motions that inevitably interfere with the understanding and communication of the truth, both uses of the pronoun are supportable. The passage does emphasize, however, the transformation of the objects of perception by the temporal, spatial and conceptual motions that accompany continuous linguistic expression. It is therefore more likely that *hêauton* refers to the nature of the Heracliteans, who are concerned about altering their data by human interference in the process of scientific observation and description. In the *Theaetetus* (180A), Theodorus complains that the Heracliteans cannot attend to an argument because always moving about, using aphorisms and taking care not to answer any questions.

26. Compare *in Parm.* 1023,20-3.

27. At *Crat.* 420B-C, Socrates suggests that *boulê* and *doxa* are both related to either the soul's pursuit (*diôxis*) of knowledge or the shooting of a bow (*toxon*). He does not define *boulê* as 'wish for good things alone' and *doxa* as 'fancy for things unwished for and unintended'. Though he, like Socrates, recognizes the role of convention in the correctness of names, Proclus here reveals his attachment to the naturalists. At *Metaph.* 1072a27, Aristotle similarly relates fancy (*epithumêtikon*) with apparent good, and desire (*boulêton*) with real good. He also argues that the philosopher follows both his thought and desire to the real

object. The theory that one may follow desire (*erôs*) to God and Truth can be traced to the *Phaedrus* (246C-D, 247C-D).

28. Apollo is the most famous source of prophetic communication between the mortal and the divine. See in *Crat.* 136 and 174 for detailed discussions. For a definition of Proclus' use of the term 'series' (*seira*), see the Guide to Neoplatonic Terms. Also compare in *Crat.* pp. 22,2 and 54,22.

29. Pythagoras (sixth century BC); Epicurus (fourth-third century BC); Democritus (fifth-fourth century BC); Aristotle (fourth century BC). The positions of Pythagoras and Democritus are set out in in *Crat.* 16, those of Epicurus and Aristotle in in *Crat.* 17 and 36ff., respectively.

30. Proclus also attributes this theory to Pythagoras at in *Alc.* 259 and in *Tim.* 1,276,16-18. In the former, we are told that speaking Greek is three-fold: (1) to observe the Greek usage of names, (2) to be accurate in the use of the Greek language and (3) to assign the correct uses of terms that are naturally appropriate to their objects (see also in *Crat.* 61). In the first case, even common people could be teachers; in the second, anyone with a knowledge of language usage would suffice; but the tertiary can be taught only by a philosopher and one who has examined existing things. We have recourse to the greater skill, he says, whenever the knowledge of the common people is insufficient to grasp reality. He then adds that 'Pythagoras too said that Number was the wisest of all the things that exist, and second in wisdom is to put names appropriately to the things that exist'. Proclus here deviates from his description of the theory in the in *Crat.*, for he states that 'intellect is the first number, and after this comes the intelligent soul which contemplates the Forms. The One, however, is prior both to soul and intellect, since it generates number'. In the in *Crat.* Proclus equates number with the intelligible order encompassing the intellectual Forms.

31. Psellus, who drew extensively from the theories of Proclus (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 72), distinguishes six types of number, each corresponding to a particular cosmic level: at the lowest there is the 'hupostatic', or that which reaches down to the mundane sphere but also remains essentially related to its intelligible *huparxis*; the 'self-moved', or spiritual form; the 'intellectual' form; the 'essential' form, which comes into existence with intelligible Being; and 'Divine Number' which encompasses even Being itself (Psellus *On Phys. Numb.* 4-5). Also see O'Meara, *Pythagoras Revived*, 79.

32. The primary and authentic existence of an entity indicates the ontological level at which that entity was instituted and prior to which it does not exist. Subsequent to this level, the entity may exist in a secondary, third, etc. manner dependent upon the medium in which the entity appears and the relative proximity of the medium to the primarily existing entity (see in *Crat.* 28 and the various levels at which the gifts of Hermes exist).

33. Proclus is here referring to the cyclical interaction of hupostases, or more particular levels of existence, within their *huparxis*, or more universal level of existence. According to Proclus, every *huparxis* is characterized by two hupostases that (1) proceed and multiply the powers of the *huparxis* and (2) intellectually return to and thereby perfect the *huparxis*. For a discussion of *huparxis* and *hupostasis*, see Gersh, *A Study of Spiritual Motion*, 30-8. Also see in *Crat.* 36 and 53.

34. At *Theol. Plat.* 5,140,3-6, Proclus explains that the intelligible, life and intellect exist primarily at the intelligible level, secondarily at the intelligible and intellectual level, and according to their third *hupostasis* at the intellectual. At in *Parm.* 945,1, we also learn that the intelligible and the intellection of it are the same through the reversion of intellect to its principle and source. Thus,

through the hypostatic process of procession and reversion, the intelligible, intellect and intellection are the same in the intelligible order. The first real discrimination that occurs is in the intelligible and intellectual order, where, according to Proclus, number is first instituted and initiates the separation of formulae (*logoi*) and Forms (*Theol. Plat.* 4,79,19). At *in Parm.* 924,2-9, Proclus explains that the objects of our knowledge are images of divine objects and that we may know the divine realm through them, just as 'the sons of the Pythagoreans' saw in numbers and geometrical figures images (*indalmata*) of the divine order and, by studying them, tried to 'grasp knowledge concerning divine things, as it were, from certain impressions (*tupoi*). Also see *in Tim.* 33,8-10 where Proclus adds that the Pythagoreans investigated the similitudes of real beings from analogies and passed from images to paradigms.

35. Proclus himself considers the name a sort of statue of the Reality to which it is assigned. And because the name is essentially related to its object, he believes, it may be used to influence the gods through theurgy (*in Tim.* 3,155,18ff.). At *in Tim.* 1,7,28, Proclus says that the Pythagorean Timaeus believes in the suspension of all things from the intelligible and the discrimination of universal beings in numbers, and that he practises the symbolic and mystical depiction of realities (*pragmata*). He then explains that things are divided into intelligible, mathematical and natural entities. 'But it is possible to properly examine all things in all, for the second and third pre-exist in a primordial manner in the intelligibles and both also exist in the mathematical – the first in the manner of images, the third paradigmatically – and in natural entities there are images (*indalmata*) of those before them' (1,8,15-21). For more on Proclus' concept of the name as a statue of the gods see Hirschle, *Sprachphilosophie und Namenmagie im Neuplatonismus*, 12-19 and Eitrem, 'La théurgie chez les néoplatoniciens et dans les papyrus magiques'.

36. The cosmic Soul mentioned here is the Animal itself, which in the *Timaeus* is said to contain and to be participated in by all living and thinking creatures (30Cff.).

37. As the cosmic Soul thus passes the being which it receives from intellect down to all intracosmic creations, it also names them according to the intellectual Forms which are images of intelligible Number itself. Both the being and the name of all things are thus derived from intelligible Reality. And the Pythagorean systems of ontology and epistemology, at least according to Proclus, are perfectly interrelated (for the unreliability of the Neoplatonic accounts of traditional Pythagorean doctrine, see Burkert, *Lore and Science in Ancient Pythagoreanism*, 98-9). The interconnection of ontology and epistemology is an important theme in the *in Crat.* See chs 116-37.

38. The same argument, including both the Aristocles-Plato and Tyrtamus-Theophrastus examples, is recorded by Sextus Empiricus (*Adv. Math.* 1.285), Hermias (*Vit. Plat.* 383,25-33), Ammonius (*in Int.* 20,19), and Anon. *Proleg.* 3.12,19. Theophrastus (fourth century BC) was renamed by Aristotle for his power of language. He inherited Aristotle's library and was named his successor at the Lyceum (Diog. Laert. 5.36).

39. For more on Democritus' language theory, see Diels-Kranz 68 B 26, lines 24 (*polusêmon*), 25 (*isorrhupon, metônumon*), and 26 (*nônumon*).

40. The 'some' who are said to confute Democritus undoubtedly include Neoplatonists with whom Proclus is familiar. Although it is impossible to be precise about their identity, the argument can almost certainly be traced back to Syrianus, the teacher of both Proclus and Hermias, both of whom wrote commentaries on the *Phaedrus*, though only that of the latter survives. In his discussion of *Phaedrus* 238C, Hermias not only stresses the different meanings

of *erôs* when derived from *rhômê* and *pterôs*, but also explains how love is the binding principle of the cosmos based on its relation to *eirein* (Hermias, *in Phdr.* 53.24ff.). Proclus discusses the etymology of *erôs* in detail at *in Parm.* 852,11-27; 853,2-7.

41. At *in Int.* 31.1-14 Ammonius responds to both of these arguments, attributing them not to Democritus in particular but to conventionalists like Hermogenes. He says, 'We change the names of things because we believe that we are substituting names more proper to their objects than the old ones, but with the majority of names we certainly will not say that this prohibits each of them from being proper to the nature of the object named'. He then introduces the plurality-of-names argument, including Proclus' *merops-anthrôpos* example, to show that the use of different names for the same object is proper only if the names are naturally related to the particular aspect of the object that they describe. Sheppard argues that Ammonius followed Proclus in his theory of both the changing of names and the plurality of names (cf. 'Proclus' Philosophical Method', 148). His primary source may, in fact, have been Proclus, but these arguments are standard in ancient conventionalist refutation of natural language theory. For more information on the relation between the language theory of Proclus and Ammonius, see van den Berg, 'Smoothing over the Differences', 191-201.

42. According to Lucretius, Epicurus taught that all objects release images (*simulacra*) which are received by the senses and result in perception of the external world. By comparing naming with seeing and hearing, Proclus here suggests that, according to Epicurus, these images fall on a faculty of speech in humans which produces names that are as naturally related to their objects as is the sight or hearing thereof (*de Rer. Nat.* 4.217ff.). Proclus believes, in fact, that the human perceives real objects through their images (*in Crat.* 71) and that these images are synthesized by sensory passages (*poroi*). For Proclus, however, this is not a form of sensory perception but of intellectual perception which is achieved by purification from material obstruction (*in Crat.* 2-3). On Epicurus' concept of '*eidôla*' or *simulacra* see Asmis, *Epicurus' Scientific Method*, 107-40. For further ancient references on natural language, see Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators*, vol. 3, 213-19.

43. Sheppard, 'Proclus' Philosophical Method of Exegesis', argues that Socrates and Cratylus could not both adhere to the fourth definition of the natural. She thus contests Usener's emendation of *deuteron* to *tetarton* at *in Crat.* 17. It is clear, however, that, according to Proclus, Socrates and Cratylus agree here only to a point: both believe that names are fabricated and applied to their objects on the basis of scientific thought. Yet, while the latter claims that names were first assigned by those with clear knowledge of the objects which they name – and these are superhuman namegivers (438C) – Socrates thinks that names are products of the imagining soul and, therefore, are properly put to their objects at the beginning only insofar as it is possible. Of course, the naturalism which Proclus ultimately attributes to Socrates also makes room for the assigning of names by the gods. But the important point here is that names may also be put by beings without the clearest understanding of things, and their names reflect the degree of their understanding.

44. In his *in Int.*, Ammonius gives two common definitions of the natural and two of the conventional. Some, he says, believe that names are demiurgic creations of nature, as Cratylus the Heraclitean thought that the name which is proper to each object is determined by nature, just as we see different perceptions directed to different perceptibles. For names are similar, he thinks, to the natural but not the artificial images of visible things, for example, as

shadows which commonly appear in water or in mirrors; and while those who use such a name in this way really name things, those who do not do not name but only make a noise, and it is the work of the knowledgeable man to search out the name which has been fashioned by nature and is proper to each thing, just as it belongs to the man with keen vision to discern the proper appearances of each thing with accuracy. But others say that names are natural because they belong to the nature of the objects named by them, so that the names Archidamus and Argesilaus and Basiliscus etc. naturally belong to one with principal intelligence, but never to a fool; and Eutychius and Eupractus belong to one that enjoys right fortune, but never to the unfortunate. These also commonly say that names are similiar not to natural images but to those crafted by the painter's skill, which fashions different similitudes of different paradigms and strives to express (*apotupousthai*) the form of each thing, insofar as it is possible, according to which we often try to analyse from names and search out the natures of the objects named by them. Understanding these natures, we try to demonstrate that the names belonging to things harmonize with their natures. Of the conventionalists, some like Hermogenes say that any man can name any object by whatever name he wishes, but others believe that names are put exclusively by the name-giver, that he is knowledgeable of the nature of things and attributes the name which is proper to the nature of each of the things that exist, or that they are put by one who is subject to the nature of each of the things that exist, or that they are put by one who is subject to the knowledgeable person and has been taught by him the essence of each of the things that exist, but has been properly entrusted with both conceiving and putting the proper name (*in Int.* 34,23-35,21). Ammonius goes on to argue that the second argument on nature agrees with the second on convention. For those put by the name-giver, because they are properly disposed to the things to which they are put, may be called natural; the others, because put by an agent, may be called conventional. Like Proclus, Ammonius clearly believes that Socrates adopts the second definition of both the conventionalist and the naturalist school, and refutes both Cratylus and Hermogenes as representatives of the radical first and third definitions given above.

45. See *in Crat.* 123 and 71 for a full description of the difference between divine and mortal names, which are based on the same Form but have different etymologies. Also see *in Crat.* 57 for a discussion of how the sound, or matter, of a name may vary but its Form be the same.

46. For a discussion of the role of powers and activities in the language theory of Proclus, see *in Crat.* 1 and nn. 3-4.

47. As a comment on ch. 18, *in Crat.* 19 suggests that, unlike Cratylus, Socrates is not distracted by the senses, which register only information about things prone to change in the material world, but follows his reason, the power of the soul, as he examines the relation between real objects and their names. Socrates himself, being named after his powers and activities, is considered divine. The Neoplatonists attribute the epithet to many authorities, including Iamblichus (*in Tim.* 1,77,24), Homer (*in Tim.* 1,78,27) and Proclus (*in Crat.* 154).

48. At *in Parm.* 845-6, Proclus explains the relationship between cosmic participation and imitation. We first learn that there are three causes of participation among the Forms – unitary goodness, the demiurgic power of the Forms and the aptitude of the things that receive illumination from above. It is through desire for the Good, he argues, that recipients rise to receive cosmic causes, and it is the Good that causes the demiurgic Forms to proceed into subsequent beings, ‘imitating the source of all good which instituted all the

orders of divine entities because of its own goodness'. It is the demiurgic cause in this hierarchy that binds together the invisible and visible elements, synthesizes the matter and pattern and instills in the matter the figure resembling the Form. Moreover, there is an entire class of imitative gods (*aphomoiôtikoi theoi*) who model their own demiurgic work after that of the intellectual Demiurge, Zeus (*in Tim.* 3,241,24).

49. The craft of production, or the art of demiurgy, is discussed in detail at *in Crat.* 52.

50. The name 'Hermogenes' is here analysed in relation to *Crat.* 384B. The outline of the *in Crat.* thus moves from an etymological analysis of the names 'Cratylus' and 'Socrates', which does not correspond with the Platonic text but develops the preceding discussion of naturalism, to that of 'Hermogenes', which is discussed in the dialogue.

51. According to Proclus, Hermogenes' losses include more than money. They extend to his entire epistemology and therefore to his knowledge of the Good itself. Since a person is led to the Good by his desire for it, Hermogenes' neglect of Telauges symbolizes his neglect of the Good, God and the One itself.

52. Although Proclus depicts Socrates as interested not in attacking other schools for their errors, but in adopting from them what is useful and correcting what is mistaken, the strongest reproach against the Heracliteans in the Cratylus is made by Socrates himself. Compare *Th.* 179E and *Crat.* 411B. For more information on Proclus' general attitude toward polemic, see *in Parm.* 631ff.

53. The notion that things are troublesome to know and impossible to speak of is almost formulaic in the works of Plato and Proclus. See *Tim.* 28C, *in Tim.* 2,299,10ff., *Parm.* 127A and *in Parm.* 680,37.

54. Prodicus appears as Socrates' sophistic rival in no less than fourteen of the Platonic or pseudo-Platonic dialogues: *Ap.* 19E3; *Prot.* 315D1; *Euthd.* 277E4; *Hipp.* I 282C2; *Men.* 75E3; *Symp.* 177B4; *Rep.* 10, 600C7; *Phdr.* 267B3; *Erx.* 397C7; *Thg.* 127E8; *Chrm.* 163D4; *Ax.* 366C1; *Lach.* 197D3; *Th.* 151B5. Socrates similarly objects to Protagoras' teaching for money (*Prot.* 313C-D), and links Gorgias' teaching to the ignorant pursuit of wealth and power (*Gorg.* 480E-81B).

55. At *in Alc.* 72, Proclus similarly criticizes the sophists because their love of money compromises the quality of their teaching.

56. In the *Theolog. Graec. Compend.* (23,6ff.), Cornutus explains that 'Hermes was born to Zeus from Maia, they say and thereby indicate again that reason is the offspring of theory and pursuit. For those that assist women in birth (*maioumenai*) are called 'midwives' (*maiai*) because they lead foetuses into light, as it were, from pursuit (*ereunê*)' (23,22ff.). Socrates too prides himself on being an intellectual midwife (*Th.* 149A). Also see *Anon. Proleg.* 11.12. Cornutus also says that Hermes is 'situated on the ways and is called "road-side" (*enodios*) and "leader" because one must use him as a leader for all action and because he is the one that leads us up onto the necessary way in our plans, but probably also because there is no void with regard to his resources and service. Through his common nature he himself exists in both the men and the gods. And whenever anyone discovers anything as he is making his way, they usually say that the common nature of this discovery is the Hermes who is in fact privy to the discovery (*heurêsis*) since he is there on the way. They thereby indicate that they consider what is discovered as common, for thence discoveries are called god-sends (*hermaia*)'. As archangelic monad, Hermes is considered the God most responsible for attaching 'the ends of the everywhere earlier order to the foremost things of the subsequent order' (*in Crat.* 117), and thereby provides the medium of communication throughout the entire cosmic structure.

57. At *Elem. Theol.* 54,25ff., Proclus explains that the more universal cause, since it first produces its results, obviously operates before them in the activity which it produces. Thus every cause operates both prior to its results and along with them, and it institutes other things after it as well. At 66,31ff. he adds that all the qualities which in the principal causes have a more universal and lofty order become in their results, through the illuminations from them, a sort of substrate for the gifts of the more particular causes. And while the illuminations from the loftier causes receive the processions from the subsequent, those processions are founded upon these illuminations. Thus different forms of participation are more principal than others, and successive images come from above to the same subject, the more universal operating beforehand, the more particular providing the participants with their own gifts as a supplement to the activities of the more universal.

58. Epideictic speech is intended to praise or blame (for more information on the three traditional kinds of rhetoric, which also include forensic and deliberative speech, see Aristotle *Rhet.* 358b8ff.). For background on the various types of dialectical arguments see in *Crat.* 2 and n. 8.

59. Proclus here is referring to the common Aristotelian concept of eristic reasoning as that which 'begins from opinions that seem to be generally accepted but are not really such' (*Top.* 100b23-5). Unlike the Neoplatonic method which is geared to diminish the influence of the imagining soul as much as possible, the sophists are said to produce phantasmal images in order to make people believe that their arguments begin from generally accepted opinions or principles, when in fact they are really based only on what seems to be the case. Euthydemus, for example, asks Clinias what sort of person learns – the wise or the ignorant. When Clinias responds that the wise learn, Euthydemus goes on to show that it is the teacher and not the student that is wise when the latter is learning. Euthydemus begins his argument by using the term wise in a general sense, but then changes it to mean 'knowledgeable' (275Dff.).

60. Claiming ignorance is a common Socratic technique of introducing philosophical discussions. See *Euthyphr.* 5A; 15D; *Meno* 71A-B; *Euthd.* 27B. On later attitudes toward irony and the proposition of ignorance see Tarrant, *Plato's First Interpreters*, 25-6, 108-11.

61. For the distinction between the possession of knowledge (*hexis*) and having it ready at hand (*prokheiros*), see *Th.* 198Dff.

62. By what is 'not real', Socrates means what is false (429D). The notion that generation is responsible for the indefiniteness and falsehood of names is based on the common Socratic teaching that the divine is eternal and stable and that generation is in constant flux and without any enduring identity.

63. In Ptolemy's *Tetrabiblos*, a surviving commentary on which is attributed to Proclus, we learn that the astral dispositions both before and after birth affect the soul, body and external circumstances of every person. Ptolemy divides external accidents into those of the soul and those of the body. Material acquisitions are the most basic type of external accident categorized under those of the body. Honour and other such advantages belong to those of the soul (4.1-2). At *Elem. Theol.* 128, Proclus explains that the character of any divine order travels through all the subsequent levels and gives itself to all the inferior genera.

64. See in *Crat.* 46 for more information on Proclus' use of formal logic in the *in Crat.* As Sheppard points out (pp. 150-1), Aristotelian and Stoic logic are combined by the Neoplatonists. The argument which Proclus here employs to reduce Hermogenes' position to absurdity is an hypothetical syllogism of the type 'if A then B; if B then –A; therefore if A then –A', which is a variation on

the form 'if A then B; if B then C; therefore if A then C'. See W. & M. Kneale, *The Development of Logic*, 110-11. The logical form, 'if the first then the second, but the first, therefore the second', is the first of the Stoic indemonstrables (see also in *Crat.* 33, 46, 58). For further ancient references on the use of logic by the commentators, see Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators*, vol. 3, 250-61.

65. Timaeus is said to 'give through discourse (*logoi*) an imprint (*apotupoutai*) of these creative powers and activities which proceed from the one universal demiurgy to the demiurgic multitude of the gods. For discourse is an image of the intelligible things, because it unravels that aspect of the intelligibles which has been compressed, leads the undivided into a divided *hupostasis* and brings what remains in itself into a condition in relation to another' (*Theol. Plat.* 5,65,23-66,2). Proclus then draws a parallel between the formulae (*logoi*) by which nature, soul and intellect communicate and the discourse (*logoi*) by which the Demiurge provides archetypes to the subsequent demiurges who imitate him in the fabrication of all particular entities. As explained in *in Crat.* 52, the Demiurge is responsible for the simultaneous creation of both things and their names. See *Theol. Plat.* 5,182-3 for a discussion of the term *logoi* as both discourse and formula.

66. At *Phlb.* 126B-C and *Crat.* 407D Socrates expresses the fear that he may offend the gods by naming them.

67. in *Crat.* 33-42 deal primarily with the first of the three dialectical arguments (*epikheirēmata*) which Socrates constructs to refute Hermogenes' concept of convention. Aristotle defines an *epikheirēma* as a dialectical deduction (*sullogismos*) (*Top.* 162a16), and dialectical deduction, he explains, begins from reputable opinions (*Top.* 100a30). 'Commanding respect' (*entreptikon*) is a relatively common Neoplatonic term used to describe rhetorical or argumentative effect. See Hermias, in *Phdr.* 26.28.

68. When looking to the particular qualities of an object, a person perceives only its contingencies because he mistakes the results of particular causes for its real identity, which can be traced back to the first discrimination of Limit and Infinity (cf. in *Crat.* 42). This understanding of objective reality is based only on what seems to be the case and lacks knowledge. For a discussion of seeming in the *in Crat.*, see ch. 14 and n. 27. According to Ammonius, the soul's powers may be divided into the gnostic and appetitive (cf. in *Int.* 5,3ff.). The former include intellect, discursive thought, opinion, imagination and perception; the latter, wish, choice, passion and appetite. In the assigning of names, a person may follow his knowledge to reality or appetite to contingency. For more information on Proclus' concept of contingency or fortune, see in *Crat.* 84, 88, 123.

69. The hypothetical syllogism, 'if a then b, not b then not a', is what the Stoics call a Type 2 Indemonstrable argument. They are called indemonstrable because they have no need of demonstration. Their validity is immediately clear (Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* 8.273).

70. In the *Republic* (8, 562A-C), Socrates argues that tyranny arises out of democracy in the same way that democracy arises out of oligarchy: just as the insatiable lust for wealth leads to the development and fall of the oligarchy, he says, lust for freedom leads to the rise and fall of democracy. Proclus suggests that in a state where both the public and private citizen names things, the latter is bound to undermine the interests of the former. The reason for this decline, he believes, is the confusion which inevitably results when a republic is organized on the belief that all things are in flux and nothing has a stable identity. Since language is the medium by which people communicate their ideas, this confusion about reality can be traced to the very names which are used in the

republic. When each citizen names things only as they appear to him and not as they are, then he deceives not only himself but all those with whom he speaks as well. In this case, he believes, names are attributed only according to an object's chance aspects which, when taken particularly, are indefinite, adopted without knowledge and only seem correct.

71. At *in Tim.* 2,142,20-4, Proclus explains that the article is used to indicate what is transcendent (*exêirêmenon*) and universal, whereas things indicated without articles are 'one among other coordinates'. The souls mentioned in *in Crat.* 35, then, communicate in an abstract state devoid of particular discrimination. Also see Ammonius, *in Cat.* 15,4-6 for the common Neoplatonic teaching that all things were known to all souls before generation. For information on a similar doctrine which served as a source for Cicero *Div.* 1.115, see Tarrant, 'Recollection and Prophecy in the De Divinatione'. For general background on the Platonic doctrine of recollection, see Tarrant, *Recollecting Plato's Meno*.

72. At *Int.* 16a9-13 Aristotle explains that, just as in the soul an intellection sometimes is without truth or falsity, but sometimes must be one or the other, this is also the case in spoken sound. For falsity and what is true have to do with synthesis and division. Names and verbs themselves are like the intellection without synthesis and division, as in the case of 'man' or 'white', when nothing further is added. Before one can talk about the truth or falsity of an intellection, it must be formulated in a statement (*apophantikos*), such as 'man is white' (17a2-3). Also see Ammonius *in Int.* 2,18-25.

73. In the *Sophist* (263C-D), Plato refutes the theory that it is impossible to make a false statement which was based on the argument that no one can think or say what is not, because what is not does not have any sort of being. The common belief was that what is is true. Socrates shows that, when one says, 'a is not b, he does not say a is not something', but that it is different from b. Thus, while what really (*ontôs*) is truly (*alêthôs*) is, what is not really is falsely. What is false exists. It simply exists in a different way than the things that are true about a given object (*Soph.* 263B).

74. At *Phlb.* 36C-40C, Socrates argues that there are true and false pleasures. He first argues that the human being forms true and false opinions by perceiving the world either correctly or incorrectly. This perceptual information is written in the soul like a book (see *in Crat.* 61), and an image, which too is true or false depending on the accuracy of perception, is formed from this spiritual information as a secondary motion. Now, pleasure is associated with the mental image associated with opinions. The good person will communicate truly and accurately with the gods, and thus the image of his anticipated pleasures will be more truthful than that of the bad person who does not relate to the gods and therefore views the world inaccurately and sets his priorities wrongly based on the anticipation of false pleasures. For a discussion of the relation between evil and ignorance see *in Crat.* 38.

75. At *Crat.* 386E-387D, Socrates will argue that names are naturally related to their objects. Also see *in Crat.* 46. At *Crat.* 425D, he argues that even the alphabet must be natural. See *in Crat.* 85-6 as well.

76. e.g. the 'truth' of Antiphon (cf. Galen *Commentary on Hippocrates' 'The Doctor's Workshop'* 18,656 Kühn) and of Protagoras (cf. Sextus Empiricus *Adv. Math.* 7.60).

77. Reading *mêd' einai antilegein* for *mê dein antilegein*. Without emendation the translation runs: 'Antisthenes used to say that one should not contradict', which is inconsistent with Aristotle's account of the doctrine. This whole chapter is excerpted as Antisthenes fr. 49 Decleva Caizzi and fr. 155 Giannantoni.

78. At *in Int.* 21,11-19, Ammonius explains that we call both intellections and

spoken sounds true when the former are fit to their objects or the latter agree with the *hupostasis* of their objects. Otherwise, they are false. For example, when Socrates is walking, our intellection is true whether we think or state that he is walking, but false whether we think or say that he is not walking (see Aristotle *Cat.* 4a22 and *in Crat.* 45): 'Still, the objects in and of themselves may be called neither true nor false but only according to the truth which is theoretically observed in our understanding (*gnôseis*). For we say truthfully that Socrates is a man but falsely that his statue is a man. And we mean by this nothing but that the definition of man is truthfully predicated of the concept of Socrates but not of his statue.'

79. Protagoras is here introduced as another adherent to the flux doctrine. The idea that there was an unwitting 'school' based on the flux principle can be traced to Plato (cf. *Tht.* 152D, 160D), and both Plato and Aristotle class Protagoras among those believing that all is one, and that it therefore is impossible to contradict. At *Tht.* 152D, Socrates explains that, according to Protagoras, 'nothing is one thing by itself nor can you correctly call it by any name'. If one calls it large, it will also be found to be small; if heavy, also to be light. In fact, all opposites may be stated of all individual objects. Aristotle similarly explains that the doctrine 'man is the measure of all things' leads to the conclusion that the same thing both exists and does not exist, is bad and good, and that the contents of all other opposite statements are true, because things often appear in opposite ways to different people (*Metaph.* 1062b13-20). This difficulty may be solved, he says, by understanding how things may come to be from what exists and from what does not exist.

80. This is a Type 2 Stoic Indemonstrable. In the commentary on Socrates' first two arguments, the excerptor speaks in his own voice mainly to formulate Proclus' argument logically based on that of Socrates. See *in Crat.* 43-8, 58-9 and 61-3. For further ancient references on the use of logic by the commentators, see Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators*, vol. 3, 250-61.

81. The notion that evil is related to ignorance of the soul, which in turn is characterized as a sort of illness, does not appear in the *Cratylus* but is drawn from *Hp. Mi.* 372E-373A. For the concept of special evil, see *Rep.* 609A1, 610E6.

82. This quote from Homer comes at the end of Hephaestus' speech to Zeus and Hera, pleading that they not quarrel because strife between them results in a bad state for all the gods. By mentioning immediately after this quote the disagreement between Socrates and Anytus, which results in the death of the former, Proclus draws a parallel between Socrates' judgement and that of Zeus, which is always correct and responsible for cosmic reason and order. It is a common feature of Neoplatonism that knowledge is derived from divine sources and that true philosophers thereby participate in the divine. For the Platonic basis of this theory, see *Crat.* 425D, *Phdr.* 249B-252C, *Tht.* 173E-76B. For the role of prayer in Neoplatonic epistemology, see *in Tim.* 1,211,9-19; 1,301,22-302,1.

83. cf. Lee, *Epistemology after Protagoras*, 156-7.

84. For more information on *ouden on*, see *Tht.* 151E1.

85. i.e. Protagoras begins from the proposition that every object is in constant flux and therefore has no stable being. Euthydemus, in contrast, argues that every being in fact is all other beings and contains all qualities. Despite Protagoras' subjective relativism and Euthydemus' objective relativism, both sophists draw the conclusion that names are only relatively assigned to their referents.

86. See Duvick, *A Translation and Analysis of Proclus' In Platonis Cratylum Commentaria*, 188-9, for a discussion of the relationship between Limit, Unlim-

ited, Number and the definition of objects and names. At *in Parm.* 938, Proclus explains that Limit and Unlimited are also the principles of the Forms. Like mathematical, the Forms receive their unity from Limit, their multiplicity and extension from the Unlimited.

87. Having gained the respect of Hermogenes, Socrates now formulates what Proclus calls a forceful (*biastikos*) argument (cf. *in Crat.* 33). The use of force (*bia*) in philosophical argumentation can be traced back to Parmenides (DK 28 B 7,3), Empedocles (DK 31 B 3,6) and Bias (DK 10, p. 65,9). Aristotle states that deduction is more forceful and effective than induction against contradictory people, though induction is more easily learned and more applicable to the common man (*Top.* 105a18). While Socrates' first argument dismisses the proponents of the flux doctrine and establishes the stable existence of Reality, the second masters any remaining resistance on the part of Hermogenes, who in the third argument will ask Socrates to explain how one may discover the natural principle of names (*Crat.* 391A). Proclus' discussion of Socrates' second argument (*Crat.* 386E-390E) runs through chs 43-63 of the *in Crat.* And is divided into two main sections: in chs 43-7 the excerptor logically formulates Proclus' interpretation of Socrates' dialectical proof that objects, the actions proceeding from them and the representations of these actions have a stable identity and definition (386E-87D), and in chs 48-63 the excerptor introduces Proclus' interpretation of Socrates' theory of instrumentality (ch.48), summarizes it (chs 49-57) and concludes the discussion with an analysis of his own (chs 58-9, 61-3). The Neoplatonists formally linked these arguments in their theory of causation (cf. *in Crat.* 53). In addition to the four traditional Aristotelian causes – the final, efficient, formal and material – the Neoplatonists recognized instrumental and paradigmatic causes. In his commentary on Socrates' second argument, Proclus demonstrates how the name-giver looks to the latter – that is, the objective Reality itself – and thereby assigns names correctly, and the dialectician uses the former to discriminate the very essence of that Reality (*in Crat.* 49). The name thereby is both created and used naturally.

88. In the *Nicomachean Ethics*, Aristotle explains more fully that doing is always performed toward an end, as in the practice of art (1140a8-14), whereas the end of acting is inherent in the act itself (1140b4-6).

89. Before taking up Plato's concept of instrumentality, the excerptor formulates Socrates' dialectical proof, as developed to 387D, in a chain argument based on the schema of a Type 1 Indemonstrable.

90. This syllogism corresponds to the argument at *in Crat.* 45.

91. For information on analytical reduction of syllogisms in Aristotelian logic, see *An. Pr.* 47a4.

92. See *in Crat.* 44.

93. See *in Crat.* 43. Note here that the excerptor uses three forms derived from the same root to indicate the natural relation between object (*pragma*), its activity (*prattein*) and the action itself (*praxis*).

94. See *in Crat.* 42.

95. See *in Crat.* 41.

96. See *in Crat.* 39-40.

97. See *in Crat.* 38.

98. As Sheppard points out ('Proclus' Philosophical Method of Exegesis', 144ff.), Aristotle does not say that statements are like composite intellections and are themselves receptive of truth and falsity, but that 'Falsity and truth have to do with combination and separation. Thus names and verbs by themselves – for instance 'man' or 'white' when nothing further is added – are like the thoughts that are without combination and separation' (*Int.* 16a12-15). It

thus makes no sense to talk of the truth or falsity of white or man. When one predicates white of man, however, the combination of the words permits one to analyse the statement in terms of truth or falsity based on the relations of the objects and action which the names and verb symbolize. Proclus' objection to this line of thought is based on Socrates' argument that it is impossible for a whole statement to be true, if any of its parts are not true (*Crat.* 385C). Thus, while Socrates argues that the object and its name are naturally related through the name as a whole as well as its individual letters and syllables, Aristotle holds that the name is only a symbol of its object. It therefore can be neither true nor false in and of itself but only insofar as it represents relations between real objects (*pragmata*) and affections of the soul (*pathêmata tês psukhês*) – both of which are the same for all people (*Int.* 16a6-8).

99. Proclus also uses the term 'revelatory' (*ekphantorikos*) of the truth (*Theol. Plat.* 6.12). For other Neoplatonic uses see Proclus *Theol. Plat.* 6.12. and Damascius *Princ.* 367. The term is commonly used by Dionysius Areopagiticus in reference to God (*Div. Nom.* 3.1), to angels (*Cael. Hierarch.* 4.2), and to bishops (*Eccles. Hierarch.* 5.3.3).

100. Proclus concludes ch. 48 with the statement, 'The argument from the form of the name is the same, just as the preceding was from the model, that is, the object'. Real objects, Proclus believes, exist in the intelligible sphere where there is no discrimination between objects (i.e. models), their Forms and their names (*in Parm.* 852-3). The Forms come into distinct existence in the intelligible and intellectual sphere and proceed through the intellectual all the way down to the cosmic (*in Parm.* 964-70). See *in Crat.* 53 for a fuller discussion of the procession of the Forms and formulae (*logoi*).

101. In *in Crat.* 61 Proclus distinguishes between two types of learning: that which is received from an external source, as in dancing or writing, and that which is summoned to knowledge through recollection of the soul which is purified. The soul, according to Proclus, possesses knowledge actually and only need recollect what it knew prior to its fall into generation. The means to this recollection is spiritual purification which is intended to restore the soul to its celestial state. By using language to communicate with the occult knowledge of his students, the instructor assists him in the process of spiritual transcendence. Compare *Anon. Proleg.* 10,50ff.: 'Again, he says, "I teach nobody" in the sense of "I do not put beliefs into anyone;" for, as we said before, to Plato the soul is not like a blank tablet, so that he could write things on it that are not already there; he seems only to bring them to light and uncovers them merely by stirring the memory, as if wiping off the gum that dims our eyesight'.

102. The term 'furnish' (*sunapergazontai*) indicates their status as auxiliary cause.

103. It is a common feature of Neoplatonic language theory that the sound of a name is its matter (cf. *in Crat.* 46). See Ammonius, *in Int.* 25,2-4.

104. It has been shown that activities are naturally related to their objects and operate in discursive thought (*dianoia*). Since *dianoia* also fits matter to the Form and model in a proper way, the correct name is so in both essence and matter.

105. Proclus' belief that the user also possesses the creative cause is based on *Politics* 1282a17-23, where we are told that in some arts those who use the products also possess knowledge of the art and sometimes are better judges of its products than the artisans themselves (also see *in Crat.* 60, 62-3). Proclus, of course, differs from Aristotle on how this knowledge is shared. For the latter, it is a question of judgement; for the former, the creator has a natural knowledge of the object based on direct reference to it, and the user does so through discrimination of its object.

106. Proclus is here attempting to establish a closed system, where the instrument functions as natural intermediary between its natural objects and the discrimination of these objects. As its creator and user ensure that the instrument is natural by performing their respective functions in a way that is suited to its objects, the user, which naturally possesses the creative cause, ensures that the instrument actualizes the products appropriate to it. The only entities exempt from this sort of creation are self-producing (*autogonos*) and self-substantial (*authopostaton*), qualities which have been definitive of divinity in both Christian and pagan circles since the fourth century (for Neoplatonic uses of *autogonos* see Iamblichus *Myst.* 10.6, Syrianus in *Metaph.* 187,9, Proclus in *Parm.* 897; for the related *autogenês* see Didym. *Trin.* 2.1; the term is also commonly used for the Gnostic *aiôn* (Iren. Haer. 1.29.2)). For Neoplatonic uses of *authopostatos* see Julian *Or.* 4.139D, Iamblichus *ap. Stobaeus* 2.8.45, Proclus in *Parm.* 610. For Christian uses of *authopostatos* (self-substantial) see Leontius Byzantinus *Contra Nest. et Eut.* (PG 86,1304B) and Maximus Confessor *Opuscula* (PG 91,276A). So all but divine names are thus created by nature.

107. At in *Crat.* 53, we are told that it is acceptable to call the very poetic and generative powers of the gods, which they lead forth into the totality, demiurgic, intellectual, productive and perfective skills. Theologians use a similar technique in describing, for example, the universal skill of weaving as Athena.

108. In the *Gorgias*, Socrates argues that the many decree laws not only by convention but also by nature, since, according to Callicles, the more powerful are naturally better than others and entitled to more, and, as Socrates proves, the many are more powerful than the few (488C-D). Callicles must then admit that the many are naturally better and thus entitled to determine law – in particular, that it is more shameful to do than to suffer injustice (489A-B).

109. Proclus uses the term *theôrêtikon* (speculative) to describe things that can be perceived only by contemplation and thus are more universal than things of the mundane sphere. In *in Crat.* 142, for instance, we are told that Socrates compares the Cronian divinities (402B) to streams because they always conduct good things from above to the things below. We honour these streams, he says, as images of the principal deities, and beyond their source their principle may be ‘theoretically observed’. That is, the principle by which the good is handed down transcends human perception, which is capable only of grasping its inferior images and tracing these theoretically back to their occult source.

110. Proclus may here be poking subtle fun at the fourth-century Christian bishops Ambrose and Athanasius. Polychronius is added in parody. By the fifth century, Neoplatonism was openly attacked by Christianity. Proclus himself was forced to flee to Asia Minor for a year (Marinus *Procl.* 15). It was long believed that, in the sixth century (529), the schools in Athens and Alexandria were officially closed by Justinian, but this theory has been seriously challenged by Alan Cameron (‘The Last Days of the Academy of Athens’) and John Glucker (‘Epilogue: Justinian’, in *Antiochus and the Late Academy*, 322-9). It is likely that there were no formal schools to close, and, although the Neoplatonists did emigrate temporarily to Persia and probably had substantial funds confiscated, they were not prohibited from giving private lessons and publishing. For more information see Blumenthal, ‘529 and After: What Happened to the Academy?’, Frantz, *Athenian Agora XXIV*, 82-92; Chuvin, *Chronicle of the Last Pagans*, 135-41.

111. For more information on the assimilation of subsequent beings to their superiors see *in Crat.* 1 and n. 3.

112. In the *in Int.* Ammonius explains that names and verbs are not simply spoken sounds, but are shaped and formed by the linguistic imagination of

expression (*hê lektikê phantasia*), and are considered symbols of the discursive thoughts (*dianoêmata*) in the soul. While spoken sounds thus are natural, names and verbs are conventional (22.33-23.3). For more information on the relation between the language theory of Proclus and Ammonius, see van den Berg, 'Smoothing over the Differences', 191-201.

113. In *in Crat.* 71, the excerptor further explains that the powers of the gods travel triadically (cf. *in Crat.* 19) through the various cosmic levels and are described as signs, in the lower orders, of the *hupostases* of the higher (30.8-10). Through the active and mobile aspect of these signs which elevate every thought, the gods turn every thing back to themselves (31.1-2). These signs are described by the Chaldeans as the extended form of light (31.13) and the mediating name of the Iunges, which 'lept into the stellar sphere because of the rushing command of the Father' (33.17). For more information on the Iunges, Teletarchs and the 'command of the Father', which is the Chaldean image for the transmission of Phanes' intelligible light into the intellectual sphere, see *in Crat.* 71.

114. Proclus often speaks of a hierarchical Republic that extends all the way from the intelligible region down to the human level. At *in Tim.* 1,28,17-27, he explains that the third form of the human republic 'appertains to natural things by the rebirth that occurs in them and the return to the same form. And it is thanks to this return that the forms remain stable in the cosmos, since the return makes their loss and destruction come full circle. And at *in Tim.* 1,57,7-10, we are told that 'the god who ordered the Republic in heaven also wants to govern generation beyond the celestial gods and always contrive war even of the forms in matter, so that the cycle of generation be an image of the celestial cycle'.

115. Proclus' concept of the Demiurge is based on *Tim.* 41A-42E, where Zeus creates the cosmos and weaves the immortal part with the mortal by distributing the demiurgy of the latter to the various gods under him, including the Titans, the Olympians and the minor gods. He thus is both the supreme creator and governor of the cosmos who makes the ordinances (*diathesmothetêsas panta*) by which all the other rulers, both divine and mortal, fashion and administer lower order cosmic creations.

116. At *Tim.* 36C Plato explains that, when the Demiurge created soul, he made it from a mixture of two kinds of being and two kinds of the Same and the Other – that which is unchangeable and that which is associated with bodies (*Tim.* 35). He then divided the mixture lengthwise into two parts, joined them at the centre in the shape of an X and connected them with themselves to form two circles. The outer circle, which is the sphere of the fixed stars, he called the circle of the Same; the inner, which is the planetary sphere, he called that of the Other (36C). According to Proclus, all cosmic structures beyond the fixed stars are prior to motion and time and are characterized by sameness. Those within the sphere of the fixed stars are moved, temporal and distinct from one another. Also see *in Crat.* 101, 118, 140 for further information on Proclus' concept of the Same and the Other, and *in Crat.* 177 for Apollo's role in harmonizing the cosmic revolutions.

117. The Demiurge's power of self-production and production of an other are parallel to his cosmic creation of the sphere of the fixed stars and that of the planets, which are associated with the Same and the Other (cf. *Elem. Theol.* 9-10 for a discussion of self-sufficiency). Because the Demiurge creates the name, it too has the power of self-production and production of an other. It thus is the instructive cause of cognition, and instruction, Proclus tells us, is an experience that occurs within the soul of the student and thereby is an activity

of sameness. But the name also discriminates essence and thereby is associated with production of a thing other than the paradigm but still naturally and essentially related to it. For further ancient references on names given by God, see Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators*, vol. 3, 220-6.

118. Proclus generally uses the Chaldaean oracles in support of his own theories or those handed down to him mainly by Syrianus. Proclus himself was initiated into the Chaldaean mysteries, studied the oracles under Syrianus, and wrote a commentary of his own on them, which is now lost (*Marinus Procl.* 28, 26).

119. This passage describes the process of assimilative reversion to principles. Procession and reversion are the primary activities of the second and third *hupostasis* in any given *huparxis*. Any real existent thus remains eternally stable, proceeds into the order subsequent to it and reverts back to its principle. See *in Crat.* 16 and Gersh, *A Study of Spiritual Motion*, 30-8.

120. *apotelesma* (product) is a technical Neoplatonic term meaning the natural resultant of a cause (*Elem. Theol.* 20,15; 62,21). The term *tekhnhêta* (artificial object) thus refers to products fashioned after the qualities produced by particular causes subject to change.

121. By 'theologians' Proclus generally means Hesiod, Homer, Orpheus and the Chaldaean oracles. They are called theologians because they use opinion and imagination to portray divine powers in symbolic form, i.e. as anthropomorphized gods, demonstrating the same kind of emotions and appetites as men, etc. See Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th Essays of Proclus' Commentary on the Republic*, 41.

122. The Cyclopes were believed to have fashioned the very instrument of Zeus' power, the thunderbolt (Hesiod *Theogony* 139-41), as well as the forge of Hephaestus (Virgil *Aeneid* 8.418).

123. It is significant here that Proclus quotes Orpheus in support of his argument that the power of Athena proceeds into the series of Core. At *in Crat.* 171 (95,6-9) Proclus explains that, according to Orpheus, Core is a triune Goddess composed of three divine monads: Artemis, Persephone and Athena. She conducts life, Proclus says, throughout the spiritual realm but also reverts back to her source. In the supercosmic region, she bears Dionysus to Zeus, then descends to the lowest realm of the cosmos where she associates with Pluto.

124. Proclus' concept of the young demiurges is based on Plato's description of them in the *Timaeus* (41D). At *in Crat.* 135, 139, and 110 (61,26-30) we learn that each god has his own particular power but also participates in those of the others. In fact, the plurality of the gods can be traced back to the One which is also identical to the Good (*Elem. Theol.* 10-13).

125. Circe, according to Proclus, is responsible for distinguishing life in the four orders descending from the intelligible to the intelligible-intellectual to the intellectual and, finally, into the realm of soul (*Theol. Plat.* 4,2,15-20). Life is associated with the middle monad of each of these triads and exists as cause in the intelligible, as essence in intelligible-intellectual and by participation in the intellectual sphere. Soul is self-vital (*Theol. Plat.* 5,38,11-14, 20). While Circe thus distinguishes the various levels at which life appears but also connects the immortal Forms with the mortal and what has been moved with what is stable, she also harmonizes the sublunar sphere by the harmonic ratios which Plato associates with the planetary revolutions in the *Timaeus* (35B-36B). This is the same power which Apollo uses in a universal way to harmonize the entire cosmos (*in Crat.* 174). The traditional etymology of *Kirkê* is undoubtedly based on the verb *kerkizein* ('to separate the web with a shuttle' (*kerkis*)). Proclus is also suggesting an etymological connection between Circe and Core.

126. The divine difference (*heterotês*) that Circe is here said to use in

discrimination is that related to Zeus' creation of the circle of the Other (*thateron*). Like him, she distinguishes the stable from the moved, but her powers are relegated to the production of life, whereas he is the universal Demiurge responsible for the distribution of the various powers to the various cosmic divinities.

127. For more information on the various types of formulae recognized by Proclus, see *in Crat.* 51.

128. The reflective power of the soul (*to epinoêtikon*) permits the soul to contemplate itself and therefore know itself. In the intelligible region, Plotinus explains, there is no difference between thinking (*to noein*) and thinking that it thinks (*Ennead* 2.9.1.51-2). In soul, however, *epinoia* is the reflection that says that it thinks that it thinks, and this reflection is in direct reference to intellect and, thereafter, to the intelligible and reality itself (2.9.2.5-6). This is necessary if the soul is going to retrieve the knowledge that it possessed prior to its fall into generation. For further information on Proclus' concept of recollection, see *in Crat.* 61.

129. Thus, through the process of recollection and communication with other souls, the artisan may recall the formulae which emanate from the natural formal (*toiadi*), final (*toude heneka*) and paradigmatic (*pros touton*) causes of his product. Since he himself is the efficient cause and has not yet fashioned his product out of matter, this passage accounts for all six of the Neoplatonic causes, which include: the final (*dio*), the paradigmatic (*pros ho*), the efficient (*hup' hou*), the instrumental (*di' hou*), the formal (*kath' hou*) and the material (*ex hou*) (*in Tim.* 1,263,20-1). While the final, efficient, formal and material causes are drawn from Aristotelian causality, the paradigmatic and instrumental are standard Neoplatonic doctrine, though the paradigmatic is also found in Seneca (*Ep.* 65) in a 5-cause schema, and Galen includes the instrumental in a 6-fold schema (cf. *Procat. Causis* 14-18). As Proclus tells us at *in Crat.* 49.18.3-4, there is not one motion common to both cause and effect but three motions – that of the cause, that of the effect and that of the instrument in between. This is an important distinction in the causal relationship because it permits the object (or the student in *in Crat.* 49) to refer directly to the paradigmatic cause – that is, the reality itself. Conventionalist theories, like that of Aristotle, do not recognize the natural relation between object and paradigm, because they recognize nothing beyond the form of an object (*in Crat.* 60), and therefore make no room for the paradigmatic cause nor any reference to it.

130. Analogy plays an important role in Neoplatonic cosmology. It not only involves such relations as, 'What the name is to the lawgiver all encosmic things are to the Demiurge', but extends to the encosmic elements themselves. At *in Crat.* 99.50.27-51.1, we are told that proportion (*analogia*) is the contiguous bond of all encosmic things, and is weaker than only that from the intellect and the soul. Similarly, at *in Crat.* 174, Apollo's medical powers are credited with removing the dissolute aspect of illness and producing unitary health, since what is diffuse is unnatural and health is proportion (*analogia*) and natural. Also see *in Crat.* 176. This natural cosmic proportion also applies to names, since they too are naturally related to their objects (*in Crat.* 46). Thus, the change of divine names occurs in proportion to both the essences and the understandings of the gods, the angels, the daemons and the souls (*in Crat.* 137). The closer the essential relationship between an entity and a given object, the more accurately that entity perceives its natural and correct name. Also see *in Crat.* 56-7 for a discussion of Proclus' concept of analogy.

131. For more information on the Aristotelian concept of art as an imitation of nature, see Aristotle, *Poet.* 1447a19-1448b23.

132. The Form of Man stems from an unmoved cause because it is the intelligible region that exists beyond the stellar sphere and heavenly arch. The structure of the intelligible and intellectual sphere is composed of the supercelestial place, Heaven and the subcelestial arch, and these three spheres are associated with essence, life and intellect respectively (*Theol. Plat.* 4.3.9). While the supercelestial is united in power to the intelligible region, Heaven (*ouranos*) is characterized by divided power and yet is the medium of connection between the intelligible region and the intellectual. The subcelestial arch, then, perfects the *huparxis* by reverting intellectually to its intelligible source and bonding with it (4.3.9-21). See *in Crat.* 110-12 for additional information on Uranus and the intelligible-intellectual sphere.

133. The young gods are discussed in *in Crat.* 53.

134. As previously noted (cf. n. 63 on *in Crat.* 28), the heavenly revolutions were believed to determine both the physical and spiritual qualities of humans. Ptolemy also tells us that terrestrial elements are affected by celestial bodies through a sympathetic relationship, and that the winds and weather are determined through celestial configurations (*Tetr.* 1.2.4). This means that the circles of the Same and the Other are directly responsible for the temporal generation, change and dissolution of all objects in the subcelestial sphere. While the intellectual emanations are ultimately suspended from Cronus himself, the spiritual come directly from the circles of the Same and the Other.

135. The theme of weaving is important in both Proclean and Platonic cosmology. In the *Timaeus*, we learn that, after creating the structure of the cosmos, the Demiurge bids the minor demiurges to interweave (*prosuphainein*) the mortal with the immortal and to create living creatures (41D). Proclus not only discusses this passage in detail (*in Tim.* 5,240,29ff.), but generalizes the concept to the interweaving of the entire universe. Athena is the goddess in charge of this art (*in Crat.* 185), and is said to weave together the order of the intellectual Forms. She then weaves the intellectual sphere together with the cosmic by way of intellectual thoughts, and cooperates with Hephaestus in interweaving the spiritual and corporeal aspects of nature (*in Tim.* 1,204,10ff.).

136. The cosmos itself, according to Proclus, is assimilated (*apotopousthai*) to first Animal and imitates all in it (*in Tim.* 1,439,20). In fact, the cosmos is impressed in power with all the revolutions of the intelligible Forms (*in Tim.* 3,98,19). 'Thus, there is an eternal aspect of mortal beings thanks to the one demiurgy through which the Form is unchangeable, one and the same in many ways, but the changeable aspect, which comes from the particular motion of the causes, alters the nature of the beings that are instituted. Yet there must also be a mortal aspect so the cosmos may be perfect, not only transcendently fashioned (*apotupôsamenos*) through the intelligible cause but in a varied manner as well (*in Tim.* 1,224,15). *Timaeus* is said to be assimilated (*apotopousthai*) to the Demiurge by reaching the apex of philosophy (*in Tim.* 1,70,6), and his dialogue with Socrates is considered a linguistic re-creation of the cosmos based on the paradigm of the Demiurge (*in Tim.* 1,4,7-11; 339,21-9; 191,13-19).

137. For more information on the theologians, see n. 121.

138. For more information on the relation between symbol and analogy in Proclus, see Dillon, 'Image, Symbol and Analogy', 247-58.

139. The sympathetic relationship, according to Proclus, is the principle of association and participation between cause and effects. The more an effect is united to its cause in being, the greater its capacity for sympathy; the more it is distinguished, the less its capacity. An effect is cognate (*sungenes*) and sympathetic with its cause insofar as it has been naturally suspended from that cause and desires attachment to it, for the cause is its medium to the Good (*Elem.*

Theol. 33,28-32). The gods themselves descend through sympathy to the terrestrial beings worthy of their reception (*Theol. Plat.* 1.125.10-13). The main point of separation between the eternal gods and the terrestrial region is the heaven, which is the cause of connection and sympathy between the two (*Theol. Plat.* 4.59.22). Thus, even though assigned among the gods, names may pass down through the various cosmic regions which are sympathetically related to the mundane world without losing the divine powers which they were allotted when created with their respective objects. Also see in *Crat.* 118 (69,21-4) and 174 (99,4-7).

140. Also see in *Crat.* 30 for a discussion of the relation between names and the powers and activities of the gods. Proclus' mention in *in Crat.* 57 of Greek and foreign names may also be prompted by *Crat.* 390C, where Socrates argues that the user of a work, whether Greek or foreign, knows better than the creator of it if the work was well made.

141. The excerptor here concludes Proclus' discussion of natural names by returning to Aristotle, with whom the analysis began at *in Crat.* 36. The excerptor is also responsible for the logical formulation of Socrates' argument analysed at *in Crat.* 43-8. The role of the excerptor is not relegated to quotation and synopsis. He also feels free to formulate, clarify and comment himself on the *Cratylus*.

142. This argument is a variation on the Type 2 Indemonstrable of the form, 'if a then b, not b so not a': if things are natural, they are the same for all, names (which are things) are not the same, so names are not natural (see in *Crat.* 46 for a similar form of argument). Although Proclus probably did refute the Aristotelian theory presented here, he almost certainly did not do so in the formal schemata of the Stoic Indemonstrable. In the *Theol. Plat.* (1.10.45.24-46.2; 2.12.66.20-4), he explains that Parmenides always uses chain arguments either to prove things by affirmation or by negation. Proclus' preference is not to use the technique but to analyse it for its philosophical importance. In the first citation, for example, he states that the logical argument is similar to a geometrical proof and actually bears an image of the things that exist. The schematized Indemonstrable is very rare in the works of Proclus. See that at *in Tim.* 2,439,4-6 which runs: if the cosmos came to be according to a paradigm and the paradigm is one thing, the cosmos is one thing; but the antecedent (*to hêgoumenon*) is the case, and so too is the consequent (*to hepomenon*). For Proclus' interest in Parmenidean dialectic more for its theoretical rather than its practical importance, see Dillon, 'The Parmenidean Dialectic'. Also see Beierwaltes, *Proklos: Grundzüge seiner Metaphysik*, 339-82.

143. cf. in *Crat.* 53-4.

144. cf. in *Crat.* 55-7.

145. In neither the *Cratylus* nor the *in Crat.* is there a two-fold definition of the natural and the conventional. As mentioned in n. 44 to *in Crat.* 16, however, Ammonius not only defines the natural and the conventional in two ways, but also makes the second definition of each agree with one another. This means that the name may be both natural and conventional, which again is precisely what Proclus argues at *in Crat.* 10, 12 and 51. It is possible that the excerptor simply omitted Proclus' two-fold definition. It is also possible that the definition was derived from his lectures on *Int.*, to which, Ammonius tells us, he owes his own ideas on the treatise (cf. *in Int.* 1,6-11). It is also possible that the excerptor who has handed down Proclus' views on the *Cratylus* comes from the Alexandrian school of Ammonius. For background on the excerptor see the Introduction.

146. Romano, *Proclo, Lezioni sul Cratilo*, 26, suggests that this passage may

refer to *Rep.* 10, 601C-E, which distinguishes the arts of the user, maker, and imitator. In the *Rep.*, however, Plato associates the user with the good, since the excellence, beauty, and rightness of every implement, living thing, and action refer solely to the use for which each is made or adapted by nature. In contrast, Tarrant has suggested to me that in *Crat.* 60 probably associates the user with the final cause and the servant with the paradigmatic cause.

147. According to Aristotle, substance (*ousia*) is composed of form (*eidos*) and matter (*hylē*). Unlike Plato's Socrates, he sees no utility in the theory that the form exists separate from substance (cf. *Metaph.* 1033b22-9). In fact, Aristotle believes that Socrates himself never postulated a separate existence for the forms, but that they were developed in reaction to the Heraclitean doctrine that everything is in constant flux. What Socrates was really looking for, Aristotle claims, was substance (*ousia*) and a principle of deduction (1078b24). Aristotle distinguishes three types of substance (1069a30). The first two are natural, but the third is eternal and unmovable (1071b3). He also argues that it is the object of desire and thought for all things in the universe (1072a22), that it is good (1072b10) and God, insofar as it is pure activity of thought (1072b26). Thus, Proclus' claim that Aristotle did not postulate an abstract existence of the Good or God beyond the essence of the forms is accurate. Proclus believes that, if one is to find the natural name of any object, it is necessary to transcend all boundaries between that object and its nominal image and perceive it in its most unified and principal state. Since form in any sense indicates discrimination, it would be impossible, according to the Neoplatonists, for a formal entity to be absolutely unified with its qualities and/or images. This can only occur in the perfect abstraction of the One, which is identical to the Good and God (*Elem. Theol.* 25; 110,10-13). For more information on Proclus' theory of Forms, see in *Crat.* 53.

148. In the *Theol. Plat.*, Proclus explains that, as Socrates teaches in the *Phaedrus* (246D-E), 'everything divine is Beautiful, Wise and Good, and this triad has come to all the processions of the gods'. Thus, when a demiurge, according to Proclus, creates an object, he looks beyond its matter and form to the beauty which emanates from the god that oversees that object. The user, however, looks even beyond the beautiful and wise to the Good of the god which ultimately is consubstantial with the One (*Theol. Plat.* 2,32,23-7).

149. This passage explicitly criticizes Aristotle. See Aristotle *DA* 3.4, 430a1; cf. Plato *Tht.* 191C; *Crat.* 414C. Compare *Anon. Proleg.* 10,20ff.: 'Plato does not think that the soul is like a blank tablet, but he believes that if only the veil is taken away she will recover herself and see reality, for she has knowledge in herself, but her sight is dimmed by her contact with the body' (trans. Westerink).

150. Ammonius compares the soul to a tablet in a different way to prove the natural relation between objects and their intellections. He argues that, while the same spoken sounds can be written in different ways and the same intellections can be expressed in different sounds, one and the same thing cannot be intellected through different intellections, but each intellection must be an image of its object, written on the soul as if on a slate – that is, if intellecting is nothing other than receiving the form of the thing intellected or making it accessible (*in Int.* 20,14-23). This theory is based on the Aristotelian view of the relation between objects, their intellections, their spoken names and their written names (*Int.* 16a5-8) but Ammonius will also argue that nature and convention agree in the case of names (*in Int.* 34,23-35,21). For more information on the relation between the language theory of Proclus and Ammonius, see van den Berg, 'Smoothing over the Differences', 191-201.

151. At in *Tim.* 3,316,21ff., Proclus explains the difference between the universal and particular creation of the Demiurge.

152. The basis for Proclus' hierarchy of dialectician, lawgiver and judge is derived from Aristotle. At *Rhet.* 1355a he explains that the dialectician is superior to the lawgiver because the latter uses the enthymeme – the rhetorical syllogism drawn from probable premises (*An. Pr.* 70a10) – which is a sort of deduction belonging to dialectic (*Rhet.* 1355a9). The dialectician is thus responsible for both developing the lawgiver's method and judging his performance. The judge is inferior to the lawgiver because the latter determines in advance as many of the judgements as possible of the former in order to protect against unwise and rash judgements in the courtroom (*Rhet.* 1354a).

153. The Cronian monad refers to Cronus' position as the first *hupostasis* of the intellectual sphere. It remains stable and in constant contiguous relation with the intelligible and intellectual sphere. It thus is most accurately able to receive realities from their intelligible source and transmit them to subsequent orders through Rhea and Zeus, the second and third monads of the intellectual *huparxis*. See the Appendix for more information.

154. In *Theol. Plat.* 4.22.2, we are told that intellectual thought (*noêsis*) is the medium between the intelligible and intellectual things. Uranus, as the primary God of the intelligible and intellectual sphere, is responsible for connecting the higher spheres with the lower by way of intelligence. Cronus, who is both related to and separate from his father, receives knowledge of the intelligible through this intelligence and hands it down as principle to Zeus.

155. Proclus here follows the Orphic interpretation of Nyx as the second of the six kings of the pantheon. Prior to Nyx there is Phanes; subsequent to her there are Uranus, Cronus, Zeus and finally Dionysus. Although Phanes is inaccessible because equated with the third monad of the intelligible sphere, Nyx, as the first monad of the intelligible and intellectual sphere, is Zeus' link to the intelligible. He was raised in the cave of Nyx and learned from her that he was to be the fifth king of the gods (*Orph. fr.* 105, 107). By reverting back to his father, Cronus, who is the first monad in the intellectual sphere, Zeus is in contiguous relation to the sphere and reverts back to Nyx as Zeus does to Cronus. See Lewy, 'Excursus VII: Proclus' Exposition of the Chaldaean System of the Noetic Entities', in *Chaldaean Oracles*, 483-4. Also see West, *The Orphic Poems*, 70-5.

156. The revolutions which the excerptor mentions here refer to the sort of life that each soul chooses when it makes its descent into generation. This theory is based on Plato's description of the cycle of mortal generation in the *Rep.* (10, 617D-619A). Coordinate to the Cronian and Zeusian spiritual lives, Proclus postulates cosmic hierarchical cycles which are essentially and analogically linked from level to level and thereby permit particular souls to transcend the effects of lower, particular causes, such as the young gods, and follow their series to its intellectual source, which has access to Reality itself. In the *in Int.* Ammonius explains that, for those wishing to lead themselves up to theoretical examination (for more information on *theôria* see n. 109 on *in Crat.* 51) of real beings and observe the causes that transcend spoken language, it should be noted that objects are produced from the gods, intellections are instituted from intellects and spoken sounds are perfected by souls which are characterized by reason and have an essence which is separate from all body (24,22-9). Thus, when a soul which is purified of body uses reason to view the intellectual image of a given object, it can produce a name perfectly representative of that object. When an irrational soul puts names, however, by the aid of perception and imagination, it names things which have a certain sense according to the nature of each of their own qualities, and it changes all the motions natural to them according to the passions that befall them at any given time (25,14-17). In other

words, like Proclus, Ammonius teaches that the soul must look beyond the proximate particular causes of a manifest object to its intellectual image and ultimately to God and the object itself.

157. See also *in Crat.* 27, where the excerptor suggests that Socrates knows by condition but not by experience. That is, he has not yet recollected the knowledge which he actually possesses in his soul and may be drawn out by the dialectical technique (*in Crat.* 61).

158. From *in Crat.* 64-185 Proclus discusses Socrates' third argument against Hermogenes, which runs from 390E-427D and is characterized as 'cause of the most perfect persuasion' (*in Crat.* 33). It earns this description for two reasons: while the first and second arguments refute traditional conventionalist language theories and establish stable objective existence and the natural relation of names to their objects, the third is an active demonstration of how names may be correct (*Crat.* 391A; *in Crat.* 66-7). The Neoplatonists considered this a process of theoretically examining the occult nature of Reality and the very powers of divinity (*theôria*), and treated every Platonic dialogue as a perfect description of the cosmos, where its arguments correspond to soul, the problems around which the arguments revolve to intellect and the good at which the dialogue aims to the Good itself. Both Proclus and the excerptor interpret Socrates' third argument as a theological description of the universe. The problem of the argument is how names may be correct. By following the dialectical argument on the correctness of divine names toward its logical conclusion, Socrates ascends through soul and intellect toward the Good itself, which is identical to God (cf. *Elem. Theol.* 14,24-5; 110,10-13). The *Cratylus* thereby becomes a demonstration both of analytical reduction, where Socrates systematically traces first the names of the kings of the Gods then those of the minor deities back to their eternal and unchanging sources, and of dialectical discrimination (*Crat.* 431C-437D) which refutes Cratylus' theory that all real names are natural. The result is that, according to Proclus, Socrates has constructed 'the most perfect argument' to analyse the correctness of names in both extremes – as they relate to the gods themselves and as they are made and used by humans in the lowest, mundane sphere. At *in Crat.* 3 Proclus explains that intellect projects dialectic as a whole to the lower realms and humans. Thus, through the four techniques of analysis, discrimination, definition and deductive reasoning, Socrates actually uses the powers of intellect to access intelligible reality. For information on the Neoplatonic introductory courses see the Introduction.

159. That is, one first does not even know that one is ignorant, then recognizes the fact, sets an aim, examines the matter and, if successful, discovers the truth. The most effective way of working through this process, Proclus believes, is the dialectical technique, which is projected as a whole from universal intellect and becomes accessible to humans through discrimination, definition, deductive proof and analytical reduction (*in Crat.* 3). Thus, although it can only think particularly and use particularly the method of essential intellect, human intellect does have access to the intellectual realm and, when properly directed, can comprehend the truth. Socrates is therefore said to imitate the guiding Hermes and scientifically demonstrate the methods of discovery to Hermogenes, who is in the process of learning (*in Crat.* 66). At *in Crat.* 25, it is noted that Maia is the Goddess of inquiry, Hermes the God of discovery. While she is the more universal and transcendent, predisposing matter, as it were, from above, Hermes is the more particular and leads lower level creatures through the discovery of successively more universal causes toward the object of inquiry and the Good itself (see *in Crat.* 25 and n. 56 for

more information on Maia as the goddess of inquiry and on Hermes as the god of discovery). It is ironic of course that Hermogenes asks Socrates to demonstrate the methods of his own namesake, Hermes.

160. The Neoplatonists commonly interpreted the Platonic characters in a way analogous to cosmic structures and activities. At *in Crat.* 10-32 Proclus follows the standard format of Platonic commentaries and examines Plato's use of character in the *Cratylus*. See also *in Tim.* 1,1,8; 1,7,9; 1,13,12 and *in Parm.* 628, 661 for allegorical interpretations of the Platonic characters.

161. See *in Crat.* 26, where Proclus explains that the sophist only 'puts on the mask of the dialectician'. Instead of working from generally accepted ideas, he fabricates his arguments with phantasmal images which only give the impression that his premises are generally accepted. Aristotle calls the former types of reasoning 'calculative', the latter type 'eristic'. Since the latter is not based on Reality, it may be used to deceive people and lead them to errant conclusions.

162. For more on the relation between irrational opinion and imagination see *in Crat.* 113, where Proclus claims that the third monad of any given *huparxis* is essentially the same as the first of the succeeding *huparxis*, just as irrational opinion is essentially the same as imagination. According to Proclus, knowledge of something is achieved when one's thought of an object corresponds with the Reality itself. Opinion results when one's thought is based on fact but is still distorted by imagination. Imagination is thought that does not correspond with the real state of affairs. At *Phlb.* 39A, Plato explains that it is the conjunction of memory and sensations along with their consequent feelings that write words, as it were, on the soul. And when this experience writes what is true, one has true opinion which gives rise to true assertions. But when this internal scribe writes what is false, one gets the opposite sort of opinion and assertions.

163. Everything in the cosmos is suspended from a causal chain which ultimately leads to the Good, God and the One. At *Elem. Theol.* 11,30-2, Proclus explains that there is a first cause of beings, and from it each subsequent cause proceeds as if from a root, some being near it, others further away. At *Elem. Theol.* 7,17-28, he further explains that every productive cause is superior to that which it produces. It produces all the power which is in its result and is able to make it like itself. It cannot make it superior to itself, however, since, then, it would first perfect itself. For more information on Proclus' theory of causation see *in Crat.* 53.

164. In the *Republic* Plato rejects poets like Homer and Hesiod for much the same reason that he usually criticizes the sophists – because they do not fully understand what they appear to teach (600Aff.). In the *in Tim.* Proclus explains that the poets (like the sophists) are unsuccessful in imitating what is excellent because they themselves do not assume a similar disposition. That is, in order for a person to teach excellence properly he must develop the excellence of his own soul (1,65,17-21). Similarly, if a person is to teach the true nature of Reality, he must gain knowledge of it by turning his thought to what is intelligible. 'Intellect and knowledge grow in the soul', he says, 'when its reason is involved with what is intelligible and in that reason the cycle of the Same reveals through its own intellectual activity the nature of real beings' (*in Tim.* 3,314,6-10). In other words, the soul uses reason to strive upward toward Reality and ultimately is linked to it through the intellect of the cycle of the Same, which is the connector between the intelligible and the intellectual regions. Proclus in large part vindicates the poets in the *in Remp.* but is careful to point out the danger in reading them literally. The poets are inspired, but their thought must be correctly and philosophically interpreted if it is to educate

the young (*in Remp.* bk 2). Cf. Olympiodorus *in Gorg.* 46.4-5 on the dangers of poetic as opposed to philosophic myth, but also its advantages.

165. Proclus devotes much of his *in Remp.* to analysing Plato's criticism of Homer, vindicating the latter of any real reproach and reconciling the approaches of both writers. In the *in Remp.* Proclus deals with such issues as how 'Plato often praises Homer as master of truth' (2.1), 'why Plato rejects Homeric verse as unsuited to the young' (2.2), 'how in all of his own writings Plato emulates Homer in the excellence of both style and subject matter' (2.3) and 'how Homer demonstrates the three forms of poetic art' (2.7). These correspond respectively with the parts of the soul which are related to the gods, operate by knowledge and are involved in imaginative and irrational reasoning. In the *in Crat.* Proclus calls upon the support of Homer in chs 40, 78 and 79.

166. See *in Crat.* 62 for another example of the excerptor's use of the rhetorical question.

167. *in Crat.* 71, the longest chapter in the treatise, is the most important link between the two major sections therein – the first dealing with Socrates' refutation of traditional conventionalist language theory and the logical establishment of a natural relation between names and their objects, the second with a theological description and analysis of the cosmic structure based on etymological studies of the names of the various entities therein. The chapter may be divided into two parts: from 29,21 to 32,17 Proclus discusses how signs like the name descend from the intelligible sphere all the way down to the mundane, and from 32.18-35.15 the excerptor (Exc.?) outlines the differences between names instituted among the gods and those assigned with varying degrees of correctness by particular souls. Tarrant argues that the original discussion of *Crat.* 392B-394D1 was presented in the form of a lecture (*theôria*), followed by specific issues (*lexeis*) raised by the text in their proper order.

168. See Romano and Taormine, *Hyparxis e hypostasis nel neoplatonismo*.

169. Every Proclean *huparxis* from the intelligible down to the mundane consists of a transcendent pinnacle which is the seat of its essence, a middle monad which reverts back to its source and perfects the *huparxis*. The presentation of triads in the order one, three, two is common in Proclus and probably reflects his interest in first defining the limits of the *huparxis*, then in demonstrating by his description how the *huparxis* moves circularly from high to low then vice-versa.

170. The excerptor here establishes a tripartite hierarchy involving the intellectual (1) Fathers, (3) Nature and the (2) Demiurge Zeus. The Fathers are the triune intellectual gods Cronus, Rhea and Zeus, the first deities in whom the masculine and feminine creative powers are distinct. These are also the first deities that sow visible and shapen signs in all their lower order products. It is by looking to these signs that the Demiurge Zeus institutes the demiurgic order, which is composed of a more particular aspect of himself, Poseidon and Hades. Although all three of these gods are united in the single monad of the transcendent Zeus, they each are also associated with a particular power in the paternal demiurgic triad: Zeus conveys essence, and thus the whole cosmos participates in being through him, Poseidon produces life and procession and Hades is responsible for the reversion of all things to their proper principle (*Theol. Plat.* 6.6). The three forms of participation which enable the powers of the gods to be transmitted to lower order creatures may be traced first to the demiurgic triad which instituted the entire intracosmic sphere, to the intellectual Fathers and finally to intelligible Reality itself. Demiurgic Being, Life and Intellectual reversion are derived from that of the intellectual Fathers, Cronus, Rhea and Zeus, respectively. In the intelligible-intellectual sphere they are represented

by the supercelestial region, Uranus and the subcelestial vault. They first become distinct (though always remain unified) in the intelligible triad. For more information on the role of the Demiurge in the creation and naming of the cosmic world based on its intelligible model see Trouillard, 'L'activité onomastique selon Proclus'. Below the demiurgic triad, there are three classes of gods which create things based on images of the Forms which are handed down from the superior orders. The Assimilative gods, who are located above the cosmic realm, are responsible for creating perceptible likenesses of the intellectual Forms. The Independent gods, who are both remote from and involved in the cosmic sphere, create reflections of these Forms. And the encosmic gods create impressions of the Forms (*in Parm.* 848).

171. The sign (*sunthêma*) which Proclus mentions here is used synonymously with the term symbol (*sumbolon*). The latter originally indicated corresponding halves of a broken knuckle-bone which was used as a token by contracting parties. The Chaldaean theurgists generalized this idea to contracts between men and the gods, wherein the *sumbola* were the *kharactêres* which the theurgist wore on his tunic. These characters correspond to the inarticulate sounds by which the Iunges were believed to mediate between the gods and men. As Sheppard points out, the symbols which the gods sowed into the cosmic system were believed to be sympathetically related to material objects in the cosmic world (*Studies on the Fifth and Sixth Essays*, 145). Thus, the degree to which a person perceives the signs dictates the degree to which he not only abides by but also controls the order in which he lives. For the theurgical significance of *sunthêma* and *sumbolon* see Cardullo, *Il Linguaggio del Simbolo in Proclo*, 20-34, 42-7. For a general history of the use of symbol in the Platonic tradition see Coulter, *The Literary Microcosm*, 32-72.

172. The excerptor here traces the first dissemination of divine signs back to the intelligible Father of the Chaldaean system. For the power by which this Father proceeds is equated with celestial revolution and is called Aeon, the invisible heaven after which the visible heaven is modelled (cf. *in Crat.* 110). It winds in a serpentine fashion within the zone of the intelligible fire which characterizes the mind of the intelligible Father. Aeon thus winds around the universe mingling one aeon with the next. And as the serpent was believed to regenerate itself by sloughing its skin, Aeon was believed to revitalize the universe at the conclusion of each aeon, presumably in the same way as the Demiurge regenerates the cosmos at the end of each cosmic period (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 100). As Aeon winds around the celestial sphere, he illuminates the aether and the planets located therein, which in turn the Chaldaeans interpret as signs of the divine order and will. Like the Demiurge, Aeon is thus responsible for both the periodic regeneration of the cosmos and the communication of divine signs from the higher to the lower realms.

173. The Chaldaeans believed that the transcendent Father manifested himself in Aeon and that, therefore, the names of both of them were impossible to apprehend in speech. The names which the theurgists used for these deities were understood to express only their qualities. Aeon was thus called 'Father-begotten light', because he contemplates the paternal intellect and passes this illumination on to all divine sources and principles (*in Tim.* 3,14,5-6).

174. i.e. the demons and angels.

175. This oracle may be traced back to Aeon and the transcendent Father and thus is itself a shape of the illumination which it describes. Yet, while its activity emanates directly from its divine cause, its shape depends on the essence which it receives. The light emitted by Aeon thus appears in different symbolic shapes depending on its level of cosmic manifestation. Those that are

higher are more ineffable, those that are lower more distinct and apparent. Form (*eidos*), shape (*morphê*) and figure (*skhêma*), according to Proclus, are distinguished by degree of universality. The *eidos* is most universal and, at its pinnacle in the third intelligible monad, exists prior to shape. As it is projected into the lower spheres by the light of Phanes, it becomes shapen. And when it becomes visible, it is considered a figure. At *in Tim.* 3,74,23-4, for example, Proclus describes figure as the 'revealed image' of the form and calls it the shape of shape.

176. Marinus reports that Proclus himself was involved in theurgical speculation and that he drew upon the exegesis of Porphyry, Iamblichus and Syrianus in his commentary on the Oracles (Marinus *Procl.* 26). According to Psellus, whose commentary on the Oracles is probably derived from that of Proclus (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 72), the theurgist used a magical top (*strophalos*) to communicate with the gods. This top consisted of a golden disk covered with mystical characters (*kharactêres*). These were considered mundane *sumbola* of the characters of light by which the gods communicated with lower order creatures. That is, the intelligible and invisible characters of the gods first are converted into the shapen characters of light which are projected into the lower regions and eventually find a sympathetic and analogous match with the characters on the magic top. The theurgist apparently swung this disk around by a leather strap and recited magical incantations. Between these incantations, Lewy believes (*Chaldaean Oracles*, 249), the theurgist would utter inarticulate sounds. From *in Crat.* 71, however, it is clear that these were not 'mostly imitations of animal cries which [...] were intended to frighten off evil spirits', as Lewy thinks (*ibid.*), but were imitations of the symbols of light which were transmitted from Aeon through the Iunges and represented Reality itself. For more information on magical names in later antiquity, see Dillon, 'The Magical Power of Names in Origen and later Platonism'.

177. The excerptor does not explain how the same essence can be correctly indicated by different names, but the Chaldaeans make it clear that this variety is due to the multitude of angelic, astral and planetary gods who transmit the illuminations of Aeon according to their own revolutions and configurations. When the magical top is swung, the theurgist conjures a particular astral or planetary god who then transmits his will into the mundane region by mediation of a Iunx. The theurgist's choice of deity depends on his precise location at the time of conjuration. For these are the factors that determine the positions of the celestial bodies in relation to the people who will be directly affected by the God's intervention. Thus, even though the illumination from Aeon will be the same, the celestial configurations and revolutions by which it becomes manifest will be different for the Indians than for the Greeks. Hence, the gods who represent the same power will be called upon by different names which are suited to their different circumstances (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 250).

178. The purity of an object's actuality depends on its degree of universality. At *Elem. Theol.* 77 Proclus explains that everything that exists potentially is brought to actuality by something which is actually what the other is potentially. With regard to names, this means that those of humans may be brought from potentiality to actuality through those of angels, daemons and gods. Names which are given by humans based on these models are superior to those based on common usage or things observed in the flux of generation.

179. Although the expression, 'He who is beyond the things as a whole' (*ho epekeina ton holon*), clearly refers to the One itself, the excerptor is still using Chaldaean terminology. The Chaldaeans distinguished the ineffable God who transcends the things as a whole from Him who is simply transcendental (*ho*

hapax epekeina) and Him who is doubly transcendental (*ho dis epekeina*). These three gods correspond to the Neoplatonic One, Cronus and Zeus. By using the Chaldaean terminology here, the excerptor maintains continuity with the previous discussion of the transmission of divine signs, but also uses the masculine article to personify the transcendent One without actually naming it.

180. The point at which, Proclus believes, the gods become ineffable is in the supercelestial region of what is both intelligible and intellectual (*in Crat.* 113). While some, he says, portray this region with ineffable symbols, others actually name it, yet leave it unknown since they can describe neither its form nor figure and shape. What is intelligible they can only name, and what is beyond that they can only describe by analogy (113 (65,21-3)). Homer does not ascend beyond the Cronian order (*in Crat.* 114) and Orpheus uses myth to reveal things prior to heaven extending all the way up to the foremost cause (*in Crat.* 115). The first deity whom Orpheus personifies is Phanes in the third intelligible monad. Hesiod and the *Chaldaean Oracles* also teach that certain causes should be honoured with silence (115 (67,7)).

181. Thus, the first monad of the intelligible triad, which corresponds to the intelligible Father in the Chaldaean system, remains in proximate yet remote relation to the One thing and thus is in large part ineffable. The middle monad, or the Chaldaean Aeon, produces life by proceeding from the intelligible heights. Both the Chaldaeans and the Neoplatonists believed that this sphere too was unnameable, except according to its qualities. Negation is a common method used by Proclus in the description of things that are transcendent and ineffable. See *in Parm.* 1073, where he describes three types of dialectical negation: that superior to, that inferior to and that equal to assertion.

182. Intelligence (*noësis*) is the means by which intelligible things communicate. As intellectual thought, it is the means by which intellectual things know the intelligible. For more information on intellectual thought see *in Crat.* 104 and n. 286.

183. Proclus is here playing on the etymological connection between *Phanes*, *apophainô* (reveal) and *phanos* (brightness, light).

184. For Aristotle there is no natural relation between the paradigmatic thought and its representation by a name (*Int.* 16a5-8). Socrates' first and second arguments are intended to prove that names may be but not always are naturally related to their objects.

185. The Platonic use of the term 'mediating' (*diaporthmion*) originates with Plato himself. In the *Symposium* Diotima explains that Eros is a great daemon with the power of communication (*hermêneuron*) and mediation (*diaporthmion*) between the gods and men (202E). It is by this power that men partake of the Beautiful and the Good (202C). The Chaldaeans then applied the term to the very name by which the Iunges transmit messages between the divine and the mortal spheres. That the Iunges mediate between the extremes of the universe is clear from *in Parm.* 1199: 'the order of the Iunges possesses the mediating power of all things, as the theologians say, from the intelligible and intellectual order all the way to matter and back to the order of the totality'.

186. After converting the intelligible light of Aeon into names, the Chaldaean Iunges, who comprise the first triad of the intelligible-intellectual sphere, pass them down to the Supporters (*anokheis*) in the second triad. In *in Crat.* 71 Proclus says that the name itself 'supports' the springs, but he usually attributes this function to the second aspect of the Iunges (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 148, n. 302). According to Oracle 40, 'every cosmic order has unbending intellectual Supporters'. This means that the Iunges actually help to maintain the stable structure of the universe, primarily at the juncture between the

super- and encosmic, or visible and invisible, orders. Lewy thinks that the 'spiritual substance of these Supporters is identical with that of the springs (*pêgai*), which in *Parm.* 801 seems to identify with the Forms: 'from the fontal (*pêgaii*) Forms, some particular ones have proceeded with the lot of demiurgically creating the cosmos'. Lewy also thinks it likely that the Supporting function of the Iunges becomes manifest in the regular positioning and movement of the planets and stars (*Chaldaean Oracles*, 136). The theurgist thus can literally read the messages of the Iunges in the stars and regulate the times and places of his incantations by their positions and relations to both one another and the mundane world.

187. The three Teletarchs are associated with the third triad of the intelligible and intellectual region. The first triad is composed of the three Iunges and the second, of the three Supporters (cf. n. 186 above). The three Teletarchs are responsible for transmitting the divine name through the empyrean, aetherial and material realms respectively (Psellus *Hyp.* 5 (73,15)). In *in Crat.* 71, then, Proclus outlines the transmission of the divine name from the intelligible sphere, where it originates from the Supreme Father, down through the intelligible-intellectual sphere, where it is passed from the Iunges to the Supporters to the Teletarchs, and finally into the stellar sphere, wherein it becomes perceptible to humans by its relation to the positions and revolutions of the stars.

188. Intermediary between those of the gods and those of humans, the intellectual and onomastic activities of the Iunges are both distinct and unified. The Iunges are associated with the first monad of the intelligible and intellectual region and are responsible for communication between the supercelestial arch, which is proximately and stably related to the intelligible region, and the stellar sphere, the first visible cosmic structure. In the Chaldaean cosmology, the stellar sphere is equated with the connecting gods (*hoi sunokheis*) who are so called because they are the primary bond between the intelligible and intellectual regions. In the Orphic system, it is called Uranus, and his castration by Cronus is similarly interpreted as a symbol of the separation of the intelligible from the intellectual. The third monad of the intellectual sphere is equated in the Chaldaean system with the three Teletarchs, who are rulers of the empyrean, aetherial and material realms (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 148, n. 302). They are also known as 'Rulers of the mysteries', and the first is said 'to conduct the wings of fire', which is the light projected from Aeon, down from the limit of the intelligible and intellectual sphere to the cosmic realm where the second and third Teletarchs 'consecrate' the aetherial and material realms with the same light according to the particular nature of each realm (Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 149). Thus, all divine names exist occultly with the gods in the intelligible sphere, then are revealed by Phanes to the intelligible and intellectual Iunges who transmit them through the connective gods and into the celestial sphere, where the Teletarchs make them accessible to creatures in the aetherial and material zones. For more information on divine names in Proclus, see Sorabji, 'Divine Names and Sordid Deals in Ammonius' Alexandria'.

189. i.e. the theurgists who follow the teletarchic Rulers of the mysteries and belong to their proper divine causal chain, not necessarily by genetic descent but by choice of life. See *in Crat.* 81-3 for a discussion of the superiority of relations based on causal chains and choice of life over genetic descent. For further ancient references on divine names, see Sorabji, *The Philosophy of the Commentators*, vol. 3, 220-6.

190. These include the cycle of the Same and that of the Other. The latter is divided into seven other cycles which harmonize with one another and are analogous to the seven planetary revolutions (cf. *Tim.* 34Cff.).

191. By 'rational essence' (*logikê ousia*) Proclus here means more than simply our rational essence. At *in Crat.* 51, we learn that the creative art of names depends on a certain power of representation by which the soul fashions likenesses of real beings. Now, these likenesses are in a way immaterial and products of only the essence of reason (*logikê*), but the soul also uses linguistic imagination (*lektikê*) to create their essence. The natural relation here between reason and the linguistic imagination is supported by the cognate terms *logikê* and *lektikê*. Proclus uses the same method to support Socrates' second argument that names are naturally related to their objects. There the relation was among *pragma*, *praxis* and *prattein*, and *onomazein* and *onoma* as a subset of *legein* (cf. *in Crat.* 45). Thus, when the divine names are transmitted from the stellar and planetary spheres they reach our rational essence which is suited to speech. The inter-relation between the Neoplatonic systems of epistemology and communication is discussed in more detail at *in Crat.* 76-9.

192. Poets follow the light of Apollo up to Phanes, who is the first intellectual projector of the intelligible light of Aeon and the transcendent Father. Yet, because this light is intellectual and conducts to the mundane sphere knowledge of the Forms through their particular formulae (*logoi*), it is clear that both poet and professional have access to divine inspiration through the projection of divine light. For more information on the relation between Apollo and the light of Phanes, see *in Crat.* 136 where Apollo is associated with Helios. For a discussion of Apollo as source of inspiration see *in Crat.* 176-7.

193. 'Xanthus' is the name given by the gods to the river god of the Scamander river in the Troad (cf. *Il.* 20.74).

194. i.e. a prophetic bird (cf. *Il.* 14.291).

195. i.e. a small mound located outside the gates of Troy (cf. *Il.* 2.813). Socrates says nothing of the sort. In fact, at 394B he argues that each name which has been correctly laid down has a certain power based on the powers of the different letters and syllables that compose it. This means that if the object of indication is hard or rough its letters and syllables will reflect that nature. But if it is soft and gentle, the name will be more melifluous. Also, letters and syllables may be both added and subtracted from correct names by those who misunderstand them. Divine names are not always of fewer syllables than mortal. The excerptor makes two points about the relation between divine and mortal names: first, since what is divine is more universal (*holos*) and simple (*haplos*) than what is mortal, the divine expression of objective Reality must be simpler as well and therefore of fewer letters and syllables; second, because the divine sphere is characterized by what is intelligible and intellectual, all motion and activity is effortless, like the transmission of light. In the mundane sphere, however, life is made difficult and hard by the influence of matter. Thus, when the human names things based on their outward appearance, their names reflect the hardness of their material aspect as well as their true essence.

196. The gods name all things, including those affected by the flux of generation, according to their definite and unchanging cause. They thus name the river Xanthus not after its superficial qualities which are always in flux, but because it itself is an internal and constant cause, whose essence becomes manifest in the quality of tawny skin tone (*xanthos*) in the people nurtured by it. The Xanthus is both an ancient cause of generation and a constant source of nourishment for the Trojans. That Proclus considers generation and nourishment two aspects of the same cause is clear from his discussion of Demeter at *in Crat.* 164-8. By analogy with Demeter, he says, even mothers both give birth and nurture their young, and these powers only operate simultaneously (*in Crat.* 168).

197. This is intended to support the excerptor's claim that the name 'chalcis' indicates 'how the gods determine by intellectual proportions (*ta noera metra*) the life carried in generation'. The intellectual proportions mentioned here are the harmonic ratios by which the Demiurge determined the revolutions of the celestial and the seven planetary spheres. These revolutions in turn belong to the cycles of the Same and the Other which are composed of soul and are the source of all individual souls falling into generation. Proclus followed Ptolemy in the belief that the heavenly bodies and their configurations had a direct effect not only on the character but also on the life and circumstances of men. It thus is likely that, according to the excerptor, the bird chalcis has been named after the ringing bronze (*khalkos*) because it is, in the realm of life and generation, both an harmonious and flying representation of the intellectual harmonies and revolutions of the celestial bodies, which are the source and principle of its own essence.

198. This interpretation is intended to support the excerptor's claim that the name 'Myrine' indicates 'how the gods separately both know and distribute even the life separate from generation'. The 'soul which was allotted this location' is that of Myrine, the wife of Dardanus, who was buried here and whose spiritual power was believed still to inhabit the place. In terms of cause and providence, this example is intermediary to the first two: while the first indicates that the gods anticipate and name all flowing essence by a definite cause, the third shows that they know and distribute from above the life which is inferior to them but superior to generation, and the second demonstrates how they determine by intellectual harmonies the life in generation. The excerptor assumes that Socrates' choice of examples illustrating divine and mortal names is intended to demonstrate the Neoplatonic system of causation as it extends from its divine principle and influences first the essence and then the life of its living products but also names them in the way that is most appropriate to their nature. It is common procedure for Proclus to list triads in the order one, three, two (cf. *in Crat.* 97).

199. See also *in Tim.* 2,274,1ff., where Proclus uses the Xanthus-Scamander etymology to argue that different names may be assigned to the same object depending on whether the name-giver's understanding of it is based on knowledge or imagination.

200. The relationship among cause, understanding, and naming, which the excerptor discusses in *in Crat.* 71, is further elaborated in chs 72-84. With the exception of the brief mention of Astyanax and Hector in *in Crat.* 80, none of the chapters in this section corresponds with the the current dialogue between Socrates and Hermogenes (*Crat.* 393). In chs 71-2 the excerptor is clearly introducing and supplementing Proclus' interpretation of divine and mortal names in Homer, which differ in correctness to the extent that the name-giver is able to understand the stable essence and universal cause of any given object, then name it accordingly.

201. At *Theol. Plat.* 4.11.35.13ff. Proclus makes it clear that formlessness, colourlessness and intangibility are qualities that belong to what is intelligible. Thus, the gods that belong to the pinnacle of the intelligible-intellectual order and are primarily intelligible in essence are known and spoken of only through intelligible symbols (*sunthêmata*).

202. The dyad of circular and straight activity commences in the third monad of the intelligible and intellectual realm (cf. *in Tim.* 1,130,28ff.). As the Orphic parallel to this cosmic level, Phanes is thus said to be carried in an endless circle (cf. *in Parm.* 1161).

203. Proclus normally distinguishes form, shape and figure according to their respective degree of universality. Form (*eidos*) exists prior to shape in the third

intelligible triad. Shape (*morphê*) is the projected image of Form. And figure (*skhêma*) is the shape of a shape (cf. *in Crat.* 71 and *in Tim.* 3,74,23-4).

204. People suspended from any given divine or daemonic series thus receive their natural figure, character and spiritual motions from that series as they are transmitted through the stellar configurations of his birth and region. At *Tetr.* 3.11 Ptolemy explains how the different planets and constellations determine the bodily forms and temperaments of the people born under them. At 3.13 he goes on to describe how the spiritual motions are affected by the celestial bodies. While the sensory and irrational parts of the soul are determined by the lower bodies, especially the moon, the rational and intellectual parts are mainly affected by Hermes, etc. As the activity of the gods, which universally encompasses all variation of human qualities, descends into the sublunar sphere, it is discriminated by the spiritual motions of the celestial bodies and by a variety of particular causes, such as a person's mortal parents, choice of lifestyle, etc. Each person then is free either to follow or reject the activity and lifestyle most appropriate to his or her own divine series (cf. *in Crat.* 81).

205. Having established the causal relationship between God, daemon and mortals in the divine series (*in Crat.* 73-5), Proclus now introduces the theme of knowledge and communication therein.

206. In theurgy, divine names were considered revelations from the gods and were used for direct communication with them. In fact, the divine name was believed to be so essentially related to its object that it could be used in conjuration and incantation to compel its deity to do the will of the priest (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 56-7, 424).

207. Proclus is here following the Chaldaean notion that the intelligible Father unfolds his essence by intellect, will and power and makes it accessible to humans by putting it in forms (*skhêmata*) appropriate to their means of perception and in material naturally suited to their soul. As Lewy explains, the action of the intelligible Father is thought. Thus, his first product is intellect. His will works in harmony with this intellect, since his will is thought and his thought is action and therefore intellectual (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 79). For Proclus this means that by their will alone, which is essentially identical to their intelligible thought, the gods convert that thought into an airy form (*skhêma*) which conveys it to men in the same way that other daemons produce the particular forms (*skhêmata*) of men which are universally encompassed by the leading God of each series. The difference is that the latter case deals with causation, the former with communication. The media of communication in Chaldaean cosmology are the Iunges and Teletarchs. The latter are composed of three angels who control cosmic communication in the empyrean, aetherial and material realms respectively. The middle Teletarch is responsible for informing paternal thought in the aetherial vehicles which enable the gods to communicate with mortals despite their differences in the faculties of expression and perception. For the aetherial vehicles are proximately and sympathetically related to the air through which they are able to penetrate into the material realm and reach the human senses. The air is located in the region under the moon (cf. *in Crat.* 170), which is intermediate between the aetherial zone of the middle Teletarchs and the material zone of the last (Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 139-40).

208. The 'visible gods' to whom Proclus is here referring are the celestial bodies, and the current argument is based on Plato's statement in the *Timaeus* that 'the universe had no need of eyes, for nothing visible was left external to it. Nor was hearing necessary, for there was nothing externally audible' (*Tim.* 33C). In the *in Tim.* Proclus responds to this passage with the same Homeric

quotation and follows it with the comment that 'the activity of seeing and hearing do not exist in the sun particularly, as in us, but according to one life and one subject (3,82,9-10). While both the *in Tim.* and the *in Crat.* passage emphasize the universal nature of the gods, the former is intended to prove that the universe is perceptive because an animal. In the *in Crat.*, however, the discussion from chs 72-83 deal mainly with the interrelation of the Neoplatonic systems of cosmic causation and communication. The visible gods are thus said to have prior comprehension of the causes of all things. Because their activity stems from the intelligible region which transcends time and then unfolds itself into the lower orders, the gods have foreknowledge of everything that happens within their series. And since they perceive what is within these series, they are said to have internal perception. For more information on the inter-relation between ontology and epistemology in the works of Proclus, see Beierwaltes, *Proclus, Grundzuge seiner Metaphysik*, 31-48 and Moutsopoulos, *Les structures de l'imaginaires dans la philosophie de Proclus*, 43-60, 73-92.

209. This statement is based on *Tim.* 33C-D, where Plato continues to argue against any universal cosmic sense organ. In his comment on the passage, Proclus infers that these organs must correspond with the senses of taste and smell, and that the universe has no need of the former because it is not nourished and does not require the latter because it does not have respiration, which is necessary for olfaction. The *in Crat.* offers no explanation for the lack of divine smell or taste. Instead, Proclus stresses the fact that the face of the moon 'bears images of the sun'. The sun is an important symbol of divine knowledge and perception in Neoplatonism. From Plotinus on, it is used to indicate the spontaneous, effortless transmission and pervasiveness of divine intellect (cf. *in Tim.* 4,60,31ff. for a discussion of the Neoplatonic doxography of the sun and moon). At *in Crat.* 136 Apollo is said to conduct the truth from himself, just as Helios conducts all encosmic light together from himself. And at *in Crat.* 174 Apollo's prophetic activity is said to be located in heaven, for thence his power of revelation 'shines through' as it reveals the intelligible good things to celestial entities: 'Apollo thus revolves with the sun as well, and the same intellect has been unified in both, since the sun too transmits light to the things in heaven as it illuminates and provides all things with the power of unification'. It is clear that at *in Crat.* 78 Proclus has carefully chosen the image of the sun to demonstrate the concordance of the intracosmic systems of divine causation and communication.

210. Odysseus explains here how the fact that his men had killed Helios' kine was first reported by Lampetie to Helios who then convinced Zeus to punish them. Odysseus says that he learned all of this from Calypso who claimed to have received her information from Hermes. Proclus interprets the passage as evidence for the existence of a hierarchy of both particular causes and communicating deities within the cosmic system. For more information on Proclus' theory of a cosmic hierarchy of communication see *in Crat.* 118.

211. In the *Odyssey* reference, Odysseus explains how the fact that his men had killed Helios' kine was first reported by Lampetie to Helios who then convinced Zeus to punish them. Odysseus says that he learned all of this from Calypso who claimed to have received her information from Hermes. The meaning of this passage, according to Proclus, is that there is a hierarchy of both particular causes and communicating deities within the cosmic system. The report of the killing of Helios' kine thus originated with the local daemon Lampetie. She then passed it up to Helios who finally delivered it to the universal cosmic cause, Zeus, for judgement. Knowledge of this process was also handed down to the lower spheres in a hierarchical fashion. We may assume

that Hermes, the universal messenger of the Gods, was informed directly by Zeus and then passed the story on to the more particular Goddess Calypso who finally revealed the divine events to Odysseus.

212. The grammarians belong to the same tradition as Aristarchus (third-second century BC) and Crates (second century BC), who were associated with the Alexandrian and Pergamene libraries. They wrote line-by-line, sometimes word-by-word commentaries on Homer, Hesiod and other 'theological' sources (see Lambertson, *Homer the Theologian*, 26). Proclus cites Longinus (third century AD) as a typical grammarian (*in Tim.* 1,86,24).

213. The contrast in this passage, like that earlier developed between Plato and Aristotle (cf. *in Crat.* 2-9), distinguishes those who look beyond the apparent phenomenon to unchanging Reality itself from those who are blinded by the density of matter and the flux of generation. The 'matter' to which Proclus is here referring is the actual spoken sound of any given name (cf. *in Crat.* 49). At *in Crat.* 170 Proclus notes that the spoken word is 'air that has been filled'.

214. At 392C-393A Socrates explains that the son of Hector was called 'Astyanax' by the men but 'Scamandrius' by the women, and that the former name was more correct than the latter because men are wiser than women. It is clear that Proclus has developed his theory of coordinate systems of cosmic causation and communication not only to prove how names may be naturally correct and handed down from their divine sources, but also to comment and expand on Socrates' interpretation of Homer. According to Proclus' theory, the Trojan men have a clearer understanding of things and their names than do women in the same way that angels and daemons see things more clearly than do men. Yet, a distinction between the intelligence or understanding of men and women is not articulated in the *in Crat.* It may be that the excerptor simply did not record it, but it is more likely that Proclus interpreted Socrates' words symbolically and replaced his human epistemological hierarchy with one reaching from the One through all the gods, daemons and heroes all the way down to the mundane region. In the *in Remp.* Proclus explains that excellence and the capacity for education are common to both men and women (1,236-50). But he believes that the feminine is more closely related to the particular than is the masculine. Thus, feminine understanding is to masculine what human understanding is to that of daemons. And what human understanding is to that of the daemons, that of the daemons is to the divine.

215. By the universe (*ta panta*) Proclus means all the discriminated universe – that is, everything from the celestial vault down. This means that the name-giver may look to the Form of the object of indication or to the celestial indicators, i.e. the planetary and stellar configurations, at the moment of a person's birth. When he looks to the Form, he perceives images in his soul which are like the intelligible paradigms reflected in the Forms of the third monad of the intelligible region (see the discussion of Neoplatonic Forms at *in Crat.* 53). When he looks to the celestial configurations, he similarly observes the planetary and stellar images of the intelligible and intellectual Heaven which connects intelligible Reality with the lower orders (see *in Crat.* 110).

216. This theory is based on *Rep.* 617E where Plato teaches that each soul chooses its own lot prior to its birth into the world of generation.

217. cf. *Rep.* 620F8-E1.

218. The natural relation among a soul's form of life, its activity and its name is based on that among the object, its action and its name. See *in Crat.* 46 and Socrates' first and second arguments (*in Crat.* 33-63).

219. Since *in Crat.* 87-185 deals with Socrates' analyses of individual names, Proclus begins with a brief introduction to etymological studies (84-7).

220. This idea becomes standard in the Neoplatonic tradition. See Ammonius in *Cat.* 21,16-22,10.

221. See in *Crat.* 123 (72,28ff.).

222. This chapter responds to Socrates' argument at *Crat.* 393E that it makes no difference if we add different vowels and consonants to the names of letters so long as we instill the letter's indicated power. It thus is permissible to add the letter *ê*, *t* and *a* to the name *bêta*, since it still conveys the 'power' of the consonant *b*. By power Proclus means the potential for communication which is implicit in any given letter or name. When the element is communicated, it becomes actual. It should be borne in mind that powers and activities imply a relation between names and their objects which is stronger even than essence, since power and activity are prior to Being itself.

223. If one can identify the same power in different material manifestations, they will not affect a person's understanding of it.

224. The etymologist must recognize that the poet has created a name that does not belong to the vernacular but describes its object of indication not according to its primary activity of labouring but according to the cause of that activity – the lack of property.

225. In the former, the Homeric genitive ending *-ophin* merely defines the noun's relation to other grammatical elements in the sentence. It does not indicate a compound noun or adjective. The Homeric adjective *pholkos*, however, whose derivation is uncertain, seems to describe a quality of Thersites' legs (cf. *Il.* 2.217). Chantraine suggests that the term may be derived from *ephelkethai*, as in *ephelkomenoisi podessin* (with his feet dragging) (*Il.* 23.693). See Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, 491. According to Apollonius Sophicus (164.17), *pholkos* may be a shortened form of *phaolkos*, since Thersites is one that 'draws his eyes together (*ho ta phaê heilkusmenos*) as if squinting.

226. Meleager's hunt becomes 'black' in a sense when he murders his uncles for dishonouring his beloved Atalanta (cf. Ovid *Metamorphosis* 8.433ff.).

227. This point stresses familiarity with the formation of diphthongs and other linguistic variations due to such phenomena as the contraction of vowels and compensatory lengthening.

228. The term *apokopê* indicates the cutting off of one or more letters from the end of a word (Apollonius Dyscolus *Synt.* 6.11 and Aristotle, *Poet.* 1458b2). The term *sunkopê* refers to cutting a word short by striking out one or more letters (Apollonius Dyscolus *Adv.* 169.15). The term *elleipsis* indicates the omission of a letter (Apollonius Dyscolus *Pron.* 56.28). The term *pleonasmus* indicates the superfluous addition of letters (Apollonius Dyscolus *Synt.* 133.14). The term *sunaloipha* is a coalescing of two syllables by synaeresis, crasis or elision (Dionys. Halicar. *Comp.* 6.22). For a discussion of *aphairesis*, the removing of initial (and medial) letters as in *susus*, see Apollonius Dyscolus *Pron.* 55.13. The term *sunizêsis* indicates a melting of two vowels into one without an alteration of the letters, as in *poleôs* (Gaisford, *Etymologicum Magnum*, 735-6).

229. This idea is based on Socrates' argument that, if a name is naturally correct, then all of its parts must be correct (*Crat.* 385C). For Proclus, the spoken sound of a word is an airy vehicle which conducts divine thought from its intelligible source down to the terrestrial world (cf. in *Crat.* 77). This thought is also responsible for creating the visible object of indication and therefore conveys its very essence.

230. Aristotle tells us that ambiguities may be avoided by calling things by their proper names (*oikeia onomata*) (*Rhet. ad Alex.* 1435a33). By 'proper' Aristotle means what is conventionally correct. For Proclus, it is imperative to

use the naturally correct name because it reveals the divine essence of its object. The homonym or verbal identity, according to Aristotle, occurs when things are assigned the same name but the definitions corresponding to the name differ for each (*Cat.* 1a1-3). Proclus disagrees with Aristotle about verbal identity at the universal level, where the former rejects the idea of divine error or confusion in assigning names. On the particular level, Proclus agrees with Aristotle. See Ammonius in *Cat.* 16,1 for more information on verbal identity at the particular level. That Ammonius agrees with Proclus on the universal level is clear from his second definition of the natural at *in Int.* 35,1.

231. i.e. the grammatical relationship between elements in a compound word may vary. While *kalamothêras* indicates a type of hunter by the instrument which he uses, *phugadothêras* identifies him by that which he hunts.

232. According to Benveniste, the Greek form *akinakês* is derived from the Iranian *kynk* (*Textes sogdiens*, 202). The etymology of *kandus* is unknown (Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, 491).

233. At *in Crat.* 85 (40,22ff.) Proclus actively demonstrates 15 different ways in which words are formed and subsequently used. This section is in direct response to points 9-11 above. In the *de Ling. Lat.*, Varro undertakes to explain how names were assigned to things (bks 1-7), how the derivatives of these names became so different (bks 8-13) and how words, when united with one another, express an idea (bks 14-25). This plan generally follows that of the *Categories*, which deals with simple expressions (*phônai*), *Int.*, which treats simple statements (*logoi*) and the *Analytics*, which deals with simple syllogisms (Ammonius in *Int.* 4,18). But Varro also cites such authorities as the Stoics Chrysippus and Antipater and the grammarians Aristophanes and Apollonius, who were associated with the Alexandrian library (*de Ling. Lat.* 6.2). Proclus, but especially the excerptor, is here working in a well established tradition dealing with the etymological analysis of words and their development. The excerptor is probably formalizing Proclus' discussion of etymological techniques much as he uses the Indemonstrable to formulate his arguments.

234. The term *drakhmê* is in fact derived from *drassomai* (to grasp). It indicates as much as one could hold in the hand – i.e. six pieces of iron which were called 'obols' (Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique*, 297).

235. The formalized structure of *in Crat.* 85 is unusual in the commentaries of Proclus, but is common to the techniques of the Alexandrian grammarians (cf. Apollon. Dysc. *Pron.*). It is likely that the excerptor has here organized Proclus' thought according to standard Alexandrian grammatical methods, just as he formalizes Proclus' arguments based on common Alexandrian logical schemata.

236. After discussing the different types of linguistic knowledge that the etymologist should master and the different methods by which words are formed and used (*in Crat.* 85), Proclus here turns to the Platonic text and comments on Socrates' argument that it is acceptable to call letters by their given names so long as these names convey the letter's indicated power (*Crat.* 393D-E). As in the excerptor's discussion of divine names in ch. 71, either Proclus or his student here (chs 85-6) provides a theoretical introduction to the primary theme – etymological study – analyses the different aspects of that theme – i.e. what an etymologist should know and how names are actually formed – and finally relates this analysis to Socrates' argument. By the time of Olympiodorus and Damascius, it becomes common practice in Neoplatonic commentaries to divide the analysis of any given Platonic passage into two parts – first, a theoretical discussion, wherein the general meaning of the passage is given and related to universal Neoplatonic principles, then a lexical discussion,

wherein the meaning of particular words, phrases and grammatical forms is treated. See Festugière, 'Modes de composition des commentaires de Proclus'.

237. This comment responds to Socrates' observation that 'we speak of the letters of the alphabet by their names and not by the letters themselves, with the exception of *e*, *u*, *o* and long *ô*. To the other vowels and consonants we add different letters and thereby create names for them (393D-E). Socrates is here referring to the common practice of expressing vowels by their sound and not by their full name. As it is apparent from his mention of both *o* and long *ô*, he does not mean that these vowels stand for long and short 'powers' including diphthongs. Proclus believes that letters convey the powers of a given object which become actual when the letters are synthesized and expressed in a name. These powers emanate from the superessential henads. See n. 3 on *in Crat.* 1.

238. *in Crat.* 87-95 are transitional chapters in which Proclus discusses Socrates' etymological analyses of certain mortal names but also treats this material as an introduction to and demonstration of the more complicated etymological techniques necessary for the study of divine names. Proclus considers Socrates' treatment of divine names an analytical reduction and discrimination of divine powers reaching all the way up to the ineffable region beyond Uranus and all the way down to the cosmic deities under the command of Zeus. This is the sense in which, according to traditional Neoplatonic theory, the *Cratylus* itself is a reproduction of the entire cosmos. Because this circular pattern of dialectical analysis is modelled after both the cyclical activity of the gods as well as the transmission of their names, Proclus finds it natural that Socrates begins his etymological studies with mortal names. He will argue, particularly through the names of Orestes and Agamemnon and Pelops and Tantalus, that a mortal's name, like his character, is determined more by the divine series to which he belongs than by his human parents. Through the name Tantalus, who is called a son of Zeus, this leads directly into Proclus' interpretation of what he considers Socrates' analytical reduction of the names of the divine kings. Tarrant notes that *in Crat.* 87 may be a surviving *lexis* to the preceding *theoria*, specific to *Crat.* 394E.

239. According to Proclus, the divine Father is associated with Limit and the cycle of the Same thing, and the generative aspect of the mother is associated with Infinity and the cycle of the Other (for more information on the relationship between divine parentage and the cycles of the Same and the Other see *in Crat.* 118). The particular soul which is involved in the cycle of the Other continues in straight procession with no reversion to the cycle of the Same and his paternal monad, and thus receives both its life and name from the circumstances of generation. The soul that reverts to its paternal monad chooses both its way of life and its name in accordance with the activity of that monad.

240. Orestes was the son of Agamemnon and Clytemnestra. He murders his mother and her lover for murdering his father. Atreus, the father of Agamemnon, was fated to struggle for life with his brother, Thyestes. Tantalus, who had enjoyed the company of the gods, stole their nectar and ambrosia, then attempted to feed them his son, Pelops. For these crimes he was condemned to perpetual hunger and thirst in the Underworld.

241. Ammonius divides the powers of the soul into the gnostic – which include intellect, discursive thought, opinion, imagination and perception – and the appetitive – including the desire for what really is good and that for what only seems so. There is a synergism between both types of power (*in Int.* 5,3). Thus, the higher a person's gnostic powers, the more he desires what is really good. Ammonius explains that the statement which demonstrates truth and falsity (*apophantikoi*, see *in Crat.* 36, 47) is the best means of elevating oneself

to higher levels of understanding (*in Int.* 5,14). This system applies best to living people who act either ignorantly or wisely based on their desire for what seems good or really is so. But it affects inter-personal behaviour as well. That is, just as a person makes bad decisions based on his ignorance of what he really wants, so too his parents may name him incorrectly because they do not know his appetites before he is born. Similarly, as a person makes good decisions when he knows what is best for himself, the name-giver may change the name of a person when his correct name becomes apparent from what he desires. Hence 'Aristocles' was changed to 'Plato'.

242. Fortune here may be personified as Tyche. Proclus considers fortune a purposeful (*in Crat.* 84) and divine (*in Crat.* 123) cause, which is able to allot names more accurately than men do (*in Crat.* 88).

243. The verb *etumologia* connotes not only the historical-linguistic analysis of any given word, but also the study of its true meaning based on its origin (cf. *etumos*, LSJ, II).

244. At 394E Socrates does in fact agree that the name 'Orestes' was probably assigned correctly, whether by fortune or by a poet.

245. Penelope here explains that a daemon inspired her with the idea of postponing the suitors by weaving a shroud for Laertes.

246. Phoenix is here trying to persuade Achilles not to withdraw from the war because of Agamemnon's insult and theft of Briseis. It turns out, however, that Achilles' withdrawal has been arranged by Zeus to satisfy both Thetis' desire for Achilles' fated honour and Hera's desire that the Greeks win the war, which was destined to occur only with the participation of Achilles.

247. A person is thus able to direct his own life by choice and free will, but the circumstances and events through which he passes in life are all determined by higher causes. At *in Tim.* 2,378,10ff. Proclus argues that even the soul's choice of life depends on a divine cause. For if it chooses its proper order, whether good or bad, it contributes to universal justice. It is either punished or rewarded by its own choice as it deserves. And yet all of this activity occurs under the foreknowledge of the soul's proper divine monad. The *Critias* reference is drawn from the story of Atlantis, where Gods are said 'not to coerce body with body like shepherds who drive their flocks to pasture with blows, but set the course of the living creature from that part from which it turns most readily, its prow, controlling its soul after their own mind by persuasion as by a rudder, and so moving and steering the whole mortal fabric'.

248. After showing how the etymological method is applied first to the lowest matter of the name (*in Crat.* 89), then to the object's form of life (ch. 90), to the Form itself and finally to its very Being (ch. 91), Proclus explains how the etymological study ultimately applies to human ethics. Tarrant notes that moral lessons of this sort are often included in *lexis* discussions. Proclus' treatment of etymological analysis corresponds with the traditional introduction to Neoplatonic studies. The student first read the *Alcibiades*, *Gorgias* and *Phaedo* to purify himself of everything conflicting with the philosophical way of life. He then read the *Cratylus* and *Theaetetus*, the so-called 'logical' dialogues, to learn how to use language carefully and technically. Through the *Sophist* and *Statesman*, he applied this tool to the examination of the natural world. He next examined metaphysics through the *Phaedrus* and *Symposium*. This course culminated in a study of the Good, as depicted in the *Philebus*. At each step the student was asked to re-evaluate his ethics in light of what he had learned. Proclus considers the ensuing etymological analysis the most perfect form of persuasion, primarily because he believes that Plato here describes the entire cosmos first in ascending, then in descending order by way of divine names. The

dialectical techniques of discrimination and analytical reduction mirror the process by which both divine products and their names proceed, then perfect the system and revert back to their source. The Neoplatonists generalized the idea that each dialogue was a representation of the entire cosmos and that dialectic imitated the activity therein, and believed that the structure of their introductory course to Platonic philosophy was the most perfect approach to education and research. See the Introduction for more information on the Neoplatonic introductory courses to Plato, the role of Aristotelian logic therein and the coordination between practical and theoretical philosophy.

249. After promising Myrtilus a reward for helping him defeat king Oenomaus in a chariot race for the hand of the king's daughter, Hippodameia, Pelops murdered Myrtilus and brought a curse down on his descendants (Apolodorus, *Bibliotheca*, 2.6ff.).

250. For Proclus this undoubtedly means participation in the Chaldaean theurgical rites (Marinus *Procl.* 18), which were intended literally to elevate the soul to communion with the gods and Reality (Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 184). But he is also referring here to the Eleusinian Mysteries (cf. *Phdr.* 244D-E), by which the soul frees itself from mundane influences and finds its essential source. At *in Tim.* 3,176,29 Proclus explains that, in the Eleusinian Mysteries, marriages are contracted with the partners looking to Earth and Heaven because these are the Mother and Father of all. The Mysteries thus release humans from their particular causes and reaffirm their real relation to the divine.

251. For the myth that the gods punished Tantalus by hanging a rock over his head see Athenaeus, 7.218b. At *Od.* 11.582ff., he is depicted in Hades as standing in water up to his neck with a fruit tree just out of reach, and he is unable to eat or drink, though perpetually hungry and thirsty. The latter punishment reflects his crime of stealing the food of the gods.

252. Proclus here shifts the emphasis of his discussion from Tantalus to his Father, Zeus, and thereby begins the transition into his commentary on Socrates' analysis of divine names.

253. In response to Socrates' statement that Tantalus was named by 'chance tradition', Proclus further discriminates the idea and attributes the creation of the name to fortune but its survival to tradition, which conveys the word of Zeus himself. Zeus is said to deify his divine subjects with his words (*in Tim.* 3,220,11). These words are demiurgic thoughts, which create all cosmic entities (*in Tim.* 3,222,3). He similarly fills souls with words (*logoi*), which are adapted in the form of images to them (*in Tim.* 3,272,1).

254. This comment begins a 'theoria' on *Crat.* 395E5ff.

255. The Chaldaeans called the point at which the intellect opens into the intelligible region the 'flower of the intellect'. But they also recognized a human faculty which they called by the same name and believed to be sympathetically related to its universal model. In their view, this was the only means by which the human could communicate with intelligible Reality. At *in Parm.* 1044 Proclus describes the One thing, the very cause of existence, as the flower of the intellect. For 'it is the first principle of intellectual light'. At *in Tim.* 4,14,11 he also states that it illuminates all things by intellect, by always contemplating in the same way (*noein*), by turning desirously about the principle of all things and by its activity (*energein*). This means that the flower of the intellect operates in two directions: it is both the source of intellectual light from the intelligible region and the point toward which all intellectual things strive. For more information about the human flower of the intellect see Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 168 and Guerand, 'L'huparxis de l'âme et la fleur de l'intellect dans la mystagogie de Proclus'.

256. This in fact is the first cosmic entity whose name is distinct from it. Phanes is the first god to be given a proper name. This is because of the intellectual aspect of the third intelligible monad where he is located. Still, he is only named by analogy (Phanes means revelation). As an intelligible god, his name is not entirely distinct from him. The Demiurge is said to have created the stellar or planetary spheres, or the cycles of the Same and the Other, out of mixtures of soul (*Tim.* 34Bff.). The Same is analogous to the intelligible sphere; the Other, to the intellectual. When a soul is united with the Same, it has access to the intelligible through which Zeus who is said to swallow the intelligible Phanes but also to connect the encosmic realm with the intellectual. See in *Crat.* 118 for more information on the relation between the Same and the masculine and the Other and the feminine.

257. The first paternal cause is the intelligible Father of the Chaldaean system, who holds the highest monad of the intelligible order and proceeds by way of Aeon, the projector of intelligible light and knowledge of Reality to the lower spheres. See in *Crat.* 71 for more information on the Chaldaean Father and his relations with Aeon and Phanes.

258. As in other sections of the commentary (e.g. in *Crat.* 43-8; 70-2), the excerptor (Exc.?) both introduces and concludes Proclus' discussion of the name 'Zeus' (in *Crat.* 99-104) with remarks of his own.

259. The section of the universe that the excerptor is here describing extends from Phanes in the third intelligible monad down through the intelligible-intellectual sphere (the Three Nights-Uranus-the Hundred-handers) and Cronus and Rhea, who comprise the first two intellectual monads, to Zeus, who both completes the intellectual order and institutes the subsequent demiurgic triad, composed of the Demiurge Zeus, Poseidon and Hades (see the Appendix for an outline of the Neoplatonic, Orphic and Chaldaean cosmic systems).

260. The excerptor distinguishes Zeus as descendent of the universal Phanes from Zeus as son of the intellectual Cronus by associating the former with the entire demiurgic genus of the gods, which is discriminated into a Zeus who governs the heavens, Poseidon, who rules the sea but is also called 'marine Zeus', and Hades, who also goes by the names 'Pluto' and 'Zeus of the underworld'. The demiurgic powers that infiltrate the sublunar sphere are thus treated as aspects of the universal demiurgic power which is projected from above by another transcendent Zeus. The proximate Father of this Zeus is said to be Cronus, who is the primary cause of his intellectual activity and his immediate object of reversion. The demiurgic genus is thus comprised of the entire series of Zeusian deities which emanate from one universal Zeus and is identified with them as *huparxis* to hupostases (for more information on the Principal Demiurges see in *Crat.* 150-63), but receive their essence and powers from both his intelligible and intellectual sources. As a result of this dual paternity, Zeus has a two-fold demiurgic role as well: he serves both as the third intellectual monad, which is primarily responsible for creating the cosmic realm of perception and connecting it to that of intellect, and as universal Demiurge, who created all the universe, including Phanes himself. The paradox that the intellectual Zeus created his intelligible Father Phanes is resolved by the Orphic myth that the former followed the advise of Night to swallow the latter and thereby absorb all his powers. The result was that not only the whole universe including all the gods therein but even time itself – past, present and future – were reunited in the belly of Zeus (cf. *Orph. fr.* 167). Then as everything unfolded again (but also for the first time) he became the creator of all the new world (*Orph. fr.* 168). At in *Tim.* 4,101,9 Proclus explains the relation between Zeus and Phanes in more philosophical terms. The latter, he says, reveals 'the

intelligible henads and is responsible for the shapes of living creatures because in him the first cause of the intelligible creatures is revealed even in manifest forms, since he primarily encompasses the intelligible forms. And he is called the key of the intellect because he bounds all the intelligible essence and connects the intellectual life. The Demiurge of the universe (*to pan*), who is himself intellectual, ascends to this God'. That Proclus here uses *to pan* as opposed to *ta panta* to describe the demiurgic creation is important. It tells us that, when the Demiurge ascends to Phanes, he receives the knowledge of intelligible Reality itself and uses this as his model in the creation of the universe as a whole, stemming immediately from the intelligible region. Also see *in Tim.* 2,451,6ff.

261. For the epithet 'Highest of Lords' see *Il.* 8.31 and *Od.* 1.45.

262. At *in Tim.* 2,450,13 Proclus explains that Phanes is both Female and Sire and proceeds all alone. After him, however, he separates the masculine and feminine generative powers into Uranus and Gaia, Cronus and Rhea and Zeus and Hera. Zeus then is said to imitate Phanes as he introduces both the supercelestial and the encosmic orders. But while Phanes introduces double triads, Zeus institutes double dodecads – the so-called Independent and Intra-cosmic gods. The important point here is that Zeus sets up a universal system of opposition based on his observation of the opposites implicit in the intelligible Phanes.

263. The Pythagorean Timaeus here explains that the Demiurge remains transcendently remote, after giving ordinances to his children, the minor demiurges, on how to imitate their own creator and, according to immortal principles, fashion the mortal world out of the elements earth, water, air and fire. The discrimination of opposites is thus multiplied when the minor Demiurges imitate Zeus, just as he is said to imitate Phanes. The quote from the *Timaeus* emphasizes the Pythagorean origin of the system of cosmic opposites. See Aristotle *Metaph.* 986a22. Although the theory of opposites dates back to Anaximander (cf. Aristotle *Phys.* 203a16), Proclus, like Aristotle, views Pythagoras as the major proponent of the theory.

264. This argument becomes formulaic in Proclus. Also see *in Tim.* 2,450,20 and *in Crat.* 169.

265. Proclus also discusses Zeus as Father of Hera and Poseidon at *in Tim.* 5,185,2.

266. At *in Crat.* 146 Zeus is said to marry Hera. At *in Tim.* 5,176,17 all masculine and feminine generative powers of the same order are said to marry. Thus, after Phanes who embodies both sets of powers, Uranus and Gaia, Ocean and Tethys, Cronus and Rhea, and Zeus and Hera are portrayed as husband and wife in myth. For more information on how the demiurgic intellect is joined with the life-bearing causes see *in Crat.* 169.

267. These figures and numbers create at the encosmic level a relation of geometrical and arithmetical proportion (*analogia*) which binds subsequent beings to their superiors, extending all the way up to the cycle of the Same and the intelligible source of the entire encosmic sphere, Zeus himself. These are the visible figures which are modelled after shapes and Forms. The numbers which Proclus mentions here are those which, according to Pythagoras, encompass all the intellectual Forms in the intelligible order (*in Crat.* 16), create a proportionate bond among all things in the universe (*in Tim.* 3,53,2) and ultimately adorn even the material world (*in Tim.* 2,388,8).

268. At *Theol. Plat.* 6.8 Proclus explains that Zeus connects all encosmic beings to Cronus by an intellectual bond. This is clearly the bond by which he is said to bind Cronus in the *Theogony* (718), because Zeus is thereby said to

maintain cosmic Justice. The important point here is that the course which both Zeus and all the things within his bonds follow is circular, leading all the way down to the mundane region on the one hand, all the way up to the intelligible on the other. In the *in Tim.* these bonds are described more philosophically as harmonic ratios of the soul (3,136,12), geometrical proportions (3,199,1) and arithmetical proportions (3,198,23).

269. This comment serves as a *lexis* on *Crat.* 396A1.

270. cf. *Crat.* 396A2-6.

271. Proclus associates the Demiurge with the One at *in Parm.* 1191 (cf. *Parm.* 139E) and explains his relation to the Same and the Other at *in Parm.* 1181-2 (cf. *Parm.* 139C).

272. The terms 'singly transcendent' and 'doubly transcendent' refer to the first and third Chaldaean intellectual Fathers and are associated with Cronus and Zeus. Psellus explains that the former is so called because he is unitary, the latter because he is dyadic (*Hyp.* 74.19). While Cronus is thus unitarily transcendent, Zeus' transcendence is both two-fold and unified. The excerptor explains in *in Crat.* 99 that it is the universal Demiurge that consumes Phanes and all his powers, but the intellectual Demiurge and son of Cronus who (1) distributes the intellectual forms, and (2) generates life from the Hera whom he encompasses on all sides.

273. At *Theol. Plat.* 5.22.79.18 Proclus again analyses Socrates' etymologies of Zeus from *di' hou* and *zan*. He then links Zeus, as the god through whom all things come into being and who is responsible for generating life, with the Demiurge whom Plato discusses in the *Timaeus* (30B). For it is the Demiurge, Proclus says, who makes the whole cosmos animate, intellectual and alive. He institutes the three-fold life in himself – the individual and intellectual, the particular and corporeal and, between these, the undivided and at the same time particular. He himself is the one that links each of the celestial spheres to the revolutions of the soul and puts spiritual and intellectual life to each of the stars. To the elements under the moon he assigns gods and souls as leaders. And among all these he institutes the particular genera of life and gives the rule of mortal animals to the minor gods.

274. Zeus' absorption of essence and life extends all the way up to the supercelestial place and Uranus. Proclus here limits his discussion to Zeus' relation to Cronus and Rhea in order to stress his role in the connection between the universal and particular and the intellectual and corporeal. Beyond Uranus essence and life are unified in the projected light of Phanes. In the *Theol. Plat.* we learn that the Paternal and Generative gods are first distinguished among the intelligible and intellectual things. In the intellectual region, they are transformed into the Demiurge and Life-bearing. These then institute the Assimilative gods in the Supercosmic region, the Independent gods in the cosmic region which is analogous to Uranus, and the Subcelestial and Sublunar in the planetary and sublunar regions respectively (4.29.88.24ff.). Also see the Appendix for a chart outlining Proclus' hierarchy of divinities and the structure of the Neoplatonic universe.

275. For the myth of the *Gorgias* as a source for the doctrine of a single demiurge over and above a triad, see *Theol. Plat.* 6.6.29, 6.6.43-6 and Tarrant, *Plato's First Interpreters*, 136.

276. The Paternal Triad is composed of Cronus, Rhea and Zeus. See the Appendix for a detailed description of the Triad.

277. According to Proclus, these measures refer to the double dodecads which are associated with the celestial and supercelestial regions (cf. *Theol. Plat.* 6.15). In the *Theol. Plat.* Proclus provides additional information on the nature

of these dodecads. At 6.19 we learn that Zeus operates not only in the intellectual, but also in the assimilative, independent and encosmic orders. Just as the intellectual is composed of the gods Cronus, Rhea and Zeus, there are gods associated with the last three orders as well. Proclus identifies the supercosmic, or Ruling and Assimilative gods, with the four triads Zeus-Poseidon-Pluto, Artemis-Persephone-Athena, the Triple-winged Apollo and the three Corybantes. He recognizes the four triads Zeus-Poseidon-Hephaestus, Hestia-Athena-Ares, Demeter-Hera-Artemis and Hermes-Aphrodite-Apollo as the twelve Independent gods. But he also believes that the exact number of the Assimilative, Independent and Intracosmic gods, the last of which are divided into the Subcelestial and Sublunar deities, is incomprehensible. See Brisson, 'Proclus et l'Orphisme', 43-91, and the Appendix for an outline of Proclus' pantheon. While the Assimilative gods bind encosmic things to their intelligible sources but remain firmly transcendent above the cosmos, the Independent gods are both transcendent and in proximate relation to the Intracosmic gods, who create all things in their own region by imitating the principal Demiurge and thus are called minor Demiurges. Also see *in Tim.* 2,451,3, where we are told that the double dodecads of Zeus are discriminated imitations of the double triads of Phanes. This means that they are related to the masculine and feminine powers of creation. In fact, in the cycles of the Same and the Other which are analogous images of the intelligible Heaven and its subcelestial vault, the demiurgic powers of Zeus do become manifest in masculine and feminine opposites. See *in Crat.* 118 for a discussion of the Proclean concept of opposition.

278. By instituting these two orders Zeus ensures that 'the demiurgic cause is always assimilated to the paradigmatic but also proceeds into multitude from intelligible unity' (*in Tim.* 1,452). For the Independent gods elevate the Intracosmic gods to the supercelestial place, which is the first monad of the intelligible and intellectual sphere, where they are directly exposed to the intelligible light of Phanes. The rationale explaining how Zeus can create the celestial arch, which Timaeus attributes to the Demiurge and calls the cycle of the Same, and institute gods that transcend it is by the Orphic theory that Zeus swallowed Phanes. Between the Intracosmic gods and Phanes are located the Independent, the Assimilative, the three intellectual gods and the three intelligible and intellectual gods. In Proclus' cosmology there are two Heavens, that of Uranus and that of the cycles of the Same and the Other, which is analogous to the former. In the *Timaeus* Zeus is said to create the latter out of the harmonic mixture of soul (*Tim.* 34Cff.). But in Orphic myth he is also said to swallow Uranus and recreate all the subsequent universe. While his double dodecads literally refer to the Independent and Intracosmic gods who are associated with the cycles of the Same and the Other, the Assimilative gods essentially unify them with the intelligible supercelestial place located above Uranus, the analogue of the cycle of the Same thing. Zeus thereby rules everything from the third monad of the intelligible region all the way down to the mundane. And his dyadic nature permits both a natural discrimination of and unity between the intellectual and mundane worlds, which ultimately become indistinct in their intelligible source. Since the Demiurge's names are natural images of this dyadic unity, they too indicate different aspects of the same divine object and are indistinguishable from it – in fact, ineffable – at their intelligible source.

279. The Soul of the Cosmos is equated with Hecate in the Chaldaean system and Core in the Orphic (see *in Crat.* 171-3; 179). She constitutes the second Principal triad and thus is described here as the 'principle of motion'. The term 'fount' indicates that she is associated with Rhea and the very fount of encosmic

life (*in Tim.* 3,129,26). See *in Tim.* 3,281,6ff. for more information on how the Soul of the cosmos operates with Zeus to put souls and bodies in order.

280. In the *Phaedrus*, Plato argues that self-motion is the very essence and formula (*logos*) of the soul, and that the heavens, which are composed of harmonic spiritual revolutions, are the first self-moved cosmic structure. In *in Crat.* 102 Proclus cites this motion as the source of the encosmic activity of living. In the *Elem. Theol.* Proclus also explains that, just as what is self-moved is superior to what is moved by another, the unmoved cause of motion is superior to the self-moved. Intellect is a cause that moves while it itself remains unmoved and active always in the same way (22.13-18). As the third intellectual monad and the Demiurge of the heavens, Zeus is the unmoved cause which projects in a simple manner all levels of life from the divine to the mundane. But as his perpetually unmoved activity proceeds through the celestial sphere, it becomes moved and is thus transmitted to the lower spheres. The movement which the Demiurge produces becomes apparent in the cycles of the Same and the Other, which are composed of different ratios of soul. While the former is associated with unity and the monad, the latter is discriminated into seven revolutions which reflect the intellectual hebdomad instituted by Cronus (*Theol. Plat.* 5.4.19ff.).

281. This is a further comment on *pasin aitios* ('cause of all') at *Crat.* 396A4 and 396B1-2.

282. The accusative case indicates not what causes but what is caused by an action. Whether intentionally or not, Proclus is here distorting the meaning of *aitiatikê* (accusative) in order to prove etymologically that even the form of the word which Socrates analyses reflects the nature of the object of indication. In strictly grammatical terms, *aitiatikê* would not indicate that Zeus is the cause (*aitios*) of all, but that he is the result of another cause.

283. The excerptor (Exc.?) here constructs a transition between Proclus' discussions of Zeus and Cronus by supplementing the former and setting the stage for the latter. This discussion takes the form of a *theôria*.

284. This passage is intended to explain how Cronus and Rhea could engender Zeus without weakening themselves in any way, but also responds to the distinction in *in Crat.* 102 between the projection of life by Zeus and that of the activity of living by the cosmic soul. In the *Elements of Theology* Proclus explains that productive causes like the gods are (4) not moved in the generation of subsequent things, because they imitate the One thing which must create without motion or lose its unity (*ET* 30,12-24). Nor (4) do they produce by transformation. For the producer is not the matter of what proceeds from it (*ET* 32,5). Nor are their products (2) fragments (*apomerismoi*) of them; 'this is not even a characteristic of physical generation (*genesis*) or generative causes' (*ET* 32,4). Nor (3) are they expelled, like mortal children, from their causes. Like the One, the divine productive causes remain the same in very Being (*ET* 30,21), and are not diminished (1) by generation but create subsequent things out of their own perfection and abundance of power (*ET* 30,26-7). They also perfect their divine products, fill them with themselves and establish them in themselves (*ET* 60,29-30). Although these products, as self-perfect hypostases, are inferior to their principal monad because of their discrimination into multitude, they are assimilated to it by their self-perfect *huparxis* (*ET* 60,31-2) – that is, as a whole in the part which belongs to a whole of parts. For the relation between *hupostasis* and *huparxis*, or the more particular and universal forms of existence for real beings see Gersh, *Spiritual Motion in the Philosophy of Proclus*, 30-8.

285. In the *Elements of Theology* Proclus explains that there are three types

of whole: that prior to parts, that composed of parts and that in the part (64,1-14). The offspring of universal gods belong to the third variety.

286. Intellectual thoughts are the medium by which intellectual things communicate with intelligible things. In the intelligible region objects, the thoughts thereof and the names given to these thoughts are essentially indistinguishable. When intelligible thought becomes intellectual, it is discriminated and known by the intellect which uses its intellectual thought to revert back to the intelligible.

287. As in the discussion of 'Zeus', the excerptor (Exc.?) introduces that of the name 'Cronus' with his own remarks.

288. For poetic examples of this theme see Theognis 153 and Solon fr. 5. The excerptor links the poets to the misinterpretation of 'Cronus' intentionally. While the poet and sophist are subject to imagination and irrational opinion, only the philosopher is able to examine things and pursue Reality by scientific reasoning (cf. in *Crat.* 113, 116).

289. Socrates' point seems to be that Cronus is satiated with purity (*katharos*) and untainted (*akêratos*) intellect, and not with the Olympian gods, whom he is commonly said to swallow. This theme is based on *Theogony* 459. For Proclus the swallowing and regurgitation of the Olympian gods indicates that all the Olympians proceeded and were discriminated from the unitary intellectual nature of Cronus, which is pure and untainted. Also see *Theol. Plat.* 5.34.125.18ff. and in *Parm.* 866, where castration of the gods is interpreted to indicate the partial participation of superior beings by inferior ones, when the latter divide among themselves the pre-existing indivisible causes of particular beings.

290. Also see *Theol. Plat.* 5.5.24, where Cronus is also said to both take and give up his kingdom by force. This indicates, Proclus says, that he separates himself from both the intelligible region of his Father Uranus and the encosmic region of his son Zeus.

291. cf. Olympiodorus in *Gorg.* 46,4 on the advantage of poetic myth, that it cannot reasonably be accepted at face value, and so prompts deeper investigation.

292. At in *Parm.* 854 Proclus explains that Plato does not usually call what is 'great' the cause of extendedness in general. That is, it does not cause extension as it is seen in a line, a plane or a solid. Rather, it is what gives things preeminence in each genus. Thus, in the *Phaedrus*, Plato calls Zeus a 'great leader' because he excels other leaders, as one who is pre-eminent over them in the matters of leadership.

293. cf. *Tim.* 39E7. At in *Tim.* 3,99,18ff., Proclus explains that Uranus is 'forefather' of this intellectual unity and discrimination, since he holds his offspring concealed within himself. Yet, because Uranus is situated only in the second triad of the Intelligible and Intellectual order, Proclus continues to trace this activity up to the intelligible order, where, he explains, 'Orpheus called this God "Phanes" because he reveals the intelligible henads, and attributed the shapes of animals to him because in him the first cause of the intelligible animals is revealed, and attributed manifold Forms to him because he first contains the intelligible Forms, and, when he called him "key of intellect" (*kleida nouu*), he said that he "shut up" (*klein*) intellect, because he limits all intelligible being and secures the intellectual life' (in *Tim.* 3,101,9-16).

294. The term 'instigated' (*diegeiresthai*) conveys the idea that intelligible Reality is awakened from its perfect stability and silence into the motion and change of the lower orders.

295. At in *Parm.* 974 Proclus further explains that the term 'something' is

used to indicate the manifestation of any given quality at different levels in the cosmic hierarchy. 'Something great' may thus refer to an entity at any level ranging from the One thing to the most particular material object.

296. At *Theol. Plat.* 5.7.27.15 Proclus does in fact associate Cronus with youth. We are told that all the souls which are associated with him above the pinnacle of the intellectual region enjoy perpetual youth, the abundance of fruits and all that the earth provides. This theory is based on Hesiod's depiction of life in the Golden age under Cronus (*Op.* 111-20), but also is related to Socrates' description of the communion of souls prior to their fall into generation (*Pol.*, 272B). See *Theol. Plat.* 5.5.23.23 for a similar etymology of 'Cronus'. He is untainted (*akêratos*) intellect because the intelligible aspect of the intellectual triad. He also is pure (*katharos*), immaterial and perfect, and is established above all the demiurgic creation as the object of desire. In fact, as a figure of transition between the intelligible and intellectual orders, he embraces pairs of opposites in general.

297. At *Theol. Plat.* 5.3.4 Proclus again links the etymology of 'Cronus' to *koros*, *akêratos* and *katharos*. Here too he accepts *koros* as the correct etymology and explains that it expresses 'nothing but what is pure and untainted'. He associates this pure fullness with the protective powers of the Curetes which Cronus encompasses and which shield the intelligible light of Phanes from all material obstruction, as it is transmitted from the intellectual order to the Demiurge and below.

298. Rhea, Zeus and Core are responsible for the material creation of the encosmic sphere. Rhea represents the powers of generation which are handed down from the intelligible-intellectual region and become manifest in her as the power of bearing life. Zeus becomes the transcendent intellectual Demiurge. And Core is projected down into the middle principal triad from the Demeter (*in Crat.* 169) who is identified with Rhea (*in Crat.* 167). Core thus becomes the generative power of particular life which may be traced back to its universal source in Rhea.

299. The Curetes belong to the implacable and immaculate triad, which is instituted by Cronus and cooperates with each of the intellectual monads according to their respective powers. The first Curetic monad thus remains with Cronus and is associated with sameness, the second protects Rhea and the procession of Being and the third ensures that Zeus may both fabricate the cosmos and remain undefiled by it. These six deities along with a seventh Separative monad, which divides the demiurgic and cosmic sphere from the intellectual, make up the Cronian hebdomad. See the Appendix.

300. In the Chaldaean system, Hecate performs the life-bearing functions parallel to those of Core. The implacable bolts and fire-receiving wombs, then, represent the discriminated masculine and feminine powers of creation which are transmitted from Cronus to Zeus and Rhea. This goddess in turn hands on her generative power to Core, or Hecate. The latter then receives the bolt of Zeus and the result is the creation of all life in the encosmic sphere. The 'flower of fire girded beneath' thus refers to the point at which the intellectual region opens into the cosmic or Zeus mingles with Core. And by the power and activity which they project, all subsequent things are modelled after intelligible Reality itself (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 168). Lewy identifies the mighty spirit beyond the fiery poles as the cosmic soul or Hecate herself (Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 122). Oracle 36 makes it clear that the intelligible light of Phanes is first converted by Cronus into intellectual light and then conducted by the 'adamant guides' of the Curetes down into the subsequent realms. In Oracle 35 Cronus' powers are further discriminated into the 'implacable bolts' of Zeus,

which convey the masculine power of demiurgic creation, and the 'fire-receiving wombs' which spring from Rhea but extend all the way down to Hecate, the first monad in the Chaldaean counterpart of Core. Core is composed of Artemis, Persephone and Athena; her Chaldaean counterpart is composed of Hecate, Soul and Excellence (cf. *Theol. Plat.* 372.2ff.). Also see in *Crat.* 171 and 179.

301. This hebdomad is comprised of the intellectual triad, its accompanying Curetic triad and a seventh monad which perfectly separates the intellectual realm from the cosmic. Each monad of this hebdomad institutes another hebdomad which extends down into the mundane world (*Theol. Plat.* 5.2.11.24ff.).

302. The Chaldaean term *amistulleutos* (unfragmented) is fully adopted by the Platonic tradition. Damascius interprets it to mean uniform (*henoeidês*) and undivided (*adiairêtos*) (cf. *Princ.* 2,148,11).

303. For the association of Cronus with youth see *Theol. Plat.* 5.7.27.11 and 5.10.33.21.

304. For a discussion of the Chaldaean idea of Paternal silence and its association with the intelligible Father see Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 78.

305. At in *Tim.* 2,280,22 Proclus explains that the theologians mistake Chronus, and thus Cronus, as the first principle because time is the first principle in the world of generation. For where there is generation, time must precede it, since it occurs in time. Thus time in the world of generation is analogous to the One thing prior to all creation. Also see in *Crat.* 115.

306. Being itself, according to Proclus, is a mixture of Limit and Infinity (cf. *Theol. Plat.* 3.8.30.19ff.). The basis of this theory may be traced to *Phlb.* 23D.

307. The reference to number here is significant, since before the supercelestial region number only appears as an indistinct aspect of intelligible unity. The three monads of the intelligible-intellectual region are the first cosmic orders at which the monad, dyad and triad are discriminated from one another and their unified causes. For the appearance of the monad, dyad and triad in the intelligible-intellectual order see *Theol. Plat.* 4.28.81.10 and 4.31.92.19. These numbers reflect the gods that only remain (monad), that both remain and proceed (dyad) and that only proceed (triad). They are associated with the supercelestial place, Uranus and the subcelestial vault, respectively. Also see in *Parm.* 807. In the above passage, Proclus emphasizes Uranus' role as 'connector' of the intelligible and the intellectual spheres, which is the function of the middle dyadic monad. The monads and triads which he here mentions therefore correspond with the first and third monads, of which the former is responsible for synthesizing (*sunagôgoi*) subsequent things with their intelligible source and the latter for perfecting (*telesiourgoi*) the subsequent gods, for reversion to their intelligible causes and for generating the whole of things (cf. *Theol. Plat.* 4.19.58.10-12 and 4.25.74.9-15. For more information on the synthesizing, connecting and perfecting functions of the intelligible-intellectual triad see *Theol. Plat.* 4.39). While the gods of the first monad thus remain in the supercelestial aspect of Uranus, those of the second both remain and proceed. Included in the latter group are the Hundred-handers who, according to Hesiod, were confined within their mother Gaia until Zeus finally released them and used their support to overcome the Titan threat to his kingship (cf. Hesiod *Theogony* 669. The Hundred-handers belong to the Orphic cosmology. See the Appendix). The Curetic power which is instituted by Cronus and protects the transmission of intelligible light to Rhea and Zeus can thus be traced back to the universal guardian power of Uranus. From his third monad, the subcelestial vault, Uranus introduces the hebdomads 'which proceed to everything and are discriminated from the Father'. These include Cronus, Rhea, Zeus, their Undeified gods and a Separative god that divides the intelligible from the intellectual

and the intellectual from the encosmic spheres (*Theol. Plat.* 5.2.10.19). The source of this discrimination is Cronus who, according to Hesiod, castrated his Father. Yet, as the Curetes are descended from the Hundred-handers, the hebdomad which Cronus institutes for creating and animating the world is also based on the numbers of Uranus. In the *Theol. Plat.* we are told that the first and most universal numbers which Uranus introduces are both formal in nature and govern generation and creation; the second, which are supercosmic, both give measure to the encosmic gods and generate life; the third are the celestial governors of the eternal revolutions who revolve all their cycles according to their intellectual causes – including the cycles of the Same and the Other, which serve as the model for the visible celestial vault and the revolutions of the planets Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the sun, Venus, Mercury and the moon – and the fourth, which is sublunar, connects and bounds the unlimited and unstable aspect of matter by numbers, Forms and Formulae (4.29.7-16). At each of these orders, the functions of definition and production are derived from the odd and even number which Uranus introduces in the intelligible-intellectual sphere, but ultimately can be traced back to intelligible Limit and Infinity. In the intellectual hebdomad of Cronus, the protective powers of the Curetes are suspended from odd number and Limit, the generative and creative powers of Rhea and Zeus, from even number and Infinity. Together these powers correspond directly and proximately with the hebdomad of the intelligible and intellectual celestial revolutions.

308. Proclus discusses Uranus' power of binding in the *Theol. Plat.* as well, where he first explains that the visible heaven binds the elements under it from all sides and thus leaves no vacuum therein. 'So just as the visible heaven connects all things under it and is cause of their continuity and sympathy [...] so too does the intellectual heaven bind all the multitude of the existing things into an indivisible association and connection, as it illuminates the lot proper to each' (4.20.59.19). For a discussion of Proclus' concept of sympathy see n. 139 on *in Crat.* 56. According to Proclus, the entire universe is both spatially and temporally connected and unified, since the end of each order is essentially related to the beginning of the next, extending from the One thing all the way down to the mundane sphere (cf. *in Tim.* 1,127,31; 1,133,3; 3,65,26).

309. As intelligible, Uranus is bordered from above by Aether, the first monad of the intelligible region according to the Orphics, and from below by Phanes, the third intelligible monad and Animal itself. At *in Tim.* 4,101,3ff. Proclus explains that Animal itself is intelligible-intellect, which encompasses the intellectual orders of the gods in itself. 'It synthesizes them, unifies them, and perfects them. It is the most beautiful limit of the intelligible things. It reveals their unified and unknown cause to the intellectual things, awakens itself to all sorts of Forms and powers and presents all the subsequent orders of the gods. Orpheus called this god Phanes, since he reveals the intelligible henads, and attributed to him the shapes of animals because in him the first cause of the intelligible animals is revealed'.

310. The terms 'weighed down' (*embrithês*) and 'bottom heavy' (*opisthobarês*) suggest the Chaldaean technique of progressive spiritual purification and transcension. According to the Chaldaeans, the primary obstacle to the human perception of divine light is matter, which may be shed like layers of clothing by the pursuit of higher goods and attachment to the divine. For the image of shedding the material like clothing see *in Crat.* 155, *in Alc.* 119, *Theol. Plat.* 1.3.16.6ff. and 1.20.96.18.

311. The term *meteôrologos* was originally used for astronomers (Gorgias *Helen* 13) or astrologers (Procopius *Pers.* 2.22). At 401B7 Plato uses it to

describe not those who look up specifically to the heavens but those who contemplate the real nature of the gods above. For Proclus as well this term indicates both the spatial and metaphysical activity of looking up and observing the things above.

312. i.e. in the heavens.

313. The reference to Gaia here suggests that, although the source of matter and generation is already present in the intelligible realm, it is coordinate with and therefore as transcendently intelligible as Uranus. The masculine and feminine powers of creation are first discriminated with Uranus and Gaia in the intelligible-intellectual region. In the intellectual sphere, they become manifest in Cronus and Rhea. And in the Principal order Zeus and Hera carry on the process of cosmic creation. Yet even in the mundane sphere the earthen body need not be identified with matter. At *in Tim.* 4,134,9 Proclus explains that Uranus and Gaia cooperate thus in creation: while she provides matter to the exhalations of the things that flow into her and belong to her, he provides them with Form and shape. These exhalations are spiritual on the cosmic level (cf. Aristotle *Meteor.* 365b22), intellectual on the intellectual, and beams of light issued from Phanes on the intelligible. At 110a3ff. Psellus analyses Chaldaean fr. 157: 'mundane beasts will inhabit your earthen vessel'. By earthen vessel (*angeion*), he says, the Chaldaeans meant the combined mixture of our lives. By mundane beasts (*khthôn*) he meant the daemons that turn about the earth (*gê*). Such beasts, he says, will inhabit our lives which have become replete with passions. The vessel which contains the mixture of our lives is thus composed of earth (*gê*) but is only drawn down to the material world when it is filled with passions and thereby attracts mundane daemons. This means that the *angeion* may remain closely related to the immaterial *Gê* by filling itself with the things loftier than the passions. These would include rational thought, dedication to the gods, etc.

314. For more information on how the gods participate in one another see *in Crat.* 135, 139 and 174. Also see *in Parm.* 750 and 1048. This is a major issue in the Christian Trinitarian debates prior to the Second Ecumenical Council at Constantinople (381). At *de Spir. Sanct.* 17,165d, Basil notes that all three Persons not only share the same names and activities, but also are equally difficult to comprehend. At *ad Eust.* 11.12-15, Gregory of Nyssa emphasizes the communion of divine activities.

315. Like Uranus, Zeus looks up to the intelligible, which is prior to time and encompasses all things and events in a unified state, and thereby is infused with knowledge of the future. From a Neopythagorean point of view, this means that Zeus observes the Forms themselves of all cosmic creations. These Forms are located in Animal itself, which Proclus equates with the Orphic Phanes (*in Tim.* 2,428,9). Zeus' looking up to the intelligible Forms is thus depicted in Orphic myth as the swallowing of Phanes and subsequent unfolding of the cosmic hierarchy within the belly of Zeus. In the *Theol. Plat.* Proclus explains more philosophically that, by looking up to Uranus, Zeus leads all the other gods up to the contemplation of both Uranus and themselves, that is, their intelligible or unconscious source (4.5.19.6ff.).

316. The ever-living rays of light are those handed down by Aeon to Phanes who first reveals them to the intellectual realm (cf. *in Crat.* 71).

317. As intelligible power is intellectually transmitted into the subcelestial region, it is discriminated into all the various intellectual and cosmic gods. Subsequent to the intelligible-intellectual region, the gods are discriminated into the intellectual – Cronus, Rhea and Zeus – the Assimilative, the Independent and the Mundane. The last of these is divided into the Subcelestial and

the Sublunar. See the Appendix for more information on the structure of Proclus' pantheon.

318. Proclus examines this etymology again at *Theol. Plat.* 4.22.6, where he also states that Uranus' role as connector between the intelligible and the intellectual regions depends on his essential relation with both.

319. At *Tim.* 37D Timaeus explains that the Father who engendered the cycles of the Same and the Other wanted to make them resemble their model which is eternal living Animal (In the Orphic system, the intelligible Phanes plays the same role as the Platonic eternal Animal). Since it is impossible to make the generated eternal, the Father fashioned an image of the eternity which 'remains in the One thing', incorporated it into the heaven and set it in motion according to number. This is what humans call 'time'. Proclus is here comparing the reverte activity of Uranus, which is both intelligible and intellectual, to eternity and time, the latter being a perfect but moved image of the former. For more information on the 'silence of the Fathers' see in *Tim.* 2,92,6, in *Alc.* 1 364,2 and Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 160, n. 353.

320. Parmenides does not distinguish between intelligible and intellectual wholeness. Proclus is here referring to the traditional Neoplatonic classification of the whole prior to parts, that composed of parts and that in the part (*Elem. Theol.* 64,1-14). According to Proclus, Uranus' intelligible activity is analogous to both eternity and wholeness prior to parts. The offspring of the intellectual gods are analogous to wholes in the part; the intellectual gods, to those of parts and; the intelligible gods, to those before parts (cf. in *Crat.* 112).

321. At *Theol. Plat.* 5.3.18.7ff. Proclus again argues that the so-called castrations (*tomai*) associated with Cronus really indicate that he is the foremost god of division, since he perfectly separates the intelligible region from the intellectual.

322. The highest monad of the intelligible-intellectual *huparxis* is the first place where number occurs in a distinct form. Prior to this, Limit and Infinity exist in a mixed state of intelligible Being (cf. *Theol. Plat.* 3.8.30.19ff.). As this Being is introduced into the intelligible-intellectual order, it is discriminated into primary number, which represents Limit, and the generative genus of gods, which stems from Infinity. In myth the union of masculine and feminine generative powers in the intelligible-intellectual region is usually depicted as the union of Uranus and Gaia (cf. in *Crat.* 146). The guardian genus then protects these powers as they continue their cosmic descent and ensures that they not be diminished by lower order corruption.

323. The intelligible order is considered a whole before parts, just as the principles of number exist there prior to any formal discrimination. In the intelligible-intellectual order, intelligible wholeness becomes a wholeness of parts at the same time number and discrimination are instituted. This is also the level at which the intelligible and the intellectual region are connected. The vault of heaven, beyond which humans cannot see, is the empirical proof of the division and the occult nature of what lies behind.

324. The perfective and reversionary class is responsible first for transmitting intelligible-intellectual activity down into the intellectual order and perfecting the gods therein, then for turning both that activity and all that is intellectual back to its source, the supercelestial monad.

325. in *Crat.* 113 serves as a transition from the discussion of Uranus to that of the gods superior to him and the literary genres in which they are portrayed. The fact that this is a quote citing Proclus suggests that the in *Crat.* is twice removed from Proclus himself. The surviving text seems to be excerpts from a student's notes on the in *Crat.* and/or Proclus' lectures on the *Cratylus*. See the

Introduction for more information on the authorship of the *in Crat.* The excerptor here is introducing a new *lexis*.

326. For more information on the relation of the intelligible to the intellectual see *in Tim.* 2,61,17-19. For background on the relation between opinion and imagination see *in Tim.* 1,255,13-20.

327. For more information on Proclus' concept of the symbol see *in Crat.* 71 and n. 171.

328. For more information on the relation between form, shape and figure see *in Crat.* 71, 73, 74, 99, and n. 175.

329. At *in Crat.* 114-15 Proclus identifies these three authorities as Homer, Hesiod, and Orpheus. For a general introduction to Proclus' interpretation of pagan myth see Buffiere, *Les mythes d'Homère et la pensée grecque*, 541-58; Lamberton, *Homer the Theologian*, 162-232; and Pepin, *Mythe et allegorie*, 475-85.

330. For more information on the flower of the intellect both as a connector of the intelligible and the intellectual regions and as the medium by which the human perceives what is ineffable and intelligible see *in Crat.* 96 and n. 255.

331. For more information on Proclus' concept of analogy see *in Crat.* 56, 57, 99, 113, and 130. Also see n. 138.

332. Proclus' use of the terms 'mystery (*teletê*), 'initiation' (*muêsis*) and 'revelation' (*epopteia*) is derived from the *Phaedrus*, where Socrates describes what the soul perceived prior to its fall into generation and what it should strive to apprehend once again by strengthening its wings. It was then possible, he says, 'to view a brilliant beauty when, following Zeus as others follow a different God, we along with a blessed chorus beheld a blessed sight and vision and were initiated into that mystery (*teletê*) which is right to call the most sacred and which we ecstatically celebrated. For we ourselves were perfect and had no experience of the evils that awaited us in the future. But we were initiated (*muoumenoi*) and received the revelation (*epopteuontes*) in pure light, regarding perfect, simple, unmoved and happy spectacles. We were pure and unburied from this thing which we now wear and call the body' (250C). At *Theol. Plat.* 4.9.30.9 Proclus explains that these simple and perfect spectacles are revealed through the connective gods of the intelligible-intellectual order to the souls from above out of the supercelestial place. 'For the mystical symbols of the intelligible things and the incomprehensible and ineffable beauties of the characters shine forth in that place. Indeed, the initiation (*muêsis*) and revelation (*epopteia*) are a symbol of the ineffable silence and the unity with the intelligible things <which one may achieve> through the mystical spectacles'. The mystical symbols and characters which Proclus here mentions are those used by the Chaldaeans to communicate with the gods (cf. *in Crat.* 71). At *in Phdr.* 178,13 Hermias distinguishes between *teletê*, *muêsis*, and *epopteia* as follows: 'the first is analogous to preparatory purification. The second, which has been derived from closing (*muëin*) the eyes, is more divine. For closing the eyes means that the initiate no longer grasps the divine mysteries by sensory perception, but by the pure soul itself. The third, *epopteia* indicates that he has been established in the mysteries and that there is a revelation of them.

333. Proclus is clearly identifying this Euthyphro with the interlocutor of Plato's *Euthyphro* (cf. 5E-8B), where Zeus, Cronus, and Uranus are the principal examples.

334. Because chs 117-120 include comments on the Platonic text from 398D-400C, I have inserted these chapters between chs 131 and 132, which treat of the Cratylus prior to 398D and subsequent to 400C, respectively.

335. At *in Tim.* 2,221,30 Proclus recommends both prayer to the daemons

responsible for cutting out material corruption and undertaking one's own spiritual purification through the purificatory virtues (cf. *in Crat.* 2).

336. Proclus may return to the sophist theme because of 'wiser than I should be' (*sophôteros tou deontos*) at 399A5, but the above passage relates directly to 396E3-397A1.

337. This comment may also be related to the 'daemonic wisdom' (*daimonia sophia*) of 396D7-8.

338. These are Julian and his son who are believed to have written the Chaldaean treatises from which Proclus worked. See Proclus, *in Remp.* 2,123,8; also Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 187.

339. The theurgist is only given access to Reality and its name by the permission and will of the gods. When he demands obedience from them, it can only be in accordance with their will and natural activity (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 58, n. 184 and Excursus V, 467ff.).

340. Plato's original name, 'Aristocles', which was given in memory of his grandfather, was replaced with one that reflects either the breadth (*platutês*) of his interpretation or the breadth of his forehead (cf. Diog. Laert. 3.4).

341. In the *Theol. Plat.* Proclus makes the sun analogous to what is Good and true (2.4.32.5). At *Theol. Plat.* 2.11.64.10 he suggests that one may follow the light of the sun toward that of Phanes and intelligible Reality itself. And at *in Parm.* 793 Proclus states that the moon is the guide of all generation and has prior comprehension of the nature of all living creatures.

342. While the main purpose of *in Crat.* 124 is to demonstrate the direct relation between Neoplatonic epistemology and causation, its mention of the sun and moon as the boundary between the orders of sensible soul and generation serves as a transition into the subsequent section (*in Crat.* 125-37), which deals with the role of the gods in the transmission of both thought and names to lower spheres, but it also introduces the final etymological analysis of divine names in the surviving treatise (i.e. *in Crat.* 125-85).

343. An anti-Christian remark. See Saffrey, 'Allusions antichrétiennes chez Proclus', 557.

344. According to Pythagoras, Number exists in the intelligible sphere (*in Crat.* 16). At *in Tim.* 1.41.25 Proclus explains that swiftness itself and slowness itself exist in the intelligible numbers and serve as the paradigm for the revolutions of the celestial bodies. The relation between number and velocity then becomes apparent in the geometrical and arithmetical relations of astronomy.

345. This means that even the Independent gods are able to follow Zeus in his course through the supercosmic region, which is analogous to the supercelestial sphere and connected with it by the intellectual order. They are thus carried up and given access to the intelligible region, as like knows like.

346. The Independent gods whom Proclus assigns to the supercosmic order are identified in the *Phaedrus* as twelve gods, including the stable monads of Zeus and Hestia, that rule companies (*stratiâi*) of daemons suspended from them (247A). It is clear that Plato is here referring to the twelve traditional Olympian gods. In the *Theol. Plat.*, however, Proclus explains that, while none has been able to number all the Independent gods, Plato describes them as twelve because this is an 'all perfect number, composed of the first numbers and completed from perfect things' (6.18). Although Proclus recognizes that Plato identifies the Independent gods with the Olympians, he believes that the former are a more universal source of life and cosmic connection than the latter. There is thus both a cosmic and supercosmic Apollo, Ares and Aphrodite. While the former belong to the twelve Olympians, the latter belong to the dodecad of

Independent gods which is a 'symbol of all-perfect procession' (ibid.). These gods are in fact responsible not only for terminating the procession of perfect, supercosmic entities but also for binding them to the cosmos and the apparent, celestial gods whom they perfect and elevate to the intelligible.

347. At *in Parm.* 1162 Proclus explains that the term 'unwearingly' emphasizes the immaterial nature of the objects of motion which are described in this passage.

348. In the *Theol. Plat.* Proclus explains that divine power emanates from the superessential Father prior to the mixture of Limit and Infinity (3.21). The power, unitary aspect of Limit and generative aspect of Infinity which are combined to form Being itself are handed down by different daemons through every cosmic order all the way to the mundane. Another type of daemon is then responsible for conducting 'understanding of the gods and their intellectual essence'.

349. cf. Hesiod *Op.* 109-201.

350. The relation here between the hero by nature and that by condition is parallel to that between natural and conventional names, where the former are essentially correct, the latter by common usage. For more information on Proclus' concept of condition (*hexis*) see *in Crat.* 27 and n. 61.

351. In the *in Tim.* we are told that the gods divide the earth according to divine number and invisible allotments and illuminate it with spirits in ways similar to the divisions of heaven (1,139,20). Rhea, for example, is the unifying goddess of the flowing spirits of air, Cronus governs the loftiest aspect of the aether (*in Tim.* 5,187,29), but each is a source and focal point of a set of spirits that transmit their activities for generation in the lower realms. The Iunges and Teletarchs use the aether and air to transmit messages from the intelligible to the mundane worlds. The operation of spirits (*pneumata*) and their airy and aetherial counterparts is essential to both the Proclean systems of causation and communication.

352. This passage may be a *lexis* added by the excerptor.

353. The cycles of the Same thing and the Other thing serve as the model for the revolutions of the stellar sphere and the seven Neoplatonic planets, respectively. The cycles themselves are modelled after the intelligible-intellectual heaven and subcelestial vault. See *in Crat.* 51 and n. 116 for more information on the creation of the Same thing and the Other thing by the Demiurge.

354. The make-up of Eros is thus parallel to that of the hero whose cycle of the Same corresponds with his paternal generative cause and that of the Other with his maternal cause (see also *in Parm.* 884 and *in Tim.* 5,171,28). At *Theol. Plat.* 1.28.122.15 Proclus draws a parallel between Poros and Penia and Being and matter, wherein Poros and Being are associated with the masculine powers of creation, Penia and matter with the feminine and Eros, their offspring, with the union of soul and body in the living animal.

355. In the supercosmic sphere Cronus institutes the Ruling gods through Zeus, and Rhea projects the Assimilative. The Independent gods hold the cosmic sphere analogous to that of Uranus – that is, they are both transcendent and related to the cosmic world (*Theol. Plat.* 6.11). The Cosmic gods are divided into the Subcelestial and the Sublunar. Just as the Independent gods are innumerable but represented by the number twelve, which symbolizes their perfection and that the twelve Olympians operate in part among them, the Ruling gods are composed of an incomprehensible number. They, the Independent gods and the Cosmic gods, are suspended from Zeus (*Theol. Plat.* 6.16).

356. Tarrant suggests reading *onomata* for *noëmata* here (*in Crat.* 78,18-9). The passage would then read: 'Yet, if names exist ...'.

357. The final section of the *in Crat.* (chs 138-85) consists of a *theoria*

discriminating what Proclus calls the Fontal and Principal gods. These are the children of Cronus and Rhea and those who follow them, respectively. The comments in this section correspond in large part to Socrates' etymologies of the divine names at *Crat.* 401B-407C, and are intended to demonstrate how one can use etymological analysis to come to know the nature and role of the gods between the lower daemonic orders (*in Crat.* 117) and the higher intellectual, intelligible and superessential orders (*in Crat.* 113). Since Plato goes on to discuss the heavenly bodies at *Crat.* 408D, it is likely that Proclus continued to follow the Socratic argument and discriminate the cosmos down through the independent and celestial powers as well (cf. *in Crat.* 144). But since the commentary breaks off at *Crat.* 407C, this cannot be confirmed.

358. This comment corresponds to *Crat.* 401B-E, where Socrates suggests that they begin their analysis of divine names with Hestia, 'as it is customary'. While the custom which Socrates here mentions probably stems from Hesiod's *Theogony* (454), where she is described as the eldest daughter of Cronus and Rhea, Proclus is referring to the Orphic practice of praying to Hestia as the supreme mother figure. Damascius tells us that, according to Orpheus, the projection of the implacable things from Cronus produces two life-generating divinities – one moved, the other stable – and these are called Hera and Hestia. While the latter establishes the gods that proceed into this mundane world, the former calls them all forth into procession (*Princ.* 283).

359. Cronus and Rhea are the parents of the Fontal and Principal gods. The Fontal deities are so named because 'they conduct the good things from above to those below'. The Principal gods are so named because after the fount of a river one can only observe its principle at work in the stream which flows from it (cf. *in Crat.* 142). The term Fontal, however, is borrowed from the Chaldaean system. It is composed of Him who is singly transcendent (*ho hapax epekeina*), Hecate, Him who is doubly transcendent (*ho dis epekeina*), the three Implacable gods (*hoi ameiliktoi*) and the Girdling Intellectual Membrane which separates the intellectual realm from the cosmic. From the Fontal hebdomad as a whole come founts (*pégai*), principles (*arkhai*), archangels (*arkhangeloí*), angels (*angeloi*) and alocal (*azónoi*) and local (*zónai*) powers. Finally, the stationary stellar cosmos and the seven planetary spheres follow. Proclus also talks of the intellectual hebdomad in Orphic terms. At *Theol. Plat.* 5.31.113.19ff. he refers to the Crater as the fount of souls, and says that, when the Demiurge puts the soul in order prior to the body, he mixes the different types together and operates with the Crater, or mixing bowl. Proclus thinks that Plato (*Phlb.* 61B-C) and Orpheus (fr. 53) share the same understanding of the demiurgic function of the Crater (*in Tim.* 5,250,19-20), but he also identifies it as Hera and the soul of the universe, or the Chaldaean Hecate (*in Tim.* 5,251,6-7). According to Neoplatonic cosmology, the four Principal triads – Zeus-Poseidon-Pluto, Artemis-Persephone-Athena, the Triple-winged Apollo, and the three Corybantes – make up the Supercosmic region. The Independent gods include the four triads, Zeus-Poseidon-Hephaestus, Hestia-Athena-Ares, Demeter-Hera-Artemis, and Hermes-Aphrodite-Apollo. Dionysus finally governs the celestial bodies and chthonic deities of the intracosmic sphere (cf. *Theol. Plat.* 6.6-9, 14 and Sallustius 6.2-3). For a general discussion of Proclus' cosmology see Brisson, 'Proclus et l'Orphisme', 43-91.

360. *essia* and *ôsia* are ancient dialectical forms of *ousia* (essence).

361. Also see *in Tim.* 4,137,20.

362. For an outline of the Principal deities see the Appendix. The basic structure is (1) Zeus, Poseidon, and Hades; (2) Artemis, Persephone, and Athena and; (3) the Triple-winged Apollo.

363. See *in Crat.* 56-7 and n. 138 for a discussion of Proclus' concept of analogy. Socrates is playful here because he uses the analogy of founts and principles. But he is earnest insofar as the analogy indicates a proportionate and sympathetic relationship between analogues.

364. In fact, Plato quotes Homer who calls Ocean 'the origin of the gods', and Tethys 'mother'. At *in Tim.* 3,179,18, Proclus mentions the Homeric name of Ocean, and associates Tethys with the feminine at *in Tim.* 3,180,28-9. Tarrant suggests that *pateres* (fathers) be emended to *progonoi* (parents).

365. At *in Tim.* 3,176,10 Proclus further explains that 'Ocean and Tethys proceed not in generative copulation nor in a sort of mingling of things that are separated nor by division nor by severing from themselves this generation which has occurred [...], but by one unity and an indivisible interweaving of their powers. This the theologians commonly call marriage.' Also see *in Crat.* 104 for a discussion of how the gods generate their so-called offspring.

366. At *in Tim.* 5,179,8 Proclus notes that we should consider Tethys, as her name indicates, the eldest ancestor of the gods, even as the Mother of Rhea. For she is a Fontal goddess, and her name indicates what is immaculate, pure and filtered (*diêthoumenon*). For while Ocean creates everything and introduces all motions, whence he is called even the generation (*genesis*) of the gods, Tethys seems to discriminate the unitary cause of his motions into primary and secondary motions, whence Plato said that she is named from her sifting (*diattan*) and filtering (*diêthein*). For these names indicate discrimination, just as combing (*xainein*) and weaving (*kekrizein*), as he says in the *Sophist* (226B-C). Thus, while Ocean universally generates every motion – divine, intellectual, spiritual and natural – Tethys is so called because she discriminates the motions both within and without, as she sifts and filters the material motions from the immaterial.

367. Poseidon and Hades are second- and third-order manifestations of the transcendent Zeus. At *Theol. Plat.* 6.9 we learn that Zeus, Poseidon and Hades in fact divide the kingdom of their Father Cronus into three domains. But prior to these the one Demiurge, Zeus, received the kingdom in an undivided way. Also see the discussion of Zeus at *in Crat.* 99 and 104.

368. Also see *in Tim.* 5,177,4, where we learn that, after Uranus and Gaia who always remain transcendent, Ocean and Tethys both remain and proceed.

369. While all three Demiurges can be viewed as different aspects of the same universal deity, each has his own identity and role within the *huparxis*. The simultaneous unity and individual identity of the gods is a common theme in both the *in Crat.* (chs 110, 135, 139, 150) and in other works of Proclus (*Theol. Plat.* 8.3.25.9, *in Parm.* 1049).

370. According to the *Orphic Rhapsodies* (fr. 151, 191), Core loses her virginity to Zeus before she is abducted by Pluto (cf. West, *The Orphic Poems*, 74).

371. Also see *in Tim.* 3,56,21ff.

372. At *in Tim.* 1,173,9ff. Proclus explains that Poseidon is the Lord of generation and that the sea symbolizes dissimilitude and the procession into multitude. Poseidon here is contrasted with Athena who is associated with intellect and the land within the Pillars of Hercules, or the Rock of Gibraltar, which symbolizes the life of stability and truth.

373. The astral souls are those that remain in contact with the stellar sphere and are the children of Zeus but are not called so because they remain in constant relation with the intelligible where there is no difference between objects and their names (*in Crat.* 97). The motions around generation are the various souls that are gathered together and descend into the sublunar realm

with each revolution of the Same and the Other or the stellar and planetary spheres. These are composed of eight harmonic motions which are reflected in the revolutions of both the celestial bodies and the composition of the soul.

Motion and time first become manifest in the intelligible-intellectual region, or the celestial vault. From this sphere down, each *huparxis* operates in a cyclical pattern of procession from and reversion to the first principle. Pluto is most responsible for the reversion of the most particular souls, whose motion has brought them all the way down to earth (see the description of the different types of soul at *in Crat.* 1, n. 5).

374. This etymology is derived from *Crat.* 403A, but is common to the poetical tradition (cf. Sophocles *fr.* 273; Aristophanes *Plut.* 727) and the naturalistic etymologies of the Stoics.

375. Like the name, the human has both a mortal and an immortal component – body and soul. While the former is dense and corruptible, the latter belongs to an *huparxis* which naturally attaches it to its eternal source and Reality itself. At *in Tim.* 5,235,11ff. Proclus explains that the human is composed of both body and soul. After the former passes away, the latter goes first to Hades when it is purified of all passions and everything material. When it has been purified, it puts off its lot in the world of generation and returns to its former state of existence with the other souls in the cycles of the Same and the Other (5,237,2ff.).

376. Odysseus is said to be ‘stripped of his rags’ (*gumnôthênai rhakeôn*) at *Od.* 22.1, where he reveals himself to the suitors just before killing them with his bow. The formula ‘like a wretched beggar’ (*ptôkhôi leugaleôi enalinkion*) occurs at *Od.* 17.202, 16.273, 24.157.

377. The last seven chapters dealing with the first Principal gods (chs 157-63) provide an analytical reduction, based on passages from *Crat.* 403D-404B, of how the human soul both returns to its eternal source and acquires knowledge thereof.

378. The necessity to which Proclus here refers is the bond of desire which Socrates says is the strongest restraint in the world (*Crat.* 403C). By associating these bonds with divine love and aim (*skopos*), Proclus equates Hades’ power of attraction with the love (*erôs*) that strengthens the wings (*ptera*) of the soul and leads it to higher levels of existence and enlightenment. The relation between love (*erôs*) and the wings of the soul is developed at *Phdr.* 252C (see *in Crat.* 9 as well). Proclus also cites *Symp.* 202D-E as a source for the concept of the bonds of love (*in Tim.* 5,217,18ff.).

379. In myth these harmonies are depicted as the songs of the Sirens. But for Proclus the model for the ‘music’ which they produce is the very structure of the heavenly spheres which the Demiurge constructed according to harmonic ratios (*Tim.* 35Bff.). In the *in Tim.* we are told that Apollo and the Muses are the institutors of harmony in the universe. While he conducts the one unity of the whole harmony, they connect the procession which is suspended from him and harmonize their own number with the eight Sirens (also see *in Crat.* 174-7). As the songs of the Sirens are transmitted to the particular, mundane world, they are taken up by the Fates which perfect them and fulfil them (*Theol. Plat.* 6.23).

380. This is a reference to Hesiod’s *Theogony* (718), where Zeus is said to chain Cronus in Tartarus after the Titanomachia. At *in Tim.* 3,208,33ff. Proclus explains that the castration and binding of Cronus by Zeus is the poetic depiction of the paradigmatic cause of the cosmic realm. That is, by the division between the intelligible and intellectual spheres and the intellectual and cosmic, it becomes necessary to model the lower order things after images. The

Demiurge can only do this accurately because of the bonds by which he holds Cronus and thereby gains access to the intelligible paradigm. Also see in *Tim.* 2,207,11ff.

381. Proclus is here referring to Socrates' description of how various souls succeed in transcending the cosmic sphere and pass around the world on the back of the celestial arch. While divine souls are able to pass complete revolutions in the supercosmic sphere, those closest to the gods are able to ride with them but have difficulty in discerning the Realities above. They also tend to rise above and sink below the celestial arch, depending on how well they are able to control the winged horses which draw their chariots and symbolize their degree of spiritual purity. At *Phdr.* 247B Plato explains that mortals have a horse of good and one of evil. It is the latter that pulls them down toward the mundane region. At *in Parm.* 1029 Proclus notes that the passions of love and honour tend to strengthen this evil horse and make the ascent to Reality more difficult. At 1025, however, he explains how a person can purify himself and make the ascent easier: (1) recognize that the senses are deceptive, (2) stop thinking through images but develop pure immaterial cognition, (3) eradicate manifold opinions and (4) ascend to the 'great sea of sciences' (*Symp.* 210D) where the practice of dialectic is possible. The development here is from imagination to opinion to discursive intellect to intuitive intellect.

382. Whereas the first Principal gods represent cosmic unity and definition, the second Principal gods – Demeter, Hera and Persephone – are responsible for encosmic life and procession. This section (*in Crat.* 164-73) corresponds with *Crat.* 404B-E, where Socrates does analyse the names of these goddesses but nowhere identifies them as either a triad or Principal deities. According to Proclus, the relations between the three Principal triads correspond with those of all encosmic huparxes, wherein the first monad is associated with unity and limit, the second with discrimination and procession and the third with intellectual reversion. The second Principal triad thus offers generation and life to the Forms which the demiurgic gods transmit from the intellectual sphere through Zeus.

383. At *in Tim.* 3,88,15ff. Proclus explains that the mutual transformation of all the elements in the universe is a sort of nurturing, whereby everything is nurtured by everything else. Among the gods what is intelligible is nourishment (*in Parm.* 775). This theory is based on *Phdr.* 247C-D, where we are told that every soul may be nurtured like the gods on reason and knowledge by ascending beyond the arch of heaven. Also see *in Crat.* 168.

384. The *Cratylus* was the first of what the Neoplatonists called the theoretical dialogues and was intended to prepare the student to use language carefully and accurately to examine the nature of the universe. For more information on the Neoplatonic introductory courses to the Platonic dialogues see Introduction, pp. 1-2.

385. Though Proclus associates the Independent gods with the four triads Zeus-Poseidon-Hephaestus, Hestia-Athena-Ares, Demeter-Hera-Artemis and Hermes-Aphrodite-Apollo, he believes that their number is really incomprehensible, but that they are commonly symbolized by the number twelve because the perfection of this number reflects their own perfection (*Theol. Plat.* 6.18.395). The Independent gods are considered perfect because they perfectly link the cosmic and intellectual regions, while they themselves remain perfectly remote from all cosmic corruption.

386. Proclus here relies on the authority of Orpheus because, according to the latter, Nyx and Rhea-Demeter collaborated to help Zeus become the fifth king of the pantheon. The myth states that, after Zeus was saved from Cronus at birth, Nyx both raised him and taught him how to overthrow his Father.

Rhea-Demeter then arranged a feast at which Zeus consequently bound and castrated Cronus (cf. *Orph. fr.* 105, 162, 189, 148-9, 154, 137).

387. At *Theol. Plat.* 5.23.86.2ff. Proclus again explains that the regal soul and regal intellect of Zeus are responsible for instilling soul and intellectual Form in all things in the universe.

388. In the *Philebus*, Plato explains that the soul is only the vehicle which enables intellect to exist. When Proclus says that intellects 'preside' (*epok-houmenos*) over souls and fill the demiurgic creation with them, he uses traditional Chaldaean terminology to portray their communion as both a mystical and sexual union, whereby the intellect impregnates soul, if you will, or Zeus engenders all cosmic entities through Hera. The Chaldaean term *epok-houmenos*, which describes the way the intellect rides on the back of the cycle of the Same, carries a mystical connotation in that universal intellect is the occult source of all cosmic things and becomes manifest only as it is transmitted down into the spiritual realm (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 10, n. 26.2; 135, n. 260).

389. in *Crat.* 171-3 deal with Persephone-Core, the third monad of the second Principal gods. The three-fold nature of Core is described differently by Orpheus and the Chaldaeans. The former identifies the three monads of Core with Artemis, Persephone, and Athena. The latter associate them with Hecate, the Spiritual Realm, and Excellence. In the Chaldaean system, Hecate is recognized as the first monad because she has the contradictory nature of a triune goddess who both remains transcendently remote from generation and yet is also said to be active on the earth as well as in the underworld. In the Chaldaean Core these latter two regions are represented by the Spiritual Realm and Excellence. While Hecate is thus the transcendent source of souls, they subsequently proceed down through the cosmic system, complete their cycle of generation, and are finally restored to their source by the spiritual perfection of Excellence.

390. Also see *Theol. Plat.* 6.11 where Proclus gives the same etymology of Persephone.

391. The etymology of Persephone is uncertain. While Chantraine thinks that the name is probably a compound, he does not offer a serious etymology for *perse-* and he considers *-phonê* equally obscure. He rejects the common derivation from *phonos*, but guardedly entertains Kretschmer's idea that she is the goddess that 'brings much' (*pherein*), since she is associated with the fertility of Demeter (Chantraine, *Dictionnaire étymologique de la langue grecque*, 889).


392. In the last surviving chapters of the *in Crat.* (179, 185), Proclus will return to explain Socrates' etymologies of the names 'Artemis' and 'Athena', the first and third monads of Core. At *in Crat.* 174, he follows the Platonic text and explains why Socrates analyses 'Apollo' immediately after 'Persephone'.

393. The three Principal triads are thus composed of Zeus-Poseidon-Hades, Demeter-Rhea-Core, and the Triple-winged Solar Principle of Apollo. The Triple-winged Principle is a Chaldaean term which associates Apollo with the projected light of the sun but ultimately with the very light of Phanes (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 150, n. 309).

394. These Formulae carry all the particular details that emanate from the Forms. While the latter thus instill within the world all the categories of things, the former give all the particular objects within these categories all the various characteristics which make them both similar to and differ from other objects of the same category. See *in Crat.* 53 for more information on Proclus' concept of Forms and Formulae.

395. Proclus is here referring to the Pythagorean concept of the tetractys, which is composed of the numbers 1-4. While their sum is identified with the

multitude of the entire cosmic system, the number one represents its unity, because it is the principle of both its origin and the entire system, which is depicted as a single figure. The number four is an intermediary form of unity in that it alone comprehends the other three numbers comprising the tetractys and because it completes the number of rows in the figure. The three corners of the figure are also significant as a symbol of the hypostatic circulation of every cosmic *huparxis*.



This figure may be understood as one whole, a triad (based on the number of angles), a quaternary (based on the number of rows), or a decad (because of the number of points therein).

396. Similarly, at *in Crat.* 171 we learn that Artemis, Persephone, and Athena all partake of the same powers, yet each also has her own specific nature. At *in Crat.* 135, 139 we are told that all the gods in fact participate in one another.

397. For more information on the sympathetic relation between higher and lower order objects see *in Crat.* 56, n. 139.

398. The summoner was responsible for invoking the deity and inviting him to possess the recipient. The god then is said to be bound by the incantation. The rite would last until the recipient could no longer hold the deity within (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 43, 468). This binding, however, should not be understood to draw the deity down, but to elevate all those participating in the rite (cf. the following note).

399. Like Apollo, the priest serves as the unifying principle of purification for his initiates. By purifying the summoners and recipients, who are responsible for establishing the ritual bond with the god in question and providing him with a material outlet of communication, the priest provides all those involved in the rite not only with a sacred relation to divinity, he also gives them the divine signs which they all may follow up to experience the divinity itself. According to Proclus, the summoner does not call God down to man but pleads for invitation to the upper spheres. The ultimate goal of the theurgical rite is reunion with the source of Reality and immortalization of the soul. This is achieved through the Flower of the Intellect and by the mediation of the Iunges. When the bond between the theurgist and the invoked God is complete, it becomes manifest in the possession of the recipient by the God. This signifies that the rite has succeeded in creating a sacred space which is essentially the same as the intelligible seat of the God and source of the praying theurgist (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 468 and Iamblichus *Myst.* 3.18).

400. This statement is probably based on Socrates' etymology of Apollo from *homopolôn* (he that moves all things together), but the Chaldaean 'hands' which Proclus mentions here are clearly analogous to the 'channels of Zeus' and 'rays of light' which Apollo projects from the Independent order down to the Principal gods. At *Plat. Theol.* 6.12 Proclus explains that the universal light of Phanes is projected down to Zeus who uses it in the creation of both simple and composite natures, and these belong to a more and less leading order, respectively. This primary cause of light and the demiurgic Dyad are called 'hands' because they perfect, move and create the whole of things. These two leading orders belong to the cycles of the Same and the Other and are so named because they lead

those that look to them up toward intelligible Reality. Apollo's demiurgic powers are derived from the same light, and by his leading powers he generates the nine Muses who are assigned to the nine parts of the cosmos – the eight celestial revolutions and the mundane sphere (cf. *in Tim.* 3,208).

401. At *in Crat.* 176 (102,10ff.) Proclus turns to Socrates' etymology of the Muses in order to complete his description of the procession of Apollo's powers all the way down to the mundane sphere.

402. As in the case of the decad, Proclus recognizes a close relationship between the henad and the ennead. Like the decad, for instance, the ennead is a henad of all the numbers which it contains. According to Iamblichus, even names *henas* and *enneas* reflect the affinity of the two numbers. The ennead also represents the perfection of multitude, for 'number admits nothing beyond the integer nine, but everything revolves within it'. This can be seen, Iamblichus says, in the way in which numbers naturally progress up to nine, but thereafter only repeat themselves in different combinations (Iamblichus *Theol. Arith.* 76,17-18). The relationship between the Zeusian henad and decad which Proclus recognizes in the tetractys both includes and serves as model for that between the Apollonian henad and the nine Muses.

403. Proclus here means the octave (2:1), the fourth (4:3), the fifth (3:2), the third (5:4), and the tone (9:8). Since the number nine is the largest to appear herein, the Muses are said to encompass and represent all five particular ratios (Iamblichus *Theol. Arith.* 76,8ff.).

404. These powers are parallel to those of Ocean and Tethys who similarly connect the activities of the supercelestial and intracosmic spheres and subsequently discriminate them. The Neoplatonists also associated Ocean with the ennead because of his role, like that of Apollo, as a boundary between the super- and intracosmic realms (cf. Iamblichus *Theol. Arith.* 77,3ff.).

405. When awaiting his execution, Socrates tells Cebes about a recurrent dream which has encouraged him for some time to cultivate the musical arts. Since he considers philosophy the greatest art, Socrates believes that he has always followed the dream's advice. But now that he has been condemned, he feels that he perhaps was supposed to practise the popular arts. And this is why he is writing poetry. He then adds that his friend Evenus may be interested in this news. But he should also be told that, if wise, he will follow Socrates to death as soon as possible (*Phd.* 60E-61B). For Socrates philosophy is not just any musical art but a means of practising death, which is ultimate health, life and freedom from the tomb of the body (cf. Sheppard, *Studies on the 5th and 6th Essays*, 162-202). Proclus believes that there is a direct relationship among the harmonies of the soul, of the cycles of the Same and the Other and of the things that really exist. They are all connected by the musical arts of which philosophy is the highest form.

406. See *in Tim.* 1,79,10ff. where Proclus gives the same etymology of Leto.

407. This light is derived from Phanes, is handed down through the intelligible-intellectual and intellectual spheres by the Hundred-handers and the Curetes, respectively, and is finally used by Apollo in the demiurgic creation of all particular encosmic things.

408. Divine ease and intellectual stillness describe aspects of life related to the intelligible sphere (cf. Lewy, *Chaldaean Oracles*, 397-8). Lack of disturbance (*ataraxia*) is the traditional Epicurean term describing the peace in which the gods abide (Democritus in Stobaeus 2.7.3 (DK 68 A 167); Epicurus *Ep.* 1; Cicero *Fam.* 15.19.2).

409. Proclus is here referring to the common etymology of Leto from *lêthê* (forgetfulness). Leto was considered a goddess of night who brought on forget-

fulness (*lanthanein*) (cf. Osthoff, 'Griechische und lateinische Wortdeutungen', 306).

410. The heat of Leto signifies her universal power which Apollo actualizes through the light that he projects.

411. At *in Tim.* 1,82,30ff. Proclus explains that forgetfulness occurs from two causes – either from abandoning for a long time the intellectual way of life which the soul enjoyed prior to generation or from falling immoderately into the process of generation.

412. See *in Crat.* 158 where Proclus advises that a person sail past the earthly Sirens lest he be charmed by them. He suggests here that the sea itself is an image of generation which may drown the soul if a person becomes too entranced by it. Also see *in Crat.* 155 where Proclus encourages a person to strip off his attachment to the flesh just as Odysseus is said to strip his rags.

413. Suggested by Pasquali to fill a lacuna.

414. The implacable gods are the Chaldaean equivalents of the Orphic Curetes (cf. the Appendix). As the light of Phanes is first projected into the intelligible-intellectual region, it is protected by the Hundred-handers. These then pass down their responsibilities to the Curetes who guard the light in the intellectual order.

415. Proclus here continues to follow the Platonic text and takes up Socrates' etymology of Dionysus at *Crat.* 406B-C. Socrates' progression from Apollo, Leto and Artemis to Dionysus makes sense, Proclus believes, because Dionysus represents the sixth and most particular kingship of the gods.

416. Popular belief in an earlier love affair between Aphrodite and Dionysus is reported by Pausanias. At Lampsakos Priapus was worshiped as son of Aphrodite and Dionysus (Pausanias 9.31).

417. The laughing and frightening aspects of these statues correspond with the creative and destructive powers of Aphrodite and Dionysus. At *in Parm.* 1022 we are told that the laughter of the gods symbolizes the procession of their activity into the visible world. Their frightening aspect represents the return of their activity and of particular souls to their universal source.

418. cf. Proclus *Hymn to Athena* 11ff.: 'You (sc. Athena) who saved the heart, as yet unchopped, of lord Bacchus in the vault of heaven, when he was once divided by the hands of the Titans'.

419. For more information on the six traditional Neoplatonic causes – paradigmatic, final, efficient, instrumental, formal, and material see *in Crat.* 53, n. 129.

420. Also see Hesiod *Theogony* 195.

421. The last two surviving chapters of the *in Crat.* (184-5) deal primarily with Socrates' etymology of the name 'Athena'. The texts seem to have been terminated somewhere in the middle of *in Crat.* 185 by scribal choice. All five manuscripts from which Pasquali worked terminate within a page or two of one another. Ambrosianus D222 appears to continue for a few pages in an illegible form. In fact, however, this is only a mirror image of the last page and a half of the manuscript which has stained the lower half of the last page and all the subsequent blank page. It is possible that, instead of continuing to the conclusion of Proclus' discussion of Socrates' etymologies of the divine names ending at 408D, the scribe felt that they had reached the conclusion of the section begun at *in Crat.* 138, which deals with the Fontal and Principal gods.

422. Proclus is here discussing the relations among the four triads of the independent order: the Demiurges Zeus-Poseidon-Hephaestus, the generative goddesses Demeter-Hera-Artemis, the reverting gods Hermes-Aphrodite-Apollo, and the protective gods Hestia-Athena-Ares. Ares is traditionally

considered a child of both Zeus and Hera (Hesiod *Theogony* 922), but Hephaestus is usually said to be the son of Hera alone (*Theogony* 931). In Neoplatonic terms, the Demiurge Zeus cooperates with the generative goddess of procession, Hera, to institute both Hephaestus, who combines their formal and material causes in his own type of creative activity, and Ares, who protects the reversion of all activities once they have been released from their lot in the world of generation. For more information on the protective role of Ares and the demiurgic role of Hephaestus among the Independent gods see *Theol. Plat.* 6.22.

423. cf. *in Tim.* 1,157,27-169,21.

424. At *in Tim.* 1,140,27ff. Proclus explains that, as with the other gods, Athena's allotment proceeds from the intellectual causes above to the region of the earth. In any case, she exists primarily in her Father, among the Leading gods in a secondary order and makes a third procession among the twelve Rulers. After this she reveals in the heaven her Independent power and appears differently in the inerratic sphere. At *in Crat.* 185 Proclus focuses only on Athena's activity with Zeus, the Independent order and Core because he wants to stress the fact that she connects the intelligible and intellectual orders and the super- and encosmic orders in a way similar to those of Zeus and Aphrodite. See *in Crat.* 184.

425. At *in Tim.* 1,156,16ff. Proclus explains that Athena's activity extends from the intelligible paradigms all the way down to the lowest realm. And at 1,157,3ff. he adds that her shields ensure that what is divine remains undefiled and unaffected by external interference, and that it possesses an unbreakable guard in itself. Her spears are powers by which she passes through all things without contact and acts on everything, as they cut out everything material and protect the generative Form. In this way, Athena protects the process of demiurgic creation.

426. In the *Theol. Plat.* Proclus explains that Necessity is the monad which governs the triad of Fates. These carry out the designs of divine Law and Justice (6.23). Thus, against divine Necessity not even the gods can struggle (*in Parm.* 1028). Even according to Hesiod the gods must obey divine Justice and keep their oaths or be cast into Tartarus for ten years (*Theogony* 793ff.). Also see *in Tim.* 1,160,29ff.

427. The harmonic dance which Proclus here mentions is focused on the cosmic Soul which is harmonized in the cycles of the Same and the Other. Athena thus is responsible for ensuring the safe transmission of Formulae and particular souls both into the mundane sphere and back to their celestial origin (cf. *in Tim.* 3,107,19).

428. Supplied to fill a lacuna by A², the corrector of MS A (Ambrosianus D 222).

429. At *in Tim.* 3,63,9ff. Proclus explains that the Demiurge keeps the cosmos free of illness and old age, because he is the source of symmetry which constitutes the health of all encosmic things. That is, when things are composed in a symmetrical manner they are healthy; when not, they are dissolved. For more information on cosmic revitalization through the intellectual Form which always remains perfect and stable see *in Crat.* 53.

Appendix

Synopsis of the Three Theological Systems of Proclus

The Platonic
The One

The Orphic
Time

The Chaldean
The Ineffable One

The Superessential Henads

The Intelligible Order

1. The First
Intelligible Triad:
Stable Limit
Infinity
Their Mixture: Being
2. The Second
Intelligible Triad:
Intelligible Life
or Eternity
3. The Third
Intelligible Triad:
Intelligible Intellect

The Occult Order

- Aether
Chaos
The Egg
- The Robe
The Cloud
- Phanes

The Paternal Depth

- The Intelligible
Father:
Father
Power
Intellect
- Eternity
or Power
- Intellect

The Intelligible and Intellectual Order:

1. The First Triad:
The Superessential Place
2. The Second Triad:
The Celestial Revolution, Uranus
The Connective Gods
3. The Third Triad:
The Subcelestial Vault
The Perfective or Protective Gods

- The Three
Nights
- The Three
- The Hundred-
Handers

The Intelligible and Intellectual Iunx:

- The Three
Iunges
- Connectors
- The Three
Teletarchs

The Platonic

The One

The Orphic

Time

The Chaldean

The Ineffable One

**The Intellectual Order:
(7 Intellectual
Hebdomads)**

1. Pure Intellect

Cronus

2. The Life-generating
Goddess

Rhea

3. Demiurgic Intellect

Zeus

4. The Three

The

5. Untainted

Three

6. Gods

Curetes

7. The Font of
DiscriminationThe Titans
Intellectual**The Fontal
Hebdomad:**Paternal Intellect,
Simply TranscendHecate or
Life-generating
Font or Second
FatherDoubly Transcend
or Third Father

The Three

Undiminished

Gods

The Girdling
Membrane**The Supercosmic (Principal) Gods**

1. The Demiurgic Triad

The Second Zeus
Poseidon
Hades-Pluto

The Paternal Triad

2. The Life-bearing Triad

Core:
Artemis
Persephone
Athena

3. The Reflexive Triad

Triple-winged Apollo

4. The Untainted Triad
of Protective Gods

The Corybantes

The Super- and Encosmic Gods

1. The Demiurgic Triad

The Third Zeus
The Second Poseidon
HephaestusThe Paternal
Triad2. The Untainted Triad of
Protective GodsHestia
The Second Athena
Ares

3. The Life-bearing Triad

The Second Demeter
The Second Hera
The Second Artemis

4. The Elevating Triad

Hermes
The Second Aphrodite
The Second Apollo

The Gods of the Encosmic or Sensible World

1. The Cosmos, an image of the Chaldean Phanes, is composed of body (fire, air, water and earth), Soul and Intellect.
 Encosmic Intellect is associated with the Orphic Dionysus
 Encosmic Soul is associated with the Orphic Hipta
2. The Cycles of the Same and the Other
 The Cycle of the Same is the sphere of the fixed stars The Cycle of the Other is that of the planets, which are divided into three groups and identified with the following Orphic Gods:
 Cronus (Saturn) – Zeus (Jupiter) – Ares (Mars)
 Helios (Sun) – Aphrodite (Venus) – Hermes (Mercury) Selene (Moon)
3. The Sublunar deities, who are associated with the Nine Orphic Gods:
 Uranus – Gaia
 Ocean – Tethys
 Cronus – Rhea
 Phorcys
 Zeus – Hera
4. The Terrestrial deities, who are descended from the Nine Sublunar Gods.
5. The Subterrestrial deities, who are descended from the Nine Terrestrial Gods.

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Guide to Neoplatonic Terms used in Proclus' Commentary

Activity (*energeia*): the actualization of potential (*dunamis*). It ultimately emanates from the One thing, but first becomes manifest in the Superessential Henads. The different types of divine activity are discriminated only when they pass down from the intelligible to the intellectual region, where they are given distinct names.

Analogy (*analogia*): indicates an analogous and proportionate relation between analogues. It thus describes both the relation between what the name is to the legislator and what all cosmic things are to the Demiurge, and the proportionate relations among such things as the harmonies of the celestial and planetary spheres and the combination of the body and soul of living creatures.

Assimilative power and activity (*aphomoiôtikê*): the process by which lower order creatures are likened to their superiors, which serve as models of imitation. It is by assimilation to the divine that the human soul achieves immortality. By likening human names to their divine models the mortal also can assign names naturally and sympathetically related to their objects of indication.

Authentically (*kuriôs*): the primary (*prôtôs*) and authentic existence of an entity is that at which that entity was first instituted and before which it does not exist. Subsequent to this level, the entity may exist in a secondary, tertiary, etc. manner dependent upon the medium in which the entity appears and the relative proximity of the medium to the primarily existing entity.

Being (*to einai*): results from the combination of Limit and Infinity in the first monad of of the intelligible triad. It then is transmitted down to every subsequent level of the universal hierarchy in the triad of Being-Procession-Reversion, the circular activity of which is responsible for the intra-communication of all existing things from the highest to the lowest and vice-versa.

Condition (*hexis*): the external circumstances into which a person is born or a thing is instituted. In the case of a human soul, its condition is determined both by its nature as a soul and its choice of life.

Cosmos (*kosmos*): all the ordered structure subsequent to the celestial and planetary spheres, or the cycles of the Same thing and the Other thing, which were crafted by the Demiurge out of proportionate mixtures of soul.

Declarative statement (*apophantikos logos*) an affirmative or negative statement that is constructed with a finite verbal form and makes a single point – i.e. the table is white (Aristotle *Int.* 17a8).

Deductive proof (*apodeixis*): a scientific deduction (*sullogismos epistemonikos*) which is reasoned from things that are true, primitive, imme-

diate, more familiar than, prior to and explanatory of the conclusion (Aristotle *Post. An.* 71b17).

Demiurge (*dêmiourgos*): the divine craftsman of the cosmic system, who is introduced in the *Timaeus* and identified by Proclus with Zeus; the archetype for all the young Demiurges, who are responsible for all particular cosmic creation, and for human craftsmen (*dêmiourgoi*) that look to divine models in their material creation.

Dialectic (*dialektikê*): the philosophical method of discussion introduced by Socrates. Proclus divides dialectic into the techniques of discrimination (*diairetikê*), definition (*horistikê*), deduction (*apodeiktikê*), and analytical reduction (*analutikê*).

Dialectical argument (*epikheirêma*): an attempt made to solve a problem. The argument may be formally schematized or conversational. It is rarely conclusive.

Discursive thought (*dianoia*): is temporal, moved, and extended; operates around intellect as a circle around a point. Intellect operates similarly around the intelligible, which is eternal and unmoved.

Encosmic (*hupokosmikon*): what exists within the the cosmic system which is separated from the intellectual region by the celestial vault, or cycle of the Same thing. The cosmic realm was created by the Demiurge of the *Timaeus*, who fashioned the celestial, the mundane and the seven so-called planetary spheres out of nine different proportions of Soul. Each of these spheres produces a particular harmony which is associated with one of the nine Muses.

Epideictic argument (*epideiktikos logos*): the sort of demonstrative argument that the sophists were famous for constructing in order to persuade their listeners rather than logically prove their case.

Essence (*ousia*): the being which is transmitted from Being itself to all existing things and defines them as such.

Eternity (*aiôn*): the unchanging, unmoved model of time; also, the middle monad of the Chaldean intelligible triad of Father-Aeon-Intellect.

Figure (*skhêma*): the most particular manifestation of Form (*eidōs*), which exists prior to shape in the third intelligible monad. The form becomes shapen (*morphê*) as it descends through the intellectual region, and figured when it becomes visible in the cosmic realm.

Fontal Gods (*pêgatoi theoi*): the founts of all good things for the cosmic realm. In Orphic terminology they are the children of Cronus and Rhea; in Chaldean, they include Him who is singly transcendent (*ho hapax epekeina*), Hecate, Him who is doubly transcendent (*ho dis epekeina*), the three Undiminished Gods and the Girdling Intellectual Membrane, which separates the intellectual from the cosmic sphere.

Form (*eidōs*): the most universal discriminated model for every object becoming manifest in the intellectual sphere or lower. The Form is instituted in the third, or intellectual, monad of the intelligible sphere. It is an image of its intelligible paradigm, the real object itself.

Formula (*logos*): a species of the universal Form. A subset of Formulae provide all the particular reason-principles necessary for the creation of all the different aspects of an image of any given Form.

Generation (*genesis*): the process of becoming; its opposite is wasting away (*hê phthora*).

Good (*to agathon*): Proclus identifies the Good and God with the transcendent One. Subsequent to the Good itself, good things are disseminated among all things in the universe. Through their attachment to what is superior, lower order creatures receive these goods as nourishment and salvation of the intellect, the soul and the body.

- Henad** (*henas*): a participated form of the One thing. It exists prior to Being but also is present in every hypostasis extending to the lowest mundane region. The monad (*monas*), in contrast, is the imparticipable leader of any given divine series. There thus is a monad of Athena, Apollo, etc. from which its stream of activity extends all the way down to the mundane sphere, but beyond which it cannot be reduced except in another form of existence.
- Hyparxis** (*huparxis*): the most universal form of existence at any given level of the cosmic hierarchy. Every hyparxis is composed of three hypostases, or particular forms of existence: Stable being, Procession, and Intellectual reversion. The activity of each hyparxis is thus circular. It proceeds from the pinnacle of the hyparxis, where it is proximately related to the superior order, to the lowest extreme of the hyparxis, where it is connected with the subsequent order, and then returns to its stable source of existence in the first monad.
- Hypostasis** (*hupostasis*): a particular level of existence within an hyparxis. Each hyparxis is composed of three hypostases: Stable being, Procession, and Intellectual reversion. Through the circular activity amongst them, the three hypostases of any given hyparxis thus create a single, universal form of existence. This may be intelligible, intelligible and intellectual, intellectual or cosmic.
- Image** (*eidôlon*): Proclus recognizes three types of image: (1) the mathematical likeness, or Form, of intelligible Reality, (2) the visible manifestation of that Form, and (3) the representation of the visible image in a painting, sculpture, mirror, etc.
- Infinity** (*to apeiron*): the first intelligible triad is composed of Limit, Infinity, and the Mixture thereof, or Being itself. Infinity is the model according to which all procession occurs throughout the cosmic hierarchy.
- Intellect** (*nous*): must be understood both cosmologically and psychologically: Intellect occupies the level of the universe which is subsequent to the intelligible sphere and superior to that of Soul. In its most universal psychological sense, Intellect is Mind in motion, that which contemplates; in Orphic terms, it is identified with Cronus. In humans intellect is the highest form of mental operation. But it is only a particular emanation of the universal Intellect which is transmitted into the cosmic realm by the mediation of the cosmic Soul. Human intellect thus is mediated by the human soul as well.
- Intellection** (*noêma*): the actual thought which is produced in the process of intellectual thought (*noêsis*), which spans the division between the intellectual and the intelligible spheres. In the intelligible region, the intelligible, the intellectual, and the intellection are indistinguishable. They are first discriminated in the third, intellectual monad of the intelligible triad.
- Intellectual thought** (*noêsis*): operates both cosmologically and psychologically: it is the medium by which the intellectual region is connected to the intelligible, but it is also the medium by which the human intellect is able to transcend all that is cosmic and intellectual and unify the soul with intelligible Reality itself.
- Intellectual** (*to noeron*): what contemplates, what belongs to the intellectual sphere. The intellectual is most characterized by reverting back to its intelligible source, by which it is nourished and sustained. It is also responsible, however, for connecting the cosmic realm, which is composed of Soul, with intelligible Reality. While the Intellect proper is usually identified with Cronus and the first monad of the intellectual sphere, the intellectual usually indicates everything that belongs to the entire intellectual hyparxis.

Intelligible (*to noêton*): what is contemplated, eternal Mind prior to motion, the stable and unchanging seat of all Reality. In the intelligible region, all thought, all divinity, all activity are unified in a sphere, wherein there is perfect and simultaneous communication of everything.

Iunges: the Chaldean angels that are responsible for communicating the Will of the intelligible Father to the Chaldean priest through oracles. The Iunx is also the magical top that the priest whirls over his head in order to establish a sympathetic relationship between the activity of the sacred rite and that of the Iunges themselves.

Knowledge (*epistêmê*) pertains to things that can be known through faculties of the soul including sense perception, experience, etc. It is distinguished from opinion (*doxa*), which results from things that can only be opined, and understanding (*gnôsis*), which is more intellectual than knowledge and may thus extend all the way up to the Forms in the intellectual aspect of the intelligible region.

Limit (*peras*): the first intelligible triad is composed of Limit, Infinity, and the Mixture thereof, or Being itself. Limit is the model according to which everything in the universe has identity and definition.

Logic (*logikê*): includes both formal logic and language theory. The reason implicit in logic is derived from that of the Formula (*logos*) which transmits the particular principles of the Form into the intellectual and cosmic spheres. For Proclus logic is thus both epistemological and ontological.

Lot (*klêros*): the proper position and function of every entity in the universe. These are generally assigned by divine providence. In the case of humans, however, each soul receives its lot based on the sort of life which it chooses to live in its next fall into the realm of generation. This choice usually reflects the sort of life that the soul last lived. There is thus a natural progression in the quality of the lives which any given soul lives. The soul that successfully rids itself of its attachment to the material world eventually escapes from the cycle of birth and death and spends eternity in relation to intelligible Reality itself.

Monad (*monas*): the imparticipable leader of any given divine series. There is thus a monad of Athena, Apollo, etc. from which its stream of activity extends all the way down to the mundane sphere, but beyond which it cannot be reduced except in another form of existence – i.e. in the intelligible sphere. It is distinct from the henad (*henas*) in that the latter is a participated form of the One thing and is present in every hypostasis extending all the way down to the mundane sphere.

Occult (*aïdion*): what cannot be seen, what exists beyond the celestial vault; often contrasted with what is corruptible and what is generated.

Order (*diakosmêsis*, *diakosmos*, *taxis*): In the *in Crat.* these terms are used virtually synonymously to indicate hyparctic orders of the universal hierarchy (i.e. the intelligible sphere, the intellectual sphere, etc.), hypostatic orders within an hyparxis (i.e. Cronus, Rhea, or Zeus; or Being, Life, or Intellect) and orders sharing the same activity (i.e. weaving, harmony, etc.). Strictly speaking, *diakosmêsis* the most universal, *taxis* the least, but this distinction only generally applies.

Other, cycle of (*ho kuklos tou thaterou*): the Demiurge, Zeus, created the cycles of the Same thing and the Other thing out of eight different proportions of Soul. While one of these is characteristic of the cycle of the Same, or the celestial vault, the other seven comprise the cycle of the Other, or the revolutions of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon. The proportions of the human soul, which descends to its life on earth from these cycles, correspond to those of the Same thing and the Other thing.

- Participate** (*metekhein*): the relation of one entity to another by being. In the intelligible region, where being remains undiscriminated, all things participate in all others. In subsequent spheres, the most common type of relation based on shared being is that between cause and effect.
- Perfective activity** (*telesiourgos*): the process by which the activity of the third monad of each hyparxis is turned back to its first monad and thus completes a circular course ranging from one extreme of its hyparxis to the other. It is also responsible for transmitting the divine activity of superior orders to those subsequent to them. The subsequent order is thereby perfected as a moved image of its superior, whose essence it receives by direct participation.
- Power** (*dunamis*): the potentiality for the actualization of any given thing. Power and activity ultimately emanate from the One thing, but first become manifest in the Superessential Henads prior to the intelligible sphere. They are subsequently participated in by all lower order entities.
- Primarily** (*prôtôs*): the primary and authentic (*kuriôs*) existence of an entity is that at which it was first instituted and before which it does not exist. Subsequent to this level, the entity may exist in a secondary, tertiary, etc. manner dependent upon the medium in which the entity appears and the relative proximity of the medium to the primarily existing entity.
- Principal Gods** (*arkhikoi theoi*): in Orphic terms, the children of the Fontal Gods. In the *in Crat.* these include the three triads: Zeus-Poseidon-Hades, Demeter-Hera-Core, and the Triple-Winged Apollo. They are called Principal because they conduct into the cosmic sphere the principles (*arkhai*) which flow down from their Fontal parents out of the Intellectual sphere.
- Procession** (*proodos*): the transmission of activity from any monad into the spheres subsequent to it. Procession is most characteristic of the second hyparctic monad whose function is to project the activity of the first monad down to the third. The last of these is then responsible for both returning this activity to its source and projecting it to the subsequent sphere.
- Reality** (*pragma*): the object itself, the intelligible paradigm of all subsequent images.
- Reversion** (*epistrophê*) the transmission of activity from any monad back to the spheres superior to it. Reversion is most characteristic of the third hyparctic monad whose function is both to perfect its own hyparxis by reverting back to its first hyparctic monad and to connect its own hyparxis with that subsequent to it.
- Same, cycle of** (*ho kuklos tautou*): the Demiurge, Zeus, created the cycles of the Same thing and the Other thing out of eight different proportions of Soul. One of these is characteristic of the cycle of the Same, or the celestial vault. The other seven comprise the cycle of the Other, or the revolutions of Saturn, Jupiter, Mars, the Sun, Venus, Mercury and the Moon. The proportions of the human soul, which descends to its life on earth from these cycles, correspond to those of the Same thing and the Other thing. Musical harmonies thus have a direct and sympathetic effect on the human soul.
- Series** (*seira*): the chain of power and activity which is suspended from any divine monad, or God, down into the subsequent spheres. Corresponding to the different links in the series of Dionysus, for instance, there are angelic, daemonic, heroic, and human Dionysuses.
- Shape** (*morphê*): the intelligible Form (*eidôs*) first becomes shapen as it passes down into the intellectual sphere. It is given figure (*skhêma*) when it passes into the cosmic sphere and becomes visible.
- Sign/token** (*sunthêma*): images of Reality which the Demiurge plants within the cosmic system in order that the lower order creature may use them as

models in its own creation and trace its way back up to participation in God and Reality itself. The term is used primarily to describe the way in which the Chaldean theurgist communicates with the Gods by elevation of the soul and is given the power to effect objects and events in the mundane world through the knowledge thereby obtained.

Soul (*psukhê*): the substance from which the Demiurge crafted the celestial and the planetary spheres, or the cycles of the Same thing and the Other thing; corresponding to and derived from these universal cycles are those in the particular human soul, which is necessary for human life. It is the seat of the particular human intellect and all of the passions.

Spirit (*pneuma*): a supernatural substance existing around the earth in the cosmic sphere. Any given God may gather spirits together and include them within his series in order to bring his proper power to manifestation. Spirits often are thus confused with and bear the same name as the God himself of the series to which they belong.

Subsequent (*deuteros*): indicates relative order, i.e. second to the entity under consideration. Gods, monads, orders, etc. may all be subsequent to another. Only the transcendent One is not subsequent to something else.

Supercosmic (*huperkosmion*): what exists just superior to the cosmic celestial arch and just inferior to the intellectual triad of Cronus-Rhea-Zeus.

Superessential (*huperousion*): three Superessential Henads exist between the transcendent One thing and the intelligible triad, in the first monad of which Being, or essence, is first instituted from the mixture of Limit and Infinity.

Suspend (*exartan*): each of the links in any given divine series is said to be suspended from the monad of that series. The angelic Dionysus is thus suspended from the God himself, the daemonic from the angelic, the heroic from the daemonic, etc.

Symbol (*symbolon*): an image of reality which may be sympathetically and naturally related to it. The more divine and knowledgeable the cause of any given symbol, the more naturally related that symbol is to its object of indication. Thus, the symbols instituted by Gods are more naturally related to their objects than are those of angels. But those of angels are more naturally correct than those of daemons, etc. Symbols occur at every level of the universal hierarchy. They include names, statues, planets, stars, etc. When used in the context of theurgy, the terms symbol and token (*sunthêma*) are virtually synonymous.

Sympathy (*sumpatheia*): the principle of association and participation between cause and effect. The more an effect is related to its cause in being, the greater is its sympathetic relation to that cause.

Telestic art (*telestikê*): the art of prophecy which depends on perfecting (*telein*) a bond between the God of invocation and the priest of the theurgic rite. The priest is said to be spiritually elevated to the level of the Gods where their will is communicated to him through the mediation of the Iunges and the Teletarchs.

Teletarchs (*Teletarkhoi*): Chaldean angels that receive the divine will of the Father from the Iunges and transmit it down through the empyrean, aetherial, and mundane regions, where it is received by the Chaldean priest in a form that he can perceive.

Theologian (*theologos*): Homer, Hesiod, Orpheus, and the other sources of the mythological tradition regarding the pagan Greek Gods.

Transcendental/remote (*exaireisthai*): beyond direct participation in, experience of, knowledge of.

Understanding (*gnôsis*): is qualitatively and hierarchically superior to knowledge (*epistêmê*) and opinion (*doxa*). Opinion results from what can only be

opined. Knowledge pertains to things that can be known only through the faculties of the soul. Understanding, however, is more closely related to intellect and thus extends all the way up to the Forms in the intellectual aspect of of the intelligible region.

Vehicle of the soul (*okhêma tês psukhês*): as the particular soul descends into the realm of generation, it passes through the spheres of the aether, the sun, the moon, and the air. It picks up a little substance from each of these spheres which ultimately combines to form the vehicle of the soul. So long as the soul remains in the mundane world, it is conveyed by this vehicle, but it is systemically shed like clothing as the soul ascends back to its proper celestial revolution after the death of the body.

Wholeness (*holotês*): Proclus recognizes three degrees of wholeness – that prior to parts, that of parts, and that in the part. The first type includes the second two and thus is the most universal. Similarly, the second includes and therefore is more universal than the third. The intelligible region is an example of the first, the intellectual of the second, and any given divine monad of the third.

Young Gods (*neoi theoi*): the young Demiurges mentioned in the *Timaeus*. The universal Demiurge, Zeus, has allotted them the task of creating all particular encosmic things.

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English-Greek Glossary

abstract: *psilos*
absurdity: *teratologia*
activity: *energeia*
ambiguity: *amphibolia*
analogy, proportion: *analogia*
analytical reduction: *analsis*
apocope: *apokopê*
apprehension: *antilêpsis*
archangelic: *arkhangelikos*
archetype: *arkhetupos*
artisan: *tekhnitês*
assertion: *apophasis*
astrologer: *astrologos*
attached to language: *philologon*
attached to learning: *philomathes*
augury: *oiônistikê*

beginning: *prooimion*
being, institution, production,
subsistence: *hupostasis*
being, reality-state: *huparxis*
beings/entities, *onta*

case: *ptôsis*
cause: *aitia*
chance: *tukhê*
changing (of names): *metathesis*
character (literary): *prosôpon*
character: *êthos*
characteristic: *kharaktêr*
chief-artificer: *arkhitektôn*
circumscribe: *perigraphêin*
circumscription: *perilêpsis*
clear: *phanos*
commanding respect (argument):
entreptikon
common usage: *sunêtheia*
compelling (argument): *biastikon*
composer of fictive images:
eidôlopoiios
compound (names): *suntheton*

concept: *ennoia*
concordance/harmony: *sumphônia*
connate: *sumphuês*
connector: *sunokheus*
consecration, art of: *telestikê*
contradiction: *antiphasis*
correctness: *orthotês*
corruptible: *phthartos*
cosmos: *kosmos*

daemon: *daimôn*
deductive proof, art of: *apodeiktikê*
deductive proof: *apodeixis*
deficiency: *elleipsis*
definition, bounds: *horos*
definition, technique of: *horistikê*
demigod: *hêmitheos*
demiurge: *dêmiourgos*
demiurgy: *dêmiourgia*
demonstrative power: *endeixis*
derivation: *parenklisis*
derive a name: *paronomazein*
desire/love: *erôs*
dialect, language: *dialektos*
dialectic: *dialektikos*
dialectical proof: *epikheirêma*
dialogue: *dialogos*
difference: *diaphora*
diphthong: *diphthongos*
discourse: *dialexis*
discovery: *heuresis*
discrimination: *diakrisis*
discursive thought: *dianoia*
disturbance, lack of: *ataraxia*
divided: *meristos*
divinity: *theotês*
division, art of: *diaretikê*

element/letter: *stoikheion*
encosmic: *enkosmios*
end: *telos*

epideictic (argument): *epideiktikos*,
epideixis

epiphany: *epiphaneia*

eristic: *eristikê*

error: *plêmmeleia*

essence: *ousia*

eternal: *aidios*

eternity: *aîôn*

etymological analysis: *etumêgoria*

etymology: *etumologia*

euphemism: *euphêanismos*

expert: *deinos*

explanation: *epilusis*

falsehood: *pseudos*

fancy: *dokêsis*

fate: *moira*

flattery: *kolakeia*

fontal (divinities): *pêgaiai*

foreknowledge: *pronoia*

forgetfulness: *lêthê*

Form: *eidos*, *idea*

free choice: *proairesis*

god: *theos*

god-given (names): *theoklêton*

grammarian: *grammatikos*

hearing: *akoê*

heroes: *hêrôes*

hint at: *ainittesthai*

historical reason: *historia*

homonymy: *homônumia*

hope (naming in): *elpis*

identity: *idiotês*, *tautotês*

illumination: *ellampsis*

image: *eidôlon*, *eikôn*

imagination: *phantasia*

imitation: *mimêsis*

imitator: *mimêtês*

impasse: *aporhia*

implacable (gods): *ameiliktoi*

ineffable: *aphrostos*, *aporrhêtos*,
arrhêtos

initiate: *mustês*, *telestês*

initiation: *muêsis*, *teletê*

inquiry: *zêtêsis*

inspiration: *enthousiasmos*

intellect: *nous*

intellection: *noêma*, *noêsis*

intellectual: *noeros*

intelligible: *noêtos*

intensity (opp. *anesis*): *epitasis*

interpret: *hermêneuein*

interpretation: *exêgêsis*

invocation: *epiklêsis*

judge: *kritês*

justice: *dikaiousunê*

knowledge, scientific: *epistêmê*

knowledge, understanding: *gnôsis*

lawgiver: *nomothetês*

likenesses, of producing:

aphomoiôtikê

limit: *peras*

linguistic (imagination): *lektikos*

logical: *logikos*

lung: *pleumôn*

man: *anthrôpos*

manifestation: *ekphansis*

mathematical study: *mathêma*

matter: *hulê*

maxim: *paroimia*

mediating (name): *diaporthmion*

method: *methodos*

metonymous: *metônumon*

mirror: *katoptron*

moderation: *sôphrosunê*

modulation: *metabolê*

motion: *kinêsis*

mystery: *mustêrion*

myth: *muthos*

myth-makers: *muthoplastês*

name: *onoma*, *epônumia*

nameable: *onomastos*

name-giver: *onomatothetês*,

onomatourgos

nameless: *nônumon*

naming: *onomatourgia*

nature: *phusis*

nomenclature: *onomasia*, *prosêgoria*

number: *arithmos*

object: *hupokeimenon*

observer of the heavens: *meteôrologos*

one: *hen*

opinion: *doxa*

oracle: *logion*

orator: *rhêtôr*

order, organization: *diakosmêsis*,

diakosmos, *taxis*

otherness: *heterotês*

painter of animals: *zôgraphos*

part: *meros*

participate in: *metekhein*

passion, modification: *pathos*,
prothumia

perception: *aisthêsis*

perfection: *teleiotês*

perfective: *telesiourgos*

periphrasis: *hyperokhê*

philosopher: *philosophos*

philosophy: *philosophia*

phrase: *rhêma*

physiognomy: *phusiognômonikê*

plausible: *pithanon*

pleonasm: *pleonasmos*

poetry: *poiêsis*

polynomy: *isorrhupon*

polyonymy: *poluônumia*

polysemantic: *polusêmon*

possessed by Apollo: *phoibolêptos*

power, ability: *dunamis*

prayer: *eukhê*

predicate: *katêgoroumenon*

premise (major): *protasis*

premise (minor): *proslêpsis*

priest: *hiereus*

principal (gods): *arkhikoi*

principle/beginning/rule: *arkhê*

problem: *aporhêma*

procession: *proodos*

product: *apotelesma*

projector: *probouleus*

property: *idiôma*

prophecy, art of: *mantikê*

prophecy: *prorrhesis*

proportion: *metron*

purpose: *skopos*

reality/thing: *pragma*

reason, formula, reason-principle,
statement: *logos*

receptor: *dokheus*

recollection: *anamnêsis*

reference: *anaphora*

reflection, appearance: *emphasis*

refute: *dialekkein*, *elegkein*

removing initial letters: *aphairesis*

restoration: *apokatastasis*

revelation: *epopteia*

revelatory: *ekphantorikon*

rhetoric: *rhêtorikê*

running words together: *sunaloiphê*

seer: *manteus*

self-substantial: *authupostaton*

series: *seira*

shadow: *skia*

sight: *horasis*

sign: *sêmeion*, *sign*

significant: *sêmantikos*

signification: *sêmasia*

similarity, likeness: *homoiotês*

simplicity: *haplotês*

skill: *tekhnê*

sophist: *sophistês*

soul: *psukhê*

sound: *êkhê*

speech: *phônê*

spirit: *pneuma*

spring/fount: *pêgê*

stamp, form: *tupos*

standard (of interpretation): *kanôn*

stationariness: *stasis*

statue, image: *agalma*

story: *diêgêma*

subcelestial: *hupouranios*

summoner: *klêtor*

supercelestial: *hyperouranios*

supercosmic: *hyperkosmios*

syllable: *sullabê*

syllogism: *sullogismos*, *sunêmnenon*

symbol: *sumbolon*

syncope: *sunkopê*

synizesis: *sunizêsis*

synthesis: *sunagôgê*

teaching: *dogma*

teletarchic (principle): *teletarkhikos*

theologian: *theologos*

theology: *theologia*

theurgist: *theourgos*

theurgy: *theourgia*

title (honorific): *prosrhêsis*

tongue: *glôssa*

type, way: *tropos*

truth: *alêtheia*

understanding: *gnome*

unity: *henôsis*

unlimited: *apeiria*

usage: *khêsis*

utterance: *phêmê*

uttered expression: *ekphônêsis*

virtue: *aretê*

voice: *phthongos*

weakness (opp. *epitasis*): *anesis*

wholeness: *holotês*

wisdom: *phronêsis, sophia*

wish, will: *boulêsis*

witness: *marturia*

word formation: *skhêmatismos*

words: *lexis*

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aidios, eternal, 4,13; 8,21; 11,2.10;
18,15.22; 22,22; 42,28; 72,19ff.;
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Aiguptios, Egyptian, 25,13; 32,6
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alêtheuein, to speak the truth,
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- Apatê**, Deception, 110,22
- apatêlon**, deceptive, 71,15
- apeikazein**, fashion, 19,13.17; 23,12; (*apeikazesthai*) 77,10; 80,21; 98,6
- apeiria**, Unlimited, 13,19
- aphairesis**, removing initial letters, 40,6
- aphomoiôtikê**, of producing likenesses, 1,2; 19,2.15; 20,22
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- apodeiktikê**, art of deductive proof, 2,11
- apodeixis**, deductive proof, 2,3; 3,25
- apokatastasis**, restoration, 106,23
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- marturia**, witness, 9,20
- mathêma**, mathematical study,
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- meros**, part, 2,21; 7,19; 14,12.22;
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- metabolê**, modulation, 36,25
- metathesis**, changing, (of names)
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- metekhomenon**, participating in,
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- metônumon**, metonymous, 7,5
- metron**, proportion, 34,21
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- mimêtês**, imitator, 29,7.16
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- mustês**, initiate, 67,20
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- Philêbos**, Philebus, 11,5; 12,11; 93,11
- Philippidês**, Philippides, 36,1
- philologon**, attached to language, 11,13
- philomathes**, attached to learning, 11,12
- Philopatôr**, Philopator, 73,5
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- philosophia**, philosophy, 2,21; 28,11; 103,7
- philosophos**, philosopher, 9,6; 10,4.20; 28,23; 37,23; 112,5
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- plêmmeleia**, error, 10,11
- plêmmelein**, to transgress, 19,21
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71,22; 74,19; 101,11
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- polusêmon**, polysemantic, 7,4
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- proairesthai**, to choose, 2,15
- proboleus**, projector, 2,5
- Prodikos**, Prodicus, 9,13
- proienai**, to proceed, 3,13.16; 14,23;
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- proklêtikon**, call forth, 75,14
- Proklos**, Proclus, 10,26; 17,1; 25,20;
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- Promêtheus**, Prometheus, 1,18
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- pronoia**, foreknowledge, 49,14.28;
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- prooimion**, beginning, 5,16
- prorrhesis**, prophecy, 99,26
- prosêgoria**, nomenclature, 21,17
- proslêpsis**, minor premise,
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- prosôpon**, character, 4,6; 14,16; (of
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- prosrhêsis**, honorific title, 50,5
- Prôtogoras**, Protagoras, 12,24; 13,10
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- prothumia**, passion, 71,3
- prumnê**, stern, (of essence) 44,20
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- pseudônômôs**, falsely, 41,3
- pseudos**, falsehood, 12,5.22; 13,27;
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- ptairontes**, sneezers, (namers like)
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- rhêma**, phrase, 5,15
- rhêtôr**, orator, 12,17; 34,9
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- rheuston**, in flux, 8,17
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89,11ff.; 90,15; 93,24; 96,14
- Seiren**, Siren, 88,14.26
- selêniakon**, lunar, 109,6
- sêmainein**, to signify, 16,11;
42,4.17; 58,1; 65,22; 66,18; 71,14;
73,13; (*semainesthai*) 96,28;
107,8; 109,8
- sêmainomenon**, signified, 7,23; 8,8;
12,7; 16,22; 87,9
- sêmantikos**, significant, 14,26;
16,29; 17,3
- sêmasia**, signification, 29,26
- sêmeion**, sign, 7,13; 43,25
- Skamandros**, Scamander, 34,17;
35,2.10
- skemma**, study, 9,10
- skhêmatismos**, word formation,
40,14
- skia**, shadow, 7,21
- skopos**, purpose, 1,1
- skotodiniountes**, whirled about in
darkness, 2,4
- Skuthai**, Scythians, 36,10
- Skuthikos**, Scythian, 25,14
- Sôkratês**, Socrates, 4,4.11; 5,9; 8,7;
(etymology) 8,18; 9,9.12; 10,7;
11,5.15.26; 12,12; 13,7; 17,27;
18,9; 20,8; 26,2.21; 29,1.8; 34,13;
43,6.28; 45,4; 46,21; 47,12;
51,12.15; 52,17; 54,12; 56,19;
63,17.24; 64,2.6.13; 66,1.15; 67,26;
68,1.8; 74,19; 76,16; 80,17.21;
82,18; 83,20; 87,8; 89,28; 94,17;
95,28; 97,1.7.15; 100,9; 101,11;
105,10; 107,20; 108,23; 110,2;
112,14
- Sôkratikos**, Socratic, 4,10
- sophia**, wisdom, 6,2.7.9; 96,6
- sophistês**, sophist, 3,14; 9,13.17;
10,3.5; 13,18; 29,3; 71,25; 87,11;
89,1
- sophos**, wise, 6,16
- sophrosune**, moderation, (Form of)
90,22
- stasis**, stationariness, 4,26.27
- stenazantes**, sighers, (namers like)
8,7
- stoikheion**, element/letter, 12,14;
40,7; 41,21; 42,16; 51,3; 77,21; 94,2
- sullabê**, syllable, 5,14; 37,25;
45,17ff.; 77,21
- sullogismos**, syllogism, 43,5
- sumbolikôs**, symbolically, 24,22
- sumbolon**, symbol, 10,25.27; 15,28;
16,18; 19,12; 21,1; 30,17; 31,4; (of
gods) 31,25; 52,9; 65,18; 93,25
- sumperasma**, conclusion, 25,28
- sumphônia**, concordance/harmony,
12,16; 43,22
- sumphuês**, connate, (power) 16,22;
(names with realities) 72,17
- sunagôgê**, synthesis, 2,8; 4,1
- sunaloiphê**, running words
together, 40,6
- sunêmmenon**, syllogism, 10,23.26
- sunêtheia**, common usage, 14,28
- sunizêsis**, synizesis, 40,6
- sunkopê**, syncope, 40,5
- sunokheus**, connector, (of 3
Demiurges) 52,20; (of springs)
59,3; (*Ouranos*) 59,29; 74,24;
111,14

- sunthêma**, sign, 19,13; 24,19;
30,8.21; 31,1; (intellectual) 33,27
- sunthesis**, synthesis, 12,4; 19,3
- suntheton**, compound, (names) 39,17
- Tantalos**, Tantalus, 43,3; 46,24
- Tartaros**, Tartarus, 74,11
- tautotês**, identity, 23,17; 36,12;
51,24; 54,2; (cause of) 79,16;
102,18
- taxis**, order, 13,25; 24,20; 29,28;
32,25; 33,11; 38,7.18; 44,13;
(demiurgic) 48,4; 50,7; 54,25;
(intelligible) 55,27; (of heaven)
60,22; 63,27; 65,26; 66,16; 72,11;
76,1; 82,23; 84,7.24; 91,10;
97,1.16; 99,7.22; 101,21; (celestial)
102,4; 106,13; 111,7; 112,1.6;
(Curetic) 112,18.22; 113,5
- tekhnhê**, skill, 8,25; 17,18; (political)
18,27; (demiurgic, intellectual,
generative, and perfective) 21,15;
22,17; 23,12; 72,25ff.; 73,1
- tekhnhêtos**, fabricated, 7,22; 21,6.10;
23,1
- tekhnitês**, artisan, 22,28; 23,10; 34,7
- Têlaugês**, Telauges, 8,27
- teleiotês**, perfection, 29,14; 53,26
- Têlemakhos**, Telemachus, 36,4
- telesiourgos**, perfective, 10,13
- telestês**, initiate, 25,1; 100,23
- telestikhê**, art of consecration, 19,12;
32,29; 46,22; 99,6
- teletarkhikos**, teletarchic,
(principle) 33,16
- teletê**, initiation, 100,24ff.; 101,4
- telos**, end, (proper) 1,5; 69,22
- teratologia**, absurdity,
(impressionistic) 68,7
- Têthus**, Tethys, 81,22; 82,10.17;
83,2; (from *Diattethus*) 83,7ff.
- Theaitêtos**, Theaetetus, 9,4
- Themis**, Themis, 49,20
- Theodôros**, Theodorus, 9,5
- theohlêton**, god-given, (names) 34,15
- theologia**, theology, (of Hesiod) 80,7
- theologos**, theologian, 21,17; 22,11;
24,20; 36,16; 52,28; 62,10; 66,17;
74,23; 76,23; 83,6; 85,19; 91,6;
97,6; 104,8; 108,13; 109,13;
110,26; 111,26
- Theophilos**, Theophilus, 42,18
- Theophrastos**, Theophrastus, 6,27
- theôrêtikos**, looks to, 18,21
- theôria**, theoretical observation,
2,27; 3,1; 10,22; 46,25
- theos**, god, 1,8; 4,1.19; 9,1.25; 10,17;
19,5.13.24; 20,11; 21,14; 22,4;
(young) 24,9; 26,17; 27,6; 29,23ff.;
30,18; 31,9ff.; 33,18; 34,4; 47,26;
48,7; (encosmic) 49,18; 53,9; 63,9;
70,4ff.; 72,8.14; (celestial) 74,14;
(name) 74,17; 78,13; (connective)
84,28; (leading) 88,19; (opp.
genera of daemons and souls)
88,25; 90,17; (nourishment of)
90,19; (purify) 100,19; 101,13;
(*ameiliktoi*) 105,29; (causal) 108,9
- theotês**, divinity, 38,18; (*pêgaiai*)
80,20.23; (*arkhikai*) 80,24; 91,19;
105,26
- theourgia**, theurgy, 31,27; 65,25;
100,21
- theourgikôs**, theurgic, 32,30
- theourgos**, theurgist, 20,27; 72,11;
98,15; 101,3; (children of) 101,27;
105,27
- Thêseus**, Theseus, 73,17ff.
- thesis**, 4,11.12.18; 5,2.4.18; 6,20;
8,13; 10,24.27; 11,8.16;
15,2.14.28.30; 16,8.30; 20,5; 21,12;
26,3; (of names) 44,22
- Thetis**, Thetis, 69,16
- thrinakon**, coping stone, (math) 1,16
- Timaios**, Timaeus, 19,27; 20,2.26;
48,5; 49,29; 50,19; 51,2.14; 62,3;
63,22; 64,2.5; 82,22; 100,19;
112,4.25
- Titan**, Titan, 56,16; 64,25; 84,14;
109,20
- Titanikos**, Titan, 28,1; 48,20.25;
56,11; (series) 60,1; 61,1.7; 64,18;
(*Titanikôs*) 77,26; 84,19; (*taxis*)
84,24; 89,12
- Titanoi**, Titans, (name of) 56,14.21
- tomê**, castration, (of Uranus and
Cronus) 64,16.24
- Triton**, Triton, 86,7
- tropos**, type, way, 3,20; 4,26
- tukhaios**, chance, 4,14.23; 11,22;
(*nomos*) 18,14.24
- tukhê**, chance, 4,13; 7,3; 43,17.20;
(poetic) 44,3; 47,9; 72,27
- tukhon**, chance, 14,1
- tupos**, stamp, form, 36,23; 40,14

- Turtamos**, Tyrtamus, (changed to *Theophrastos*), 6,27
- Xanthippos**, Xanthippus, 73,12
- Xanthos**, Xanthus, 34,16; 35,10
- Zélos**, Jealousy, 110,22
- zêtein**, to study, inquire, 3,10.23; 9,23
- zêtêsis**, inquiry, 9,27
- Zeus**, Zeus, (*Dios*) 5,24; 20,9; 21,20; 27,16.23; 28,4.18; 33,23; 37,17; 46,29ff.; 47,16.28; 48,11; 49,1.21; 50,3.19.24; 51,9; 52,5.17; 53,8; (son of Kronos) 53,28; 54,28; 55,6.11; 56,4; 58,4; 61,27ff.; 62,5.27; 64,18.27; 74,2; 78,8; 79,14ff.; 80,13; 82,28; 83,2.11.19.24.28; 85,6.11.15.23; (*Diia*) 85,28; 86,13ff.; (*Diake* life) 86,24; 87,3; 88,15; 89,3.10.16.25; 90,2.6; 91,2; 93,3.11.18; 95,6; 101,21.26; 104,27; 107,1.26; 108,20; 110,23; 111,3.25
- zôgraphos**, painter of animals, 41,8