

QUESTIONS
ON THE METAPHYSICS
OF ARISTOTLE
BY JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

I

BOOKS ONE-FIVE

Translated by

Girard J. Etzkorn and Allan B. Wolter, O.F.M.

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Editor's Preface

Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle by John Duns Scotus is an English translation in two volumes of the Latin critical edition of *B. Ioannis Duns Scoti: Quaestiones super libros Metaphysicorum Aristotelis, Libri I-IX*, volumes III and IV of Scotus's *Opera Philosophica*.*

The Latin critical edition contains all the information pertaining to the critical apparatus, complete notations, and indices. This English translation follows the paragraph numbers found in the Latin text. The footnote references have been simplified, however, and the extensive background material found in the critical edition is not included. The translators have provided an introduction to the translation which provides helpful background material. (See pp. xv-xviii.)

*(St. Bonaventure, NY: Franciscan Institute Publications, Vols. III & IV, 1997, 1998.)

INTRODUCTION
TO THE ENGLISH TRANSLATION OF
QUESTIONS ON THE METAPHYSICS OF ARISTOTLE
BY JOHN DUNS SCOTUS

John Duns Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle* do not lend themselves to casual reading. Always the metaphysician and theologian, this Scottish Franciscan thought, taught, and wrote during the two decades that spanned the thirteenth and fourteenth centuries. With indubitable justification he came to be known as the Subtle Doctor, always analyzing reality, scrutinizing the thoughts of his predecessors, anticipating weak spots in his own thinking, reviewing and revising his own opinions. During his brief life and short career, Scotus found time to return to two of his major works, by making corrections, additions, and cancellations, frequently called "Extras" or "Additiones" or "extra cancellati" in the manuscript tradition. This is true of one major theological work, namely his *Ordinatio*, the revised version of his lectures on the *Sentences of Peter Lombard*, and of one major philosophical work, i.e. his *Questions on the Metaphysics*.

In the introduction to this English translation, we have no intention of rehearsing the extremely complicated attempts to establish the chronology of his life and works.¹

Volumes have been written on these subjects and yet there is much that remains in doubt. There is little hope that more clearly established factual data will be uncovered, so that the best hope for enhancing probability in this regard is to be gleaned from "fore" and "aft" references in his own writings, the vast bulk of which still awaits critical editions.

With regard to the *Metaphysics*, we mean to content ourselves with saying that there is no doubt as to their authenticity. Nor is there any doubt that they were subjected to Scotus's revision. It is likewise clear

¹Cf. A. B. Wolter, "Reflections on the Life and Works of Scotus," in *American Catholic Philosophical Quarterly* 67 (1993), 1-36; W. A. Frank and A. B. Wolter, *Duns Scotus, Metaphysician* (Purdue U. Press, 1995), 1-16.

that Scotus never got around to composing questions on Books Ten to Twelve of Aristotle's major philosophical text.²

As far as the time of composition is concerned, it is the judgment of the critical editors that it is highly unlikely that all the books came from the same period of Scotus's academic life. Contrary to the popular and largely unsubstantiated belief that the *Metaphysics* came early in his career, there is strong evidence that the later books, particularly Books Seven to Nine, are the product of a later period.

As a careful reading of these questions will show, Scotus did not think in a vacuum. He is unquestionably beholden to his predecessors, principally Thomas Aquinas (who came to be known as *the* "Expositor") and Henry of Ghent. While Scotus frequently subjects these two great thinkers to scrutiny and criticism, especially Henry, there is also no doubt that he absorbed many of their insights.

It was often the case, in this period of the medieval Universities, that the professor—as time and talent allowed—might compose a literal commentary on a work of Aristotle as well as sets of questions on the same work. Sometimes the literal commentary and the questions were combined. There are about five references in Scotus's *Questions* which leave no doubt that he also—because he refers to it—did a literal exposition of the *Metaphysics*. However, this is not to be confused with the literal exposition printed in the Wadding-Vives edition. This is now clearly the work of Antonius Andreae³, a faithful disciple of Scotus, who often copied copiously from his master and—alas!—frequently made the Subtle Doctor more clear and simple than he ever intended to be. It is now safe to assume, barring a wonderful discovery, that Scotus's *Expositio literalis* has been lost.

²Cf. C. J. Ermatinger, "Some Recent Finds Made with the Help of an Incipit Catalogue of Medieval Philosophical *Quaestiones*," in *Manuscripta* 19 (1975): 72-73; idem, "John of Tytynsale (d. ca. 1289) as the Pseudo-Scotus of the Questions on *Metaphysics* X and XII," in *Manuscripta* 23 (1979): 7; L. J. Thro and C. J. Ermatinger, "Questions on Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X and XII by Master John Dymdale," in *Manuscripta* 36 (1992): 71-124; idem, *Manuscripta* 37 (1993): 107-167.

³Cf. C. Berube, "Antoine André: Témoin et Interprète de Scot," in *Antonianum* 54 (1979): 386-446; G. Pini, "Scotistic Aristotelianism: Antonius Andreas' *Expositio and Quaestiones* on the *Metaphysics*," in *Via Scoti: Methodologica ad mentem Ioannis Duns Scoti* (Rome, 1995), 375-399; G. Pini, "Una lettura scotista della Metafisica di Aristotele: L'*Expositio* in libros *Metaphysicorum* di Antonio Andrea," in *Antonianum* 54 (1991): 529-586.

We have suggested that Scotus makes for difficult reading. This is true, first of all because of his style: cryptic (as if he believes that the reader easily understands what he's talking about), forgetful to state relative pronouns, changing genders from masculine or feminine to some neuter thing or other, returning without warning to something previous which he found unsatisfactory. But the difficulties are not all stylistic. The manuscript tradition may safely be considered as one of the "messiest" of this period of handwritten documents. There is no sure path back to any autograph, apograph, or original. The English did not share the practice of the University of Paris where an authentic copy was deposited with the stationer, from which all subsequent copies were to be made. The manuscripts which report "Extras," "Additiones," and "Textus cancellati" (only about a third of them do so), often do not agree as to where the "Extras" begin and end or where they were to be inserted; nor is it always clear where a canceled text begins and ends.

We have said that Scotus was always the metaphysician and theologian. He frequently cites doctrines of Trinitarian and Sacramental theology to prove his point. His predilection for metaphysics also surfaces from time to time when he manifests some reluctance in discussing issues of natural philosophy or even "non-metaphysical psychology."

If the curious reader wishes to learn more about the manuscript tradition, the arguments in support of authenticity and the time of composition, about the sources and subsequent influence of Scotus's *Questions on the Metaphysics of Aristotle*, we suggest that he or she consult the introduction to the Latin critical edition (see Editor's Preface, p. xi).

A first draft of this translation was done prior to 1980 by Allan B. Wolter. During the summers of the 1980s he brought his translation to the Franciscan Institute at St. Bonaventure University where daily he and Girard J. Etzkorn met in closed sessions while Wolter read the English text and Etzkorn listened while watching the Latin text. However, the process of making the critical edition was still ongoing during this time. The team of critical editors were holding bi-weekly *scrutinia* to "brain-storm" the Latin text subsequent to the collation of the manuscripts, the composition of the text, and the identification of sources. As a result, the final English translation had to be modified

after the completion of the Latin text in the early 1990s. After a final “closed session” between Wolter and Etzkorn in the summer of 1995, the latter completed, during December 1995, a line-by-line, paragraph-by-paragraph, note-by-note comparison and “harmonization.”

A word about phrases in brackets [...] and explanatory notes is in order. These are to be credited principally to Allan B. Wolter with occasional minor modifications suggested by Etzkorn. We hope they will prove helpful to the reader struggling to overcome the stylistic and codicological messiness to which we alluded above. To those who believe in getting to the root of reality and who have the courage to struggle with deciphering Scotus, his work will prove well worth their while.

In processu generationis humanae semper crevit notitia veritatis.

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ABBREVIATIONS EMPLOYED IN THIS TRANSLATION

a = first column	FIP = Franciscan Institute Publications
a./art. = articulus	ibid. = ibidem
AL = Aristoteles Latinus	Lat. = Latinus
al. = alii	lect. = lectio
AMPh. s. 2 = Ancient Medieval Philosophy. Series 2	MS(S) = manuscript(s)
AviL = Avicenna Latinus	n. = (paragrah) number
b = second column	nn. = (paragraph) numbers
BAW = Bayerische Akademie der Wissenschaften	ordin. = ordinariae
BSF = Bibliotheca Franciscana Scholastica	Oxon. = Oxoniae
BGPTM = Beitrage zur Geschichte der Philosophie und Theologie des Mittelalters	p. = part/ page
Bibl. = Bibliotheca	PG = Patrologia Graeca
Bk(s). = Book(s)	PhB = Les Philosophes Belges
CCL = Corpus Christianorum Latinorum	PL = Patrologia Latina
Cf. = Confer	praed. = praedicamentum
ch(s). = chapter(s)	prol. = prologus
CLCAG = Corpus Latinum Commentariorum in Aristotelem Graecorum	proem. = prooemium
cod. = codex	prop. = proposition
com. = commentum	Ps. = pseudo
concl. = conclusion	ps. = psalmus
CSEL = Corpus Scriptorum Ecclesiasticorum Latinorum	q. = question
d. = distinction	qq. = questions
disp. = disputatae	Quaest. = Quaestio (nes)
ed. = editio/edited	Quodl. = Quodlibet
f./fol. = folio	r = recto
ff. = folia/following	resp. = response
	Sent. = Commentary on Sentences of Lombard
	t(t). = textus
	theol. = theologica
	tr. = tractatus
	v = verso
	Vat. = Vaticanus
	viz. = namely
	{{...}} = additions or extras by Scotus

BOOK ONE

PROLOGUE

THE NOBILITY AND CAUSES OF THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS

Text of Aristotle: "All men by nature desire to know."¹

[I.—THE NOBILITY OF THE SCIENCE OF METAPHYSICS]

1 [1] At the beginning of the *Metaphysics* which we have in our hands, the Philosopher sets forth this proposition indicating the dignity and nobility of this science, as will become clear as we proceed. To see this, we must first explain the proposition itself, and second apply it to the conclusion we have in mind.

[A.—CLARIFICATION OF THE PROPOSITION]

2 In general there are two ways to make this proposition clear; one is a posteriori, the other a priori.

[1.—A POSTERIORI]

3 The Philosopher gives a certain a posteriori indication when he writes:² "A sign of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness, they are loved for themselves,"—as if to say, the senses are loved naturally not only insofar as they are useful for sustaining life, but as cognitive.

He proves this in the text³ by the fact that we naturally love that sense most which gives us the most knowledge, namely sight. He says it is the most cognitive sense for two reasons, first because of the certitude of the knowledge it gives and second because of the variety of what we know by means of it. The certitude stems from its immateriality. The more immaterial a cognitive power is, the more certain is its knowledge. More objects are also known through

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 21.

²Ibid. 980a 21-23.

³Ibid. 980a 25.

this sense, because all bodies, both celestial and terrestrial, have their share of light and color. This is not the case, however, with the other sensible qualities, namely the tangible, the audible, and the like.

4 Hence, the force of this proof of Aristotle lies in this. If we love naturally the more cognitive senses, not because they are useful for life, but because of the knowledge they give, then it follows that what we naturally desire more is to know, for this knowledge is more noble than sense knowledge and is that toward which sense knowledge is ultimately ordered.

[2.—A PRIORI: THE OPINION OF THOMAS AQUINAS]

5 [2] [Exposition of the opinion] Second, certain persons⁴ give three a priori clarifications of the aforesaid proposition.

First in this way: Everything imperfect naturally seeks its perfection, as one can glean from Bk. I of the *Physics*, the last chapter.⁵ But the soul of man is of itself imperfect as to its intellectual power, since this is like a blank slate on which nothing is depicted, according to the Philosopher in Bk. III *On the Soul*.⁶ Therefore, it naturally desires knowledge, which is the perfection of this power.

6 Secondly, they explain it thus. Everything naturally wants to function in its own proper fashion, like the heavy body that wants to descend. The function or operation proper to man is to know or understand, because this is what distinguishes him from everything else.

7 Thirdly, in this way. Everything seeks to be one, or be joined, with its source. Man, however, becomes one with the separate substances [i.e. the pure spirits] by knowing, as the Philosopher proves in Bk. X of the *Ethics*, ch. 10.⁷ For in the contemplation of the truth we most resemble these separate substances, and he concludes this is what our happiness consists in. Therefore, man naturally desires to know.

⁴Thomas, *Metaphysics* I, lect. 1, nn. 2-4, ed. Parma XX, 247ab.

⁵Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 9, 192a 16-19.

⁶Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 4, 429b 31-430a 2.

⁷Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 8, 1177b 26-31; 1179a 22-32.

8 [3] [Refutation of the opinion of Thomas] It does not seem that these three proofs, insofar as they are valid, are much different from each other.

For there is a twofold act, namely, a first act and a second act, as is clear from Bk. II, *On the Soul*.⁸ And so there is a twofold perfection, one that is first, another that is second. The first is the form or habit [i.e. the science], the second is its operation. Everything naturally desires both perfections, since the operation is the purpose of the habit. Therefore, this proposition “Everything naturally seeks its perfection”⁹ implies the thesis to be proved, both as regards the science, which was the object of the first proof, as well as the act of knowing, which was the object of the second. Neither does there seem to be any need for the second, for why is the operation sought if it is not because it is a perfection?

9 Furthermore, “power” is used equivocally of what is essential, i.e. the form, and what is accidental, i.e. the operation—as is clear from Bk. II, *On the Soul*.¹⁰ Hence, “desire” also seems to be used equivocally of the form and of the operation that is a consequence of the form. For in the first sense the one desiring cannot have what is desired without the action of some extrinsic agent; in the second sense one can, if there is no impediment. If both the first and second proof, as two distinct proofs, imply that this proposition is true, then it follows that in this one proposition “desire” is used equivocally.

10 Furthermore, the third proof does not seem to differ from the second, because man does not become one with his source except through this operation. Neither does the reason for desiring the operation seem to be different from the reason for desiring to be joined with one’s source.

11 [4] [Summary] We can combine these three proofs, therefore, into a single one like this. “Everything naturally desires its perfection, both that which is first (the form) and that which is second (its proper operation), through which it is also joined to its principle. Therefore, man naturally desires the science [or habitual

⁸Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 1, 412a 10-11.

⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 5-6.

¹⁰Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417a 26-28.

knowledge], which is the first perfection, and the act of knowing or understanding, which is the second, through which he is joined with his source.

12 And with the same desire, at least in a univocal sense (as will be explained later¹¹), the science [i.e. the habitual knowledge] is wanted immediately and the actual understanding is wanted mediately through or by means of that science. Indeed, the desire corresponds to the essential potency,—for what lacks form is in essential potency to both first and second act.

13 And with the same essential desire one can want [1] the operation immediately as its end, and can want [2] the form because of the end, when neither is had. Or at least one can want both with desire used in a univocal sense. For perhaps the volition of the end and the volition of the means to that end are not the same volition, inasmuch as both are wanted as end, even as color and light are not objects seen by one vision; rather one is what is seen, the other that by which it is seen.

14 But, in an equivocal sense, both the science and the act of knowing are wanted immediately by the other “desire”—speaking of accidental desire. The first [i.e., the science] corresponds to the essential potency, the second [i.e., the act of knowing] to the accidental potency. The first can be called a desire for the form; the second, a desire that which follows from the form.

15 Certain objections to this proposition will be dealt with in the subsequent questions.¹² But this is enough to clarify it.

[B.—APPLICATION TO THE PROPOSAL]

16 [5] Now the proposition needs to be applied to our purpose, namely, to show the dignity and nobility of this science. This we do in the following way. If all men by nature desire to know, then, they desire most of all the greatest knowledge or science. So the Philosopher argues in ch. 2 of the first book of this work.¹³ And he immediately indicates what the greatest science is, namely “that

¹¹Cf. *infra*, Bk. I, q. 2, nn. 36-44.

¹²Cf. *infra*, Bk. I, q. 2, nn. 30-42.

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 30-b 3.

science which is about those things that are most knowable.” But there are two senses in which things are said to be maximally knowable: either [1] because they are the first of all things known and without knowing them nothing else can be known, or [2] because they are what are known most certainly. In either way, however, this science is about the most knowable. Therefore, this most of all is a science and, consequently, most desirable.

17 Proof of both parts of the minor: [Proof of (1)] The first is proved in this way. What is most knowable in the first way is what is most common, such as being qua being and its properties. For Avicenna says in Bk. I, *Metaphysics* ch. 5:¹⁴ (a) that “being and thing are impressed in the soul with the first impression, and they are not acquired from anything more knowable than themselves,” and infra (b) “those prior things which are imagined through themselves are the things which are the most common of all, like thing and being and one. And hence they cannot be made evident through any proof that is not circular.” These most common things are considered by metaphysics, according to the Philosopher in the beginning of Bk. IV of this work.¹⁵ “There is a science which deals theoretically with being qua being and with what characterizes it as such.”

18 The need for this science can be shown in this way. From the fact that the most common things are understood first, it follows—as Avicenna¹⁶ proves—that the other more particular things cannot be known unless these more common things are first known. And the knowledge of these more common things cannot be treated in some more particular science. For the same reason one particular science could treat them allows all the others to do so as well (since being and one are predicated equally of all, according to ch. 3, Bk. X of this work),¹⁷ and thus we would have many useless repetitions. Therefore, it is necessary that some general science exists that considers these transcendentals as such. This we call “metaphysics,” which is from “meta,” which means “transcends,”

¹⁴Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 5, AvIL 31-33.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21-22.

¹⁶Cf. supra note 14.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 2, 1053b 25-26.

and “ycos”,¹⁸ which means “science.” It is, as it were, the transcending science, because it is concerned with the transcendentals.

19 [Objection to the preceding proof] {{But this proof does not seem to be efficacious, because being is affirmed first of substance, from Bk. IV of this work,¹⁹ and the same is true of one, if it is transcendent. But if one is in the category of quantity alone, as will be pointed out subsequently in one of the questions on Bk. IV,²⁰ it cannot be predicated of all. For an understanding to this proposition²¹ look in Bk. X among the problems.²²

20 [Solution to the objection] Reply: if being is predicated equally, our proof is evident. If it is not, but it is predicated primarily of some single category, then this science—not some lower science—will treat of those things which have to do with being as such. And so, as prior [the higher or principal science], one will be a universal science, not because its subject is universal predicatively,²³ but because it is more perfect.}}

21 [6] [Proof of (2)] The second part of the minor²⁴ is proved in the following way. What is knowable most certainly are principles and causes, and the more they are prior the more certainly are they known. For from these stem all the certainty of what is posterior. But this science considers such principles and causes, as the Philosopher proves in Bk. I, ch. 2 of this work,²⁵ and—as is evident from the text there—on the grounds that it is wisdom.

In this way, therefore, it is clear how this science is concerned with what is most knowable. From this it follows that it is most truly a science, and thus most to be sought, as was proved above.²⁶

¹⁸See the lengthy explanatory note in the critical edition.

¹⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 6-10.

²⁰Cf. *infra*, Bk. IV, q. 2, nn. 93-126.

²¹I. e., “Being and one are predicated equally of all”; cf. *supra* n. 18.

²²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 6, 1056b 4-1057a 18.

²³An interpolated annotation follows here in six manuscripts: “because then it would not differ from logic.”

²⁴I. e., Things are said to be maximally knowable because they are what are known most certainly; cf. *supra*, n. 16.

²⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 5-10.

²⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

[II.—THE CAUSES OF THIS SCIENCE]

22 [7] From what has been said one can extract three causes of this science: the final, the formal and the material cause. We are not too much concerned with the instrumental efficient cause, so long as the science has been handed down to us in good condition, but it is said to be Aristotle. The principal efficient cause, however, is God, as we gather from Bk. I of this work, ch. 3.²⁷ Only God has this science to a maximal degree, although he does not have it exclusively, because he is not suited by his nature to be jealous, for jealousy is not compatible with the highest goodness, and it is because of his goodness that God wished to share with man this knowledge, as he wishes to do with other perfections. "For every truth uttered by anyone, is spoken through the Holy Spirit," as we read in the Gloss²⁸ on that passage in 1 Corinthians [12, 3]: "No one can say 'Jesus is the Lord,' except in the Holy Spirit." And Augustine in *Eighty three Different Questions*, q. 1:²⁹ "Everything true is true by the first truth." And Damascene in ch. 91 says:³⁰ "Should we be able to get some profit from other sources," namely those outside the Church, "this is not forbidden. Let us be proved bankers and amass the genuine and pure gold, while we reject the spurious. Let us accept the best sayings, but let us throw to the dogs the ridiculous gods and unhealthy fables, for from the former we should be able to draw great strength against the latter."

23 As for the final cause know that the proper end of this science is the operation that stems from this habit, namely knowing theoretically about the essences of things and especially about the highest causes and separate substances, in the contemplative knowledge of which Aristotle assumed our happiness consisted, *Ethics X*.³¹ The first cause and the separate substances, however, are the extrinsic end; to them our intellect is joined by means of the habit of this science. This science, however, is not ordered to any

²⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982b 29-983a 4.

²⁸Rhabanus Maurus, *In I Cor.* (PL 112, 106C).

²⁹Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83 q. 1 (PL 40, 11; CCL 44A, 11).

³⁰Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 90 (ed. E. Buytaert, FIP t.s. VIII, 337; PG 94, 1177).

³¹Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 8, 1178b 8-10.

other as its end, but others are ordered to it. According to the Philosopher in the text,³² therefore, this science is not “useful for another,”—where this phrase means properly “ordered to another as its end”—but this science is of greater dignity and nobility than any useful science.

24 [9] As for the formal cause, note that the formal cause of this science is the way it advances. As with other sciences, this is a threefold procedure: it divides, it defines, and it puts things together.

25 {{On the contrary: you say below³³ that every science defines and demonstrates through essentials.—Reply: I concede this. But what will be proper to this science is that it demonstrates through most universal causes and most general attributes and through what is essential to each of these, not insofar as each is individual but insofar as each is universal or substantial.}}

26 But what is proper to this science is that it divides and defines according to what is essential in an unqualified sense, and it connects i.e., it demonstrates through essential causes that are simply prior and better known, especially the highest causes.

27 And in this way Metaphysics would be knowable as such. However, it is not known in this way by us, nor does Aristotle hand it down in this way.³⁴ Because of the weakness of our intellect, we begin with what is sensible and less known in order to come to the knowledge of immaterial things, which are more knowable in themselves and ought to be accepted as principles of knowing other things in metaphysics.

28 [10] [The subject of this science] {{The question arises: Which cause is the subject of the science?³⁵

It seems to be the effective cause, because there is something related to both the potency and the habit in the same causal way.

³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 17-20.

³³Cf. *infra*, n. 26.

³⁴Five manuscripts report the following note, some indicating that it was cancelled: “Look through the entire book and see if you find one metaphysical demonstration of the reasoned fact.”

³⁵An interpolated annotation follows here in three manuscripts: “A doubt arises here, look among the problems in Bk. VIII” [*Metaphysics* VIII, ch. 6, 1045a 8-36].

For example: just as the good is the end both of the will [a potency] and of charity [a habit], (for a habit does not alter the object of the potency, but gives it the means to function), so the intelligible object seems to be the efficient cause with respect to the intellectual potency, since it is passive.

29 The end or final cause appears to be the subject of this science, since the object of our will is its end; therefore, it is also the end or purpose of our scientific knowledge. Proof of the implication: what is the end of an end is the end of what is ordered to that end; the act of the will is the end or purpose of the act of the intellect.—Also knowledge of the subject is what is principally intended, otherwise the science would be several sciences.—Also, everything is named after its end; now a science is named after its subject; therefore, etc.

30 The subject, it seems, has the character of the formal cause with respect to the science, because the subject gives it its specific nature, unity, order and dignity; all these pertain to the form.

31 It is generally said that the subject has the character of matter. But there is a difference, because the subject at first is known only confusedly [i.e., by name] and what we seek is distinct knowledge [i.e., of its essential nature]. Matter is never foreknown to exist in actuality the way the subject is in the natural sciences. Likewise, the subject gives a science its unity, its distinction from other sciences, its order, and its necessary character, none of which matter gives.}}

32 As for the material cause³⁶ note that we do not speak of the matter of a science as being that out of which it is composed, since accidents do not have such matter, according to the Philosopher in Bk. VIII, ch. 5 of this work.³⁷ Nor do we speak of the matter in which it is, for that is the soul, and this because of its intellectual power. But we speak of the matter in the sense of its being what the science is about. This is called by some³⁸ the subject of the science,

³⁶Cf. supra, n. 22.

³⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 5, 1045b 23-24.

³⁸Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 19, q. 1, ad 2 (I f. 115H-I): “Est et alia materia circa quam exercetur operatio tantum, supra quam nihil manet factum cessante... Talis enim materia est subiectum scientiae quod necesse est coincidere cum fine.”

but more properly it should be called its object, just as we say of a virtue that what it is about is its object, not its subject.

QUESTION ONE

Is the subject of metaphysics being or God?

Concerning the object of this science, it has been shown above that this science deals with transcendentals. However, it has likewise been shown that it deals with the highest causes. There are various opinions as to which of these ought to be its proper object.

1 [1] Therefore our first question: Is the proper subject of metaphysics being qua being as Avicenna¹ claims or God and the Intelligences as the Commentator, Averroes² assumes?³

[Arguments Pro and Con]

[Arguments for the negative] Proof it is neither:

[Arg. 1] One must know two things about the subject of a science, according to the Philosopher in I *Posterior Analytics*, and later on in the chapter beginning "It is difficult to know".⁴ First, we must know that it is [i.e., the "si est"]; second, we must know what it is [i.e., its definition]. But in this science we do not know [1] that God

¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 2, AviL 12.

²Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 1 (ed. Iuntina IV, fol. 30vb); *Physica* I, com. 83 (fol. 22vb).

³Here follow two interpolated annotations: "Note that according to some, being is here the subject (or object) concerning which determinations are made *per se* and primarily and according to all modes. Determinations are made concerning substance [as its object] *per se* and primarily but not according to all modes. Accident [is its object] as determined *per se* but not primarily. Finally privations and negations [are its object] neither *per se* nor primarily nor according to any mode, but only as attributed to the primary subject which is being. Hence substance, accident, privations and negations are rather parts of the subject [of Metaphysics] rather than its subject.

Likewise, note that, according to the common opinion, being is here the subject as common to the ten categories, but not as it is common to all being, whether real or rational or privative, because the latter do not fall *per se* under a real science such as Metaphysics. Likewise, if being according to its total ambit were here [the subject], it would have the cause of its being and hence all being and even God [would be its subject], because whatever is the subject of a science must contain its cause and parts etc. This however is impossible, therefore etc. Consequently, it must be understood concerning created being, which alone has its own cause.

⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 11-12; ch. 9, 76b 12-20.

is [i.e., that he is real] or [2] what he is; [3] as for being, we do not know what it is. Therefore, etc.

2 The minor has three parts.

[Re 1] There are two proofs for the first part [viz., we do not know that God is]. First in Bk. I of his *Metaphysics*,⁵ Avicenna proves: [a] that God's existence is not known *per se*,⁶ since we infer this from his effects, according to VIII *Physics*⁶ and XII *Metaphysics*;⁷ and [b] "we do not despair of knowing about him, because we have signs of this." And [c] also if we did despair, then his existence would be not foreknown or inquired about in some other science, whether it be moral, theoretical or otherwise. Hence, he concludes that we inquire about him in this science.

3 A second proof for this same part of the minor is this. In Bk. II of this work,⁸ Aristotle proves we must come to an end in a series of efficient causes. Hence, he proves that there must be a first efficient cause and that is God.

4 [Re 2] There are two proofs for the second part of the minor [viz. we do not know what God is]: The first is, because God has no quiddity, according to Avicenna, VIII *Metaphysics*, in the chapter beginning with "We need to repeat":⁹ "The first, who is most high and glorious, has no genus, quiddity, or definition."—Second, if he had a quiddity, that would not be foreknown in this science, because according to the Philosopher in Bk. II, ch. 1 of this work:¹⁰ "As the eye of the bat is to the light of the day so is the intellect of our soul to those things which by nature are most manifest."¹¹

5 [2] [Re 3] Proof of the third part of the minor is twofold. First, because being is equivocal, according to Porphyry in the chapter

⁵Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 1, AvIL 4-5.

⁶Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 1, 251a 8-b 10.

⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 6, 1071b 12-20.

⁸*Ibid.*, II, ch. 2 994a 1-b 32.

⁹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VIII, ch. 5, AvIL 405, 411.

¹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 9-11.

¹¹Here follows an interpolated text: "Also because the Commentator [Averroes] says in book I chapter 18a of the *Metaphysics* that the definition designates things terminated in the thing defined. However, nothing is 'terminated' in God because he is altogether infinite.

“The Species”:¹² “If one spoke of all beings, he would be speaking equivocally, not univocally.” We will speak more of this later when we inquire about the univocation of being in Bk. IV.¹³—Also because, if being were univocal, it would still be most common, having neither a genus nor a specific difference, and hence no definition, for a definition indicates what it is.

6 [Arg. 2] Also to the main issue. Every subject has attributes that are demonstrable of it, according to the Philosopher in I *Posterior Analytics* cited above.¹⁴ But neither God nor being is this sort of a subject. Therefore, etc.

7 Proof of the first part of the minor [viz., God has no demonstrable attributes]. First of all an attribute lies outside its subject, but there is nothing in God that is not his essence.—Secondly, according to Avicenna, in VIII *Metaphysics* cited above:¹⁵ “The first has no quality or quantity,” etc., and “there can be no demonstration of him.”

8 Proof of the second part of the minor [viz., that being has no demonstrable attributes]: first, because an attribute differs essentially from its subject, as we said before. Being, however, is of the essence of everything.—Second, an attribute is predicated denominatively of the subject and the subject is predicated of the attribute only accidentally. Being, however, is predicated “in quid” of everything, according to Bk. IV of this work.¹⁶

9 [3] [Arg. 3] Also to the main issue. The subject of any science has its own principles and parts, according to the Philosopher in I *Posterior Analytics* in the chapter beginning with “A science however is more certain”.¹⁷ Neither God nor being have principles or parts. Therefore, etc.

10 The first part of the minor [re God] is evident, since God is the first and most simple. A proof of the second part [re being] is that if being qua being had principles, then every being would have

¹²Porphyrius, *Liber praedicabilium* ch. 3 (AL I⁶, 12).

¹³Cf. infra, Bk. IV, q. 1.

¹⁴Cf. supra, n. 3.

¹⁵Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VIII, ch. 5, AvI 411.

¹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 5-10.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 27-28, 87a 31-39.

principles, as the Philosopher argues in Bk. I of the *Prior Analytics*, in the chapter "On Reduplication."¹⁸ If justice were good in that which is good, justice would be all good.

11 [Arguments for the affirmative] For the opposite view about being there is the text of Aristotle at the beginning of Bk. IV of this work,¹⁹ where it seems he clearly wants to say that "some science deals theoretically with being qua being" and it is not some particular science. And Avicenna in Bk.I of his *Metaphysics*, ch. 2d,²⁰ says: "The first subject of this science is being qua being."

12 For the opposite view about God there is the last comment of the Commentator in I *Physics*,²¹ which says: "The genus of the separate beings is made clear only in natural science. He who claims that the First Philosophy has to prove the separate beings exist, sins. For these beings are the subjects of the First Philosophy. And it is impossible that some science proves that its subject exists, but it concedes that it exists, either because this is self-evident or because it is demonstrated in some other science. Hence Avicenna sinned when he said that First Philosophy demonstrates the first principle exists."

[I.—BODY OF THE QUESTION

A.—THE OPINION OF AVERROES

1.—EXPOSITION AND PROOFS FOR THE OPINION]

13 [4] In answer to the question it is clear that there are various opinions. One is that of the Commentator that the separate substances, namely God and the Intelligences, are the subject here.

14 [Arguments from authority] [Arg. 1] This is confirmed first by authoritative statements of Aristotle cited here in the Prologue.²² He proves that wisdom is the theoretical science of first principles and first causes from a description of wisdom. And later on in chapter 3,²³ he says "this science is most divine, because it is about

¹⁸Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, ch. 38, 49a 12-25.

¹⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21-22.

²⁰Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 2, AvI 12.

²¹Averroes, *Physica* I, com. 83 (fol. 22vb).

²²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 29-30.

²³*Ibid.*, ch. 2, 983a 5-8.

those beings which are divine." And further on in Bk. VI of this work,²⁴ Aristotle distinguishes three parts of theoretical science saying: "Physics is about the inseparable and mobile; mathematics about the immobile and inseparable; the first philosophy however is about the separable and immobile," and these are the separate substances. If this distinction of the theoretical sciences is appropriate, it seems that it is about the proper subjects of these sciences. For according to the Philosopher in Bk. III, *On the Soul*:²⁵ "Sciences are divided as things are," i.e., as the subjects considered in the sciences.

15 Also, in the same Bk VI,²⁶ he calls this science "theology" and gives a twofold proof of this: first, "because if anywhere the divine exists, it exists in such a nature," that is, in the immobile and what is separable from matter, which he said this science considers.

16 The second proof goes this way:²⁷ "The most honorable science must deal with the most honorable genus." But this is the most honorable, as has been proven in Bk. I,²⁸ [where he shows that] the genus of the separate substances is the most honorable; therefore, etc.²⁹

17 [5] Confirmation from reason. Furthermore, the position of the Commentator is proved by reason in this way. The separate substances are not unknown to us, since we have many signs of them.³⁰ Therefore, the knowledge of them must be treated in some science. But this is neither physics nor mathematics. Therefore, they are treated in this science, since there are only three theoretical sciences according to the Bk. VI of this work.³¹

18 Also, every science considering many things attributed to some one primary thing, above all considers that first as proper subject to which the others are attributed. As the Philosopher says in Bk. IV

²⁴*Ibid.* IV, ch. 1, 1026a 14-17.

²⁵Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 8, 431b 24-25.

²⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 20-21.

²⁷*Ibid.*, ch. 1, 1026a 21-23.

²⁸Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 983a 5-8.

²⁹Here follows an interpolated text: "Also, in book I *De generatione* chap. 1: 'Concerning these matters, as is appropriate (or fitting), it is the task of first philosophy to make distinctions concerning the immobile principle' etc."

³⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

³¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 18-19.

chap.1 of this work:³² “In every case the science is properly about the first on which the others depend and because of which they are spoken of.” But the first cause is that to which all other beings are attributed. Therefore, it is about the first, as its subject, that this science is most concerned.

[2.— THE OF SOLUTION AVERROES TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

19 [6] To the first proof. [nn. 1-5] According to this opinion one replies to the arguments to the contrary. To the first,³³ the minor is false as to both parts [about God, i.e., that he is and what he is]. For in itself the “si est” of God [or that God is] is known naturally. To the proof to the contrary,³⁴ one replies that we do not despair of knowing God, neither is he sought for in another science, nor in this as such. To us, however, he is known from his effects, as the argument goes on to say. For something that in itself is more knowable, we can know from other things more knowable to us.

From this the answer to the second proof³⁵ is clear. For that demonstration in Bk. II of this book³⁶ only proceeds from effects, whether it uses a medium that is natural or metaphysical.—Otherwise, to the second proof [of the minor] it is said that in Bk. II of this work what is shown is not the existence of God but only a status [or “first”] in efficient causes. And although these two are coextensive,³⁷ nevertheless one can be foreknown in this science and the other proved, just as the definition and an attribute of the subject are coextensive and nevertheless one is a means of demonstrating the other.

20 [The second reply to the first part of the minor]. The Commentator, in his last comment to Bk. I of the *Physics*³⁸ seems to give a different answer. Only in physics is God’s existence established, and if there is some argument in metaphysics to show this,

³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 17-18.

³³Cf. supra, n. 1.

³⁴Cf. supra, n. 2.

³⁵Cf. supra, n. 3.

³⁶Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 1-b8.

³⁷Namely, God and First Cause.

³⁸Averroes, *Physica* I, com. 83 (fol. 22vb).

this is only on the assumption of something established in physics. This is clear from his exposition in Bk. II of this work, comment 6,³⁹ where he explains Aristotle's demonstration about the status in efficient causes. He says: "It was declared in the natural sciences that everything that is moved has a mover," and the whole argument proceeds from moving and moved.

[7] From this the answer to the first proof⁴⁰ is clear, because God's existence is sought in physics and not in this science.—And the answer to the second [proof of the minor]⁴¹ is also clear, because that demonstration in Bk. II of this work has a physical, not a metaphysical, basis, namely it proceeds from the notion of moving and moved.

21 [Third response to the first part of the minor] Thirdly one can reply to these two proofs [for the minor]⁴² that some science may well demonstrate the existence of its subject a posteriori, as in the book *On Sophistical Refutations*⁴³ one demonstrates the existence of the sophistical syllogism. Similarly, Priscian in his book *Constructions*⁴⁴ shows a sentence is constructed from a consistent arrangement of syllables and words and sentences [from a consistent arrangement] of words. However, no science demonstrates that its subject exists by a demonstration that is a priori and gives the reason for the fact.

22 This third reply agrees with the first,⁴⁵ for it asserts its second part [viz. that God is not sought in another science]. Likewise, it only seems directed to second proof.⁴⁶ [of part] [n. 4]. Hence, since foreknowledge of the subject is required prior to the whole science—and only the first reply⁴⁷ assumes such—that alone is sufficient to answer both proofs.⁴⁸ For the Commentator only runs away from the problem, if he assumes God's existence is foreknown

³⁹Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 6 (fol. 15ra).

⁴⁰Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁴¹Cf. supra, n. 3.

⁴²Cf. supra, n. 2-3.

⁴³Aristotle, *De sophisticis elenchis* ch. 1, 164a 23-25.

⁴⁴Priscian, *Institutiones grammaticae* XVII, ch. 1, ed. Hertz II, 108.

⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 19.

⁴⁶Cf. supra, n. 3.

⁴⁷Cf. supra, n. 23.

⁴⁸Cf. supra, nn. 2-3.

to us only through physics. If he postulates God's existence is foreknown in an unqualified sense through physics and here is presupposed as known, then physics is simply prior to metaphysics; for corresponding to what is most knowable here, there is always something more knowable there.

23 [8] [Reply to the second part of minor] As for the other part of the minor⁴⁹ about the quiddity, one can say that God has no "quid" or "what" [i.e., an essence] that can be expressed through a definition, because every "quid" of this sort is limited. (Since every defining difference has something opposed to it, everything having an opposite is limited.) Nevertheless, God has an unlimited essence, and so has an unlimited quiddity. One can explain the authority of Avicenna, cited above,⁵⁰ where he says "no quiddity," etc., if we understand this of God in the first way.⁵¹ And he adds a little later "he has no definition," speaking properly of a definition that consists of a genus and difference, which earlier in the same chapter he denied was applicable to God. From all this the answer to the first proof⁵² is clear.

24 To the second proof [for the second part of the minor],⁵³ just as was said of the "si est" according to the first reply,⁵⁴ one can say the existence of God is naturally foreknown in this science as such, although not so far as we are concerned; and the same is true of his quiddity. However, both can be made manifest in this science a posteriori, as the third reply maintains.⁵⁵ But this proposition in Bk. II about "as the eye of the bat," etc.⁵⁶ implies that so far as we are concerned the knowledge of the quiddity is not known in an unqualified sense. Whether this analogy should be understood in the sense that it is impossible, as some explain it,⁵⁷ or simply in the sense that it is difficult, as the Commentator says in his comment

⁴⁹Cf. supra, n. 4.

⁵⁰Cf. supra, n. 4.

⁵¹That is to say, God has no "quid" or essence that can be expressed through a definition.

⁵²Cf. supra, n. 4.

⁵³Cf. supra, n. 4.

⁵⁴Cf. supra, n. 19.

⁵⁵Cf. supra, n. 21.

⁵⁶Cf. supra, n. 4.

⁵⁷Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 84, a. 7 resp. (V, 325b).

on this,⁵⁸ will be dealt with in its proper place.⁵⁹ Hence, as he himself explains it, there is not much here that is contrary to his opinion.

25 [9] To the second main argument⁶⁰ it is said⁶¹ that God has many properties, such as that he is desirable, that he is immutable, that he is eternal, and that he is the first mover, and such like. These attributes, however, are conceived of as subsequent to the essence of God considered absolutely, because they imply a relationship to what is outside.

26 As for the first proof [viz., about God having no proper demonstrable properties],⁶² it is not necessary that a property be always essentially other than the subject of which it is a property, although this is always the case with creatures. There, because of their imperfection, “the one having” is not “what it has.” Hence, in them⁶³ there is composition according to act and potency. In God, however, all unlimited existing perfections are the same as his essence, because of the highest simplicity characteristic of him. Nevertheless, these properties differ from the essence mentally or conceptually. And this difference between subject and property suffices there, just as a real distinction suffices in the case of creatures. As for the authority of Avicenna that “there is no demonstration of God,”⁶⁴ this can be explained away as meaning there is no prior cause through which such a demonstration could take place. Neither is there any definition that might be used as the middle term of a demonstration, because he has no definition.

27 As for the third main reason,⁶⁵ one can say to the major that it is not necessary that every subject have principles prior to itself. What it needs are principles of properties, that is, reasons why its properties inhere in it if they are demonstrable of it by a demonstration of the reasoned fact. Of God, however, there is only

⁵⁸Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 1 (ed. Iuntina VIII, fol. 14ra-rb).

⁵⁹Cf. infra, Bk. II, qq. 2-3, nn. 51-79, 86-94.

⁶⁰Cf. supra, n. 6.

⁶¹Cf. Bonaventure, *Sent.* I d. 8 p. 1 dub. 1 (I 162a); Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 19 q. 1 ad 4 (I f. 116L).

⁶²Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁶³That is, in creatures, which are always imperfect.

⁶⁴Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁶⁵Cf. supra, n. 9.

a demonstration of the simple fact. And therefore, in place of such principles, effects are for us the better known means, from which we infer the divine perfections that pertain to God.

28 [10] As for what the Philosopher says about the subject of a science having principles and parts,⁶⁶ this is true in most cases, but it is not a necessary prerequisite for a subject of a science. For perhaps there could be a mathematical demonstration of unity, even though it is the first of its kind [i.e., as discrete quantity] and is indivisible and thus in its class having neither principles nor parts.

29 Otherwise one could admit that the subject of a science ought to have principles,⁶⁷ understanding this of complex principles [i.e., propositions] like the principles of demonstration. For of every subject of a science something can be proved through some proposition which can be taken as a premise in a demonstration about such a subject. And of such principles, one ought to know that it is, i.e. the fact that it is true, Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁶⁸ And a little later in the chapter beginning with "It is not from another genus",⁶⁹ he enumerates the subject and attribute. And he says, first,⁷⁰ that "the axioms are one [of the three elements of a demonstration], and then in that chapter [that begins with] "It is hard to be sure,"⁷¹ he says:⁷² "Every demonstrative science is concerned with three things, the genus, and what are commonly called 'axioms,' and third, attributes." But the effects of that subject can have such principles [viz., factual principles about the effects of the subject that are known to be true]. And in proportion to the terms of such principles, there is a demonstration about the subject [of the aforesaid effects]. For it suffices for a principle of this sort that it be known immediately once its terms are known. And such a principle can be something used to demonstrate something of God.

⁶⁶Cf. supra, n. 9.

⁶⁷Cf. supra, n. 9.

⁶⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 11-12.

⁶⁹*Ibid.*, ch. 7, 75a 39ff.

⁷⁰*Ibid.*, 75a 42-b 2.

⁷¹Cf. *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 9, 76a 26.

⁷²*Ibid.*, ch. 10, 76b 11-16.

[3. REFUTATION OF THE OPINION OF AVERROES
a. AGAINST THE OPINION ITSELF]

30 [11] Against this position:⁷³ according to the Philosopher in the preface to Bk. I of this work,⁷⁴ wisdom is the most certain science; now a science of the reasoned fact is more certain than a science of the simple fact, according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁷⁵ Therefore, metaphysics, which is properly speaking wisdom according to the Philosopher here in Bk. I,⁷⁶ is a science of the reasoned fact. But no science of God as first subject is of the reasoned fact, and no science considers God as cause, since in all truth he causes nothing necessarily—whatever Aristotle said about the matter. Therefore, in no science is God considered in either way—certainly not as an effect or as a complex principle; therefore, in no way whatsoever,—as the reply to the third reason admits.⁷⁷

31 And this is proved: it is certain that nothing is known of God by some cause prior to him. But if a cause is taken as a middle term with respect to anything we infer about God, either it implies an absolute property of God, such as wisdom, power, eternity, immutability and such like; or it implies some external relationship, such as desirable, first mover, first cause, etc. Whether it be this or that, whatever is demonstrable of God must be essentially the same as God, on the grounds that nothing else is true of him. What is essentially the same as God, however, does not have something other than God that is naturally prior to him.—But a cause is other than what is caused and is naturally prior to it.—Therefore, nothing that is in God can be shown to be true of him through some cause, whether it be a cause of being or of inhering, for in neither way can anything be other and naturally prior to him. If something of this sort could be demonstrated of God through some effect, however, this would be a demonstration not of the

⁷³Cf. *supra*, nn. 13ff.

⁷⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 9-21.

⁷⁵Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 27, 87a 31-33.

⁷⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 981a 5-21.

⁷⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

reasoned fact but of the simple fact, according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁷⁸

32[12] {{But this argument is not cogent. For if there were something naturally prior and other that could be a means of knowing something else that is naturally posterior, this would not be insofar as it is other [i.e., really distinct], because this is accidental. It would rather be insofar as it is this same individual, [but regarded] as if it were other, and so it would be naturally prior and as such known first and the other would be known afterwards. But we find this to be the case with the divine properties and attributes; therefore, etc.}}

33 {{Another reply: one property of God is conceptually prior to another.—On the contrary: this difference does not suffice to serve as a cause, or to establish a priority, or to serve as a means of demonstration. Its insufficiency to establish the first two is clear from what has been said. The third is to be granted as a [disputational] “petition,” because the mind can consider the same thing differently as either prior or posterior.}}

34 Also, against the Commentator.⁷⁹ There does not seem to be anything univocal to God and the Intelligences, because then one could distinguish differences in them and so God could be defined. Therefore, there cannot be one science about God and the Intelligences as subject, because “one science is about one genus,” according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*, in the chapter that begins “But more certain,” etc.⁸⁰

35 Also another subject must be posited in metaphysics, as will be shown⁸¹ through the Commentator when he treats of the view of Avicenna. Therefore, it is not God, because there cannot be two first subjects of the same science.

36[13] To solve those arguments that seem to favor the Commentator’s view,⁸² note that a science is not only said to be about something if the thing in question is regarded as its principal

⁷⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 13, 78b 10-12.

⁷⁹Cf. supra, n. 13.

⁸⁰Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 28, 87a 38.

⁸¹Cf. infra, nn. 68-73.

⁸²Cf. supra, nn. 13-18.

subject, but it is also said to be about the causes or principles of its subject. Physics treats of nature, although neither the Commentator nor Avicenna assume nature to be the subject of this science, but it is something of which nature is the principle or source. Similarly, the book *On the Soul* treats of the definition, the properties, and the parts of the soul, although the subject of this science is assumed to be the animated body of which the soul is a principle. Logic also treats of many things which are principles of the syllogism, although the syllogism is presented there as the principal subject.⁸³ And the work *On Interpretation* treats of the noun, the verb and the sentence that are principles of the proposition, which is given as the subject of this book. And so it is with other sciences.

37 Similarly in the case at hand, this science considers the highest causes,⁸⁴ not as its principal subject, but as principles of that subject. We gather this from the statement at the beginning of Bk. VI:⁸⁵ “We are seeking the principles and causes of being qua being.” And the Philosopher in the beginning of Bk. IV⁸⁶ shows this science is about being from the fact that it seeks the first causes, because these are causes as such of the first effect which is being qua being.

38 [Two objections] Against this: The Intelligences produce nothing except through motion. Therefore, they are properly speaking only moving causes. Hence, it is only in natural science that they are considered as causes.

39 Also, only through a cause that produces necessarily do we know anything about its effect. But God is a voluntary cause acting freely and causes no effect necessarily.

40 The first argument⁸⁷ can be conceded. The second⁸⁸ is false according to the mind of the Philosopher. He assumed God to act according to a necessity of nature, as Rabbi Moses points out.⁸⁹

⁸³Cf. Duns Scotus, *Porph.*, q. 3, n. 20.

⁸⁴Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 29-30.

⁸⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1025b 2-3.

⁸⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21-32.

⁸⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 38.

⁸⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

⁸⁹Maimonides, *Guide for the Perplexed* part II, c. 21, ed. Friedlander, 190-192.

41 {{Against this last point. In Bk. I⁹⁰ it is said further “If God is envious, all who excel in this knowledge would be unfortunate.” This would follow only if God willed the good of others as a voluntary agent. For if he acted necessarily, no matter how envious he might be, he would still act.}}

42 [14] One should also keep in mind that immaterial and immobile substances are not considered in any of the special sciences [cf. n. 9]. They do not pertain to the consideration of physics or natural science, because they are not mobile; nor to mathematics, because they have no quantity. But their consideration pertains to some higher science, a consideration that abstracts from motion and quantity. Hence, in this science they are not only considered as the causes of the subject, but as principal parts of the subject abstracted on the basis of existence. This sort of abstraction is proper to this science and is the way other things are considered in this science. For nothing considered here is treated as having quantity or being mobile, and thus everything considered according to this sort of consideration abstracts from both quantity and motion. Consequently, those things which are considered here precisely according to their existence are without either. Such are the separate substances [i.e., God and the Intelligences].

[b.—TO THE CITATIONS FROM ARISTOTLE FOR THE OPINION]

43 According to this it is clear how the citations from the Philosopher⁹¹ are to be answered. For the reason this science is said to be about the highest causes and the divine is because it is about God, not as subject, but as the cause of its subject; and it is about the Intelligences as principal parts of its subject, though not as causes, for they only cause by moving. But it is about God as the cause, and not as part, of its subject, since nothing in God is univocal with other things.

⁹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 983a 1-3.

⁹¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 14-16.

44 [15] {{To the contrary: If God causes nothing, according to the mind of Aristotle,⁹² except by moving; then God is not considered here as a cause.

45 Reply: God does not cause the separate substances or anything else through motion. He causes them insofar as they are beings and not insofar as they are mobile or have quantity—although, according to Aristotle, he does not do so without motion. But an Intelligence causes nothing except insofar as it is mobile.

46 In question 8 [infra, Bk. I, q. 9, n. 7-14] it was noted that anyone who holds the affirmative position (viz. that it pertains to the metaphysician alone to consider the quiddities of things, also in particular) ought to say that not only is God considered here as cause, but also an angel, the sun, fire and all agents, if these cause the entity of anything. Indeed, one has to claim this. Otherwise these causes cause nothing. As I argue in question about cognition, so I argue about creation.

47 Reply: God causes the entity in everything; another agent causes it to be the specific kind of thing it is. More about this elsewhere.”

48 If one held the negative view in question 8,⁹³ then no cause of a particular entity should be considered here, just as one does not consider this being qua this being. But here one considers only being in general, so one considers here as the cause of the subject only what is the cause of being in general, and that is God alone. You may hold this unless, perhaps, you maintain the Intelligences are considered here not only insofar as they are beings, but insofar as they are Intelligences, as was said above ‘One should also keep in mind...’ [Cf. supra, n. 42].

49 [16] For if some science of Intelligences as such is possible [nn. 13-14], and it is not this—since it is evidently not physics or mathematics,—the Philosopher’s division in Bk. VI⁹⁴ of the theoretical sciences into three is insufficient. And so it seems that the Intelligences qua Intelligences pertain to the consideration of metaphysics.

⁹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 7, 1072b 3.

⁹³Rather Bk. I q. 9 n. 15.

⁹⁴Cf. supra, n. 14.

50 On the contrary: being as such abstracts from immaterial things as well as from material things; therefore this science, which *per se* is about being qua being, is no more about immaterial things according to their proper nature than it is about material things.

51 This is confirmed, because every conclusion proper to this science is a premise for drawing conclusions about immaterial as well as material things. Therefore, the science about either of these subjects would be equally subalternate [to metaphysics. Neither is the argument valid that was set forth earlier,⁹⁵ because this science, just as it considers some things insofar as these abstract from matter, so also it considers things insofar as they abstract from immateriality; therefore, this does not follow: 'it will consider these which in their existence have this abstraction from immateriality.'

52 [17] This is confirmed, because substance—which you posit as subject—is divided into material and immaterial, as into opposite species. But it seems that there is equal reason why there should be a science of the genus of these two closest species.

53 It is conceded according to the position you hold in question 8⁹⁶ that this is no more a science about Intelligences qua Intelligences than about fire qua fire, whether it be about these as its subject or causes of its subject. For—according to you—it is about neither, just as—according to the opposite opinion on question 8—in the same way it is about both Intelligences and fire, if they cause anything insofar as it is a being.

54 But then how do you salvage Aristotle's threefold division of theoretical science in Bk. VI?⁹⁷

55 Also, how is it about the highest causes, if it is only about God as cause?—Answer: God is called "causes" in the plural, because of the multitude of causal aspects in him.

56 The reply to the Philosopher⁹⁸ is evident below⁹⁹ where the division of the theoretical sciences is treated. For this division

⁹⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 42.

⁹⁶Cf. *infra*, Bk. I q. 9 nn. 15-17, 36-39.

⁹⁷Cf. *supra* n. 15.

⁹⁸Cf. *supra* n. 54.

⁹⁹Cf. *infra* n. 58.

holds of what can be known by us through natural reason, and not about all the possible [natures] that on their own part are knowable as such.

57 It is an evasion to claim a science that treats of the genus [i.e., of separate substances or Intelligences] is about the first species only under a special aspect [i.e., only about God, the uncreated Intelligences, and that as a cause knowable by natural reason] and not about the second species [i.e., about the uncreated pure spirits or Intelligences]. Thus this science is about the Intelligences as the first species of substance and not about it as a cause.}}

58 [18] [First reply to the first citation] To the first authoritative citation from Bk. VI of this work,¹⁰⁰ it is said that according to the Philosopher in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*, in the chapter that begins: “But more certain,” etc.¹⁰¹ “One science differs from another, when their principles have neither a common source nor are derived those of the one science from those of the other.” Therefore, sciences are distinguished from one another not only on the basis of diverse subjects but also on the basis of diverse principles. And perhaps this distinction based on principles is prior and more essential, although at times it does stem from a distinction of subjects, as that citation from Bk. III *On the Soul* proves.¹⁰² Thus one can understand that distinction of the three theoretical sciences in Bk. VI of this work, where although two of them, namely, natural science and mathematics, are based on a distinction of subjects, nevertheless in this science of metaphysics, principles, not subjects, are what distinguishes it from the others.

59 Another answer can be to say that this science considers all those things which other particular sciences also consider, although from a more common and abstract viewpoint. But it also considers some things not considered by other sciences—things whose very being is abstract to an extent not characteristic of the things considered in other sciences. And, therefore, when this science is distinguished from the others, this is conveniently done by a consideration of those things in which it does not agree with

¹⁰⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

¹⁰¹Cf. *supra*, n. 34.

¹⁰²Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

the other sciences, but is distinguished from them. Hence, this science is about separable and immovable things,¹⁰³ not as its subject, but as principal parts of its subject which [separable and immovable things] do not fall under the subject of any other science.

60 [19] Still a third answer is that this science is about separable and immovable things.¹⁰⁴ Whatsoever it deals with, it does so from viewpoints which abstract from motion and physical matter that is a principle of generation and corruption, just as mathematics said to be about immobile things—not because quantities are altogether immobile in their being,—but because the mathematical science considers them under a higher aspect by abstracting from motion.

61 [To the remaining citations] To the other authorities of Bk. VI,¹⁰⁵ it is evident that this science can be called theology, not from the aspect of what is its subject, but from the aspect of cause, just as natural science is named after nature, which is not the subject of this science but a principle of its subject.

[c.—TO THE REASONS FOR THE OPINION OF AVERROES]

62 As for the first argument,¹⁰⁶ it is clear that separate substances are considered here and in what way, for they are not considered as causes, but as principal parts of its subject. These are abstract in their being, just as all things here considered are considered abstractly.

63 To the other argument,¹⁰⁷ one can say to the major that a science, which treats of many things attributed to one primary thing, treats most of all that primary thing as its subject only if the thing in question has the requisite characteristics of a subject in such a science—for instance, if the science is a science of the reasoned fact and the primary thing in question has something demonstrable of it through some cause. But such is not the case here,

¹⁰³Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

¹⁰⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

¹⁰⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 15-16.

¹⁰⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

¹⁰⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

since this is [not] a science of the reasoned fact, and of God nothing is demonstrated through a cause.

64 [20] [Objections to n. 63] This argument¹⁰⁸ is confirmed, for when some things are attributed to another, as to the prior and posterior, what is considered first without qualification about those things is that they are attributed to what is simply first. All accidents are immediately attributed to substance, but first of all to God, because the category of substance itself is attributed to God. Therefore, the first consideration of beings in an unqualified sense is of them as attributed to God, not to substance. Hence, God is the first subject in an unqualified sense.

65 Reply: the first consideration of beings in an unqualified sense is insofar as they are attributed to God, not as subject, but as cause, for it is impossible that God have the conditions necessary for a science of the reasoned fact.

66 Another attempt to sustain this argument:¹⁰⁹ The first in an unqualified sense to which all things are attributed is God, therefore he is the subject of the first science.

67 Reply: this would follow if he had the other conditions necessary for the subject of a science. But just what that first thing is to which all others are attributed, and hence should be placed here as the principal subject, will be explained in what follows.¹¹⁰ And the Philosopher in Bk. IV, where it has been cited,¹¹¹ immediately adds:¹¹² "If, then, this is substance, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and causes." Hence, he makes substance, not God to be that first to which all else is attributed. And we find the same thing at the beginning of Bk. VII.¹¹³

¹⁰⁸Cf. supra, n. 18.

¹⁰⁹Cf. supra, n. 18.

¹¹⁰Cf. infra, nn. 91-96.

¹¹¹Cf. supra, n. 18.

¹¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 18-19.

¹¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 1, 1028a 29-34.

[B.—THE OPINION OF AVICENNA: BEING QUA BEING.
1.—EXPOSITION AND PROOFS FOR THE OPINION]

68 [21] Another opinion is that of Avicenna,¹¹⁴ that the first subject of this science is being qua being.

[Arguments from authority] The Philosopher seems to prove this in Bk. IV of this work:¹¹⁵ “There is a certain science” etc., where according to the Commentator,¹¹⁶ Aristotle wishes to establish the subject of this art. His argument there is such as to imply as much, since metaphysics considers first causes—as was already proved in Bk. I of this work.¹¹⁷ Hence, it should consider what is as such the effect of first causes. But these causes as such are the causes of beings qua beings; therefore, being qua being is considered here as its subject.

69 Also in Bk. VI,¹¹⁸ after distinguishing the three parts of theoretical science, he introduces a doubt as to “whether first philosophy is a universal science or whether it concerns some particular genus.” And it seems he opts for a universal science. And in the end of his solution he says:¹¹⁹ “And it will be the task of this to think theoretically about being qua being.”

70 He also says there:¹²⁰ “If there is no other substance than that formed by nature, then natural science will be the first philosophy,” because it will treat all beings, as it now treats of all natural things, for then all beings would be natural. But now it is about all natural things in such way that its subject is something common to all natural things, and there is not a first something to which all others are attributed—as is evident from Avicenna, in Bk. I of his *Metaphysics*, ch. 2,¹²¹ and Bk. I of his *Physics*, ch. 1,¹²² and from the Commentator on Bk. IV of this work, comment 1,¹²³ and

¹¹⁴Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 2, AviL 12.

¹¹⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21.

¹¹⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 1, (ed. Iuntina VIII, fol. 30vb).

¹¹⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 29-30.

¹¹⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1026a 24-25.

¹¹⁹*Ibid.*, ch. 1, 1026a 31-32.

¹²⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 27-29.

¹²¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 2, AviL 10-14.

¹²²Avicenna, *Sufficiencia* I, ch. 2, fol. 14rb.

¹²³Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 1, (VIII, fol. 30vb).

according to others speaking about the subject of metaphysics. Hence, the subject of the first science is most common; otherwise it does not seem that Aristotle's inference is valid.

71 [22] Also, the Commentator says here, in the preface to Bk. III:¹²⁴ "The subject of both sciences is being in an unqualified sense," namely, referring to this and the argumentative science [i.e., logic].

72 [Arguments from reason] Also, there seems to be a rational argument for this, both [a] because it is necessary that some science *per se* considers what are most common, without which particulars could not be known; and [b] because the attributes that are considered here, such as one and many, potency and act, and the like, do not seem to pertain primarily to some particular being, but to anything insofar as it is being. That appears to be primarily the first and proper subject, the attributes of which are considered *per se* in the science.

73 Also, if this science were about some special genus, this would indeed have something superior to it, and then there would be another superior and prior science to this. The consequent is false, from Bk. VI of this work.¹²⁵ Proof of the implication. That superior subject would have some attribute demonstrable of it in some other science. Therefore, the same attribute could be demonstrated of the subject of that science by taking as a middle term that to which the attribute first belongs. And thus that science of the more general subject would demonstrate something as a conclusion that here would be accepted as a principle, and thus that science would be prior and higher than this.

[2. AN AVICENNIAN REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

74 [23] According to the opinion of Avicenna one can reply to the [initial] arguments. To the first,¹²⁶ the minor is false, [viz. that we do not know what being is]. As for the proof,¹²⁷ based on the equivocation of being, Avicenna seems to deny being is equivocal in

¹²⁴Averroes, *Metaphysica* III, com. 1, (VIII, fol. 18ra).

¹²⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 23-30.

¹²⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

¹²⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

Bk. I of his *Metaphysics*, both in ch. 5,¹²⁸ cited earlier,¹²⁹ and in ch. 2d.¹³⁰ As for the authority of Porphyry,¹³¹ and others who defend the opposite view, an answer will be given in Bk. IV,¹³² when the question of the equivocation of being is taken up.

75 To the other proof,¹³³ when it is claimed that being does not have a quiddity because it is transcendent, I reply: This would hold for everything that is most general, since no most general category has a quiddity properly so-called. Nevertheless, each has a “what,” both because it has an essence, and also because otherwise it would not be predicated “in quid” of something. Hence, this proof is insufficient, namely, “if it does not have a definition properly so-called, it does not have a ‘quid’ [or ‘what’].” This only follows in regard to the quiddity of a species, which does have a proper definition.

76 To the other argument,¹³⁴ I reply: Being qua being can have some attribute which is outside its essence qua being, just as one-or-many, act-or-potency, is outside the essence of anything insofar as it is being or a “quid” or something in itself. Nevertheless, being taken according to any more general aspect is predicated of everything “in quid,” and is of the essence of everything.

77 This provides an answer to the other reason as well,¹³⁵ for being is predicated “in quid” of everything taken as a quiddity; but not when these are taken under the aspect of an attribute of being.

78 [24] As for the third argument,¹³⁶ the expression “if being qua being had principles” must be glossed. “Qua” is not understood reduplicatively as if it denoted the cause, but specifically, as if its meaning were: “of being qua being, i.e., being according to its entity.”

¹²⁸Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 5, AviL 31-32.

¹²⁹Cf. supra, in the prologue, n. 16.

¹³⁰Avicenna, *ibid.*, ch. 2, AviL 13.

¹³¹Cf. supra, n. 5.

¹³²Cf. infra, BK. IV, q. 1, nn. 17-26.

¹³³Cf. supra, n. 5.

¹³⁴Cf. supra, nn. 6. 8.

¹³⁵Cf. supra, n. 8.

¹³⁶Cf. supra, n. 9-10.

79 {{It is like saying: “This is seen qua white, i.e., according to its whiteness.” However, the inference from “qua” to the universal is only valid when “qua being” holds reduplicatively. For beings not only are caused according to something posterior to the entity as such, but also according to their entity, so that in created [beings], the entity is what is caused first.

In this sense the argument at the beginning of Bk. IV¹³⁷ is valid [in the text beginning] ‘Quoniam autem’¹³⁸ as was explained in a marginal note there.

80 Or the argument there also holds up, because the cause of being in general is considered here, namely God, whose first effect is being or existence. And note that the first causes of knowing are the first immediate propositions. In another sense first causes, not only of knowing but of being, are the middle terms in a demonstration. These “cause” the attributes to exist in and be known of the subject. In still another sense what are called the first causes of knowing—not perhaps, properly speaking, of knowing something of the subject, for they are not middle terms of a demonstration—are the principles of understanding the subject, because they pertain to what it is, so that by understanding this quiddity, these causes are understood, either as intrinsic to it, as matter or form, or extrinsic to it. And the latter are understood as being prior to the subject, but are not understood as being internal to the quiddity of the subject.

81 [25] This science concerns first causes in the first two ways,¹³⁹ because these two only differ as the whole and the part, or as a proposition and its term. From the most common terms the first propositions are formed, and the most common terms are the initial middle terms in a demonstration. In this way there are principles of being qua being, if we understand “qua” reduplicatively, and this is so even if being is univocal to all.

82 In the other two senses,¹⁴⁰ however, this science is not about the first causes of being qua being reduplicatively, because not every

¹³⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 26-28.

¹³⁸Here follows an interpolated note: “On this point more is treated at the beginning of Book IV in the text marked ‘Extra’.”

¹³⁹Namely, the first causes of knowing are either (1) the first immediate propositions, (2) the middle terms in a demonstration, *supra*, n. 80.

¹⁴⁰Namely, either as intrinsic or extrinsic causes; cf. *supra* n. 80.

being has such extrinsic causes, as is clear, nor do simple things have intrinsic causes, and so it is necessary to take “qua” in a specific sense.

83 Note here that all four causes pertain to the metaphysician insofar as each in its own way gives being, even where motion and change are excluded; matter and form give being insofar as they are parts of the essence; the efficient cause, insofar as it gives being independently of motion (and although it might not act except by moving, nevertheless its role as giving being is prior to its role as a mover); the end does so insofar as a thing according to its entity is ordered to such an end, even though this can only be attained through motion or activity. The end, however, is prior in giving being rather than producing activity.}}

84 Another answer to this is to claim that the expression:¹⁴¹ “if being qua being had principles” refers only to created being, and if one concludes “then every being would have principles,” there is nothing wrong with every being of this sort having principles.

[3.—AGAINST THESE REPLIES TO THE ARGUMENTS]

85 [26] Against the reply to the first argument.¹⁴² Suppose that there could be no concept of being that is common to all ten categories, because of the authoritative statements of the Philosopher and the reasons touched on at the beginning of Bk. IV.¹⁴³ Now, one science has one subject, according to the *Posterior Analytics*,¹⁴⁴ and a proof is this. The function of one habit is to produce a single act. One act of understanding, however, can have but one object (for a single act of understanding cannot grasp all the properties attributed to some single thing, for then one would understand all beings, since all are attributed to one first being). Hence, it follows that one must postulate some one being to which the others are attributed as a proper subject. Its unity gives unity to the science.

¹⁴¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 9-10.

¹⁴²Cf. *supra*, n. 74.

¹⁴³Cf. *infra* Bk. IV, q. 1, nn. 40. 50-69.

¹⁴⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 28, 87a 37-38.

86 Likewise, contrary to the answer given to the second argument,¹⁴⁵ if being as commonly predicabile of the ten categories would have some property, for example A, two inadmissible consequences follow.

87 First, being according to its common predicability would be outside the essence of its attribute, as a subject is outside the essence of its attribute, since it enters the definition of its property as something added, according to Bk. VII of this work.¹⁴⁶ Hence, being according to its common predicability would not be predicated quidditatively of everything.¹⁴⁷

Another inadmissible consequence would be that A would be a proper attribute of itself if being were predicated quidditatively in some way of A. For any proper attribute of what is superior is also an attribute of what falls under it, although it is not a primary attribute of the latter. Consequently, A would be demonstrable of itself by a reasoned fact demonstration by using “being” as a middle term. For any property that pertains primarily to the superior is demonstrable by a reasoned fact of any inferior that falls under it by using the notion of the superior as the middle term. Therefore, A would be simply more knowable of being than it would be of itself, and this would be a proper question: “For what reason is A A?” since it could be answered by a demonstration of the reasoned fact.—This is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Bk. VII, the last chapter.¹⁴⁸ It seems, therefore, that being according to its common predicability of the ten categories is not the subject of any science.

88 [27] [A possible objection and some solutions] Suppose one objects to this on the grounds that being in general qua being is admitted to have in general some proper attribute, because every being qua being has some proper attribute outside its essence (for in anything its entity is different from its unity or actuality).—There is a twofold reply to this:

¹⁴⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 76.

¹⁴⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 6, 1031b 21-27.

¹⁴⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 77.

¹⁴⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 17, 1041a 14-15.

First, it seems to admit the counterthesis that being according to its common predicability is not a subject, because as general it does not have a property, although any particular being, considered according to its quiddity, has some proper attribute.

Second, it follows that one and the same thing is a property of itself, or—to put it circularly—one and the same thing is both attribute and subject, both of which are impossible. Proof of the implication. Since all beings are finite, every being, according to the answer given above, has a proper attribute. Take for example, A, B, and C. Let B be a proper attribute of A, and C be a proper attribute of B. If C has a proper attribute, it is either itself (which is one inadmissible consequence) or it is A or B, and so we have a circle (the other inadmissible consequence).

89 The following answer is given against this [twofold reply]: Let A be unity, B actuality, and then neither of the two inadmissible consequences follow. For unity is actually some being by denominative predication. Similarly, actuality is something that is one by denominative predication. Nor is there a circle here, since unity in its generality is denominated by some actuality. Thus actuality in its generality is not denominated by unity in its generality, although actuality in its generality is denominated by some unity.

90 Against this [solution]: if unity in its generality is denominated by some actuality as a proper attribute, then every unity is so denominated, although not primarily. For the proper attribute of what is more general is the property of everything inferior, though not primarily. It would also follow, according to this answer, that actuality in its generality is denominated by some unity as a proper attribute. Hence, some one unity is a subject and a property as regards actuality.

[II.—HOW SUBSTANCE CAN BE THE SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS
A.—EXPLANATION OF THIS VIEW]

91 [28] For these reasons¹⁴⁹ it seems one should conclude that being according to its total amplitude as predicable of the ten categories is not the subject here. First, because being does not have a greater

¹⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 85-90.

unity than the ten categories have, since it does not have a common concept with respect to these, although accidents are attributed to substance. Second, because according to its total community it does not have any property. This has been proved¹⁵⁰ in two ways: on account of the essential difference between a proper attribute and its subject, and because one and the same thing would be a property of itself, or there would be a circle in proper attributes and their subjects, which is against what the Philosopher says in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*, in the chapter “De statu principiorum”:¹⁵¹ “This is not a quality of that or that a quality of this,” where this follows:¹⁵² “No quale can be reciprocally predicated of another quale, namely as subject, except by accidental predication.”

92 From all this it follows that one has to admit some single subject of this science, one that can have proper attributes demonstrable of it by a demonstration of the reasoned fact, because this is one science and a science of the reasoned fact. Also, this single subject has to be the first being to which all else is attributed. Otherwise this science would not consider all beings. The implication holds [i.e., if this single subject were not that to which all else is attributed, then the science would not consider all things], because every science that considers many things *per se*—not as attributes or causes—either has a subject that is common to them [which is ruled out above] or one primary subject to which the other things are attributed [which is the thesis here]. But the consequent [i.e., that this science does not consider all things] was proved to be against the mind of the Philosopher above,¹⁵³ when it was argued for the opinion of Avicenna. Only substance has all the other necessary conditions, therefore, it should be regarded here as the proper subject.

93[29] This is confirmed by the Philosopher in Bk. IV where—after he has distinguished being and shown how this science considers all things, because there is one science that has to do with all things attributed to one, adds:¹⁵⁴ “But everywhere

¹⁵⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 88.

¹⁵¹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 22, 83a 36.

¹⁵²*Ibid.*, 83b 10-11.

¹⁵³Cf. *supra*, nn. 74-78. 84.

¹⁵⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 16-17.

science deals chiefly with that which is primary, and on which the other things depend, and in virtue of which they get their names." And he concludes from this that¹⁵⁵ "if this be substance, then, it will be of substances that the philosopher must grasp the principles and causes."

94 Likewise, at the beginning of Bk. VII, after he proves that substance is the first of beings according to knowledge, definition, and time, he concludes:¹⁵⁶ "And so we must consider chiefly and primarily and, so to speak, solely that being which is predicated in this sense, namely, of substance." The words "so to speak, solely" are added advisedly, for this science not only considers substance, although this is its principal subject, but it also considers all other things insofar as these are attributed to substance.

95 Also in Bk. IV, ch. 2,¹⁵⁷ the Philosopher says that philosophy has as many parts as there are substances. By this he implies this science is distinguished according to the distinction of substance as its principal subject.

96 [30] All those authorities cited earlier¹⁵⁸ to prove that this science is about being qua being, then, are to be conceded to the extent that this science, which is about some one primary thing as its first subject, considers also those things attributed to the first, but not as principal subject, as the Philosopher illustrates with his example of health in Bk. IV.¹⁵⁹ Hence, in the beginning of Bk. IV, where—according to the Commentator¹⁶⁰—his main aim is to indicate the subject, after saying that this science is about all beings, he adds an explanation of what a proper subject is, namely that it is that "on which others depend"¹⁶¹—as has been stated previously.¹⁶² Not only is substance first, but also the common attributes considered here are in it primarily, and through its nature are attributed to other posterior things. Also things other than sub-

¹⁵⁵*Ibid.*, 1003b 18-19; cf. *supra*, nn. 18, 67.

¹⁵⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 1, 1028b 6-7.

¹⁵⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1004a 2-3.

¹⁵⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 68-71.

¹⁵⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 35-b 3.

¹⁶⁰Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 2 (fol. 31vb).

¹⁶¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003a 17.

¹⁶²Cf. *supra*, n. 93.

stance are not only treated here as attributes demonstrable of substance, but also insofar as they are certain beings having in their own right proper attributes. Consequently, also these properties can be demonstrated of them in this science. For it is not incongruous that the attribute of some prior subject can be the subject of some posterior attribute, as is seen in the case of ordered accidents. For accidents are considered in this science under a twofold aspect. Hence all the arguments marshalled for both sides lead to this one truth. Those for the first¹⁶³ [i.e., the view of Avicenna] show it has to do with all beings; those of the other side¹⁶⁴ [i.e., that it is substance], that it is not about all of these about one [being], nor is it about something they all have in common, but it is about one first being to which all the others are attributed.

[B.—ARGUMENTS AGAINST SUBSTANCE AND THEIR REFUTATION]

97 [31] {[Arg. 1] But against the aforesaid solution this objection is raised. If substance, to which metaphysical attributes are attributed, is posited as the subject in metaphysics: [Subarg. 1] show me where some conclusion is demonstrated of substance?—You may point to the beginning of Bk. VII,¹⁶⁵ where substance is shown to be the first being in a threefold way.

98 Objection: To what category does this attribute demonstrated of substance pertain? Not quantity, because quantity is not characteristic of every substance. Neither does it pertain to any genus that is posterior, because all these presuppose quantity.

99 I reply that this attribute, namely “first of all” is a relation and a relation does not presuppose quantity, because substance, if it is first only insofar as it is a subject of quantity, then it is not prior to quantity, just as “white man” is not prior to “whiteness.”

100 On the contrary: in Bk. V¹⁶⁶ only three kinds of relations are given and all presuppose quantity.

¹⁶³Namely, the reasons in n. 91.

¹⁶⁴Namely, those given in nn. 92-95.

¹⁶⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 1, 1028a 32-33.

¹⁶⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 26-32.

101 [Subarg. 2] Also, what might the middle term be that demonstrates an attribute of substance in its generality? It cannot be a definition, for substance has no definition, and nevertheless, the most potent demonstration is by way of a definition. Therefore, this is not the most certain science.

102 [Subarg. 3] Also, nothing seems to be demonstrated of substance by way of a difference taken as a middle term.¹⁶⁷ For in what figure would such a demonstration be?

103 [32] [Defense of substance—applicable also to God as subject] To this it can be said, perhaps, that according to the *Posterior Analytics*¹⁶⁸ many true things may be called subject of a science in the proper sense of the term. For the subject of a science is the subject of the conclusion of a demonstration, where an attribute is inferred of it. But by taking science in another sense as an aggregate of many elements of knowledge, simple and complex, principles and conclusions, as geometry is said to be one science, in this sense the subject of the science is said to be one thing common to all the subjects of science in the proper sense, or one first thing to which all the others are attributed. For you find one science demonstrating of figure all its general attributes; another which demonstrates all the proper attributes of the various species of figure. These seem to be sciences subalternate to the first, neither in such is any attribute shown of figure in general. Nevertheless, the subject of this science [of geometry] seems to be figure in general, because this is the sole thing common to all that is considered in this science. If this be a good distinction, God could be assumed to be a subject here just as he is in theology, although no attribute is demonstrable of him, because all things considered here are traced back to him as to that which is first in an unqualified sense.

¹⁶⁷Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 8, 93a 1-13.

¹⁶⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 4, 73a 35-b 16.

[C.—ARE PRINCIPLES ABOUT THE INFERIORS CONSIDERED IN METAPHYSICS?]

104 But whether God or substance be postulated here as subject, are there any principles in an unqualified sense as regards the other posterior things considered in this science?

[For the negative] It seems not, because all posterior things, so far as everything in them is concerned, have a cause.

105[33] I reply: truly there are complex principles, namely immediate propositions, for posterior things. For the definition of number is immediately true of number, as is the definition of angle of an angle. Hence, in Bk. V, in the chapter on *per se*,¹⁶⁹ it is said that “man has more than one cause,” but why man is man has none. Then I concede that posterior things are caused in themselves, and each of them in an unqualified sense. Nevertheless, some propositions about men do not have other propositions that are the prior causes whereby they may be demonstrated; otherwise there would be only one proper principle in one science, in which the definition of the subject was predicated of it.

106 On the contrary: the attributes of quantity are demonstrated of quantity through some principle, just as the proper attributes of substance are of substance through a principle. Therefore, if principles are equally first, because no one of them is the cause of another, then the conclusions will also be equally knowable, and thus the sciences of substance and quantity will be equally first.

107 Also, is not some complex uncreated truth the cause of any complex created truth, as some [uncreated] simple is the cause of the [created] simple, since “God is” is no such truth?

108 To the first:¹⁷⁰ principles are not equally first, although no one is the cause of the truth of the other, as is clear in the case of unity and the point. Neither are both equally known as such, because those principles are better known which have better known terms, and the terms of one are naturally better known than those of the other, and so one is more true than the other. Hence, there is an order among immediate truths, although there is no causality. It is

¹⁶⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 18, 1022a 33-35.

¹⁷⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 106.

also this way with articles of faith, not all of which are equally first, because not all are immediately about God. And nevertheless, all are principles of theology in an unqualified sense and are simply indemonstrable.

109 To the second:¹⁷¹ a complex truth [i.e. a proposition] is caused by God, because its terms are caused by God, which terms are the cause of the complex truth. But it does not follow: "Because God is God; therefore, man is man," although it is from God that man exists.}}¹⁷²

[III.—HOW GOD CAN BE A SUBJECT OF METAPHYSICS]

110 [34] If one holds that God is the subject here, it must be posited here in a way other than Averroes does.

For this, two things need to be done. One is to show how both Averroes and Avicenna erred in their opinions. Second, we must show how God can be assumed to be a subject in metaphysics.

[A.— HOW AVERROES AND AVICENNA ERRED]

111 As for the first, know that Avicenna and Averroes have this proposition in common: "No science proves the existence of its subject." Second, Avicenna says that only first philosophy can prove that God exists, not natural science. Third, Averroes on the contrary declares that it is only natural science that proves this, not first philosophy. Fourth, Avicenna assumes God is not a subject of metaphysics. Fifth, Averroes assumes the genus of separated beings are the subject there.

¹⁷¹Cf. *supra*, n. 107.

¹⁷²An inserted note: "Note here five points: first, the order of the nine categories of accidents among themselves: in particular what is the order of relation to the others? Second, about the middle term of the most powerful demonstration. Third, about the distinction of the sciences. Fourth, according to this, how can God be posited as a subject? And here look at the solution of the first argument against the opinion of the Commentor [*supra*, n. 30]. For that conclusion is applicable to the subject of theology. For both the argument making faith a conclusion from premise taken on faith, as well as a demonstration, infer something about the subject through a middle term different from the other two terms. Fifth, how is there order among immediate principles?"

112 Against the first of these¹⁷³ we argue in this way. A science of the simple fact demonstrates the existence of its subject, because through an effect something is demonstrated about its cause in this fashion. From the fact that an effect cannot exist without such and such a condition in the cause, the effect cannot exist without the existence of the cause; therefore, the cause exists. For it is evident that the first thing we conclude about a cause from its effect is existence. But a science of the simple fact presupposes some concept of the subject in the intellect, and about that concept it argues first that it exists, and second that other characteristics are in it.

113[35] Against the second and third¹⁷⁴ simultaneously. Every property considered about the effect that could not exist if the cause did not exist implies as a simple fact that the cause exists. But a property considered in natural science as well as in this science about the effect cannot exist unless a first moving cause exists, and unless a first being exist. Therefore, both sciences can prove its existence. Nevertheless, this science [of metaphysics] is more immediate, because of the general properties of created being as they are considered here lead more readily to the positive knowledge of the first being's perfections par excellence than the special conditions considered in other sciences. The reason for this is that these conditions [established in the other science] lead more to a privative knowledge or some less excellent positive knowledge. For a primacy as mover seems less excellent than that a first being in an unqualified sense exists. Hence, as far as the second and third points is concerned, both the positions of Avicenna and Averroes should be denied, but more so that of Averroes.—Against him in particular the following proof is also given. According to his position that which is purely and simply a conclusion in physics would be in metaphysics in an unqualified sense a first proposition completely indemonstrable, and thus physics would be prior to metaphysics.

114 If you say that here it is not demonstrated as a reasoned fact, this is irrelevant to the minor.¹⁷⁵ Neither is it demonstrated in

¹⁷³Cf. supra, n. 111.

¹⁷⁴Cf. supra, n. 111.

¹⁷⁵Cf. supra, n. 113 [The minor] But a property considered in natural science [i.e., physics] or as well as in this science [of metaphysics] about the effect cannot

physics in this manner. Hence, its demonstrability is denied equally in physics and metaphysics.

115 [36] Against the fourth,¹⁷⁶ [viz., Avicenna's claim that God is not a subject of metaphysics] we have [1] the argument based on the authority of the Philosopher in Bk. VI of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁷⁷ and [2] the last reason adduced for the opinion of Averroes¹⁷⁸ with a confirmation of that reason made to an objection to it.¹⁷⁹

116 Also, one argues against his claim¹⁸⁰ in this way. Avicenna [himself] admits that metaphysics is about God, since it considers him, and that it is also about being qua being, although the metaphysician does not intend to consider God because of his consideration of being qua being, since God is not a principle of knowing being in a science of the simple fact.

117 Likewise, the ultimate end of this science, then, would not be to contemplate the highest and first causes, nor would natural happiness consist mainly in an act of wisdom; therefore, metaphysics chiefly considers being because of the first being. But that is the subject in a science the knowledge of which is chiefly sought as to its properties, perfections, and also its existence in a science of simple fact. Therefore, etc.

118 From this reason it is evident that God is not considered here as a principle of the subject; for something is considered in a science as a principle of knowing the subject only in that science which bears its [i.e., principle's] name, as language in reference to a proposition, and nature in reference to a natural being. Hence, the gloss to the words of Aristotle in Bk. VI of the *Metaphysics*¹⁸¹ adduced in favor of Averroes is of little worth.

119 [37] Also, the initial arguments for Avicenna¹⁸² concerning the distinction between "that it is" and "why it is" are of no validity,

exist unless a first moving cause exists, and unless a first being exist.

¹⁷⁶Cf. supra, n. 111.

¹⁷⁷Cf. supra, nn. 14-17.

¹⁷⁸Cf. supra, n. 18.

¹⁷⁹Cf. supra, n. 64.

¹⁸⁰Namely, against the fourth point, i.e. Avicenna's claim that God is not a subject in metaphysics; cf. supra, n. 111.

¹⁸¹Cf. supra, nn. 14-15.

¹⁸²Cf. supra, nn. 74-75.

since metaphysics—as all admit—is necessarily a science of only the simple fact of God, since we cannot know God in any other way.

120 The arguments¹⁸³ based on the proper attributes and principles was solved very well earlier in sustaining the opinion of the Commentator.¹⁸⁴

121 But the argument in favor of Avicenna¹⁸⁵ against the Commentator given above is not valid. For though metaphysics, considered from the standpoint of what is knowable, that is to say, if it were known in the way that knowables are by nature suited to be known, would be a science of the reasoned fact. Metaphysics as knowable to us, however, is necessarily a science of the simple fact of God, as will be made clear.¹⁸⁶ The Philosopher only sketches what the first would be like, the second he hardly hands down to us.

122 Relevant¹⁸⁷ also is point which Henry argued for in the *Summa*, XIX, 1,¹⁸⁸ that the “subject in a science must be the first known” and under this aspect all the other things are known, as is the case with the object of a potency; God however is known here only from his effects, for it is not by knowing him that other things are known,—I reply, that this is true of the first known by a primacy of principality and of intention, but not of execution. This is clear from the case of the prior treatment of the noun and verb [rather than the proposition, which is the subject of the book] *On Interpretation*.¹⁸⁹

123 Also, one can argue in this way. Knowledge of the first and formal subject of this habit virtually includes a knowledge of the science and the knowledge habit, because the knowledge of all subsequent things are reduced cognitively to a knowledge of that subject. If being, therefore, and not God is posited as the subject in metaphysics, it follows that the wisdom-knowledge which is had

¹⁸³Cf. supra, n. 8; i.e. the Averroistic position solves these just as well as Avicenna does in nn. 76-78.

¹⁸⁴Cf. supra, nn. 25-29.

¹⁸⁵Cf. supra, n. 68.

¹⁸⁶Cf. infra, nn. 150-151.

¹⁸⁷Namely, to the fourth point, cf. supra, n. 111.

¹⁸⁸Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 19, q. 1 ad 3 (I, fol. 115K).

¹⁸⁹Aristotle, *De interpretatione* I, ch. 2-3, 16a 19-b 25.

in metaphysics is virtually included in the knowledge of being. But it is impossible that the more perfect knowledge be virtually included in the less perfect. Therefore, the knowledge of being is more perfect than the knowledge of God and the separate substances. Since natural felicity, then, consists in the knowledge of God and the separate substances, as is clear from Bk. X of the *Ethics*,¹⁹⁰ it follows that felicity consists in the knowledge of being qua being, which is false, since such knowledge is most imperfect. In this way, therefore, it is clear what is wrong with the fourth point¹⁹¹ and how the contrary position would be sustained. More will be said of this later, and how one may respond to it in favor of the fourth.¹⁹²

124 [38] But against the contrary position [i.e., that God is a subject of metaphysics] there are doubts other than those that have been mentioned, and these will be treated later after an answer is given to the question.¹⁹³

125 Against the fifth¹⁹⁴ [namely, that God and the pure spirits are the subject of metaphysics], it was argued above¹⁹⁵ about univocation that there does not seem to be anything univocally common to God and the Intelligences, according to the common opinion; therefore, there cannot be some one science about what is common to God and the Intelligences.

126 This is confirmed, because in no special science is there a greater unity [of subject matter] between God and the separate substances on the one hand and God and the corporeal substances on the other. Therefore, if because of some unity among the whole class of such beings one ought to posit one subject, by the same token it would include the class of corporeal substances as well.—And this conclusion is strengthened further because no common science is more about one species than about another.

¹⁹⁰Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 7, 1177a 12-b 13; ch. 8, 1178b 7-32; 1179a 22-32.

¹⁹¹Namely, Avicenna's claim that God is not a subject in metaphysics, cf. supra, n. 111; the arguments against this position are found above in nn. 115-121.

¹⁹²Cf. infra, nn. 130-136.

¹⁹³Cf. infra, nn. 137-145.

¹⁹⁴Cf. supra, n. 111.

¹⁹⁵Cf. supra, nn. 34, 43.

127 If however it be said that there is one science about these separate substances because of a unity of attribution; therefore, the first will be the *per se* subject; hence, it will not be especially about the Intelligences any more than about corporeal things, [a] unless, perhaps, the former are more noble beings and are more immediately attributed to the first being—or [b] unless what is knowable of the Intelligences in particular is so minimal that they ought not to be treated in a special science by us, so that it would be more appropriate to this modicum that we speak of it in the science about the first being. However, so far as their knowable nature is concerned, they ought to be treated in a science different from metaphysics, just as is the case with corporeal substances.

128 And on this basis the division of the Philosopher of the theoretical sciences given in Bk. VI of this work,¹⁹⁶ holds for what is transmitted to us rationally, and not what is fully knowable about them in view of their natures. Therefore, the Intelligences are not a subject here, nor a part of a subject, but are only considered here because of their close likeness to the first being, since we can have so little natural knowledge about them [beyond what we have said of the first being].

129 To all the authoritative citations of the Philosopher in favor of the fifth point,¹⁹⁷ it must be said that he speaks of God as “first causes,” because of the many causal perfections characteristic of him, since he thinks the angels cause nothing except by moving them.—To that argument, then, the response he would give is clear from what has been said.

[B.—THE WAY GOD CAN BE A SUBJECT IN METAPHYSICS]

130 [39] Having treated of these things in this fashion, we turn now to our principal topic, namely, how God can be a subject of metaphysics.

131 And it must be said that, presupposing the distinction of the sciences [cf. *supra* n. 103] on the basis of their being either [1] a habitual knowledge of conclusions [2] or an aggregate of many such

¹⁹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 18-19.

¹⁹⁷Cf. *supra*, nn. 14-18; for ‘the fifth point’ cf. *supra*, n. 111.

habits of both principles and conclusions that are somehow interrelated—a distinction that is clear from the first question of Bk. VI of this work¹⁹⁸—God can be a subject first of all of this science as one of reasoned fact, both according to the reply to the second principal argument for the view of the Commentator [nn. 25-26], as well as what is said in that marginal addition, which was inserted earlier in response to the first argument brought against the opinion of the Commentator [n. 32]. For as it was said there,¹⁹⁹ “if something were naturally prior and other that could be a means of knowing something else that is naturally posterior, this would not be insofar as it is other, because this is accidental.” It would rather be insofar as it is this [i.e., this individual thing], as is evident there. And therefore this first argument²⁰⁰ against the opinion of the Commentator is not cogent.

132 Similarly, God can be the subject in the first way²⁰¹ [i.e., as the habitual knowledge of a conclusion] in a science of the simple fact. For presupposing we know what the name “God” means, if such a being is the cause of such and such effects, from the effect one can conclude that such a being both exists and that it is an individual, and this so far as essentials go as well as properties. And the demonstration in such a case is one of simple fact. But nothing can be inferred about God from such an effect unless it be something he has without which such an effect could not exist.

133 [40] God can also be the subject of a science in the second way we spoke of,²⁰² i.e., insofar as the science is an aggregate of conclusions about God and about other attributes that are established of him either as simple facts or reasoned facts. And such a science, if it existed, would be especially one generically in virtue of the unity of its subject.

134 Or it could be a science that is an aggregate of many conclusions and principles about God and about other things attributed to him as first insofar as these are ascribed to him. And such would be one in virtue of the unity of its subject, but not as the previous science

¹⁹⁸Cf. *infra*, Bk. VI, q. 1, nn. 8-12.

¹⁹⁹Namely, *supra* in the addition, n. 32.

²⁰⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 30-31.

²⁰¹Cf. *supra*, n. 131.

²⁰²Cf. *supra*, n. 131.

would be. Rather, it would be one inasmuch as all the other things considered in the science would be attributed to the one subject, since the consideration in that science would be about something that is first in an unqualified sense, and this first would be considered under the first aspect under which it could be considered. And a created being (although it be univocal under the aspect of the first being) can be considered insofar as it is ascribed to the first being, and thus the first consideration about any being would be the sort of consideration appropriate to what is attributed to the first being, and not as to what is attributed to substance. Therefore, if metaphysics is the first science, it is about all things under this aspect. Hence, they are considered here [1] either as attributes, because they are known from a knowledge of God, or [2] because from a knowledge of such God is known. In the first way, this would be about God and it would be a science of the reasoned fact. In the second way it would be a science of the simple fact.

135 These things were suited by nature to be known in the first way,²⁰³ and this science would be the first science about them, since it concerns them insofar as they are attributed to one thing that is simply first. Not in such a way that there they would not be considered according to their own proper essence, (for otherwise they would not be known), but the cognition of their essences would stem from the fact they are attributed to God. God possesses such a metaphysics, but for him it is not science, because it is not a knowledge of himself acquired discursively from other things. For even though he knows of the existence of other things through himself, he still does not know such things because he knows himself, which would be required for scientific knowing in the technical sense. Such an imperfect metaphysics the angels could possess, perhaps, if they were pilgrims for a long time and from their natural knowledge of God could acquire additional knowledge by discursive reasoning.

136 [41] Only in the second way²⁰⁴ can man possess metaphysics now (whatever is to be said about the natural knowledge of God possessed by the blessed or those in a state of innocence), because

²⁰³Namely, from a knowledge of God things are known, cf. supra, n. 134.

²⁰⁴That is, God is known from a knowledge of things, cf. supra, n. 134.

now all our knowledge stems from sense perception. Therefore, only in this form could [metaphysics] have been handed down from the Philosopher. Hence, the first science possible for man to acquire by natural reason is of this sort and it is a science of simple fact—and it is of God as of its first subject and is about every being as its subject matter insofar as each is attributed to the first being. This science neither presupposes that God exists, or that knowledge of other things stems from knowing him, although both would be presupposed if this were a science of the reasoned fact. For in a science of the simple fact, properly so-called, the only thing presupposed about the subject is what is meant by the name, and what one infers about such is both its existence and what it is, as was said.²⁰⁵ The same thing can be the case with a science of the simple fact consisting of an aggregate [of principles and conclusions]. For to assume God could be proved to exist as a simple fact in some other science and not in this science would be incongruous, since this science considers effects as immediate to itself as any other science does. That is why a science of the simple fact does not prove the existence of its subject as a reasoned fact does and also why a science of the reasoned fact presupposes knowledge of the existence and nature of its subject, since it could prove this through the principles of its subject, if it has principles.

[C.—SIX DOUBTS AND THEIR SOLUTION]

137 [42] But against this position there are some doubts.

[First doubt] For the first doubt is in regard to this that God is assumed to be a subject in metaphysics and that this science considers being as attributed to God, because the consideration of beings qua beings seems to be prior to the consideration of them as attributed to the first being. Therefore, there will be some other metaphysics that considers beings qua beings which is prior to that which assumes God to be the subject. The antecedent is proved, because the absolute is prior to its relationship, and also because the premise is knowable before the conclusion or the notion of the conclusion,—and from the existence of beings qua beings as from the first effect one infers the existence of God. Another reason is that

²⁰⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 132.

these things seem to be knowable from beings qua beings apart from this attribution, since they are absolutes, and their relationship is not of the essence of what is absolute. What would that science be that considers them as being qua beings apart from such an attribution? It seems that one has to postulate another metaphysics.

138 Also, all other beings are attributed to the first under the aspect of being, in particular as well as in general. Therefore, that one science is about all, both in general and in particular.—This is confirmed because God, who has a metaphysics of the reasoned fact, through his essence knows everything in particular just as well as in general.

139 Also, there is this third argument. These things are not attributed to the first being save under the triple aspect of cause, and this triple attribution is not truly necessary [because they stem from God's free will]. Therefore, just as there could not be a metaphysics of these things insofar as they are attributed in the first way [i.e., reasoned fact], so neither in the second way [i.e., as a simple fact].

140 [43] [Reply to the first doubt] To the first reason for this doubt²⁰⁶ one must say that this consideration by which beings are considered as such is prior by a priority of origin—as the first two proofs establish²⁰⁷—but not by a priority of intention. And the first subject is assigned on the basis of what is primarily intended, or on the basis of that principle to which the whole aggregate of many cognitions is ordered primarily.

141 To the third proof²⁰⁸ it must be said that this sort of science would be a part of metaphysics, just as physics would be imperfect, if only the knowledge of matter and form were included and the complete treatment of natural being omitted, or [the science *On Interpretation* would be imperfect] if one treated only the noun and the verb and nothing about the proposition. For the consideration of the principal subject to be considered would be omitted. For then there would simply be no other science, because the science about the first being has the function of treating those things qua beings.

²⁰⁶Cf. supra, n. 137.

²⁰⁷Cf. supra, n. 137.

²⁰⁸Cf. supra, n. 137.

Hence where they are considered in attribution, there they are considered in themselves, but they are considered in themselves because of the first.

142 To the second reason,²⁰⁹ it must be said that the principal conditions to be inferred about the first being follow from the properties of being qua being [i.e., in general]. For the special conditions of being imply nothing primarily in regard to it [i.e., the first being]. Therefore, [this science] only considers being in general.—On the contrary: whatever is true of being qua being is true of God; therefore, through these [properties in general] nothing is inferred [in particular] of God.

143 To the third,²¹⁰ although there is no necessary cause with respect to the existence of others, nevertheless there is a necessary cause of the properties which are present in them. Because he is pure act, therefore, being is divided into act and potency.—To the contrary: how are the conditions of being to be understood, since they are not sensibles?

144 [Second doubt] There is also a second doubt: What aspect in the first being entitles him to be considered the *per se* subject of metaphysics?

145 [44] [Reply to the second doubt] To this one must say it is not an aspect that is knowable by the physicist; first, because this aspect is accidental so that his nature in itself is not considered, just as “body” is not considered under the aspect of motion. Second, because that aspect pertains to the method of the science and the aspect under which the subject is known presupposes the method of the science. Third, because the aspect under which [the first being is considered] is common to all subjects of sciences. Fourth, because that common aspect posits nothing about his nature, but only perhaps about the knower or a relationship to the first being. Also this aspect is not that of a first mover or of anything attainable by the physicist. For even though there occurs [in God] a primacy both of moving and of giving existence, nevertheless there is nothing about either of these aspects that would imply it is a contradiction if both were not necessarily coexisting in the first being. Hence, the

²⁰⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 138.

²¹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 139.

physicist never shows anything about the first being that is not accidental. Consequently, he does not show there is any being that is first, but only that some mover is first, and thus he does not establish that any being is ultimate, but only that there is some ultimate mover. Hence, if the first being would cause nothing except by moving—which perhaps is not true according to the Philosopher—he would still be efficient insofar as being efficient implies a universal characteristic of whatever is moving, namely, as that by which something exists. The end also is not just that of motion but of entity. Hence, perhaps the subject will not be posited here under the aspect of a double primacy, but only a primacy of excellence, [i.e.] containing [all perfections] unitively, which is a formal sort of primacy. And according to this aspect other things are truly attributed to him.

146 To the contrary: The aspect that is first conceived of and is the basis for demonstrating existence and all the other properties ought to be made the subject. But such is not this formal primacy, since this is proved apparently through other prior features that are established from effects.

147 [45] [Third doubt] Also, there is this third doubt: Why cannot metaphysics be ordered primarily to the cognition of the first being as end, and nevertheless be about being qua being as its subject matter, since matter and end do not coincide?

148 [Reply to the third doubt] I reply this is the case, because the matter, about which the science is principally concerned, is its end insofar as perfect knowledge or some concept of such is what we seek, if we presuppose what was said.

149 [Fourth doubt] Also there is this fourth doubt. Since a science of being qua being will be a science of the reasoned fact, why is this science of God only a science of the simple fact? And if there is something which makes metaphysics a science of the reasoned fact, why is it not also a science of the reasoned fact as regards God? For once the first property about him is given, could not the others—it seems—be proved of him as reasoned facts?

150 [Reply to the fourth doubt] I reply that the entire science of being qua being as a science of the reasoned fact is ordered to the science of God as a simple fact. Indeed, the metaphysics that is

possible for us at present is not primarily a reasoned-fact science about God. For his first property is always established as a simple fact. And though from this a second might be demonstrated as a reasoned fact, it would not be known as such in an unqualified sense, because its cognition would depend upon a simple factual knowledge of the first attribute.

151 Otherwise, one could say that the first attribute inferred of God as a simple fact is always more remote and posterior to his essence, because it is closer to the effect from which it was inferred, so that in regard to attributes one always proceeds according to demonstrations of the simple fact. An indication of this is that the Trinity which is existentially characteristic of this essence is never inferred from an effect.

152 [46] [Fifth doubt] Also there is this fifth doubt. If there is one notion of being in regard to God and other things, why cannot being be posited as the first subject under which are contained all things known whether they be God or other things?

153 [Reply to the fifth doubt] I reply, even granting that being is univocal, God will still be the principal subject here, because the science is not treated primarily for the knowledge of being as such. For then one would equally intend the knowledge of all things under being, because the science would be primarily concerned with knowing being in its entirety. Just as in other sciences, a genus is never held to be the principal subject if the science treats of the genus and its other species principally for the sake of one special species. But a genus is held to be the subject only when the science gives equal priority of treatment to all the species in order to have a knowledge of the genus insofar as it is knowable.

154 [47] [Sixth doubt] Also there is this sixth doubt. In this science we perceive nothing more particular of God's quiddity than that he is a being. Indeed, even when we say "first being," any particularization is by way of a description, like "risible animal." If metaphysics is about the concept we have of God as first being—a concept like "risible animal"—it follows that metaphysics is only about a being per accidens.

155 Also, the demonstration whereby "first" is demonstrated of "being" naturally presupposes a notion of "first being" to the extent

that this is known not to be false in itself. But this necessarily is to presuppose something about the subject, because otherwise one could claim [something nonsensical like] an inanimate animal is assumed to be the subject. Now this not only presupposes the subject has the being of existence but also that it has quidditative being. Hence, if one says that through metaphysics God's existence is established, if one understands this of his actual existence, this is not a demonstration; neither is the premise necessary. If this is understood of quidditative existence, however, this is true and thus the premise is not taken from the existence of some creature, but from some property inhering quidditatively, from which it follows that what is characteristic of being is "first" or "highest" or "most perfect" or "optimum." And from this it follows that the notion on which one imposes the name "God" is not something false in itself, and thus is a circumlocution for some essence or quiddity, and so God has entity quidditatively. But the demonstration inferring "first" of being, since it is particular, cannot be established through the nature of being. Therefore, every demonstration of a transcendent attribute of being is prior to this, as the universal is prior to the particular or as one means is prior to another or as every demonstration of number in general is prior to that whereby some number is proved to be first. Therefore, a entire transcendent metaphysics will be prior to the divine science, and there will be four theoretical sciences, one transcendent and three special sciences.

156[48] [Reply to sixth doubt] Against this: To demonstrate a universal and a particular conclusion of the same subject is the same sort of thing. This is granted. But what is the middle term of this demonstration? Every disjunctive attribute is characteristic of what is common and pertains to all—not precisely as common, but as characteristic of most cases; thus it is either the first being or the second, because beings are ordered. Therefore, some being is first. But if you wish to have a disjunctive attribute, provide the means of proving every being is first or second, it will be denied if the order is denied. But through what will such an order be proved except through special quiddities and thus not through being? Also, order presupposes a multitude, and through what will such a multitude be proved of beings?

157 Another way of providing a middle term, however, is as follows. This is undeniable, "Every being is either first or not first." Further, "this being—such as a stone—is not first; therefore it is a non-first. But every non-first being presupposes a first being." But what is the basis of this, for this must be proved from a primacy?—One may say that the first attributes of being are indemonstrable and are immediate propositions.

158 Whatever is to be said of this, if some special attribute is first shown of being, for instance, one, or wise, if it is not assumed to be transcendent, it will seem to be outside of metaphysics, because it presupposes the cognition of some special quiddities to which these attributes belong.

159 Hence, it pertains to the same science to demonstrate [1] the common simple attributes that are coextensive with the subject and [2] the attributes that are coextensive with the subject in disjunction and [3] and to establish by a particular demonstration the alternate portion of the attribute that is coextensive only in disjunction. And therefore, it is the task of metaphysics to demonstrate the attributes of being, such as one, true, etc., of being, if this can be done, and the first [i.e. the coextensive attributes] or the second [i.e., the disjunctive attributes] of being, and the existence of the first being. To demonstrate something of God as God and to consider the other separate substances in themselves, however, pertains to another particular science to the extent that they are partially knowable.

160 [49] On the contrary: the end of metaphysical knowledge is knowledge of being in the highest degree, and this is characteristic of the first being; therefore, it pertains to the metaphysician to consider the first being.—Also, happiness consists in the act of knowing metaphysically and sapientially, according to Bk. X of the *Ethics*,²¹¹ and this is found in knowledge of the first being; therefore, etc.

161 Hence, by rejecting the idea that there are four theoretical sciences and by assuming this science to be about God, all things naturally knowable of him will be transcendentals. The purpose of this science will be the perfect knowledge of being, which is knowl-

²¹¹Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 7, 1177a 12-b 13; ch. 8, 1178b 7-32; 1179a 22-32.

edge of the first being. But what first occurs to the intellect as most knowable is being in general, and from this will be established of the first being its primacy and other things in which this science culminates.

162 Note, however, that for the demonstration demonstrating the disjunctive attributes of some subject, that if some correlatives are distinguished—such as cause and caused, prior and posterior—from the premise which asserts one of these is in something, it follows that the other will be in another, not as to actual existence, but as to its quidditative being, [for a demonstration must be based on what is essential and not upon what may be contingent].

163 Note also that the physicist demonstrates that something moving is first and from this aspect shown to be true in itself, one shows a first mover that is immobile, incorruptible, etc. Therefore, metaphysics and natural science are about the same thing accidentally. But in regard to God natural science is more accidental, because the highest description of him to which it attains is more remote from the quiddity of God than the highest notion established by metaphysics—just as a science, like medicine, that treats of him as an organism, is accidental to man compared to a science that treats of him as man. Nevertheless, the same conclusions can be shown to be true of what is really the first being by both metaphysical and physical means,—just as the earth can be shown to be round by either physical or mathematical means. And this conclusion about the first being must be called metaphysical and physical—or it pertains in an unqualified sense to that science the means of whose proof is more immediate or *per se* with respect to such a conclusion. Just as the earth is simply round physically, because the medium of proving it as a reasoned fact is simply natural, whereas the mathematical means is not proof of the reasoned fact. But who will prove that the same thing is both the first mover and the first being? The metaphysician, according to Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*:²¹² “There is nothing to prevent the same thing being a man and being a white man.”}}

²¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4, 1007a 11.

QUESTION TWO

Text of Aristotle: "All men desire to know. An indication of this is the delight we take in our senses; for even apart from their usefulness they are loved for themselves; and above all others the sense of sight. For not only with a view to action, but even when we are not going to do anything, we prefer seeing (one might say) to everything else. The reason is that this, most of all the senses, makes us known and brings to light many differences between things." (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 23-26).

Do all men naturally desire to know?

1 [1] Is this true: "All men naturally desire to know?"¹

[Arguments Pro and Con]

[For the negative] I prove that it is not true: For if it were, then they would naturally know that they know. The implication is evident, because nothing is desired unless it is known, according to *On the Trinity* IX, ch. 4.²

2 Also, if this were true, then if the impediment were removed, all would know. The implication is evident in the case of fire, because it naturally is inclined to move upward, and immediately does so if it is outside of its proper place and there is nothing to stop it.

3 Also, if this were true, then no one would have scientific knowledge, or at least if they had it, they would not desire it, since "desire exists only in regard to what is not possessed."³

4 Also, some want to remain ignorant, because some ignorance is affected.

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 23-26.

²Augustine, *De Trinitate* X, ch. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 974; CCL 50, 315).

³Cf. Augustine, *Enarrat. in psalmos* ps. 118, sermo 8, n. 4 (CCL 40, 1688; PL 37, 1522): "Desiderium ergo quid est, nisi rerum absentium concupiscentia"; *Sermo* 177 (ed. C. Lambot p. 68; PL 38, 956): "Desiderium est dicendum eius rei non quam habent, sed quam volunt habere".

5 [Arguments of Henry of Ghent] Also, there are the arguments of Henry of Ghent in his *Summa*:⁴ Nothing is wanted except under the aspect of the good; therefore, appetite is not naturally inclined towards truth.

6 Also, will is distinguished from nature.

7 Also, [each] nature is determined to one single thing; therefore, [the human intellect qua nature] would only wish to know only one thing.

8 [Reply of Henry to the aforesaid arguments] To the first:⁵ To know is something advantageous to the intellect.

9 To the second,⁶ this is true of the will insofar as it is free.

10 To the third,⁷ [the human intellect] is determined to one genus. Just as matter is determined to whatever has the characteristic of a form, so the intellect is with respect to knowing. It is like fire, which is determined to rise in general but not determined to just this single instance.

11 [For the positive] For the contrary view there is the text of the Philosopher.⁸

[I.—ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE PROOF OF ARISTOTLE]

12 [2] Against the proof of the Philosopher⁹ that we do not love most of all the sense of sight, there is this proof. That sense is most loved the opposite of which we hate most of all, according to the *Prior Analytics*,¹⁰ in chapter [beginning with the words] “When the extremes are converted”, where the last rule states: “That is sought the more whose opposite we shun the more. “But we hate the opposite of touch more than the opposite of vision, because the opposite of touch destroys an animal, but not the opposite of vision; therefore, etc.

⁴Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 4, q. 3 (ed. Paris, fol. 31 L).

⁵Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 4, q. 3 ad 1 (I fol. 32P;; cf. supra, n. 5).

⁶Ibid., ad 4, fol. 32 R; cf. supra, n. 6.

⁷Ibid., ad 2, fol. 32 Q; cf. supra, n. 7.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 21-25.

⁹“Signum autem est sensuum dilectio”; cf. preceding note.

¹⁰Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, ch. 22, 68a 25-68b 7.

13 Also, against the statement that vision gives us the greatest knowledge there is what the Philosopher says in *On the Senses and the Sensibilia*¹¹ about those born blind with hearing being wiser than those with vision born deaf. Hence, if the sense of sight is loved more because it is more cognitive in the sense that it leads to scientific knowledge, then it follows that hearing is even more to be loved. But if one is not speaking of knowledge in an unqualified sense, then it seems that this is not relevant to our proposed thesis, because from this one ought to conclude that we naturally desire to know.

14 Also, in his sermon on the Passover, Leo¹² prefers the touch of Thomas to vision as regards certitude of knowledge.—I reply: as regards the proper object of both senses this is not true, although, perhaps, it might be true so far as experiencing the body of Christ is concerned.

15 Also, against the statement that vision shows us several differences¹³ there is the fact that touch shows us several things as well, because touch can discriminate between two contraries whereas sight [deals with but] one.

16 Also, the Philosopher, in Bk. II *On Generation and Corruption*,¹⁴ says that the first qualities are tangible *per se*. Now the later things are not discovered before the earlier things are known. Therefore, wherever a visible quality is to be found, there also is something tangible, but not vice versa. Hence, touch shows us more differences than vision does.

¹¹Aristotle, *De sensu et sensato*, c. 1, 437a 16-17.

¹²Leo, *Tract.* 34 n. 3 (CCL 138, 182-183; PL 54, 247A): "Et haec quidem, quantum ad illuminationem fidei pertinebat, potuerunt illis credita et intellecta sufficere, ut corporali intuitu non inquirerent quod plenissimo visu mentis inspexerant... ut sicut omnibus nobis profuit quod post resurrectionem Domini vestigia vulnerum in carne eius Thomae apostoli exploravit manus, ita ad nostram utilitatem proficeret, quod infantiam ipsius magorum probavit aspectus"; *Tract.* 73 n. 3 (CCL 138A, 452; PL 54, 396A): "... ad sananda infidelium cordium vulnera, clavorum et lanceae erant servata vestigia, ut non dubia fide, sed constantissima scientia teneretur."

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 27; Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* I, lect. 1, n. 8. ed. Parma XX, .

¹⁴Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, ch. 2, 329b 9-15.

[II.—REPLY TO THE QUESTION]

17 [3] Response to the question. The truth of the first proposition is evident from what was said in the introduction.¹⁵

18 {{Note that so far as the order in which the truth of what is knowable is investigated, before one asks about knowables it is necessary to inquire about the method of knowing, according to Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*,¹⁶ and prior to this whether it is possible and necessary to know scientifically those knowables that will be specified. And even before this, can we know anything, or know everything? And how? And prior to this, can we know that we do or can know something? For if we could not establish this scientifically, it would be useless to ask whether we could know. For this question is not knowable, contrary to Bk II of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁷ And even before all these there is the more general question of whether we can know, i.e., whether we can have certain and infallible knowledge about our own acts, and which ones? Or about our own existence? Or whether we are alive and awake. And about simple intellectual awareness? And about knowing, believing, doubting and opining and about other acts of the intellect? And about willing and nilling and other acts of the will? And about sensing and imagining, etc.? And about acts of moving and vegetative acts, etc.?

19 [4] In general it seems scientific knowledge of all these things is out of the question, because they are all contingent facts; therefore, there can be no scientific certitude that they are true.

20 Also, whatever is assumed to be the case, by what means will we know about these things with the exception of being alive? Also, when are they in us and when are they not, as in sleep?

21 Also, by what faculty are they known? Not by the intellect, because they are singular. Not by the senses, as is clear in the case of many of these things.

¹⁵Cf. *supra*, Bk. I, prologue, nn. 2-4, 8-15.

¹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 3, 995a 13-15.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 1-2, 89b 23-90a 34.

22 Also, from what are these things known? Is it from their essence—and against this look at the questions about the intellect¹⁸—or is it from their species? And how do the species of many things known come to the intellect if their sense images were never in the senses?—If you say they are known by experience, then—as we argued before—it is either from their essence or their species.

23 Also, if it were certain that these acts existed, the same evidence would indicate the sort of things they were, and thus it would always be certain which intellection and which sense perception was true and which was false.

24 On the contrary: there is what Augustine says in Bk. XV of *On the Trinity*,¹⁹ about being alive. And about being awake, there is what Aristotle says in Bk. IV of this work:²⁰ “There are those indeed who doubt,” etc. Such doubts are unreasonable and are like puzzling over whether one is asleep or awake. For they are looking for a starting point by way of demonstration.²¹ As for believing, there is what Augustine says in Bk. XIII of *On the Trinity*, chs. 1 and 2.²² As for doubting, there are his statements in Bk. XV of *On the Trinity*.²³

25 It seems one must assume the certitude about many of these things, and this because they are primary, indemonstrable and known *per se*. For there are some contingent propositions that are as primary in their own way as these necessary propositions are. And this is what Aristotle wants to say in Bk. IV of this work, cited above,²⁴ where he likens these to the principles of demonstration.}}

26 [5] To the solution of this question, however, keep in mind that according to Bk. II of the *Physics*²⁵ one proof that nature acts for the sake of an end is that otherwise there would be no mistakes

¹⁸Cf. *infra*, Bk. II, qq. 2-3, nn. 67-75.

¹⁹Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 12, n. 21 (PL 42, 1075; CCL 50, 493).

²⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 6, 1011a 2-11.

²¹Here four manuscripts (three in the margins) append the following text: “To the contrary: While awake Peter thought what he saw was a vision.”

²²Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 1, n. 3, ch. 2, n. 5 (PL 42, 1014-1015; CCL 50, 383-387).

²³Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 15, n. 24 (PL 42, 1077; CCL 50, 497).

²⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

²⁵Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 6, 197b 22-27.

occurring there, nor would it act in vain. Therefore, an end was intended, and hence it was sought, and nevertheless there was no knowledge of such. Consequently, there exists some appetite where there is no knowledge. And since perfection is somehow the end of what is perfectible, according to Bk. II of the *Physics*,²⁶ for it is also the end of the movement, consequently natural desire is assumed to exist in the perfectible with respect to its perfection. Hence, there is a natural desire in everything that is ordered to some end other than itself and in those things that are perfectible by a perfection that is different from their essence.

27 From this standpoint, then, the proofs for this proposition set forth above in the prologue proceed.²⁷

28 Nevertheless, all these arguments of Thomas²⁸ presented above seem to show that this desire pertains to the intellect itself.

[III.—THE OPINION OF HENRY OF GHENT
A.—EXPOSITION OF HENRY'S OPINION]

29 On the contrary: Henry, in the *Summa*²⁹ in answer to the third objection, argued that, if the act is specifically the same and the object is specifically the same, it seems these pertain to the same potency. The desire that precedes knowledge and that which follows it is specifically the same act and concerns the same object or good; therefore, etc.

30 Also, in the solution:³⁰ a superior mover looks to a universal end, and its role is to move and incline lesser movers to their actions and purposes. Hence, the will inclines the other powers to their respective ends, but this it cannot do if it does not desire those ends.

31 Also, in Bk. XV of *On the Trinity*, ch. 7:³¹ The will wills itself and other things, just as the intellect knows itself and other

²⁶Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 2, 194a 27-30.

²⁷Cf. supra, Bk. I, prologue, nn. 2-15.

²⁸Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* I, lect. 1, ed. Parma XX, 247a-248a; cf. supra, prol. nn. 5-7.

²⁹Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 4, q. 3, ad 4 (I, fol. 32R).

³⁰Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 4, q. 1, resp. (I, fol. 30B).

³¹Augustine, *De Trinitate* XV, ch. 6, n. 10 (PL 42, 1065; CCL 50, 474); cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 4, q. 1 (I, fol. 31E).

things.—To this I answer: this is about an elicited volition which is an act of one part of the [soul as an] image [of the Trinity], and not about natural volition [which is an inclination and not an elicited act] about which we are now speaking.

[B.—AGAINST THE OPINION OF HENRY OF GHENT]

32 [6] I argue against the Ghentian as follows: Natural desire follows every nature ordered to an end other than itself and that is perfectible by a perfection other than itself. Therefore, this desire stems from something common to all natures. Hence, it cannot be assumed to be the will.

33 Also, the intellect, if it were to exist without the will, would be perfectible and would be ordered to such an end [and, hence, would have a natural desire for what perfects it].

34 Also, it seems the soul naturally desires to be united to the body. This desire is immediately in the essence of the soul, because it is united immediately in this way.

35 These reasons are conceded, for not every desire in man is a function only of the will. And nevertheless the will naturally desires primarily its perfection, and afterwards there is a desire for all those things without which it can have no perfection. Hence, man naturally desires himself, first by the intellect and then through the will.

36 Therefore, one must answer the arguments of Henry of Ghent. As for the first,³² the minor is false, namely, that it [desire] is an act. Also, it [the desire] is only for an advantageous good, and it does not stem from a potency with respect to an object, because there is no such potency. The relationship is that of something to its natural end. What is the “desire” of a heavy object? Is it heaviness? Is the relationship the potency or is it another relation? Study this case.

37 To the major of the second argument.³³ The higher mover does not incline the lower movers against nature; therefore, it inclines

³²Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 30.

them in accord with their nature. Hence, in those things there is a natural inclination to that to which they are inclined by the higher mover, and consequently they, and not the higher nature, desire. Furthermore, when it is said, "this it cannot do if it does not desire those ends," this is false. For then God would naturally desire the perfections of creatures or, if it were not he—because he only moves voluntarily—then the sun would naturally desire the perfection of the particular agent, which seems false. For then, if that agent did not achieve its perfection, the sun would seem to be less perfect. For the failure to attain what is desired by an elicited desire—whether it be in oneself or in another—and in the manner desired, saddens the one desiring this, and so it seems that the failure to attain what is naturally desired, either in itself or in another, would imply some imperfection in the one desiring this. But the sun is not imperfect, if some inferior agent fails to attain its end. Therefore, the end of the inferior mover is the end the superior wants, not something perfecting it, just as we are the end of creatures.³⁴ Now there is no natural desire for an end of this sort, but only for an end that perfects one.

[IV.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS FOR THE CONTRARY VIEW]

38 [7] To the first initial argument for the opposite view,³⁵ it must be said that the implication would hold if this desire to know were an elicited act of the will itself. But it is not. What is more, this desire to know is a certain natural inclination of the intellect, which naturally delights in knowledge when it has it, just as any potency has a natural inclination towards its perfection and delights in it when it possesses it.

39 However, there is a doubt about what is said about delight,³⁶ although Avicenna may have said that in Bk. VIII of his *Metaphysics*, the last chapter:³⁷ "If you know that the full delight of any virtue is the acquisition of its perfection," etc.—Also,

³⁴Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 2, 194a 34-35.

³⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

³⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 38.

³⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VIII, ch. 7, AvIL 433.

delight perfects the operation as an inseparable accident; therefore, it is in the same subject.

Reply: every delight is the attribute of an appetitive virtue that is perceived as pleasing.³⁸

40 On the contrary: How then is what violently corrupts delightful?³⁹—Reply: it does not delight one according to the will, but according to some proper appetitive potency that follows touch. For to every apprehensive potency there corresponds its own appetitive potency that elicits an act of appetition, which is not just a natural appetite. Neither is there any delight associated with this natural appetite. For the stone does not delight to move downward. Hence delight only seems to be characteristic of an elicited desire. Consequently, not only is there doubt about natural desire⁴⁰—which is our thesis—but it is also irrelevant.

When it is said⁴¹ that “nothing is desired unless it is known,” this is true only of the desire elicited by the will. For the will’s natural volition is no different from that of a stone. The will of the damned does not elicit some act of love towards God, whom they naturally love, nor does the will of an infant have an elicited act as regards happiness. However, some volition elicited by the will, presupposing cognition, can be called natural, because it is in accord with the inclination of nature, just as some volition is called virtuous, because it is in accord with the inclination to virtue. But this is not the most proper sense in which natural desire is in the will.

41 [8] To the second argument:⁴² what it says is true of the desire which follows the form and the first perfection, but it is not true of the desire that precedes the first form. And note the equivocal meaning of “potency” and “desire” above in the lecture.⁴³

³⁸Damascene, *De fide orth.* ch. 36 [II c. 22] (ed. E. Buytaert, FIP t. s. VIII 132; PG 94, 940): “Passio est motus appetitivae virtutis”; cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 15, q. un., nn. [8-17] (ed. Vives XIV 572-586).

³⁹Cf. Augustine on a virgin violated by rape; *De civ. Dei* I, ch. 19 (PL 41, 32-34; CCL 47, 20-22).

⁴⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

⁴¹Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

⁴²Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

⁴³Cf. *supra*, n. 38-39; see also Bk. I, prologue n. 9.

42 To the third:⁴⁴ it must be said that the proposition is understood of every man considered as such, just as the soul as such is always bare of any knowledge, and thus the consequent is true that not all men know considered simply in themselves.

43 Or another answer⁴⁵ would be that desire exists also with respect to what is habitual, lest disgust develop, as the Gloss on I Peter [v. 12] puts it: *On whom the angels desire to look*.⁴⁶ That gloss speaks of a desire that is an elicited act of the will and that perhaps does not remain once what is desired is attained, according to Bk. IX of *On the Trinity*, the last chapter:⁴⁷ "The appetite of the gaping mouth becomes the love of the one who has it in his mouth." It is doubtful which of these occurs. Is it like the imperfect that becomes perfect while remaining the same in substance? Or does the desire perish, because it is like an actual movement which ceases when the goal is reached? But the natural desire does not perish, when what it wants is possessed, because then it would be a principle that seeks its own demise, as is said of privation in Bk. I of the *Physics*.⁴⁸ Hence, this natural desire seems to be completely identical with natural love. This is evident, because the Philosopher⁴⁹ proves the first proposition from the natural desire of the senses, whereby we do not seek only what is not had, but we love what we have as well.

44 To the fourth,⁵⁰ it must be said that these two coexist, namely that man naturally desires to know and nevertheless he actually and voluntarily wills the contrary. For in us the will in its liberty can go against the natural inclination, never to the extent that it can will not to know, but accidentally. For by an elicited act, the will can prefer not to know something it is inclined to know naturally and can choose to be lazy or to have no remorse of conscience about doing nothing.

⁴⁴Cf. supra, n. 3.

⁴⁵Another answer to the third argument; cf. supra, n. 3.

⁴⁶*Glossa ordin.* I Pet. 1, 12 (apud Nicolaum de Lyra, VI col. 1311); cf. Bede, *In I Petr.*, v. 12 (PL 93, 45); one manuscript here reports the words of the Gloss.

⁴⁷Augustine, *De Trinitate* IX, ch. 12, n. 18, (PL 42, 972; CCL 50, 310); two manuscripts here complete the text of Augustine.

⁴⁸Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 9, 192b 18-22.

⁴⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 21-22.

⁵⁰Cf. supra, n. 4.

[V.—TO THE ARGUMENTS ADDUCED AGAINST ARISTOTLE'S
PROOF]

45 [9] As for the other—against the sign of this natural desire that Aristotle gives⁵¹—it must be said that the rule does not apply in this instance, because:⁵² “it is better to live well than to simply live.” And nevertheless we hate more the opposite of living than we do the opposite of living well, because the opposite of living negates both living and living well. Hence, the Philosopher in Bk. VII of the *Topics*⁵³ glosses that proposition in this way: “Unless one implies the other.” And he has in mind that this rule does not hold when what is wanted more includes what is wanted less. And this is so in the example given, for to live well includes to live. And it is the same way in the question at issue, for the sense of sight includes the sense of touch and the opposite of the sense of touch destroys both touch and vision.

46 To the other,⁵⁴ one must say that vision is more conducive to knowledge *per se* or to scientific knowledge that is attained through discovery, which is what the Philosopher had in mind here.⁵⁵ And to the Philosopher one must say that what he had in mind was that hearing alone accidentally contributed more to knowledge or to science through teaching inasmuch as the audible voice which moves the hearer is significative of concepts. And this is something accidental to voice inasmuch as it moves the hearer. If the same sounds were uttered as they are now, and there were no signs instituted to signify concepts, hearing such would be of no help in learning. If visible signs were imposed to signify all concepts, as many monks have done in regard to many things, then vision would contribute to scientific knowledge in the same way that hearing does now. But vocal sounds are most ready signs and it was for this reason that speech was given to men, according to Bk. II of *On the Soul*.⁵⁶ And so it is clear how sound contributes accidentally to

⁵¹Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

⁵²Aristotle, *Topics* III, ch. 2, 118a 7.

⁵³Aristotle, *Topics* VII, ch. 1, 152a 27-30.

⁵⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

⁵⁵Aristotle, *De sensu et sensato*, ch. 1, 437a 16-17.

⁵⁶Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 8, 420b 20-32.

knowledge, because its object from its institution was made a sign of the concept. Through such institution nothing was added to it. Hence it is only accidentally that hearing contributes more to knowing, whereas vision does so *per se* and directly, by the mediation of the natural light of the intellect.

47 [10] To the other argument:⁵⁷ it is true that touch reveals two contraries where vision reveals but one. And from this it follows, perhaps, that touch is not simply a matter of one sense. However, from this it does not follow that touch reveals several differences of things. Because the object of vision itself, namely, light and color, is found in more bodies than all the tangible qualities, even if they were a thousand. And because we know substances through their accidental features and the object of vision is found in more bodies than the object of touch or that of any of the other particular senses, it follows that vision reveals more things and is more conducive to scientific knowledge, and hence is loved more.

48 To the last argument,⁵⁸ one can say that it is true when the prior is of the essence of the posterior, as animal is of the essence of man. But this is not the case in the issue at hand, for the first, [i.e., the tangible] qualities, are not of the essence of light. Also those tangible qualities are not first in an unqualified sense, but they are the first qualities with respect to what can receive these, viz., light and color, and these are the terrestrial bodies. Therefore, it is simply bad to adduce this authority here, for it says there, that what it looks for are the principles of sensible bodies and what is sought is something tangible. Therefore, only contrarities according to touch are what differentiate the various species of bodies, which is what is intended there. And after that it says:⁵⁹ "Yet vision is prior to touch, so that its subject (i.e., its object) is also prior. But the object of vision is a quality of tangible body not qua tangible, but under another aspect—qua something that may well be naturally prior to the object of touch," namely, according to some nature common to both a body that can be generated—which is

⁵⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

⁵⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

⁵⁹Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, ch. 2, 329b 12-16.

what was intended here—and to a celestial body, whose nature, perhaps, is to be translucent.

QUESTION THREE

Text of Aristotle: "From sensation memory comes into being in some animals but not in others. Because of this animals which can remember are more prudent or more apt at learning than animals which cannot remember" (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 25-b 5).

Do animals possess prudence?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] For the negative:

Prudence is right reason about what is to be done, according to Bk. VI of the *Ethics*, ch. 5.¹ But brute animals do not have reason.²

2 Prudence includes providing for the future on the basis of a memory of the past, which is possible only by comparing the past with the future; but to compare is the work of reason itself.

3 They [animals] know nothing except through the senses, but the senses have to do *per se* with only the proper and common sensibles; neither the harmful nor the useful, however, with which prudence is concerned, are proper or common sensibles; therefore, etc.

4 [For the affirmative] The Philosopher holds the opposite in the text cited above.³

[I. —BODY OF THE QUESTION]

5 [2] I reply that prudence exists in brutes only metaphorically, and has to do with those things which are sought after or avoided by natural instinct, like a lamb following its mother and fleeing from the wolf, or a swallow building a nest or an ant collecting

¹Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, ch. 5, 1140b 3-4; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 240: "Prudentia est recta ratio agibilium."

²Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* I, lect. 1, ed. Parma XX, 249a, where the two following arguments can be found.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 225-b5.

grain for the winter. Now [a] these things do not stem from memory, for how can an ant, born during the summer, remember the winter? And still it collects grain. But memory, according to our text here,⁴ is part of prudence. Also [b] these things which occur by natural instinct necessarily pertain to the entire species, and behavior in these matters does not vary from individual to individual.

6 But in us, prudence is a deliberative habit, not about the end aimed at, but about the means or ways of getting there, and it concerns not what has to be done of necessity, but with what can be done contingently [one way or another]. And so also in animals, it concerns something which could be otherwise, for instance, that [grain] could be gathered in this place or that, or from this heap or that, and from a memory of the place where it had placed it, or the heap from which it first gathered it. Or the spider builds its web in a place where there is a greater abundance of flies, or the swallow constructs its nest where it is more difficult to get to.⁵

[II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

7 As for the arguments, then, I say to the first⁶ that it is clear that the definition given is that of prudence properly so-called.

8 To the other,⁷ as the text says,⁸ experience plays a small role and as animals somehow have experiential knowledge, so they can in some way compare things, although theirs is not the sort that is characteristic of reasoning, which moves from the known to the unknown by means of discourse.

9 As for the third,⁹ by means of internal sense knowledge, some things can be known that are unknown to the external senses, although perhaps the likeness or image was in the external sense; as some¹⁰ assume to be the case with the cognition of substance by

⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980b 25-26.

⁵Cf. Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 8, 199a 26-30 for comparable examples.

⁶Cf. supra, n. 1.

⁷Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980b 27.

⁹Cf. supra, n. 3.

¹⁰Cf. Roger Bacon, *De multiplicatione specierum* p. 1, ch. 2, ed. D. Lindberg, p. 22: "Ergo substantia generat suam speciem in principio, sicut accidens"; *ibid.* (p. 24):

the intellect (which no sense is able to grasp) even though, according to some teachers, substance transmits its likeness along with that of the accidents. That the senses do not “know” substance in virtue of that species or likeness is because there is a deficiency in their cognitive power, not because there is something lacking in the representative power of the species, just as color is not seen in the medium itself, though the color species is there.

[III.—ARGUMENTS CONCERNING THE ABILITY OF ANIMALS TO COMPARE THE PAST WITH THE FUTURE]

10 [3] Against the answer given to the second argument:¹¹ [some object that] many animals accomplish things by knowing in the same way that things are done by a reasoning man on the basis of his knowledge. Hence, they seem to have the same sort of knowledge.—The antecedent is evident. As a man argues by syllogizing thus “By a shorter way one gets to what we want; this is the shorter way; therefore, etc.” And on the basis of this sort of reasoning process, a man chooses the quickest way to obtain something. In a similar fashion, the dog seems to pursue the hare, and so with other things.

11 To this it is said that, although there is a certain similarity in the way both man and the animal act, nevertheless, this does not mean that their knowledge is similar, for a man acts from deliberation; and that which he elicits after deliberating could also be arrived at without deliberation and from the sense appetite alone. And while the exterior acts of both resemble each other, both would not be masters of their actions in the same way.

12 Against this: then brutes could act in a like fashion as if they had prudence or compared the past with the future, although they possessed nothing of the sort. For the ant provides against the winter, as if it knew the winter was coming; but since this does not seem

“... substantia facit speciem sensibilem, non tamen a sensibus exterioribus quinque nec a sensu communi... Unde bene potest anima sensitiva percipere substantiam per speciem suam, ut nunc dictum est, licet pauci considerent hoc, cum velit vulgus naturalium quod substantialis forma non immutet sensum”; Ioannes Pecham, *Quodl. II* q. 7-8 (BFS XXV 95): “Totum enim individuum multiplicat speciem suam in medio.”

¹¹Cf. supra, n. 8.

to be a case of “knowing,” since nothing is known of the thing in itself, but only in its cause, and what passes for knowledge is necessary, if it is necessary that it occur, or contingent, if it happens contingently. Therefore, it does not seem that the future is future to it, if it could know it necessarily or probably conjecture about it from its causes. But cognition of an effect through its cause is by inference properly so-called, which brutes are denied to possess; therefore the prudence which is present in animals in this fashion does not seem to be a case of providing for the future on the basis of a memory of the past.

[IV.—A LATER RESPONSE]

13 {{I reply that this could be admitted, viz., that where any action is involved, they do not act but are rather acted upon,¹² and therefore they are not properly speaking masters of their acts, nor do they provide for the future on the basis of a memory of the past, but they seem to act by reason of their natures as if they were moved to act in this way [by prudence].

14 [4] Against this reply: How could Aristotle¹³ assume there were some degrees of knowledge in brutes?—I reply that in all truth, all brutes lack provision for the future based upon knowledge. But among animals some know only the present and have no instinct about what is to be done that would be useful for the future. Others, however, have along with such present knowledge an instinct about how to act as though they were providing for the future, but for all that, they act necessarily and not out of any precognition, nor is there any freedom; hence we have only the appearance of prudence in their case.

¹²Cf. Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 41 (ed. E. Buytaert, FIP t. s. VIII, 153; PG 94, 960).

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980b 20-28; according to the expositors of Aristotle, there are three grades of cognition in various animals, cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* I, lect. 1, ed. Parma XX, 249a: “Patet igitur tres esse gradus cognitionis in animalibus. Primus est eorum, quae nec auditum nec memoriam habent; unde nec disciplinabilia sunt nec prudentia. Secundus est eorum quae habent memoriam, sed non auditum; unde sunt prudentia et non disciplinabilia. Tertius est eorum quae utrumque habent, et sunt prudentia et disciplinabilia”.

15 But then you might ask: Why does such behavior not follow the entire species?¹⁴—I reply that the difference in behavior results from the [different] sense [knowledge], for instance, to collect grains from this pile and to store them in that place. But what is uniform about their behavior stems from an instinct of their nature, for instance, simply to collect as though providing for [the future]. Hence, the sense serves natural instinct.

16 But on this explanation, it would seem to follow that prudence is less involved with what is not uniform than with what is uniform, because no one postulates prudence in the case of sense perception, but according to the situation as explained, what departs from the uniformity in the behavior of the animal pertains precisely to its sense perceptual knowledge.

17 There seems to be another way of saving what Aristotle has in mind, because in the passage cited above he never speaks about providing for the future, but only of memory, and from this he concludes [as the text cited puts it]¹⁵ “because of this animals which can remember are more prudent,” as if they had no higher degree of knowledge than remembering.

18 [5] We must also note that here he does not distinguish between the phantasy [or imagination] and memory, nor between sense and the estimative ability; and to every apprehensive potency there is a corresponding appetitive one. Consequently, every animal has a twofold appetite: one sensitive, the other estimative. Therefore every animal, as well as having sense, has some evaluation [of what is harmful or useful].

19 But where these powers or virtues are present without retentive powers, no desire or appetition is present either; neither is there any awareness of what is suitable or what is appropriate to one nature at the level of sense knowledge. Nor is there any sense knowledge that pertains to the estimative power except when something sensible is present to it. But going after merely what is present cannot be called being prudent, nor does such action even have the semblance of prudence.

¹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980b 21.

20 As for animals, however, that have an imagination retentive of sensible species and a memory that retains the species of an agreeable or desirable situation once present in the estimative power, if—when that sensible object is no longer present—such an animal will actually imagine it, it will also actually imagine it as agreeable. And though the imaginative appetite does not impel action, perhaps, because what is imagined is not delectable to the sense, nevertheless, if it is agreeable to the nature of the animal, it will impel the appetite of the estimative faculty. And thus from such a memory, evaluation, and desire, it will go after what is absent; not as something delectable to the senses, but as agreeable to its nature. And in this respect, the act of the brute animal most resembles the act of prudence in us, because so far as the execution goes, they [the acts of the animal and man] are similar.

21 Now, if we were to go after something not out of prudence, but after we had perceived something to be suitable, and after a long deliberation we had determined it to be appropriate, and if we were to pursue it in this way, not because we find it delightful, then nothing seems to be missing in the animal behavior except this lack of deliberation. But it is not on this score that the way one seeks such is dissimilar. For as we said before,¹⁶ we do many things without deliberation, but we act as if we had deliberated. The greatest degree of similarity occurs if something agreeable or suitable is not for immediate use at the time we seek it, but for the future; for then we seem to be providing. In animals, however, this never occurs because of a knowledge of the future, but rather because of knowledge about something present or past that is now present in the estimative power.

22[6] [Objection and reply] But against this one can object as follows: Why does it happen to animals that one phantasm moves them rather than another?—I reply that this one impressed itself more forcibly upon the phantasy or sense imagination and when the external sense stimulation ceased somewhat, this was the first recalled.

23 [Other objections] Also, it is argued. Why is the phantasy and estimative powers moved at other times and not now? In winter the

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

ant does not collect grain.¹⁷—Also, why does the dolphin flee before the storm, given the fact that it did not sense the storm earlier?¹⁸—Also, whenever the external stimulation of the senses quieted down, the phantasy and the estimative powers should impel one to act, and any animal would always do the same.—Also, why is not the past perceived as past, or at least as present, in the way it pertains to the phantasy or imagination to know things?—Look for the solution to these problems elsewhere.}}¹⁹

¹⁷The following answer is inserted in three manuscripts: “Dicendum quod vel instinctu agentis in aestate, non in hieme; vel si ex memoria aestimati simul fuit in memoria per multum tempus, quod non aestimat modo nec sentit esse, similiter oportet simul esse in sensu derelicto temporis.”

¹⁸The following answer is inserted in two manuscripts: “Dico quod vel instinctu naturae vel aliquid sentit in se mutare.”

¹⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 45, q. 3, nn. [7-19] (ed. Vives XX, 329a-350b); the following note is appended to the question in four manuscripts: “Nota quod bruta non habent memoriam, quia non apprehendunt aliquid nisi cuius speciem habent apud se, et hoc non in quantum praeteritum; memoria autem est respectu actus praeteriti ut praeteritum, sicut respectu primi obiecti, quod non convenit brutis.”

QUESTION FOUR

Text of Aristotle: "Science and art come to men through experience, for 'experience produced art,' as Polus rightly says, 'but inexperience luck'." (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 1-5)

Is art the fruit of experience?

1 [1] Does experience produce art as the Philosopher seems to say in the text?¹

[Arguments Pro and Con]

That it does not:

According to the Philosopher in the text,² to have knowledge of many individual instances of something is a matter of experience, but to have knowledge of it in all cases is a matter of art. But from many cases one cannot conclude to all, but this is [a fallacy of] the consequent [according to the statement above]; therefore, etc.

2 Also, according to the text,³ men of experience know the simple fact that something is so, but those who possess the art know the reasoned fact. But from a knowledge of the simple fact one cannot infer knowledge of the reasoned fact.

3 Also, if from many experiences art was produced, then I ask: What kind of cause is expressed by the word "from"? It is surely not the formal or the final cause. Hence, it must be either the material or the efficient cause. Now it is not the material, because matter is a part of the thing and remains after a thing has been made. Experimental knowledge is of individuals, which is not a part of the universal knowledge that art gives. Neither is it the second, for then art either stems from an univocal efficient cause, and the effect and cause would be of the same species, which is false; or art

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 5.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 6-14.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 29-30.

stems from an equivocal cause, and then the efficient cause would be more noble than the effect, which is also false, because art is more noble than experience.

4 Also, according to the opinion of Plato,⁴ art and science are in man by nature; therefore, art is not produced in this way from experience. Proof of the antecedent is that Plato⁵ asked a boy who had never been taught about the art of geometry. When the lad was asked about geometric principles and conclusions he answered all correctly. But then it is argued: No one responds rightly to what he is ignorant of. Now this boy responded correctly to the right questions, and yet he had never been taught this; therefore, etc.

5 [2] Also, it does not seem from the text⁶ that art is generated by a single experience—just as experience does not stem from one memory, therefore, it has to be from many. But many experiences of the same sort are simply knowledge of many singular instances of the same kind. These cognitions, since they are accidents of the same species, cannot simultaneously exist in the same experiencing potency, namely, some cognitive or other faculty, whatever it might be. Therefore, art can never be generated from experiences, since several cannot coexist; therefore, etc.

6 Also, Augustine, in his *Eighty-three Questions* q. 9,⁷ says: “Truth in any genuine sense is not something to be expected from the bodily senses.” He proves this first because every sensible is continually changeable; but from such there is no certain sense perception, and if such be the case, experience would never come from such, and hence neither would any art.

7 Also, Augustine, in the same place,⁸ argues secondly that since all sensibles are sensed through a species [of the object], the sense cannot perceive whether or not it is affected by a true object, or only by its species. But one must not expect certain truth from any perceptual potency that cannot distinguish between a true or false

⁴Plato, *Meno* (81d-84); cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 15, n. 24 (PL 42, 1011; CCL 50, 377-378).

⁵Plato, *Meno* (81d-84).

⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 6-7.

⁷Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 9 (PL 40, 13; CCL 44A, 16).

⁸*Ibid.*

object. Therefore, from experimental sense knowledge one will never have any certain universal cognition, such as art is.

8 The Philosopher maintains the opposite in the text cited, as well as in the *Posterior Analytics* II, the last chapter,⁹ where he assumes art is produced by the same method as he suggests here.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

9[3] We have to say that science is produced in two ways, namely, by discovery and by teaching, but science by way of discovery is prior. For no one teaches unless he has learned either through teaching or through discovery. And if it is through teaching, he still has such learning through someone who first knew this in the other way.

10 These two methods of knowing are illustrated in the case of healing. For sometimes nature is so potent that without any external help it induces healing. At other times, external help is needed, but still this extrinsic aid is only an instrument, and nature is still the principal healer.

11 Thus in certain persons, the natural light of the intellect is so potent that it suffices of itself to apply principles to conclusions and then scientific knowledge is acquired by discovery. At other times it cannot do this, and then it is helped by certain sensible signs proposed to it by a teacher, through which the teacher makes an application of what he knows. And the learner grasps this and in virtue of his own lights he consents to the conclusion, which he sees as following from principles that he himself knew of before. The Philosopher here limits the production of scientific knowledge to invention.

{But this is not correct, namely, that it is only limited here to this, because a learner cannot learn unless he knows what meaning has been given to the signs that the teacher shows him, and unless he grasps in some way to what they refer. Therefore, what he needs first is sense cognition so far as simple apprehension is

⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980b 30-981a 11; *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 19, 100a 3-b 17.

concerned, as well as with regards to knowledge of such principles as the occasion warrants, and also with regard to knowledge that the conclusion is in fact true. For unless he would know this from experience, he would only believe it because the teacher tells him of it. For he will not know this either as a simple fact or as a reasoned fact until it is demonstrated to him. And such faith suffices to learn a demonstrative proof from another rather than to discover this for oneself. Because one will never discover anything *per se*, perhaps, unless certain factual knowledge is presupposed, and once this is possessed, a person looks for the reason why it is so by using the method of division.}}

12 [4] Keep in mind here that the first operation of the intellect, according to Bk. III of *On the Soul*,¹⁰ is simple apprehension. This is followed by the second act of composition and division [i.e., of forming affirmative and negative propositions], and by the third act of reasoning.

13 Simple notions, however, if they are sensibles, cannot be understood in general unless they are first perceived by the senses in some individual. For the Philosopher proves, in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*,¹¹ that “the loss of any of the senses produces a corresponding loss of knowledge from the objects of that sense,—knowledge that simply cannot be acquired.”

{{Here there is a doubt, because perhaps—according to Avicenna in his *De anima*, part 1¹² and according to Augustine,¹³ if someone were alive and never sensed anything and were of a mature age, he would know that he lived and existed. Therefore, this at least is certain, sense knowledge did not precede such intellectual knowledge as its originative source, although in other cases intellectual knowledge could originate in this way.}}

14 If, however, these simple notions grasped are not of sensibles, for instance, notions of substances or second intentions and the like, then such are conceived by the intellect, either by the first act of the intellect, without any sensible perception as their basis, or by a

¹⁰Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 6, 430a 26-b 6.

¹¹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 18, 81a 37-39.

¹²Avicenna, *De anima* pars 1, ch. 1, AvI L I-III 36-37.

¹³Cf. *supra*, Bk. I, q. 2 at the beginning of paragraph 24.

reasoning process, or certain things among them are known—according to a different opinion¹⁴—by a multiplication of their species along with the sensible species. Hence, nothing is known by us by any act of the intellect unless sensible knowledge of it in the sense precedes it. But once this precognition exists, subsequent cognitions are produced in the common sense and imagination. And finally, because what exists in the sense imagination—as it exists there—is not suited to move the possible intellect, therefore, certain persons¹⁵ attribute to it some form acquired through the agent intellect in virtue of which it can move the possible intellect. Then the latter, given these simple concepts, by its own power can combine and divide these [and thus make affirmative or negative propositions]. Such complex conceptions, however, if they are about first principles will be recognized as true by the natural light of the intellect, because “we know principles insofar as we know their terms,” according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹⁶ We can also know that they are true from frequent sense knowledge that we have experienced and remembered, through which we know the terms of such principles in their singular instances where they are found in reality to be conjoined, as the sense frequently saw them to be together either always or in most cases.

15 Therefore, it is clear what sort of experimental knowledge is valid for knowing what is a principle of science or art, as Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*,¹⁷ tells us. For such knowledge of principles stems from the cognition of simples known through sense perception together with the knowledge of propositional truths, as we said above.¹⁸

16 [5] As for the first, [i.e., simple knowledge of the meaning of terms], neither experiential knowledge or the frequent awareness of sensibles is needed, although some sensible apprehension is so

¹⁴Cf. Roger Bacon, *De multiplicatione specierum* pars I, ch. 3 (ed. D. Lindberg; Oxford, 1983, 20-32); cf. supra, Bk. I, q. 3, n. 9.

¹⁵Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 84, a. 7 (V, 325b); Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. VIII* q. 12 (f. 324B); cf. infra, Bk. II, qq. 2-3, nn. 22-26.

¹⁶Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 3, 72b 23-25.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 19, 100a 3-b 17.

¹⁸Cf. supra, n. 12.

necessary that without it the intellect can neither have the simple knowledge of the terms of a principle or combine them in a proposition. And the same is true of conclusions as is true of principles.

17 As for the second [i.e., knowledge of propositional truths], experiential knowledge helps, in order that one might more readily assent to an affirmative principle, if the senses recognize the conjunction of the terms in singular instances; to a negative principle, if one finds them disjoined. But this experience is not necessary as such nor is any previous sense perception required. For even though one may never have perceived through any sense such an affirmative or negative situation before, or experienced these extremes separated in reality, but merely apprehends from sensibles an affirmative or negative instance, and if the intellect were to form this proposition, "Of everything either its affirmation or its negation is true,"¹⁹ the intellect will assent to this. And even where the sense does perceive a conjunction of such singular terms in reality, one will still adhere to the complex principle more certainly by the natural light of the intellect than because of any sense perception.

18 For if in what it apprehends, the sense should be in error [be deceived], and the intellect would judge the sense erred in this matter, and nevertheless the intellect would take from an erring sense knowledge of some simples and combine them on its own, as far as a [primary] principle is concerned, the intellect still would not err so far as the truth of this proposition.

19 As for the conclusions one draws, as was said before,²⁰ sense knowledge is necessary for the apprehending of simples, as was said earlier.²¹ As for the truth of the proposition, this is aided occasionally by experiential knowledge produced by frequent memories, but this is only because the conclusion is true. And furthermore, since the intellect assents to the conclusion because it is true as something found frequently in sensibles, and realizing that what it assents to is not self-evident or a first principle, it recognizes

¹⁹Aristotle, *Topics* VI, ch. 6, 143b 15-16.

²⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

²¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 13-14.

there must be some cause why this is true and this prompts it to search for the reason behind it.

20 Hence, those who experience the fact of the conclusion discover themselves to be wondering about not knowing the cause of what they know to be true and this leads them to philosophize and inquire into its causes.²² This wonder, however, is less than knowledge through experience, because wonder can be provoked by a single act of sensing, before one knows for certain that this is always the case.

[II.—TO THE FIRST AND SECOND INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

21 [6] To the first argument,²³ one can say that according to the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the *Topics*,²⁴ it is necessary that one who inductively knows many singular instances has to concede the universal, or show an exception, otherwise the quibbler would [have reason to] reply. The expert has knowledge of many instances and knows of no exception; therefore, he can accept that this is the case in all instances.

22 To the contrary: although dialectically one may concede to the respondent that this is true of art as it is now called, still this does not produce any scientific knowledge. For though it may be true in many cases, it is not necessarily true in all, although one knows of no instance to counter this. And as long as it is not necessarily so in all instances, there can be no firm conviction that it is this way in all cases.

23 To this one must say that the [above] argument proves the truth that experiential knowledge, no matter how frequent, does not imply necessarily it is so in all instances, but only that this is probably the case. And from this it follows that there is insufficient cause for producing either art or science. One could grant this and admit that such experiential knowledge only helps or is an occasion for producing art or science.

²²Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982b 13-14.

²³Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

²⁴Aristotle, *Topics* VIII, ch. 8, 160a 39-b 6.

24 One can also say on this score to the second argument²⁵ that from experience scientific knowledge of the reasoned fact does not follow but only knowledge of the simple fact.²⁶ For given the knower's experience, this gives occasion for inquiring into the causes and thus of finding the reason behind it, and consequently that it is true in all instances. Hence, the expert argues by analogy from singulars, that what is so for one is so for all, and as it is the case in many singular instances, so it is in all.

25 To admit that the situation is similar in one case as in others, however, is to compare the subject to the predicate not accidentally nor insofar as it differs from other singulars, but to compare that subject *per se* and according to its common nature.

26 [7] On the contrary: how would I know from experience that the predicate is in many singular instances by reason of its common nature, when I can doubt that some singular I have not yet seen is followed by such a predicate?

27 Also, to suppose that the singular is such by reason of its common nature whereby it resembles other singulars, is to suppose that what is common is such *per se*. But this is to beg the question, because knowledge of this is derived from singulars.

28 Likewise, in confirmation of the second main argument,²⁷ that it is only quasi-causally that one argues from seeing it to be the case in many singular instances that it is so for all. This only holds because the common nature is the *per se* cause of this general truth, and this is even more in question than the conclusion is, or at least it is equally doubtful.

²⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 2; also see below, n. 69.

²⁶At this juncture, an interpolated text is found in four manuscripts: "Sed experto quia ita est de principio sufficit quod illud non cognoscitur propter quid et statim notum est experto de conclusione quia ita est."

²⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

[III.—A MORE AMPLE SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION
A.—THREE NON-ARISTOTELIAN VIEWS OF SCIENTIFIC
KNOWLEDGE]

29 [8] For a more complete or ample solution to this question, therefore, keep in mind that first of all there are three opinions that deny that scientific knowledge is produced in us in the way Aristotle assumes it is, by experience and discovery.

30 [1.—Ancient Skeptics] One of these claims that, because of the mutability of what is sensible and because of the deception of the senses, there is truth only about what appears to be the case. This was the opinion of those older philosophers, who said that appearances are true. Their view is treated in Bk. IV of this work.²⁸ The probability of their viewpoint is treated in the sixth and seventh arguments²⁹ which are from Augustine.

31 [2.—Avicenna] The second view is that of Avicenna about how the species are impressed by an Intelligence, a theory he postulates in Bk. IX of his *Metaphysics*,³⁰ which it is not our present business to criticize.

32 [3.—Plato's view] The third is the opinion of Plato, who assumes that scientific knowledge is innate in us. One argument for this was cited above in the reply to the question, and it is the fourth argument given there.³¹

33 Another reason of the same sort is hinted at in *Posterior Analytics* I,³² which goes like this. No one looking for what is unknown will find it except by chance. For even if he found it, he would not know he had found it. Therefore, every learner looking for something already knows it.

34 This is confirmed, because it does not seem that nature is any less solicitous about man than about brute animals. Indeed, the Philosopher in Bk. II of *De caelo et mundo*,³³ claims that those

²⁸Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1009a 8-10.

²⁹Cf. supra, nn. 6-7.

³⁰Avicenna, *Metaphysica* IX, ch. 3, AvI 474-476.

³¹Cf. supra, n. 4.

³²Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 24-29.

³³Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* II, ch. 12, 292a 21-b 25.

things that are higher and more perfect, like the world above, acquire their perfection by fewer means than do those things which are below. But the senses in brutes immediately acquire their perfection in one action. Therefore, this is all the more true of the human intellect.

35 [9] [Against Plato's theory] Aristotle argues against this opinion of Plato in Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*, the last chapter:³⁴ "It is strange that knowledge more certain than demonstrations lies hidden from us," but before we learn of such we have no perception that such knowledge is in us; therefore, knowledge of this sort is not present there.

36 The major is confirmed, because an intellectual habit, even the weakest, is not in us without our being certain it is in us; neither is it hidden from us. For everyone who ventures an opinion, or who doubts or believes, is certain he is conjecturing, doubting and believing. Hence, Augustine in Bk. XIII of *On the Trinity*, chs. 1 and 2 says:³⁵ "Each one, therefore, sees his own faith in himself," and the other things he has there.

{To the contrary: therefore, every knower knows he knows, the opposite of which is affirmed in the reply to the second argument at the beginning.³⁶ It is also proved from the fact the apostles knew the way, because Christ said: *You know the way* [John 14, 4-5]. But they did not know that they knew it, because then Thomas would have been lying when he said: *We do not know where you go* [John 14, 5], as Augustine says in his work *In Ioannis Evangelium*.}³⁷

37 Also, Augustine argues against Plato³⁸ in Bk. XII of *On the Trinity*, the last chapter,³⁹ where he has much to say about this matter; thus: If the boy responded correctly about the conclusion because he knew of it before, then, if he were first asked about it before he was asked about the principle, or if he were asked about the conclusion apart from the principle, he would have responded

³⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 19, 99b 26-28.

³⁵Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 1, n. 3 (PL 42, 1014; CCL 50, 383; ch. 2, n. 5 (PL 42, 1016; CCL 50, 385-386).

³⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

³⁷Augustine, *Super Ioannem* tr. 69, n. 1 (PL 35, 1816; CCL 36, 500).

³⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 33, see also n. 4.

³⁹Augustine, *De Trinitate* XII, ch. 15, n. 24 (PL 42, 1011-1012; CCSL 50, 377-379).

correctly that it is false. For he could never respond correctly unless he was interrogated in an orderly fashion where he immediately saw the principles and their orderly connection with the propositions, and thus was taught demonstratively.—Also, why when he was asked about sensible things or other things that were not interrelated demonstratively, would he not respond correctly?

38 [10] Also, thirdly, against Plato: Nature seems primarily to intend the perfection of the lower powers rather than the higher powers, according to the way they develop. This is clear in the case of the intellect and the will. The situation seems similar, therefore, in the case of the relationship of the sense to the intellect; otherwise there would seem to be no necessary connection of the soul with the body, nor would the senses be necessary for us.

39 But this argument has no force, for even though science is not acquired through the senses, they could be necessary for the perfection of the composite [i.e., soul with the body], just as the power to grow is necessary for what is imperfect in size.

40 Also, a fourth argument against Plato is this. There is some knower that is identical with its knowledge [i.e., God], and there is some knower that is not its knowledge, but whose knowledge is innate [e.g. the Intelligences or Angels according to some theologians]; therefore it is reasonable and possible to postulate a third type, a knower that is neither its knowledge nor possesses it innately, but one who seeks knowledge.

41 Also, one never postulates a plurality without necessity, according to Bk. I of the *Physics*,⁴⁰ in that section that speaks about the finitude of principles. And according to Bk. III of *On the Soul*:⁴¹ “Nature neither abounds in superfluties nor is it wanting in what is necessary.” But there is nothing about man that implies necessarily that his knowledge should be innate. Therefore, this should not be assumed.

42 Also, why do people have contrary opinions, and do not know everything?

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Physics*, ch. 4, 188a 17-18.

⁴¹Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 9, 432b 21-23.

[B.—EPISTEMOLOGICAL CONSIDERATIONS
1.—HOW THE INTELLECT ARRIVES AT KNOWLEDGE]

43 [11] In the second place, for a clearer understanding of the question consider that from the sense, whether erring or not, the intellect can apprehend simple notions and immediately understand what is most universal.

44 For with any sense perception whatsoever, “being” and “thing” are impressed upon the intellect.⁴² Once simple things are apprehended from the sense, whether they be presented truly or falsely, the intellect can form propositions about them in virtue of its own power, first about what is more universal, and afterwards about other things. About the most universal things, given their common concepts, the intellect immediately assents to such not because of the sense. Indeed it does so even more certainly than it could through the sense, given the assumption knowledge of the truth of these propositions could be received from the sense. The intellect forms other immediate propositions about less universal things, but these are not known at once to be immediate truths, because their terms are not known. By inquiring into the meaning of the terms, however, the intellect is directed methodically through its common conceptions, by way of division, removing one alternative and attributing the other. Knowing at first what the name means, it knows if the proposition is immediate, and at once assents to it on its own merits if it is.

45 The intellect also knows that mediate propositions are mediate from a knowledge of their terms. Once it knows this, the intellect on its own can arrange all the immediate propositions whose terms coincide with that of the conclusion, or with the terms of another proposition, ordering them immediately in every possible way. And if it finds other immediate propositions which it recognizes to be immediate from their terms and sees they are antecedent to this mediate proposition, at once in virtue of its own light the intellect assents to their connection, because “the perfect syllogism needs nothing other than itself to make plain what

⁴²Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 5, AviL 31.

necessarily follows,"⁴³ and thus the intellect knows the conclusion. And it proceeds in this way in regard to other propositions. Therefore, no matter what error is postulated of the sense, simple notions can be acquired, just as they are now, and propositions can be formed from these notions, and one can arrive at the knowledge of which propositions are immediate, which are mediate, and which mediate propositions can be inferred from those that are immediate. From this it follows that all conclusions that are naturally knowable to us by way of demonstration, can be known even if every sense errs, or if some sense errs while another does not.

46 This is confirmed because, if in sleep someone born blind were impressed with every species of color, although such a person would have an intellectual apprehension of color from an erring sense, because the imagination was using a sense image in place of a thing, still he could form every proposition about color that another could, whether such be mediate or immediate; and through immediate propositions he could arrive at mediate ones, and would be missing no knowledge demonstrable in an unqualified sense. All he would lack is knowledge of some proposition that could not possibly be proved demonstratively, but could only be known from frequent sense perception, and he would be ignorant of the conclusions that depended upon such a proposition.

[2.—INTELLECTIVE COGNITION IS MORE CERTAIN THAN SENSE PERCEPTION]

47 [12] According to this it seems one must admit that in us intellectual cognition is simply more certain than sense cognition.

Proof of this: first, because intellectual cognition can judge what sort all sense knowledge is; second, because certitude is never found in apprehending the true unless the knower knows he has grasped the truth or knows that what he apprehends is true. If I have only conjectural knowledge about a first principle, even though I necessarily grasp what is true, I am still not certain about it. For only the intellect on reflection judges that it grasps the truth. And this accords with the second reason of Augustine, cited

⁴³Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 24b 22-24.

earlier⁴⁴ in answer to the question, that the sense does not distinguish the true from the false. Indeed, it is not that the sense does not apprehend the true, but only that it cannot judge it to be true by differentiating it from what is false. The reason for this is that the sense never perceives the immutability of the object, although that which is immutable can be sensed. For the sense only perceives such an object as it is disposed at the time it is sensed. And thus the sense is not more certain that the immutable is immutable than it would be, if what is immutable were in a continual process of change. This also accords with the first reason of Augustine given above⁴⁵ in answer to the question. Not that the sensible is always changed, but with respect to the senses, it is as if it were continually altered.

[3.—SOME COUNTERARGUMENTS AND THEIR SOLUTION]

48 [13] [First objection] But against this it is argued first in this way: no intellect judges about an act of the sense except through knowledge taken from the sense (knowledge, which perhaps is more true), and only then does it [the intellect] judge the sense does not err. But, if in every act the sense were to err, the intellect would have no basis on which to judge that the sense is now in error.

49 I reply to this that the intellect judges about the act of the sense through knowledge only occasioned by the senses, or only insofar as it apprehends simple notions. But it is not [dependent upon the senses] for formulating propositions of principles and conclusions.

50 [Second objection] Another argument for the counterthesis is this. The sense is always true in regard to its proper object, although not in regard to other things. But the reflex act, which is posited in the intellect, is only true because of the truth of the first act; therefore, because its act is only a reflex act, the greater certitude should not be ascribed to the intellect.

51 [Third objection] Also, why could not the common sense judge in this way about a lesser sense?

⁴⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

⁴⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

52 I reply that it is not only because its act is reflective that one ascribes to the intellect a greater certitude than to the sense, but because of the intellect's ability to combine notions into propositions and to use the method of composition and division, which either implies what is known as self-evident to the intellect, or what is evidently to be inferred from such self-evident propositions. In neither of these operations is the intellect dependent upon the sense except that sense perception provides their occasion. Through this the answer to the other is evident.⁴⁶

53 [Fourth objection] Also, Bk. VIII of the *Physics*, a little before the words, "moventium," etc.,⁴⁷ he [Aristotle] seems to say that the sense is the more dignified, and that it is sufficient for believing.—The argument there is against those who refuse to admit things are sometimes at rest, sometimes in motion.

54 [Fifth objection] Also, if according to Augustine,⁴⁸ the intellect discerns the difference between the true and false, and perceives the immutability itself of what it knows, I ask through what does it perceive this? Either it is through knowledge accepted from the senses, and then the first argument above holds good,⁴⁹ that, if all such is false, then the intellect judges badly. Or else it is through some innate knowledge not acquired through the senses; and this is not something we assume.

55 [14] [To the two preceding objections] To the first of these⁵⁰ one must say that the notion of the intellect is more worthy, because something is known through it *per se*. This is not the case with the senses.

56 To the other⁵¹ one must say that certitude properly speaking has only to do with what involves composition and division [i.e., affirmation and negation]—something that pertains properly to the intellect. The first operation of the intellect is always true, even though the intellect follows an erring sense. For, even if vision apprehends a black body as white, the intellect gets the concept of

⁴⁶Cf. supra, n. 51.

⁴⁷Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 3, 253a 32-33.

⁴⁸Cf. supra, nn. 47, 7.

⁴⁹Cf. supra, n. 48.

⁵⁰Cf. supra, n. 53.

⁵¹Cf. supra, n. 54.

whiteness just as well as if its conception of whiteness came from a sense that was seeing truly something white. Because, it is enough that the species representing truly what whiteness is be present to the intellect, for the intellect to have a simple awareness of what it means for something to be truly white. In composition and division, however, as was said above,⁵² the intellect errs following an erring sense—not as regards any first principle or about the conclusions which it deduces from such first principles—but only in regard to other conclusions, the sole knowledge of which stems from an erring sense. But even in regard to such, although some sense errs, nevertheless, the intellect does not have to follow it, but it can hold the opposite if it judges that sense errs.

[4.—HOW WE JUDGE WHICH SENSE IS TRUE
a.—THE CRITERIA OF HENRY OF GHENT]

57 [15] But how will one judge which sense is true and which errs? The reply of the Ghentian in the *Summa*⁵³ is that every sense is true which is not contradicted by [a] information from another truer sense or from itself when better disposed, or [b] by some intellectual knowledge derived from some other truer sense or from the same sense when better disposed.

58 But how does one judge which sense is best disposed?—[Henry's] Reply:⁵⁴ It seems to be self-evident that nature, because it is a *per se* cause and is not free, acts correctly in most cases, so that if error occurs, it happens in a minority of cases, and hence, what the sense says in most cases is true.

[b.—THREE OBJECTIONS TO HENRY'S CRITERIA]

59 Against this: "The truth should not be determined by the large or small number"⁵⁵ of those who hold the belief. For then, if there were only three [mentally] healthy people and all the else were sick, the judgment of the sane would be refuted.

⁵²Cf. *supra*, nn. 49, 52.

⁵³Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 1, q. 1, resp. (I, f. 1B-2C).

⁵⁴*Ibid.*, q. 1 ad 3 (I, f. 3G).

⁵⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1009b 2-3.

60 Also, vision always errs about the size of the sun and the moon, and about the broken stick in the water, etc.

61 Also, that argument presented above about the simple apprehension of the intellect⁵⁶ seems to show that the sense is always true, since its apprehension is also simple and it has the species or likeness of whatever produced it.—This is also confirmed, because the sensible acts according to what it is in actuality, and the sense knows according to how the sensible moves it; therefore, it always knows truly.

[c.—IN DEFENSE OF HENRY]

62 As for the first,⁵⁷ there is no simultaneous plurality of the senses; there is only a plurality of sensations. And this is because a sense more frequently senses in the same way.—Also, in this case, there is other knowledge derived from a more certain sense than from that which is infirm. It is through this knowledge that it [the intellect] judges that an infirm sense errs.

63 One replies to the second⁵⁸ on this same basis, because the sense says something is farther away than appears to be the case, whereas the physicist argues [or natural reason points out] that the farther away an agent is, the weaker is its action, since its power is limited.

64 To the third,⁵⁹ the conclusion can be conceded about the proper sensible. However, as regards common sensibles and those that are accidental or are involved in constructing propositions from these things, the sense is deceived.

[d.—AGAINST THE ANSWERS TO THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS]

65 [16] Also, against the aforesaid⁶⁰ one argues in this way, according to *Posterior Analytics* I:⁶¹ Everything is known by way of

⁵⁶Cf. supra, n. 56.

⁵⁷Cf. supra, n. 59.

⁵⁸Cf. supra, n. 60.

⁵⁹Cf. supra, n. 61.

⁶⁰Cf. supra, nn. 49, 56.

⁶¹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 5-11.

the syllogism or through induction; conclusions through the syllogism, principles by induction. But you deny this, inasmuch as, according to you, principles are better known than the singulars on which their induction is based.

66 One can reply, according to the mind of Aristotle,⁶² that the sense is necessary only for knowledge of what the terms mean. Hence, universals are not known without induction, that is, without the knowledge of some singular that is only known through the sense in sensibles. Therefore, in regard to such things, if the sense were wanting, knowledge would be lacking. It is not necessary, however, that induction be taken there as a kind of argument; at least if it be an argument, the truth of its premise is not known because of some sense. But only the term [i.e., the notion] of the composition [i.e., proposition] is derived from the sense. But the intellect grasps something identical, and forms a proposition about it and consents to such, and then argues inductively.

67 Against this: at least prior temporally the intellect adheres to the singular proposition before it does to the principle that is proved from induction.

Let us say [in answer] that knowledge of this singular proposition is from sensitive cognition through which the conjunction of the terms, as they exist outside, is perceived. This knowledge, however, is only the occasion of knowing the principle, but it is not the reason why it is known. Hence, induction is not taken here in a simple or unqualified sense, because the universal is perhaps first and immediate, whereas the singular only *per se* and mediate. Perhaps there is also no proof adduced here, but only the simple imparting of information. For whenever this proposition is understood as a principle it is adhered to more than to something singular arrived at by way of induction.

⁶²Cf. *ibid.*, 71a 11: "The pre-existent knowledge required is of two kinds. In some cases admission of the fact must be assumed, in others the meaning of the term used." The meaning of the term, Scotus insists, can be derived from erring senses.

[IV.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS
A.—TO THE FIRST AND SECOND ARGUMENTS]

68 [17] To the first argument at the beginning⁶³ it must be said that from many singular instances together with this proposition: "nature acts most often if it is not impeded," [etc.] a universal conclusion follows. And if the cause cannot be impeded, the conclusion follows in an unqualified sense in all cases.

69 To the second,⁶⁴ it is said that from experiential knowledge nothing follows that would produce knowledge of the reasoned fact, though the one who experiences it knows this simple fact is so. For a principle, this suffices, because it is not known as a reasoned fact. And as soon as one knows that the conclusion is a fact, however, this provides an occasion to the one who experienced such to look for its cause, and thus to discover knowledge of why it is so, and consequently why it applies to all such cases.

70 Against the preceding argument⁶⁵ we have this. How can one come from a sensible effect to a knowledge of its cause?

[Digression on Inductive Knowledge] I reply: by the method of division in this way. In A there are items B, C and D; if you wish to know which of these is the cause of D (Is it B, C?), then separate them. Where you find B without C, and there D follows B, and it does not follow from C, then in A, B was the cause of D. Thus it happens that one can know the cause, if several are conjoined.

71 [Three arguments (e, f and g) against this method] On the contrary: I assume B, D and C are always conjoined, and then your method is no good {arg. e}.

72 Also, assume that where B is, D also is, and that no C is there. From this the negative conclusion follows that in A, C was not the cause of D, but the affirmative does not follow that B was the cause of D, because of a fallacy of the consequent {arg. f}.

73 For the antecedent of the other cause of the truth can be double or triple. One that CD is the cause of B. Another that B and D are two necessary effects of the same cause, so that neither is the cause

⁶³Cf. supra, n. 1.

⁶⁴Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁶⁵Cf. supra, n. 69; see also n. 24 above.

of the other, as both light and heat are found in fire. A third case is that B, if it is not prior in time to D, it can still not be said to be the proper cause, but only a sine-qua-non condition, as is the case with privation in matter with regard to change, or intellection with respect to the will, and so with many other instances.—But this argument is not valid, because a cause that is only a sine-qua-non condition never produces the effect.

74 [18] If you say that B is prior naturally to D, on what basis do you prove this?—I reply: Because B is a substance and D an accident. Or because B is something absolute, and D only exists in relationship to another. Or because B is a primary act, and D a secondary one such as some operation. Or because B is closer to some third that is simply first. Look for all these possibilities in Bk. III of the *Topics*,⁶⁶ where there is a comparison of more and less.

75 Also, given the case that in one instance you see that D follows from B but not from C, you do not know this to be the case in all instances. Neither could you know this, but you could only believe it by an argument from analogy. Therefore, you could never know that something is necessarily and *per se* the cause of the other, and thus you would know nothing [scientifically] {arg. g}.

76 It is claimed that one may indeed discover by the way of division what the necessary cause of an effect is, but will never be able to demonstrate that this is the cause, as those three arguments,⁶⁷ e, f and g, prove. Hence, something will be known, because its cause is known, but I will not be aware that I know something scientifically, but only that I believe this.

77 That this is the cause of that, however, is not just an opinion, but is something understood, since it is always implied in one premise of the demonstration, especially the most powerful demonstration. Hence, since there is no middle term that could prove the immediate cause of this effect, predicating this effect of this cause represents an immediate proposition in the fourth mode of *per se* predication, e.g. that heat heats;—or if, however, one can find something that is *per se* without it being necessary, as is the

⁶⁶Aristotle, *Topics* III, chs. 1-6, 116a 3-120a 6.

⁶⁷Cf. *supra*, nn. 71-72, 75.

case with non-necessary natural causes, namely those which act in most cases.

78 Likewise, if one can bring up the arguments given in Bk. IV of this work⁶⁸ about the truth of appearances, and this so far as the appearances of simples is concerned, then the proofs and arguments that to one person seem to be a demonstration [i.e., of the necessity of being skeptical], would look like sophisms, or arguments that sin materially, to another person.

79 [19] [To return to the second initial argument] To this the second argument at the beginning,⁶⁹ one must say that [1] the inexperienced lacking a demonstration, only believes the conclusion to be a simple fact. [2] The expert however, lacking a demonstration knows the simple fact, that is, with certitude and without doubt he knows this, because he sees it and is certain it is nature that is acting for the most part uniformly and orderly. [3] One who has an understanding of a principle, without applying it to the conclusion, will have scientific knowledge [of that conclusion] only virtually, whereas [4] one who has a demonstration of this conclusion will know it as a reasoned fact.

80 Prior to these four degrees of knowing conclusions, however, there are three kinds of ignorance. [1] There is ignorance of a negative sort, when one does not apprehend even the terms. [2] And there is ignorance based on an opposite inclination, namely, when one believes the opposite. [3] And there is mere ignorance, when one has no opinion about the conclusion one way or the other, even where a knowledge of the terms is given and the proposition is formulated. [4] Opinion ought to be put into the first of the four grades [of n. 79], perhaps, for it resembles such before [5] doubt enters in. Therefore, there are eight or nine grades in learning.

81 [Application of the way of division to the four grades in n. 79] Insofar as one inquires by way of division⁷⁰ “this is caused either through this or that” etc., [in the first grade], at the end of the investigation one still does not know scientifically, but only believes—unless, perhaps, in the course of dividing one comes upon

⁶⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 6, 1011a 3-b 13.

⁶⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 2; see also nn. 24, 69.

⁷⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 70-77.

propositions that are immediate and common, from which the proposition believed can be deduced. At the second grade, however, through the way of division one will know the conclusion as a reasoned fact; for at this stage one already knew that such is the case [i.e., because one saw it as a simple fact and is certain it is nature that is acting for the most part uniformly and orderly], and by the way of division one [ascertains the cause and] knows that for no other reason is this the case; therefore, one will know, because of this, that this is so. At the third grade, however, by simply applying the principle one will know the reasoned fact. Hence, one who has the second degree of knowledge is disposed proximately to know this fact as a reasoned fact, whereas one with the third degree is even more immediately disposed. For one with the second degree, as it were, will immediately demonstrate the cause through the effect that he knew, and then from this he will know further the effect through the cause. But one at the third grade, through the cause already known will know the effect immediately—not that the mere knowledge of the principle causes knowledge of the conclusion, but it does dispose one to know it.

82 [20] [To the aforesaid objections] I reply to the objections:⁷¹ although these [effects] proceed from a real cause, it is difficult to prove what sort it is; for it is not a principle of knowing. For by dividing many of the predicates affirmed of the subject of the mediate proposition to be proved, one will find one [middle term] that mediates between it [the subject] and the predicate to be proved of it. Whether this one is mediately or immediately in the subject will be apparent from the nature of the terms. And similarly, it will be ascertained if the predicate to be proved is in the subject immediately or not.

[B.—TO THE THIRD ARGUMENT]

83 To the third argument at the beginning,⁷² it must be said that the word “from” can denote there the efficient instrumental cause. Neither is such a cause the sort that yields a knowledge of the

⁷¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 71-76.

⁷²Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

conclusion based on what is implied by the principles; but is that which stems from knowing a lesser occasional cause. But the principal efficient cause in the acquisition of any knowledge, both in this case and in that of conclusions drawn from principles, is the intellect by reason of its natural light. But the proposition cited about the efficient cause is true of the principal cause, according to the Commentator on Bk. IX of this work.⁷³

84 [First objection to n. 83] But you object: if the intellect is the principal cause in the acquisition of knowledge, is it the agent or the possible intellect?—I reply that in the demonstration the possible intellect is the principal cause, because it has the habitual knowledge of principles and conclusions.

85 But what has that to do with this?—I reply: if experiential knowledge is in the sensitive part, then the agent intellect abstracts from it simple notions and the possible intellect puts these together, and assents to this combination *per se* if it is a principle, or from sense perception, by which it has seen the extremes conjoined in singular instances many times.

86 [Objections against the aforesaid] To the contrary: knowledge of the conjunction of the extremes, therefore, is caused in the possible intellect immediately by the sense, which is contrary to what was said above.⁷⁴

87 Also, when it is said⁷⁵ that the agent intellect abstracts the simple notions, I ask if such abstraction causes something in the imagination, that enables it to move the possible intellect instrumentally. If it does, since an instrument only moves if moved, then the phantasm is first moved naturally by the agent intellect before the phantasm can move the possible intellect, and in that prior instant some form is impressed on the phantasm by the agent intellect. This is only universality, because the term of the agent intellect's action is universality. If, however, it causes nothing in the phantasm, its abstraction is not really a true action.

88 Also, if the phantasm instrumentally were to move the possible intellect, this instrument will have no proper operation in

⁷³Averroes, *Metaphysica* XI, com. 39 (ed. Iuntina VIII, f. 141va-vb).

⁷⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 17-19; see also nn. 44-56, 83.

⁷⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 85.

moving the possible intellect beyond that which it has through the form impressed upon it. But it has this in virtue of the principal agent.

89 [21] [Reply to the above objections nn. 86-88] To the second of these three,⁷⁶ it is said that the last result of the action of the agent intellect is universality. But this is not the proximate result it produces in the phantasm, by means of which it produces the final result. Indeed, some light is what is produced in the phantasm. What is more, according to you, the agent intellect does not simply cause universality, because the first object of the possible intellect is the singular. But afterwards the possible intellect, from this knowledge of the singular, by seeing how it agrees and differs, abstracts the universal, so that to abstract is a cognitive action, and this is not the sort of action the agent intellect performs.

90 To the third of these,⁷⁷ one must say that everything having an action that is not in virtue of another is the principal agent of this action. Therefore, it seems repugnant that something acting instrumentally qua instrument would have a proper action of its own that is not something it does in virtue of the principal agent. Hence, Thomas's foundation⁷⁸ for creation seems weak.

91 About this opinion, however, as to whether some form is impressed on the phantasm by the agent intellect, and why an agent intellect is postulated, is not something it is proper to treat of here [in *Metaphysics*], but in Bk. III of *De anima*.⁷⁹

[C.—TO THE REMAINING INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

92 [22] To the fourth argument at the beginning,⁸⁰ one must say that Plato taught the boy. For the teacher can do nothing to provide assent to a proposition except to put those principles the disciple knows into the proper order, and to put the other things that

⁷⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 87.

⁷⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 88.

⁷⁸Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 45, a. 5 resp. (IV, 469ab).

⁷⁹Cf. Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 5, 430a 13-20; also Duns Scotus, *De an.* q. 13 (ed. Vives III, 544-546).

⁸⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

follow from these principles in the order in which they follow. And it is the intellect itself that assents to what is set before it in this way, because “the perfect syllogism needs nothing other than itself to make plain what necessarily follows.”⁸¹

93 But how does the teacher cause a species in the intellect of the disciple of some sensible which the disciple has never perceived? This species is necessary, not only for scientific knowledge, but also for the disciple to believe his master. For instance, someone might teach me about the color indigo or something similar. How do I believe him when I have no conception of the simple notions because I have no species [images] of these; therefore, how do I know [i.e., deduce the conclusion] from what is greater [i.e., a more general principle]?

94 Reply: if I see something similar to it, or something that exceeds it or is less than it, he can say to me that what he is talking about is similar to this, or that it is related in such and such a way to this, and so I can form in me some idea of it by putting things together, like a gold mountain. Otherwise, if from what I know there is nothing I can fancy that is similar to it, then I can never learn anything more than its name, as one blind from birth can do in regard to colors.

95 To the fifth argument at the beginning,⁸² it was pointed out above⁸³ in the solution to the question, how one cognition based on the sense experience suffices for knowledge of a principle. If in addition the intellect abstracts and combines [notions] to know some conclusion, several memories and also a number of experiences are of more value for producing knowledge of the simple fact and for causing one to inquire into the reasons why it is so.

96 The question of whether many accidents of the same species can coexist in the same subject, however, will be treated in one of the questions on Bk. V.⁸⁴

⁸¹Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 24b 22-24; cf. supra, n. 45.

⁸²Cf. supra, n. 5.

⁸³Cf. supra, nn. 12-20.

⁸⁴Cf. infra, Bk. V, q. 7, nn. 71-118.

97 [23] As for the sixth initial argument⁸⁵ taken from [Augustine's] *Eighty-three Questions*, namely, that there can be no certain truth in regard to what is sensible and changeable, we have Aristotle's argument against this in Bk. IV, ch. 5,⁸⁶ for the movement of sensibles is something that can be perceived by the senses *per se*. Therefore, some truth could be had through the sense about sensibles that are continually moving, namely, that they are continually moving.—Likewise, it is not true that they are always moving in every respect. For the sun is not continually changed in substance, nor is it changed as regards the light whereby it is sensible. Hence, there is something permanent about what can be known sensibly, even though it is continually in a process of change [i.e., the celestial bodies are substantially unchangeable but are in continual local motion]. Many other things said there are relevant here.

98 The second argument of Augustine⁸⁷ seems to raise the question: Why should one believe mentally healthy persons more than those who are sick or mad, or believe those who are awake more than those who are asleep? Hence, to these arguments insofar as they are arguments, one must say that not all sensibles are continually changed under all aspects. Nor are species impressed in such a way from the phantasms themselves that one could not discern when the object is present and when it is not, especially in regard to a particular sense which does not retain the species in the absence of the sensible object.

99 [In defense of Augustine] To save in some measure the authority of Augustine, however, one could admit that genuine truth is not known from the sense in such a way that the sense would perceive the unchangeable character of the truth it apprehends, nor is it aware of the immobile object *qua immobile*. For the sense only perceives what is present while it is present. And, therefore, it does not of itself know whether something exists in this way except when it is present; and it is not always present to the bodily sense. For Augustine explains himself in this sense in his *Retractions*, Bk.

⁸⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁸⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1010a 2-1011a 2.

⁸⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

I, ch. 25.⁸⁸ Therefore, the sense does not perceive that this is always existing in this way. Also, even supposing that my vision of object A continued to exist in the same way as it did at the first instant, I would still not perceive the immutability of A, because at that first instant I only perceive how it was at that instant, since I only see it to be as it was present then. Thus, I never perceive the immutability of A in the entire period I envision it, no matter how long that be. But all I perceive at any moment is how it is at that moment.

100 [24] To the contrary: one could prove in this way that the intellect's intuitive cognition in heaven does not perceive the immutability of the object, since there is no demonstration of it. Nor will it be known by seeing [intuitively] that it is so [i.e., immutable], except for that moment when it is seen.

101 Reply: The intellect does not see the immutability of God, because it has a continuous act of vision—for then in the first instant it would not see such—but the immutability itself is one aspect seen intuitively, just as God's goodness is.

102 So much for the first proof of Augustine.⁸⁹ It is not this way with the intellect [but with the sense], for in this "now" I cannot understand a thing to be always immutable nor can I grasp its immutability.

103 As for the second proof of Augustine,⁹⁰ one must say that the sense perhaps does not reflect on the species, and therefore it does not discern whether it is only the species that informs it or whether the object is also present. This is particularly true of the sense imagination. It is also this way with the external senses. For, according to some,⁹¹ by a very active imagination one could impress on the sense the imagined species. But there is another and higher power than this sensitive power, one that can judge in an unqualified manner whether or not the sense is well disposed.

⁸⁸Augustine, *Retractions*, Bk. I, ch. 26 (PL 32, 624; CSEL 36, 116; CCL 57, 75).

⁸⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

⁹¹Cf. Algazel, *Metaph.* II, tr. 5, n. 7, ed. J. Muckle p. 192; Ioannes Pecham, *Quodl.* III q. 4; *Quodl.* IV q. 34-35 (BFS XXV 139-140. 252-255); Rogerus Marston, *Quodl.* IV q. 6 (BFS XXVI, 391).

104 And according to this one should admit that the arguments of Aristotle in Bk IV⁹² do lead to the conclusion that some genuine truth about sensibles is not impossible, which is the point he wished to make against those with whom he argued. But it is true, as Augustine says, that it is not the sense that perceives that such genuine truth exists, or that it is genuine or immutable, and that it is different from what is false. Hence, Aristotle does not really confront him.

105 Another way of explaining this would be to say that one should not expect genuine truth from the senses, as if the senses were its principal efficient cause, but it is only that sense knowledge provides the occasion for acquiring genuine knowledge about the truth and immutability, because all our knowledge originates with the senses,⁹³ although it is not totally caused by the sense.⁹⁴ The Philosopher, however, was speaking about natural knowledge in the way he experienced it. Augustine,⁹⁵ on the other hand, is speaking about the higher knowledge that is present in the divine and eternal rules, in which alone what is true is seen perfectly. For these are the rules for judging about every true thing with a judgment that is perfect, and sense knowledge does not arrive at such.

106 [25] Note, however, in view of what we have just said that one could doubt if a sense were healthy and not impeded by some indisposition in the organ that would fool it by informing it with the species in the absence of the object in the same way it would be informed if the object were present—or that some species would come to exist in the organ either by something that would fool it immediately or by virtue of a strong imagination. At least it never seems one could be fooled into sensing it in this way, unless the sense was directly stimulated, namely by being informed by some species. At times, however, one could be in error about just what caused this species, or just where it is, since perhaps one would see whiteness or some white subtle stuff, interposed between the eye and the black object, and would think that this object is white. At times, how-

⁹²Cf. *supra*, n. 97.

⁹³Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 18, 81b 6-9.

⁹⁴arguitive multa cognoscuntur quae non per sensum intuitive."

⁹⁵Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 3, q. 4, nn. 270-279.

ever, the organ is indisposed by some intrinsic quality that prevents it from operating, such as a feverish tongue or an inflamed eye, and then one might still sense the object whose species informs it, although it does not stem from the external object.

107 I say, therefore, to the point at issue that the sense is never deceived insofar as it served the intellect in regard to the apprehension of simples or so far as the truth of first principles is concerned, but only as regards conclusions that are not inferred from first principles.

QUESTION FIVE

Text of Aristotle: "With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals" (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 14-17).

Does one with experience who lacks the art act more certainly than the one who has the art but no experience?

1 [1] I prove he does not:

The Philosopher in Bk. VI of the *Ethics*¹ says that just as prudence is the cognitive habit regarding what is to be done, so art is regarding what is to be made; but no one acts more certainly regarding what is to be done than a prudent person; therefore, neither does one act more certainly regarding what is to be made than one who has the art.

2 Also, one who acts through knowledge will act more certainly the more certainly he knows; but the one who has the art² knows more certainly, because he knows the cause and the reason why, whereas the one with experience knows only the simple fact; therefore, etc.

3 [Objection against the preceding argument] To this it is objected that the argument would hold only if it were the singular instance involved in the action *per se* that the one with the art knew more certainly than the one with experience, but this is not the case. Rather it is the universal that is known more certainly by the one who has the art,³ whereas the man of experience knows more certainly the singular involved in the action *per se*. Therefore, the man of experience acts with greater certainty than one with the art.

¹Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, ch. 5, 1140b 3-4.

²Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 29-30.

³Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 15-16.

4 [Answer to the objection] On the contrary: then it would seem to follow that the artist or artisan did not know the particular *per se*, which is against what some say.⁴ Or if he does know the particular, then the argument would hold good, because then the one who has the art would know the particular as a reasoned fact just he knows the universal. The one with experience does not have this sort of knowledge. Therefore, the artisan knows more certainly what can be done, and so the argument proceeds as before.

5 [2] {{Also, he who knows the quiddity or essence of something more perfectly, knows that thing in a more perfect way; but one who has the art knows more perfectly what it is to heal than the man of experience; therefore, the former knows more perfectly how to heal. Proof of the minor: the essence of healing is universal and it has to do *per se* with a universal object. Such is known better by one who possesses the art.

6 [Reply of the author to n. 5] I reply that the major⁵ is true of theoretical knowledge and the minor similarly.⁶ In the conclusion, when “to know” is constructed with the infinitive signifying an operation [i.e., to heal], according to the common way of speaking it can only be taken to mean practical knowledge, therefore it does not follow. If the conclusion is understood of theoretical knowledge, it can be conceded.

7 [Objections against the aforesaid] To the contrary: one who has the art as such does not know theoretically, but practically, because art is a practical cognitive habit. Therefore, although the major⁷ is true of both [theoretical and practical knowledge]—for if you know more perfectly what a thing is, then you know that thing more perfectly—the minor⁸ is true only of practical knowledge, and hence, the conclusion likewise is true only of practical knowledge.

⁴See, for example, John Pecham, *Quodl. IV* (BFS XXV 180-181); Matthew of Aquasparta, *Disp. Questions on Cognition* (BFS I ed. 2, 285); Peter John Olivi, *Sent. II* q. 67 (BFS V 617); Gonsalvus of Spain, *Quodl. q. 10* (BFS IX 419).

⁵Namely, he who knows the quiddity or essence of something more perfectly, knows that thing in a more perfect way; cf. *supra*, n. 5.

⁶Namely, the one who has the art knows more perfectly what it is to heal than the man of experience; cf. *supra*, n. 5.

⁷See note 5.

⁸See note 6.

8 Also, practical knowledge, if it is a habit of the intellect, and the *per se* object of the intellect is the universal, then practical knowledge is more about a universal *per se* than about a singular object. And then our proposed thesis follows that the person who knows the universal *per se* has the more perfect practical knowledge.

9 [Reply to these objections]—As for the first⁹ there are two ways to know practically: [a] to know how to operate [or do something], and [b] to know what is ordered to such a skill [i.e. to know what can be done in this way]. The first is properly practical knowledge; the second is commonly called practical. And in this second way every artist knows practically, but not in the first way. In the second way, to know can be called theoretical in reference to the first way; and it is in this sense that the reply to the preceding argument is to be understood.

10 As for the second of these,¹⁰ to know practically in the first way [i.e., to know how to do something] is in regard to the singular *per se*; but to know in the second way [i. e., to know what can be done] can be about the universal. And it is false that nothing is known *per se* except the universal. Or else say that practical knowledge in the first sense is only acquired by way of experience. Hence it pertains to the same potency, to which experiential knowledge pertains, which is probably a cognitive potency. But to know practically in the second way is something in the intellect whereby its knowledge is extended to what can be done universally.}}

11 To the opposite there is what the Philosopher says in the text.¹¹

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

⁹Cf. supra, n. 7.

¹⁰Cf. supra, n. 8.

¹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 14-17: "With a view to action experience seems in no respect inferior to art, and men of experience succeed even better than those who have theory without experience. The reason is that experience is knowledge of individuals, art of universals."

12 [3] Reply: It is plain that the one with experience acts more certainly than one who has the art but no experience, because experiential knowledge is about the singular *per se*. Knowledge of the art is about the universal *per se*. And, if it is about the singular, this just happens to follow incidentally. Since one with experience knows more certainly than the artisan what can be done; therefore, he acts more certainly in this regard. And this is what the Philosopher says in the text:¹² "If, then, a man has the theory without the experience, and recognizes the universal but does not know the individual included in this, he will often fail to cure."

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

13 To the first,¹³ it must be said that in some respects there is a likeness, namely, that as prudence is a cognitive habit regarding things to be done, so art is a cognitive habit regarding things to be made. And in other respects there is a lack of similarity, namely, in this that prudence is produced in the soul only through our acts. Therefore, no one is prudent except through experience. Art, however, is produced both by experience and by teaching; and it can be produced by teaching without experience. And thus someone can acquire the art who has no experience, and so is less certain how to operate than one with experience, since he knows less certainly about what can be done *per se* [i.e., about any individual case].

14 To the other¹⁴ as above.¹⁵

15 The argument against this¹⁶ attempts to show the Philosopher held that the singular can be understood *per se*. For if he acts more certainly who knows the singular better *per se*, then an agent who acts most certainly, like God or an angel, knows the singular *per se* best of all. But here we have an agent acting most certainly with only intellectual knowledge, since he does not have the other. Therefore, he understands the singular *per se*.

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 21-23.

¹³Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

¹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

¹⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 3-4.

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

16 Then to the form of the argument.¹⁷ It is said that one with the art is a perfect artist solely because he has perfect habitual universal knowledge. However, he can have a perfect habitual knowledge in general without applying this to any particular. For, according to the Philosopher, in Bk. II of the *Prior Analytics*,¹⁸ one can know in general and be ignorant in particulars. Therefore, it is possible that one who has the art is perfect as to his art and yet lacks *per se* knowledge of the individual operation. The expert, however, cannot be the perfect expert without *per se* knowledge of the singular, for experiential knowledge is about the singular itself *per se*. Therefore, the artist by reason of being an artist, does not have to know what can be done, as the expert does, since he is a man of experience. And thus what the Philosopher had in mind is kept intact.

17 Nevertheless, from this it does not follow that it is not possible for one who has the art to know the singular *per se* just as perfectly as the person with experience if he applies the universal knowledge he has to the singular. The comparison of the Philosopher, therefore, must be understood of these habits compared precisely to those of which there are principles of knowing as such; not however of what could be known by those having such habits by applying them to other things.

18 [4] {{On the contrary: If the artisan or artist by applying his art to different singulars as *per se* intelligibles could have two *per se* understandings of them and from many acts of this sort he could generate a habit, then he could have two *per se* arts about them, which seems impossible.}}¹⁹

19 Another way is to say that in the singular about which the operation is *per se* there are many other things besides the individuated nature of what is common, and these many things diversify the action. One has to act toward this sick person in this place and at this time in another way than towards that sick person

¹⁷See the note to n. 11.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II, ch. 21, 67a 15-21.

¹⁹Here follows an annotation: "This touches on the question of whether the singular could be understood *per se*. See what Scotus has discussed in Bk. VII as to whether the singular is understood *per se*."

with the same specific infirmity at another place and at another time. But the expert knows these connections from the multiple experience of singular instances, and knows this in itself and in regard to all that is connected with it. But all these connected circumstances the person with the art [of healing] does not have to know solely because he is an artist. Because even though he could know the reasoned fact about the singular *per se*, if he applied his art, he would nevertheless not know about these connections through his habitual knowledge of the art [of healing]. Therefore the expert knows the singular more certainly in so far as what is to be done than insofar as it is connected with these accidentals which vary with the action. Whatever is to be said of the knowledge of the art and of experience, the expert from frequently acting has the habit in his operative faculties, from which the appropriate action follows. Or perhaps he has it in the bodily member which acts, as the skilled harpist has it in his hands; but such the inexperienced artist does not have. This does much to expedite the action.

QUESTION SIX

Text of Aristotle: "Actions and productions are all concerned with the individual" (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 17-18).

Do acts have to do with singular instances?

Are acts and all productions about singulars, as the Philosopher says in the text?¹

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That they are not:

The act of understanding is proper to both science and art. Nevertheless, it has to do *per se*, not with the singular, but with the universal, according to Bk. II of *On the Soul*.² The singular is sensed, while the universal is understood.

2 Also, if acts were about singulars, then the singular is the *per se* subject of movement and of production and of the attributes of such a subject. And thus these attributes would exist in the singular *per se*. Therefore, these would not be attributes that are demonstrable *per se* of any subject of a science, because the singular is not the subject *per se* of any art or science, since—according to Porphyry³—singulars are what art leaves behind.

3 Also, just as the unity or diversity of an act stems from the unity or diversity of the *per se* object, so from the unity or diversity of the act stems the unity or diversity of the potency. Therefore, if the singular were the *per se* object of the act, then the act in regard to this particular would be other than the act in regard to that one, and hence would stem from another potency. And thus it would be a

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 17-18: "Actions and productions are all concerned with the individual."

²From the *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 294; cf. Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, V, prosa 6, (PL 63, 862; CCL 94, 104); Aristotle, *De anima* II, t.c. 60, ch. 5, 417b 22-25.

³Porphyry, *Liber praedicabilium*, cap. 'De specie': (trans. Boethii, inter opera Aristotelis) in AL I⁶, ed. L. Minio-Paluello et B. G. Dod, Bruges-Paris, 1966, 12.

different faculty that would see this white thing and that white thing, since these are two distinct acts.

4 Also, Socrates is healed *per se*; Socrates is a man *per se*; therefore, man is healed *per se*. Man, however, is not singular *per se*; and consequently, not all acts are about singulars *per se*.

5 Also, if they were, either they would be about this singular or about the singular as abstracted from this or that. If they are about the first, then they are not about the other. If they are about the other, then they are about a universal, because "singular" as abstracted from this or that is a universal.

6 For the opposite view there is the Philosopher.⁴

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

7[2] It must be said that the proposition is true [a] so far as outward acts are concerned and insofar as these are realized in external things, but [b] not insofar as the mind thinks of them.

8 These two points are made in glossing the proposition. Proof of the first: since a transient act involved with externals is singular *per se* and exists in something as a subject, this subject has to be singular *per se*. For the singular does not exist in a universal subject. But this is not true of the act as it exists in the agent, because this is not in the object it is concerned with. Hence, such an act is singular, because it exists in a singular subject, even though—as is the case with understanding—the object it is concerned with is universal *per se*. But this proof is not valid, if every action is in the agent as subject.

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

A.—TO THE FIRST AND SECOND ARGUMENTS]

9 This answers the first argument,⁵ since the proposition does not refer to actions that remain in the agent such as understanding does.

⁴Cf. note 1.

⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

10 To the second,⁶ it must be said that any motion that exists in nature is associated with some particular. However, from this and that case of motion one can abstract the common notion of motion, and this can have an attribute that is demonstrable *per se* and primarily of some common subject in some science, like the subject of the science of physics.

11 {{Proof of this is to be found in the fact that whatever is in many things univocally and is not in any of them in virtue of something else, has to be primarily characteristic of one thing common to them through the nature of which it is in these many things.—To the contrary: then the act has no more to do with the singular than any real accidental thing, such as whiteness. For any such thing as it exists in the real world is singular and is a singular of a certain sort.}}

[B.—TO THE THIRD ARGUMENT

1.—FIRST REPLY]

12 [3] To the third,⁷ it must be said that the unity or diversity of the potency does not stem from every unity or diversity of the object or the act, but only from generic unity or diversity.

13 Confirmation of this: just as the receptive potency of matter with respect to forms is the same with respect to all forms of the same genus, so also the cognitive potency is the same with respect to all objects.

—Proof of the first part of the analogy. All forms of the same genus can be interchanged, according to Bk. X of the *Metaphysics*.⁸ But no such interchange is possible unless the recipient is the same *per se*.

14 This is also confirmed by what the Philosopher says in Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*:⁹ “For though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal—is man, for example, not the man Callias.”

⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 27-31.

⁹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 19, 100a 17-100b 1.

[a.—THREE OBJECTIONS TO THIS SOLUTION]

15 To the contrary: Three incongruities follow from the above. The first is that something under a universal aspect would be a *per se* object of a sense. Proof of the implication: an object that is generically one is a *per se* universal. Proof of the falsity of the consequent: Then the sense and intellect would not be distinguished on the basis of the formal notion of their objects, so that the fact that it had to do with the universal would no longer be something proper to the intellect. This is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Bk. II of *On the Soul*.¹⁰

16 The second is that universality would precede every act of the intellect, which runs contrary to what the Commentator says:¹¹ “It is the intellect that produces universality in things.” Proof of the implication: Every intellectual act is preceded in us by some sensation, and the object of a sense qua object precedes the act of sensation. Therefore, according to this argument, it precedes the act of the intellect. And whatever is prior to the anterior is prior to the posterior.¹² The object of the sense, however, insofar as it has a generic unity—according to the reply¹³—has a unity that is that of a universal.

17 [4] The third incongruity is that something is the *per se* object of a cognitive potency under an aspect that makes it impossible for that potency to know this object *per se*. Proof of the implication: the sense knows nothing except by sensing; only the singular, however, is sensed *per se*, as the reply states¹⁴ and Aristotle says in Bk. II of *On the Soul*.¹⁵

¹⁰ Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417b 22-23.

¹¹ Averroes, *De anima* I, com. 8 (ed. F. S. Crawford, p. 12).

¹² Cf. Scotus, *De Primo Principio*, ch. 2.

¹³ Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

¹⁴ Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

¹⁵ Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417b 22-23.

[b.—AGAINST THE AFORESAID CONFIRMATIONS]

18 Against the first confirmation of this position.¹⁶ Although all potencies that have to do with forms of the same genus have the same object, as the argument proves—for otherwise there would be no interchange of forms *per se* between them—nevertheless, it is not necessary that the potency with respect to all of these forms be the same. Indeed, the opposite seems to be the case according to what the Philosopher says in Bk. III of the *Physics*:¹⁷ “‘To be capable of health’ and ‘to be capable of illness’ are not the same, for if they were, there would be no difference between being ill and being well.” From this it is clear that potencies are distinguished according to a distinction of acts, and not solely by genus, but by species. For health and sickness are of the same genus, so that there is a *per se* interchange between them.

19 Against the second confirmation,¹⁸ from Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics*, is what is said in *On Sleep and Waking*:¹⁹ “The subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality”; therefore, etc.

20 Also, it follows that the object of the potency and the act are not the same, and thus the potencies are not distinguished through acts, as acts are through objects, which is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Bk. II of *On the Soul*.²⁰

21[5] To the first of these two:²¹ The proposition of the Philosopher has to be glossed. It refers to a potency that is ordered to act, inasmuch as potency and act are differences of being. For in this way the same subject is first in potency to something and afterwards is in act with regard to the same thing. But this is not the case with a cognitive potency. The example, the statement: “The subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality” is not valid for an operative faculty if the action takes place in the patient, according to Bk. III of the *Physics*.²²

¹⁶Cf. supra, n. 13.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 1, 201a 35-b 2.

¹⁸Cf. supra, n. 14.

¹⁹Aristotle, *De somno et vigilia*, ch. 1, 454a 8.

²⁰Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 4, 415a 17-22.

²¹Cf. supra, n. 19.

²²Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 3, 202b 6-22.

[2.—SECOND REPLY]

22 [On the unity of the common nature] I give another answer to the argument,²³ therefore. The unity of the object of the sense is not some universal unity in actuality, but is something that is one by a prior unity—namely a real unity—by which the intellect is moved to cause something common to be abstracted from this and that singular, and from singulars that are of the same species more than from singulars that are of different species. Otherwise, the universal would be a mere fiction. For apart from any act of the intellect, this white object agrees more with that white object than with something of a different genus.²⁴ Hence, I say that this one real thing [i.e., whiteness] before any act of the intellect is one in many, though not derived from many.²⁵ It becomes such through the intellect, and then it is a universal, but not before. For, according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*,²⁶ both conditions are required for a universal.

23 [Objection] [As for this unity, as for whether one should posit it or not, look up the question of the universal in Bk. VII.²⁷ But here one argues against this insofar as this issue is concerned, because one does not solve the difficulty of the object of the sense in this fashion.

24 Likewise, this one common feature is “apt by nature to be predicated of several,”²⁸ therefore, it is actually universal.

25 Reply: it has only a remote aptitude in actuality, but through the consideration of the intellect, this aptitude becomes proximate,

²³Cf. *supra*, nn. 3, 12.

²⁴There follows here an interpolated annotation in three manuscripts: “That an action takes place in a singular thing and regarding a singular object is treated in this question. That it deals only with a singular [object] is treated in Bk. V, q. 7 (see below Bk. V, q. 7, nn. 48-51) by a singular agent, because singular causes come from singular things V *Physics* [Bk. II ch. 3, 192b 25-27]. This provides a valid proof that singulars are understood.”

²⁵Cf. *infra*, Bk. I, q. 10, n. 12; Bk. V, q. 7, nn. 41-64.

²⁶Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 4, 73b 25-74a 3.

²⁷Cf. *infra*, Bk. VII, q. 18, nn. 16-69.

²⁸Aristotle, *De interpretatione*, ch. 7, 17a 39-40.

and this is what the definition of the *Posterior Analytics*²⁹ has in mind when it says the universal is predicated of many.}}

26 [6] To the contrary: this object that is really one is either singular or universal it does not seem possible there is any intermediary alternative, for no philosopher postulates such. But it is not universal according to you. Therefore, it is singular. Then the argument proceeds as before,³⁰ viz. there are different potencies for different singulars.

27 To this argument, note that Avicenna,³¹ referring to this statement does not deny there is a quidditative unity, but only that there is no numerical unity. Now the multitude opposed to numerical unity is something quidditative unity is indifferent to, and so of itself it is determined to neither; in like manner it is indifferent to being universal or singular. And so considered in itself, without either of these, it is the object of the sense.

28 {{For every being in the world, whether it is a quiddity or whatever it is, to the extent that it is a being, is also one with its own proper unity. For in this way just as the unity of the quiddity is related to the quiddity, so the unity of an individual subject is related to the individual subject. And so the nature, with the unity proper to it, can be taken as an object; but this is something real, not universal. Or if one considers the intellectual quiddity without this unity attributed to it, one can consider this the object without that unity, just as one considers it the object, taken absolutely qua quiddity, not qua act or potency.}}

29 [7] According to Avicenna in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*, chapter 1³²—passim—neither humanity nor any quiddity is such actually or potentially, neither one nor many, neither universal nor singular. This is what I am saying about this object of the sense.

30 [Instances against the above] On the contrary: then it would follow that the same thing according to the same *per se* notion is an

²⁹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 11, 77a 6-7.

³⁰Cf. supra, n. 3.

³¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* V, ch. 1, AviL 228: "Unde ipsa equinitas non est aliquid nisi equinitas tantum: ipsa enim ex se nec est multa nec unum."

³²Avicenna, *Metaphysica* V, ch. 1, AviL 227-238.

object of both the sense and the intellect. For it is only *per se* intelligible according to this notion whereby it is a quiddity, but—according to you—it is *per se* sensible as well.

31 Also, then the sense will be cognitive *per se* of the quiddity and not of the singular, which seems to be contrary to what [Aristotle] says later,³³ that the “senses give us the most authoritative knowledge of singulars.” How, then, does this happen? Not because they pertain solely to the sense, according to you, nor because they pertain to such *per se*, according to you.

32 [Reply to these instances] I reply that the quiddity is not without singularity.

33 {{Otherwise, one must say that the sense has to do *per se* with the singular, namely the composite of nature and individual difference; however, the nature is the formal reason why the thing is known.

34 On the contrary: then the formal reason is known more so [than the individual difference];³⁴ “the reason why the attribute inheres in the subject always inheres in it more firmly than the attribute.”

35 Also, then the sense would not err in distinguishing this from that [if the individual difference were known].

36 To the first,³⁵ the implication [that the formal reason is known more than the individual difference] holds of the intellect which is suited by nature to know this aspect in such a way as it is in itself, and this is not true of the sense. However, in the proposition of the *Posterior Analytics*, the word “because” is to be understood in an effective sense.

37 To the second,³⁶ the sense does not err with respect to the formal notion or about this thing insofar as it is related to that [formal notion].}}

38 To the first incongruity above,³⁷ it is said that if the actual universal were the *per se* object of the possible intellect, and the

³³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 10-11.

³⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 72a 29-30.

³⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 34.

³⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 35.

³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 30.

universal *per se* would be caused by the agent intellect, then the incongruity would not follow.

39 Otherwise, it is said the agent intellect does not cause the universal, but the possible intellect, considering this unlimited [i.e., indifferent] quiddity, causes in it the universal so that the universal is not the *per se* act of the intellect, but it follows the first action of the possible intellect. Thus the quiddity as such, as it is an object of the sense—according to the preceding reply³⁸—is also an object of the intellect.

40 {{To the contrary: to be predicated of many pertains to the quiddity conceived as such; therefore, it is actually universal. Also, if it were not, what does the possible intellect do by considering it that it becomes universal? For, it only compares the quiddity to this and that, and it was predicable of these beforehand and so is was already universal.—Also, through what sort of intellection will the intellect have a new species, and where would it come from?}}

41 [8] But then it would not be said to be an incongruity that the intellect knew the singular *per se*. Just as every thing which the sense of sight knows in something white, the common sense knows, but not just in the same way.—Similarly, the possible intellect would know that quiddity just as the sense knows it, but not only in this way, but as it has actually become universal.

42 But then I say to the argument that claims the potencies are distinguished by objects,³⁹ that ordered potencies are distinguished according to what is most common, but disparate potencies are distinguished by disparate objects.

43 To the other,⁴⁰ it is said that the incongruity that is inferred does not exist. And it is proved in this way. Every potency knowing an object under a certain aspect seems to know that aspect even more than it does the object.

44 Then it is argued that the sense knows the quiddity, not *per se*, [according to you], but under A, namely under some accident. Then I

³⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 27, 29.

³⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

⁴⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 31; see also n. 17.

ask about A, whether A is known *per se*, and then whether one knows the quiddity *per se*. For if it knows it under something other [than A], then you go on to infinity or you come to a halt [with A]. However, the sense only senses that which is color; [whereas] the intellect knows the quiddity by defining and attributing the definition to the thing defined by saying: "This is what [it is, viz.] this sort [of thing]," and thus it seems one knows the quiddity [itself] and not just what [this is].}}

[C.—TO THE REST OF THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

45 [9] To the fourth argument at the beginning,⁴¹ I say that the implication is not valid, because the *per se* statements are not similar. For a necessary conclusion can only follow from necessary propositions. Unless falsity were to follow from what is true, the antecedent cannot be true without the consequent being true. They are separated only so far as causality goes [i.e., the reason why each is true] and that causality lies in why the propositions are true *per se*. Hence, in the propositions *per se* there is [the fallacy of] accident. For, even though the two share one cause, it does not follow that one [proposition] is the cause of the other.

46 To the other:⁴² this act is about this singular; this singular act in general is about singulars in general and the act in accord with the nature is about the object according to its nature and the universal act is about a universal object abstracted from singulars. And for such one can save that statement in Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics* cited above:⁴³ "For though the act of sense-perception is of the particular, its content is universal." For every single act of sense perception is about one singular only; many acts, however, are about many. And all these acts are from the same potency. From this one concludes that no one singular is the first object of the potency, but something one in many singulars which is somehow universal, as was first explained.⁴⁴ Although each sense perception is only about one singular, nevertheless, it is not about it as its first

⁴¹Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

⁴²Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

⁴³Cf. *supra*, n. 14; Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 19, 100a 17-b 1.

⁴⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

object, but about that one object as it exists in an individual. Otherwise, the potency and its act would not have the same object. But it is not about that one object except in its singularity, just as color is not seen except in quantity. From many such acts, however, one can abstract one common feature, and of that object something universal is posited, as was said in response to the second main argument.⁴⁵

47 On the contrary: if the sense does not sense the object without its singularity, how is the singularity related to the object, e.g. to color? Is it a *per se* sensible, although not proper, like quantity? Is singularity itself a *per se* intelligible? Study this.⁴⁶

48 Note however that in regard to the above, the third initial argument does not present a special difficulty for this question. For it is solved as the first initial argument⁴⁷ is solved about the immanent act.

[III.—AN ADDED QUESTION:

IS THE *PER SE* OBJECT OF THE SENSE SOMETHING UNDER THE ASPECT OF THE SINGULAR?

A.—ARGUMENTS PRO AND CON]

49 [10] In regard to that text of the Philosopher below in this first book:⁴⁸ “Again we do not regard any of the senses as wisdom,” there is a good reason to doubt whether the *per se* object of the sense is anything under the aspect of the singular.

50 It seems that it is, because he adds there: “yet surely the senses give the most authoritative knowledge of singulars.”—Bk. II *On the Soul*⁴⁹ also says that “the singular is only sensed” and BK. II of the *Posterior Analytics*⁵⁰ says that “sense perception is of the singular.”—And:⁵¹ “The subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality.” Therefore, the sense is of the singular itself. How else maintain the difference between the sense and intellect?

⁴⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

⁴⁶Cf. *infra* Bk. VII, q. 14, nn. 25-27; Bk. VII, q. 15, nn. 14-37.

⁴⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

⁴⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 10-11.

⁴⁹Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417b 22-25.

⁵⁰Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 19, 100a 17-b 1.

⁵¹Aristotle, *De somno et vigilia*, ch. 1, 454a 8.

51 But the contrary is argued in the third initial argument⁵² about the diversity of potencies, and in the first confirmation of the first reply to the third initial argument,⁵³ where an analogy is drawn between a [cognitive potency] and the real potency [of matter]. For it is admitted there is a *per se* unity of the receptive potency of matter as regards the generic unity of the forms that can be interchanged. Therefore, the unity of the sensitive potency will be judged similarly as regards a generic unity of its object.

52 This is also proved by the second confirmation of II *Posterior Analytics*.⁵⁴

53 Also, singularity is of one sort in color and sound. Therefore, this is not a formal aspect of their object, for this would distinguish the potencies.

54 Also, this singularity is not the formal object of the sense, because then another singular could not be sensed. Singularity, however, in the common sense seems to be a universal, because there is something, not a second intention, whereby the singularity in this color resembles the singularity in another color. Therefore, from these two singularities the one universal, "singular," is abstracted just as the one universal, "color," is abstracted from the two colors.

[B.—REPLY TO THE ADDED QUESTION]

55 [11] To this doubt I reply that both ways concede that the singular is not the *per se* or first object of the potency. But the prior way⁵⁵ [namely, that the unity of any potency is determined according to generic unity] claims that something according to a generic unity is the object of the potency. The second way⁵⁶ [viz., that a real unity is the object of a potency], however, avoiding unity of the universal which is proper to the object of the sense,

⁵²Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

⁵³Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

⁵⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

⁵⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 12-14.

⁵⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 22-44.

assumes that there corresponds to it a real fundamental generic unity in so far as it is the object, but not that the object posits this unity, but it posits the nature to which, without the consideration of the intellect, this unity pertains.

56 According to this then both confirmations of the first way⁵⁷ posited to confirm the reply to the third argument are in favor of the second way. For the potential material principle is not said to be primarily the same for forms of this genus, as genus is a second intention caused by the intellect. Rather it is the same for forms having a nature that is one by the sort of real unity that is the foundation of the generic unity produced by the intellect when it considers that nature.

57 Also, that statement in the second confirmation⁵⁸ from Bk. II of the *Posterior Analytics* has to be glossed, viz. that as to its content, "sense-perception is about the universal." It is about one thing which has the sort of unity that is the foundation for the unity of the universal.

58 Also, the three incongruities⁵⁹ adduced against the reply to the third initial argument are against the first way; not against this second way.

59 Also, the argument [n. 18] against the first confirmation,⁶⁰ from Bk. III of the *Physics*,⁶¹ viz. that potencies to contraries are as diverse as "to be capable of health" and "to be capable of illness," is sophistical. For that first confirmation [n. 12] must be understood not of the potential relationship as is the case with the dictum of the Philosopher in Bk. III of the *Physics*, but of the potential principle in which there is a relationship to form, because the cognitive potency itself is not just a relation.

60 To that argument made above against the second confirmation of the reply to the third initial argument,⁶² it must be said that the statement of the Philosopher in *On Sleep and Waking*,⁶³ "The

⁵⁷Cf. supra, nn. 13-14.

⁵⁸Cf. supra, n. 14.

⁵⁹Cf. supra, nn. 15-17.

⁶⁰Cf. supra, n. 18.

⁶¹Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 1, 201a 35-b 2.

⁶²Cf. supra, n. 19; see also n. 21.

⁶³Aristotle, *De somno et vigilia*, ch. 1, 454a 8.

subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality," is to be understood subjectively in the sense that the potency has the same subject as the act does. For he proves from that proposition that just as the act of sensing pertains to the composite [of body and soul], so too the potency is not just that of the soul. However, the objective version of the proposition is also true, viz. "The potency belongs objectively to what the act belongs objectively," as the other argument⁶⁴ that follows this proves, because otherwise the same things would not be the object of both the act and the potency.

61 [12] This is also evident from the third incongruity cited above⁶⁵ against the reply to the third initial argument, because otherwise something would be the object of the cognitive potency according to some aspect according to which it was impossible for the potency to know that object.

62 According to this second way, then, just as one denies the sense potency is primarily and *per se* about the singular, so one denies this of the act. Consequently, all contrary statements, understood in this second way, are glossed. For instance, when one says "acts of sense-perception are of the singular," or similar things, this is about singularity as a "sine quo non" condition, just as [visual acts] are said to be about quantity. Hence, this second way assumes that the primary object of the visual sense is color or light, which it actually is. Similarly, it is the object of the act itself, but not without singularity.

63 A doubt: Is it the object of the potency without singularity?—Reply: the situation is the same as with quantity. Indeed, it is [color], not the quantity or extension that moves [the visual sense], although [color] could not actually act [if were without extension].

⁶⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

⁶⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

QUESTION SEVEN

Text of Aristotle: "This must be a science that investigates the first principles and causes; for the good or final cause is one of the causes. That it is not a science of production is clear even from the history of those who began to philosophize" (*Metaphysics* I. ch. 2, 982b 9-12).

Is metaphysics a practical science?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] It seems so:

It is to make us good, for it aims immediately at happiness, which is our highest good; therefore, etc.

2 Also, according to Bk. I of this work,¹ the sixth condition of wisdom² is that it is the governing science that orders the others; but to order or govern is the act of a practical science; therefore, etc.

3 Also, just as supernatural theology is to perfect us in super-natural being, so this science is to perfect us in natural being; but supernatural theology is assumed to be practical, because of the love that is charity; therefore, etc.

4 Also, [metaphysics] is common to theoretical and practical matters, therefore, it is neither just a theoretical science nor just a practical science.

5 To the contrary:

The Philosopher argues for its theoretical character here³ and in Bk. VI of this work.⁴

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 19.

²Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *In Metaph.* I, lect. 2, ed. Parma XX, 254b where this is referred to as the sixth condition.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 19-20.

⁴*Ibid.* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 18-24.

[I.—STATE OF THE QUESTION]

6 To solve this and the following question we must determine the meaning of “practice” or “praxis,” from which the term “practical science” is derived. Secondly, we must see in what way a science should be related to “practice” in order to be called a practical science.

[A. —WHAT DOES “PRAXIS” MEAN?]

7 As for the first, note that “praxis” refers to any operation not theoretical in nature; otherwise the division of science into theoretical and practical would be inadequate. For every operation is essentially distinguished from contemplation in that contemplation or theoretical knowledge is ultimately its own end, whereas [every operation is] for the sake of something. This operation [called “praxis”], however, has to be something that is not determined merely by nature, but can be done either rightly or wrongly.

[B.—HOW IS PRACTICAL KNOWLEDGE RELATED TO PRAXIS?]

8 This is evident from the second clarification. For practical knowledge or science is related to practice as directive. But there is no need of direction where no deformity can be present. Now the operations which are under our command are either cognitive functions of both intellect and the sense faculties, or are operations of the intellective or sense appetites or motor operations, but not vegetative functions, about which there is no practical science.

9 [2] If you object that medicine seems to be about these [vegetative functions], I reply that it is really about our actions that have to do with medicine, namely, how such applications dispose medicine in such a way.

10 Cognitive operations of the intellect, however, are threefold: [1] One sort is ordered to nothing further, as knowledge of ultimate conclusions. [2] Another sort is ordered to another as its cause, as knowledge of a principle is ordered to a conclusion. [3] Another sort of knowledge is ordered to other knowledge as end, in the way that

a less noble science is ordered to metaphysics, or as directive in another [science] in the way that logic is. Nevertheless, all of these are theoretical, because they are not ordered to anything besides contemplation.

11 However, a cognitive function pertaining to the sense is to some extent under our command, for example to imagine this or that, or to dispose the eye to see in this or that way. And, if there would be scientific knowledge about this matter, it would be practical knowledge, teaching us how and when to function in this way. But to the extent that sense knowledge is not under our command (when a sensible object is presented to an organ well-disposed and with nothing to impede it, that object, for instance, is necessarily perceived), there is no practical knowledge regarding this.

12 As for the appetitive operation of the will tending towards its ultimate natural end, this has no alternative and is uniform, namely, there is a simple complacent love as it were that requires no directive knowledge. For as we said earlier,⁵ where no deformity can be present, there is no need of a directive science.

13 However, it is possible to err in natural actions that regard a means to an end, and in this regard virtues and practical moral knowledge do exist.

14 Where supernatural acts of the will are concerned, it is possible to be in error or to act rightly not only in regard to the proper means to the end, but also in regard to the end itself. For an act cannot be right without many circumstances accompanying it; therefore, direction is required in regard to both. Here, then, the directive science is supernatural theology, and therefore, this is assumed to be a practical science in this way.

15 [3] Now the operation of the sense appetite can be either right or not right. Hence it falls under direction and is also in this way [under] ethics insofar as moral virtues are also present there, although, perhaps not to such an extent, in the main, as these virtues are in the will.

16 Motor operations, however, [fall into several classes]. Certain ones are simply immanent, like dancing or riding horses; others are

⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

transeunt but leave no product behind, such as singing at the first stage and accompanying it with the lyre or harp at the second; still others do leave something, and such are most properly called “making”.

[II.—TO THE QUESTION]

17 This science [of metaphysics], therefore, since it is concerned with the first being, is in no way a practical science, except for the reason that it leads to a natural act of the will in regard to that being. But although the science is ordered to that, this does not make the science practical, since it is not ordered to the act of the will as directing it, since this act [of contemplating being] is natural and right and not deformed.

18 This can also be proved in another way. No knowledge is practical unless it has to do with [1] an operation or [2] the operable qua operable. But this science [of metaphysics] does neither. It does not consider the second, because the first being under this notion as such is not an operable object.

19 To the contrary: [If it is not such an object,] then neither is supernatural theology a practical science. Therefore, I reply: For the operable—or that with which an operation is concerned—to be lovable is for it to be that with which the operation is concerned, like “to be curable.” This suffices for a science to be practical.

20 Objection: the lovable aspect that allows one to assert that in God there is some conceptual relationship cannot be the primary ground or reason in him why everything is attributed to him. Therefore, neither is God considered here in this way.

21 I reply: the same argument can be applied to theology, for we cannot assume here a subject of any higher or more noble conception than in metaphysics. Hence, I reply that under the aspect of the good, God can be considered both here [in metaphysics] and there [in theology]. This is an absolute aspect upon which the notion of the lovable is based, just as the physician considers the body insofar as it is hot or cold, on which its ability to be healed is based. And this is enough to have a practical science. Hence, there

is no reason why metaphysics cannot be practical so far as its object is concerned.⁶

22 It will not do to say that Aristotle considered it to be theoretical, since he assumed that wisdom was the most noble intellectual habit, according to *Ethics* VI, ch. 8,⁷ and hence was not ordered to some other science, nor to anything other than its own act, and thus it is not directed to praxis, but purely to contemplation.

23 [4] Though this argument might seem valid, it is no good. For it is clear that every science is more noble than the transeunt actions of a motor power that affect extrinsic matters; and yet it is with respect to such actions that a science is assumed to be practical. Therefore, it is evident that the essential characteristic of a practical science is not the fact that it is ordered to an end as something more noble, but that it is directive in regard to some other action, even if this is less noble than contemplation. In fact, Aristotle assumes no science is practical unless it directs the acts of a potency less noble than the intellect, unless, perhaps, it be moral science —if the virtues, perhaps, are in the will.

24 Also, the argument⁸ fails on another count. It is clear that Aristotle assumed the intellective appetite is in us (*Ethics* VI and *Rhetoric* I, ch. 12).⁹ If that potency is nobler, however, its act will be nobler than the act of the intellect, and so the act of the intellect will be ordered to it, and this is practice or praxis, as was had before.¹⁰ Therefore, etc.

25 Neither does the proof about wisdom hold up.¹¹ For even though it were the most noble habit, still a natural act of the will and thus, not one stemming from a habit, can be nobler than an act of the intellect stemming from a habit, if the will is a nobler power than the intellect. For it does not detract from the nobility of an act

⁶The following annotation is added here: "The first reason is valid, namely concerning the difference between natural and supernatural love."

⁷Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, ch. 7, 1141b 2-3.

⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 21-22.

⁹Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI, ch. 2, 1139a17-b11; *Rhetoric* I, ch. 10-11, 1369a 1-4; 1370a 18-19.

¹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

¹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

that it stems from a potency without a habit intervening, especially if the act is natural and uniform.

26 For example, vision is a more noble act than the act of writing, which stems from a manual habit, because vision is more noble than a motor potency. And this would be so even if the habit of writing were the most noble of all habits, since there is no habit in the visual potency.

27 {{Objection: Why could not one generate in the will a habit of natural love from an act of natural love?—i.e., from purely natural acts which are, nevertheless, freely elicited frequently, just as one generates such in the intellect by natural intellections? For the will is even less determined than the intellect, at least with respect to principles, of which there are habits.

28 Reply: if a habit were generated, it would be from the fecundity of the act, but not because of its necessity, so that between the potency and the habit an act would intervene; but between a potency and its act there is no need of a habit. Aristotle, however, only assumed a habit, perhaps, because it was needed to cause the act.}}

[III.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

29 [5] To the first argument¹² of the question it must be said that what it assumes is that we become good by contemplation.

30 To the second¹³ one must answer that this [science] orders the other [sciences] as an end orders the means to that end, and not as a directive science orders others.

31 To the third¹⁴ one must say that there is no similarity [between metaphysics and supernatural theology], not because of the two arguments rejected above,¹⁵ but because of the naturalness of the love [of knowledge] in regard to which there is no deformity.¹⁶ But this reason is weak, as is clear from the argument about natural love

¹²Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

¹³Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

¹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

¹⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 19-26.

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 8, 12.

above.¹⁷ For there is liberty as regards acts stemming from purely natural endowments, that is to say, they may be elicited with or without the appropriate circumstances, viz. [loving God] “above all” or “for the sake of another,” even though these circumstances do not make the love something supernatural. Likewise, what proof have you that it [i.e., this science] is directive? For the Philosopher says in Bk. II of this work¹⁸ that “the end of a practical knowledge is action.” He does not say “its purpose is to direct one in acting.”

32 To the fourth¹⁹ we must say that, insofar as the subject is common [to both the theoretical and practical sciences], their method of treatment and their end is one.

33 To the argument about the object of a practical science²⁰ we must maintain that its object is not our work or action, but what can be directed through the science; neither is its object the operable, but any absolute condition²¹ can fill the role of an object of a practical science, according to which condition there can be an operation of ours about it that is not contemplation. Volition, however, can be about an object based on its absolute nature, just as intellection can. In this way it is clear how God qua God or qua good or qua any other absolute aspect can be the object of a practical science. Therefore, it is not its object that distinguishes a practical and a theoretical science. For there is nothing intelligible as regards which under an absolute aspect there could not be an operation of the will just as well as one of the intellect.

34 Richard²² in question 4 of Bk. I wants to differentiate them on the basis of the end rather than on that of their subject matter, and this speaking of the essential end the science as such is concerned with, not the accidental end the person knowing might have in mind. The fact that there can always be a theoretical science about any operable matter whatsoever proves this. But there still

¹⁷Cf. supra, n. 27-28.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 20-21.

¹⁹Cf. supra, n. 4.

²⁰Cf. supra, n. 18.

²¹Cf. supra, n. 21.

²²Richard of Mediavilla, *Sent.* prol. q. 4, resp. f. 3ra.

remains a question here about why a science of God is not practical, as becomes clear elsewhere.²³

²³Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* prol. pars 5, qq. 1-2, n. 331: He points out the question as to whether theology or knowledge of God is practical or not hinges mainly on this point. Granted there is a rectifying potency in the knower, that puts into practice the sort of knowledge that is of itself able to direct that potency. Is that knowledge practical solely because that potency is able to be directed by it in this way, or is it not practical but theoretical, because that potency that puts it into practice is unable to be directed by it. Depending upon which side one holds he will answer accordingly. (I, 216-217).

QUESTION EIGHT

Text of Aristotle: "And the science which knows to the reason why particular things must be done is the most authoritative of the science and more authoritative than any ancillary science." (*Metaphysics* I, 982b 4-5)

Is theoretical knowledge nobler than practical knowledge?

[Initial Arguments]

1 [1] [For the negative]:

Practical knowledge is nobler, because its end is to good, whereas the purpose of theoretical knowledge is to know the true; but the first goal is better than the second.

2 Also, political science, which is practical, orders theoretical knowledge, as is clear from Bk. I of the *Ethics*,¹ but ordering is better [than being ordered].

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

3 [For the affirmative]

It is said² praxis or practice is common to affective knowledge (which is an action) and knowing how to produce or make something.

4 Others³ say bare will is not called practice, and that the speculative science is nobler. And they prove this from the object, for the object of theoretical knowledge, which is the quiddity of a thing, is nobler than the object of a practical science, which is some work of ours. The quiddities of intellectual things is nobler.

¹Aristotle, *Magna moralia* I, c. 11, 1181a 26-b 27.

²Cf. Bonaventure, *Sent.* prooem. q. 3 resp. (I 13ab); Richard of Mediavilla, *Sent.* prol. q. 4 (p. 8a); Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* X q. 11 (PhB IV 350-353); cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* prol. p. 4 q. 1-2 n. 164-179 (XVI 54-60); *Ordinatio* prol. p. 5 q. 1-2 n. 228-235 (I 155-160).

³Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI q. 10 in corp. (PhB III 192. 210); *Quodl.* VI q. 7 (PhB III 154).

5 Others⁴ would say to this that if God is the aim of our action, that is, as lovable, this is better than just knowing about God.

6 Another proof is based on the end, since the purpose of practical knowledge is its usefulness, whereas theoretical knowledge has contemplation as its goal.⁵ But the second is more noble than the first, according to Bk. X of the Ethics.⁶ For that is nobler which makes us like the most noble things of all. But it is through the knowledge of truth that we become most like the gods, for they do not make things like us, nor do they perform any actions common to us.

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

7 [2] As for the arguments to the contrary, I say to the first⁷ that this [practical] science does not aim at making us good in an unqualified sense, but on the basis of virtues, i.e., that in the sensitive portion of our soul we become moderate—if you assume the sensitive part to be the subject of a virtue—and this is not an unqualified good. For, according to the Philosopher, this is ordered to our greater good, which is contemplating the separate substances, and resting in such contemplation. For this contemplation is our highest good, since it is happiness, according to the Philosopher (*Ethics* X).⁸

8 As for the other,⁹ political science orders the person who hears it, and not theoretical science as such. It is one thing to order the use of something and the person who ought to know and practice such, and quite another thing to order the knowledge or science itself. Hence, political knowledge orders [how one] carries out [his duties] and it is true in some sense that “ordering is better.”

⁴Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* I q. 14 (AMPh s. 2, V 87): “... melior est amor et dilectio Dei quam cognitio eius”.

⁵Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982b 20-21.

⁶Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 7, 1178a 5-8.

⁷Cf. supra, n. 1.

⁸Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 8, 1178b 25-32.

⁹Cf. supra, n. 2.

QUESTION NINE

Text of Aristotle: “We suppose first, then, that the wise man knows all things as far as fitting, although he has no knowledge of each particular in detail.” (*Metaphysics* I, 982a 8-10)

Does it pertain to the metaphysician as such to know the quiddities of all things in particular?

1 [1] That it does:

According to what is said in Bk. IV of this work,¹ no other science investigates what a thing is. But if the quiddities are known, and no other science knows them, then they are known in this science.

2 Also, knowledge in general is only imperfect, for it is confused and indistinct. Therefore, if the wise man would know only in general, he would be a person who knows only imperfectly, whereas others would know things perfectly—which is contrary to what the Philosopher says in Bk. I.²

3 Also, there seems to be a similarity between ordered habits and ordered potencies. But where potencies are concerned, the higher potency can comprehend every aspect that the lower potency can. Therefore, the higher habit [or science] will know all that is known by the lower habits. Now the lower habits know things in particular; therefore, the higher does also.

4 To the contrary:

In Bk. I³ it is said that it pertains to the wise man to know all things, and it is explained there that it is not necessary that he know everything in particular, but only in general.

5 Also, if he did know all things in particular, the other sciences would be superfluous.

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1025b 9-10.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 12-24.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 8-10.

[I.— TO THE QUESTION
A.—THE COMMON VIEW]

6 It is commonly⁴ said that it pertains to the metaphysician to know each quiddity qua quiddity and qua this, but not according to every accidental aspect that this quiddity has.

[1.— ARGUMENTS FOR THE COMMON VIEW.
a.—THE METAPHYSICIAN CONSIDERS EVERY QUIDDITY AS
QUIDDITY AND AS THIS]

7[2] The first point is explained in this way. In the order of cognition, definition, and time, this quiddity is prior to motion and quantity, and therefore, can be considered apart from motion or quantity. Now it is not so considered in physics, because the latter considers what is mobile, nor in mathematics because it considers a thing as quantified. Therefore, it is considered in metaphysics.

8 Also, if this quiddity were not considered by the metaphysician *per se*, then it would be considered by someone else, and then it follows that this other science would be subalternated to metaphysics, because it considered this particular quiddity, whereas metaphysics considered quiddity in general.

9 And it follows, also, that what is lower and higher *per se* would not pertain to the same science, which does not seem to be the case with other sciences. For the same person [i.e., the mathematician] considers both number and the binary, and so on.

10 {{Also, what we know when we first consider anything is what is there primarily, for this is something that cannot be shown through anything else; all other things such as attributes are demonstrable through this, or—like other essential predicates—they can be shown through this. But what is in anything primarily is its own quiddity, which is expressed by a proper definition. Hence, it is the task of the metaphysician, to whom the first knowledge of anything belongs, to consider this quiddity it has. The major is clear, because knowledge of A that can

⁴Cf. Albertus M., *Metaph.* I tr. 1 c. 2 (XVI¹ 4b); Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* VI lect. 1.

be shown only through something other than A is not primary knowledge of A. Proof of the minor: although being is the first thing that is in man, it is not in man primarily, first because it can be shown, though not demonstrated, through the definition of man; but that man is a rational animal cannot be shown through anything. Hence, one should not look for something [i.e., demonstrative proof] where there is nothing of this sort to look for, according to Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,⁵ since there is no other reason for it [i.e., because it is self-evident or a first principle]. For instance, there is no reason why man is man, according to Bk. V of the *Metaphysics* in the chapter about *per se* propositions.⁶ This is proved in the following way. If A pertained to B primarily, then it would not pertain to anything else that is not B. Hence, if being pertained primarily to man, it would not pertain to anything else *per se*. Therefore, just as one is primarily only in “one” according to the second mode of *per se* predication, so also, only what is properly a “what” [i.e., an essential note] can be in anything according to the first mode of *per se* predication.

11 [Refutation of this common view] If this reasoning were true, then “Man is man” would be a principle prior to “Being is being,” because the latter could be shown through the former, but not vice versa. A principle has to show us conclusions.

12 Here, however, it is said that the first propositional principle⁷ [i.e., “Being is being”] is included in all propositional truths [like “Man is man”], just as the first notion someone has [i.e., being] is included in all the other notions. Therefore, this first notion is shown through each of these other notions, although it is not demonstrated [for only attributes, not essentials, are demonstrated].

Another way is to say that from common concepts universal propositions are formed, and thus the one with the greater extension includes that with the lesser extension, but not vice versa.

⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 17, 1041a 20-24.

⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 18, 1022a 33-35.

⁷Cf. Aristotle, *On interpretation* ch. 9, 18a 29-30.

13 Hence, to this argument itself,⁸ one must reply that the first cognition is either universal or particular. The first universal knows what is primarily in itself as universal; the first particular, however, knows what is primarily in itself as particular. Metaphysics is not the first particular science about man, or about man in particular, but is the first universal science about him insofar as man is a being or substance. And thus it knows what is primarily true of him in general, such as “Being is being.”

14 Objection: at least the particular knowledge of man would show that “Being is being.”—The reply to this is as before.}}⁹

[b.—THE METAPHYSICIAN DOES NOT CONSIDER THE QUIDDITY UNDER ANY ACCIDENTAL ASPECT IT MAY HAVE]

15 [3] The second point is explained in this way. This quiddity is prior to any accidents it may have, and *per se* or proper accidents are prior to per accidens or accidental accidents. Hence it happens that even though the fact that the quiddity is a “this” [or individual] pertains to the *per se* accidents or proper accidents considered by metaphysics, the fact that it is mobile or some such thing—that is insofar as it is understood formally under some per accidens accident—pertains to some other science, because its accidental status is posterior to what can be understood of the quiddity without these accidents.

[2.—REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS OPPOSED TO THIS OPINION]

16 On this basis [they say] to the first¹⁰ that “the wise man knows everything” refers not to knowing every aspect that is knowable, but only everything that pertains to its quiddity, not just in general, but in particular.

⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 11-12.

¹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

17 To the other,¹¹ they say the other sciences consider quiddities according to the accidents they have.

[B.—REFUTATION OF THE COMMON OPINION]

18 Against this position:¹² if the other sciences consider neither the quiddity nor this quiddity in itself, but deal with such only according to what is accidental, since a quiddity with its accidents is only “accidental being,” then it follows that all the sciences other than metaphysics would be about accidental being. But about such there is no science, according to the Philosopher in Bk. VI of this work.¹³ And I prove this because it is necessary to know beforehand just what the subject is; but an accidental being has no “what” or quiddity, since every thing that has such is either a genus or in some genus. But an accidental being is not in any genus, because it is distinguished from all ten categories according to Bk. VI of this work.¹⁴

19 {{To this it is replied that although a mobile body is an accidental being, this is not true of body insofar as it is mobile, because to have one knowable object of one science, it is enough to have one formal aspect.

20 Another answer that is given is that the Philosopher in Bk. VI¹⁵ denies that science is about accidental being, because it has no specific cause, and occurs only in a few cases, which is not the case here.}}

21 To the contrary: One cognition is about one knowable, but there is no more one body here qua mobile than there is one mobile body. For either I understand precisely “body” or precisely “mobile” by understanding body qua mobile, or both. I propose that it will be the third.

¹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

¹²Cf. *supra*, nn. 17. 6.

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 2, 1026b 3-4; 1027b 27-28.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 2, 1026a 34-b 4.

¹⁵*Ibid.*, 1027a 10-11.

22 [4] Also, the Philosopher says in *On Sophistical Refutations*¹⁶ that this is accidental, “You know Coriscus, and he is approaching, therefore, you know someone who is approaching.” Therefore, you know simultaneously both these items, namely the approaching and this happens to be true of Coriscus. And nevertheless you are ignorant of just who the subject is in this case. In the same way the physicist knows both the mobile and this accident and nevertheless is ignorant of it as a body.

23 They say that those things that accrue to it [the subject] are known only accidentally. Nevertheless, those reasons for knowing those other things [that accrue to it] are known *per se*.

24 To the contrary: If the [physicist] knows *per se* mobility through which he knows a body then this is either because he knows mobility insofar as it is a “what,” and then you admit what we propose, or if he does not know it as a “what,” then he does not know it *per se* but only *per accidens*, and then I ask about this accident, and so on ad infinitum.

25 Also, the physicist knows a body qua mobile, according to you. Now either it is the same science whereby he knows the mobile qua mobile, and then he knows it as a “what.” If he does not know the mobile as a “what,” then it follows that the same thing under the same formal notion is considered *per se* by different sciences. For the same reason why a body qua mobile is known is why the mobile qua mobile is known. For mobility is the aspect under which it is considered and mobility is the *per se* formal reason why anything is known in physics. It is the same [with formal reason] in metaphysics. Therefore, etc.

26 Thirdly, it is argued in this way. If the mobile qua mobile is not considered in physics, and the mobile qua mobile is considered in some other science; therefore, it is considered under the same formal aspect in two sciences.—Then we argue as before.

27 [5] They say¹⁷ that it does not pertain to the same science to consider the mobile qua mobile and the body qua mobile, because

¹⁶ Aristotle, *De sophisticis elenchis*, ch. 24, 179b 33-34.

¹⁷Cf. Albertus M., *Metaph.* IV tr. 1 ch. 1 (XVI¹ 162a); *Physica* II tr. 1 c. 9 (IV¹ 92b); Robertus Kilwardby, *De ortu scientiarum* ch. 28 n. 235.

they are not said to be alike. For the notion of mobility accrues to the body accidentally, whereas it pertains *per se* to the mobile.

28 But this is not valid, although this answer does say correctly that this aspect [i.e., *qua mobile*] is related in different ways to what is known under this aspect. Nevertheless, it does not get away from the fact that it is the same formal aspect that is considered in the two sciences *per se*. For the same unvaried aspect which is accidental to one, pertains essentially to the other. And then I argue as before.¹⁸

29 Similarly, from the fact that the different sciences do have different formal reasons, it follows that the same formal reason cannot be considered *per se* in both sciences.

30 {{Also, if the science is to be one, its object must have a formal unity. At least the unity of the first [science] requires such. Not just in itself, but as compared to the materials of which it is the formal reason. To these it is not compared in different ways, such as *per se* and *per accidens*, although it might be compared to them according to different ways of predicating something *per se*. Hence it pertains to the same person to consider risible *qua risible* as to consider man *qua risible*, because there is the same formal reason in both and both are related *per se*, though the mode of *per se* predication is not the same. And then, as it is argued later¹⁹ [at the words] “this they concede,” nothing seems to remain for the other sciences to know.

31 [6] [First Answer] I reply: although no accident *per accidens* is affirmed of being, because being is included in the definition of everything, not as most common, but as included in something more specific, such as “figure” is included in the definition of “having three sides,” although this is not something that it alone has, and yet this pertains to it *per se*. However, to a line visibility is a *per accidens* accident, but visibility is a *per se* accident not only of being, but also of something more specific, such as color or light. Therefore, although the metaphysician considers being, color or the like insofar as they are visible or visual, he does not consider a line *qua visual*. Because this is something that pertains to optics.

¹⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 24-25.

¹⁹Cf. *infra*, n. 41.

32 [Objections to n. 31] To the contrary: this position seems to be a mere play on words.²⁰ First because, as one argued above,²¹ it seems we know the visual line qua visual. Second, because if there is a science about the line as visual [viz. optics], then something will be demonstrated of the line. Now what is the means used to do this? It is not something characteristic of the material aspect; therefore, it must have to do with the formal aspect. Hence, it is necessary to know the formal as such inasmuch as it is the means whereby one establishes what is present there. Similarly, if there could be a formal aspect that would accidentally accrue to an infinity of things, there would be a science of each of them, for the argument is the same in both cases.

33 [Reply to n. 31] Keep in mind, however, what was said above,²² namely that for the unity of a science what is required is a unity of some formal aspect. To this the qualification “at least for the first science” is added, because otherwise the position would be self-contradictory. For there is a different formal reason for being qua being than for man qua man. Nevertheless, among all these formal reasons that of being is the first and is one. To the contrary: there is the equivocation of being.

34 [Second Answer] I reply in another way that the notion of man is not simply other than that of being, because it includes it.}}

35 To the argument for the opinion²³ I say that not every quiddity is prior to every quantity, but only the quiddity of substance; the quiddity of quantity is not.

36 [Objection] One argues against this as follows: The quiddity of fire is prior to all motion; therefore, as such it is not considered as mobile or as quantified, and thus it is not considered by either the physicist or the mathematician.

37 [Reply to the objection] I say that mobility is not what has the formal aspect of being the subject, but whatever is considered in the science of physics. Proof of this is to be found in the fact that the subject insofar as it has this aspect of subject, is prior naturally to

²⁰Cf. *infra*, Bk. VI q. 2 n. 24.

²¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 24-25.

²²Cf. *supra*, n. 30.

²³Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

any attribute. Then the attribute is not the formal reason for considering it, since it is posterior. Mobility, however, is an attribute in physics.

38 [7] I say, therefore, that the quiddity of fire together with whatever its property is—whatever that may be—that makes it to be the proper subject of motion, is considered in physics. But the property that makes it the subject of motion, is not motion itself, because it has this characteristic naturally prior to being the subject of motion.

39 [Objection to nn. 37-38 and two replies] On the contrary: the Philosopher says²⁴ that physics considers mobiles qua mobiles.—I say that he says this because he does not know that aspect which a thing has as the subject of motion, but he uses motion as something better known.—Or I say that he considers the mobile qua mobile, insofar as “qua” indicates there the coextensiveness of the attribute with the subject, etc.

40 To the other argument²⁵ [for the first part of the common opinion] I say that it is necessary that they concede the subalternation. Proof: one condition of the subalternation of a science is that its subject falls under the subject of the science above it. The other condition [for subalternation] is that the lower science only knows the simple fact, whereas the higher science knows the reasoned fact, and from the higher the lower science accepts its principles for proving its conclusions. At times, however, the subject adds to the subject an essential difference, for example binary adds something to number. Sometimes it adds an accidental difference, as sound adds to number. But now it is this way in all the sciences, as is clear if you run through them, that the subalternate only adds an accidental difference to the subject of the higher science. And thus it is commonly with all sciences that the more they are subalternated, the more they add an accidental difference rather than that they add any essential difference. Hence, every science that is subalternated to two is subalternated according to two aspects included in its subject, as is illustrated by music which is subalter-

²⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 1, 1026a 11-14; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse p. 147.

²⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

nated to physics and arithmetic. Therefore, the situation is the same here. Since, according to these²⁶ the subject of the other sciences add accidental reasons, and according to my position it adds something essential, for instance this quiddity to the other quiddity, the subalternation follows more according to what they hold than for me.

41 Also, if this science [of metaphysics] alone considered quiddities, {{this is something they concede without argument. For—as is evident above²⁷ “to which *per se* there is some attribute,” that attribute under its aspect will be considered by the metaphysician, who considers every attribute in itself. E.g. whoever considers A qua A, also considers in itself whatever has A qua A. And it follows that there is no attribute at all—neither a first nor a subsequent attribute—which is in some subject *per se* which subject the metaphysician would not know under the aspect of this attribute. Therefore, nothing is left to other sciences except accidental accidents, which are not in any subject *per se*. If however some are such—especially since they assume²⁸ according to Porphyry²⁹ that according to the second mode of *per se* predication there are four modes of properties—at least none is a *per accidens* accident with respect to being, as they concede, because he distinguishes each that falls under this. Therefore, being would [not] be known here entirely under the aspect of any [per accidens] accident whatsoever. And so—as they say³⁰—[being] as considered by the metaphysician will not lack attributes, Indeed, this will be true, but then no attribute remains to be considered by the other sciences. Indeed,

²⁶Cf. Richard Rufus, *Metaph.* (Vat. lat. 4538 fol. 2va): “Attende enim quae differentia addita supra subiectum facit subalternationem. Si enim fiat substantialis consideratio bene perpendetur quod ‘mobile’ additum supra subiectum non facit subalternationem. Illa enim differentia quae subalternationem facit est ... alterius generis quam sit illud supra quod additur illa differentia et plus exigitur quod ex illis duobus natum sit unum subiectum fieri. Verbi gratia: numerus de genere quantitatis est, sonus autem de genere qualitatis. Ex applicatione horum ad invicem natum fieri est unum, quod est subiectum musicae. Eodem modo est de linea simpliciter et linea visuali”.

²⁷Cf. supra, n. 10.

²⁸Albertus M., *De praedicabilibus*, tr. 6 ch. 1 (ed. Borgnet I 114b); *Physica* IV tr. 1 ch. 5 (IV¹ 210a).

²⁹Porphyry, *De praedicabilibus* ch. ‘De proprio.’

³⁰Albertus M., *Metaph.* III tr. 3 ch. 6 (XVI¹ 145a).

neither will—it seems—any accident per accidens. Therefore, metaphysics is every science.}}

[8] Then, this science alone demonstrates the first attribute of all quiddities, because the first attribute is in its respective quiddity *per se* and immediately without any accident. For, only in this way will it then be first. But the other sciences consider subjects under accidental aspects; therefore, they do not consider *per se* the first attributes. But that science which always considers later attributes presupposes that some first attribute exists; therefore, no science that considers such later attributes demonstrates that the first attribute exists but presupposes it is demonstrated in another science. But the conclusion, where the first attribute is demonstrated, is the principle for the lower science where the posterior is demonstrated. But this is the condition of a subalternating and subalternated science. Therefore, all other sciences are subalternated to metaphysics. According to my position,³¹ however, if this quiddity were the *per se* subject of physics, since it would have its own *per se* attribute, this could be demonstrated in physics.

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

42 [9] To the first initial argument,³² namely to the text of Aristotle, I say that he only holds that no other science besides metaphysics considers being, or “what” in general.

43 [To arg. 2, first reply] To the other,³³ it must be said that Aristotle in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*³⁴ where he compares a universal demonstration to a particular one, he says in the epilogue that the universal demonstration produces scientific knowledge more than a particular demonstration does. But this is irrelevant.³⁵

³¹Cf. *supra*, n. 40.

³²Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

³⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 24, 86a 10-30.

³⁵Here follows an interpolated text: “Likewise, Aristotle meant that an argument concluding an attribute to a first subject is better than a demonstration concluding it to a secondary subject, as for example ‘having three’ of an isosocles”.

44 {{For the conclusion above,³⁶ although the first opinion³⁷ is attacked with regard to the truth of the proposition, it is not attacked as regards the knowledge of a particular taken precisely in contrast to knowledge of a universal.}}

45 [Second reply] Therefore, another answer is given that although it is better to know in particular than only in general, insofar as the particular includes the general, nevertheless, where the particular does not include the universal it is not better.

46 {{As we have it from Dionysius³⁸ that existence is the most noble perfection of God; this is true taken precisely; nevertheless, insofar as other [attributes] include this [i.e. existence] and something more, they are more noble.}}

47 [Third reply] Another response. Although in some way knowledge of a particular is more perfect in itself taken precisely, nevertheless, knowledge of a universal about its own knowable object is more certain proportionately than particular knowledge of its knowable, because the universal as knowable is better known than the particular.

48 To the other,³⁹ potencies and habits are not alike. Since the higher potency has more power, and if it has several species, it can know those several things [of which these are the species]. But the habit is only a reason for knowing inasmuch as it represents a thing. But the potency not only has more power, but can receive other species.

49 [10] Proof that what pertains to a lower habit is not known by the universal one. One can know in general and be ignorant of particulars.⁴⁰ This would not happen, if the universal habit were representative of these particulars.

50 [Objection to n. 49] To the contrary: one is potent through the potency; therefore through the higher potency one is potent

³⁶Cf. supra, n. 43.

³⁷Cf. supra, nn. 7-9.

³⁸Ps.-Dionysius, *De div. nom.* ch. 5 n. 5 (ed. B. R. Suchla I p. 183 PG 3, 818D; Dionysiaca I 324-325).

³⁹Cf. supra, n. 3.

⁴⁰Cf. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* II ch. 21, 67a 15-21; *Posterior Analytics* I ch. 13, 79a 5-6.

regarding a more common object; and is potent with respect to whatever comes under it; but through the habit one is determined to the object.

51 Reply [to n. 50]: there is no need, if it is determined to the superior, that it be determined to the inferior. For there is the same recipient for color and for any particular color. But it does not follow, however, that if color informs, then every color informs.

52 To the other for the contrary opinion⁴¹ that it pertains to the same science to consider genus and species, I say that this is false, although in some cases it is the same science, i.e., because it treats of the same aspect. But here and elsewhere where there is not the same aspect, this is not true.—Or I say that they are simply different sciences, not however disparate but ordered to one another.—Or one could say of the science of binaries, that if the binary had many attributes, these would be treated partly in arithmetic and partly in another science.

⁴¹Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

QUESTION TEN

Text of Aristotle: "And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses." (*Metaphysics* I, 982a 23-24)

Is it more difficult for us to know more universal things?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That it is not:

According to Bk. I of the *Physics*¹ the method of proceeding from the more knowable things is innate in us. What he had in mind—and it is evident from the text—is that the more universal things are better known to us, whereas singulars are less well known.

2 Also, what are confused and indistinct are better known to us, according to the same source.²

3 And in the same place³ the whole is better known to us than the parts; now the universal is the whole.

4 Also, those things come more quickly to mind whose singulars are perceived more quickly by the senses; but singulars of what is more universal are sensed more quickly by the senses; therefore, those universals are first understood.

Proof of the minor from Avicenna⁴ and Bk. I of the *Physics*:⁵ "Infants first call all men fathers," etc.

5 Likewise, according to Bk. I of the *Physics*:⁶ "The same things are not knowable relatively to us and knowable without qualification." But the less universal things are better known [without qualification] by nature; therefore, they are less well known to us. That the less universal things are better known without

¹Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 1, 184a 16-18.

²Ibid., ch. 1, 184a 18.

³Ibid., ch. 1, 184a 24-25.

⁴Avicenna, *Sufficientia*, I, c. 1, fol. 13va-vb.

⁵Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 1, 184b 12-14.

⁶Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 1, 184b 18.

qualification by nature, I prove. Whatever is more perfect and more a being is what is better known by nature. The less universal adds to the more universal some perfection.

6 Also, according to Avicenna:⁷ the most common things are impressed by the first impression; therefore, they are first known, and other things are known in their respective order.

7 Also, if the more universal were not more readily known, then the science about them would be less certain; but this is contrary to one of wisdom's characteristics.⁸

8 [To the contrary]:

To the contrary is the text of the Philosopher,⁹ [viz., that more universal things are more difficult to know].

9 Likewise, composite things are better known to us than simples, as is clear from Bk. I of the *Physics*.¹⁰ The whole, which is composite, is better known to us than its parts. But the less universal is composed of what is more universal; therefore, etc.

10 Also, according to Bk. VI of the *Topics*:¹¹ we know the thing defined less well than we know the defining terms. But the defining terms are more universal than the defined.

11 Also, the definition is made up of what is prior in an unqualified sense, according to Bk. VI of the *Topics*.¹² But such things are less known to us; therefore, the prior are less known to us.

⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 6, fol. 72rb.

⁸With respect to Aristotle's remark: "The most certain of the sciences are those which deal with first principles" (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1 982a 25-26; see Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysica* I, lect. 2, ed. Parma XX, 253b: "Ostendit tertium eidem inesse, tali ratione. Quanto aliquae scientiae sunt priores naturaliter, tanto sunt certiores."

⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 23-25: "And these things, the most universal, are on the whole the hardest for men to know; for they are farthest from the senses."

¹⁰Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 1, 184a 24-184b 15: "Now what is plain and obvious at first is rather confused masses, the elements and principles of which become known to us later by analysis. Thus we must advance from generalities to particulars; for it is a whole that is best known to sense-perception and a generality is a kind of whole, comprehending many things within it. Much the same thing happens in the relation of the name to the formula. A name, e.g. 'round,' means vaguely a sort of whole: its definition analyzes this into its particular senses. Similarly a child begins by calling all men 'father,' and all women 'mother,' but later on distinguishes each of them."

¹¹Aristotle, *Topics* VI, ch. 4, 141a 27-142a 15.

¹²Aristotle, *Topics* VI, ch. 4, 142a 8.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

12 [2] [Two senses of universality] One is said to be universal through predication and this is what is defined in *On Interpretation* and in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*¹³ as that which is one in many and of many.¹⁴

13 Another is universal through causality, whose power extends to several effects, such as the first cause. This cause is singular and is not predicated of several singulars.

14 In this second sense, the more universal through causality is less well known by us than that whose causality is less universal, because the more universal is more perfect, and the more perfect are less sensible, as is clear in the case of the Intelligences and substances without matter. These more universal causes, however, are less sensible, and hence less well known by us.

15 As for the universal through predication, either [a] this is compared to the singular in an unqualified sense, or [b] the more universal is compared to the less universal, as genus to species.

[Re a] As for the first of these [i.e., a], one has to first distinguish "cognition" insofar as it is common to sense and intellective knowledge, and this is what is called "cognition in general." And then the singular is simply better known to us than the universal, because that is better known to us which is known by the first cognition we have, and this is sense cognition.

16 But if we are not comparing the universal to "cognition in general," but to one type of cognition, then so far as sense cognition

¹³Aristotle, *De interpretatione* I, ch. 7, 17a 39-40; *ibid.*, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 11, 77a 6-7.

¹⁴Here follows an interpolated annotation: "Note that when it is said that the universals are more difficult to know because they are further removed from the senses, it is clear that Aristotle intended this regarding universal causality, such as the first cause and the separated substances. With regard to the universal by way of predication, I say that it can be known in two ways. One way by means of the simple apprehension of a thing which is imperfect, and thus animal is known prior to man, because the intellect proceeds from the imperfect [to the more perfect]. The universal is known in another way by means of its properties found in things [its contents] and thus it is known later. For from the properties of particulars and less universals we arrive at the properties of the more universals because we proceed from the effects to their cause;" cf. *supra*, Bk. I, q. 6, n. 22.

is concerned the singular is better known to us. If it is intellective cognition we are talking about, then, according to those who hold the singular is not understood except per accidens,¹⁵ the singular would be known afterwards, because what is per accidens is known later than what is *per se*, as the Philosopher says in Bk. II of the *Physics*.¹⁶

17 If the other opinion were true, however, that the singular is perceived *per se*, then there would be a question [as to which was better known]. And one could say that the singular is better known, because a conclusion is only known through principles that are better known, according to the Philosopher.¹⁷ And according to him,¹⁸ principles are gotten through induction; but induction is made from singulars.

18 [3] [Re b] If one were to compare the more universal to the less universal, as when both are simply universal, then [i] either both are compared to the intellect, [ii] or their singulars are compared to one another. If [ii], then what is more known to us is the singular of what is more universal rather than the singular of what is less universal. If both universals are compared to the intellect (viz., [i]) then either one is speaking of the higher as something indistinct containing several things confusedly, and in this way it is better known to us. And this is what the first three arguments prove.¹⁹ If, however, one takes the universal as something distinct that is used to define, then the thing defined is better known by indistinct knowledge, because one first knows the defined indistinctly before one knows the defining terms.

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS PRO]

19 To all the authorities. The first three arguments²⁰ prove that the more universal compared to the less universal is better known to us by intellective knowledge insofar as the more universal

¹⁵Cf Thomas, *Summa theol* I, q. 56, a. 1, art. 2 (V, 62a).

¹⁶Aristotle, *Physics*, ch. 6, 198a 6-7.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 27-32, 36-37.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 18, 81a 38-b 9.

¹⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 1-3.

²⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 1-3.

indistinctly contains the less universal. Therefore, the more universal things are first known.

20 To the two illustrations,²¹ one must say that the singulars of the more universal are more quickly known than those of the less universal, and this by sense knowledge. And the universals corresponding to these are likewise known more quickly.

21 As for the statement that the more common things are impressed first, etc.,²² this implies that the more universal is better known, insofar as the more universal contains the less universal indistinctly.

[III.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS CON]

22 As for the arguments for the opposite:²³ [the text of the Philosopher] should be understood of the causality of universal causes.

23 To the other²⁴ about simplicity [viz., that composite things are better known to us than simples]: it progresses [or becomes more perfect as it moves towards] what is more universal [and difficult to know] as defining. Otherwise one can deny the proposition, because matter is more simple than the composite, and yet it is not more perfect. Hence, some composites are more perfect than simples, whereas others are not.

24 As for the other,²⁵ this is to be understood of what defines [i.e. primitive terms used to define are also the more universal terms.]

25 Likewise, the other from Bk. VI of the *Topics*²⁶ that the defining elements are better known, is true insofar as they are terms used to define.

²¹That is, that "Infants first call all men fathers," etc. and that "the same things are not known better by us and in an unqualified sense"; cf. supra nn. 4-5.

²²Cf. supra, n. 6.

²³Cf. supra, n. 8.

²⁴Cf. supra, n. 9.

²⁵Cf. supra, n. 10.

²⁶Cf. supra, n. 11.

[IV.—OBJECTIONS AND REPLIES
A.—OBJECTIONS]

26 [4] Against what was said that what is more universal causally is less known to us.²⁷ Proof that it is false: In Bk. II of this work²⁸ it is said: "Truth is like the proverbial door that no one can fail to hit." There the point is that the prior principles of the science are more easily known. Therefore, the most universal causes are better known to us. Proof that this follows. The most universal principles are those which give a proof of the reasoned fact with respect to several conclusions; but principles that give a reason for the fact assert the cause of the fact; therefore the most universal principles assert the most universal cause. But the most universal cause is the cause of several effects. For that is a most universal principle whose power extends to more things.

27 Against the other point²⁹ that if the singular is simply speaking better known to us, then that which is closest to that singular is also better known, according to what is said in Bk. III of the *Topics*³⁰ "What is nearer to the good is better and more desirable." But this is what is less universal; therefore, such is better known to us, which is the opposite of what is said above.

28 Against the other remark:³¹ it is true that sense cognition in some way precedes intellective cognition as a "sine qua non" cause, but this holds good for the production of the scientific knowledge, although this is not true of the respective perfection of the two types of knowledge, for the cognition of the intellect is more perfect. Then one argues in this way. The more perfect power knows more intensely and knows more than the less perfect power; the intellect is more perfect; therefore, etc. The Philosopher also says³² here that the artist knows more certainly, because he knows the cause, whereas the one with experience does not know the cause.

²⁷Cf. supra, n. 14.

²⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 5.

²⁹Cf. supra, n. 15.

³⁰Aristotle, *Topics* III, ch. 5 119b 20-22.

³¹Cf. supra, n. 16-17.

³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I ch. 1, 981a 25-30.

The sense, since it never knows the reason why something is so, knows less perfectly.

[B.—REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS]

29 [5] To the first:³³ Those principles do not have universal causes as their terms, but they have the most common terms according to predication. Then to the form: as a universal attribute has a universal subject, so the more universal attribute has the more universal subject. Then according to this, the universal that is predicable of more will assert something as a reasoned fact, more so than what is predicable of less, but it does not assert anything about the cause of the being of the lesser. And this is the way it is with principles of demonstration.

30 To the other:³⁴ I say that the rule there, taken from Bk. III of the *Topics*, has to do with what should be chosen. And I say that it must mean, "What is nearer to the good is better [and should be chosen]." But the singular is more known to us, because it is sensible. Therefore, what is more known to us is what is closest to the singular in sensibility; but there the more universal is closer than the less universal.—Note, however, that I am not saying that something universal is properly speaking sensible. But of those things which exists in subjects, one is more sensible than another.

31 To the other:³⁵ It is true that the intellect knows more perfectly and certainly than the sense does. Nevertheless, at the same time sensibles are the prior things known to us more easily, because it is easier to know those things that lead us to the knowledge of other things.

32 [An objection and reply] Objection: it seems that one cannot speak of something being "more known," because "more known" implies the imperfect [i.e., that cognition can be imperfect, or that one can know and yet not know].—To this I say that something is said to be better known inasmuch as the knowable is more

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 26.

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

³⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 28.

proportioned to the knower; it does not refer to the perfection of the cognition as such. For example, the weak eye proportionately knows the candle to a greater degree than the eagle knows the sun, if we consider to what extent each is visible, but the vision of the eagle is more perfect than that of the weak eye. That is how it is here.

33 Note in the text:³⁶ Anything then is perfect when it can generate something similar to itself.—On the contrary: then God could generate another god.

34 [6] If you say this is not something that can be made.—To the contrary: an angel can be made, and nevertheless, one angel cannot make another.

35 Reply: I say this is fallacious, when the perfect is so perfect that it requires an equivocal cause, and this is because of its perfection. It is still fallacious where things are univocal, if no active potency is there. For a hard rock cannot produce another like itself, because it only has the passive potency of resistance. For it is hard in that it resists one pushing it—but it does not have a principle of acting that is an active quality. Then to the thesis. Although this follows: “When it has the power [i.e., to reproduce], then it is perfect,” however, this does not follow: “When it is perfect, then it can [reproduce itself].” Note that the text³⁷ says that the cognition of singulars is most appropriate to the sense. He [Aristotle] says this because this pertains exclusively to the sense, and it is not said because of the intensity of the act, because the intellect can be more perfect in this [i.e., knowledge of the singular] and in the other.

36 To the one argument that remains³⁸ that this science [of metaphysics] is less certain, I say that if it held uniformly, it would not imply that the science is uncertain in itself, but inasmuch as the most universal things are the most difficult to know, so this science that is about such is most difficult, but those first causes are most difficult for us, so also is this science.

³⁶Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 22-27.

³⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981b 10-11.

³⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

37 [Objection to this reply] Against this it is said that this scientific knowledge is through causes. He also says:³⁹ “we are seeking the principles and causes of the things that are”; therefore, these are not known to us, etc.— [Reply] This is true that they are not known to us inasmuch as we are seeking to know them, but in themselves they are known.

³⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI ch. 1 1025b 2.

BOOK TWO

BOOK TWO

QUESTION ONE

Text of Aristotle: "Therefore, the truth seems to be like the proverbial door which no one can fail to hit." (*Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 993b 4-5)

Are first principles known naturally?

Are the first complex principles or propositions, such as "Of anything whatsoever one can either affirm or deny it,"¹ or "Every whole is greater than one of its parts,"² and the like, known to us naturally?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] It seems that they are:

The Commentator, in comment 1 on that passage in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*³ that "truth seems like the proverbial door that no one can fail to find," says that⁴ "the first principles in every category of being are naturally known to us."

2 Also, they are not known to us by discovery, nor by teaching; therefore, they are known naturally, because there are no other way of knowing such. Proof of the assumption: Every thing known by teaching or discovery is known through something previously known, according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁵ But there is nothing prior to first principles.

3 For the opposite: the Philosopher in III *On the Soul*⁶ says the soul of itself is like a blank tablet on which nothing is depicted.

¹Aristotle, *On Interpretation*, ch. 9, 18a 29-30; *Topics*, Bk. VI ch. 6, 143b 16.

²Euclid, *Elements* I n. 8 (ed. H. Busard p. 33).

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 993b 4-5.

⁴Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 1, 14rb.

⁵Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 1-2.

⁶Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 4, 430a 1-2.

Therefore, the soul as such and by its nature does not have any knowledge.

[I. — TO THE QUESTION]

4 [2] Response: It must be said that [the intellect] does not have any natural knowledge according to its nature, neither of simples [i.e. concepts] nor complexes [i.e. propositions], because all our knowledge arises from sense perception.⁷ For first the sense is moved by something simple and not complex, and once the sense is moved, the intellect is moved and it understands simples, which is the first act of the intellect. Then after the apprehension of simples, the other act follows which puts simples together. After this composition, however, the intellect has by its natural light the capacity to assent to that complex truth, if that complex is a first principle.

[II. — REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

5 To the Commentator⁸ I say that those things are said to be naturally known by us inasmuch as, given the composition of the simple terms, the intellect immediately by its natural light assents to and adheres to that truth. Nevertheless, the cognition of the terms is acquired from sensibles and that understanding is said to be a habit of principles whereby we adhere to first principles.

6 To the other:⁹ the cognition of principles, so far as simples are concerned, is acquired from sensibles. And to the assumption that it is not acquired by discovery or teaching, one must say that these two categories divide up knowledge that is acquired through something previously known; but not the understanding that is a habit of principles.

7 [Objection] Against the reply to the first:¹⁰ If man by his natural light assented to the truth of principles, then all men equally would assent to such, because whatever follows from the

⁷Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 18, 81b 6-9.

⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

¹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

nature of man or of our intellect is found equally in all who have an intellect, which is contrary to the Commentator in the beginning of Bk. III of the *Physics*,¹¹ where he says that some, because of custom have denied first principles. And he gives the example of Christians, who deny that principle: "From nothing nothing comes."¹²

8 [Reply] To this it must be said that the argument applies to principles that are first in an unqualified sense, such as "It is impossible for the same thing to simultaneously exist and not exist," and "Every whole is greater than a part of it," and the like, in regard to which there can be no error according to the Philosopher in Bk. IV of this work.¹³ But it does not apply to principles, which can be the conclusions with respect to first principles. For one person can assent to such more readily than another. Is not the assent to such under the command of the will, given the fact that their connections to the first principles is seen?

[III. — EIGHT DOUBTS REGARDING THE AUTHOR'S SOLUTION]

9 [3] Here several doubts are presented. First, is this assent an act of the intellect other than apprehension? For Avicenna, at the beginning of his *Logic*¹⁴ seems to assume that "to assent" and "to know" mean the same.

10 Second, is this assent elicited by the agent intellect, which is posited as the intelligible light?

11 Third, is the formal principle of the adherence to the conclusion the same as that of the adherence to the principle or as the knowledge of the principle?

12 Fourth, is the habit of a principle, which is called understanding, a principle *per se* of apprehension or of adherence?

13 Fifth, why is adherence natural and not apprehension, since adherence presupposes apprehension?

¹¹The prologue of Averroes to Bk. III in the Junta edition is placed in comment 60 of Bk. I (177b); the Commentator reprehends Christians however in *Metaphysics* XII, com. 18, (143rb). [Scotus, VI Vat. 345ff.].

¹²Aristotle, *On sophistical refutations* Bk. I ch. 5, 167b 15.

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics*, ch. 3, 1005b 6-34; cf. *infra*, Bk. IV, q. 3, nn. 24-35.

¹⁴Avicenna, *Logica*, p. 1, ch. 1, ed. Venice, 1508, fol. 2va.

14 Sixth, does the composing of the proposition differ from its apprehension? And are the two simultaneous? And is the apprehension of the simple [terms] simultaneous with their composition, so that there are five simultaneous acts in regard to a principle, namely, two simple apprehensions, putting them together, apprehending the complex, and adhering to its truth? Look this up elsewhere.¹⁵

15 Seventh, if it pertains to the intellect to assent and dissent, why do not delight and sadness equally pertain?

16 Eighth, why is there only an apprehension of simples and not an assenting to them or a dissenting to them? From this perhaps it would become clear how there is truth in composition and division, and not in simples.

¹⁵Cf. *infra*, Bk. VI, q. 3, nn. 6-7.

QUESTION TWO

Text of Aristotle: "Perhaps, however, as the difficulties are of two kinds, the cause of the present difficulty is not in the facts but in us." (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 8-9)

Does the difficulty of understanding stem from the side of the intellect or from that of the things that can be known?

In this connection, the question arises: Does the difficulty of knowing a thing stem from the side of our knowing intellect or from the side of the things that can be known?

1 [1] That it stems from the side of things I prove:

Things are knowable insofar as they are in act, and certain in themselves and determinate, according to the last chapter in Bk. IX of this work.¹ But many things are of themselves potential, such as matter; uncertain, as time and motion; indeterminate, as the infinite. Therefore, the difficulty of understanding such things has its roots in their forms, and does not stem from the side of our intellect.

2 This argument is confirmed by the Commentator in I *Metaphysics*,² according to his translation, comment 1—which says that the difficulty of understanding material forms is on the part of those forms and not on our part.

3 Also, when matter is disposed in the highest measure to the reception of a form, matter has no difficulty in receiving the form. As is evident from the case of light in the medium; for since the medium is most highly disposed on its part, therefore, the medium has no difficulty in receiving the form. But the intellect of itself is most highly disposed to know things, because in the intellect there is only the mere privation of knowledge. For there is not present there anything contrary to the cognition of a thing. For if there

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 10, 1051a 29-31.

²Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 1, fol. 14rb-va.

were, alteration could be present in the intellective part [of the soul], which the Philosopher denies in Bk. VII of the *Physics*.³

4 Also,⁴ there is no difficulty on the part of the intellect understanding the most excellent intelligibles, as there is on the part of the sense perceiving the most intense sensibles, because the intellect is not damaged by an excellent intelligible, but becomes better able to understand it easily, since it is not an organic power.⁵ According to Bk. III *On the Soul*⁶ however, the sense is damaged by the most intense sensible, because it is an organic power; therefore, etc.

5 For the opposite there is what the Philosopher says in Bk. II, ch. 1 of this work:⁷ "The cause of the difficulty is not in things, but in us; as the eye of the bat is to the blaze of day, so is the intellect of our soul to those things which are most evident of all."

QUESTION THREE

Text of Aristotle: "As the eye of the bat is to the blaze of day, so is the intellect of our soul to those things which are most evident of all." (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 9-11)

*Could immaterial substances be understood by us
in our present state?*

According to this the question is raised: Could immaterial substances be understood by us according to their quiddities and this by our intellect as joined to a body?

³Aristotle, *Physica* VII, ch. 3, 247b 23-24.

⁴Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysica* II, lect. 1, ed. Parma, XX, 298b.

⁵Averroes, *De anima* III, com. 4, AverL 383; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse p. 189: "Intellectus non est corpus, nec virtus in corpore".

⁶Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 13, 435b 7-9; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse p. 189: "Excellens sensibile corrumpit sensum".

⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 8-9.

[Arguments Pro and Con]

[For the affirmative]:

6 [1] It seems that they could: For the Commentator⁸ has this to say: “This,” namely, the example of Aristotle, “does not demonstrate that it is as impossible for us to understand abstract things, as it is for the bat to look into the sun. For if this were the case, nature would have acted in vain, for it would have made what in itself is naturally understood, not understood by any other, as if it would have made the sun something not comprehended by any vision.”

7 Also, the intellect understands nothing except under its immaterial aspect, according to III *On the Soul*.⁹ Therefore, it understands most of all those things that are immaterial in an unqualified sense. For where the formal aspect of its object is present, there is something that can be apprehended by the potency. Proof of the antecedent: there is no need to assume the action of the agent intellect except where a material object has to become in some way dematerialized, so that it is suited by nature to move the possible intellect.

8 Also, the Commentator in Bk. II *On the Soul*¹⁰ cites the opinion of Avempace: The intellect can abstract the formal from the material and thus the quiddity of a material substance from singulars. If in the quiddity, thus abstracted, there remains anything material, the intellect could still abstract the formal from the material, and it could always go on doing so. Hence, it would eventually come to some quiddity that is immaterial in an unqualified sense. This it will know, because it has abstracted this from singulars; therefore, etc.

9 Also, many things are demonstrated by philosophers about the separate substances, for instance in Bk. XII of this book, that a substance of this sort is sempiternal,¹¹ that it moves as something unmoved that is desirable, that it is life, that it is always actually

⁸Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 1, fol. 14va.

⁹Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 4, 429a 18, 429b 21-22.

¹⁰Averroes, *De anima* III, com. 36, ed. Crawford 490-492.

¹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 6, 1071b 15-21; ch. 7, 1072a 26-27; 1072b 29-30; ch. 7, 1072b 20-22; ch. 9, 1074b 31-1075a 5.

knowing intellectually, that it knows itself as its primary object, and so on. We find this there [in Bk. XII] and elsewhere. And there,¹² we learn that the number of the intelligences corresponds to the number of the orbs they move. But it is necessary to know beforehand what the subject of a demonstration is and the fact that it is, according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.¹³ Therefore, the quiddities of all these were known to the philosophers.

10 [For the negative]:

The text¹⁴ seems to favor the contrary opinion: "As the eye of the bat is to the blaze of day, so is the intellect of our soul to things which are by nature most evident of all." Such are the separate substances. The first [i.e. that the bat sees] is impossible; therefore, the second is also impossible.

11 [2] {{Also, as to the intelligibility of God, whether he is intelligible or not, look infra in question about the knowledge of the infinite.¹⁵

12 Also, the uncreated intelligible is further removed from a created intellect than is the created intelligible from the sense; but such an intelligible cannot be apprehended by the sense; therefore, even less can the uncreated intelligible be known by the intellect.

13 Reply: this [i.e. that the uncreated intelligible is further removed] is true of his being or existence, but not of his knowableness, nor [is it true of him as] object proportioned [to our intellect].

14 Also, the scope of a passive potency extends only to those things that fall under the scope of an active potency of the same genus; therefore, neither does the possible intellect extend beyond such things as the agent intellect makes intelligible. But such are only those things that can be imagined by the phantasy.

15 [Objections to n. 14] I say that the major is false, i.e. about one active potency being concerned only with one, and that a passive

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 8, 1074a 1-32.

¹³Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 11-12.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 9-11.

¹⁵Cf. infra, question 4-6, nn. 150-153.

potency concerned with contraries is only about one that is primary. This is evident from *Metaphysics* XII, comment 9.¹⁶

16 Otherwise an answer to [n. 14] is that once the possible intellect is in act it is no longer said to be passive, and once it has been put into act in regard to an effect it seeks the knowledge of those [things that are intelligible].

17 Another answer [to n. 14] is that things become intelligibles through the agent intellect insofar as in it, as in a light, their species can be impressed on the possible intellect. In this way the Intelligences become intelligibles, because the possible intellect receives nothing except in the light that is connatural to it, which is agent intellect. But this does not salvage the notion that the agent intellect has any action in regard to the separate substances or Intelligences; its action is solely in regard to the possible intellect which can only receive their species in its light.

18 Also, it is argued that if this were so [i.e. that we could know immaterial quiddities] then man could naturally attain his beatitude.

19 [Digression on intuitive knowledge] The reply to this is evident from the solution to the question below,¹⁷ because beatitude is a vision that consists of an intuitive intellection, not just any sort [of knowledge].

20 [3] Against this: so far as the same potency and same object are concerned, there is but one kind of action; therefore our cognition at present would not differ specifically from that vision, and then although we are now less blest, still we are blest, for among the blest, one will see God less clearly than another.—Proof of the first proposition: it makes no difference whether the action stems from a species produced by the agent intellect or the object, if both species are the same, then the action will be the same specifically.—This is confirmed in Bk. VIII of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁸

21 I reply that this [intuitive] vision differs specifically from this cognition [we have now], and the cognition of faith differs

¹⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* XII, com. 9, fol. 139vb; cf. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 2, q. 2 (III, 250-330).

¹⁷Cf. *infra*, nn. 80-85.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VIII, ch. 3, 1043b 34-1044a 14.

specifically from both of these. Then to the first proposition¹⁹ one must say that it is true when both [i.e. the object and the action] are the same, and not just the subject is the same. But there will be one action specifically based upon what acts or what the object is, if these are related to one another in the same way. For example: water both cools and humidifies; the Sun solidifies clay but not ice; fire placed near wood ignites it, but when it is further way it only heats it. As for those things that are known, there can be a variation because of the organ: sometimes it is indisposed totally, like the tongue of a person with fever; or it is so only at times, like the eye of an old person; or it is well disposed as the eye of a youth; or it is optimally disposed, like the eye of an eagle. At other times the variation is because of the medium: vision differs if we look through water or through the air; the sun looks different in the morning and at midday because of the vaporous medium. Or the variations depend on the light: things look different in candle light than in the indirect or the direct light of the Sun.²⁰ Or the variation stems from the basis or reason why we know: it differs if it is through a proper species, or whether it is direct or reflex knowledge. But this [beatific] vision and that [knowledge we now have] are seen in different lights and their objects are represented differently.}}

[I.—REPLY TO QUESTION 3

A.—THE OPINION OF THOMAS

1.—THE FOUNDATION FOR AQUINAS'S POSITION]

22 [4] It is replied to the question that the soul joined to the body cannot understand the quiddities of the separate substances on two counts.

[The first basis for Thomas' opinion] The first²¹ is that the soul thus joined understands nothing except by abstraction from phantasms [or sense images]; but the separate substances do not produce sense images in the phantasy, nor can they be known from those things that produce a phantasm; therefore, etc.

¹⁹Namely, so far as the same potency and same object is concerned, there is but one kind of action; cf. *supra*, n. 20.

²⁰Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d. 13 q. un. n. [5], ed. E. McCarthy p. 28.

²¹Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 84, art. 7 resp. (V, 325b).

23 The proof of the first proposition is twofold. One, because if the organ of the imaginative power or phantasy is damaged the intellect is impeded,²² both from learning about what is unknown and in contemplating what is known. But this only appears to be so because the intellect needs the phantasms for both operations. The other proof is because, when we wish to understand anything, we must form a mental image of it in which to inspect or examine it. And in Bk. III of *On the Soul*²³ it is said: "Sense images are to the intellect as sensibles are to the senses."

24 The second proposition has two parts. The first [viz. the separate substance does not produce phantasms]²⁴ is evident, since the imagination is a movement produced by an actual sensation, according to Bk. II *On the Soul*,²⁵ and separate substances are not sensibles; therefore, etc.

The second part [viz. they cannot be known through things that produce phantasms]²⁶ is proved in two ways: [1] because an effect which does not measure up to the full potency of its cause does not lead to a knowledge of the quiddity of that cause; but the separate substances, if they are known through those things which produce phantasms in us, are only known through such effects, which do not do full justice to their cause; therefore, etc. (The first [or major] proposition is evident, because the quiddity of such a cause exceeds such an effect). [2] because there is a disproportion between the finite and infinite, therefore, there is also a disproportion between the effect of something sensible and the quiddity of God. If the quiddity of God, therefore, which is the first cause of the effect, could not be known through its effect, still less could the quiddity of some separate substance. For every other cause causes to a lesser degree than does the first, according to the first proposition in the *Liber de causis*.²⁷

²²Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol* I, q. 84, art. 7 resp. (V, 325a).

²³Aristotle, *De anima* III, ch. 7, 431a 14-17; Averroes, *De anima* II, com. 30, ed. Crawford, 469.

²⁴Cf. supra, n. 22.

²⁵Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 3, 429a 1-2; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse p. 183: "Phantasia est motus factus a sensu secundum actum..."; Averroes, *De anima* II, com. 160, ed. Crawford, 372.

²⁶Cf. supra, n. 22.

²⁷*Liber de causis*, prop. 1, ed. A. Pattin, p. 46: "Omnis causa primaria plus est

25 [5] [The second basis of Thomas' opinion] The second main support for this opinion²⁸ assumes that the quiddity of a material substance is the proper object of our possible intellect; therefore, nothing could be understood *per se* by us that is neither such a quiddity nor something knowable through such a quiddity. The first [i.e. the quiddity of a material substance is the proper object of our intellect] is manifest in regard to the quiddity of material substances. The second [i.e. that nothing could be understood, etc.] is proved, as above, from the inadequacy and lack of proportion [i.e. between the a material quiddity and what is to be known through it]. The first assumption here [i.e. the quiddity of a material substance is the proper object of our intellect] is proved, because an object is proportionate to the power of which it is the object; but the intellect is a power existing in matter, not operating, however, through an organ; therefore, its object will be something existing in matter, even though it is not known qua existing in matter. Such is the quiddity of a material substance abstracted through the agent intellect.

26 This is confirmed, because unless it [a material substance] were the object of the possible intellect, there seems to be no need to posit the action of the agent intellect in regard to an object of the possible intellect. Also, other authors do not see what else might appropriately be assumed to be the object of the possible intellect.

[2.—REFUTATION OF THIS POSITION OF THOMAS]

27 [6] Against this: In the first place there are five arguments against this view as such.

[Arg. 1] The first is this. "All men by nature desire to know," according to *Metaphysics* I.²⁹ "Therefore, they desire most of all to know what is most knowable."³⁰ And so it is argued in the same first book:³¹ "The highest science is about what are most knowable, which are the first causes and first principles, because through these all other things come to be known," and the reverse order is not

influens super causatum suum quam causa universalis secunda."

²⁸Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 88, art. 1 (V, 364b).

²⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 980a 21.

³⁰Ibid., 982a 32-b 2.

³¹Ibid., 982b 3-4.

true, in the same book one. Therefore, the science of the first causes is most desired naturally by man; now there is no natural desire for what is impossible, according to I *Metaphysics*,³² for then such a desire would be in vain; therefore, etc.

28 [Arg. 2] Also, in X *Ethics*,³³ the Philosopher proves that the happiness of man consists in the contemplation of the truth, and he concludes at the end of the chapter³⁴ that the wise person will indeed be the most happy. And according to him in Bk. VI of the same work,³⁵ wisdom is about the highest causes; therefore, in the contemplation of the highest causes the felicity of man consists. Since it is the proper end of man, however, it is not impossible for man to attain this happiness, because in Bk. II of this work³⁶ it is said that “no one would try to reach an end that is not finite.” And nature provides itself with all that is necessary to attain that end, as can be proved from the comment 50, in Bk. II *De caelo*, in the chapter “On the Stars.”³⁷

29 [7] [Objection to arg. 1 & 2] To these two arguments the following reply is given. As for the first [n. 27], it is possible for man to know the science that is most knowable; as for the second reason [n. 27] it is the possible for man to contemplate the highest causes, but not in this life—just as, according to Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 3 and ch. 8,³⁸ all desire the happiness that they cannot attain in this life.

30 [Four arguments] to the contrary. The felicity of which the Philosopher speaks in *Ethics* X³⁹ can be had in this life. For he tells us why “happiness must be some form of contemplation. But one will also need external prosperity. And our body must also be healthy and have food and other attention,” etc. It is certain that this is had only in this life.

³²Rather Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 1 (fol. 14rb).

³³Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 8, 1178b 7-32.

³⁴*Ibid.*, 1179a 31-32.

³⁵Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VI ch. 7, 1141a 18-19; 1141b 2-3.

³⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 14-15.

³⁷Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* II, ch. 8, 290a 29-31.

³⁸Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 3, n. 6 (PL 42, 1017-8; CCL 50, 387-9); n. 11, (PL 42, 1022-3, CCL 50, 396-8).

³⁹Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* X, ch. 8, 1178b 32-34.

31 Also, it is not certain from the mind of the Philosopher that he assumed there was another life, because he speaks of it as doubtful in different places, such as in Bk. II *On the Soul* and Bk. XII of this work.⁴⁰ But it is certain, according to him, that felicity is the end of man, and consequently, that it is possible to attain such; therefore, one ought to assume it for some state where it is certain that he [Aristotle] was sure we could attain it.

32 Also, a potency that is disproportionate to some object cannot know that object *per se* by means of some habit added to it. Therefore, if the intellective power of the soul as joined [to the body] is disproportionate to the quiddity of a separate substance, it will never become proportionate through any habit which it might receive when separated [from the body]. Therefore, the separated intellect will not know the separated substances. Proof of the major: any habit a potency can receive, regards either [1] the object of that potency as its proper object, if that potency functioning as the proximate formal elicitive principle can elicit all its acts in regard to that object, or [2] some particular contained under the object of that potency, as is clear of the different habits of the intellective potency. But no habit that regards as an object something that is disproportionate to the potency could be received in such a potency.

33 [8] Also, if the separated intellect could [in the afterlife] know some object *per se* that it is unable to know now, for example, the quiddity of such substances, then it would no longer be the same potency, because the same object characterizes the same potency, according to Bk. II *On the Soul*,⁴¹ therefore, etc.

34 [Arg. 3] Also, the third argument against this position goes as follows. The Philosopher in Bk. II of this work⁴² argues in this way. If ends were serially infinite, then there would be no acting through the intellect. This consequence would only hold good if one who acted through the intellect intended not only the proximate end, but all the ends that are essentially ordered. But this proposition taken from the argument of the Philosopher is true, that no one acting through the intellect would intend to act for an end that was not

⁴⁰Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 2, 413b 24-27; *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 3, 1070a 25-28.

⁴¹Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 4, 415a 17-22.

⁴²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 9-17.

known. Therefore, every agent through an intellect knows not only the proximate end, but all ends essentially ordered, and thus such a one knows the ultimate end. If then that could not be known, it would not be acting through the intellect, which the Philosopher regards as incongruous.

35 [Arg. 4] Also, a fourth argument goes this way. In Bk. II of this work⁴³ Aristotle argues in this fashion. If causes were infinite, nothing would be known. And he draws a similar inference in Bk. I of the *Physics*⁴⁴ against Anaxagoras. This implication would not be valid unless to know anything it would be necessary to know all of its causes. Therefore, if one could not understand the first cause, which is most of all the cause of any effect, no effect could be understood.

36 [Arg. 5] Also, the fifth argument runs thus. Either truth is conformity of a thing to its proper measure, or it does not exist without such conformity. Therefore, if one could understand the truth of some natural thing, it will be possible to understand the conformity of that thing with its proper measure. This measure is an idea in the divine mind. But the conformity to this idea could not be understood unless this idea were grasped, since a relation is not understood without its term. Therefore, if some truth is intelligible to us, it follows that its idea is also known.

37 This is confirmed through what Augustine says in his *Eighty-three Questions*, q. 46:⁴⁵ "It is not likely either that there were no wise men before Plato: or that they did not understand those things which Plato termed ideas, since indeed so great is the importance attaching to these ideas that no one can be wise without having understood them."

[B.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS ACCORDING TO THE
MIND OF THOMAS]

⁴³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 28-29.

⁴⁴Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 4, 187b 7-13.

⁴⁵Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 46, n. 1 (PL 40, 29; CCL 44A, 70).

38 According to the aforesaid opinion an answer is given to the initial arguments to the contrary and to the five arguments [nn. 27-37].

39 [9] To the first argument at the beginning,⁴⁶ it is said that the argument of the Commentator commits the fallacy of the consequent. For this does not follow: "If nature would not make these known to us, then they could not be made known to anyone," but the antecedent is negated. Also there is another defect, for "in vain" is described as something ordered to an unattainable end, as we glean from Bk. II of the *Physics*, in the chapter 'On Chance and Fortune'.⁴⁷ But the separate substances, according to their intelligibility, are not ordered to our understanding as an end; therefore, they are not intelligibles in vain, even though they could not be understood by us. For example: the sun is not visible in vain, if it cannot be seen by a bat.

40 [Objection to n. 39] Here it is said⁴⁸ that what the Commentator had in mind was not that these substances were unknowable to us on their part, and this his argument proves. For then nature would have made them intelligible on their part, and yet unknowable to us on their part; therefore, [they would be intelligible] in vain.

41 [Reply to the objection] Against this is the text of the Commentator cited above⁴⁹ that it is not "as impossible for us to understand abstract things, as it is for the bat to see the sun." But the impossibility of seeing the sun does not stem from the side of the sun, but from the side of the bat. In the case at hand, it is not impossible on our part, otherwise it would be simply impossible in both instances.

42 Also, there is still a fallacy of the consequent as before. For this does not follow: "they are not intelligible on their part by us, therefore they are not understandable by anyone."

43 Also, as to the expression "in vain,"⁵⁰ if one responds that their purpose, on their part, was to be intelligible to us, then in order to

⁴⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁴⁷Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 6, 197b 22-29.

⁴⁸Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 88, art. 1, ad 4 (V, 366b).

⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁵⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 39-40.

conclude that this be “in vain”, it is necessary to add that they cannot attain this end. Hence, the Commentator would have to infer that nature made them intelligibles as such for our sake, and nevertheless, they could not possibly be understood as such by us. But this is to infer one contradictory from another contradiction, which cannot be done unless a contradiction is included in the premises.

44 [10] To the second argument at the beginning,⁵¹ it is replied that something is not understood by us unless it be under an immaterial aspect, that is, what exists in matter is considered as not in matter, and this position⁵² claims such is the case with the object of our intellect.

45 To the third,⁵³ according to one interpretation, abstraction is not from something understood in actuality, but only from something existing in the imaginative power.

46 To the contrary: at least the intellect traces the caused back to the uncaused, the more complex things to those that are simpler, as is manifest in the case of the defined and the parts of the definition. Hence, in this way the immaterial is abstracted from the material by a process of tracing back [the material to the immaterial], if one can call this “abstraction.”

47 Therefore, another reply is given.⁵⁴ Whatever is abstracted, as is what is immaterial in the quiddity of a sensible substance from what is material, what is abstracted is always of the same species as the singulars from which it is abstracted. And as a consequence, we never come to the quiddity of an immaterial substance, but only to the quiddities of a substance that is in matter, but is not considered as it is in matter.

48 To the fourth⁵⁵ that we do not demonstrate anything about the separate substance except from their effects. And in such a demonstration it is not necessary to know beforehand what the subject is, but this is only demanded in a demonstration of the reasoned fact.

⁵¹Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁵²Cf. supra, n. 25.

⁵³Cf. supra, n. 8.

⁵⁴Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theologiae* I, q. 88, art. 2 resp. (V 367b).

⁵⁵Cf. supra, n. 9.

49 [11] To the other five reasons⁵⁶ against the position [of Thomas] this reply is given. Either [1] they conclude that we know that the separate substances exist as a simple fact, or [2] they conclude we know them insofar as they are cause of what happens terrestrially. But this is not known as a reasoned fact, since an effect, that does not measure up to what the cause is capable of, does not suffice for us to know from it the [essence or] quiddity of the cause.

50 Or another answer⁵⁷ is that we know what they are not, namely, because they are not some of the terrestrial things, since we know them to be causes that excel these [terrestrial things].

[4.—AGAINST THE REPLIES FOR THE VIEW OF THOMAS]

51 Against these all of these replies at once. First, in this way. According to the Philosopher in Bk. IV of this work:⁵⁸ “The formula which the name signifies is the definition”; the definition expresses what a thing is; therefore, wherever we understand what the name signifies, we can know what the thing is. But we impose the name to signify only where we can understand what is meant by the name. For no one uses a word to signify something he does not understand. But we impose names upon the separate substances that are properly significative of them. Therefore, etc. The last assumption is clear, because there is nothing true of them that we affirm of God except the notion of a substances separated [from matter]. And it is upon this [notion] that we impose this name.

52 [12] Against the first response⁵⁹ in this way. In the *Posterior Analytics* II,⁶⁰ in that chapter “Iterum autem speculandum”, etc. where the Philosopher treats of the knowledge of “what a thing is” and “if it is.” What he wanted to say there was that when one knows *per se* that a thing is, then one knows “what it is”, but “when one only knows that it is *per accidens*, then one necessarily has no knowledge of what it is, because we do not even know the simple fact

⁵⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 27, 28, 34-37.

⁵⁷Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 88, art. 1, ad 3 (V, 366ab).

⁵⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 7, 1012a 24-25; Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysica* IV, lect. 16, ed. Parma, XX, 377b: “Ratio quam nomen significat est definitio rei.”

⁵⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 49.

⁶⁰Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 8, 93a 1.

that it is."⁶¹ It is as if he said that according to accidental cognition we know either that it is nor what it is. And he adds a little later:⁶² "If we have factual knowledge of something it is easy to have [some] knowledge of what it is. Thus it follows that the degree of our knowledge of a thing's essential nature is determined by the sense in which we are aware of its existence." Therefore, since we know that the separate substances exist—not just per accidens, because that is not to know that it is—it follows that we can know of them their quiddity, especially of God, where they are the same, namely, his quiddity or "what he is" and his existence or "that he is."

53 Also, in Bk. IX of his *Metaphysics*,⁶³ he wants to say that about simples there is no deception; either the whole thing is attained and then there is knowledge, or nothing is attained and then there is ignorance, not deception.

54 Also existence is immediately in the quiddity of these. Therefore, since we know existence to be in their quiddity, according to them,⁶⁴—and it is not possible to know the proposition unless we know the terms, because, according to the Philosopher in Bk. I, *On Interpretation*,⁶⁵ in the chapter 'On Verbs': " 'To be' signifies a certain coupling which cannot be understood apart from the things coupled,"—hence, it follows that we must necessarily know their quiddity.

55[13] Also, to every negative proposition there is a prior affirmative proposition, according to Bk. II of *On Interpretation*, the last chapter.⁶⁶ For this proposition: "Good is not bad" is true because this prior affirmative proposition is true: "Good is good." And the Philosopher in Bk. IV of this book says:⁶⁷ "A statement will be more known than its opposite negation." Therefore, if one knows what an angel is not, one must know beforehand what it is.

⁶¹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 8, 93a 25-26.

⁶²*Ibid.*, ch. 8, 93a 27-29.

⁶³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 10, 1051b 30-1052a 4.

⁶⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 49.

⁶⁵Aristotle, *De interpretatione* I, ch. 3, 16b 22-25.

⁶⁶Aristotle, *De interpretatione* II, ch. 8, 23b 8-27.

⁶⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4, 1008a 17-18.

56 Also, against the first basis for [Thomas' opinion] about the sense image or phantasm,⁶⁸ if it were true, then the intellect would not be a higher power than the sense imagination or phantasy, because they would both have the same first object and what it contains for both would be equal.

57 Also, either this opinion means that we understand nothing unless we receive a knowledge of it from sense images, and then the fact stands that we could know what separate substances are, as will be proved later.⁶⁹ Or it means that we understand nothing unless its species as such was first in the phantasy. And then against this it follows that nothing would be *per se* intelligible unless it were *per se* sensible, because nothing else produces a proper species in the sense imagination, which is contrary to what they hold.⁷⁰

58 [14] Also, the soul knows many quiddities of things which do not produce their own species in the sense imagination, namely, incorporeal things, such as the soul itself and its powers and the second intentions. Proof of the first: Boethius in *De hebdomadibus*:⁷¹ "It is self evident to the wise that incorporeal things are not in some location; though this is not something known to all," because the meaning of the terms is not known to all. Proof of the second: the Philosopher in *On the Soul* II:⁷² defines the soul, which would only be the case if he knew its essence or what it is.

59 One could object that the soul is not defined properly but through a subject.—Against this: something is posited in its definition, namely that it is an act and such like, namely, things that do not fall under the perception of the sense or produce a species in the sense imagination.

60 Of the potencies it is evident that the possible intellect knows itself just as it knows other things.

61 To this it is said that this is true, because of the species of other things; it is not known through its essence or quiddity.

⁶⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 23-24.

⁶⁹Cf. *infra*, n. 58.

⁷⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 23-24.

⁷¹Boethius, *De hebdomadibus*, PL 64, 1311; ed. Peiper 169, 34-36.

⁷²Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 1, 412a 19-22; 412a 27-28; 412b 5-6.

62 To the contrary: how is the agent intellect known, which does not receive a species, nor is it in act through some species it receives?—Also, this reply [n. 62] asserts what is false, because to know the possible intellect through the species of a stone that is in it—something which is only accidentally connected with it—is not to know it, since that species could directly represent only the stone of which it is the species. Just as to know Corsicus⁷³ insofar as he comes along, since his coming is something that is accidental to him, it follows that I do not know him in an unqualified sense.

63 Also, it is clear regarding habits, for through “intellect,” which is the habit [i.e. the habitual knowledge] of principles, by which a man adheres to first principles, he can know that he adheres to such. Also, through “science” he knows that he knows conclusions through their causes.

64 Also, it is evident of actions, for love is better known than he who is loved, according to Augustine.⁷⁴ Also, one reflects upon the act of the intellect, which is not something that can be imagined.

65 [15] {{Also, Augustine in his letter *To Nebridium*, about eternity;⁷⁵ and *On Genesis* IV, ch. 3,⁷⁶ about the understanding of sixes, look in the florilegium. And about happiness, in Bk. XIII *On the Trinity*, ch. 2.⁷⁷ And of the soul that it ought to disassociate itself from the sense images that it may understand itself, in Bk. X of *On the Trinity*, ch. 20.⁷⁸—Reply: it must disassociate itself under the aspect of something understood in order that it does not believe it is a phantasm. Similarly, it must do so under the aspect of a principle of understanding, first that a phantasm is not a principle primarily for understanding the soul, because then the soul would be a body, but it must not disassociate itself from the phantasm under the aspect of a principle of understanding that follows [the phantasm] and by a reflex act. Hence, in the same place he says of the phantasm,⁷⁹ that

⁷³Cf. Aristotle, *On sophistical refutations*, II c. 24, 179b 2-3.

⁷⁴Augustine, *De Trinitate* VIII, ch. 8, n. 12, PL 42, 957; CCL 50, 286: “Magis enim novit dilectionem qua diligit quam fratrem quem diligit.”

⁷⁵Augustine, *Epist. 7, ad Nebridium*, ch. 1, n. 2; PL 33, 68; CSEL 34¹, 14.

⁷⁶Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* IV, ch. 2, nn. 2-4, PL 34, 296-8; CSEL 28¹, 94-97.

⁷⁷Augustine, *De Trinitate* XIII, ch. 4-9; PL 42, 1018-24; CCL 50, 389-99.

⁷⁸*Ibid.*, X, ch. 8, n. 11, PL 42, 979; CCL 50, 324.

⁷⁹Augustine, *De Trinitate* X, ch. 6, n. 8 PL 42, 979; CCL 50, 324.

the mind “regards itself as being that without which it cannot think of itself.” Also, in this way it is replied everywhere to Augustine about disassociating and abstracting from the sense image; thus also about the understanding of sixes and of units, which are not understood without the sense images of bodies; nevertheless, the intellect knows that the sense images do not pertain to these *per se*. Hence, it [the intellect] understands these things negatively; and the same way with eternity. Similarly, when he says that the images of bodies are the cause of deception and error, etc.,⁸⁰ this must be understood if one believes that what is spiritual is first represented through these sense images or is the same as these. Against this it seems manifest in chapter 25,⁸¹ namely, “It would not think of itself through an imaginary phantasy, but by a kind of inward presence that is not feigned but real (for nothing is more present to it than itself).”}}

66 Also, as for second intentions, it is most certain that these can be defined.

67 [16] About the second proposition⁸² that the quiddity of a material substance is the *per se* object, it is clear that this is false, if the object is the first under whose aspect all things are understood. For it has been proved⁸³ that many other things are understood *per se* by us, and these are known according to their quiddity, and none of these is the quiddity of material substance. If, however, one takes “first,” for that which is understood to be first in time, it is obvious that this is false; but those things which are first understood are what are first sensed, and these are accidents.

68 Also, if the quiddity of a material substance were the *per se* and primary object of our intellect because of the proportion between the object and the power,—since the intellect of an angel, according to those who hold this view is not a power that exists in a body—it follows that an angel would not know the quiddity of a material substance, which exists in matter.

⁸⁰Ibid., X, ch. 6, n. 8, PL 42, 978; CCL 50, 321.

⁸¹Ibid., X, ch. 10, n. 16, PL 42, 982; CCL 50, 329.

⁸²Cf. *supra*, nn. 25-26.

⁸³Cf. *supra*, nn. 58-64, 66.

69 Also, then our intellect would not know the quiddity of a rose, if no rose existed, since such a quiddity would not exist at that time in matter.

70 Also, Avicenna in *Metaphysics* I, ch. 5:⁸⁴ “Being and thing and the like are what are first impressed in the soul in the first impression,” but none of these are material quiddities.

71 Also, in Bk. VII of this work,⁸⁵ the Philosopher proves that substance is the first thing we have knowledge of. But this is not understood of what is primary in the order of execution but that of dignity, because—namely—it is the most perfect thing knowable according to him in that place. Therefore, substance is above all the proper object. However, he speaks there of substance in general, insofar as it is one of the ten categories, as is clear from his intention as expressed in the beginning of of Bk. VII.⁸⁶

72 [17] Also, at times he says⁸⁷ that the true is the proper object of the intellect because it is related to the intellect as good is to the will.

73 Also, at times the universal is said to be the proper object, as in Bk. II of *On the Soul*:⁸⁸ it is said that the universal is understood, the singular is sensed.

74 I respond: although the universal is properly an attribute of the object of the intellect, nevertheless, it is not its object just as visible is not the object of vision, but color is its object. Otherwise, one could say that neither is it a proper attribute, but all the authorities that claim it is, are to be understood as saying that it is in this that the intellect exceeds the sense. Therefore, in this the difference [between sense and intellect consists].

75 To this argument, then, about the proportion between object and potency⁸⁹ one must say that a proportion in essence or in the way it

⁸⁴Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 5, AvI 31.

⁸⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 1, 1028a 33-34.

⁸⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 1, 1028a 10-b 3.

⁸⁷Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 16, art. 1 resp.

⁸⁸Rather according to the *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse p. 294; from Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae*, V, prosa 6 PL 63, 862; CCL 94, 104; cf. Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 417b 22-23.

⁸⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 25.

exists is not necessary; likewise no proportion in nature is needed. For then how could an eye that is corruptible see the incorruptible sun? And why does not a star or the moon know the sun? And how does an angel know a corporeal quiddity? And how does our intellect know an nonexistent quiddity? But the proportion required is that which exists between the mover and the mobile. But if a body can move the intellect, all the more so can what is incorporeal.

[B.—AN ADDITIONAL REPLY TO QUESTION 3]

76 [18] {{To the question one must say that it [i.e. a immaterial substance] can be known by us, according to Bk. IX of this work, the last chapter.⁹⁰ But ignorance of such things is not in us, like blindness, but as something existing in those completely deprived of intellect. If nothing were known by us except those things whose intelligible species is taken from the sense, then material substance would never be known, because so far as the sense is concerned the knowledge before and after the consecration of the host is no different.

77 Also, if the effect led to a knowledge of the cause to the extent it is the cause, then the more it is a cause, the more it would be known. Proof: it depends more on that which is more a cause—and an effect depends more on an efficient cause than on a material cause, because God could make it without matter. But it cannot exist without an efficient cause and even more, without the remote efficient cause [i.e., God], because without God it could exist even less.

78 To the contrary: then the species of a stone represents God more than it does the stone.—I reply: the argument holds for discursive knowledge, which is had only insofar [as we are arguing to a cause from its effect]; but if it is an effect, then together with this, its species is already a principle of intuitive knowledge, not discursive knowledge.

79 Also, when one argues⁹¹ from an effect to a cause, where does the argument stop? Not with an effect. Rather, it would stop with the

⁹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 10, 1052a 2-5.

⁹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 48.

precise cause, from which the conclusion of the demonstration immediately follows.

[1.—ABOUT INTUITIVE COGNITION]

80 [19] Note that in the sense there is one cognition primarily proper, [viz.,] intuitive cognition; another sort of cognition is proper primarily and *per se* and that is knowledge through a species, but it is not intuitive. To both of these corresponds their respective accidental cognitions, namely through knowledge that stems from the privation of what is knowable *per se*. An example of the first: the visual sense sees color; an example of the second, the sense imagination or phantasy imagines color; an example of the third: the visual sense sees darkness. An example of the fourth: the phantasy imagines darkness. The fifth sort of knowledge is proper to the phantasy and is through the composition of the species of the different sensibles, for instance, imagining a gold mountain. The sixth sort of cognition is the accidental cognition of something, for instance, the knowledge of a man through figure and color, etc.

81 [Type 1—Intellectual cognition] In the intellect, intuitive cognition or vision, which is primarily knowledge, is not possible in this life, because no potency reserving the species or the formal principle of knowledge in the absence of the object, could know in this fashion. For such a potency has the same principle [of knowing] whether the thing is present or not present, and that knowledge [i.e., intuitive] is only of a thing present under the aspect of its being present. Hence, if vision could have species in the absence of the object, then that species would never be a principle of intuitive cognition.

82 Also, it seems, that the immutability of anything is never known through intuitive cognition. Look above in Bk. I, q. 4 in the answer to the sixth initial argument.⁹²

83 [Type 2] The second cognition is only of sensible accidents, since only these produce a species in the intellect, but not of substance, as

⁹²Cf. *supra*, Bk. I, q. 4, nn. 97-105.

is evident above from the argument that begins with the words: "If nothing were known," etc.⁹³

84 [Types 3 and 4] The third and fourth sorts of knowledge, which in this case are the same, i.e., of privations of proper intellections through species of things once had, on their removal [i.e. specific knowledge of what is absent]. In this way privations of sensible things are known intellectually.

85 [Type 5 and 6] The fifth sort of knowledge, perhaps, is of separate substances, which are known by the fact that many things apprehended are conceived together, all of which are never found elsewhere. But because of this, no specific essence of anything is known except in general, and perhaps accidentally, not *per se* through something higher. But essences have a status in this cognition analogous to the status of accidental sensibles in sensible cognition, where we have the sixth grade [of cognition].

[2.—TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPPOSITE VIEW]

86 [20] To the argument for the opposite⁹⁴ "As the eye," etc. I reply: the analogy as to the impossibility is to be understood of visual knowledge, because there is no other that pertains to the sense [of sight], and perhaps the sun could be imagined if God were to give it a species.

87 Otherwise, one could say that as the eye of the bat acts of necessity with all its power toward the light of the sun, so the intellect acts [with all its power] to know those things [that are by nature most knowable] according to their full ability to be known; otherwise the analogy does not hold.

88 Another answer would be to say that it refers to the potency that receives a proper species of some object through which second knowledge comes, and then it is impossible that the intellect think of both: there absolutely and here according to this state of receiving species only from sensibles.

⁹³Cf. *supra*, n. 76.

⁹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

89 Another way, based on the Commentator,⁹⁵ is to understand it of the difficulty, not impossibility, the intellect has with the fifth type of cognition.

[3.—TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THOMAS]

90 [21] To the arguments for the first opinion⁹⁶ it is clear how all things are understood through an abstraction from phantasms or sense images. Because neither in the third, nor in the fourth, nor in the fifth, nor in the sixth types of cognition [nn. 84-86] would the intellect arrive at knowledge without some previous knowledge of the second type [n. 84-85]. However, there are many things it never knows in the first way [n. 83] or in the second way [n. 84], and thus not abstracted from phantasms, but making use of abstract notions, the intellect knows things according to the other ways [of knowing].

91 As for what is said of damage to the organ,⁹⁷ I reply that the objects of both powers are not on the same plane, but the reason [the intellect depends upon the sense images] is the natural order [that exists between the two], just as our intellect does not reason when we are asleep.

92 As for forming some mental sense image,⁹⁸ it is true that knowledge begins with this, but it progresses to a stage where it has no such sensory images, indeed it rejects any such image.⁹⁹

93 To the other:¹⁰⁰ What Avicenna wants to say in his *Metaphysics* I, ch. 5¹⁰¹ is that being and thing make the first impression on the soul. The reason seems to be that the object of a potency's primary habit [i.e. metaphysics] is the primary object of that habit, as the first object of metaphysics is being qua being, according to Bk. IV of the *Metaphysics*.¹⁰²

⁹⁵Cf. Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, lect. 1, ed. Parma XX 298b-299a.

⁹⁶Cf. supra, n. 22.

⁹⁷Cf. supra, n. 23.

⁹⁸Cf. supra, n. 23.

⁹⁹An interpolated text is attached here: "To the other [argument, cf. nn. 25-26] that nothing else seems to be a more appropriate object for the intellectual potency than the material quiddity because in this case there is a fitting proportion."

¹⁰⁰Cf. supra, nn. 25-26.

¹⁰¹Cf. supra, n. 70.

¹⁰²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21-22.

94 Also, nothing else besides being is common to all *per se* intelligibles, except perhaps the other notions that are coextensive with being, before all of which [other notions] intelligible being is naturally prior, as a subject is prior to its properties.

[4.—OBJECTIONS AGAINST WHAT HAS BEEN SAID]

95 To the contrary: then being has one concept, for a potency can have some one act in regards its proper object.

96 Also, then there would not be a formally different aspect of the object of intellect and will, because the aspect of the object of the will is some aspect of being; therefore it is what is *per se* intelligible.

97 Also, then whatever is actually a being would be actually intelligible, and then the agent intellect would be superfluous.

98 Also, then the singulars would be *per se* intelligible. Corporeal things would also be intelligible, which is against Augustine in Bk. XII, *On Genesis*:¹⁰³ “The agent is nobler than the patient.”

99 Also, then the intellect by its natural power could know all things, the inmost thoughts of the heart, future contingents, etc.

[5.—REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS]

100 [22] To the first,¹⁰⁴ this is an evasion. Color is the first object of sight, even though sight could not have an act in regard to color in itself, [i.e. in the abstract] but only in regard to a singular [i.e., specific color].

101 On the contrary: sight is not able to know the universal.—I reply that in this way neither can the intellect through a single act know what is equivocal according to logic—even if such is analogous according to the metaphysician—but one can only know in this way the first among the analogates.

¹⁰³ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram* XII, ch. 16, n. 32; PL, 34 466s; CSEL 28¹, 401.

¹⁰⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 95.

102 Against this: that is substance; therefore, that would produce a proper species, because otherwise, it would not be known most certainly, which is against what was said above.¹⁰⁵

103 Similarly, whiteness would not be known beforehand as whiteness, but insofar as it pertains to a substance.

104 Likewise, the first object must be posited first and to it all other things attributed, otherwise, whence the unity of the potency? Concede this, if being is not univocal!

105 Reply: the species proper to substance is in the sense, as transmitting, not as perceiving; or as subject, not as object.

106 Another answer to the first:¹⁰⁶ There is one essential notion of being as is touched upon in Bk. IV of this work,¹⁰⁷ otherwise, it would not be certain that something is a being and doubtful if it is a substance or an accident.

107 To the second,¹⁰⁸ the same thing is the object of both the intellect and the will. Look in Bk. VI, q. 3, and in Bk. IX, q. 5.¹⁰⁹ In another way that aspect is intelligible, but it is not an intelligible reason under that aspect under which something is understood *per se*.

108 To the fourth:¹¹⁰ the first conclusion is conceded. Augustine has to be explained.}}¹¹¹

[C.—A FULLER EXPLANATION OF THE QUESTION]

109 [23] {{For a fuller solution of this question know that there are four degrees of sensitive knowledge.¹¹² The first is that of intuitive cognition which is of a thing present, and not just through a species, nor only under a knowable aspect, but in its proper nature. The second degree is of a thing known through a proper species produced from it. The third is through some species fashioned by the cognitive power

¹⁰⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 76, 83.

¹⁰⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 95.

¹⁰⁷Cf. *infra*, Bk. IV, q. 1, nn. 4-8, 12-14.

¹⁰⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 96.

¹⁰⁹Cf. *infra*, Bk. VI, q. 3, nn. 7-22; Bk. IX, q. 5, nn. 24-35.

¹¹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 98.

¹¹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 65.

¹¹²Cf. *supra*, n. 80.

from the proper species of certain things that were impressed upon it. All these cognitions are *per se*. An example of the first degree: sight sees color; an example of the second, the phantasy imagines color that was seen; of the third, the phantasm imagines a gold mountain, or from a pale blackness or gray that has seen, it imagines something pitch black. In these cognitions there is something that is in some way universal and particular, as is evident from Avicenna's *Physics* I.¹¹³ And the knowledge in general is still *per se* knowledge, especially in the intellect.

110 Beyond these degrees of cognition, is knowledge *per accidens*; and this is either knowledge of the object or its opposite, by way of negation.

111 [Doubt about intuitive cognition in our present state] As for the first grade, namely intuitive cognition, whether it is in the intellect in this life, there is a doubt.

112 However, it seems that there is [i.e. intuitive cognition in the intellect in this life], because whatever is of perfection in an unqualified sense in an inferior power ought to be assumed of the more perfect. But it is a matter of unqualified perfection in sense knowledge that it knows something as it is present through its essence; therefore, such cognition seems to pertain here to the intellect.

113 On the contrary: no potency retentive of a species in the absence of an object knows a thing by intuitive cognition, namely, insofar as it is present through its essence; but the intellect retains a species—let's assume this—; therefore, etc. Proof of the major: the species, by which such a potency knows, yields a uniform knowledge of a thing, whether it be present according to its essence or not present; therefore, etc.

114 [24] [Reply of the author to the doubt] But this argument would prove that God could not be seen in the fatherland [i.e. heaven] through a species, which could be conserved in the absence of the object, because then there could not be vision. If, however, one held that the intellect could know intuitively here, one could say that every distinct act of the sense is accompanied by an act of the

¹¹³Avicenna, *Sufficientia* I, ch. 1, f.13ra-vb.

intellect about the same object; and this intellection is vision. But at least according to the first grade of knowledge¹¹⁴ no separate substance is known by us here. Neither is such known in the second way,¹¹⁵ because it would be necessary that this species would originate immediately from that object, which does not occur. For we receive no species except that it come through the sense or the intellect fashions it from what it has received. Also in the third way¹¹⁶ it is not known, because it would be necessary that we have the proper species of the parts that make up the composite concept. None of these three intellections in particular are of anything but accidents. Everything known in the fourth way¹¹⁷ is by conceiving being in general, and that it is this being, namely, some singular being.

115 But beyond the concept of being nothing more special is known of the quiddity of any substance, not only of a separate substance but of a material substance. For by whatever reason a material substance subject to accidents could multiply a proper species of itself along with the species of the accidents, by the same reason an immaterial substance could do so with the species of its actions. For the action depends upon the agent no less than an accident does upon a subject. But to 'being' itself we conjoin positive or privative accidents that we know from the sense, and we make from being and many such accidents a single description, the whole of which is never found except in such a species. And the concept of such a description is the more perfect concept which we have of such a species of substance. For instance from "being that is located in something" we conceive of "being in another," as an accident in a subject. And going further, we take the opposite of this accident, through "not being in a subject" we compose "not being in a subject" [i.e.] a substance. But we conceive nothing as a "what" or "quid" except being. Beyond dimensions [i.e. quantity] we think of "a being that is not in a subject suited by nature to receive dimensions" [i.e.] the concept of a body; and "one not suited to receive such" [i.e.] an incorporeal substance. And that in all these

¹¹⁴Namely, intuitive cognition of a present thing; cf. *supra*, n. 109.

¹¹⁵Namely, cognition through a proper species; cf. *supra*, n. 109.

¹¹⁶ Namely, cognition through a species fashioned by the cognitive power from the proper species of certain things that were impressed upon it, cf. *supra*, n. 109.

¹¹⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 110.

if one asks “What is that which is suited in this way?” or “To what does that pertain that is not existing in a subject?” we say that it is one being, that it is something, that it is a thing. We do not have any more specific concept of its quiddity. Going further, by removing all that is proper to bodies and from our intellection and volition, which we experience as characterized by imperfection, by abstracting intellection and volition in general and by removing the imperfection of each, and attributing to these positively, we have one description from privative and positive notions, where there is nothing of the quiddity of the thing described except being; all the other notions are properties of such a quiddity.

116[25] In this way, therefore, it is clear how no substance is understood *per se* except in a most universal concept, namely, that of being. Per accidens, however, it is understood in particular, viz. by understanding a property or many properties that pertain to it alone. But God is also understood in some way, it seems, more perfectly than any other substance.

117 But against the aforesaid it is argued that substance is understood by us *per se*, because we define substances, as we do accidents, through genera and their proper differences.

118 Also, how do we understand general accidents when we only sense singulars?

119 To the first of these,¹¹⁸ we must say that of substances we have a [only] a “verbal habit”¹¹⁹—as one born blind reasons about [syllogizes] colors, because we do not understand their genera, only [that they are] beings.

120 To the second¹²⁰ one must say that the abstraction of the universal from the particular takes place through the power of the intellect, and therefore, we can understand universal accidents.

121 Also, against that statement made above¹²¹ where it was said that “none of these three intellections in particular are of anything

¹¹⁸Cf. supra, n. 117.

¹¹⁹That is, our names refer to the substance, because we can name things more distinctly than we can conceive of them; cf. Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 22, q. un., n. 6; V, 344.

¹²⁰Cf. supra, n. 118.

¹²¹Cf. supra, n. 114.

but accidents”, it is argued that according to this, it seems to follow that we never understand any substance naturally, even in heaven. For our intellect is as capable now as it will be then, because it is the same potency. If substance itself could produce a species then, it also has the power to do so now.

122 Also, how is being understood? Is it not understood through a proper species? Study this.}}

[II.—TO QUESTION 2
A.—SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

123 [26] To the other question it is replied¹²² that the Commentator has in mind that on the part of our intellect there is a difficulty of knowing separate substances, but not on their part. In the intellection of a material substance it is on the part of the thing, because “each is knowable insofar as it is in act”.¹²³ Therefore, those things which are not simply in act, have on their part difficulty in being known.

124 [Objections to n. 123] On the contrary, if that were so, then this will be by comparing those things to any intellect; the consequent is false regarding the divine intellect. Proof of the implication: take the opposite of this, namely, that the difficulty of knowing such is not with respect to any intellect whatsoever, but with respect that of some particular intellect, namely, ours. Then, since those substances are the same when compared to any intellect, it follows that there is no difficulty on their part, but on the part of our intellect to which they are compared.

125 Also, there is no difficulty on the part of the thing, in that which immediately follows a thing insofar as it is a thing, but knowableness immediately follows being insofar as it is a being, because, according to Bk. II of this work,¹²⁴ what makes anything a being also makes it knowable.¹²⁵

¹²²Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysica* II, lect. 1, ed. Parma XX, 298-99); see also Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 2, q. 6 in corp. (I f. 27G); cf. supra, n. 2.

¹²³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 9, 1051a 30-31; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse p. 135: “Omne quod cognoscitur, cognoscitur secundum quod est ens in actu.”

¹²⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 30-31.

¹²⁵The following text is inserted here: “To the first initial argument for the

126 I concede, therefore, that in material as well as in immaterial things the difficulty of knowing is on the part of our intellect. But material things are not in act in the same measure as immaterial things are, and therefore, they are not as perfectly known. But knowledge can be had of them, just as easily as of immaterial things. Because, according to its knowableness, the material thing moves the intellect just as easily as the immaterial, only both do not move with equal intensity—just as a small fire heats with equal facility in proportion to its heat as a bigger fire does in proportion to its heat.

[B.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS OF QUESTION 2]

127 To the argument that everything is known insofar as it is a being¹²⁶ I say that because they are less perfect in their entity, they do not have as perfect a cognition; nevertheless, the cognition proportionate to them is as readily known of them on their part as is the case with immaterial things on their part.

128 As for the other reason:¹²⁷ the minor is false. To the proof one must say that the indisposition is not because of something contrary, as the eye of the bat does not have something contrary to the light of the sun, but it is because of the weakness of its power to know and thus the power is the formal element in knowing.

129 To the other:¹²⁸ the argument proves that the difficulty does not stem from a weakening of the organ, but because the power itself is weak in what it can know; but the sense can have both impediments.

negative [n. 124], it can be conceded as such. — Another answer: this knowability is a relational quality and veridical; therefore also its term is veridical with respect to the thing in which it is rooted. Such is only the created intellect and perhaps only a human intellect, and of it is true that [it is such] ‘with respect to anything whatsoever.’”

¹²⁶Cf. supra, n. 1.

¹²⁷Cf. supra, n. 3.

¹²⁸Cf. supra, n. 4.

QUESTION FOUR

Is it necessary to assume a status in every kind of cause?

“But clearly things have a beginning, and the causes of things are not infinite.”¹

1 [1] In this connection the question is raised: Is it necessary to assume a status in every kind of cause?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

For the negative view:

According to Bk. VIII of the *Physics*,² motion, especially circular motion, never had a beginning, and if this be so, then generation also did not, from II *On Generation and Corruption*.³ Therefore, infinite generations have come to be and each generation has its own proximate efficient cause, final cause, and matter in those things which are generated by way of propagation. Hence, all [types] of causes are infinite.

2 When there is an infinite distance between extremes, an infinite number of intermediaries is possible. But between the first efficient cause and any other efficient cause there is an infinite distance, and hence also between other causes, viz. the formal and final. Proof of the major: The more distant some things are, the more intermediaries can be between them. Therefore, if they are infinitely distant, there can be an infinity of intermediaries.—Also, I apply the same major premise to matter, with this minor. Being is infinitely distant from nothing. Therefore, between nothing and being, an infinity of potential entities is possible. But matter is of this sort.

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 1-2.

²Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 1, 250b 19-21.

³Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, ch. 10, 336a 15-20.

3 For the opposite:

What the Philosopher says in the text⁴ of every type of cause proves that there is a status.

QUESTION FIVE

Can one proceed to infinity in effects so that there exists an actual infinity?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

4 [For the affirmative] It seems that one can:

Any difference among any sort of thing has another opposite difference that codivides that class of things. But the finite in act represents a difference in quantity. Therefore, it has the infinite as its opposite difference; and this is the infinite in act, not the infinite in potency, because opposed differences are not mutually compatible. But the same thing can be actually finite and potentially infinite. Therefore, the finite in act has as its opposite the infinite in act.

5 Also, according to Bk. VI of the *Topics*,⁵ Aristotle rejects the definition of a straight line as that “to which a middle is added to its ends, because those things that are infinite have neither a middle nor an end. But a straight line is infinite.” Therefore, infinity is not opposed to a straight line.

6 Also, according to *Physics* III:⁶ “Any magnitude that can exist potentially can exist actually.” But magnitude can be infinite potentially, because according to II *On the Soul*:⁷ “Fire goes on without limit so long as there is a supply of fuel.”

7 Also, “the continuum is divisible into divisibles that are always divisible,” according to Bk. VI of the *Physics*.⁸ But number

⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 1-994b 31.

⁵Aristotle, *Topics* Bk. VI, ch. 19, 148b 26-32.

⁶Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 7, 207b 17-18.

⁷Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 4, 416a 15-16.

⁸Aristotle, *Physics* VI, ch. 1, 231b 15-16; *De caelo et mundo* I, ch. 1, 268a 6-7.

follows the divisions of the continuum, according to Bk. III of the *Physics*.⁹ Therefore, number is infinite.

8 It is objected here that number like division is only infinite in potency.—To the contrary: I *De caelo et mundo*:¹⁰ “If it could not have been made, it could not have come into being.” Therefore, if a continuum cannot be infinitely divided, then it is impossible that it be potentially divided infinitely.

9 Also, what is said of number,¹¹ that what is infinite in potency, is actually the case, I prove: It is conceded that number is infinite in potency. But given any species of number, a unit can be added to produce a new species. Therefore the species of number are infinite in potency. But each species adds a unit to the other; therefore, there is a certain species—which while being in potency—has in itself an infinity of units. The ideas of all possible species are in God actually. Therefore, he actually has an idea of a number having infinite units. But every species, whose idea God has in actuality, can be made by God in its singular. Therefore, some species having an infinity of units, is producible by God externally.

10 For the negative:

The Philosopher says of numbers in Bk. III of the *Physics*¹² that “every number is numerable.” But one can go through everything that is numerable, and every such thing is finite; therefore, etc.

QUESTION SIX

Text of Aristotle: “But there is no understanding, unless one comes to a halt...But if the kinds of causes had been infinite in number, then knowledge would have been impossible.” (*Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 20-28)

⁹Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 7, 207a 32-207b 2.

¹⁰Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* I, ch. 1, 279b 12-31.

¹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

¹²Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 5, 204b 9-11.

Can the infinite be known by us?

“But there is no understanding, unless one comes to a halt,”¹³ namely, a line ends in a point....

About this we can ask further: Can the infinite be known by us?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

11 [1] For the affirmative:

God is infinite and we can know him, as we have said above;¹⁴ therefore, etc.

12 Also, knowledge is through all the causes; therefore, we know by means of the first cause, which is infinite.

13 We also define the infinite and assign attributes to it and give it a name, which signifies it; therefore, we understand it.

14 Also, all the species of any genus are known by us, because we can define them; but the species of numbers and figures are infinite, since we can always proceed to infinity beyond any given species; therefore, there are an infinity of things which are true species, even though they do not exist—just as the species of rose is a true species, even if no roses existed. Hence, these species can be known.

15 Also, in *Physics* IV, in the chapter “On the Void”:¹⁵ “If two bodies could be in the same place, any number could be together”; therefore, if we can think of two species at the same time, then, an infinity of species could be thought of, each one of which is a principle of knowing; therefore, etc.¹⁶

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 994b 24-25.

¹⁴Cf. supra, Bk. II, qq. 2-3, nn. 51-52.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Physics* IV, ch. 8, 216b 10-12.

¹⁶There is an interpolated text here found in one manuscript: [Objections] “Likewise, a specific nature is determined to no single individual, because ‘to be man’ is in Socrates as well as Plato, nor does such a nature pertain more to Socrates than to Plato. Given this, I argue as follows: a specific nature that is communicable and not determined to a single individual, is not restricted to a finite number of individuals. However, whatever such nature is not restricted to finitude, is not repugnant to be in an infinite number [of individuals] nor to contain an infinitude of individuals under it; therefore, etc. Likewise, that it would actually contain [an infinitude], I

16 For the negative:

The Philosopher in *Metaphysics* II¹⁷ says that if the formal causes were infinite, nothing could be known, and he also says in *Physics* I,¹⁸ against Anaxagoras, that if their principles were infinite, it would be impossible to know things.

17 Also, the Commentator¹⁹ says in this connection that if one were to imagine an infinite line, he will not understand.—On the contrary: “what²⁰ a lesser power can know, a higher power can also know”; whatever can be imagined, therefore, can be understood.

[I.—TO THE QUESTIONS: ON INFINITY]

18 [2] Here we must see what “infinite” in general means, for it can be understood in three ways: [1] negatively, [2] privatively, or [3] contrarily.—The first is evident from *Physics* III.²¹ A point is negatively infinite, as sound is invisible.—What is privatively such lacks an end with which it is apt by nature to be terminated, and this is what “infinite” seems to signify.—What “contrarily infinite” is Boethius makes clear in *Super praedicamenta*, in the chapter “On Quality,”²² where the Philosopher says: “One quality may be the contrary of another, as justice is the contrary of injustice.”²³ “Unjust” is asserted contrarily, because the unjust person has a habit contrary to justice generated by repeated actions. And in this sense, “infinite” negates finitude with the postulating of its contrary state, as an infinite extension without limits. It is in this

prove: since the aforesaid nature is related to actually existing things, so too an infinite number, as has been demonstrated; but a finite number of such actually existing things can participate in such a nature; therefore, etc. -- Solution: I say first that this implies a contradiction. Because, since the infinite is that to which an addition is repugnant, so if it would not be repugnant to such a nature that it exist in an infinite number of individuals, then if God created a new individual, he would not be able to add it to the others, nor would that nature be communicable to it, and this is contrary to the very notion of ‘nature’.”

¹⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2 994b 20-22.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 4, 187b 10-12.

¹⁹Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 11, fol. 16vb.

²⁰Boethius, *De consolazione philosophiae* V, prosa 4; PL 63, 849; CCL 94, 97.

²¹Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 5, 204a 11-17.

²²Boethius, *In Categorias Aristotelis* III, PL 64, 225B-256A.

²³Aristotle, *Praedicamenta*, ch. 8, 10b 12-14.

fashion that the Philosopher in *Physics* I²⁴ argues against Parmenides and Melissus.

19 Infinite understood contrarily can be taken in two ways: [a] either as something that actually exists without limits, or [b] what is potentially such—which the Philosopher defines in *Physics* III:²⁵ “The infinite, then, is that whose quantity is such that no matter how much has been taken, there is always more one can take,” so that no matter how much one has taken, there is always something more to take. If it were only negatively or privatively infinite, there would not always be something more to be taken.

20 Infinite in these last two senses²⁶ is always in a quantity of mass or power; this is mainly the case with the second [privatively], and always with the third [contrarily]. Quantity of any sort—taken properly or metaphorically—is either a magnitude or a plurality, in a proper or metaphorical sense. Therefore, infinity of any sort is either an infinity of magnitude or plurality, properly or metaphorically speaking.

[A.—ON NUMERICAL INFINITY]

21 [3] As for plurality or number, we see that negative infinity cannot be found in numbers, but only in the starting point of number, nor can privative infinity be there, because no plurality exists which is apt by nature to be terminated, and it is not terminated. Contrarily infinite is in numbers potentially, since number follows the division of the continuum. Also, the actually infinite is also difficult to avoid for it seems that, according to the Philosopher,²⁷ the infinite contrarily exist in actuality, as is clear in the case of the souls of men, if one assumes perpetual generation.

22 {{In a similar vein runs the last argument [n. 1], and Avicenna²⁸ and Algazel,²⁹ his follower, concede this.—It is countered³⁰ that

²⁴Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 3, 186a 4-b 23.

²⁵Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 6, 207a 7-8.

²⁶Namely, infinite taken privatively and contrarily; cf. supra, n. 18.

²⁷Cf. Aristotle, *On generation and corruption* II ch. 10, 336a 15-20.

²⁸Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, c. 2, AvI 303.

²⁹Algazel, *Metaphysica* I tr. 1, div. 6, ed. Muckle, 40-41.

³⁰Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 46, art. 2, ad 8 (IV, 481b); *ibid.*, *De aeternitate*

man would not have existed from all eternity, even if the world would have.

23 But against this interpretation is *Physics* II:³¹ “We use everything as if it was there for our sake, for we are also in some sense an end.” For to what purpose would other things exist for an infinite period of time without their end?

24 Also, Augustine in his *Questions on the Old Testament*, q. 33 seems to disprove this:³² “To what end is the annual harvest without man?”

25 To the contrary: If this were so, the numerical infinities could be compounded, and made into an infinite magnitude.—Answer: Magnitude is never greater than the whole from the division of which such a number has resulted, which whole was something finite.}}

26 As for plurality taken in a transferred or improper sense, which obtains in the case of essentially ordered species of any kind, the situation is similar as regards negative and privative infinity.

27 But where potential infinity taken contrarily is concerned, the situation is different, because there cannot be an infinity as regards diversity of species, such that God could make an infinitely more noble kind of things than any he had made. For then there could be some possible stage that is intensively infinite in perfection, and then there would be a possible creature that is simply infinite in its essence, and consequently such a substance would be God.

That a plurality in the category of quantity could not be actually infinite, is evident from Bk. III of the *Physics*:³³ “If the numerable can be numbered, it would also be possible to go through the infinite.” Therefore, etc.

28 Also, it is impossible to divide any continuum actually ad infinitum, because it is divided either into divisibles or into indivisibles. If the second be so, then the continuum is composed of indivisibles, since it is resolved into such. If the first be so, then it can be divided further, and so it is not divided ad infinitum. But

mundi (XLIII, 89b).

³¹Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 2, 194a 35.

³²Ambrosiaster, *Quaestiones ex veteri testamento*, ch. 28; PL 35, 2234.

³³Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 5, 204b 9-11.

'number is caused by dividing the continuum';³⁴ therefore, number cannot be actually infinite.

29 Also, *Metaphysics* V, the chapter "On Quantity"³⁵ says that plurality, if it is finite it is number; therefore, every number is a finite plurality.

30 Also, *Metaphysics* X:³⁶ "Number is a plurality measured by one"; but to be measured by the finite violates the very notion of the infinite, as *Physics* VI³⁷ proves that the infinite cannot be measured by the finite; hence, no number can be infinite.

[I.—TO THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS]

31 [4] Accepting the arguments already given, one can reply to the reasons cited in support of the opposite view.³⁸

As for the one about souls,³⁹ one must say that it does not assert some form to be somewhere, or that the intellective soul remains after separation [from the body]. Whence in *Metaphysics* XII,⁴⁰ he seems doubtful as to what should be said on this subject.

32 Another way of replying to the argument: if all human souls, which would have come to be through a perpetual generation in the past, or all the potential parts of a plurality would coexist, they would not constitute things that are infinite actually, in the sense that "infinity" is linked with "in act." Hence, one could concede, perhaps, that "in act" there would be infinite souls in potency, because "potentially" means taking one soul after another—for infinity would not be compatible with them otherwise. But they would not be infinite in act, for they would not number so many that no others could exist. But things infinite in act are so many that no more are compossible. Hence, there is a fallacy of composition and division here, in that "infinity" can be joined with the word "actual" and then it expresses something false. Or

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

³⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 13.

³⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 6, 1056b 23-24.

³⁷Aristotle, *Physics* VI, ch. 2, 233a 24-34.

³⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 21-30.

³⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 3, 1070a 24-27.

“infinity” can be separated from “in act” and hence, though the premises are conceded, the inference would be invalid.⁴¹

33 On the contrary: There would be as many souls as men; hence, if men were numerically infinite, so too would be their souls.—It must be said that successive infinities, if they were to coexist, would not be infinite, or if there were as many men coexisting as there would have been coming into existence successively, they would not be infinite in act, because they would be infinite potentially, where one is taken after the other. Therefore, an actual infinite would never follow from such, were they to coexist, because an actual infinity and a potential infinity are different in nature, and hence an actual infinity can never be inferred from a potential infinity.

34 To the other point,⁴² that although there was some sort of number grasped by God which has infinite units, according to the Philosopher⁴³ this could not exist outside [God’s mind], because God makes nothing external to himself except through the intervention of lesser causes which cannot produce such an effect.

35 Granting this hypothesis,⁴⁴ it must be said that that what could be done externally is what is capable of having existence, namely one unit after another ad infinitum; never all at once, but only successively—just as God all at once has the idea the whole of time, which nevertheless, is not able to be made all at once, but only one part after another.

36 Against this reply, if this number can come to be in this way, at some time these units will exist at the same time outside of God and then there will be an infinite number at some time; if not, then this number will never be an external effect, because a number never exists externally unless it contains all its integral units at the same time, and time does not exist with respect to its parts in this way.

⁴¹Cf. *infra*, nn. 116-117.

⁴²Cf. *supra*, nn. 27, 9.

⁴³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 7, 1072a 19-1072b 30.

⁴⁴Namely, the assumption that generation is perpetual.

[THE HYPOTHESIS OF DIVINE POWER RE INFINITE NUMBER]

37 [5] By maintaining, then, that God could make a number containing an infinity of units, [the following answer could be given] to the argument of the Philosopher when he says:⁴⁵ “Every number is numerable,” etc., we must say that this same argument could be applied to a number that is potentially infinite. “Every number in potency is denumerable potentially, and every potentially denumerable is in potency to being gone through, and every number that could be gone through is finite potentially; therefore, a potentially infinite number is finite potentially.” Hence, we have to say this argument is only probable, according to what was said in the text “But it is reasonable,” etc.,⁴⁶ which is his way of expressing reasons that are only probable. Hence, one of the premises must be denied.

38 To the other argument⁴⁷ that the infinite could be caused in such a fashion [i.e. by compounding finite things, we can say]: It is not only in this way that the infinite can be caused, because a new continuum can be produced and number increased; therefore, number can be caused in some other way than by dividing the continuum; hence, we are faced here with a fallacy of the consequent.

39 To the other⁴⁸ we can say it is an instance of the fallacy of the consequent, for while this follows: “If plurality is finite, it is number,” but by denying the antecedent we do not come up with a valid argument.

40 To the other⁴⁹ [viz., that number is a plurality measured by one] no infinite can be measured by something finite taken a finite number of times, but only by a finite taken an infinite number of times. At present, however, we do not mean by number essentially that it be measured by one taken finitely, because according to him [Aristotle], number is potentially infinite, and as such cannot be measured by one taken finitely, but only infinitely.

⁴⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

⁴⁶Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 7, 207b 1.

⁴⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 28.

⁴⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 30.

41 [6] There is no negative or privative infinity as regards an essential or specific plurality of things which are arranged according to an essential order.⁵⁰ An actual infinite, taken contrarily, cannot be present here, because then there would be that infinite that is intensively perfect and it would be God. Neither can a potential infinite be found in such a case, according to the Philosopher,⁵¹ for two reasons: [1] because the universe is perfect, since he considers that “perfect to which no addition is possible”; [2] because he does not assume that anything could be made that did not preexist in the passive potency of some matter and had its [corresponding] active potency in some efficient cause other than the first [being], since he assumed God could only make something through the intermediacy of some [other] cause, as the Commentator tells us in his comment⁵² on *Metaphysics* VII:⁵³ “It is clear from what has been said, then, that everything is made from something which shares its name,” at the end of his comment [31] where he says “it is impossible that the first agent transmutes matter except by means of some body which is not changeable, namely the heavenly bodies; and therefore, it is impossible that the separate Intelligences put some form pertaining to compounds into matter.” He infers this of things that can be generated which are produced by a transformation of matter, but not about Intelligences, which he assumes exist in an infinity of grades—if such an infinity is to be assumed anywhere.

42 For, in truth, there are several opinions about this. One⁵⁴ is that God could make a species higher than any given species potentially ad infinitum, since anything able to be made is infinitely distant from God; therefore, if one thinks of anything more perfect, it is still within the creaturely limits.—The other opinion, treated earlier⁵⁵ [viz., that God could not do so ad infinitum] has one argument for it.

⁵⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 26.

⁵¹Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 16, 1021b 11-12; *ibid.*, *De caelo et mundo* I, c. 1, 268b 4.

⁵²Averroes, *Metaphysica* VII, com. 31, fol. 85va-vb.

⁵³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 9, 1034a 21-23.

⁵⁴Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I q. 7, a. 4 resp. (IV 79b); I q. 46 a. 2 ad 7-8 (IV 482b); *Sent.* I d. 44 q. 1 a. 2 resp., ed. Parma VI 354b.

⁵⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

43 Negatively the infinite does not exist in something divisible, but in a point.

[THE PRIVATIVELY INFINITE]

44 [7] Now some⁵⁶ prove that infinite, understood privatively,⁵⁷ can exist in something divisible on the ground that a terminus is not essential to what is divisible, just as a point is not of the essence of a line, and if what is outside the essence is removed, the thing as such remains. But if one removes the last point ending a line, either a line remains that is not apt by nature to have an end, but is actually without such, or this is not the case. If so, then the privative infinite will be in a divisible line; if not, then some point is more immediate to the point removed, and thus two points are contiguous in the line, and so the line is composed of points.—The same argument could be applied to time, if one removed the last instant.

45 [Objections against the aforesaid] Arguments to the contrary: One cannot think of a line without an end, according to *Metaphysics* II:⁵⁸ “We cannot think of a line unless we make a stop.”

46 Also, according to *Posterior Analytics* I:⁵⁹ “Those things are predicated according to the first mode of *per se* predication that are in their subject according to its essential or quidditative nature, as line belongs to triangle and point to line, for the very being or substance of triangle and point are composed of these.” But such [an attribute as a point] cannot be separated from the thing, while the thing continues to exist, for then it would be a line and not be a line.

⁵⁶Cf. Peter John Olivi, *Summa* II q. 3 ad 11 (BFS IV 71-72): “Quod autem dicitur quod essentiam puncti potest Deus separare ab essentia partium lineae, cum sint realiter diversae: ad hoc quidam dicunt quod punctus penitus nihil reale dicit nisi solum privationem partium ultimarum; alii vero dicunt quod etsi dicat aliquid positivum, non tamen dicit aliquid quasi extrinsecum ab essentia lineae et partium eius”; *Summa* II q. 3 append. ad 8 (BFS IV 85): “Ad octavum: quod nulla forma extensa et continua potest aliquo modo habere aliquam partem indivisibilem seu punctalem, quia omnis pars quanti et extensi et continui est quanta et extensa et continua”.

⁵⁷Cf. supra, n. 21.

⁵⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 24-25.

⁵⁹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 4, 73a 35-40.

47 Also, at the beginning of [Euclid's Elements of] Geometry [Def. 2]:⁶⁰ "A line is a length without width whose extremities are two points."

48 Also, *Physics* III⁶¹ makes "bounded by a surface" to pertain to the very notion of what a body is, and line to pertain to the definition of a surface, and point to be essential to a line.

49 [Response to these objections] To the first of these reasons⁶² that a terminus or end pertains to the very notion of a continuum, one must say that to the extent that it is included in the definition, to that extent it pertains to the essence thereof, namely, that it functions as an end, and not in the sense that a line is a point, but that it is terminated by points.

50 By means of this qualification, the answer to the other arguments⁶³ is clear, because none of these concerns the continuum considered absolutely, but only as ended.

[B.—ON INFINITE MAGNITUDE]

51 [8] As for the infinite taken contrarily know that it cannot exist actually in magnitude according to what the Philosopher has in mind in *Physics* III and *De caelo et mundo* I⁶⁴ where he argued about light and heavy bodies and the circular [planets] with many arguments, because the very notion of a body implies termination by a surface, and thus with other magnitudes.

52 But the question remains: Can there be a potential infinity here?

⁶⁰Euclid, *Elementa* I, nn. 2-3, def. 2-3, ed. H. Busard, p. 31.

⁶¹Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 5, 204b 7-9; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Physica* V, lect. 5, n. 2 (II, 244b): "Ultima autem corporum sunt superficies, et ultima superficierum sunt linea, et ultima linearum sunt puncta."

⁶²Cf. *supra*, n. 45.

⁶³Cf. *supra*, n. 46-48.

⁶⁴Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 5, 204a 20-29; *De caelo et mundo* I, ch. 6, 273a 7-274a 18.

It must be said, according to the Philosopher that there cannot be such according to *Physics* III:⁶⁵ “Any magnitude that can exist potentially can exist actually.”

[1.—THE FIRST EXPLANATION OF ARISTOTLE’S STATEMENT]

53 This proposition can be explained in two ways: First, because the potency of magnitude to be increased is a potency to form and to being a whole, whereas potency to division is a potentiality to matter and imperfection and to parts. But it pertains to form to terminate and to matter to be infinite and not to end. Therefore, a line can be as great in actuality as in potency, but it cannot be as small in actuality as it can in potency.

54 To the contrary: [If this be so] then an increasing number would run towards form, because it would tend towards some species of number, whereas divided number would tend towards unity and matter. Therefore, a number could be as great in potency as it could in actuality, which militates against the opinion of the Philosopher,⁶⁶ who admits this to be true of magnitude, but not of number.

[2.—THE SECOND EXPLANATION OF ARISTOTLE’S STATEMENT]

55 Another way of explaining this proposition: Although potency to one form can be reduced to act, still a potency to several, as is the case with a potentiality to be divided in magnitude, cannot be reduced to act, because it is not one potency nor is it a potency towards one. The potency of number to be divided is a potency towards one, whereas its potency to be augmented is a potency to several. The converse holds for magnitude.

56 To the contrary: Just as an augmented magnitude is one magnitude, and therefore there can be as much in act as in potency, so too with numbers, a number which has been increased is also one number.

⁶⁵Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 7, 207b 17-18.

⁶⁶Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 7, 207b 1-21.

57 And if you say that it is always another species of number by the addition of one unity, in the same way if the magnitude of a certain cube is increased until it has the size of three cubes, there will be a variation of the species as the size increases, just as is the case with numbers.

58 Also, this response does not exclude contiguous quantity from being infinite, since from such contiguous entities a continuum does not arise any more than it does with numbers.

[3.— THE THIRD EXPLANATION OF ARISTOTLE'S STATEMENT]

59 Therefore there is another explanation, because the Philosopher says⁶⁷ that "the infinite by addition comes about in a way inverse to that by way of division," because magnitude cannot be increased except by adding to it from another magnitude that has been divided. If the magnitude of a foot be divided and added to another magnitude of a foot, it will never exceed a magnitude of two feet. Nor does the Philosopher think any differently about magnitude.

[C.—MAGNITUDE OF PERFECTION]

60 As for the magnitude of perfection, where the greater is what is better, there is no infinity negatively in such, because perhaps each grade is divisible. Neither can the infinite in a privative sense be there, because there is not some grade that can be terminated that is not actually ended. But whether there is a potential infinity of contrariety is open to question, for according to the Philosopher⁶⁸ such an infinity exists nowhere but in number, and there only potentially. In actuality, however, it only exists in God and not in effects.

⁶⁷Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 6, 206b 3-16.

⁶⁸Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 7, 207b 1-10.

[II. A.—REPLY TO QUESTION 4]

61 [9] [First way of arguing] To the first question,⁶⁹ with this in mind, [one can say that] infinity in a transferred sense exists in causes, because it is present in the first efficient cause. However, also accidentally ordered causes can be infinite in number, but not existing all at once, but successively. But in the case of causes differing according to species (that is, essentially ordered causes) there is neither simultaneous nor successive infinity, because no cause qua caused is ultimate, since the ultimate produces nothing. Every cause acting in virtue of another is not the first cause. But if all of them were infinite, each of them would act in virtue of another. Therefore, none would be first or last, but all would be mediate causes. Now all mediate causes taken simultaneously have their causality from some one cause. But this one cause would not be one of the mediate causes, for then the same thing would be a cause of itself. Hence, there will be some first cause which is the cause of all of them. Otherwise, the totality of mediate causes would not be caused.

62 To the contrary: There is an inconsistency in this answer,⁷⁰ because the same would apply to accidentally ordered causes and to other sorts, on the following grounds. Let us take all the fathers who beget; if they are infinite in number, then all are mediate causes, and if they are such, then the causality of all of them will depend upon some one cause that is not one of them, for if it were, one and the same would be a cause of itself. And the same argument would be applicable as with causes that are ordered *per se*.

63 Also, the Commentator⁷¹ explains "an infinite series" [in Aristotle's remark: "the causes of things are neither an infinite series nor infinitely various in kind," ch. 2, 994a1-2] in this way: "By 'infinite series,' perhaps, he means those causes which are of the same kind, as man from man." But causes of this sort are accidentally ordered and, nevertheless, he [Averroes] assumes that causes ordered in this way that are of the same species are finite,

⁶⁹That is, to the fourth question of this book, cf. *supra*, nn. 1-3.

⁷⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 61.

⁷¹Averroes, *Metaphysica* II, com. 5, fol. 15ra.

and afterwards he says that causes that are accidentally ordered are infinite, and thus he seems to affirm contradictories.

64 [10] Also, if there were an infinite procession of accidentally ordered causes, they would be infinite in number, and the species of number are essentially ordered; therefore, in such there would be an infinity.

65 Also, I prove the argument⁷² is a begging of the question, because it assumes in the antecedent of the minor that all causes are mediate; therefore, it presupposes a first and a last; otherwise it would be assuming a middle without extremes.

66 Also, it assumes⁷³ that all mediate causes would have some [single] other cause.—But I say they would not, but each would be caused by another. But it does not follow that because each is caused by another, that all are caused [by some other]. But this is a fallacy of figure of speech, where the singular is changed to the plural.

67 [A second way of arguing] Hence, the reason given in the text⁷⁴ of the solution of the question is reformulated [in this way]. The causality of each of the mediate causes is from some one cause, because the causality of any mediate cause stems from something that is essentially prior. No cause is prior essentially unless some cause is essentially first, because “prior⁷⁵ is what is closer to the beginning”; therefore, no cause can have any causality unless some first cause exists from which all have their causality.

68 Against this argument: In time and motion prior and posterior obtain, but nothing there is prior in an unqualified sense.

69 To this objection, the Philosopher replies in *Metaphysics* V in the chapter “On the Prior and Posterior”⁷⁶ that there is no prior or posterior, unless we assign it; in other cases, however, something is first in an unqualified sense.

⁷²Cf. supra, n. 61.

⁷³Cf. supra, n. 61.

⁷⁴Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 11-19.

⁷⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 11, 1018b 9-11.

⁷⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 11, 1018b 9-1019a 14.

70 Because this second way of arguing⁷⁷ can in some way salvage the first way of arguing⁷⁸ (which is that of the Commentator), one ought to answer those arguments directed against the first way.

71 [11] Against the first,⁷⁹ this inference holds: "If all causes are mediate, then the causality of all stems from some one cause," but only if the causes are essentially ordered. In accidentally ordered causes, the implication is not valid. Evidence for this answer is found in the second⁸⁰ [or reformulated interpretation of Aristotle's text], for an essential order requires that the causality of all [such] stems from some one first [cause].

72 To the other argument⁸¹ based upon the Commentator's second explanation, [note that] it does not express the mind of the Philosopher; he [Averroes] gives two explanations, since perhaps you will not approve of the first of these.

73 To the third,⁸² one must say that it does not follow that there is an infinity in numbers, except potentially,—not in actuality.

74 To the other,⁸³ in the antecedent all the causes are assumed to be mediate in a negative sense that one denies of them that any is either first or last; hence, there is no assumption that there is an infinity of mediate causes in a positive sense, as would be the case if some cause were simply first and some simply last, in comparison to which the rest are said to be intermediate; but he takes it negatively by simply denying that there is a first and a last.

75 As for the last,⁸⁴ though the form of arguing is invalid, "the totality is not caused; therefore, some is not caused," the argument holds in virtue of the matter. For if the totality [of mediate causes] is not from one first cause, then there would not be some one first cause of all, nor among them would there be one which was essentially prior to the other, and thus none would be the [essential] cause of any other.

⁷⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 67.

⁷⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 61.

⁷⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 62.

⁸⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 67.

⁸¹Cf. *supra*, n. 63.

⁸²Cf. *supra*, n. 64.

⁸³Cf. *supra*, n. 65.

⁸⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 66.

[B.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS OF QUESTION 4]

76[12] To the first argument:⁸⁵ according to the mind of the Philosopher, accidentally ordered causes are infinite successively, assuming generation is perpetual. This is not true of material causes, however, for there are only as many material causes as there are actually existing effects at any one time, for the same matter is involved in those things produced successively.

77 To the contrary: according to *Metaphysics* VII:⁸⁶ “This is distinct from that which generates it, because the matter is distinct;” therefore, in diverse products there will be diverse matter.—Reply: what generates and what is generated coexist, so that the matter in each is different, as this objection proves; but this is not so in the case of what is generated and what has perished.

78 To the other:⁸⁷ [the claim that an infinity of intermediaries is possible between infinitely distant extremes] is true of distance in a proper sense, namely, that which falls into the category of dimensional quantity; it does not hold good of the distance ascribed to perfection, as is clear from the case of contraries which are maximally distant from each other, yet there are some contraries where no medium intervenes.

Or one could concede that if there were an infinity of agent causes, they could not bridge the distance between extremes [i.e. between the perfection of the first cause and an infinity of secondary causes]. Neither does the argument prove anything more, for whenever an infinite distance intervenes, no matter how many intermediates there may be, they never reach to the other extreme.

79 [Objections to this reply] On the contrary: if this were so, then there could be another and yet another intermediary, and if so ad infinitum.—Also, the Philosopher in Bk. I of the *Physics*⁸⁸ in arguing against Melissus, says that both finite and infinite in act are characteristics of quantity.

⁸⁵Cf. supra, n. 1.

⁸⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 8, 1034a 4-8.

⁸⁷Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁸⁸Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 2, 185a 32-185b 5.

[C.— A LATER SOLUTION TO THE FOURTH QUESTION
ABOUT CAUSES PER SE AND CAUSES ORDERED PER SE]

80 [13] {{For a fuller explanation⁸⁹ of the answer to this question, you must keep in mind the following. It is one thing to speak of *per se* causes and quite another of causes that are ordered *per se*.

81 *Per se* causes are those which cause by reason of their own nature and not in virtue of something incidental to them, so that in speaking of such there is a biunique comparison [i.e. of one cause to one effect].

82 Causes ordered *per se* are so-called with respect to some one effect caused by both. A triple difference sets such causes apart from those which are accidentally ordered.

The first is that with causes ordered *per se*, the second cause depends upon the first cause for the very nature of its causality, whereas accidentally ordered causes do not, although they are dependent regarding something else.

83 The second difference is that the essential nature of their respective causalities is different in causes ordered *per se*, whereas accidentally ordered have the same sort of causality.—This second difference follows from the first. And for this reason, causes ordered *per se* are said to be of different species, whereas accidentally ordered causes are said to be of the same species. But this need not be the case, because a diverse way of having the same specific form, perhaps, may suffice for having causes that are ordered *per se*. Just as fire has heat and other things have it as well.

84 The third difference follows from the second, namely, that all the *per se* ordered causes must of necessity cause the effect at the same time, for otherwise some proper aspect of causality would be lacking for the effect. In accidentally ordered causes one cause suffices to produce the effect.

85 And from this it follows that if there were an infinity of *per se* ordered causes, they would of necessity all be in act and all at the

⁸⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 47-51 (II, 153-155); *ibid.*, *Lectura* I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 45-48 (XVI, 127-128).

same time. An infinity of causes ordered accidentally, if such exists, need only exist successively, because it is never necessary that many causes coexist as such for the production of the effect.

86 [14] From this it is apparent why an infinity is not incompatible with the notion of accidentally ordered causes causing in this way, although an infinity may be repugnant to them, perhaps, for other reasons. But infinity is repugnant to causes ordered *per se*, because of the way they cause. There are two ways of showing this,⁹⁰ the first of which is in accord with what Aristotle says in the text.⁹¹ It runs this way: (a) Of all the intermediate causes having a first and last there must be something first which is the cause of all; (b) therefore, of all intermediate causes there must be something first which is their cause; (c) but if the causes were infinite, all would be intermediate; therefore, for all of these there must be some one first cause. So far on this hypothesis there is an ostensive deduction of the proposed thesis.⁹²

87 But from the same hypothesis a *reductio ad absurdum* follows by concluding the opposite of the consequent, and hence, inferring the opposite of the antecedent, which is done in this way.⁹³ If the causes are infinite, none is first, wherefore no cause will be intermediate, and thus there would be no cause at all. Thus, in the minor "intermediate" is taken negatively in the sense that a first and a last is negated; in the first proposition "intermediate" is understood in the sense that there is a first and a last cause; and if it were taken in this sense in the minor premise, it would be false. But if one leaves "intermediate" indeterminate, we seem to have four terms. For this reason one may argue, as is done here, namely, that the proposition about the intermediate causes be antecedent to the major, because as will shortly be proved and has been proved, in all ordered causes it is true, what he [the Philosopher] accepts in the antecedent.

88 One must keep in mind, however, that he intends that an infinity of causes thus ordered in some way includes a contradiction,

⁹⁰Cf. *infra*, n. 92.

⁹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 11-13.

⁹²Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 2, p. 1, qq. 1-2, nn. 49-51 (XVI, 128-130); *Ordinatio* I, d. 2, p. 1 q. 1-2 nn. 52-53 (II, 156-159).

⁹³Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 17-19.

for it is from this order that a primacy follows, as he admits in the antecedent of the major, which he himself proposes; and he adds a minor about infinites,⁹⁴ and is silent about the conclusion that follows from these. But from an infinity, it follows that nothing is first, and if to this you add the fact of order it follows that no cause whatsoever exists. And this he infers when he says:⁹⁵ “For, if [there is no first, there is no cause at all].” But the whole force of this argument consists in this that just as where there are intermediates, i.e. causes that are caused (for he is speaking in this way) which have a first and a last, there a first exists which is the cause of all the intermediates, and thus it is universally true of all the intermediary causes, that is, the causes that are caused, that there has to be one first being which is causing. Or one can put it even more briefly, with less concern about the text of Aristotle, that the whole force of this lies in this proposition: “There is some one first thing which is the cause of all the causes which are themselves caused,” which proposition would be denied by assuming an infinity. For in such a case, there would always be some cause for each and every cause, but not one that is the cause of all the caused causes.

89 [15] The proposition is proved in this way. To cause is a pure perfection; but every caused cause possesses causing imperfectly, because qua caused it depends upon another; therefore, this [perfection]⁹⁶ will exist in something without any imperfection (for whatever is purely and simply perfection, if it exists in something imperfectly, it stems from something which is perfect in this respect). But that in which causation exists without some imperfection is not caused, for then it would be dependent. Therefore, this cause is first.

90 This same proposition is confirmed also by the following which he adds later:⁹⁷ “The prior is closer to the beginning, and thus is more perfect the closer it is to the most perfect.” If then some one of these caused causes would be prior and more perfect than another, therefore, some one will be first.

⁹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 17.

⁹⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a18.

⁹⁶Namely, to cause in an unqualified sense, i.e. without imperfection.

⁹⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 11, 1018b 9-11; cf. *supra*, n. 67.

91 But neither the prior proof nor this confirmation is taken from the text of Aristotle, but from another source, to prove this proposition on which the whole of his argument rests.

92 Another way to argue for this same proposition: It is reasonable to suppose that no thinkable degree of perfection pure and simple is impossible in the universe. To cause perfectly without dependence and without being caused is a thinkable degree of perfection pure and simple; therefore, it is not impossible in the universe. But if it does not exist, it is impossible, because whatever does not exist but is possible, can be caused; therefore, if such a degree is possible, it exists.

93 Also, a cause of infinite perfection in causing is completely independent in causing, and thus is first. But if there are infinite essentially ordered causes, there is one of infinite perfection in causing. Therefore, it is independent and first in causing. Proof of the minor: the superior cause in *per se* ordered causes is always of greater perfection in causing. Therefore, what is infinitely superior in essentially ordered causes is of infinitely greater perfection in causing. But on this hypothesis there is some cause that is infinitely superior to any given [superior cause], and in this way, therefore, one assumes both an infinity and a first.

94 [16] Keep in mind that every *per se* cause is ordered *per se* to its effect, because a *per se* cause is prior *per se* and what is prior *per se* is *per se* ordered. But if it happened that such an effect be a cause (for it would be a cause if it were uncaused), then its cause would not be ordered *per se* to its effect qua cause; and thus it and its cause would not be causes that are *per se* ordered, because they would not be ordered qua causes, even though they are ordered *per se* qua cause and effect. But whether it be caused by something or not, if it depended qua *per se* cause upon some cause, for instance, because it is an instrument and it depends upon a principal cause, then these would be called *per se* ordered causes, since they are ordered in their causing and together form one sufficient cause.

95 From this the first difference above [n. 82] is clear; similarly, the second.⁹⁸ For, if the same notion of causality were in each,

⁹⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 82-83.

whether it be numerically the same, as in the divine, or specifically the same, as in creatures, and they would cause the same effect, then they would be ordered accidentally or else they would not be ordered at all. They would then form one cause, however, because order pertains to what is prior and posterior; therefore, an order in causing pertains to what is prior [and posterior in causing]. Thus, [from the fact they form one cause] the third difference is evident [viz. simultaneity].⁹⁹

96 There is still another difference in *per se* ordered causes. The prior possesses its order [of priority] with respect to the entire species of posterior causes, or at least with respect to the whole manner in which they have their form. According to the second difference,¹⁰⁰ in accidentally ordered causes, however, the prior possesses this order [of priority] only with respect to the individual produced by it, in which individual the two ideas of cause and being caused by this cause are only accidentally conjoined.

97 Also, in accidentally ordered causes, one has power in something in which another has no power (because it can not produce itself which the other could have), though it has power in something similar. In *per se* [causes this is] not the case. The *per se* order has to do with natures, whereas the accidental order has to do with individuals.

98 [Objections to the aforesaid] Against this [n. 96]: of nothing qua cause is any cause [*per se*] the cause of another, for then any cause would be the cause of everything [below it] and some cause would be the cause of everything qua cause. Therefore, every cause is only accidentally the cause of a cause, namely in so far as the aspect of cause and being caused are conjoined only accidentally.

99 Also [viz. n. 97], therefore, in an accidental order, the formal principle by which it is a cause is not the nature, but the individual principle.

100 Also, the order of *per se* causes is an order of things causing *per se*—"acts belong to singulars."¹⁰¹

⁹⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 84.

¹⁰⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 83.

¹⁰¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 17.

101 [Reply to these objections] To the first [n. 98]: causes are said to be ordered, not because one is the cause of the other, as the argument proves, but because one, not qua cause in general, but qua this sort of cause, is prior to another cause qua that sort of cause, so that the priority and posteriority qualify the causality *per se*. This is not the case with cause and effect.}}

[III.—REPLY TO QUESTION 5]

102 The answer to the question [viz. Can one proceed to infinity in effects so that there exists an actual infinity?] was given above.¹⁰²

103 [17] To the first argument at the beginning,¹⁰³ the infinite is not repugnant to quantity in general, though it is repugnant to every species of quantity.

104 Against this, although this rule does not hold “Whatever is repugnant to the antecedent, is repugnant to the consequent,” nevertheless, whatever is repugnant to every instantiation of the antecedent, is repugnant to the consequent. Proof of this: everything repugnant to anything is so because of something else present there, just as a negative proposition is true because of some true affirmative proposition. If then something is repugnant to several things, the reason is because of something in these many things; but nothing is present in every species of quantity except quantity, which is a generic notion.—Also, what is in many things univocally, is something present in them through something first in them, of which genus is [predicated] primarily.

105 Therefore, it is said that “finite in act” is not a difference of quantity, but is coextensive with quantity. But finite and infinite in potency are differences of quantity.

106 To that claim of *Physics* I¹⁰⁴ that finite and infinite are congruent with quantity, it is countered that [Aristotle] is speaking here according to the mind of Melissus, who assumes that both the finite and infinite can actually exist, whereas the truth of the

¹⁰²Cf. *supra*, nn. 18-60.

¹⁰³Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

¹⁰⁴Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 2, 185a 32-b 5; cf. *supra*, n. 79.

matter is that infinite is not a difference of quantity in act but in potency.

107 {{Against this, the Commentator says in *Physics* I¹⁰⁵ that “quantity is the category to which the infinite pertains.” He proves this from its definition, because the infinite is a quantity that is not limited. But neither of these would be true of the infinite in act—which is only what we are speaking of here—if “infinite” were repugnant to the category of quantity.

108 Likewise, finite in potency is compatible with infinite in potency; therefore, these two are not differences of quantity. Proof for the antecedent: finite in act is compatible with infinite in potency; and it follows: “Finite in act, therefore, finite in potency,” ergo etc.

109 [18] To the first argument, against the objector,¹⁰⁶ it suffices to interpret it according to him, because no inconsistency follows in this case, except from what is said “according to Melissus.” If something were infinite as he assumed, i.e. an actual extension without limits, it would pertain to quantity and thus he would have to admit that it was quantity, and if such, also an [infinite] substance as its subject. Thus he would have to admit many things which militate against him, and this was Aristotle’s intention there.¹⁰⁷ And so the answer to the argument is clear.

110 And thus one would answer the first remark of the Commentator that according to Melissus, quantity would be a genus, i.e. common to finite and infinite, if things were as Melissus assumed.

And to what he says about the definition [as a proof of the statement that “quantity is the category of the infinite,”¹⁰⁸ the reply is to be found in *Posterior Analytics* II,¹⁰⁹ namely that there is a twofold definition of a thing, [1] that of its essence or quiddity, and [2] that which explains the meaning of the name. The second is what pertains to non-entities and impossibles and incompatibles, and the aforesaid definition of infinite is of this sort. But what is

¹⁰⁵Averroes, *Physics* I, com. 15, fol. 7rb.

¹⁰⁶Cf. supra, n. 107.

¹⁰⁷Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 2, 185b 2-3.

¹⁰⁸Cf. supra, n. 107.

¹⁰⁹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* II, ch. 7, 92b 26-28.

defined by such can be repugnant to both sorts of definitions, when it includes the opposite of what the definition assigns to it.

111 As to what is said about the “potentially infinite” [“The infinite, then, is that whose quantity is such that no matter how much has been taken, there is always more one can take,” (cf. *supra* n. 9)],¹¹⁰ one can say that the potentially finite means that whose quantity is such that howsoever much is taken, it is not the case that there is always more for the taking. This, for instance, is the case with a triad. And under this aspect [“potentially finite”] is opposed to “potentially infinite” and finite in potency does not follow from finite in act.}}

112 To the other argument about the line,¹¹¹ [one could admit] that although whiteness would be of infinite extension, it would still fall under the category of whiteness as whiteness does at present. Similarly, if a line were infinite, it would still be a line, for it would not be intensively infinite [or an all perfect being], and therefore, the notion of a line would pertain to it.

113 [Objection] On the contrary, it is against the very notion of a line that it lacks boundaries, because to have termini is something essential to a line, so that if it were without boundaries the notion of being a line would be foreign to it, since that combination [“infinite line”] would include incompatible notes, namely “termination” and “no termination.”

114 [19] Another answer must be given which does not blame the definition “because it is a line,” for one can never blame a definition because it does not pertain to something that cannot fall under the defined without assuming inconsistencies. One should say “It is because it is a straight line,” since it is the notion of being straight qua line that is inconsistent with infinity. Whereas “straight” as such is not opposed to infinity, although it is because of the nature of being a line that falls under straightness which introduces the inconsistency. But in the definition of “straight”—as presented there—is placed “whose middle does not exceed the ends,” as if straightness essentially implied finitude.

¹¹⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 108, n. 9; Aristotle, *Physics* III, ch. 6, 206b 33-207a 2.

¹¹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

115 To the other,¹¹² it must be said that in the same book¹¹³ he says the opposite, namely “All complex things formed by nature will have a definite quantity of size and growth,” and because of this the meaning of the Philosopher is that fire does not act mainly by increasing in size, since augmentation proceeds to a definite size or to a determinate quantity which pertains as such to such a species. But fire does not grow in this way, but goes on without any definite limit. But it never reaches an infinite size.

116 The second reply to the argument about souls¹¹⁴ confirms this, because in all things other than God, actual infinity includes a contradiction. From possibles and compossibles, however, a contradiction or impossibility never follows. But, according to everyone, it is possible for number to be potentially infinite, and for souls to remain in existence is possible, and the two are compatible with each other, because what is necessary is incompatible with nothing except the impossible. But for a number to be infinite in potency and for a soul to remain forever is possible; therefore a number to be infinite in potency is compatible with this possible of a soul remaining forever. Therefore, from the following “a soul remains forever” and “the number of souls is infinite in potency” actual infinity does not follow.

117 Also, infinity in potency consists in taking no more than several at a time, whereas infinity in act consists in taking so many that several more cannot be added to it, for otherwise something infinite in act could be exceeded and so would be finite. But this does not follow: “Souls have been so many that several more could not be added; therefore, at present so many exist that several more cannot be added,” because in addition to all those which now exist, God could create one more and add it to these. Therefore, before he did this, there were not so many that several could not be added.

118 [20] [[Objection] On the contrary: if the souls were those of an infinite number of deceased men, now they are actually coexisting together, and then they are either actually finite or actually infinite. If they are infinite, our thesis is granted; if they are

¹¹²Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

¹¹³Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 4, 416a 16-17.

¹¹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 32.

finite, then by taking one after another we come to a last one, and thus they are not infinite [taking one by one].—The same argument applies to the future in this way. All future things if they coexisted would be actually infinite, but all will be together. Therefore, they will be actually infinite.

119 Proof of the first statement. They would not be actually finite, because then at some future time all would be taken. Proof of the second statement. The future will come to be. The predicate of this proposition is included in the subject.}}¹¹⁵

120 To the other argument about this proposition,¹¹⁶ “What could not have been made, could not have come into existence.” This is true of what can be made in one production [i.e. this is true of what can be made at one time] but not of infinities which have a potentially infinite limit where these two notions must always be compatible: “One production has been made,” “Another is necessarily still possible.” But now with whatever has been divided up, it is necessarily the case that there is a possibility of another division, because both of these notions holds for whatever has been divided, viz. [a] what has been divided is a whole, and [b] each of these parts is necessarily a continuum, and thus necessarily in potency to further division.

121 {[[Objection] To the contrary: when every singular instantiation of some universal is possible and each such is compatible with each compossible, then this universal is possible. Now it is possible that a continuum be divided according to this boundary mark [i.e. at this point], and this is true of each component of this continuum. Also, each of these individual parts is compossible with any other,

¹¹⁵Here follows an annotation in the Cambridge Peterhouse manuscript: “It seems that the following implication must be denied ‘If the souls of an infinite number of bygone men are actually finite, therefore by taking one after the other one would finally arrive at a last one’. Because by taking one after the other they are infinite, because they are infinite in potency. Hence by taking them in this fashion one never arrives at a last, and by taking them all together they are actually finite. -- To the contrary: whatever is repugnant to the consequent is repugnant to the antecedent; but to be finite in potency follows from being finite in act; therefore whatever is repugnant to what is finite in potency, is likewise repugnant to that which is finite in act. But to be infinite in potency is repugnant to that which is finite in potency; therefore it is repugnant to that which is finite in act and hence to be finite in act and infinite in potency is repugnant to one and the same thing.”

¹¹⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 7-9.

because it is possible for the continuum to be divided all at once according to any two points; therefore, etc.

122 [Reply] The Commentator seems to address himself to this in *On Generation and Corruption I*¹¹⁷ when he treats of Democritus' argument. Not all singulars are compatible, because dividing it at one point, prevents one from dividing it at another.

123 To the contrary: Either these points [of division] are separated, and then one has no influence on the other, because the continuum precludes this, or else they are immediate, and [in a continuum] there is no such thing.

124 [21] Therefore, another answer is given.¹¹⁸ In the same moment of time, it is impossible that two parts come to be simultaneously; therefore, it is impossible that all parts come to be at once, although all are simultaneously in potency to come into existence successively. But it is possible at one time that several, for instance, two or three parts of the time of day, have come to be, so it is possible to say at one time that not only each part, but all parts of the time of day have come to be,—even at the same time—although they will not have come into existence at one and the same time, nor will they all have been made simultaneously at the outset. In the division of the continuum it is simultaneously possible to divide it and that it be divided at any number of points, provided they are finite. But it is impossible that it be divided at all points, because of the reason given above.¹¹⁹

125 Therefore, as to the form of the argument¹²⁰ it is conceded that one can make a universal statement, "This continuum is divided at any point, or it has been divided at any point"—taking such individually. But it is not valid to say it is divided or has been divided at all points simultaneously, for if at present it were divided at all points, then it would exist actually under as many divisions as it could have, and thus it would exist under an infinity of divisions. And when these divisions are ended there

¹¹⁷Averroes, *De generatione et corruptione I*, com.. 9, AverL 20.

¹¹⁸Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio II*, d. 2, p. 2, q. 5, n. 354-375 (VII, 311-321).

¹¹⁹Cf. supra, n. 124.

¹²⁰Cf. supra, n. 121.

will be that many dividends, and thus it will be completely divided up.

[22] Therefore, one replies in a different way to the form of the argument,¹²¹ that no matter how many finite compossible singulars there are, other finite compossible singulars are always possible, and each of these specific singulars is compatible with any other specific singular. But nevertheless, to each singular there is some singular that is incompatible with it. But it will not be this or that specifically, because with each division it will be necessary to end with some part in which the division takes place and so at some point where now there is no division. Indeed, for every singular there is an infinity of such impossibles, for in every part there are infinite possibilities for division. In a process, as long as it continues, there must always coexist with the prior act[uality] a potentiality for what follows, and yet all such potencies have their end point. But it is not that way here [i.e. in dividing a continuum]. There [i.e. in a process], one specific part is necessarily also before another specific part, and no one coexists with the other. Here [viz. in dividing the continuum] there is no order as to which division comes before another. At any one given time, however, any individual part is subsequent to any [other], even though each is potentially infinite by reason of the part or parts into which it was divided or could be divided ad infinitum. It is in this way that one saves the statement of the Commentator¹²² that a division made at one point prevents one making a division at another, where this other is not specified but left indeterminate, but this does not prevent another division being made there.

126 To the other argument¹²³ in *On Generation and Corruption I*,¹²⁴ “everywhere a line is continuous, therefore, everywhere there is a continuing point,” I say that the inference does not hold good, but what does follow [from the antecedent] is “therefore, everywhere there is a point or a continuing part.”[pars continuata].

¹²¹Cf. supra, n. 121.

¹²²Cf. supra n. 122.

¹²³Cf. supra, n. 122.

¹²⁴Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione I*, ch. 2, 316b 1-317a 17; cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De gener. et corrup.* I lect. 5 nn. 2-6 (III 281a-283a).

127 To the contrary: if there is not a point everywhere, then either the continuum is immediately next to the point or there is something in between. Now the second is not the case. The first is not the case either, because no continuum is immediately next to any given point, because there is a part of it that is closer to that point, as is proved from *Physics* VI,¹²⁵ because no part of motion is first.

128 Against this entire answer: division is not the same as generation. Hence, it does not make something exist in actuality which was not previously in act, although it may not have been actually separated before. Therefore, as many can be by an act of division and can exist apart as were actually there before in a non-separated way. It is in this fashion that infinities are actually present in a continuum and there is an infinite number there.}}

[IV.—REPLY TO QUESTION 6

A.—THE OPINION OF THOMAS AQUINAS]

129 [23] To the third question it is said¹²⁶ that according to the mind of the Philosopher in the text,¹²⁷ the infinite cannot be understood by us. Reason proves this.

130 The proper object of our intellect is the material quiddity;¹²⁸ therefore, nothing is knowable by us except under this aspect; but the infinite is not this sort of thing.

131 Also, with one intellection we can only understand what can be grasped intellectually by means of one [intelligible] species. But the infinite is not known to us in this way; but neither can it be known by means of many species, one after another. Therefore, we cannot know the infinite in any way. Proof of the first proposition.¹²⁹ All intelligible species are forms of the same genus, and such they cannot coexist in the same subject, according to Bk. X of this work.¹³⁰ Therefore, several cannot perfect the intellect at the same time; hence, etc.

¹²⁵Aristotle, *Physics* VI, ch. 5, 236a 7-236b 18.

¹²⁶Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I, q. 86, art. 2 resp. (V, 349ab).

¹²⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 22-25.

¹²⁸Cf. *supra*, Bk. II qq. 2-3 n. 25.

¹²⁹Namely, the major premise.

¹³⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 7, 1057b 2-34.

132 Also, the infinite cannot produce one species in the intellect: every agent acts insofar as it is a being; what causes one species is one in act and as such has one form. But the infinite has no form, because it is a characteristic property of a form that it limits, whereas the infinite has no boundaries.

133 Also, it is necessary that a power be proportionate to its object; but the potency is finite in being and hence in operation; therefore, the object of the potency will also be finite necessarily.

Bk. I of *De caelo et mundo*¹³¹ confirms this. The finite cannot be moved by the infinite; but the intellect is moved by the object.

[1.— TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS ACCORDING TO THE MIND OF
THOMAS]

134 As for the first,¹³² God is not knowable qua infinite, because he is known through his effects, and no effect is adequate to him, and hence, it does not represent him qua infinite.

135 To the other,¹³³ the argument is invalid, because we also assign a name to “nothing” and yet “nothing” is not intelligible. We can give a nominal definition to something that is simply unintelligible. But we only define something that is intelligible in an unqualified sense by a definition that expresses a quiddity or essence.

136 To the other,¹³⁴ the only things that we can know are those whose species in individuals can be apprehended by sense perception.

137 As for the other,¹³⁵ there is no similarity [between what is in a place and is in the intellect], because place is the boundary of a body. In functioning as such place acts as form and the body as matter. The [intelligible] species, [however,] functions as form and the intellect as matter. But if one form could inform two things, by the same token it could inform an infinity, because the termination

¹³¹Aristotle, *De caelo et mundo* I, ch. 7, 275a 14-15.

¹³²Cf. supra, nn. 11-12.

¹³³Cf. supra, n. 13.

¹³⁴Cf. supra, n. 14.

¹³⁵Cf. supra, n. 15.

stems from the form. That is why the antecedent is impossible [that the form could inform two things]. But if matter could be perfected by two forms that are not opposed, it could not for this reason be perfected by an infinity of such, because this would imply that the matter in question has an infinite capacity.

138 Another answer: the Philosopher's inference must be understood to hold when no greater power is required for many than for a few or where impossibility is the same for a few as it is for many. It is this way in what the Philosopher proposes, because a place has the same capacity to contain all bodies; but it is not this way [with the intellect].

[2.—AGAINST THE ARGUMENTS OF THOMAS AQUINAS]

139 [24] As for those arguments about the object of the intellect [nn. 129ff], these were refuted earlier in question 3 [of this second book] against the first opinion.¹³⁶

140 The first part of the minor of the second reason¹³⁷ is refuted, because anything that can be one term of a proposition in the intellect can be understood in one simple apprehension. Proof: Only that which the intellect can first grasp by a simple act of apprehension can it combine with another notion. But it is possible to have as a term two things whose species are in the intellect, such as a gold mountain, and it can combine this with some third notion. Therefore, "gold mountain" is one term of a propositional judgment, and it is clear that "gold mountain" is not understood by a single species, since there is nothing outside the mind that is such as to cause this in the senses, and hence, not in the intellect either. Nevertheless, "gold mountain" is understood by a single simple intellection, as has been proved.

141 Also, if the reason held, it would prove equally that we cannot know several things at the same time, because everything actually known is a species in the intellect *in actu primo*. But if it were impossible to have several species simultaneously in the intellect

¹³⁶Cf. *supra*, Bk. II, qq. 3, nn. 67-75.

¹³⁷Namely, the infinite is not understood by one intelligibile species; cf. *supra*, n. 131.

in actu primo, as the reason proves, then it would be impossible to know several things simultaneously.¹³⁸ The minor is proved as was done earlier, because these species are of the same genus [and hence represent contrary states and cannot be in the intellect simultaneously]. The major is proved: I consider one conclusion by a species in act, and I know as possibilities two other conclusions habitually. So long as I do not have the species of these two there in actuality, therefore, I could acquire the species of these conclusions. But I postulate as something possible that their singulars do not exist extramentally so that they could produce a likeness in the sense, nor as a consequence, in the intellect. Either then I never understand this conclusion or else I have a species in act, just as I do of the first conclusion. But not by virtue of the phantasy or sense imagination can the species of this conclusion be abstracted, because the two cannot exist there simultaneously, according to you, any more than they do in the intellect.

142 Against the third,¹³⁹ because something finite can be understood by one species, it follows that its privation can, because the Philosopher in *Metaphysics* VII,¹⁴⁰ for “the same formula explains a thing and its privation.”

143 Against the other¹⁴¹ I ask: What sort of proportion? If it is to be numerical, none such exists; if it is one of perfection such that one taken so many times equals the whole, this does not hold good, because vision taken infinitely many times will not give us the sun, since it pertains to a different sort of a thing. But if it be the ratio of finite to infinite according to a mover-moved relationship, this is not valid, because if something were moved by something finite, the same finite thing could be moved by an infinite agent, just as the heavens could be by God, though it is now moved by an angel.

144 [25] [Refutation of the above arguments] Against the reply to the first argument:¹⁴² According to you, we could know God qua infinite through his effects; but there is a certain effect of which God as infinite is the cause, namely, creation. Also, it follows that

¹³⁸Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* II, ch. 10, 114b 34-35.

¹³⁹Cf. supra, n. 132.

¹⁴⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 2, 1046b 9.

¹⁴¹Cf. supra, n. 133.

¹⁴²Cf. supra, n. 134.

one knows the infinite qua finis or end, because every agent with an intellect knows its ultimate end qua ultimate, according to *Metaphysics* II¹⁴³ about final causes. For there it is argued that ‘if ends were infinite, there would be no agent with an intellect’, since every such agent knows the ultimate end for which it acts. But only an infinite end is ultimate. Proof: for every finite good one can think of a greater good. Therefore, if God qua ultimate end were not an infinite good, one could think of a greater good than God qua ultimate end, at least such could be thought of, and therefore, something greater than God could be for such a person an end, and thus such would exist in reality, as is clear from the argument of Anselm¹⁴⁴ that there is a greater in reality than in the intellect alone, etc.

145 Against the other,¹⁴⁵ this statement is false “An effect can lead to a knowledge of its cause only if that effect is adequate or measures up to what the cause can do.” Proof: the effect is adequate either to the first cause—which you deny—or to a secondary cause. Now this cause causes either in virtue of itself and then it is a first cause, or in virtue of some other cause, and then it is more dependent upon this other. And the effect, by an argument that is a demonstration of the simple fact, leads to a knowledge of its cause insofar as the effect depends on it. Therefore, it represents more the first cause upon which the entity of the effect is more dependent.—A similar argument is found in the solution to question 3, in Bk. II.¹⁴⁶

146[26] Against the statement¹⁴⁷ “we also assign a name to ‘nothing’ [and yet ‘nothing’ is not intelligible]”, there is what is said in *On Interpretation*:¹⁴⁸ “Spoken words are symbols of ideas, and written words are symbols of spoken words.” Also, I would not be able to conceive ‘nothing’ and ‘something’ as contradictories, if I did not understand both, even though I know one through the other.

¹⁴³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 9-17.

¹⁴⁴Anselm, *Proslogion* ch. 2, ed. Schmitt I, 101; PL 158, 228.

¹⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 134.

¹⁴⁶Cf. supra, Bk. II, qq. 3-4, nn. 27-37, 51-75.

¹⁴⁷Cf. supra, n. 135.

¹⁴⁸Aristotle, *De Interpretatione* I, ch. 1, 16a 3-4.

147 Against the other,¹⁴⁹ this inference is valid: "I say that I say nothing, therefore, I say something." Similarly, "I know I understand nothing; therefore, I understand something."

148 Also, I can know an infinite number of species of a genus.¹⁵⁰ If unity produces a species in the phantasy, I could understand an infinite number through the species of one, because through the species of one unit that of another can be understood, as Augustine says¹⁵¹ that through the species of one sun I can understand or imagine as many suns as I wish, and thus infinite units could be put together by saying "These are suited by nature to make one."

149 Against the other,¹⁵² if the inference about bodies holds, because one body is opposed to another in the same place and it is opposed to being with another body in all places, then for the same reason, if one species is not compatible with another, it is not compatible with an infinity of such.—Also, in the intellect there can be a potency for the infinite, because in matter there is a capacity for infinite real forms; therefore, in the intellect there is a capacity for infinite intentional [forms]. Proof: this unity is in potency to infinite real perfections differing from the whole, because it is in potency as part of an infinity of ordered numbers. But every part in a whole has real perfection; otherwise the whole would not be truly one. Also in this way the center is in potency to terminate an infinity of lines.

[B.—SOLUTION OF QUESTION 6]

150 [27] To the question according to what was said above, [a] it is one thing to ask about infinity in itself and [b] another about those things to which this notion applies, just as it is one thing to ask about accidental being and another about what falls under the class of accidental beings. For Aristotle proves certain things about accidental being in *Metaphysics* VI,¹⁵³ from which it follows that there can be a science about accidental being, and nevertheless, he

¹⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 135.

¹⁵⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 136.

¹⁵¹Augustine, *De Trinitate* XI, ch. 8, n. 13, PL 42, 994; CCL 50, 350.

¹⁵²Cf. *supra*, n. 137.

¹⁵³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 2, 1026a 34-1026b 23.

proves there cannot be a science about such. The first statement must be understood about the notion itself of accidental being; the second about what falls under that notion. And so it is with the question at hand.

[1.—FIRST MEMBER:
ABOUT THE NOTION OF THE INFINITE IN ITSELF]

151 If one asks about the notion of the infinite in itself, I say that in every way [i.e. negatively, privatively, contrarily; cf. supra nn. 18-20], it can be understood by us, for it is impossible to know whether something exists or does not exist in another unless we first understand what it is in a simple act of apprehension. But in every such way, we can know whether the infinite is present in something or not. But how do we grasp it? Know that it is not by means of a species proper to itself, but through a species of what we know of it, and by one intellection.¹⁵⁴

For this member some of the arguments against those at the beginning run in this direction [nn. 11-14].

[2.—SECOND MEMBER: ABOUT WHAT COMES UNDER INFINITY]

152 But whether one can understand what falls under infinity we must say that infinity can be understood to be present in something without contradiction, because there is something actually infinite in perfection, namely, God. But there cannot be an actual infinity in the magnitude of mass.¹⁵⁵ And in what is essentially ordered there cannot be either a potential or actual infinity. In accidentally ordered things a potential infinity could exist, and—according to the philosophers—actually does exist, though not all at once, but as something that could be taken [one after the other], as the infinite in time, if time had no beginning.—Privative infinity cannot be understood in the case of continuous magnitude nor of discrete things without contradiction.—Negative infinity can exist in indivisibles. Whatever, therefore, can fall without

¹⁵⁴Cf. supra, nn. 139-149.

¹⁵⁵Cf. Augustine, *De Trinitate* VI, ch. 8, n. 10, PL 42, 929; CCL 50, 238: "In his enim quae non mole magna sunt hoc est maius esse quod esse quod melius esse."

contradiction under the notion of infinity, can be understood by us under the notion of infinity, but this must not be interpreted to mean that we cannot understand that which includes a contradiction, for how would we know that certain things are contradictory? But how we do this or do not do this, look into the questions in Bk. IV of this book.¹⁵⁶

153 {{Note that the infinite as understood contrarily¹⁵⁷ of magnitude of perfection is intelligible to us. The contrarily infinite in plurality,¹⁵⁸ however, as intelligible to us could be understood to occur in two ways. Either an infinite plurality would be grasped as one object, or infinitely many would be understood by an intellection proper to each. [If it be in the first way, one has to say of it as we did of the perfectly infinite being.] Taken in the second way, this is what Aristotle had in mind—and this is certain as regards the acts of understanding that are actually infinite—either simultaneously [and this is impossible], since no power exists sufficient to have them all together, or successively, and this is how Aristotle talks. But perhaps it is not impossible that an infinity of things be understood habitually according to their proper species, not indeed as something naturally acquired, but as impressed by God, because there is no greater impossibility for more than there is for a fewer number, for according to *Physics IV*,¹⁵⁹ speaking of bodies, “where two can coexist, an infinity can coexist.” And where something has the capacity for one form of a certain kind, it has the capacity of all. Therefore, the intellect is capable of all intelligibles, nor are all forms more repugnant than two.¹⁶⁰ Of the other possibilities¹⁶¹ [i.e. those to which the notion applies] just as infinity is incompatible with something, thus to understand something as [actually] falling under infinity is to think of something under contradictory aspects, such as we think of an “irrational man.”}}

¹⁵⁶Cf. *infra*, Bk. IV, q. 3, nn. 21-27.

¹⁵⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 60.

¹⁵⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 21-50.

¹⁵⁹Aristotle, *Physics IV*, ch. 8, 216b 10-12; cf. *supra*, n. 15.

¹⁶⁰Two manuscripts have an interpolated annotation at this point: “That two species can be simultaneously in a sense [organ] is clear from Augustine, *De veritate*” (rather Anselm, *De veritate*, ch. 6 [ed. Schmitt I 183-185; PL 158, 473-475]).

¹⁶¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 151-152.

[C.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

154 [28] To the first two reasons¹⁶² we must say that they do imply something true. Wherefore, Damascene in his *Sentences*, says:¹⁶³ “This alone do we know of God, that he is infinite and incomprehensible.” And there is also Augustine’s statements in *Eighty-three Questions* q. 32.¹⁶⁴ But from this it does not follow that God is comprehended, because to have such an act, one would have to have as intensively [perfect] an intellect as there is intelligibility in such an object, so that God would have to be known insofar as he is infinite and to an infinite degree on the part of the knower.

155 To the other reasons about the definition¹⁶⁵ these prove the first member¹⁶⁶ that we can know the notion of the infinite in itself.

156 To the other¹⁶⁷ [I reply] that the notion of the infinite can be demonstrated. But of something that [actually] falls under such a notion there cannot be a demonstration.

157 To the other¹⁶⁸ this does not follow: “I know I do not understand A, therefore, I know A.” What does follow is: “Therefore, I know something.” Similarly, this is invalid: “I know I do not understand the infinite; therefore, I know the infinite.” What does follow, however, is “Therefore, I know something.”

158 To the other¹⁶⁹ “if two bodies are together,” etc. I concede that there can be *in actu primo* at one time, and even an infinity of species so far as the species go; similarly on the part of the intellect, as was proved above¹⁷⁰ about unity, and this is conceded, viz. that a passive potency can be referred to infinite perfections as the center can be the terminus of an infinity of lines, but no passive potency is in potency to infinite perfection intensively.—Similarly,

¹⁶²Cf. supra, nn. 11-12, 134, 144-145.

¹⁶³Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 4, PG 94, 800; FIP VIII, 21.

¹⁶⁴Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 32, PL 40, 22; CCL 44A, 46.

¹⁶⁵Cf. supra, nn. 13, 135, 146-147.

¹⁶⁶Cf. supra, n. 151.

¹⁶⁷Cf. supra, nn. 13, 135, 146-147.

¹⁶⁸Cf. supra, nn. 13, 135, 146-147.

¹⁶⁹Cf. supra, nn. 15, 137, 149.

¹⁷⁰Cf. supra, n. 148.

an active potency can be potent extensively with respect to infinite effects, for instance, as the sun is to infinite herbs, if generations would continue forever, but not to an infinite effect. And then an intellect could know an infinity habitually, if there were infinite species impressed in us. But the intellect could not acquire an infinity naturally, because this would imply that there would be an infinity of acts by it, which it could not have either simultaneously or successively, so that all would have passed by; and therefore, it could not have that many species. But the soul of Christ could have habitually an infinity, because God could have impressed at once infinite species.¹⁷¹

159 To the other argument¹⁷² that through a species of the unit one could understand as many units as you wish, I concede that one could know any number of such units you could arrive at by replicating the unity, but one would never arrive at an actually infinite number, because one could not replicate the unit an infinite number of times.

[D.— TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE OTHER POSITION]

[29] The arguments against the other opinion are to be conceded in part.

160 To the first,¹⁷³ however, I say that the major is false, because I can understand some things at once which do not have one species. And the minor is false, because an infinite can be known by one species of [intellectual] habit.

161 To the other¹⁷⁴ about proportion in the “contra,” I say that there is a proportion of the perfectible to perfection, and this proportion can be of the finite to the infinite.

162 To the authority of the Philosopher¹⁷⁵ that an infinity in plurality which are understood by diverse species cannot be understood by us, let us say there is a situation where an intellect

¹⁷¹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* III, d. 14, qq. 1-2 n. 13-14 (ed. Vives XIV 509b-510a).

¹⁷²Cf. *supra*, nn. 14, 136, 148.

¹⁷³Cf. *supra*, nn. 131, 140-141.

¹⁷⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 133, 143.

¹⁷⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 129, 131, 133.

would have infinite species in it, it still could not simultaneously elicit infinite operations, nor could it understand an infinity taking one item after another, because it could not go through an infinity, or if it could go through what it had, this would not be infinite. Hence, it seems that what the Philosopher had in mind was rather that one could not understand an infinite plurality where one had to take one thing after another. "For an infinite number could not be gone through,"¹⁷⁶ nor could an infinite intellect do so. But the infinite, whether it be in magnitude or a plurality—properly so called or in a transferred sense—is intelligible in itself by an intellect that both is able to comprehend it and to have the essential notion whereby it is known. And both of these are in God. But the other sort,¹⁷⁷ namely to have a species or species of the infinite in this way, or that it is possible for us, both so far as our soul and the species are concerned, this is not something we can have naturally. As for the rest, namely, to have an act that comprehends the infinite in number is not possible to us because of a defect in our intellect, since neither simultaneously nor successively can it extend to all; but as regards some, this acquisition is possible through God in a vision of him, and regarding an infinite plurality, he could have impressed upon the soul of Christ, the species of all possibles which God knows.¹⁷⁸

¹⁷⁶Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 22, 84a 2-3; *De caelo et mundo* I, c. 5, 272a 3.

¹⁷⁷Namely, an infinite multitude.

¹⁷⁸See the note at the end of n. 158.

BOOK THREE

BOOK THREE

THE ONLY QUESTION

Text of Aristotle: "But it is not possible for the genus taken apart from its species (any more than for the species of the genus) to be predicated of its proper differentiae." (*Metaphysics* III, ch. 3, 998b 25-26)

*Is the genus predicated "per se" of its proper difference?*¹

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That it is:

Man is *per se* rational [which is a proper difference]; therefore, what is rational *per se* is a man [a species]; hence, what is rational *per se* is an animal [i.e. a genus]. Proof of the first implication [i.e. that what is rational *per se* is a man]. The converse of a necessary proposition is a necessary proposition; therefore, the converse of a *per se* proposition is a *per se* proposition. Proof of the last implication [i.e. what is rational *per se* is an animal]: Because man includes animal *per se*.

2 Also, man *per se* is an animal; and man *per se* is rational; therefore, [what is rational *per se* is an animal]. Proof of the implication: As a necessary conclusion follows from necessary premises, so a *per se* conclusion follows from *per se* premises.

3 Also, Bk. VII of this work,² when something is predicated of something according to the first mode of *per se* predication, one thing is predicated of another in the abstract; therefore, these statements are true: "Humanity is rationality" and "Humanity is animality." Therefore, it follows that "Rationality is animality" and then the concrete [i.e. what is animal] is [predicated] of the concrete [what is rational] in the first mode of *per se* predication.

¹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Porph.* q. 16.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 12, 1037b 30-1038a 35.

4 Also, in an essential predication, the predicate pertains to the notion of the subject; but in Bk. V of this work, in the chapter 'On the Element',³ it says that "where the difference is present, the genus accompanies it."

5 Also, if it were predicated accidentally of the difference, it would be also predicated accidentally of the species. — Proof: for when anything is predicated of something accidentally, it is predicated accidentally of everything which is understood to be formally under that notion; but the species is understood to be formally under the notion of the difference; therefore, etc.

6 [2] To the contrary:

If the genus were [predicated *per se*], then one animal would be many animals,⁴ because if the genus is in the notion of the difference, and animal is given in the definition with the difference, then either the same animal would be implied through the genus and also through the difference, and there will be a redundancy, because you give the notion of animal for animal; [where] animal is an animated sensible substance, and the notion of rational for rational, and the redundancy will be evident. If there is another animal, then man will be two animals.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

7 To this Avicenna replies in Bk. V of his *Metaphysics* ch. 3,⁵ that although the genus and the difference are predicated of the whole *per se*, they do not signify the whole *per se*, but the genus signifies the material aspect, and the difference the formal aspect; but both signify a part of the species after the manner of a whole, and as the material lies outside the formal, so the concept of the genus is outside that of the difference.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 3, 1014b 12-13.

⁴Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* VI, ch. 6, 144a 36-37.

⁵Avicenna, *Metaphysica* V, ch. 3, AvI L 250-253.

[II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

8 To the first,⁶ the first conversion [i.e. man is *per se* rational, therefore what is rational *per se* is a man] is invalid, but there is a fallacy of the consequent. Why? Because the higher [i.e. more comprehensive] notion [i.e. rational] does not have any reason why the lower [i.e. man] is in it. For in a subject there can be a reason why the predicate inheres in it, whereas there is no reason in the predicate why the subject inheres in it.—As for the proof, the inference is not valid, because the antecedent cannot be true necessarily, unless the consequent is also, because otherwise it [i.e. the antecedent] could be true without the consequent. However, the antecedent could have a reason why the predicate or consequent is in it, although the reverse is not true. Otherwise a universal affirmative proposition could be converted simply, because “*per se*” presupposes it is predicated “of all.”

9 Similarly, to the second:⁷ Only what is necessary can follow from necessary premises; otherwise, the premises could be true without the conclusion being true; but from what is *per se* something accidental can follow [i.e. a proper accident], when such is necessary.

10 To the contrary: according to Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*,⁸ if it is an accidental conclusion, it is not necessary.—Reply: this is true of [proper] accidents compared to their subject, of which he is speaking, because he speaks of the conclusion of a demonstration.—On the contrary: it is proved there that a demonstration has to be from *per se* [premises]; therefore it is speaking of first premises.

11 To the other,⁹ the premises are false, namely “Humanity is animality,” and the other¹⁰ is likewise false. To the proof:

⁶Cf. supra, n. 1.

⁷Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 71b 9-12; *ibid.* I, ch. 6, 74b 5-12: “Si igitur est demonstrativa scientia ex necessariis principiis; quod enim scit, non potest se habere aliter... omne autem aut sic est aut secundum accidens, accidentia autem non necessaria sunt”; *ibid.* ch. 6, 75a 18-21; *ibid.* ch. 6, 75a 30-33.

⁹Cf. supra, n. 3.

¹⁰Namely, the other premise: “Humanity is rationality.”

abstraction is twofold and concretion is twofold, one refers to the subject, the other to the supposit [or individual].¹¹ The first way¹² occurs when something denominates something else outside its essence. Concretion involving the supposit is when something signifies denominatively something proper to its nature, such as “This whiteness is whiteness.”¹³ It is this way with the twofold abstraction.¹⁴ To the form: it is true of what is concrete and abstract in the second way, and the reason is because in predication of the first mode, there is a predication of the notion of the quiddity. If the predicate is included in the quiddity of the subject, therefore, in whatever way one prescind[s] [i.e. abstracts], it is still part of what is meant by the subject. But if it is concrete in relation to the subject, the subject is outside.

12 [3] But in the second concretion,¹⁵ the predicate is only the same as the subject because it signifies after the manner of the whole. In

¹¹Cf. *infra* lib. VII, q. 17, n. 22: “Vel aliter: quod est concretio duplex; quaedam enim forma concernit suppositum quod est eiusdem naturae concretae et in eodem genere; et est alia concretio ad subiectum quod non est eiusdem naturae. Et per hoc, abstractio duplex: scilicet a supposito, sicut humanitas; et alia a subiecto, sicut albedo. In proposito est abstractio, non solum a subiecto alterius naturae, sed a supposito propriae naturae”; Note what John Foxal says in his commentary on Scotus’s *Questions on Porphyry* (Venice 1499 f. 63va-vb): “Here, in his response (*Porph. q. 16 n. 39-41*) the Doctor distinguishes a twofold concrete and a twofold abstract, and these distinctions are excellent and very necessary for all truth; and through them [the distinctions] corrections need to be made concerning comparable distinctions made by him in III *Metaphysics* as noted by Antonius Andreae in book III of his *Metaphysics*.”

¹²Namely, concretion to the subject.

¹³Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* III, q. 2 (f. 16va): “Exemplum primi: album quod denominat subiectum; exemplum secundi, ut haec albedo est albedo.”

¹⁴Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* III, q. 2 (f. 16va): “Similarly, there is a corresponding double abstraction: one from the subject, the other from the supposit [or individual] proper. An example of the first: when whiteness is abstracted from a man. An example of the second: when whiteness is abstracted from this whiteness and man from this man. To the form of the argument therefore I say that the dictum of the Philosopher in Bk. VII of this work, is true of concrete and abstract things in the second mode, but not in the first. Hence, if this is true, ‘This man is man,’ this is true, ‘This humanity is humanity.’ But it is not this way in concrete and abstract things in the first way. For this does not follow ‘If man is white, therefore humanity is whiteness.’ The reason for this is that in *per se* predication in the first mode, we have predication by reason of its quidity. However, when the predicate is within the quiddity of the subject, prescind[ing] from everything else, it is still pertains to what is understood of the subject. But if it is concrete to the subject, the subject is outside, nor is the predicate of the subject.”

¹⁵Namely, to the supposit.

the abstraction, this mode is removed. Hence, I say that here there is not the same predicate of the subject unless it be because of the supposit which is denominated by both, because the predicate asserts the form [or nature], not the supposit.

13 To the other,¹⁶ that the consequent is not always part of the meaning of the subject or the antecedent, although it is in the case of an essential implication. Otherwise, what the Philosopher says about "where the difference is present, the genus accompanies it," this is the species. Where the difference is present, likewise the individual. And the genus is predicated of the individual and the species *per se*, but it does not follow the difference *per se*.

14 To the other,¹⁷ I deny the implication. To the proof: it is true if it is a reason which causes one to understand that its conjoining with another makes up a *per accidens* one, but not if it constitutes something that is one *per se*, as the difference is with the species, etc.

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

¹⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

BOOK FOUR

BOOK FOUR

QUESTION ONE

Is everything called being in a univocal sense?

Text of Aristotle: "There is a science that investigates being as being."¹

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That it is:

In equivocals there is no contradiction, according to *On Sophistical Refutations*;² being and not-being contradict one another. The minor is proved. The Philosopher in *Physics* I,³ refuting Parmenides charges him with this incongruity that not-being is being.

2 It is said that he arrives at this by conceding that all things are one.—To the contrary: in that same work the Philosopher says:⁴ "The principle to use against them is to admit that the term being is used in many senses"; but if these [men] had in mind that being is asserted without qualification, then the Philosopher would be begging the question by using as his argument against them something not proven to be true, namely, that being is used in many senses.

3 Also, there is proof that ["not-being is being"] is simply a contradiction. "Something is and nothing is" is a contradiction; but "something" is no less common than "being," for according to Avicenna in *Metaphysics* I, ch. 5:⁵ "Being and something have many names, [but are one in concept"].

4 If you say there is no contradiction here, then there will never be a contradiction between "someone" and "no one," because the

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21.

²Aristotle, *De sophisticis elenchis* ch. 30, 181b 1-3.

³Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 3, 186a 22-186b 5.

⁴Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 2, 185a 20-21.

⁵Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 6, AvI 34.

concept “someone” cannot be more common than the concept “something.”

5 Also, nothing equivocal can be determined to a particular thing it signifies by adding something to it; but being can. Proof of the major: every equivocal implies actually everything that it signifies; whereas everything determinable is indifferent to being this or that. Proof of the minor: otherwise “white being” would be no easier to contract than “being” without anything added.

6 Also, this follows: “This is a substance, therefore, it is a being.” The antecedent could not be true without the consequent; from equivocals nothing follows, for they have no opposites.

7[2] Also, being is predicated of everything of which it is predicated according to one notion of predicating, because it is predicated “in quid”; therefore, it is predicated according to one abstract meaning.

8 This is confirmed, because as one real attribute requires a subject that is one in reality, so it seems that one conceptual attribute requires one conceptual subject, that is to say, one intelligible grasped in a single concept. For how will one conceptual attribute be in many things *per se* unless it is primarily in one thing common to all those, as is argued about a real attribute?

9 Also, act and potency are differences of being;⁶ therefore, potency is no more univocal than being; but potency is used univocally, because possible and impossible contradict one another, and possible follows from necessary. But neither contradiction nor implication holds for equivocals.

10 Also, according to *Physics* VII,⁷ there is no comparison in equivocals, but there is a comparison in regard to being. There are two proofs of the minor: first, because substance is more of a being than accident is, and one accident is more a being than another; second, because in Bk. II of this work⁸ it says: “A thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things, if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well.”

⁶Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 12, 1017a 35—1017b 4.

⁷Aristotle, *Physics* VII, ch. 4, 1019a 33-1020a 4.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 24-25; *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 72a 27-28.

11 Hence, “the principles of eternal things must be always most true”⁹ because they are the cause of the truth of other things. But it is the same with being as with truth;¹⁰ therefore, if there is a comparison in regard to truth, there is also a comparison in regard to being.

12 Also, essentially the same notion of what is divided is retained in the parts into which it is divided; but being is divided into other things; therefore, etc.

Also, if being means something absolute or related, to add being with something that falls under it would be a useless repetition or an improper use of words.

13 Also, according to Bk. III of this work;¹¹ being is not a genus, because it is part of the meaning of everything; but if it were equivocal according to one meaning it would be the same as substance and would not be included in the meaning of accident.

14 Also, according to *Metaphysics* IV:¹² “There is one science which investigates being qua being,” and one science is about one univocal subject; proof of which is found in *Posterior Analytics* I:¹³ there is no demonstration where equivocals are concerned. But there are demonstrations that concern the subject [of a science].¹⁴

15 Also, one has to know beforehand just what the subject is;¹⁵ but what is equivocal has no “quid” or “what”;¹⁶ therefore, etc.

16 Also, in Bk. IV of this work,¹⁷ the firmest principle of all is that it is impossible for the same thing to exist and not exist; the most evident principle has the most evident terms, “for we know principles insofar as we know their terms.”¹⁸ But the terms of equivocal statements are not the most evident.—This is confirmed: all principles which are common conceptions [or axioms] are

⁹Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 27-28.

¹⁰Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 30-31.

¹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 3, 998b 22- 24.

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003a 21-22.

¹³Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 11, 77a 9-10.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 7, 75a 39-b 2.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 3, 10, 71a 11-12, 76a 31-34.

¹⁶Aristotle, *Topics* VI, ch. 2, 139b 22-28.

¹⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4 1006a 3-4; see below Bk. IV q. 3.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 3; 72b 23-25.

[composed] from transcendent terms; if being is equivocal, all other [transcendental terms] will be equivocal, and thus all common conceptions will be doubtful, which does not seem to be true; therefore, etc.

17 [3] To the contrary: Porphyry:¹⁹ "If someone were to speak of all beings, he would not be speaking univocally."

—This is confirmed, because nothing that is one in meaning is predicated of all things, since there is an infinity of such.²⁰

18 I reply: it is true in the sense that equivocation is used by the philosopher who treats of the real world [i.e. the physicist, or metaphysician]; even more so than in a genus, which *Physics* VII²¹ speaks about.

19 To the contrary: he [Aristotle] was a logician.—I reply, many things are said in logic that are not logical, just as in Bk. II of this work:²² "Everything that is moved [presumably has matter]." This is a statement that pertains [to the physicist], not the metaphysician.

20 Also, in *On the Categories*:²³ "Individual concepts signify either substance, quantity," etc. But if there were one concept common to all beings, that statement would not be true, because a concept signifying that [common aspect] would not signify substance, or any of the others.

21 Also, in *Physics* I:²⁴ "The term 'being' is used in many senses." The same thing is said in Bk. IV of this work.²⁵

22 Also, in Bk. IV of this work: "Those things having being and unity fall immediately into a category."²⁶

¹⁹Porphyrius, *Liber praedicabilium* c. 3 (AL I,⁶ 12).

²⁰Here follows an interpolated note: "If one should wish to hold that being is univocal, he can reply to the principal arguments in the following fashion: 'To the argument of Porphyry: If one says that all beings are univocal' etc."

²¹Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 4, 249a 22-24.

²²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 26-27.

²³Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 4, 1b 25-26.

²⁴Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 2, 185a 20-21.

²⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 5; V, ch. 9, 1018a 35-36; VII, ch. 1, 1028a 10.

²⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV c. 2, 1004a 5-6.

23 To the first of these,²⁷ viz. that single concepts signify a thing of some category: there he [Aristotle] intended to divide concepts into categories, but not single concepts signifying something transcendent.

24 To all those authoritative statements²⁸ about “many senses” one must say that this is so, because “being” is not predicated of everything in a primary sense. Nevertheless, it is not used equivocally according to logic, so that there would not be one concept.

25 To this last;²⁹ the Philosopher says that being is “immediately” a quiddity, a quality, etc., because these are immediately the parts of being, so that being does not first descend to [i.e. is divided into] parts other than these, as substance first descends to other parts [e.g. corporeal and incorporeal] before it does to rational and irrational. Hence “immediately” does not imply equivocation. Avicenna explains all this in Bk. I of his *Metaphysics*, ch. 2.³⁰

26 Otherwise,³¹ one could say that the reason being is immediately a substance, quality, etc. is that it descends to these through nothing added.³²

[I.—TO THE QUESTION
A.—ONE OPINION].

27[4] {{One reply to this question: some claim the question is simply a verbal dispute about what the name signifies, which depends on your pleasure (ad placitum). Therefore, the question cannot be settled by argument but only by authority or because the term is used in most cases in this way, as it says in Bk. II of the *Topics*.³³

²⁷Cf. supra, n. 20.

²⁸Cf. supra, n. 21.

²⁹Cf. supra, n. 22.

³⁰Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 2, AvI 12-13.

³¹Namely, another reply to the argument in n. 22.

³²An interpolated annotation follows: “As was responded in the fourth solution to the argument ‘regarding everything that is one in itself, if it is distinguished [as it appears] in diverse [things], it is distinguished because of something added to it.’”

³³Aristotle, *Topics* II, ch. 2, 110a 15-19.

28 [Refutation of this opinion] On the contrary, the question is whether there can be some concept that is common to all ten categories, whether you call it "being" or give it some other name. But one can argue rationally as to whether there is such a concept or not.

29 As for the claim that what is signified is *ad placitum*,³⁴ I say that what is *ad placitum* is [a] whether you give this name or another to this concept and whether you give the same name to many equivocally, or [b] reserve its use to one. What is not *ad placitum*, however, is the question of whether or not there could be a concept more common than this. Indeed, this depends on the nature of things.

30 Also, you cannot impose a name *ad placitum* on what you cannot conceive of. Therefore, if one cannot conceive of anything more common than the ten categories, it is not *ad placitum* of the one imposing the name that some name will signify something common to these ten.}}

[B.—THE VIEW OF AVICENNA]

31 [5] The opinion of Avicenna in Bk. I of his *Metaphysics*, chs. 2 and 5,³⁵ seems to be that being is asserted of everything of which it is affirmed according to one meaning, though not of all in the same primary fashion, for certain things are quasi genera or species of being; other things are attributes, etc.

[THREE ARGUMENTS FOR THIS VIEW]

32 This is proved in the following way: The first things we need to know are most common, because the more common is always known before [the less common], and there is no infinite regress in understanding this before that. Therefore, the first intelligible in an unqualified sense is what is simply most common. But nothing other than being is of this sort, for none of the ten categories is more

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

³⁵Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 5, AvIL 40.

common in an unqualified sense, since no category is predicated of any other. Hence, there can be one common concept of being.

33 This is confirmed, since what first occurs should be what is confused [i.e. has confused denotation] with respect to all that occurs secondly, when there is a process [of logical descent] from the confused to the determinate. But no category has such denotation with respect to any other category that occurs secondly; therefore, etc.

34 Similarly, just as accidents are sensed *per se*, so primarily what is most general about them [i.e. that they are all accidents] could be understood. But what is simply first is only one [i.e. the common concept "accident"]; therefore, "accident" cannot be some particular genus, since there can occur primarily another genus that is not substance.

35 Also, one potency has but one first object, for a potency is moved by the object according to its form, and unless the object has one form it will not move, and if the intellect does not understand that one thing, it understands nothing, according to *Metaphysics* IV.³⁶ But the first object of the intellect is being as common to all.—Proof: that is the first object of a cognitive potency under whose aspect all other things are known by that potency, as is clear of the object of vision; but neither the notion of substance nor of accident is found in all intelligibles.

36 [6] [Objection] You may say God is the first object of his intellect and yet he is not included in everything he can know.

37 [Reply to the objection] To the contrary: if it would be enough that the first proper object of a potency is that to which all other objects can be attributed, as the aforesaid reply claims,³⁷ then God would be the first object of the intellect in an unqualified sense, which does not seem to be true; this is disproved in 19d.³⁸

³⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4, 1006b 10-11.

³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 36.

³⁸This may be a reference to a consecutive numbering of the questions as they appear in Scotus's *Lectura* (Bk. I dist. 3 part 1 q. 3 [n. 91], XVI p. 259) or possibly his *Ordinatio* (Bk. I dist. 3 part 1 q. 3 [n. 126-127], III p. 79-80); see the introduction to the Vatican edition of Scotus, vol. I p. 158*.

38 Also, it is clear that a potency receptive of some form to which others are attributed is not receptive of these other forms, as is evident of matter compared to an essential form (i.e. substantial) and to an accidental form.

39 Also, God and, perhaps, substance are not known through a proper species; how then are they known more perfectly? But the first object is known most perfectly.

40 {{Note that this argument³⁹ about the object of the intellect [n. 35] would imply that being *per se* is included in every *per se* intelligible. For no matter how much it would be the same as something, if it were not included *per se* in what is understood, so far as the formal objective notion is concerned it would be as if being were incidental to it. But when the *per se* object of a potency is incidental to something, that thing is only per accidens knowable; therefore, etc.—Nevertheless, this procedure has an counterinstance in the common sensibles, which are not per accidens sensibles. Then too, there ought to be one concept common not only to the ten categories, but also to genus and difference, to one and true, and thus there would be a vain repetition and an infinite regress.

41 [7] Note that if we are talking about things, then being is the same essentially as each thing. If about a concept, then [being] is included in every concept where something is conceived of as a quiddity in itself, such as rationality, humanity, unity, etc. But when these are conceived of denominatively [e.g. as rational, human, one, etc.], being is not included *per se* in what one conceives of them, but then they are conceived of as informative [i.e. as forms] of being.

42 The way I avoid a useless repetition and a process ad infinitum⁴⁰ is as follows. I concede there is repetition in expressions such as “an animal-being,” “a rationality-being,” “a unity-being,” unless we understand this specific construction to mean: “a being that is an animal,” etc. Then we no longer have a useless repetition. But a conjunction of genus and difference in the abstract never occurs in a definition; hence, the same thing is not included there twice. And, nevertheless, that difference is essentially a being by identity,

³⁹Cf. supra, n. 35.

⁴⁰Cf. supra, n. 40.

although not by formal *per se* predication in the first mode, but rather *per accidens*, as in this case: "Wisdom is God's power."

43 But suppose you argue about the process *ad infinitum* in this way: "Animal and rational essentially agree in entity, and are not the same; therefore they differ by something, and that something agrees with them in being, and yet is not completely the same; therefore, it differs by something, and that something by something else, and so *ad infinitum*."

44 I say in this case that they differ in everything [i.e. as a whole] and agree in everything [as a whole], because "a being" does not refer to a part of their perfection, but the whole of it;—just as individuals differ as a whole and agree as a whole, for the species⁴¹ expresses the whole being of individuals. In this way, therefore, this reply that denies that what is commonly one in many is distinguished in them by something other than itself, avoids the process *ad infinitum* on the part of the things. But that⁴² which assumes being is not included *per se* in every concept, avoids vain repetition in every case where a denominative term is added to being, and avoids *per se* predication wherever such a term is made the subject of which being is predicated, and it saves this fact that "being is one" is *per se* in the second mode. And nevertheless so far as reality goes, both this *per accidens* predication "one is being" and this "being is one" are identical. Then to the argument⁴³ against this opinion (which claims that what is added to being is also a being) I say that it is such by identity, but not by formal *per se* predication.

⁴¹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 3 p. 1 q. 5-6 n. 186 (XVIII 288): "... quando arguitur (secundum Boethium in *Divisionibus*) quod 'species praedicat totum esse individuorum', dico quod Boethius [Boethius, *Liber de divisione* (PL 64, 887); *In Isagogen Porphyrii* ed. secunda, V c. 6 (CSEL 48, 303; PL 64, 141B): "genus ac species totum sunt eorum quae intra suum ambitum continent et coercent; omnium enim specierum totum est genus, et omnium individuorum totum species"]; hoc non dicit, sed tamen dicit alia verba, unde hic accipitur quod 'species est totum esse individuorum';" cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d. 3 p. 1 q. 5-6 n. 197 (VII 489); *Porph.* q. 12 n. 6.)

⁴²Cf. *supra*, n. 41.

⁴³Cf. *infra*, n. 57-61.

45 [8] Note also that these arguments⁴⁴ imply that being is common to a created being and an uncreated being, [because these two states of mind are compatible]; namely, certainty that the sun is a being and doubt as to whether it is God.

And this is well confirmed through that statement in Bk. II of the *Metaphysics*:⁴⁵ “The principles of eternal things are most true,” where it seems he wants to say that truth is univocal to the principles of sempiternal things and to those [effects] that proceed from them. Otherwise, what value is the statement “according to which the univocally same quality exists in others”?⁴⁶ Then it is said that being and all that is attributed to it qua being, such as true, good, and the like, are of themselves indifferent to limitation and illimitation. And further, under what is limited,⁴⁷ to substance and accident. And going still further, since every thing in any category is necessarily limited, it is impossible that something transcendent be formally the species of some genus. Thus, these [transcendents] do not denominate all things in such a way that they are species of a genus, but rather they fall into no genus whatsoever.}}

46 It is also evident in another way. We experience in our very selves that we can conceive being without conceiving this being to be either in itself or in another, for there is a doubt when we conceive being whether it is a being in itself or in another, as is evident in the case of light. Is it a substantial form, existing in itself; or is it accidental, inhering in another as a form? Therefore, we first conceive something indifferent to both, and afterwards discover in both of these that the initial concept of being was preserved.

47 Also, in Bk. III of this work,⁴⁸ being cannot be a genus, because it pertains *per se* to the notion of everything. But if it were somehow equivocally predicated, it could—according to one of its meanings at least—be extrinsic to the notion of something. For if we take “being” as signifying substance, it is thus extrinsic to the differences

⁴⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 31-39.

⁴⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 27-28; cf. *supra*, n. 11.

⁴⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 24-25.

⁴⁷Namely, they are indifferent to substance and accident.

⁴⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 3, 998b 22.

of substance, just as "substance" itself is. And the same would hold good of any other signification of "being."

48 Also, everything enumerated agrees in something common. Substance and quantity are diverse beings, because "same" and "diverse" divide all of being;⁴⁹ therefore, they are two beings. Hence, "being" is one concept common to them.

49 Also, otherwise [if it were not univocal] being would not be divided more appropriately into substance and accident, than into temporal being and non-temporal being, for then "accident" could not signify something common to the nine categories any more than "being" could to the ten, and then the primary division of being would not be into two, but rather into ten.

[C.—SEVEN OBJECTIONS TO UNIVOCATION AND THEIR SOLUTION]

50 [9] Against this view: [if being were univocal], then it would be a genus. Proof of the implication. What is properly predicated of many is predicated of them according to the meaning of some universal among the five universals [of Porphyry]. But if being is this sort of predicate, then it is predicated according to the meaning of one of these five. This is not that of a difference, however, for a difference is predicated as a 'quale.' Neither is it predicated as either a property or an accident, because both are extrinsic to the essence of that of which they are predicated. Therefore, it is predicated as the genus.

51 To this the answer is given that Porphyry oriented his book towards the *Categories* of Aristotle, as he says in the preface.⁵⁰ Therefore, he speaks about those universals that in some way are found in the predicamental order. But besides this one can assume a transcendent universal that does not pertain to any category. And there are two such transcendent universals: one that is asserted "in quid," (viz. being), and another "in quale," (viz. one, etc.).

52 Another answer that retains Porphyry's definition, is that, perhaps, "being" is a genus, and "one" a property, but not to the

⁴⁹Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 15-16.

⁵⁰Porphyrius, *Liber praedicabilium*, proemium (AL I⁶, 5).

extent that being would be called a part of the species, so that it would be determined by a difference.

53 Still another answer: being in relation to what falls under it can have character of a most special species [under which only distinct individuals fall], as is said in the second reply⁵¹ after the words "This argument," etc.⁵²

54 Also, [if being is univocal, then] the primary genera [or categories] are species. For everything that has in its essential concept something material and something formal, can be defined properly through some of the two notions expressive of that concept. But every category is such, because it has in itself the concept of being plus something formal which determines this common notion to this genus. Therefore, it is definable through the common feature and the added formal element.

55 This argument does not prove that being is not univocal to the ten categories, [but only that it is not univocal to genus and difference], and this can be conceded, although the first point cannot.

56 Otherwise, it can be said that just as two individuals differ in all that they are and yet are one in species (and there is nothing real in the other individual except the nature of the species), so here in the categories that fall under being. Hence, one can deny the first proposition⁵³ [if there is a common univocal notion, what falls under it are species] in the case of every common notion that expresses the whole of what falls under it. It is true, however, of cases where what is common expresses only a part of what falls under it, for then it may be determined by something expressing the other part. Being, however, expresses the whole thing that is a substance and that is a man, because whatever is there is a being according to the first mode of *per se* [predication].

57 [10] Also, everything one in itself, if it is distinguished into diverse things, is distinguished by something added to it. The concept of being of itself is one in all categories. Then, I inquire about the added feature, call it A. [1] Either it is a being, and thus being will pertain to its concept, namely, A. For "being" predicates

⁵¹Cf. *infra*, n. 56.

⁵²Cf. *infra*, n. 55.

⁵³Namely that the primary categories are species of being; cf. *supra*, n. 54

the substance of every being, according to Bk. IV of this book.⁵⁴ Substance, therefore, will be a being, and thus there will be a vain repetition. [2] Or it is not a being, and then every most general genus or category is formally not a being, because its formal element is not a being, and each species is formally not a being.

58 To this argument there are four replies: The first concedes that being is not common to both the genus and the difference. The second admits it is common through identity, as it is common to one and good, but not that it is included formally in the concept of each. The third claims that what is common is formally and essentially common to each nature conceived as something in itself. But if the nature is conceived only as denominating something else, being is not common to it formally, but only by identity. The fourth says that being is common to everything no matter how conceived, be it formally or by identity. However, it is the sort of common feature that descends to its inferiors with nothing added but expresses the totality of what the inferior [implicitly] says.

59 The first response⁵⁵ has to say that being used equivocally is asserted formally of the difference, and then the arguments for the first opinion⁵⁶ seem to be against this. Or if one says there is nothing common to the difference, neither formally nor by identity, then one will be admitting that the difference expresses something in reality other than being, whatever meaning one gives to "being."—The second response,⁵⁷ although it avoids this criticism, nevertheless raises the question: Why is being formally included in one being and not in the other?—The third response⁵⁸ avoids this difficulty, but does not say why being is not included formally in the denominative concepts of such beings.—The fourth reply⁵⁹ does not escape the accusation of vain repetition whenever something is

⁵⁴ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 32-34.

⁵⁵ Namely, that being is not common to both the genus and the difference.

⁵⁶ Cf. *supra*, nn. 31-35, 46-49.

⁵⁷ Namely, that being is common through identity, as it is common to one and good, but not that it is included formally in the concept of each.

⁵⁸ Namely, that being is common formally and essentially common to each nature conceived as something in itself; but if the nature is conceived only as denominating something else, being is not common to it formally, but only by identity.

⁵⁹ Namely, that being is common to everything no matter how conceived, be it formally or by identity.

added to being or something is added to another, because the identical concept of being is included formally both [in what is added and in that to which it is added]. What it does escape is the charge of infinite regress, since it admits that nothing other is added for it to descend to [or be divided into] what falls under it.

60 [Scotus's personal solution] The third reply seems probable, because it is not incongruous that being be included in something when it is conceived of as an absolute thing in itself, though not when it is conceived of as denominative of another. For instance, color is formally included in whiteness but not in white. Hence, there is no vain repetition in the expression "white color."⁶⁰

And if one joins to this [third response] the claim of the fourth⁶¹ that with respect to those things to which it is formally common, it is the sort of common feature that does not descend to [or is divided into] its inferiors through something added, then both the charge of vain repetition and of infinite regress is avoided.

61 None of the arguments for the first opinion [of Avicenna]⁶² militates against this interpretation, for it suffices that the first intelligible—in the first argument⁶³—and the proper object of the intellect—in the second⁶⁴—be something formally common to each

⁶⁰The following text is inserted here: {"Objection: whiteness is included formally in "white."—Also, then, this is false 'White qua white is formally colored,' for then it would not include color formally. Therefore, analogically, what is colored as such does not include quality.—Also, why is a genus and difference excluded more from what is concrete, when they are both affirmed of the abstract and in the first mode of *per se* predication?—Also, in [Aristotle] in the *Categories* [ch. 5, 3b 19-20]: "'White' signifies nothing other than a quality"; through this less general genera are not excluded, for then "This is white" and "This is a qualification" would say the same thing.—Also, why is a remote genus more than a proximate one excluded from what it signifies, since its constitutive difference refers more immediately to the proximate than to the remote genus? Indeed, it only refers to the remote through the proximate, as is evident from Bk. VII, in the chapter "On definition" [ch. 12, 1037b 30-1037a 18]. Why then is there a vain repetition in "a whiteness color" and not in "a white color"?—The reason is that when whiteness is added to color in the form of a concrete expression, this [speculative grammatical] mode is always held to be specificative or determinative, which is not the case with the abstract expression. Hence, there is no vain repetition in "a white color."}

⁶¹Cf. *supra*, n. 58.

⁶²Cf. *supra*, n. 31.

⁶³Cf. *supra*, nn. 32-34.

⁶⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 35.

thing conceived of absolutely and to be common by identity to everything conceived of howsoever. And as for the third argument⁶⁵ [on this interpretation], someone may well be certain that something through identity is a being, howsoever it be conceived, and yet be ignorant in particular what sort of being it is, or just how it is a being, i.e. whether or not "being" be formally included or not formally included in it as conceived in this way. Also, this community—both formal and identical—sufficiently prevents being from becoming a genus.⁶⁶ Also identical community suffices to explain the fact that those things to which it is common are properly enumerated,⁶⁷ because number pertains more to the notion of essences [i.e. to what is essential] than to the mode of conceiving them. But being is formally common to essences conceived of in one way.

62 [11] Also, [if being were univocal] there would never be a definition without a vain repetition and this is incongruous according to Bk. VII of this work.⁶⁸ Similarly, this would be a repetition "a white man," because being according to the same meaning pertains *per se* to both concepts.

63 This is not valid, because even in the case of "a human man" there is no vain repetition. Neither is being, as common to the ten categories included *per se* in whiteness. Hence, perhaps there would be a repetition in an expression like "man whiteness."

64 Also it is argued in Bk. V of this work:⁶⁹ "'Different' is applied to those things which though other are the same in some respect." Therefore, if the ten first genera or categories had something affirmed of them univocally, there would be a difference, and they would not be diverse [i.e. having nothing in common], and then nothing would be diverse except those differences. For what transcends the ten categories is neither diverse nor contained under them.

⁶⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 46.

⁶⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 47.

⁶⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 48.

⁶⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 12, 1038a 19-21.

⁶⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 9, 1018a 12-13.

65 I reply: two opposing differences would be diverse, as well as two individuals falling under the same most special species.

66 Also, it is argued that if this were so [i.e. if being were univocal], there would be no immediate negative when one most general genus [or category] is denied of another; the consequent is false, according Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*.⁷⁰ Proof of the implication: both extremes would be in some whole [i.e., being], which is not the case when the negative is immediate.

67 I reply that they are not in some whole that can be a means of separating one from another, as neither are two individuals [of the same species].

68 Also, it is argued as follows: all beings are attributed to substance insofar as they are beings. But there is nothing univocally common to an attribute as attributed and that to which it is attributed, because a univocal predicate is predicated "in quid." It is predicated, therefore, of that thing according to what it is in itself and not as attributed to another.

69 I reply to the major, when it is stated that 'all beings as beings are attributed to substance',⁷¹ that it is true when understood in this way, since beings as a whole, and not "insofar as they are being" (i.e. insofar as being is predicated of them) are attributed to substance as to what is first. For in this same way being is predicated "in quid" and *per se* of quality just as it is of substance. And understood in this way the second proposition [i.e. the minor]⁷² is true. Take, for example, the various species of numbers [which are attributed to one insofar as they are numbers]. Hence, they are beings effectively through substance—which does not rule out univocation; [they are not beings formally through substance].

⁷⁰Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 72a 7-14.

⁷¹Namely, that all beings are attributed to substance insofar as they are beings; cf. supra, n. 68.

⁷²Namely, there is nothing univocally common to an attribute as attributed and that to which it is attributed, cf. supra, n. 68.

[II.—SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

70 [12] To the question,⁷³ I concede that being is not asserted equivocally, because something is said equivocally when those things of which it is asserted are not attributed to one another. But when such an attribution exists, then something is said analogously. Since it does not have one concept, therefore, it signifies all things essentially according to their proper meaning and simply equivocally according to the logician. But because those things it signifies are attributed essentially among themselves, it follows that it is attributed analogically according to the metaphysician, who deals with reality.

[III.—ANSWER TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

71 To the first,⁷⁴ the major is false. To the proof one must say: that he [Aristotle] uses the hypothesis of Parmenides that being is predicated univocally.

72 As for what is said to the contrary,⁷⁵ we have to say that when someone argues against another, he should take the opposite of something that follows from what the other said if it is better known, and this is not to beg something be accepted for the sake of argument [“petere”], but to prove that it is there. For what follows from holding that all things are one, is that being is asserted univocally. Aristotle takes the opposite of this consequent, namely, that being is used in many senses.

73 To the contrary: then he would be using opposed propositions in his argument, for he accepts the opposite of the consequent that

⁷³At this paragraph, one manuscript, namely Cambridge Peterhouse cod. 64, has the following note in a later hand: “This is not the opinion of this doctor as is obvious to one giving it careful consideration.” Another note is added to the text at this juncture by the first hand of manuscript Erfurt, Amplon. 4.291: “The author’s opinion which he does not now hold. Also note how he holds analogy; elsewhere he held univocity as is more obvious in other [writings]. Also note the replies to the reasons arguing for univocity which take up an entire column;” a third manuscript, viz. Munich CLM 15829, in a later hand, has the following note: “Response to the question which he did not hold in the *Sentences*.”

⁷⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

⁷⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

“being is predicated in many ways” and the conclusion which he infers from this, namely, that “being is not being” is not incongruous unless being is asserted without qualification. Therefore, his argument assumes two opposed propositions.

74 To this one must say that one cannot infer a proposition’s negation of itself unless opposed premises are accepted.

75 To the other,⁷⁶ one must say that the argument does not hold good unless a distinction is made by using *res* or “thing” for substance, or for some [other] specific genus.—As for the proof: [n. 4] expressions like “someone” and “something,” and other syncategorematic terms of this sort, are second intentions, and can have the same meaning as those things to which they are added, nor is there an equivocation on their part. But if there be an equivocation, this will be on the part of the determinable things, as when one says: “no being,” “some being”; and there is no equivocation from the aspect of the thing here in expressions like “no man” and “some man,” because the thing [in this case, man] has the same sense in both.

76 [13] To the other⁷⁷ it must be said an equivocal term cannot be determined.—To the minor: it must be denied because such a determination of being is either a vain repetition or a repugnance of notions. But so far as those who use the term go, there can be an equivocal determination, because they are using the equivocal for its significate, where one can find determination.

77 To the other,⁷⁸ the implication “substance, therefore being” is invalid unless “being” is distinguished. This is proved, because either “being” is taken for substance, and then the implication is not valid, because in an implication there is an order [i.e. from the more general to the less general]; or if “being” is taken for quantity, or something else, then the inference is false.

78 To the other:⁷⁹ it is false; but the same intentional sense of predicating [viz. “in quid”] can hold for all genera, although the concept under it is not univocal.

⁷⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 3-4.

⁷⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

⁷⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁷⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

79 To the other:⁸⁰ according to Bk. V of this work⁸¹ ‘possible’ in one sense is a principle of transmuting; in another sense, relevant to the issue, it is equivocal to things of second and of first intention.

80 To the other:⁸² properly speaking comparison is made between things of the same form according to greater or lesser with same form. But this is not the case with being. For a comparison according to being is only based on the order in which one thing depends upon another in entity, as is the case of accidents with respect to substance, and hence substance is said to be the first being in causing the accidents. However, the Philosopher in Bk. VIII of the *Ethics* in ch. 1⁸³ says that “even things different in species admit of a degree of more or less.” But this can occur in a secondary way.

81 To the other point⁸⁴ it must be said that the principles of celestial bodies of necessity are most true but they are of the same genus.

82 To the contrary: if there is a univocal entity to both principles and what proceeds therefrom [i.e. those things that are caused or “principled”] and all things are either principles or principled; then [being is univocal to all things].—It must be said that principles and principled follow being [as attributes] not only in general but also in a particular category or genus; hence, if they be principles and principled of the same genus then they have a univocal entity; otherwise they do not.

83 To the other saying that being is not a genus,⁸⁵ it must be said that being cannot be a genus, but not because it has no common concept. As convertible with substance, however, being is a genus.

84 To the other⁸⁶ about the univocal subject, it must be said that a subject is that sort of thing. However, being is not this subject, but substance is and that is univocal. And not only is this considered [in metaphysics]; but all things attributed to substance are not treated as its subject.

⁸⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

⁸¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 12, 1019a 15-b 13.

⁸²Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

⁸³Aristotle, *Ethica Nicomachea* VIII, ch. 2, 1155b 15-16.

⁸⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

⁸⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

⁸⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 14-15.

85 To the other⁸⁷ it must be said that this is true, because once the terms [of the firmest principle] are known, it is most certain so far as the composition [of its terms] is concerned; then, by apprehending being according to one distinct meaning and then combining the other term one can get a most certain principle.

[IV.— TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPINION OF AVICENNA]

86 [14] To the first argument for the opinion of Avicenna,⁸⁸ I say that the most common things are first understood and the ten categories are the most common; still not all of these are first understood, but rather substance to which all the others [pertain or are connected or related], and substance is prior to the other nine categories, not in predication, but in perfection and as [their] cause. Neither is there anything common to the ten categories that is first understood.

87 To the other:⁸⁹ the major is false; but that [first object] is substance. To the proof: it is not necessary that the first object is commonly predicable of all intelligibles, as is clear from the case of the object of vision which is not predicated of all that is sensed by vision; for magnitude is not color. It suffices, however, that the first object be the reason for knowing the others, because magnitude would not be seen unless the objects were colored. It is in this way that substance is related to the other categories.

88 To the third⁹⁰ I say that it is appropriate to know of something that it exists without knowing if it exists in itself or in another. But this 'to be existing' [esse existere] is not a quiddity, but is predicated denominatively of it as accident [is predicated denominatively], and that ['to exist'] is posited in the category of action and is of the same meaning in all things as denominating them. Of being that is predicated in quid of all, no one concept can be conceived except in some determinate genus.

⁸⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

⁸⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 32-34, 61.

⁸⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 35, 61.

⁹⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 46, 61.

89 To the contrary: if it is appropriate to conceive this 'existence', I conceive this quiddity [esse quid], because it is not known to exist except because it is known to have some essence, and thus some 'quid.'

90 Otherwise, it is said that the same essence can be conceived under diverse meanings of conceiving and in one way a concept can be certain, and in another not. For being signifies the same thing that substance does. However, it happens that one can conceive the same essence under the aspect of being from which the name "being" is imposed, and not by conceiving it under the aspect of substantiality, from which the name "substance" is imposed.

91 Against this: anyone who knows that something necessarily belongs to some substance, knows that it has some quiddity. And this concept he is certain of, but he doubts whether this quiddity is that of a substance or of an accident, for otherwise whichever of these he would conceive of, he would immediately know whether it would pertain to the definition of that to which it necessarily belongs or whether it is a proper attribute, since even the wise have doubts about many such things. Hence the first concept seems to be of being, as opposed to that which is nothing, determinable further as either *per se* or not *per se*, etc.

QUESTION TWO

Text of Aristotle: "If then being and unity are the same and one nature, in the sense that they are implied in one another as principle and cause are, not that they are explained by the same formula..." (*Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, t.c. 3; 1003b 23-25)

Do being and one signify the same nature?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] It seems that they do not:

For then this proposition would be true:¹ "There is only one being." [or "Only one being exists."] The consequent is false; therefore, the antecedent is also. The falsity of the consequent is clear, from the Philosopher in *Physics* I,² because he reproves Parmenides, who postulates only the one exists. The implication is evident, because when something is predicated of another coextensively, it is predicated of it by exclusive diction.

2 It is responded that Parmenides conceded only one determinate thing existed, and against this the Philosopher argued.

3 To the contrary: this follows: "There is only the 'one,' therefore, only 'this one.'" Proof: the antecedent implies the affirmative explaining the consequent; and a negative explaining the consequent implies the negative of the antecedent.

4 Proof of the first: "Only one is a being; therefore, every being is one,"—according to the dialectical rule [regarding the use of "only"].³ From this it follows further: "therefore, this being is one"; then further, by conversion, "therefore, this one is a being."

¹The antecedent of this implication, viz. 'every being is one', has been omitted.

²Aristotle, *Physics* I, ch. 2, 184b 15-17.

³Cf. William of Sherwood, *Syncategoremata*, ch. "Tantum," ed. J. R. O'Donnell, p. 69; Petrus Hispanus, *Summulae logicales* "Tractatus de exponibilium," ed. J. P. Mullaly, Notre Dame, 1945, p. 106: "Tertia regula est quod ab exclusiva affirmativa ad universalem de terminis transpositis est bonb a consequentia si fiat exclusio gratia aletatis, et non econtra; ut "Tantum animal est homo; ergo omnis homo est animal."

5 Proof of the second:⁴ this follows “nothing other than one, therefore, nothing other than this one.”

6 Proof: because from the universal affirmative follows the singular affirmative in this way: “everything other than one, therefore, everything other than this one.”

7 Proof: singulars of the first universal imply singulars of the second. Hence this follows: “this [is] other than one; therefore this is other than that one and this other [one is other than that one],” and so on with the rest. Consequently, the first universal implies the second, and then [the argument proceeds] as before.

8 Also, the divisor does not signify the same nature with the dividend. One divides being. Proof of the first: if it did, then a codivisor from the fact that it is opposed to a codividend, would not be a being, and thus would not divide being.

9 Also, all of whose species are of a determinate genus, is itself of a determinate genus; but all the species of “one,” [i.e.] same, similar, and equal, are in the genus of relation; therefore, etc.

10 For the opposite is the Philosopher, Bk. IV of this work:⁵ “a being, man” and “a man” and “one man” all signify the same. Proof: “because they are not separated in generation and corruption.”

11 Also, “being” and “one” predicate the essence of anything; therefore, they signify the same. The Commentator proves the validity of the inference.⁶

[I.— TO THE QUESTION
A.—THE OPINION OF AVICENNA]

12 [2] The opinion of Avicenna: in Bk. VII of his *Metaphysics*,⁷ he ‘says that “being” and “one” are predicated of all things; never-

⁴Cf. William of Sherwood, *Syncategoremata*, ch. “Tantum,” ed. J. R. O’Donnell, p. 69.

⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 26-31.

⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3 (32rb): “Et istae duae significationes sunt idem. Quia dicere iste homo significat unum hominem per consignificationem. Et cum propalatur hoc nomen unum, non erit differentia inter duas significationes, nisi quia in illo significatur unum per consignificationem, et hic per propalationem.”

⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VII, ch. 1, AvI 349.

theless they are not the same according to nature, but as to subject, [i.e., related] as subject and attribute.

For if "one" were essentially the same as "being," then a multitude would be not-being.

13 Also, to say "one being" would be a vain repetition.⁸

14 [Reply of the Commentator] To this the Commentator⁹ says that it is not a repetition, because they do not signify the same thing in the same way.

15 [Refutation of the Commentator] To the contrary: genus and species signify the same nature in different ways and nevertheless, to add a particular to a universal dictum is a repetition, according to the Philosopher in Bk. VI of the *Topics*.¹⁰

16 Also, Bk. V of the *Topics*¹¹ when the definition is expressed for the name, then the repetition will be plain, whereas it was previously hidden, as in the following case. Let A be the nature signified through "being" and "one" and let B and C be the diverse modes. Then it is the same to say "one being" and to say "A," [or to say] "A A" with "B" and "C." But it is surely the case that it is a repetition to say "AA"; therefore, [it is also a repetition to say "AB" and "AC"].

17 Also, I ask of these modes: either they are within the concept of "being" and of "one," or they are outside. Under which concept then are they are conceived? If they are outside, it does not exclude a repetition, as is proved above¹² about "animal man." If within, then either that mode is the whole concept or a part. If the first, [i.e., if the mode is the whole concept of being or the whole concept of one] then they [the two concepts, being and one] do not signify the same, which is the opposite of the thesis assumed. If the second [the mode is only part of the concept of being and part of the concept

⁸Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3 (32ra): Et iste homo [Avicenna] ratiocinatur ad suam opinionem, dicendo quod si unum et ens significant idem, tunc dicere ens est unum esset nugatio, quasi dicere unum est unum, aut ens est ens."

⁹Ibid. (32rb): "Nos autem diximus quod significant eandem essentiam, sed diversis modis."

¹⁰Aristotle, *Topics* VI, ch. 3, 141a 15.

¹¹Aristotle, *Topics* V, ch. 2, 130a 30-b 10.

¹²Cf. preceding question, nn. 58-61, and also nn. 41-44.43.

of one], substitute the definition for the names [one and being], then there will be something the same that is said twice. It follows also that from "one" and "being" one concept that is more common or simpler than both could be abstracted, and this is to assert the same thing twice.

18 Also, a third reason for the opinion of Avicenna: what signifies the same as something, is predicated of it "in quid," but "one" is predicated denominatively of being.

19 [Objection] It is said 'one' is not predicated denominatively, although it seems so.

20 [3] [Reply] On the contrary, if it is predicated "in quid," then the abstract of 'one' [i.e., 'unity'] is predicated of the other abstract, an abstraction having been made from the subject alone. But unity, namely, and entity are abstracted from the subject, not from a supposit,¹³ because "This unity is unity." Then this would be true "Unity is entity"; or conversely, ["Entity is unity"]. But this is false, because "indivision" pertains to the concept of unity, but not to the notion of entity. Therefore, they are not the same.

21 Also there is a fourth reason. Each unity is in the category of quantity; therefore, no "one" is convertible with being. Proof of the first: each unity with another constitutes a number; therefore, each unity is of the category of quantity.

22 [Another opinion: "One" is equivocal] It is said¹⁴ that "one" is equivocal to the [transcendental] "one" that is convertible with "being" and to the "one" that is the principle of number; then this¹⁵ is false: "Each unity is of a determinate genus." And to the claim that all unity with another unit constitutes number is false, except in continua. But in the transcendental sense one with another constitutes a multitude.

23 Against this is what constitutes number, properly so-called. For in Bk. X of this work¹⁶ we have this notion of number: "Number is multitude measured by one." But every multitude is a multitude

¹³Cf. *supra*, Bk. III, q. un., n. 11 and *infra* Bk. VII, q. 17 n. 22.

¹⁴Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IV* q. 5 in corp. (f. 92H); *Summa* a. 25 q. 1 ad 3 (l f. 148H).

¹⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

¹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics X*, ch. 6, 1057a 3-4.

measured by one. Proof: number is not measured by “one” unless it be as an *aliquot* part. But unity—wherever it be—is an *aliquot* part of multitude, because no matter how many times it be taken, a multitude results.

24 Also, wherever there is unity and unity, there is a difference either in number or species or genus; and where there is a difference in genus, there is also a difference in number; and where there is a difference in species there is a difference in number as well, and where there is a difference in number, we have also a difference in number. But all beings differ in species, as an angel from man.

25 Also, the Commentator in Bk. VI of the *Ethics*¹⁷ before the chapter on good counsel, says that number is a measure, whether in bodies (as in ten men) or in non-bodily things (as in ten souls).

26 Reply: this is because of the [soul’s] inclination to a body. On the contrary: the soul, because it is this or individual, is inclined to this body, and not vice versa. Similarly, the soul of man is inclined to the body of man, and not vice versa. The analogy is evident from Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*¹⁸ about a universal and a singular cause [as related] to [their] effects.

27 Also, Damascene in his *Sentences*, ch. 54:¹⁹ speaks of two natures [i.e. the divine and human] as discrete in quantity.

[B.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS ACCORDING TO THE OPINION
OF AVICENNA]

28 [4] By sustaining the opinion of Avicenna, one can give a reply to the initial arguments. To that²⁰ statement of the Philosopher about “being” and “one” signifying the same nature, he adds²¹ “as principle and cause.” And then the statement is to be understood in

¹⁷Eustratius, *Ethica ad Nicomachea* VI, ch. 6 (cod. Vat. Urtbin. lat. 222. f. 123rb): “Unusquisque enim numerus in differentibus subiectis subsistere potest: corporibus et incorporeis puta decem numerus mensurans; et in decem corporibus et in decem animabus potest inesse.”

¹⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1014a 7-25.

¹⁹Damascene, *De fide orthodoxa*, ch. 52 (FIP, t.s. VIII, 196; PG 94, 1016): “Modo igitur differentiae et solo numeratae sub discreta quantitate reducentur.”

²⁰Cf. supra, n. 11.

²¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 1, 1003b 24: “Si igitur ens et unum idem et una natura eo quod se ad invicem consequuntur sicut principium et causa.”

this way: namely, what is signified *per se* by being, allows one to understand “one,” not as the principal significate, but since it signifies a privation *per se*, and privation exists only in a nature; it allows one to understand nature as a consequent.

29 To the first,²² the inference does not hold, viz. “this being,” “man,” and “one man” all signify the same; therefore, “one” and “being” are the same.” Proof by a counterinstance: in Bk. VII of this work:²³ if a snub nose and a concave nose are the same [i.e. the nose and its shape are the same], it does not follow that snubness and concavity are the same, because they are drawn together in a third [i.e. the nose] where they are determined to one.

30 It is said, however, that he does not argue in this way, “A being, man,” and “a man” and “one man” all are the same; therefore, “one” and “being” are the same.” But he argues thus:²⁴

31 To the proof:²⁵ that “they are not separate in generation” [and corruption], this is, because indivision necessarily accompanies the generation of a being. However, unity, viz. indivision, is not generated like being, so that unity terminates generation *per se*. Hence, “one” does not imply a positive nature other than being. You might say, perhaps, that some proper generation does end with unity according to the first principal opinion.

32 To the other point,²⁶ [that “being and one predicate the essence of anything,” one could say] that each substance is a being according to the first mode of *per se* predication and each nature is “one” according to the second mode of *per se* predication, because indivision immediately follows every being.

33 To the argument of the Commentator,²⁷ [about the different ways]: either [being and “one”] signify “one” *per se* or per

²²Cf. supra, n. 10.

²³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1030b 29-35.

²⁴The end of the argument is missing in the manuscripts.

²⁵Cf. supra, n. 10.

²⁶Cf. supra, n. 11.

²⁷Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3, 32rb: “Et etiam apparet quod unum non dicitur de re addita naturae dispositae ex hoc, quia substantia cuiusque rei est una essentialiter, non per rem additam illi. Quoniam si res esset unum per aliquam rem additam suae naturae, sicut credit Avicenna, tunc nihil esset unum *per se* et per suam essentiam, sed per rem additam suae essentiae”; cf. supra, n. 11.

accidens.—Reply: per accidens is said to have as many ways as there are *per se*. I concede that of per accidens opposed to the first mode of *per se* but not of what is opposed to the second mode *per se*.”

34 [5] When he says: “Therefore through something other,” this proposition: “Man is one through something other,” can be understood in two ways, just as this can “Man is risible through something other.” [1] Either through something other than both extremes, which is false; for an attribute is in a subject because of the subject; [2] or through something other than the other extreme, as man is risible through something other than risible, and this is true, because it is through his humanity; hence “Because man is man; therefore, man is risible.” This second mode, I concede, but then it does not follow: “Therefore this other is one *per se*,” but what does follow is “Therefore, man, of whom ‘one’ is predicated per accidens, is man *per se*,” so that in no way per accidens, because those things which are *per se* in it, can be there in neither way of the aforesaid per accidens ways, because there the subject because of which the predicate is in it is other than neither of the extremes in an unqualified sense. However, according to the three grades in the first mode, the subject is more or less other than the predicate; maximally when a part of the definition is predicated of the defined. It is less so when the entire definition is predicated of the defined. Minimally when the same thing is predicated of itself. Therefore, here is the first grade of the first mode.

35 Note: one can well concede: “Whenever something is A per accidens that something is A *per se*,” because “A is A.” In this way per accidens is reduced to *per se* as something necessarily presupposed. But this never holds: “B is A per accidens; therefore, through something which is A *per se*”; in such a way that per accidens is reduced to *per se* which is the cause, and this on the part of the predicate. For it can be the total cause of the inherence of A per accidens in its subject, as also is commonly in the case of properties *per se* that the cause of the *per se* inherence is in the subject, not in the predicate. For the animal is not the cause why it is in man, because then animality in the ass would be the cause; but humanity is the cause or reason why animal is [in man]. But it can happen that inherence per accidens is reduced to inherence *per se*, either on the part of the subject or the part of the predicate. Hence, in

arguing to only one or the other is a fallacy of the consequent. It is reduced, however, to that as to a *sine qua non* cause; this is true, but not to a cause inferred necessarily. For otherwise every *per accidens* would be necessary, because from what is necessary follows only necessarily what is necessary. Hence, commonly to infer inference *per accidens*, if a *per se* proposition is assumed, it is necessary to join with it another [proposition] *per accidens*.

36 [6] Against this: A is a *per accidens* proposition. If it concludes to something, there will be introduced one premise *per accidens* and you will conclude that through another; therefore, you will go on *ad infinitum* in premises *per accidens*.

37 Reply: there is some first *per accidens* which cannot be concluded; not first in an unqualified sense, because to every such there is some prior *per se*, without which that *per accidens* is not true, but it is not 'through which' [i.e. as a cause rather than a *sine qua non*]. Hence, *Posterior Analytics* I, last chapter²⁸ shows that opinion can be either of the fact or the reasoned fact. Hence, wherever there is an order there is some first in that order, although taking this order as a whole there are others that are prior.

38 Also, it may be granted that "one" is one 'through another'. Hence, that other through which the other is one, is not one, as whiteness is not white; or if it be "one," it is "one" *per se* in the first mode. Neither does it follow; therefore, one must come to a stop in a first; for not in the same way is unity identical with itself and with the subject that supports unity.

39 Against this reply: because the Philosopher in Bk. IV ch. 4,²⁹ in his second argument against those who deny a first principle makes the following inference: "If no predicate is substantial but all are accidental, predication must go on *ad infinitum*." Hence, the same will be true here of "one."

40 To this it must be said that the Philosopher argues well, because if no predicate would be *per se* in the first mode, then none would be in the second mode, because every proposition true in the second mode *per se* is reduced to another true proposition in the first

²⁸Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 33, 89a 16-17.

²⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4, 1007a 33-1007b 3.

mode, and if nothing was predicated *per se* in either mode, all would be predicated simply *per accidens* and each such is reduced to another, and so *ad infinitum*. Such is not the case here.

[C.—AGAINST THE OPINION OF AVICENNA]

41 [7] Against the opinion of Avicenna: against the first reason:³⁰ it follows from it that “being” and “one” are not interchangeable. This can be had from the first argument for the opinion, because they are not predicated of the same things; he contradicts himself, because he says in Bk. VII of his *Metaphysics*:³¹ “Being and one are on a par in predication, because whatever [one is predicated of the other is also].”

42 Also, Boethius in the book *On Unity and One*:³² “Every being, whether composed or simple, is “one.”

43 As for the third argument,³³ one disproves that unity does not signify indivision; privation is posterior to having;³⁴ unity however is prior to multitude; therefore, unity is an essential part and a prior part.

44 As for the second³⁵ and fourth together, that unity is not of a determinate genus or category, as he claims, because then “One being” would be a vain repetition, for whatever is in a determinate genus, the genus is predicated of it in the first mode, and this genus is being, whether being is univocal or equivocal; therefore, by adding this determinate qualification to being, the same is said twice. This holds for the second and fourth.

45 Also, if “one” is of a determinate genus, namely quantity; therefore, that genus is predicated of it in the abstract, and being in

³⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

³¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 2, AvI L 115: “Unum autem parificatur ad esse, quia unum dicitur de unoquoque praedicamentorum, sicut ens.”

³²Rather Dominicus Gundissalinus, *De unitate et uno* (BGPTMA I 3): “Unitas est qua unquaqueque res dicitur esse una: sive enim sit simplex, sive composita.”

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 18-20.

³⁴Cf. *Auctoritates Aristoteles*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 187: “Privatio cognoscitur per habitum”; Aristotle, *De anima* III, c. 6, 430b 21-23.

³⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 13, 21.

the abstract is predicated of the genus; therefore unity is entity—[an inference] from the first to the last.

46 Also, “one” is on a par with “being” in predication.³⁶ Therefore, “one” [1] is either an essential convertible, which it cannot be if it is a species of a determinate genus; [2] or “one” is predicated of “being” in the second mode of *per se* predication, and then the same thing is predicated of itself in the second mode of *per se* predication, because it will be an attribute of itself. The implication is evident: if “one” is an attribute of “being” in general, it will be an attribute of that genus in which “one” is, and whatever is an attribute of a superior, is an attribute of an inferior; and thus the same will be an attribute of itself, if these reasons hold.

[D.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

47 [8] To the first³⁷ for the opposite, I say that this is true: “Only one is being,” whether “one” be taken for the same significate, or in general.

48 To the other point,³⁸ it is true that Parmenides held that only one determinate being exists and that it is immobile.

49 To the other (to the contrary):³⁹ this does not follow: “only one being, therefore, only this one being.”

50 To the proof of the consequence,⁴⁰ the first process up to “this being is one,” we concede. But when the demonstrative pronoun is not syncategorematic, but a part of the term, then we must say, according to the *Prior Analytics*,⁴¹ that the singular proposition be converted into the indefinite; but this has no force.

³⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 12, 41.

³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

³⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 1-2.

³⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

⁴⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

⁴¹The editors of the critical edition suggest that this might be a garbled reference to *Super Priscianum*; cf. Petrus Helias, *Summa super Priscianum maiorem*, ed. L. Reilly p. 186-187: “Quoniam vero ‘hic’ et ‘haec’ et ‘hoc’ praepoñuntur in declinatione ad discernenda genera et casus sicut quidam articuli apud Graecos, inde videntur esse articuli sed non sunt. Omnis enim articulus relative ponitur in constructione et

51 To the expository negative⁴² “nothing other than A; therefore, nothing other than this A”: this is a fallacy of the consequent, because it follows from a removal of the ‘this’ [i.e., sign] and not vice versa; therefore, by arguing in this way one destroys the antecedent.

52 As for the proof,⁴³ this must be denied: “everything other than A; therefore, everything other than this A,” for the same reason.

53 As for the proof,⁴⁴ I concede that singulars of the first universal imply some singulars of the second; all those, namely, which are other than A, but they do not imply all; for many are other than this A, which are not other than A. Hence, from the singulars of the second which follow from singulars of the first universal, by inferring the second universal one commits the fallacy of the consequent (based on an insufficiency) as in this case: “ ‘Every man runs; therefore this and that...etc.,’ and further ‘therefore, that animal and this...etc.,’ and further ‘therefore, every animal runs,’” is a fallacy of the consequent. For many singulars of the second universal which do not follow from universals of the first are missing.

54 To the other:⁴⁵ what is “one” in an unqualified sense is not converted with “being” simply, because “one” is not predicated of its opposite, viz., multitude. Nevertheless, “one” in some way converts with “being,” because every being either simply or in a qualified sense is one.

55 To the other,⁴⁶ that which “one” signifies is not a [first level] relation, but a relation superadded to it, as similarity to whiteness. About this look in Bk. V, q. 2 or 3,⁴⁷ which is concerned with the category “relation.”

nunquam demonstrative... ‘Hic’ vero et ‘haec’ et ‘hoc’ in constructione posita substantiam significant. Non ergo sunt articuli sed pronomina.”

⁴²Cf. supra, n. 5.

⁴³Cf. supra, n. 6.

⁴⁴Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 8.

⁴⁶Cf. supra, n. 9.

⁴⁷Cf. infra, Bk. V, q. 12 nn. 33-47 which is second of four questions “De relatione;” see below n. 74 of this question.

[E.—SOLUTION TO THE ARGUMENTS AGAINST AVICENNA]

56 [9] To the arguments⁴⁸ against the opinion of Avicenna it must be said that he concedes non-essential convertibility, but being and one are the same in the subject but not according to essence. For if they were, multitude qua multitude would not be a being, because a multitude qua multitude is not one, so that this is an essential predication, but “one” happens to multitude. Therefore, [one and being] are converted but not essentially or according to essence.

57 To the other of Boethius⁴⁹ that every being either simply or in a qualified sense is one; Avicenna concedes this.

58 To the other⁵⁰ that in which indivision is, is naturally prior to that in which division exists, and that is part of multitude; however the concept associated with the term or the name is indivision.

59 To the contrary: that which is a part *per se* of multitude is something positive from what is granted; if it is the same essentially with being, then “one being” would be a vain repetition. But if it is something positive other than what being asserts, then one may impose upon that positive entity a name, and that name will not signify a privation.

60 I reply: this other is positive, but because it is unknown, it is not named positively, but privatively; hence, one includes something positive that is not just being.

61 To the other two together⁵¹ that infer the same conclusion against the other opinion⁵² about one being a principle of number. If therefore “one” in general is not a determined genus [as they claim], then neither is “one” as a principle of number (if their arguments hold). To the forms,⁵³ that if one does not assume another “one” than one which is a principle of number, there is no vain repetition, because it is not of some genus as a species but as a principle of a

⁴⁸Cf. supra, n. 41.

⁴⁹Cf. supra, n. 42.

⁵⁰Cf. supra, n. 43.

⁵¹Cf. supra, nn. 44-45.

⁵²Cf. supra, nn. 22-25.

⁵³Cf. supra, n. 44.

genus, nor is genus included in its concept, nor is being as it is in that genus.

62 Similarly to the second:⁵⁴ this unity does not receive *per se* predication of any genus. Or another way, given that it does, it does not [receive such] in the abstract, nor is entity predicated of the genus except in the abstract.

63 To the third:⁵⁵ [unity] is an attribute of any species in that genus but it is not an attribute of itself, because it is not a species nor an individual.

[F.—OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST AVICENNA]

64 [10] Against Avicenna it was argued in another way that if unity is of a determinate genus (from which [assumption] he did not concede being and one are essentially the same, then this is a *per se* predication of the second mode: “Whiteness is one, color is one,” from which it follows that quantity is posterior to all the other categories, because unity is prior to all species of quantity, since it is a principle of quantity alone. But unity is posterior to every genus, because every attribute is posterior to its subject, and “one” is an attribute of every genus; therefore, quantity is posterior to all of the nine genera or categories.

65 Also, substance is prior to accidents; therefore it is prior to quantity; therefore, it can be understood apart from quantity, because in this way it is one, and I can then understand it as being the same as itself and diverse [i.e., different from another], since those relations are immediately based upon the essence of substance. But it is impossible to understand essential identity and diversity without essential unity and plurality. Therefore, such unity and multitude is without quantity.

⁵⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 45.

⁵⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 46.

[II.—SCOTUS'S OWN SOLUTION]

66 It must be said to the question that [unity and being] are not converted because of the reason given (which was the second [n. 2] to the first part of the question⁵⁶ and which also was the first for the opinion of Avicenna [n. 38]), [they are only convertible in the sense that everything is one either] 'simply or in a qualified sense.' This disjunct is convertible with being, as is 'potency or act.' Neither [disjunct] taken alone, however, is [equated with or predicated of being] *per se*. Nor are they the same essentially, because of [the arguments against] a vain repetition,⁵⁷ and of predication in the abstract. [However both [are predicable] of themselves [in the abstract], and also because being in the abstract⁵⁸ is predicated of something, of which one is not, as of multitude.

[A.—TO THE ARGUMENTS IN OPPOSITION]

67 It is relevant to the arguments about the mind of the Philosopher⁵⁹ that to the same science it pertains to consider the subject, such as "being," and its disjunct attribute, "one or many," and both aspects of the disjunct. Hence, he intended to prove here that it pertains to the same science to consider being and one. To prove this it is not required for the antecedent that "one" be the same essentially as "being," nor that it be convertible or coextensive with "being," but it suffices that this 'disjunct together with its opposite' is converted or is coextensive with being. And from this the conclusion of the Philosopher follows.

68 And then to the argument⁶⁰ is the fact that being and one are not the same nor simply convertible essentially, because the Philosopher⁶¹ says that they follow one another as principle and cause. And when he says⁶² that "a being man" and "one man" all say the same, one must say that they are one as to their subject,

⁵⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 8, 12.

⁵⁷Cf. *supra*, nn. 13-17.

⁵⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 18-20.

⁵⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 10-11, 28-40.

⁶⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 10, 28-31.

⁶¹Cf. *supra*, n. 28.

⁶²Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

because the same [subject] is asserted when one says “man” and “risible.”

69 To the other⁶³ [when it was said] that the substance of everything is one not according to accident is true, because it is not “through something other” [i.e., than substance or essence]. However, it is not assumed that the predication of one of substance is *per se* in the first mode, but rather in the second, as an attribute of its subject. And it can be said that “one” is of a determinate genus, as Avicenna says.⁶⁴ My proof is this: I accept “one” as an attribute in the category of substance, [viz.] ‘this is some being, either [1] a being in a subject or [2] a being not in a subject. For though “white man” and “non-white man” do not contradict, nevertheless in regard to man, “white” and “non-white” do.

70 In the same way in regard to being “in a subject” and “not in a subject” do contradict each other. Neither of these is an attribute of another [subject] nor are they the same as each other nor is one an attribute of the other. If it is the second [i.e., a being not in a subject], then it is a substance; hence, it is the same [as the subject] to which unity pertains, or it is other. But if it [i.e., one] is a being in a subject, then it is an accident in some determinate genus. I concede then that every one is of a determinate genus, namely, quantity; for as everything other than God is created, so that creation-attribute is a property of a created being, and nevertheless, creation is of one category or genus, such as relation, and is a determinate species in that genus, so one can be of a determinate genus and yet pertain to the whole being simply or in a qualified sense. Nor is its essential notion varied because of the diversity of the subjects in which it is; otherwise “equal” and “similar” would not be in a genus, because they are in things of any predicate or genus. Hence, there is nothing here that militates against Avicenna.

⁶³Cf. *supra*, nn. 11, 32-40.

⁶⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 21-27, 44-45.

[B.—TO THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY AGAINST
AVICENNA]

71 [12] To the first⁶⁵ I reply that every attribute in addition to the fact that it is an attribute, is something in itself. Similarly about relation, one can conclude that it is founded upon each of the predicates, but that considered in itself as a predicate it is prior to being an attribute. Unity, however, considered in itself as such is prior to whatever else befalls it. Therefore, although it is posterior to its subject qua attribute, considered in itself as such it is prior.

72 Or another way would be this. There is an essential order of quantity to substance and in comparison to substance, quantity is prior to the other accidents, because it inheres in substance more immediately than any other accident. But an order of things is based on what in them is essential or principal, not what is accidental. It is accidental, however, to compare quantity with the other categories of accidents.

73 To the other claim⁶⁶ that if you only understand substance you do not understand identity or diversity, [I say]: If you wish to understand relation, however, it is necessary first to understand something prior to the relation but posterior to substance, namely, the foundation of the relation, and I grant you the foundation, namely, unity. For as unity applied to a supposit make for suppositional unity, so unity applied to essence makes for unity of the essence and nevertheless unity is always an attribute in the category of quantity.

74 You will find just how this is to be understood in Bk. V, q. 3 or 2, dealing with the chapter 'On relations',⁶⁷ because unity also differs in degree.

75 Against this reply:⁶⁸ It is only with the genus of man and of ass, and with the concept of no other, that this true proposition can be

⁶⁵Cf. supra, n. 64.

⁶⁶Cf. supra, n. 65.

⁶⁷Cf. infra, BK. V, q. 12 [6] which is second question "De relatione"; see also Bk. V, q. 9, nn. 33-71.

⁶⁸Cf. supra, n. 73.

formed: "Man is man" and "Man is not an ass." The affirmative is only true because of an identity of the terms or extremes, and the negative because of their diversity. Therefore, identity and diversity are first understood.

76 Reply: here is the order that obtains. First, we conceive "man" and "ass." Second, we conceive "Man is man" and "Ass is ass"; then through these first affirmatives, or through one of them, we conceive the negative "Man is not an ass." This is done without conceiving some extreme of another category. After this we first conceive "Man is one, ass is one"; and this second afterward: "Ass is the same as itself" and "Man is the same as himself." Thirdly, because "one" and "one man" and "ass" are distinct or many, it follows that they are diverse. Hence, it is false to say that the truth of the affirmative is the identity of the extremes and the truth of the negative is their diversity. Indeed, it is more the other way around, as is evident from what has been said.

[III.—A FURTHER RESPONSE OF SCOTUS TO THE QUESTION:
FOUR DOUBTS AND THEIR SOLUTION]

77 [13] {{Note there are certain difficulties about this question concerning "one" and "being." First, does "one" assert something positive? If so, then—second—is it converted or coextensive with being? If so—third—is the "one" that is converted with being the "one" that is the principle of number or is it something that is simply transcendent? Fourth, does one, if is transcendent, assert some thing other than that asserted by being?—This is a common doubt about all the transcendentals, true, good, etc. Or, if it is a principle of number, does it assert some thing other than that of which it is? And this pertains to the question about the categories or predicaments, namely, whether they assert different essences.

[A.—DOES "ONE" ASSERT SOMETHING POSITIVE?]

78 To the first you have what is said above (in q. 2).⁶⁹ Note in the *Summa*.⁷⁰

⁶⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 58-60.

⁷⁰Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 43, q. 3 resp. (II f. 10T); a. 25, q. 1 resp. (I f. 147E).

79 Avicenna confirms this in Bk. III of his *Metaphysics*, ch. 3:⁷¹ “If someone were to say that a plurality is composed of things which are not units, as of men, we say that these things are not units but things subject to units. In this way also they are not a plurality, but things subject to a plurality”; therefore, besides humanity unity, which is a *per se* part of a plurality, is something positive.

80 This is confirmed: privation posits no perfection; unity does. This is proved, because in anything it is more perfect to have it than not have it. For division everywhere implies imperfection, both [1] because in imperfections one never finds things reduced to something that is such in a maximal degree, just as there is not a greatest evil to which all evils are reduced as to one highest; and also [2] because privation is not subject to degrees of more or less. Something, on the other hand, is more one than another is, such as something simple with respect to something composite—this from Avicenna *Metaphysics* III, ch. 2.⁷² Regarding what is said privatively, see Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 4:⁷³ “A plurality is more sensible.” Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 3⁷⁴ also says plurality is prior with respect to what can be imagined. [14]

[B.—IS “ONE” CONVERTIBLE WITH “BEING”?]

81 [14] About the second we have the following. Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 2 and VII, ch. 1⁷⁵ says the division⁷⁶ into the one and the many does not militate against this; for it is not properly speaking a division through opposites. He insists, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 6⁷⁷ in no way are they opposed, but it is as if one were to say, being, another being, another being, etc. In this way [being] can be divided into one and ones, so that properly many things are not a being, but beings, and thus they are one plurality itself.—Similarly, it is not only a “being in the soul” [ens in anima]

⁷¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 3 (AviL 116).

⁷²Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 2 (AviL 114).

⁷³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054a 26-28.

⁷⁴Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, c. 3 (AviL 115).

⁷⁵Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, c. 2 (AviL 114).

⁷⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 12, 41, 56.

⁷⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 6, AviL 141: “Igitur iam manifestum est quod oppositio quae est inter unum et multum non est oppositio contrariorum.”

but in reality being in a proper sense is one in a proper sense; Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 5.⁷⁸

82 Aristotle [*Metaphysics*] X, ch. 4⁷⁹ asserts that [being an one] are opposed as indivisible and divisible, and afterwards, as contraries; the contrariety extends to separation, not such as is characteristic of diverse species, but as it were between individuals, which properly speaking is called discretion. "For unity only removes plurality because it first posits unity," Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 6.⁸⁰

[C.—IS THE "ONE" THAT IS COEXTENSIVE WITH "BEING"
THE ONE OF NUMBER?]

[Pro]

83 [15] To the third article one proceeds in this way. For it seems at first that one which is a principle of number is not convertible with being.

For—as was proved above, question 2⁸¹—unity which is a principle of number is the continuum.

84 This is confirmed from *Physics* III:⁸² "Number is caused by a division of the continuum."

85 Also the principle of number is not unity, because from it enumeration begins. For in this way 5 would be a principle of 6, because it is numbered before 6. Therefore, something is a principle because it contains number in itself; but this is only the continuum, since only from its division does number come. However, number is threefold: sensible, mathematical, and formal. The last named is not in continua, but exists in the participants that share something in common. [arg. i] For everything is measured by something of the same sort;⁸³ and [formal] unity measures this.

⁷⁸ Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 5, AvI 133.

⁷⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054a 20-23.

⁸⁰ Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 6, AvI 140.

⁸¹ Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

⁸² Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 7, 207b 1-10.

⁸³ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 18.

86 Also, Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 5:⁸⁴ “Number is not a plurality which does not agree in or share some unity.”

[Contra]

87 Against this: it follows that as there is a minimum in number, so in continua, because [continua are] everywhere in act, not potency. The consequent [i.e. there is a minimum in continua] is against Aristotle.⁸⁵ [Hence, no minimum in number.]

88 It is confirmed from BK. IV of *On Genesis* 3,⁸⁶ where Augustine says about the understanding of ‘six’ that the intellect has rejected corporeal objects from the imagination, because these are divisible whereas units are indivisible.

89 Also, whatever of continuity there is in the continuum, the whole remains really in the parts, whereas the unity which was previously there does not remain; therefore, that continuity is not essentially that unity.—Proof of the first [that the whole remains in the parts]: Otherwise division would seem to be truly generation. Similarly nothing is there that is new, it seems, except the terminal point.

90 Also, there would be three species of unity as there are of continuity, [viz.]: length, width, and depth.

91 Also, how in the same quantity do we have one whiteness today and tomorrow some other [whiteness]?

92 Also, unity as a principle of number more truly pertains to the point than to the continuum, because the point exists immediately by reason of position.

93 Also, an accident cannot be abstracted from a *per se* subject, because it is defined through it [the subject]; number, however, is abstracted from the continuum, because arithmetic is prior to geometry (Bk. I of this work and *Posterior Analytics* I).⁸⁷

⁸⁴ Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, c. 5, AviL 133: “Numerus autem non est multitudo quae non conveniat in unitate: ita quod non est necesse dicere esse aggregatum ex unitatibus. Ipse enim numerus in quantum est aggregatus unus est.”

⁸⁵ Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 1, 231a 24-25.

⁸⁶ Augustine, *De Genesi ad litteram*, ch. 7, n. 13, (CSEL 28¹ 103; PL 34, 301).

⁸⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2, 982a 28; *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 27, 75a 38-39.

94 [16] Also, [there are the] arguments given earlier in the fourth argument for the opinion of Avicenna, against the proofs of the first opinion.⁸⁸ This does not follow: “Something is caused in this way; therefore, it is only caused in this way. For, according to them,⁸⁹ a celestial body together with fire constitutes a number which never originated from the parts of the same continuum.

[1.—DEFENSE OF CONTINUITY AS THE PRINCIPLE OF NUMBER]

95 Reply:⁹⁰ all continua by reason of their continuity are suited by nature to become one, although at times this is not possible because of the most perfect forms of the continua. [circles or spheres of celestial bodies]

96 Against the second proof:⁹¹ if unity of the whole is a principle of number because it contains parts which once divided make number, and unity is a part of every number of which it is a principle, then, the unity of the whole is a part of number caused by its division. But after its division there are two unities of the divided parts, and besides this—as was proved⁹²—the unity of the whole. Therefore, it is a principle and thus a part; therefore, a binary will [would] be a trinary.

97 Hence, I reply: not only is unity a principle, because from it enumeration begins, but also because it is a *per se* part of number and in potency to its form, whereas no number is *per se* a part of number, as we glean from Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 5.⁹³ Hence six is once six and not twice three.

98 What is said about the triple number⁹⁴ is not cogent, because that division can be based on what is enumerated, namely because number of this or of that [sort of thing]; but [the several kind] is not

⁸⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

⁸⁹Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 29 q. 5 arg. 2 and ad 2 (I f. 173F, 174L); *Summa* a. 29 q. 7 resp. (I 175Y).

⁹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 83-84.

⁹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 85.

⁹²At the beginning of this paragraph.

⁹³Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, c. 5, AviL 136: “Non putetis quod sex sunt tres et tres: sed sunt sex semel.”

⁹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 85.

based on what is essential to the meaning of number in itself. Thus, the same number is sensible, mathematical, although considered in different ways.

99 Note: The the first argument⁹⁵ against this opinion raises a doubt: Is unity entirely non-extended, as the soul is non-extended?

[2.—SOLUTION OF THE THIRD ARTICLE]

100 [17] So far as the third article goes, leaving behind the opinion⁹⁶ first rejected here,⁹⁷ we must note that there are not two unities of the same thing, Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 3.⁹⁸ Hence, unity which is the principle of number is in everything, in which it does not really differ from that unity which is convertible with being. But the concept of transcendent unity is always more general, because it is of itself indifferent to limited and non-limited. Unity of a determinate genus, however, necessarily implies something limited, as everything does that is in any genus.

101 But where is unity a principle of number?—I reply: [1] either in every created thing, because of every created thing there is a limited unity, and then the subject of that unity is a created being, which is divided into the ten genera or categories. [2] Or it is only in substance, because of that argument above, where it is argued against Avicenna, at this sign 'O-O-O.'⁹⁹ And then only substance, as a most general genus will be the subject of such unity and not some quantity, nor subsequent accidents, lest other accidents be postulated prior to quantity. For unity is simply the first accident, because the first in quantity which is the first with respect to the other accidents. Of this disjunctive¹⁰⁰ perhaps the first part [1] is truer, because the arguments for the second part [2] are solved later.¹⁰¹

⁹⁵Cf. supra, n. 83-84.

⁹⁶Cf. supra, n. 85.

⁹⁷Cf. supra, n. 95-99.

⁹⁸Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 3, Avil 119.

⁹⁹Cf. supra, nn. 64-65, 73.

¹⁰⁰Namely, unity as a principle of number is either in every created thing or only in substance. Cf supra n. 101.

¹⁰¹Cf. infra, n. 146-149.

102 Nor is unity as the principle of number assumed to be prior to transcendental unity. If therefore that transcendental unity can be as it were an attribute of posterior genera of accidents, why cannot unity which is a principal of number not be as it were an attribute of later genera of accidents, notwithstanding its primacy among accidents?

103 This is confirmed: it does not seem against the primacy of an accident to be in a posterior subject, but not as in a first [subject] but as contained under the first, so long as the first subject is something common to the subject that is simply prior and is simply posterior.

104 [18] If we hold, then, the first part of the disjunctive,¹⁰² it follows that in every created thing the unity convertible with being is really not different from the unity of the category of quantity, although the concept of transcendental unity is always more general, as has been said.¹⁰³ For truly nothing can be a part of number except insofar as it is limited, since to have a potential relationship to the form of the whole is of the very essence of what it means to be a part. And one qua convertible with being does not imply limitation; therefore, from such as such we do not get number, nor plurality that is in anyway one, but only an aggregation—as Henry of Ghent says of the ten categories.¹⁰⁴

105 The unity of quantity [quantitative unity], in truth, because it asserts something limited *per se*, is therefore a *per se* part of number. Therefore, every plurality of creatures really is number, although not insofar as it is from units by a unity convertible with being, but insofar as it is from units of the category of quantity, because these two unities are not really two in creatures, as was said.¹⁰⁵ And all plurality, if number is only in the soul, has no real part, but only unity as understood, and in this way is limited. Hence in reality there is no unity except the transcendent.

¹⁰²Namely, unity as a principle of number is in every created thing; cf. *supra* n. 101.

¹⁰³Cf. *supra*, n. 100.

¹⁰⁴Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 29, q. 7 resp. (I, f. 177C); *Quodl.* IX, q. 3 (ed. Lovanii XIII, 46-88).

¹⁰⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 100, 104.

106 But this position¹⁰⁶ has to deny God and creature are two by a duality which is number, or many by some one plurality, because every one plurality is a number. It only concedes that they are two by aggregation, however, not because they do not agree in some one, as in being, but because the unity of God is unlimited, something that is against the very idea of a part of number.

107 Also, if your position maintains that a unity of creatures is really accidental, it has at least to postulate that unity at least is naturally posterior to the being in which it is, and thus genera do not differ according to essences, the contrary of which is held in question 5.¹⁰⁷

108 I reply: no real unity is in the category of quantity, nor also unity as a principle, but only perhaps a unity as in the mind and it is a part of number which is a conceptual, not a real quantity.

109 But how then number the persons in the divine?—I reply: there is limitation [which is twofold, namely], of distinction and of imperfection. Through the first¹⁰⁸ [something] is this and not other; through the second¹⁰⁹ it is perfect in this way, though not entirely. The first pertains to unity as a part of number, but not the second. In this way it is clear how the two points made before are solved.¹¹⁰

[D.— DOES UNITY ASSERT SOME OTHER THING THAN BEING?]

110 [19] As for the fourth article of this question, whether it be about transcendental “one” or about “one” as the principle of number, [all Avicenna was saying is that substance is an accident] according to Avicenna it was a way of designating number, because all number is an accident.

111 Also, as he has argued in *Metaphysics* III, ch. 3,¹¹¹ that “one” is neither a genus nor a difference, but naturally presupposes being in a specific act, and it is in it “not as a part, and it is impossible that

¹⁰⁶Henry of Ghent, *Summa*, a. 29, q. 7 resp. (I, f. 177F).

¹⁰⁷Cf. *infra*, Bk. V, qq. 5-6, n 81-103.

¹⁰⁸I.e., limitation of distinction.

¹⁰⁹I.e., limitation of imperfection.

¹¹⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 106-107.

¹¹¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 3 (AviL 118).

the being be without it" — this seems to be [his] definition of accident.

112 Also, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 1:¹¹² plurality qua plurality is not one.

113 To the contrary: there are two arguments of Aristotle¹¹³ with a confirmation by the Commentator.¹¹⁴

114 Also, there is that argument about identity given here earlier.¹¹⁵

115 Also, every pure or unqualified perfection which pertains to being qua being, exists in a more perfect way in a more perfect being. Proof: since these, existing in the most perfect way in the first being, are pure or unqualified perfections. Substance is simply a more perfect being, therefore it is one in a more perfect way than an accident is. But this would not be the case, if accident, and not substance, were the same essentially as unity, for then the first being would not have all things most perfectly, that are the same as it essentially. But this reason runs counter to the reply which would be given to the Commentator¹¹⁶ (one must stand with the second, not the first [mode of *per se* predication]).

116 Also, all perfection which is in the effect, if it is unlimited so that it pertains to being qua being, is formally in the cause and more perfectly than in the effect. These things are of this sort, and substance is the cause of accident; therefore, etc.

117 Also, just as an accident according to its being or existence presupposes a subject, so unity presupposes a subject that is one.

¹¹²Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VII, ch. 1 (AviL 349).

¹¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003b 23-24; 30-31.

¹¹⁴Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3 (32ra): "Quemadmodum manifestum est quod nulla differentia est inter dicere iste homo et homo, neque in generatione, neque in corruptione; ita est inter dicere homo et iste homo unus, scilicet quod quemadmodum non numeratur subiectum quando dicimus iste homo et homo, neque in generatione neque in corruptione."

¹¹⁵Cf. supra, n. 65.

¹¹⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3 (32rb): "Si dicitur quod est una per intentionem additam suae essentiae, quaeretur etiam de illa re, per quam fit una, et per quid fit una; si igitur fit una per intentionem additam illi, revertitur quaestio, et procedetur in infinitum"; cf. supra, n. 11, 38; et infra, n. 126.

118 Also, if true is assumed to be the subject of the intellect and good the subject of the will, it follows that being will be only intelligible accidentally and also lovable. This seems incongruous, because being is first impressed in the soul, according to Avicenna, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 5¹¹⁷ and we love most to be. This reason seems to be against those who concede the first proposition assumed in upholding the view of Avicenna.¹¹⁸

[1.— ONCE AGAIN TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS ACCORDING TO
THE OPINION OF AVICENNA]

By sustaining the opinion of Avicenna to the arguments to the contrary:

119 To the Philosopher:¹¹⁹ [if one and being] signify the same nature either it is because an attribute is of the same nature as its subject; or they signify being *per se* and one as that which follows being, as the name imposed on an attribute signifies its subject.

120 To the first argument:¹²⁰ as subject and attribute they are not separated.

121 To the contrary: it seems a contradiction that they be separate, which would not be the case if they were two things, since they would be absolutes.

122 Also, it seems the generation of a stone and of being and of one, etc. is the same; otherwise, whenever substance is generated there would be at the same time two or ten generations, but one generation only terminates with one essence.

123 To the first point:¹²¹ perhaps it pertains to the greater potency to be able to make absolute things completely inseparable without contradiction rather than not be able to do so, because the first is power over two differences, namely, those separable and those inseparable; otherwise it would have power only over one, namely

¹¹⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, c. 6 (AviL 31).

¹¹⁸Namely, that 'every number is an accident'; cf. supra n. 110.

¹¹⁹Cf. supra, n. 113; also nn. 10, 28-29, 68.

¹²⁰Namely Aristotle *Metaphysics* Bk. IV, ch. 2, 1003b 30-31; cf. supra, n. 113 and nn. 10, 31, 68.

¹²¹Cf. supra, n. 121.

over separable unities. For example, it pertains to the stronger potency to be able to make [certain] things *per se* compossible and other things in no way compossible, than it would be to be able to make only one [of the alternatives]. Otherwise it would not be contradictory for a being to come to be, or to be understood, [without unity]: Avicenna,¹²² “quiddity is only quiddity.”

124 To the second:¹²³ there is not the same generation *per se* except of substance; other things are generated only accidentally, because they follow the substance generated, as do the other properties.

125 To the second argument,¹²⁴ to every substance “one” pertains *per se* in the second mode, not in the first
—this is true also according to Aristotle, because these are attributes of being qua being.

126 To the argument of the Commentator,¹²⁵ one must stand with the second, not with the first [mode of *per se* predication]; [cf. n. 26].

127 [21] If one objects to this, because of what is said in Bk. X of this work:¹²⁶ “Being and one equally follow all things, etc.”—I reply: Equality of proportion exists between being and one, because just as “something” follows being, so proportionately “one” follows it. But there is not an equality in following this and that, so that there is an equality in what follows; look for the exposition there in Bk. X.¹²⁷

128 To the contrary: if “one” by its very meaning is an accident of being, then it will be an accident to every being.—I reply: everywhere it will be an accident, but not to everything will *per accidens* be the same, for to substances and to other things that exist of themselves, it will be in this *per accidens* [in the sense] that it is not the same essentially. It will be essentially the same as itself, however.

¹²²Avicenna, *Metaphysica* V, c. 5, AviL 275.

¹²³Cf. supra, n. 122.

¹²⁴Cf. supra, n. 113 and nn. 11, 32, 69-70.

¹²⁵Cf. supra, nn. 113, 115 and nn. 11, 33-40.

¹²⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 2, 1054a 14-15.

¹²⁷Here Scotus refers to his own literal exposition of the *Metaphysics* which is now lost; cf. Antonius Andreae, *Expositio in libros Metaph.* X summ. 2, ch. 1 (inter opera Scoti, ed. Vives VI 380b-381a).

[2.— TO THE AFORESAID ARGUMENTS]

129 To the other¹²⁸ about unqualified perfection or pure perfection, I reply that pure perfections which presuppose everywhere the nature of the being *per se* complete in itself, are no more identically in the being *per se* than in a being that is in another, unless that being *per se* is infinite; for then whatever is in it is more identically present there than in any other being. The reason for the first is because such perfections by their nature are always accidents, in such a way that of themselves they do not have to be identified with substance any more than other accidents. But if anywhere they are not accidents or are more identified [with their subject] than accidents, this is because of the unlimited nature of the substance in which they are. But even though a created substance is assumed to contain other things unitively, for instance, all without which its essence is not understood to be perfect, nevertheless, those which of their nature are outside the essence, will not be contained unitively; such are these, so that the distinction of what is unitively contained preceding the intellect, viz., of substance, and what follows from it, seems to be nil.

130 To the other¹²⁹ about the cause: perhaps it is true of an effective cause, not originating [as substance does its accidents] or, at least, not [a case] of a subject [producing its properties and accidents]; and then these accidents would be caused effectively by whatever is producing the substance. Otherwise, the major is true of a pure perfection that is unlimited, namely, which by its nature neither departs from the genus of a *per se* being nor falls into [that of an] accident; otherwise it is not true, unless it be from a cause that is infinite.

131 To the other¹³⁰ about the subject, unity is not an accident following existence but only following essence, as perhaps existence itself is an accident; such an accident, however, only presupposes the quiddity, not some other added disposition [of the subject].

¹²⁸Cf. supra, n. 115.

¹²⁹Cf. supra, n. 116.

¹³⁰Cf. supra, n. 117.

132 [22] The other¹³¹ is against those holding a hypothesis of the object [of the intellect being truth rather than being].¹³² In another way the argument will be against others [holding a formal distinction between truth and being],¹³³ because no matter how much there is a real identity of truth and entity, it will not save the fact that being is *per se* intelligible, if truth be the object, because there is as much a difference so far as the intellect goes, as if the difference were real, because these [truth and entity or being] are as diverse as the concepts of “true” and “being,” as if they were two things in the same thing.

133 For that opinion of Avicenna¹³⁴ are those [reasons] that are presented in Bk. V in the question about the number of the categories, against the second opinion, look there.¹³⁵ Similarly, other arguments to which an answer is given now¹³⁶ are in some way against the opposite part about unitive containing,¹³⁷ because at least entity is naturally prior to those perfections that are unitive contained. Hence, it may be argued about that insofar as it is prior.

[A.—OTHER ARGUMENTS AGAINST THE OPINION OF AVICENNA]

134 [23] Against the opinion it is still argued, because it is impossible that some things mutually befall each other; therefore, truth will not be one nor will unity be true, and this raises the question as to what order *per se* holds between these accidents—what is first? what second? and thus the second will not be the subject of the first.

¹³¹Cf. *supra*, n. 118.

¹³²Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I-II q. 3 a. 7 resp. (VI 34b): “Proprium autem obiectum intellectus est verum”; cf. below Bk. VI q. 3 in its entirety.

¹³³Cf. for example, Richard Rufus, *Sent. Paris*, I d. 35 q. 3 (ed. G. Gal p. 157); Peter John Olivi, *Summa*, II q. 14 (BFS IV 264-272); Alexander of Alexandria, *Metaph.*, V (ed. Venice 1572 f. 147va): “Veritas et entitas unam realitatem dicunt, tamen veritas est una intentio et entitas alia, quia entitas est apta nata concipi praeter veritatem... conceptus unius ex eadem realitate potest concipi praeter conceptum alterius, qualia sunt verum et bonum”; cf. *infra* Bk. VII q. 19 n. 43.

¹³⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 110-112.

¹³⁵Cf. *infra*, Bk. V, qq. 5-6, nn. 44-55.

¹³⁶Cf. *infra*, nn. 134-137.

¹³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 129.

135 Also, there is the process ad infinitum, because these things agree in something and are not entirely the same; therefore, they differ. I ask: In what? That will still be some thing other than either, and it will agree with them and will differ, and this will raise the further question: By what? And so there will be infinite things.

136 Also, a plurality should never be assumed without necessity, according to *Physics* I.¹³⁸ Here there is no necessity. Proof: these by their very nature are not accidents, because if they were formally in God according to the same essential meaning, they would be there as accidents. Hence, the fact that they are accidents, is only because they are OF ACCIDENTS or because substance cannot contain them unitively. But if some [substance] could unitively contain anything, all the more so would it contain these that inseparably follow all entity; therefore, etc.

137 Also, how could God separate from this thing its unity and give it another? For then it would seem to remain the same and other.

[B.—SOLUTION TO THE AFORESAID]

138 To the first of these,¹³⁹ as it is necessary for the other side to assign some order to these [attributes] according to nature, in such way that one is more immediately in the essence than another, so we will give this order: and then being *per se* will only be denominated by everything else; also perhaps what is prior by what is posterior, and what is posterior by what is prior, but only according to accident.

139 To the second¹⁴⁰ the reply is evident above¹⁴¹ from the reply to that argument that asked of the common concept of being as to what distinguishes it.

¹³⁸Aristotle, *Physics*, I, ch. 4, 188a 17-18.

¹³⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 134.

¹⁴⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 135.

¹⁴¹Cf. *supra*, Bk. IV q. 1 nn. 26, 45, 56, 58-61.

140 To the third¹⁴² it seems that whatever is posterior to a specifically perfect quiddity must be an accident, if that quiddity is receptive of accidents. This excludes God.

141 [24] [Notations of Scotus] Note therefore that the argument¹⁴³ about the object of the intellect is simply common to both sides; similarly that of the order of these things.¹⁴⁴ Similarly, "others" can in some way be adduced, to the degree that a difference is assumed there.

142 Note, also, that that opinion¹⁴⁵ about the real diversity need not be attributed to Avicenna, although Averroes¹⁴⁶ seems to have charged him with it. For whatever Avicenna said, in Bks. III or VII of his *Metaphysics*¹⁴⁷ about this matter can be explained there, on the grounds that [for him] an accident is anything that is outside the concept of essence *per se*, as he himself says in Bk. V of this work:¹⁴⁸ "The quiddity is just the quiddity, it is neither universal nor particular, etc.," that is, none of these are actually included in an understanding of the quiddity, but as it were naturally presuppose the quiddity. Perhaps he does not necessarily assume that they are accidents, but rather that they are unitively contained.

[2.— SOLUTION OF THE FOURTH ARTICLE

A.—BEING AND ONE ARE THE SAME BY A REAL IDENTITY]

143 Therefore one could sustain that opinion¹⁴⁹ about the real identity in this way: as the divine essence contains infinite perfections, and contains all unitively in such a way that they are not other things, so the created essence can contain unitively other

¹⁴²Cf. supra, n. 136.

¹⁴³Cf. supra, nn. 132, 118.

¹⁴⁴Cf. supra, nn. 138, 134.

¹⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 132.

¹⁴⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3 (32ra-rb): "Avicenna autem peccavit multum in hoc quod existimavit quod unum et ens significant dispositiones additas essentiae rei...Quoniam si res esset unum per aliquam rem additam suae naturae; sicut credit Avicenna, tunc nihil esset unum *per se*."

¹⁴⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 2-3; VII, c. 1 (AviL 114-122; AviL 349-357).

¹⁴⁸Avicenna, *Metaphysica* V, c. 5 (AviL 275); cf. supra, 123.

¹⁴⁹Cf. supra, nn. 66, 132.

perfections. Everything in God is infinite, however, and therefore properly speaking one perfection cannot be called a part of the total perfection, nor could one get from some one perfection the idea of a genus and difference, which always imply a possible or actual part of the perfection of a species and, therefore, limited perfection. In a creature each perfection contained is limited and is more limited than the containing essence considered according to its totality. Therefore, each of these can be called a part of the perfection, but not as something really differing from it in such a way as to be another nature. But each is another real perfection; “other”—I say—in the sense of not being caused by the intellect, though not “other” to such an extent as we have in mind when we speak of diverse things. Rather it is less of a real difference, provided one ought to call a real difference everything that is not caused by the intellect. A somewhat comparable example of this is in a continuum in which there are many parts; this plurality is real, in such a way as not to be caused by the mind. However, here we do not understand these diverse things to be so real [i.e. as these aliquot parts], but the real distinction here is less, because the plurality is not simply of what is diverse [i.e. in an unqualified sense], but of what is in some way diverse yet contained in one whole. In this way you should understand this difference here, except that here through identity each perfection contained is the containing thing itself, although this is not precisely that as a whole. In a continuum, however, no part is simply through identity the whole itself. Look up this matter about containing unitively and how the contents differ.¹⁵⁰

¹⁵⁰Cf. Duns Scotus, *Rep.* IIA d. 16 q. un. (cod. Oxon. Merton 61 f. 179v-180r): “De continentia unitiva loquitur Dionysius, 5 *De divinis nominibus*, quia continentia unitiva non est omnino eiusdem, ita quod idem omnino contineat se unitive, nec etiam omnino manentium distincte, requirit ergo unitatem et distinctionem. Est ergo continentia unitiva duplex: uno modo sicut inferius continet superiora essentialia, et ibi contenta sunt de essentia continentis, sicut eadem est realitas a qua accipitur differentia in albedine et a qua genus proximum, ut color et qualitas sensibilis et qualitas, et quamquam essent res aliae, unitive containerentur in albedine. Alia est continentia unitiva quando subiectum unitive continet aliqua quae sunt quasi passiones, sicut passiones entis non sunt res aliae ab ente, quia quaecumque detur, ipsa res est ens, vera et bona. Ergo vel oportet dicere quod non sunt res aliae ab ente, vel quod ens non habet passiones reales, quod est contra Aristotelem, IV *Metaphysicae* expresse. Nec tamen magis sunt tales passiones de essentia, nec idem quiditati [MS = quiditatem] quam si essent res aliae. Ideo non sunt potentiae idem formaliter vel

144 [25] To the arguments to the contrary: To the first:¹⁵¹ There is no vain repetition, because diverse names are imposed upon diverse perfections, none of which is included *per se* in the concept of the other.

145 To the second:¹⁵² this is denomination properly so-called, because a nature perfect in itself is presupposed; not however, a denomination from another nature, because this is unitively contained.

146 To the third:¹⁵³ to say that all number of substances is itself a substance seems incongruous, because that form of number whereby number is a being and is one, is not some substance; for it can be present or absent to substances while they remain; therefore all number is an accident; but not every unity [is such]; only that which pertains to an accident.

147 To the contrary: How is a substance a part of an accident, since the whole can exist in something only if the part is in something, and thus is only an accident?

148 I reply: Number by reason of its being discrete—which is its form—is an accident. Units in truth are not *per se* parts of it, because the number itself is a simple form as another accident. But units are quasi-parts of its subject, because its subject is something containing parts, in which parts number is *per se*; not however, in some one [part]; and this distinguishes number from the other accidents.

149 To the contrary: If its subject has parts; therefore it is a quantum: By what quantity? Not this; therefore, by continuity; you deny this.

quiditative, nec inter se nec etiam essentiae animae, nec tamen sunt res aliae, sed idem identitate”; infra Bk. VII q. 13 n. 123-132; Bk. VII q. 19 n. 43-57); The following text is inserted here: “To the contrary: if a line were infinite it would still be continuous and in a genus, according to Bk. VI of the *Topics* (Bk. VI ch. 11, 148b 26-32); therefore because of this it [the notion of genus] is not inapplicable to God.—I answer: everything in God is infinite and hence if he were not formally wise, but only good, then formal goodness would be more excellent than formal wisdom. Against this is Anselm: ‘If He could lie, He would not be God.’”

¹⁵¹Cf. supra, nn. 13, 110 and also nn. 56-65. Note that the arguments responded to in nn. 144-146 are not found expressly in n. 110 but are found in nn. 15-21.

¹⁵²Cf. supra, nn. 18, 110.

¹⁵³Cf. supra, nn. 21, 110.

150 To the fourth¹⁵⁴ the answer is evident: How infer accidentality? This is outside the essence *per se*.

151 To the fifth:¹⁵⁵ plurality is not one *per se* in the first mode (in this way [i.e. the first mode] understand “qua”). It is *per se*, however, in the second mode. But being is *per se* in the first mode. Therefore, the notion of being and the notion of one are not the same *per se*. To the arguments against the second opinion:¹⁵⁶ in the question about the distinction of the predicaments or categories take a look at the response there.¹⁵⁷

152 [26] [Objection against this second way] Against this second way:¹⁵⁸ what seems to follow from it is that nothing can be perfected from diverse essences. Proof: The same reason why a created essence can contain some perfection unitively, by the same token it can contain all without which the essence cannot be perfect, and thus no difference of substances. Also the same reason why it contains one accident such as numerical unity, holds for its containing others, and everything will be simple, not having within itself many essences.

153 [Answer to the objection] I reply: composition is inferred by means of separation. First in this way: if A is transmuted and B remains, they differ essentially; this is [used to distinguish] the medium from place, matter from forms, substance from quantity. Further, when the thing in question cannot be changed, one still does not conclude that there is an essential identity (as if circle were always in brass). But then one must consider if something of the same sort is elsewhere and is an accident there. [If so], then, it is an accident here, because what is an accident to one thing, will never be a substance to another as long as it retains the same nature. For example: transparency in the heavens and in the elements. Further, when perhaps nowhere else is this to be found, one must go to its genus [compared to the genus] of something else, and one must consider of it what refers to that genus *per se*—if there is an essential connection that is not revealed in some other species

¹⁵⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 111.

¹⁵⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 112.

¹⁵⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 104.

¹⁵⁷Cf. *infra*, Bk. V, qq. 5-6, nn. 44-55.

¹⁵⁸Namely, about unitively containing; cf. *supra*, n. 143.

compared to another species. For example, the younger Socrates said,¹⁵⁹ if the form of a circle never was outside gold matter, gold would still not be of the essence of a circle. Hence, if neither the first way nor the second way [of establishing this distinction] is of any use, we must use the third. Figure in general is related to sensible matter in general as this circle is to this gold material and every other figure to its respective material. But wood is not of the essence of a triangle; therefore, by the same token neither is gold the essence of a circle. Let us grant that there is proportionality.

154 Certain ones¹⁶⁰ add that when something has its own active powers and proper actions, then there is no unitive containing; also when something first can be in actual existence without something posterior, then there is no such containing. They give an example of this in the case of the elementary forms with respect to the form of the compound.

155 Against this addition [n. 154]: If some essence could contain in itself diverse formal perfections and each essence had its own proper active power and action, then the first [method]¹⁶¹ would not hold, nor the second,¹⁶² because the perfection of the superior can always be found without this inferior perfection; therefore, [the latter] will never be contained unitively. The antecedent is evident, because it [the superior] is found in another inferior.

156 To that argument about composition,¹⁶³ perhaps one could say that one could never infer composition of substance from anything except from one matter and one form, and the matter is inferred from change. About accidents, however, it is different, because while one remains unvaried, another sometimes varies, and vice versa.

¹⁵⁹Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* VII, lect. 11, ed. Parma XX 490a: "Videtur autem ipsum Platonem Socratem iuniorem nominare, quia in omnibus libris suis introducit Socratem loquentem, propter hoc quod fuerat magister eius."

¹⁶⁰Cf. Peter John Olivi, *Summa* II q. 7 (BFS IV 134-146), q. 54 ad 13 (BFS V 281); Alexander de Alexandria, *Metaph.* IV t. 3-4 (ed. Venetiis 1572 f. 77va, 79ra).

¹⁶¹Namely, if A is transmuted and B remains, then these two differ essentially; cf. *supra*, n. 153.

¹⁶²That is, when something is non-transmutable, then one must consider whether something of the same sort is to be found elsewhere; cf. *supra*, n. 153.

¹⁶³Namely, of the composition of the elements in a mixture; cf. *supra*, n. 154.

157 Note for the third argument to which one replied above:¹⁶⁴ number is a simple accident, not having matter and form, just as whiteness does not; therefore, it is essentially discretion [or its being discrete]. But if this is in things, then this one substance and that one substance are the proximate subject of this discretion; nor is this unity a part of discretion nor a part of the subject of discretion, because the subject of discretion or what is discrete is not first conceived of as quantified, since discretion is the first quantity that is in it; rather this one substance and that one substance is first conceived of.

158 [27] To the contrary: how then is unity a part of number?—I reply: number is taken, then not only for discretion or this state of being discrete, which essentially is number, having this part and that part, but for the composition out of discrete [units], and for what proximately receives it in the subject, namely, units, and that whole composite is like so much flesh. And just this flesh, is assigned as a part of this whole, so also the unity of number. For unity formally does not have the nature of a part, but through the part of discretion grounded in it, it becomes a part, as is evident in the case of flesh.

159 [Something notable regarding unitively containing] And of this unitive containing know that nothing contains unitively that is mutable according to what it contains. For it is because it is this essence that it contains this; therefore if it does not contain, it becomes 'not this.'

160 Also, although what contains unitively could not be changed and be numerically the same according to what is contained, nevertheless, another thing could be containing some of those characteristic contents apart from others, just as sensitive features may be present apart from intellectual features, and if this other could be of the same species as this, then one would argue from the diversity of that to this, as if the same thing numerically were changed.—If a real identity in the same form is postulated [as being capable] of more and less, then the reply does not seem

¹⁶⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 146-148.

sufficient that one could prove composition through mutability in one thing, where another is not changed.¹⁶⁵

[IV.—AN ADDED QUESTION: ABOUT UNITIVE CONTAINING]

161 About what contains unitively, if it be compared to the many [perfections] to which as a unified [whole] these [perfections] always come to be compared, it is a question whether it is compared in this way qua unlimited or qua limited as to its containing this perfection. For instance, if God qua infinite in every perfection causes every created thing, [or] if the essence of the soul as unlimited containing all its powers were immediately the principle of its operations, [or] if whiteness qua whiteness is the object of vision, of the common sense, and of the intellect.

162 PRO It seems that it is this way [i.e. questionable] in all these cases, because such a containing thing is the cause of another order than the perfection contained would be the cause of, because God is an equivocal cause and the perfection contained a univocal cause.

163 Also, if limited qua limited has the power, all the more the unlimited qua unlimited.

164 Also, if the will caused no volition, except insofar as it has in itself its perfection and insofar as it has it, it does not have the opposite perfection; therefore, under no single aspect can it elicit opposite volitions, and thus also not qua free.

165 [28] To the contrary: actions are distinguished through elicitive principles.

166 Also, then the essence would be the immediate principle of generation in God.

167 Also, then potencies would not be distinguished through their acts.

168 Also, neither would they be distinguished through their objects.

¹⁶⁵Cf. *infra*, Bk. VIII, qq. 2-3.

169 Also, nothing is the *per se* cause of an action or is an object qua A, if the same nature of cause and object remain when A is taken away. But if something contained in it is [only] removed by the intellect while [the agent or object] contains this perfection, in the same way it will cause or will be the object; therefore, insofar as it contains A it is not *per se* cause or object; therefore neither is it cause or object, insofar as it is unlimited.

[A.—REPLY TO THE ADDED QUESTION]

170 I reply that everything that contains some perfection unitively has it in itself in another way than it would have it where it exists alone; and besides this, when together with this perfection it contains another perfection, the difference of each can be assumed to pertain to the same illimitation.

171 If this is understood to be characteristic of the first,¹⁶⁶ I reply to the question [n. 161] that this is what the first two arguments prove,¹⁶⁷ if for the second¹⁶⁸ this is not proved by the arguments to the contrary.¹⁶⁹

172 To the argument for the first part about the will,¹⁷⁰ I reply...¹⁷¹

173 When the contained regards the contained, does what contains regard another containing thing? It does not have to do so in the case of causality, because then God would cause [another] God; perhaps in an object and potency it is otherwise. It is obvious in the case of God.

174 In another way the inferior contains unitively the perfection of the higher in the categories; otherwise of dispartes the superior, i.e., the more noble, contains the perfection of the less noble. Unitive containing in one extreme does not require that the first

¹⁶⁶I.e., it is a question whether the container as unlimited is compared; cf. supra n. 161.

¹⁶⁷Cf. supra, nn. 162-163.

¹⁶⁸I.e., it is a question whether the container as limited is compared; cf. supra n. 161.

¹⁶⁹Cf. supra n. 165-169.

¹⁷⁰Cf. supra n. 164.

¹⁷¹The reply is wanting.

containing is in another but rather it requires community. At times it may well have the second containing.[i.e. the less noble]

175 By assuming these to be the same in reality, whence would their order would be known?—I reply: The order of the contents unitively contained is known from their operations.

176 Also, by assuming [i.e we assume] these to be diverse things, why would the removal of one remove the other, or likewise why would the advent of one [cause the advent of the other]. Granting all this, generally whatever would pertain unitively to the contents based on what their nature is *per se*, if they would be diverse things, would pertain to those things as united; for the nature or formal notions of these would not perish. But because of the perfection of the container, they become the same thing, as if many bodies were placed in the hand and from the perfect compression of the hand all become one body, the essential nature of none perishes *per se*. But the example is not entirely similar.

QUESTION THREE

Text of Aristotle: "The most certain principle of all is that regarding which it is impossible to be mistaken." (ch. 3, 1005b 11-12) "The same attribute cannot at the same time belong and not belong to the same subject and in the same respect. We must presuppose, to guard against logical objection, any further qualifications that might be added. This then is the most certain of all principles." (Ibid., 18-21).

Is this principle "It is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not be" the firmest of all?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That it is not:

[a] First because it is false and [b] also because another is better known and [c] also because one can doubt about it.

Proof of the first: opposites can be in the same thing; therefore, contradictories, since they are included in others which can be contraries, *Topics II*:¹ 'To everything in which there is a genus, there is also a species', whether it be in essential or denominative predication. But a shield that is half white and half black is colored; therefore, it is denominated by some species of color; by the whiteness and by the same token by blackness; therefore, it is at the same time both white and black.

2 And so it is with contraries of relative opposites. This is the double of that; therefore, it is double; the opposite of the consequent cannot stand with the antecedent; therefore *a simili*; this is half of that; therefore, this is half; therefore, the same thing is double and half.

3 Also, some inference is good in which the opposite of the consequent does not imply the opposite of the antecedent; therefore, etc. Proof of the antecedent; both in what is uniform about the contingent, and in other instances, 'the stone sees; therefore,

¹Aristotle, *Topics II*, ch. 4, 111a 33-35.

something having eyes sees'; however from the opposite of the consequent it is not valid. To the issue at hand: if the opposite of the consequent does not imply the opposite of the antecedent, then it can stand in truth with the antecedent, and with what the antecedent stands the consequent also stands, and thus we have simultaneously the consequent and its opposite.

4 As for the second [b], namely that something is better known than this principle. Proof: In Bk. IV of this work:² An affirmative statement is better known than its negation; but this [the principle of contradiction] is negative.

5 Also, in the syllogism from opposites the conclusion must be better known in its falsity than the principles themselves; but the conclusion denies the same thing of itself; in the premises the opposites are taken; therefore, it [the conclusion] is better known.

6 Also, one can doubt it. Proof: all cognition has its origin in the senses,³ but one can err regarding all sense cognition; therefore, also regarding intellectual cognition one [can err].

7 Also, one can know in general and be ignorant of the particular; in *Prior Analytics* II,⁴ so that one can opine the opposite in particular, but that is the contradictory of what is known; as every mule is sterile, and some [mule he sees and thinks to be with foal] is not; therefore one can opine contradictories.

8 [2] For the opposite there is the Philosopher, because of the three conditions:⁵ [1] that one cannot doubt it; [2] that it is not a conditional; [3] that it is a principle everyone must have.

[I.—STATE OF THE QUESTION]

9 These are the conditions of a most certain or firm principle. Proof of the first according to the Commentator:⁶ One cannot doubt it, because if one did, he could think that contraries were in the same thing, for instance, that the same thing is both hot and cold.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4, 1008a 17-18.

³Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics*, I, ch. 18, 81b 6-9.

⁴Aristotle, *Prior Analytics*, II, ch. 21, 67a 26-38.

⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 3, 1005b 12-18.

⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 9, f. 36ra.

10 Proof of the second, that it is non-conditional: because all propositions are reduced to it.

11 Also it is the principle of all the axioms. Therefore, it cannot be acquired through something else. Therefore, it is immediately known once its terms are known.

12 Against this: that the first declaration⁷ is not valid, because it begs [the question], since the consequence is not more incongruous than the antecedent. For if one can think of contradictories being [true] at the same time, all the more so contraries.

13 It is said that it is more impossible according to the sense knowledge.—To the contrary: the Philosopher says at the end of this Bk. IV,⁸ that no sense asserts at the same time to be and not to be.

14 Also, here he [Aristotle] has not argued against those who deny the first principle, but he proves that for those who accept it it is best known. But that contrary opinions cannot be in my soul is better known to me according to the intellect, than that this is the most certain or firm principle. Therefore, one must not take refuge here in something better known according to the senses.

15 Also, in the inference of the Commentator,⁹ there is a fallacy of the consequent, because to contraries contradictories follow, not vice versa. But one may well opine or know the consequent, although I will never know or opine the antecedent. This is evident from many instances. Hence, note that he [Aristotle] does not lead one to the incongruity that someone is opining contrary beliefs, but that contrary opinions are in the soul, which are opinions of contradictories. The Commentator goes to the [objects] opined.

16 One can explain the first condition¹⁰ in this other way: The intelligible species are related to the intellect as the material forms are to matter; but opposite forms cannot exist in matter simultaneously; therefore, neither can the species of contradictories be simultaneously in the mind.

⁷Namely, 'if one did [doubt the first principle], he could think that contraries were in the same thing'.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1010b 15-19.

⁹Cf. supra, n. 9.

¹⁰Viz. that one cannot doubt first principles; cf. supra, nn. 8-9.

17 Nevertheless, this does not hold good, because then one could not know many contraries at the same time, which is false, because the species of contraries are together also in vision; otherwise one would not judge about contraries at the same time; therefore in the intellect all the more so are there species of contradictories; hence, they [i.e. the species] are not contradictories.—

[3] Also, contradictories are understood through the same species.

18 {{How is magnitude that is actually infinite grasped by simple intellection or something under its opposite, because this is first presupposed in Bk. II¹¹ and there—according to you—one assumes not a habit but species in simple intellection and species of the contraries at the same time?

19 I reply: it is understood by apprehensive intellection, not assenting as is the case with understanding a proposition through a habit.

20 On the contrary: no simple intelligible is understood by an assenting intellection. How then are magnitude and infinite magnitude grasped differently by the intellect through simple apprehension. It does no good to say that by two simple intellections one understands “magnitude” and “infinity,” because then no repugnance would be understood, at least under the aspect of being repugnant.}}

[II.—TO THE QUESTION]

21 Therefore, it is argued that this does not follow. “One opines two contraries to be simultaneous in existence; opinions of contraries are repugnant to one another, contrary opinions are really in the soul; therefore they cannot be there in the intellect.” Therefore it is argued that for contraries to be in the mind, is impossible, although contrary species could be simultaneously in the mind, contrary opinions could not. And opinion is a certain real habit, and it has real existence in the soul; for science and virtue and habits of this sort do not have just mental existence in the soul. Indeed, they are really there and not elsewhere. Therefore, if two real contrary

¹¹Cf. *supra*, Bk. II, qq. 4-6, nn. 140-142.

habits were in the soul, real contraries would be in the soul. Species however do not have a real existence; hence as it is impossible that ignorance of disposition—which is indeed a habit—is in the soul simultaneously with scientific knowledge, so too it is impossible that there be opposite opinions. For they are not representative intellections [i.e., statements or proposition] but species [i.e. concepts of things].

22 [Objections against this] Against this declaration: “knowledge of contraries is one and the same thing”;¹² knowledge is a habit; therefore, the same habit is of opposites.

23 Also, opinions of contraries are contraries; contraries are not, therefore, of contradictories. The antecedent is evident according to the Philosopher in *On Interpretation*, last chapter,¹³ where he says that opinions are opposed.

24 Also, there seems to be a begging of the question here, because the conclusion which he draws is no more incongruous than the principle from which it follows [for it does not seem to be more incongruous, namely incongruous to what one deduces, and that from which it follows.]

25 [4] [Reply to the objections] To the first:¹⁴ concerning the simple intellect there is no assent nor dissent, because if one assented, then one would combine and divide these simple notions. Of such simple notions, i.e. the species, there is the same scientific knowledge.¹⁵ For I do not assume any habit of them except the species; for I would not assume a habit unless there were assent or dissent there. Hence vision does not assent, but intuitively reaches its object. Hence, scientific knowledge is taken here for a species. And otherwise, it is conceded that of all, viz., contrary propositions, there is the same science, because I know this to be true and the other to be

¹²Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 2, 1046b 10-11.

¹³Aristotle, *De interpretatione* ch. 14, 23a 33-34.

¹⁴Cf. supra n. 22.

¹⁵An interpolated annotation is appended here: “This however is false unless taken discursively from principle to conclusion because the one is known from the other, as must be shown elsewhere” (Cf. Duns Scotus, *De interpr.* opus II Bk. I q. 3 n. 3 [ed. Vives I 588]; *Lectura* I, d. 3, p. 1, qq. 1-2, n. 27 [XVI 234-235]; *Ordinatio* I, d. 3, p. 1 qq. 1-2, n. 35 [III 23]).

false; it is not the same habit by which I adhere and assent to this and to that, but that by which I assent to this, I dissent to that.

26 To the other,¹⁶ I concede the argument; hence, I do not accept here 'contraries' properly speaking, but insofar as it is the same as 'repugnant' and this suffices to prove the opinion.

27 To the other,¹⁷ it does infer what is simply more impossible, for it thus proves this principle is most certain or firm, since it cannot be doubted. For—grant its opposite—then it follows that it is false. Now, that it is impossible for it to be false is more knowable than that one could doubt about a first principle, since many doubt whether it is the most certain who do not believe it to be false. But in other principles also common concepts from the fact that one could doubt about them, it does not follow that they are false.

[III.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

28 As for the first:¹⁸ The implication is good, but the antecedent is false. To the proof: the rule holds in essential predication. But this does not hold, because the Philosopher presents an example where there are [several] denominations. Otherwise: whatever is denominated, etc. [by color] is denominated by one or several species [of color] and this either simply or in a qualified sense; thus it is a shield that is not simply white but white only in a qualified sense.

29 To the other,¹⁹ the implications are valid and they are inferences of Aristotle in the *Categories*,²⁰ where he proves that great and small are not contraries, because they are predicated of the same thing, as a mountain is large or small when taken in respect to diverse things.—When it is stated that "Relatives are predicated of the same thing; therefore, they are relatively opposed," this does not follow, because not all relatives are relatively opposed, as this man is a father and a son; but these are not relatively opposed except where they are affirmed of the same individual, as they are referred to one another, or with respect to

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

¹⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

¹⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

¹⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

²⁰Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 6, 5b 34-38.

the same third person. The first response is better, and if you infer something else, there will be a fallacy of ignorance according to *On Sophistical Refutations*.

Also, some inference is good in which the opposite of the consequent does not imply the opposite of the antecedent; therefore, etc. Proof of the antecedent; both in what is uniform about the contingent, and also in other instances, 'the stone sees; therefore, something having eyes sees;' however from the opposite of the consequent it is not valid. To the issue at hand: if the opposite of the consequent does not imply the opposite of the antecedent, then it can stand in truth with the antecedent, and with what the antecedent stands the consequent also stands, and thus we have simultaneously the consequent and its opposite. Study *Topics* II, ch. 8.

30 [5] To the other:²¹ in the same way, in which the first implication is good, the other is also. To the proof about the contingent etc., one can say that it was not because of something else that the Philosopher denied that a mixture of the necessary and the contingent would not yield a necessary conclusion. It was only that one can not infer some determinate proposition in the mode of necessity, but one which is the consequent to all that are in the mode of necessity. Now the following is not valid "if the consequent follows the consequent, then the antecedent the antecedent." Similarly, from this syllogism: the uniform conversion of the contingent some determinate opposite in the mode of necessity, whether affirmative or negative, does not follow. But what follows is one opposite, which is the consequent of all the necessary premises, viz. "it does not happen that every B is A," where Aristotle does not deny a necessary conclusion follows,²² but that a determinate necessary one does.

31 To the other,²³ it is not a formal implication, neither the first nor the second implication, because they are reduced to a syllogism as every enthymeme is. And one must take such a minor from which it formally follows, namely that a stone has eyes, nevertheless, of

²¹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

²²Cf. Aristotle, *Prior Analytics* I ch. 22, 40a 12-b 15.

²³Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

itself it is not evident; therefore, it is not valid; hence that rule in sophisms: "Whatever follows from the antecedent and consequent, follows from the antecedent *per se*," is not valid. Hence, Boethius says:²⁴ "Let one be silent [Do not express] about a self-evident proposition."

32 To the other:²⁵ this too does not follow: "Every man whom you do not know, is running; therefore you are running." For that to which one descends is not contained under what was distributed. Similarly, the second implication is not valid 'from the opposite,' etc.

33 To the main argument about most certain:²⁶ I say that this principle is formally affirmative, as is this. From "It is not impossible that a man runs" one can validly infer that "It is possible that a man runs." Similarly, this principle "It is impossible for the same thing to both be and not be" implies validly this "It is necessary that these be same thing not both be and not be." Hence, the dictum is denied, but not the mode.

34 [6] To the other:²⁷ many syllogisms are taught as hypotheticals, because in such a mode one can argue, not because one can prove anything through these modes. The proof of this: there he [Aristotle] teaches about the syllogism from false premises, and through such [premises] one will never prove anything. Similarly, with the circular syllogism through which nothing is proved; indeed from the fact that it is circular it is not probative. Hence I say that this is more knowable: "It is impossible that something be and not be the same simultaneously" than the denial of the same of itself. Hence, although one might deny that the same thing is itself, nevertheless, one would never say that it is the same as itself and not the same as itself.

35 To the other:²⁸ all deception through the senses about what could be outside will not have falsified the first principle;²⁹ hence,

²⁴Boethius, *De syllogismo hypothetica*, PL 64, 844D.

²⁵Cf. supra, n. 3.

²⁶Cf. supra, n. 4.

²⁷Cf. supra, n. 5.

²⁸Cf. supra, n. 6.

²⁹Cf. supra, Bk. I, q. 4, nn. 18, 43-56, 62-64.

never does some sense say this that this sensible object is this and is not this in the same instant.

36 To the other:³⁰ it is true and it is a cause because the minor will never be [logically] connected with the major. Hence, the Philosopher wishes³¹ that the major alone happens to be known first in time before the minor and the conclusion. Nevertheless, the major is known, and the minor and the conclusion, at the same time, if they are applied [or put together as an argument]. Hence, to the form: when it is said that one can be ignorant in particular and know in general, this is true because of this [fact], that this particular is not known to be contained under the universal. But if I would know [the particular is contained under the universal] and would make use of this [in an argument], then this is not so, [for] the implication does not hold. For I do not think of something contradictory unless I would think this mule [i.e. this pregnant animal] is contained under “mule” and under the aforesaid assumption I do not do this. Neither does it follow “I doubt this; therefore, I doubt something,” but it is a fallacy of the consequent. For I am certain this is false: “Some mule is not sterile,” but it is not necessary to simultaneously know that this is false “This animal is a mule” etc. because, just as a true antecedent [allows one to argue to] the truth of the consequent, thus the falsity of the consequent [allows one to argue to] the falsity of the antecedent.³²

³⁰Cf. supra, n. 7.

³¹Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1, 71a 17-22.

³²Here the Tortosa codex has the following annotation: “Note that one could prove in another way that this is not simply a first principle in propositions ‘it is impossible for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be’. First, because it is a negative proposition as is clear from its opposites which are affirmative: ‘It is contingent for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be’ and ‘It is necessary for the same thing simultaneously to be and not to be’. However, no negative proposition is simply first, at the end of Book II *De interpretatione* (Bk. II ch. 14, 23a 27-38). But each such is reduced to a prior affirmative. Secondly, because this proposition can be deduced from prior propositions syllogistically as follows: ‘being is being; non-being is non-being; therefore being and non-being are not the same’. Thirdly, because it is a hypothetical proposition with a conjoined predicate, and hence can be resolved into more simple categorical propositions. Fourthly, because in truth it is not the most well-known, because one can doubt it and believe the opposite. In I *Physics* (Bk. I, ch. 3, 186a 4-5), the Philosopher says that those who regard everything as one being, posit contradictories simultaneously, and hence it seems that not every first principle is naturally known like the door to the house

(Averroes, *Metaphysica* Bk. II, com. 1 [f. 14^{rb}]). Fifthly, because it is not something first in the divine intellect, nor are its terms first known; rather the Deity—and not being in general about which there is doubt as far as our understanding is concerned—is first understood and the reason for understanding all else. Sixthly, because its opposite is not most false, namely ‘something is and is not, or can simultaneously be and not be’. The falsity of the following seems to be better known, i.e. ‘being is not being’ or ‘no being is being’, because from this proposition more falsities follow and it contains more impossibles and false than the first proposition, since it is universal, whereas the first is particular. Seventhly, because the Philosopher and the Commentator in Book IV of the *Metaphysics* (Bk. IV, ch. 4, 1006^a 1-18; Bk. IV, com. 9, f. 35^{vb}-36^{rb}) prove it by arguing against those who deny it. Now they do this either by deducing its opposite from better known true or false propositions, in which case it is not the most known or a first principle. Or else they argue from propositions which are not better known, and thus such a proof is not at all valid. However, this argument deserves much reflection. Confirmation: because terms are ‘multiple’ because being is predicated in many ways, according to *Physics*, Bk. I (ch. 2, 185^a 22-23). Thus, this [proposition] is neither simple nor first nor best known.

QUESTION FOUR

Text of Aristotle: "But on the other hand there cannot be an intermediate between contradictories, but of one subject we must either affirm or deny any one predicate." (*Metaphysics* IV, ch. 7, 1011b 23-25)

Is there an intermediate between contradictories?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That there is:

According to Bk. II¹ of this work, there is always something in between "There is a generation" and "There is not a generation"; therefore, etc.

2 Also, between extremes of greater distance there are several intermediaries; therefore, between infinitely distant things there is an infinity of media; contradictories are infinitely distant, because one cannot think of a greater distance, for if one could, then it [i.e., anything greater than this] will fall under a contradiction; [for] one can always think of [this term, viz.] 'something greater than anything finite.'

3 Also, between every relative there is an intermediary relation; contradictories are referred to one another; therefore, there is an intermediary relation.

4 Also, there is a medium through denial, because a shield half of which is white and the other half black is neither white or non-white.

5 Also, if there were no intermediate in this way; then one could say of anything [that one of the two alternatives is true],² but both of these statements are false: "Every man is white" and "Every man is non-white."

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994a 27-28.

²Cf. Aristotle, *De interpretatione* I, ch. 9, 18a 29-30; *Topics* VI, ch. 6, 143b 16; *Metaphysics* IV ch. 3, 1005b 19-24.

6 The opposite represents the intention of the Philosopher in *Posterior Analytics* II.³ "A contradiction is an opposition with no intermediate as such."

7 [vs. 6] Against the [above] definition: it is not proper, since it applies to immediate contraries.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

8 To this, it must be said that there are multiple definitions, in as much as a negation can negate perseity, or that there is perseity of negation there; and then there is there the understanding that perseity is affirmed; then "it is an opposition of which, as such, there is no intermediate." ['A is *per se* B' 'A is B' is *per se*.] From this it follows that in no way whatsoever is there something intermediate. For where there is one opposite *per se* the rest cannot be there in any way. But between immediate contraries there is *per accidens* an intermediate, but that is not the case here [i.e. with contradictories].

[II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS
A.—TO THE FIRST INITIAL ARGUMENT]

9 [2] To the first argument at the beginning:⁴ that there is nothing between being and not being if these are accepted as contradictories. However, if we take not-being as nothing and being as being in act, then there is an intermediary.

10 [Objections] On the contrary 'every change represents something intermediate between its *per se* terms';⁵ but the terms of generation or coming to be are contradictories, because they are to be and not to be. Proof of the assumption: *Physics* V:⁶ "Coming to be is from a non-subject to a subject"; corruption or perishing is the converse. And he says in that same place that coming to be and perishing are between contradictory states.

³Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 72a 12-13.

⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

⁵Cf. Averroes, *Physica* VI, com. 45, f. 126ra.

⁶Aristotle, *Physics* V, ch. 1, 225a 12-18.

11 Also, in Bk. IV of this work, ch. 6⁷ he argues in this way: If there is an intermediate between being and non-being, then there is some intermediary change between generation and corruption; the implication is not valid unless contradictories be taken as the terms of generation.

12 [Against this reply] It is said to this:⁸ to the minor that the terms [generation and corruption] are not the contradictories, but rather privation and form.

13 To the authorities:⁹ he [Aristotle] understands by “non-subject” privation of form. What follows is explained in a similar way, because privatively opposites are contradictories in regard to a subject apt by nature to be changed.

14 To the other,¹⁰ here in Bk. IV it is said that the argument is from the greater [to the less], namely, if there were an intermediate between contradictories, all the more so between other opposites, and thus between privation and form, and so some intermediate change between that which terminates at form and that which terminates at privation.

15 [3] Against the first gloss,¹¹ in the text where it says “non-subject,” I say privation; therefore, through a non-subject he understands privation.

16 Against the second¹² in this way: there could be a generation or corruption between immediate contraries, because those [contraries] are contradictories with respect to the subject.

17 Also, the reply¹³ concedes the point at issue, if privation and form are the proper terms of generation, but privation and having in regard to something susceptible of them are contradictories. If then between privation and form there is an intermediate, then between contradictories there is a medium.

⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 7, 1012a 6-9.

⁸Cf. supra, n. 10.

⁹Cf. supra, n. 10.

¹⁰Cf. supra, n. 11.

¹¹Cf. supra, n. 13.

¹²Cf. supra, n. 14.

¹³Cf. supra, n. 12.

18 To the first¹⁴ I say: it could be believed that through a subject, understanding this to be a positive form, he would understand [this form to be] only the more noble extreme of the contrariety, since the less noble extreme would be a privation of the more noble. By excluding this [i.e. the subject or more noble], he explains that he understands through “non-subject” the more ignoble extreme of the contrariety, saying by “non-subject” I mean privation. That is to say, both extremes of contrariety, and not only the other which is most perfect; but also the less perfect, as nude and black,¹⁵ [are what we are discussing]. But neither of these is an unqualified privation. Hence by “non-subject” he does not understand some unqualified privation, [which the objection claims]. but the contrary [i.e. a qualified privation]—as has been said.

19 To the other:¹⁶ as to the meaning of contradiction, it involves two [terms or extremes]. The one [asserts that something is necessarily the case], and the other asserts nothing [to be the case]. Immediate contraries [however, i.e., as opposed to ordinary contraries, are those which] with respect to some appropriate natural subject have one condition, namely that one of the two be in it, but the second condition¹⁷ they do not have, because each is positive. And the second is required for generation and corruption—as is evident *infra*¹⁸—but each [i.e., the form generated and the form corrupted] is privatively in opposition [to the other].

20 To the third argument:¹⁹ it speaks either [a] of generation, and then it is neither privation or form, nor is it under privation or form, [i.e., as a subject] as deprived or as informed, and then there is an intermediate between these; but in this way they are not contradictories, but are about something apt by nature to have either. But generation is not a subject of this sort. Or [b] it speaks of what is generated, and that is suited by nature to receive privation and form; then I respond that this subject is always either deprived or

¹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

¹⁵Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* V, ch. 2, 225b 4-5: “... privatio ponatur contrarium, et monstratur affirmatione, nudum et album et nigrum.”

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

¹⁷Namely, the other asserts nothing to be the case.

¹⁸Cf. *infra*, n. 20.

¹⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

formed, because it is deprived up to the last instant, and formed in that instant, and so there is never an intermediate.

21 [4] [Objections to this answer] To the contrary [n. 20]: in regard to a subject suited by nature, for instance in regard to a subject generated or capable of being generated, there is an intermediate between privation and form. Proof from *Physics* VI:²⁰ the Philosopher proves that everything that is changed is partly under the terminus *a quo* and partly under the terminus *ad quem*. Therefore, the subject of mutation is partly under privations and partly under form.

22 Also, if privation is the terminus *a quo* of generation; then the subject itself ceases to exist while it is under privation and not in the instant in which it is under form; therefore in another “before” [i.e., a prior instant] that is not immediate. Therefore, it is mediate [“before”]. And between such there is a medium in which the subject is under neither of the contradictories.

23 [Reply to the objections] To the first²¹ it is said that the proposition is true of divisible mutation, such as is motion, but not of indivisible mutation such as generation is. For at the same time there is [the process of] being generated and the thing generated.

24 To the contrary: the Commentator²² says there that “demonstration” [that divisibility and hence motion] has a place in four categories, namely, substance, quantity, quality and place.

25 Also, I argue in the category of substance, as the Philosopher argues there,²³ what is entirely under the terminus *a quo* is not changed, and when it is entirely in the terminus *ad quem* then it is changed; therefore, what is [in the process of being] changed is partly under the terminus *a quo* and partly under the terminus *ad quem*.

²⁰Aristotle, *Physics* VI, ch. 4, 234b 10-20.

²¹Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

²²Cf. Averroes, *Physica* VI, com. 32, f. 122rb: “Et considerandum est quid sit primum in unaquaque quattuor transmutationum. Nam ista *demonstratio* fundatur super hoc quod hoc primum inveniatur in omnibus transmutationibus.”

²³Aristotle, *Physics* VI, ch. 5, 235b 6-19.

26 To the first of the first of these:²⁴ the Commentator speaks falsely of indivisible generation which is the term of motion. Because, if it has partly privation, partly form, then it does not have the whole form completely. Hence, in order to have it, it must be changed, and then that change is not ultimate. Therefore, I say that this proposition²⁵ obtains in the category of substance only by reason of the motion preceding generation. But from this it does not follow that it is in the category of substance only by an extension of meaning. Hence either the text of the Commentator seems to be twisted or must be denied. Unless [you want to say that] it be because the alteration by [by=that necessarily precedes] generation, which is the term [of the whole process change], can be said to be in the category of substance in a different way than an alteration where generation is not the term. Therefore, one must say—as before²⁶—that the dictum of the Philosopher is true only in the case of divisible mutation.

27 To the other:²⁷ that which is changed only by an indivisible mutation, when it is changed totally it is under the terminus *ad quem*.

28 To the contrary: nothing is changed [in regard to the category of habitus or] to 'what is had', *On generation* I.²⁸—It must be said that something has a form in a state of rest, and the form is presupposed for mutation; to such there is no change. However, a mutation is [a change] to that which is had at the same time but is posterior by nature, because it is now acquired. This is necessary in indivisible mutation.

29 To the other:²⁹ that the subject at times ceases to exist under privation, in the instant in which the form is first there. "Ceases to be" is explained in two ways: In one way by positing the present and negating the future; thus "it is and it will not be." In the other way it is explained by negating the present and positing the past, thus "now it is not and it was." This second mode is how it should be

²⁴Cf. supra n. 24.

²⁵I. e. "demonstratio habet locum in quattuor generibus"; cf. supra, n. 24.

²⁶Cf. supra n. 23.

²⁷Cf. supra n. 25.

²⁸Aristotle, *On generation and corruption* I, ch. 7, 324b 16-17.

²⁹Cf. supra, n. 22.

explained in the case at hand, not the first. For there is no last 'now' of the terminus a quo of generation or corruption, in which that term exists.³⁰

[B.—TO THE SECOND INITIAL ARGUMENT]

30 [5] To the other argument at the beginning:³¹ properly speaking distance is in the category of quantity of which the statement is true. However, it does not hold for "distance" in a transferred sense as applied to other things such as opposites. For immediate contraries are maximally distant³² and nevertheless, there is no intermediate. For here in the case at hand the distance is privative, because one of the contradictories is a privation of the other.

31 To the form: what is taken in the major is not true except where the extremes that are maximally distant are positive, and perhaps not even in all such cases. And perhaps the minor is false that contradictories are infinitely distant, for one of the contradictory terms [is predicated] of anything.³³ For, howsoever little something is distant from one of the contradictories, the other extreme is predicated of it. Then the proposition is glossed in this way: there is there an infinite or maximal distance, i.e. "indeterminate," because any minimal distance whatsoever suffices, and it can also be maximal. Hence, it does not follow that here there is an infinite distance positively. However, it can be there because of some matter, if the other extreme is positively infinite, as "God" and "non-God." Hence, a contradiction requires a minimal distance and permits of a maximal distance, so that it is indifferently preserved in all.

³⁰Cf. Aristotle, *Physics* VIII, ch. 8, 263b 20-21.

³¹Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

³²Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 4, 1055a 10-18; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 135: "Contraria sunt quae sub eodem genere posita sunt, et maxime a se invicem distant."

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

32 [Objection to this response] Against this: if the extremes are not infinitely distant, but indeterminately so, therefore contraries are more formally opposed than contradictories are.

33 Proof: because contrariety posits the maximal and requires it; whereas a contradiction—according to you³⁴—only permits but does not require this maximal degree; therefore, etc. But this is false, because a contradiction is the primary opposition; but the first opposition is maximally such.

34[6] [Response to this objection] To this: [I say] that contraries include positively a repugnance greater than contradictories, nevertheless contradictories permit the greater distance, if there be any such [distance]. Because posit a greater distance than between contraries, and of such a contradiction will be affirmed.

35 Proof of the first:³⁵ because it is impossible that a genus include some perfection which is not in a species with something superadded through which the species is a species. Therefore, since contradictories are included in every opposition, as what is superior to them—I do not speak of the notion of a contradictory, but of those things in which it is affirmatively or negatively—whatever is in a notion by way of contradictory opposition will be in whatever other opposition exists with some thing added, and not vice versa.

36 To the proof of the falsity of the consequent:³⁶ [I say], that 'first' is equivocal in the fifth mode [of priority]. In the *Categories*³⁷ something is said to be first by nature and causality, and such a first is maximally such. But a contradiction is the first [sort of] opposition, not by way of causality, but first because it is most common, that is the second mode of priority in the *Categories*.³⁸ Hence, it is included in any other; therefore, it [the opposition] is not maximal.

³⁴Cf. supra, n. 31.

³⁵Viz. contraries include positively a repugnance greater than contradictories.

³⁶Cf. supra, n. 33.

³⁷Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 12, 14a 26-b 13.

³⁸Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 12, 14a 29-35.

37 To the contrary: that [opposition] is first by causality; proof: because if it were not that opposition, there would be no other, and if there were no other, the opposition would be contradiction. This seems to be a condition of the cause, that it can exist without the caused, but not vice versa. Therefore, it seems that it is first by causality.

38 It must be said that by analogy God would make an animal without a specific difference, as perhaps an animal in an embryonic state. If the animal did not exist, no species would exist, and if no species existed, the animal could be: "Therefore, the animal would be in this way most perfect" is invalid. But it follows from this that "animal" is most common. And so in the case at hand.

39 Also, that between contradictories there is no maximal distance positively.³⁹ Proof: because between all contradictories qua contradictories there is an equal distance; therefore, if some are finitely distant as contradictories, it follows that all contradictories are finitely distant. The assumption is proved, because between contradictories there is some natural change, because concerning himself everyone who is not sitting can sit down; therefore, no contradictories are infinitely distant as such.

40 To this: they are equally distant, as to their mode of their co-existence, not as to the grade of their being.

41 This response does not save the infinite distance, because if one understands "infinite distance" as a mode of co-existence, in this sense as regards the divine potency there is an infinity of things, because God cannot make them all existent at the same time.—Also, then in every opposition there would be an infinite distance, since none could exist simultaneously. If ["infinite distance" be understood] as a grade of being, then there is no infinite distance, because howsoever little one is distant from the other, it ceases to be this.

³⁹This is the proof of the second claim made above in n. 34, i.e. "contradictories permit the greater distance, if there be any such."

[C.—TO THE THIRD INITIAL ARGUMENT]

42 [7] To the third main argument:⁴⁰ [I say] that it is true speaking of intentions, where there is an intermediate relation, and thus all opposites are in the category of relation, because opposition, which is a genus of relations, is there. Speaking of the underlying things, however, it is not true; man and non-man are not referred to each other.

[D.—TO THE FOURTH INITIAL ARGUMENT]

43 To the fourth main argument:⁴¹ some would say⁴² this is not incongruous, from the fact that one of the contradictories is in one part and the other contradictory is in the other. Therefore, [black and white] do not refer to the same thing, but each is present in a qualified sense.

44 To the contrary: then between contradictories there would be an intermediate, just as there is between immediate contraries.

45 It must be said that between contradictories there is no intermediate in an unqualified sense, since in regard to no subject can that subject be simply or in an unqualified sense neither [the one nor the other] but it could be both in a qualified sense. Nevertheless, in other [sorts of opposition] there can be something that is simply intermediary in regard to some subject, because a stone is neither blind nor seeing in an unqualified sense; nor in a qualified sense is it one or the other.

46 But in another way one could say that it is true to say that this shield is not simply white.

47 However, of contraries this is not valid: "This shield is white or black." I say that it is neither, because nothing is denominated by an accident unless that accident is there in an unqualified sense. In contradictories the negative is simply true, because whatever falsifies the affirmative, verifies the negative in an unqualified sense. In a qualified sense it falsifies an affirmative proposition,

⁴⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

⁴¹Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

⁴²Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 7, q. 13 ad 3 (I, f. 63Z): "Veridica igitur iudicia huius scientiae et aliarum circa idem non possunt esse contraria nisi secundum quid."

therefore, it simply or in an unqualified sense verifies the negative.”

48 To the contrary: “If this shield is simply not white, and since it is not black”—and so on for all other colors—“therefore, it is not colored.” But this is false; therefore, also some negative which preceded it. The implication is proved, because whatever is denominated by a genus is denominated by some species, according to one of the ‘considerations’ of *Topics* II.⁴³

49 [8] It must be said that the implication is not valid. As for the proof, one must say that to the destruction of anything inferior in denominative predication, the destruction of the superior does not follow unless every inferior in itself and in conjunction with its opposite species is destroyed [i.e. denied or negated]. But this is not the case with white, black, or white and black together, and in this way the ‘consideration’ of the *Topics* is explained.

50 Another way of explaining the *Topics* is this: what is denominated by a genus should be denominated by some species. This is true of some of those denominations of which there is talk there. Or, namely, in this way: this is white, or this has whiteness, or this has whiteness in it. The last two are true in the case at hand. Or one could put it in this way: this is simply true: “The shield is not colored”, because [it is colored] by no [single] color [exclusively], because it is neither white nor black, as if two persons had a vineyard, then neither would have a vineyard.⁴⁴

[E.—TO THE FIFTH INITIAL ARGUMENT]

51 To the other argument at the beginning:⁴⁵ [some say] there is no contradiction in simple notions and therefore, neither [white nor non-white] is predicated of everything in such a way.

⁴³Aristotle, *Topics* II, ch. 4, 111a 33-35: “Quoniam autem necessarium, de quibus genus praedicatur, et specierum aliquam praedicari, et quaecumque habent genus vel denominative a genere dicuntur, et specierum aliquam necesse est habere vel denominative ab aliqua specierum dici.”

⁴⁴Here Scotus is citing a faulty translation of the *Topics* VI, ch. 13, 150a 8-9: “Nihil prohibet ambos habere mnam [i.e. decem dracmas] cum neuter habeat”; instead of *mnam*, variant readings in the text of Aristoteles Latinus have: *unam*, *umeam*, *munera* and *mineam*! Scotus’s text reads *vineam*.

⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 5.

52 To the contrary: Bk. V⁴⁶ of this work says “one or the other of two contradictories” is predicated “of everything”; a proposition, however, is predicated of nothing.

53 Also in the *Categories*⁴⁷ four oppositions are distinguished; in *On Interpretation*⁴⁸ two, because only those are of propositions or complexes, of which he speaks there. Therefore, in simple notions there are all four, of which *The Categories* speaks.

54 Also, in Bk. IV of this work,⁴⁹ if the opposite of a first principle is true, then “the same thing is true of man and non-man,” and so further “there will not be either man or non-man, for of the two, there are two negations.” Therefore, he understands that two contradictories are predicated in two affirmative propositions of which he takes the negations.

55 Also, man and non-man are repugnant: not contrarily repugnant, because in substance there is no contrariety, according to the *Categories*.⁵⁰ Similarly, because non-man posits nothing. Neither privatively, for ‘non-man’ is predicated of that which is not apt by nature to be a man. Nor relatively, therefore, contradictorily.

56 I concede these arguments.⁵¹ I say to the argument that of contradictory notions [incomplexis] it is true that one or the other of them is predicated of any one thing, but not of anything taken distributively for all individual instances, because in one supposit there can be one and in another another.

⁴⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 7, 1011b 20-24.

⁴⁷Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 8, 11b 17-19.

⁴⁸Aristotle, *De interpretatione* ch. 7, 17b 17-22.

⁴⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 4, 1008a 5-7.

⁵⁰Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 5, 3b 25-27.

⁵¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 52-55.

QUESTION FIVE

Can a part supposit for the whole of which it is a part?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That it cannot:

If it could, then a part could be predicated of the whole, because to predicate is common to supposition.

[I.—THE OPINION OF OTHERS]

2 It is said¹ that a term signifying a proposition after the manner of a simple [notion] as a part of a proposition of complex, it supposits for it, as for another.

3 Also, expressed in this way “Every proposition is true,” if ‘proposition’ supposits only for contradictories and not other things, then contradictories can simultaneously be false.

[II.—REPLY TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT OF THE CONTRARY OPINION]

4 To the first to the contrary:² I say that the common term signifying the complex, taken as a simple notion, is predicated of the whole; not insofar as it is an integral part, but insofar as it is a universal whole, etc.

¹Cf. Simon de Faversham, *De soph. elenchis* (Quaest. novae), q. 25, ed. S. Ebbesen et al. p. 167: “Et ex hoc potest concludi quod terminus significans complexionem, cuiusmodi est propositio, secundum quod est pars alicuius orationis non supponit pro illo toto cuius est pars. Ex consequenti tamen supponit pro illo cuius est pars, quia proprie loquendo pars secundum quod pars non supponit pro toto, sed improprie. Et adhuc non ut est pars, sed ut est totum; quoniam ut est pars integralis non supponit pro toto cuius est pars, sed prout ad illud potest habere rationem totius universalis, supponit pro eo.”

²Cf. supra, n. 2.

BOOK FIVE

BOOK FIVE

Text of Aristotle: "Hence, the nature of a thing is a beginning and so is the element of a thing, and thought and will and essence and the final cause—for the good and the bad are the beginning both of the knowledge and the movement of many things." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 1, 1013a 1-3)

"The end, i.e. that for the sake of which a thing is, e.g. health is the cause of walking." And this follows: "Things can be cause of one another, for example exercise of a good condition and good condition of exercise); not, however, in the same way, but one as the end and the other as the source of the movement." (1013b 10-11)

"And this principle is the final cause, for all the causes are not principles except it be for the sake of this first." (Averroes, com. 1 near the end)

[QUESTION ONE

Is the end a principle and a cause?]

Is the end a principle and a cause, and is it a cause for the agent and is it a cause most of all?

1 [1] That it is not a principle:

It pertains to the very idea of a principle that it be first (Bk. V, ch. 1 of this work).¹ But to be last pertains to the very idea of an end (Bk. V of this work in the chapter 'On the Perfect').² First and last are opposed.

2 That it is not a cause:

For, either it is such qua being or qua non-being; not the second, because non-being is the cause of nothing; the end is the cause of being, therefore, etc. Neither is it a cause qua being, because an end is only a cause insofar as it moves the efficient cause to act. But when the end is attained or exists, the efficient cause is no longer

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1012b 35-1013a 1.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 16, 1021b 25-31.

moved; indeed, it ceases to act, because “when the state sought is present the motion ceases.” (Bk. I *On generation*).³

3 That it is not a cause with respect to the efficient cause:

For if it were, the efficient cause is also the cause of the end; then the same thing with respect to the same is both cause and caused, and consequently, is both naturally prior and naturally posterior.

4 It also follows that the same thing would be the cause of itself, because “whatever is the cause of a cause is the cause of what is caused,”⁴ and “whatever is prior to the prior, is prior to the posterior.”⁵ Wherefore, if the end is the cause of the efficient and the efficient cause is a cause of the end, then the end is the cause of the end, and the same holds good about the prior [i.e., the prior is the cause of itself].

5 Also, it would then follow that a demonstration of the reasoned fact is circular, or at least it can be—which is false according to the Philosopher in Bk. I of the *Posterior Analytics*, chapter 3.⁶ For the same thing would be prior and posterior with respect to the same. The implication is proved, because a demonstration of the reasoned fact is through the cause, and [if one cause is the effect of the other] and vice versa [the demonstration becomes circular]; therefore, if there could be demonstration of the efficient cause through the end, and vice versa, then [the implication] would be circular.

6 That it is not what is most of all a cause:

For it is an extrinsic cause; matter and form are intrinsic, and an intrinsic cause seems to contribute more to existence than extrinsic causes.

³Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, ch. 7, 324b 16-17; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 168: “Habitibus praesentibus existentibus in materia cessat omnis motus et transmutatio.”

⁴Cf. *Liber de causis* prop. 1, ed. A. Pattin p. 49; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse p. 231: “Quidquid est causa causae, etiam est causa causati”; Nicolaus Ambianensis, *De articulis fidei* I a. 1 (PL 210, 597): “Quidquid est causa causae, est causa causati”; Duns Scotus, *Theoremata* theor. 19 n. [8] (ed. Vives V 77b).

⁵Cf. Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 12, 14a 26-29.

⁶Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 3, 72b 6-35.

7 Also if it were above all a cause, then the most noble effects would have such a cause; which is false, because the most noble things caused are immobile, and they do not have a final cause; hence in Bk. III,⁷ Aristotle says that in immobile things there is no end or final cause.

8 The same point is proved, because every end has to do with some action. Action involves movement, and immobile things have no movement.—This is the argument of the Philosopher in the text.⁸

9 Also, if it, most of all, were a cause, then one would have the most certain knowledge through it.—But this is false, because we know a thing best when we know what it is, and this we know through the form; hence, everywhere the Philosopher uses “quid” [or ‘what it is’] as a circumlocution for the form.⁹

10 [To the contrary] The Philosopher refutes the first [namely, that it is not a principle] in ch. 1 of Bk. V.¹⁰

11 In the same chapter¹¹ there is a refutation of the second [i.e. it is not a cause].

12 A denial of the third [i.e. it is not the cause of the efficient cause] is found later in the same chapter.¹²

13 The Commentator refutes the fourth [i.e. that the end is not most of all a cause] at the end of the chapter ‘About the Principle.’¹³

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

14[2] I reply that the end is a principle and a cause. The proof is this. Every agent *per se* (I add ‘*per se*’ to exclude chance and fortune) acts for the sake of an end, according to the Philosopher in

⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 2, 996a 27-29.

⁸Ibid., (l. 27): “All actions imply change.”

⁹Cf. Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 71b 9-16.

¹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 1, 1013a 17-22.

¹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1013a 32-36.

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1013b 25-26.

¹³Averroes, *Metaphysica* V, com. 1, ed. R. Ponzalli, p. 67.

Physics II,¹⁴ where he divides an agent that acts for the sake of an end into [a] an agent that acts by nature, and [b] an agent that acts by the intellect. Chance occurs in an effect of a natural cause, but fortune befalls an agent that acts for a purpose. According to what is said in that same book,¹⁵ nature acts for an end. And, according to *De generatione*,¹⁶ the intellect acts similarly.

15 And there is one argument that holds for both: Every agent in whose action error can occur, acts for an end, but every *per se* agent is of this sort. In nature monstrosities occur, and in the intellect false judgments and habits.

Also, as one gleans from Bk. II of the *Physics*,¹⁷ that action which cannot attain the intended end is said to be in vain; but if no end were intended, no agent would act in vain; it is necessary, therefore, to assume an intended end.

{[Nor would the argument [have to be] about [actual] error. Therefore, if every *per se* agent could err, every agent then would act for an end. Such is a natural agent which can err. At times this is also true of one that acts through the intellect.]} [Comment: Is Scotus attempting to qualify or modify the argument as formulated by Aristotle, whose Prime mover or deity did not act effectively to create or cause earthly events? God for Scotus would not be able to err, hence the major premise states an unreal possibility, but from such a major one could argue that those agents which can err, do act for the sake of an end.]

16 Further, if the end is intended, then the end is a cause, since the [agent, i.e. efficient cause] acts because of it [the end] and it is that agent's motive principle. The efficient cause, now activated or motivated by the end, produces the form in matter. And this is the causality of the form, [viz.] to inform. And the causality of the matter is to support the form. The causality of all of these stems from the end. Therefore, etc.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 5, 196b 17-19.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 8, 198b 10-11.

¹⁶Rather Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2, 994b 13-14; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 119: "Nullum agens naturale sive intellectuale ab intentione finis absolvitur."

¹⁷Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 6, 197b 22-27.

17 [3] To the first argument:¹⁸ note the manner in which the end functions as a cause, namely as applied to something already existing [literally 'a thing in motion'], not applied to the end taken as an operation. For a being that is already existing can have a reality and coexist with that of which it is the end. Then there is no problem about its entity when this end exists as something that has already been made. The difficulty has to do with its entity as a process, for then it does not exist as something accomplished or attained. Therefore, to the objection one can say that the end as a being in potency is the cause of motion, such that potential entity is due to it inasmuch as it causes motion.

18 Against this: if this were so, then once the end qua end is had, the motion would cease, and the end according to the potential entity it has at the beginning is the cause of motion insofar as it is a cause; therefore at the beginning of the motion the motion would cease.

19 Also, the end according to the entity whereby it is a cause, moves the efficient cause to act; therefore, according to this entity it is more noble than the efficient, and the efficient is the actual cause of the existence of the end. And the end according to its potential being is the cause of the efficient, and the end has a more noble form of being as cause of the efficient than it does as its effect, for everything is more noble as a cause than it is as an effect. Therefore, the potential being of the end is more noble than its actual being or existence.

20 Another answer given to the argument [in n. 2] is that it is not as a future entity that the end moves the efficient, since the same argument can be made about the end as something in the future as about the end as potency, nor are these distinct ways. But the end, in as much as it is in the mind or intention of the agent, moves the efficient as something good and desirable, because if it were simply grasped as bare [i.e. not as good, etc.] and did not move the affection [of the agent], it would not have the characteristic of an end or cause.

¹⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 2, namely to the argument claiming that the end is not a cause unless it moves the efficient cause to act.

21 [4] Against this one can raise the same arguments as before.¹⁹ For at the outset of movement, the end has only potential being as something that exists in the intention as something desirable; therefore at the outset motion will cease.

22 Also its being [in the mind] is less perfect than its actual being extramentally; therefore, since according to that actual being it is caused, according to its conceptual being it cannot be a cause.

23 Nevertheless, in maintaining this opinion to be the case, I say to the first of these [objections]²⁰ that the proposition 'once the end is had, the motion ceases' is false; for it accepts incompatible notions. For, when the action exists, the end as cause is a reason why the movement occurs. Therefore, this cannot be true: "When the action exists, the end does not exist."

24 To the authoritative statement against this, in *On generation and corruption*,²¹ where it says that "when the state sought is present in matter, the motion ceases," I say that it is this way with the end. Once it is had in matter, the motion ceases, but the end in matter does not play the role of end, nor of cause.

25 To the contrary: if when the end qua end is had, there is still action, then that further action would be in vain, since it is not performed in order to attain the end since this is already possessed. Nor is it had, because of the extramental end, since that is not an end according to you.

26 I deny that this follows, because an action performed for the sake of an end is an action prompted by something that moves the agent as desirable. Therefore, since the action is for the sake of an end now presented, it [the end] is something moving the agent to act.

27 I say that it is for the agent's end. I say further that this end is something the agent possesses. I say also that this is required if it is to be an end.

¹⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 18-19.

²⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 18, 21.

²¹Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I ch. 7, 324b 16-17; cf. *supra*, n. 2.

28 To the other objection²² note that it contains two propositions, one is that “something exists more truly in the cause than in the effect,” and the other is that “in the cause the effect has potential being.” But I argue that what is only potential is worse than what is actual and exists in itself. I say therefore that the effect does have a truer sort of being in the cause than it does extramentally, because the divine has existence in its cause, which existence is indeed the cause of its existence. Just as this health intended by the physician has truer being in the mind of the physician than health in the matter, because it has being in an unqualified sense, namely, as a cause and form of the agent, viz., of the physician for the sake of which he acts.

[II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

29 [5] To the initial argument²³ I say that [the end] is first according to the being it has in the mind of the agent, and last according to the being it has in matter.

30 To the other,²⁴ I say that to the extent that it is a being presented in the intention of the agent, it is moving him as something desirable.

31 As for the other:²⁵ each of those four causes is the first of its kind, as is [the case with each of the ten] most general [categories], and nevertheless one category is prior to another. Such is the case here: each cause by reason of its type of causality enjoys some sort of priority with respect to every other. Hence, priority is equivocal, just as causality is equivocal.

32 As to the proof: it is not incongruous that priority and posteriority be affirmed in diverse ways, and the same is true of causality in an equivocal sense. Nevertheless, to affirm both would be incongruous if it were the same type of causality and priority that was meant. Hence, the efficient is the cause of the end qua

²²Cf. supra, nn. 19, 22.

²³Cf. supra, n. 1.

²⁴Cf. supra, n. 2.

²⁵Cf. supra, n. 3.

effecting, whereas the end is the cause of the efficient insofar as it is desirable.

33 As for the other incongruity,²⁶ that it would be the cause of itself, I say that "Whatever is a cause of a cause is a cause of what is caused." But in this proposition 'cause' occurs three times. If the sense of the first varies from that of the middle, and that of the middle varies from that of the last, there will be a [fallacy of the] accident. Hence, the statement quoted is not a true proposition, if the meaning of the terms is varied in this way. But it is a true proposition and the inference is valid, if the first cause is the efficient cause of the second, and the second is the same type of cause with regard to the third. The same applies to the argument about the prior [and posterior].

34 To the argument about circularity,²⁷ no incongruity follows. To the proof, I say that just as 'cause' is equivocal, so too is 'demonstration.' For the demonstrations to be circular, it is necessary that the same type of cause be what is proved in each. Similarly, it is necessary that in both demonstrations, it be the same type of cause that is given as the reason why the proven fact is true, because if it [the cause cited as the reason for the two facts] is not of the same kind, there will be no circle.

35 [6] [Objection] Against these three responses,²⁸ is the fact that the end is a univocal cause of the efficient and vice versa. Proof: the end is an effective cause with respect to the efficient cause, and vice versa.

36 Proof of the assumption: In agents acting through the will, the will in regard to what is reasonable is an efficient cause with respect to the end chosen, and the chosen end is what is active in an unqualified sense. Therefore, it moves the will actively and effectively. Hence, it follows that the will is simply passive. Proof:²⁹ every potency is either simply active or simply passive. But the

²⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

²⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

²⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 31-34.

²⁹That the will is a passive power is held by Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I-II, q. 1, a. 4, resp. (VI 11b); Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI, q. 5 (PhB III 161, 164); Giles of Rome, *Quodl.* III q. 16 (ed. Venice 1502, f. 37vb); and Thomas Sutton, *Quaest. ordin.*, q. 7 resp. (BAW III, 218).

will is not the first sort of potency, because an “active potency is a principle of transmuting another qua other.”³⁰ The will is not this sort of thing, because its object would be truly passive and be transmuted by the will. Neither is the second sort of potency applicable to the will.

37 It is said that there is a twofold end.³¹ One is in the intellect, and it is in this way that the end moves the will effectively. The other is the external end, and it moves qua end, namely under the aspect of good. The second extramental being is what moves as an end.

38 To the contrary: the Philosopher in the text says³² “Causes are not causes of one another according to the same type of cause.” And I prove this in the following way. For then the same thing would be prior and posterior under the same aspect and in a univocal sense. And similarly, the same thing would be prior and posterior with respect to itself and under the same aspect. And that demonstration also would be circular [if “cause” be taken] according to the same [sense].

39 He assumes³³ that the external end moves under the aspect of cause.—To the contrary: that which is not a being does not have the nature of a cause. Similarly if it moves internally as an end, then it does not function as an efficient [cause].—As for this proof given: note that the Philosopher when he speaks of end, says that it moves metaphorically.³⁴

40 This will do to answer the argument.³⁵ As for the proof that the will is a passive potency, this is something I deny. As for its proof, to the definition that says a potency is a principle of transmutation, I say that a principle of making is a principle of transmutation, which properly is making, etc. Hence it says in Bk. IX of this work, in the chapter ‘On Potency,’³⁶ that the ‘the

³⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 1, 1046a 9-11.

³¹St. Thomas, *Metaphysics* XII, lect. 12, ed. Parma XX 651ab.

³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1013b 9-11.

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 37.

³⁴Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* I, ch. 7, 324b 14-15; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 168: “The end acts only in a metaphorical sense.”

³⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 35-37.

³⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 8, 1050a 23-29.

ultimate goal of vision is seeing, [but] the ultimate goal of building is not the act of building but the house outside.' If, then, the immanent action were a principle of transmuting another qua other, then it would cause something other than the operation, viz., some work, which is contrary to what the Philosopher says there.

41 [7] To the other³⁷ that says the intrinsic causes are more of a cause, I say that this is not always the case, but that which is the first causality of all is more truly a cause.

42 To the proof³⁸ that every end has to do with some action, I say that not every end is one of action but it can be of some absolute essence.

43 To the other³⁹ [that we know most of all when we know through the form or essence] I say that all causes [including the formal cause] can be demonstrated through the end. Therefore a demonstration through the end is the most powerful and most certain. Hence, "as the principle is in theoretical matters, so is the end in practical matters."⁴⁰ Therefore, just as [theoretical things are] known most certainly through principles, so too [are practical matters known most certainly through] their ends.

44 To the other,⁴¹ mathematical demonstrations, though not the most certain in an unqualified sense, are to us the most certain. This happens to be the case in mathematics, however, because there the same things are known both by us and in an unqualified sense.

45 To the other claim,⁴² I say that the "quid rei" or real essence can be established from any one of the four causes and the definition likewise.

46 To answer another way⁴³ I would say that it is one thing to speak of knowledge in an unqualified sense and quite another to speak of it proportionally, as is done in Bk. I.⁴⁴

³⁷Cf. supra, n. 6.

³⁸Cf. supra, n. 8.

³⁹Cf. supra, n. 9.

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 9, 200a 15-16.

⁴¹The argument to which this refers seems to be missing.

⁴²Cf. supra, n. 9.

⁴³This refers to nn. 43-45.

⁴⁴Cf. supra Bk. I, q. 4, nn. 9-20 and 29-56.

47 I say, therefore, that “quanta” are known more certainly proportionately than other things according to the degree that they are able to be known. Knowledge through the end is known better in a simple and unqualified sense. Knowledge of this thing, however, is more certain according to the knowledge one has of it through form, since form is a more proximate cause than is the end.

48 And the Philosopher says in *Posterior Analytics* I,⁴⁵ that knowledge through the proximate cause is knowledge of the reasoned fact, whereas knowledge through the remote cause is simple knowledge of the fact.

49 [Objection] Also, in causes qua causes there is no circularity.⁴⁶ Therefore, since the end in its actual existence is caused by the efficient, the end in this sense is not the cause of the efficient, nor is it a cause as a less noble being. The being a cause has as something known, therefore, is true being and more noble than actual existence.

50 I reply: either it moves according to some being that is more noble, but which is not its truer being; or else every end is simply something existing and loved. As desired, however, it is an end with respect to another desired thing, but it does not [exist] simply in an unqualified sense, but rather in the way a creature is in God.

[III.—THE PRIORITY OF THE FINAL CAUSE]

51 [8] To the question, one must distinguish as Avicenna does in Bk. VI of his *Metaphysics* ch. 5d:⁴⁷ “At times what is caused is a thing’s causality, at other times what is caused is a thing’s existence.” In the first way “the final cause in its causality precedes the agent and the recipient active causes,” [i.e., matter and form] and this according to its being in the soul, “because the soul first selects it, and afterwards envisions the action within itself and the quest for the recipient [i.e., the material] and the quality of form. With respect to its causality and its existence in the soul, therefore, no cause is prior to the final. Indeed, the latter is the cause of

⁴⁵Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 13, 78a 22-26.

⁴⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 34.

⁴⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 5, AvIL 337-338, 348.

the being of the rest of the causes in actuality. The existence, however, of the other causes in actuality is the cause of the actuality of the final cause." And he has much to say there about this. And at the end of the chapter [he says]: "If there were scientific knowledge of any one of these causes, the knowledge of the final cause would be the more noble, and it would be wisdom, and this would also be more noble than the other parts of this science [of metaphysics], because it is the science that considers the final causes of things."

52 And the Commentator in the end of the chapter about the principles says⁴⁸ "This principle is intended in order to know scientifically in this science, and that [principle] is the final cause; for the other causes are only principles because of this."

53 And *Physics* II:⁴⁹ "As the principle is in theoretical matters, so is the end in practical matters."

54 Hence, if we are speaking of priority in causing [with respect to intrinsic and extrinsic causes], I say that the extrinsic causes cause first.⁵⁰ For it is because they cause, that the intrinsic causes cause, not vice versa. But of the extrinsic causes the end is the first to cause, for it moves the efficient under the aspect of being loved, and this is why the agent acts; not vice versa.

55 But of the causality of matter and form which is prior?—It seems that it is the causality of the form, because it is closer to the efficient and final cause. For matter "matters" [i.e., it functions as the matter in] this supposit [or subject] because it is under this form; this form, however, does not constitute this supposit because it is in this matter.

56 But so far as existence goes, the efficient cause is first; at times however the matter does not depend upon it for its existence, as in the case of natural things, but the total effect depends upon the producing cause, and consequently the essence of an efficient cause is not to transmute matter [but rather the total effect], for matter then so far as its existence goes, would be as kind of coeval principle of the efficient.

⁴⁸ Averroes, *Metaphysica* V, com. 1, ed. R. Ponzalli, p. 67.

⁴⁹ Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 9, 200a 15-16.

⁵⁰ Cf. supra n. 41 and n. 6

57 The form also as to its existence is from the efficient cause. In some way it also depends upon the matter. But it is doubtful whether it is more this way or the other way about.⁵¹

58 The end—not taken in a simple or unqualified sense, namely which is attained through the operation, but the end which is the operation itself—does depend for its existence on all the other causes.

59 But matter always depends upon the efficient insofar as it is the matter of *this* composite. For it is this, insofar as it comes to be under this form.

60 [9] It is argued in this way: the end is of the same species as the efficient cause and is the same numerically with the form, according to *Physics* II.⁵² Therefore, there is no essential order between them.

61 Also, the end insofar as it is in the mind or the intention of the agent is not more noble than the existence of the agent, because it does not have a more noble being than the agent in which it is. Hence, according to that being it is not a cause of the agent.

62 Also, the end seems to contribute nothing to the agent, because if the agent were to have the same active power, and nothing were intended, it would produce the effect in the same way.

63 Also, this is confirmed, for what is in the intention of fire when it produces more fire? What mode of being is this “in”?

64 Also God, under the aspect of an ultimate end is posited as the object of the beatific act; this, however, is not insofar as he moves to action, as desirable. [comment: for he is already possessed and enjoyed]

65 Also, the causality of the end seems to be to end or terminate, for it is the cause opposed to the principle of motion according to Bk. I of this work;⁵³ therefore, it is not the function of the end to

⁵¹This seems to refer to whether matter is more dependent upon form, or form upon matter; see n. 55 supra.

⁵²Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 7, 198a 22-27.

⁵³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 3, 983a 27-32: “Causae vero quadrupliciter dicuntur, quarum unam quidem causam dicimus esse substantiam... unam vero materiam, tertiam unde principium motus, quartam vero causam ei oppositam, et quod est cuius causa et bonum.”

initiate action, but to terminate it. Why then is it assumed to be the first to cause?

66 Also, according to this opinion⁵⁴ the efficient in no way will be the cause of the end insofar as the end is a cause, and hence the efficient and final causes will not be causes of one another.⁵⁵

67 Abandoning, then, the aforesaid opinion,⁵⁶ one alternative is to say that whatever is essentially ordered to something more noble than itself as to its end or goal, [is ordered to it]—not as moved [in the literal sense of moved, rather than just metaphorically], nor [ordered to it as to] an operation as such, but [rather] as the quasi term of the operation; not in the sense that it is producible through the operation or its object,—but rather as it [i.e., the end] is that to which this [agent] is assimilated [i.e. becomes similar to] through the operation.

68 Thus, God can be posited as the immediate end of anything whatsoever. This [object, i.e. God] as it exists in itself is the end and is loved. Everything else, whether it be an operation or an object, is not an end in an unqualified sense, but only with respect to his liberality, of which Avicenna speaks in Bk. VI of his *Metaphysics*, ch. 5:⁵⁷ “Giving to others, not with a view to receiving something in return,” etc.

69 And in this way the higher things are for the use of the lower, as he himself says in *Metaphysics* I, ch. 2,⁵⁸ and because of the ordination to this end in an unqualified sense, as it is in itself, he operates and produces, so that this operation and production are not an end for him speaking simply.

⁵⁴Cf. supra, nn. 60-65.

⁵⁵Cf. supra, n. 38.

⁵⁶Cf. supra, n. 60-65.

⁵⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 5, AviL 342: “Verbum autem liberalitas et consimilis, ex sua prima impositione apud omnes linguas est donator tribuens alii extra se donum non propter retributionem.”

⁵⁸Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 3, AviL 19-29: “Cum autem utilitas absoluta dividitur in suas divisiones, necessario dividitur in tria: quorum unum est id ex quo provenit aliud melius eo, aliud ex quo provenit aliud sibi aequale, aliud vero ex quo provenit aliud inferius eo, et hoc tertium prodest perfectioni eius quod est infra se.”

70 To the arguments⁵⁹ it might be said: Which ones are against this [view]? Against this [view] is the fact that the ordination of anything to an end seems to be through some desire. If this is purely natural, it cannot be for anything except what is advantageous, and thus the ultimate end of it is the one desiring it.

71 [10] Also, this [end], insofar as it exists [extramentally] in itself is not that for the sake of which the agent acts. For if it were destroyed in itself, and still remained in the intention of the agent, the agent would act in a similar way.

72 Also, this way cannot be assumed to hold for an intelligent agent, who prefigures for himself the end he wishes.

73 Also, if he intends to be assimilated to it [his goal], by sharing its perfection, where is this assimilation insofar as it moves [the agent]?

74 [Another way] The other way is, that the end causes insofar as it terminates [or is ultimately achieved], and thus it is not necessary to attribute to it any other being than what it has as intended by the agent, but in this way [as in the mind] it is not an end [achieved], but [it is achieved only] insofar as it terminates [the action that gives it actual existence].

75 Against this, assume that it does not attain the desired end, did not the action have an end insofar as there is a cause? Otherwise, it would not be said to have been in vain.

76 Furthermore, in so far as it [the end achieved] terminates, it does not seem to cause any more than an instant causes time or mutation [or instantaneous change] causes motion, because the terminus is rather internal.

77 [Conclusion] By holding the first way,⁶⁰ therefore, that the [end] is a cause insofar as it is in the mind of the agent, we must note that it is there as having a quasi objective and formal being. Objective being is real being. Formal being is that, by which it is now something intended, and this is being in intention. For example, if I understand a rose to be existing, and the object understood is a thing;

⁵⁹I.e., nn. 67-69.

⁶⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 14-28.

objectively there is a species or likeness formally in the understanding or intellect.

QUESTION TWO

Must cause and effect exist simultaneously?

Is it necessary that an individual particular cause and its individual effect exist simultaneously and simultaneously cease to exist. And it is the opposite order characteristic of a cause in potency and an effect in potency, as is stated in the text.¹

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] Proof that it is incongruous of a cause in act.

Take an efficient cause that produces its effect through movement; in the beginning the efficient cause is in act; therefore, the effect is also, but once the effect exists the motion ceases, and therefore it ceases in the beginning as well.

2 Also, according to Bk. IV of this work,² for “that which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and if they are correlative terms, this is no less the case.” Therefore, a mover can exist apart from what is moved, as the prior can without the posterior. Hence, a cause can exist in actuality without an actually existing effect.

3 Also, what is actually known is the cause of scientific knowledge that is actual. But what is known can be in act apart from the actual science, because they are referred to one another according to the third type [of relations].³ There is no essential order here, nor mutual dependence, because the science depends on what is known, but not vice versa.

4 Also, God is always a cause in act; therefore, there would always be an effect in act. The antecedent is evident; if it were not so, then he would have first been causing in potency and then changed.

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1014a 20-25.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1010b 37-1011a 2.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 30-33.

5 [Is the first statement true]⁴ that an actual individual cause and its actual effect exist simultaneously and together cease to exist?

6 To the contrary:

Cause and effect exist together and cease to exist together inasmuch as they are co-dependent. Therefore, the greater they depend on one another, the more their need to coexist. But a universal cause in act and a universal effect in act are of this sort.—Proof: something could be an actual cause and be this cause, although it would not have this effect in act, as someone can be a father in act, although not with respect to this son, because he can be [a father] with respect to another. But no one is a father unless he is father of a son. Therefore, in the case of a universal cause and effect, the two are more dependent. This is evident because in this way things are primarily correlative.

7 {{Also, where the motion is one of throwing, the object thrown continues to move when the thrower is no longer throwing. Also if one is turning [a potter's] wheel and then stops, the wheel does not cease to turn. Also in a qualitative change, when the cause that produced the change ceases to act, the qualitative change does not immediately cease. Similarly, in regard to a hanging rope, if it is swung to one side, and the swinger moves on, the rope does not immediately come to rest.

8 Also, a forced rest has the same cause as a forced motion, and nevertheless, when the agent restraining it ceases to act, the object restrained remains at rest.

9 Also, what is caused continues to be caused as long as the effect continues. What initially caused the effect, however, may have ceased to exist, and hence is no longer actually causing; therefore, etc.

10 Proof of the first statement⁵ is found In Bk. VI of Avicenna's *Metaphysics*, ch. 1.

⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

⁵Namely, that what is caused continues to be caused as long as this effect continues.

[a] First, because existence continues to be caused so long as it continues to be, and not just insofar as it begins to exist. For it only begins to be if a state of nonexistence preceded. It is not caused, however, insofar as there was first nonexistence, for it is accidental to the cause that the existence of the caused only comes after a prior state of non-existence. This is proved from the same chapter,⁶ because it is incidental to the agent that it has not always been acting, for this only happens to it insofar as it was at sometime a patient, or at least insofar as [its action] can be impeded.

11 And also [b] because—as he [Avicenna] argues there⁷—that existence of the caused either always depends on another or not. If not, it is of itself necessary and thus never began to be. If it is [always dependent on another], then as long as it is actually dependent, it is always being caused. For it is solely because in that first instant it depends, not because it began to be, that it is caused, as the preceding argument proves.

12 Also, [c] because of what he says there,⁸ namely that “the caused always needs something to give it existence as long as it exists.” But it does not need someone to give it existence as long as it is, if it is not caused.

13 Similarly in ch. 3,⁹ “when, among real things, something by reason of its essence will have been the cause of another’s existence, it will always be its cause as long as the other exists.”

14 [Avicenna’s] opinion, then, seems to be this: an essential cause (not only at that moment when it first causes, but always so long as the thing caused exists) is simultaneously in act with what is caused, and perhaps that the caused is always caused while it is in act.

15 Against Avicenna:¹⁰ a father is the cause of a son and fire is the generating cause of fire generated and seems to be such *per se*; nevertheless, the effect remains when the cause is destroyed.

⁶Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 1, AviL 299.

⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 1, AviL 297-298.

⁸Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 1, AviL 300.

⁹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 2, AviL 303.

¹⁰Cf. *supra*, nn. 10-14.

16 Also,—as he seems to say in ch. 2¹¹—if the generator does not remain simultaneously with what is generated, but with something else, which is immediately caused by it, and that in turn coexists with some other thing caused by it, and so on up to the effect, then there would seem to be a process *ad infinitum* in causes. But this he himself concedes in ch. 2: “As for causes that are not essential or proximate,” he says, “I do not deny that they go on to infinity.”

17 To the contrary: either [a] these [effects] that are immediate with respect to one another, exist in diverse instants [of time], and then there would be two instants that are immediate [to one another], or [b] there is a time interval between them, and then the cause is not simultaneous with the caused, or [c] there is nothing in between, but each effect caused coexists at the same time as its cause, and then all the infinite causes will be in act simultaneously. This is the argument he gives there in ch. 2 and he replies to it. Look there.}}¹²

18 As for the other statement,¹³ the Philosopher says¹⁴ that a cause in potency and an effect in potency are not simultaneous.

19 On the contrary: a cause in potency and an effect in potency refer to one another in the second type of relation,¹⁵ as what heats to what can be heated. But there we have a mutual essential dependence. Therefore, they exist and cease to exist simultaneously.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION
A. OPINION OF GILES OF ROME]

20 [3] To the first question [about actual causes and their effects] one answer¹⁶ given is that the efficient cause through motion is the cause of one effect immediately, namely of becoming, and [is the cause] of what has been made only mediately. Then the proposition

¹¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 2, AvI L 303.

¹²Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 2, AvI L 302.

¹³That is, “Is the contrary true of a cause in potency and its potential effect?” cf. *supra*, n. 1.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1014a 20-25.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 15-26.

¹⁶Giles of Rome, *Physica* II lect. 6 (f. 36ra); *Physica* VIII lect. 2 (f. 180rb).

is true of a cause in act and its immediate effect, namely, the state of becoming. For when the cause is in act, it moves, and when it moves, there is 'becoming' in the mobile.

Of the mediate effect, this is not required, because then all would happen of necessity, if we suppose that all would have *per se* causes. For if something happened on the third day, call it A, if A is coming to be, it will be through a *per se* cause, namely, B; but B has another cause, because if B is in act, then its cause, namely C, [will also be in act] and thus one will eventually get back something which now exists, call it D, which is the cause of C itself. But D was a cause in act, from which, on this hypothesis, an effect, namely C, simultaneously in act, necessarily followed, and thus from C, B, and from B, A. Therefore, all things would come about necessarily.

21 Such an argument the Philosopher presents in Bk. VI of this work, ch. 2.¹⁷ Hence these two propositions are not simultaneously true, viz. "Of everything coming to be it is necessary that there be a *per se* cause," and "On the assumption the cause is in act, it is necessary that the effect be posited in act." For from this the absurd or impossible conclusion follows in the way presented above, namely, that all things will exist necessarily. It does not follow because of the first proposition, however, for even if it were true, the conclusion still would not follow. Therefore, it is because of the second proposition that it follows; hence, the second is impossible.

22 Of a cause in potency,¹⁸ he [Giles of Rome] says that it cannot coexist with the effect, because it is prior to the effect.

23 But against those who hold this opinion [of Giles] there is the argument given.¹⁹ It refutes their assumption that 'becoming' is an immediate effect. For of those two proposition assume the first²⁰ together with this proposition which they themselves grant: "On the assumption the cause is in act, it is necessary that the 'becoming' be posited in act." Then I argue as before: if D is existing in act, then C is necessarily coming to be, and from C, B; and from B,

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VI, ch. 2, 1027a 9-18.

¹⁸ Giles of Rome, *Physica* VI, lect. 13 (f. 152vb).

¹⁹ Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

²⁰ "Of everything coming to be it is necessary that there be a *per se* cause."

A is coming to be. Therefore, all future [things] will be coming to be necessarily. This is just as incongruous, as that all future events will exist necessarily. For not only is it incongruous that all would coexist of necessity, as the first deduction infers, but also that they would successively exist [of necessity]. For one cannot avoid the fact that all will exist successively of necessity, save on the sole assumption that something could come to be but will not do so because of some impediment. But this evasion does not hold if at the very outset of the process of becoming there is something coming to be.

24 Similarly, this too does not seem to be true, viz., a particular cause and its immediate effect are simultaneous. And the very argument they themselves give proves this. Let us assume that there would be many ordered causes that do not act by moving. Then given that the cause exists in act, there must be an immediate effect in act as well, and then everything such causes can produce would come to be of necessity. This, however, is false. For the will produces something contingently, but not through motion in the way fire does. Indeed, [the will produces its effects] even more contingently. The proof of the implication is the argument they use. And that argument is no more valid there than it is here.

25 To the form of the argument, therefore, one must say here there is a fallacy of diction in a qualified and unqualified sense. I concede that when a cause actually causes, it follows necessarily that its effect will be actual. But this does not follow: "Therefore the effect will exist necessarily," since the cause acts contingently. The following inference is not valid: "An effect will necessarily be in act, if its cause is in act, by a necessity of implication, therefore the effect necessarily exists." This would follow only on the assumption that the cause is necessarily in act. For never from the necessity of a conditional does a necessity of the consequent follow. It would do so only if the antecedent were necessary. Such is not the case here. Only contingently does the cause become actual. The Philosopher, however, does not argue this way.²¹ But presupposing this, granting that the cause exists [and causes], the other follows necessarily, as is evident from his example there.

²¹Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

26 [4] To the contrary: still that which is a cause, contingently is, or was, or will be a cause; therefore the consequent is not necessary.

27 I reply: if something already exists, from which something necessarily follows, the latter will necessarily occur with a necessity of inevitability, such that it cannot be avoided lest it will be. But it is not necessary in an unqualified sense, since it could have been avoided. For that which now exists, need not have occurred at this time.

28 Against that other point²² about the cause in potency and the effect in potency: since they refer to one another according to the second type of relatives, which are mutually dependent [i.e., are correlatives], it seems that at the same time they either both exist or they both do not exist.

[B.—SOLUTION OF SCOTUS]

29 One could give another answer to the question. This difference does not stem from the relation of a cause in potency and an effect in potency. For in this way a cause in potency and an effect in potency are simultaneous, just as a cause in act and an effect in act are, for they all fall into just one kind of relation. Hence, in this there is no difference [between the actual and the potential]. The truth of this dictum must be considered from the foundations of the relationships, because the relation of cause in act and effect in act can only be founded on a being in act. And therefore as relations are either simultaneous or not, so also are their foundations, as will be explained later.²³ But the relations of a cause in potency and an effect in potency do not require foundations in actuality, and therefore it is not necessary that their foundations exist at the same time, although the relations are simultaneous when actualized.

30 [5] {{But if there is a cause in act, there will be at the same time this relation [to its effect], and that can only be founded on a being in act. Therefore, there is some being in act on which it is founded; and, hence, if the cause is in act, something is not only an effect in

²²Cf. *supra*, nn. 22, 18-19.

²³Cf. *infra* nn. 35-36.

act, but something actually exists which is the effect in act. But if the relationship of the cause in potency is founded on what is an actual being, for instance, that this person is a builder, it is not necessary that the relation of the effect in potency, which is simultaneous with the relation of the cause in potency, is based on some being in act. Thus, there is no need that at the same time, someone exists who is a builder, and that something else also exists that can be built, for what can be built can exist in a being in potency.

31 Neither is this difference between the foundations of the relations of cause in act and effect in act and the foundations of the relations of cause in potency and effect in potency to be thought of in so far as their foundations exist. For just as both relations are simultaneous with each other, so also their foundations are simultaneous in this way; they are also actual functioning as foundations, that is, they are actually grounding these relationships, even though they are not simultaneously existing in actuality. But in a cause and in an effect in act, if one [foundation] exists, the other does also. But this is not so if they are in potency.

32 Neither do I say: if one foundation exists, namely of the cause in act, the foundation of the effect must actually exist. For the foundation [can] actually exist without the relation. But if it is rooting the relation of a cause in act and actually exists, then the foundation of the relation of the effect in act actually exists as well.

33 The greatest difference there and here is not between relations, because both necessarily exist simultaneously. Neither is there the greatest difference between the foundations of the relations qua foundations, because those are necessarily simultaneous with one another, since without the foundations there are no relations. Nor should those things which are the foundations be considered in themselves to be without substance, since in this way neither are simultaneously in act, nor necessarily simultaneous in potency. But the difference is to be understood of the foundations as actually existing and grounding the relations in contrast to or compared to their existing absolutely, and not just their existence as grounding the relations.

34 In this way we explain that if a cause is in act, the relationship is in act; therefore, it is necessary that something exist in actuality in which this relationship of the cause in act and the effect in act is rooted. But if the cause is in potency, as the builder, it is not necessary that there be some being in actual existence, in which this potential relationship is founded, but it is enough to have as a basis a being in potency.}}

[II.—REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING]

35 [6] To the first reason,²⁴ that both relations are simultaneously in act and the foundations are really in act, but while the movement continues, the agent is not the cause of product as actually made. [This occurs] only at the last instant. By taking the effect, however, to refer to what is actually moving, this effect is in act, but while the cause is moving, it is not a cause in act except as regards what is coming into existence. In the last instant, however, it is a cause in act of what is made, and then both cause and effect are simultaneously in act.

36 To the other argument based on what is said in Bk. IV of this work,²⁵ I say that the mover is by nature simultaneous with the effect, because if these correlates are *per se*, their relations are simultaneous. However, the thing subjected to the mover is prior to another thing in which the relation of the effect is rooted. Then [Aristotle] speaks about the foundations, not about the relationships as such, because he says there²⁶ that sensibles can exist, without the senses existing, because sensibles and senses are called relatives of the third type.

37 To the third argument,²⁷ it must be said that the known is the cause of science in some way, and I say that the known in act and the science in act are either simultaneous or not; and when you say

²⁴Cf. supra, n. 1.

²⁵Cf. supra, n. 2 and infra Bk. V, q. 12-14, nn. 94-107. An interpolated annotation is appended here: "Regarding this and the solution to the following argument, see below on the chapter 'On relations' in the conclusion regarding the third mode [of relations]."

²⁶Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1010b 32-35.

²⁷Cf. supra, n. 3.

that they are related according to the third type of relatives, this I deny. [What pertains to this type] is science in actuality and what is able to be known but not actually known.

38 To the other about God:²⁸ [I say] that God always existed, but not always as a cause in actuality.

39 To the contrary: then he was a cause in potency, and hence was changed, because, from a cause in potency, he became a cause in act.

40 This is not a valid argument, because a voluntary agent by a will that remains unchanged can cause when it pleases him without any change in himself, just as if I now decide to sit tomorrow, I could sit tomorrow without changing my will.

41 To the contrary is what Averroes says in Bk. VIII of the *Physics*.²⁹ One who now wills to make something later but not now, at least looks forward to that time; this does not occur without some change.

42 I reply that poor Averroes did things in this way, because he functioned in a time-frame—but not God in his eternity before the creation of the world; he did not look to time, because [he decided] in an instant, which ‘expectation’ is an eternity-instant. Do not measure God according to Averroes.

43 {{Proof that a new effect can proceed from a cause that is unchanged. A is something new; therefore, it has a cause; and, if it has a new cause, then the latter will also have a cause. Since one cannot go on ad infinitum, we will come to a cause that is not new from which something new immediately proceeds.

44 Also, how can a cause that is unchanged always be moving? To be moving is to have one effect after another continually, and a cause of this sort cannot move at some time that did not follow a previous state of motion. For is it only the first effect in the chain that is new, and not also the second? But why does he move now and not then? Because he wished it; of this there is no asking for the cause, because once we have a cause that is immediate and sufficient with respect to the effect, there is no further query, for then there could be a demonstration for everything. Therefore, it is

²⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

²⁹Averroes, *Physica* VIII, com. 4, f. 155rb-va.

for the unlearned to ask what is new in God as a quasi-conceptual relation that would not precede creation; but would follow it, as it were, so that the cause insofar as it precedes the causing, is in no way changed. As God acts, however,—in causing the action, as it were,—he remains as was before, and naturally, neither in reality nor conceptually is he changed.

45 Others³⁰ say that every new relationship is in the effect, also that by which the cause is said to be [related] to the effect.

46 To the contrary: where there is a relationship there is a basis for it there.

47 Also, that [i.e. the subject] in which the relation exists is the referent of that relation.

48 Also, relations opposed to one another will be in the same thing.

49 Another answer given is that there is a new name given to an old relationship.

50 To the contrary: by the same token, my father when he begot me, would not have had acquired new relation, because initially he was only able to generate, and thus only when generating would he be called by a new name.

51 If we hold therefore the first of these ways,³¹ there is still one last doubt.[n.45] Which is first: the conceptual relation in the cause or the real relation in the effect? It is said it is the second,³² because the real is the cause of the conceptual relationship, not vice versa. For example, the right side in an animal and the left side in a column.

52 To the contrary: what is prior naturally was this causal agent rather than this effect that can be caused (for it is because this is causative, therefore that is able to be caused), therefore, this causative agent is prior to what is caused.

Confirmation of this: whatever is in the cause, precedes that which is in the effect.

³⁰Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* III q. 10 resp., f. 62T.

³¹Cf. supra, n. 43-44.

³²Viz. that the second alternative is true, i.e., there is a real relation in the effect.

53 The reply of those³³ is not valid, because a major difference is always traced back to a minor difference.}}

54 To the third argument:³⁴ there is another answer [than that in n. 37], according to some. The knowable as such refers essentially to science in potency, and science in potency and the knowable are at times simultaneous and at other times not. Neither is the fact that it may be known potentially something that accidentally accrues to the knowable. That it be known is something accidental to the stone, however, just as it is accidental to John that he is a father; but nevertheless, it is not accidental to a father that he be a father. Hence, as science in potency depends essentially upon the knowable, so vice versa, And just as science in act depends on what is actually known, so vice versa. Hence, when they say that it accrues to the knowable that it be known, this must be understood of the thing that is the subject of knowledge, namely, the stone or the wood.

55 Proof of what is said. For the knowable is knowable only because potentially there can be scientific knowledge of it. For if it were knowable, and there would be no scientific knowledge of it in potency, then it would be both knowable and not knowable. Therefore, it is under the aspect of the knowable that it is included in potential scientific knowledge, as its *per se* correlative.³⁵

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 45.

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 3, 37.

³⁵Several manuscripts append annotations here: "Note how a stone, if it were eternal, would be *ex nihilo*, whereas the Son of God would not (Scotus, *Lectura I*, dist. 36, q. un., n. 17 [XVII, 465]). Note Henry of Ghent's opposition to the second reason, *Quodl. I* q. 9 (AMPh s. 2, V p. 51), that the effect is no more necessary than its cause. The will of God is not necessary to effects in an unqualified sense, and hence no effect always existed with him. Because his will, as eternal, is free with respect to such [effects]. Also, when it is said that he loses power by causing the effect, does not argue against his causing contingently. For he does not cause in the sense that the effect is understood as [already] existing, but as to be posited in existence. A determination is understood only with regard to what is already existing. Also, note the response of Henry in *Quodl. VIII* (q. 9 resp. [f. 314K-319I]) regarding equivocation concerning 'potency', and later regarding *ex se non esse* rather than *non ex se esse*, and how he assigns there twelve fallacies (cf. Scotus, *Ordinatio I* dist. 8, p. 2, q. un., n. 232 [IV 282-283]; Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. VIII* q. 9 resp. [f. 314K]). Look for the [Scotus's] response in the quaternus."

QUESTION THREE

Text of Aristotle: "Now some things owe their necessity to something other than themselves; others do not, but are themselves the source of necessity in other things." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 1, 1015b 9-11)

Have necessary beings a cause of their existence?

Do necessary beings have a cause of their existence?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That they do not:

Avicenna in *Metaphysics* I, ch. 6:¹ Because everything having existence through a cause, if you write off the cause, has no existence, and then it is not necessary of itself; therefore nothing necessary of itself is caused.

2 Also, "the efficient cause is the principle from which motion stems,"² but in immobile things there is no motion.

3 For the opposite:

In Bk. II of this work:³ there are causes of necessary or sempiternal things.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

4 It must be said that if something can be a necessary effect, its necessity can have an efficient cause, just as the thing itself has a cause, because it is necessary to assume one thing from which the causality of everything [in it] stems. For if the necessity of the effect would have no cause, since it is in what is caused, something in the caused would not be caused.

¹Avicenna, *Metaphysica* I, ch. 7, AviL 43-44.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 2, 1013a 30-32.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1 993b 26-31.

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

5 [2] As for what Avicenna says:⁴ he understands this of what is necessary *per se*. But something is said to be necessary *per se* effectively, so that '*per se*' only excludes another prior efficient cause, and in this sense God alone is necessary *per se* in the genre of efficient causes.

6 Or something can be formally necessary *per se*, and such can be existing from another, because as formally necessary in itself it is effectively from another, and thus its necessity is also from another. Then to the form [of the argument]; "if you write off the cause, such a thing would not be necessary of itself," is true in the genre of efficient cause. Formally, however, if its form could stand on its own, it would have necessity without the efficient cause, but it could not exist without the first [cause]; hence, if this be written off, you will also write off the formal intrinsic cause of the necessity that follows from it. For it does not have part [of its being] from itself, and part from the efficient cause. Rather the whole, both its nature and its necessity, stem from its efficient cause, which if removed, everything is taken away.

7 To the contrary: "if something is written off, it is not necessary." It is only necessary by supposition.⁵—To this one must say that what is necessary from a necessary supposition, is itself necessary.

8 To the other,⁶ I respond that this is an a posteriori description from what is better known. For it is not simply from its character as an efficient cause that it is a principle of motion; it is incidental to an efficient qua efficient that it act through movement, because an efficient cause can act without motion; however, in natural [efficient causes] it is generally true [that they act through motion].

⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

⁵Namely, by making an assumption such as was done in the exercises of *De obligationibus*.

⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

[III.— FURTHER REPLY TO THE QUESTION]

9 [3] {{A response to the question: for an effect to be necessary, a cause is needed that is necessary both in being and in causing, since if either of these conditions is absent, the effect can not exist.

10 In complex things [i.e., logically necessary propositions and inferences] both are found. For principles in themselves are necessary, and they cause the conclusion necessarily, because the characteristic of a cause necessarily causing, is that if the effect is destroyed, it too is destroyed. This is the way it is with principles with respect to their conclusions, according to *Physics* II, ch. 8.⁷

11 In simple notions or in the entity of things, there is no cause that is necessary in both ways; for unless the first cause existed, no cause after it would exist, since all causes other than the first are caused. And if none is necessarily caused, none necessarily exists, and so neither does any cause cause necessarily. But the first [i.e., God] is not necessary in causing, because the very idea of a necessary cause implies that if the effect were destroyed, it too would be destroyed, and thus its entity would not be entirely absolute and independent [as is God's].

12 To argue here 'because it freely causes' is not valid;⁸ for the Holy Spirit is produced freely but nevertheless necessarily.

13 But some effects are necessary in a qualified sense or conditionally, namely, if there be a cause for it, that by reason of its proximity and natural connection with the necessary effect, so long as it is present, causes the effect. But such a necessity does not exist in the first cause, because then there would be necessity in an unqualified sense; since that condition [namely of existing and being present to all things] would be necessary in an unqualified sense. For what is necessary by reason of a condition that is simply necessary, is itself necessary in an unqualified sense. This supposition in the case of other natural causes is not simply necessary.

⁷Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 9, 200a 20-23.

⁸Cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. I* qq. 7-8 resp. (AMPh s. 2, V 36-37); *Summa* a. 50, q. 1, resp. (II, f. 155X-Y)

[A.—TO THE ARGUMENT TO THE CONTRARY]

14 To the initial argument for the opposite:⁹ not every sempiternal being is necessary. But here in the text¹⁰ and in [ch.] 8 of the *Physics*¹¹ the talk is about complex things [namely, necessary principles and inferences].

[B.—ARGUMENTS AGAINST AVICENNA'S POSITION]

15 [4] Against this: necessity in an unqualified sense is as such a possible condition in creatures, because it does not include a contradiction. This is proved as follows: the mode of production does not change the nature of the product. If God were to produce things of necessity, something caused would be necessary; therefore, although now they are produced in another way, necessity will not be repugnant to them.¹²

16 Also, if God were to produce by a necessity of nature, the caused thing would be simply necessary; therefore, since the mode by which he now produces them is equally noble or more noble than that, what is simply necessary [i.e., an effect that is also a cause] could produce in this way.

17 Also, in every condition of being,¹³ a necessary being is simply nobler than one that is not necessary; therefore, in causing also; hence the noblest cause causes necessarily.

18 Also, from the plenitude of perfection in the cause, the effect follows. If therefore, in something caused there could be such perfection, that if it existed, the existence of another would be necessarily posited, all the more so would this be true of [God] the first cause.—Confirmation: if the first is not necessary, then neither are any of the essentially ordered things that follow. Therefore if the connection of the effect with the first cause, which

⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

¹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 5, 1015b 7-9.

¹¹Rather it is Bk. II, ch. 8; cf. *supra*, n. 10.

¹²An annotation here follows in two manuscripts: "This is proved in another way according to the position taken above about effective and formally necessary in this question (nn. 5-6)."

¹³Necessary or contingent.

is essentially the first connection, is not necessary, neither is any other.

[C.—AGAINST THE PREVIOUS RESPONSE]

19 The argument adduced about God¹⁴ is attacked; first, because it is not necessary to accept it because of what is said in Bk. II of the *Physics*.¹⁵ The talk there is about a [necessary] principle and conclusion. Now the way a conclusion is contained in a principle is quite different from the way an effect is contained in a cause. For the conclusion is, as it were, a kind of part of what is understood by the principle, and is actually contained in it, not distinctly, but as the singular is contained in the universal. But the effect is not in the cause in this way.—This reason is conceded, because this [analogy] does not provide any notion of a necessary cause.

20 Also, in things caused [which in turn themselves cause], the fact that they cause something necessarily is not attributable to their imperfection nor to their dependency as effects, but to their plenitude of perfection. Therefore, the situation is not similar here [to conclusions that necessarily follow from principles]. Hence, 'if something is destroyed, the other is destroyed'¹⁶ follows either as a kind of a priori argument or one that is a posteriori. In the first way imperfection is implied, in the second an abundance of perfection. Such is the case of a subject and its proper attribute, which does not merely subsist in itself, but flows into another, especially if it is impossible that this other be destroyed.

21 Also, according to this God could produce more differences among beings than he has at present, because he could produce both necessary and possible [i.e., contingent] beings.

22 Against the reply to the argument in Bk. I of *De coelo et mundo*,¹⁷ that nothing that is of itself only possible [or contingent] could be necessary through another, this reason is added here: the necessary and possible divide the whole of being; therefore, they

¹⁴Cf. *supra*, nn. 9-11.

¹⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 10-11.

¹⁷Aristotle, *De caelo* I, ch. 12, 283a 24-29.

divide every difference of being; for the divisions of being qua being [i.e. the ten categories or predicaments] commonly are not subordinated.

23 To the contrary: the will, which primarily is concerned with the end, is not necessarily about something that is not necessarily ordered to that end.¹⁸

[D.—IN DEFENSE OF AVICENNA]

24 [5] To the arguments above against Avicenna. To the first:¹⁹ that the mode of production does not alter any condition proper to the product, but there is some [mode of] production that implies necessity of the product, and yet because it is caused, it implies there is no necessity; therefore, there is a contradiction that something be caused by God by a necessity of nature.

25 This gives an answer to the second argument.²⁰

26 To the third:²¹ in any absolute entity [i.e., God], necessity is a matter of perfection. Also, as regards the prior upon which something depends, if there were necessity there, it would not imply imperfection in the absolute. As regards something posterior by nature, it would necessarily posit imperfection in the absolute. However, that respect would be more perfect, if it were not a contradiction in terms. For a term to which necessity is repugnant, there cannot be a necessary respect.

27 To the fourth:²² the plenitude of limited perfection is not an unqualified plenitude.—To the confirmation: although some connection [between natural causes and their effects] is in a qualified sense necessary, nevertheless, none is simply necessary in

¹⁸This seems to be a reference to *Physics* II, ch. 9, 200a 19-21, where Aristotle draws attention to the parallel between the necessary relationship between a principle and the conclusion, and the means to an end, on the one hand, and the end itself. "But in things that come to an end the reverse is true, if the end is to exist or does exist, that also which precedes it does exist or will exist; otherwise just as there, if the conclusion is not true the premise is not true, so here the end or 'that for the sake of which' will not exist."

¹⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

²⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

²¹Cf. *supra*, n. 17.

²²Cf. *supra*, n. 18.

an unqualified sense, because each thing depends upon a first cause which causes contingently. If it, as naturally prior, is not causing, nothing else causes. Similarly, generally speaking secondary causes can be impeded. Even though such an impedible cause is actually not impeded, it is not thereby a necessary cause.

28 For the first reason touched upon,²³ which is that of Avicenna, it is said that whatever is necessary of itself would possess that necessity intrinsically. Hence, whatever hypothesis you assume about what is extrinsic—be it possible or impossible—[what is necessary of itself] will not cease to be non-necessary.

29 To the other here above,²⁴ I respond: those things that assert perfection in an unqualified sense, and this not indeterminately, but in the highest possible way, do divide being.

30 To the contrary: the opposites [necessary and possible] are coextensive in disjunction [with being] along with other similar disjuncts that divide being. For example, finite-infinite, possible-necessary, imperfect-simply perfect, etc.}}

²³Cf. *supra*, nn. 19 and 1.

²⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 22.

QUESTION FOUR

Text of Aristotle: "Some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 31-32)

Is the division of "one" into one in general, one specifically, one numerically, and one proportionally, appropriate?

As for 'one', the question is raised about its division, which is divided into one numerically, one specifically and one generically and one proportionately or analogically. Is this division appropriate, and what about the parts of the division.

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] That it is not:

Either this is the same as the first [division] he posited [in this chapter], or it is other; but it is not the same, because then it is insufficient, since the first¹ has five members; and this has only four;² it is not other, because two members of this division agree with two of the other [division], namely, that of genus and of species.

2 Also, it is a division [of one either as equivocal]³ or as univocal into univocals]. It is not the latter, for then "many" would not be said to be in modes opposed to these modes, which is against what the Philosopher says in the text.⁴ For 'irrational' and 'rational'

¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1015b 35 -1016b 17.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 31-32: "Some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy."

³Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaphy.* V, q. 6, ed. Venice 1513, f. 14rb. He formulates the argument thus: Praeterea, illa divisio unius est divisio unius univoci: vel equivoci; non est divisio univoci; quia tunc multum quod sibi opponitur non diceretur tot modis quot ipsum unum, cuius oppositum patet... Consequentia probatur, quia quando aliquid univocum dicitur multis modis non oportet eum oppositum tot modis et aequalibus dici: patet de rationali et irrationali quae non dividuntur in aequalia, quia de pluribus irrationale quam rationale.

⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1017a 4: "Evidently 'many' will be said to have many meanings opposite to those of 'one'."

are not divided into equals.⁵ Neither is it a division of 'one' as equivocal, because then wherever "one" or "many" are put into a proposition, the proposition would have to be distinguished, which is not true.

3 Also, [if this division were appropriate], no one member could be attributed to another. But this is against what the Philosopher says in the text, since one member of the division agrees with all the members. For, "it is characteristic of one to be a principle or beginning of number," as he says in this chapter.⁶ Therefore, 'to be one' is a principle of number, and hence, 'one' numerically—which is one of the members of the division—is common to all the members.

4 Also, about the meaning of the members, where he says that that which defines one in number is that whose matter is numerically one.⁷ But, then, nothing immaterial would be one numerically; the consequent is false, because just as the prior unity always implies the posterior unity, so for multiplicity it is the other way around. But in immaterial things there is a multitude of species, therefore, there is one numerically.

5 Also, then contraries would be numerically one, because their matter is numerically one.

6 The Philosopher states the opposite.⁸

⁵See Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaphy.* Bk. V, q. 6, fol. 24rb: "Patet de rationali et irrationali quae non dividuntur in aequalia, quia de pluribus dicitur irrationale quam rationale."

⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 18; One was not a number for Aristotle, but was the beginning of number, for all numbers are measured by one or some unit: "The essence of what is one is to be some kind of beginning of number."

⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 33.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 32-35: "Some things are one in number, others in species, others in genus, others by analogy; in number those whose matter is one, in species those whose definition is one, in genus those to which the same figure of predication applies, by analogy those which are related as a third thing to a fourth."

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

7 It is said⁹ that this [second] division is appropriate, because it is according to the logical intentions, and the first division [n. 1] is according to real foundations. That [second] division is according to [logical] intentions found in things. But whether “one” that is divided in the first division and in the other division is real, or whether what in one is real and in the other is intentional, will be taken up in the first solution to the first argument.¹⁰ But always what is said here is true [viz. that the division is appropriate].

8 And then one may assign its adequacy, because the intellect understanding something under the aspect of one: either understands it under the aspect of incommunicability, and this is numerical unity, or under the aspect of predicable of several; and then this can be understood in two ways: either [a] of numerical differences, and then we have a unity of species; or [b] of several which differ specifically, and then we have a generic unity. Beyond this unity [however] we do not find one concept that can be predicated; but by taking one most common concept and comparing it with another most common concept, unity of proportion [or analogy] is found in things that are related similarly to other things, namely to their inferiors in predicating something “in quid” of these. And thus the division is adequate.

9 To the contrary: two members are not taken according to the intentional foundations. The first¹¹ is not, because then [in n. 4] it calls that numerically one, whose matter is one; but matter is not just a consideration of the intellect. The fourth¹² is not, because some proportion would exist even if no intellect existed [to consider it], for even then 8 would still be related similarly to 4 as 6 is to 3. Therefore, unity of proportion is not caused by the intellect.

10 One way of explaining the first¹³ is this. That is said to be numerically one, which is not predicated of several, and this is singular unity and so the foundation of one is the singular.—This is

⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Praedic.*, q. 10, n. 10.

¹⁰Cf. *infra*, n. 12.

¹¹I.e. one in number.

¹²Namely, one proportionately.

¹³Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

proved, because the universal and the singular are referred to one another. The universal, however, is intentional, therefore, the singular is intentional as well, because they are simultaneous by nature, and a first intentional thing and a second intentional thing are not simultaneous by nature.—This is confirmed, through Bk. III of this work in question 13.¹⁴ “There is no difference in meaning between ‘numerically one’ and ‘individual.’”¹⁵

11 To the other about proportion,¹⁶ I say that proportion can be based on real things, as in the case of numbers, or on intentional things, as in the case of “predicated” and “subjected”; the first can exist without the intellect, the second cannot. And the latter is what we are talking about, because predicates have this proportion in predicating “in quid” what is contained under them.

[II.—REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS AT THE BEGINNING]

12 [3] To the first argument at the beginning,¹⁷ it is said that neither this [second] division nor the first division divides “one” according to the essential meaning of “one,” namely, according to the notion of indivision, but the division is according to the foundations upon which unity can be founded. Then this division differs from the first, because the first has real foundations whereas this has intentional foundations.

13 To the contrary: a first intentional thing, such as unity which is in the category of quantity, is not founded on a thing of second intention, because everything that has its foundation in another has a lesser entity than its foundation. And a thing of first intention has a greater entity than a thing of second intention.

14 This is conceded, and another response is given, because the unity divided at first is real. In this second division, however, the unity is conceptual, and the foundations also. Then I say that the two members, namely, genus and species, do not agree here and there [as to their meaning].

¹⁴Scotus has only one question for Bk. III; see later in Bk. V, qq. 5-6, n. 26 and Bk. V, q. 9, n. 63, where he speaks of the division of Aristotle's Bk. III into questions.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 4, 999b 33.

¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

¹⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

15 To this, note that every unity caused by the intellect has a unity in reality from which it originated (as is touched on in Bk. I of this work, question 1,¹⁸ and even more clearly in Bk. VII.)¹⁹ Just as fire generates fire, because it is the same species, even if no intellect exists. And from that unity in reality the intellect is moved to find an intentional unity, which is based on that real unity. And this real unity is characteristic of the first members and conceptual unity, founded on such [real] unity, is in the second division.

16 To the other,²⁰ one could say that the “one” divided here is equivocally predicated of one of the previous dividends. Nevertheless, this ‘one’ and that ‘one,’—each taken in itself with respect to its own mode—are not predicated equivocally, but unity here in its modes and unity there in its modes differ according to more or less. And when it is said that “many” is not predicated in this way,—indeed when one opposite is predicated according to more and less of some things, then the other opposite is predicated in as many modes. It is not necessary, however, to divide the opposite in as many inferiors as the other.

In what genus is this intentional “one,” when the other is real? And I ask in what genus are those intentions “genus” and “species”? If they are in no genus, then there is no point asking about the ‘one,’ ‘In what genus it is?’ If they were in some genus, then it is there that the “one” is posited according to the second division.

17 To the third,²¹ one must say that the “one” divided here is conceptual, and it is not the ‘one’ that is the beginning or principle of number, but ‘one’ as the common principle of number is something real to each. Hence, ‘one’ numerically and ‘one’ as the principle of number differ. The first [i.e. ‘one’ numerically] is the divisor in the second division, and the second ‘one’ [as a principle of number] is what is divided in the first division.

¹⁸Cf. *supra*, Bk. I, q. 1, nn. 89-90; clearer treatment however is found in Bk. I, q. 6, nn. 22-28.

¹⁹Cf. *infra*, Bk. VII, q. 13, nn. 60-83; q. 18, nn. 21-25, 29-38, 39-43.

²⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

²¹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

18 To the other,²² the Commentator²³ says that “there is a difference, because one in number is in matter, whereas one as the principle of number is not in matter.” And this answers the argument.

19 Against what he²⁴ says about “one as the principle of number not being in matter”: either this statement is a universal negative, or a particular negative. If it is the first, then the statement is false, because there is some unity which is the principle of number that is in matter. This is evident as regards the divided parts of a continuum; for every dividend is one numerically, and if no ‘one’ that is a principle of number were in matter, then no number would be in matter. If the statement is to be understood as a particular proposition, why is the ‘one’ that is assumed to be convertible with being, other than the ‘one’ which is the principle of number?. For in all immaterial things there is the ‘one’ that is the principle of number, according to him, and it is also in material things, as was shown immediately before.²⁵ Therefore, in all things there can be ‘one’ as a principle of number. Hence, the other ‘one’ is superfluous.

20 Also, about the other member [i.e. ‘one’ numerically]. Either there is no difference, or one would have to understand that everything numerically ‘one’ is in matter. But this is false, because in immaterial things there is some unity that is greater than a specific unity. But no unity is greater than a numerical unity, as we speak of it here. Therefore, this is in immaterial things. Proof of the first of these: because some angel is one in this way that it is not predicated of several; therefore, it has a unity greater than specific unity.

21[5] [The Opinion of Aquinas] Therefore, omitting the explanation of Averroes, Thomas says²⁶ to this argument²⁷ that

²²Cf. supra, n. 4.

²³Averroes, *Metaphysica* V, com. 12, ed. Ponzalli, p. 123.

²⁴Namely, the Commentator in n. 18.

²⁵Cf. supra, n. 17.

²⁶Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* Bk. V, lect. 8, ed. Parma XX, 399b: “Materia enim, secundum quod stat sub dimensionibus signatis, est principium individuationis formae.”

²⁷Cf. supra, n. 4.

numerical unity is caused by the matter being one, inasmuch as the matter is subject to limited dimensions.

22 And on this basis he answers the other argument²⁸ insisting that contraries do not have simultaneously matter that is numerically one.

23 [Against the Opinion of Aquinas] To the contrary: in immaterial things there is one, and nevertheless, there is no matter there.

24 Against the second:²⁹ if simultaneity is required, then it is simultaneity in time. But then abstracted from time, it could not have that unity and such are mathematical things. Nevertheless the Philosopher in Bk. III of this work,³⁰ says that in mathematical things there are many things that belong numerically to the same species.

25 Another answer is that the proposition of the Philosopher is assigned to everything in itself, not to two things compared to one another.

26 On the contrary: if this is the *per se* meaning of numerical unity in any thing itself, then it is the same meaning wherever this notion is found, and [there will also be there] its effect [viz. this unity]. Therefore, if in two things compared [to each other] this notion is to be found, you will also find this unity.

27 [He returns to the fourth argument] Therefore, it is said regarding the proposition that numerical unity is not defined through [Aristotle's] dictum: "one in number is that whose matter is one," howsoever this may be proved. Because a being of second intention³¹ is not defined by a being of first intention, neither is there a circumlocution through convertibles. Take an example that is obvious: for instance, an accidental being as such lumps two things together, whereas "Man" asserts something *per se*, because it does not join two. Nor is it necessary to enumerate all things. Hence,

²⁸Cf. supra, n. 5; Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* Bk. V, lect. 8, ed. Parma XX, 399b: "Et propter hoc ex materia habet singulare quod sit unum numero ab aliis divisum."

²⁹Cf. supra, n. 22.

³⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 6, 1002b 14-16.

³¹Cf. supra, n. 13-14.; Duns Scotus, *Porphy.* qq. 9-11, n. 28: "Impossibile est autem aliquam rem secundae intentionis definire rem primae intentionis."

unity in material things is more evident to us than unity in immaterial things. However, he does not exclude the possibility [that there be unity] in immaterial things.

28 Another answer: the singular is something that can be a subject in an unqualified sense; but every such subject has a material aspect and is appropriated to what is simply singular.³² Hence, you must gloss the proposition [in n. 4] that "one numerically is that whose matter is one in number" in this way: that thing whose ability to be a subject is simply singular; and then it says nothing about real matter.

[III.—OBJECTIONS AGAINST THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION
AND ANSWERS THERETO]

29 Against what is said in the solution³³ to the initial argument: if the unity is distinguished here on the basis of its intentional foundations, then there would not be more unities than there are [such] bases for it, nor vice versa [would there be more bases than unities]. But this is false. There are more foundations than these four, namely, genus, difference, property, and accident.

30 Against one dictum to the first argument that the foundation of this unity is intentional,³⁴ I prove that it is simply worthless. That which is less a being than an intentional being is entirely non-being. But a proper attribute [like 'one'] in a conceptual being is less a being than an intentional being; therefore, it is nothing; in this way this unity [as its proper attribute] would be nothing.

31 To the first,³⁵ one must say that this division is based on the idea that intentional unity is founded in whatever is considered as a quiddity or essence, and these are not predicables "in quid" unless they be one of the four enumerated above, because other quiddities enumerated are predicated "in quale."

³²I.e., substance in the sense of being the primary subject of a proposition, as opposed to genus and species which are secondary substance in the sense of being the subject of which the other categories are predicated.

³³Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

³⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 29.

32 Another answer is this: the division is according to what is characteristic of the concept of anything in itself, not as compared to other things, and this according to the diverse grades of unity. And through this the unity of definition and difference is excluded. Through the first stipulation property and accident are excluded, which in themselves are specifically one [namely accident].³⁶

33 To the other,³⁷ there are degrees in real things just as there are in conceptual things. Hence that conceptual being which is subject to another conceptual thing is more a thing in some sense; however from this it does not follow that the other is simply nothing.

³⁶An annotation is inserted here in one manuscript: "Concerning these two ways, a doubt arises as to which is first: the relation of reason in the cause or the real relation in the effect."

³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 30.

QUESTION FIVE

Text of Aristotle: "The kinds of essential being are precisely those that are indicated by the figures of predication; for the senses of 'being' are just as many as these figures." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 7, 1017a 23- 25)

Is being as such divided into ten categories?

Is being as such commonly divided into ten most general genera [or categories]?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] For the negative:

On the part of what is divided: 'a being, as such,' since it is, needs no other; according to the *Posterior Analytics* I,¹ it is in the third mode of *per se* predication;² but an accident does need another; therefore it is not 'a being, as such.'

2 It is said that being is not divided here [viz. in the *Metaphysics*] in the way it is understood there, [in the *Posterior Analytics*] where it refers to a solitary being, namely, an individual or first substance. Rather, it is taken here [in the *Metaphysics*] for anything that is not in itself an aggregate of diverse natures.

3 To the contrary: Bk. VII of this work,³ the essence of 'white' is not the same as 'the white,' nor [the quiddity] of 'musical' the same as 'the musical,' because of the double meaning [of such accidental terms]. Therefore, all accidents signify aggregates.⁴

¹Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 4, 73b 5-8.

²The first two modes concern the predication of either something essential (first mode) or a proper attribute (second mode.) Substance is not predicated of anything other than itself and this is in the third mode of *per se*. "Things not said of an underlying subject I call things in themselves and those which are said of an underlying subject I call accidental."

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 6, 1031b 22-25.

⁴The aggregate consists of the accidental quality itself and the substance or subject possessing the quality. The counterargument, therefore, is intended to refute the assertion in n. 2 that an accident is itself [i.e., "a being, as such" or 'ens secundum

4 Also, for the negative:⁵

On the part of the divisions,⁶ *Topics* V:⁷ “What is said in the superlative pertains to one alone.” What is most general [i.e. a category] is such; therefore, etc.

5 [In a proper division] there are only two: [e.g.] being is divided into “a being *per se*” and “a being that is not *per se*.”—Similarly, it is divided into “a being in another” and “a being not in another,” into “a dependent being” and “a being that is not dependent.” Therefore, as there is one member that is most general, so also with the rest.

6 In reply to this it is said here that the implication is invalid, since one member is univocal whereas the other is equivocal; the equivocal can contain several under itself which the univocal cannot. Therefore, etc.

To the contrary: According to *Topics* I:⁸ ‘Of [contradictory] opposites, one is predicated in as many ways as the other.’ Therefore, if the division is through opposites, if one member is common to nine, so too is the other.—Similarly if one member of the division is equivocal to the nine genera, then, no accident would pertain more to another than it would to substance. This is incongruous, since all would depend upon substance, whereas substance would not depend.⁹

7 Similarly, the division would be no truer than here, where one being is ‘when’ and the other, ‘not-when.’¹⁰

se’] and hence, not an aggregate of distinct categories.

⁵“ad principale” refers to the initial position, which in this case is the negative. Hence, we translate it “for the negative.”

⁶I.e. the specific categories, quantity, quality, etc.

⁷Aristotle, *Topics* V, ch. 5, 134b 24-25.

⁸Aristotle, *Topics* I, ch. 15, 106b 14-15: “For if it [a contradictory opposite] is used in more than one way, then the opposite of it also will be used in more than one way.”

⁹The argument here seems to be that no accident can depend primarily upon another, which is false, e.g., relations of equality depend upon quantity, those of similarity upon quality, and quality depends upon quantity.

¹⁰The argument here seems to be that if every accident depends primarily or exclusively upon substance, then the correct or truer division should be dichotomous, namely, “substance” vs. “non-substance.” As the very etymology of the word indicates, “substance” stands on its own or is independent, whereas what is essential

8 Also, for the negative:¹¹

[As for quantity] Under quantity there are two genera; “in every single genus there is some meaning that is primarily one.”¹² In quantity, however, there are two: a unit and a point.

9 It is said [in answer] that these two are not first in an unqualified sense, but unit and point are reduced to¹³ ‘unity,’ as is clear from Bk. V of this work in the chapter ‘On the one’:¹⁴ “That which is in no way divisible in quantity if it has no position it is a unit, if it has position it is a point.” And in the *Posterior Analytics* I:¹⁵ “The point is the unity that has position.”

10 To the contrary: what is characteristic of the source is characteristic of what originates from the source.¹⁶ Therefore if ‘point’ as

and common to the other nine categories is that they do not stand on their own. Such a dichotomous division, however, is no better or truer than the dichotomous divisions into “when” and “not-when,” or “quantum” and “non-quantum,” “related” and “not-related,” etc. For any given category can be used as the primary form of being, or being as such. Its negation or contradictory opposite will cover the remaining nine categories.

¹¹Scotus repeats the same argument for a dichotomous division, showing that each of the nine aristotelian accidental categories are violations of this rule.

¹²Cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 135: “In unoquoque genere est dare aliquod primum et minimum quod fit metrum et mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere”. The “*Auctoritates Aristotelis*” is the accepted anthology of quotations from Aristotle used commonly by the scholastics. According to this what Aristotle is saying in *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 18 is that in every true genus, and this would be eminently true of the categories as the most general of the genera, there is some fundamental minimal meaning that is characteristic of everything that falls under that genre specifically. The category of quantity, however, seems to contain no such single fundamental meaning, but breaks down like a logically equivocal term into two formally diverse conceptions, the notion of a unit and that of a point.

¹³That is they fall under a common indivisible notion of ‘unity’ as its subdivisions.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 29-31.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 32, 87a 36.

¹⁶This is the closest I can think of in English to translate the essential meaning of the Latin maxim “sicut principium ad principium, sic principiatum ad principiatum.” which would read more literally “as the source to the source, so too what stems from the source to what stems from the source.” An analogous dictum would be “as the parent, so the child.” The argument is that if the several apparently different meanings of quantity can be reduced to one core meaning, then the species that fall under this category can be reduced to one another, specifically “continuous quantity” could be reduced to “discrete” or vice versa. But in such a case they are not two distinct species of the same generic nature, because the latter applies equally well to any species that falls immediately under it.

having position can be reduced to a 'unit,' then continuous quantity can be reduced to discrete quantity; and then they [continuous and discrete] are not species of one genus, because the genus is affirmed with equal particularity¹⁷ of each of its species.

11 Also, this is false: "a point is a unit having a position." Neither ought one quote the Philosopher, who is not giving his own opinion but is speaking of the view of Plato that assumes quantities to be the substances of things. For the Philosopher says in *Posterior Analytics* I,¹⁸ that a point is a substance having position; but according to his mind, it is false that a point is a substance. Therefore, he is speaking in another vein.

12 Also, every genus is first divided through two differences into only two primary species. Quantity in the *Categories*¹⁹ has two divisions [viz. discrete or continuous] neither of which is contained under the other, but both are primary.²⁰ Proof of this: because 'to have position' is not contained under the continuum; nor is discrete. Because both continuous quantity and discrete quantity can be without position; therefore, they are two genera.

13 And as for quality, it has four primary species [rather than two].²¹

¹⁷One of the alternate expressions for "primarily" given in the Thesaurus is "particularly." "Primo" in the expression "primo dicitur" has the sense of "being predicated primarily," i.e., according to its primary or essential meaning. To express this is done "equally" in regard to several subjects, I have chosen the phrase "affirmed with equal particularity."

¹⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

¹⁹Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 4b 20.

²⁰Proof that both are primary or exclusive divisions follows from the fact that "discrete" does not fall under "continuous" as a subdivision, and that "having position" which is a subdivision of "discrete"—for discrete quantity can be either points, if they have position, or units of some sort if they have no position. "Continuous" is the opposite of "discrete" because it denies that any portion thereof has distinct boundaries, whether these boundaries be separated or be immediately adjacent to one another. Since both continuous and discrete quantity can 'be without position' [that is, to have unity or be a unit], both are more general and less specific notions than "an indivisible non having position" i.e., a 'unit' Units resemble points in that they are indivisible. Quantity however, is not something indivisible *per se*, nor is a continuous quantity [like a line or a surface or a solid] or a discrete quantities [like number] something indivisible like a unit or a point is. Scotus is assuming that quantity as a unitary category or most general genus has a core meaning.

²¹Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 8, 8b 25-10a 11.

14 And as for relation, [the problem is that it is not a single notion] for it involves two. Every relative refers to a correlative that is simultaneous [in nature] with it,²² and this [correlative] is a most general relation, as equally primary as its relative; and thus there are two primary [categories].

15 As for 'acting' [actio] and 'being affected' [passio] these are essentially relations; therefore they are not distinct genera [from the category of relation]. Proof of the antecedent: everything is essentially a relation by which something is formally referred; but acting and being affected are such; therefore, etc. Proof: heating refers to what can be heated; but heating qua heating is formally heating by an action, and what can be heated is such by being passively affected [or as the recipient of action].

16 As for 'where' and 'when'; 'where' is 'being in place,' and 'when' is 'being in time'; but 'to be in something' does not pertain to a genus other than that in which it is, just as to be in health is not some genus other than health, because if it were, then there would be eighteen most general genera or categories of accidents. Therefore, 'to be in place' and 'in time' is the same genus as place and time.

17 Also, position is an order of parts in a place. 'Part' is not of the essence or quiddity of position, because a part is in a category of relation, nor is it existing 'in a place,' [of the essence of 'part'], for then position would be 'where' or ubiety; therefore, [position] is essentially an order, and an order is a relation; therefore position is essentially a relation.

18 As for 'status,'²³ this 'having' is the linkage between the one having it and the thing had, but this is a relation.—Also 'having' is a medium between the 'subject having' and what is had, as 'making' is a medium between the maker and the thing made. But 'making' produces two most general genera by reason of both 'from this' and 'in this,' and the same would be true of 'having.'

²²Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 7, 6b 29 and 7b 15.

²³Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 9, 11b 14 "in the category of state are included such states as 'shod,' 'armed.'

19 [For the affirmative]

In the *Categories*²⁴ the Philosopher says the opposite: “Expressions in no way composite signify [substance, quantity, quality, relation, place, time position, status [or having], acting and being affected.]” Neither is this [enumeration] opposed to what he says here [in Bk. V of the *Metaphysics*], where he omits two [of the ten].²⁵ This he does, the Commentator explains, “for the sake of brevity.”²⁶ But what sort of verbosity would it have been to have cited two more words, which it is necessary to do [for the division to be complete]?

20 {{There is a doubt about these categories: How is each genus one in itself? In many cases there seems to be no one reality characteristic of each of its species: [for example] of substance in the angel and in a body; or of quality in its four species, etc.

21 Another doubt: Why are not ‘when,’ ‘where,’ ‘position,’ and ‘having’ double categories as are ‘acting’ and ‘being affected’? Also where are the aspects of the potencies of the soul? Or the violent inclinations given to the mobile by their movers? Or the species produced by sensibles or intelligibles? Where does motion fit in? Where do the principles²⁷ of substance go, since each of these is some being as such, since it has one quiddity? Also, why are not concrete things genera like the abstract?}}²⁸

²⁴Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 4, 1b 25-26.

²⁵Namely, ‘position’ and ‘having’ are here omitted.

²⁶Averroes, *Metaphysica* V, com. 14 “He is silent about the categories of position and status because of brevity of speech or because these are less evident.”

²⁷The ten categories represent a classification of finite being and hence leave open the question of where to classify God as infinite being, or according to Aristotle, the Intelligences in general. Aquinas treats these as the causes or principles of substance rather than substance as such. According to Scotus, one could consider an ‘ens in se’ as the disjunct of ‘ens in alio’ as a quasi-substance in an extended or transcendental sense. Principles could also refer to matter and form as somehow intermediate as incomplete substances, matter having more the character of a subject (and hence of substance in the sense of a primary substrate) and form that of a modification or as something in a subject, like the accidents.

²⁸Cf. Duns Scotus, *Praedic.* q. 11, n. 8 “Item, album est unum aliquid essentialiter, quia—per praedeterminata—nihil aliud significat quam albedinem. Igitur est in aliquo genere *per se*. Non in genere qualitatis: quia qualitas vere praedicatur de omni quod est *per se* in genere qualitatis; qualitas non vere praedicatur de albo; igitur album *per se* est in alio genere generalissimo. Ita contingit arguere de concreto cuiuscumque generis accidentis; igitur sunt duodeviginti genera accidentium.”

QUESTION SIX

Are the categories distinguished essentially?

According to this distinction of the divisions the question arises of whether they are distinguished essentially.

[Arguments Pro and Con]

22 [1] That they are not:

Quantity is “essentially divisible into those things which are in it, [of which each is a ‘one’ and a ‘this.’]²⁹ But such is a corporeal substance without any further essential addition. Proof: a subject qua subject is naturally prior to its accident [or to what is added to it incidentally] A corporeal substance, therefore, is naturally prior to quantity, since it is quantity’s subject; but such a substance can receive quantity only in its parts, since to have parts outside of parts pertains to the very notion of quantity, and the indivisible cannot receive the divisible. Therefore, the very notion of a recipient [of quantity] as such is to have parts of the same sort.

23 As for quality: one meaning of ‘quality’ is ‘a difference of substance.’ But [such a substantial] difference does not differ essentially from substance [itself]. Therefore, etc.

24 Also, quality of the fourth species [i.e. shape or figure] does not differ essentially from quantity; therefore [shape or figure] is not distinct. Proof: if figure were essentially distinguished from a body, since both are absolutes, God, therefore, could make a body without figure, and thus without boundaries.

25 Also, then one could think of quantity as having no configuration or boundary, which contradicts what the Philosopher says in Bk. III of the *Physics*³⁰ that one cannot think of a body except as ‘bounded by a surface.’ See the chapter there “On the Infinite” the first argument that begins ‘Reasonably, etc.’

²⁹ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 7-8.

³⁰ Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 5, 204b 6-7: “If ‘bounded by a surface’ is the definition of a body there cannot be an infinite body either intelligible or sensible.”

26 Similarly in Bk. III of this work, question 16, argument two:³¹ “It is impossible that there be a body without these,” namely, surface and line, for these define a body, not vice versa.

27 As for a relation, it can arise without any real change [in what is related]; therefore, it is not a truly distinct thing. Proof of the antecedent is found in Bk. V of the *Physics* of Aristotle,³² [where he denies there can be motion with respect to relations.]—But this is not valid, because he denies motion there of substance in the same way he denies it of relation.³³ It is manifest, however, that this holds good only for motion as distinct from mutation, because in substance there is a mutation at the end.³⁴

28 [2] To this counterargument, however, it is said that the subject to which the new relation comes is not changed in itself, but as regards the way it exists towards another, that is, in its ‘existence towards another’ that is otherwise.

29 To the contrary: every form is naturally prior as to its ‘being in its subject’ [the cause] to its ‘subject being such and such’ according to this form [the effect]. Therefore, a relation in itself is naturally prior as ‘being in its subject’ to its ‘subject itself being related’ to something else according to this relation. Therefore, in this prior moment [the subject] will exist itself in another way [than it does as related], and thus will be changed in itself.

³¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 5, 1002a 7-8.

³²Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 2, 225b 11-13.

³³Ibid, 225b 10-13: “In respect to Substance there is no motion, because Substance has no contrary among things that are. Nor is there motion with respect to Relation.”

³⁴Aristotle is speaking of movement or motion as an continuous on-going change or process as opposed to a sudden or instantaneous mutation, where one state is immediately replace by another opposed either contrarily or contradictorally to the previous state. The classical definition he gives to movement or change is found in *Physics* V, ch. 1 [201a 10-11], namely, “The fulfillment of what exists potentially, in so far as it exist potentially, is motion.” In change, actual fulfilment coexists with potentiality, act with potency. In mutation as opposed to motion the succession of distinct states is discrete rather than continuous. In substantial change one form replaces another, each form being substantially distinct from its predecessor. Though there may seem to be a succession similar to movement by reason of the matter’s continuity, each term of the change is a distinct substance. The appearance of a new relationship in a subject occurs suddenly, e.g. the relationship of similarity between two white objects, occurs in one when the second exists, but the latter’s existence involves no internal change in the original white object.

30 As for 'acting' [action] and 'being affected' [passion], they are essentially one movement, hence do not differ [essentially from one another]. Proof is found in *Physics* V,³⁵ where Aristotle shows that there is no motion with respect to 'acting' or into 'being acted upon,' just as there is no motion with respect to motion; 'acting is motion' [or in Latin 'actio est motus']; therefore, etc. If [in the Latin formulation of] this minor, 'motus' were in the genitive case,³⁶ the argument would not be valid; therefore, it is necessary to understand it in the nominative case. Proof that the argument would not imply the conclusion, if in the minor 'motus' were in the genitive, meaning "of movement" rather than simply "movement." For this does not follow "With respect to nothing of substance is there movement; whiteness is an accident 'of substance' (taken genitively); therefore with respect to whiteness there is no movement." Since the argument does not hold in this case, neither does it elsewhere.

31 It is said that [agent and patient] are the subjects of one motion.³⁷ And to the argument ["there is no motion with respect to motion, and hence with respect to acting, but acting is itself the motion"] it is replied in refutation that the argument is not an inference from a logical whole [i.e., motion] to a part [i.e., action or passion]. The argument is rather an instance of the dialectical rule 'a maiori.'³⁸ If there is no motion with respect to motion, a fortiori there is no action or passion with respect to motion. For motion ends even more with respect to motion than with respect to action and passion. For motion which is the subject of these [relations], is more determined and absolute than 'acting' or 'being affected' which are

³⁵Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 2, 225b 13-16: "There is no motion with respect to agent and patient—in fact there can never be motion of mover and moved, because there cannot be motion of motion or becoming of becoming or in general change of change."

³⁶The Latin term for movement or motion is 'motus' which could be either in the genitive or nominative case. If action is not the motion or movement itself, but is only the agent or cause "of movement" in the patient that is moved, 'acting' and 'being acted upon' are not essential the same real effect.

³⁷That is, action is the subject producing the motion or moving the patient and the patient is the subject put in motion by the agent.

³⁸The 'a maiori' rule holds for a valid argument 'a fortiori.' What is true of the lesser is true of the greater.

in motion.³⁹ Then the dictum of the Philosopher proceeds according to the 'a maiori' rule.

32 To the contrary: if they are not essentially motion they are essentially something else. But there seems to be nothing in action with respect to the agent except motion; neither does there seem to be anything in the patient except motion with respect to that patient. Therefore, from your position that they are not motion, it follows that they are essentially relations.

33 Also, the reply [in n. 31] is not an answer to the argument [in n. 30]. [If motion is a more determined and absolute entity], I ask of what sort of determination is meant? If it is a matter of perfection, since there could be no motion with respect to substance, then neither is there with respect to an accident in it.—If it be a matter of permanence, then the reply is irrelevant, because motion is successive according to its essence, whereas action is not, because it can take place in an instant,⁴⁰ and no motion can be in an instant.

34 [3] About 'where' and 'when,' 'when' does not differ essentially from time, because everything that is successive and continuous is time or motion; but 'when' is this sort of thing; therefore, etc.—Proof of the minor: every proper measure of what is successive is itself successive; 'when' is the proper measure of what is successive as such, therefore, etc.—Proof of the assumption: When did it come? Yesterday. When will it come? Tomorrow. [Gilbert] Porretanus, the author of *The Six Principles*⁴¹ has in mind that present, past, and future are the *per se* differences of 'when.' As is evident from his definition, he speaks of the divisible present, of which part is past, part future; therefore, etc.⁴²

35 As for 'where,' denominatively it signifies nothing other than what is absolute. In the *Categories*:⁴³ "white indicates quality and

³⁹Since mover and moved [which are relative, not absolute notions] are in motion, and motion seems to be the absolute or more determinate subject in which the relation exists.

⁴⁰A mutation is an instantaneous action, as is volition.

⁴¹*Liber sex principiorum* ch. 4, n. 33 (Aristoteles Latinus I⁷, p. 42).

⁴²Psychologists, like William James, stress the durational aspect of the present. Unlike a point, it is saddle-backed, looking back to the past and forward to the future.

⁴³Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 5, 3b 19-20: "nihil aliud significat album quam qualitatem."

nothing further." Neither then is 'where' other than place, or 'when' other than time.

36 Of all in general this is true: the categories as such are not real things, therefore they are not distinguished really. Proof of the antecedent: they are universals and universals are not distinguished in this way, but they are predicated in this way; all things however are singular.

37 For the opposite:

The Philosopher in Bk. V of this work, in the chapter 'On being',⁴⁴ divides being as such into the ten genera; therefore, the ten genera represent ten diverse beings as such; but if these differed only as modes of predication, there would be only ten diverse conceptual entities.

38 Also, Boethius in his work *On the Categories*,⁴⁵ speaks of the ten words that signify the ten genera of things.

[I.—TO THE FIFTH QUESTION
A.—THE OPINION OF AVICENNA]

39 [4] One could say that is it not necessary to assume ten, as Avicenna says in *Physics* III, ch. 2 and 3:⁴⁶ "We are not forced to observe that famous division which claims there are ten genera, each one of which is most certainly a generality, and there is nothing beyond them." For, there is something to be found that can be located under no genus, such as motion; for if the comparison of motion to the subject is a category, namely 'to be motion in a subject' is in the category of 'being affected,' then all the more so will motion be a category in its own right. Or if not, let us assume the comparison of quality to a subject to be a category and not quality itself. Or if you wish to make quality a category you have to posit motion as such. And if further, you make the the comparison of motion to its subject [a category], therefore you will make the

⁴⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 7, 1017a 25-27.

⁴⁵Boethius, *Praedicamenta* I (PL 64, 161A): "Dicendum est in hoc libro de primis vocibus prima rerum genera significantibus." Ibid. (PL 664, 162D): "Quoniam rerum prima decem genera sunt, necesse fuit decem quoque esse simplices voces, quae de subiectis rebus dicerentur."

⁴⁶Avicenna, *Sufficientia* II, ch. 2 (25va).

comparison of quality to the subject a category and so the same with the other accidents. And in this way, “you will increase the number of the categories greatly.” This is [the view of] Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III, ch. 3.⁴⁷ And it is against those who assume motion through comparison to the patient to be a category.

40 All the statements to the contrary [in n. 1-18] are easily solved, because the Philosopher did not invent the categories, but only cites a famous way of speaking of them.

41 Similarly, in Bk. V⁴⁸ he is not dividing being into so many categories, but rather into so many things.

42 Nevertheless, in his work *On the Categories*⁴⁹ Boethius admits “there cannot be an eleventh category that can be added to the other ten.”

43 Similarly, Boethius in *On the Categories*,⁵⁰ says that this book, *Categories*, is simply the work of Aristotle.

[B.—THE OPINION ADMITTING THE ADEQUACY OF THE DIVISION
INSO FAR AS IT INCLUDES PROPERTIES]

44 Some⁵¹ claim that the division suffices; not because the division embodies these genera only, or includes only those things that are in a genus directly, but because these [categories] can be con-

⁴⁷Rather *Sufficientia* II, ch. 2 (25**rb-va**): “Similiter praedicamentum patiendi quod est comparatio huius, cuius nomen est ambiguum, ad subiectum, dicetur quasi aequivoce, et sic non est genus. Sed si praedicamentum est comparatio alicuius maneriae motus, tunc similiter hoc debent habere aliae maneriae, et sic erit *per se* unum genus. Et in comparatione sui ad subiectum, erit aliud genus, et augebuntur genera multa augmentatione.”

⁴⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 7, 1017a 23-25: “Secundum se vero esse dicuntur quaecumque significant figuras praedicationis; quoties enim dicitur, toties esse significat.”

⁴⁹Boethius, *Praedicamenta* I (PL 64, 169C): “Maior hac divisione non potest inveniri, nihil enim esse poterit quod huic divisioni undecimum adici queat.”

⁵⁰Boethius, *Praedicamenta* I (PL 64, 161D): “Aristotelis vero neque ullius alterius liber est, idcirco quod in omni philosophia sibi ipse de huius operis disputatione consentit, et brevitatis ipsa atque subtilitas ab Aristotele non discrepat.”

⁵¹Cf. Alexander Hal., *Summa theologiae* II pars 32 inq. 2 tr. 3 q. un. in corp. et ad 1 et 2 (II 158b-159b); Bonaventura, *Sent.* I d. 3 p. 2 a. 1 q. 3 (I 86a); II d. 24 p. 1 a. 2 q. 1 (II 560ab); Thomas, *Summa theol.* I q. 77 a. 1 ad 5 (V 237b) where he speaks of the potencies of the soul and asks in what category they fall.

sidered to embrace other things only indirectly in a genus, as some do who assume substantial properties⁵² are reducible to the same genus [i.e., of substance], and not only the *per se* principles of substance.⁵³

45 [5] To the contrary: these claimants repudiate the notion of division as Boethius speaks of it in his work *On the Categories*:⁵⁴ “The first division of all is into substance and accident”; this is the first; therefore, it is the most immediate. Those⁵⁵ who assume there is something in between these two do not retain the division of Boethius; therefore, it [viz. this division into ten] is not first.

⁵²A good exposition of the view is to be found in St. Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, dist 24, part 1, art. 2, q. 1 where he raises the question of whether the potencies of the soul, specifically intellect and will, are to be simply identified with the essence. He cites three opinions: [a] The first he attributes to St. Augustine, which holds that these faculties or powers are simply different modes or relationships of the soul to its diverse acts. [b] The second which Hugh of St. Victor seems to support holds they are not just modes or relations but they also indicate ‘inherent properties’ which fall into the genre of accidents, and in Aristotelian terms into the second species of qualities, namely, characteristic of potencies or impotencies. These hold that these potencies “differ essentially as different accidental forms existing in the same subject.” [c] The third opinion, favored by Bonaventure himself, holds that these powers or “potencies of the soul are not so identified with the soul itself as to be intrinsic and essential principles, nor are they so diverse as to fall into a different genus, as do accidents, but they are in the genus of substance by reduction.” He points out that this view falls midway between the first two. Scotus we know will use the formal distinction a parte re to deal with this problem, but he seems to have Bonaventure, and perhaps Alexander’s *Summa*, in mind in this discussion in the *Questions on the Metaphysics* when he speaks of the “proprietates substantiales” as distinct from the proper attributes or propria, which are intermediate between essential characteristics expressed by the genus and substantial difference, and the accident that is predicated only per accidens, for these ‘proper attribute’ are predicated *per se* but in the second mode.

⁵³The causes of predicamental being are regarded as having a special character. God as the first efficient and ultimate final cause does not fall under a category even that of substance, since this refers to finite substances. Intrinsic causes like matter and form, would seem to fall under substance as incomplete substances, though much depends upon how one understands matter as capable of existing apart from all form, or as one interprets the existential status of subsidiary forms said to be substantial, by those who hold a pluriform version of hylomorphism.

⁵⁴Boethius, *Praedicamenta* I (PL 64, 169D): “Prima quidem rerum est omnium divisio in substantiam atque accidens.”

⁵⁵Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* I q. 77 a. 1 ad 5 (V 237b): “Si vero accipiantur accidens secundum quod ponitur unum quinque universalium, sic aliquid est medium inter substantiam et accidens.”

46 Also, “of things themselves, some are in a subject; others are not.”⁵⁶—Avicenna in ch. 1, Bk.II of his *Metaphysics*⁵⁷ says the division is sufficient. Just as white and non-white are contradictories, so also white and non-white with respect to wood, if we assume that wood exists. But whatever is a being and is not in a subject, is a substance or its *per se* principle, and nothing is a ‘being in another’ that is not an accident.

47 It is said that the same argument⁵⁸ can be made for principles, because principles are neither substances nor accidents, but are reduced to substances.⁵⁹

48 Similarly, the second argument⁶⁰ is not conclusive, because then one of these two [viz.] ‘not to be in a subject,’ and ‘to be in a subject’ must be affirmed directly of matter or form, which you deny.⁶¹

49 Then, it is said that the division of being into substance and accident is sufficient, insofar as being is predicated of complete being,⁶² or on the part of the dividends, what is divided into all things that can be reduced to a genus.⁶³

⁵⁶Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 1, 1a 20-22.

⁵⁷Avicenna, *Metaphysica* II, ch. 1, AvIL 65.

⁵⁸Cf. supra n. 45; the view of Bonaventure seems to introduce an intermediary between the two extremes and hence contradicts the dichotomous division requirement.

⁵⁹See the view of Bonaventure above in note 52.

⁶⁰Cf. supra, n. 46.

⁶¹It is not clear whether the direct application to ‘ens in alio’ is to be understood only of form as being in matter, or of both matter and form as being in the composite as substantial parts. In either case, one of the two at least falls directly into the class of being ‘in a subject’ and hence should be classified as an accident, whereas both are substances in their own right. This contradicts what is said in n. 46 “Nothing is ‘a being in another’ that is not an accident.” NB The Brussels MS [Codex K] has n. 48: “Praeterea, secundum argumentum non concludit quia tunc si nullum posset dari medium, tamen oportet necessario dare alterum circa quodlibet ens, scilicet vel quod est in subiecto vel quod non est in subiecto. Ergo et istud dabitur consequenter, scilicet quod vel est substantia et directe de genere substantiae vel non. Sed est directe accidens et de genere accidentis. Et tunc verificabitur de materia et forma quod tu negas.”

⁶²That is, not of form or matter which are incomplete beings, and somehow have the character of either substance (matter as substrate) or accident (form as being in matter as its subject).

⁶³This would cover the view that the potencies of the soul, or more generally the diverse powers of simple substances, are not accidents but are reductively to be identified as substantial.

50 That the arguments are not conclusive for both principles and properties is evident, because the principle is naturally prior to what stems from a principle;⁶⁴ but a principle of substance⁶⁵ [be it God as efficient or final cause, or matter and form as internal causes of substance] cannot be a non-substance [or accident]; therefore, that principle cannot be of another [accidental] genus. [Neither does it fall under the properties of substance] But any property whatsoever of substance is posterior to that substance and outside its concept and what we understand by such; therefore, the reasons about principles and these properties are not conclusive in a similar way.

51 Similarly, to the other:⁶⁶ [namely] everything that is, either is 'a being in another' or 'a being not in another,' or is 'a being in itself,' or is 'a principle of a being in itself';—this is not true of a property.⁶⁷

52 Also, [a property] is not of the same genus [as the subject which has the property], because in the *Categories*⁶⁸ 'to be in a subject' [means to be an accident].⁶⁹ I say that—since it [i.e., a property] is in another—it is not in it as a part in a whole, and it is impossible that it be without that in which it is. But inasmuch as 'being in a subject' is the proper description of an accident that is convertible with its subject,⁷⁰ in this sense it pertains directly to property.

⁶⁴Just as cause is naturally prior to its effect.

⁶⁵That is, as a category or as limited or determinable being.

⁶⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 46.

⁶⁷Properties, refer to multiple potencies of a simple substance, such as intellect and the will in an angel or in the spiritual soul [see notes 52 and 53 *supra*]. What differentiates 'properties' from 'principles' is that they are posterior ontologically to the subject of which they are properties, whereas principles or causes are ontological prior to their effects.

⁶⁸Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 1, 1a 24-25.

⁶⁹This is basically the argument made by the second interpretation of substantial properties according to St. Bonaventure, see note 52.

⁷⁰An accident convertible with its subject would be a property [proprium] as opposed to an accident [accidens]. As one of the five predicables of Porphyry, it is predicated in the second mode of *per se* predication whereas accident is predicated only *per accidens*. Scotus sometimes speaks of these as 'proper accidents' as opposed to 'incidental accidents.'

53 Also,⁷¹ that property is not in the same genus unless it be through its immediacy to that to which it belongs.⁷² But because of this it ought not to be put into the same genus, because some attribute is immediately in its subject; and nevertheless, is in the genus of accident.⁷³ For⁷⁴ some demonstration is the most potent or

⁷¹This is a second argument confirming that in the previous paragraph that a substantial property should be classified as an accident, rather than a substance. As distinct a *parte rei* from the essence of a simple substance like the soul or an angel, it can be multiple as are the potencies of a spiritual substance.

⁷²This seems to be an argument against the third opinion about substantial properties of the soul or the angel given by St. Bonaventure [note 52] and favored as his personal opinion. Potencies of the soul like intellect, will, etc. according to this view "are not so identified with the soul itself as to be intrinsic and essential principles" such as would be those which constitute generic or specifically different perfections that put it into a distinct species and are predicated in the first mode of *per se* predications. On the other hand neither "are they so diverse as to fall into a different genus, as do accidents, but are in the genus of substance by reduction."

⁷³A proper attribute is something other than the essential nature of the subject that is nevertheless necessarily connected to the essence, being predicated of it in the second mode of *per se*, and this necessary connection is demonstrated of the subject by means of the essence as a middle term. Scotus seems to be saying here that as something other than the essence such an attribute should be classified as an accident (i.e. something that comes secondarily to the essence, unlike those perfections or characteristics that are considered essential, like generic and specific difference which are predicated in the first mode of *per se*). Nevertheless, despite its accidental character it is most immediate, because it is demonstrable of its subject by the most powerful demonstration. That is to say, it is the first or nearest attribute to the subject that can be demonstrated. Scotus in dealing with the question of whether whatever is moved is moved by another seems to consider the relationship between a subject and its proper attribute to be a case somehow of where the subject causes necessarily its proper attribute in a way similar to the way in which the will produces its volition, being both an active cause and the recipient of its immanent effect. But cause and effect, he considers to be really distinct beings, because of the opposite relationship they bear to one another. The difference between the will producing its volition and the subject producing its properties, however, is that the first is a contingent production whereas the latter is a necessary production. Hence in the *Metaphysics* he seems to favor the idea that the subject and its proper attributes are really distinct entities. Later, when he discovers or analyzes the nature of distinctions a *parte rei*, he sees the need of an intermediate formal distinction which does justice to the distinct character of such perfections as can be conceived as conceptually distinct and can even be realized apart from one another in really distinct simple substances, yet in the particular substance in which they coexist, one perfection cannot be separated from the other, even by the power of God.

⁷⁴The argument against the third interpretation, here comes down to one in favor of the second interpretation Bonaventure speaks of, which he attributes to Hugh of St. Victor, namely, that "potencies" of the soul fall into the accidental category of quality as its second species. Scotus argument seems to be that there is no

there would be no demonstration whatsoever; since all demonstration holds in virtue of some first. 'First' and 'most potent' are the same; therefore, its [i.e., the demonstration's] principles will be most immediate; hence, the attribute inferred is in the subject immediately [by reason of such a most potent demonstration].—Or take the opposite:⁷⁵ [i.e., the principles for demonstrating a substantial property are not immediate] then the major or the minor proposition is not the most immediate.⁷⁶

54 Also⁷⁷ I ask: In what way is this property predicated [*per se*] of its subject? Is the predication only *per accidens*? [If so], then it is more in the genus of accident than an attribute, because an attribute is predicated *per se*. If it is *per se* in the first mode, then it is of the essence of a thing, which is a contradiction. If in the second mode,

way of distinguishing between a substantial property and a *passio* or proper attribute on the basis of the way each is demonstrated to inhere necessarily in its respective subject. Proper attributes are established of their subject by the most potent form of demonstration, i.e. one in the figure *barbara* in which the middle term is the definition of the subject and the predicate of the conclusion is the attribute according to Aristotle. An example, such would be a demonstration in which risibility is established as a necessary attribute of a human being on the basis of the essential definition of man as a rational animal. Another would be a demonstration of the necessary and inseparable connection of God's attributes, such as wisdom, omnipotence, etc. by using as a middle term the definition of God's essence as 'infinite being.'

⁷⁵Take the opposite, viz. that demonstration of the substantial properties of anything are not established by the most powerful demonstration where the major and minor are both self evident or most immediate principles. And then since one of the premises is not most immediate, neither is the conclusion. And hence you have no basis for claiming the property to be in the category of substance because of its immediacy. Rather it should be in the category of accident.

⁷⁶Since the proposed argument to prove the immediacy of a substantial property like the potencies of intellect or will for the soul is not set up in strict syllogistic form, it is unclear just what proposition would constitute the major and minor of the argument. If you admit at the outset, however, that the property is not most immediate such as that used in proof of proper attributes, then the fact that the property is not in the same category as the substance would seem to follow without further ado.

⁷⁷This argument makes it even clearer that there is no logical alternative way of establishing a connection more immediate between a substantial property and the essence than that of a proper attribute or "*passio*" without identifying it with the essence of the thing. The best one can do is admit it is in the same logical class as a proper attribute, viz. an accident that is predicate in the second mode of *per se* predication.

then the subject falls into the definition of the predicate as something added, but every such thing is truly an accident.

55 Also, the division of substance, not as predicated of the species only, but as it is predicated of everything, seems to be that found in the *De anima* II,⁷⁸ and Bk. VII of this work,⁷⁹ that “substance either is the form or the matter or the composite,” therefore, etc.

[II.—TO THE SIXTH QUESTION
A.—THE OPINION OF THOMAS]

56 [6] To the second question the answer is given⁸⁰ that the categories are not distinguished essentially, but on the basis of the diverse modes of predicating.

57 That they are not distinguished essentially is proved:

Of quantity: the continuity of substance is its unity. If then that unity were distinguished from substance, then substance is one through something other than itself, which is against what the Philosopher says in Bk. IV of this work,⁸¹ and the Commentator as well.⁸²

58 Of relation: if it were distinct from its foundation; then no absolute form would be an immediate principle of any action, because every such form would have a relationship superadded, if it were a principle of action; therefore, its relation is formal insofar as [the form with its relation] elicits its operation.

⁷⁸Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 1, 412a 7-9.

⁷⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 3, 1029a 2-5.

⁸⁰Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* V, lect. 9, ed. Parma XX 401b: “Hence, it is necessary that being be contracted to the different categories according to the diverse modes of predication, which follow from the diverse modes of being; because in as many ways as ‘being’ is asserted, i.e., as many ways as ‘something’ is predicated, in so many ways does ‘is’ signify, i.e., in so many ways does ‘to be something’ signify.” Also, Bk. XI, lect. 9 ed. Parma XX 608b: “Keep in mind, however, that the categories are diversified according to the diverse modes of predication. Hence, the same thing, according to the diverse ways it is predicated of diverse things, does it pertain to diverse categories.”

⁸¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 27, 1003b 33.

⁸²Averroes, *Metaphysica* IV, com. 3 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 32rb)

59 The second⁸³ is declared in Bk. V of this work:⁸⁴ “For the senses of ‘being’ are just as many as these ‘figures’ [of predication].” Just as a category signifies things diversely, so does it [signify diverse modes] of being.

[B.—AGAINST THE OPINION OF THOMAS]

60 Against this second:⁸⁵ the first mode of predication is only these two, simply “in quid”⁸⁶ and “in quale.”

61 Also, there are only four predicates [genus, species, property and accident],⁸⁷ and there are only five universals, therefore, the categories, if they are ten, cannot be distinguished on the basis of the modes of predication.⁸⁸

62 Also, if ‘to be,’ which signifies the predication of one thing of another, would signify as many things as there are essential predicates, then in every proposition there would be a vain repetition. For in combination with the predicate, ‘is’ co-signifies that thing, and thus the same thing would be asserted twice.

63 Also, ‘to be’ “co-signifies a certain composition without which [it has no meaning]”.⁸⁹ This composition is caused by the intellect; therefore, “to be” signifies something of second intention; but such is not diversified because a distinction of things of first intention, nor vice versa [are things of first intention diversified by such second intentions].—Proof of the assumption: because genus according to the same meaning⁹⁰ is predicated of substance and quality, etc.—Similarly ‘animal’ in itself does not vary in meaning because

⁸³That is, that the categories are distinguished on the basis of the diverse modes of predication.

⁸⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 7, 1017a 25; cf. note 80.

⁸⁵That is, that the categories are distinguished on the basis of the diverse modes of predication.

⁸⁶I.e. the genus and species; the in quale is the specific difference.

⁸⁷This is the list in Aristotle’s *Topics* I, ch. 8 103b 1-19.

⁸⁸With either number of predicables we get only four or five categories.

⁸⁹Aristotle, *De interpretatione* ch. 3, 16b 24-25.

⁹⁰Genus is a second intention, and is predicated in the same way of all of the ten categories, which are first intentions.

the intentional character⁹¹ of 'genus' or 'species' is attributed to it by the intellect.

64 Also, if this be so, then this proposition "Man is an animal," would signify of itself that man is an animal in the first mode of perseity, and then this would be a vain repetition "Man is *per se* an animal," because that which is expressed by *per se* is already expressed by the composition, according to you.⁹²

65 I concede these arguments,⁹³ that 'to be,' which indicates a conceptual composition is not diversified as are things. And then it follows that 'to be' could not used as the complete predicate⁹⁴ in asserting "Man is." We must say that 'is' is equivocal to things of first and second intention. For when 'is' signifies a thing of first intention, it can be used as a predicate to assert that "Man is," that is, "Man exists"; but 'is,' used as a copula, is not predicated.

66 [7] To the text of the Philosopher,⁹⁵ it must be said that this 'being' is not the 'is' of copulation. Rather it is the derivative sense of 'being' [asserted by noun 'a being'], which has the same signification with respect to each category of being, in such a way that 'a being' is divided into those [ten categories], as the word is into its significations.

67 When it is argued against those⁹⁶ about the intention of universality, they⁹⁷ say that not every mode of intentional

⁹¹The meaning of 'animal' as an intention does not vary, whether it is used as a genus with respect to intermediary species, or as a species with respect to individuals.

⁹²Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* V, lect. 9, ed. Parma XX, 402a.

⁹³Cf. supra nn. 60-64, especially n. 63.

⁹⁴When 'is' is used as a predicate it is said in Latin to be 'secundum adjacens' whereas, used as a copula, it is 'tertium adjacens.'

⁹⁵See n. 59: "For the senses of 'being' are just as many as these 'figures' [of predication]."

⁹⁶What is the nature of the objection Scotus says Aquinas is answering here? Is it perhaps that the categories do extend to all cases, including *per se* principles and properties? For being is also predicated of these, or better these too must be subsumed somehow under being, if the categorial division is to be adequate.

⁹⁷Thomas Aquinas, *Metaphysics* V, lect. 11, ed. Parma XX, 404b-405a: "Ex hoc autem concludit ulterius conclusionem, quod in omnibus praedictis modis praedicandi, in quibus idem per accidens praedicatur, non praedicatur aliquod nomen universaliter... Ea enim sola de universalibus praedicantur universaliter quae secundum se insunt eidem. Propter hoc enim modus praedicandi, qui est universaliter praedicari, convenit cum condicione subiecti, quod est universale, quia praedicatum *per se* de subiecto praedicatur."

predication distinguishes the categories, but those modes of predication which are modes of the things predicated. For quantity has another mode of predication⁹⁸ than does quality.

68 To the contrary: another mode of predication pertains to the abstract than to the concrete, according to such a mode of predication as you postulate. Proof: those first modes, excluded [by Aquinas],⁹⁹ namely, the intentional modes of predicating,¹⁰⁰ do not cause falsity in the proposition; but these modes of abstract and concrete do make for falsity in a proposition such as 'white is whiteness'; therefore in every genus there will be two most general categories.

69 Also, this diverse mode of predicating in diverse categories is in them through a comparison to substance, because by comparing them to its proper species is a predication "in quid."¹⁰¹ Those, therefore, that are predicated of the first substance will be categories, and such are accidents, taken concretely, and thus 'quale' will be the category and not 'quality'.

⁹⁸Substance is predicate 'in quid,' that is as a noun; a quality 'in quale' and quantity 'in quantum' are predicated as adjectives, or as modifications of a quiddity. Another way of expressing this is to say 'substance' is predicated as a thing [Latin 'ens'] and the other as accidents of things [Latin 'ens entis' or 'entia entis'].

⁹⁹Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* V q. 7, ed. Venice 1517, fol. 25^{rb}: "Dicunt ergo quod non quilibet modus intentionalis praedicandi distinguit praedicamenta, sed illi soli qui sunt modi ipsarum rerum praedicamentorum, quia alium modum praedicandi habent quantitas et qualitas ex natura rei, puta quia qualitas praedicatur per modum informantis et quantitas per modum mensurantis; tu autem arguis de modo intentionali, puta de ipso esse sive compositione propositionis quae est secunda intentio... Contra... Probatio consequentiae: quia alius modus praedicandi secundum istum modum est abstracti, alius concreti. Quod patet, quia modi intentionales praedicandi, quos excludit, non causant falsitatem in propositione."

¹⁰⁰Aquinas seems to be claiming that we are not arguing that every different intentional mode such as whether the category in question is predicated in quid or in quale, etc. makes a difference, we exclude such differences therefore. Scotus argues however that some of these excluded differences come down to using a term either abstractly or concretely, and since these can cause one proposition to be true and another false, we have two different categories.

¹⁰¹That is to say, if each category is referred to a distinct being, e.g. as a quality, a quantity, a time and a place, then 'is' or 'to be' or 'being' is predicated of them as a quiddity or in quid. However, this is not the normal way in which these meanings are predicated, for they are predicated in the way they are related to substance, namely as modification of it, or as a 'quale' rather than as a 'quid.'

70 To the contrary:¹⁰² Avicenna in *Physics* III, ch. 2,¹⁰³ where he says it is incongruous that ‘motion in a subject’ is a category whereas ‘motion’ itself is not. Proof of this is that in this way one has some notion of genus insofar as it is predicated ‘in quid’; therefore, what is more truly predicated ‘in quid’ is more truly a genus; such are abstract things.

71 Also, if diverse modes of predicating would distinguish genera: either this suffices, or with this is required a diversity of those things which are predicated. And if the second is the case, the first is not naturally prior in distinguishing, because that which is predicated is prior to the mode or manner in which it is predicated; therefore, something first distinguishes before the mode of predicating does. If not, then the categories are not diverse entities in themselves.¹⁰⁴

72 Similarly, it follows that this negative¹⁰⁵ will not be first in which one category is denied of another, which is contrary to what

¹⁰²The next three paragraphs are objections to n. 69 which argues that one can disregard the way in which the category is predicated, viz. whether in quid or in quale, whether in the abstract or concrete, whether as distinct in themselves or whether as a modification of substance. N. 70 argues that it is incongruous that ‘motion’ in a subject is a category, whereas motion itself is not, and hence ridiculous to claim that ‘quale’ is the category, not quality, etc. N. 71 argues that ‘quality’ has to be something distinct, an entity in its own right, before it can modify something by being in it as a subject. N. 73 argues that the primary negation which excludes one thing from another, has to do with considering each as completely distinct, each a thing in its own right. ‘Man is man,’ ‘quantity is quantity,’ ‘quality is quality,’ are all primary affirmative propositions and because they are such ‘quantity is not quality’ or ‘quantity is not substance,’ etc are primary negatives. Their primary diversity stems from the fact that their affirmations refer exclusively to themselves, hence as categories, they are predicable only of themselves, not of substance or as an accident of substance.

¹⁰³Avicenna, *Sufficientia* II, ch. 2, f. 25rb-va.

¹⁰⁴But are rather modifications of substance.

¹⁰⁵The claim that each category is distinct from every other is equivalent to a proposition in which is denied of every other; conversely it means each is something in its own right affirmatively, i.e. substance is substance, quantity is quantity, etc. On this point Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* V, q. 7, fol. 25rb says: “Contra: tum quia praedicamenta non erunt diversa entia realiter et *per se*; tum quia negativa in qua negabitur unum praedicamentum de alio non erit prima negativa. Consequens est falsum et contra Philosophum in I *Posteriorum*, capitulo “Figurarum autem”. Probatio consequentiae: veritas negative est ex diversitate extremorum; sicut veritas affirmativae ex identitate; ubi ergo maior diversitas, ibi verior negatio; sed diversitas quae est in re est maior quam diversitas in modo praedicandi solum; sed ista ‘homo

the Philosopher says in *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 1:¹⁰⁶ “Of all the syllogistic figures, however, [the first is the mostly scientific]. Proof: the truth of a negative [proposition] stems from a diversity of the terms, just as the truth of an affirmative stems from their identity, as “man is man.” Where there is greater diversity, therefore, there more truly is a negation. That proposition will be more true whereby it is distinguished by the thing rather than by the mode of predicating alone. The following proposition is of this sort: “Man is not an ass.” Therefore, it is more immediate than this: “Substance is not a quantity.”

[III.—NOTE ON THE ADEQUACY OF THE CATEGORIES]

73 {{Note:¹⁰⁷ [from what has been said, we can gather that] the various ways for showing the sufficiency of the categories [so far] all seem to sin doubly.

non est asinus’ est diversitas in re; ergo ipsa erit verior prior et immediatior quam ista ‘substantia non est quantitas’ ubi secundum te est tantum diversitas in modo praedicandi.

Si detur aliud membrum, scilicet quod cum diversitate in modo praedicandi requiritur diversitas rerum quae praedicantur, sequitur quod distinctio praedicamentorum secundum diversos modos praedicandi non erit prima, quod est contra Philosophum et contra eos. Probatio huius: quia res quae predicatur est prior quam modus praedicandi; ergo aliquid distinguit ipsa genera prius quam modus praedicandi.”

¹⁰⁶Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 14, 79a 17.

¹⁰⁷Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* V, q. 7, fol. 25rb-va, says: “Ex praedictis colligitur quod omnes viae divisive ad ostendendum sufficientiam praedicamentorum videntur peccare dupliciter: tum primo quia ostendunt oppositum propositum, scilicet quod divisio entis in decem genera non sit prima. Si enim prius fiat divisio in ens *per se* et in ens non *per se*; et ultra unum membrum subdividatur; vel ambo erunt multae divisiones subordinatae; et sic ens non immediate dividitur in decem genera; tum secundo quia non probat divisionem illam sic debere fieri et non aliter; oportet enim probare quod divisum sic dividitur, et quod dividenda sic constituent generalissima; et etiam quod praecise sic dividitur, et non aliter.

Dicendum ergo quod tenendo divisionem esse sufficientem, ipsa divisio entis in decem generalissima est prima, nec est alia trimembris aut bitembris prior ea, ita quod ens descendit in decem genera, non per diversos modos praedicandi, sed per modos essendi distinctos ex natura rei; quorum quodlibet habet rationem contractivi respectu entis; et constitutivi respectu alicuius praedicamenti; nam sicut ens prima sui divisione simpliciter descendit per finitum et infinitum in ens creatum et increatum tamquam per modos intrinsecos, sic ens finitum et creatum; cuius est divisio in decem genera; contrahitur et descendit prima et immediata divisione in

74 First, because they prove the opposite, namely, that the division of being in these ten is not primary. For if prior to it, is the division into 'a being in itself' and 'a being not in itself,' [as Boethius seems to say], and further, that one member of these is subdivided, or that both are, then [a] either each division will be only of an equivocal term into its equivocates (which proves nothing, because names are applied at will),¹⁰⁸ or [b] that some of those ten fall under a more common concept more 'immediate' to being, and thus 'being' is not immediately divided into ten. To give an example: assume that by subdividing the category of substance many times in the genera of substance one finally comes to ten most special species, these would not divide substance primarily.

75 Secondly, because all these ways of dividing do not prove [our proposal]; for one would have to prove that what is divided is thus divided,¹⁰⁹ and precisely in this way,¹¹⁰ and this to the issue at hand, namely that the dividends constitute these most general [categories].¹¹¹

76 Therefore, if we hold the division to be sufficient, it must be said that this, viz. the division of being into ten genera is the first. Neither are other two-membered, or three-membered divisions prior to it; nor can this be proved. For one cannot prove [a] either that the dividends are contained under what is divided (since there may be an immediacy there),¹¹² [b] nor that they are diverse (because they are primarily diverse, as are their primary negatives which deny one of the others),¹¹³ [c] nor that these alone are under what is divided, because all immediacy of the divisors are proved by contradiction, the first of which is "not to have an

decem genera per proprios modos essendi.

¹⁰⁸That is, arbitrarily.

¹⁰⁹Namely, into ten categories.

¹¹⁰That is, with no specific differences that are exclusive of what is divided, namely, do not include being 'sicut additum.'

¹¹¹Such that there are no other more general categories.

¹¹²The notion [univocal or equivocal] of being descends immediately without any added difference into each of the ten categories. This shows there is an immediacy about this subdivision into ten. If this immediacy exists, then it represents a simple fact, not one that can be proved from some more evident fact that can be used as the basis for a deductive proof.

¹¹³E.g. material or immaterial, animate or inanimate, or other disjuncts.

intermediary," which procedure here is inapplicable, since the first division is into ten.

77 [Two objections] against this: all division has to come about through two, because of our assumptions that "one thing has but one contrary."¹¹⁴

78 Also, being divided in this way is not a first principle; therefore it can be proved.

79 [Reply]: To the first [of these objections], it¹¹⁵ is true of the division within a genus where there are opposites. The division of a subject into accidents, although it is not within the genus divided, is nevertheless within a genus. Otherwise, in the division of the species into individuals, this dictum would be false: 'they are included under such a division'; and therefore, it is true in a formal division, that is, where the differences that formally divide, determine the thing divided, and are distinct from its concept.

80 To the second,¹¹⁶ as the proposition enuntiating the immediate superior of the inferior is immediate, so the reverse is true of disjunctives. Nevertheless, that it is only these [ten], however, is shown in this way: because there are no others, by removing whatever alternatives are suggested by showing that they may be subsumed under some one of these ten. But this is not proved by claiming that there are no other, for this is a fallacy of consequent.}}

[IV.—SCOTUS'S REPLY TO BOTH QUESTIONS]

81 [9] I concede, then, that the division is sufficient and that the [ten categories] are really distinguished.

82 This can be proved specifically of quantity.

First that quantity is distinguished from corporeal substance. "An accident is what can be there or be absent," according to Porphyry.¹¹⁷ But quantity comes and goes from substance, and the corporeal substance is unchanged; therefore, etc. Proof [of the

¹¹⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 5, 1055b 30.

¹¹⁵That is, such a dichotomous division.

¹¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 78.

¹¹⁷Porphyry, *Liber praedicabilium* ch. 'De accidente', ed. Busse 12, 25-26.

minor]: while the substance remains the same, its quantity can be rarified or condensed.

83 It must be said¹¹⁸ that just as quantity is changed, so is substance, [viz. as to its quantity] because as quantity comes to quantity, so substance to substance, and such a change then is in substance as in quantity.¹¹⁹

84 Another answer¹²⁰ is that rarification and condensation are not a change in quantity, but in quality.

85 Also,¹²¹ quantity alone is divisible into parts of the same sort, as is evident from Bk. V of this work.¹²² And in *Physics* I,¹²³ against Melissus, the Philosopher says that finitude and infinity are accidental to substance; *per se* they pertain to quantity; therefore, quantity is not the same essentially as substance.

86 This is confirmed from *Physics* III,¹²⁴ where the Philosopher is arguing against those who assume that the infinite is a substance, and nevertheless that it is divisible. He says that if it is divisible then it has magnitude or multitude in parts of the same sort; therefore, etc.¹²⁵

87 Also, if substance would have its own extension through its essence, then the extension of heat would not differ from heat, but at the same time it is a part of fire and of heat; therefore the two

¹¹⁸In the next two paragraphs [n. 83 and 84] Scotus seems to be raising questions to himself that he sees could create difficulties without however taking the time here to answer them adequately.

¹¹⁹This seems to be an objection to n. 82 that substance is unchanged. The following [n. 84] is an objection to the idea that in rarefaction there is a quantitative change. Thus both aspects of n. 82 are being challenged. Are these then simply reflections that Scotus is noting down as points to be considered and answered at some future time?

¹²⁰Cf. Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl. II*, q. 10 (PhB II 143): "Ex intensioe autem et remissione rari et densi et primarum qualitatum elementarium potest salvari intensio et remissio omnium aliarum qualitatum corporalium."

¹²¹In view of the difficulties raised in the preceding two paragraphs, Scotus formulates additional arguments in n. 84 and 85, then he raises another argument in 86 which he challenges in n. 87 and then a final argument for his thesis in n. 89.

¹²²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 7-9

¹²³Aristotle, *Physica* I, ch. 2 185a 32-b 5.

¹²⁴Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 5 204a 11-12.

¹²⁵Therefore, it is quantity, not substance.

extensions would exist simultaneously, which is against what the Philosopher says.¹²⁶

88 Perhaps it might be said that the extension of heat is not the same as heat, just as the extension of fire with fire, because heat in fire does not have its extension formally, but is extended through the accident [of heat] to the extension of the substance.

89 Also, according Bk. V of the *Physics*,¹²⁷ motion *per se* is with respect to quantity. The term *per se* of motion is a true nature and is something absolute, but this is not the corporeal substance, because with “respect to substance there is no motion,” according to the same Bk. V,¹²⁸ therefore, etc.

[CONCERNING THE REMAINING CATEGORIES]

90 [10] Of quality also it is clear it is other than substance, because it is susceptible of more or less and has contraries and there is motion in regard to it, all of which are repugnant to substance.

91 Of relation [it is clear that] it is other than its foundation, because upon the same foundation numerically, diverse opposed relations are based; therefore, neither of them is essentially the same as the third [on which they are both based]. The assumption is evident in the case of whiteness, which is similar to white and dissimilar to black.¹²⁹

92 Also, there is some relation in every creature which is immediately based on the essence of the creature itself, from the very fact that the creature exists. But the essence of a creature is ‘produced’ prior by nature to any of its accidents. Then all things said of it are essentially and formally relative, which contradicts the Philosopher in Bk. IV of this work.¹³⁰ And if you concede this, then all appearances will be true. The Philosopher infers this incongruity, as a consequence of the view that all things are

¹²⁶Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 5, 204b 10-19.

¹²⁷Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 1, 225a 34-b 9.

¹²⁸Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 2, 225b 10.

¹²⁹Scotus’ argument here is based on a color theory prevalent in his day that made whiteness and blackness the result of radically opposed effects produced in the medium, one dialating it the other contracting it.

¹³⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 6, 1011a 17-21.

essentially relative to something. If therefore you concede that the consequent is true, you have to concede the antecedent is also, because the consequent is more impossible than the antecedent. For from the antecedent the Philosopher reduces them [their arguments] to a greater impossibility.

93 Of action and 'being affected' [passion] that they differ from relation is clear, because it is impossible that a relation be the foundation of another relation; but some relations of the second mode¹³¹ are founded upon action and passion; therefore, etc. The major is evident, because the relation is not referred incidentally but *per se*. The minor is clear, because the relation of what heats to what is heated is founded upon acting and 'being affected,' according to the Philosopher in Bk V of this work.¹³²

94 Also about ubiety: with respect to this there is motion *per se*, but not with respect to a relation, nor with respect to place; therefore, ubiety is not a relation, nor is it a place. The first is evident from the Philosopher, in Bk. V of the *Physics*.¹³³ Neither [is there motion] with respect to place. Proof: for if local motion would be to place *per se* then with respect to the same numerically boundary there would be more than one mutation. For something could move itself into the same numerical place by two distinct numerical motions, since the place always remains the same, although the same thing moves into it once and then moves itself into it again. But this is impossible, as will be proved later.¹³⁴

95 Also, then both the way [to the end] and the terminus itself are not in the same thing, because place is not in the mobile; motion, however, is.

96 [11] About 'when': this differs from relation and time, because time is a measure, whereas 'when' is what remains from a comparison of the measure to the measured; therefore, 'when' is posterior to

¹³¹Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 15-18: "...activa vero et passiva secundum potentiam activam et passivam sunt et actiones potentialium, ut calefactivum et calefactibile, quia potest, et iterum calefaciens ad calefactivum et secans ad sectum tamquam agentia."

¹³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 15-18.

¹³³Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 2, 225b 11.

¹³⁴Cf. *infra*, n. 100.

the relation, because it is an effect of time; therefore 'when' is essentially other than time.

97 Also, action and affect [passion] are not relations, for if they were, then—since whatever is included in the notion of a genus, is included in the notion of its species,—it would follow that each species of action would include the relation, which is false. For action remaining in the agent¹³⁵ does not include a relation to some affect [passio], because it causes nothing of this sort, since it is the ultimate end of the potency, Bk. IX of this book.¹³⁶ The action remaining in the agent is truly action, because the agent of this action is truly active.¹³⁷ Proof: it is truly in act according to the elicited form of that action.

98 Ubiety differs from relation and place, for with respect to place there is no motion *per se*, but with respect to ubiety there is.

99 Also with respect to place there is no motion *per se*, because "all motion is from one contrary to another," or occurs in the medium, Bk. V of the *Physics*.¹³⁸ But the same subject is receptive of all contraries, Bk. V of this work,¹³⁹ and receptive of the middle with the extremes, Bk. X of this work, ch. 9.¹⁴⁰ The places, however, 'from which' and 'towards which' do not have the same recipient, therefore, they are not contraries; hence there is no motion from that to this.

100 And the first proof¹⁴¹ is confirmed by this, for if the mobile after it first acquired term A, had to move once more from there to the selfsame term A, it would have to first recede from A.

¹³⁵That is to say, an immanent action like seeing, thinking that remains in the agent does not include the sort of relationship that exists between the agent and its effect in a patient really distinct from it. Such a relationship would be circular and would imply a division in the agent performing it.

¹³⁶After showing the action is in the patient Aristotle, in *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 8, 1050a 34-b 2, says: "But where there is no product apart from the actuality, the actuality is present in the agents, e.g. the act of seeing is in the seeing subject and that of theorizing in the theorizing subject and the life is in the soul (and therefore well-being aslo; for it is a certain kind of life)."

¹³⁷For example, the seeing eye is actively seeing and the thinking mind is actually thinking.

¹³⁸Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 2, 226b 2-3.

¹³⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 10, 1018a 23-24.

¹⁴⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 7, 1057b 2-34.

¹⁴¹Namely, that position is not ubiety or 'whereabouts'; cf. *supra*, n. 94.

Therefore A, after [the mobile] was in it—as has been proved—would now cease to exist; or the accident will migrate from out of the subject back into the subject. Hence, if [the mobile] will again be moved to the same numerical boundary A, the same numerical [place] will be generated and corrupted over and over again. This contradicts the Philosopher, *V Physics*,¹⁴² who considers this incongruous.

101 Regarding position: it is distinguished from relation. If position were an order¹⁴³ of parts in a place, that would be positioned which possessed this order; but order is [an arrangement] of the parts, and is not something that pertains to the whole; therefore the parts would be positioned; hence it would be the parts of man that are sitting and not the man. Proof of the assumption: what is ordered, is that to which the order pertains, but order pertains to the parts.

102 Proof that [position] is not the same as ubiety: from this the fact that what is located is a certain substance, prior [by nature] to any accident it has; therefore, one could think of a man having a perfect size and quality, without thinking of him having a certain ubiety or whereabouts over and above 'place.' His bodily parts could conceivably be arranged according to [some particular pose or posture¹⁴⁴] pertaining to this category [of position], wherefore, ubiety or whereabouts is not of his essence.

103 As for 'status' [habitus]: this is not relation. For one species of status is that by which one formally habituated is said to be 'habituated.' But in such a state [such as being 'armed' or 'shod'¹⁴⁵] is founded a respect to that which is had. The form that is in the category of status, therefore, is the foundation of the relation. The relationship of 'having' between them, however, is not that category itself, for then 'status' would comprise two most general genera or categories, as action and passion.

¹⁴²Aristotle, *Physica V*, ch. 4 228b 3-19.

¹⁴³Order is a relation, and if 'position' were not something the subject positioned had, but something characteristic of that subject's parts with respect to one another, then position would be characteristic of the parts and not the subject which has these parts; cf *supra*, n. 17.

¹⁴⁴Literally, an order of parts pertaining to this category [of position].

¹⁴⁵Two examples Aristotle gives of state or 'habitus'.

[V.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS OF QUESTION 5]

104 [12] To the argument for the opposite of the first question we must answer as we did before.¹⁴⁶

To that¹⁴⁷ for the contrary: in Bk. VII of this work, ch. 10,¹⁴⁸ the Philosopher says: "In the case of accidental unities the two would generally be thought to be different, e.g. white man would be thought to be different from the essence of white man." It seems then that 'accidental expressions' consist in calling a man 'white,' or 'musical.' And it is true that 'white man' signifies several things; but 'white' only one, and similarly 'musical.'

105 To the second argument:¹⁴⁹ what is said is true, if it be said in an unqualified sense. However, something can be said to be superlative in its genus or category, and thus it would be most general.—Another explanation is that 'most general' can be interpreted in two ways:¹⁵⁰ either positively, namely, what is maximally such through excess with respect to all things, and there is only one such, viz., God. Or it may be taken in the other way, negatively, through this that it is not exceeded by anything of this sort, as would be said of what is most white, that it is not exceeded by any other white thing. And in this sense 'most general' is asserted of the first genera or categories, because they have no higher genus above them.

106 To the other:¹⁵¹ about what follows if we hold that one member is equivocal. It is said that the implication is not valid, because a 'being *per se*' and a 'being that is not *per se*' are not opposites, but the opposite of the first is a 'non-being *per se*.' And it is true that what is taken [from the *Topics*] that "in as many ways as one [is predicated], being is predicated."

¹⁴⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 40-43.

¹⁴⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

¹⁴⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 6, 1031a 20-22.

¹⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

¹⁵⁰Cf. Duns Scotus, *Praedic.* q. 11, n. 31.

¹⁵¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 5-6.

107 To the other,¹⁵² it is true ‘there would be no truer division,’ nor would accidents agree more among themselves than they do with substance, since what is equivocal, is in everything in which [its equivocates] agree.¹⁵³

108 Otherwise, I concede that the division¹⁵⁴ is more appropriate, and that the nine [accidental categories] agree more among themselves, nevertheless it is not “in quid,” but “in quale” that they do so. For many things are said of the nine genera denominatively, which are not said of them and substance univocally, and, nevertheless, are said of them [i.e., the nine] univocally, but only denominatively.¹⁵⁵ But nothing univocal is said of them, namely the nine accidents “in quid”; hence, if the division is through univocals, this is solely of what is said of the [nine] denominatively.

109 {{To the contrary: a univocal attribute requires a univocal subject.—I reply: an attribute of being, expressed by two mutually exclusive disjuncts,¹⁵⁶ primarily is proper to ‘being qua being,’ if ‘being’ is univocal,¹⁵⁷ and that common attribute in every inferior is of this being. If an attribute, properly signified, pertains to a genus, then something falling under that genus has that attribute, but now as in a species.¹⁵⁸ For example, sensibility is an attribute of animal, hence such sensibility is an animal attribute, in as much as animal

¹⁵²Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

¹⁵³For instance ‘not-when’ is an equivocal term that applies to both substance and all the accidents other than ‘when’.

¹⁵⁴This seems to refer to the dichotomous division, e.g. “a being in another” and “a being not in another,” i.e., into “substance” and “accident.” It is convenient to lump the nine accidental categories under one heading.

¹⁵⁵As denominative terms they modify substance in a common and hence univocal way. They are all aspects “of substance” where this phrase is understood univocally.

¹⁵⁶For example, ‘finite or infinite,’ ‘material or immaterial,’ etc. ‘temporal or non-temporal’ are transcendental attributes of being if being is univocal. This passage is a later addition, and presupposes Scotus’ theory of the transcendentals, the first of which is ‘being’ understood in a univocal sense.

¹⁵⁷That is if ‘being’ is taken as a transcendental, before it is divided into infinite and finite, it can be understood in a univocal sense. The categories fall under finite being as substance and accident.

¹⁵⁸For example, the property of having interior angles equal to two right angles is a proper attribute of triangle as a genus, but it is also a characteristic [not a proper attribute] of an isosceles triangle which is a species of triangle in general.

is in man.—To the contrary: when the attribute is contracted, it has the inferior for its *per se* subject.}}

110 To the other about quantity,¹⁵⁹ I concede that a point is not unity.

111 [13] To the other for the contrary that was put this way:¹⁶⁰ if a point is not unity [as such], and is something that pertains to or falls under it,¹⁶¹ it is either the material or formal aspect of unity. Then whatever alternative is chosen, it follows that the continuum will be either the material or formal element of number. Then, I say, since it is said:¹⁶² “in every single genus there is some meaning that is primarily one,” that this is not true of the most general predicable, as is evident as regards the category of quantity, where there are two minimals that are equally first; therefore, one understands this dictum of the physical¹⁶³ genus. For all forms that are interchangeable have one first in perfection which is the measure of the other forms, as in the genus of color whiteness, and in the genus of taste, sweetness, and so with the others which can be interchanged. Then, the assumption is understood of such genera [i.e., physical]; but it is not necessarily true of the most general category of predicables.

112 To the other,¹⁶⁴ it is true that there is one first formal division according to which species are formally constituted;¹⁶⁵ however,

¹⁵⁹Cf. supra, n. 8.

¹⁶⁰Cf. supra, nn. 9-11.

¹⁶¹That is they are reduced to or fall under ‘unity’.

¹⁶²Cf. supra, n. 8.

¹⁶³That is of the forms studied by the natural sciences that are changed into one another, by coming to be and perishing. Discrete quantity has to do with the science of mathematics. Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* Bk. V, q. 10, ed. Venice 1517, f. 26va where he seems to say that the essence of quantity is to have parts and that its two species are continuous and discrete.

¹⁶⁴Cf. supra, n. 12.

¹⁶⁵The division into continuous and discrete is based on formal differences that constitute species formally, but in addition there can be material differences; cf. infra Bk. VII, q. 13, n. 124. Antonius Andreae takes the description in Bk. V, c. 13 1020a 7-8 “‘Quantum’ means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a ‘one’ and a ‘this.’” and raises the question as to whether divisibility is of the essence of quantity, and determines that the essence is to have such parts and that having such, divisibility follows as a primary attribute. Unit and point are not formal differences of quantity.

there can be material differences, which do not constitute species and are equally first, and one division is not reduced to the other.

113 To the other about quality:¹⁶⁶ that there are not four species that are first, but two of them are contained proximately under the first.

114 As for first [objection] about ‘relation’ [being a dual category],¹⁶⁷ it is said, denying the minor,¹⁶⁸ that the category¹⁶⁹ is not the ‘relative’ [i.e., the term] but the relation whereby it is referred [to the other term].

115 To the contrary: what is said [in n. 114] is false.

For then it follows that what the Philosopher says in *Categories*¹⁷⁰ and in Bk. V of this work,¹⁷¹ is not relevant to the issue at hand, [namely], “those terms are called relative the nature of which is explained by reference to something else.” If, therefore, what is most general [i.e., the category of relation] does not have this characteristic, neither would anything that falls under this genus primarily *per se*. Then, the definition—according to you—is simply not valid, because it cannot be understood of relations. For ‘relations’ are not said to be correlatives¹⁷² nor to be simultaneous by nature, but rather the relative terms are said to be such.—Likewise, in Bk. V of this work,¹⁷³ the definition of relation pertains to relatives.

¹⁶⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

¹⁶⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

¹⁶⁸That is, that the co-relative is also most general and, hence, is a category as well.

¹⁶⁹The Latin calls it simply, ‘the most general.’

¹⁷⁰Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 7, 8a 32.

¹⁷¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1021a 27-31.

¹⁷²The Latin has “*relationes non dicuntur ad convertentiam.*” ‘Convertere’ (to convert) and the noun ‘convertentia’ (convertibility) express the idea that one notion implies the other, and a proposition affirming the existence of one, entails necessarily a corresponding proposition affirming the existence of the other. The Oxford translation of Aristotle’s *Categories*, uses the expression “All relatives have correlatives” to translate what Scotus read in the Latin anthology as “*Omnia relativa ad convertentia dicuntur.*” See note 181 *infra*.

¹⁷³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1021a 27-31. In English translation it reads: “Relative terms which imply number or potency, therefore, are all relative because their very essence includes in its nature a reference to something else.”

116 Also, it is impossible that something be compared formally through a form that is absolute [and not relational]. But if the forms in the category of relations are not compared, then nothing is compared through them, and then they are absolute forms, since the opposite [i.e. the absolute] is not the cause of [its] opposite [i.e. the relative].

117 Also, as every relative is predicated with respect to some relative that is simultaneous with it, so the relationship is the reason for referring the father to the son, who is simultaneous with the father. If, therefore, the category¹⁷⁴ is the form for referring something, it has some other term¹⁷⁵ that is simultaneous with it. This will have another relationship, a reason for referring it back to the other category, and thus there will be two relations that are equally first, and so two categories of relations..

118 In answer to the first two,¹⁷⁶ I declare the relative [term] is not what is most general [or is the category of relation].¹⁷⁷

119 [14] As for the argument¹⁷⁸ to prove the falsity of the response [in 114], it simply does not follow, because the relation as such has the weakest being [of any category].¹⁷⁹ Therefore, the relation is better known through the relative [term] than it is as considered in itself. It is more appropriate, however, to specify something through what is more knowable, if knowledge of it can be had through this. I prove that such is the case here. For, if the being of the relative is to 'have itself referred to another,' then the being or essence of the form¹⁸⁰ consists of the 'aspect of being referred to another,' and the relation is a thing of this sort. And if "All relatives have correlatives."¹⁸¹ then the relations are the forms,

¹⁷⁴The Latin uses "generalissimum" (namely, "the most general genus"), which I translate simply as "category."

¹⁷⁵That is, some alternate form as the term to which it refers.

¹⁷⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 115-116.

¹⁷⁷See above, n. 114. This confirms the original claim made in n. 114, namely, that the category is not the relative term, but the relationship which refers it to another.

¹⁷⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 115.

¹⁷⁹See Averroes, *Metaphysica* XII, com. 19 (ed. Iuntina, VIII f. 144ra): "Et dicit proprie relationem quia est debilioris esse aliis praedicamentis."

¹⁸⁰Latin "esse formae".

¹⁸¹The quotation is from Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 7, 6b 29, according to the Oxford translation. But the Latin anthology of Aristotelian quotations used by Scotus reads:

according to which they are predicated formally as correlatives. And thus the knowledge of the relation is better had through the relative [term] than if it were considered in itself.

120 To the second,¹⁸² that claims ‘absolute’ and ‘compared’ are opposed as regards the subjects¹⁸³ of which they can be predicated. ‘Absoluteness’ and ‘comparison,’ however, are not characteristics of this sort.¹⁸⁴ For ‘health’ is neither ‘well’ nor ‘sick,’ for ‘health’ is not the subject of which either is predicated. Similarly, ‘relation’ is neither an ‘absolute’ nor a ‘relative,’ but rather it is the reason for referring to something else.

121 But to the claim about the relations being equally first,¹⁸⁵ it is said that the category of relation is not the ‘reason for the referral’ in itself, but only in its species.¹⁸⁶

122 [Objections to 121] To the contrary:¹⁸⁷ the essential notion of quality, as a category, is that ‘it is the reason why anything is called such and such.’¹⁸⁸ The same is true here.¹⁸⁹

“Omnia autem relativa ad convertentia dicuntur.”

¹⁸²Cf. supra, n. 116.

¹⁸³The Latin has, “absolutum et comparatum sunt opposita circa susceptibilia.” A more literal translation would be “the absolute and what is compared are opposed as to what is able to receive them.”

¹⁸⁴That is, they are not meanings so diametrically opposed that they cannot be used as concrete predicates of the same subject.

¹⁸⁵Cf. supra, n. 117.

¹⁸⁶The argument here admits that it is the linkage rather than the terms linked that represents the category of relation, nevertheless there seems to be a double linkage, if we regard the relationship residing as an accident in the relative term rather than as something with a dual subject. On this view, the viz.. idea of a single linkage with two subjects, we have two subjects each with a linkage to the other. These seem to be species under the more general notion of linkage such that since every relative has a correlative, there are also always two relationships as well, one on the part of the relative to its correlative, the other on the part of the correlative to the relative.

¹⁸⁷The analogical argument used here appeals to the statement Aristotle makes about a quality that seems applicable to the case of the relation which --since it connects two relative terms--seems to be a property of each rather than a joint property they possess in tandem.

¹⁸⁸Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 8, 8b 25: “Qualitatem vero dico secundum quam quales quidam dicuntur.”

¹⁸⁹That is to say, it is the common linkage of two terms that is the reason why each of the terms has its own link to the other. Hence, it plays the role of a genus with respect to the relations as an accidental characteristic specific to each term.

123 Also, what is in many things univocally, is in them through something common, to which that [characteristic, whatever it may be] exists first, according to Bk. II of this work.¹⁹⁰ But in all inferior [i.e. more specific] relations there is [this common] aspect of reference; therefore, [it comes to them] through their common genus.

124 Also, according to Bk. IV of the *Topics*,¹⁹¹ if the species are relations, then the genus is also; therefore, if the species is a reason for referral, then the genus is also.

125 I concede these arguments¹⁹² and the fact that the most general [i.e., the category of relation] is also something that 'refers to another.' Nevertheless, it is said to the first of these¹⁹³ that 'the reason why anything is called such and such' is the quality which can qualify a subject. But it is not the most general category, but its species which functions thus; and so it is here.¹⁹⁴

126 On the contrary: something can be understood to be informing in virtue of quality in general and not just quality in particular. And it is like this in regard to relation, because what is common is prior to what is specific, and that which is prior can be first understood, and then in that prior instant I understand the common relation to be referred to the subject; and then I ask: "Referred to what?" It can only be to something else, and thus there will be two relatives that are equally first, and also two relations that are equally first, and thus two most general [categories], as I argued before, and I have my thesis.

These arguments¹⁹⁵ are conceded.

¹⁹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* II, ch. 1, 993b 24-27. The Oxford translation reads in full as "A thing has a quality in a higher degree than other things if in virtue of it the similar quality belongs to the other things as well (e.g. fire is the hottest of things; for it is the cause of the heat of all other things); so that which causes derivative truths to be true is most true." The argument is similar to the previous. The generic concept interpreted univocally is 'reference to another' and this has as its species the reference characteristic of each related term to its specific correlate.

¹⁹¹Aristotle, *Topics* IV, ch. 4, 124b 16. "Nam species ad aliquid, et genus."

¹⁹²Cf. supra, nn. 122-124.

¹⁹³Cf. supra, n. 122.

¹⁹⁴That is, it is not the generic idea of a 'reference to another' in the abstract, but rather of a concrete characteristic of one of the relata as a subject. And this would be a species falling under the more general abstract notion.

¹⁹⁵Cf. supra, nn. 122-124.

127 [15] Then I say to the initial argument¹⁹⁶ that the most general relation is a principle of referring something to another, which is not referred by another form in that genre. This is done in such a way that the relation, which is most general, is the reason why two things are referred, as something similar is referred to another similar thing conjointly in the same species by one specific relation, or [otherwise] there will be two first species in the same species.¹⁹⁷ Therefore one specific similitude is the reason for referring two extremes.

128 Against this [n. 127]: all that are referred according to the same form in them and not according to the diversity, are referred according to a symmetrical relationship; therefore, the relative predicated by the most general [category] is a symmetrical relative.¹⁹⁸

129 It must be said that a relative of this sort is equivocal.¹⁹⁹ For properly speaking, a symmetrical relative has for its proximate foundation the unity of a species of some form in the category of quality or quantity. In another way, [a symmetrical relative] is said to be one where there is some unity, be it in the foundation, or in the referring relation,—and this improperly, if there be some unity. In the case at hand there is some unity of the form that is referred, a unity I call 'generic,' and then it is incongruous that it be symmetrical in the first way.

130 To the contrary: all symmetrical relatives fall into the second class of relatives.—This I concede.

131 Also, if relatives according to the relation that is a category are one and the same generically, then the relative would be

¹⁹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

¹⁹⁷Scotus seems to be reaching here for a more modern notion of the relation as being something that is not an accidental characteristic primarily of either term, but rather something that has a dual subject, neither of which enjoys a primacy with respect to the other.

¹⁹⁸In three manuscripts an interpolated text is inserted here: "Also, that relation which is in another foundation and refers to another term, is other than this which is its converse. Therefore, if the relatio is to another term and is in another foundation, therefore the two relations most general are equally primary. [cf. n. 117] Thus also it is argued from contrariety and another opposition to prove that not only are there four relationships of the first propositions but more."

¹⁹⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Praedic.* q. 25, nn. 30-38.

conceptual and the relation which is a genus would be a conceptual relation.

132 It must be said that the unity required in a relation of identity is greater than a generic unity, because it is necessary that the foundation of identity be numerically one, but taken twice, and that the relation of identity be one numerically, but conceptually two.

133 To the argument from 'acting':²⁰⁰ only by reason of the act [produced by the agent]²⁰¹ is anything referred fundamentally, for instance, by reason of whiteness.

134 As for the proof,²⁰² I say that so far as 'as such' [i.e. as heating] refers to a cause that is reducible to perseity in the first mode, the proposition [i.e. "What is heating as such is heating formally by an action"] is false, because it signifies that heating is essentially²⁰³ this relation. But it is true insofar as this is reducible to the second mode of *per se* predication.²⁰⁴

135 To the other,²⁰⁵ that 'where' [i.e. ubiety] and 'when' are not predicated of place [and time respectively]²⁰⁶ in a derivative sense, but ubiety is affirmed denominatively from passive circumscription,²⁰⁷ in such a way that location in what is located is the

²⁰⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

²⁰¹The act produced in the patient by the agent, e.g. whiteness is the basis or foundation for a relationship.

²⁰²That is the second proof in n. 15.

²⁰³That is, quidditatively.

²⁰⁴That is, the action of the agent heating is the effect of heat in the thing heated; this action is not the 'acting' as something essential that is predicated *per se* of the agent in the first mode as would be a generic or specific characteristic, but is an effect distinct from the agent but necessarily connected with it as a proper attribute, and therefore predicated of the agent in the second mode of *per se* predication.

²⁰⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 16.

²⁰⁶Scotus omits mentioning 'time' which has a similar relationship to 'when' as 'where' has to place. Time is defined by Aristotle *Physics* IV, ch. 11 as "the number of movement in respect to the before and after." As a continuum it contains a thing or event in a similar way that place as the innermost surface of the surrounding body contains the body located in it.

²⁰⁷Aristotle defines place in the Bk. IV of the *Physics*, ch. 4, 212a 20: "The innermost motionless boundary of what contains is place." It circumscribes the body located in the place. It is this passive circumscription or containment by the surrounding place that is attributed to the object located as its "whereabouts" or ubiety. Scotus denies that ubiety is predicated in a derivative or denominative sense of the place, that is the containing boundary, but is rather predicated of the body that is contained or circumscribed. As 'where' is the location of the body in place, so

effective cause of the 'ubiety'; and in a similar way one should understand 'when' with respect to time.

136 Otherwise I say that it [i.e. ubiety] is not predicated denominatively of place formally, but only effectively as stemming from it qua cause. And this [formal] sort of denominative predication can be of a different genus or category than that characteristic of the cause, as in the case of a 'human work.'²⁰⁸

137 To the other,²⁰⁹ that the essential meaning of position is not ubiety [or a thing's whereabouts], although position cannot exist without ubiety, just as is the case with quality and quantity, for quality cannot exist without quantity, and nevertheless, quantity is not of the essence of quality. I say then that position is the form of what is positioned, to which an order follows, and the order is extrinsic to its essence.

138 About status,²¹⁰ [I say] that status [e.g. clothed] is not the intermediate 'having' between [what is had, e.g. the tunic and the person wearing it] but is the [accidental] form of 'having' [been clothed] whereby the [person clothed] formally has this status,²¹¹ and in this form is rooted a kind of relationship to that which invests it, namely the tunic.

[VI.—TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR QUESTION 6]

139 [16] To the arguments for the second question about quantity,²¹² it must be said that there is a fallacy of equivocation or accident. For example: someone has the power to see, when he has this habit,²¹³ and even before he has it, but only equivocally. For he has the power in the first case because he has the form [i.e. the human

'when' is the location of the body in the time continuum.

²⁰⁸The term 'human' is predicated derivatively of some work that is de facto performed by a human being, but is not something that only a human being could perform. The latter would be formally 'human.'

²⁰⁹Cf. supra, n. 17.

²¹⁰Cf. supra, n. 18.

²¹¹Cf. supra, n. 103.

²¹²Cf. supra, n. 22.

²¹³'Habit' and 'disposition' are in the first species of quality. "Habit differs from disposition in being more lasting and firmly established. The various kinds of knowledge and of virtue are habits." (*Categories*, ch. 8, 8b 26-27).

soul] that is [the remote basis for seeing], and he does not yet have the [proximate basis].—Similarly, the divisible is said in one sense of something that has a [substantial] form according to which it can be formally divided [i.e. the substantial form of corporeity]; but it does not have in actuality, but only in potency, the [accidental] form [of quantity or extension in place] that gives it the immediate capacity to be divided. A corporeal substance of itself is divisible in this second way.²¹⁴

140 To the contrary: it is divisible in the first way. If formal divisibility were not there, it could not receive the several parts of quantity, for if the whole quantity is in the whole substance, and the parts of quantity in the parts of substance, it is said that substance has parts only through quantity as actually extending them.—Another answer: substance has its own distinct proper parts besides the parts it has by reason of quantity.

141 To this argument: substance is only potentially divisible formally before it has quantity in actuality. And as the subject of quantity, it has parts of itself only in potency, just as of itself as the subject of quality it has qualities only in potency. Then, one can say to the argument that just as the whole quantity is received in the whole substance that is potentially divisible, so the parts are received into the parts of substance which are in potency. Then, to the argument, when it is said ‘every divisible thing is quantified,’²¹⁵ this is true of what is divisible as actually extended.

142 To the first about quality,²¹⁶ it is said that the difference of substance is not a quality, but is mentioned as one type of quality, because it is predicated “in quale.”²¹⁷

143 To the argument about figure,²¹⁸ that if quality existed and did so as an absolute essence other than the quantity, etc., then it must be said that this does not follow: ‘The body would be understood as infinite, if it were thought of without figure,’ because the boundary

²¹⁴That is, corporeal substance as such does not have the actual accidental form such that it can be divided, but is only in potency to receiving such a form.

²¹⁵This is stated equivalently in n. 22 above.

²¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 23.

²¹⁷That is by Aristotle in the *Metaphysics* V, ch. 14, 1020b 1: “The essential difference is a quality.”; cf. Duns Scotus, *Praedic.* q. 28, n. 8.

²¹⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 24-26.

of the body is essentially its surface; the figure is an accidental boundary. Therefore, take away the figure and the body will still be bounded by its proper boundaries.

144 Similarly, Avicenna in *Metaphysics* II, ch. 2 says:²¹⁹ “Finite and infinite are accidental to quantity.” Nevertheless, I do not hold this, but rather the solution just stated [in n. 143].

145 Otherwise one could say that that body, if it were without figure, would not be infinite positively, but only privatively. And this would not include a contradiction. It would be as if God were to take away the last point of the line, and then that line would be privatively infinite, because a point is not immediate to another point.²²⁰ Unless you were to say [it would not be privatively infinite], for he could only do this by causing a new point to exist.

146 [17] To the contrary: it always seems that figure could not exist without a body, nor vice versa.

147 It is said that not every absolute can exist without another that is extrinsic to its essence, just as God could not make a creature without any relationship. If, therefore, something absolute essentially depended upon a relationship, God could not make that absolute without the relationship inhering in it. In this way figure is caused from the order of the parts of the body. And then the proposition is glossed in this way: “God could make something absolute without any other absolute other than himself,” which is true only of a *per se* absolute which does not depend essentially upon a relation, to which the rest depends. For instance, a body cannot exist without a respect, whether the respect precedes or follows, just as a respect follows upon figure.

148 {{The whole reply [n. 28] consists in this that if two absolutes agree in one respect, without which neither can exist, as is the case with body and figure—for a body cannot be without an order of parts and figure is an immediate consequence of an order of parts, such that both the body and the figure agree in one respect,—and so

²¹⁹Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysica* II, ch. 2, AvIL 70-71; as stated, however, the adage comes rather from *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 140: “Ratio finiti et infiniti soli quantitati congruit”.

²²⁰Cf. Aristotle, *Physica* VI, ch. 1, 231a 27-b 10.

in this way, then, God could not separate one respect from the other. And if this is not the case, then God could do it.}}

149 To the other about relation,²²¹ I answer as before.²²²

150 To the other point,²²³ by holding that the relation is other than its foundation, [I say] that this [subject] to which the relation comes, is immediately changed in itself and with respect to the other, but there is no mutation as to its absolute form. What undergoes a mutation in this way, i.e. according to its absolute form, is what the Philosopher means by mutation. For “with respect to relations, there is no motion,” since all motion is with respect to an absolute form, and motion is denied of substance, but not mutation. Likewise, although he [Aristotle] denies motion of relation, he does not deny mutation.

151 Another answer is that the whole reality of the relation is habitually produced with its foundation. But in actuality something is said to be related only if there is another term, and the reason is this: the relation is the form referring to the other.

152 To the contrary: if the essence of the relation were there, since the being of a thing, in the category of relation, is ‘to be associated with another,’²²⁴ if this other does not exist, there is no genus or category of this sort.

153 As for action and being affected,²²⁵ [I say] that they are distinguished essentially from [the category of] relation, from one another and from motion.

Proof that they are distinguished among themselves: potencies essentially distinct have acts essentially distinct, according to *Physics* III.²²⁶ But the potencies of action and of passion are of this sort, *Metaphysics* V;²²⁷ therefore, their acts are also. But the act of

²²¹Cf. *supra*, n. 27.

²²²Cf. *supra*, nn. 114-132.

²²³Cf. *supra*, n. 28.

²²⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 115.

²²⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 30-33.

²²⁶Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 1, 201a 27-b 5.

²²⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 12, 1019a 33-b 11.

an active potency is action, and the act of a passive potency is to be affected, *Physics* III.²²⁸

Proof that action may be essentially distinguished from motion: if it were not, then the act of an active potency qua active would be “the act of being in potency qua potency.” The consequent is impossible. Proof: motion²²⁹ is the act of what is imperfect qua imperfect. If, then, motion were an act of something active qua active, then, if the antecedent were true, the active qua active would be imperfect.

154 Also, the motion is the act of what is mobile and the act of what is active is an action; but no agent as such is mobile, although this at times happens to it incidentally, as in the case of a physical agent that is moved in acting.

155 {{Proof, however, that this action is not in the agent: If it were, then there would be an action about an action about an action to infinity. For the action, which is the form of the agent qua acting, is a true thing and a nature in the category of action, therefore it is truly caused by some cause. But everything causing is prior, at least by nature, to what is caused, according to Bk. IV of this work:²³⁰ [“That which moves is prior in nature to that which is moved, and] if they are correlative terms this is no less the case.” Therefore in that ‘causing’ that is prior by nature, it causes formally by some type of causation. Not that which is the action caused, for that action is not in this prior [causing], but is in what is to be caused. Therefore, the action would be of this caused action, and of this there would be another for the same reason and so ad infinitum.

156 It is said²³¹ that with respect to action there is not another action. And to the argument,²³² [it is said] that this action is caused in some way. And when it is said that this is ‘by another action,’ this must be denied; but it is by the same action. For the same numerical action is prior and posterior by nature to itself; for inso-

²²⁸Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 3, 202a 13-b 5.

²²⁹Cf. Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 1, 201a 10-11.

²³⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1011a 1-2: “Movens enim moto prius est natura. Nam et si ad invicem dicantur eadem, nihil minus.”

²³¹Cf. Peter John Olivi, *Summa* II, q. 25, arg. 6 ad oppositum (BFS IV, p. 442).

²³²Namely, if action were in the agent, the action would be of action ad infinitum.

far as it is an action of the agent, it is prior to itself insofar as it is an act that is caused.

157 On the contrary: I accept action in this priority of nature in which it is prior to itself as caused. Thus taken, it is true that the action itself is caused; therefore it is by some cause, whose causation causes it, as prior; and then the first incongruity follows.²³³

158 Also, it would follow that the same thing in the same instant of time would be and not be. For in that prior [instant] in which the agent is prior to its act, it is not actual. For if it were such, then it would be prior and not prior in an unqualified sense. If therefore you assume the action and the act caused to be the same thing, you assume the same thing simultaneously exists and does not exist.}}

159 The same can evidently be said of 'being affected,' namely, that it may be distinguished from acting essentially. For if you say that 'being affected' is motion, then it is distinguished essentially from action, because action is distinguished from motion. If not [being affected is not motion], it still follows that it is distinguished [from action], as it evident above.²³⁴

160 Then to the argument²³⁵ to the contrary from *Physics* V.²³⁶ It must be said that the argument is not through the dialectical rule "from the whole in quantity," but rather is "from analogy" in this way. If there cannot be motion of motion because there would be a progression to infinity, so too of action, there cannot be action of an action, since there would also be a progression to infinity. And the same would hold for 'being affected.'

161 But if to this it is still said that action is founded in motion, the same reply would hold. For if motion could be the subject of action, then there could be an action of action, because motion, as the term, is the same as action founded in the motion; and if there could be an action of the action, then there could be motion of the motion, according to the dialectical rule 'from analogy'. Therefore,

²³³That the action goes on to infinity.

²³⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 153.

²³⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 30-33.

²³⁶Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 2, 225b 13-16: "There is no motion with respect to agent and patient—in fact there can never be motion of mover and moved, because there cannot be motion of motion or becoming of becoming or in general change of change."

conversely, if there cannot be motion of motion, there cannot be action of action. And further, if this be so, there cannot be an action of motion, because to the same thing there would be motion and action based on the motion.

{{But further: How does this follow “Of action there is no action, therefore of action there is no motion”?—Reply: through this proposition: “With respect to the same thing there is motion and action,” or through this: “To whatever there is motion, with respect to that there is an action.” For nothing happens through motion that does not occur by an action.}}

162 [19] To the other about “when”:²³⁷ it is not the same as time.—To the proof, the major is conceded,²³⁸ but the minor is false.²³⁹ To the proof: since it is said that “when” is divided into past, present and future, and that it is the measure of what is successive, it must be said that time is the cause of “when” and time is an extrinsic measure of those things that come under it. Then, “from the fact that time is adjacent to the temporal, the form remains in the temporal,”²⁴⁰ and this form is successive incidentally [i.e. *per accidens*], because time is successive *per se*.

Similarly, that division happens to ‘when’ only incidentally, because it belongs to time *per se*, since these essential differences of time cause similar accidental differences in ‘when,’ but there they are only incidental.

163 To the other:²⁴¹ that it can be successive through the succession that inheres in it, but it is not something there essentially; and the proposition assumed is not universally true.

164 To the other arguments:²⁴² that they do indeed prove the first, [viz.] that ‘being affected’ is not ‘to be motion in a subject’. For if it were, all the more so would motion be a category, as the argument

²³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 34.

²³⁸Everything that is successive and continuous is time or motion.

²³⁹“ ‘When’ is this sort of thing,” i.e. something essentially successive and continuous.

²⁴⁰*Liber sex principiorum*, ch. 4, n. 33 (AL I⁷ 42).

²⁴¹Cf. *supra*, n. 34.

²⁴²Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

proves; but 'to be affected' is essentially an act of what is passive qua passive.

165 To the other²⁴³ about existence in a subject, it must be said that this description is not sufficient. Proof of this: that whole pertains to the substantial form in matter.

166 Against this: 'to be in a subject' is not as a part, namely, of the subject in which it is, nor of that which results from matter and form; it is being in a subject as an accident. But form, although it is in matter, nevertheless, it is not a part of matter, but it is a part of a third thing, namely, the composite. This is not the case with a property;²⁴⁴ therefore, it is there truly as an accident,

167 [Against the arguments of Thomas] Concerning the opinion about the modes of predication.

To the arguments proving that the categories are not distinguished essentially.

As for quantity,²⁴⁵ when it is said that 'the continuity of the substance is the unity of the substance,' assume that the unity of the thing is its continuity. Nevertheless, that from which secondarily the essence is formally one, will then fall into the category of quantity, according to Avicenna.²⁴⁶ For "one principle and measure of number" is the foundation for identity in substance, according to the Philosopher in the chapter 'On relation'.²⁴⁷ Hence, continuity is not that by which the substance is one essentially and *per se* in the first mode, but that by which it is quantified and one *per se* in the second mode.

168 To the other about relation,²⁴⁸ the argument is invalid, because a relation founded upon action is not a principle by which the agent acts elicively, but is posterior to the elicited action. For it is not the relation in the visible that moves vision.

²⁴³Cf. supra, nn. 48, 51-55.

²⁴⁴This seems to be a reference to n. 50 or 51.

²⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 57.

²⁴⁶Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 2, AvI 107-111.

²⁴⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 14: "Unum autem numeri principium et metrum."

²⁴⁸Cf. supra, n. 58.

169 To the [final] argument for the negative²⁴⁹ when it is said that 'categories as categories are not things; therefore, they are not distinguished really as such,' it must be said that if the reduplication is about intentions, this is true. But we are not speaking in this way, but about those things to which intentions refer²⁵⁰ and these are [real] things. Proof: a thing of second intention is not of the essence of a first intention. This is evident, because things of first intention have a complete quiddity apart from the thinking mind; things of second intention do not. If this be so, then it²⁵¹ would be the same sort of thing it is, with or without the intellect. Hence, this quantity would be true quantity apart from any intellect.

²⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 36.

²⁵⁰Literally, those things which come under the intentions. Scotus uses intention in a dual sense, one of the concept in the mind, the other of the formality in the thing.

²⁵¹That is, a thing of first intention.

QUESTION SEVEN

Text of Aristotle: "And those things which are different within the same substance, are of opposite species." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 10, 1018b 6-7)

Is it possible that some accidents only numerically different are in the same subject?

Is it possible that some accidents only numerically different are in the same subject?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] [For the affirmative] It seems to be so:

In the same part of the [translucent] medium as well as in the same eye there are many sensible "species" [or accidental forms]¹

¹"Species" is used in two widely different meanings in the Latin which reads: "In eadem parte medii et in eodem oculo sunt multae species eiusdem speciei." I have found no acceptable translation of "species" in the sense of something that is totally and completely informational. It is something through which something other than itself is known but is not directly perceived or known in itself. Like the electronic transmission of visual pictures from an orbiting satellite, the picture or 'species' transmitted cannot be seen in the electromagnetic medium whereby it is transmitted. In a similar way "species" is the physical medium or entity that is used to transmit knowledge or information about the object that is known. As a physical entity it represents an accidental modification of the subject in which it occurs, and is classified usually in the Aristotelian category of "quality." It "re-presents" the form or characteristics of the object, not in the way a picture represents them by being seen in itself, but rather as they are seen in themselves through one's eyes or through a pair of glasses. N.B.: A synonym for species is "idolum." i.e. the inverted 'species' that one can perceive by looking into another person's eye. The term is apparently derived from "speculum"—the Latin term for mirror. A perfect mirror is like a pair of glasses through which something else is seen, but which itself is not perceived or seen directly. As an entity it is a bearer of information. Here I have used the expression "sensible accidental forms" for the first occurrence where it has the sense of a quality that is somehow a bearer of visual information."

The very term "information" in English reflects something of the Aristotelian theory of knowledge according to which what is knowable about anything, i.e., its "form," is transferred in some way to the soul of the knower who is then "informed" by the object. This "information" takes place initially at the level of sense perception and is then somehow through the internal senses or imagination, is transformed or conceived as an intellectual form which is impressed upon the mind or intellect.

that are specifically the same; therefore, etc.—Proof of the assumption: let us assume that many white things exist in the translucent medium. The eye, from any point in the medium, can see them; therefore it has the intentional “species” of them and can distinctly see them; hence, it has distinct “species.”—Likewise, in the imaginative power are two such “species” of the same kind.

2 It is said that the argument holds good of intentional² accidents, but not of real accidents, for real do not denominate.

3 To the contrary: the reply presupposes something false. For the action of the ‘species’ [as an accidental form] in an organ [like the

Thus we speak of the eye being informed by the shape, figure, color, etc. of the material object. But we also speak of the immaterial intellect or mind as being informed about the essential nature of the object known, be that object something spiritual or material. In all cases the “information-bearing-entity” is called by the generic name “species.” Roughly it has the initial meaning of a “mirror image”—“speculum” being the Latin term for mirror, derived, perhaps, from this notion of the “species” as a reflection, likeness, or representation of what is seen or known. “Representation” itself carries the connotation of making the object or its characteristics present to the knower. Thus we have both intellectual “species” and sensible “species,” one identified as the formal cause of intellectual knowledge, the other as the formal cause of sense perceptual knowledge. How the “species” as an “information-bearer” is transferred from the object to the senses, where it exists as sense perceptual knowledge is usually explained as the work of reflected light (lumen) and a multiplication of the species in the translucent medium. How sense perceptual information gives rise to conceptual knowledge or information has a wider variety of explanation, all of which some creative enlightenment ascribed to an agent or active intellect processing the information contained in the imagination, and impressing it as a “intelligible species” on the passive or possible intellect (identified as a potency of the soul, i.e. as a potential knower). “Species” as a bearer of information, therefore, has a wide spectrum of meanings that is difficult to translate into English by any single word. In this question, I translate “species” as image (in the knower) and usually as ‘likeness’ in the translucent medium. In all cases it is an accidental quality in the subject in which it exists, whether that be the object itself, the medium, or the soul of the knowing subject.

²That is, “species” as informational have a dual entity as it were; in the real order they represent a real accident of some substance and pertain to the accidental category as quality, but as a means whereby something other than themselves is known, they can be said to contain the object in a cognitive way. The object has a diminished being as something intelligible or as something envisioned or imagined; Avicenna called it “a diminished being” namely as a psychic entity or “intentional form.” Because of its informational or referential aspect, it was called an “intention” that is something that tends outward to some object. As present in the knower, it brings the “forms” i.e., the knowable aspects of the object, be they accidental or substantial characteristics into the knower. As form bearers, they “inform” the knower, and do so as accidental modifications of the organs or the intellect.

eye] is a real action, according to *De anima* II:³ “Sensible qualities in excess destroy the organs of sense.” They only do this through the ‘species’; therefore, the ‘species’ is the source of a real action; therefore, it seems that a sensible ‘species’ is a real accident.

4 Also, a ‘species’ in the medium is truly visible, therefore it is a thing. Proof of the assumption: if the ray of the sun passes through a piece of red glass, the ‘species’ of red in the glass is seen on the wall, where the ray ends. But that this red on the wall is a ‘species’ is clear, because if the eye is placed there, through the ‘species’ it has, it will see the red in the glass.

5 Also the response [in n. 2] does not eliminate the difficulty. Proof: this father can have many sons; therefore in the same individual there are many real relationships. Proof of the implication: a person is called a father because he begot, Bk. V of this work;⁴ therefore, if he begot by many acts, the father is a subject of many relations.

6[2] Also, two distinct light-forms are in the same part of the medium, and these are real forms. Proof: if two candles are placed, one here, one there, and an intervening body is inserted, they will produce two shadows; if the body is then removed the luminosity of both candles by direct contact will intersect at the place where the opaque body had been, and thus the two light-forms will be in the same part of the medium. For one shadow results from a privation of the first light where it was suited by nature to be, just as darkness is a privation of light in an unqualified sense; therefore, by removing the obstacle to both candles, the light of the first will be where the shadow had been previously. Dionysius, in Bk. I of *On the Divine Names*,⁵ also makes use of this example to explain the indwelling of the [divine] persons.

³Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 12, 424a 28-30.

⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 24-25.

⁵Ps.-Dionysius, *De divinis nominibus*, ch. 2, n. 4 (PG 3 642AB): “Siquidem in domo cernimus, in qua multae lampades existunt, in unum quoddam lumen cunctarum lumina coalescere, splendoremque unum individuumque proferre; nec quisquam, ut arbitor, potest unius lampadis lumen ab aliarum ex aere cuncta lumina continente secenere.”

7 Also, two sources of heat⁶ can heat one object that can be heated; therefore, there are two actions here. The proof is this: otherwise, there would be only a single active principle in two numerically different agents, which does not seem to be true. From the fact that there are two agents, there are two actions, because action is the act of an active [potency] qua active, *Physics* III;⁷ hence, there will be two acts, and two end results induced, namely, a twofold heat in one and the same numerical object.

8 It is said [to this, n. 7] that the twofold heat becomes one through fusion.⁸—To the contrary: I assume there are two agents, and these equally hot sources are equally distant, and the same numerical patient is equally disposed to receive the action of the heat from both. The dual heat induced, therefore, will be equally in act and equally perfect in all respects. But “two things completely actual in themselves cannot become one in complete reality,”⁹ since, for two to become one, one of the two must be in potency with respect to the other; or if both are actual and they are to become one, a distinct third form must evolve which is the perfection of both, and is more an actuality than these two that are equally actual [when separated]. This is not the case here, because there would be nothing to produce this third form.

9 Also, every motion has some actual result; hence, if there are two actions, because the motion is twofold, the actual end products will also be two, but “from two distinct actualities nothing unified results.”¹⁰

10 [3] [Arguments for the negative]

To the contrary: the Philosopher says here:¹¹ “Diverse things within the same substance are different in species.”

⁶The Latin has “agentia duo calida” which literally means “two hot agents.”

⁷Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 3, 202a 21-b 5.

⁸For “fusion” the Latin has “compositio.”

⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 13, 1039a 4-6, 8-10: “A substance cannot consist of substances in it in complete reality; for things that are thus in complete reality two are never in complete reality one... if the substance, it will not consist of substances present to it and present in this way, which Democritus describes rightly; he says one thing cannot be made out of two nor two out of one”; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 130: “Ex duobus entibus in actu non fit tertium in natura.”

¹⁰See the previous note.

¹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 10, 1018b 1-7: “Diversa vero specie dicuntur...”

11 Also, *Physics* V:¹² motion is numerically one that results in the same specific end-product, if the mobile is numerically one, and its motion [consecutive or] measured by the same time. But if it were possible for the same specific term to be multiplied in the same thing, there could be two motions with the same specific result, and thus the two movements would become one motion. For the Philosopher says¹³ that, if the mobile is one in number, and the time likewise is the same, then the motion is numerically one which ends with the specifically same result.

12 Also, *De anima* II:¹⁴ it is necessary that the recipient be denuded of that which it receives; therefore, existing in actuality through a form that is specifically one, it cannot receive another form of the same species.

13 {{Against what was said above [n. 4] about the redness on the wall (produced by the ray of light that passed through the red glass) being a [sensible] 'species', we have this argument. If that were so, then an eye should see the redness of the glass reflected as in a mirror somewhere besides the place [on the wall] where the ray of light transmitting¹⁵ the redness ends. But this is false [for several reasons]: [a] because for such a reflected vision of what is visible, the eye and the point of reflection must lie on the same plane, according to Pecham's *Optics* (part 2, conclusions 6 and 26).¹⁶

quaecumque in eadem substantia entia differentiam habent."

¹²Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 4, 227b 27-32: "Horum autem esse quidem genere aut specie unum est in re in qua movetur, habitum autem erat in tempore, simpliciter autem unum esse in omnibus his est; et namque in quo est unum oportet esse et indivisibile, ut speciem, et quod est aliquando unum tempus et non deficiens, et quod movetur unum esse non secundum accidens."

¹³See the preceding note.

¹⁴Aristotle, *De anima* II, c. 12 424a 17-19: "Oportet autem universaliter de omni sensu accipere quoniam sensus quidem est susceptivus specierum sine materia, ut cera anuli sine ferro et auro recipit signum.; cf. Averroes, *De anima* III, com. 4, ed. Crawford, p. 385: "... omne recipiens aliquid necesse est ut si denudatum a natura recepti."

¹⁵Transmitted, i.e., its likeness or "species" is multiplied in the translucent medium.

¹⁶John Pecham, *Perspectiva communis* pars II prop. 26, ed. D. Lindberg, p. 178: "In omni superficie reflexionis quattuor praecipue puncta contineri, et quod extra illam est minime videri. Hi quattuor puncti sunt centrum visus, punctus apprehensus, terminus axis, id est perpendicularis ductae a centro visus in speculum, et punctus reflexionis." "Every plane of reflexion, outside of which little is seen, contains four

And also [b] because the angle of incidence has to be equal to the angle of reflection, according to the same work, part 2, conclusion 6,¹⁷ what is seen here [i.e., redness on the wall] can be seen at any angle [from which one can see the spot on the wall].—[c] Also, because a reflection is perceptible only on a finely polished surface, according to this same work, part 2, concl. 2,¹⁸ a wall is not this sort of thing.—Also, [d] because no species simply overshadows something visible in its own right, for it is not suited by nature to be present in anything so solid, nor thus to end up as what is seen, or as something visible in itself.¹⁹ Here the color of the wall is completely obscured.—Also, [e] because in a reflected vision the primary object is always seen with intense clarity,²⁰ as is evident from the sun as seen in water; here, however, the redness is not as bright as it is in the glass, howsoever small the intervening distance.—Also, [f] because that is seen as a proper visible,²¹ the accidents of which are seen as common sensibles. Here the redness on the wall is perceived to waver between motion and rest, which movement is not caused in the glass itself.—Also, [g] because in a uniformly lighted medium that redness of the glass spreads spherically and evenly; hence, throughout the entire area equally illuminated by some ray of the sun, a uniform reflection would be produced at any spot by the interposing an equivalent obstacle, and thus the vision [of redness] would be produced. But it is evident

principal points. They are center of the vision [in the mirror], the point where it is seen, the end-point of the axis, i.e., that is a perpendicular [line] drawn from the center of what is seen in the mirror and the point of reflection.”

¹⁷Ibid. pars II prop. 6, ed. D. Lindberg, p. 160: “Angulos incidentiae et reflexionis aequales esse, radiumque incidentem et reflexum in eadem superficie esse cum linea erigibili a puncto reflexionis.”

¹⁸Ibid. pars II prop. 2, ed. D. Lindberg, p. 158: “Reflexiones solas a regularibus superficiebus factas ab oculo sentiri.”

¹⁹A “species” re-presents the object, it is not itself the object perceived. It is that by which something is seen, that is to say, it is an intention, something that tends outward. It is not like a picture of something, but like a magnifying glass through which something other is perceived.

²⁰The Latin has “secundam suam intensionem,” the meaning being that the strength or intensity of the image overrides the normal appearance of the reflecting surface.

²¹A proper visible is an object perceived only by one sense, such as color by the eye. A common sensible, like motion, is perceptible by more than one sense, e.g. by touch or vision.

that this is false.²² For to whatever equally distant point [a species] is transmitted, it is multiplied uniformly, for it is seen equally well there by direct vision; therefore an obstacle [like an opaque surface] placed there should reflect it equally.}}

[I.—THE CONTRARY OPINION OF SOME]

14 It is said that it is not possible.²³ Proof: the unity of a thing and its entity stem from the same source.²⁴ But the subject is the cause of the entity of its accident; therefore, of its unity; therefore, if the subject is one, so too is the accident.

15 This is confirmed: as specific unity is from a form that is one according to species, so numerical unity is from the matter that is numerically one, the chapter 'On one'.²⁵ But the subject is the matter²⁶ of the accident and the subject is one numerically; therefore, the accident is also.

16 Also, matter *per se* is in potency to form, and to this form incidentally [per accidens].

²²That is to say, it is only at some specific point or area on the wall or other intervening opaque surface upon which the colored ray passing through the colored glass falls that redness is produced. It does not spread in a uniform sphere as would the image [species] emanating from a point source of light would do. The redness is not in the original ray of light, but is in the glass. Here then is the point source of redness and if it represented a typical "species" transmitted through being multiplied in the medium, it should spread spherically.

²³Namely, that it is impossible that some accidents only numerically different exist in the same subject, cf. Thomas, *Metaph.* V, lect 12, ed Parma XX 408b: "Quintus modus est quando aliqua accidentia sunt in eodem subiecto, et tamen differunt ad invicem, eo quod impossibile est plura accidentia unius speciei in eodem subiecto esse"; Godfrey of Fontaines, *Quodl.* VI, q. 5 (PhB III 123): "Respondeo dicendum quod sicut plura accidentia eiusdem speciei non possunt esse simul in eodem subiecto, ita etiam unum accidens, nullo agente, potest esse simul in duobus subiectis... Impossibile est ergo quod duo accidentia quae sunt eiusdem rationis et speciei fiant unum subiecto et quod duo maneant et distincta."

²⁴Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Quodl.* IX a. 3 resp.: "Quia vero ex eodem res habet esse et unitatem, ideo realis unitas relationis pensanda est ex ipso relationis fundamento et causa."

²⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 6, 1016b 32-33: "...numero quidem quorum materia una."

²⁶According to St. Thomas, the complete substance of primary matter and substantial form, are the matter of the accidental form. That is to say, the form has no subject matter other than the substance itself.

17 Proof: the form is this [i.e., individual] only because it is received in this matter;²⁷ therefore, the form is this only after it is received.²⁸

18 Another proof: if it [i.e. matter] were in potency to this and to that, there would be infinite potencies in matter. I prove this is impossible: for to each passive potency there is a corresponding active potency; but there are no infinite active potencies in anything, for if there were, it [the agent] would be intensively infinite.²⁹

19 In this way, then, that proposition has a twofold proof. Matter *per se* is in potency to form [in general], and only accidentally is it in potency to this form. From this it follows, then, that matter is *per se* in act through form, and only per accidens through this form. If, therefore, it were in potency to another form, namely, whiteness, since it already has whiteness as such, it would be in act and in potency with respect to same thing; for it is in act *per se* through form and is in potency *per se* to form, and in potency to another only per accidens.

[A.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS ON THE BASIS OF THIS VIEW]

20 To the first argument,³⁰ to begin with, it is said to the contrary that the species of this and that white are not in the same part [of the medium or the eye], and when this is said of the eye, they say that the two species are in different parts of the eye.

²⁷Unlike Scotus, Thomas has no distinct principle of individuation or haecceity for the accident. Just as the substantial form is individualized by being in this matter, so the accident is individualized by being in this substance.

²⁸There follows an interpolated note in the margin of the Cambridge Peterhouse manuscript: "If this opinion were partially true, true at least about such adventitious accidents which are suited to make it one, as would be all absolute accidents or at least some of them, not however, relative accidents, [then one might hold it]. However, the reasons adduced here are of no validity, because they hold good in equal measure of all accidents. And therefore this view should be rejected."

²⁹Scotus proves that God is intensively infinite, because he has infinite knowledge, an active power, that of omniscience. He seems to approve a similar argument here.

³⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

21 To the contrary. Let us assume there is only one white thing, namely, an egg. Its species, then, will be in the whole illuminated medium, as far as its energy extends. Now, let another white object be placed there. Its species also will be in the same part as the species of the white egg, or else that white egg will not be seen by an eye that is perfectly disposed to see it. This makes no sense, since according to you, [this second white object] could not produce its own species [if the other were already there]. Nor can we say that by producing its species it corrupts the species of the other white thing [i.e. the egg], because I assume that it is weaker than the other. Hence, [we are faced with these alternatives]: either its species will coexist with the species of the other, or its species will corrupt the other species, which it cannot do if it is weaker, or it will not be seen.

22 Also, the imaginative power has an organ, therefore, it has [several]³¹ parts,—at least let us assume this—and, then, that it has just as many species within it. If then I would see in the eye something new that is similar in species to one of those species already in the imaginative power, I would be unable to imagine it, since the species in relation to its subject could not be received in the imagination—which seems absurd.

23 [5] {{There is a minimal species of white that can perfect the organ of the imagination *per se*, and consequently, there must be a minimum that can be perfected by a species existing *per se*, since that minimal species is not related to an indefinite perfectible, howsoever small or large, in the organ as a whole. For there is a species existing *per se* in the whole which perfects the organ to the same extent that this same species existing *per se* would perfect a being *per se*. But there is a minimal organ that is capable of receiving a species. Therefore, there is a minimal in the whole which is capable of receiving a distinct species and of a *per se* being.}}

24 Also, whatever is to be said [of two] species, one of the two is in another part of the organ or the medium [n. 17]—at least this is so because cognition is in the cognitive potency as a whole, although it is there through a form that is in a part. It is not probable that

³¹The manuscripts are divided on the precise number.

these two cognitions, if they are in some potency at the same time, are in diverse parts of the organ or potency. On the contrary, according to Aristotle in Bk. I of this work,³² 'one experience is generated from many memories'. Those many memories, however, are cognitions of the same species, because they are of singulars of the same species, according to the Philosopher in the text.

25 Similarly, it is clear that there are diverse species simultaneously in the sense memory. For if now I imagine this white object which I previously saw, I have a species of it in the memory. Immediately I imagine another white object I have seen, and therefore I have a species of it as well. With it, the species of the other white object remains, for otherwise I would be unable to imagine the previous white thing, unless I would see it again and thus acquire a new species of it—the opposite of which I obviously find to be the case.

26 To this,³³ as far as memory is concerned, it is said that there is no actual cognition, but only a habitual sort of knowledge, because the memory only conserves the species as a habit. In this way, then, it is conceded that the sensitive memory, as well as the intellective memory, have in them many species simultaneously as a habit, and many habitual cognitions. But it is not this way with the sense imagination, or the intelligence, because these [potencies] are perfected by a species that is actual, produced from the species of either the sense or intellective memory. And through that produced species, they have actual knowledge.

27 [6] From the first [viz. that several species are in the memory habitually] what we propose follows, [namely,] that those two species and two habitual cognitions in the sense memory, stem from two individuals of the same species, are accidents of the same species, and they coexist in the same thing.

28 As for the other member [viz. about the sense imagination and actual intelligence], this pertains to another question, namely whether many are known as many simultaneously. But how, then, can the intellect fail to have many habitual scientific cognitions of

³²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 1, 981a 1-2: "...eiusdem namque rei multae memoriae unius experientiae potentiam faciunt."

³³Cf. supra, nn. 22, 24-25.

the same species of something that pertains to the same species, when the sense memory has many habitual cognitions of this sort? And then Christ could have acquired knowledge [in addition to] his infused knowledge.

29 I reply: if the intellect first understood the singular as the sense first sensed it, what is proposed would follow. But if the intellect first knew the universal, it would be enough to have one cognition of what is specifically one; for there could be no other, since its first object would not be different. For in each case of knowing, it would be the same universal that is first known. It is not this way with memory.

30 To the contrary: you assume that antecedent, namely, "if the intellect,"³⁴ etc.

31 Also, the same conclusion could be known by many means.

32 {{Response to the first [n. 30]: scientific knowledge is acquired by means of a definition as middle term. According to Bk. VII of the *Metaphysics*,³⁵ this is not something that pertains to the singular but only to the universal, and therefore only of the universal is there a demonstration and scientific knowledge.

33 To the contrary: science is a habitual knowledge of some particular demonstrated conclusion. Where the species [i.e., the essence or definition] is taken as the middle term, the proper attribute [of that species] can be concluded of the singular and demonstratively. Therefore, etc.

34 Reply: demonstration occurs when through a cause coextensive with a proper attribute, the latter is demonstrated of something. Hence, a consequence would be to say that the proper attribute of a genus could not be demonstrated or known scientifically about some species, but only about the genus or about all the species, by means of one science or a single demonstration.

35 To the contrary: an attribute of a genus can be inferred of one species where the genus is used as the middle term, without understanding anything of the other species; therefore, the same scientific knowledge will be applicable to two, of which one is

³⁴Cf. *supra* 29.

³⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 15, 1039b 27-30.

knowable apart from the other. One can argue in a similar way about singulars.

36 The example in *Posterior Analytics* I,³⁶ about every triangle, etc. and here about the semicircle, is applicable to this situation.³⁷ Therefore, he gives an example of principles of demonstration by taking a species under the genus as regards an attribute of a genus.}}

37 Another answer [to n. 1] would be to say that two species compared to their subject are one species, and, compared to the objects that effectively caused them, they are two.

38 To the second,³⁸ they say³⁹ that many relations are not simultaneous; hence a father is not a father because he begot this son, but a son; neither is the foundation this act, but act in general; therefore, there is but one paternity there *per se*, and if there happen to be several sons, this is purely incidental.

39 As for the other⁴⁰ as before:⁴¹ one light-form is produced from the two.

³⁶Aristotle, *Posterior Analytics* I ch. 1 71a 20. Recognition of a truth may in some cases contain as factors both previous knowledge and also knowledge acquired simultaneously with that cognitive knowledge; this latter being of the particulars actually falling under the universal and therein already virtually known. For example, a student knew beforehand that the angles of every triangle are equal to two right angles; but it was only at the actual moment at which he was being led on to recognize this as a true instance before him that he came to know 'this figure inscribed in the semicircle' to be a triangle. For some things (viz. the singulars finally reached which are not predicable of anything else as subject) are only learnt in this way, i.e. there is here no recognition through a middle or minor term as subject to a major.

³⁷Aristotle, *Metaphysics* VII, ch. 10, 1035b 9-10. "The semicircle is defined by the circle."

³⁸Cf. supra, n. 5.

³⁹Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol.* III, q. 35, a. 5, resp.: "Unitas enim relationis vel eius pluralitas non attenditur secundum terminos, sed secundum causam vel subiectum... Unde paternitas non potest specie differre, cum actus generationum sint idem specie. Et quia plures formae eiusdem speciei non possunt simul inesse eidem subiecto, non est possibile quod sint plures paternitates in eo qui est pater plurium filiorum generatione naturali"; Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IV q. 3 (I f. 90X): "...aliquis dictus pater ex respectu ad unum filium generatum ab ipso primitus, etsi postmodum generat alium... unica tamen paternitate secundum numerum respicit utrumque."

⁴⁰Cf. supra, n. 6.

⁴¹Cf. supra, n. 37.

40 To the fourth,⁴² the answer is the same as above.⁴³

[B.—AGAINST THE FIRST OPINION
1.—AGAINST THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE OPINION]

41 [7] Against what was first said⁴⁴ about unity and entity stemming from the same source, I ask: “What sort of unity?” or “What unity?” The unity of the subject is the unity of an accident, either formally or materially or effectively.

42 If it is in the first way [i.e., formally], then to understand an accident numerically one, apart from a subject that has its own unity, would be a contradiction, and even God could not separate the accident from its subject.

43 Also, if this were so, two whiteness would become one numerically; let Socrates be white now, and afterwards, black, and then white again. Then if whiteness is formally one with the unity of its subject, since this unity of the subject will always remain the same numerically, then these ‘whitenesses’ would be numerically one, and thus the same numerical thing will naturally be frequently regenerated and repeatedly perish.

44 Also, that is evident for another reason. For, if entity and unity are the same, your argument turns against you,⁴⁵ because the entity of an accident is formally other than the entity of its subject; hence, it has another unity, [one of its own]. That the entity of an accident is formally other than that of its subject is evident; or, if it is not, the same thing will be a cause of itself, since you assume [n. 14] that the subject is the cause of its accident. If then the unity of the subject and of the accident were formally the same, they would be the same being formally, and then the same would be a cause of itself.

⁴²Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

⁴³Cf. *supra*, n. 37.

⁴⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

⁴⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

45 If it [has this unity] effectively,⁴⁶ I concede that from the same efficient cause diverse effects are produced that differ only numerically.

46 But if materially [n. 41], I concede that there is one matter of numerically diverse things of the same species, and if you assume the opposite, you are asking me simply to accept this without proof [i.e. as a “dialectical petition”].

47 Against the confirmation:⁴⁷ then contraries would be one numerically, because the subject is the same.

48 As for the other main argument,⁴⁸ there is proof of the opposite, namely, that matter is in potency to some singular form primarily and *per se*, because motion is an act, etc. *Physics* III.⁴⁹ If the mobile were then in potency first to whiteness and not to some singular; therefore, what will be first produced through motion will be the specific nature and not a singular nature, except accidentally—which is false, because it says in Bk. I of this work:⁵⁰ “Actions and all productions are all concerned with the individual, for the physician does not cure ‘man’ except in an incidental way.”

49 This proof is not valid, it seems, because that which is the subject of motion is not its terminus.

50 [8] To the contrary: Whatever is induced *per se* in the individual qua individual is singular. The term of motion is induced in something, in regard to which there is an operation that is *per se*; therefore, that term is singular.

51 Also, the author of the book, *The Six Principles* says:⁵¹ “Nature operates occultly in these,” by producing the universal when it produces the singular. Therefore, what is produced primarily and *per se* is the singular.

⁴⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 41.

⁴⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 15.

⁴⁸Cf. *supra*, nn.16-17.

⁴⁹Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 1, 201a 10-11; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 148.

⁵⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I ch. 1, 981a 18-19.

⁵¹*Liber de sex principiis* ch. 1, n. 9 (AL I⁷ 37).

52 Against the other:⁵² that several things are in numerical potency to the same specific form, from *Physics* III ch. 1:⁵³ “if it is possible to be sick and it is possible to be well are the same, then sickness and health are the same.” Similarly, if it is possible for anything to become white by this or that whitening, which are numerically the same, then this whiteness and that whiteness are numerically the same.

53 It is said that the two cases are not the same, because the first two are potencies to specifically different forms, and therefore they are not the same; but it is not this way with the other example.⁵⁴

54 To the contrary: then it would follow that the same potency at the same time existed and did not exist, because I assume that some subject was white at some time and that it was in potency to that whiteness. And I assume further that this whiteness perished and the subject is still in potency to another whiteness; if it is through another potency then you have what I maintain; if it is through the same potency, since there is no potency to the whiteness that was, because the same numerical whiteness cannot be reintroduced, therefore, it follows that the same thing exists and does not exist.

{To the contrary: therefore the natural form is annihilated, because it is not just reduced to potency; therefore it in no way exists, namely, neither in act nor in potency.—If you say something similar to it does remain in potency, so that it could exist, although God has annihilated the first, therefore it follows that the same thing exists and does not exist.}

55 For the potency to future whiteness exists, [whereas] potency to a past whiteness does not exist, for then the same thing numerically could return naturally after it had perished. And, according to you, this potency is the same as that potency. Hence, the same thing exists and does not exist at the same time.—Or conclude in this way: the same natural potency is with respect to what is possible to be induced naturally and to what it is impossible to induce naturally.—Or this way: if the same potency exists, then

⁵²Cf. *supra*, nn. 18-19.

⁵³Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 1, 201a 35-b 2; cf. *supra* lib. I, q. 6 n. 18.

⁵⁴That is, becoming sick or well.

that which was, can return.—Or argue in this way: now it is in potency to two future whitenesses that can be induced at different times, and there is not just one potency to these, because potency to one does not exist when the potency to the other does, for instance, after ten years when the first had perished, and the second was not yet induced.

56 Also, potency in you and in me to be white only differ numerically by what? If it is by its subject, then all potency in me differs only numerically from any in you, which is false. If the two potencies differ from their term, then my proposal follows. Similarly, in the same subject there are numerically two terms, and when it is granted [n. 18] that then there would be infinite active potencies, I concede this; neither is it incongruous. For if the sun revolved through the medium ad infinitum, it would generate every year ad infinitum a new plant, if the matter were receptive of its influence.

57 [9] To the contrary: the same active potency is in the sun which could produce infinite plants.

58 It is admitted of that potency that is substance or quality, namely, which is something absolute and a principle of operation, but not of an active potency that is only a relationship founded in such a principle in comparison with a patient; for such [an active potency] is numbered according to the numbering of the passive potency, as relatives are of equal number.

59 To the contrary: then there are such infinite potencies in the sun at present and they are all of the same species because they all refer to infinite forms of the same species.

60 This is conceded, just as infinite passive potencies of the same sort are assumed to be in matter. But when it is argued above [n. 18] that such a thing would be intensively infinite, the implication is not valid. For neither do all those active potencies, i.e. relations founded upon one absolute perfection, constitute something more perfect than one potency would.

61 To the contrary: if the first relation implies some perfection, twice that perfection is in two and infinite perfection in an infinity of such relations. If [each relation implied] no [additional perfection], it would not seem to be something positive.

62 A denial of the implication confirms this, for in *Physics* VII,⁵⁵ it is argued that if infinite mobiles were moved for a finite time, therefore, also one infinite mobile would be moved for a finite time. As he argues there of what is infinite in extension, so he argues here of what is such in intensity.

63 I reply: this difficulty of the infinity of relations is common [to other things]; it is proved to be in me just as it is proved to be in the sun. For, by reason of some quality I have, I can resemble an infinity of things, if there are such, also if they were actualized. For if there were actually an infinity of things, even at present I have the reality of all those relations, according to Sherwood.⁵⁶

64 This is admitted, then, of relations, at least of potential or habitual relations, although not of actual relations, according to some.⁵⁷

[2.—AGAINST SOME REPLIES OF THE FIRST OPINION TO THE
INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

65 [10] Against the reply to the arguments.

Against the second response to the first argument,⁵⁸ whatever forms of the same species in the same thing [i.e., the subject receiving the light from the two candles] make up the one, the single third that results is at least more intense than either of the two [produced effectively by the two candles]. If then two “species” existed at the same time in the medium [as they stemmed from

⁵⁵Aristotle, *Physica* VI, c. 1, 242b 18-19: “Differt autem nihil; penitus enim infinitum motum in finito tempore accidit moveri; hoc autem impossibile est.”

⁵⁶This may be a garbled reference to ‘Syrianus’ in Simplicius’s, *In Praedicamenta praed. ‘Ad aliquid’* (CLCAG V¹ 273): “Syrianus autem prudentissimus ait: ‘quod quidem neque primam substantiam neque secundam ad aliquid esse tolerat, valde recte facit; omnis enim substantia secundum se est et sui ipsius, sicut et Archytae videtur, ipsa vero ad aliquid in ea quae ad invicem habitudine colligata sunt et sui invicem sunt.’”

⁵⁷Cf. Thomas, *De veritate* q. 1 a. 5 ad 15 (XXII 21b): “Quarto quando ens comparatur ad non-ens, ut cum dicimus quod nos sumus priores his qui sunt futuri post nos; alias sequeretur quod possent esse infinitae relationes in eodem, si generatio in infinitum protenderetur in futurum”; idem, q. 4 a. 5 ad 1 (XXII 132a); Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 1 ad 1 (AM Ph s. 2, XIII 6-18).

⁵⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 37.

different sources] and became one [when they intersected], they will cause a single more intense "species." But such does not lead [to vision] of the weaker whiteness which has multiplied one "species," and for the same reason, [to vision] of the other whiteness which produced the other "species," because the "species" composed of both is 'disproportionable' to either whiteness. Hence it will represent something more intense and perfect than either of them, and thus in no way will those two whitenesses be seen by the eye.

66 Also, since this composite "species" is numerically one, it follows that it will not represent two whitenesses distinctly. Therefore, the eye would not see distinctly the less intense white thing that was there before, but something more intensely white.

67 Also, a distinct action pertains only to a distinct being. If the "species" represents two distinct beings, therefore, they will be distinct.

68 Against the response to the second argument,⁵⁹ paternity in that father to this son has a unity greater than specific unity, because otherwise his own paternity would have no greater unity in itself than it would have with the paternity of Plato, which seems incongruous. But the only paternity that is greater than specific is particular paternity, namely, just this paternity. Hence, in this individual there is this paternity with respect to this son. Through this paternity, however, a father is not related to all his sons, because if this son is destroyed, so too is this paternity. If through the selfsame paternity he was related to another son who still exists, [however], this paternity would still be there. At the same time, therefore, this paternity would be and not be.

69 Against the other about the lights,⁶⁰ we argue as we did above about "species,"⁶¹ but not because the lights are not representative of something else, as are "species." It is also evident that the intensity of light [is greater] when the illumination is from two lights of the same sort.

⁵⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 38.

⁶⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

⁶¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 65-67.

70 Another and better answer: if they are one as to the subject [they light up] and yet proceed as two rays, then it would follow that these two rays are two 'geometrical' rays, [and] not visual rays, for they would be two simply as lines and not as visible lines by reason of some added physical quality. And then all the optical conclusions⁶² about the ways the rays intersect, and similar things which depend upon the rays' diversity, would be true only as they are considered geometrically, and not according to optics, because optics⁶³ considers a line as it exists in physical matter.

[II.—REPLY TO THE QUESTION]

71 [11] To the question, then, it can be said there is no reason it should be impossible or contradictory for two accidents of the same species to coexist [in a subject] if they are [1] intentional, or [2] real relations, or [3] real but not educed from the potency of the subject, or [4] they are educed from the subject's potency, but not through motion.⁶⁴ The incongruity arises, however, where the forms are introduced through motion, because motion only exists if, in the mobile, there is an opposite disposition to the form to be induced, as is the case with contraries or an intermediate form. But if the agent were to find in the mobile a form of the same species, it would not find this under an opposed disposition. Therefore, it will not move the mobile by simply inducing another form. Rather it will increase the form preexisting in the mobile, and will do this if that preexisting form is less perfect than the form the agent could induce. But if it were to find the mobile under a form just as perfect as the form to be induced by the agent itself, the agent will not move the mobile at all.

⁶²Conclusions of the science of optics.

⁶³The Latin has "perspectivus" that is the scientist skilled in optics; cf. John Pecham, *Tract. de perspectiva*, ed. D. Lindberg, p. 24: "Sciendum igitur quod geometria considerat lineam in quantum est mathematica, sed perspectiva lineam considerat non tantum in quantum mathematica sed in quantum naturalis."

⁶⁴Antonius Andreae reduces the first part of this statement to four affirmative conclusions about the coexistence in the same subject of accidents specifically the same that differ only numerically. No contradiction is involved, if these accidents are [1] intentional, [2] real but relative, [3] real and absolute but not educed from the potency of matter, or are [4] real, absolute, and educed from the potency of matter, but not through motion, but rather as the result of a mutation.

[III.—REPLY TO THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY]

72 To the first authoritative citation from Bk. V of this work:⁶⁵ two forms of the same species cannot be induced through motion. In the same subject, therefore, all forms that differ, if introduced through motion, must necessarily differ specifically. This is unnecessary, however, for forms other than those induced through motion. Indeed, it is quite possible for two such of the same species to coexist in the same subject, like the two “species”⁶⁶ of two whitenesses, and two paternities, and two lights, and so with other things not induced through movement.

73 Similarly to the other argument⁶⁷ taken from Bk. V of the *Physics*.

74 To the other argument⁶⁸ from the *De anima*, it must be said that the recipient need not be denuded of every form of the same species, but it is necessary that it be denuded of the same numerical form.

75 Perhaps another and better answer would be to say it should be denuded of a form of the same kind⁶⁹ that perfected the recipient to its full capacity.

76 {{This gloss is taken from Anselm’s work *De veritate*,⁷⁰ in chapter [six]. The example is of the glass vase that is colored intensely, and when a liquid is placed in it, it is not represented in its true coloring, but according to the color of the glass.}}

⁶⁵Cf. supra, n. 10.

⁶⁶That is, the sensible species, only numerically different, whereby two distinct whitenesses are perceived.

⁶⁷Cf. supra, n. 11.

⁶⁸Cf. supra, n. 12.

⁶⁹Though the Latin has “forma eiusdem generis,” it is clear that “generis” does not mean “generically different”—since this would include a specific difference—but here it refers to a difference in kind, but within the same species, e.g., where one form of the same species is weaker than another.

⁷⁰Anselm, *De veritate* ch. 6 (PL 158, 471; ed. Schmitt I, 184): “Ut si transit per aliquod corpus, velut per vitrum, quod ita sit perfecte rubicundum, ut omnino ipse visus afficiatur eius rubore, nequit diverso simul affici colore. Si autem non tam perfectum invenit ruborem qui prior occurrit, quantum coloris capax est: quasi nondum plenus adhuc alium valet assumere colorem, in quantum eius capacitas priori colore non est satiata”; cf. supra n. 13.

77 If it had one form, provided this did not perfect it to its full capacity, a subject could receive another form of the same species, but only if they were not induced through motion, as is evident about the forms enumerated above.⁷¹

78 About light, however, there is a doubt, if light would require some indisposition in the medium or a shadow or very little light, then the agent would not impress a new form, but would intensify the preexisting form.

79 [12] To the argument⁷² about the two agents that produce heat through motion, this runs counter to what was just said.⁷³ But it could be admitted that they heat through two distinct heating actions, because they do so by virtue of two forms. And the Commentator in Bk. V of the *Physics*, comment 38,⁷⁴ says that “if the action is one, the form also is one,” just as the action of the sun is other than the action of the father in begetting, because the action of the sun is nobler than the action of the man. But only one passive state, not two, corresponds to the two actions, for the son that is begotten could be generated by the sun and by the father through several distinct actions and nevertheless, there would be but one passive effect and one thing generated.

80 If the action implied a relationship of the agent to the patient, and conversely, the affect implied a relationship of the patient to the agent, [as a relative accident] this is multiplied, as this case was argued for above.⁷⁵

81 If the action, however, were to imply a relationship of motion or mutation to the agent, as coming from the agent, and ‘being affected’ implies a relation of the same [i.e., of the agent] to what is affected, as it exists in this,⁷⁶ then the two [actions] are not corresponding relationships, but two disparate relations that are based in the same thing [i.e., the agent] but refer to diverse terms [i.e. one the action as in the agent, the other as identified with the

⁷¹Cf. *supra*, n. 72.

⁷²Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

⁷³Cf. *supra*, nn. 71-77.

⁷⁴Averroes, *Physica V*, com. 38 (106ra-rb).

⁷⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 71-79.

⁷⁶That is, in what is affected or in the patient.

form being received in the patient].⁷⁷ And because the motion is one, since the form in flux [received in the patient] is one, even though the agents [e.g., the sun and the father] acting are several; therefore, there are several relations to the agents, but the recipient term is one, and the form in flux is one. Hence, the term of both is one and thus the intermediate relationship unique.—And in this second way, I understand the reply given above [n. 71].

82 All arguments above against this are solved except the second,⁷⁸ to which I give this reply. If one of the agents did not act,⁷⁹ its effect would not be in what is coming to be in the patient in which it [now] is [if the agent is acting], namely it [what is coming to be] implies a relationship to that agent; but it does not follow that what is made [the form induced in the patient] does not come into existence absolutely [i.e., as absolute accident such as a quality or certain quantity], but not [come into existence] with respect to that agent [which is not acting].

[IV.—OBJECTIONS TO THE SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

83 61 [13] {{Against the solution to the question:⁸⁰ Take two agents of equal potency and assume that they discover a patient under a contrary disposition and impress it at the same time; therefore, forms induced through movement could be duplicated in the same thing.

84 The same answer is given to this as was given to the last,⁸¹ [namely], that the mobile cannot be moved simultaneously by two motions so as to end up with two [accidental forms] of the same species, although there are two actions.

⁷⁷Or in the patient, there is a dual relationship, one to the form received and the other to the agent from which it is received. But since, in the patient, the form received from a dual source is one, as the term of the relationship to a dual agent is forked, but that forked relationship is also unique and thus from the side of the patient it is one. Hence, though induced by motion resulting from a dual action by two agents, it is not two numerically different accidents in the patient that are specifically the same.

⁷⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

⁷⁹That is, if one of the two heat sources were eliminated.

⁸⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 71.

⁸¹Cf. *supra*, n. 81.

85 To the contrary: at the same time there are two potencies in this patient to the two forms of the same species; therefore at the same time there can be two acts of it insofar as it is in potency, and thus two movements.

86 Also, "Causes actually at work [and particular] exist and cease to exist simultaneously with their effect," *Physics* II⁸² and Bk. V of this work.⁸³ This is true of the immediate effect which is coming to be. This individual heater, therefore, coexists and ceases to coexist simultaneously with the heating it causes, and that other heater with the heating it causes. Hence, if both cause the same heating, this will exist and not exist simultaneously, if you assume the first heater ceases to heat whereas the second does not. But one cannot argue in this way of agents that are [essentially] ordered, since the inferior [or dependent] agent that coexists with the 'state of being heated,' cannot act if the higher agent is not acting, and nevertheless, that 'state of being heated' cannot be produced by the superior without the inferior.

87 Also, if there are two actions (as well as that relation in the patient to the agent) and these actions are really the same as these relations in the patient, there will be two instances of being [heated].

88 Also, in a relationship based upon action and being affected, where one term is multiplied, the other is as well; therefore there are as many actions as there are instances of being affected.

89 Also, what do you say of the forms that can be induced through mutation? Can two such exist at the same time if they are of the same species?

90 It is said⁸⁴ that they cannot, because with respect to any one species there is only one privation, which is removed through the

⁸²Aristotle, *Physica* II, ch. 3, 195b 16-18: "Differunt autem in tantum, quod operantes quidem et singulares simul sunt et non sunt et quorum sunt causae."

⁸³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 1, 1014a 21-23: "Differunt autem in tantum quod agentia quidem et singularia simul sunt et non sunt eadem et quorum causae"; cf. supra lib V q. 2 n. 20-34.

⁸⁴Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *De gener. et corrupt.* I, lect. 8, ed. Parma XIX 227a: "Cuilibet autem formae naturali quae est in generalibilibus et corruptibilibus adiungitur privatio," idem, *Physica* I, lect. 13 (II 45b).

advent of the first form and consequently, there is no 'term from which' [terminus a quo] there could be a mutation to the second.

91 To the contrary: privation is the lack of something in a thing suited by nature to have it. Of another thing there is a second deprivation. This too is proved, because privations are contradictories with respect to what is suited by nature to have them. Hence, if this form is not in the subject, its privation is, and between the privation of this and that there could be a mutation. Similarly, of such a form, there could be this privation, just as there could be this potency.

92 To the first article,⁸⁵ it seems one must admit that two forms of the same species can simultaneously exist in the same thing, and even those induced through motion, in such a way that they are simultaneously induced by two agents discovering the same patient existing under a contrary. And yet the two could not be induced successively so that one is introduced after the other through motion; for once the first is induced, the contrary state vanishes, and thus there can be no further motion to some form of the same species as that which is already in it. But if the second agent finds the form imperfect, and thus to some degree opposed to what it can bring about, the second agent can take away the imperfection by intensifying the form that is there.

93 [14] To the second article⁸⁶ about the mutations that necessarily presuppose motion, one must say, as we did to the first article,⁸⁷ that two forms specifically the same that are the end result of the two mutations caused simultaneously by two agents, can be induced at the same time by, but they cannot be induced one after the other, nor after the first is induced can there be any motion that is necessarily required for the mutation which would be due to the second.

94 But what of the mutations that are not necessarily the end result of motion, such as the illuminations [produced by the candles in n. 6] seem to be?—I reply: that the two [actions] and their resulting forms can exist in anything either simultaneously or

⁸⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 85-88 and n. 1.

⁸⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 89-91 and n. 5.

⁸⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 92.

successively. For, after the induction of the first, the potency for the second remains together with its proper privation in the mobile subject. If an agent is present, it will cause the same form as before, or if it is another agent, it can cause another form; and if such forms are suited by nature to remain a while in the subject, they can remain there simultaneously in any number. You do not assume, therefore, that light and the "species"⁸⁸ have any fixed being⁸⁹ in the medium, but are continually generated [as a process]. The relation you assume remains, and therefore there are as many of the same species [as the light produces], indeed, there is an infinity of such. Consequently, as many potentially visual things as are in process with respect to a point in the translucent medium, that many "species" will be there; and there are as many lights as there are luminous sources.—But how then is light increased?

95 Against the first article:⁹⁰ its claim that the same thing at the same time is moved by two motions of the same species, seems to negate what Aristotle says about this.⁹¹

96 Also, two fires will produce two fires from the same water, or at least would induce two forms of fire in the same material, which seems impossible.

97[15] For the solution to the question,⁹² note that any form whatsoever that can only be induced after another incompatible form perishes, and only one such can exist in one and the same recipient. Proof: the other would not be induced after the first is induced, and continues to remain there, because another incompatible form would not precede this other [additional] form [of the same species]. For by the induction of the first form, whatever is incompatible with it is expelled. Neither could two such incompatible forms be induced simultaneously, because they would not stem from the same agent, according to Bk. VIII of the *Metaphysics*:⁹³ If the efficient cause is one and the matter is one

⁸⁸"Species" in the sense explained in note 1.

⁸⁹Light and the "species" exist as a process and not as a fixed accident with any permanent existence.

⁹⁰Cf. supra, nn. 85-88 and n. 1.

⁹¹Cf. supra, n. 11.

⁹²Cf. supra, n. 71.

⁹³Averroes, *Metaphysica* VIII, com. 11 (ed. Iuntina VIII f. 103rb): "Quoniam, cum

the effect is one. Neither would the two stem from diverse agents, because if these were placed near the different parts of the mobile thing, for instance, if one fire were at the head and the other at the feet, the agents in different parts would be acting in different parts primarily. Where they are acting together, however, they will induce one form.

98 Proof: the two induce a more intense form than either one alone could induce, just as if they were placed in the same position with respect to the same part of the patient, they would induce one form. [That this occurs] through intensification is proved as before.⁹⁴ But every form that could be induced through motion or through the mutation that it must end up with, requires necessarily as a precondition for its induction, the destruction in the recipient of the form incompatible with it. For even though the 'terminus a quo' of mutation *per se* is privation, and not the opposite form which privation accompanies, (and hence between the two forms there are two mutations having altogether four terms).⁹⁵ For although the two movements also run together between contraries, the first movement—which is one of remission—goes from a perfect grade (in which the mobile was in the last stage of rest) to the privation of that contrary entirely, or to the privation of a some divisible degree of it that is successively eliminated. The second movement, however, which is one of intensification, goes from the privation of the contrary that has to be induced or that divisible grade that has to be induced [by the first movement] to the perfect degree that terminates the motion. Although, I say, there are two mutations and two motions, there are four terms for the two. And so the incompatible form to be eliminated is not the *per se* term of that motion or mutation; it is rather the form to be induced *per se* as the terminus ad quem. Nevertheless, that prior form is necessarily required and it is necessary that there be two transitions at the same time. For no natural agent moves or changes some recipient by a mutation that terminates a movement unless the recipient first had a form incompatible with [the new form it receives].

materia fuerit una, et motor fuerit unus, et de necessitate generatum erit unum."

⁹⁴Cf. supra, nn. 71, 65-66.

⁹⁵The first mutation occurs when the first form perishes, following by motion or a process at the end of which the final form appears (the second mutation).

Therefore, there cannot be several forms of the same species having existence simultaneously through motion nor through mutation that terminates motion *per se*.

99 What about a form which does not need another incompatible form in the recipient if it is to be induced? How do you prove it is only one? Not by means of this, that the agent does not find a patient under the terminus a quo with respect to the action. For with this form there is in the patient a privation of that which alone suffices for the terminus a quo with respect to the induction of this form. Look for another source. There are, then, three absolute forms from which the power could come: they are light, knowledge, "species." For from the relation there is no power beyond its being multiplied as a correlative, first, because it is not simply in [a subject]—speaking absolutely and strictly—but in it with respect "to another," and, secondly, because it does not terminate motion or mutation *per se*, except perhaps a change with respect to its whereabouts. And that sort of change presupposes an action with respect to an incompatible place. Nor does the same thing naturally have several whereabouts. But if supernaturally another whereabouts [or presence in a place] were induced, it suffices that the correlative [i.e. the place locating it] be multiplied, for instance that miraculously there comes to be another circumscribing place at the same time as the first.

The same must be said of these three absolute forms, namely, light, "species" and cognition, because in dist. 13 of the second book,⁹⁶ the luminosity [lumen] is assumed to be the "species" of light [lux].

100 [16] [Objection] On the contrary: luminosity is what is intensified.⁹⁷ This is evident to the sense. Therefore there are not two "species." [The species not in transit to the intersecting point] is not

⁹⁶Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 13, q. un., nn. 16-18 (XIX 106-107): "Igitur lumen est species sive intentio ipsius lucis"; *Ordinatio* II, d. 13, q. un. (ed. E. McCarthy p. 26; Vives XII 616b): "Hoc modo dico quod lumen est proprie intentio, sive species propria ipsius lucis sensibilis."

⁹⁷"Intended" here seems to mean what is intended or known, here visual knowledge. Intentio has the sense here of "meaning" See William and Martha Kneale, *The Development of Logic* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1968), p. 229 where "intentio" is explained as the translation of Avicenna's ma'na, which was his translation of "species."

intensified [until it fuses with the other at that point], as was proved before in this question,⁹⁸ because the more intense species does not lead to the knowledge of the weaker visible.

101 [Answer] I reply: the species of the thing present in the medium and the sense organ, is intensified, [i.e.,] both the luminosity, which is a "species" of light, as well as the color. As a consequence, the former is only one in one subject. And the reason is not because the agent presupposes an incompatible form in a subject before it can act [as Aquinas claims], but because everything of the same species introduced in the same subject is suited by nature to intensify a form of this sort in the subject. The "species" of the absent light⁹⁹ [lux] of the sort that is required in the imagination or sensitive memory is not luminosity [lumen]. Similarly, the sort of "species," say of whiteness itself, that is in the imagination is not essentially the same as the [species] outside [that is either in the medium or in the eye]. It is necessary that there be two such "species" of what is absent [or no longer seen as present] in the organ of the imagination or of the memory.¹⁰⁰ Neither is [the "species" of] one there more intense than the other,¹⁰¹ as was proved above.¹⁰² For, since the absent object is known by the imagination only to the extent it is made visible in such a "species," it is necessary that the "species" be in proportion to the object, namely as representing [the object] it should not be more intense than what such an object is apt by nature to produce. For a more intense "species" would represent proportionately a more intense object. Neither could one "species"

⁹⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 71 and 65-66.

⁹⁹In the imagination, the light source is not presently existing but is recalled. This light source [lux] is not luminosity [lumen] or the intensified "species" that is characteristic of the spot where the two light rays intersect.

¹⁰⁰Scotus seems to be referring to the memory of two distinct candles that were previously seen. Their "species" would be distinct, and only numerically different. One is no more intense than the other, because since the absent object is not recalled by the imagination except in the way it is revealed in such a "species" which is proportionate to the object. Namely, it is not represented in any brighter form than such an object would be suited to produce. A more intense species would represent a more intense object. Neither can one assume that whenever the imagination pictures two light sources or the memory recalls such, that these fuse, or that one has to exist in one part of the memory and the other in another.

¹⁰¹That is, there are not two "species" in the imagination or memory, one of a weaker intensity, the other of one stronger.

¹⁰²Cf. *supra*, nn. 71, 65-66.

be placed in one part of the organ and another in another part, as was proved above in this question.¹⁰³

102 But why is a “species” in the particular sense organ not distinguished in the way it is in the organ of the imagination or memory? Indeed the same reason would seem to hold for both. Proof: otherwise, they would not distinctly represent [their object].

103 Similarly, how can two “species” be generated in the interior [sense] from one in the organ of the external sense rather than one intense “species” there from one intense “species” [in the external sense]? For it seems even more unreasonable to assume one “species” in the exterior is a principle with respect to two remiss “species” within than that two objects present cause in the external organ [viz. in the eye] two “species.”

104 Also, against that [essentially ordered] cause,¹⁰⁴ no agent whose power is less perfect than the form of what is received, intensifies that; it is evident that if something that is not very hot is placed near something intensely hot, that which is less hot will not act to intensify the heat of the hotter object.

105 Against the argument of the two forms;¹⁰⁵ [viz.] therefore, two actions; therefore, two passions; therefore, two termini.—This has been treated above.¹⁰⁶

106 [17] To the first,¹⁰⁷ the “species” in the external organ is not the reason for representing the object as known [by the imagination or the memory], but the exterior sensation [viz., in the eye] is of the object immediately. Hence it is accidental that there be a “species”

¹⁰³Cf. *supra*, nn. 24-29.

¹⁰⁴This refers to the conclusion of n. 86 where Scotus says that if causes are essentially ordered, the inferior contributes to the combined effect, even though it is less perfect. As he will make clear later in answering what is said here in n. 109 where the causes are equivocal, i.e., qualitatively different, a lesser cause can intensify a stronger cause. The case has to do with sources of heat. Where several different types of heat sources act together to produce a single more intense heating. Somehow ever added heat source whether it be unable to cause such intense heat as is already present in a heated object, seems to be able to add something to what is already there, even though if it were the sole heater, it could not produce the amount of heat that is present when it adds its bit.

¹⁰⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 87-88.

¹⁰⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 97-98.

¹⁰⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 102.

there for the sake of sensation.¹⁰⁸ In the interior sense, however it is required, so that the interior [sense] is of the object 'precisely as shining in the species,' because the object is not present in itself.

107 To the second:¹⁰⁹ the species in the imagination or memory is only left there by means of sensation; therefore, two ["species"] follow from two [sensations]; indeed, I only retain objects [e.g., in the memory] after the sensations have been perceived, according to Bk. XI *On the Trinity*, ch. 8;¹¹⁰ Therefore of such [i.e., of a perceived sensation] there is only one at a time of the same species. Why not several of several objects presented at the same time? This is because of a defect¹¹¹ [namely], the intensification that frequently joins them in the same place.

108 And through this it is clear as to the power source of the third absolute form,¹¹² which is cognition. Neither does this follow: 'At the same time there will be a more intense species because of the many objects of the same species presented; therefore, there would be several visions'; nor does this follow: 'Therefore one vision would be more intense.' The first¹¹³ does not follow, because the intensity does not join things as several [but fuses them into one]; therefore there are not several visions at the same time, at least not distinct visions at the same time. If one [vision] follows another, I concede that there is a "species" proper to each in the memory. But that is no reason why one interior ["species"] is generated from one intense exterior; indeed nothing is generated except by the sensation present, and two sensations are not

¹⁰⁸That is, when the sensible "species" in the medium encounters the eye, its effect is sensation; the sensation therefore is distinct from the "species" that causes it. Though the "species" causes the sensation qua quality in the eye, it is not what is cognitively sensed as object, and hence if it is known by the internal sense as something on-going, this is accidental. Or 'accidental' may refer to the fact that is not what is sensed, but it is the object outside that is sensed, i.e. it is the object that is what is known. In the imagination or in the memory, however, there is no object present externally, nor is any functioning of the external sense required. In the imagination or memory, however, the species is required as what is known.

¹⁰⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 103.

¹¹⁰Augustine, *De Trinitate* XI, ch. 8, n. 13 (PL 42, 994; CCL 50, 350).

¹¹¹This is a defect in the sense that it prevents the two from being perceived distinctly as separate objects.

¹¹²Cf. *supra*, n. 99.

¹¹³Namely, that there are multiple visions simultaneously.

simultaneously present, and two images result from two successive [sensations].

109 To the third:¹¹⁴ in dist. 17, q. 4:¹¹⁵ an equivocal agent intensifies [the form] beyond the grade it could cause [by itself], but not a univocal agent. But so what? Already no absolute form of the same species is assumed to be multiplied in the same [subject] with the sole exception of a “species” in the interior sense, which remains behind in the absence of the object; and precisely for this purpose [finis], that two white things seen previously can be imagined.

110 And this is a possibility, because those [two white things] follow distinct perceived visions, which were not simultaneous, nevertheless, their sense “species” remain after they have passed on.—Why in all [three of] these absolute forms is none similar to the phantasm or to such an interior “species” as regards plurification in the same subject?

111 It can be said that such a “species” is similar to other forms so far as our proposal goes, because in Bk. XI *On the Trinity*, ch. 8:¹¹⁶ “I remember only one sun, yet if I please, I can think of two or three suns, formed from the same memory by which I remember the one sun.” So says Augustine. Therefore, one “species” in the phantasm or memory suffices to imagine all that are specifically the same. For if you wish to imagine a perfect effigy with quantity, color, figure, etc., one phantasm suffices for all those of the same species. To imagine all [these characteristics] simultaneously in a single effigy, it suffices to use many sense “species” in combination, as with the gold mountain, as Augustine teaches.¹¹⁷ “I can picture the sun as greater or less than I remembered it, [and can picture it as square, though I remember it as round.]”

¹¹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 104.

¹¹⁵Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 17 p. 2 q 1 n. 211 (V, 242): “Sed tunc est dubium, an ita sit in calore, quod remissior adveniens intendat intensiorem inventum in passo (videtur quod non...). Potest dici quod agens univocum non intendit intensiorem formam suam inventam in passo, sed magis e contra; agens autem aequivocum intendit, quia natum est agere in hoc et non pati ab hoc, et forma sua est nobilior quocumque gradu effectus aequivoci quem invenit, licet non possit statim esse in tantum gradum effectus aequivoci.” Note that this text is indicated as an “Extra” in the *Ordinatio* of Scotus; there is nothing about this in the *Lectura*.

¹¹⁶Augustine, *De Trinitate* XI ch. 8 n. 13 (PL 42, 994; CCL 50, 350).

¹¹⁷*Ibid.*

112 Most of all is this the case according to the second article that denies such imagination to be of just ‘this,’ and [admits] only [that the imagination is] of the nature here present. Such a nature is present through one species no matter how often it is joined with others in some effigy. Therefore what the argument presupposes about the end [purpose]¹¹⁸ is false, [viz.] that distinct white things are presented to the sense imagination as distinct, but it is only through one form that I have many acts of thinking or imagining about white in general, made up or derived from such diverse effigies. But is the phantasm never intensified? It is in this way, according to Augustine in VI *Music*,¹¹⁹ that it continually fades and is revived through the external senses.

113 But the other argument about the possibility,¹²⁰ because “they follow two sensations,” does not prove the conclusion. For this does not follow “therefore, there are two phantasms.” The same [phantasm] could be intensified, not only after two acts, but also if these acts were *per se* intensified. Still the duality of [the sensations] would not imply that what is induced through both does not make up one intense form.—Finis:¹²¹ The phantasm [or “species’] seems unlike the other absolutes [i.e. the luminosity or the cognition], although previously it was taken to be similar.

114 [19] And what about the second?¹²² This is sufficiently solved about two sensations,¹²³ nor was that proof above,¹²⁴ more than a quasi-solution.

But the first [argument]¹²⁵ seems to remain [unanswered]: how distinctly do I imagine a whiter or less white object I have seen? Not through the vision of many sense phantasms I have put together in some statue or effigy,¹²⁶ as I do when I imagine a gold

¹¹⁸Cf. supra, n. 109.

¹¹⁹Augustine, *De musica* VI c 11 n 32 (PL 32, 1180).

¹²⁰Cf. supra, n. 110.

¹²¹Cf. supra n. 109 and n. 112. It is for this end or purpose, viz. that two white things seen previously can be imagined.

¹²²Cf. supra, n. 103.

¹²³Cf. supra, nn. 107-108.

¹²⁴This seems to refer to the proof in n. 102, viz. “Otherwise, they would not distinctly represent [their object].”

¹²⁵Cf. supra, n. 102.

¹²⁶Cf. supra 111.

mountain. It is evident that an increase or diminution in intensity have not proper phantasms different from the phantasm of the form as such; nor do I imagine such [greater or lesser intensity] distinctly through that phantasm, since it naturally represents the object according to the degree proportionate to that object.

115 Up to now everything said referred to natural or physical action. One could raise a question about the absolute incompatibility of forms with respect to divine power.¹²⁷

116 If you concede the unity of luminosity, "species," and knowledge in one [individual], and not because they presuppose some incompatible form before they are induced in the patient, then the lengthy argument¹²⁸ for this is a particular one. Look for a more universal reason.¹²⁹ You have it there that whatever can induce something of that species in such a patient, can intensify such, because it is suited by nature to produce one effect. [It is doubtful] if at the same time in one thing, such as continuous quantity, the units continue to exist in liquids. But it is doubtful whether it is always the case that whatever comes to it could cause augmentation [intensification], or whether nothing coming to it could intensify beyond the perfection of its proper effect; or thirdly, whether some thing of this sort intensifies, but to what extent.¹³⁰

117 To what is said about the 'cause'.¹³¹ Whence will they be united if they stem from diverse potencies?—I reply: because one [potency] will be first actuated in the highest degree.

118 Against this: granted that this [potency] is actuated in the highest degree, why is not the other actuated?—I reply: There is an equal limitation of the potency to the act and vice versa, because although the potency may not depend upon an accidental act in an unqualified sense, or vice versa, nevertheless, in order for it to be such, it does depend upon it; all simultaneous dependence stems from one unique thing, if this suffices to terminate it. Therefore, the

¹²⁷Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I d. 17 p. 2 q 2 (V, 252-264)

¹²⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 97-99.

¹²⁹Cf. *supra* n. 99; "Not by means of this... look for another source."

¹³⁰The question of the intensification of accidental and substantial forms is treated extensively in Bk. VIII, qq. 2-3.

¹³¹Cf. *supra*, n. 104.

whole is reduced to this; one sufficiently actualizes in this species.
But how do you prove that?}}

QUESTION EIGHT

Text of Aristotle: "The words 'prior' and 'posterior' are applied to something on the assumption that there is a first, (i.e. a beginning, in each class) because they are nearer some specified beginning." (*Metaphysics V*, ch. 11, 1018b 9-11).

*Is this the common meaning of "prior":
prior is that which is closer to the beginning?*

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 That it is not:

"Time is the number of motion according to before and after."¹
But in time there is no beginning; therefore, etc.

2 Also, in things that can be produced through generation, if generation was without a beginning, one generating [parent] is prior to another, and nevertheless, none is first.

3 Also, if what was closer to the beginning was prior, then the beginning itself is not prior to what stems from it, because if it were, this is with respect to some [other] first principle, according to you; therefore, the principle [of beginning] has a beginning; and this is incongruous, because there would be an infinite sequence of principles.

4 Also, it does not seem necessary to assume a first because of "prior" except where there is a greater and a greatest; but this is false in the case of numbers.

5 Also, prior and posterior is more remote from this "now" and, nevertheless, he [Aristotle] speaks of 'our using this "now" as a source or beginning',² therefore, not every prior is closer to the beginning, but sometimes it is more remote.

6 To the contrary, there is what the Philosopher says here and in Bk. IV³ against those denying principles.

¹Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 11, 219b 1-2.

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 11, 1018b 15-20.

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 11, 1018b 9-11; IV, ch. 4, 1006a 1-18.

[I.—TO THE QUESTION]

7 It is said that this description is apt; but it pertains in different ways to those things that are prior according to an essential order and those that are prior according to an accidental order.⁴ For in essentially ordered things nothing causes without something that is first in an unqualified sense, but in accidentally ordered things this is incidental, because that something precedes this revolution of the heavens is accidental to it, since it could have existed even if the previous revolution had not occurred, to assume the impossible. Hence the entity of all such is not from some one thing that is first in an unqualified sense, as is the case in essentially ordered things where all depend upon some one first. Hence, prior in accidentally ordered things is asserted on the basis of a relationship to something that is first, not simply, but with reference to it, and this incidentally. In essentially ordered things prior is asserted with respect to something that is simply first and is the cause of this and of all posterior things.

[II.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

8 To the first,⁵ it is said or could be said, perhaps, that regarding time we assign arbitrarily what is "prior" and, also, what is taken as a beginning.

9 To the contrary: then time will not be in the category of quantity and then the first motion will be without time or its motion would depend upon the soul.

10 Therefore, another answer is given that in time there is a beginning apart from the soul, that is not simply first; also it would not be with the soul. But there is there a beginning with respect to some posterior and prior, because this day begins with the morning and the first hour is closer to the beginning of the day than the third morning hour.

11 Against this: if in time as such there is no beginning, but in some part of it with respect to another part, then time as such does not

⁴Cf. *supra*, Bk. II, qq. 4-6, nn. 80-101.

⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

have either a prior or posterior, but only with respect to some parts. This is incongruous, because the following definition pertains to the whole *per se* (and the parts only *per accidens*) because "Time is the number of motion according to before and after."⁶

12 Also, time is a continuum; hence, some "now" as such is prior there not actually, with respect to which some part may be said to be posterior, but only potentially insofar as it is a part of time. For if it were there actually, time of itself would be discontinuous; therefore, 'prior' and 'posterior' are there because we have arbitrarily assigned them to be such, but in reality they are only there potentially.

13 To the first:⁷ that if 'as such' [*secundum se*] be taken for the whole of time, it is true, and therefore, the whole of time is not prior and posterior, but from this it does not follow that in time there is no prior or posterior, because according to the parts there is a prior and posterior.

14 To the other:⁸ what is in potency is predicated equivocally of being in potency to a first act, which is essential potency, and of being in potency only with reference to a second act. The "now" of time, however, is only in accidental potency.—I say then that in a continuum nothing is indivisible in a second act of termination. I concede, therefore, that nothing is prior in that second act. Nevertheless, they are there in that first act and existing in this way in actuality, it is not discontinuous.

15 To the other:⁹ three 'generators' [counting from the present moment] have a fourth for a beginning with respect to them. And in reference to this [fourth] they are said to be prior and posterior among themselves.

16 To the other:¹⁰ this description applies to those things that are after the beginning, and not to the beginning properly speaking.—Or another answer: the beginning is not prior but

⁶Cf. *supra*, paragraph n. 1.

⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 12.

⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

¹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

first.—Or still another answer: this description is given to a thing where the minimal meaning of prior is to be found.

17 To the other about number:¹¹ if something is greater according to form, then it is necessary to assume a maximum; but it is not necessary to do so in those things that are more or less in quantity. For where there is greater or less according to perfection, the entity of all is from that which has the greatest perfection [i.e. God], whereas in numbers this is not the case, because the perfection of the larger number is from the lesser numbers inasmuch as the lesser numbers are repeated or replicated several times, or that which is the unit (the minimum) is frequently replicated to produce the perfection of the higher numbers.

18 To the other:¹² this “now” is not a beginning with respect to which prior or posterior is asserted of what is past except mediately, because there is some now that is prior with respect to which those things in the past are said to be prior and posterior.

¹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 4.

¹²Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

QUESTION NINE

Text of Aristotle: "'Quantum' means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 8-10)

Is the essential meaning or description of quantity divisibility or is it measure?

1 That it is not divisibility:

For if it were, then the parts after the division would differ. I ask in what way? It is either accidentally or formally. It is not accidentally, because then quantity would only be divisible accidentally. Proof: because the same thing is the principle of division and of the distinction of the divided parts, therefore, the parts would [differ] accidentally, etc. Not formally, because a formal distinction is specific;¹ therefore, the divided parts would differ in species,—which is false insofar as they are quantitative parts.

2 Also, the proper meaning of the genus is found essentially in all its species, because it is equally predicable of them; but divisibility is not. Proof: discrete quantity is actually divided; continuous quantity is in potency [to division]; therefore, [divisibility] is not [predicated] essentially [of the two species of quantity]. Proof: what is discrete is actually divided; six if it were actually divided, would have two actual triads as its parts. But two triads are parts of six that are actually existing. Therefore, six, if it is actually existing as six, is divided actually, since it has two actual triads in it. Proof of this is found in the authoritative statements of the Philosopher in the chapter "On part":² "Two is called in a sense a part of three." Hence, in three there is the form of duality.

¹Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa contra gentes* II, ch. 80-81 ad arg. 2 (XIII 505a): "Non enim quaelibet formarum diversitas facit diversitatem secundum speciem, sed solum illa quae est secundum principia formalia vel secundum diversam rationem formae."

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 25 1023b 14-15: "...for that which is taken from a quantum qua quantum is always called a part of it, e.g. two is called in a sense a part of three."

And in the chapter “On mutilated”:³ “... a number has unlike parts, as five has two and three.” If it were made up only of units, however, it would not have unlike parts.⁴

3 Also, Bk. VII of Euclid, proposition 5:⁵ “Every lesser number is a part, or parts, of a greater number”; therefore, etc.

4 Also, if divisibility essentially or *per se* pertained to every species of quantity—and “the subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality,” according to the first chapter of *On Sleep and Waking*,⁶—then, to be divided could pertain *per se* to every continuum, but ‘to be divided’ is repugnant [to a continuum], because what is divided is not a continuum insofar as it is divided. [If it were,] then, it would also be in the quantum of the divided naturally and not forcibly, and thus the pattern of cut would be naturally in the matter and the art⁷ generally dividing the continuum would have matter in natural potency to the form which it induces.

5 Also, for the negative, that definition is not universally applicable to all quanta, because there is a minimal⁸ part in natural things, according to *Physics* I;⁹ but every natural thing is a quantum and nevertheless it is not divisible into parts that have quantity.

6 Also, if this were the essential meaning of quantity, then everything in which it was found would be a *per se* species of quantity. But this is false of place, because it is not enumerated among the species of quantity, nor is time *per se* quantity, because it is only a quantum incidentally, and motion similarly, according to

³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 27, 1024a 17-18.

⁴ An interpolated note: “The first reason in this regard can be expressed otherwise as follows: unless six were actually divided there would not be actually two triads in six.”

⁵Euclid, *Elementa* VII prop. 5, ed. H. Busard, p. 201: “Si fuerint duo numeri quorum unus pars alterius itemque alii duo quorum unus alterius pars quota pars primi erunt duo minores in duobus maioribus pars eadem.”

⁶Aristotle, *De somno et vigilia*, ch. 1, 454a 8.

⁷The art of the sculptor chipping away at the matter.

⁸That is, an ultimate indivisible part.

⁹Aristotle, *Physica* I, ch. 4, 187b 16-21.

the Philosopher here.¹⁰ Likewise, the Commentator says of place that it is not quantity.¹¹

7 For the opposite there is the Philosopher's statement here.¹²

[I.—TO THE QUESTION

A.—FIRST OPINION: THE PROPER MEANING OF QUANTITY IS THAT GIVEN TO MEASURE]

8 [2] The question could be answered in this way:¹³ the proper meaning or description of it [quantity] is that of measure, because as quality is a disposition of substance, so quantity is the measure of substance.—Similarly, in the *Categories*:¹⁴ "Language is a quantity, measured by long and short syllables."

9 Also, that [the proper notion of quantity] is measure more than divisibility is proved,¹⁵ because those things are given as distinct species of quantity which are distinct measures, such as surface and place, and nevertheless, a place and a surface are not distinguished by reason of divisibility; therefore, this [i.e. description of measure] is the proper meaning of quantity.

10 To the contrary: the notion of genus is equally first in all its species, because it is equally predicated of all; but the notion of measure is not, since it is not [predicated] equally of what is continuous and discrete, as is evident of from Bk. X, ch. 2,¹⁶ for it is

¹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 26-33.

¹¹Averroes, *Metaphysica* V, com. 18, AverL 161: "Et forte dimisit locum hic, quia apud ipsum est de passionibus quantitatis, et ideo non posuit ipsum in eis quae sunt quantum per suam substantiam."

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 7-8: "'Quantum' means that which is divisible into two or more constituent parts of which each is by nature a 'one' and a 'this'."

¹³Cf. Albert the Great, *Praedic.* tr. 3, ch. 1, ed. Borgnet I, 194b: "... si per definitionem notificarem eam [i.e. quantitatem], non possumus dicere nisi quia est mensura substantiae."

¹⁴Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 6, 4b 32-35.

¹⁵Cf. Thomas, *Metaphysics* V, lect. 8, ed. Parma XX 399a: "Quod igitur est in genere quantitatis unum et primum, oportet quod sit indivisibile et secundum quantitatem. Si autem sit omnino indivisibile et secundum quantitatem et non habeat positionem, dicitur unitas."

¹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 20-1053a 31.

more in discrete things, and is in *continua* only insofar as they participate in discrete quantity.

11 Also, if measure were, unity above all would be species of quantity, because the notion of measure is most true of “one,” according to Bk. X.¹⁷

12 Also, measure is not the notion affirmed of quantity in the first mode of *per se* predication, for measure is only said denominatively from the third type of relation; therefore, it is only there as in a genus, and then it is a proper attribute of quantity, and thus is not the essential or proper meaning of quantity, because from Bk. X,¹⁸ “in every genus there is one first which is the measure of everything else in that class.” This pertains to every category and even more so to other things, such as whiteness in the genus of color, or sweetness in the genus of taste. Therefore it is not proper to quantity.

13 [3] It is replied to this:¹⁹ that a certain kind of measure is measuring by repetition, which by taking something so many times one gets the whole, and such is proper to quantity.—Another kind of measure is that of perfection or according to perfection, and that is not this [i.e. a property of quantity], because whiteness will never get us back to blackness.—Likewise, neither is the measure of cognition, because that which leads to the cognition of others in that genus [of quantity], does not lead to those.²⁰

14 To the contrary: the reply concedes what we propose, because measure is not essential to quantity, nor is it a proper attribute except in regard to replication, which does not pertain equally to *continua* and discrete things, because in discrete there is simply a

¹⁷ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 20-24.

¹⁸ Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 18-19; cf. *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 135: “In unoquoque genere est dare aliquod primum et minimum quod fit metrum et mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere.”

¹⁹ Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 2 (AMPh 2 s. 2, XIII 39): “Est quaedam mensura quae a mensurato exceditur semper, et ideo non mensuratur nisi replicatione.”

²⁰ Cf. Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* ed. Venice 1517, fol. 26vb: “Dices: duplex est mensura, Quaedam mensura mensurans per replicationem, quae aliquotiens ducta reddit suum totum. Quaedam est mensura secundum perfectionem et cognitionem, quomodo albedo mensurat colores, et illud quod ducit in cognitionem alterius dicitur mensurare illud. Prima mensura est proprie quantitatis, secundo vero non, sed competit aliis generibus.”

minimum [or unit]²¹ that leads to the whole through replication; in continuous things there is not, according to Bk. X, of this work, ch. 2.²² For the only minimum there [in continua] is the point, and that does not render [the continuum] through replication. Therefore such a measure does not pertain properly to quantity, since it does not pertain to all of its species. Thus these arguments are conceded.

15 In refutation of these one could argue: against the first reason²³ that it seems that the continuum has the proper means of measuring apart from applying number, because motion and time are said to be long, *Physics* IV ch. 'On time'.²⁴ Measurement of length, however, is not a measurement of what is discrete.

16 To this it must be said that no continuum is measured except by applying to it a discrete measure, because we don't know the length of time or of a road, except because of so many [hours] there, [or] feet in space over which one has moved. Consequently, measurement is according to the replication of parts taken so many times—and thus as number is applied to these—and these [parts] make up the whole.

[B.—THE OPINION OF SCOTUS]

17 [4] It must be said then to the question²⁵ that the proper meaning or description [of quantity] is divisibility into parts of the same sort.

18 One opinion is that corporeal substance has proper parts of the same sort extended in potency as such [i.e. as substance] and in actuality through quantity.

19 Another opinion²⁶ is that [corporeal substance] does not have parts of the same sort, but only essential parts.²⁷

²¹Namely, the number 1.

²²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1053a 15-30.

²³Cf. *supra*, n. 10; also against n. 14.

²⁴Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 12, 220b 15-30.

²⁵Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d. 2 p. 2 q. 5 n. 316-353 (VII 290-311).

²⁶Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* IV, dist. 16, q. 1, a. 1, qc. 3 resp., ed. Parma VII, 753a: "Quaedam vero sunt partes essentiae, sicut materia et forma, non quantitatis; et hae semper sunt diversarum rationum et habent ordinem naturae ad invicem."

²⁷That is, of matter and form.

20 If the second is true, then divisibility into parts of the same sort pertains properly to quantity.

21 If the first is true, then one would have to add that divisibility in actually extended parts is the proper sense of quantity.

22 However, the first opinion does not seem to be true, because according to it, the essential notion of quantity would not pertain to number, nor to discrete things. Therefore, nothing “should be added”²⁸ except that divisibility into parts of the same sort is the meaning of quantity.

23 There is authority for such here in Bk. V,²⁹ where it is given as the proper meaning of quantity.—In like manner the species of quantity are described through divisibility here in Bk. V;³⁰ and according to the diverse modes of divisibility he [Aristotle] assigns the diverse species of quantity. But that is the essential notion according to the distinction whereby the species of the genus are distinguished.

24 Similarly in the *Categories* in the chapter ‘On quantity’:³¹ Quantity is continuous whose parts are joined together, discrete whose parts are not joined; therefore the sense of both is to have parts; but everything that has parts is divisible.

25 Similarly, *Physics* III,³² against those who assume an infinite, and that it is a substance, Aristotle says that if it is [a substance] it is not divisible as a magnitude or aggregate; for the divisible is either a magnitude or an aggregate; substance is only divisible through one or the other of these ways.

26 To the contrary: the authoritative statements prove that divisibility is the property of quantity, but not that it is its essence, because divisibility is a relation; and a relation is not of the essence of something absolute.

27 Also, potency and act are of the same genus and they divide every being and are of its essence; but to be divided is not of the

²⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

²⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

³⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 10-11.

³¹Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 6, 4b 20-5a 14.

³²Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 5, 204a 8-29; see above Bk. V, qq. 5-6, n. 86.

essence of quantity, for if it were, every quantity would be actually divided; therefore, neither would a potentiality to be divided be of its essence.

28 {{This description seems to militate against you, for there are as many acts as there are potencies, according to *Physics* III:³³ "To be capable of health [and to be capable of illness are not the same,]" etc. Therefore, if in a quantum there are potencies to an infinity of divisions, it seems that in it are infinite divisibilities, but there is only one first attribute of any one thing.}}

29 Likewise, 'to be divided' is not compatible with a continuum; therefore, it is not of its essence, because the continuum qua continuum is not divided. For, if it were, it would not be continuous. It does not follow further: "therefore, neither is it divided in potency," because it is also of the essence of potency that 'it is not divided' be characteristic of its term.

30 I concede then that divisibility is the first proper attribute of quantity and is not of its essence; hence as this is *per se* in the second mode: "Color is visible," so too is this "Quantity is divisible." Hence, as visibility is a certain relationship in color with respect to vision, so divisibility has its basis in quantity, and implies a relationship to division. And it is through quantity, that there is divisibility in parts of the same sort in anything. Then this statement, "Quantity is divisible," is *per se* in the second mode, just as is this "Color is visible," *De anima* II.³⁴

31 Hence, all authoritative statements prove that quantity is divisible *per se*. And it is conceded that it is not in the first, but in the second mode of *per se*. Hence, quantity is described here through its proximate proper attribute and is not defined [in terms of its genus and specific difference]; and similarly, divisibility is a proper attribute of every species of quantity, although not primarily, but it pertains primarily to the genus and to the species *per se* but not primarily.

³³Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 1, 201a 35-b 2; see above Bk. I, q. 6, n. 18.

³⁴Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 7, 418a 30-31.

32 {{Finite and infinite follow divisibility,³⁵ because finite presupposes something that should be bounded. That is necessarily presupposed by divisible; equal and unequal follow finite and infinite, and then next the notion of measure. This seems to be the order of these four proper attributes of quantity; the first two are of quantity in itself. The other two stem from its relationship to another; of those, equal and unequal precede measure, for it is because they are equal or unequal, therefore, they are measures, not vice versa. The first is referred to here³⁶ and in the Bk. III of the *Physics*,³⁷ the second in Bk. I of the *Physics*,³⁸ the third in *Categories*,³⁹ and the fourth in Bk. X of this work, chapters 1 and 2.⁴⁰ There is a question whether they are all properly and equally in every quantity where they are as species.}}

[II.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS
A.—TO THE FIRST ARGUMENT]

33 [6] To the first argument,⁴¹ it is said that this and that quantity differ accidentally because it is through their subjects.

34 Against this, of those subjects that receive those parts, I ask: How do their subjects differ? If they do so *per se*, but not specifically; therefore, it is by some essential difference, and nevertheless not specifically, which is against what some hold.⁴² If they differ through the parts of quantity in them; then, we have a circular argument, and if the difference does not stem from the subject, and nevertheless, it is through an accident, then they differ through something other, and let that other be A or B, and it will follow

³⁵Number is finitely divisible, the continuum is infinitely divisible; the four attributes of quantity are expressly enumerated by Antonius Andreae, *Quaest. in Metaph.* V, q. 10, f. 27ra: "... a Philosopho assignantur quattuor passionis. Prima est divisibilitas in partes eiusdem rationis. Secunda est esse finitum vel infinitum... Tertia est aequale et inaequale... Quarta est ratio mensurae."

³⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 7-8.

³⁷Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 5, 204a 8-14.

³⁸Aristotle, *Physica* I, ch. 2, 185a 32-b 5.

³⁹Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 6a 26-35.

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 25-1053b 8.

⁴¹Cf. *supra* n. 1.

⁴²Cf. *supra* n. 1.

that one of the two aforesaid [is that by which they differ] or you will go on to infinity.

35 Also, the argument stands that if the parts divided differ accidentally, the whole was divisible only per accidens, because the manner in which the divided parts differ is the way the whole is divisible into its parts, and not vice versa.

36 {{To the contrary: quantity is divisible through an absolute other than itself,⁴³ according to you; therefore, the parts of quantity differ through absolutes other than themselves, if the rule through which you argue is good.}}

37 Then I say, that the parts of quantity differ from one another formally,⁴⁴ so that the parts of quantity are the proximate basic differences, and nevertheless they do not differ specifically. Those⁴⁵ also for whom it is a principle that all formal difference is specific, are forced in truth to except quantity from this rule.

[B.—TO THE SECOND ARGUMENT]

38 To the second:⁴⁶ [I say] that the minor is false, [i.e. divisibility is not predicated equally of all the species].—As for the proof: the major is false, namely ‘what is discrete is actually divided,’ but both are divided in potency.—To the proof: there are not two triads there actually, but potentially, because the different numbers are different most special species, constituted by opposite differences under their genus; of such it is impossible that one be a part of the other, just as it is impossible in other species with respect to other subdivisions of the same genus.

39 On the contrary: then the divisor which only seems to be causing something to perish, will generate [in the technical sense of that term], because it will make the divisible parts to be actual after being in potency.⁴⁷

⁴³Is this perhaps a reference to matter?

⁴⁴Each part after division would have its own haecceity, a formal difference that is not specific, and qua divisible potentially, they would have such haecceity even before division.

⁴⁵Cf. supra, n. 1.

⁴⁶Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁴⁷The divisor by dividing seems only to be causing the unity to perish, but is not

40 Reply: the divisor does away with what prevents [the specific parts from becoming actual]. Hence, there is no part of the quantum in the whole in such potency in the manner that something is [in potency] before generation, namely, essentially, but it is there only accidentally. The reason is the part is not distinct, nor is it under its proper actuality, because of the unity of the whole. Solve what prevents this [part as it exists in the whole from being there actually]! A part becomes actual through the division; this is 'generation' only in a qualified sense; therefore the one dividing does not generate, but only does away with what is prohibiting [the part as it exists in the whole from being actual as it exists there].⁴⁸

41 To the authoritative statements:⁴⁹ that in every number no [smaller] number can be a material part of another, the units in a smaller number, however, are material parts in a larger number; then the two units [in the number two] are material parts of the triad, because the unit [or 'one'] is not a species of quantity, but only in the category [of quantity], as a potential principle perhaps, in the way matter is the category of substance. Then the Philosopher's dictum is glossed in this way: that two, i.e. two units are parts of a triad only 'in some way,' because they are quantitative parts, not aliquot parts. Likewise, the Philosopher does not say that the dyad is a part of a triad, but only that "two [is in some

generating new species. But if each number when actualized is a most special species, when one divides the number six actually into two triads, he is not only corrupting the one species but generating two new species.

⁴⁸If this be a later addition or "Extra" added by Scotus himself, as Maurice O'Fihely believed, then what Scotus seems to have done is added a strengthening argument, namely, that each number is an ultimate species and hence does not contain smaller numbers actually, or it would not be a most special species in its own right. The objection is immediately raised that in this case on dividing the number, since it is potentially divisible, into smaller numbers would be not simply be destroying the original unity (corrupting its form) but generating new species, namely the actual numbers into which it is divided. His reply attempts to solve this by claiming that one who divides removes what prohibits the potential parts which are there in a different way in which a substantially different form can be introduced into matter under a previous form (which is generation in a strict or unqualified sense). Removing what holds the group of units together only generates in a qualified sense parts that are actually distinct and specifically unique.

⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

sense, a part] of three." "Two" denominates two 'units';⁵⁰ it is therefore true [denominatively] as is this dictum: "Two white things are running."

42 [7] To the other authority:⁵¹ that just as to have dissimilar parts in a substance, one must have parts that are different according to substance, so to have dissimilar parts it suffices to have the greater or lesser parts, and thus to have two units and three units.

Such an interpretation suffices to explain [Aristotle's] intention, because everything he proves to be true about number, with this gloss, holds just as if one number formally would be part of another.⁵²

[C.—TO THE THIRD PRINCIPLE ARGUMENT]

43 To the third of Euclid:⁵³ 'every lesser number,' i.e. all the units in a lesser number, 'are parts in a larger.'⁵⁴

[1.—THREE ARGUMENTS AGAINST THIS RESPONSE]

44 Against this: if number is not actually divided, it is actually one; therefore, it is such by some unity, which is a principle of number. [But the 'units' of number] seem to be opposed [to any such

⁵⁰The point Scotus is making is that "two" is an equivocal term, it can mean the number two, a binary, that is a distinct species of number with its own formal unity, and as such is not actually divided, or it can refer to the potential parts which are the "matter" out of which it is composed, and in this sense one can say the number "two" has "two units." Aristotle, on this interpretation, is not saying that a binary is a formal part of a triad, but that it contains materially the two units of the binary as part of its three units. With this gloss then everything he says about one number containing the other as a part, would be just as true as if the higher number formally contained the smaller number.

⁵¹Cf. supra, n. 2.

⁵²From what he says here, these glosses are intended to safeguard Scotus's contention that the parts into which quantity is divided are formally different without being specifically different. This, in his *Metaphysics* is guaranteed by the way he interprets the individuating difference, not only in substance, but in matter and here in regard to quantity.

⁵³Cf. supra, n. 3.

⁵⁴The reason is the same as in the second paragraph in n. 42, and it could be repeated.

unity].⁵⁵ Similarly it follows that number five is six.⁵⁶ Proof of both implications: what is one is one by some unity, but not by a unity that is not in the category of quantity, as was determined above according to Avicenna.⁵⁷ Then number is one by a unity that is the principle of number, which is the first incongruity, because it is a case of “oppositum de opposito.”⁵⁸ And it will be one by a unity other than that which it has from its parts, and so it will be greater than itself through that one unity.⁵⁹

45 Also, every accident that is one is in some subject that is one;⁶⁰ number is not; therefore, etc.

⁵⁵The Latin reads: “si numerus non sit actu divisus, est actu unus; ergo aliqua unitate quae est principium numeri, quae videntur opposita.” It is not clear to me what “quae” (in the plural) refers to, since there is nothing in what precedes that is not individual. The principle of number is the unit ‘one’ and since one is not a number, but the measure of number, every number (beginning with two) has a plurality of such ‘units’ as the matter out of which it is formed. These ‘units’ are opposed to one another and seem to be the basis for actual division rather than actual unity of any given number. Scotus’ answer gives no clue to how “quae” should be interpreted, since it identifies the unity by which a number is actually undivided to be that by which it is a ‘this.’ And in n. 32 he admits it has not been given a name. Does this mean this section of the *Metaphysics* antedates what he says of the principle of individuation?

⁵⁶That is, by the additional unit that unifies the five units in number five.

⁵⁷Cf. *supra*, Bk. IV, q. 2, nn. 110-133.

⁵⁸Cf. Aristotle, *Topics* IV, ch. 3, 124a 7-8; *Auctoritates Aristotelis* ed. J. Hamesse, p. 326: “Sicut propositum in proposito, sic oppositum in opposito;” this may be an allusion to Avicenna’s remark that “A multitude is said to be one, but not insofar as it is a multitude.” Here, the objector is claiming something similar. “The number, e.g. five, is made one number by a unity that makes it number six,” for six is number five, plus one additional unit or unity.

⁵⁹The addition of one more unit creates the next number, which is greater than its predecessor and becomes a distinct number by the addition of a unity other than the units of the lesser number.

⁶⁰From the example Scotus gives in n. 59 of ‘ten horses,’ it is clear how one or ten subjects is to be understood. Hence my first explanation was wrong, for at first I thought this seemed to be the classical theory of individuation of accidents by being in an individuated substance. Scotus in his formal treatment of the principle of individuation argues that an absolute accident like quantity needs its own distinct principle of unity. Here, according to the classical formula he quotes from Aristotle “Forms are like numbers,” each has its distinctive difference, expressed as an additional or “*ultima unitas*.”

46 Also here in the text,⁶¹ number is essentially an aggregate, but an aggregate qua aggregate is not one, Avicenna, *Metaphysics* VII;⁶² therefore, neither is number [qua number].

[2.—REPLY TO THE THREE ARGUMENTS
a.—TO THE FIRST OF THE THREE]

47 To the first:⁶³ that number is one by some unity, but it is 'this' by the final unity.⁶⁴ But all others are material parts, the ultimate is the completing and formal [constituent] of all.

48 To the contrary: This is against what the Philosopher says in Bk. V, chapter 'On the whole',⁶⁵ about "those to which the position does not make a difference " in the substance⁶⁶ of a thing, nor in figure. There it is called 'all' [i.e., a total], not a 'whole,' as

⁶¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 6, 1056b 23-24: "For each number is said to be many because it consists of ones and because each number is measurable by one." For Aristotle and the scholastics, one is not a number, but two is the first number and it is a multiple.

⁶²Avicenna, *Metaphysica* VII, ch. 1, AviL. 349: "dicitur enim quod multitudo est una, sed non in quantum multitudo."

⁶³Cf. supra, n. 44.

⁶⁴Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* VIII, lect. 3, ed. Parma XX, 521a: "Numerus est id quod est unum. Est enim *per se* unum numerus, in quantum ultima unitas dat numero speciem et unitatem."

⁶⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 26, 1024a 1-3: "Amplius quantitate habente principium et medium et ultimum, quorum quidem non facit positio differentiam, omne dicitur quorum vero facit totum." The third definition of a 'whole.' The Oxford translation reads: "Again of quanta that have a beginning and a middle and an end, those to which the position does not make a difference are called totals and those to which it does, whole."

⁶⁶"Substance" in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 8, 1017b 10-23, has four meanings: "(1) simple bodies, i.e. earth and fire and water and everything of the sort, and in general bodies and the things composed of them, both animals and divine beings, and the parts of these. All these are called substance because they are not predicated of a subject but everything else is predicated of them.—(2) That which, being present in such things as are not predicated of a subject, is the cause of their being, as the soul is of the being of an animal.—(3) The parts which are present in such things, limiting them and marking them as individuals, and by whose destruction the whole is destroyed, as the body is by the destruction of the plane, as some say, and the plane by the destruction of the line; and in general number is thought by some [Pythagoreans and Plato] to be of this nature; for if it is destroyed, they say, nothing exists, and it limits all things.—(4) The essence, the formula of which is a definition, is also called the substance of each thing.

in liquids and numbers.⁶⁷ Therefore, if the first unity were to become the last and the last, the first, there would be no difference in the substance of number. This would be so, if the last unity were the completing and specific form of number, from which it has unity. For then those things that are transposed would become another form and thus another number,—which is not only against Aristotle, but impossible for another reason, [viz.] that one absolute would become another absolute solely by a change of relations, namely of an order. It is not this way with the parts of a human being, where there is no change of order without a change of something absolute in the parts; it is not that way here.

49 Also, all unities constituting numbers could be equally first by nature and temporally (e.g. if many individuals of the same species were caused at the same time). How then is any one of these the last, because if the last is taken from enumeration, I could begin counting conversely with the last and that would be the first?

50 Also, it is impossible that five as such should be a part of six. Hence, nothing that is formally proper to five exists in six. Or if you grant that it does, then five would be actual in six, and nevertheless, in six there is a fifth unity of five; therefore that cannot be the form of five. Or grant that it is, since the fifth unity is in six, it follows that the fifth is in actuality in six.

51 Also, the form is in matter (otherwise, one *per se* being would not result from matter and form, if they were merely juxtaposed); the ultimate unity is not in other things;⁶⁸ therefore, etc.

52 I concede these arguments.⁶⁹

Then to the third argument:⁷⁰ a number is one by its specific form, from which stems its discrete character, (existing as something consisting of five units in one matter, just as man is one by his

⁶⁷Ibid., ch. 26 1024a 6-8: "Aqua vero et quaecumque sunt humida et numerus 'omne' quidem dicuntur, totum vero numerus et tota aqua non dicitur nisi metaphora." [Oxford translation: "Water and all liquids and number are called totals, but 'the whole number' or 'the whole water' one does not speak of, except by an extension of meaning."]

⁶⁸For it is unique to that in which it is; it cannot be replicated as a final individuating difference.

⁶⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 48-51.

⁷⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 50: that it is impossible for five, qua five, to be a part of six.

form). And what is this form? I say that the form according to which indivisibility⁷¹ is in it has no special name.⁷²

53 [Aporiae] {{Is the unity whose subject is six like that unity which is characteristic of one part of six? Either this is a perfect unity or unity receives more or less.—Also it was proved through a unity that is both specific and numerical. In man there is a unity proper to himself as well as a unity of each of his accidents, because everything that is one has a unity proper to itself.

54 Do these many unities make up a number? Does the unity of an accident denominate a subject? Then it would be one by many unities? Then also whiteness—which is denominated *per se* by a unity proper to itself—could be predicated in the abstract of a subject.

55 Against the first:⁷³ Bk. I of this [*Metaphysics*] where the opinion of Plato is refuted, where, to the second part in the second reason given, it is argued:⁷⁴ “How does one number come from many numbers, and one species from many?”—and it is in the other translation, comment 35. The reply is added there: “If not from themselves,” namely, the numbers, “but from the units, how do these have unities [of their own]?” This part of the statement is true. And the question “how come” is difficult for Plato, perhaps, but not for us who assume some difference⁷⁵ and not just a proper attribute [which makes it one].

⁷¹Since ‘one’ is defined as “unum est indivisum in se et divisum ab omni alio,” an individuating principle has a twofold aspect, not only does it differentiate (unum est divisum ab omni alio), but the individuating difference is unique and cannot be duplicated (unum est indivisum in se).

⁷²It would seem at the time Scotus wrote this, he had not worked out the principle of individuation he will propose in Bk. VII, q. 13. The sections which follow [n. 53-56] seem to be a later addition.

⁷³Cf. *supra*, n. 53.

⁷⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* I, ch. 9, 991b 22-24: “Again from many numbers one number is produced, but how can one Form come from many Forms? And if the number comes [not] from the many numbers themselves [but] from the units in them, e.g. in 10,000, how is it with the units?”

⁷⁵That is specific, and predicated *per se primo modo*, and not a proper attribute which is only predicated *per se secundo modo*.

56 Against the second:⁷⁶ these unities and those unities⁷⁷ in it, if they were to have the form of an actual duality [or dyad], it would be impossible for a triad to come from them, because of its parts being actual [rather than potential]. Hence this reply is not valid, but that which was given earlier,⁷⁸ namely that 'two' refers to "units" which would have the form of a dyad, if they existed outside of the whole [i.e., the present number]]}

57 [8] Against this: the argument [in n. 50] still holds good. Every "one" is one in virtue of some unity, but nothing is one unless it falls under the category of quantity,⁷⁹ but such unity is the principle [or beginning] of number. That unity [i.e. of six] is not some unity of "five"; therefore, it has to be another. If, however, it is this, then this, together with the five others, will make six, and so it will follow that the "fives" are "six."

58 I say that it is one by the unity that falls under the category of quantity, and it is not some unity whereby from five there will then be six. I say that as the unity of man is an attribute of man that follows from his essence, so the unity of "five" follows from [the nature] of five as its proper attribute. And it is one formally through that unity, (because in all units, such as matter, there is one form, from which unity follows), which [unity] is a proper

⁷⁶Cf. supra, n. 54.

⁷⁷That is those unities connected with the formal aspect of the number as such, and those connected with the individual units that make up the number as its matter.

⁷⁸Cf. supra n. 38-41.

⁷⁹An interpolated text follows in five manuscripts, which reads in English: "A number is nothing in reality, because it has no greater unity than that of things being counted or numbered, which is only a unity of aggregation. Also, if it were [one in reality], it could be separated like continuous quantity may be separated [in the Eucharist]. Also, [there would be] an infinity of things, etc. Also, from substances one does not get non-substance, nor from units which are substances, nor for the same reason, does quantity come from those things which are qualities, nor also from continuous unities [comes discrete], because the forms of one species are not material principles of another. To the contrary: number is a *per se* sensible, II *De anima* [ch. 3, 425a 16-19]. Also it is the subject of a real science such as arithmetic. Also, it is the foundation for a real relation in the first mode of "relative." Also, Augustine that "six is more perfect" [*De Genes. ad lit.* IV, ch. 7, n. 14 (CSEL 28¹ 103; PL 34, 301)]: "Quamobrem non possumus dicere propterea senarium numerum esse perfectum, quia sex diebus perficit Deus omnia opera sua, sed propterea Deum sex diebus perfecisse opera sua quia senarius numerus perfectus est." etc.

attribute of five. This is not posited as being numbered along with the five material units, because it is not a material part, but is rather a proper attribute of the whole composite. Hence a number is 'one' by a denominative predication. And then that unity which is a proper attribute of five, following [a quintet] as existing in act through its specific form, is not some material unity, but that of an unnamed form. At times it is founded on the nature of things, at times on suppositis or individual subjects.⁸⁰ Whence five and six are two numbers numerically, [as Peter and Paul]⁸¹ are two men. For this to turn five into a six, the number would have to have six units as material parts. For that formal aspect in five is not placed in its number.

[b.—TO THE OTHER TWO ARGUMENTS]

59 To the other,⁸² [we admit] it is true. Hence, ten horses are the subject of ten, but it is not necessary that a divisible accident be in an indivisible subject.

60 To Avicenna⁸³ I say that that a multitude as such is not one in the first mode of *per se* predication; not, however, denying that it is one by denominative predication. Indeed, as man is one by a unity of the category of quantity by denominative predication, so also is a multitude and number as well.

[3.—AGAINST SCOTUS'S OPINION]

61 To the contrary: it seems that unity as the principle of number is the form of this number, because you give no other one, and three incongruities would seem to follow.

⁸⁰This is explained by Scotus in his lengthy discussion of the principle of individuation, both here in Bk. VII, q. 13, and in the *Lectura* and *Ordinatio* (Bk. II, dist. 3).

⁸¹Added in five manuscripts.

⁸²That is, that the number as an accident is not in one subject; cf. *supra*, n. 45.

⁸³Cf. *supra*, n. 46.

[a.—THREE INCONGRUITIES]

62 The first is that six and five are two numbers only numerically, because each is one numerically.

63 Second, that they are only two singular numbers, and not two specifically, because Bk. III of this work, question 13:⁸⁴ “There is no difference in us saying ‘numerically one’ and ‘individual.’”

64 Third, if five and six are two numerically, then their binary number, call it C, will be a third number distinct from them, and that will make a fourth from the three preceding ones, and so ad infinitum. Not only is this the case with several numbers. Assume only two numbers to be actual, and you will concede an infinite number exist now, because as A and B are two numbers numerically, so their duality, C, is other than either A or B; therefore, it is a third number. Now D is the number of these three numbers, A, B, and C, and thus it follows to infinity that all enumerated now exist in actuality, and therefore all numbers do.

65 [9] This is confirmed, because of all quanta actually existing and really diverse there is some number in actuality. C and A are such; therefore, etc. This argument proves that now there is in actuality infinite numbers of diverse species, as is clear. Similarly, [it proves] they are of the same species, because A and C are two by one duality, B and C by another duality. Also, A and C, likewise, A and D, as well as D and C, and so ad infinitum.

[b.—REPLY TO THESE THREE INCONGRUITIES]

66 As to these three incongruities, [the answer] to the first two⁸⁵ is clear [from what is said] in the first question of the fourth book.⁸⁶

⁸⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* III, c. 4, 999b 34-1000a 1: “Nam numero unum aut singulare dicere nihil differt; sic enim dicimus singulare: numero unum, universale vero quod in his est.” [Oxford translation: “For there is no difference of meaning between ‘numerically one’ and ‘individual’; for this is just what we mean by individual—the numerically one, and by the universal we mean that which is predicable of the individuals.”]; cf. supra, Bk. V, q. 4, n. 10.

⁸⁵Cf. supra, nn. 62-63.

⁸⁶The correct citation is to question 2 of Bk. IV, nn. 23-27, 61-63, 83-109.

67 To the third,⁸⁷ just as if all bodies in the universe were *continua* with respect to each other, there would be only one body in actuality, since each discrete one is discrete from every other one. So too there is but one discreteness in actuality. Neither can there be several numbers [of what exists] in actuality, but there is only that number [in actuality] which contains all units, and in that number is each lesser number potentially.

68 To the contrary: the ten of ten men is other than that of ten dogs, *Physics* IV.⁸⁸

69 I reply: if the parts of this continuous body differed specifically, then there would be a maximal extent of water and a maximal amount of air, and so on with the other parts (no body would be actually the biggest unless it contained all these other parts). In like manner, the maximal number of dogs and the maximal number of men is given [in the actual number of things existing]. But no [maximal number] is actual in an unqualified sense except that containing all units.

70 To the contrary: we speak now of two houses, or of three. Therefore, two is there in actuality.

71 I reply: just as the continuum is said to be 'tricubed' (not because it is divided into three cubes, nor is some cubital quantity there in actuality, but only potentially, for, at present, it is only the case that it could be divided in so many parts), so it is in this way that stones are said to be two, because in that [pair] of stones there are that many parts of the actual sum of all the entities as there would be, if that pair existed *per se* apart from the whole; and that number would be a duality.

[c.—FURTHER OBJECTIONS]

72 [10] Against this whole way of answering the third]:⁸⁹ it seems to assume all number is indivisible in an unqualified sense, and

⁸⁷Cf. supra, n. 64.

⁸⁸Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 14, 224a 3-6: "Dicitur autem recte et quod numerus quidem est idem canum et ovium, si uterque aequalis sit, decem autem non idem neque decem eadem sunt, sicut neque trianguli idem quod est aequilaterum et gradatus."

⁸⁹Cf. supra, nn. 67-71; also supra, nn. 37-52.

thus—so it seems—not a quantum. The first implication is evident: for if some [number] is divisible, it is possible that it be two, and thus the argument stands.

73 Also, it seems to assume that God could not make two numbers exist in actuality. Why this, since each species can be actually made, and that one can exist with the other includes no contradiction?

74 Third, take the greatest number there is to be in act. This is one number, and not by a unity that is a part of it, therefore, by some other unity. Hence in co-numbering this unity with the material unities, one has a greater number, and in actuality; and thus two numbers⁹⁰ in actuality.

75 Fourth, in the whole a part of the quantum is not there in potentiality as something that can be generated. Indeed, it has its whole entity, although not as separated. Hence, it has just as many units as it would have, if it were actually divided, but not have them as separated.

[d.—REPLY TO THE OBJECTIONS]

76 To the first:⁹¹ that ‘indivisible’ [means] ‘impossible to be divided’ may be conceded.⁹² But it does not follow further that [a number] is not a quantum, because a quantum is apt by nature to be divided qua quantum, but not qua ‘possible [to be two].’ Otherwise the heavens⁹³ would not be a quantum.

77 The second⁹⁴ may be conceded, because it is a contradiction that there be two discretenesses, as if there were some ones that were not discrete from the other ones, and being discrete from them, would then with them make one number.

⁹⁰That is, two numbers as actual totals.

⁹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 72.

⁹²That is to say, a number cannot be divided and still be that number.

⁹³The heavens is indivisible as the “fifth essence” or element, nevertheless it is a quantum, apt to be divided into the signs of the Zodiac.

⁹⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 73.

78 To the third:⁹⁵ it is impossible that the informing unity be enumerated with the materials except in the imagination, in which numbers go on to infinity.

79 To the fourth:⁹⁶ I concede that the entity of all the units is what would be if the division were made. But now the only number in actuality is the sum of all units, so that this and that do not make up a dyadic entity unless it be precisely as distinct from one another, nor do any other units.⁹⁷ Hence, neither is the dyad in the triad in the way a part of the line is in the line.

80 [11] On the contrary:⁹⁸ if the number [is] one and the parts are not [numbers] in actuality, this is simply false: "Two times three is six."⁹⁹ But the contrary is seen [to be the case], because the statement is true in the composite sense according to the Philosopher in Bk. I of *Sophistical Refutations*.¹⁰⁰

81 Also, "twice three" is a multiple in a number, and a quality that number has, but a quality is predicated of a subject.

82 It is said¹⁰¹ that "Two times three is six" is false, and this authoritative reason is cited, "Because one times six is six."¹⁰² However, one can concede the proposition that "Two times three is six." As for the Philosopher, he only denies that the multiple of three is of the essence of six, but [he admits it is] a quality.

⁹⁵Cf. supra, n. 74.

⁹⁶Cf. supra, n. 75.

⁹⁷That is, no other group of units has an actual entity as a distinct number.

⁹⁸Namely, to the contrary of the response in n. 60.

⁹⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 14, 1020b 8-9: "For the essence of each [number] is what it is once, e.g. that of six is not what it is twice or thrice, but what it is once; for six is once six."

¹⁰⁰Aristotle, *De soph. elenchis* I, ch. 3, 166a 32-36: "Secundum divisionem vero, quoniam quinque sunt et duo et tria, et paria et imparia, et maius aequale; tantumdem enim maius et adhuc amplius. Nam eadem oratio divisa et composita non idem semper significare videtur." [Oxford "Upon division depend the propositions that 5 is 2 and 3, and even and odd, and that the greater is equal (for it is that amount and more besides). For the same phrase would not be thought always to have the same meaning when divided and when combined."]

¹⁰¹Viz. in answer to n. 80.

¹⁰²Quoted above in n. 80.

83 To the other,¹⁰³ by accepting it in this way that it is not two three's that are six, but what has twice three units has six units. And the predication is denominative.

[D.—TO THE FOURTH INITIAL ARGUMENT]

84 To the other principal argument:¹⁰⁴ when potency which is only 'potency-before-actualization'¹⁰⁵ is proper to anything,¹⁰⁶ the actuality [referred to in the hyphenated expression] cannot pertain to that thing, and the potency [i.e., 'potency-before-actualization'] still remains. For if that subject is essentially¹⁰⁷ that sort of potency, it cannot coexist with the actualization [it precedes]. For 'corruptible' is essentially a "potency for corruption before actualization," and the act [i.e., the actual corruption] destroys both the subject and the potency.

¹⁰³Cf. supra, n. 81.

¹⁰⁴Cf. supra, n. 4.

¹⁰⁵The awkward Latin expression "potentia ante actum" is meant to express the idea of 'something in process' or something that is essentially in motion to becoming something else. The examples Aristotle gives are building, learning, doctoring, rolling, leaping, ripening, aging. In terms of act and potency, if one can give names to such processes, then that to which the name is given can itself be said to be either potential or actual. Aristotle attempts to explain the actuality of such a thing in his famous definition of motion, that in Latin translation reads "actus in potentia in quantum est in potentia" which in the Oxford translation reads: "The fulfilment of what exists potentially in so far as it exist potentially" (*Physics* III, ch. 1, 201a 10-11). Scotus here uses another equally awkward phrase about 'process' or 'becoming' when used grammatically as the subject of a proposition to express what is essential to process as process. It is "subjectum determinat sibi potentiam ante actum," which literally reads "the subject determines itself 'potency-before-actualization'." I translate the phrase 'determines itself' as 'is essentially.' Charles Sander Peirce indicates something of the philosophical problems associated with this when he discussed his famous notion of turning what is essentially a predicate into a subject as 'subjectification' or 'precession.'

¹⁰⁶With regard to such a "potentia ante actum," its 'actualization' is the process itself, e.g. building, not the permanent object that results from the process, viz. the house.

¹⁰⁷The Latin "determinat sibi potentiam ante actum" which literally reads "determines for itself potency before act." I translate "determinat sibi" as "is essentially."

85 Similarly, the Philosopher in *Physics* III, ch. 'On motion':¹⁰⁸ the buildable is more properly an act, not the house but the building of it. And the buildable never has the house as its act, because it is no longer actually buildable when it is a house.

86 Similarly, because the continuum is a potency to being divided, before the division takes place, therefore, 'to be divided' is not consistent with 'continuum.' The same can be said of unity.¹⁰⁹ The case is not similar to that of 'risible' and 'to laugh,' because this is not a "potency-before-actualization."¹¹⁰

87 To the contrary: "the subject of actuality is identical with that of potentiality,"¹¹¹ Otherwise, potency would be to the impossible.¹¹² Hence it seems a contradiction to include [both these notions simultaneously, namely, that there is something that is] precisely 'potency-before-actuality' [and yet is] proper to [i.e., is a property of] any subject, or [that such potency] must necessarily inhere in it, because then a possible and an impossible act would be in it.

[E.—TO THE FIFTH INITIAL ARGUMENT]

88 To the other,¹¹³ some¹¹⁴ give this answer. The physical minimum, is divisible as a 'quantum' but not as something physical.

¹⁰⁸Aristotle, *Physica* III, ch. 1, 201b 16-17. "When the buildable, in so far as it is just *that* is fully real, it is *being built*, and this is the *building*." See later, 201b 9-15 "Take for instance the buildable as buildable. The actuality of the buildable as buildable is the process of building. For the actuality of the buildable must be either this or the house. But when there is a house, the buildable is no longer buildable. On the other hand it is the buildable which is *being built*. The process then of being built must be the kind of actuality required. But building is a kind of motion, and the same will apply to the other kinds also." [i.e. learning, doctoring rolling, leaping ripening, ageing].

¹⁰⁹Unity as a state of undividedness cannot coexist with its negation, 'actual division' or the state of 'being divided.'

¹¹⁰Actual laughing does not destroy risibility, or the ability to laugh or the person that has this ability.

¹¹¹Aristotle, *De somno et vigilia*, ch. 1, 454a 8.

¹¹²That is, what is in potency or possible is the impossible.

¹¹³Cf. *supra*, n. 5.

¹¹⁴Cf. Giles of Rome, *Quodl. IV* q. 6, resp., f. 44rb: "Videmus enim in rebus naturalibus quod ex sola divisione [*in editione*: dimensione] potest fieri corruptio. Nam licet divisio [*in editione*: dimensio] continui vadat in infinitum ratione qua quantum, non tamen vadit in infinitum ratione qua quantum naturale. Est enim devenire ad

89 [12] To the contrary: according to that argument, the indivisible is no more a physical minimum than a maximum, for the maximum is not divisible as such, but only as a quantum. If, therefore, true quantity is just as much in the minimal in this way as it is in the maximal, then the physically minimal will be truly divisible in the same way as the maximal.

90 Also, sometimes it is impossible that something exist in a subject according to a condition that subject has, [whereas at other times] it is suited by nature to exist [in that subject] according to another condition it has. If it exists according to that condition according to which it is suited by nature to be in something, then it exists there in an unqualified sense. But division exists in substance according to quantity. Therefore, whatever exists in something in this fashion, exists there in an unqualified sense. But division is in the minimal according to quantity; therefore, because it is formally a quantum, it is divisible in an unqualified sense.

91 One could say to the first¹¹⁵ that in that quantum there is at times something added that impedes such a division, as in the case with the minimum. In the greater, this is not the case, because given the division in the greater, the parts remain specifically the same as before, whereas this is not the case in the minimum.

92 To the contrary: either [a] that added impediment is simply repugnant to divisibility, and then it is repugnant to the quantum, and so the minimum is not a quantum, or [b] if [the added impediment] is not [simply repugnant] but is consistent with divisibility (and there is no potency to the impossible), therefore, it is possible that at some times it be actually present; therefore, this minimum can be divided.

93 Also, it is not repugnant to the natural form, such as flesh, that it exist under howsoever small a quantity, even under a point. Proof: some natural body that is not circular [like the heavenly bodies] is finite; therefore, some non-circular surface is actual and

minimam aquam et ad minimum aërem, ita quod si ulterius divideretur non esset ibi species aquae vel aëris, ut probat Philosophus in I *Physicorum*; also Thomas, *Physica* I, lect 9, (II 29b): "Sed dicendum quod licet corpus, mathematicè acceptum, sit divisibile in infinitum, corpus tamen naturale non est divisibile in infinitum."

¹¹⁵Cf. supra, n. 89.

not infinite; therefore it is bounded by a line, and the line here by a point. Hence, some point in natural bodies exists in actuality. But the point is in the category of quantity. Therefore, it is essential¹¹⁶ to some subject, which is not prime matter. Hence [the point] is in some composite substance, and therefore some flesh in that composite is beneath that point.

94 And to this the adversaries¹¹⁷ wish to say that although this represents 'minimum' in the sense of what can exist *per se*, still this is not what is meant by a minimum part in the whole, because in what can be heated, there is no minimum part that comes to be heated first, just as there no first part in motion, *Physics* VI.¹¹⁸ And likewise, infinitely small mobile parts are moved, one before the other, so that there is no first part. And nevertheless that minimal part [of motion], which is in the whole, would not remain if it were divided, because it perishes in what contains it.¹¹⁹

95 To the contrary: it is not repugnant to itself *per se*,¹²⁰ because if alteration [which is a qualitative change] were divided according to the division of the mobile, since in the whole one admits there are lesser and lesser parts ad infinitum, it follows that it is not repugnant to the form in the whole that it perfect howsoever small a part.

96 [13] They¹²¹ also say that the minimum is indivisible, because the parts divided do not remain after the division. But this is no answer, because although the parts cannot remain after division,

¹¹⁶Scotus again uses the awkward expression 'determinat sibi aliquod subjectum,' where I translate 'determinat sibi' followed by an accusative case as "essential to" what follows.

¹¹⁷Giles of Rome, *Physica* VI, lect 4, f. 139rb: "Magnitudo enim dividitur in infinitum ratione qua continua, non ratione qua est quid naturale; quia ut est quid naturale habet statum in maius et in minus; est enim dare minimum carnem et minimam aquam..."; Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II d. 2, qq. 5-6, nn. 381-389 (XVIII 216-219); *Ordinatio* II, d. 2, qq. 5-6, nn. 334-349 (VII 300-308).

¹¹⁸Aristotle, *Physica* VI, ch. 6, 237a 17-28.

¹¹⁹Namely, the moving subject.

¹²⁰What is the subject here? It seems to be a first part that remains, that is, a quantum of time. This suggests a quantum theory of becoming, similar to that proposed by some philosophers today.

¹²¹Cf. Albert the Great, *De gener. et corrupt.* I, tr. 1, ch. 13, 15 (V² 123a, 124b); Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.*, II, d. 30, q. 2, a. 2, resp., ed. Parma VI, 665; Giles of Rome, *Theoremata* prop. 20, f. 97vb.

the same can be said of the whole as divisible, since it is a quantum.

97 As for the Philosopher:¹²² he speaks of the minimal against Anaxagoras, and he takes it for granted that [Anaxagoras] admitted 'all such things are already present in one another,' and this because anything can be generated from anything else.

98 To the contrary: the Philosopher¹²³ says that I come to some minimum from which no lesser can be generated, because that minimum cannot sustain the action of any natural agent. But this is against Anaxagoras, who assumes that anything can be generated from anything ad infinitum. But the Philosopher does not hold this.

99 Also, from the minimal amount of water¹²⁴ fire can be generated more than a hundredfold. Then one may take some mean amount of fire from which some earth can be produced, but less than that from which the whole of the fire was generated. By taking the opposite proportion [viz. what remains of the fire], if it were then the minimum, [this] would be less than the minimal.

100 {{Also, if there is a minimum that could exist *per se*, then there is something which is first induced from heat through alteration, so that the first is at the same time the whole [of the minimum]. Otherwise, if it were only something of it, and not the whole, that other would be less than the minimal, and this less would be existing *per se*, because [heat] is not yet in the whole, since nothing besides this has been induced up to now.

101 Also, there is a minimal part of motion and of time, because they are physical things, and then two incongruities follow:

102 The first is against Aristotle, *Physics* VI, chs. 4 and 5:¹²⁵ "Everything that is in motion must have been in motion before,"

¹²²Aristotle, *Physica* VI, ch. 6, 237a 17-26.

¹²³Aristotle, *Physica* I, ch. 4, 187b 22-34.

¹²⁴Tenfold air from water, earth is the least. This seems to refer to Aristotle, *De generatione et corruptione* II, text. 37, 333a 20-27 Averroes, *ibid.* Quoniam si dixerimus quod unus pugillus aquae aequalis est in quantitate decem pugillis aeris, hoc non erit nisi habeant subiectum commune ambobus." Iuntina, vol. 5, fol. 171vb.

¹²⁵Aristotle, *Physica* VI, ch. 6, 236b 32-237b 22.

and conversely [everything that was in motion before must be in motion].

103 The second: because suppose I take a thing moved in a time-span having seven minimal parts, and I assume a mobile that is twice as fast; it will move an equal amount in half that time; therefore, in three and a half minimal parts [of time], and thus the minimal will be divided. The Philosopher argues in this way in *Physics* VI, ch. 1 about the instant.¹²⁶

104 Here it will be said that because every part of motion is a part in the whole, and the same will be true of time, it follows that there is no minimum. There would be nevertheless a minimal motion, which could exist *per se*, and not be in a whole.

105 To the contrary: each part can exist *per se*,¹²⁷ which then exists when nothing of it is in the whole. The subject seems to include the predicate. Such is any part of motion and time, even the one part which you assume to remain [is] in the whole; otherwise, many successive parts would exist simultaneously. Therefore, each part of motion and time able to exist *per se* in the whole, can exist *per se* [apart from it]. If therefore there is no minimal part in the whole, neither is there any existing *per se*.

106 Also, since the moving agent first causes the prior part of motion before the posterior, why could it not stop midway and there will be a prior part existing *per se* so that it is in no whole? And so might I argue in this way of every part of motion which you grant is in the whole, because the agent causes every such [part] before the posterior [part].

107 Also when something hot changes¹²⁸ to something cold, the change occurs first in something minimally [hot] if such exists, before all the heat is dissipated, because while the hot is always losing heat, the degree lost is left *per se* outside the whole. Finally, therefore, I come to a minimal in the whole. The mobile exists necessarily only for an instant, for if it existed for two, then it would be at rest and immediately after that instant the hot

¹²⁶Aristotle, *Physica* VI, ch. 2, 233b 19-32.

¹²⁷Exists *per se*, i.e., apart from the whole.

¹²⁸Literally, Scotus says "when the motion occurs from what is hot to what is cold."

would not exist. Therefore, there will be a decay of this degree; it is evident it will not be successive, because then there would be left behind as existing *per se* something less than the minimal; therefore, the change will be sudden and thus occur in an instant, and so one instant will be immediate to another.¹²⁹

108 [14] Here the reply is given about the corruption of that minimum,¹³⁰ of which the ultimate in existence is given, as there is of the corruption of the 'now,'¹³¹ because neither exists at some first time.

109 To the contrary: simultaneous is the corruption of this minimum of heat and the induction of some degree of cold. Therefore, if in this mobile never was the hot not there from the first, then never was coldness there to begin with, or that degree of coldness. And so ad infinitum there is a part of it before a part; therefore there is no minimum.

110 Note, if nothing of frigidty is assumed to be induced before the whole heated object perishes, according to the opinion perhaps of Harclay,¹³² then it necessarily follows that there is no minimum coldness to be generated, if there is a minimum heat that must be corrupted, and similarly it would be argued about the converse, and then this argument would come down to the same as the first of the arguments above.¹³³ For those two minimals according to Harclay will be immediate to one another, and under neither is the mobile

¹²⁹Which is against what Aristotle says: cf. *Physica* VI, ch. 1, 231b 6-7: "Nor, again, can a point be in succession to a point or a moment to a moment in such a way that length can be composed of points or time of moments."

¹³⁰The adage about things that are essentially successive or are processes: "Impossibile est dare primum vel ultimum inesse"; cf. Aristotle, *Physica* VIII ch. 8, 263b 20-21; there were numerous treatises "De primis et ultimis," e.g. Walter Burley.

¹³¹Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 10, 218a 8-21.

¹³²Henricus de Harclay, *Sent.* I, d. 17, q. 2 (cod. Casal Monferrato B.2, f. 40vb): "Tertio arguitur de forma remissa. Esto quod actus vitiosus remittat habitum virtuosum vel quod frigidum remittat calorem. Esto. Calor nunc habet decem gradus. Remittatur a frigido quae non habet nisi novem. Quaero utrum illa caliditas remissa quae non habet novem gradus praeexistat in caliditate intensa habente decem gradus, aut non. Si sic, habeo propositum. Si [ms = Sed] non, ergo tota alia caliditas de novo inducitur. Quaero: a quo? Non a frigido circumstante, manifestum est, quia frigidum non inducit calorem. Nec potest induci a caliditate praecedente quia efficiens et effectus sunt simul. Sed forma praecedens omnino corrumpitur et nova introducitur, ergo illa forma remissa a nullo introducitur."

¹³³Cf. supra, n. 107.

assumed to exist except for an instant if it continually is moved from hot to a perfect frigidity; otherwise, it will be moved and be at rest at the same time.

111 But if against Harclay,¹³⁴ it is assumed from the beginning in the remission of the hot there is an induction of the frigid, then the argument in this way is not cogent. For never from the first was the hot not existing, nor ever from the first was that degree of frigidity that is induced immediately after the minimal heat, because already the frigid was there before, and that grade already does not exist *per se*, and therefore, we have no minimum.

112 To the contrary: the remission of [heat] in the heated object, if it begins with a mutation [or sudden change], does not have something first, neither is there a first induction of the cold, and thus the argument stands. If however there is some first mutation through which some degree of coldness is induced, then it is the first change through which something of the hot is lost, and thus there is no final moment when the hot is in a state of rest, which seems to be incongruous and against what Aristotle says in *Physics* VI.¹³⁵ About this material look in the notebook of the *Physics*, Bk. V¹³⁶ and in the questions on *Physics* V.¹³⁷

¹³⁴Harclay reports Godfrey of Fontaines as being opposed to his view; Henricus de Harclay, *Sent.* I d. 17 q. 2 (cod. Casal Monferrato B.2, f. 40rb): "Sed ipse [i.e. Godefridus de Fontibus (PhB V 20)] respondet ad illa, IX *Quodl.* q. 3. Ad primum inconueniens dicitur quod quando secunda quantitas existit sine materia et non habet habitudinem ad aliquam quantitatem priorem, illa quantitas producitur in esse de nihilo et creatur. Sed non est sic in proposito, nam licet sit ibi quantitas sine materia, habet tamen habitudinem ad quantitatem praecedentem a qua procedit secundum quemdam fluxum. Unde eodem miraculo quo dabitur sibi posse existere sine subiecto, eodem datur sibi posse sine altera et rarefieri ab agente naturali..."; (f. 41ra): "Ad primum argumentum pro illa opinione dico quod termini proprii motus sunt privatio et habitus, scilicet forma introducenda et privatio illius formae, et illa semper sunt impossibilia. Sed aliquid annexum termino a quo non necessario repugnat termino ad quem unitum. In quibusdam motibus est contrarietas positiva inter terminos motus, sicut cum ex albo fit nigrum et ex aere ignis, et ibi terminus ad quem positive contrariatur termino a quo, et ideo illud in contrarium positivum abicitur in tali motu."

¹³⁵Aristotle, *Physica* VI, ch. 5, 234a 24-b 9.

¹³⁶These may be a reference to some florilegium on the physics.

¹³⁷These could be questions of Aristotle, as in Bk. III of *Metaphysics* there is a division into questions.

[F.—TO THE SIXTH INITIAL ARGUMENT]

113 To the other:¹³⁸ place is not in the category of quantity, and therefore it is divided only according to the division of the surface and thus it is divided *per accidens*; indeed, a point can be located. And those remarks of the Philosopher in *Categories*¹³⁹ about place are not true; nor does he speak according to his own mind but in accord with a celebrated opinion of others, according to Avicenna.¹⁴⁰ For he says there that place is continuous. And in *Physics* IV,¹⁴¹ where he determines the truth of the matter, he says that it is not. As for motion and time, since they stem from another according to Bk. V of this work,¹⁴² they are said to be *quanta* incidentally, because motion is [quantified] through magnitude and time through motion.

114 To the contrary: that which has proper parts of the same sort, distinct from the parts of another, has its own divisibility that in essence is other than the divisibility of the other; but motion has such parts *per se* and time does as well; therefore, etc.—Proof of the minor: The *per se* parts of time and motion are parts which cannot exist simultaneously; parts of magnitude are together at every moment; therefore, divisibility here and there is not the same. And the parts of motion and time are prior and posterior, and the others¹⁴³ are simultaneous.

115 Also, of the property of quantity the same is evident, for its proper attribute is 'more and less.' Therefore, what has the proper attribute of 'more and less' other than the 'more and less' of something else, has its own proper divisibility. Motion is this sort of thing with respect to magnitude; therefore, etc.—Proof of the minor: given an existing magnitude of such and such an extent, motion can be greater when the slower mobile traverses this than when a faster mobile does so.

¹³⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

¹³⁹Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 6, 5a 5-25.

¹⁴⁰Avicenna, *Sufficiencia* II, ch. 9, f. 31vb-32rb.

¹⁴¹Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 6, 211a 23-b 1.

¹⁴²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 26-32.

¹⁴³That is, the parts of magnitude.

116 Also, “a continuum is that whose parts are joined at a common boundary.”¹⁴⁴ Something whose parts are joined at another boundary, therefore, has another continuity. But the parts of motion and of magnitude coalesce in two different indivisibles, because the parts of motion are joined to some ‘mutated being’ and the parts of magnitude to a point; therefore magnitude is not continuity of motion, but it has another [continuity].

117 Also, against the reason given that ‘they are quanta [or quantified] through another,¹⁴⁵ therefore, etc.’ This antecedent is false [viz. that motion is through magnitude and time through motion]; the implication is invalid.

The first is evident: motion is continuous [in its own right]. I ask: Is it from the continuity of the mobile, or from the continuity of magnitude? Not the first as the Philosopher says plainly in the text.¹⁴⁶ Nor ‘from its [i.e., magnitude’s] continuity according to which’ there is motion, because in *Physics* V, ch. 3,¹⁴⁷ [Aristotle], defining ‘continuously moving,’ says the contrary. “[A thing is moved continuously] if it leaves no gap or only the smallest possible gap,” as in the strings of the harp.

118 Similarly, the weight existing above would move as continuously to the earth, if the ten intervals [through which it passed] were contiguous, as it would if they were continuous. Hence, the

¹⁴⁴Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 5a 9-14: “It follows that the parts of space, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity for its parts have a common boundary;” cf. supra, n. 113.

¹⁴⁵Namely, motion is quantified through magnitude and time through motion, cf. supra n. 113.

¹⁴⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 13, 1020a 31-32.

¹⁴⁷Aristotle, *Physica* V, ch. 3, 226b 27-31: “In minimis autem est medium tribus; ultimum quidem enim mutationis contrarium est; continuo autem movetur quod nihil aut paucissimum deficit rei—non tempori (nihil enim prohibet deficiens, et statim autem post ypaten, id est, primam, sonare ultimam) sed rei in qua movetur.” [Oxford translation: “Thus ‘between’ implies the presence of at least three things; for in a process of change it is the contrary that is ‘last’: and a thing is moved continuously if it leaves no gap or only the smallest possible gap in the material—not in the time (for a gap in time does not prevent things having a ‘between,’ while, on the other hand, there is nothing to prevent the highest note sounding immediately after the lowest) but in the material in which the motion takes place.”]

continuity of motion does not stem from the magnitude over which it moves.

119 Also, that the continuity in motion is not 'from its [magnitude's] continuity according to which' there is motion,¹⁴⁸ because then in alteration there would be no continuity, because whiteness, according to which there is motion,¹⁴⁹ is only divisible per accidens.

120 That the implication¹⁵⁰ is invalid: "A fly is a fly from another; therefore it is not in the category of substance" is not valid, because it is effectively from another substance and formally is a substance in its own right. Similarly, here motion is effectively quantified from magnitude and is formally quantified of itself.

121 I concede therefore that they [i.e., time and motion] are formally quanta of themselves. I concede the conclusions of the first three arguments,¹⁵¹ namely, that motion formally is quantified, but not by magnitude.

122 To the other against the cause,¹⁵² I admit 'the implication is invalid.'¹⁵³ But because of the Philosopher here¹⁵⁴ the antecedent ought to be salvaged.

When [in n. 117] it is argued against the antecedent, I reply that the essential notion of the continuum is twofold: one is 'to be divided perpetually into divisibles.' The other is that it has unity from this that 'its parts are joined at a common boundary' [n. 116]. As for the first, one can admit that motion follows magnitude, so that motion is divided according to the division of magnitude, and time according to the division of motion. As for unity, this is not the case, because one does not require such unity in magnitude as in motion, since motion can be continuous and one, even if magnitude were contiguous.

¹⁴⁸Cf. supra n. 117.

¹⁴⁹That is if something becomes white gradually and hence through movement.

¹⁵⁰Cf. supra, n. 117.

¹⁵¹Cf. supra, nn. 114-116.

¹⁵²Cf. supra, n. 117.

¹⁵³Cf. supra, n. 120.

¹⁵⁴Cf. supra, n. 117.

123 To the other about alteration:¹⁵⁵ if it does infer something true, it is not against, [or a refutation of, motion].¹⁵⁶—Since it pertains primarily to motion, namely local, it can be simply conceded that divisibility of motion is from that ‘according to which,’ viz., from magnitude.

124 Against the first response,¹⁵⁷ [I say] that the divisibility of motion is not from that ‘according to which’[i.e., magnitude]. Proof: I take a circular magnitude [for example]. While it remains one existentially, there can be frequent motion about it, so that if this motion were divided, never would one part of the motion be the same as the other. Nevertheless the magnitude is not divided so frequently as, at times, to prevent some designated part from being the same as a previously designated part.

125 It is said here that the dictum is true of any motion that is one. Now, however, motion, frequently replicated, about the same circular magnitude is no longer simply one; indeed any one motion is divided in an unqualified sense, as is magnitude.

¹⁵⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 119.

¹⁵⁶Since continuous motion could have small gaps, according to Physics.

¹⁵⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 119.

QUESTION TEN

Text of Aristotle: "Some are quanta in the way that movement and time are so; for these also are called quanta of a sort and continuous because the things of which these are attributes are divisible mean not that which is moved, but the space through which it is moved; for because that is a quantum, movement is also a quantum, and because this is a quantum time is one." (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 13 1020a 29-34)

Is time the quantity by which motion is a quantum or quantified?

It is asked further whether quantity, by which motion is quantified, is formally time.

1 It is said¹ that it is time materially speaking.

But I prove it is not through the two points made earlier.² "A continuum is that whose parts [are joined at a common boundary]."³ But the parts of time and the parts of motion are joined to another [indivisible] terminus, which militates, at least against the Commentator. For according to him,⁴ an instant is one in the whole time and the parts of motion are joined to some 'mutated being' which is not one in the whole motion.

2 Also, from 'more and less':⁵ time has the property of 'more and less' distinct from the 'more and less' in motion, because in a lesser

¹Cf. Bonaventure, *Sent.* II d. 2 pars 1 a. 1. q. 2 resp. (II 59b): "...unitas temporis sumitur ab unitate subiecti, a quo causatur; subiectum autem, a quo causatur, est materia ut mutabilis... tempus maxime inter omnia accidentia se tenet plus cum materia"; Richard Rufus, *Sent.* II, d. 3 (Balliol 62, f. 113ra 1.33): "... materia est causa temporis vel temporalium."

²Supra Bk. V, q. 9, n. 116.

³Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 5a 9-14. "It follows that the parts of space, which are occupied by the parts of the solid, have the same common boundary as the parts of the solid. Thus, not only time, but space also, is a continuous quantity for its parts have a common boundary."

⁴Averroes, *Physica* IV, com. 104 (ed Iuntina IV, f. 85ra): "Et ita debet esse etiam in instanti, quoniam, secundum quod est in uno subiecto, semper est idem: quoniam ipsum est prius et posterius in motu, scilicet quoniam instans prius et posterius in motu est idem, quia translatum est idem, et est numeratum quia translatum numeratur."

⁵Cf supra Bk. V, q. 9, n. 115.

time there can be a greater motion, and in a greater time lesser [motion].

3 Furthermore, the measure and the measured refer to one another in reality, and such are really distinguished. But time is the measure of motion;⁶ therefore, the quantity of motion is not essentially time.

4 Also, every motion is formally successive of itself, but not every motion has time in itself, but only the first motion; therefore, the succession of any motion is not time.

5 And I concede that [succession of any] motion is not [time]. But quantity by which motion is a quantum, is of another species from magnitude and time,—so that there are three species of permanent quantity, namely a body, a surface, and a line, and two species of successive [quantity], namely, motion and time.

[I.—OPINIONS OF OTHERS ACCORDING TO WILLIAM DE LA MARE

1.—THE FIRST OPINION

a.—EXPLANATION OF THE OPINION.]

6[2] Note that as Brother William de la Mare in the second part of his *Scriptum*⁷ puts it: some⁸ say⁹ that “time is one, because it is the measure of variation, whose cause is matter which always seeks to induce a new form; and because matter is one in all material things, therefore they say that time is one.”

⁶Aristotle, *Physica* IV, ch. 12, 220a 1-2; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 151: “Tempus est mensura motus rerum mobilium.”

⁷William de la Mare, *Scriptum in Secundum librum Sententiarum*. II, d. 2, q. 2 (ed. Kraml, BAW XVIII, p.33): “Alii dicunt quod ideo tempus est unum quia est mensura variationis. Omnis autem variationis causa est materia quae semper appetit novam formam induere, et quia materia est una in omnibus materiis, ideo dicunt quod tempus est unum.”

⁸Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* II, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Parma V, 404b where he cites the opinion of others: “Alii dixerunt quod quia tempus est mensura variationis, et omnis variatio est ex possibilitate materiae, et quia materia est una, ideo dicunt quod tempus est unum.”

⁹Bonaventura, *Sent.* II, d. 37, pars 2, dub. 2: “...tempus ... de se dicit mensuram variabilem et rei variabilis”; II d. 2 pars 1 a. 1 q. 2 resp. (II, 59b) where he cites supra n. 1.

[b—RESPONSE TO THE OPINION]

7 But he says¹⁰ that “this does not suffice,¹¹ because time is the measure of actual variation; matter, however, is the cause of only potential variation”; therefore, etc.

8 Also, although matter according to its essence is said to be one, but not “in so far as it is under diverse forms, but as formed now in this way, now in that; hence matter in actuality is now this, now that, and only in this way is it the cause of variation”; therefore, etc.

9 Also, “time, since it is number, of necessity regards some numerical multitude; in primary matter, however, there is no such multitude until it is actualized, and then it is not one in all [material things].”

[2.—SECOND OPINION

a.—EXPLANATION OF THE OPINION.]

10 “Others¹² say that the aevum [or aeviternity] is one of all

¹⁰Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* II, d. 2, q. 1, a. 2, ed. Parma V, 404b: “Sed hoc non videtur verum. Tempus enim non mensurat variationem in potentia, sed variationem in actu; actus autem variationis in materia non est unus sed plures; sed tantum prima potentia ad variationem est una; quamvis etiam hoc non sit *per se* motum; immo forte falsum quod omnium mobilium sit materia una. Et praeterea tempus de necessitate, cum sit numerus, respicit aliquam multitudinem numeratam. In materia autem prima secundum essentiam non est aliqua multitudo, sed solum secundum esse; et secundum hoc esse non est una in pluribus; unde nec tempus materiae secundum essentiam suam respondet, sed solum esse secundum quod variatur per motum; unde ex unitate materiae nullo modo potest esse tempus unum.”

¹¹William de la Mare, *Sent.* II d. 2, q. 2 (ed. H. Kraml): “Hoc non sufficit quia tempus est mensura variationis in actu, materia autem est causa variationis in potentia tantum.”; the following paragraphs up to n. 19 inclusive [as indicated by our quotation marks] are taken almost verbatim from William de la Mare’s distinction 2, question 2 of book II.

¹²Richard Rufus, *In Physicam Aristot.* IV (cod. Erfurt Q. 312, f. 8ra-9ra: “Ad intelligendum quomodo nunc manet idem in tempore mihi videtur quod oportet incipere a nunc aeternitatis... Ulterius intelligendum quod esse mutabile non addit novam naturam super esse simpliciter... Sicut ergo ipsum nunc aeternitatis debetur enti intransmutabili, similiter debetur omni enti in quantum esse habet. Sed in hoc est differentia, quod enti intransmutabili debetur indeficienter et ut aeternitas est; enti autem universaliter habenti esse debetur abstrahendo ab his differentiis ‘deficientis’,

[aeviternals] and time is one for all measurables,¹³ because time is number, and several things can be measured and enumerated by the same number; and in the same way they say of the 'aevum' that is the measure and number of aeviternals, and because the number is one, there is one measure."

11 This argument is confirmed, because the Philosopher¹⁴ shows the unity of time through the unity of number.

[b.—REFUTATION OF THE OPINION]

12 "But this is no reason, because number by which the things of different genera are numbered, as ten men and ten dogs, is not formal but mathematical.¹⁵ What is formal, however, is diversified according to the diversity of forms. Time, however, is not some mathematical quiddity, since its definition includes motion. Hence, he says¹⁶ that "Number is twofold, namely, formal and mathematical. Formal number is number which is in the things numbered, and this is diversified according to the diversity of what is numbered, and therefore it is other in angels than in men. Mathematical number, however, is the same, because it is in the soul and removed from matter, and therefore it can be the same for diverse things."

'indeficientis'. Et sic habemus quod omni enti in quantum esse habet, debetur ipsum nunc... sic ergo intelligendum est simile quod sicut numerus in quantum est mensura est idem diversorum quia debetur eis per naturam unam inventam in eis, sic tempus in quantum quantitas vel accidens est idem diversorum motuum, quia debetur eis per naturam unam et in quantum uniuntur"; cf. Robertus Kilwardby, *De tempore* q. 13 n. 67, ed. O. Lewry, p. 26: "Aliter assignant aliqui causam unitatis temporis dicentes quod est unum tempus numero in omnibus, et non inveniunt causam praedicto modo scilicet unitatis eius, sed dicunt quod non ab unitate temporalis rei est unum sed ab influenza una aeternitatis."

¹³Or temporals.

¹⁴Aristotle, *Physics* IV, ch. 12 221a 1-26.

¹⁵Aristotle, *Physics* IV, ch. 11 220a 22-24; Boethius, *De Trinitate* ch. 3 (PL 64, 1251B; ed. Peiper p. 154-155): "Numerus enim duplex est: unus quidem quo numeramus, alter vero qui in rebus numerabilibus constat... Ergo in numero quo numeramus repetitio unitatum facit pluralitatem; in rerum vero numero non facit pluralitatem unitatum repetitio."

¹⁶Continuing the recital of William de la Mare.

[3.—THE OPINION OF THOMAS]

13 [3] “Therefore, others say,¹⁷ according to the Commentator in Bk. IV of the *Physics*,¹⁸ that time is one by a unity of motion of the first mobile¹⁹ to which it is compared as the measure to the measured, and as accident to a subject. To others, however, motion of the inferior [or sublunar bodies] is compared as the measure to the measured only, but not as accident to subject. And because the unity of the accident stems from the unity of the subject, therefore, time is one from the unity of the motion of first [mobile, i.e. the firmament]. And similarly, they say of the ‘aevum’ that it is one from the unity of the most simple of the aeviternals, which is the first angel. To this angel, ‘aevum’ is compared not only as a measure, as it is to the other angels, but as an accident to its subject.”

[4.—A FOURTH OPINION]

14 “According to those,²⁰ however, who²¹ claim that the ‘now’ of the ‘aevum’ and the ‘now’ of time are the same ‘now’ in the genus of being, though not in the genus of measure,—the one remains stationary and the other flows, and insofar as it is stationary it constitutes the aevum and insofar it flows it makes for time.—these could say that the aevum is one by the unity of the substantial being of the first mobile, just as time is one by the unity of its motion. For an instant is compared to the being of the first mobile

¹⁷Thomas Aquinas, *Sent.* II, d. 2, q. 1, qu. 2, resp., ed. Parma V, 404b: “Et ideo dicendum cum Commentatore, in IV Physicorum, quod tempus est unum ab unitate motus primi mobilis; tempus enim comparatur ad istum motum non tantum ut mensura ad mensuratum, sicut ad alios motus, sed sicut accidens ad subiectum, quod ponitur in definitione eius; ex quo habet unitatem et multitudinem... Et similiter dicendum est de aevo, quod est unum ab unitate esse simplicissimi aeviternorum quod est primus angelus.”

¹⁸Averroes, *Physica* IV, com. 132 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 93vb): “Est igitur propter hoc numerus motus, id est, corporis caelestis.”

¹⁹That is, the firmament of stars.

²⁰Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II d. 2, nn. 58-61. (VII, 182-183).

²¹Cf. Alexander Hal., *Sent.* I, d. 9, n. 6 (XII 116): “Nunc tamen aeternitatis non est aliud nunc quam nunc temporis vel aevi; sed nunc temporis dupliciter sumi potest: vel stans, quod est aeternitas; vel fluens, quod proprie temporis est, et hoc dicitur instans.”

not only as accident to its subject, but as measure to the measured; to other things it is only compared as a measure. And just as all things in process, (whether they be successive operations and affections of angels and men, or whatever else there be in which in some way change occurs) are measured by time whereby we measure the motion of the first mobile in which motion exists as in its proper subject, so all permanent things (in which no change occurs with regard to their substantial beings) are measured by that 'now' by which the substantial being of the first mobile is measured. In this substantial being there is this 'now,' not only as a measure, but as an accident in its proper subject."

15 "Hence,²² just as 'now' in flux measures all changeables so 'now' as stationary measures all aeviternal things. But the same 'now' is in flux and is stationary. For it is stationary insofar as it measures the existence of the first mobile, but it is in flux insofar as it measures its motion. And just as the same 'now' in flux measures all changeable things, so the stationary 'now' measures all aeviternal things. And as we posit one time for all motions, corporeal and spiritual,—although spirits are not ordered to the motion of the first mobile,—so we can posit one 'aevum' from the unity of the first mobile's substantial being, although the existence of the aeviternals is not ordered to it."

[5.—A FIFTH OPINION: THAT OF HENRY OF GHENT
a.—EXPLANATION OF THE OPINION]

16 [4] Still others²³ say that there are several 'aeva' [or aeviternities], because there are several aeviternals which are not reduced to one, nor does one depend upon another, as all temporals are reduced to one, namely to the first mobile. And because the unity of an accident stems from the unity of its subject and the aeviternals are diverse, therefore, the aevum which is an accident will be diverse in diverse [subjects].

²²William de la Mare, *Scriptum in Secundum librum Sententiarum*. II, d. 2, q. 2 (ed. Kraml, BAW XVIII, p.33).

²³Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. XI* q. 11 resp. (f. 465 K).

[b.—AGAINST HENRY'S OPINION]

17 This argument is of no worth, because the Philosopher in the chapter 'On time',²⁴ says that if there were several heavens, there still would be one time. But it is clear that [if there were] these several heavens, one would not depend upon the other nor would one be reduced to the other.

[II.—A MORE SUBTLE AND TRUER OPINION]

18 "Another opinion²⁵ about the unity of time and of the aevum is more subtle, and I believe truer. For all motion flows according to a linear dimension and time measures motion according to such a linear dimension. Hence, just as infinite lines can exist simultaneously on their part as they lack dimension, namely, in regard to width, therefore all motions, because they flow linearly, are simultaneous as regards the present 'now.' And because time measures all motions according to their linear flow, and as such they are simultaneous, it follows that they have the essential mark of a unified subject with respect to time, and therefore time is one."

19 "Similarly the duration of any aeviternal is similar to linear dimension and, therefore, is one with the others, and all are simultaneous. Hence, they are one subject with respect to aevum and therefore aevum is one with respect to all aeviternals."

20 It must also be noted that Brother William de la Mare in the question where he asks: "Do spiritual things have a proper

²⁴Aristotle, *Physics* IV, ch. 10, 218b 3-5: "Amplius autem si plures essent caeli, similiter esset tempus cuiuslibet ipsorum motus." [Oxford translation: "Besides, if there were more heavens than one, the movement of any of them equally would be time."]

²⁵Roger Bacon, *Communio naturalia* I, p. 3, d. 1, ch. 6 (ed. R. Steele III, 163-164): "...omne dimensionatum, licet a parte ea qua dimensionatum est, excludat aliud secum a sua mensura, tamen a parte illa qua non est dimensionatum, non excludit aliud; sed motus non habet dimensionem, nisi secundum longitudinem spatii;... ergo simul possunt plures motus in praesenti licet praeteritus et futurus simul esse non possunt... Linea enim non habet latitudinem... unde excludat secundum latitudinem aliam lineam... et ideo ubi earum unum est numero... Et ideo dicendum est quod tempus non debetur motibus pluribus tanquam pluribus subiectis sed tanquam uni subiecto."

measure other than time?" says²⁶ "As the same quantity, through comparison to the body in which it is, is called a surface, but is called a place, through comparison to the ambient body, so time and aevum are the same in essence; their difference stems from the different way in which they are compared, so that the 'now' of the aevum and the 'now' of time are the same 'now' as to their essence, but are diverse only when compared."

21 "Hence the Commentator on *Physics* IV, in the chapter on time,²⁷ has in mind that as the first mobile according to its substance is immutable as to its form, but is mutable with respect to place, or 'about'²⁸ place, so also the same instant [or 'now'] that is immutable with respect to its essence, as mobile can be in flux with respect to place."

22 [5] "But if you object that according to Augustine, in *Eighty-three Questions*,²⁹ the 'now' of aevum is stable whereas the 'now' of time can flow, and it is impossible that one and the same thing may move and at the same time stand still:"

23 "One must say that this is not impossible, according to the Commentator on *Physics* IV, in the chapter on time.³⁰ He says: 'Somehow an instant is quasi the same and never changeable, and yet somehow is changeable and can be multiplied, and the reason for this is that what is moved has this characteristic.' Let us imagine, for instance, a moving point that through its motion produces a line. Since the point is simple, however, it is immutable according to its essence, but insofar as the line flows from it, it is mutable. I say it is similar with 'now.' For considered according to

²⁶The remainder of Scotus's question is taken virtually verbatim from William de la Mare's *Sentences*, Bk. II, d. 2, however, from question 1 (ed. H. Kraml, BAW XVIII, pp. 29 and 31). The opinion described in this paragraph is alluded to by Bonaventure, *Sent.* II, d. 2, p. 1, a. 1, q. 1 (II, 56a) and by Peter of Tarantasia, *Sent.* II, d. 2, q. 2, a. 1, resp. (ed. Toulouse 1649, II, 20b).

²⁷Averroes, *Physica* IV, com. 104 (ed. Iuntina IV f.85ra).

²⁸The first mobile as the outermost celestial body is not contained by any body and hence is not 'in place.' But as the remote container of all bodies it is 'about place.'

²⁹Augustine, *De diversis quaestionibus* 83, q. 72 (PL 80, 84; CCL 44A, 208): "An aeterna tempora aevum significavit, inter quod et tempus hoc distat, quod illud stabile est, tempus autem mutabile."

³⁰Averroes, *Physica* IV, com. 104 (ed. Iuntina IV f.85ra): "...instans quodammodo est quasi idem et nunquam transmutabile, et quodammodo est transmutabile et multiplicabile, et causa in hoc est quia translatum est tale."

its essence, since it is simple, it is immutable and stationary. Insofar as through its flow causes time, however, it is mutable and variable as to existence. Considered in the first way it is called the 'now' of the aevum; in the second way, the 'now' of time; one and the same, however, numerically."

24 "Hence, note that the 'now' of eternity and the 'now' of time differ in regard to the genus of being and the genus of measure. The 'now' of the aevum and the 'now' of time, however, are the same 'now' in the genus of being, but they differ in the genus of measure, so also there is the same 'now' in the whole of time and yet it is other and other according to the mind, as the Commentator says in the aforesaid citation."³¹

25 "It must be said, therefore, according to this opinion, that time and aevum can be considered in the genus of being, and as such do not differ, because in this way they are the same being. Or [they can be considered to be] in the genus of measure and in this way they are diverse, because the measures are diversified by reason of the things measured. Therefore, time and aevum are one being and diverse measures."

³¹Averroes, *Physica IV*, com. 104 (ed. Iuntina IV f.84vb): "Instans est in aliquo existente in dispositionibus diversis; et quod est tale, est unum secundum subiectum et duo secundum rationem; ergo instans est unum in subiecto, et duo ratione."

QUESTION ELEVEN

Text of Aristotle: "Things are said to be essentially 'relative' as double to half," etc. (*Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 26).

Is relation a real thing to which a mode of being to another pertains?

The question about relation is raised: "Is a relation some thing to which a mode of being to another pertains?"

1 [1] It is argued that it is:

'Existence in' does not constitute a category, but [the category is] some thing to which this mode pertains; therefore [the same is true of] 'existence towards another.'

2 Also, both [i.e., the thing and its mode] are not equally first, because then genus would not be simple, which is against Simplicius¹ in his exposition of equivocals.

3 [Arguments of Henry of Ghent] To the contrary:² Then the category of relation would not be used in a transferred meaning in the divine, because the category truly consists of a thing and not of a mode, as is evident of substance.

4 Also, that real thing will be a subject or the basis of a relationship to another, and thus the relation is not immediately founded in quantity or quality.

5 Also, that real thing grasped *per se* will pertain to none of the ten categories, and thus there are several first beings other than the ten, by understanding that thing without the mode "towards."

¹Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta* (CLCAG V¹, 28): "...et hic igitur, quoniam de primis dictionibus, quae sunt primarum et simplicium rerum significativae, proponit dicere, sub quibus oportebat alia omnia reduci, siquidem uniuscuiusque rei unum esset proprium nomen..."

²Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 51): "Sed tunc non vere transferretur praedicamentum relationis ad divina manens in eis,... Praedicamentum enim in quo aliud est res, aliud modus, vere consistit in re ipsa, non in modo, ut patet de praedicamento substantiae."

6 Because of the argument,³ “relation is considered in one way as a kind of interval and a certain medium; in another way it is considered as founded in its [two] termini. In the first way it is a pure mode, as ‘existence in.’ Neither does it receive some distinction from anything,—i.e. from God or creature, from what is real or mental. In the second way relation contracts the reality [in which it is] from the foundation that gives it its character. In the first way it is only in the intellect, as a universal abstracted from a particular. In the second way it is in the *relata* outside the mind. Thus, from the mode and the reality which it has from its character, the hypostasis⁴ of relation is integrated. But not in such a way that the real thing, that is the foundation of the relation, is included in the essential notion of the relation, for it would follow that ‘the genera were composites of the first and the second.’⁵ It is

³Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 52-55): “...dupliciter habet considerari ipsa relatio: uno modo ut est quasi medium et intervallum habentium inter se habitudinem; alio modo ut est fundata in ipsis, non separata ab eisdem... Et primo modo est purus modus et ratio essendi ad aliud aliquorum quae sunt ad aliud, et fundamentorum per quae sunt ad aliud, quemadmodum ‘esse in’ purus modus essendi est alicuius quod est in alio. Et quantum est ex se ad aliud esse, nullam recipit distinctionem aut diversitatem, sive fuerit in divinis sive in creaturis, sive in relationibus secundum rem sive in relationibus secundum rationem... Secundo autem modo contrahit realitatem a fundamentis characterizantibus... Et primo modo est in solo intellectu, non ab intellectu existens, operatum in ipso, sed ut modus in communi acceptus ad modos distinctos, et quasi abstractus ab illis sicut universale a particulari. Secundo autem modo per fundamenta habet esse in ipsis relatis participantibus habitudine, et sic extra intellectum, et diversi secundum diversitatem fundamentorum, a quibus abstrahitur ut est medium et intervallum... Ex quibus duobus, scilicet ex modo et realitate quam habet per characterizationem a fundamento, integratur, et in eisdem consistit hypostasis relationis... Quod tamen non sic debemus intelligere quod intelligamus quod res fundamenti, secundum quod huiusmodi, cadat in significato relationis cum habitudine... sicut dicit Simplicius ‘inconveniens scilicet composita facere genera ex prioribus et secundis’...in quantum super ipsum fundatur, secundum conditionem suae realitatis determinat.”

⁴‘Hypostasis’ has the meaning here of a concrete entity or subject one can speak about.

⁵The quotation, cited by Henry of Ghent, is from Simplicius. Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta* (CLCAG V¹, 226-227): “Ita semper habitudo coexistit characteribus differentiae, et non duo haec sunt, sicut suspicantur illi, sed unum simul utrumque. Sequitur autem ipsos et illud inconveniens scilicet composita facere genera ex prioribus quibusdam et secundis, ut ad aliquid ex quali et ad aliquid.” It refers to the fact that the relation and its various differences [based on the different foundations] do not constitute a composite of two things but both are at once the same. Here, Henry applies it to the relation as not being a composite of its foundation and the relationship as such.

rather that the mode itself, which as such is indeterminate, determines the foundation according to the condition of its reality," as snub nose.

7 To the contrary: the mutation occurs according to the relation whereas its foundation remains.⁶—Reply:⁷ there is a twofold mutation: one from a defect in the foundation, the other from a lack of a term. As [Augustine says] in Bk. V, ch. 4, *On the Trinity*⁸ about an accident: it perishes in a twofold way, but it is not corrupted into its opposite or into the medium, but perhaps annihilated.⁹ Neither is the argument valid [viz. that its accidentality puts it into another category], any more than it is about the mode of 'being in' [in the sacrament of the] altar.¹⁰

8 [2] To the first initial argument.¹¹ Simplicius¹² in explaining the category 'when' says: "Not everything that is in something deserves to be a special category, but only those things in which one, 'contains,' viz. substance]¹³ and 'this is contained,'¹⁴ where

⁶It seems, from what follows, that the argument Henry is attacking concerns the theologian's interpretation of what takes place in the eucharistic transubstantiation. The relationship, of 'being in' characteristic of an accident like quantity can vanish, when in the case of the sacrament of the altar, the accident of quantity remains miraculously unsupported by the substance of bread. This quantity, however, was the foundation of the relationship of 'being in.'

⁷Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3, ad 1 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 65).

⁸Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 4, n. 5 (PL 42, 913; CCL 50, 209): "Accidens autem dici non solet, nisi quod aliqua mutatione eius rei cui accidit, amitti potest."

⁹In the case of the relationship of 'being in' the term of the relationship of quantity to the material substance, is annihilated and the foundation remains. Hence the defect is in the term, not the foundation.

¹⁰Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 76): "Sed illa accidentalitas non facit quod pertinet ad aliud praedicamentum, sicut neque accidentalitas eius quod est 'esse in,' licet separari potest ab accidente in sacramento altaris." This existence apart from a subject does not put quantity into the category of a substance.

¹¹Cf. supra n. 1-2; cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 71).

¹²Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta*, praed. 'Quando' (CLCAG V², 478): "Forte igitur dicendum quod non omne quod in aliquo est dignum est speciali praedicamento, sed illa sola, in quibus hoc quidem continet, hoc autem continetur, utroque suam naturam salvante et neutro parte alterius facta neque complente alterum." The first, 'hoc continet,' refers to substance. The second, 'hoc continetur' to absolute accidents. The remainder seems to refer to the category of relation. It preserves its nature in both [termini] neither made part of one, nor completing the other.

¹³That is, the category of substance with respect to accidents.

¹⁴The accidents which are contained in the substance. The 'containing' or 'being in' is not the category.

each preserves its own nature and neither perfects or completes the other as a part." Both whiteness and its 'being in' accidentally accrue to a body in virtue of the selfsame accidental characteristic, because 'whiteness in the body' is nothing else than 'the body being white.' 'To be towards,' however, in its entirety is accidental to what it pertains, because it can be present and absent.¹⁵

9 To the contrary: 'to be in' can also be present or absent.¹⁶

10 Also, whiteness itself is 'towards,' namely, similar to whiteness, for that by which it is whiteness puts it into the species of whiteness, and so similar to another whiteness.

11 A relation has a triple foundation:¹⁷ it is founded [1] "either upon an accident, as this is in a subject, or [2] upon a substantial form, as it exists in a supposit; [3] the third mode is founded upon either of the above, as considered in itself. The first is accidental. The second is substantial to the supposit, as the form is accidental to the species, inasmuch as it happens to the form to be in this supposit. The third is essential by reason of the foundation, although it has something of the character of an accident by reason of its concomitance. Hence,¹⁸ it [i.e. the foundation] characterizes,

¹⁵Porphyry, *Liber praedicabilium* ch. 4 (AL I⁶ 20; ed. Busse 12, 25-26): "Accidens vero est quod adest et abest praeter subiecti corruptionem."

¹⁶I think the reference in Henry, however, is to the notion of quantity in the eucharistic species, where it exists without its 'being in.'

¹⁷Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 75-76): "...relatio super formam absolutam habet fundari tripliciter: uno modo super formam accidentalem ut habet esse in subiecto... alio modo super formam substantialem ut habet esse in supposito... tertio super hanc aut illam... Primo modo est relatio omnino accidentalis subiecto; secundo modo est substantialis supposito pro quanto forma speciei est substantialis supposito, sed solummodo accidentalis pro quanto accidit formae, quod sit in supposito... Relatio tertio modo omnino est essentialis et nullo modo accidentalis ratione ipsius fundamenti, etsi forte aliquid accidentalitatis habet, quia non habet ab una illarum formarum causari aut secundum actum fundari super ipsam, nisi per coexistentiam alterius."

¹⁸Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 81-82): "Sed est advertendum quod, licet totum praedicamentum relationis, ut dictum est, accidens sit, et ratione modi et ratione characteris, quod tamen est alia et alia ratio accidentalitatis hinc inde, et alia atque alia ratio eius cui accidit. Ratione enim characteris tribus modis solet assignari habitudinis characterizatio. Uno modo ut ipsum fundamentum ponatur cum habitudine constituere praedicamentum et hypostasim relationis, quemadmodum si figura quae est in sigillo cupreo character cupri, esset in cera, applicata eadem numero, character cerae. Alio modo ut non ipsum fundamentum sit character habitudinis, sed aliquid a fundamento, quasi impressum habitudini, quemadmodum

not in such a way that the real thing with its relation makes up the independent entity of the relation, even though Simplicius¹⁹ seems to talk in this way, as if the same numerical figure of the seal were to mold the wax to its likeness. Neither is it there in such a way as though the seal impressed a figure that was quasi-other, having an absolute reality of its own, since this could only occur in something that was bodily separated. Therefore, it is there in a third way, namely, by merely determining the relation, which of itself is indeterminate.”

[I.—TWENTY FOUR CONCLUSIONS ABOUT RELATIONS]

12 [3] The [Latin] terms *relatio* [relation], *comparatio* [comparison], *habitus*, *annuitio*²⁰—this term is used by Simplicius²¹—*respectus* [respect], *adaliqutitas* all seem to signify the same thing and the same with their derivatives. *Ordo* [order] and *dependentia* [dependence], perhaps, are more special than these aforesaid five. Order does not seem to exist except in something prior with respect to something posterior; dependence is not in the divine [relations].

13 [Conclusion 1]—There is some relation that is a real thing of nature, because physical action depends upon the proximity of the agent to the patient without which it never exists, no matter what

sigillum non suam figuram imprimit cerae, sed eius similem. Tertio modo ut nihil aliud intelligatur habitudinis characterizatio quam determinatio ad illud in quo fundatur, quae ex se indeterminata est, quemadmodum simitas est curvitas determinata naso, quae ex se indeterminata est ad nasum et ad alia.”

¹⁹Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta*, praed. ‘Ad aliquid’ (CLCAG V¹, 229): “Sed quod quidem non omnem habitudinem intermedium, palam ex eo quod oportet sicut substantiam et quantitatem et qualitatem et aliorum generum unumquodque, ita et habitudinem inter entia poni, cum multam opportunitatem exhibeat. Ipsa neque enim genere neque quae sub ipsis sunt communionem habebunt aliquam ad invicem, nisi aliquid sit ratio habitudinis in entibus. Inconveniens est autem interimere communionem differentium ad invicem, inconveniens autem etiam harmoniam perimere.”

²⁰The term is derived from the Greek for nodding, or giving a signal.

²¹Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta* praed. ‘Ad aliquid’ (CLCAG V¹, 227): “Esse enim oportet et *annuentem* virtutem secundum differentiam consideratam et *annuitionem* ipsam et habitudinem; quodcumque enim defecerit horum, non salvatur tale praedicamentum; neque enim habitudo nuda secundum se est neque differentia sine habitudine facit hoc praedicamentum”; cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl. IX* q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 54).

sort of absolute entities are placed in the agent and patient. Likewise, the action differs because of a different relationship, even when the absolutes there remain the same.

14 Also, Simplicius²² distinguishes 'quantum,' 'equal,' 'of such sort,' and 'similar' as being different.

15 Also, real things of themselves are connected according to Bk. XII of the *Metaphysics*,²³ [where Aristotle excoriates] "those who reduce the substance of the universe to a mere series of episodes." In that same place,²⁴ he points out the good of the universe is twofold: [1] intrinsic, which is the order of parts among themselves, [2] the other is the order they bear towards God.

16 Also, real things of themselves are really distinct.

17 Also, certain things are really composed; if you assume all are absolute essences without relation, there is no compound.

18 Also, real things produced from the four causes really stem from them and never without a determinate relationship of those causes

²²Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta* praed. 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V¹, 234-235); cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 199 (XVIII, 66); *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 220 (VII, 110).

²³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XII, ch. 10, 1075b 37-1076a 3: "And those who say mathematical number is first and go on to generate one kind of substance after another and give different principles for each, make the substance of the universe a mere series of episodes (for one substance has no influence on another by its existence or non-existence), and they give us many governing principles; but the work refuses to be governed badly." Speusippus is meant, cf. Bk. VII 1028b 21-25: "And Speusippus made still more [than Plato's two, viz. form and the object of mathematics], beginning with the one, and assuming principles for each kind of substance, one for numbers, another for spatial magnitudes, and then another for the soul; and by going on in this way he multiplies the kinds of substance." Cf. also Bk. XIV, 1090b 13-20.

²⁴Idem, ch. 10, 1075a 15-25: "For [an army's] good is found both in its order and its leader, and more in the latter for he does not depend on the order, but the order depends on him. And all things are ordered together somehow, but not all alike -- both fishes and fowls and plants; and the world is not such that one thing has nothing to do with another, but they are connected. For all are ordered to one end, but it is as in a house, where freemen are least are at liberty to act at random, but all things or most things are already ordained for them, while slaves and the animals do little for the common good and for the most part live at random; for this is the sort of principle that constitutes the nature of each. I mean, for instance, that all must at least come to be dissolved into their elements, and there are other functions similarly in which all share for the good of the whole."

to one another. If they were without that relationship, these absolute essences [four causes] would cause nothing.

19 Also, where the subject²⁵ is real, there the attribute 'equal' is a proper attribute of quantity, and 'similar' of quality.

20 On the contrary: a proper attribute exists in its subject necessarily; equal does not, because it is not there, if the other quantum does not exist.

21 Also, the mathematical sciences show [real] relationships between quanta, according to Bk. XIII of the *Metaphysics*.²⁶

22 [4] [A Mini-question from Simplicius] Simplicius in his work on the *Categories*²⁷ disputes this question: "Is relation a real thing?"

And he cites many reasons why it is not.

23 For without a change [in its subject] the relationship comes and goes. He says that this was the strongest argument of the Stoics.²⁸

24 Also, because a relation is based on so many categories, there is no one real thing that pertains to all of them.

25 Also, because there are many relations towards non-beings,²⁹ such as prior and posterior.

26 For the opposite, he argued:³⁰

"To destroy harmony which really delights is incongruous;" therefore, something real is the cause of this delight.

27 Also, [relation] is a category of being; only what is a true being is contained under this.

²⁵That is, the accidents, quantity or quality.

²⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* XIII, ch. 3 1078a 31-1078b 2; cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 208 (XVIII, 69); *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 224 (VII, 112).

²⁷Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta praed.* 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V¹, 212-237).

²⁸Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta praed.* 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V¹, 233); cf. Henry of Ghent, *Quodl.* IX q. 3 (AMPh s. 2, XIII 49): "Aliqui, ut Stoici, ponebant quod relatio praeter suum fundamentum non est aliquid in entibus existens a natura in rebus extra animam, sed in anima tantum."

²⁹For example, to a future naval battle; cf. Aristotle, *De interpretatione* I, ch. 9, 18b 9-16.

³⁰Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta praed.* 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V¹, 229).

28 Reply: true being which consists in composition [viz. in a proposition] is excluded, *Metaphysics* VI,³¹ but not true being which is in the intellect or is a consequence of something insofar as it is in the intellect. Such is a second intention and any conceptual relation.³²

29 Also, Avicenna, *Metaphysics* III,³³ says that even though no intellect existed, the heavens would still be above and the earth below, and this one would be a father and that a son.

30 Also, Simplicius argues:³⁴ either [a] something in reality corresponds to a judgment of the mind, and then our thesis is evident, or [b] it does not, and then the judgment is a fiction.

31 To the contrary: in this way one could argue that a conceptual relation or a second intention would be either a fiction or a real thing.

32 Reply: the intellect would have no basis for distinguishing a conceptual relation [as something special] unless it apprehended a real relation in something, such as in the divine attributes. Therefore if all relations were conceptual, they would be fictions; but not [all would be fictions] if certain ones are real.

33 To the first argument of Simplicius:³⁵ the subject is changed in its 'towards something' but not in itself. This argument supports our eighth conclusion.³⁶

³¹Aristotle, *Metaphysica* VI, ch. 4, 1027b 17-1028a 6.

³²Is this intended to challenge the statement in n. 27 or is it simply a random observation that 'true being' can be understood in more than one way, and that some relations are conceptual? Intentions exist in the intellect as qualities and as such have true being. But as relations to the knowable, they have only a mental or conceptual reality. But Aristotle in discussing the third species of relation indicates that the real relation is in the knowable, not in the knowing subject. "That which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it. For that which is thinkable implies that the thought of it is possible, but thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought'; for we should then have said the same thing twice." Number 29 however seems to continue the positive argument for the existence of some real relations.

³³Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 10, Avil 178: "Nos scimus quod haec res in esse est pater illius, et ille in esse est filius eius, sive intelligatur sive non intelligatur... Et scimus etiam quod ipsum caelum est super terram et terra inferius eo, sive apprehendatur sive non."

³⁴Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta* praed. 'Ad aliquid' (CLCAG V¹, 234).

³⁵Cf. supra, n. 23.

³⁶Namely, that the relation is not the same real thing as its foundation, cf. infra

34 To the second:³⁷ this is also an argument for conclusion 8,³⁸ because how would one kind³⁹ be identical with so many different kinds?—Reply: the relation is distinguished from its foundation materially.⁴⁰

35 To the third:⁴¹ those are conceptual relationships which are compared to terms that do not coexist in reality;⁴² therefore, they are not real relations.

36 Note⁴³ that every mutating⁴⁴ thing is actuating, but something [i.e. a relation] is newly added, that is, immediately after privation [non-being]. This order, for you, means nothing, therefore neither does mutation.⁴⁵

Everything that is actuating is also unifying; every thing passively unified is united formally and uniquely. Conversely, putting the argument negatively, if A is not united formally by a real relation, then [1] it is not united passively by a real relationship.—Further, [2] then it does not actuate formally [and] really (or actually formally and really).—Furthermore, [3] then it is not really changed or there is nothing in reality there whereby what has been changed is changed.—Further, [4] something [causing] change is not really acting. The converse of the last

n. 50.

³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 24.

³⁸Cf. *infra* n. 50.

³⁹The Latin reads: “*quomodo esset unum genus idem tot generibus.*” It is not clear whether Scotus is using ‘genus’ in a strict sense or loosely for a difference in kind. How would one genus be identical with so many genera? If relation is a genus or category, then it is one, yet its foundation can pertain to different categories.

⁴⁰The relationship between the relation and its foundation is analogous to that of form to matter. The foundation can pertain to different genera, some relations are based on number or quantity, others on potencies or qualities, still others on relations. The material basis or foundation can change.

⁴¹Cf. *supra*, n. 25.

⁴²One of the two terms of a conceptual or mental relationship must not exist as a real entity; for a real relationship both terms must be real things.

⁴³Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* II, dist. 1, qq. 4-5 nn. 200-240 (VII, 101-120).

⁴⁴Mutation is distinguished from movement or gradual change by its immediacy or suddenness. It is characteristic of qualitative and substantial change where the contrariety of forms prevents their coexistence or gradual change.

⁴⁵Scotus here seems to be arguing against n. 25 that where the foundation for the relation is mutable in the technical sense, the relationship it founds arises instantaneously with the existence of the opposite term, and ceases the same way when that term no longer exists. It is not clear against whom he is arguing here.

implication is not valid.⁴⁶ But the other [converse implications] are valid.⁴⁷ Therefore, if all relations were real, then the two mutual relations would pertain to what is formally united, under which relations formally fall the actuating and actuated, and under which 'mutated' is neutrally included, [but] not passively. And in so far as it is changed, mutation, something new is added. The other two relations will pertain to two [terms] formally united, insofar as they are passively united, because there will be a passive union of whatever is formally and really united, and under these, as prior, those two will pertain to what are actively unifying with respect to two things passively united, and under these [relations] actuating in this and that way; and under these transmuting in this and that way. However, as regards correlatives a single relation is posited in things acting and being passively acted upon.

37 [5] [Conclusion 2]—But there is some relationship that is conceptual, because it is based upon a conceptual being and because it is not in a real thing as that exists [extramentally], but as it is understood by a comparison, made by the intellect, to something else.

38 On the contrary: why assume the intellect makes a relation any more than it makes quantity?—Answer: because the intellect is the sort of power that puts things together.

39 Note there is a difficulty in regard to the second conclusion about a relation, namely, as a creation of the mind. If the mind produces it, then it does so either [1] in the way it constructs a gold mountain or [2] in the way it produces intellection. If in the first way, it seems to be a relation only in a qualified sense. If it is in the second way, it can be a true [i.e., real] relation, just as the intellection is a true action and scientific knowledge is a true quality, although produced by the intellect. For [if] something natural⁴⁸ can be caused by the intellect, why cannot the natural entity of a relation? But it would not have to be called a real relation, just as scientific knowledge need not be called a real quality in the same

⁴⁶Namely, if something causing change is not really acting, then it is not the case that A is not formally united by a real relation.

⁴⁷Namely, the converse of implications [1-3] in this paragraph.

⁴⁸That is a real accident in the category of quality.

sense that it is called a real knowledge, understanding by “real” something which in no way depends upon an intellect.

40 If, however, the intellect does not make it, but insofar as it is conceptual, it exists only in the consideration of the intellect, as a rose—thought of, when none exists—is only in the consideration of the intellect, then one must speak of such a relation as one does of the rose, so far as reality is meant.

41 Concerning the first member,⁴⁹ namely, if the intellect constructs the relationship [like a gold mountain] there is this doubt. Where will it exist as in a subject? Only in the intellect, it seems, and so through this [so-called relation] the thing thought of is not referred—unless it be said that the intellect in causing something in itself, accidentally causes in itself a relationship to the real thing, and incidentally, *per accidens*,⁵⁰ it causes another [relationship] in the thing with respect to itself. But then the conceptual relation will only be in something as compared to the intellect.

42 Hence, it all comes down to this: either [1] the intellect creates the conceptual relation or [2] it only considers it.—If the intellect makes or creates it, the relation does not exist in the other [term of the relationship] and this other is referred by it only to what is understood, at least. Also, how does one avoid mutation on this assumption?⁵¹ Also if the intellect produces the relation, by which of the two modes does it do so?⁵² Now it is not in the first way, since the relation is intelligible in an unqualified sense and is not put together from the “species” of many things [like the gold mountain]. If it is in the second way, then the efficient cause does not take away its reality.—If the intellect only thinks of [the relation],⁵³ therefore, that real relation itself either exists now or did exist, and at some time it moved the intellect, as the rose, although it may no longer exist. And so relation is not divided into

⁴⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 39.

⁵⁰That is, if the rose or other thing thought of really exists.

⁵¹The relation is not supposed to cause a change in what is related, but if the intellect produces the conception of the relation as a quality in itself, the conceptual relation cannot exist in the mind unless a mutation occurs in the intellect.

⁵²Cf. *supra* n. 39.

⁵³Cf. *supra* n. 40.

real and conceptual, just as rose is not divided into a real rose and one of the mind; for these are just two modes of the same thing.⁵⁴

43 [6] Reply: the intellect produces the relation through an act of considering something, and it is founded in that thing qua considered and not in the consideration insofar as the latter is a real [quality or accident in the soul]. For in this way [the relation] could be real, just as a difference between heating and intellection is a real relation. And since intellection is truly a real action, then the relation based on it as a real thing will also be real. It follows the nature of the real thing,—although it is this sort of thing.⁵⁵ The conceptual relation, on the other hand, is only in the thing considered exclusively as considered; and through such consideration it is compared to another, because the consideration is the sort of action that joins one thing with another. Hence the relation of the intelligible and its concept is real in both,⁵⁶ but the relation of the universal and the particular is conceptual.

44 If you ask: what really is a conceptual relation? The [proper] response is: Ask first what the object of the intellect qua intellect really is. For it has no existence except in ‘being understood’—according to others⁵⁷ this is to found a relationship of reason.⁵⁸ Furthermore, it will be less of a being, because it is a quasi accident of it [being], and such is a conceptual relation.⁵⁹ It is false,

⁵⁴Here an interpolated text is added in the margins of two manuscripts: “The relation is [a] a true thing or [b] the same as its foundation, [c] or other than its foundation, [d] or coeval with its foundation, [e] or not coeval with its foundation. A is evident from the first conclusion [n. 13] and so b is false, c is refuted from 8 [cf. infra n. 50] and so one can refute d, thus leaving e, therefore mutation and composition. Reply: as a respect terminates a mutation.”

A second interpolated text follows in the margin of one manuscript: “Also, infinite things. Look for the argument and its reply infra against [conclusion] 9.”

⁵⁵Namely, as a real accident in the mind or soul.

⁵⁶That is, the relation of the knowable object to concept, of which it is a partial instrumental cause, is real and the relation of the concept, as the partial effect of that intelligible object, is also real.

⁵⁷Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 63 q. 4 resp. (II f. 193F): “Appellantur autem relationes secundum rationem illae quae totaliter aut saltem complete habent esse et causari a consideratione rationis... non autem ab eo quod naturaliter et realiter habet esse in subiecto relato.”

⁵⁸That is, a conceptual relation.

⁵⁹That is, it will be a quasi accident of the extramental thing, to which the intellect ascribes it.

therefore, that a conceptual relation is based immediately in an act of understanding. For the object, insofar as it is understood, is not formally an act of understanding.⁶⁰ It is also false that the conceptual relation stems from a reflex act of understanding. For it comes to be by a first or direct act of the intellect comparing this to that. But when the intellect reflects, thinking of its comparison qua object, then the conceptual relation is not caused but only considered, and it is a logical consideration.

45 [Conclusion 3]⁶¹—Relation does not seem to have one meaning as applied to both real and conceptual relations, just as it is not the same notion of quantity that characterizes real quantity and conceptual quantity. Why then will one category not be as real a being as the other, and therefore all its species as well?—To the contrary: that conceptual relation seems to be a respect just as is a real relation.

46 [Conclusion 4]—A real relation is one category *per se*, because it asserts one concept predicated “in quid” of all of its inferiors, and nothing pertains in quid to this category except a being.—On the contrary: the relationship to its subject does not seem to be another being in ‘whiteness’ and ‘being white.’—Also, the last six categories also seem to be respects.

47 [Conclusion 5]—A real relation is not a *per se* being, nor an interval⁶² between two extremes, nor is it in two things as in one subject, but is in one relatum and is towards the other.

48 [7] [Conclusion 6]—A real relation is in one thing immediately which is called its foundation. In the other, which is called its subject, it exists sometimes mediately,⁶³ sometimes as identical [with the subject], just as quantity, [although] a *per se* being, is related [immediately] to its double.—To the contrary:⁶⁴ in God:

⁶⁰The distinction is that of the thought itself and its content. The thought has real existence as a quality whereas the content has only a diminished being as ‘esse intelligibile.’

⁶¹Are these ‘conclusions’ or ‘aporiae’?

⁶²According to Henry of Ghent; cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁶³The difference is between relation as an accident of the subject and one that is essential to the subject or a substantial relation. Most relationships are accidental, to a creature, but its relationship to its creator is substantial.

⁶⁴Two manuscripts omit this objection, as also they omit the *contra* in conclusion 8.

perhaps [relation to creatures] is not a proper attribute, because it is posterior to the entity of the subject;⁶⁵ [nor] is 'similar' a proper attribute of what qualifies.

49 [Conclusion 7]—A relation depends upon that in which it exists and not vice versa; therefore that in which it is, is prior by nature; hence, the relation is destroyed if what it is in is destroyed, but not vice versa.

50 [Conclusion 8]—A real relation is not the same real thing as its foundation,⁶⁶ because [the relation and its foundation are] not contained in a unitive way.⁶⁷ Even in God, things formally opposed cannot coexist. Also neither does relation have a single meaning when the [subject] containing [it] is mutable with respect to the same foundation, and there can be a single relation of reason regarding opposites. Opposed relations exist simultaneously in regard to diverse things and successively in regard to the same thing.⁶⁸ And thus the foundation is able to exist in various ways with respect to the relation itself. Also the more perfect the container, the more perfect that what it contains.⁶⁹ But it is not always the case that what is whiter is of greater similarity [to another].

⁶⁵Is this perhaps a reference to a theory Scotus once seems to have considered probable, or to have been held by earlier scholastics, that the opposed relationships that constitute the divine persons logically presuppose some absolute entity as their subject? See Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, dist. 26 and the accompanying explanation in the Prolegomena to vol. VI of the Vatican edition.

⁶⁶Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, nn. 184-198 (XVIII, 61-66); *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 275 (VII, 136): "Ita dico in proposito quod fundamentum non est tantum relatio (quam continet per identitatem), sed est ita absolutum sicut si relatio esset sibi addita, vel omnino nullam haberet relationem."

⁶⁷Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 194 (XVIII, 64): "...nulla continentia virtualis extendit se ad habendum opposita formaliter per identitatem (immo nec hoc patitur continentia divina: licet enim Deus contineat perfectiones virtualiter, non tamen continet album et nigrum per identitatem formaliter"; *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, n. 211 (VII, 106-107). From here to the end of the paragraph is omitted by two manuscripts. This seems to refer to formal identity.

⁶⁸The same foundation can be the basis for opposite relations, e.g. the color white may make the object similar to another white object and dissimilar to one that is black.

⁶⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 197 (XVIII 65): "...si enim contentum sit idem realiter continenti per identitatem, quanto continens fuerit perfectius, et contentum erit; sed ad perfectionem fundamenti non sequitur perfectio relationis... sicut aliquid potest esse albius alio, et non ex hoc ei similis"; *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, n. 213 (VII, 107-108): "...continens aliquid per identitatem, si est perfectius, concludit etiam 'contentum in eo' esse perfectius... non autem perfectius fundamentum

51 [Conclusion 9]—A real relation is founded upon a real thing in any sort of category: primacy of substance with respect to quantity is a clear example, or [it can be based on] quality, a principle of action; the proper characteristic of a relation is a relation. And ‘more similar,’ see Avicenna III, ch. 10 ‘About causes’.⁷⁰

52 To the contrary: if there is a relation of a relation, then there are infinite relationships and thus infinite things, from conclusion 7.⁷¹—The same⁷² seems to be true in regard to [the relationship of] diversity that is diverse by way of another diversity, and of causation which is caused, and inherence of accident which is ‘in’ [something], and the potency of matter, and the unity of some [components].

53 Reply: the ninth conclusion [n. 51] may be altered as regards relation [as the foundation of a relation]. Just as every substance is *per se* and not in another—although one may be more perfect than another⁷³ so no relation is that in which another [relation is based].

54 Otherwise, by conceding that a relation can be founded in a relation, one could say that the foundation is contained unitively by those kinds [of relation] in which this objection [of infinite regress could be made].⁷⁴ For a founding relation can never be

continet in se perfectiorem relationem, quia non omne albius est similius.” [For if the content were really the same as the container in identity, then what it contains would be as perfect as its container, but a more perfect foundation does not guarantee that the relation contained will be more perfect]

⁷⁰Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 19, Avil 174: “Paene enim omnia relativa possunt contineri in speciebus aequalitatis: et in his quae fiunt per augmentum et deminutionem, et quae fiunt per actionem et passionem, et quae proveniunt ex potentia, et quae proveniunt ex assimilatione. Quae autem sunt per augmentum et deminutionem sunt de quantitate, sicut nosti. Quae vero sunt per potentiam, sunt ut victor, expulsor et ablator et similia. Quae autem sunt per actionem et passionem, sunt ut pater et filius, et incisor et incisum, et similia. Sed quae sunt per assimilationem, sunt sicut scientia et scitum, et sensus et sensatum: inter hoc enim est assimilatio.”

⁷¹Conclusion seven says a relation depends on that in which it is [i.e. upon things]. If there are infinite relations, then there are infinite things; cf. supra, n. 49.

⁷²Namely, the argument of infinite regress which leads to an infinity of things.

⁷³This is a comparison by the mind and is not a real but a conceptual relationship in substances, as is its primacy with respect to quantity.

⁷⁴For example, fatherhood which is a relationship in itself can be the basis of similarity between fathers. Here the foundation [the relation of fatherhood] is treated logically as if it were an absolute like quantity or quality. Its further relationship to the man is ignored as irrelevant to the basis for the similarity between two fathers.

changed there⁷⁵ with respect to that which is founded. This is evident, except in regard to diversity,⁷⁶ for that [diversity] between A and B can remain, while its diversity from the other diversity between C and D,⁷⁷ which can be destroyed, may not remain while the first remains. Hence here in this case one must retain the first answer given.⁷⁸

55 One may argue to the contrary: Only of absolute being is it true that 'Every being is the same or diverse from every other being.'⁷⁹

⁷⁵That is, where relation and its foundation are contained unitively, or only as formally distinct.

⁷⁶The relationship of diversity between the relationship and its foundation cancels out any hope of identity.

⁷⁷Since the relationship is the 'being towards' but not as rooted in two subjects but in one term as an accident in its subject, it is not clear at first sight what two differences Scotus is talking about or labelling with the four letters. The only way these letters make sense seems to be not to interpret a and c both as the subject a with respect to b its term, and c as a with respect to d its diversity, but rather interpret the diversity which remains as individual diversity between a and b, and the diversity which is destroyed, between c and d, as diversity in kind. The diversity in kind arises proximately between two accidents in a and b respectively, for example, whiteness (c) and blackness (d), and only remotely between their respective subjects a with whiteness and b with blackness. The infinite regress develops only if one argues that the difference between individual diversity and specific accidental diversity is also real, which at first sight it seems to be since a's distinction from its accident whiteness is real, and hence a's real difference from b, based on its haecceity is really different from whiteness' specific difference from blackness. However, the difference between a diversity based on haecceity and one based on a specific difference, is of a different order, since haecceity and specific differences can coexist in one and the same simple real thing. If then one denies that whiteness's specific difference is really distinct from its accidental haecceity, and further, that a's haecceity is really distinct from a's essential substantiality, then the real distinction between a and its accident whiteness, a's diversity from b based on haecceity is an additional real diversity from whiteness's diversity from blackness. The attempt to treat is as another real distinction, is similar to the way in which the unity of a number is put on a par and added to the units making up that number, to increase the number by one, making it, e.g. both 4 and 5. — [To put it another way] The diversity between a and b (that is their real distinction from each other, call it individual diversity) can remain, while the other diversity c and d (their having different accidents, a having whiteness and b having blackness, call this diversity in kind) can be destroyed. And thus what Scotus says could hold. That between a and b (individual diversity) could remain, while this individual diversity's difference from difference-in-kind is destroyed, if either individual loses the quality or quantity that makes it different, in which case either there is no difference because the two terms, though still really distinct, have become similar or non-diverse.

⁷⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 53.

⁷⁹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 14-16.

Or [i.e., instead of restricting it to absolutes, distinguish the two ways in which things may be the same or diverse, namely] ‘either denominatively or essentially the same or diverse’—[i.e. denominative or essential] identity or diversity. So in other things: ‘Every being [whether] absolute or compared’ is true [either diverse or the same either] denominatively or essentially—absolutism or relativism.⁸⁰ In this way no ‘generation’ is generated [or ‘causing’ caused].

56 [Conclusion 10]—Every distinction of relations stemming from their foundations is extrinsic and not formal, at least in this way, it is extrinsic such that it is not *per se* within the concept of what is essential to the relation. And if it is the same unitively,⁸¹ this is against Henry⁸² in the question about the number of the categories.

57[8] How are the three types Aristotle gives to be understood?⁸³—Reply: every relation between a term and what terminates it pertains to the third type.⁸⁴ For the term is referred in

⁸⁰Scotus contrasts the disjunction to be either “identity or diversity” or “absolutism or relativism.” In the first case all absolutes among themselves have either identity or diversity. In the second case, all things, whether absolute or relative, are identical or diverse either essentially if absolute, or denominatively if relative. A son is generated [or fathered] essentially by the father, but only denominatively is fatherhood fathered.

⁸¹This seems to be an anticipation of the notion that there is at least a formal distinction between the foundation and the relation, where there is no real distinction that would allow for separate existence of the foundation.

⁸²Henry of Ghent, *Summa* a. 32, q. 5, resp. (AMPh s. 2, XXVII 95): “Propter huiusmodi rationem accidentalitatis in istis sex diversam, contractam ab illo super quod fundatur eorum respectus ab accidentalitate in praedicamento relationis, contracta ab illo super quod fundatur eius respectus, in *Sex principis* dicuntur ista sex accidentia ‘extrinsecus advenientia’, cum tamen proprie dicta relatio dicatur esse de accidentibus intrinsecus advenientibus”; *Quodl.* V q. 6, resp. (f. 161I-163V).

⁸³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 26-32: “Ad aliquid dicuntur alia ut duplum ad dimidium et triplum ad tertiam partem, et totaliter multiplicatum ad multiplicati partem et continens ad contentum; alia ut calefactivum ad calefactibile et sectivum ad secabile, et omne activum ad passivum; alia ut mensurabile ad mensuram et scibile ad scientiam et sensibile ad sensum”; Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 30, qq. 1-2, n. 36 (XVII, 407); *Ordinatio* I, d. 30, qq. 1-2, n. 31 (VI, 181-182).

⁸⁴For example, between the knowable and the person or intellect that is able to know it; it is not the thought that is relative, but the thing known is relative because something else involves a reference to it [i.e., the possibility of thought about it]. But the thought’s relation to the thinkable, is not really distinct from the thought, in the same way ‘thinkable’ is really distinct from the thing thought about. In the case of thought, the thought as a quality in the thinker and its relationship to something

the first way as the object is the term of the act or habit or potency; in the second way, every term of quanta and motion. Every relation of cause and effect especially of the efficient cause and of matter⁸⁵ pertains to the second type. To the first, every relation of any whole and its part, and generally, of what is more and what is less.⁸⁶

58 But against this: where are [we to put] the relations of diversity, distance, and all their species, difference and opposition, up and down, etc., prior and posterior, sign and signed, measure, not through a replication (a part is this sort of measure), but exterior as place with respect to a body?—Similarly, how is end qua end, or form founded on action and passion.⁸⁷ The efficient cause, also, if it effects the action, and matter if it receives the attribute, [is not this 'effecting the action' and this 'receiving the form'] not act and potency over and above the aforesaid [acting and being affected].

59 Hence, it can be conceded that he [i.e., Aristotle] does not posit all relative modes, but only those that are most manifest through which the others can be understood because of their similarity to these.

60 How come in the third type there is the non-mutual relation?⁸⁸—Reply: it can be understood either because the foundation from one part depends essentially for its perfection upon the other and not vice versa; or because whenever one exists the other does also,⁸⁹ but not vice versa.

extramental are really the same. Otherwise, says Aristotle, we are saying the same thing twice.

⁸⁵The relationship can be based either on an active potency or a passive potency. Cause, especially the efficient cause is the paradigm of an active potency; matter, of a passive potency.

⁸⁶Aristotle defines it in general as "that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else and that which exceeds to what is exceeded," *Metaphysics V*, ch. 15, 1020b 27-28.

⁸⁷Above, in n. 57, the relation based on action applies primarily to efficient cause, not to the final cause, and the relation based on passion, applies primarily to matter, not to form.

⁸⁸That is the intelligible or sensible is the relative, not the thought or the sense perception, which would 'be saying the same thing twice'; cf. note 84 supra.

⁸⁹When the thought exists its relationship to the object known exists as well, whether the object actually exists or not; but when the object exists, its relationship as

And thus the relation in it⁹⁰ is always actual, because it is to the already existing term. In the other,⁹¹ existing without that other,⁹² can be habitual, and thus non-mutual. But it is mutual, if that [the relation of knowing in the thinker] is in something actual, and that [that is the intelligibility of the object is in something actual, for that [knowledge] is [always at least] habitual in the being in act [an actual thinker or intellect], and that [intelligibility in the actually existing object] is habitual in that being potentially.

61 Note: the agent in the second mode [based either on active or passive potency] commonly is taken with reference to what produces and to what transmutes, and the producer and the product are primarily referred or related to each other, and not to some third entity *per se*. But what changes and what is changed, although they may be affirmed mutually, nevertheless both are said to be referred *per se* to that which is the mutation itself. And so abstract from those first relata,⁹³ what is common, namely mutation in general, and what is said [to be relative refers] primarily to that.⁹⁴ But according what [foundation] and according to which mode [first, second or third]? Not the first⁹⁵ or second,⁹⁶ hence the third; therefore in the third way, and hence it is non-mutual.

62 [9] [Conclusion 11]—A relation is not prior by nature to be in [a subject] than to be towards [its term], because then it could be understood as an absolute, nor is there any priority conversely, for then it could be understood as a non-accident; therefore, its being in and

knowable presupposes the thinker or intellect also exists, if neither exists it ceases to be knowable.

⁹⁰That is the relation of 'being intelligible' in the object is always actual, for it is intelligible if and only if an intellect or thinker is actually existing. In the other, that is in the thinker, if the object it knows is not actually existing, its knowledge of that object is only habitual in the entity actually existing, namely the knower or intellect.

⁹¹Namely, the thinker or intellect.

⁹²Namely, the object known.

⁹³Namely, the agent and the patient.

⁹⁴Here he is asking us to consider the mutation itself as the referent action of the agent or the what the patient is receiving, that is, its 'being affected.' If we do this, then one can ask, what is the basis or foundation for this relation? And what kind of relation is it?

⁹⁵Mutation is not a part of either the agent or patient but something accidental.

⁹⁶The foundation for the action or mutation is the active potency, that for 'being affected' the passive potency in the patient. But the referent of both of these is the mutation, not agent or patient with respect to its opposite. *Qui potest capere capiat!*

being towards are simultaneous [by nature].—The first proof⁹⁷ is invalid if the concept is indifferent to what is absolute and to what is other; the second⁹⁸ is invalid, if the concept is common to substance and accident.

63 [Conclusion 12]—“In which” and “towards which” are diverse, because the being of the relative is to have itself towards another.⁹⁹ This is true in relations founded upon plurality and not upon unity except to the other i.e. the correlative.

64 [Conclusion 13]—Relative and correlative are opposed, because one genus of opposition is relative opposition.¹⁰⁰

Of relatives according to plurality¹⁰¹ and for those for which they are referred, not in general or compared to the same thing, note when we speak of “in which” and “to which,” [such expressions are] to be understood of those which receive the relations, not of those things composed of them and the relation, but of the composites it is understood when we speak of a relative and correlative.

65 [Conclusion 14]—One relation is to only one term primarily and to diverse *per se* through the destruction of which *per se* it is primarily destroyed; not vice versa; otherwise, if it is mutual, it would exist and not exist simultaneously.

66 [Conclusion 15]—A relation can be terminated by something absolute. This is clear, because the dependence is to the independent, and because just as the [thing] ‘in which’ is prior to the relation—from the seventh¹⁰²—so the ‘to which’ holds only regarding correlatives, since they are simultaneous by nature—from

⁹⁷Namely, if a relation by a priority of nature was ‘in’ rather than ‘towards,’ then it could be understood to be an absolute.

⁹⁸If a relation were by a priority of nature ‘towards’ rather than ‘in’ then it could be understood as a non-accident.

⁹⁹Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 7, 8a 33: “... sunt ad aliquid quibus hoc ipsum esse est ad aliquid quodammodo se habere.”

¹⁰⁰Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 10, 11b 25-26: “Quaecumque igitur ut relativa opponuntur, ea ipsa quae sunt oppositorum dicuntur, aut quomodolibet aliter ad ea.”

¹⁰¹Cf. supra Bk. II, qq. 4-6, nn. 21-40; supra Bk. V, q. 9, nn. 8-87.

¹⁰²That is, from the seventh conclusion, supra n. 49.

the proximate¹⁰³—and [finally] because thus one can save Aristotle¹⁰⁴ about the knowable and knowledge.

67 Then *per se* is never said of correlatives qua relative; and then never are the relative and the 'to which' simultaneous in nature, but the 'to which' is prior to the relative qua relative, because upon that it depends, not the contrary, and without which the other is not, but conversely.

68 No *per se* mutual relatives, nor conversely non-mutuals, are defined, nor are they known from one another. The relation is only terminated to the relative *per se* qua relative, and vice versa to the [thing] informed by some relation. And so the words of Aristotle¹⁰⁵ can be saved that are opposed to the conclusions deduced just above.¹⁰⁶

69 [10] [Conclusion 16]—Never is there is a real relation in one extreme and a conceptual relation in the other, because it is impossible that a real thing and a conceptual being be simultaneous by nature, for then the real thing would depend upon the intellect, because it depends upon its correlative.

70 On the contrary: what about the relationship of God to creatures?¹⁰⁷—I reply it is only a real thing that is really related that may depend upon the consideration of the intellect, from which these are called conceptual relations, and thus every such relation of God to creatures at least depends upon the consideration of the divine intellect, as ideas are assumed to be in God or from the act of the will, as 'creator'; but no relation, not even [a relation] of reason is new in God.

¹⁰³That is, from the preceding conclusion, supra n. 65.

¹⁰⁴Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 7, 7b 23-30: "Non autem in omnibus relativis verum videtur simul esse natura; scibile enim scientia prius esse videtur; namque in pluribus subsistentibus rebus scientias accipimus; in paucis enim vel nullis hoc quis reperiet, simul cum scibili scientiam factam. Amplius scibile sublatum simul aufert scientiam, scientia vero non aufert scibile; nam si scibile non sit, non est scientia, scientia vero si non sit, nihil prohibet esse scibile."

¹⁰⁵Cf. supra, n. 66.

¹⁰⁶Cf. supra, nn. 62-65.

¹⁰⁷Cf. conclusions 7 and 8; supra, nn. 49-50.

71 It is proved in another way, because those things in God are prior to these in creatures, Bk. IX, q. 1.¹⁰⁸ It would not be so if they were to depend upon a created intellect, since this only considers those from real relations in ceatures. This is confirmed, because Augustine¹⁰⁹ calls these new names.

72 The relative can be prior to the correlative in the fifth mode of priority in the *Categories*,¹¹⁰ but not in the second mode.

73 [Conclusion 17]—Because it is a being, a relation is *per se* and primarily intelligible, although not without other things being understood at the same time.

What is common is primarily referred [a] to what is common, although for singulars; or [b] to singulars primarily. If the first,¹¹¹ then never in what is said according to one, is a relation towards another as its first correlative, but for another; if the second,¹¹² it is always “ad aliud” except in identity¹¹³ or that is a relation of reason; look at conclusions 10 and 8.¹¹⁴

74 I reply: to be referred *per se* in the first mode pertains to what is common, namely to the concrete in the category of relation. But [to be referred] *per accidens* or *per se* in the second mood pertains to the singular of another category in which there is a relation.—On the contrary: a relation is at times a proper attribute; this is primarily in the species, and *per accidens* in the individual.

¹⁰⁸Cf. infra Bk. IX, qq. 1-2, nn. 23, 33.

¹⁰⁹For example, Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 13, n. 14 (PL 42, 920; CCL 50, 221): “...non possumus negare etiam Spiritum Sanctum recte dici principium quia non eum separamus ab appellatione creatoris;” cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* I, d. 30, qq. 1-2, n. 11 (VII, 172).

¹¹⁰Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 12, 14a 26-b 13: “Prius alterum altero dicitur quadrupliciter... Secundo quod non convertitur secundum subsistendi consequentiam, ut unus duobus prius esse... Videtur autem praeter eos qui dicti sunt alter esse prioris modus; eorum enim quae convertuntur secundum essentiae consequentiam, quod alterius quomodolibet causa est digne prius natura dicitur.”

¹¹¹Namely, if common referred primarily to common.

¹¹²Namely, if common referred primarily to singulars.

¹¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 9, 1018a 7-9: “...quare palam quia identitas unio quaedam est, aut plurium unius est aut quando utitur ut pluribus, veluti quando dicit idem eidem idem; nam ut duobus utitur eodem.”

¹¹⁴Cf. supra, nn. 56, 50.

75 Opposed relations¹¹⁵ can be founded in the same limited thing; act and passion in motion; the will moves itself.

76 [11] The unlimited foundation for opposite relations is not referred to them, because it is not distinguished. Therefore the divine essence is not referred, but the persons. Otherwise 'God' is referred per accidens as is 'man'; deity in no way just as humanity is not; the Father [is referred] *per se* in the first mode.

77 To the contrary: then God would be distinguished.—I reply: it does not follow regarding the unlimited in which [the relation is], but regarding a limited "in quo" or a relative.

78 [Conclusion 18]—Limited: [are] imperfect, mutable, dependent, naturally ordained, really related. The order among the first three is evident. The fourth needs the explanation, viz. that it anticipates something outside itself in which the relation is grounded. The fifth is ordered such that in some way or other it may be perfected by that upon which it depends, because it is more to have whiteness in two than in one.

79 On the contrary: therefore the most white is not similar to the most white, given that two would exist.—Also, how is white dissimilar to black?—Also, the created does not act insofar as it is imperfect, but insofar as it is perfect and in act, and nevertheless insofar as it acts, it is really referred.—Also, if A, insofar as it is imperfect depends upon B, as that by which it may be perfected, therefore, B is perfect insofar as A is said to be referred to it. And thus B insofar as it is perfect, either it is said to be towards A, which is our thesis; or it is not said to be related to A insofar as A is said to be related to it, [conclusion] 15.¹¹⁶—Also, to understand God under an intelligible aspect, is to understand him imperfectly, because 'to understand' is dependency qua intelligible, because it is towards another. For just as a real relation, because it is "ad aliud" implies dependence in its foundation, and as foundation it is in the thing in itself, so too a relation of reason [implies dependence] in its fundament.—Also God, prior naturally, understands the first being before he understand himself to be the first being; therefore that real relation [is] 'primacy'.—Also, that relation 'intelligible'

¹¹⁵Formally speaking.

¹¹⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 66.

precedes the act of intellection.—Also, as formally “productive being” is necessarily a matter of perfection in the Father, in this way “causative” necessarily is in God, because perfect largess is not dependence.

80 But why is necessary causality required for a real relation, since the will causes? or why determination or limitation to the caused, since the will is unlimited to [any given] act? whether it be an act which is an accident, since the effect is equally distinguished from the cause, or whether the act by which it [the effect] is produced, is the same as the cause or different?—I answer: because a relation is not founded immediately upon substance.

81 [12] [Conclusion 19]—Correlatives are simultaneous,¹¹⁷ [this] is understood [1] either so far as the act of being, and there are many instances, prior and posterior, etc. [2] or insofar as correlatives [are] simultaneous. In this way, whenever one relation is in something, whether actually existing or not, the corresponding relation is in the other; just as whenever paternity is in someone, filiation is in something, whether existing or not. However there will always be the subject, since its existence is required to found such a relation, as it had to be at some time [in order] to be generated.

82 [Conclusion 20]—Correlatives, if they are simultaneous by nature, whenever one relation does not necessarily require that there be a subject actually existing in which it [the first relation] is founded, so neither does the other relation; but if it [the subject] does exist in actuality this is incidental. Just as what is actually ‘generable’ is in a being in potency, it is incidental that the generative be founded in a being in act; for in actuality it could be generative, although in actuality it were not existing.

83 According to conclusions 18 and 19,¹¹⁸ all relations in God can be posited to be real—as the corresponding [relations] in creatures—, and these relations are eternal, and there is a new denomination when the subject or term newly becomes actual.

84 Against this; the same quality as the relation could be posited before generation, because it will be in the potential subject.—Also,

¹¹⁷Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 7, 7b 15: “Videtur autem ad aliquid simul esse natura.”

¹¹⁸Cf. *supra*, nn. 78, 81.

when it informs uniformly, why does it not uniformly denominate?—Also, then the passage from *On the Trinity* V¹¹⁹ is nothing [meaningless]; ‘therefore, a relation is an accident in creatures, because it comes to it by way of some change’; for nothing comes to it on the basis of what is eternal, nor the foundation of anything qua foundation.

85 [Conclusions 21-24]—A relation is not [1] that by which the agent acts; nor by which [2] it has the potency to do what it is able to do; neither is the relation [3] that by which it is receptive, nor [4] that by which the object is object.

86 The first¹²⁰ is proved, because the action is something more perfect than the relation or at least the term of the action [is more perfect]. If some act is first, it is always more perfect than a second act.—From this a second¹²¹ follows, because by the same thing by which it acts, it is potent or able to act.—The third¹²² is proved because the absolute recipient immediately is perfected once the absolute is received; if the relation were that by which [it was perfected] then the composite of the absolute and the relation would be the immediate recipient. The first [conclusion] could also be proved in a similar way.—The fourth¹²³ follows from the first and third, because the object either is active or passive.

87 But this proof¹²⁴ is invalid. First, because the relation of the object—also where it is active—is other than the relation of the active; and secondly, because the division is not valid. For the object of the will and [the object] of an non-fabricating active potency [viz. immanent], is neither active or passive, because passion in something extrinsic corresponds only to the making.

¹¹⁹Augustine, *De Trinitate* V, ch. 5, n. 6 (PL 42, 914; CCL 50, 210): “In rebus enim creatis atque mutabilibus quod non secundum substantiam dicitur restat ut secundum accidens dicatur. Omnia enim accidunt eis, quae vel amitti possunt vel minui et magnitudines et qualitates, et quod dicitur ad aliquid sicut amicitiae, propinquitates, servitutes, similitudines, aequalitates et si qua huiusmodi et situs et habitus et loca et tempora et opera atque passiones.”

¹²⁰Conclusion 21: relation is not that by which an agent acts.

¹²¹Conclusion 22: relation is not that by which the potent has a potency or power.

¹²²Conclusion 23: relation is not that by which a recipient receives.

¹²³Conclusion 24: relation is not that by which an object is an object.

¹²⁴Namely, proof of the fourth.

88 [13] Therefore, it is proved in another way: the relation of an object to the potency is a conceptual relation; this does not presuppose an act of reason, therefore it cannot be the formal notion of the object of the intellect, because the formal notion of the object precedes the act [of knowing]. Neither is it, in short, the act of another potency—unless it may be [wrongly] imagined to be of the will—, because all others have their acts, apart from presupposing an act of the intellect. The argument is totally invalid concerning the will, because [1] it tends to a thing as it is in itself, and [2] because volition can accompany the first apprehension of the object, when no conceptual relation has yet been caused.

89 The first assumption—namely, that the relation of the object to the potency is a conceptual relation—seems to be false, both from the second conclusion treated above¹²⁵ and from conclusion 15.¹²⁶ Neither does Aristotle say this in the text.

90 All these members¹²⁷ are refuted by this, that the relation upon action and passion is founded on act and potency; therefore, it is naturally posterior.—Also, in particular about the second and third, whether that potency perishes, when it acts, or when it receives.—Also, those terms of the relations are simultaneous by nature, or they are not posterior by nature to the relations themselves. Action and reception are terms of active and receptive potencies, but to act or to receive does not naturally precede itself; therefore neither does the potency thereto.

91 Note that about the four conclusions now lastly proposed,¹²⁸ the first three pertain to the the second type of relatives and the fourth to the third type.

92 For the fourth conclusion,¹²⁹ note that although the object at times is active and at other times passive, nevertheless it is not the same relation of the object or the relation of the active, but there are two relations founded in the same absolute. For when the object

¹²⁵Cf. *supra*, nn. 37-44.

¹²⁶Cf. *supra*, nn. 66-68.

¹²⁷Cf. *supra* n. 85; cf. *infra* Bk. IX, q. 5: "Utrum potentia includat essentialiter aliquem respectum" nn. 12-37; also Bk. IX, qq. 1-2 and qq. 3-4.

¹²⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 85.

¹²⁹Namely, conclusion 24: Relation is not that by which an object is an object; cf. *supra*, n. 85.

so far as real existence perishes, it ceases to act on the potency; it does not however cease to be an object, because what exists and what does not exist is similarly understood and loved. Also, when it [the object] acts on the potency or is acted upon, it still is not insofar as it acts or suffers potentially, but insofar as it is the term of the action of a potency, it is the object. It is the term, I say, but not one produced, because the latter is the effect of the producing agent, but the term into which it passes, as in the object of a making or productive potency. This is not the third type of relation, however, but of the second type of the active to the passive. Therefore, the action that remains in the agent is not a term “in which” but a term “about which” [and] it is the object of a potency as an intelligible, or of a habit, as a knowable; this is a relation of the third sort.¹³⁰

93 From this it follows that objects of passive potencies are not referred in the third mode, but the second; for they only act on passive potencies, and do not terminate them; it is evident it is not according to their substance nor according to a passion, because if something is the term of a passion it remains in the patient, nor is the object of a ‘fabricating’ potency referred in the third way, nor, namely, is the term produced, nor on which it acts, as was said.¹³¹

94 [14] Of those relations of the third type the Philosopher¹³² says that they are not mutual, but they are not said without their being *per se*, nor are they said to be conceptual relations. Of the first and second note.¹³³

¹³⁰Cf. supra n. 57.

¹³¹Cf. supra n. 92.

¹³²Aristotle, *Metaphysicae* V, ch. 15, 1021a 30-b 2: “...mensurabile vero et sententiale eo quod aliud ad ipsum dicitur ad aliquid dicuntur. Nam sententiale significat quia eius est sententia, non est autem sententia ad hoc cuius est sententia (bis enim idem diceretur) et similiter alicuius visus est visus, non cuius est visus (est et verum hoc dicere) sed ad colorem aut ad aliud aliquid tale. Illo vero modo bis idem diceretur, quia est visus cuius est visus.”

¹³³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15 1021a 30-b 2: “Ad aliquid dicuntur alia ut duplum ad dimidium et triplum ad tertiam partem, et totaliter multiplicatum ad multiplicati partem et continens ad contentum; alia ut calefactivum ad calefactibile et sectivum ad secabile, et omne activum ad passivum;” the aforementioned are the first two modes of relation according to Aristotle. Scotus apparently never completed the final sentence of paragraph 94.

95 Of the third¹³⁴ it is proved that the visible is not a conceptual relation both [1] because it necessarily accompanies the visual potency or it precedes it, because “preempted,”¹³⁵ etc.; but a conceptual relation is not prior nor simultaneous with the true real thing; and also [2] because in *De anima* II,¹³⁶ the Philosopher wishes that this is *per se* in the second mode: “Color is visible.” It is impossible that a conceptual thing be predicated *per se* of an extramental thing. Hence the proof of the fourth conclusion¹³⁷ about the object, viz. by means of a conceptual relation is invalid.

96 Therefore so far as this second mode¹³⁸ goes, one must put it in this way, that the absolute nature, whether active or passive, as naturally prior is ordered to acting or receiving before it acts or suffers something, and this relation determining to acting or suffering is not an elicitive principle nor a receptive principle, however, but an order founded on an elicitive and receptive principle, as is proved of the elicitive principle, which asserts more perfect being and of the receptive which is immediately [such], and of both which remain with the action and the reception.

97 It remains, therefore, to answer the two arguments, viz. [1] how the relation is based upon action and passion in potency, since it precedes action, and [2] how this relation exists when it term does not.

98 To the first it may be conceded that potential relations are founded upon action and passion in potency. And this is proved, because actual relations are founded upon action and passion in actuality, and potential relations are of the same species as the actual. Therefore, they have the same specific foundation. But the relation of potency which is in act is founded upon the absolute

¹³⁴Cf. supra n. 93.

¹³⁵Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 7, 8a 1-7: “...sensato autem perempto peremptum est et corpus (sensorum enim est corpus), cum vero corpus non sit, perimitur et sensus; quare simul perimit sensatus sensus. Sensus vero sensatum non simul perimit; animali enim perempto sensus quidem peremptus est, sensatum vero erit, ut corpus calidum, dulce, amarum, et alia omnia quaecumque sunt talia.”

¹³⁶Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 7, 418a 30: “Visibile enim est color, hoc autem est in eo quod secundum se visibile.”

¹³⁷Cf. supra n. 86.

¹³⁸Namely, the second type of relatives according to Aristotle, namely between active and passive; cf. *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 15-27 and supra, n. 57.

nature, which is the principle of acting; see Simplicius at the beginning of the chapter “On Relation” in his commentary on the *Categories*.¹³⁹

99 To the other¹⁴⁰ it is said that the term of the relation in potency is the action in potency, and thus it is simultaneous with the potency.—Another answer: the simultaneity of correlatives, for example prior and posterior, should be denied in such cases.

100 [15] Against this way: a principle that always has its action coeval with itself is no less an active principle than one that precedes its action, and nevertheless the first is not ordered by some relation of potency to acting, because the potency does not remain with the action; therefore, that potency is not prior naturally in what is active or receptive to its action or reception. But only in time—and this if the active or receptive happens accidentally to be prior in time to its acting or receiving. From this it follows that it [the potency] is not necessary as determining, both [1] because the agent, to which action is coeval, acts determinately, and [2] because it would be more necessary when it acts in actuality than before it acted. For then, when it actually acts, it is maximally determined to action. The potency, however, remains with the actuality.

101 Also, a relation is more determined by a determination of the term that vice versa, at least the determination of the term is prior; but the action is the term of this potency. Because it is determined to this action, therefore, it is this potency, not vice versa.

102 Against the response to the first:¹⁴¹ that potency, according to you, is prior naturally to action in actuality, and the action is the foundation of the actual relation; therefore, that relation is prior to the fundament of the actual relation founded upon action in actuality; but it is not prior to the fundament of the potential relation founded upon the action in potency, because the potency in it [the subject] to act is not prior to the action in potency; therefore, the actual and potential relations do not have a foundation of the same species, against what was said above [n. 98], “And this is proved,” etc.

¹³⁹Simplicius, *In Praedicamenta* praed. ‘Ad aliquid’ (CLCAG V¹, 218).

¹⁴⁰Namely, how the relation is when its term does not exist, cf. supra n. 97.

¹⁴¹Cf. supra, n. 98.

103 Against the first response to the second:¹⁴² if action in potency is the term of a relation of potency, I ask: In potency to what? For that potency is a relation. Let it be either to A in act, and as [argued] previously, it [A] does not exist. Therefore, neither does the potency to it exist; therefore neither does the first potency. If the second potency is to A in potency, I ask: In potency to what? For also that potency is a relation, and thus an infinite process follows. Also it is evident that the term of the relation of potency is a being in act or an act, because the potency is to an act and not to a potency.

104 Against the second response to the same:¹⁴³ the intellect¹⁴⁴ can separate more things than can be separated in existence. But it is impossible to understand one relative without its correlative; therefore it cannot exist without the other coexisting.

105 Also, this entire view assumes that the Philosopher has not distinguished the modes of relative sufficiently, since that potency could be founded immediately upon the substantial form or some active quality, and not upon something in the category of action or passion.

106 [16] Therefore, it is conceded¹⁴⁵ that potency properly so-called, which namely is opposed to act, is neither an elicitive nor a receptive principle, nor is it naturally prior to the act of acting or suffering, as in potency, as the first way admits.¹⁴⁶ And the first three arguments [n. 98-99], which this way concedes, conclude to this. But it is founded in both when it precedes the act of acting or receiving. Nor is it naturally prior to the action or passion, such that it in some way pertains to the notion of cause, as determining, or in any way whatsoever, as has been proved there "Against this way,"¹⁴⁷ etc. Because it does not remain with the act, nor is it in any way necessary for acting or receiving, neither as previous nor as concomitant.

¹⁴²Cf. supra, n. 99.

¹⁴³Cf. supra, n. 99.

¹⁴⁴Cf. Averroes, *Metaphysica* XII, com. 39 (ed. Iuntina VIII, f. 151ab): "Intellectus enim natus est dividere adunata in esse in ea, ex quibus componuntur, quamvis non dividantur in esse."

¹⁴⁵Cf. infra Bk. IX, qq. 3-4, nn. 15-28.

¹⁴⁶Cf. supra, n. 96.

¹⁴⁷Cf. supra, n. 100.

107 But is potency understood in an extended sense, taken as a potential active or passive principle,—I do not say taken as an absolute which is a principle, but for that relation of the principle or cause—necessary for acting or suffering, whether as naturally (or any other way) prior, or as necessarily concomitant?

108 I reply: the relation of the principle, whether it is said with respect to the action or to its term, is not actual except when the action exists. But then it is not naturally prior to the action, but posterior, since then [if it were prior] it would be naturally prior to its term. The relation itself, however, is necessarily concomitant with the action, because it [the relation] necessarily exists, given the existence of both extremes [termini]. For both together with it [the relation] are in act if it is sudden [instantaneous]. And if successive, then the absolute upon which it is founded, and the action then exist, although not the term of the action. But a relation of cause or principle in potency does not accompany the action, because it [the action] does not then exist, nor is it necessarily prior, because it is not necessary that an absolute precede its action temporally. What has been said about action, may be understood in the same way of passion, but the relation of the potency is temporally prior to the action and passion, if the absolute precedes the action or reception.

109 [17] As for the second type of relative,¹⁴⁸ note that these are found here in regard to action and passion. First, there is the potency founded upon an absolute nature of substance or quality or quantity with respect to acting, suffering or receiving. And then the relation of the act based in action or reception, which is the term of this potency. Still there is not the relation of this cause except in potency, and not in potency except as the term of the aforesaid potency. And this [term] is not immediate. What is immediate is the action or reception qua act upon which the relation of efficient or material cause is based, to which the opposite relation of the caused, based upon the term produced through the action or upon what has been received or composed of the recipient and what it has received, corresponds. Because perhaps the matter is called

¹⁴⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 96.

more the matter of the composite than of the form, according to the second conclusion about the form.¹⁴⁹

110 But not only action is of the act, according to which aspect it terminates the first relation, viz. of the potency to it; nor is it only the production according to which aspect it founds a relation to the term produced; but also it is motion or active mutation according to which aspect it founds a relation to that which is moved. In this way passion is an act, as it terminates the relation of the potency to it; and it is the production of something, and it founds a relation to the product; it is motion or passive mutation, and it founds a relationship to the moving agent.

111 The three aforesaid¹⁵⁰ are contained unitively perhaps in the action, and similarly three other in passion, not in any action but only in that which is a making, and not that which is immanent by which nothing is produced. And not just in any making,—if creation could be called a making, since through it [creation] something outside the agent is produced, although it may not pass outside into a [pre-existing] subject, nevertheless it still passes into a term—, but only in natural making which is a motion which is a certain species of action, including the three aforesaid, and according to these [aforesaid, it is a making] founding three relations.

112 But some actions, which do not include these, do not found as many. For volition founds only one, which is the act and the term of the potency, which is in the will to willing. Creation founds two relations: one by which it is the term of the potency, the other by which it is the production to the product, and thus upon it is founded the relation of efficient cause, and upon the term the

¹⁴⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Theoremata*, 'De forma' concl. 2 (ed. M. Dreyer, G. Krieger, H. Moelle, at press): "...forma est causa duorum causatorum et informati, extra quod est essentialiter, et informati, cuius essentiae est aliquid. Si tamen illud possit dici informatum, cum nunquam sit informabile proprie, et tunc vigesima quarta infra cum tribus sequentibus intelligendae sunt de causato formae, quod est compositum, non quod est materia prima... et tunc compositum non videretur unum nisi aggregatione, cum nulla formarum ordinarum sit in potentia ad aliam, nec aliqua alterius actus—aut cum hoc quod actuat etiam formam quamlibet intermediam, et etiam compositum quodlibet intermedium—, et tunc videretur idem esse actus multorum tamen ordinatorum, multorum etiam totorum et partium eorum."

¹⁵⁰Namely, in action (and similarly in being affected) is action, production and motion, cf. supra n. 110.

relation of effect. The generation of fire founds a third relation; for it is the term of the potency founded upon the substantial form of the generating fire or upon the generating fire; and it is the production of the fire generated and it is a mutation of the potential matter to the form of the fire to be generated.

113 But every passion properly so called of the category of passion includes the three aforesaid relations. For it never even exists unless it corresponds to an action including the aforesaid three relationships. For it does not correspond to the first action, such as volition, because this action has no term other than itself. And the aspect of production in action is prior to the aspect of motion, because nothing is moved or mutated except something other than the passion itself. Nor does it correspond to the second,¹⁵¹ because there, although something is produced, nothing is moved or mutated, because then it would have to naturally precede the term. Hence, it corresponds to the third action.¹⁵²

114 [18] Therefore, of these three relations that have already been mentioned, the first¹⁵³ is not of the agent and patient, in such a way that real things of the category of action and passion found there mutual relations, but it is a relation transcending potency and act, transcending in the manner of which we will now speak.¹⁵⁴

115 Also the second¹⁵⁵ is likewise not founded mutually upon action and passion, but either upon one of these (as in creation), or upon both of these (as in generation) as to its term. And this term is [one and] the same thing, speaking of the absolute, although it founds two relations, when it terminates two, and nevertheless it founds but one when it is the term of action only, as in creation. And this relation similarly is transcendent in some way, because the relation of cause and caused. Therefore only relations of the third order are founded mutually upon action and passion, and this varies according to Aristotle in the text.¹⁵⁶

¹⁵¹Namely, creation, cf. supra n. 112.

¹⁵²Namely, generation, cf. supra n. 112.

¹⁵³Namely, action, cf. supra nn. 110-111.

¹⁵⁴Cf. infra, n. 115.

¹⁵⁵Namely, production, cf. supra nn. 110-111.

¹⁵⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 19-b 2.

116 For howsoever action and passion are accepted proportionately—whether in potency or in act, whether in the past or the future, whether positively or privatively—, they always found mutual relations, because the essential notion of the foundations always remains *per se*; nevertheless, in some way they are diversified by the factors determining that fundament. And where there is unity together with some diversity, there is similitude. For example, if I were to say, as one simile to another simile, so this simile howsoever determined to another simile comparably determined, for instance similar in whiteness to something similar in whiteness; and so in other instances. Therefore, the relation founded in an absolute with respect to action or passion is other than that which is founded in action in potency and passion in potency, and this according to the aspect by which action is motion and passion is motion. And although that determination, which determines the action and passion, is a relation of a potency—and perhaps is the same thing as that which is the relation to action and passion—, nevertheless as determining it is not the cause of the mutual relation, but is that which is determined through it.

[II.—DOUBTS ABOUT THE SOLUTION
A.—TWELVE DOUBTS]

117 [19] In this account there are several dubious points.

The first: it follows that the Philosopher did not distinguish sufficiently the types of relation,¹⁵⁷ because the relations of the first and second order¹⁵⁸ pertain to none of them, according to you.

118 Second: it seems that every potency ends immediately with action or passion, which seems false, since being is divided in general through act and potency, and thus every genus is thus divided.

119 Thirdly: that the relation of the efficient or material cause is only founded on the categories of action and passion and not upon some absolute form, since that would seem to be a principle or cause of action.—Similarly, an efficient cause seems more perfect than its

¹⁵⁷Cf. *infra*, Bk. V, qq. 12-14; and *supra*, n. 105.

¹⁵⁸Namely, act and production; cf. *supra* n. 110.

effect, which at times is substance; therefore the formal aspect in a cause is not action, because there is also matter; hence, it [the cause] seems to receive and not vice versa.

120 The fourth: relation regarding reception is towards something received, and this is not something composed.—Also, the composite is a product and thus terminates the second notion¹⁵⁹ of act, and hence, not the first.

121 Fifth: that the same thing can be produced by generation and creation; therefore it will found these same relations, otherwise that product would refer to two, which is against Aristotle here;¹⁶⁰ the same thing will also be produced by two productions.—Also, if the agent formally is denominated by relation of efficient cause, therefore, the foundation is in it, but the action is not. Therefore God and fire are not said univocally to be calefactive, because God qua calefactive is not said [to be referred] to what can be heated, whereas fire is so said [to be referred]. This seems incongruous, since the diversity of the subjects does not vary the relations.—Also, the same specific action is referred to the same thing specifically; therefore it founds these relations.

122 Sixth: if creation is in the creating one; therefore, it is eternal, and thus does not terminate a potency.

123 Seventh: why then is God not said to be really related to a creature, as efficient causative towards the creature effected?

124 Eighth: because volition is a passion insofar as it is received into the will, and intellection likewise.

125 [20] Ninth: because since action could be without a term other than itself, why not similarly some passion? And this is true in regard to the first intellection, which is a passion without any other impressed form.

126 Tenth: why in creation cannot the potential naturally be understood prior to the actual and in this prior moment of nature be transmuted to act, and this transmutation [understood to] be a production of the composite? As if God were to create only matter in a most highly disposed [state] and in the presence of a natural

¹⁵⁹Namely, production; cf. *supra*, n. 110.

¹⁶⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 30-32; cf. *infra* Bk. V, q. 14, n. 21.

agent, such that the agent in the same instant—although posteriorly by nature—were to induce the form into the matter; thus if God would create nothing but matter and from it in a simultaneity of duration would produce the composite without creating it.

127 Eleven: because since “a passion is an effect of action” in the *Six Principles*¹⁶¹ of act by act and potency by potency; why is not that third mode of relatives one of an efficient cause to its effect?

128 Twelve: because “active” implies being able to act; “passive” implies being able to suffer or be acted on, by reason of the potency here and there they are not predicated mutually, because it [potency] in both is predicated only with reference to act; therefore only by reason of acting and ‘suffering’ as terminating a potency; but action terminating a potency is an action in act. Therefore the very same relation is of action and passion according to act and according to potency, because it is the same relata.

129 This is confirmed: the term is not specified through relation; therefore neither is act through the potency related to it.—Or in this way: those things which are immediately referred and those which are not, are not referred in the same way. An agent is immediately referred to a patient able to act, not to the passive qua passive, because ‘able to act’ primarily refers to acting just as ‘passive’ primarily refers to being acted upon beyond action and passion.

[B.—REPLY TO THE DOUBTS]

130 [21] To the first:¹⁶² the conclusion is conceded, because it is not about the transcendentals, but only a certain category or genus for a foundation with respect to the recipients, look up how it must be glossed.¹⁶³

131 To the second:¹⁶⁴ potency and act, as differences of being, divide any being whatsoever. Here it is this way. Whiteness is in

¹⁶¹*Liber de sex principiis* ch. 3, n. 29 (AL I⁶ 7, 41): “Passio autem est effectus illatioque actionis.”

¹⁶²Cf. *supra*, n. 117.

¹⁶³Cf. Duns Scotus, *Ordinatio* IV, d. 13, q. 1, n. [26-28] (ed. Vivès XVII, 684-685).

¹⁶⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 118.

objective potency,¹⁶⁵ i.e. as object or term of a potency. Term, I say, whose correlative is whiteness in act, i.e. a term exhausting the potency, as whiteness is in a state of becoming to which a passive relation of making follows with respect to being made.

132 On the contrary: 'becoming in being made' exhausts 'becoming in potency' as its *per se* term.

133 To the third:¹⁶⁶ it must be conceded 'act by act and potency by potency'.¹⁶⁷ Form and end [goal] are not founded only upon action and passion, because efficient and matter precede the real thing. Its form and its end both accompany the production and follow the production according to the order of nature; therefore they are more as termini of action and passion than that these [relations] are founded on these [i.e. action and passion]. Action and passion, however, can be terminated as absolutes of diverse genera. What is added [n. 119], that the absolute is a principle of action seems to be false; look for a process ad infinitum among the conclusions about action concerning this.¹⁶⁸ Hence this argument proves that one has to assume a fourth relation which is in between the first and second.¹⁶⁹ What is added [n. 119] about the perfection of the efficient cause is understood insofar as the remote foundation for the relation is concerned.

134 To the fourth:¹⁷⁰ passion is an act and production and reception and motion. Reception is understood in motion, as on the part of action, active impression is understood in motion. Hence, production is suitably placed in the second place;¹⁷¹ motion in the third place.—On the contrary: the reception of the form is prior to the production of the composite.

¹⁶⁵For the divisions of potency, see below Bk. IX, qq. 1-2, nn. 39-48.

¹⁶⁶Cf. supra, n. 119.

¹⁶⁷Cf. supra, n. 127; and infra, Bk. IX, q. 5, nn. 17, 25.

¹⁶⁸Cf. supra n. 103; Duns Scotus, *Theoremata* 'De causis' concl. 14 (ed. M. Dreyer, G. Krieger, H. Moelle, at press): "In omni genere causae est status et ita aliquod primum, II *Metaphysicae*."

¹⁶⁹Cf. supra, nn. 110-111.

¹⁷⁰Cf. supra, n. 120.

¹⁷¹Cf. supra, n. 110.

135 To the other:¹⁷² It may be conceded. The same thing is the product by a production of action and passion and to each it is referred by way of a different relationship.

136 To the fifth:¹⁷³ When the absolute is a mediate effect, action and passion are immediate, according to the *Six Principles*;¹⁷⁴ then the absolute depends upon several; therefore, it grounds more relations than when it immediately terminates action. It may be conceded that it is not univocally, because fire is able to make something hot, God can make heat califactive; [heating] can signify both equivocally.—The other about the identity of action¹⁷⁵ is false; it is not from the term, but from the elicitive principle, according to Bk. V of the *Physics*, comment [38].¹⁷⁶

137 To the sixth¹⁷⁷ this way: no action coeval with the agent terminates, but it is suited by nature to terminate; so is it here.

138 To the seventh:¹⁷⁸ Look for it.¹⁷⁹

139 To the eighth:¹⁸⁰ volition, if taken *per se* would be an action and an act and a production, but if it is 'in' something, it is as its form, not as a passion. But as the reception of whiteness would be a passion, so too the reception of volition.

140 Against this: reception is the immediate effect of some action, which can only be the will; and what was said in the first mode of action is destroyed, viz. [when you said] that "these do not have a term other than themselves."¹⁸¹

¹⁷²Cf. supra, n. 120.

¹⁷³Cf. supra, n. 121.

¹⁷⁴*Liber de sex principiis* ch. 2, n. 23 (AL I⁷, 39-40): "Naturalis vero proprietas actionis est passionem ex se in eo quod subicitur inferre; omnis enim actio passionis effectiva est omneque passionem inferens actio est. Contingit tamen actionem actione effici; actio enim eius quod *per se* movetur eius actionis quod per aliud generativa est."

¹⁷⁵Cf. supra, n. 121.

¹⁷⁶Averroes, *Physica* V, com. 38 (ed. Iuntina IV, f. 106rb).

¹⁷⁷Cf. supra, n. 122.

¹⁷⁸Cf. supra, n. 123.

¹⁷⁹Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 30, qq. 1-2, nn. 55-64 (XVII, 414-417); *Ordinatio* I, d. 30, qq. 1-2, nn. 59-70 (VI, 196-201).

¹⁸⁰Cf. supra, n. 124.

¹⁸¹Cf. supra, n. 113.

141 Also, volition will then be prior to itself, because its being is in the subject and its reception is before this, as the way, and volition before that, as its cause.

142 To the first:¹⁸²

143 [22] To the ninth:¹⁸³ Look for it.¹⁸⁴

144 To the tenth:¹⁸⁵ he [Averroes?] does not argue against the creation of the matter as having two primary reasons¹⁸⁶ for action, and not a third, whatever be the case with the composite. Similarly, although he proves it is not necessary that the composite be created, but only the matter; nevertheless he does not prove that this is not possible; for the form can be produced by God without the matter being naturally presupposed, as it were.

145 To the eleventh:¹⁸⁷ one may concede that the relation of action and passion is a relation of such an efficient cause through motion, namely, or mutation with respect to such a proximate effect of a cause. But a creating [cause] without that proximate effect, produces the ultimate effect which always, both here and there, is what is principally intended, although the diminished efficient cause could not produce this immediately, because it cannot produce things from nothing, and thus produces something by transmuting something [already existing]. But that passion is not the efficient cause of matter, but is more the material cause of the product, so that the efficient cause not only effects the principal product, but also its matter: [1] either simply by creating it, [2] or as the matter of this [being] by generating it. And thus it [the efficient cause] effects in some way all the other three causes. About this [see] above.¹⁸⁸ Concerning the form and the end and the extreme, this is made sufficiently clear in Bk. II.¹⁸⁹

¹⁸²The reply to nn. 140-141 is missing; cf. the interpolated text (appended to n. 132) printed in the appendix.

¹⁸³Cf. *supra*, n. 125.

¹⁸⁴Cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* I, d. 6, q. un., n. 19 (XVI, 464); *Ordinatio* I, d. 6, q. un., n. 12 (IV, 92).

¹⁸⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 126.

¹⁸⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 110.

¹⁸⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 127.

¹⁸⁸Cf. *supra* n. 109; also Bk. V, q. 1, nn. 57-61.

¹⁸⁹Cf. *supra* Bk. II, qq. 2-3, nn. 27-34.

146 To the twelfth:¹⁹⁰ it proves that by reason of the determination from here and there they are not mutually predicated, which I concede; but [it is] by reason of the things determined; for if the determining factors were the reason why they are referred,—since these are diverse: act, potency, pastness, futurity, privation,¹⁹¹—it would follow that all these would not be similarly predicated, because not by reason of what is one in them, but [by reason of what is] diverse. For example: as the greater in science to the lesser in science, so the greater in similitude to the lesser in similitude; this is true everywhere by reason of the things specified, namely of the greater and of the lesser, not by reason of the specifying factors, which to each are predicated with reference to others. As science, not to what is lesser, but to what is knowable; and this in still different ways, because science as measured; similar is not [related] to similar in this way. On the other hand: potency and potency, act and act, are two correlatives under one extreme of the relation, as under potency; then both under another as act.

147 To the form: the ground for referring is always action and passion, but not without the diversity of the specifying [factor]; and therefore, there is similitude.

148 What is assumed in the confirmation¹⁹² is to be denied, because just as [something can be determined] through another relation, so something can be determined by the [present] relation whereby it is related.

149 To the other:¹⁹³ by looking at the things determined, every relation is immediate, [but] not so far as determinants go. Nor are they mediate, because they produce nothing as regards that mutual relation.

¹⁹⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 128.

¹⁹¹Cf. *supra*, n. 116.

¹⁹²Cf. *supra*, n. 129.

¹⁹³Cf. *supra*, n. 129.

APPENDIX I
BOOK FIVE
QUESTION ELEVEN

The following interpolated text is attached to paragraph 132 in three manuscripts:¹

Likewise, being in act and being in potency do not immediately divide being, because according to this explanation, the second does not exist as already made under either coequal member.

Against what was said in C [the response in n. 133]: since potency and act sufficiently divide being, then to each category according to genus and species there corresponds its proper potency and proper act. But if the proper act is 'becoming', according to you, then the relation founded in reception has its proper 'becoming' of the first relation [as already made]. If in the other relative [term] it ought to have a potency, it will be terminated *per se* by its proper 'becoming,' and in it there will be a relation to 'the already made' of the second [relation], and so on ad infinitum; therefore, etc.

Against the dictum [response in n. 134] to D: if passion were act, production, reception and motion, since it [passion] is received naturally prior to its act, then it follows that the relation founded in it as a reception, would be prior to the relation founded in it as act.

Likewise, just as this instant is prior, then production etc. —Answer: this is true; but the production of the form is prior to its reception.

To the contrary: the relation, which you assume in the passion with regard to the total composite as its *per se* terminus, is not preceded by a relation; the reception of the form, however, does precede it [the composite]. Consequently, so does the relation based upon the passion, as the reception to what is received, precede the relation of production, which you assume to be with regard to the product.

¹The numbers in brackets [...] refer to the corresponding paragraphs in question 11 of Book V.

Against the other statement added there [in n. 135]: if the product as such is predicated of action and passion for different reasons, how then will not the same thing be said twice?

Against the response to the argument [in n. 139]: if volition is not a *per se* passion, whereas the reception of the volition [is a passion], therefore the reception of the volition rather than the volition itself first terminates the relation of potency.

Also, if volition is not reception nor an active production, but the form produced, then for the same reason 'removing' ought not to be called an action-produced as volition is [so-called]. Hence, just as volition is not productive of something else, so neither is whiteness or quantity. And just as whiteness and quantity require action and passion as their *per se* termini—in the way that forms are produced—so too does volition [require this]. These arguments seem to be contrary to the ninth [conclusion in n. 143].

To the first [argument in n. 140]: the 'coming to be' of volition, which is a quality informing the will, is also the reception of that quality, its production and a passion in which the relationship between the production and the product is founded. Therefore there is no way that volition, which is a 'produced' quality, can produce either the passive production or the active one. Hence, production or passive reception is an immediate effect of the action, which is 'I elicit'; [production] is not the elicited quality.

This makes the answer to the second [n. 141] clear: the same thing does not precede itself, but the action 'I elicit' precedes both.

Perhaps someone might say in response that just as a passion in the category of passion is not without a terminus, so neither is its corresponding action, but both found the three relations. Volition, however, which *per se* is not a passion, but only insofar as it is received in something else, has no other terminus.

QUESTION TWELVE

Text of Aristotle: "One type¹ of relative is as double to half, and treble to a third, and in general that which contains something else many times to that which is contained many times in something else and that which exceeds to that which is exceeded. Another type of relative is that which can heat to that which can be heated and that which can cut to that which can be cut, and in general of the active to the passive; and another type is as the measurable to the measure and the knowable to knowledge and the sensible to sense perception." (*Metaphysics V*, ch. 15, 1020b 26-32)

Are the philosopher's three modes of relatives suitable?

Does the Philosopher aptly assume three types of relation or relatives?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

1 [1] [The three modes in general] That he does not in general:

These diverse modes are founded upon diverse categories; therefore, the relations are in diverse categories. Proof of the implication: if a relation is the same as its foundation, then it is evident; if it is other than its foundation, since one takes the species and distinction from the foundation, then the relations will differ as the foundations do. Why should not the relations be distinguished generically, if the foundations are?

2 Likewise, the Philosopher says in Bk. V² that "eight may be described as a double number by use of the definition of two." Since doubleness is only in other numbers through duality, which is the first foundation of doubleness, therefore, it follows that the unity and distinction of a relation stems from its foundation.

¹Modus = mode, i.e. a way, a manner, a style of relating things. It explains how they are related, i.e. in what way. If one speaks of the noun form "relation" however, we need something other than 'mode.' The Oxford translation = kind, where I prefer 'type.'

²Aristotle, *Metaphysics V*, ch. 29, 1025a 1.

3 Also, these modes are not sufficient, because relatives according to genus are *per se* relatives, and are not contained under these modes. Proof of the first: whatever is contained in the concept of the genus, pertains to the concept of the species; therefore, if the genus depends on another, so too does the species.—The Philosopher says as much about the second³ in the text.⁴

4 [The relations of the first type] With reference especially to the first type,⁵ the same thing is not related *per se* to diverse things, but the same container is referred to the many things it contains [according to Aristotle].

5 Also, all relatives are opposed according to the *Categories*, in the chapter 'On Opposites';⁶ but containing and contained are not opposed. Proof of the minor: in the *Categories*, the chapter 'On Quantity':⁷ great and small are not contraries, because the same thing is called great and small; similarly, a number may be double this and half of that. Therefore, they are not opposed.

6 Also, the second part of this [first] type is not appropriate [i.e. equal, like, and the same], because identity [or sameness] is a conceptual relation; therefore, it is not a true relation of this sort. Proof: "identity is the oneness characteristic of more than one, when the intellect uses one as two";⁸ hence identity and real similarity are not in the same genus.

³Namely, that relatives are not contained under these modes.

⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 26-1021b 11.

⁵Paragraphs 4 and 5 deal with the first part concerning the first type of relatives, whereas paragraphs 6 and 7 treat of the second part concerning the first type of relatives; cf. Antonius Andreae, *Expositio in libros Metaph.* V, sum. un., ch. 14 n. [101] (ed. Vives VI 82b): "Ad evidentiam primae partis notandum quod relationes primi modi fundantur super aliquid de genere quantitatis, scilicet super numerum vel super continuum. Prius tamen reperitur relatio istius modi in numeris et inest dupliciter: uno modo comparando numerum ad numerum, ita quod oportet utrumque extremum esse numerum; alio modo comparando numerum ad unum, ita quod solum alterum extremum est numerus... Secundum hoc ergo, haec pars dividitur in duas: quia primo prosequitur de relativis primi modi, secundum quod consequuntur ipsum numerum. Secundo, prout sequuntur ipsum unum, quod est principium numeri."

⁶Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 10, 11b 25-26.

⁷Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 6, 6a 9-10.

⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 9, 1018a 7-9.

7 Also, “same,” “similar,” and “equal” are the *per se* parts of “one”; but one is characteristic of every genus or category;⁹ therefore, etc.

8 [Relations of the second type] Of the second mode in this way: neither the relation nor the relative are the foundation of a relation, but active and passive potencies [which are relations] are referred; therefore, the relation is not founded upon active and passive potency, nor are the forms of the “relation” in this genus [of action and passion], just as quality is not the form by which “double” is referred; likewise, quantity is not the form by which something similar is referred.

9 Also, if something is said relatively with regard to an active potency, it is also said with reference to passive potency; but this cannot be so, because then the same thing would be referred to two, because active potency *per se* refers to acting. If, therefore, it refers also to passive potency, then the same thing is referred to two different things.

10 [Relations of the third type] Of the third type: that nothing is referred according to this mode; both relatives are in the same category or genus; if they are not, then there are two categories of relations; but things said in this way are not in the same category, according to the Philosopher in Bk. X, ch. 9.¹⁰ He wishes to say that between relatives there is no medium, “because they are not in the same category”; and he gives the example of knowledge and what is knowable.

11 Also, by rational argument in this way: everything whose proper notion is in the category of relation has as the proper being or existence of that category (whether it be concrete, or a form or denominatively) to be towards something other than itself. But the being of the knowable is not to have itself towards something other than itself; here in Bk. V,¹¹ because it does not depend upon the knowledge.

⁹Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 1, 1052b 18; *Auctoritates Aristotelis*, ed. J. Hamesse, p. 135: “In unoquoque genere est dare aliquod primum et minimum quod fit metrum et mensura omnium illorum quae sunt in illo genere.”

¹⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IX, ch. 7, 1057a 37-38.

¹¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 31 and 1021a 30-32.

12 The Philosopher explains the contrary in the text.¹²

QUESTION THIRTEEN

Is the third mode distinguished from the second?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

13 [1] That it is not:

In this [third] mode sense perception and the sensible is posited. But the sense and the sensible are referred according to active and passive potency, according to the Philosopher in Bk. IV, in the chapter 'About the Truth of Appearances';¹³ the sensible is what moves the senses and, as moving it, is prior to what is moved, and if this is so, then, etc.

14 Also, the sense is a natural potency; therefore it is in the second species of quality.¹⁴ And it is a passive potency according to Bk. II of the *De anima*;¹⁵ and such a potency is the foundation of a relation of the second type.

15 That scientific knowledge is not referred to the knowable, I prove: scientific knowledge *per se* is in the category of quality; but as such it is not dependent.

16 The contrary is assumed by the Philosopher in the text.¹⁶

¹²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 26-1021a 11: "That which is measurable or knowable or thinkable is called relative because something else involves a reference to it."

¹³Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 5, 1010b 36-1011a 1.

¹⁴Cf. Aristotle, *Categories* ch. 8, 9a 14-16.

¹⁵Aristotle, *De anima* II, ch. 5, 416b 33-35.

¹⁶Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1020b 31-32; 1021a 27-b 4.

QUESTION FOURTEEN

Is the same thing referred to two per se?

[Arguments Pro and Con]

17 [1] That it is:

The same container is related to the many contents, [just as the same number can contain many numbers].

18 Similarly, one and the same active potency is referred both to acting and to a passive potency.

19 Also, whatever the genus depends upon so also does the species; therefore species is referred to the correlative of the genus and to its own proper [correlative], and to both *per se*.

20 Also, the species is referred to the genus *per se*, according to Porphyry,¹⁷ and *per se* to the individuals. The species is what is predicated *per se* of the individuals. Here individuals are posited and defined through the species, because it [the individual] is not posited there as genus, nor as subject; therefore only as the correlative of the species; therefore, etc.

21 For the opposite, there is what the Philosopher says here in Bk. V,¹⁸ where it is regarded as incongruous that the same thing be said twice.

[I.—TO THE FOURTEENTH QUESTION
A.—SOLUTION OF THE QUESTION]

22 [2] It must be said that the distinction is suitable. Note about the last question [q. 14] that the solution of the others [qq. 12-13] depends upon it—viz. that the same thing cannot be referred to diverse things primarily; it can however be referred *per se* but not primarily. Because what pertains to something primarily, pertains to it through its species; what pertains to it *per se*, pertains to it

¹⁷Porphyry, *Liber praedicabilium* ch. 'De specie', ed. Busse, p. 4, 9-10, AL I⁶, p. 9.

¹⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 30-32; for the text of Aristotle, cf. the note attached to n. 31 below.

through a cause¹⁹ in itself. Hence, those are said to be relative primarily which are of this sort through their own specific notion, as a *per se* father. Other relatives are said *per se* according to something understood to be in them, as the notion of some generic characteristic, for example, medicine is said relative to the notion of the science, which is its genus, which is understood to be characteristic of it.

23 Proof of the first:²⁰ because if this were so, then that relation which is the reason for referring one to two terms primarily would be two relations essentially. For to two, there is not primarily the same relationship, but a relation as such is a relationship. Also, then the same thing would have two definitions, because through both correlatives it would be defined primarily in equal measure, and then it could be known through one and not known through the other.

24 Also, then the same thing could be and not be simultaneously. I take [for example] two correlatives A and B, and C refers to both. If C refers to A and in an equally primary way to B, since A could exist without B, it would follow that C, relative to both, namely to A and B, would both exist and not exist, if A existed but B were destroyed.

25 Also, it is possible that the same thing be referred to diverse things not primarily, because primarily and *per se* it is referred to its proper correlative, and *per se* though not primarily to a correlative of its genus. For example, multiple and submultiple are referred, [e.g.] double and half are referred; but double is referred *per se* and primarily to half, and *per se* but not primarily to a submultiple, which is a correlative of its genus. And the fact is that the submultiple—which is the *per se*, but not the first, correlative of the double,—can exist when the half is non-existent. But the half cannot be if the submultiple is non-existent.

26 But the same thing cannot be referred to any diverse things whatsoever. For if it is referred to one primarily and to the other *per se*, then it could be that the first is such that it could not exist

¹⁹Cause has the meaning here of a *ratio* or notion contained in something's essential or necessary attributes.

²⁰Namely, that the same thing cannot be referred to diverse things primarily.

without its *per se* correlative, although conversely [it could be] *per se* without its primary correlative. Proof: because if it could exist without its *per se* correlative, it would follow that one term exists and does not exist at the same time, since given the existence of the half, the double, of which it is the primary and *per se* correlative, necessarily exists. But if the submultiple is destroyed, which is the *per se* correlative of the double though not primarily, the double is destroyed. If therefore, the half could exist with the submultiple nonexistent, at the same time the double could simultaneously exist with reference to the existence of the half, and it would be destroyed if its *per se* correlative were destroyed.

27 Also, for the *per se* correlative to exist, one need only assume the existence of the genus, and not assume something posterior to the genus.

[B.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

28 To the first argument²¹ about the container and contents, I say that there, one [thing] is not referred to diverse things primarily, but the container in general [is referred] to the contents in general, and the container has as many species under it as there are contents. And when it is said that the same number can contain many numbers, I say that this must be understood of the *per se* term of the relation and not of the subjects of the relation. For it is not necessary that one relation be in as many as is the other relation, because paternity can be in one subject and filiation in many sons. Nevertheless, as many filiations as there are in diverse sons, so many paternities are there in the one who is their father.

29 To the other:²² [I say] that active potency is referred primarily to passive potency as such; as a potency, it is referred only *per se* and not primarily to acting. And the first relative, namely passive potency, cannot be without its non-primary but *per se* correlative, viz. without the act of the active potency.

²¹Cf. supra, n. 17.

²²Cf. supra, n. 18.

30 To the other:²³ [I say] that the species is primarily referred to the genus, and [only] *per se* to the individuals. Hence genus, which is the first correlative, cannot exist without the individuals which are *per se* correlative.

31 The answer to the authoritative citation²⁴ to the contrary is evident, because if thought is said with reference to the thinker and to the intelligible, the same thing is said twice²⁵ primarily to the same degree, because it regards both equally.—Or another answer: then every accident would have two correlatives, namely subject and object.

32 To the other:²⁶ [I say] 'that to which the genus refers, so too does the species' is true, but [the genus] does not refer to it primarily.

[II.—TO THE TWELFTH QUESTION
A.—THE THREE MODES IN GENERAL
1.—SOLUTION]

33 To the question in general: the distinction is suitable.

Note here that although relations, like other things have their specific distinctions according to proper differences, nevertheless because they are hidden from us, we take their distinction from foundations, from which the distinction of relatives or relations are [better] known, namely [we distinguish them] effectually or materially.

[2.—REPLY TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

34 To the arguments in general.

To the first:²⁷ I deny the implication, because not only is it true there, but also in other genera, because a thing in other

²³Cf. *supra*, n. 20.

²⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 21.

²⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 30-32: "For the thinkable implies that there is thought of it, but the thought is not relative to that of which it is the thought, for we should then have said the same thing twice."

²⁶Cf. *supra*, n. 19.

²⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 1.

genera—such as unity—can be based on the notion of any genus, and [then] the notion has a basis. Nevertheless, because all those fundamentals do not have something predicated of them “in quid” in which they agree, therefore, they do not agree generically the way relations agree as ‘related to something else’, and therefore they [i.e. relations] all pertain to one category. Then I say that upon two distinct categories a relation of the same species can be grounded. And when it is argued that the relations ‘get their species from the foundations,’ this is true. But the distinction is not the same sort in the relations as in the foundations. For instance, the soul and the worm are distinguished among themselves, but nevertheless, the sun does not produce the maggot effectively in the same way that God creates the soul.—Or one can simply deny the principle they accept, namely, that not all relations have their distinction from their foundations or terms.

35 To the Philosopher,²⁸ namely, that ‘eight may be described as a double number [by use of the definition of two],’ I say that this is not because duality is a proper and first foundation of a ‘double number,’ so that it could not be founded in something else. But formally doubleness is present in itself, [wherever anything] is contained twice in another. Hence it is not true fundamentally, namely, that “eights” are double proportions or ratios of duality. Rather it is more the case that eight contains two times four, just as two contains one twice.

36 To the other²⁹ [I say] that the antecedent is false, since these relatives [according to genus] do fall under or are reduced to one of these [modes]. And when it is said of genus, we say that those things that are referred by reason of genus, are not referred primarily, but only *per se*. And every relative according to genus is referred according to some one of these three types, but not primarily. Hence, ‘not to be referred’ denies ‘to be referred primarily’ according to some one of these modes, and it does not deny ‘to be referred *per se*.’

²⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 2.

²⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 3.

[B.—CONCERNING THE FIRST TYPE OF RELATION
1.—THE FIRST PART OF THE FIRST MODE]

37 [3] Concerning the question regarding the first type,³⁰ and first of all regarding the first part,³¹ [I say] that relations there are founded upon something in the category of quantity, namely either upon number or upon the continuum; the relation of that [the first] part, however, is found prior in numbers, and there, by comparing number to number so that both terms must be numbers, or by comparing number to one, and this is a multiplex proportion; and from these discretives is derived the relation to *continua*. But some relation is here in discretives that is not in *continua*, because in number there is a measure, so that where unity is at times replicated, it results in the other term; but in *continua* it is sometimes an incommensurable proportion, like the diagonal to the side.

[2.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS INSOFAR AS THEY REFER TO
THE FIRST PART OF THE FIRST MODE]

38 To the first,³² it is already evident that the same [container], subjectively, can be referred to the many things it contains, but the [relationship of] containing is multiplied as many times as the other term is multiplied.

39 To the other,³³ it is said that the implication is invalid when [*secundum quod*] 'containing' and 'content' are opposed. Proof: all opposites include contradictories, because the contradiction is the

³⁰Antonius Andreae, *Expositio in Metaph.* V, text 20 (ed. Vives, VI, 82b): "Ad evidentiam primae partis, notandum quod relationes primi modi fundantur super aliquid de genere quantitatis, scilicet super numerum [vel] super continuum. Prius tamen reperitur relatio istius modi in numeris, et inest dupliciter: uno modo comparando numerum ad numerum, ita quod oportet utrumque extremum esse numerum; alio modo comparando numerum ad unum, ita quod solum alterum extremum est numerus. Et sic est multiplex proportio secundum primum modum. Ab istis autem discretis derivatur a continua; sed tamen aliqua reperitur relatio in discretis, quae non reperitur in continuis."

³¹Cf. supra, n. 4.

³²Cf. supra, n. 4.

³³Cf. supra, n. 5.

basic opposition.³⁴ Therefore to those antecedents to which contradictories do not follow, neither does some other opposition, because that to which the consequent does not follow, neither does the antecedent. But to some things taken through comparison to diverse things no contradictory follows; this is a case of [the fallacy of irrelevance] base ignorance. Therefore, neither does any other opposition follow.

40 To the contrary: how does the argument of the Philosopher in the *Categories*³⁵ hold good about the large and small mountain, which are said of the same thing and are not opposed, according to you.

41 Therefore, there is another answer: not all relatives assert opposites, because opposites are compared simultaneously to the same thing at the same time. But when some relative is compared to diverse things, they are relatives, but not opposite relatives.—Or another way, [assuming] that they are opposed.³⁶ Double and half in general are opposed relatives, but double of this and half of that are not opposed relatives.—Or another answer: [assume] that they are opposed inasmuch as they are referred to one another: but when the same thing is both generating and generated, the father is not referred to himself as son, but to his son, and son [qua son] is referred to his father, and in this way father and son are opposed and in no other way. And it is no different with double and half in the case at hand.

42 [4] But the argument of the Philosopher holds,³⁷ because he argues from the hypothesis that great and small are contraries absolutely; then the opposition is true of the same things, because from the fact that the mountain is large with respect to this, absolutely it is great, and absolutely it is small with respect to a

³⁴This may refer to the fact that Aristotle mentions contradiction first of the logical 'opposites' in *Metaphysics* V, ch. 10, 1018a 20: "The term opposite is applied to contradictories, and to contraries and to relative terms etc."; cf. also *Posterior Analytics* I, ch. 2, 72a 12-13: "A contradiction is an opposition which of its own nature excludes a middle."

³⁵Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 6, 5b 18-20: "For if the terms 'great' and 'small' were used absolutely, a mountain would never be called small or a grain large."

³⁶We grant they are opposed, but...

³⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 40.

greater mountain; therefore absolutely contraries are of the same thing. But [here], they are not absolutely contraries.

[3.—ABOUT THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST TYPE]³⁸

43 To the other³⁹ where it is asked about 'same,' 'similar' and 'equal': [I say] that these relatives are founded upon [comparing number to] this one. And nevertheless one of them is [only] conceptually relative, namely identity, because the being of relative is 'to be towards another.' The same thing can in no way be 'to another' except conceptually, because insofar as it is simply the same, "the intellect treats one, as two."⁴⁰

44 Against this: the same and diverse are contraries according to Bk. X⁴¹ of this work. For they are opposites and not privatives, nor contradictories, [hence, they are contraries]; but contraries are in the same category from Bk. X.⁴² But diversity is a real relation; therefore identity is also, because a real being is not opposed to a conceptual being.

45 Also, in Bk. X⁴³ everything compared to everything else is either the same or diverse; therefore, the same and diverse are immediate contraries with respect to being and those things coextensive with it. But conceptual being is distinct from real being and is not a coextensive attribute with extramental being, because a real being can exist without a conceptual being. Therefore, identity is not a conceptual being.

³⁸Cf. the text of Antonius Andreae in the note at the beginning of paragraph 37: "alio modo comparando numerum ad unum."

³⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 6-7.

⁴⁰Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 9, 1018a 8-9: "Therefore 'sameness' is a unity of the being either of more than one thing or of one thing when it is treated as more than one, i.e. when we say a thing is the same as itself; for we treat it as two."

⁴¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 22-23: "The other, then, and the same are thus opposed..."

⁴²Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 33-1055a 2: "Contraries are different, and contrariety is a kind of difference... For all of these too are seen to be different, and they are not merely other, but some are other in genus, and others are in the same line of predication."

⁴³*Ibid.*, 1054b 14-16: "And the other in one sense is the opposite of the same, so that everything is either the same as or other than everything else."

46 Also, if identity were a conceptual being, it would not pertain to the consideration of the metaphysician but of the logician, which is against what the Philosopher says in Bk. X, ch. 2, of this work.⁴⁴

47 Also against the argument:⁴⁵ if the argument held, then each identical thing is accidentally the same as itself and not essentially. Proof of the implication: as for the *per se* reason given for this, which is 'the same qua same' as something attributed to it by the mind, this is what the 'position' states.⁴⁶ For the essence of a stone is not the same as itself except through something attributed to it by the mind, because the essence as the foundation and as the term are the same *per accidens*, as is 'man' and 'similar man.' For, insofar as it is the term, it is something with some conceptual attribute. And in the other term similarly there is some composition of a real and a conceptual thing, and thus that term composed of a thing and a concept is the same *per accidens* with the other term, by reason of this diverse act attributed by the mind to one term and the other, since what is given to the one term and what is given the other are diverse.

48 [5] Likewise, then everything that is the same would be diverse. Proof: the *per se* reason for self referral is 'otherness,' which stems from the fact that the intellect attributes something conceptual to both terms.

49 The consequent of the first⁴⁷ [viz. each identical thing is accidentally the same as itself and not essentially] is impossible: it is said to be 'the same as itself,' because the same thing is said *per accidens* and to be in itself [i.e. essentially] as one, according to the Philosopher in the text.⁴⁸ Therefore, something the same as it [e. g. musical] is [predicated] of itself [i.e. a man].

⁴⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 25-31: "For everything that is existent is either other or the same, but that which is different is different from some particular thing in some particular respect so that there must be something identical whereby they differ."

⁴⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 43.

⁴⁶That is, something presented as an assumption the opponent must accept; cf. treatises *De obligationibus*.

⁴⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 47.

⁴⁸Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 9, 1017b 28-1018a 9: "The 'same' means (1) that which is the same in an accidental sense, e.g. ...'a man' and 'musical' because the one

—Also, “every thing per accidens is traced back to something *per se*,” according to Bk. II of the *Physics* I;⁴⁹ therefore, if nothing is the same as itself *per se*, then neither is it something that is per accidens the same.

50 Likewise, if everything that is the same as itself per accidens, then it is so through something else, and there will be [accidental] identity ad infinitum. Or if you stop the regress, then the identity per accidens will be of the whole to the whole, because it will be a *per se* [identity] of one real thing, namely the fundament, to the [same] real thing, and then the relation will be a real relation of the first type.

51 Also, this is impossible: because in every true affirmative proposition, the truth of the proposition is in the same mode as the unity of its terms. Hence, if the identity of the terms is only per accidens, then no proposition is true *per se*.

52 That the second conclusion⁵⁰ is impossible, [proof]: because two opposites are understood of the same term, since the identity and the otherness [are characteristic of the same term] *per se*.

53 Also, if the relation is conceptual, either both of the terms are mental beings or one of them is. But it is not only one, because the identity is founded equally in both terms. If it is both, then they commonly negate [one another], because the foundation of the other relation is a real essence, not just insofar as something mental is attributed to it.

54 Also, if it [identity] is such [i.e. conceptual], then similarity and equality are likewise, because ‘otherness’ is [part] of the essential meaning of those relatives, whereas according to the text,⁵¹ it is unity [not otherness that is essential]. Therefore, if because of ‘otherness’ identity is a conceptual relation, then because of ‘unity’ these will be conceptual relations. But this they do not concede.

is an accident of the other...The complex entity is the same as either of the simple ones and each of these is the same as it..”

⁴⁹Aristotle, *Physics* II, ch. 6, 198a 5-9: “Nothing incidental is prior to what is *per se*.”

⁵⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 48.

⁵¹Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 15, 1021a 11-13.

[a.—ABOUT IDENTITY, SIMILARITY AND EQUALITY]

55 [6] Of these three [types of relations] it is said in this way that these three are based on 'one' which is of different kinds, because just as "being is predicated in many ways,"⁵² so too is unity. Therefore, just as being is divided into the diverse categories, so unity is divided into other unities, so that identity [is based] upon 'one in substance,' equality upon 'one in quantity,' etc.

56 To the contrary: any being⁵³ compared to any being is either the same or other; therefore identity is not only in the category of substance, but in every category.

57 Also, whiteness compared to whiteness is not similar to itself nor equal, therefore, it is the same as itself, and different from blackness.

58 Also, the Philosopher in Bk. V of this work in the end of the chapter 'On Opposites',⁵⁴ says that " 'other' must be different for each category." If 'other' is, then 'same' is likewise, since they are opposed. Hence, 'same' is not limited solely to the category of substance.

59 Also, Bk. IV, ch. 2,⁵⁵ that in every genus or category [something] is found and attributed primarily to substance.

60 Proof that 'similar' is not found exclusively in the category of quality. Individuals of the same species not only have a specific unity, but a unity in their specific difference.⁵⁶ And insofar as they are thus one, either they are the same, properly speaking, or not. If they are the same, then "one" is inappropriately divided into one in number, genus and species and proportion.⁵⁷ They are not the

⁵²Aristotle, *Physics* I ch. 2, 185a 22-23; *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1003a 33-35; cf. supra, Bk. IV, q. 1, n. 24.

⁵³Cf. Aristotle, *Metaphysics* X, ch. 3, 1054b 14-16: "And the other in one sense is the opposite of the same, so that everything is either the same as or other than everything else"; cf. supra, n. 45.

⁵⁴Aristotle, *Metaphysics* V, ch. 19, 1018a 35-37: "Since 'one' and 'being' have many senses, the other terms which are derived from these, and therefore 'same', 'other', and 'contrary', must correspond, so that they must be different in each category."

⁵⁵Aristotle, *Metaphysics* IV, ch. 2, 1004a 26-32.

⁵⁶This is a 'substantial similarity,' not an accidental one based on quality.

⁵⁷Cf. supra Bk. V, q. 4.

same then in their specific difference, and hence they are similar in [some] difference, since they agree in this [difference], and the difference is predicated of them 'in quale.'⁵⁸

61 Also, Boethius says:⁵⁹ "Species is a tenuous likeness of singulars."

62 Of quantity in this way: in every genus—speaking of the real thing falling under this genus and comparing it to another of the same genus—this essence is just as equally perfect as that. And according to Bk. X:⁶⁰ "In every genus there is one first that is the measure of the others" and according to their proximity to it [the first], they are said to be more or less perfect; therefore, equality there is not based on quantity.

63 Also, in the category of quality there is more or less that does not stem from a greater or less quantity. This is evident; otherwise a horse would be [quantitatively, not qualitatively] whiter than a pearl.

64 Also, the Philosopher says in Bk. V,⁶¹ that these three are based on 'one' which is the principle of number, and it is the

⁵⁸Elsewhere he speaks of this predication as 'in quale quid' as opposed to accidental predication 'in quale.' Cf. Duns Scotus, *Porph.* q. 12, nn. 15-16.: "Praedicari in quid est praedicari essentiam subiecti per modum essentiae, id est, per modum subsistentis, non denominantis. Sed hoc contingit dupliciter. Vel quod praedicet totam essentiam subiecti, et sic est species. Si enim aliquid esset in essentia individui praeter essentiam speciei, duo individua differrent essentialiter, et per differentias acceptas ab illo quod plus est in hoc et in illo, posset species dividi et individuum definiri, quod est inconveniens. Si partem essentiae, sic est genus. Si enim ipsum genus diceret totam essentiam speciei, sufficeret ad definiendum speciem et superflueret differentia."

"Praedicari in quale est praedicari per modum denominantis, quod contingit dupliciter. Vel quod aliquid praedicet essentiam subiecti per modum denominantis, et tunc praedicatur 'in quale substantiale' et sic est differentia. 'Est enim differentia substantiae qualitas' per Aristotelem V *Metaphysicae* [ch. 9, 1018a 13-17]. Vel quod praedicet accidens per modum denominantis, et tunc praedicatur 'in quale accidentale.'"

⁵⁹Rather Themistius, *De anima* I (CLCAG I, 8-9): "Genus quidem enim conceptus est sine hypostasi summatim collectus ex tenui singularium similitudine et aut omnino nihil est genus aut multo posterius singularibus; species autem natura quaedam vult esse et forma"; cf. Boethius, *In Isagogen Porphyrii*, [ed. 2] I, ch. 11 (PL 64, 85BC; CSEL 48, 166).

⁶⁰Cf. supra, n. 7.

⁶¹Cf. supra, n. 54.

measure; [they are not based] upon 'one' as found in the different categories.

65 [7] Therefore, these arguments are conceded, at least about 'same', that same and other are found in every category. Concerning similar and equal, one can also concede that they are the same, apart from quantity and quality which are accidents. Here then, there is equality and similarity of essences, because 'same,' 'similar' and 'equal' signify relations and are founded immediately upon one as the principle of number; their remote foundation are real things of other categories or genera, according to one way. According to the other way, these three can be founded upon a real thing in any genus: insofar as the real thing is a quiddity and insofar as it is one, identity is founded. And insofar as the real thing is *sortal*⁶²—not only accidentally but by an essential difference—and insofar as this is one, similarity is founded. Likewise, insofar as the real thing has quantity of perfection and is one, equality is remotely founded upon it in this way. Therefore, these three are [based on or found] in every genus, and are in the category of relation as species.

66 To the contrary: some have unity according to the real thing in the category of action insofar as it is an action and an accident of the agent; therefore a relation is founded here, which is not that of identity, similarity or equality.

67 I concede then that a relation can be founded upon unity in the category of action. Hence, when the two agree in action, that relation is other than these [three].

68 Also, it follows from what has been said that the 'same' is similar to itself, because if a real thing in the category of substance is of such a sort by an essential quality, and, having such unity, is similar, then it follows that this man, since he has this,⁶³ would be similar to himself.

⁶²Philosophers have coined the adjective 'sortal' to express some characteristic predicate 'in quale' or as a qualification.

⁶³That is, sortal character.

69 I say that the foundation of identity is one in number. Therefore, the same is the same as itself, but the unity of similarity is only a specific unity. Therefore, the same is not similar to itself.

[b.—TO THE ARGUMENTS TO THE CONTRARY]

70 Holding that that identity is a real relation, [one can answer] the arguments [as follows]:

To the first,⁶⁴ when it is said to be a relationship of reason, I say that it is not characteristic of a conceptual relation that it be really related to another extreme, but that it be a relationship to a correlative, whether this other be really existing or not. But this is incidental to the relationship as such; hence it can be real. This is proved, because such a relation is founded upon one. Here, then, one must rather concede unity than diversity.⁶⁵

71 Also, from specific similarity something is said to be ‘similar in species,’ and the first relative is [specifically] the same as itself, and is referred to itself, and nevertheless, there is a real relationship here, according to everyone; therefore, etc.

72 Also, what is said⁶⁶ that ‘the being of relation is to be towards another,’ this is true of relatives mentioned above of the first type. But in the other types the unity is more about the [essential] meaning of the terms than their otherness.

73 To the contrary: if identity is a real relation the relation would be a real thing other than its foundation, and then that would be the same as itself, and thus one could proceed ad infinitum.⁶⁷

⁶⁴Cf. supra, nn. 43, 6.

⁶⁵An interpolated text in five manuscripts: “Here one must rather concede that there is a [real] relationship. Such maximal unity is real.”

⁶⁶Cf. supra, n. 43.

⁶⁷Cf. Avicenna, *Metaphysica* III, ch. 10, AvI L 179: “Dixit enim prima secta quod, si relatio esset in rebus, oporteret tunc ex hoc non finiri relationes... Oporteret igitur ut relationi esset alia relatio, et procederet hoc in infinitum”; cf. Duns Scotus, *Lectura* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, nn. 167-203 (XVIII 54-67); *Ordinatio* II, d. 1, qq. 4-5, nn. 192-222 (VII 96-110), where he argues against Henry of Ghent.

74 One must say that this identity, which is the relation, is not the relatum,⁶⁸ but is the reason why the relatum is referred. For this relation qua relation would be neither the same nor other than itself, but it would be the reason by which something would be the same as itself. And this 'same as itself' *per se* will be the relatum, not the relation. And then one must halt with these 'firsts' [viz. the relatum and its relation].

[c.—TO THE ARGUMENTS OF THE SECOND PART OF THE FIRST MODE]

75 To the first principal argument to the contrary.⁶⁹ The argument assumes something false.⁷⁰

76 To the other:⁷¹ [I say] that they are not parts of 'one' as to the species they signify, but, because they require a different unity for their proximate foundations, they are parts of 'one.' Also, so far as their remote foundations go, they divide 'one' in some way. Because the foundation of identity is 'man as one', there is a difference of 'similarity' in man.

[d.—TO THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT IDENTITY]

77 [8] By sustaining the other part [about equal, like, and the same], one can answer the arguments in this way.

To the first three reasons:⁷² [I say] that these propositions are true by reason of the indivision of their essences, and not by reason of some superadded relationship coming upon them.

78 To the other,⁷³ a similar answer can be given.

79 To the fifth:⁷⁴ it is conceded that the same is the same as itself per accidens, because either 'same' is taken for the form which it

⁶⁸That is, what is related.

⁶⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 6.

⁷⁰Namely, that it is a conceptual relation.

⁷¹Cf. *supra*, n. 7.

⁷²Cf. *supra*, nn. 44-46.

⁷³Cf. *supra*, n. 48.

⁷⁴Cf. *supra*, n. 47.

signifies, and then this [proposition] will be *per se*: 'The same is the same as itself.' [Or] if it is taken in the sense of 'same' in [the proposition] 'Man is the same as man,' fundamentally this is true *per accidens*. Not in the sense that identity is accidental to man—because whiteness is accidental to man in this way, but whiteness is the basis of similarity *per se*—but Socrates is not the foundation for identity unless something conceptual is attributed to him.

80 To the other argument to the contrary:⁷⁵ [I say] that it is not necessary that it be traced back to something that is such *per se*, but to something which is its *per se* cause. In this way, identity *per accidens* is reduced to an indivision of the foundation which is *per se*.

81 To the argument to the contrary,⁷⁶ one must say that this distinction about 'same' is said of that so far as indivision is concerned in which the identity is based.

82 To the other about the process to infinity,⁷⁷ it is said that 'same *per accidens*' is 'same through another'; not that this other [is said to be the same], either *per se* or through another.

83 To the other about the truth of the proposition:⁷⁸ [I say] it is not necessary that the proposition be true according to the unity of the terms with the relations superadded, but the truth stems from the identity of the foundations in which the relation of identity is rooted.

84 To the other⁷⁹ that 'every thing the same will be the same with respect to some other': it is true according to the mind; hence where there is unqualified identity, there is also diversity in a qualified sense, and these are not opposed.

85 To the one main argument,⁸⁰ I say that each term as referred is something conceptual, but the remote foundation is real and the unity is essential.

⁷⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 49.

⁷⁶To the first part of n. 49.

⁷⁷Cf. *supra*, n. 50.

⁷⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 51.

⁷⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 52, 48.

⁸⁰Cf. *supra*, n. 53.

86 To the other,⁸¹ I say that similarity and equality are founded in a real unity, because this whiteness and that whiteness have a real unity among themselves even if there never was an intellect. And from this unity the intellect is moved to attribute to that real unity a unity of species and this [specific] unity, is neither a conceptual unity nor a singular unity,⁸² but something intermediate, and it is in potency to a conceptual unity based upon it.

[C.—CONCERNING THE SECOND MODE OF RELATIVES
1.—SOLUTION OF SCOTUS]

87 As for active and passive unity, it is said that the foundation of the relatives of the second type are based upon the category of action and affection and this in the category of action, to which 'being affected' [passio] corresponds. Also it is founded in active and passive principles, as in a form which is the principle of acting⁸³ and that which is the principle of suffering [the action].⁸⁴ According to some⁸⁵ these belong to the third species of quality.⁸⁶

88 Nevertheless, this is not necessary,⁸⁷ because if only a quality was some immediate principle of operation, then substance would never be generated univocally, because the principle of generating and substance are not in the same category.—It is said here⁸⁸ that

⁸¹Cf. supra, n. 54.

⁸²That is, haecceity.

⁸³That is, active potency.

⁸⁴That is, passive potency.

⁸⁵Cf. Roger Marston, *Quodl. II* q. 1, resp. (BFS XXVI, 96, 100): "Unde relatio similitudinis non est aliud quam qualitas in qua fundatur ipsa relatio. Et sic est de relationibus quae fundantur in rebus aliorum praedicamentorum quae non sunt nisi in modo numeri et potentiis activis et passivis, sicut dicitur V *Metaphysicae*... Si comparantur relationes ad res in quibus fundantur immediate, manent secundum rationem speciei. Quia enim vere est ibi potentia activa qua Pater generat et potentia passiva qua Filius generatur..."

⁸⁶That is, potency and impotency.

⁸⁷These potencies of acting and being affected are really identical with the substance and only formally distinct. Hence they are not species in the category of quality.

⁸⁸Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Summa theol. I*, q. 77, a. 1, ad 4 (V 237b): "... hoc ipsum quod forma accidentalis est actionis principium, habet a forma substantiali"; Rogerus Marston, *Quodl. I* q. 17 (BFS XXVI 53): "sicut substantia agit per qualitates accidentales, sic etiam ipsa substantia vere *per se* agit. Impossibile est enim quod

the accident acts in virtue of the substance, which is univocal to what is generated.

89 On the contrary: either it is in virtue of it as an efficient cause, and then we have what we propose. For the first efficient cause causes more than that which causes in virtue of it,⁸⁹ and does so more immediately, and it has some effect in what is generated which another agent does not have.

90 I say then that a principle of acting can be in the category of quality (in the first,⁹⁰ the second,⁹¹ and the third species⁹²) and it can also be a substance;⁹³ hence in the generation of substance, a substance is *per se* efficient.

91 Then it must be said that the relations of the second type can be based upon such principles of acting. And in that [second] mode a relation is based upon principles of 'being affected.'⁹⁴ At times quantified substance is the immediate principle of reception with respect to whiteness.

[2.—TO THE ARGUMENTS FOR THE SECOND MODE OF RELATIVES]

92 To the arguments:⁹⁵ [I say] that the foundations are absolute forms, which are the principles of acting and suffering or being acted upon.⁹⁶ If you accept potencies⁹⁷ as they are referred, you accept the foundation with the relation.

accidens sufficienter disponat ad inductionem substantiae; quin potius, sicut accidens non subsistit nisi in substantia, ita non agit nisi ipsa substantia veraciter coagente."

⁸⁹That is, by a really distinct accident (as Aquinas declares a potency or faculty of the soul to be).

⁹⁰That is, as a habit or disposition.

⁹¹As accidental capacities, e.g. something potent (in the sense of an accident that can be lost, qua impotent).

⁹²Affective qualities i.e. those that produce or cause affections.

⁹³The intellect and will, for example, as substantially the same as the soul, though not formally.

⁹⁴That is, a passive potency.

⁹⁵Cf. *supra*, n. 8.

⁹⁶Cf. *supra*, Bk. V, q. 11, nn. 11-18, 105-108, 133.

⁹⁷Which are really identical with the substance or substantial form, as referred by the really distinct accidental relation, then... etc.

93 To the other,⁹⁸ [I say] that it first refers to the passive potency primarily and *per se*, it does not refer primarily to acting.

[III.—TO THE THIRTEENTH QUESTION
A.—SOLUTION TO THE QUESTION]

94 To the second question,⁹⁹ it is said that the measure taken in the third type is not quantitative, but a measure of perfection. Otherwise, it would not differ from the first type of relation; and then the measure is founded upon every essence and what is measured [is founded upon] 'habit' [as the first species] in the category of quality.

95 [The View of Thomas Aquinas]—To the contrary:¹⁰⁰ it could be taken for a quantitative measure, because what contains quantitatively does not measure everything contained, as is evident of some numbers.

96 Also, time measures motion, and nevertheless it is not reduced to motion.

97 Also, that mode or type is not appropriated to a habit and to cognition and to the object, because according to Bk. X, c. 2,¹⁰¹ 'in every genus there is something first which is the measure'; therefore apart from any habit, there is something in the category of substance that measures everything in that genus, and in the same is true of the other genera or categories.

98 [Against the position of Thomas]—Then the relations of the first mode are founded precisely upon a real thing in the category of quantity, and no mode is founded precisely in the category of substance. And relations of the second mode are founded in things of the category of action and affections, and upon the principles of acting and being affected, which can be in many genera. Relations of the third mode are founded in every thing of any genus whatsoever, and also upon the idea [or model] in the divine mind,

⁹⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 9.

⁹⁹Cf. *supra*, nn. 13-16.

¹⁰⁰Cf. Thomas Aquinas, *Metaph.* V, lect. 17, ed. Parma XX, 420b: "Omnes enim numeri habent unam communem mensuram, scilicet unitatem. Sed continens et contentum non dicuntur secundum aliquam commensurationem numeralem."

¹⁰¹Cf. *supra*, nn. 7, 62.

because it is the measure and perfection of what is modeled; and at times these [relations] can be founded upon real things of other genera, because each real thing is intelligible and cognition is in the category of action and the cognitive habit is in the category of quality.

99 But now we must look to how scientific knowledge and the knowable are measured. Our practical knowledge is caused by things, and therefore, the knowable measures scientific knowledge. But artificial things are caused by practical knowledge and there the knowable is measurable, and scientific knowledge is the measure. Hence all natural things are related to the knowledge of God, as artificial things are to our knowledge, so that the knowledge of God is the measure.

[B.—TO THE ARGUMENTS ABOUT THE THIRD MODE OF
RELATIVES]

100 To the arguments which are against the third type of relation:¹⁰² [I say] that all relatives, expressed denominatively, are in one category; hence I deny the minor. To the proof: that it speaks of natural genus, where between opposites there is a change [transmutation]. And there something is first changed with respect to the middle before it is changed with respect to the term. But relatives are not opposed in this way, and therefore there is no medium [between them].

101 To the argument,¹⁰³ I say that the being of the knowable is 'to be related to something other than itself.' And in the other modes, there is a mutual dependence, because the terms are taken uniformly. If one is actual, the other is also; if one is in potency, so too is the other. But here, measure is taken, as it were, actually, and the measurable potentially. But if it is taken as proportionable,¹⁰⁴ in this case there is mutual dependence, as in the other modes, and they exist and cease to exist simultaneously. Hence the knowable is related to science in potency.

¹⁰²Cf. *supra*, n. 10.

¹⁰³Cf. *supra*, n. 11.

¹⁰⁴That is, if both are taken as actual, or both as potential.

102 To the contrary: there is what Aristotle says in the *Categories*:¹⁰⁵ if the knowable is destroyed, the scientific knowledge is destroyed, but not vice versa.

103 It is said that this is true, that through the destruction of the knowable in potency, scientific knowledge in potency is destroyed, and vice versa. Likewise, when the known in actuality is destroyed, actual knowledge is destroyed, and vice versa, when the scientific knowledge in actuality is destroyed so too is the known in act. But when actual scientific knowledge is destroyed, the knowable in potency is not.

104 Already therefore it is evident that this mode¹⁰⁶ is distinguished from the second mode,—as is evident from what has been said¹⁰⁷—not through mutual or non-mutual dependence, but through their respective foundations, as is clear.

[C.—TO THE INITIAL ARGUMENTS]

105 To the first contrary argument:¹⁰⁸ [I say], 'sense' is equivocal as regards natural potency (which is in the category of quality) and the act of sensing, and thus this 'sensing' is in the category of action. Then the sense in the first type is the foundation for the second type; the 'sense' in the second type is the foundation for that third type.

106 And thus to the other argument.¹⁰⁹

107 And further, that scientific knowledge is in the category of quality *per se* and not in that of relation, because "if genera are different and co-ordinate [their differentiae are themselves different in kind.]"¹¹⁰ But scientific knowledge, which is a habit, is

¹⁰⁵Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 7, 7b 25-30: "Again, while the object of knowledge, if it ceases to exist, cancels at the same time the knowledge which was it correlative, the converse of this is not true. It is true that if the object of knowledge does not exist, there can be no knowledge."

¹⁰⁶Namely, the third mode of relations.

¹⁰⁷Cf. *supra*, nn. 98-101.

¹⁰⁸Cf. *supra*, n. 13.

¹⁰⁹Cf. *supra*, n. 14.

¹¹⁰Aristotle, *Categories*, ch. 3, 1b 16-17; cf. Duns Scotus, *Praedic.*, q. 10.

the proximate foundation of the relation, just as four in the category of quantity, and doubleness in the category of relation.