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By

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BOOKS



Panic Power

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The past year has seen a significant development. I am not saying that it is the most important, but it is one of the most important, or rather one of the most symptomatic. At a banquet commemorating the February revolution, a toast was made to the god Pan, yes, to the god Pan, by one of those young people who can be described as educated and intelligent.

– But," I said, "what does the god Pan have in common with the revolution?

– But it's the god Pan who makes the revolution. He is the revolution.

– Besides, hasn't he been dead for a long time? I thought that a great voice had been heard hovering over the Mediterranean, and that this mysterious voice, which rolled from the columns of Hercules to the shores of Asia, had said to the old world: The god Pan is dead!

– That's the rumour. They're talking out of turn, but it's nothing of the sort.

No, the god Pan is not dead! the god Pan is still alive," he continued, raising his eyes to the sky with a very strange touch... "He's coming back. He spoke of the god Pan as if he were the prisoner of St Helena.

– And what," I said to him, "are you then a pagan?

– Do you not know that Paganism, properly understood, of course, is the only way to save the world? We must return to the true doctrines, obscured for a moment by the infamous Galileo. Besides, Juno gave me a favourable look, a look that penetrated to my very soul. I was sad and melancholy in the middle of the crowd, watching the procession and imploring this beautiful divinity with loving eyes, when one of her looks, benevolent and profound, came to lift me up and encourage me.

– Juno has given you one of her cow looks, Bôôpis Éré. Perhaps the unfortunate man is mad.

– But can't you see," said a third person, "that we're talking about the fatted ox ceremony. He looked at all these pink women with pagan eyes, and Ernestine, who is engaged at the Hippodrome and who played the role of Juno, gave him an eye full of memories, a real cow's eye.

– Ernestine as much as you like," said the disgruntled pagan. You are trying to disillusion me. But the moral effect has been produced nonetheless, and I regard this glance as a good omen.

It seems to me that this excess of paganism is the work of a man who has read too much and read Henri Heine badly, and his literature rotten with materialistic sentimentalism.

Charles Baudelaire, The Pagan School

The Pastorian revolution, i.e. the birth of bacteriological medicine, triggered a profound revolution in the conception of the social bond: invisible links connect all individuals: microbes. There is therefore a profound interdependence between all living beings, which undermines the separation between the medical and the social, the present and the future. Thus (...) the fight against tuberculosis and the policy of

In the future, associated prevention will become an unlimited programme: all aspects of an individual's life are concerned, from birth to death. Pastorian theories brought with them the idea that evil reveals solidarity; moreover, it underpins the anti-naturalism of political action: nature must be thwarted, society is never social enough; finally, it underpins positive morality: I cannot want my own good without wanting that of others, it is impossible. The State therefore has positive duties towards its members and the individual has positive rights: this is the revolution in thinking of solidaritarianism founded on Pastorian medicine (...) Pastorian medicine therefore founds a theory of the solidaritarian microbial body politic, the principles of which can be formulated as follows: the whole is more than the sum of its parts.

parts; it forms a sui generis reality. Secondly, there is no part that is not part of a whole, and there is no whole that is not part of a greater whole: individuality is only the result of a process of individualisation. Finally, the relationship between the parts and the whole must be analysed using the logic of causality

complex, i.e. that of probabilities (...). (T)he individual responsibility for a fault becomes the collective and shared responsibility for a risk. The accident rate is constant, whatever the circumstances. The simple fact of

living and producing together, creates inescapable and determined relationships of interdependence (...). The State itself becomes responsible (...). A new social contract is being put in place based on the principle of totalisation, distributive justice and the global mass of goods produced, as opposed to the old form of contract as a relationship between individuals, with a distinction between the State and civil society, and simple commutative justice, for which the State was the guarantor. Fundamentally, there is damage and risk because we all live together: it is up to us collectively to assume this organic solidarity, through the State which finds in it, at the same time, its necessity, its justification and its line of action. Broadly speaking, then, the welfare state is born of the Pastorian metaphor of the body politic. The creation of the Ministry of Health in 1920 enshrined the definitive assimilation of the Pastorian approach in the very structures of the State.

Suzanne Rameix, Corps humain et corps politique en France. Statut du corps humain et métaphore organiciste de l'État (emphasis added)

Electrical circuits did not (continue to) create the public; they created the mass, in other words an information environment in which everyone interacts.

Marshall McLuhan, Address at Vision 65

Occultism is not the study of all that is hidden from science, it is the study of facts which, although not yet belonging to science (by which I mean positive science in the sense of Auguste COMTE), may one day belong to it.

Joseph Grasset, L'Occultisme hier et aujourd'hui: Le merveilleux prescientifique (*)

Every revolution is the culmination, the materialisation, the final stage of a mystical contemplation.

The profound transformations in society, institutions and the fundamental values of civilisation that have taken place in Europe since antiquity all have their origins in mystical contemplation. In the first instance, it takes on an intellectual character and takes the form of a religious doctrine, which, in the second instance, is translated ideologically in the form of a philosophical system, which, in the third instance, finds political expression (1).

The mystical contemplation in question is that of a single substance, universal and primordial, of which the world and man are but the attributes. Its first religious formulation seems to be the one given in Egyptian theology, the substance of which Jamblicus has preserved for us: "There is a God prior to the beginnings of all things. He existed before the first god. He remains immutable in his unity. He is the source of everything. He exists by himself. He is the principle and the god of gods. Existence emanates from him (2). This materia prima is called Amon, meaning the hidden, the impenetrable. It corresponds to Purusha, the "cosmic Being" to whom hymn 10.90 of non-Aryan origin in the Rig-veda is dedicated. The Orphic Hymn to Pan (dating from the 6th century BC) (3) is the first known echo of this in Europe.

It was precisely in Greece that pantheistic theology first appeared in philosophical disguise. The Pythagorean Ocellus of Lucania (sixth century BC) says: "I call the Universe and the Whole the world in its totality, for that is why it has been so called, because it is a regular compound of the whole, which is an ordered system, in fact and complete of all natures. For nothing is outside it; if anything is, it is included in it; everything is in the whole,

everything is with the whole, or as a part, or as production. Everything in the world has
But the world has no relationship with any being; it has only with itself".

(4). The idea of unity and the identity of the absolute principle, of things and beings, was the subject of speculation.

infinite in the Pythagoreans, Eleates, Xenophanes, Parmenides, Stoics, Neoplatonists and Gnostics.

Philosophically, pantheism is the doctrine that God is everything or the whole. "God is everything and everything is God. The whole is nothing other than God and God is nothing other than the whole (...) Only God exists" (5); or again: "God is both the One and the Universal (...). He is not only the Being of beings, the primordial Being, being of Himself, by Himself and for Himself, the principle of all existence and all reality, without which nothing is or can even be conceived; but also the unique Being, outside and in front of which is no being, no existence, no reality in itself; in such a way that man, the world and the universe are nothing in themselves, are only the Divinity in its infinite manifestation; for God alone is and exists, He alone is everything (6).

From the point of view of pantheism, the relationship of the divinity to the world can be conceived in two forms: immanent or emanatist. "In the first case, not only do all things have their origin in the Godhead, but the being and life of all things are permanent in God, or God is permanent, immanent in them. Being is, has been and will be; it is infinite and posits nothing finite outside itself; it is eternal and creates nothing temporary: there is no passage from the absolute to the contingent; no exit of the created from the uncreated. God is a closed and perfect whole, which identifies all beings in totality and absolute unity, today and always, in an immutable and eternal way. Without God there is no world, and without a world there is no God. God and the world, the universe and God, are one and the same, absolutely and from all eternity; all things are, exist, live and are united in God, as in their substance, and in their nature.

never obtain true and substantial being, life and existence, in them and for them; for One is everything" (7). This is the position of immanentist pantheism, also known as monist pantheism.

"In the second case, God is not a whole closed in on itself, the universe in its totality; he is the primordial Being, propagating himself through successive generations that perpetually emanate from him and that he embraces in his unity: everything is one. The Absolute has emerged from itself, the Infinite has posited the finite distinct from itself, the pân has progressively emerged and is continually emerging from the ên, whereas, in the system of immanence, the ên cannot be conceived without the pân" (8). This is the view of emanatist pantheism, also known as dualism, even though it basically admits the identity of substance between God and the world.

The monist pantheist denies all reality to phenomena, "he regards them as pure appearances, as a veritable nothingness, and wants to admit only one reality: absolute substance" (9).

Emanatist pantheism concedes "a certain reality to phenomenal variety, considering it either "as a development of the divine substance," or "as attributes and modes immanent or created of the infinite substance" (10). All the beings of which the great whole is composed are but an extension - a flow - of the divine substance, from which they emanate continually, without diminishing or lessening it. The emanations are decreasing, that is to say, the beings lose their purity as they move away from absolute being, just as light loses its brilliance as it moves away from its focus.

In Neo-Platonism, this distancing is called "procession" (prohodos). However, neo-Platonic emanationism tends to be combined with an eschatology that envisages the return of the soul to its ultimate source by 'conversion' (epistrophe). For Plotinus, the procession of beings from the One also means the return of beings to the One, an equally universal law that requires beings to desire more or less.

matter receives its form from the soul, which in turn receives its form from the Intellect, which itself receives its form from the One, itself devoid of form and therefore perfect. This return of "particular souls" to the One "is accomplished (...) in the course of time" (11).

In ancient times, Vedantine philosophy, Pythagoras, the Stoics and, in modern times, Spinoza, were monists. In antiquity, Samkhya philosophy, Manichaeism, the neo-Platonists (Proclus and Plotinus) (12), the Kabbalists, some of the Gnostics (13) and, in modern times, the representatives of philosophical idealism, were emanatists.

Ideologically, the historicisation of the concept of the unity and identity of all things and beings with the absolute principle gave rise to the feeling of the unity of the human race and the consequent doctrine of the equality of all members of the same people, of all peoples and of all races, while the historicisation of the concept of the epistrophe helped to give rise to the feeling of an evolutionary process towards an ideal end, which, once grafted onto the Christian belief in the progress of revelation and the gradual march of the human race towards truth (14), set in motion forces whose action would lead to the formation of the myth of progress.

Politically, monistic pantheism's refusal to grant the slightest reality to created substances and second causes and its "assertion that all beings are but modifications of one and the same being, or the instruments and occasional causes of the successive manifestations of that being" finds expression in centralism, which is effectively expressed by "the denial of any independent personality with regard to the Public Ministry, and of any action proper to it ; (par) l'affirmation que les individus formant ce ministère ne sont nullement Pouvoirs eux-mêmes, mais qu'ils sont des nuances, des organes du Pouvoir suprême" (15).

The idea of human progress is a theory that involves "a synthesis of the past and a prophecy of the future. It is based on an interpretation of history which considers that men advance slowly - pedetentim progredientes - in a definite and desirable direction and deduces that this progress will continue indefinitely. And it implies the ultimate enjoyment of a general happiness that will justify the whole process of civilisation; otherwise, this direction would not be desirable. It also implies that the process must be the necessary result of man's psychic and social nature; it must not be at the mercy of an external will; otherwise, nothing would guarantee its continuity (...) and the idea of progress would be transformed into the idea of Providence" (16).

The Greeks ignored the idea of progress. Although they felt that civilisation had evolved for the better in the past, they did not believe that it was destined to progress indefinitely in the future. Even Protagoras, Critias, Xenophon, Democritus, Euripides and Aeschylus (17), for whom man had progressed gradually and painfully from the state of brute to that of civilised being, did not imagine that this progress could be indefinite. Nobody doubted the myth of the "Golden Age", but philosophers had no trouble combining it with the idea of a gradual sequence of social and material improvements during the period of decline that had followed it. While they did admit some progress relatively speaking, they generally agreed that they were living in a period of degeneration and that this degeneration was inevitable, inevitable because it was inherent in the nature of the universe. The world was the work of the divinity, and as such was perfect; but it was not immortal, and carried within it the seeds of decay. The universe would eventually dissolve into the original chaos, only to be reborn from it, and so on. Plato applies the theory of decay in his study of political communities in the last books of the Republic. He explains this deterioration mainly in terms of a degeneration of the race, due to the laxity and errors of the State in regulating marriages and the consequent birth of biologically inferior individuals. Plato's theories valued immutability over change. His social ideal was that of absolute order; once this society had been achieved, any deviation from absolute order would endanger it. Aristotle, looking at the issue from a practical point of view, argues that changes to an established social order are undesirable and should be as few and slight as possible. "Because of their distrust of change, the idea of civilisation as a progressive movement was alien to them. It did not occur to them that a perfect order could be achieved by a long series of changes and adaptations. This order, being an embodiment of reason, could not be created by a long series of changes and adaptations.

than by the deliberate and immediate act of a planning mind. It could be conceived by the wisdom of a philosopher or revealed by divinity. Consequently, the salvation of a community must lie in preserving intact, as far as possible, the institutions imposed by the enlightened legislator, for change meant corruption and disaster" (18). They therefore saw "time as an enemy" (19).

The theory of cycles, which can be described as a theory of cosmic time, passed unchanged from Greece to Rome. Although it could be presented in less extreme forms than in Pythagoreanism, where each cycle reproduced in minute detail the course and events of the previous one, it was hardly suitable for stimulating speculation about the future.

However, the first to do so was Seneca, who, while evoking the memory of a "past golden age", spoke of the progress of science and its applications. The idea of a possible improvement in society thus emerged in Stoicism, and the morality of the Stoics was seen as that which would bring happiness, not only to the people, but also - from the day when, having taken up the concept of cosmopolitanism from the Greeks - to the people.

Cynics, the philosophers of this school declared that all men are brothers and that a man's true country is not his particular city but *oikeiosis* (*oecumene*) - to humanity (20).

The idea of progress is based precisely on the concept of humanity, and even more so on the concept of the unity of humanity, which was put forward and systematised for the first time by Christianity. "(T)he Greeks and Romans knew many other peoples on earth, peoples as far removed from them as the Chinese. And references to 'man' were frequent in classical treatments of progress. We need only recall Protagoras' 'Man is the measure of all things' and Sophocles' ode to the marvels accomplished by man on earth. But neither this, nor the awareness of a great multiplicity of peoples and cultures on earth, is the same as the conception of humanity or man as something existing in his own right, unified and endowed with a capacity for development and progress over a long period of time. This conception did not appear in the West until the beginning of the third century AD, when Christian theologians, eager to promote the theme of the universality of the Church and its accessibility to all human beings, whatever their family, geographical, ethnic or cultural origins, and to advance the idea of God's suzerainty over all the peoples of the earth, began to speak in their writings not of Roman civilisation but of humanity!" (21) And, what's more, of human solidarity, of vital common interest between the various races. "It is to Christianity that we owe the idea of progress; it is the logical consequence of its teachings. What has it taught us? That we are all sons of the same father, who is God, that we are all members of the same body, that the day will come when there will be only one flock and one shepherd, and so on. Thus, not only is the human race one, but it is also in society (...)" (emphasis added) (22). To the notion of human unity, Christianity thus added that of historical unity, another necessary condition for the birth of the idea of progress. Augustine was the first, in the City of God, to "concern himself with the meaning

(...) (to) look for the common link between them, and (...) (to) classify them according to a providential law which explained them and gave them meaning" (23).

Already the "good news" had not been presented as a radical break with the past. In the Sermon on the Mount, Jesus shows Christianity "as prepared from the beginning of history, but proclaimed only when the fullness of time was accomplished". They proclaimed that there had been certain progressive stages in revelation, a certain education of mankind wisely graduated by Providence. This series of revelations had always been related to the capacities of the species and adapted to its needs; the last was the crowning one, the absolute truth, the perfect life in Christ; the advent of the latter was envisaged as having to operate progressively on humanity in the same way as leaven acts on flour until the complete transformation of the mass.

Thus, according to the formulators of the new religion, the latter was the continuation of the former beliefs, which had gone through progressive stages following an itinerary mapped out by Providence, and the present form was the absolute ideal which was to impose itself more and more on the universality of mankind. The concept of continuity in evolution was therefore subordinate to a pre-existing and artificial plan and to an end that was fixed and absolute as ideal, and whose extension to the mass of the human race alone could be deferred for the time materially necessary for the latter to be rallied to the common faith" (24).

The idea of a continuous, permanent and inevitable development towards a determined goal is also evident in the Epistle to the Hebrews, where Paul explains how Christianity emerged from Judaism and why it is superior to it.

This proclamation of the fundamental superiority of the new law over the old did not imply a belief on the part of its proponents in an evolutionary process of a material nature (25); for them it was a question only of intellectual and moral progress. The fact remains that the first followers of Christianity were convinced that Jesus would come to re-establish the kingdom of God on earth and recognised that the revolution he announced was fundamentally and materially messianic (26). "Jesus asked for God's will to be done in the world; the divine reign he desired was universal good; he wanted the perfect city which could be dreamt of as existing in heaven to be realised on earth (Matthew, 6:10); he asked for 'the reformation of all things' (Acts of the Apostles, 3:21); and the idea of an imminent change in the world could well be accredited in people's minds by the miracles which Jesus performed and which were translated into new facts in the material world. Jesus even used parables to make the seraglio understand this change that would become definitive for the world" (27). "Primitive Christianity was a theory of Progress as it was conceived at the time" (emphasis added) (28).

Jesus called for "the reformation of all things", while affirming that his "kingdom is not of this world" (Matthew, 13:3). The nascent Church emphasised "my kingdom is not of this world", but the messianic hopes of the Jewish prophets (29) were found among the first Christians, as witness the ramblings of the Apocalypse, a text steeped in Neoplatonic abstractions (30), about a new Jerusalem. Even if, or because, the "reign of a thousand years" was very early on interpreted less literally than symbolically (31), the meeting of the millenarian themes of early Christianity with the Neoplatonic theory of the epistrophe provided the bedrock for the nascent idea of progress.

From its foundation in Alexandria in the second century AD until its decadence in the sixth century, Neoplatonism was intellectually the only serious opponent of Christianity and even its best enemy, since Christian theology borrowed from it on numerous occasions (32). To explain the struggle that this philosophy, inspired by Plato and Eastern religious doctrines, waged against the Eastern syncretism that was Christian theology, Guizot invokes two reasons that he deems "essential": the first is that "Neoplatonism is a philosophy, Christianity a religion. The first has human reason as its starting point; it is to reason that it addresses itself, that it questions, that it confides in. The starting point of the second, on the other hand, is something external to human reason; it imposes itself on it instead of questioning it. Hence the dominance of free examination in Neoplatonism, This is its fundamental method and its usual practice, whereas Christianity proclaims authority as its principle, and indeed proceeds by way of authority. From this it also follows that, although Alexandrian Neoplatonism, judging by the language and appearance of its writings, presents itself in an infinitely mystical guise, at heart its principle is rational, whereas primitive Christianity, which has nothing mystical about it, is on the contrary very positive and very simple, nevertheless has a supernatural principle"; the second is that "(t)he dominant doctrine of Alexandrian Neoplatonism is pantheism, the unity of substance and being, individuality reduced to the condition of a pure phenomenon, a transitory fact. Individuality, on the other hand, is the fundamental belief of Christian theology. The God of Christians is a distinct being who communicates and deals with other beings, to whom they address themselves, who responds to them, whose existence is sovereign, but not unique. Among many other

The diversity of the two doctrines on this point is clearly revealed in the idea they form of man's future beyond his present existence. What does Neoplatonism do with human beings at the moment of their death? It absorbs them into the bosom of the great whole; it abolishes all individuality. What, on the other hand, does Christian doctrine do? It perpetuates individuality into infinity; it substitutes the eternity of punishment and reward for the absorption of individual beings.

(33). The Alexandrian scholar Étienne Vacherot (1809-1897), while agreeing with the historian, suggests, nolens volens, that what brings Neoplatonism and Christianity together is perhaps more essential than what separates them; he shows, in fact, that they have the "same starting point, (the) same principles, (the) same conclusion: both, from the depths of that sad prison they call...", like the Gnostics, the body and the world, aspire to the eternal, the immutable, the invisible, and constantly remind the soul of its true homeland; both, under different names, embrace the three sides of the divine nature, and through their doctrine of the Trinity respond to the same need of thought; both

finally take the soul to the bosom of God, on the wings of the same faculty which they call Faith, Reason or Intelligence" (34). Hence, for example, the inclination of Christian theology towards pantheism.

By the time they became Christians, most of the philosophers of the Alexandrian school had mixed their ancient speculations with their new faith, trying, though not always succeeding, to reconcile them. Origen, a representative of the Alexandrian theological school, was accused of pantheism by Jerome (c. 347-420), Theophilus of Alexandria, pope from 384 to 412, and the emperor Justinian.

(35). The neo-Platonic training of Christian theologians who flirted or were suspected of flirting with pantheism does not explain everything, however: pantheistic tendencies can be found in the Church Fathers who, like Justin the Martyr, Tatian the Syrian and Theophilus of Antioch in the second century, had not passed through the school of Alexandria (36). In their defence, the dividing line between the god of Christianity and the god of pantheism is not as clear-cut as the doctors and historians of the Church of later periods would have us believe, with presentations full of cavillations and labyrinthine twists (37).

The attempt to bring Christian theology and Neoplatonic doctrine closer together became more pressing in the fifth century, with the publication of a whole series of treatises under the name of Dionysius the Areopagite, a disciple of Paul and the first bishop of Athens. Although their authenticity was immediately attacked, and despite the pantheistic overtones of their definition of the Christian divinity ("He dwells in hearts, minds and bodies, in heaven and earth; constantly unchanging, he is in the world, around the world, beyond the world, beyond the heavens, beyond all substance; he is sun, star, fire and water, wind, dew and cloud, cornerstone and rock; he is all that is, and is nothing of what is") (38), these treatises were soon accepted by the Church, where they generated a powerful current of ideas that lasted until the beginning of the "Renaissance". It has to be said that they proved to be of apologetic interest to the Church (39). From the ninth century onwards, the books of Dionysius the Areopagite were circulating in cloisters and abbeys, and certain doctrines of Neoplatonism found their way into mystical theology, where, despite the fact that the rationalism of the all-powerful Scholastic theology opposed their influence, they gave rise to two currents: one theistic and contemplative (40), the other, more directly linked to the writings of Erigenes, pantheistic altogether.

At the request of Charles the Bald, Scotus Erigena (41), the author of a second Latin translation of the works of Denys, was the first representative of realism in the "Middle Ages", two centuries before the outbreak of the Quarrel of the Universals, the scholastic controversy over the nature and origin of general ideas. The nominalists, starting from Aristotle, asserted that general ideas or concepts exist only in words, that they exist only in the words used to express them; that they are pure abstractions of our mind, which have no real existence outside us. In contrast, the realists, building on the ontological speculations of Plato and Socrates, declared that our ideas exist outside us: in God. The nominalists therefore taught that there is no reality except in individuals, while the realists taught that the only reality is God. The first position led to rationalism, the second to an idealist pantheism that denied all individuality (42).

Erigenes set out his philosophical system in *De divisione naturae*, which is steeped in Platonic ideas and the mysteries of astrology. By "nature" he meant not only being, i.e. God, from whom all things emanate, but also non-being, i.e. the phenomenal world, beings, which emanate from Him. The phenomenal world has no reality, except insofar as it derives its origin from God. In these pantheistic speculations, which Erigenes had borrowed from a Greek monk named Maximus (43) and which we have summarised very briefly here (44), Marsilio Ficino (*De immortalitate animi*, 1499), the German theologian and philosopher Reuchlin (*De verbo mirifico*, 1522), Agrippa (*De occulta philosophia*, 1486), Paracelsus (*Paracelsi volumen Medicinae paramirum*, ca. 1520), the alchemist, chemist, physiologist and physician Jean-Baptiste Van Helmont (1579-1644), the Dominican monk and philosopher Campanella (1568-1639) and Giordano Bruno (1548-1600), to name but the best-known, drew on part of their doctrine; as early as the end of the 12th century, they had been pushed to their final consequences by the theologians and philosophers Amaury de Chartres (c. 1150- c. 209) (45) and David de Dinant (1165- c. 1215).

David of Dinant saw God as the material principle of all things; for him, there was only one substance, the sole principle of all forms, which are merely imaginary accidents, and this substance is God. He completed his system with the following millenarian theory: "The Father acted in the Old Covenant in certain forms, notably in the form of the law; the Son acted in the New Covenant in certain forms, notably in the form of the sacraments. The forms of the Mosaic Law fell at the coming of Christ; so will now fall all the forms in which the Son has worked; the sacraments will be abolished, because the Holy Spirit will manifest Himself.

He will speak mainly through the mouths of seven prophets, of whom I myself am one. The reign of the Spirit is approaching; when God has visited the peoples, the princes, the burghers and above all the prelates with the plagues of famine and war, the earthquakes and the fires of heaven, all the kingdoms of the world will be subject to the King of France. The Pope is the Antichrist, and Rome the Babylon of impurity (46). So there were three ages: the reign of the Father was the Old Testament, that of the Son the New Testament, and that of the Holy Spirit was about to dawn. The fundamental dogmas of Christianity were under radical attack.

This heresy inspired all the mystical sects of the "Middle Ages" and even spread to the Franciscans. The Cistercian monk Joachim de Fiore (c. 1130-1202), a fervent supporter of the speculative and mystical doctrines condemned by the University of Paris, was venerated by the Franciscans. It is true that, in the commentary he wrote on the Apocalypse, he predicted great success for this order. He thought he had discovered the law of the progressive revelation of God in the world. History was divided into three ages: the age of the Father or the Law; the age of the Son or the Gospel; and the age of the Spirit, which was to begin in 1260. This age would be marked by such an overabundance of light and grace that it would

would make the existence of the Church and the clergy unnecessary. All men would be equal, free from the cares of life and filled with the spirit of God. He called this millennium "the everlasting Gospel" (47).

Dinant, no more than de Fiore, thought of finding a practical application for his doctrine. On the contrary, Amaury de Chartres founded a sect.

One day, one of its members had the imprudence to talk about Almaric doctrine to a stranger. Denounced by the latter to the Bishop of Paris, he was arrested, imprisoned and interrogated, and his co-religionists, of whom there were many, soon suffered the same fate. On 18 November 1209, ten of them, most of them clerics, were burnt in public and four others sentenced to life imprisonment.

In 1210, Pierre de Corbeil, Archbishop of Sens, Pierre de Nemours, Bishop of Paris and several other bishops met in Paris to condemn the writings of Amaury de Chartres, David de Dinant and Aristotle, albeit on different grounds. Orders were given to exhume Amaury's body and dispose of it in "pagan soil". Certain works by Aristotle and his Arab commentators were forbidden to be read. Dinant's writings were to be taken to the Bishop of Paris before Christmas, to be burnt.

Anyone who kept them after that date would be excommunicated (48). A severe reprimand was pronounced against the doctrine of Scotus Erigena, for having been the source from which Amaury had drawn his heresies. The sentence was renewed in 1215 in the statutes given by the legate Robert de Courçon to the University of Paris. The study of Aristotle's dialectic was recommended, but the ban on his natural philosophy was extended to his metaphysics. The doctrine of Dinant and that of Amaury were condemned for a second time, but not the work of Scotus Erigena incriminated in 1210, which Pope Honorius III admitted in 1221 was "in the hands of a large number of monks and school doctors" (49).

Aristotle's works, against which the sentence of the Synod of Paris had never been fully executed, were quickly rehabilitated (50). As for de Fiore, who had died twelve years earlier, his posterity fared well: the Lateran Council (1215) condemned only one of his propositions and his doctrine remained considered orthodox by the Church (51). Honorius III called him "vir catholicus" (52) and, when the members of the Order of Flora, founded in 1189, were suspected of heresy, he defended them and forbade them to be attacked again on this subject (53).

Dinant died in solitude, while the sect founded by Amaury de Chartres, who was too young to be a member of the sect, continued to grow.

In order to be destroyed, the group was growing in numbers, as its persecutors themselves admitted. Persecuted, the

The Amalricians dispersed and the heresy spread to schools and convents, as well as among the people. On the one hand, they seem to have found refuge in Lyon, where they mingled with the Waldensians, who were also persecuted for harbouring feelings similar to those of the Amalricians towards the Church and the external forms of Christian worship. Whether by coincidence or not, Amaury de Chartres' doctrine soon took root in the western provinces of Germany, which was to be the hotbed of pantheist heresy in the "Middle Ages" and which Heine would call "the fertile ground of pantheism", "the public secret" and "the occult religion of Germany" (54).

In these regions, Erigene's speculations, more or less in the form given to them by Amaury, were collected and propagated first by the beguines and beggars, lay mendicant orders born in the Netherlands in the eleventh and late twelfth centuries respectively (the beggar order was formed on the model of the beguine order), and then by the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, a movement in gestation in the wealthy trading cities of the Rhine from the beginning of that same century. The Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit appear to have professed schismatic and heretical doctrines right from their foundation, while the attention of the beguines and beggars was initially focused solely on the practical tasks for which their order had been founded and which earned them the protection of the great and the sympathy of the small: manual labour and works of piety. Very early on, towards the end of the thirteenth century, the pantheistic mysticism of the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit and the apocalyptic doctrines of the Franciscan rigorists (known as fraticelles), which we mentioned earlier in connection with Joachim de Fiore, spread among them (55). A doctrine emerged.

The stutterers taught that, already in this life, "man can reach such a degree of perfection that he will be completely free from all sin; from then on he will make no further progress in grace. For if a man were always advancing in grace, he would perhaps become more perfect than Jesus Christ. When one has reached this point of perfection, therefore, one should no longer pray or fast [...] Moreover, freedom is where the spirit of the Lord is; now, since the spirit of the Lord is with those who attain this perfection of stutterers, they must desire freedom; consequently, they are subject neither to the authority of men nor to the commandments of the Church. Final bliss can be achieved in this life as well as in the next. All intelligence finds its happiness in itself; to see God and enjoy him, the soul needs no light of glory. The perfect soul has excluded the virtues; it is therefore an imperfection to practise them. At the elevation of the body of Jesus Christ, the perfect man must not pay any mark of respect; for it would be an imperfection to descend from the purity and height of his contemplation to think of the passion and humanity of Jesus Christ or of the Eucharist" (56).

Christ had said: "I and my Father are one" and, consequently, the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit professed that "God is all; that there is no difference between the Creator and the Father". creature; that man's destiny is to unite himself with God, so as to lose his own essence in

the divine nature; that, by this union, man becomes not only like God, but God himself by nature and without difference, that is to say Creator, eternal, infinite...". (57) Since there is an identity of substance between God and man and man is therefore God, he is absolutely free; he no longer has to worry about the prescriptions of human law or divine law and can do whatever he wants, since it is no longer he, but God, who wants. The sole aim of human life is union with God, and since man is capable of uniting himself with God through the inspiration of the Holy Spirit alone, neither the sacraments nor the clergy have a n y meaning.

The sectarians derived from their pantheistic doctrine a morality that was both libertarian and communist.

For the beguadians, when man had reached a state of perfection, union with God, any action was permitted and he could indulge his senses in all pleasures. In fact, if the minutes of their trials are to be believed, the greatest licence reigned in the places, called beguinages, where men and women, who had joined the order in large numbers, lived together. In the same way, the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit declared all passions, all pleasures of the senses, legitimate, on the grounds that sensuality has no influence on the spirit and that, in any case, a free man can allow himself anything. For a free spirit who feels at one with God, all moral distinctions disappear and, with them, all social distinctions and all differences between the sexes. Both sects demanded and practised community of property and women.

The sectarians were excommunicated and persecuted because of their spirit of opposition to the Church, the mystical pantheism of their doctrine and the lifestyle of cynical idleness and hedonism that this doctrine encouraged among the lower classes.

At the beginning of the 15th century, some of them found refuge in Bohemia, where they earned the nickname of the Picards" (58). Their freedom of spirit continued to be particularly apparent in relations between the sexes. "The most complete community of women reigned among the heretics. The man would present the woman of his choice to the patriarch of the sect, saying: 'My spirit has led me to this one'; to which the patriarch would reply: 'Go, grow, multiply! Such was the ceremony that preceded these temporary unions. Moreover, they regarded nudity, especially during the ceremonies of worship, as the outward sign of moral perfection. We have not, like Adam and Eve, transgressed the law of God, they said; we live in the state of innocence of the first men before the fall. Ulrich de Rosenberg, a Bohemian gentleman who persecuted these heretics under the orders of Ziska, told Aeneas Sylvius in 1451 that he had held men and women of the sect in prison, and that he had heard the women declare loudly that clothing is only a sign of spiritual servitude. Whoever," they said, "uses clothes does not possess freedom. One of the

truths spread among the sectarians was that the whole human race is slaves, and that only they and their children are of the free race" (59). Driven out of the place where they had settled for abusing the hospitality of their neighbours, albeit non-sexually, they returned to the German states, where a good number of them fell into the hands of the Inquisitors.

Extirpated from France, Germany and Bohemia around the middle of the 15th century, the heresy remained underground in the Netherlands and Belgium, where it resurfaced at the time of the Reformation among the "Spiritual Libertines", descendants of the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit. Their doctrine is an antinomian pantheism. "According to them, there is only one spirit that exists and lives in all creatures, and that is the spirit of God, though it exists differently here below than in heaven. All creatures, angels, etc., are nothing in themselves and have no real existence apart from him; man in particular is preserved by the spirit of God which is in him; it is God who animates and vivifies our bodies and all our activity. In a word, all our actions and everything that is done in the world emanates directly from God, is his work in an immediate way. Apart from that, everything else - the world, the devil, the flesh, the soul, etc. - falls into the category of illusion, is the 'cuider', or nothing" (60). Since God accomplishes all things in all people, sin can only be a pure illusion, which disappears as soon as we recognise it as such and no longer attach any importance to it. The practical consequences of this doctrine are the "emancipation of the flesh", which the "spiritual libertines" justified their position with 1 Corinthians 10:23: "anything goes". On the whole, their teachings were based on the Bible, where, as we know, everything is said and its opposite.

One of the leading figures of the Libertines was Antoine Pocque, chaplain to Marguerite of Navarre (1492-1549) and tutor to her daughter Jeanne d'Albret (1528-1572) (61). Despite Calvin's publication of *Contre les Libertins*, in which Pocque was the main target, he remained in the queen's favour. The Libertines and, with them, their teaching, gradually disappeared from France, but their principle: "... l'Église de Dieu est la ou sont les cœurs fideles" (62) found supporters among the many members of the nobility and clergy who were in favour of religious reform. The one area in which progress was widely envisaged was religion.

To sum up the pantheistic doctrines of the sectarians of the "Middle Ages", their "main object of interest was not nature but, principally, man and, consequently, contemplation was directed less towards nature than towards mankind".

to the divine being as present in the universe than to God as present in humanity, the former being presented simply as a consequence or complement of the latter. What mattered above all was God in the mind or consciousness of man. Hence the pantheism of these groups was not materialistic but idealistic. Creatures [...] are in themselves pure nothingness. God alone is the true being, the real substance of all things. God, however, is principally present in everything that is spirit and therefore in man. In the human soul there is something uncreated and eternal, namely the intellect. This is the divine principle in man, by virtue of which he

resembles and is one with God" (63). Thus, to be effectively divinised, man must annihilate his will in God. This is the essence of the pantheistic doctrine, the consequences of which can already be foreseen when applied to the social sphere.

This pantheistic mysticism gave rise to the doctrines of the Rhenish mystics Eckhart (c.1260-1328), Jean Tauler (c.1300-1361), Ruysbroek (1293-1381) and Henri Suso (14th century) and, through the intermediary of the German Theology, a mystical treatise written towards the end of the 14th century, the Reformation and Luther's idea that God manifests himself directly to the conscience (64). The anonymous author of this treatise escapes pantheism only because of the inconsistencies in his theory: he teaches that "God is everything", "everything is one and the one is everything in God", while maintaining the distinction between the perfect and the imperfect, the absolute and the contingent, thus God and man; while maintaining it up to a certain point, since, in this doctrine, the finite is composed of two elements: being, as being, which is essentially divine and good in everything, even in the devil; and the will, which is nothing, insofar as it is evil, and which is evil insofar as it is nothing. The will is not the being; therefore the will is evil in itself. It must be attacked, stifled ceaselessly if we are to be nothing more than the blind instrument of God manifesting his divine perfections..." (65). Inherited from the Cathars, the Vaudois, the disciples of Amaury de Chartres, the Brothers and Sisters of the Free Spirit, and John Hus, Luther cast this pantheistic conception, according to which man must annihilate himself in God in order to be divinised, in an Augustinian mould, and here is what came out of it: "Original sin has completely corrupted human nature; that is why man is born an absolute serf. What he does for good or ill is not his doing: it is God's doing. Faith alone justifies, regardless of works. We are saved simply by trusting in God's forgiveness (...). Hierarchy and priesthood are therefore unnecessary; external worship is useless. There is no point in worrying about holy things. Prayer, fasting, vigils, good works, all this holy discipline of the soul is useless, and can be replaced by faith, simply by faith. By means of this procedure, every Christian is a priest, and can administer salvation to himself, without being subject to any special means instituted by God, not even that of works."(66). The doctrine of justification by faith was taken even further by the Jew Calvin, according to whom God is all and does all in man, who is the plaything of his goodness or of his wrath, both gratuitous (67).

Although they did not declare themselves pantheists, the Anabaptists nonetheless drew all the practical consequences from this deterministic theology: "If God is everything, and if everything is God, then every man, and everything in every man, intelligence and will, soul and body, is by this very fact consubstantial with God, God or a portion of God; therefore, he has and can have no superior; therefore, he cannot be subject to any law, except that which constitutes him and which he can no more be subject to than that which constitutes him.

violate, that it cannot, like God, cease to be. So there is no lawgiver for us any more than there is for God, or for animals or plants. Our sovereign, independent legislator, if there is one, is ourselves, our reason alone; it is God as well as the reason of anyone else in the world. My reason, my soul, my body, my whole being having been drawn from nothing, being divine, eternal as the substance of God himself, who therefore in the world or outside the world can bind them together?

(...) Therefore, we are all equally the creators and authors of our being; we are all equally our legislators and our masters; we are all equally independent of one another. Therefore, any government, any authority, any tribunal that wants to make me dependent on it and subjugate me, is a tyranny, a contradiction, a nonsense, which I cannot admit without losing my divine independence and my portion of God. Therefore, all that we call laws, right and duty, just and unjust, vice and virtue, religion and worship, all that constitutes the moral world, is no more than a shadow, a phantom without any meaning.

reality, an empty word, myths, symbols in which we contemplate what is not there, as the masters of pantheism speak, clouds, images, figures that the sun of philosophy dissipates more and more every day, as the disciples speak" (68). Socially, the Lutheran doctrine produced a number of Jacqueries: the Peasants' War and the Anabaptist War (69). While some of their social demands were far from unjustified (70), to say nothing of their libertarianism before its time, Lutheranism devoured them by inoculating them with an egalitarian and anarchist ideology of Christian origin (71).

From the time of the Reformation onwards, mystical pantheism retreated into the realm of pure speculation. The doctrine of the identity of God and the world nevertheless continued to exist, in two forms: one humanist, in thinkers such as Michel Servet (1511- 1553) and his admirer, Sébastien Franck (1499-1542) (72), both of whom fused the ideals of humanism with mystical experience (73); the other, in the following century, monistic, naturalistic and set out in scientific terms, in Giordano Bruno.

On the boat that took him from Byzantium to Florence, Cardinal de Cues (1401-1464), as he later wrote in the postface to his *Docte Ignorance*, was "led by, I believe, a gift from the Father of lights, from whom comes every excellent gift, to embrace incomprehensible things in a way incomprehensible in learned ignorance, going beyond incorruptible truths humanly knowable. Docte Ignorance which, thanks to him who is Truth, I am today completing to expose in these books which can be summarised or developed from the same principle. All the effort of our human spirit must be concentrated on these profound things in order to rise to that simplicity where the contradictory coincide" (74).

De docta ignoventia, de Cues' first work, consists of three books. The first deals with the The first is the "absolute maximum", the second the "contracted maximum", and the third both the "absolute and contracted maximum".

The contracted maximum is the universe. It emanates from the absolute maximum, which is God. "The Universe, privatively and not negatively, is but the similitude of God; it is, as it were, the intermediary through which God is in everything and everything is in God" (75).

The absolute and contracted maximum is Jesus Christ, both God and man. By putting on the spirit of Christ, man can rise to the divine state.

De Cues "calls maximum (absolute) a thing such that there can be no greater. Now, fullness is appropriate to a single being; this is why unity coincides with maximality and is also an entity. Now, if such a unity is absolute in a universal way, beyond all relations and all restrictions, it is manifest, since it is the absolute maximality, that nothing is opposed to it. This is why the absolute maximum is a single thing which is everything, in which everything is, because it is the maximum. As nothing is opposed to it, with it, at the same time, coincides the minimum; that is why it is thus in everything. And because it is absolute, it is in act all possible being, suffers no restriction from things and imposes them on all" (emphasis added) (76). The coincidence of opposites (77) is infinite unity, i.e. God, but also man insofar as he is the image of God.

We see that absolute maximality is infinite, that nothing is opposed to it and that it coincides with the minimum, but we see it "in an incomprehensible way" (78). God is unknowable, but it is still possible to form some idea of him through mathematical language, "the only path open to divinity" (79). If the human mind is incapable of conceiving the infinite in act, it can arrive at a dynamic approximation of the infinite through processes of infinitisation, which de Cues calls *transumptio*. *Transumptio* has three stages. It is the reverse operation of *subsumption*: mental determination does not relate to a sensible diversity that it integrates into its unity in order to

In order to identify or classify it, it is itself placed under the superior unifying power of the infinite in an attempt to gain a vision of it. "The first step is to mobilise rational knowledge of a finite geometric figure. The mind then infinitizes the properties of these figures in such a way as to form infinite mathematical figures, according to an infinity in act that is both mental and fictitious, before making a second, properly theological leap from these infinite figures to divine infinity itself. Thus, the circle, whose diameter gradually increases to infinity, sees the degree of curvature of its circumference gradually decrease and tend towards the straightness of the straight line. At infinity, the straight and the curved are no longer in opposition but come together and pass into each other" (80). To quote de Cues, "it is as if human nature were the polygon inscribed in the circle, and divine nature, the circle; if the polygon must be maximal to the point that it cannot be greater, it would absolutely no longer subsist by itself in its finite angles, but in the figure of the circle, so that it would no longer have a specific figure of subsistence, a figure that could be separated, even mentally, from the eternal figure of the circle" (81). "God is the infinite sphere whose centre is everywhere and whose circumference is nowhere", said *The Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers* (twelfth century) (82), "one of the most mysterious and hermetic texts,

but also the most important in the entire history of medieval philosophy and even in the history of philosophy itself" (83). "The machine of the world has, so to speak, its centre everywhere and its circumference nowhere, because God is circumference and centre, he who is everywhere and nowhere (84).

"(emphasis added), says de Cues, thus transferring to the universe a quality hitherto attributed only to God. He thereby established the existence of an unlimited universe. Until then, the concept of a closed universe, inherited from Aristotle and Ptolemy, had been universally accepted.

From this hypothesis de Cues deduced a whole theory of human thought and activity, which led him to interpret the notion of microcosm in a dynamic sense. "Now it is precisely human nature, elevated above all divine works and scarcely inferior to that of the angels, which, embracing within itself the intellectual and sensitive natures, and summing up the entire universe in itself, was rightly called the microcosm or world in miniature by the Ancients. It is this, then, which, if elevated to union with maximity, could constitute the fullness of all the perfections of the universe and of each of the beings that constitute it, so that in humanity it could reach the supreme limit of itself" (85). The fullness referred to here is not simply the state of spiritual perfection. In the new conception of the relationship between the microcosm and the macrocosm, man is a creator and the universe is a "living being moved by forces that man alone can dominate and guide by succeeding in constructing the appropriate instruments" and perfecting the appropriate techniques (86).

In the *Compendium* (1467), de Cues declared that "the diversity of the arts and of the products of art manifests, in a visible and varied manner, the one and indivisible intellect of man" and "consequently of God, since there is identity of substance between them" (87). In the Sermon for the Epiphany he delivered on 6 January 1546, he evoked "the myth of Protagoras and the idea of a progress in time in which - with explicit reference to the Incarnation - man's 'natural' work and the 'supernatural' graces that are added to give it its full value collaborate" (88). "The Cusain's dream is the moral and religious unification of humanity through the doctrine of Christ as homo maximus. For him, the Incarnation, which he believes to be a requirement in all philosophies, gives full meaning to humanity's collective effort towards the progress of scientific knowledge, conquering technology, the *concordia catholica* and the *pax fidei*" (89).

Between the death of de Cues and the publication of Giordano Bruno's first book (*De umbris idearum*, 1582), two works were published that are important, in different respects, for our purposes: *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (1543) and the *Six Books of the Republic* (1570). In the latter, the philosopher, historian, jurist and theologian Jean Bodin (c. 1530-1596) rejected the idea of a golden age and the subsequent degeneration of mankind, arguing that his era was comparable to, if not superior to, classical antiquity and that, although the whole world was the fruit of a divine plan in which all the parts were intimately linked, history depended largely on the will of the individual.

men. He went even further, applying the notion of progress to political matters (90). In the tradition of ancient stoicism, he maintained that all the peoples of the world had a common interest, an idea to which the discoveries of contemporary navigators had given new importance. On several occasions, he spoke of the world as a universal state and suggested that the different races, with their particular aptitudes and qualities, contributed to the common good of the whole. This concept of the solidarity of peoples was to play an important role in the development of the doctrine of progress and, of course, of cosmopolitan ideology.

Copernicus' treatise *De revolutionibus orbium coelestium* (1543) took up the heliocentric theory put forward eighteen centuries earlier by Aristarchus of Samos, a theory that implied the idea of the infinitude of the universe. In Copernicus' theory, the universe is still conceived as finite, but it is said to be "unmeasurable"; yet there is only a small step from "unmeasurable" to "infinite", a step that would be taken halfway by the Copernican Thomas Digges (91) and completely by Giordano Bruno, when he identified the previously revealed infinity of God with the newly revealed infinity of the universe (92).

Unlike de Cues, Giordano Bruno does not distinguish between an absolute maximum (God), infinite in act, and a contracted maximum (the universe), infinite in potential. God is infinite and the universe is similarly infinite, and since there cannot be two infinities and the existence of the world cannot be denied, it follows that God and the universe are one and the same being. It follows that there is no longer any need for a mediator between God and the universe. God is not the creator, but the soul of the world. The idea of creator and free creation is replaced by that of nature and necessary production. The production of the world in no way alters the God-universe. An absolute and indivisible unity, he is in all things and all things are in him. The human soul is the supreme expression of cosmic life. All beings are both bodies and souls: living monads reproducing in a particular form the monad of the

monads, or the God-Universe, of which they are the reduced image. This is the theory of divine immanence (93), on which Bruno bases his moral philosophy. Since God and nature are one, divine law, natural law and civil law are inseparably linked. The law, impenetrable and elusive for Luther, is rational and comprehensible for Bruno. In his eyes, "civil law can only be the effect of human virtue, of human power appropriating natural law and civil law".

and transforming them according to the civil perspective of freedom. The law enabling the constitution of the human community, of every human community, is identified with human power, with virtue, acting in the immanence of divine law and natural law" (94). Through the institution of just laws, i.e. based on activity, effort and virtue, the individual perfects himself and contributes to the perfection of the community of which he is a part, in the knowledge that the effort must above all be collective. "In this sense, civil justice enables men to become 'like the gods'" (95). "For Bruno, it is not just a matter of accumulating knowledge in the physical-natural realm; it is truly a matter of perfecting and constantly transforming oneself in accordance with the *vera religione*. The perfectibility, and consequently progress, are real and effective when people act in accordance with their own needs.

with divinity and nature" (96). He calls this action "natural magic". He clearly states that "The modern mind is superior to that of antiquity, and that the men of its time are older than those who are called 'ancient', that they have more experience" and "does not admit that the Golden Age was a time of happiness, because man did not need to work: on the contrary, it is necessary for man to work". "Man transforms nature by the power of his mind: we felt the need for something better, and we made the discoveries of modern industry" (97).

Thus, in addition to his conception of an infinite universe containing an infinity of worlds and his conviction that reason is the preferred instrument for knowledge of the infinite, his theory of human perfectibility paved the way for so-called classical science and consequently for the philosophy of progress. The time was not far off when science-loving fools could trumpet from the heights of their vanity: "the universe", which is "everything", "is the source of progress; progress is therefore infinite like the source from which it flows" (98).

All Bruno's ideas, more or less derived from the Kabbalah (99), were to be found in the more or less Kabbalistic systems of Baruch Spinoza (1632-1677) and Gottfried Wilhelm Leibnitz (1646- 1716) and, later, in those of the representatives of German idealism (Kant, Fichte, von Schelling, Hegel), all developed and matured more or less Kabbalistically (100).

Kabbalah ("tradition") appears to have started out as a collection of speculations giving an allegorical and mystical meaning to certain passages in the Bible, but from the middle of the twelfth century, when it spread to the Jewish communities of Provence, Languedoc and the Rhineland (101), it became the art of entering into communication with the spirits and becoming like them through contemplation. Kabbalah used to be divided into two sections: bereshith ("in the beginning of") and merkabah ("chariot" or "zodiac"). The former is the science of the occult virtues contained in the world, the latter the knowledge of supernatural things through geomancy, numerology, gematria and other divinatory techniques. The Kabbalist can relate to three types of divination of intelligences: the first receive the light of heaven immediately; the second govern the celestial spheres and the third govern the destiny of mankind. The latter are four in number: Esh, who presides over fire, Mayim over water, Ru'ach over wind, Afar over earth. These intelligences are divided into two sexes; they live for several centuries, but their souls are mortal; the male intelligences that manage to unite with a woman and the female intelligences that manage to unite with a man are mortal.

Uniting with a man can conquer immortality; demonology has turned them into incubi and succubi (102). The Kabbalistic doctrine of the "Middle Ages" seems to have been founded on trade with elemental spirits of the third type (103), i.e. those who govern the destiny of men.

Historically, the first book in the Kabbalistic corpus is the Sefer Yetsirah (10th century), followed by the Sefer haBahir (12th century) and, from the 13th to the 20th century, by a dozen other treatises, including the Book of Splendour (13th-15th century) by Moses de Leon, which is pantheistic in its theistic language; the Shulhan Arukh (The Table Set) by Joseph Caro (1488-1575), which, like the Derush Hefzi-Bah by Joseph Ibn Tabul (1545-1610), a complete exposition of the Kabbalah by Isaac Luria (1534-1572), is an attempt to reconcile theism and pantheism; the Baal Shem Tov (The Master of the Holy Name), resolutely pantheistic, by Israel ben Eliezer (1698-1760), founder of Hasidism.

According to the Lurianite Kabbalah, there are three phases in the creation of the world: tsimtsum, the act by which Eyn Sof contracts or withdraws into itself in order to make room for creation, which consists of the projection of a ray of light from the Infinite into the newly created space(104) ; the "breaking of the vessels" (shevirat ha-qelim) in which the divine light had been enclosed and the subsequent appearance of evil in creation; the struggle to rid the world of evil and accomplish the redemption of the cosmos and history (tikkun, "reparation"), a struggle that results in the rebuilding of the divine kingdom, the "new" and the "old".

divine sparks are brought back to their source and Adam Qadmon, "primordial man", the highest manifestation of divine light, is rebuilt. In this restoration of primordial harmony, man plays a decisive role through kavvanah, the appropriate state of mind for performing religious duties, particularly prayer. The importance that the Lurianite Kabbalah attaches to man's responsibility in the cosmic order is such that a modern Jewish historian and philosopher of the Kabbalah describes man's function as that of an "activity of maintenance of the cosmos" (105).

From the Middle Ages onwards, the principles of Kabbalistic mysticism were incorporated into alchemy (106).

The origins of alchemy are lost in a cloud. It can be traced back to the Poimandres, the first treatise of the corpus hermeticum, attributed to the legendary Hermes Trismegistus. What seems almost certain is that it originated in Egypt, under the influence of the pantheism that developed in Alexandria during the first centuries of our era as a result of the encounter between Greek philosophy and Eastern mysticism (107).

alexandrines: Synesius, Heliodorus, Olympiodorus, the Greek-Syrian Zosimus of Panopolis (108). Zosimus writes: "One is the whole, through him the whole is; if the whole does not contain the whole, it is not the whole" (109). The Arabs claim to have received their alchemical knowledge from a certain Adfar (seventh century), a Christian philosopher from Alexandria. He was reputed to have found the writings of Hermes. Jabir ibn Hayyan (Geber) (721-813), the second author of alchemy among the Arabs, belonged to the Sufi sect, a direct descendant of Alexandrian mysticism. "This alliance is easy to explain. By admitting, in the philosophical and religious order, that there is only one substance of beings, or that there is only one being in infinitely varied forms, how can we prevent ourselves from believing, in the sphere of human nature and industry, that all the bodies of which this world is composed are only "one"?

That all metals, provided they are subjected to a sufficiently powerful agent, can be reduced to a single metal, which is their common type and their highest degree of perfection." (110) This is the principle from which alchemy was born and through which it first linked itself to the mystical pantheism of the Greeks of Alexandria and the Sufis of Persia.

Introduced to Europe, via England, at the same time as the term *alchimia*, derived from *al-kīmiyâ*, by the *Liber de compositione alchimiae quam edidit Morienus Romanus Calid regi Aegyptiorum quem Robertus Castrensis de arabico in latinum transtulit* (1144), Robert de Chester's Latin translation of the work

by the Byzantine monk and alchemist Maryanus (Morienus Romanus) (7th century AD), master of the Umayyad prince and alchemist Khālid ibn Yazid (111), the doctrine can be summed up in a few words. All material things are formed by the interaction of four elements - earth, water, fire, air - dryness, moisture, heat, cold. The four elements are opposed to each other; knowledge of them is a step towards knowledge of the single substance of which they are the expression; there is a prime matter of which the four elements are the simplest forms. The interactions of the elements are directed by the one substance that is common to them all and to all the things that are formed by their union. The single substance is hidden beneath the four expressions it takes. The four outer forms of the inner unity are hidden by the various coverings that nature has imposed on them, in order to incite men to seek its hidden simplicity, a simplicity that it reveals only to those who are not distracted from the quest by the fascinating complexity of appearances. The adept must not hope to change material things at will; he must follow nature. Nature aims at perfection. To attain perfection is to find rest, immutability. To find rest in this changing world, he must have the means to live as long as possible in material conditions that will enable him to satisfy his intellectual aspirations. To be free from want, he needs gold and, to prolong his life, an elixir (112), which the Franciscan Roger Bacon (1214-1294) defined as "a certain kind of medicine" (113).

Bacon's mental attitude towards natural phenomena is what later earned him the nickname "father of experimental science" (114). It "was closer to that of the student of science than to that of the alchemists who preceded him and those who followed him. His writings contain no vague discourse on the need to strip matter of its properties, on invisible elements, on the soul of bodies, on the unique substance and so on. He opposes the alchemical doctrine of a raw material as being harmful to the study of nature" (115). "Alchemists, both before and after Roger Bacon, drew from their intellectual and emotional aspirations a schema of nature's working method, and then observed natural change through the prism of their imagination. Bacon tried to look first at external realities and to base his intellectual explanation of material change on observed facts" (116). He rejected occult causes. He taught that excessive respect for worthless authority is one of the causes of ignorance. At the same time, he affirmed the need to obey the Church and placed theology at the top of his hierarchy of sciences.

transposed theological methods into scientific enquiry (117) and came up with "operative" or "practical" alchemy.

Operative alchemy "teaches man how to make noble metals and colours and many other things, better and in greater quantities by art than by nature. And this science is more important than all those that preceded it because it provides more advantages

" (118). Bacon also considers it more effective in this respect than the magical arts, which, in *Epistolae Rogerii Baconis de secretis operibus artis et naturae et de nullitate magia*, he declares inferior to both nature and art. He writes: "I shall say a few words about these admirable operations of Art and Nature which have not the slightest magic in them, and then I shall assign them their causes and their domains. I shall begin with those machines which are purely artificial" (119). This is followed by a catalogue of these "machines", which justifies Carl Gustav Jung's assertion that "(i)n alchemy Alchemy was the dawn of the era of the natural sciences, which, through the demon of the mind, forced mankind to take control of the world.

(120) "In this way, nature and its forces will be placed at the service of man to an extent never before attained: "A small instrument the length of three fingers and of equal height, which could be used to raise or lower incredible weights without fatigue, and which would be very useful on occasion: one could, with its help, remove oneself and one's friends from the depths of a dungeon to the heights of the air and come down to earth at will; another to drag any resistant object over solid ground, and allow a single man to drag a thousand of them against their will

These things are marvellous, but, Bacon insists, they are not magic; they are produced by human art applied to the results of the study of natural events. 121 "These things are marvellous, but," he insists, "they are not magic; they are produced by human art applied to the results of the study of natural events. These things are marvellous, but, Bacon insists, they are not magical; they are produced by human art applied to the results of the study of natural events. The English translator of the *Epistolae*, published in that language four centuries later, must not have been entirely convinced, as he gave it the title *Frier Bacon his Discovery of the miracles of Art, Nature, and Magick*, faithfully translated out of Dr. Dees own copy, by T. M., and never before in English (1656).

that "figures and charms can sometimes be used (as well as holy water) with success by doctors" (122).

For Bacon, it was not simply a question of following nature, but of surpassing it and, first of all, mastering it. He asserted that art could improve nature (123), which for him meant above all prolonging life.

His medical knowledge, like his alchemical background (124), was essentially derived from Arab authors such as Avicenna, whom he called "dux et princeps philosophorum" (125). Most of the Arabic medical treatises he cites deal with the preservation of youth; later, Francis Bacon declared that the part of medicine concerned with the prolongation of life was the noblest of all and wrote a special treatise on the subject, *History Natural and Experimental of Life and Death, or of the Prolongation of Life* (1590) (126). In his *Opus Majus*, Roger Bacon claims that there is a "remedy capable of ridding the lower metals of all impurity and corruption (and that it) can also, according to the learned, extirpate so much corruption from the human body as to prolong life for many centuries" (127). Even if, according to Bacon, the human body was "naturally immortal" (*naturaliter immortalis*) (128), an opinion which he based in all probability on 1 Corinthians 15:50-54, his aim was not to make him so, but, more modestly, to prolong his life (129) by means of remedies prepared from alchemical gold or a compound derived from the distillation of human blood and sublimated mercury (130), which however had no effect until they had been activated, so to speak, by divine power (131). The elixir was not only capable of transforming a person, it could also transform peoples: all that was needed was to "change their air" (emphasis added) (132), as (pseudo-)Aristotle advised Alexander in *Secretum secretorum* (Letter to Alexander) (c. 1150), translated from an Arabic treatise on magic, alchemy, medicine, morality and political science entitled *Sirr-al-asrar* (tenth century), which was Bacon's bedside book (133). The "secret of secrets" was that which, through the fusion of medicine and alchemy, would make it possible to prolong life, to prolong life, not for worldly purposes, but in order to survive the reign of the Antichrist, which, according to Bacon and a number of his contemporaries, such as Joachim de Fiore, was imminent.

Bacon's writings on *scientia experimentalis* and, more specifically, on alchemy are steeped in apocalypticism. And yet," he writes in his *Opus Tertium*, "it is true that these magnificent sciences, through which great good can be done as well as great evil, should be known only to certain persons authorised by the pope: who are subject to laws and regulations : Who (...) are to work for the public good under the command of the pope, so that the Church in all her tribulations may have recourse to these powers, and that at last she may face the Antichrist and his followers, and, as the miracles which he would perform would be equally performed by the faithful, it would be shown that he is not God, and his persecution would be hindered and mitigated in many respects..." (134). Notwithstanding his conviction that the Church was corrupt, Bacon was convinced that circumstances demanded that the Church defend Christendom against its various enemies, militarily, but above all through the application of *scientia experimentalis* (135). The millenarianism fostered by Bacon's apocalyptic turn of mind was also found among the other Franciscan alchemists (136). "In Franciscan circles, the discovery of the secrets of alchemy became a messianic quest in an apocalyptic battle between Christianity and its enemies, the Muslims, the Jews, the evil Christians and the Antichrist himself (...). The Franciscans promised not only the transmutation of base metals into gold that would pay for the crusades against the enemies of the faith, but also the production, through alchemy, of the 'quintessence' which would fortify the bodies of the crusaders" (137). Paul had not

Did he not identify "the Son of Man" with "the last Adam", whose true divinity and immortality had been revealed by the Resurrection and could be won by his followers through the baptism of regeneration? (138). In the second century AD, did not Justin (Discourse to the Greeks) (139) assure non-Christians that "the divine Word, the incorruptible king (...) makes us pass into eternal life, and from mortal beings he makes gods" (emphasis added)? Irenaeus asserted that men "were not made gods from the beginning, but first men, and only then gods"?

(140). For Christians, human efforts to recover Adamic perfection and imitate the life of Christ were one and the same thing: the quest for a divine nature, through piety, asceticism or the grace of God during the first millennium and, from the beginning of the "Middle Ages", through the perfection of technology. At that time, inexplicably, this quest became something of a "technical question" (141). "Technology came to be identified more closely both with lost perfection and with the possibility of renewed perfection, and the progress of the arts took on a new significance, not only as a proof of grace, but also as a human preparation for imminent salvation and a sure sign of it" (142).

The notions of death and rebirth, transformation, purification, redemption and restoration are also characteristic of Kabbalistic and alchemical teachings, but it was not until the 17th century, shortly after the concept of tikkun had undergone a transformation (143), that alchemists began to apply the exegetical methods of the Kabbalah almost systematically to their art (144). The publication in two volumes by Baron Christian Knorr von Rosenroth (1636-1689) of the *Kabbala denudata* (1677) (145) was certainly not unrelated to this renewed interest in Kabbalistic doctrines, which, in addition to treatises by contemporary kabbalists and a translation of the oldest fragments of the *Sepher ha-Zohar*, brings together the *Emek ha-Melekh* of Naphtali Bacharach on *tsimtsum*, the *Sifra di-Zeni'uta*, the *Sefer ha-Gilgulim* (The Book of Revolutions), the passages of the New Testament that bear a resemblance to Kabbalistic doctrines, which ends with the *Adumbratio kabbalae christianae*, a summary of the Christian Kabbalah by François-Mercure van Helmont (1614-1699).

For the alchemists and Kabbalists of the 17th century, particularly van Helmont and his disciple Christian Knorr von Rosenroth, the Kabbalah provided the key to the natural world. The frontispiece of the *Kabbala denudata* depicts a young girl with long hair, dressed in a Greek robe, running, gazing skywards, along a narrow ledge leading from the sea to a cave surmounted by the inscription "antrum materie" ("the cave of matter"), which contains the astrological and alchemical signs of the planets and the corresponding metals. The word "domat" ("she subdues") is written under her right foot and "alterer" ("she alters") under her left foot. She is walking towards a door that reads "Palatium Arcanorum" ("place of secrets"). On the threshold of this palace is written "Intrat" ("she enters"). In her right hand, which she extends over the tumultuous waves, she holds a burning torch, under which is written "On her left hand, she is holding a scroll representing the Scriptures. In her left hand, she holds a scroll representing the Scriptures, on which is written "explicat" ("she explains"). Keys hang from

a rope around his wrist. A ship is sailing in the distance, while on the shore a tree is almost submerged in the waves. The clouds and darkness are crossed by a large circle of light, within which are three circles, each containing a circle. These last three circles represent the ten Kabbalistic sephirot, or ten faces (parzuphim), of the hidden divinity as revealed in the act of creation. Where the sea meets the sky is written 'Metaphysics of the Gentiles'.

The female figure represents the Kabbalah (146) and the keys they hold indicate that only the Kabbalah is capable of unveiling the secrets of the Old and New Testaments (147). The poem on the back cover of the first volume of the work emphasises the encyclopaedic nature of the Kabbalah, whose theology alone is capable of uniting Christians, Jews and Gentiles, while at the same time providing a morality that soothes the passions to which the soul is prey. The Kabbalah is the only way to enter the "Palace of Secrets", that is to say, true natural philosophy: alchemy (148). Man is perfectible, salvation could be attained by everyone and the millennium was inevitable; "the mixture of neoplatonic, alchemical and kabbalistic conceptions of which the Kabbala denudata, Knorr's other books and those of van Helmont are formed, encouraged a euphoric faith in man's ability to save himself and the world" (149). This faith was based on the axiom that nature aspires to perfection, an axiom itself founded on the alchemical concept of transmutation. In fact, the alchemists and Kabbalists shared the view of the Gnostics and certain theologians of the early Church that man was a potential god. In certain forms of Gnosticism,

Man not only has the power to make himself a god, but, as a microcosm, he contains within himself the whole of creation and, as such, is considered capable of saving matter itself. This perfectionism can be found in the Rosicrucian Manifestos, whose authors asserted that the *prisca teologia* would restore man to the state of perfection he was in before the Fall; another passage in the Manifestos speaks of "a perfect method concerning all the Arts" and of Axioms that would enable everything to be fully restored" (150), Axioms that constitute "an encyclopaedia of knowledge and an infallible 'rule' for acquiring other knowledge" (151). The numerous references to globes and circles in the Manifestos suggest that the Rosicrucians, like the Kabbalists and followers of Lulle, turned a kind of wheel (*rota mundi*) representing the celestial spheres in order to arrive at truth and knowledge. "The belief that truth and knowledge could be discovered or generated almost automatically by the use of an appropriate 'rule' or 'method' was common in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries" (emphasis added) (152). The Manifestos and van Helmont's writings also all insist that the transmutation of base metals into precious metals is not the supreme and ultimate goal of alchemy, that "True philosophers have other things in mind, esteeming little the manufacture of gold, which is only a parergon, for they have many other things to worry about" (153), including medicine and the invention of new drugs.

The Manifestos oscillated between two perspectives: that knowledge was a secret wisdom accessible only to the pure of heart, and that everyone not only could but should have access to it. While they addressed the whole world and invited all men to enter their "royal houses and palaces", a common alchemical motif derived from Old Testament considerations of the tabernacle and the temple, they presupposed that only those worthy would understand their message.

The proclamation by seventeenth-century thinkers of emancipation from the ancients was largely dependent on the second perspective. Francis Bacon (1561-1626) was the most prominent of these thinkers,

conceived of science and its new methods as capable of producing material improvements in the lives of men, tried to turn the whole of science towards their realisation, proclaimed that its aim should be the usefulness and well-being of men and that these were the most important goals of science. masters of their own destiny, which was common. In *The New Atlantis*, he urged the peoples of the whole world to establish a "sort of universal institute, where the results obtained by all those who, on the whole surface of the globe, devote themselves to the contemplation of the works of God and to the study of the labours of man, would come to be concentrated" (154). Bacon's utilitarianism was backed by a reasoned millenarianism

(155). Like his predecessors, such as Roger Bacon, "(if he) considered that techniques were essential to the enrichment of knowledge, he thought (...) that the enrichment of knowledge was essential to salvation and the restoration of perfection, 'the entrance into the kingdom of man, founded on the sciences, being (...) nothing other than the entrance into the kingdom of heaven'" (156). Like many of his contemporaries, he believed that the millennium was at hand and, "inspired by prophecy, he regarded the increase of knowledge in his day as a confirmation of this expectation as well as a means of preparing and hastening the days of glory to come" (157).

Equally indebted to the view that knowledge can and indeed must be made available to everyone is the Christian theme of the spread of "the good word", particularly present in the discourse of seventeenth-century Christian radicals (158) as well as in the Rosicrucian Manifestos and van Helmont's Confession. "In the course of the seventeenth century, science played an increasingly important role in the redemptive dissemination of the good word, to the point where redemption came to be seen from the point of view of scientific progress. One of the major phenomena that occurred in the seventeenth century was therefore not so much, as is generally thought, an attempt to separate science from religion as the incorporation into science of many of the functions previously performed by religion", One example of this incorporation is the effort of the Irish chemist and physicist Robert Boyle (1627-1691) to legitimise science and the role of the scientist by asserting that scientists are the true priests because they are the only ones who can read the Book of Nature and thus provide a solid foundation for the Christian faith (159).

This glorification of the scientist was surrounded by a halo of messianism. Knorr described him as "a highly renowned prophet, a naturalist and an exemplary sage who disdained riches" (160). Paracelsus (1493- 1541), inspired by medieval Jewish and Christian legends relating to the return of the prophet Elijah, created

a figure called Helias Artista, a magician and forerunner of the Messiah, who held all the secrets of nature and announced the reign of equality and justice for the poor and pious (161). The Lutheran alchemist Anna Zieglerin (c. 1550-1575) promised to help restore the lost fecundity of the pre-Fall world and contribute to a rejuvenation of nature in the Last Days. "The link between alchemy and eschatology seems to have been particularly strong: alchemy not only confirmed biblical and other prophecies about the workings of nature and the unfolding of the Last Days, but it also helped to bring about a renewal of nature.

But it also provided true Christians with the tools to face the imminent Last Days, either by resisting the tribulations of the end times or by restoring the world in extremis. Even Martin Luther appreciated the way in which alchemical work could in a sense ratify the prophecies about the fate of the world" (162).

The world did not perish, and the 17th century even saw "the most beautiful flowering of Hermetic art and literature" ever recorded. In 1631, Descartes, in a letter to an alchemist of his acquaintance, invited him "to disabuse the poor sick in spirit of the sophistications of metals", before adding that the alchemical principle of the four elements and the "fifth which is of them results" "is very much in line with my way of philosophising, and is wonderfully in keeping with all the mechanical experiments I have carried out on nature on this subject" (163). Leibnitz, secretary to a circle of alchemists for a few months in 1667 (164), during which time he would have hoped to find in this art "the explanation of the resurrection of bodies" (165), sounded the same note, judging that alchemy is "the most deceptive of researches" (166), but that alchemists are "people of great talent and even experience" (167). Spinoza, for his part, felt that alchemy rested on apparently rational foundations, that the alchemists' experiments were worthy of attention, but that the theory of transmutation was dubious (168). The work of these three seventeenth-century philosophers marks an advance in the idea of progress.

Born in Amsterdam to two Jewish parents who had fled Portugal for religious reasons, Baruch Spinoza was a pupil of the rabbis Saul Levi Morteira (c. 1596 -1660) and Menasseh ben Israel (1604-1657), with whom he studied the Talmud.

Although he called the Kabbalists "charlatans" (169), his philosophical system contains echoes of the Kabbalistic conception of the relationship between God and the universe (170), which he even radicalises: where Cordovero says "God is the whole but the whole is not God", Spinoza affirms "God, in other words nature", or "what we call God is nature" (171). It is true that, as Maxime du Camp points out, Spinoza's theories could have been derived not from specifically from the Kabbalah, but, in general, from the traditions of Eastern philosophy (172), hermeticism, neo-platonism and gnosticism, and even the seeds of pantheism that the first Descartes bore, the one in the Discourse on Method (173), and which Leibnitz, familiar with the

Jewish Kabbalah (174), by positing "the consciousness of a Unique Reality as the foundation of all phenomena" (175).

Cartesianism meets the three preliminary conditions for the formation of a theory of progress.

The first was the recognition of the value of worldly life and the subjugation of knowledge to human needs. The secular spirit of the Renaissance had prepared the world for this new evaluation, which Francis Bacon had already formulated and which would lead to utilitarianism.

It is not certain that knowledge will progress continuously as long as science is not based on solid foundations. Science can only rest on solid foundations if the invariability of the laws of nature is accepted (176). Descartes' philosophy established this principle, which is the palladium of science; thus the second preliminary condition was fulfilled.

Finally, Descartes definitively freed science and philosophy from the belief that the Greeks and Romans, in the best days of their civilisation, had reached an intellectual level that posterity could never hope to match (177).

Least but not last, it was under the influence of Descartes and his successors during the seventeenth century that the idea of progress became mainstream, moving from philosophical theses into the public domain. "At the end of the century, the Querelle des anciens et des modernes made the question of progress the real issue of the day; people had to take sides with the ancients or with the moderns" (178).

In the meantime, many scientific advances had been made. The establishment of the Royal Society in London, the Academy of Sciences in Paris and the Academy of Sciences in Berlin, "which are to the University what the latter had been to convents" (emphasis added) (179), had facilitated and centralised the work of scientists, who were now concerned with practical results. Journals had been created to popularise science. The principles of rational mechanics, the law of gravitation and infinitesimal calculus had been discovered; physics had made great progress; physiology, human anatomy and comparative anatomy had been established. Astronomical knowledge had multiplied and spread. Chemistry was born in the laboratories of the alchemists (180), and was honoured in the courts of Europe (181). Also under the influence of Cartesianism, Roger Bacon's hopes were coming true: the separations between the sciences were disappearing. Descartes' scientific theories succumbed, but the "abstract, logical, geometrical" (182) world that took shape in his philosophical and social views would inspire the "Enlightenment" (183). In this atmosphere of intellectual optimism, which had its origins in the

In the previous century, the view of the philosopher, Oratorian priest and theologian Malebranche (1638-1715) that the universe is "the most perfect that can be" (184) found a blissful supporter in Leibniz. According to him, everything, from the simplest being, progresses towards God and man, like society, is susceptible to progress": "Videlur homo ad perfectiohem venire posse" (185).

The revolutionary speculations on the social and moral condition of man which marked the eighteenth century in France and which had begun around 1750 were a development of the intellectual movement of the seventeenth, which had transformed the perspectives of speculative thought. "Rationalism having spread to the social sphere, the idea of intellectual progress naturally extended to the idea of the general progress of man. The transition was easy. If it could be proved that social ills were due neither to the innate and incorrigible handicaps of the human being nor to the nature of things, but simply to ignorance and prejudice, to improve his condition and ultimately enable him to achieve happiness, it would be enough to illuminate ignorance and remove error, to increase knowledge and spread light. The growth of 'universal human reason' - a Cartesian expression that figured in Malebranche's philosophy - was to ensure a happy destiny for mankind" (186). Between 1690 and 1740, the idea of the indefinite progress of knowledge made its way into French intellectual life, and must have been a subject of discussion in the salons. such as that of Madame de Lambert, Madame de Tencin and Madame Dupin, one of whose distinguished guests was Fontenelle (1657-1757), whose *Digression sur les anciens et les modernes* had taken the idea of progress a decisive step further by asserting resolutely that the moderns were superior to the ancients not only in the quantity of knowledge they possessed, but also and above all in the quality of that knowledge (187). His friend the Abbé de Saint- Pierre (1658-1743) belonged to the same circle, and in his writings progress was for the first time considered in social terms. In his eyes, charity was the queen virtue, and it was he who introduced the word into the French language in 1725 (188). There were few areas in which he did not point out shortcomings and draw up ingenious plans for improvement. Most of his many writings are detailed plans and programmes for reforming government, the economy, finance and education, all aimed at increasing pleasure and reducing pain. For him, progress meant not only moving forward, but above all reform. Some of his financial proposals were put into practice by Turgot (189). The work of the abbé de Saint-Pierre represents the transition between Cartesianism, which was concerned with purely intellectual problems, and the thinking of the second half of the eighteenth century, which focused on social problems. He anticipated the humanism of the Encyclopaedists (190) and was the first to proclaim indefinite social progress.

The theory of human progress could not be established in the long term by abstract arguments. "It had to be judged in the last resort by the evidence of history, and it is no coincidence that the study of history underwent a revolution at the same time as the advent of this idea. If progress was to be more than the dream (...) of an optimist, it had to be shown that man's career on earth had not been a series of accidents that could lead anywhere or nowhere, but a series of events that could lead to the future.

was subject to laws that had determined its general itinerary and would ensure its arrival at the desired location, and these laws had to be discovered. The Christian theory of the providential plan and final causes had made it possible to find a certain order and unity in history. New principles of order and unity were needed to replace the principles that the rationalism had discredited. Just as the advancement of science depended on the postulate that physical phenomena are subject to invariable laws, so too, if we wanted to draw conclusions from the laws of physics, we had to accept that the laws of physics were invariable. In order to arrive at conclusions about history, a similar postulate was needed for social phenomena" (191). It was thus in harmony with the general movement of thought that, towards the middle of the eighteenth century, new avenues of research were opened up, leading to sociology, the history of civilisation and the philosophy of history. Montesquieu's *De l'esprit des lois*, Voltaire's *Essai sur les mœurs* and, above all, Turgot's *Deux discours sur l'histoire universelle* marked the beginning of a new approach to the history of civilisation. era in man's vision of the past.

The two speeches that Turgot gave in 1750 at the Sorbonne are an apology for Christianity as a social model. The first extolled it for having been the first to establish a body of teachers for the people, to overturn the barriers between the different races, to proclaim the equality of men and to increase human happiness (192). However, Turgot was essentially concerned with the progress of knowledge; he outlined a law of intellectual progress, which Auguste Comte, the founder of positivism, would formulate.

The second speech sketches out a universal history that "rehabilitates the entire human race, something of which no history had yet given an example" (193). Hence his absolute confidence in the future. His ideal is "religious respect for the freedom of people and work, justice for all. This will necessarily lead to a multiplication of subsistence and an increase in wealth, an increase in enjoyment, enlightenment and all the means of happiness. Turgot believes that the progress of science is the fundamental progress; with it, civilisation develops; and the development of morality will bring happiness to society" (194). If his general thesis - the progressive march of humanity towards reason and knowledge - coinciding with that of Voltaire - makes the idea of Progress more vital; for him, it is an organising concept, just as the idea of Providence was for Augustine, an organising concept that gives history its unity and its "meaning". meaning (195).

Turgot's views found fertile ground and zealous propagandists in Germany, the "fertile land of pantheism" (196). The doctrine of progress manifested itself there in the more or less pantheistic philosophical systems of Schelling, Hegel, Lessing, Herder and Kant, who were indebted, especially the first two (197), to cabalistic and alchemical theories, even if partly via Spinoza, in whom they hailed the precursor of idealism (198). In a language that is more or less varied in form, but identical in content, all the masters place the philosophy of history in the "philosophy of history".

It is always the universal spirit, the one universal idea, the soul of the world, the creative force, the absolute. It is always the universal spirit, the one and universal idea, the soul of the world, the creative force, the absolute, which manifests itself on the vast stage of the globe in a series of necessary and progressive evolutions; it is the divinity which moves by virtue of the laws inherent in its nature, which acquires in humanity the awareness of its existence and its forces, and which, having reached this degree of development, constantly extends its action, its life, its power and its benefits; It is the divine principle united to human nature; it is God in man, who moves forward, because movement is the law of life, and who successively finds thought, speech, ideas, religion, philosophy, the arts, the various civilisations, in a word, all the phenomena under which the one and eternal substance manifests itself in the course of the centuries; it is the absolute which is constantly developing in order to come closer to the ideal of perfection in all genres and in all directions" (199). Such, in broad outline, are the systems of Schelling and Hegel and, more or less, that of Kant (1724-1804), in whom the Stoic-Christian chimera, heavy with the dogma of the equality of nations and races, of a progressive unity and solidarity of the human species in space (200), combined with the illusion of a law of continuity of historical development in time, is to be found in its purest form. His Idea of a Universal History from the Cosmopolitical Point of View, "a writing of capital importance in the history of the formation of social science" (201), aims to demonstrate that history has a meaning, that it follows a course that owes nothing to chance, that this course constitutes, to use an image of Johann Gottfried Herder (1744-1803), the "golden (c)hated of perfection" (202).

Of the nine propositions in this essay, two relate directly to the theory of progress. Proposition 4 is a principle of the dynamics of societies: "The means which nature uses to bring to completion the development of all human dispositions is their antagonism in society, until this antagonism nevertheless ends up becoming the cause of an order in accordance with the law". Proposition 8 aims to provide a natural explanation of social progress: "The history of the human species, as a whole, may be regarded as the execution of a hidden plan of nature, to bring about, internally, and for this purpose also externally, a perfect political constitution, for this is the only way in which she can fully develop in mankind all his dispositions". In the final analysis, Kant's system "consists in saying that humanity is moving towards a social state in which it will be able to develop its faculties to the full, within a political and civil organisation in harmony with man's dual nature. Within each country, this organisation will consist of the complete reconciliation of the liberty of each with the liberty of all, and of the liberty of all with the power of the law; in other words, in a society free of all useless cogs, of all heterogeneous elements, and based solely on the law. Externally, this organisation would be complemented and guaranteed by a kind of cosmopolitan state, a fraternal alliance of peoples under the rule of the law of nations.

universally accepted; in other words, a kind of amphictyonic association responsible for to govern the antagonism between peoples, in the same way that the internal organisation of each nation aims to govern the antagonism between individuals (...). Humanity will have found the means to develop all its faculties to the full in the midst of perpetual peace. This will be the reign of God on earth" (203). For Schelling, too, the reign of God is inescapable, under which no longer

not only individuals, but also peoples "will submit (all) to the same law; (...) they will group together as individuals once did, and their indissoluble alliance will produce the State of States, the universal Areopagus" (204), which, according to Hegel, could not fail to be Germany, to which the "universal supremacy, the empire of the world" had devolved, to the great satisfaction of Henri Heine (205). In the meantime, Hegel had to content himself with being an admirer of the revolution of 1789, insofar as it gave substance to "the State (of) civil servants, (...) the centralising and administrative State" (206), "the very substance of the individual" (207) conceived as a pure abstraction (208), of which he dreamed.

The intellectual movement that prepared French opinion for the Revolution of 1789 and provided the principles for the reconstitution of society can be described as humanist in the sense that man was at the centre of the speculations of its representatives. This is why psychology, morality and the structure of society took the place of the metaphysical questions that had occupied Descartes, Malebranche and Leibniz. It did not matter that the universe was the best that could be composed; what mattered was the relationship of man's little world to his will and his abilities. The physical sciences were important only insofar as they could help social science and satisfy man's needs. In a similar way, in Greece in the second half of the fifth century BC,

Protagoras, Socrates and others had turned from the study of the cosmos, which had captivated their predecessors, to the study of man, his nature and his works. Descartes' metaphysical system had fallen out of fashion, but the great postulates that guided it - the supremacy of reason and the immutability of natural laws, untouched by human intervention - were still valid.

Providence - had survived oblivion. These postulates still governed Enlightenment thought, but Descartes' particular view of mental phenomena had been supplanted by that of Locke, whose psychology Voltaire and Condillac had introduced to France. "The doctrine according to which all knowledge comes from sensations is at the basis of the whole theory of man and society, in the light of which the revolutionary thinkers, Diderot, Helvétius and their companions, criticised the existing order and exposed the prejudices that (, according to them, N. D. E.) reigned. This sensualism (which they understood more radically than Locke) implied the strict relativity of knowledge and led to the old pragmatic doctrine of Protagoras, according to which man is the measure of all things. And the spirit of the French philosophers of the eighteenth century was clearly pragmatic. Interest was their principle, and the value of speculation was judged by the services it rendered to humanity (...). Behind all philosophical speculation there is a n undercurrent of emotion, and in eighteenth-century French philosophers this emotional force was strong and even violent. They aimed at practical results. Their work was a calculated campaign to transform the principles and spirit of government (...). Since the problem for the human race was to achieve a state of bliss through its own powers, these thinkers believed that it could be solved by the gradual triumph of reason over prejudice and of knowledge over ignorance. Violent revolution was far from their thoughts; by spreading knowledge, they hoped to create a public opinion that would force governments to change their laws, reform their administration and make the happiness of the people their guiding principle. The optimistic belief that man is perfectible, i.e. capable of indefinite improvement, inspired the movement in

as a whole (...)" (209). Public opinion had been created: the views of the philosophers, the rationalists and men of science had interested the nobility and the upper classes for two generations and were a subject of discussion in the most distinguished salons (210); Voltaire's enmity with Frederick the Great and the relations of d'Alembert and Diderot with the Empress Catherine gave these men of letters and the ideas they defended a prestige that imposed themselves on the bourgeoisie; As for the humble, increasingly educated, they were as sensitive as the great to theories that provided simple keys to the universe and suggested that everyone was capable of judging the most difficult problems for themselves. Strengthened by the evidence of improvements in science and technology, "faith in progress was widespread; the idea served as the basis for the sect of the masses believed in it so much that they did not even know that they believed in it, but they acted as if the idea had been incorporated into their organism and was part of their automatic life" (211). All that remained was to harness public opinion to induce "governments to change their laws, reform their administration and make the happiness of the people their guiding principle" and, to begin with, to fight, to use an anachronistic term, against obscurantism (212). Many of the arguments used by the "Enlightenment" in its intellectual struggle against the throne and the altar (213) had been honed by the English representatives of republicanism, notably John Toland (1670-1722) (214).

The son of a clergyman, he was the author of around a hundred philosophical works and pamphlets combining hermeticism, alchemy, cosmology and the occult sciences (215), the translator of Giordano Bruno's *Lo spaccio de la bestia trionfante* (1584) and *De l'Infinito, Universo e Mondi* (1584) by Giordano Bruno and a critical and more or less tendentious populariser of Spinoza's philosophy and that of Leibniz (216), he was the first to attempt to give political expression to pantheism, precisely in the form of republicanism. He invented the term "pantheism" (217).

In 1696, Toland, just out of Oxford, published a book whose deist overtones in the title (*Christianity Not Mysterious*) were affirmed in the subtitle: "A Treatise showing that there is nothing in the Gospel contrary to Reason or above it: and that no Christian Doctrine can properly be called a Mystery." In other words, biblical doctrines are perfectly intelligible to human reason without the aid of any divine revelation. The book caused an uproar and Toland was taken to court in London. The Irish Parliament, for its part, proposed that he be burnt alive; unable to apprehend the accused, it had three copies of *Christianity Not Mysterious* burnt in public. Furious, Toland compared Protestant legislators to "Papist inquisitors" (218). This misadventure did nothing to calm his burgeoning anticlericalism. From simple opposition to the ecclesiastical and state hierarchies, he gradually moved on to a general criticism of the Church and the monarchical state, and to a condemnation of Christianity, and then of all revealed religions and theocratic states. A supporter of the Whig party, which was opposed to monarchy, he believed that political institutions should be designed not only to establish and maintain order, but also to guarantee freedom of conscience, freedom of religion and freedom of speech.

freedom of the press, freedom of trade and so on. Reason and absolute tolerance - except towards Catholics - were the only two solid pillars of society. Toland's belief in the need for equality for all citizens also applied to the Jews, and he was the first to call for them to be granted full British citizenship and equal rights. On their behalf he wrote two memoirs: *Reasons for Naturalizing the Jews in Great Britain and Ireland: On the Same Foot with All Other Nations; Containing Also, a Defence of the Jews Against All Vulgar Prejudices in All Countries* (The Reasons for Granting the Jews of Great Britain the Freedom of the City) (1715) and *Nazarenus: Or, Jewish, Gentile, and Mahometan Christianity* (Nazarenus, ou le christianisme des Juifs, des Payens et des Mahométans) (1718). Toland professed, to use a tautological expression, a boundless cosmopolitanism. One day, annoyed by a question that Leibniz had mischievously put to him about his nationality, Toland replied, pompously dry-hearted: "The Sun is my Father, the Earth is my Mother, the World is my Country and all Men are my Parents" (219).

His last work, the *Pantheisticon* (1720), laid the foundations of a universal religion, the creation of which he attributed to the ancients. He sums it up in a formula attributed to the mythical figure Linus, a Theban poet and musician and teacher of Orpheus and Hercules, and preserved by the compiler Jean Stobée (fifth century AD): "Ex Toto quidem sunt omnia, et ex omnibus est Totum". Toland writes: "Pantheists (...) say: all things come from the ALL and the whole is the compound of all things (...). They say that the universe, of which this visible world is only a small part, is infinite both in extent and in power; that it is ONE, by the continuation of the Whole, and by the contiguity of the parts...". Toland's pantheism is based on the "law of Reason", the only one, he asserts, that is appropriate to nature and not misleading. Pantheists wish to be brought up in and governed by this natural law, which is opposed to all the superstitions created by and for man (220). Everyone can be a pantheist, though not to the same degree. There are in fact "two doctrines, one External or popular, adjusted to a certain extent to the Prejudices of the People, or to the Doctrines publicly authorised, as being true; the other Internal or philosophical, entirely in conformity with the Nature of Things and therefore with Truth itself" and which is to "It is only to Men of consummate Probity and Prudence that (...) (...) in its entire nakedness, without veil and without boring them with words, in the recesses of a private Chamber, can it be communicated" (221). To justify this difference in treatment, Toland explains that pantheism is, more than any other philosophical system, an "esoteric" teaching and that the pantheistic philosophers of antiquity, such as Pythagoras, only divulged the doctrine in an "exoteric" form (222).

The subtitle of the *Pantheisticon*, "sive Formula Celebrandae Sodalitatis Socraticae" (Or Formula for Celebrating a Socratic Society), is particularly appropriate for the second part of the work, entitled *The Form of Celebrating the Socratic-Society*, which gives details of the ceremonies of the *Pantheistae*. "Reason is the Sun that illuminates this sect, and liberty and equality are the objects of their worship" (223). The *Pantheistae* celebrate equinoxes and solstices with modest banquets at which they toast Truth, Liberty and Health and praise Socrates,

Plato, Cato the Elder and Cicero, "in order to meet Friends and savour the sweets of conversation"; they "are to be found in great numbers in Paris, in Venice too, in all the cities of Holland, especially in Amsterdam and even (surprisingly) at the court of Rome, but they are even more numerous in France".

many in London, where they have established the headquarters and, as it were, the citadel of their sect... (224). Toland again teases the reader in the last pages of the book: "Suppose that this (the existence of such societies) is not true; you cannot at least help agreeing that it is probable. All the parts of this Society agree in themselves like the truest things; or if you prefer it to be a mixture of true and false, you will be obliged to agree that this Socratic Society will be no less useful to those who read its description than Horace's Chorus can be in ordering the practice of virtue and defending that of vice (225)!"

No trace of any branch of his "Socratic Society" was found, either in Venice, at the papal court or in Lisbon.

What about Paris?

In *Doutes sur la religion proposés à MM. les Docteurs de Sorbonne*, an unpublished treatise popularising hermetic and magical teachings by Bonaventure de Fourcroy (1610-1691), there is mention of a clandestine circle of Parisian naturalists that bears striking similarities to the "Socratic Society". The author, a lawyer at the Paris parliament and a friend of Boileau, Molière and M. de Lamoignon, first president of the Paris parliament, was a "brilliant, cheerful, well-spoken man with a powerful voice" (...)

a man who loved freedom and independence, (and who) loved the simple life and the countryside as much as he was passionate about justice and truth" (226), was arrested by the police just as he was putting the finishing touches to his work (227). This happened in 1696, more than twenty years before the *Pantheisticon* was published. The fact remains that Toland, in the *Pantheisticon*, asserts that "Socratic Societies" exist, without specifying when; the fact also remains that, as early as the 1690s, he made the following statements

belonged to libertine and republican societies similar to his "Socratic Society". For Toland, "republicanism and pantheism were one and the same, and Freemasonry provided a model for its moral and social expression" (228).

Republican ideology, which originated in fifteenth-century England (229), opposed monarchy and tyranny and argued that a political system should be based on the rule of law, the rights of the individual and the sovereignty of the people. It began to take shape in 1649, when, after seven years of civil war, Parliament brought King Charles I to justice, abolished the monarchy and the House of Lords and proclaimed a form of republic called the Commonwealth.

The violence committed against the royalists in the wake of these developments forced some of them into exile on the continent.

It seems that, in the early years of the seventeenth century, Toland belonged to a coterie of republican Whigs called The College, whose members met in a tavern on the Strand, near Trafalgar Square. For ten years or so, Toland had been close to small, more or less structured philosophical cénacles, including, in Rotterdam, the Lantern Club of the Quaker merchant Benjamin Furley (1636-1714) and, in Amsterdam, the Literary Society and the Calves' Head Club - co-founded, shortly after the execution of Charles I, by the poet John Milton (1608-1674), to celebrate the king's death each year. As early as 1701, Toland had been prosecuted for taking part in secret groups.

What these four clubs had in common was the free exchange of philosophical and literary ideas, political liberalism, even republicanism, and a taste for secrecy and festivities (230). On 24 September 1711 in The Hague, as Toland's papers indicate, a group of English intellectuals, a number of publishers and journalists took part in a festive meeting, which Toland describes as an "assembly of pantheists" (231), to found a secret society called the Society of the Knights of Jubilation. The main members of this circle were the English freethinker and philosopher Anthony Collins (1676-1729) and the French jurist, historian and journalist Jean Rousset de Missy (1686-1762), First Master of the "La Bien-Aimée" Lodge, founded in 1734 in Amsterdam (232), then of the "De la Paix" lodge (233), Prosper Marchand (1678-1756) and Bernard Picard, editors of Pierre Bayle's *Dictionnaire historique et critique*, Charles Levier, first editor of the blasphemous *Traité des trois imposteurs* (234); some of them - we do not know which - belonged to the vast network of spies that, as soon as he came to power in 1721, the Whig Robert Walpole (1676-1745) had set up on the Continent to keep an eye on the Stuart supporters in exile there (235). In this secret society, the work of Giordano Bruno was the subject of much discussion (236). The Knights of Jubilation were called "Brothers" and the society was headed by a "Grand Master" (237).

Around 1712 "... this nucleus of 'enlightened radicalism' gave rise to a much wider literary circle, bringing together politicians, publishers, publicists and, of course, republican radicals. Some of them were also affiliated to Freemasonry. They would meet regularly on certain evenings of the week to discuss politics, literature and the new sciences, indulge in friendly gossip and, from time to time, have harmless meals. In a nutshell, the aim of this association was to cultivate camaraderie, knowledge and awareness of public affairs" (238). No doubt it was because of their "sensitivity to public affairs" that, during the second Orange Revolution (1747-1748), a handful of Knights of Jubilation, including Rousset de Missy, led a movement of artisans and merchants who demanded democratic reforms (239).

On 3 September 1751, the Marquis d'Argenson wrote in his Journal: "A philosophical wind of free and anti-monarchical government is blowing from England; it is passing through people's minds and we know how opinion governs the world. It may be that this government has already been arranged in people's minds so that it can be carried out at the earliest opportunity, and perhaps the revolution would take place with less opposition than we think. It would not require a prince, a lord, or the enthusiasm of religion: it would be done by acclamation, as good popes sometimes elect themselves. All orders are dissatisfied at once. The military, dismissed the moment after the war, is treated harshly and unjustly, the clergy vilified and scorned as we know, the parliaments, the other bodies, the provinces, the states, the lower classes overwhelmed and gnawed by misery, the financiers triumphing over everything and reviving the reign of the Jews. All these matters are combustible, a riot can lead to revolt, and revolt to a complete revolution in which true tribunes of the people, comices, communes would be elected, and where the king and ministers would be deprived of their excessive power to do harm (240). While this "philosophical wind of free and anti-monarchical government" was indeed blowing from England, a large proportion of the anti-monarchical and anti-Christian propaganda circulating in France at the time came from the presses of Huguenot printers and publishers exiled in the Netherlands (241), which, as mentioned above, included Rousset de Missy, Prosper Marchand and Charles Levier. It is therefore no exaggeration to say that Toland, particularly through the Knights of Jubilation, introduced into France "a political radicalism and a pantheistic naturalism of English origin, which formed the basis of a change in mentality leading to the Encyclopédie and the Revolution" (242).

In France, Toland's writings, starting with the *Pantheisticon* (243), spread fairly quickly through the philosophical salons. The distinction that the Irish philosopher drew, and which he reiterated in *Clidophorus ou de la philosophie ésotérique et exotérique* (1720), between "the internal and external doctrine of the ancients, the one manifest and public, accommodated to popular prejudices and to the religion established by law, the other private and secret, by means of which the real truth was taught without disguise to the few who could hear it and were capable of discretion" (244) could only flatter the vanity of the nobles and bourgeois infatuated with new ideas, who were increasingly seeking to distance themselves radically from the people. "The pantheistic ritual that forms the heart of the book is presented as a dialogue between the person presiding over the ceremony and the audience, the second part of which opens with the words 'Profanum arcet vulgus', which are highly revealing of the double barrier that separates the learned from the common people: the common people are socially vulgar - a social barrier - and they are also ignorant - a barrier of knowledge. On the one hand, there would remain the small cénacle of the happy few, the only ones who knew the ultimate truth of the world and of things; on the other, there would remain the herd of ignorant people, who had to be kept in obedience, a task for which a slightly enlightened despot could suffice" (245). What also helped to make the fortune of Toland's philosophy in these circles was his materialistic pantheism and anti-Christianism, which had a direct, if partial, influence on the "Enlightenment" (246).

The "Enlightenment" drew some of the arguments for their anti-Christian polemic from Toland. The German philosophers of the eighteenth century idealised Spinozism, so to speak, without using it to attack Christianity directly; Toland, on the other hand, materialised it and used it to wage open war on the Christian religion. In 1720, in addition to the *Pantheisticon*, Toland had published a pamphlet entitled *Hypatia or the History of a Most Beautiful, Most Virtuous, Most Learned and in Every Way Accomplish'd Lady: Who Was Torn to Pieces by the Clergy of Alexandria, to Gratify the Pride Emulation, and Cruelty of their Archbishop, Commonly but Undeservingly Stil'd St. Cyril*. Hypathie (c. 360-415), a Greek neoplatonist philosopher, astronomer and mathematician from Alexandria, was brutally murdered by Christian monks, for reasons which, contrary to popular belief, were not well known. Toland imagined or wanted us to believe, were political and not religious (247). Under the pen of the Irish philosopher, Hypatia was transformed into a brilliant freethinker, a champion of rationalism, a martyr of deism (248). Voltaire (249) painted a similar portrait of Hypatia in his *Examen important de Milord Bolingbroke ou le tombeau de fanatisme* (1732) and also mentioned her in his *Dictionnaire philosophique* and in *De la paix perpétuelle* (1769). The figure of Socrates had been Christianised in the first centuries of our era (250); in the *Pantheisticon*, Toland enlisted him, de-Christianised, in the service of deist pantheism. Similarly, d'Holbach, in his *Essai sur les préjugés* (1770), presents Socrates as one of those "most enlightened and virtuous men (whom) (we find) (in antiquity) occupied with undermining the empire of the Priesthood and often forced to succumb under its blows". Condorcet, in his *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1794-1795), described the death of Socrates as "the first crime to arise from the war between philosophy and religion". In *Le Procès de Socrate* (1790), inspired by Voltaire's *Socrate* (1759), a tragedy in three acts in which the Greek philosopher, during his trial, pleads for a deist religion, the playwright and revolutionary Collot d'Herbois (1749-1796) portrays a revolutionary Socrates saved in extremis before drinking the hemlock. It was in the *Treatise on Tolerance* (1763) that Tolandian Pandeism found its final form (251).

Another aspect of Toland's anti-Christian polemic was his attempt to resurrect Druidism, which also involved John Aubrey (1626-1697) and the Freemason, antiquarian and Anglican clergyman William Stukeley (1687-1765), who was the first to try to pass off Stonehenge as a Druidic monument (252). Like the English republicans, Toland knew that it was "in religious consensus, in a civic and universal religion, that lay the key to the reform of the old order" (253) and, for him, Druidism constituted precisely the universal religion through which the reform of the old order could be achieved. excellence. In the history he wrote of this cult (published posthumously as *History of the Celtic Religion and Learning Containing an Account of the Druids*, 1726), many continental Freemason scholars found material for treatises on the universalism they themselves promoted (254). Since the end of the eighteenth century, when Henry Hurle gave considerable impetus to the revival of Druidism by establishing the Ancient Order of Druids (AOD) in London on the model of the Masonic lodges, the history of neo-Druidism, which had become a religious movement, is still very much in progress,

philosophical and spiritual during the nineteenth century, is inseparably linked to that of Freemasonry (255).

The preparatory work for the emancipation of the Jews in France, one of the hobbyhorses of the Franco-Saxon movement, was a major priority.

Some of the arguments he put forward in Reasons for naturalizing the Jews were taken up by the Reformed pastor, theologian, historian and diplomat Jacques Basnage (1653-1723) in *Histoire des Juifs, depuis Jésus-Christ jusqu'à présent. Pour servir de continuation à l'histoire de Joseph* (1716) (257), then, during the Revolution, by Abbé Grégoire (258) who, along with Mirabeau, Robespierre, Adrien Duport, Barnave and the Comte de Clermont-Tonnerre, played a decisive role in the granting of citizenship status to Jews by the so-called National Assembly.

Philosophically speaking, the Tolandian thesis, already defended by Heraclitus, that movement is an essential property of matter "came to form the basis of the French materialism developed by d'Holbach and Diderot half a century later" (259) and thus of all the monstrosities that, from transformism to "devenirism", would arise from philosophical materialism over the following centuries. In *Letters to Serena* (1704), translated by d'Holbach as *Lettres philosophiques* [1768], Toland wrote: "changes of parts produce no changes in the universe; for it is evident that the alterations, successions, revolutions, and continual transmutations of matter can no more increase or diminish the sum of this universe than the alphabet can lose any of its letters, in spite of the infinite combinations we make of them in a language. In fact, as soon as a being leaves one form, it leaves the stage in a certain garb, so to speak, only to reappear in a new disguise; this produces perpetual youth and vigour in nature..." (emphasis added). (emphasis added) (260) "Everything", echoed d'Holbach in *Système de la Nature*, simply substituting the term 'matter' for 'nature', 'is movement in the universe. The essence of nature is to act; and if we carefully consider its parts, we shall see that there is not a single one that enjoys absolute rest; those that appear to us to be deprived of movement are in fact only in relative or apparent rest; they experience a movement so imperceptible and so little marked that we cannot perceive their changes'" (261). In *Le Rêve de d'Alembert*, which Diderot wrote a few months after reading d'Holbach's translation of *Letters to Serena*, Julie de Lespinasse reverberates this Spinozo-Tolandian pantheism later called "evolutionary" by the philosopher Charles Renouvier (1815-1903) (262), when she tells D'Alembert: "Everything changes, everything passes away, only the whole remains. The world begins and ends incessantly; it is at every moment at its beginning and its end; it has never had another, and never will have another"; which D'Alembert then develops the outlines of transformism sketched out in the above-mentioned passage from *Letters to Serena*: "I am therefore such, because I had to be such. Change the whole, and you necessarily change me; but the whole is always changing... Man is only a common effect, the monster only a rare effect; both equally..."

Every animal is more or less man; every mineral is more or less plant; every plant is more or less animal... There is nothing precise in nature... Don't you agree that everything holds together in nature and that it is impossible for there to be a gap in the chain? There is nothing precise in nature... Don't you agree that everything holds together in nature and that it is impossible for there to be a gap in the chain? What do you mean by individuals? There is only one great individual, and that is the whole (263). Similarly, Lavoisier's law (264) on the conservation of matter, "(p)rinciple, foundation of modern science" according to Bergson (265) who attributes it to Lucretius, teaches us that the matter of the cosmos represents a constant and invariable quantity and that, even when a body seems to disappear, for example in combustion, or appears as new, for example in crystallisation, it is always a change of form or combination; Lavoisier had studied Diderot's texts on chemistry (266). Similarly, the law of conservation of energy of Robert von Mayer (1814-1878) and the physicist von Helmholtz (1821-1894) would demonstrate that energy in the world is a constant and unchanging quantity and that, even when a force appears to diminish or disappear, it is merely the transformation of one force into another (267).

The biologist Ernst Haeckel (1834-1919), author of *Proofs of Transformism* (1879), summed up the law of the conservation of matter and the law of the conservation of energy in a single statement: "In our monistic conception, force and matter are inseparable, and merely different manifestations of the same universal essence, substance" (emphasis added) (268). Toland is also to be found at the origin of the transformist theory, since it was from the *System of Nature*, which, as indicated above, owes much to the pantheistic materialism of the Irish philosopher, that the physiologist Cabanis (1757-1828) (269) drew inspiration to formulate, in *Rapports du physique et du moral de l'homme* (1802), the theses that heralded Lamarckism (270). Transformism is based on pantheistic premises: protoplasm (271) is to a single substance what the transformations of species through adaptation to their environment in the course of different geological periods are to emanations. To arrive at evolutionism, all that remained to be done was to replace the influence of the environment by natural selection as the cause of evolution, to apply the philosophical notion of perpetual becoming to biology and to detach the notion of progress from a "properly theological thought in which a certain natural election of the economically most dynamic classes was the extension of a theology of divine grace" (272). Evolutionism, initially unrelated to the idea of progress (273), once applied to sociology, gave birth to progressivism in the mid-nineteenth century, and then, once the myth of progress had been dispelled at the end of the twentieth century, to that "demon of change-for-change's sake" whose shadow Valéry saw looming in the 1930s (274).

There is no article on progress in Diderot and D'Alembert's *Encyclopédie* (275) and the very word "progress" rarely appears in eighteenth-century philosophical writings, even if it does, "The idea circulates everywhere" (276). What does this mean if not that, in the thinking of the Encyclopaedists, "movement" was more important than progress - Diderot was, moreover, sceptical about progress.

societies. It was precisely during the Revolution that the term "movement" came into its own for the first time. For the first time, the meaning of collective action, violent or otherwise, aimed at bringing about social or political change (277).

The idea of progress had acquired a vital force; it had become a mystique with millenarian modulations. "A naïve confidence that political upheaval meant regeneration and ushered in a reign of justice and happiness permeated France in the first period of the Revolution and found striking expression in the ceremonies of the universal 'Federation' which took place on the Champ-de-Mars on 14 July 1790. The festival, decreed and organised by the Constituent Assembly, was theatrical in the extreme, but the enthusiasm and optimism of the people who had gathered to pledge allegiance to the new Constitution was genuine and spontaneous. Consciously or unconsciously, they were under the influence of the doctrine of Progress that opinion-makers had been instilling in the public mind for several decades. It never occurred to them that their oaths and fraternal embraces changed neither their minds nor their hearts and that, as Taine pointed out, they remained what centuries of political subjection and a century of political literature had made of them" (278). The revolutionaries, for their part, imagined (?) that they could make a clean break with the past and that a new method of government, constructed according to the rules of the mathematical sciences, a constitution, to use Burke's phrase, 'an army of pied-en-cap, ripe from birth, a true goddess of wisdom and war, drawn, by our blacksmiths, from the brain of Jupiter himself', would have created idyllic bliss in France and that the arrival of the millennium depended only on the adoption of the same principles by other nations" (emphasis added) (279). The revolutionaries were mistaken, not in thinking that such a method of government was possible - Louis XIV had laid the foundations of Europe's first centralised state bureaucracy - but in imagining that it could be applied in all its rigour and scope overnight.

Man's march towards ultimate bliss was unstoppable, but there was still a long way to go, asserted the "guide of the French Revolution", as one of his biographers calls him. What a singular destiny," he exclaims in the preface to his biography, "that of Condorcet! Brought up by a mother who was pious to the point of superstition, the nephew of a bishop and a pupil of the Jesuits in Reims and Paris, he became a militant freethinker. Born into a noble military family, and destined for a career in arms, he chose study. A brilliant mathematician and academician, he became a journalist and member of parliament.

Shy and of a delicate complexion, he threw himself into the political fray and took part, either as a politician or as a member of a political party, in a number of political events.

He either reflected on, or directed, all the events and important legislative decisions of the great era (1789-93). As a gentleman and marquis, he led the Republican party.

A Republican before 1789, even before there was talk of a republic, in 1793 he drafted France's first clearly republican and democratic constitution. Esteemed and respected by all, acclaimed by several départements, he was destined to play a leading role, even after the proscription of the Girondins; and he, the good man par excellence, was to end up known throughout France and even in the United States.

in Europe as the most intelligent, the most learned and the most disinterested man, as the 'representative man' of that time, he will end miserably, by a voluntary death, in a village gaol" (280).

His *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain* (1794-1795), which he wrote while under threat of the guillotine, presents the history of civilisation as that of the progress of human beings. science and shows the close link between scientific progress and the development of "natural rights".

"Turgot, like his predecessors, did not say anything about the possibility of predicting the future on the basis of past events, nor did he define the nature of progress, the way in which it occurred and what it consisted of. This 'gap' was filled by Condorcet, who argued that observation of the past should provide the means to ensure and accelerate progress. "... there is a science destined to foresee the future progress of society, and founded on the analogy of individual and social faculties; man is broken down into three forces which give rise to physical, intellectual and moral facts; the observation of tendencies which are marked in history indicates the probable future of institutions; societies

are divided into owners, who are idle by inheritance, and the working poor; all of them are social institutions (in particular public education) must have as their aim the physical, intellectual and moral improvement of the largest and poorest class" (281). If public education (282) was the first lever for reducing inequalities of wealth and position, developing knowledge, softening morals and improving institutions, the second was the laws. In addition to equality between individuals, men and women, Condorcet envisaged equality between all the peoples of the world - the erasure of distinctions between advanced and backward races and, ultimately, a uniform world civilisation.

Progress was based on man's perfectibility, which "is really indefinite (and) the progress of this perfectibility, henceforth independent of any power that might wish to halt it, has no other term than the duration of the globe into which nature has thrown us. Without doubt, this progress will follow at least as long as the earth occupies the same place in the system of the universe, and as long as the general laws of this system do not produce on this globe either a general upheaval or changes that would no longer allow the human species to preserve and deploy the same faculties and find the same resources" (283); and as long as men are prepared to unite to form a single humanity, without distinction of race, religion, culture or sex (284). This march, he asserts, will not be retrograde because of the discovery of genuine methods in the physical sciences, their application to human needs, the channels of communication that have been established between them, the large number of people who study them and, finally, the printing press. Now, if the continuous progress of knowledge is a certainty, there is no doubt that social conditions will continue to improve.

The doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of the human species (285) is the logical consequence of a pantheistic conception of society: "If," he declares, "the indefinite perfection of our species is, as I believe, a general law of nature, man must not regard himself as a being...". He becomes an active part of the great whole and a co-operator in an eternal work" (286) (emphasis added). Pantheism and the theory of material progress were to combine like weft and warp in most of the French "social innovators" of the nineteenth century, from Auguste Comte and Saint-Simon to Pierre Leroux. They already coincided to a greater or lesser extent in the thinking of the English reformer, theologian, pastor, philosopher, educationalist, political theorist and reformer Joseph Priestley (1733-1804), to whom Condorcet attributed in part the theory of indefinite perfectibility (287).

The idea of progress could not fail to cross the Channel (288) in both directions at a time when the reciprocal intellectual influence of France and Great Britain had never been so marked. Works by leading British authors were translated into French and, conversely, books by leading French authors were translated into English and, as censorship made it dangerous to publish them in France, printed in London. English thinkers were generally of the opinion, with Locke, that government should be limited to preserving order and defending the physical integrity of people and their property, to ensuring the conditions in which men could pursue their aims, and should not aim directly at the improvement of society. By contrast, most French reformers believed in the possibility of shaping society indefinitely through political action, and their hopes for the future rested not only on the achievements of science, but also on the activity of government. Because of this difference in outlook, the doctrine of progress tended to have a more practical significance in France than in England. However, the same optimism prevailed among the wealthier classes on both sides of the Channel.

Adam Smith's *Wealth of Nations* (1776) was the greatest work on social problems produced in 18th-century Britain. More than a treatise on economic principles, it is a history of economic progress and an argument for the indefinite increase of wealth and well-being. Smith was in perfect agreement with the French economists on the value of opulence for civilisation and human happiness. He taught that trade relations between all peoples, provided they were not hindered by government policies, would be beneficial, and would benefit everyone. William Pitt (1759-1806) assimilated his doctrine very early on and, once Prime Minister of Great Britain (1783-1801 and 1804-1806), endeavoured to apply it.

While Adam Smith saw progress in the extension of free trade and the growing interdependence of nations, Joseph Priestley believed that indefinite progress was possible by virtue of the infinitude of reason. According to him, "from the day when men gave up primitive anarchy to endow themselves with a

By force of circumstance, they have constantly increased their enlightenment, their wealth, their virtues and their happiness (...); an incessant, regular and universal progress is taking place. Institutions improve as time reveals their imperfections to the eyes of the people, and the latter, by an inevitable correlation, lose, at each step they take in this career, a multitude of vices that are the product of defective governments. Work multiplies wealth, spreads ease, makes people appreciate the value of order and ends up consolidating for ever the civilising principle of individual property. Industry, science and the arts, uniting their fraternal forces, Every day, the circle of families torn from the crude necessities of life is enlarged; and society, which has become happier and richer, is constantly calling for new and better laws to protect the treasures amassed over the centuries from the passions that are still festering in the remote regions of the world. lower. Civilisation spreads, ideas are elevated, taste is refined, the character of man is stripped of its primitive harshness, the charms of honour and virtue are felt by the masses, nature reveals its secrets, and nations, brought closer together by religion, trade and science, come to perceive the natural and divine bonds that unite them. The time is not far off when all peoples, enlightened by the torch of experience, will abhor war and its dreadful devastations, which in one day wipe out the fruit of a whole century's work. It would be in vain for tyranny to join forces with barbarism to stop this admirable flowering of humanity! They might burn a few archives, topple a few buildings, pulverise a few monuments; but the human spirit, henceforth freed by science, would retain its vigour and resume its course of work and conquers the very next day. Obstacles sharpen the faculties, persecution exalts genius, injustice redoubles the zeal of virtue, even misfortune becomes a school of wisdom. We can boast of being superior to the ancients in religious opinions, in the sciences, in government, in general and particular laws, in the arts and letters, in commerce, in all the pleasures born of industry, in all that can be called happiness; but we shall in our turn have descendants superior to us, and no one can set the limits of a continuous improvement decreed by providence" (289), the pledge of the millennium (290). This shows that many of the remarks, Priestley's reflections and maxims served as the basis for Condorcet's *Esquisse*. Won over by the theologian's historical and philosophical optimism, the Welsh clergyman, pamphleteer, moralist, philosopher, mathematician and economist Richard Price (1723-1791) delivered a sermon in 1787 on *The Evidence for a Future Period of Improvement in the State of Mankind, With the Means and Duty of Promoting* obligations and the means of bringing them closer to completion, which earned him from Condorcet the title of "illustrious apostle of the doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of the human species" (291).

The success of the idea of progress, in England as elsewhere, was helped by its association with socialism. The term "socialism", first used in the early 1830s in both England and France, was applied in the former country to the Owenites from 1836 onwards (292). The first phase of socialism was initiated at about the same time in England by their leader of

The first was the Welsh textile manufacturer, philanthropist and social reformer Robert Owen (1771-1858), whose pamphlets promoted the replacement of all religions by a cult that had all the characteristics of pantheism (293), and the second was Saint-Simon in France, who brought socialism down from the clouds where these two utopians had built it and transformed it into a political force. However, both in their early years and in their later forms, socialist economic doctrines were based on a theory of society that assumed, more or less explicitly, that social institutions alone were responsible for the ills and misery of society.

It should be noted that, in these socialist theories, the concept of progress as indefinite tends to disappear or lose importance. "It should be noted that, in these socialist theories, the concept of progress as indefinite tends to disappear or lose its importance. If the millennium can be achieved all at once by a certain organisation of society, the objective of development has been reached; once it has been achieved, we will only have to live in and enjoy the ideal state, a menagerie of happy men. Knowledge may still advance, perhaps indefinitely, but civilisation in its social character will become stable and rigid. Once man's needs have been fully satisfied in a harmonious environment, there is no longer any stimulus to bring about new changes, and history loses its dynamism" (294).

The theories of progress at the beginning of the nineteenth century would therefore be differentiated into two distinct types, corresponding to two radically opposed political theories. "The first type is that of the idealists and pragmatic socialists, who (like the Owenites and the Simonian Saints) can name all the streets and towers of 'the golden city', which they imagine to be situated just around a promontory. Human development is a closed system; its end is known and accessible.

The other is that of those who, (like Priestley and Smith,) through the study of man's gradual ascent, believe that, by the same interplay of forces that have brought him this far, and by the increase in freedom that he has struggled to win, he will slowly evolve towards greater and greater harmony and happiness. Here, development is indefinite; its end is unknown and lies in the future.

Individual freedom is the driving force and the corresponding political theory is liberalism, whereas the former doctrine naturally leads to a symmetrical system in which the authority of the State is preponderant and the individual has little more value than a cog in a well-oiled wheel: his place is assigned, he has no right to follow his own path" (295). In all cases, whether of socialist or liberal inspiration, the idea of progress, from the beginning of the nineteenth century, "was not presented (...) only as a speculative theory: it has taken the form of a passion, a belief, a religion (...). (T)he men of this century have found in the belief in progress, in the faith in the future of humanity, an order of feelings that until now only religions seemed able to give (...). Just as this faith has its believers, its devotees, its martyrs, so it has, it must be said, its fanatics, and it has a great deal to do with the revolutionary fever with which (the nineteenth) century is ablaze" (296).

The first social reformer to systematically deduce practical consequences from his metaphysics was Saint-Simon, "Condorcet's successor" (297), whose theory of progress belongs to the first of the two currents presented above.

Of the *Esquisse* Claude Henri de Rouvroy Comte de Saint-Simon (1760-1825) said that, "although vicious in all its details, (it) is one of the finest productions of the human mind" (298). Condorcet's first mistake, according to Saint-Simon, was to "give a very false idea of the starting point of human intelligence" and to have considered it "to be of infinite perfectibility" (299); he also criticised him for not having discovered, while acknowledging its existence, the "regular laws" which "societies" "obey" (300). Like Auguste Comte, his secretary from 1817 to 1824, Saint-Simon believed that society could be studied by the same scientific methods as those used in the natural sciences and maintained that, once researchers had

The imagination of poets has placed the Golden Age in the cradle of the human race, amidst the ignorance and coarseness of early times.

Rather, it was the Iron Age that had to be relegated to it. The golden age of mankind is not behind us, it is ahead of us, in the perfection of the social order. Our fathers did not see it, our children will one day. It is up to us to show them the way" (301). These researchers were dubbed "sociologists" by de Goncourt in 1888. Before the term "sociology" was popularised in the sense of the study of social facts by Comte (302), Saint-Simon had called this science "social physiology" (303). The encounter between "social physiology" and biology (304) gave rise to organicism (305), a doctrine that likens society to a living being and therefore to a unit. "More and more, society is seen not as a state within a state in relation to cosmic and organic nature, but as an integral part of a great whole" (306). This concept of the unity of all natural, social and moral phenomena, as envisaged by Saint-Simon, "science will seek to achieve..." (307) and, adds Quillet, "the future will certainly see its triumph" (308). Society," wrote Saint-Simon in the mid-1820s, "having arrived at that period of its growth when the errors of childhood can no longer blind it to the regime that suits it best, when it can put to good use the knowledge acquired through so many years of troubles and revolutions, when the experience of the past can be put to good use.

Since the past can serve to establish institutions favourable to general health, it naturally follows that politics has returned to the realm of physiology" (309) and even, since society is seen here as a sick organism, to that of medicine. The present age," insists Saint-Simon, "is full of suffering; anarchy and egoism are devouring it. The source of these evils lies in the total absence of social unity, of a common view, of a common goal; and the absence of this unity is due to the absence of a social doctrine and hierarchy. Individualism, intellectual anarchy, egoism reign today and reign everywhere. In the political order, freedom is nothing but constituted anarchy, animated by the most likely distrust of all power. In science, the arts and industry, everything is given over to individualism; there is no unity, no order, no whole. Modern competition is the source of the deepest immorality, and the principle of the greatest evils. In a word, society today is organised for war and destruction. corruptions, all the public and private ills. This is the sick society that needs to be cured. The cure is

is to be found in a new doctrine which will clearly show everyone the purpose of human life, and in a new organisation which will allow all forces to develop harmoniously, and will enable everyone to find all the well-being to which he can lay claim" (emphasis added) (310).

Organicism is thus part of biopolitics.

Condorcet's second major fault, according to Saint-Simon, was to "present religions as having been an obstacle to the happiness of humanity" (311). For Saint-Simon, on the other hand, Christianity, the "true" Christianity, was supposed to make man happy, and the "true" Christianity, which had been led astray by the Papacy and Protestantism, lay in the brotherly love preached by Jesus Christ. From Christianity, then, Saint-Simon retained only morality, the sole aim of which was to improve living conditions.

of the lower classes. "The power of Caesar, impious in its origin and in its claims, will be annihilated; united in a single rejuvenated religion, and understood in a single organisation, the human race will prepare for a state of perpetual peace" (312). Saint-Simon set out his plan for the total reorganisation of society according to this "divine morality" in a book published under the title *Nouveau christianisme* (1825), a few months before his death, at a time when he was more convinced than ever that he was "fulfilling (...) a divine mission, by recalling peoples and kings to the true spirit of Christianity" (313).

The few disciples Saint-Simon had gathered around him devoted themselves to deepening his metaphysics in thousands of "pages of abstractions, phrases as pompous as they were empty of meaning".

meaning" (314). Through their proselytism, they succeeded in winning over "other groups of that restless generation which, disgusted with the past and dissatisfied with the present, was struggling to bring about an unknown but better future" (315). "Apostolic letters" were exchanged; meetings were held and centres of active propaganda were formed, where the spoken word was of greater service than the press. A school was formed, *à Paris*, whose most gifted member began to develop the new doctrine systematically and in all its details, and to fill in the text, which had many gaps, with new glosses. This doctrine was expounded (1829) in public courses, taught by rue Taranne by Bazard (born in 1792) (316), a mature man, who had studied at the *École polytechnique*, with resolutely revolutionary leanings, who had been initiated into the conspiracies of the Carbonari and who had only escaped, as if by a miracle, the avenging arm of criminal justice. In the beginning, Saint-Simon's disciples, like the master himself, had based their principles solely on But since Saint-Simon had claimed for his new Christianity the pre-eminence over all philosophical doctrine, his school also wanted to reserve for its doctrine the more beautiful name of 'religion'. Their historical-philosophical knowledge of the future had taught the Saint-Simonians that, in the course of time, after the abolition of slavery and serfdom, of the right of the strongest and the privileges of birth, society was ripe to pass from the eternal antagonism of peoples to a

universal and peaceful union of all nations. Now, their master's religious mission, which was to fulfil the ancient prophecies and bring about the fraternal and universal love promised by Moses and his followers, was to be a great success.

prepared by Jesus Christ, this mission, they said, imposed on them the obligation of effectively founding this association and beginning the kingdom of God on earth. In this kingdom, every vocation was to be a religious function and the political order a religious institution, for nothing was to develop outside the laws of God, of that one great God 'who lives in all things'. Science and industry, the peaceful elements of the new society, would be as sacred as religion; all members of society would be divided into priests, scholars and industrialists, and the leaders of these three classes (leaders solely by virtue of their moral, intellectual and industrial capacity) would form the entire government. These leaders, who would at the same time be legislators and judges, would also become the heirs and distributors of the general fortune. In fact, in this truly universal Church, where all property would be Church property, and where all privileges without exception would cease to exist, we would inevitably abolish the transmission of property to children by virtue of the right of blood, a transmission that is the basis of the most immoral of all privileges, namely the right to live in society without working. Property that was purely personal and inherited by happy chance was to be replaced by property acquired by individual merit, which the Church would share and attribute (...) to each according to his ability and to each according to his works" (317).

The neo-Christian society which the Saint-Simonians worked tirelessly to reorganise (318) was based on pantheism (319), not the rationalist pantheism of Schelling or the historical pantheism of Hegel (320), but a mystical pantheism, "a kind of inner sense vague and indefinite feeling, by which the spirit immediately grasps its consubstantial life in God, who, as infinite love, manifests himself in the spirit and in nature". God," declared Enfantin, one of the main leaders of Saint-Simonism (321), "is one; God is everything that is; everything is in him; everything is through him; everything is him. God, the infinite, universal being, expressed in its living, active unity, is infinite, universal love, which manifests itself to us in two principal aspects, as spirit and as matter, or, which is merely the varied expression of this double aspect, as intelligence and as strength, wisdom and beauty" (322); or again: "GOD IS ALL THAT IS. All is in him, all is through him. None of us is outside him; But none of us is him. Each of us lives by his life, And all of us JOIN in him; For he is all THAT IS" (323); from which it follows that "the inferior is no longer the slave of the superior, they are partners; the man is no longer the master of the woman, they are married; one people is no longer the tributary of another people, they form ONE FAMILY". (324). Man," the Saint-Simonians maintained, "is a collective being that develops" (325). The aim of this progressive development is the increasingly complete formation of the "human association". (326). "So far, the development of its collective existence has included the family, the city, the nation, and finally the spiritual communion of several nations; a communion which, for the peoples of Western Europe, has been achieved by Catholicism" (327). "(T)he partial associations which have hitherto existed (in Europe) must at last be succeeded by UNIVERSAL ASSOCIATION, the union of all the peoples of the world.

This was possible, according to Saint-Simon, by virtue of the "progress of the MORAL conception by which man feels he has a social destination" (329) and, according to Enfantin, by the application of algebra and geometry to morality (330). The objective of progress was thus no longer simply, in addition to the reduction of inequality within each nation and the destruction of inequality between nations, the perfection of the human species itself, as in Condorcet's social ideal, but the unification, the fusion of all the members of the human species into a great whole, a great organism, which Enfantin, in a letter he addressed to Heine from the Nile dam on 11 October 1855 and which contained an allusion to Spinoza, calls "ASSOCIATION OF THE PEOPLES BETWEEN THEMSELVES AND OF HUMANITY WITH THE GLOBE", "translation into French of the idea of the association of the peoples of the world".

politics" "(of) pantheism" (331).

Pantheism finds its political expression in both absolutism and democracy, characterised from a legal point of view respectively by the concept of divine right and that of national sovereignty. Indeed, pantheism, particularly in its monistic form, "is nothing but the negation of all substance and all created reality, and the affirmation that there is in the universe only one substance, one reality, the substance, and the uncreated reality; the affirmation that all that IS is God, and that nothing IS apart from God. In the same way, the system of divine right is basically the negation of all subordinate power, of all social right, and the affirmation that in society there is only one Power, one right: sovereign Power and sovereign right, the affirmation that everything in society belongs to the sovereign, and that everything must be counted for nothing apart from the sovereign" (332). Democracy starts from opposite premises and ends up with the same result: "It is not the 'divinity' that draws the world out of nothing, that makes everything out of nothing. It is the parts of a whole that, by their own force, combine, coordinate and modify themselves. At a certain moment, some of the molecules of the eternal universe are detached; according to eternal laws, they agglomerate, and a globe is formed: today the sun, later the earth, the moon, and so on. It is no longer a single being that creates and creates.

governs the world; it is the universal mass; it is no longer monarchy, it is democracy (...); none of these atoms created the world, all served to form it; none has the right to claim superiority, all are useful, without having any value in themselves; all are in an average situation, which does not rise, which does not fall": it is universal equality" (333). One term, which we underline, is particularly interesting, because it designates the divinity to which b o t h the Republic and Freemasonry sacrifice themselves (334), in the formula used by Pierre Leroux (1797-1871) to sum up this conception: "Sovereignty is in God (the Supreme Being); but it is in everyone and in all. Sovereignty is in everyone; but it is in God (the Supreme Being) and in everyone. Sovereignty is in everyone; but it is in everyone and in God (the Supreme Being) (335) (336).

"National sovereignty" brings any State that recognises it "closer to that kind of social pantheism called socialism, which consists in making the State the arbiter and administrator of all things, in the name of the interests of the masses. The people become the political God (who is made to believe that he) can do anything, (that he) owes nothing to anyone and (that he) manifests his thoughts in what is pompously called the majesty of the law. Human law (...), expression of the general will which is the object of a kind of of idolatry" (337) and which is itself the expression of the decisions of representatives of the Nation (338).

As soon as the nation, the cornerstone of the theory of political representation, is written with a capital letter, it no longer defines a human group whose members are linked by affinities of an ethnic, social, historical or cultural nature, etc., but a collective entity, indivisible and distinct from its individual members, a legal person constituted by all the individuals making up the State and "existing above them and surpassing them" (339). In democracy, "the (completed) political form of pantheistic society" (340), "national sovereignty" is a (legal) fiction, the "people" a (legal) object (341), and the State a (legal) abstraction.

"The French Revolution operated, in relation to (real society), in precisely the same way as religious revolutions act in relation to others; it considered the citizen in an abstract way, outside all particular societies, just as religions consider man in general, independently of country and time. It has not only sought to determine the particular rights of the French citizen, but also the general duties and rights of men in political matters" (342); and thus "above the real society, whose constitution was still traditional, confused and irregular, where the laws remained diverse and contradictory, the ranks clear-cut, the conditions fixed and the burdens unequal, an imaginary society was gradually built (...).) little by little an imaginary society, in which everything seemed simple and coordinated, uniform, equitable and in accordance with reason" (emphasis added) (343). The propensity of the democratic spirit to consider everything, and above all the individual, in the abstract means that individualism (344) as a doctrine, ideal and attitude is exalted to the same extent that the individual is lowered, stifled and annihilated (345).

In the pantheism of Eastern religions, God is everything and the creature is nothing. In democracy, the State is everything and man, as an individual, is nothing (346); he exists for the State only as a citizen. "Just as the universe drags along all its parts, which are obliged to follow without resistance, so the Republic (347) aspires to absorb all that surrounds it, to become Universal, and the more it grows, the more it demands submission from the individuals who make it up; the more it demands submission from them.

equalizes them by annihilating their freedom and their will, subjugates them, puts them under it, according to the force of the word, subjecti. The Republic, says J. de Maistre, is the government that gives the most rights to the sovereign and takes the most rights away from the citizens. In the Republic, the State is the centre (348) where everything converges: no one should have a will, ideas, action or life other than the will, ideas, action and life of the State. Let there be no more talk of municipal freedoms! If a town or the smallest hamlet wants to move around a bit and turn over on its bed, it has to ask permission from that impalpable master, the State. The State takes the place of local authorities, guilds and families, takes all initiative away from them, and proclaims its intention to take charge of their welfare. Do the people complain of a lack of
of work, the Assembly of the people's representatives declares to him "that citizens must not be allowed to assemble for their supposed common interests, and that it is up to the nation (i.e. the Assembly), to the public officers, in its name, to provide work for those who need it, and of the help for the infirm. Hence, to the maximum, the exclusive right of the authorities to regulate the threshing, transport

and preserving grain, selling it on the markets at a fixed price, etc. (349)". The same applies to people. "The law of the Republic is to attract to itself, like a magnet, to seize all peoples one by one, to absorb them, to impose on them a single legislation, a single doctrine, a single education, to erase their character and their genius, so that they are no longer distinguishable from one another, to make of them a whole where all opposites, evil and good, virtue and vice, error and truth, are amalgamated, melted together, to constitute the universal Republic, universal tyranny! This is how all the pantheists, from Saint-Simon to Hegel, and, following them, the republican sophists understand the Republic: they project, announce and proclaim the universal Republic" (350).

If democratic man is the victim of the State, he is its willing victim. He consents to his servitude, in the name of the "idea (which) obsesses him, (which he seeks) on all sides, and (in the bosom of which), when he believes he has found it, he willingly stretches out and (rests)" (351) and this idea is that of unity in equality ; in short, it is the idea of uniformity; hence its willingness and even eagerness to give up the concrete characteristics that make it special, in order to merge into a single, abstract substance.

The Internet seems to be the epitome of this (352).

B. K., February 2019 (recast and considerably expanded, October 2020)

(*) Joseph Grasset, *L'Occultisme hier et aujourd'hui : Le merveilleux prescientifique*, Coulet et Fils, Montpellier, 1907, p. 9. As an associate professor at the Faculty of Medicine in Montpellier, the author knew what he was talking about. In his conclusions on the subject of the "polygonal imagination", which is a form of association of ideas, Grasset mentions "a poetry which arose and automatically imposed itself on Miss Miller during a night on the railway, in that special state, intermediate between wakefulness and sleep, all too familiar to so many travellers, weary and dazed, who are always on the point of falling asleep without however managing to lose sight of themselves completely" (Miss Frank Miller, *Quelques faits* of subconscious creative imagination. In *Archives de psychologie*, 1905, t. V, p. 36. Quoted in *ibid*, p. 204). Grasset only mentions in passing the particular effects of rail travel on the human psyche; in fact, it never occurred to him to study them. He thus missed out on some edifying discoveries about the 'suggestive' powers of modern means of locomotion on those who use them frequently, and in particular about their capacity to induce twilight states of consciousness in them. These discoveries have yet to be made, because the extraphysiological consequences of modern modes of transport on their users are only studied from the point of view of their phobic manifestations. Particular attention should be paid to the impact of the aircraft on its users, the most addicted of whom we know are the current "decision-makers", visible or otherwise.

invisible, the "thieves", both in the everyday sense of the term and in the neological sense of "people who often steal".

(1) According to the British historian, poet and philosopher Nicholas Hagger (*The Syndicate: The Story of the Coming World Government*, O Books, 2004), all the revolutions that have broken out since 1453 have been fomented by Freemasonry and have had four phases: in the first phase, an idealist had an occult vision, which was then formulated intellectually, and in the third phase, politically; in the fourth phase, the revolutionaries were physically suppressed once they had taken power. For example, the occult roots of the Revolution of 1789 are to be found in the thought of Adam Weishaupt and Jean-Jacques Rousseau, to which Mirabeau and Moses Mendelssohn are said to have given intellectual expression, and Robespierre and Napoleon political expression, before being swept away by the revolutionary historical process they had set in motion. The very fact that Hagger considers that all these revolutions were aimed at destroying Christianity speaks volumes about the reductive nature of his interpretative scheme. We have adapted and expanded it, without taking into account the fourth stage that he assigns to the revolutionary dynamic, the analysis of which is beyond the scope of this study.

(2) *De Myst. AEgypt*, sect. viii, c. 2, quoted in P. Leroux and J. Raynaud (eds.), *Encyclopédie nouvelle*, t. 3, Paris, 1811, p. 572.

(3) "I invoke Pan the strong, the substance of all, the etheric, marine, terrestrial, general soul, the immortal fire; for the whole world is you and everything is part of you" (the translation is ours, all the French translations of this text that we have been able to consult being overloaded with poetic flourishes (see, on the subject of the Orphic Hymn to Pan, <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2019/07/06/le-pouvoir-panique-2/>)).

(4) Quoted in Henri-Louis-Charles Maret, *Essai sur le panthéisme dans les sociétés modernes*, Débécourt, 1840, pp. 118-19.

(5) Isidore Goschler, *Du panthéisme*, Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, Paris, 1862, p. 1.

(6) *Ibid.*

(7) *Ibid.*, p. 1-2.

(8) *Ibid.*, p. 2.

(9) Vincenzo Gioberti, *Restauration des sciences philosophiques*, vol. 3, translated from the second Italian edition, Jacques Lecoffre et Cie, Paris, 1847, p. 24.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 3.

(11) Plotinus, *Enneads*, translated by M. N. Bouillet, Hachette, Paris, 1859, p. 492. Although he was mainly interested in the way in which the soul could practically achieve its transfer to planes

of existence, his disciple Porphyry of Tyre (234- c. 310) developed a similar doctrine: that of ascent to the Intellect through the exercise of virtue (aretê) in the form of "good works" (Luc Brisson, *La doctrine des degrés de vertus chez les Néoplatoniciens*. In *Études platoniciennes*, 1, 2004, available at <http://etudesplatoniciennes.revues.org/1125>, accessed 21 November 2016); an enthusiastic Neoplatonist, even after his conversion to Christianity, Augustine was probably inspired by Porphyry's theory when he elaborated in *De quantitate animae* (388) the conception according to which the spiritual ascent towards knowledge

mystique comporte sept degrés (Augustin, *Œuvres*, vol. 50, Desclée De Brouwer, 1936, p. 550), a concept taken up and bequeathed to the early "Middle Ages" by the Cistercian monk and theologian, friend of Bernard of Clairvaux, Guillaume de Saint-Thierry (c. 1085-1148) (*Le Patrimoine littéraire et spirituel de Cîteaux. Part One. Les Traités De anima [sur ce qu'est la personne humaine] dans l'Ordre de Cîteaux au XIIème siècle*, https://www.abbaye-timadeuc.fr/les_ecrits/deanima.pdf), in his Letter to the Brothers of Mont-Dieu, where, in pages with pantheistic overtones (Étienne Gilson, *La Théologie mystique de saint Bernard*, J. Vrin, Paris, 1934, Appendix V, p. 216-220), he studies "successively the commencements, les progrès et la perfection de l'homme animal, de l'homme rationnel et de l'homme parfait" (Matthieu Rougé, *Doctrine et expérience de l'Eucharistie chez Guillaume de Saint-Thierry*, Beauchesne, Paris, 1999, p. 97; see also J. M. Déchanet, *Œuvres choisies de Guillaume de Saint-Thierry*, Aubier, Paris, 1944, p. 229 and Pierre Courcelle, *Guillaume de Saint-Thierry, Lettre aux frères du Mont-Dieu [Lettre d'or]*. Introduction, critical text, translation and notes by Jean Déchanet, 1975 [Sources chrétiennes, no. 223]; Dhuoda, *Manuel pour mon fils*. Introduction, critical text, notes by Pierre Riché, translation by Bernard de Vregille and Claude Mondésert, S. J., 1975 [Sources chrétiennes, no. 225]. In *Revue des Études Anciennes*. t. 80, 1978, no. 1-2 [p. 179-84]).

(12) On the doctrine of Plotinus and the other main representatives of Neoplatonism, see Henri Ritter, *Histoire de la philosophie*, translated from the German by C. - J. Tissot, Part 1, vol. 4, Livre XIII: *Histoire de la décadence de la philosophie ancienne*, Ladrangue, Paris, 1836.

(13) On the subject of Gnostic doctrines, see Pierre Bouèdron, *Histoire de la philosophie*, p. 129 et seq, V. Sarlit, Paris, 1864.

(14) René Latourelle, *Révélation, Histoire et Incarnation*. In *Gregorianum*, vol. 44, no. 2, 1963 [p. 225-62]. See, as preparatory reading for the developments that will be brought to this question below, Ludwig Edelstein, *The Greco-Roman Concept of Scientific Progress*, in Leonardo Tarán (ed.), *Selected Philosophical Papers by Ludwig Edelstein*, Routledge Library Editions, 2016 [1987], p. 10 ff.

(15) Gioacchino Ventura di Raulica (T. R. P.), *Le Pouvoir politique chrétien*, Gaume Frères and J. Duprey, 1858, pp. 546-7.

(16) J. B. Bury, *The Idea of Progress*, Outlook Verlag, 2019 [1980], p. 8.

(17) On the precursors of the doctrine of progress in ancient Greece, see Robert A. Nisbet, *History of the Idea of Progress*, New York, 1980, chap. 1.

(18) J. B. Bury, *op. cit.* p. 12.

(19) Ibid.

(20) See Jules Delvaille, *Essai sur l'histoire de l'idée de progrès*, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1910, p. 61: "If nature (, as the Stoics maintain,) is one, if all the beings that make it up depend on one another, how much more profound is this unity and how much closer this dependence when we consider them in the human race! All men have the same essence and the same origin; they are of the same family, since they call God their father. What is good or bad for humanity is also good or bad for each of its members, and those who believe that they find their good in the evil of others are wretchedly mistaken; for, as Marcus Aurelius poetically says, what is not useful to the beehive cannot be useful to the bee. So the good that virtue pursues is not the particular good of each man, but the good of all: or rather the individual good merges with the common good; and thus, by a final and admirable development, the Stoic conception of life ends in this: living for the general good" (emphasis added) (Amédée de Margerie, *Théodicée études sur Dieu, la création et la Providence*, II, 3rd ed, revised and expanded, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1874, pp. 58-9).

(21) Robert A. Nisbet, op. cit. p. 59. See also Christian Karl Josias Freiherr von Bunsen, *Outlines of the Philosophy of Universal History*, vol. 2, London, Longman, Brown, Green and Longmans, 1854, p. 161.

(22) P. J. B. Buechez, *Introduction à la science de l'histoire*, vol. 1, Louis Hauman et COMPe, Brussels, 1834, p. 88. In the 4th century, Eusebius of Caesarea (*Demonstr. evang.*, 1. 1, c. IV, t. III, p. 42, J. - P. Migne. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 77) "already announced the advent of a truly Christian era in which all peoples would be fraternally united under the great name of Humanity". It is true that the illusion of the unity of the human race had already been nurtured by Stoicism (see *supra*, note 20).

(23) Ibid. Augustine's doctrine of original sin and man's innate corruption was hardly conducive to the emergence of any idea of perfectibility. It does, however, shine through in his belief in a Providence that intervenes in the lives of individuals and empires alike. Using a comparison that was to animate all philosophical debates on progress in the 17th and 18th centuries, he maintained that "[t]he Providence of God, which admirably guides all things, governs the succession of human generations, from Adam to the end of the ages as one man, who, from childhood to old age, provides his career in time by passing through all the ages". (De quaestionibus octoginta tribus; quaestio 58. Quoted in Jules Delvaille, op. cit., p. 86), each of which he never ceased to profit from. From the study of the history of the Jewish people, he deduced that "the education of the human race resembles that of a single man; it must have followed the progressive succession of ages to rise, as it were by degrees, from time to eternity, and from the visible to the invisible" (id., De Civitate Dei, X, 14. Quoted in *ibid.*). He distinguishes three main stages: youth, characterised by the absence of the Law, from Adam to Abraham; manhood, characterised by the Law, from Abraham to the birth of Christ; and finally old age, which is the Christian era and the age of grace. Augustine envisages only intellectual and moral progress, and while he places the source of progress not "outside man, above him" (Hippolyte Rigault, *Histoire de la querelle des anciens et des modernes*, L. Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1856, p. 19), but in the human mind, he seems to consider that the latter cannot progress without God's help. So, according to Rigault, the City of God contains a draft

philosophy of history, but not a doctrine of progress. According to Robert A. Nisbet (op. cit, p. xiii), on the other hand, "in Augustine (...) we find all the essential ingredients of the modern idea of progress: the vision of a continuous and cumulative progress of the human race over time - a single unified human race, a single temporal framework for all peoples and all epochs of the past and present, the conception of time as a single linear flow, the use of evolutionary stages and epochs in human history, the belief in the necessity and sacredness of human history as set out in the Old Testament and, finally, the idea of a distinctly utopian end to history, where the elect would go to eternal heaven". Other Fathers of the Church contemplated a form of progress that would not be solely religious in nature. In the third century, Origen (*Contr. Celsum*, 1. IV, c. LXVII and LXIX, p.1135 et sqq, J. - P. Migne, quoted in Jean-Joseph Thonissen, *Quelques considérations sur la théorie du progrès indéfini*, 2nd ed, revue et considérablement augmentée, H. Casterman, Paris, 1860, pp. 78-9) states: "If it is true that mortal and corruptible beings always roll in the same circle, from the beginning to the end, and that it is necessarily the case that, according to the immutable order of revolutions, what has been, what is and what will be, is always the same thing... I do not see how our freedom would subsist, nor how we could reasonably deserve either blame or praise... It is not so!... God arranges the centuries as he does the years, and his providence grants to each century what the needs of the universe require: for he alone knows them perfectly and can grant all things necessary." (On the influence of Origen's writings on pantheistic doctrines in the Middle Ages, see Jacques-François Denis, *De la philosophie d'Origène*, Imprimerie nationale, 1884). In the fifth century, the monk and Father of the Church Vincent Lérins (S. Vincent. Lirin, *Commonitorium*, § 23, J. - P. Migne, p. 667. Quoted in *ibid.*, p. 211-2) writes: "Some will say, perhaps, that there will be no progress of religion in the Church of Christ? There certainly will be, and a very great one. Who could be such an enemy of men, such an enemy of God, as to want to prevent this progress? But it must really be a progress of faith, and not a change. It is in the nature of progress that one thing develops within itself; of change, that one thing becomes another. It is therefore necessary that the intelligence, the knowledge, the wisdom of each member of the faithful and of the Church

All souls grow with the centuries; but only in their kind, that is to say, in the same dogma, in the same spirit, in the same feeling. Let the religion of souls imitate the condition of bodies, which grow and develop with age, but without ceasing to be themselves" (emphasis added) (see also C. Douais, *Saint Augustin et la Bible [Continued]*. In *Revue Biblique [1892-1940]*, vol. 3, no. 3, July 1894 [p. 410-432]).

(24) Guillaume De Greef, *Le transformisme social: Essai sur le progrès et le regrès des sociétés*, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1895, pp. 78-9.

(25) "Considered in its substantial content, divine revelation is, from the beginning, whole, complete and perfect, in such a way that the believer who reaches the end of the chain of times will not possess, as regards quantity, more truth, nor, as regards quality, a purer truth than the believer who was at the beginning of the chain. In spite of this, there is an objective progress of Revelation, corresponding to the progress of spiritual development and the religious needs of humanity, in that the divine truth and the truth of God are becoming clearer and clearer. In this way, little by little, truths come to light which, although originally enveloped within it, appear to be new,

seem a real increase, in that human reason, relying on itself or on already existing revelation, could not have arrived at these truths either by the analytical or the synthetic route. Thus, from the finite, empirical point of view, we must also and unquestionably admit the material perfectibility of Revelation. not only formally, but materially, a real progress, a positive improvement, not because it has in it an essentially different content, but because it presents the same content more developed, richer in its exposition, more abundant in its manifestation (Dr Wetzer and Dr Welte [under the dir.], Dictionnaire encyclopédique de la théologie catholique, s. v. perfectibilité du christianisme, translated from the German by Abbé I. Goschler, 2nd edition, vol. 18, Gaume Frères and J. Duprey, Paris, 1864, p. 156).

(26) Jules Delvaille, *op. cit.* p. 76.

(27) *Ibid.*, pp. 76-7.

(28) *Ibid.*, p. 76.

(29) The Yahwist fragments of the Bible, which contain the accounts of the Fall, the legend of Cain and Abel, the legend of the Flood and of the perversion of humanity, are pessimistic, whereas the idea that Yahweh's work is good is continually found in the Elohist fragments, which do not include the legend of the Fall and which contain notions of cosmological progress and especially of moral progress (*Ibid.*, p. 8 ff.) (*). Jewish prophetic literature develops this notion of moral progress as well as intellectual, social and material progress. For Isaiah, purely national improvement would be succeeded by universal improvement; the old law, exclusive and narrow, "would be replaced by true religion, embracing all mankind" (*ibid.*, p. 26) and Israel, henceforth rich, powerful and holy, would bring prosperity to the peoples of the whole world. Isaiah's enthusiastic speeches were to be followed by early Christian belief in the millennium, as witness the ramblings of the Apocalypse of John.

(*) Renan (*Histoire du peuple d'Israël*, t. I, p. 79, quoted in J. Delvaille, *op. cit.*, p. 11, note 2) sees the authors of these stories as "unknown Darwins": "The chapter Berechit (of Genesis) was science in its day; the succession of creations and ages of the world, this idea that the world has a becoming, a history, where each state emerges from the previous state through an organic development, was an immense advance on a flat theory of the universe, conceived as a material and lifeless aggregate".

(30) Rudolf Bultmann, *Le christianisme primitif*, Payot, "Petite Bibliothèque" collection, Paris, 1969, p. 195.

(31) Catherine Wessinger (ed.), *The Oxford Handbook of Millennialism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford and New York, 2011, p. 262.

(32) "Neo-Platonism had a profound influence on Christian theology in the early centuries. It can be said to have conditioned its development in two ways: firstly, by stimulating Christian thought through its opposition, and secondly, by providing this thought with elements that it had to assimilate. The latter, in fact, was not content to react against Neo-Platonism by

of the refutations; it appropriated all the reserves of truly human Spiritualism, of fine analyses that it contained; it borrowed from it categories and a language to think and express its faith" (Auguste-Joseph Gaudel, *Christianisme et néo-platonisme*. In *Revue des Sciences Religieuses*, t. 2, fasc. 4, 1922 [p. 468-75], p. 468).

(33) François Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France*, vol. 3, Vandooren Frères, Brussels, 1830, p. 120.

(34) Étienne Vacherot, *Histoire critique de l'école d'Alexandrie*, t. 3, Ladrangé, Paris, 1851, p. 9.

(35) On the accusations of pantheism levelled against Origen, see Charles Freppel, *Origène - cours d'éloquence sacrée fait à la Sorbonne pendant les années 1866 et 1867*, t. 1, Ambroise Bray, 1868, p. 362). Eusebius himself was suspected of pantheism by several ecumenical councils, including the Council of Nicaea. "Eusebius (...) is a disciple of Philo, who never had a clear enough doctrine of creation and who posits *ex nihilo nihil fit*, which made him suspect of floating between pantheism, which derives everything from the substance of God, and dualism, which admits an eternal principle of matter. In fact, if not in relation to matter, at least in relation to spiritual beings, Philo has a kind of pantheism of which he did not realise himself. He seems to agree with the cabalists, and as the Gnostics taught more clearly, t h a t there are emanations...

of God, like so many rays emanating from a single centre. The Word, the first emanation, is also the most perfect. The Holy Spirit, the second emanation, is already less so, and so on. If Philo is excusable for not having had a clearer idea of the divine persons and of their equality in the identity of substance; if the Greek Fathers of the first centuries are also inexcusable for having sometimes drawn from Philo and from the Hebrew traditions some less perfect formulae, then this is not the case. I do not believe that the same excuse can be applied to Eusebius, in whom the system of decreasing emanations appears, and who does not want to depart from it, even after the decision of an ecumenical council. I do not claim that he has extended this system as far as created spirits; and yet I notice in him, on this point, almost the same obscurity as in Philo. We are the sons of the Word, just as the Word is the Son of God. The death of Jesus Christ consisted in the separation of the Word from the body, and so on. This axiom, that all the works *ad extra* are common to the three persons, is perfectly unknown to him. The Father is above all, not influencing the world by himself, but creating it and governing it through his Word, who penetrates the universe in all its parts. As far as I can judge, these ways of speaking are not, for Eusebius, founded on the rules of the appropriation of works & to this divine person rather than to that divine person.

He took them literally, repeated them and never corrected them sufficiently. It is not by reading a few isolated texts that we can be convinced of this, but by considering his writings and his conduct as a whole" (Rémy Ceillier [R. P.], *Histoire générale des auteurs sacrés et ecclésiastiques*, nouv. éd., t. 3, Louis Vivès, Paris, 1859, p. 307-08).

(36) Paul himself seemed to yield to it, saying (Acts 17:28): "in ipso vivimus et movemur et sumus" ("in God we have life, movement and being"). See John Hunt, *Pantheism and Christianity*, chap. 4: *The Church*, Wm Isbister, London, 1884.

(37) To give an idea of the Byzantine subtleties with which theologians of all periods have tried to extricate themselves from the embarrassment caused by the question of knowing, for example, what separates the biblical conception according to which God is omnipresent from the pantheistic view according to which God is everything, here are those deployed with some smugness by the prelate Jacques Ginoulhiac (1806-1875) (*Histoire du dogme Catholique*, 2nd ed, t. 1, Auguste Durant, Paris, 1866, p. 104) in an attempt to show that Celsus was wrong to see in Origen's propositions about God a transfer of the Stoic conception of the soul of the world: "Celsus did not understand what we teach; because

animal man does not understand the things that are of the spirit of God. Divine Providence therefore spreads everywhere, but not like the spirit of the Stoics; it contains all that it governs, not like a body that contains another body, but like a divine power that embraces all that it understands". And then he invokes the authority of Lactantius: "divine intelligence travels through all the parts of the world, attentive to everything, governing everything, everywhere present, everywhere widespread" (*ibid.*, p. 103).

and finally that of Clement of Alexandria: "... it is neither shared nor divided, (...) it does not pass from one place to another, because it is always everywhere and is contained nowhere (*ibid.*, p. 106). The prelate concedes, without laughing: "The other doctors are easier to explain" (*ibid.*, p. 107) and concludes his

defence of the orthodoxy of the Fathers of the Church by summing up their views on divine omnipresence in the following formula: "it is proper to the divine nature [...] to fill everything and to be in every place, not by a part of itself, but to be everywhere entirely" (*ibid.*). See, for a very detailed discussion of pantheism in its relation to Christian theology, <https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/pantheism/#NatuCosm>.

(38) *Œuvres de Saint Denys l'Aréopagite, traduites du grec et précédées d'une introduction par* Msg Darboy, Paris, 1845, p. 166.

(39) "At the beginning of the ninth century, a particular circumstance (...) gave (the works of Denys) prodigious popularity in the West, and especially in Frankish Gaul. Around the middle of the third century, a Saint Denys was said to have been the apostle of Gaul and the first bishop of Paris. It occurred to some monks to maintain that this Denys and Denys the Areopagite were one and the same man. Christianity in Gaul was thus carried back to a much earlier time, and could boast a far more illustrious founder. In 814, Hilduin, abbot of Saint-Denis, the same man under whom Hincmar was raised, wrote a book entitled *Areopagetica* in support of this opinion. It quickly gained currency and became a kind of patriotic belief in Gaul. From then on, the works of Dionysius the Areopagite were the object of intense curiosity...". (François Guizot, *Histoire de la civilisation en France depuis la chute de l'Empire romain*, nouv. éd., t. 2, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1859, p. 349).

(40) The theistic and contemplative trend was inaugurated in the eleventh century by Robert and Hugues de Saint-Victor. The latter presided over the revival of Dionysian studies by proposing the first commentary on the *Celestial Hierarchy* (*Expositio in hierarchiam caelestem S. Dionysii*) since that of Erigenus. For Robert and Hugues de Saint-Victor, mystical contemplation is the best way for man to know God and God, for them as for John, is love; but whereas, in Denys's pantheistic doctrine, this knowledge comes through ecstasy (Nicolas Joseph Laforet, *Denys l'Aréopagite*, Louvain, 1871, p. 5 et seq.), for Hugues it involves introspection. Robert de Saint-

Victor was the first to analyse the psychology of mystical experience (Étienne Vacherot, op. cit., p. 131).

(41) Lambertus Marie De Rijk, *Philosophy in the Middle Ages*, translated from the Dutch by P. Swiggers, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1985, p. 76.

(42) A. Wabnitz, E. Doumergue, H. Bois (eds), *Nouvelle revue de théologie*, vol. 5, 1re livraison, Treuttel et Wurtz, Strasbourg, 1860, p. 7-8; J. -P. Migne (abbé), *Encyclopédie théologique*, t. 32, chez l'auteur, Paris, 1862, p. 1356.

(43) Étienne Vacherot, op. cit. p. 118.

(44) On Erigene's philosophical system, see Isidore Goschler, op. cit. p. 35.

(45) Erigenes said: "Nothing subsists in creatures except God alone, who is not this rather than that, but everything. He also said: "God creates and is created; he is and becomes everything at the same time". Amaury de Chartres, albeit by slightly forcing his master's words, says: "Everything is God, God is everything. The Creator and the creature are one and the same. Ideas create and are created. God is called the end of all things, because they must all return to him to rest there eternally, to form a single indivisible and immutable substance. And just as Abraham and Isaac do not each have a nature of their own, but the same nature is common to them both, so, according to Amaury, everything is one and everything is God; God (...) is the essence of all creatures". (Gerson, *De concordia metaph, cum logic*, iv, p. 44, 826, quoted in Étienne Vacherot, op. cit, p. 76) In addition to Erigene, one of the main sources of Dinan's system seems to be Arab philosophy - which also had a major influence on the development of scholasticism - and especially the Fons vitae of Salomon ben Yehudah ibn Gabirol (1021?-1070) (Avicembron), which teaches the identity of substance between God and the world and which later influenced Giordano Bruno (see infra, note 93).

(46) Auguste Jundt, *Histoire du panthéisme populaire au Moyen Âge et au seizième siècle*, Sandoz and Fischbacher, Paris, 1875, p. 21.

(47) John Hunt (Rev.), *An Essay on Pantheism*, Longmans, Green, Reader, and Dyer, London, 1866, pp. 142-3. It is not absolutely certain that *L'Évangile éternel* is the work of Joachim de Fiore; some attribute its authorship to the Franciscan John of Parma (1209-1289), seventh general of the Friars Minor, others to Amaury de Chartres or one of his disciples (Nicolas Bergier [abbé], *Encyclopédie méthodique : Théologie*, t. 2, Panckoucke, Paris, 1798, p. 342). The fact remains that, "thanks to Joachim, the history of the Church rediscovered progression. In other words, the Church militant could improve; it could even reach the stage of perfection, which would last a thousand years before the Last Judgement" (Irena Backus, *Les Sept Visions et la Fin des Temps, les commentaires genevois de l'Apocalypse entre 1539 et 1584*. In *Cahiers de la Revue de Théologie et de Philosophie*, no. 9, Geneva, Lausanne and Neuchâtel, 1997, p. 14). But the scope of de Fiore's millenarian theory went far beyond this. It was inevitable that the announcement he made of "the advent of a highly spiritualised humanity, in direct communication with God, merging in him under the effect of the Spirit" (see Jean-

Louis Harouel, *Les droits de l'homme contre le peuple*, Desclée De Brouwer, 2016) gives rise to a shift, first towards Protestant ideology, then "towards the belief in an identity between God and man, towards the old Gnostic idea of the God-man, with the consequence of abolishing all submission or obedience (...). The last age will be the age of freedom" (ibid.). Joachim de Fiore's "gnosticising pantheism" thus legitimised both the millenarian revolution that sought to establish paradise on earth and the proud project of the God-man that had been promoted by gnosticism since Antiquity. Its message was to inspire both the great millenarian revolutionary explosions aimed at establishing the communist paradise of the future, which in fact produced a little hell (the revolt of Dolcino of Novara, the Taborites of Bohemia, Thomas Müntzer's Peasants' War, the Anabaptists of Münster, etc.), or a mystical millenarian gnosis such as that of Jakob Böhme, who at the turn of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries also announced the coming of a final age - the time of the lilies - marked by the advent of a new man, a God-Man. In the long term, Joachim de Fiore's intellectual legacy was immense. His mechanistic system of history was to have an unequalled influence in Europe until the emergence of Marxism, which in many respects was dependent on Joachimism" (ibid.). Now, de Fiore's theory, like Amaury's, was indeed based on canonical Christian texts, in particular Revelation 20:4-6 - which some ancient Christians, hostile to millenarianism (see Jacques Le Goff, *La naissance du Purgatoire*, Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 2014), had tried in vain to remove from the biblical canon - and The Gospel of Saint John: "The Gospel of Saint John," writes de Fiore, "attributes the Old Law to the Father and the New Law to the Son. Will the Law of the Son of God be the last? No, since Saint Paul declares that it is imperfect, and when perfection has come, he says, then that which is imperfect will be abolished. Who will reveal this perfect religion? Jesus Christ tells us that it will be the Paraclete, the Comforter, the Holy Spirit" (quoted in F. Laurent, *Histoire du droit des gens et des relations internationales*, vol. 8, Brussels, 1850, pp. 295-7).

(48) G. Théry (O. P.), *Around the decree of 1210: I. David de Dinant. Étude sur son panthéisme matérialiste*. In *Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques*, Kain, 1925.

(49) Auguste Jundt, op. cit. p. 23.

(50) Ibid.

(51) Francisco Russo, *Rassegna bibliografica Gioachimita (1957-1967)*. In *Cîteaux, commentarii cistercienses*, no. 19, 1968 [pp. 206-14], p. 212.

(52) Gert Wendelborn, *Gott und Geschichte: Joachim v. Fiore u. die Hoffnung d. Christenheit*, Böhlau, 1974, p. 161.

(53) Pierre Hélyot (R. P.), *Dictionnaire des ordres religieux: ou, Histoire des ordres religieux et militaires et des congrégations séculières de l'un et de l'autre sexe, qui ont été établies jusqu'à présent*, t. 1, J. -P. Migne, Petit-Montrouge, 1847, p. 461.

(54) Henri Heine, *De l'Allemagne*, nouv. éd. entièrement revue et augmentée de fragments inédits, vol. 1, Michel Lévy Frères, Paris, 1861, p. 85.

- (55) See Carl Ullmann, *Reformers before the Reformation, principally in Germany and the Netherlands*, vol. 2, T. & T. Clarke, Edinburgh, 1852, p. 15 ff.
- (56) *Grand dictionnaire universel du XIXe siècle*, t. 2, Pierre Larousse, Paris, 1867, p. 479.
- (57) Étienne Vacherot, *op. cit.* p. 152.
- (58) J.-B. Christophe (abbé), *Histoire de la Papauté pendant le XVIe siècle*, t. 2, Bauchu et Cie, Lyon, 1863, p. 517.
- (59) Auguste Jundt, *op. cit.* p. 116-7.
- (60) Simon Cheyron, *Étude sur les libertins Spirituels au Temps de la Réforme*. Thèse présentée à la Faculté de Théologie protestante de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 1858, p. 12.
- (61) Bernard Cottret and Olivier Millet (eds.), *Calvin et la France*. In *Bulletin de la Société d'histoire du protestantisme français*, t. 155, vol. 1, 2009 [p. 1-374], p. 55.
- (62) Auguste Jundt, *op. cit.* p. 162.
- (63) Carl Ullmann, *op. cit.* p. 17-8.
- (64) Karsten Klaehn, *Martin Luther: sa conception politique*, Sorlot, 1941, p. 11-2; see also Claude-Marie Magnin, *Histoire de l'établissement de la Réforme à Genève*, 1844, p. 304 ff; Carl Ullmann, *op. cit.* chaps. 3 and 4; Chrétien Gerlinger, 'Théologie Germanique'. Exposé des doctrines du livre anonyme, intitulé la 'Théologie germanique'. Thesis presented at the Protestant Faculty of Theology, Strasbourg, 1831, p. 14." The author (of the German Theology) defines God 'a being in which all beings are included and enclosed, without which and outside of which there is no true being, since he is the being in which all things have their being'; without doubt he adds: 'If he is the being of all things, he is immutable and invariable in himself; but he moves all things'; and he says of the creature: 'That which is emanated from being is not true being and has no being apart from God; it is only an accident, an appearance, which is or has no other being than that of fire which bursts forth and radiates, that of light which emanates from the sun and shines'" (Dr Wetzer and Dr Welte [eds.], *Encyclopaedic Dictionary of Catholic Theology*, translated from the German by I. Goschler, 3rd ed, vol. 23, Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, Paris, 1870, p. 328), but, of course, according to the editors, this is not pantheism.
- (65) Auguste Nicolas, *Du protestantisme et de toutes les hérésies dans leur rapport avec le socialisme*, Goemare, Brussels, 1852, p. 240; see also, on the influence of Germanic theology on Luther, Jean Alzog, *Histoire universelle de l'Église*, translated on the third edition by Isidore Goschler and Charles-Felix Audley, t. 2, V.-A. Waille, 1846, p. 568.
- (66) Augustin Nicolas, *op. cit.* p. 240-1.
- (67) In this respect, Luther was very close to him when he said: "The will of man is like a horse. If God rides it, it goes and wills as God wills and leads it; if the devil sits on it, it runs where the devil takes it. All things happen according to the immutable decrees of God. God makes in

(De servo Arbitrio ad Erasm., 1525, Walch, t. XVIII, p. 20, p. 50. Quoted in Augustin Nicolas, op. cit. p. 248).

(68) Nicolas Deschamps, *Un éclair avant la foudre ou Le communisme et ses causes*, Seguin Aîné, Avignon, 1848, p. 54-6.

(69) There were two main tendencies in the Anabaptist movement: "one, radical and revolutionary, calling for the immediate establishment of a universal theocracy, a government of the saints, to be preceded by the annihilation of the wicked by force of arms ; the other, more moderate and evangelical, not dreaming of the constitution of a visible kingdom of God on earth, and not expecting for this purpose a new outpouring of the Holy Spirit, but seeking to found communities of Christians regenerated by the second baptism and sanctified by meditation on the word of God" (Auguste Jundt, op. cit, p. 163). David Joris belonged to the second tendency, because of his rejection of all religious violence, while his social ideas put him among the most extreme of the radicals. As his life is full of lessons about the support that certain religious reformers of modest and poor extraction received from the nobility, it may be interesting to give an overview. A glass painter of "enthusiastic imagination" (Auguste Jundt, op. cit., p. 164) and of Jewish origin, David Joris rallied to the Reformation with no less enthusiasm. When Melchiorite Anabaptism, a dissident form of Protestantism, had spread to his home town of Delft, he joined the local branch of the sect, seduced by the apocalyptic atmosphere that reigned there (Joseph Lecler, *Histoire de la tolérance au siècle de la Réforme*, Aubier, Paris, 1955, p. 121). As soon as he was "installed", Joris gathered a few disciples around him and "conceived the grandiose project of putting himself at the head of the Anabaptist movement and extending over all nations a spiritual kingdom of which he would be the head" (Auguste Jundt, op. cit., p. 165). He had visions of this, as reported by one of his biographers: "At that time [...] he often spent long hours in prayer, without knowing either how he prayed or what he asked for; he asked for nothing in his prayer, knowing that he should not allow himself to be distracted by He had no idea of the spiritual heights to which he had attained, but had to absorb himself in the Spirit and allow himself to be deified. And so it came to pass that he received a special revelation about the meaning of the word God, and how men misuse it in the lightness of their minds. Another day, as he was standing in his workshop, he was transported out of himself and heard a great tumult: all the kings of the earth were falling on their knees before some children who were clapping their hands, handing over to these children the insignia of power and imploring their protection. Then he saw a crowd of unclothed women along the wall, and he cried out: 'Lord, now I'm allowed to see everything'" (ibid.) Convinced that he had been invested with a divine mission, the erotomaniac decided to devote himself entirely to it and gave up his profession. In 1538, the sect was discovered and measures were taken to put an end to its activities. A price was put on Joris' head and twenty-seven of his followers, including his mother, were executed in Delft. Questioned before being handed over to the executioner, they confessed to practices that were common to all Anabaptist sects, as well as others that were not.

were less so: they "claimed that a man could not be forced to marry only one woman, and they had introduced among them the most absolute community, indulging even at mealtimes in the grossest excesses, and teaching that one should not be ashamed of nakedness, but should strive to be as naked as possible.

go back to the state of innocence of Adam and Eve before the fall" (ibid., pp. 167-8). The persecution suffered by his followers did not prevent Joris from pursuing the mission he believed God had entrusted to him. He set out to unite various Anabaptist sects and to lead the Strasbourg sect. It was a failure, which was followed by a setback: the Anabaptists in the province of Oldenburg defected. They did not agree with some of Joris's proposals, including the following: the usefulness of complete nudity and the annihilation of all feelings of shame for achieving perfection; public confession of all sins in the congregation of the faithful; the non-binding nature of marriage bonds for the perfect. Undaunted, Joris set about rallying the crowned heads to his cause, starting with Philip of Hesse. In response, the latter invited him to come to his States, where he could live in safety (Joris was then living in the lands of the Countess of Oldenburg and Emden). Once "settled", he made contact with the German reformers. To his emissary, the Lutheran Melanchthon (1497-1560) replied: "Your doctrine is fantastic, if you

have really come to Wittemberg to propagate your follies, I shall apply to the magistrate to have you thrown into prison immediately". (quoted in ibid., p. 174) Joris lived off donations from his supporters, to whose generosity he regularly and generously appealed; in exchange, he wrote them "letters". In 1540, the sums he received from them were so considerable that he was able to enjoy relative affluence and publish his *Wonderboeck*, which contained an exposition of his doctrine of the Trinity, which bordered on the pantheistic Sabellian heresy (1st century AD) and can be summarised as follows: "God can only live and act in man" (Isaak August Dorner, *History of Protestant Theology, Particularly in Germany*, vol. 1, Edinburgh, T. & T. Clarke, 1871, p. 192). The first edition featured obscene engravings depicting "the last Adam, the new heavenly man" and "the bride of Christ, the renewal of all things" (Auguste Jundt, op. cit., p. 179). Despite everything, the book did not sell. He had them removed from subsequent editions. The book still didn't sell. All Joris's efforts to get people to recognise his authority had been in vain.

In 1544, "a wealthy foreigner, claiming to come from the Netherlands and to have been expelled from his homeland for religious reasons, went before the magistrate of Basel and obtained to be entered on the list of burghers of that city under the name of Jean de Bruges. The foreigner bought a house in Basel and a country estate on the outskirts of the city, brought his family to live with him, and lived the luxurious life of a patrician for the rest of his life. From time to time, faithful emissaries brought him news from the Low Countries and sometimes large sums of money; John of Bruges responded to these gifts by writing to his distant friends to refrain from any public profession of their faith and to wait in silence for the manifestation of the Day of the Lord. He lived in Basel in a state of absolute quietism, abstaining from all religious propaganda, affable with those whom circumstances brought into contact with him, and full of charity towards the poor. He put on the outward appearance of a zealous Christian, showed the greatest respect for evangelical ministers, and frequently attended public worship; but as soon as he returned to his home, he set about erasing from the minds of his family the impression that he had been an evangelical. He never missed an opportunity to express his aversion to Protestant preachers in the privacy of his own home. He even published treatises against them entitled: *Against True and False Preachers, True Zion and Jerusalem*, while continuing to accommodate himself to evangelical rites with perfect dissimulation. While he did his best to give his outward life an irreproachable appearance, his private life, according to his biographers,

was not without its faults. It seems that he kept Anne de Bergheim, from a noble family that had followed him from the Netherlands, as his second wife" (Auguste Jundt, op. cit., p. 179-80). This "rich foreigner" was Joris.

The popular, mystical pantheism which, originating in the doctrine of Amaury de Chartres in the thirteenth century, had gradually developed over the following two centuries, found in Joris one of its last propagandists, one of the last, but also the most influential, if it is true that, as the preacher Cornelis Tuinman (1659-1728), the critic of Spinozism, asserted, this doctrine was no more than a rehash of Jorism (Michiel Wielema, *The March of the Libertines: Spinozists and the Dutch Reformed Church [1660-1750]*, Uitgeverij Verloren, Hilversum, 2004, p. 173). In its sectarian form, Jorism, more or less reworked, persisted until the end of the sixteenth century among the Adamites, the Lucianists (see Nicolas-Sylvestre Bergier [abbé], s. v. Lucianistes, *Dictionnaire de théologie*, 2nd ed. revue, corrigée avec le plus grand soin et enrichie, vol. 5, Besançon, 1830, p. 54) and the familists (see H. Stein-Schneider, *Les familistes : une secte néo-cathare du 16e siècle et leur peintre Pieter Brueghel l'Ancien*. In *Cahiers d'Études Cathares* 36e année, 2e série, n° 105, 1985 [p. 3-44]), whose leader, Henri-Nicolas de Munster, was a disciple and friend of Joris. Towards the beginning of the reign of Elizabeth, he went to England and founded an association there with Dutch refugees, which he called "the family of love". "This association still forms one of the hundred branches of Protestantism in England. They also persisted in the Low Countries and survived the bloody persecutions ordered by the Inquisition and the Duke of Alba" (Germer Baillièrre [ed.], *Variétés - Le panthéisme populaire au moyen*

Age. In *La Revue Scientifique de la France et de l'étranger*, p. 331). The Anabaptists, known as "Mennonites", still have several communities in eastern France.

(70) In the following diatribe by the Anabaptist Muncer, one can read the desire to incite the people to anarchic individualism by stirring up the resentment and envy that their living conditions could arouse in them: "We are all brothers, all children of a common father. Where then do poverty and wealth come from? Why do we groan in indigence, why are we burdened with troubles, while the great of the world swim in abundance and delight? Give us back, rich men of this world, greedy usurpers, give us back the goods that you are holding back unjustly: they are meant to be shared by all; it is not only as men that we are entitled to an equal distribution of the benefits of fortune, but also as Christians. In the early days of the Church, when the word of the divine Master still resounded in every heart, what rule did the apostles follow in distributing the money brought to their feet? They considered the needs of each member of the faithful: that was all. Will we never see the return of those happy times! And you, poor flock of Jesus Christ, will you always groan under oppression, under the ecclesiastical powers!... The Almighty expects the peoples to destroy the tyranny of magistrates, to ask for their freedom again with arms in their hands, to refuse tributes and to pool their goods. They must be brought to my feet, as they were once brought to the feet of the apostles. Yes, my (Catrou, *Histoire des anabaptistes*, Sleidan, l. X., quoted in Johann Adam Möhler, *Défense de la symbolique*, translated from the German by F. Lachat, 2nd ed. revised and corrected for the translation, t. 2, Louis Vivès, Paris, 1852, p.

176-7). Muncer's reasoning is vicious because, if "having nothing of one's own" is "the spirit of Christianity", to be perfectly Christian it follows that one must strip oneself of everything one owns and, in that case, far from refusing to pay taxes, one should agree to pay even more, u n t i l o n e no longer has anything of one's own.

(71) On Christian anarchism, see Alexandre Christoyannopoulos, *Christian Anarchism: A Political Commentary on the Gospel*, Imprint Academic. Exeter, pp. 84-8, 2010 and Jacques Ellul, *Anarchie et christianisme*, Table Ronde, Coll. "La Petite Vermillon", 2018, who locates the origin of the anarchic tendency of Christianity in Judges 21:25: "In those days there was no king in Israel. Everyone did what seemed good to him."

(72) *Correspondance de Théodore de Bèze*. t. 7 : 1566, Droz, Geneva, 1973, p. 30.

(73) For Franck, the concept implicit in the speculations of the popular pantheism of previous centuries, "of the universal Christ who dwells in all human souls, to whatever religion they belong...", is embedded in the humanist precept of "tolerance" and leads to the "[establishment of] the principle of the widest religious tolerance", which will make its way into t h e practice we now call "interfaith dialogue", the religious component of the construction of "world government".

(74) Nicolas de Cues, *La Docte Ignorance*, Lettre postface, III, 263, trans. H. Pasqua, p. 254, quoted in Jean-Michel-Counet, *Dieu est-il au-dessus de la logique ? Quelques aperçus des positions médiévales*, available at: http://www.academia.edu/34644623/Dieu_est-il_au-dessus_de_la_logique_Quelques_aper%C3%A7us_des_positions_m%C3%A9di%C3%A9vales, accessed on 20 February 2019.

(75) Edmond Vansteenberghé, *Le cardinal Nicolas de Cues : (1401-1464) ; l'action - la pensée*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1974, p. 267. Nicolas de Cues declares "that we cannot attribute to God the fact that He is both everywhere and nowhere, since these two concepts are opposites. On the other hand, it can be said of Him that He 'is everywhere while being nowhere, and that He is nowhere while being everywhere'. Such a proposition prompted the Cusan's opponents to accuse him o f pantheism. It seemed to them that in his thesis on the coincidence of opposites, he was asserting that the creature coincided with the creator to the point of identifying with him. Nicolas de Cues responded to his detractors by maintaining that "just as God is everywhere in a mode such that he is nowhere [...], so God is also every place in a non-local mode, every time in a non-temporal mode and every being in a non-ontic mode"; that "God is in all things through the mediation of the universe: it clearly follows that all things are in all and that each is in each" (Marcel Viau, *La métaphore du miroir chez Nicolas de Cues*. In *Revue des sciences religieuses*, vol. 83, no. 2, 2009, available at <http://journals.openedition.org/rsr/478>, accessed 26 February 2019). However, de Cues also declared that God is all that can be, but that "(i)f we consider God in things, we believe that the things in which he is have some reality; and we are mistaken: take God away from creatures, there is nothing left" (quoted in Edmond Vansteenberghé, *op. cit.*, p. 312). "Thus, the very subject of immanence

fades away; the world is pure nothingness; God is everything; and Nicholas de Cues' doctrine is presented as a monistic pantheism" (ibid. p 313).

(76) Nicolas de Cues, *De la docte ignorance*, Guy Trédaniel, Editions de la Maisnie, Paris, 1979, p. 39.

(77) De Cues drew the notion of the "coincidence of opposites" from Bonaventure (c. 1220-1274) (Ewert H. Cousin, *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites: The Theology of Bonaventure*, Franciscan Press, 1978; id., *Bonaventure and the Coincidence of Opposites: A Response to Critics*, *Theological Studies*, vol. 42, no. 2, 1981 [p. 277-90]), in Raymond Lulle (1232-1315), in Dionysius Areopagytus, in Proclus' commentary (fifth century AD) on Plato's *Parmenides*, a treatise on apophatic theology which de Cues himself commented on (see *Commentary on Plato's Parmenides*, pp. 277-90). Platon, texte établi par Leendert Gerrit Westerink, avec la contribution de Alain Philippe Segonds, traduit par Joseph Combès, *Introduction et notes de Joseph Combès*, t. 2, Belles lettres, 2010, p. xc ; Michèle Porte, *Mémoire de la Science*, t. 1. Ouvrage " Hors Collection " des Cahiers de Fontenay, séminaire 85-86, École Normale Supérieure de Fontenay-aux-Roses, juin 1987, p.. 271; Stephen Gersh [ed.], *Interpreting Proclus*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2014, p. 343), in the *Enneads*, where Plotinus asserts that, "necessarily, the Whole is made of opposites" (*Enneads*, I, 8, 7, quoted in Robert Maynard Hutchins [ed.], *Plotinus: The Six Enneads*, *Great Books of the Western World*, vol.17, Encyclopaedia Britannica, Inc, 1952, p. 311) as well as the Kabbalist Azriel of Girona (1160- 1238) (see, on the subject of "coincidentia oppositorum" in the Kabbalistic tradition, Sanford L. Drob, *A Rational Mystical Ascent: The Coincidence of Opposites in Kabbalistic and Hasidic Thought*, http://www.newkabbalah.com/Coinc.htm#_ftn63). See also Antonino Drago, *The coincidentia oppositorum in Cusanus [1401-1464], Lanza del Vasto [1901-1981] and beyond*. In *Epistemologia*, vol. 33, no. 2, July 2010 [p. 305-28].

(78) Nicolas de Cusa, *De la docte ignorance*, Guy Trédaniel, Éditions de la Maisnie, Paris, 1979, p. 44.

(79) Quoted in Edmond Vansteenbergh, *op. cit.* p. 375.

(80) Frédéric Vengeon, *Infinity and speculative logic. Deux philosophies de l'absolu : Nicolas de Cues et Hegel*. In *Archives de Philosophie* 2013, t. 76, n° 1 [p. 61-79] ; see also Jean Celeyrette, *Mathématiques et théologie : l'infini chez Nicolas de Cues*. In *Revue de métaphysique et de morale* 2011, vol. 2, no. 70 [p. 151-65].

(81) Nicolas de Cusa, *op. cit.* p. 185.

(82) On the subject of the *Book of the Twenty-Four Philosophers*, see Jacques Follon, *Le livre des XXIV philosophes*. Translated from the Latin, edited and annotated by Françoise Hudry. Postface by Marc Richir. In *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*, vol. 87, no. 74, 1989 [p. 359-63]; Françoise Hudry, *Le livre des XXIV philosophes : résurgence d'un texte du IV^e siècle*, J. Vrin, Paris, 2009; David Dubois, *Essais II - 2008-2010*, published by the author, 2020, p. 104.

(83) The formula was taken up by Jean de Meung and Master Eckhart, and would later be used by Giordano Bruno, Robert Fludd and Pascal, among others.

(84) Nicolas de Cusa, op. cit. p. 44.

(85) Nicolas de Cues, *De la docte ignorance*, III, translated by Maurice de Gandillac, Paris, 1942, Aubier, Éditions Montaigne, p. 146.

(86) Eugenio Garin, *Hermétisme et Renaissance*, translated from the Italian by Bertrand Schefer, Éditions Allia, 2001, p. 85.

(87) Quoted in Pierre Musso, *La Religion industrielle : Monastère, manufacture, usine. Une généalogie de l'entreprise*, Fayard, Coll. "Poids et mesures du monde", Paris, 2017.

(88) Maurice de Gandillac, *Genèses de la modernité : les douze siècles où se font notre Europe : de 'La cité de Dieu' à 'La Nouvelle Atlantide'*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1992, p. 96.

(89) *Ibid*, p. 97.

(90) See Jules Delvaille, op. cit. p. 148.

(91) Laurent van Eynde, *L'ontologie acosmique : la crise de la modernité chez Pascal et Heidegger*, 1993, FUSL, Brussels, p. 39.

(92) Eugène Maillet, *La création et la providence devant la science moderne*, Hachette et Cie, 1897, Paris, p. 294. See Jean Seidengart, Bruno et Galilée face à l'infinité cosmique et à la relativité, *Anabases*, 15, 2012, available at <http://journals.openedition.org/anabases/3757>, consulted on 20 May 2018; see also Jean-Pierre Luminet and Marc Lachièze-Rey, *De l'infini : Horizons cosmiques, multivers et vide quantique*, nouv. éd., Dunod, 2016, p. 21), an enterprise continued by Descartes (see Y. Gauthier, Jean Seidengart, Dieu, l'univers et la sphère infinie. Penser l'infinité cosmique à l'aube de la science classique. In *Revue Philosophique de Louvain*. Quatrième série, t. 106, n° 3, 2008 [p. 645-9], p. 647.

(93) Wilhelm Gottlieb Tennemann, *Manuel de l'Histoire de la Philosophie*, translated from the German by Victor Cousin, 2nd ed. corrected and enlarged on the fifth and last German edition, t. 2, Ladrangé, Paris, 1869, p. 44-5. The Brunian theory of divine immanence seems to push the pantheistic doctrine expounded by the Judeo-Andalusian rabbi, poet, theologian and philosopher Solomon ibn Gabirol (c. 1021-c. 1058) in the *Fons Vitae* to its final consequences (see also S. Munk, *Mélanges de philosophie juive et arabe*, A. Franck, Paris, 1859, p. 300; M. Wittmann, *Giordano Brunos Beziehungen zu Avencebrol*. In *Archiv für Gesch. der Philos.* vol. 13, 1900 [p. 147-52]. The *Fons vitae* was translated from Arabic by the archbishop of Segovia, possibly of Jewish origin, Dominic Gundissalvi (c. 1105-c. 1181), assisted by the Jew John of Seville (L. Arréat, [review] Adolfo Bonilla y San Martín. - *Historia de la Filosofía Española desde los tiempos primitivos hasta el siglo XII*, V. Suarez, Madrid, 1908. In Th. Ribot [ed.], *Revue philosophique de la France et de l'étranger*, 34e année, LXVIII, 1909, p. 314; see also Leo Catana, *The Concept of Contraction in Giordano Bruno's Philosophy*, Ashgate, Aldershot, 2005).

(94) Saverio Ansaldi, *Perfection of faith, perfectibility of virtue: M. Luther and G. Bruno. Une lecture de l'expulsion de la bête triomphante*, in Bertrand Binoche (ed.), *L'homme perfectible*, Éditions Champs Vallon, 2004, p. 54-5.

(95) *Ibid.*, p. 56.

(96) *Ibid.*, p. 57.

(97) Jules Delvaille, *op. cit.* p. 146-7.

(98) Henri Lecouturier, *La cosmosophie, ou, Le socialisme universel*, published by the author, Paris, 1850, p. 62. This philosopher and socialist journalist, "a man of study in his study, a man of the world everywhere"

(Lucien Platt, *Lecouturier, sa vie, ses travaux*. In *La Science pittoresque : journal hebdomadaire*, n° 18, 5e année, p. 137), he also published a work with a programmatic title: *Paris incompatible avec la République : plan d'un nouveau Paris où les révolutions seront impossibles* (Desloges, Paris, 1848).

(99) On Bruno's borrowings from the Kabbalah, see Francis Yates, *Giordano Bruno and The Hermetic Tradition*, University of Chicago Press, 1979 and Karen Silvia De León-Jones, *Giordano Bruno and the Kabbalah: Prophets, Magicians, and Rabbis*, University of Nebraska Press, Lincoln and London, 1997.

(100) On the influence of the occult sciences on the genesis of Kant's epistemology, see, Djordje Djordjevic, *Kant's Epistemological Geography: The Role of Schwarmerei and Demarcation in the Conception of Critical Philosophy*, thesis, University of Cape Town, 1997, p. 5, https://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:rT5m-GJYreJk:https://open.uct.ac.za/bitstream/handle/11427/13907/thesis_hum_1997_djordjevic_d.pdf%3Fsequence%3D1+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ua; Brian Gibbons, *Spirituality and the Occult: From the Renaissance to the Twentieth Century*, Routledge, London and New York, p. 91; Gottlieb Florschütz, *Swedenborg's Hidden Influence on Kant*, Swedenborg Scientific Association, 2014; see, on Fichte's "kabbalistic realism", Paul Frankes, *op. cit.*, p. 109 ff; on the influence of Kabbalistic literature on Hegel, Glenn Alexander Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition*, Cornell University Press, 2008, p. 231 ff; and G. W. F. Hegel, *Lessons on the History of Philosophy*, vol. 4: *La philosophie grecque*, translation and notes by Pierre Garniron, J. Vrin, Paris, 1975, p. 952 ff; on German idealism in its relation to the occult-penetrated socialist movement of the 19th century, see Philippe Hauger, *Examen de la doctrine de J. Bœhme et de Saint-Martin*. In *Revue de progrès social* [p. 408-37], *Au Bureau du Journal / Bachelier*, Paris, 1934 and Julian Strube, *Socialist religion and the emergence of occultism: a genealogical approach to socialism and secularization in 19th-century France*. In *Religion*, vol. 46, no. 3, 2016 [pp. 359-88], available at: https://www.researchgate.net/publication/299497605_Socialist_Religion_and_the_Emergence_of_Occultism_A_Genealogical_Approach_to_Socialism_and_Secularization_in_19th-Century_France, accessed 24 February 2019.

(101) Arri Eisen and Gary Laderman (eds.), *Science, Religion and Society*, vol. 1-2, Routledge, London and New York, 2007, p. 270.

(102) According to the Zohar, incubi and succubi date back to the origin of the world. Eve gave in to the temptation of the incubus Samael disguised as a snake and Adam, having separated from her after Cain had killed Abel, suffered the assaults of the succubi Lilith and Nahema for one hundred and thirty years and had children by them, of whom

Asmodeus (Marie d'Ange, *Dictionnaire de démonologie occidentale*, Éditions la Rose du Soir, 2018, p. 216 *Mythes de la décadence*, Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, "Littératures" series, Clermont-Ferrand, 2001, p. 375).

(103) Charles-François Bailly de Merlieux, *Encyclopédie portative*, Paris, 1830, p. 83 et seq.

(104) See Gershom Scholem, *La Kabbale*, Éditions du Cerf, Paris 1975, p. 129.

(105) Moshe Idel, quoted in Allison P. Coudert, *Kabbalistic Messianism versus Enlightenment Messianism*, in Matt D. Goldish, Richard H. Popkin (eds.), *Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture*, vol. I, Springer Science +Business Media, Dordrecht, 2001, p. 113.

(106) Charles H. Silverstein, *Kabbalistic Influences on Alchemy, Psychoanalysis, and Analytic Psychology*. In *Psychological Perspectives. A Quarterly Journal of Jungian Thought*, vol. 55, n° 2 : C.G. Jung and the Kabbalah, 2002.

(107) Adolphe Franck, *Philosophie et religion*, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1867, p. 59 ff.

(108) The philologist Casaubon (*De rebus sacris exercitationes XVI, Exercitatio I*, 10, 1614) did not rule out the possibility that the Hermetic texts as a whole could have been forged by early Christians (see <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2017/02/27/isis-2/>). His point of view was challenged in 1904 by the philologist Richard Reitzenstein, who argued that "they constitute a Hellenistic gloss of the ancient Egyptian religion" (Gurgel Pereira and Ronaldo Guilherme, *The Hermetic Λόγος: Reading the Corpus Hermeticum as a Reflection of Graeco-Egyptian Mentality Dissertation zur Erlangung der Würde eines Doktors der Ägyptologie Vorgelegt der Philosophisch-Historischen Fakultät der Universität Basel*, Basel, 2010, p. 24; see also Anthony Grafton, *Forgers and Critics*, new ed, Princeton University Press, Princeton and Oxford, 2019, chap. 3). Study of the Nag Hammadi manuscripts, discovered in the 1940s, has confirmed that they were probably written in the second century AD, from which, incidentally, the oldest hermetic text found to date dates, or is dated (ibid.).

(109) Quoted in Marcellin Berthelot, *Les origines de l'alchimie*, G. Steinheil, 1885, p. 252.

(110) Adolphe Franck, op. cit. p. 60-1.

(111) See Ahmad Y. al-Hassan, *The Arabic original of Liber de compositione alchemiae: the Epistle of Maryanus, the Hermit and Philosopher, to Prince Khālid ibn Yazīd*. In *Arabic sciences and philosophy*, vol 14, n° 2, 2004 [p. 171, 173, 213-231].

(112) See M. M. Pattison Muir, *Roger Bacon: His Relations to Alchemy and Chemistry*, in A. G. Little, *Roger Bacon: essays contributed by various writers on the occasion of the commemoration of the*, Oxford University Press, London, 1914, pp. 290-1.

(113) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 292.

(114) Herbert Stanley Redgrove, *Roger Bacon, the Father of Experimental Science and Mediæval Occultism*, W. Rider & son, Ltd, 1920.

(115) M. M. Pattison Muir, *op. cit.* p. 301.

(116) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 302.

(117) *Ibid*, p. 306.

(118) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 292-3.

(119) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 294.

(120) Quoted in Ralph Bauer, *The Alchemy of Conquest: Science, Religion, and the Secrets of the New World*, Virginia University Press, 2019; see, on the important role of alchemical doctrines in the development of modern science, Irene Zanon, *The alchemical Apocalypse of Isaac Newton Zanon*, thesis, Università Ca' Foscari Venezia, Venice, 2013.

(121) Quoted in Émile Charles, *Roger Bacon. Sa vie, ses ouvrages, ses doctrines d'après des textes inédits*, L. Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1861, p. 300.

(122) M. M. Pattison Muir, *op. cit.* p. 295.

(123) *Ibid*, p. 294.

(124) J. M'Clintock (ed.), *The Methodist Review*, vol. 38, 4th series, v. 8, 1856, p. 472. The teachings of the Kabbalah shine through in his *Opus Majus*, which, however, owes much, like the writings of other Franciscan astrologers and alchemists of the time, to the *Picatrix*, a Latin and Spanish translation of the eleventh-century Arabic treatise *Ghāyat al-ḥakīm* (*The Finality of the Sage*) (see Ralph Bauer, *op. cit.*).

(125) M. M. Pattison Muir, *op. cit.* p. 351.

(126) *Ibid*, p. 354.

(127) Quoted in Michel Noize, *Le Grand Œuvre, liturgie de l'alchimie chrétienne*. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, vol. 186, no. 2, 1974 [pp. 149-83], p. 182.

(128) Quoted in Zachary Matus, *Reconsidering Roger Bacon's Apocalypticism in Light of His Alchemical and Scientific Thought*. In *The Harvard Theological Review*. vol. 105, no. 2, April 2012 [pp. 189-222], p. 218.

(129) *Ibid*, p. 218.

(130) Ralph Bauer, op. cit; Antoine Calvet, Recherches sur le platonisme médiéval dans les œuvres alchimiques attribuées à Roger Bacon, Thomas d'Aquin et Arnaud de Villeneuve. In Revue des sciences philosophiques et théologiques, t. 87, n° 3, 2003 [p. 457-98].

(131) Zachary Matus, op. cit. p. 219.

(132) Ibid, p. 221.

(133) According to him, "Aristotle" had obtained the "secret of secrets" from Hermes Trismegistus himself and then revealed it to the Arabs. The influence of the Arabs on the medicine of the time lay in the "secret of the secrets" of Hermes Trismegistus. the importance they attached to alchemy in the discovery of new medicines and the proper synthesis and 'fermentation' of remedies" (E. Withington, Roger Bacon and Medicine, in A. G. Little, op. cit., p. 345).

(134) Quoted in Zachary Matus, op. cit, p. 207.

(135) Amanda Power, Roger Bacon and the Defence of Christendom, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 27.

(136) The first alchemists in Europe were mostly Franciscans. Interestingly, their theories were wrapped up in the same prophetic spiritualism as that which, derived from the In the fifteenth century, in his Buch der heiligen Dreifaltigkeit, the German Franciscan Ullmann used the terminology of the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ. As late as the fifteenth century, in his Buch der heiligen Dreifaltigkeit, the German Franciscan Ullmann used the terminology and iconography of the alchemical purification of metals to describe the passion, death and resurrection of Jesus Christ (see Ralph Bauer, op. cit.).

(137) Ralph Bauer, op. cit.

(138) David. F. Noble, The Religion of Technology, Penguin Books, 1999, p. 10; 1 Corinthians 15:49-50, 53; the theme of immortality is taken up again in Revelation, 21:4L.

(139) Quoted in Edmond de Pressensé, Histoire des trois premiers siècles de l'église chrétienne, 2e série, livre 3 : la polémique du christianisme contre le paganisme, Ch. Meyrueis et Cie, Paris, 1861, p. 391. Seventeen centuries later, Saint-Simonism called man "a God; man is God himself in the finite order; but he is not God in his entirety, he is not the infinite being. Man, the finite manifestation of the infinite being, is like it, in its active unity, love; and, in the modes and aspects of its manifestation, spirit and matter, intelligence and strength, wisdom and beauty" (Doctrine de Saint-Simon. Exposition. 1st year, 1829, 2nd edition, Paris, 1830, p. 112).

(140) Irénée de Lyon, Contre les hérésies, Éditions du Cerf, Paris, 1952, p. 959.

(141) According to historian Lynn White, the change in man's attitude towards technology in Europe may have begun with the introduction of the heavy plough in the Frankish Empire. "This major technological innovation is said to have radically reversed the relationship between man and nature by substituting the capacity of the machine for the basic needs of the population as the norm for agriculture.

division of the land (...). Shortly afterwards, around 830, a new form of calendar illustration began to appear among the Franks, which highlighted this new attitude towards nature. The images depicted men ploughing, mowing hay and harvesting in an attitude of coercive and domineering. Man and nature are two things (apart) and man is the master" (quoted in David F. Noble, *op. cit.*, p. 13).

(142) David. F. Noble, *op. cit.*; see also Allison P. Coudert, *Newton and the Rosicrucian Enlightenment*, in *Newton and Religion: Context, Nature, and Influence*, J. E. Force, R.H. Popkin, eds, Springer Science. +Business Media, Dordrecht, 1999.

(143) In the earliest Kabbalistic texts, *tikkun* was understood not as 'retraction' but, on the contrary, as in the doctrines of the Neoplatonist, Gnostic and Manichaean systems, as the flow of divine substance in the process of creating the world (see Lawrence Fine, *Tikkun: A Lurianic Motif in Contemporary Jewish Thought*, in Jacob Neusner et al. [From Ancient Israel to Modern Judaism: Intellect in Quest of Understanding-Essays in Honor of Marvin Fox, vol. 4, Scholars Press, Atlanta, 1986).

(144) Peter J. Forshaw, *Cabala Chymica or Chemia Cabalistica-Early Modern Alchemists and Cabala*. In *Ambix*, vol. 60, no. 4: *Alchemy and Religion in Christian Europe*, 2013 [pp. 361-389].

(145) Karen de León-Jones, *Kabbalah and Christianity from the Middle Ages to the Dawn of Modernity*, in Jean-Christophe Attias and Pierre Gisel, *L'Europe et les juifs, Labor et Fides*, Lausanne, 2002, p. 76. It was from the *Kabbala denudata* that the occultist Newton drew his knowledge of the Kabbalah (Allison P. Coudert, *op. cit.*, p. 33).

(146) In the same vein, Ripley *reviv'd*: *Exposition upon Sir George Ripley's hermetico-poetical works (1678)*, a commentary, published under the pseudonym of Eirenaeus Philalethes, on the works of the ecclesiastic and alchemist Sir George Ripley (c. 1415-1490), contains the image of a 'magnificently dressed' Queen feeding a work entitled *Philosophy Restored to its Primitive Purity* to an alchemist who, once he has ingested the book, becomes a full member of the alchemist fraternity (see Allison P. Coudert, *Kabbalistic Messianism versus Kabbalistic Messianism*, in Matt. D. Goldish and Richard. H. Popkin, *Millenarianism and Messianism in Early Modern European Culture*, vol. 1, Springer Science + Business Media, Dordrecht, 2001, p. 117).

(147) Allison P. Coudert, *The Impact of the Kabbalah in the Seventeenth Century: The Life and Thought*, Brill, Leiden, 1999, p. 137.

(148) *Ibid.*, p. 138; in the *Gei Hizzayon* by the physician and Kabbalist Abraham Yagel (1553- c. 1623) who, like Knorr and van Helomon, tried to integrate the Kabbalah into the scientific discourse of the time, the Kabbalah is also represented by a woman (*ibid.*, p. 141).

(149) *Ibid.*, p. 142.

(150) *Ibid.*, p. 148.

(151) Ibid, p. 149.

(152) Ibid.

(153) Ibid, p. 150.

(154) Jean-Joseph Thonissen, *op. cit.* p. 96. The 'House of Solomon', the name by which Bacon referred to this institute, was one of the driving forces, a few decades later, behind the creation of the French and English scientific academies" (Aurélien Ruellet, *La maison de Salomon. Histoire du patronage scientifique et technique en France et en Angleterre au xviiie siècle*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, 2016).

(155) Henri de Ferron, *Théorie du progrès*, t. 1, Germer Baillièrre, Paris, 1867, p. 66 ff. Although Bacon saw science and its new methods as likely to produce material improvements in human life, he was nonetheless convinced that the arrival of the Antichrist and therefore the end of the world were imminent (J. B. Bury, *op. cit.*, p. 19).

(156) Quoted in David F. Noble, *op. cit.*

(157) Ibid, citing the most characteristic prophetic passages in Francis Bacon's work.

(158) Allison P. Coudert, *op. cit.* p. 151.

(159) Ibid, p. 152.

(160) Quoted in Allison P. Coudert, *Kabbalistic Messianism versus...*, p. 117.

(161) Walter Pagel, *Religion and Neoplatonism in Renaissance Medicine*, Variorum Reprints, 1985 p. 6.

(162) Tara Nummedal, *Alchemy and Religion in Christian Europe*, *Ambix*, vol. 60, no. 4, 2003 [p. 311-22], p. 319.

(163) Bernard Joly, *La rationalité de l'alchimie au XVIIe siècle*, J. Vrin, Paris, 1992, p. 26, who shows rather convincingly that there is no contradiction between Descartes's invitation to his acquaintance "to disabuse the poor sick in spirit of the sophistications of metals" and his statement that the alchemical principle of the four elements and the "fifth that results from them" "is the same as that of the fifth". "The terms hermeticism, occultism and esotericism are often used today in a way that is doubly ambiguous. On the one hand, they are often used as simple synonyms, without taking account of the fact that their etymology and historical usage refer to very different realities. On the other hand, they are used to designate doctrines which, it is suggested, are the current expression of ancient traditions, in such a way that the themes developed in our time under these terms would simply be the reiteration of teachings from a distant past. Yet these three terms were not coined until the mid-nineteenth century, to designate doctrines whose development did not predate that period. Contemporary enthusiasts of noble esotericism are quick to criticise the confusion between these terms.

of occultism, a movement founded at the end of the nineteenth century by the disciples of Eliphas Lévi, a syncretic and superficial assembly of Pythagorean, neo-Platonic, magical, astrological and theosophical traditions. It is true that such a compilation had already been drawn up in the 16th century by Henri Cornelis Agrippa in his famous *De occulta philosophia*, published in 1533. François Secret has

showed how, from this work, 'a distorting mirror of the works he plundered, the slope of decadence is long until the occultism of Eliphas Lévi'. It is clear that modern occultism is based on a fundamental misunderstanding of the tradition of occult philosophy, since in the Renaissance this expression was used not to designate a mysterious, hidden doctrine, but the body of knowledge whose aim was to reveal the 'secrets of nature'. Aficionados of astrology, alchemy or natural magic were not seeking to confine themselves to the circle of a group of initiates who would be able to discover the 'secrets of nature'.

imagined they were the repositories of an exceptional science. He wanted to understand the forces that act invisibly in natural beings, with a view to acquiring a mastery of them that would enable him to

enable him to live better ('[wanting] to understand what forces act invisibly in natural beings, with a view to acquiring a mastery of them that will enable him to live better' is rational? N.). At the end of the sixteenth century and the beginning of the seventeenth, the 'occult sciences' were no different in aim from Descartes in his *Discourse on Method*, when he hoped to

to become 'as master and possessor of nature', and it is understandable that, before inventing his own method for establishing the truth of the sciences, he should have been seduced for a time by the strange knowledge that the enigmatic Rosicrucian libels promised to possess" (Bernard Joly, *La rationalité de l'hermétisme*. In *Methodos* [Online], 3, 2003, online 05 April 2004, accessed 04 October 2020. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/methodos/106> ; DOI :

<https://doi.org/10.4000/methodos.1064>). In short, it would have been "a youthful error". Descartes aside, this view raises a twofold objection: firstly, the desire, which was that of the men of the 'Renaissance', to

to become "master(s) and possessor(s) of nature" cannot be considered rational, nor can the techniques used to achieve this, nor, a fortiori, the knowledge required to develop the techniques in question; secondly, the fact that this knowledge

were presented as rational, it does not follow that they really were; it does not follow that they did not derive from 'occult' or, to use a less overused term, 'necromantic' teachings. Judging by its industrial and computer applications, it is not unreasonable to wonder whether science is not a body of knowledge of this kind disguised by the catch-all term 'reason'. "(A) look at the history of science, and if we set out to see how some of the most famous refutations (of hypotheses) came about, we are led to the conclusion either that some of them are manifestly irrational, or that they are based on principles of rationality radically different from those (generally) envisaged (...). Karl Popper in turn cannot help admitting that, 'historically speaking, all - or almost all - scientific theories have their origin in myths, and that a myth may contain important anticipations of scientific theories'. In one way or another, this brings us back to the epistemology of Hume, who already claimed that 'man is not only an irrational animal, but (that) moreover, that part of ourselves which we thought rational - human knowledge, including practical knowledge - is in part irrational'. All reason, from this perspective, is first and foremost myth - and as James Hillman notes, 'all things are full of Gods', Reason as much as anything else... (Cf. Plato, *Phaedrus*, 252, c) (...) It would be

It would be tedious to recount the entire history of scientific discoveries which, even if only over the last four centuries, have taken root in the deepest recesses of the unconscious - whether they emerge in the form of

We are well aware of the fact that Copernicus, for example, referred in his work to the Revelation of Hermes Trismegistus, which provided him with guides for his scientific imagination. In this respect, it is well known that Copernicus, for example, referred in his work to the Revelation of Hermes Trismegistus, which provided him with the guides to his scientific imagination; it is also well known that Kepler drew some of his major insights from the

He deploys his theory in a three-dimensional framework that seems to him to be unsurpassable under the influence of the archetypes of number, which lead him to assert that nature cannot have more than three dimensions because of the very constitution of the divine Trinity, the dynamic and personalised deployment of the unity of Being; we even know that Faraday (a British physicist and chemist known for his discovery of electromagnetic induction, diamagnetism and electrolysis. N. We even know how Faraday (a British physicist and chemist famous for his discovery of electromagnetic induction, diamagnetism and electrolysis), in the middle of the 19th century, in his research into electromagnetism and in his brilliant hypothesis of the convertibility of forces, initially relied on the religious idea of divine omnipotence, which force expressed by representing its emanation, so that it became ipso facto 'the essential constituent of the natural order'. This last example, in fact, is quite remarkable insofar as it is the best example of what I would call (sic) the ultra-rationalist recuperation of scientific activity: when he developed Faraday's ideas, Maxwell (a Scottish physicist and mathematician known for having derived the general equations of the laws of electromagnetism. N. D. E.) got rid of this 'mystical' foundation that he no longer knew what to do with, and succeeded so well that Helmholtz (sic) (Helmholtz was a German physicist and physician who

made major contributions in a number of scientific fields. N. D. T.), a little later, could calmly assert that one of Faraday's aims had been to 'purify science of its last remnants of metaphysics'. This is how the St. Sulpician fiction of the pure image of science is constructed, little by little in the empyrean realm of reason" (Michel Cazenave, *La Science et l'âme du monde*, Éditions Albin Michel, 1996). The example of Newton is even more revealing in this respect: "

By what miracle, then, is it possible for the purely irrational to provide a space for reason, only to turn around and contradict itself in the end? Indeed, we cannot simply claim that Newton's 'imaginative' speculations supported his intuitions, or that they simply enabled him to change his point of view: they were at the very root of his work, and throughout it they are so inextricably intertwined, so constitutive in a word, that without them his work would not even have existed. For what does Newton actually write? Other than that, echoing on this point the thinking of the Cambridge Platonists and the latest developments in Hebraic esotericism under the impetus of Isaac Luria at the end of the sixteenth century, he is clearly inclined to think that the that the very matter of the world was not created ex nihilo by God, but that on the contrary it originates from a

primordial matter, - as a 'shadow' of God, a residue (reshimu) of light, which in turn was formed by God's withdrawal into His own depths, and by the fact of this withdrawal (the so-called Tsimtsum), this exile ultimately of the En Sof within itself, which then enables Him to create by expansion and to manifest Himself in faces. What happened before (the Six Days of Creation) is hidden and not revealed.

Nevertheless, from what is said, here is what can be inferred: the Mysterious Holy One engraved a point, by a hidden withdrawal. In this point, He has enclosed the Whole of Creation...'. Hence the necessary consequence, as Lurianism maintains or as Henry More wrote, that space and time are absolute realities insofar as they are the manifestation of the divine presence in the universe.

world, and a representation of the divine essence itself. In this way, we move seamlessly from the theosophical neoplatonism of Cambridge, wonderfully expressed in Henry More's second letter to Descartes: '(Assuming this), why should we have difficulty in attributing (to God) an extension that fills infinite spaces as well as an infinite succession of durations?' to Newton's cosmology, which states very clearly: 'Existendo semper et ubique durationem et spatium constituit (Deus): by existing always and everywhere, God constitutes space and duration'. Space, in other words, in its absolute character, is assimilated to the sensorium Dei, allowing us to unfold alchemical research and the basic intuition of the art of astrology, according to which universal sympathy is exercised under the inspiration of the divinity, and through the creation of forces that establish universal Laws of coherence that are so many translations of the intimate structures of Being. Taking up the oldest human reveries on the magnetic phenomenon as an index of Love and signature of a divine Erotology that ensures the authenticity of the alchemical process (didn't Plato already say on this basis that 'the Divinity, through all these intermediaries, attracts where it pleases the soul of humans, passing this force from one to another?'), Newton comes to speak of "that species of very subtle spirit which penetrates through all solid bodies and which is hidden in their substance; it is by the force and action of this spirit that the particles of the body attract each other at the smallest distances, & that they cohere when they are contiguous". This spirit is itself a subtle light, the virtual light that the alchemist hunts down everywhere, that becomes incarnate in his dreams like the philosopher's gold, and that enables him to play at the mechanisms of the Living by in turn carrying the Spirit.

metaphysics. Through this theory of light, in which he distinguishes between lux and lumen, spiritual light and empirical light (although one, of course, is the finite incarnation of the other), Newton thus rediscovers the major intuitions of the great Christian Kabbalah, and while preparing for future research into electricity through a desire for the analogical, and therefore fundamental, unity of the two mystical and material natures, in this way brings his scientific theory full circle" (ibid.).

Hermeticism" in the sense of "occult knowledge" and "esotericism" in the sense of "teaching reserved for the initiated" are thus seen as repellents, and not by chance.

if they were both put into circulation (the term 'esotericism' was used for the first time by the historian Jacques Matter in his *Histoire critique du gnosticisme et de son influence* [1828] and that of 'hermeticism' by Hugo in *Notre-Dame de Paris* [1832]) (*) at a time when "(t)he great scholars, the greatest, the most imbued with the scientific spirit, the most authoritative representatives of science - that is to say, those who created it, its founders, its initiators - (...), almost all have been believers" (Antonin Eymieu, *La part des croyants dans les progrès de la science au XIXe siècle*, Part 1, Perrin et Cie, 1920, pp. 11-2) and where this science, through its industrial and domestic applications, began to transform people's daily lives. To prevent the most curious from becoming aware of the occult or necromantic aspects of science, it was necessary to give them something to gnaw on:

esotericism (for a discussion of the continuity between magic and science, see Carl Du Prel, *La magie: science naturelle*, translated from the German, Slatkine, Geneva and Paris, 1982; Pascal Sanchez, *La rationalité des croyances magiques*, Droz, Geneva and Paris, 2007, Part 2: *Les Différents enjeux des théories de la magie*; Vibeke Steffen, Steffen Jöhncke and Kirsten Marie Raahauge [eds. *Between Magic and Rationality: On the Limits of Reason in the Modern World*, Museum Tusulanum Press, Copenhagen, 2015).

(*) See Jean Borella, *Ésotérisme guénonien et mystère chrétien, L'Âge d'Homme*, Lausanne, 1997, p. 21, which lends credence to the thesis we have just put forward, pointing out that the milieu in which the term "esotericism" appeared was "that of the socialising romanticism that inspired the 1848 Revolution: an ideological nebula in which the religion of Humanity and the cult of democracy were combined with confused speculations on the Trinity, Woman, and industrial and social Progress".

(164) Shortly after completing his law studies, Leibniz became a member of the Rosicrucian Society of Nuremberg, where he studied alchemy and the occult sciences.

(165) *Ibid*, p. 27.

(166) *Ibid*, p. 26.

(167) *Ibid*.

(168) *Ibid*, p. 26-7.

(169) Quoted in Maxime du Camp, *La philosophie des Juifs. Maimonides and Spinoza*. In *Revue des deux mondes*, 32e année, 2de période, t. 37, 1862, p. 326.

(170) See Miquel Beltrán, *The Influence of Abraham Cohen de Herrera's Kabbalah on Spinoza's Metaphysics*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2016; H. Serouya, *La Kabbale. Ses origines, sa psychologie mystique, sa métaphysique*, Paris, 1947; Johan Aanen, *The Kabbalistic Sources of Spinoza*. In *The Journal of Jewish Thought and Philosophy*, vol. 24, no. 2, 2016 [p. 279-99]; see also, for a clear exposition of Spinoza's pantheistic system, Émile Saisset, *Descartes, ses précurseurs et ses disciples*, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1862. According to the philosopher and writer Friedrich Heinrich Jacobi (1743-1819), Spinoza's philosophy is "immanentized Kabbalah" (quoted in Paul Frankes, *Fichte's Kabbalistic Realism, summons as zimzum*, in Gabriel Gottlieb [ed.], *Fichte's Foundations of Natural Rights*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2016, p. 102). It is also dependent on the hermetic-alchemical tradition, which was re-elaborated in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries in terms of metaphysics and

Spinoza's spiritual teacher, the pantheist Franciscus van den Enden (Bedjai Marc. Franciscus van den Enden, Spinoza's spiritual master. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, vol. 207, no. 3, 1990 [pp. 289-311]).

(171) See Étienne Balibar, *Spinoza politique : Le transindividuel*, PUF, Paris, 2018.

(172) Maxime du Camp, *op. cit.* p. 325.

(173) Saint-René Taillandier, *La Philosophie spiritualiste depuis Descartes jusqu'à nos jours*. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 2nd period, vol. 35, 1861 [pp. 62-95], pp. 73-4; see also Émile Saisset, *op. cit.* p. 317.

(174) J. B. Bury, *op. cit.* p. 77, who sums up Leibniz's philosophical optimism as follows: "The Creator, before acting, had considered all possible worlds and had chosen the best one. He could have chosen one in which mankind would have been better off and happier, but that world would not have been the best possible, because He had to take into account the interests of the whole universe, of which the earth with mankind is only one.

insignificant part. The evils and imperfections of our little world are negligible compared with the happiness and perfection of the whole cosmos. Leibniz, whose theory is deduced from the abstract proposition that the Creator is perfect, is not saying that, now or at any given moment, the universe is as perfect as it could be; its merit lies in its potential; it will evolve towards perfection in infinite time. Leibniz's optimism therefore concerns the universe as a whole, not the earth, and would obviously be entirely compatible with a pessimistic vision of humanity's destiny. Indeed, he believed that it would be impossible to improve the universal order, 'not only for the whole, but for ourselves in particular', and he also noted the possibility that, 'in the course of time, the human race will attain a greater perfection than we can now imagine'. But the importance of his and Malebranche's speculation lies in the fact that the old theories of degeneration (of the world) are definitively abandoned" (ibid.). However, at the end of his life, after van Helmont had introduced him to the Kabbalistic concept of tikkun (see main text and Allison P. Coudert, *Leibniz and the Kabbalah*, Springer Science+Business Media, Dordrecht, 1995, pp. 35 et seq.), the German philosopher's optimism no longer concerned the universe alone; he adopted the view that every living creature eventually reaches a state of perfection after a series of transformations (see *ibid.*, pp. 110 ff; see also Daniel Cook, *Leibniz's Use and Abuse of Judaism and Islam*, in M. Dascal and E. Yakira [eds], *Leibniz and Adam*, University Publishing Projects Ltd, Tel Aviv, 1993 [p. 283-97], p. 294 ; Bernardino Orio de Miguel, *Adam Kadmon: Conway, Leibniz and the Lurianic Kabbalah*, in *op. cit.*, [p. 267-82] ; see, on the concept of tikkun olam, at the origin of ecology, <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2016/08/19/isis-1/>, note 480).

(175) Constance E. Plumpre, *General Sketch of the History of Pantheism*, vol. 2, Samuel Deacon and Co, London, p. 207.

(176) J. B. Bury, p. 50: "Cartesianism asserts the two positive axioms of the supremacy of reason and the invariability of the laws of nature; and its instrument is a new method of rigorous analysis, applicable to history as well as to physical knowledge. The two axioms in question had destructive corollaries. The immutability of the processes of nature came up against the theory of a Active providence. The supremacy of reason shook the thrones (of) (...) authority and (of) tradition. Cartesianism was the equivalent of a declaration of human independence" (*ibid.*).

(177) *Ibid.*

(178) Jules Delvaille, *op. cit.* p. 225.

(179) Mme Louis Vismara, *La croyance au surnaturel et son influence sur le progrès social: essai historique et religieux*, Delhomme et Briguët, Paris et Lyon, 1896, p. 384.

(180) It was in the seventeenth century that a distinction began to be made between alchemy and chemistry, and it was made by the alchemists themselves, but it "does not correspond at all to the opposition that prevails today". Bernard Joly's thesis, *À propos d'une prétendue distinction entre la chimie et l'alchimie au xviiiè siècle: Questions d'histoire et de méthode*. In *Revue d'histoire des sciences* 2007, t. 60, no. 1 [p. 167-84], a very well-founded thesis that will set off a storm in the glass of water of the "alchemy" movement.

Some historians," he writes, "have believed (...) to see the beginnings of a rationalisation of alchemy in the frequent condemnations of the frauds of the alchemists in alchemical texts. Some historians," he writes, "have thought (...) to see the beginnings of a rationalisation of alchemy in the frequent condemnations of the frauds of the alchemists in the alchemical texts themselves, and thus the first attempts to gain access to what we call chemistry. In reality, it was a question of

For the alchemists, it was simply a matter of distinguishing between the craftsmen, who were ignorant of the doctrine and could only be charlatans and fraudsters, and the serious alchemists, whose practice was simply the implementation of a theory studied through the reading of numerous treatises which, handwritten and then printed, were constantly circulating throughout learned Europe" (id., *Profession médicale et savoir alchimique: luttes et enjeux du Moyen Age au XVIIIe siècle*. In *Spirale. Revue de recherches en éducation*, no. 13, 1994. *L'université et les savoirs professionnels* [p. 17-42], p. 23-4). Many people in this

From the twelfth century, when Robert of Chester introduced the term 'alchemia' into medieval Latin (see main text), to the eighteenth century, when it began to be discredited (see *supra*, note 163).

(181) Bernard Joly, *op. cit.* p. 28.

(182) Saint-René Taillandier, *op. cit.* p. 73.

(183) Jules Delvaille, *op. cit.* p. 226.

(184) *Œuvres complètes de Malebranche*, published by MM de Genoude et de Lourdoueix, t. 2, Paris, 1837, p. 63.

(185) Quoted in Jules Delvaille, *op. cit.* p. 228.

(186) J. B. Bury, *op. cit.* p. 91.

(187) For Fontenelle, "... compared with that of the Ancients, our thought is not only, from a strictly quantitative point of view, more complete, in that it can take advantage of what they have already achieved and add its own contributions, but it is also, from a qualitative point of view this time, stronger, more complex, in that it requires more effort, which also supposes that it has
This is not to say that our mind is any different from that of the Ancients, at least in terms of its natural disposition. For, let us not forget, our spirit is in no way different from that of the Ancients, at least in substance, i.e. reduced to its natural dispositions, which in no way prejudices the way in which these dispositions are actualised, which is a matter, not of nature, but of culture. In fact, this strengthening of our spiritual activity in relation to that of the Ancients is not due to nature alone, i.e. it did not happen automatically. It is the result of work that was in no way predetermined in its conditions. The Ancients, somewhat haphazardly, tried out systems of thought that they derived from nothing and for which they had no criteria of comparison. The Ancients, somewhat haphazardly, tried out systems of thought that they drew from nothing and for the evaluation of which they had no criteria of comparison: those who succeeded them had the task of rectifying these systems by comparing them with others, which made it possible to improve them little by little" (Study group "Philosophy in the broad sense". Led by Pierre Macherey, Fontenelle et la Querelle des Anciens et des Modernes, 04/01/2006).

(188) This word was coined by the Abbé de Saint Pierre in the following sentence: "The spirit of true religion and the principal aim of the Gospel is beneficence, that is to say, the practice of charity towards one's neighbour".

"(quoted in *Journal de la langue française*, grammatical, didactic and literary, vol. 4, 1829, Paris, p. 216).

(189) J. B. Bury, op. cit. p. 98.

(190) In this Cartesian and utilitarian writer and diplomat, Sand saw a precursor of revolutionary ideology, of Saint-Simonian ideas (in fact, Saint-Simon often quoted him) and of humanitarianism.

(191) J. B. Bury, op. cit. p. 102.

(192) See Henri de Ferron, op. cit. p. 255 et seq.

(193) *Ibid*, p. 258.

(194) Jules Delvaille, op. cit. p. 402-3.

(195) J. B. Bury, op. cit. p. 109.

(196) See *supra*, note 63.

(197) Christoph Schulte, *Ẓimzum* in the Works of Schelling In *Iyyun: The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly*, no. 41, January 1992 [pp. 21-40]; Agata Bielik-Robson, *God of Luria, Hegel, Schelling: The Divine Contraction and the Modern Metaphysics of Finitude*, in David Lewin, Simon D. Podmore and Duane Williams (eds.), *Mystical Theology and Continental Philosophy: Interchange in the Wake of God*, in *The Jerusalem Philosophical Quarterly*, no. 41, January 1992 [pp. 21-40]. Podmore and Duane Williams (eds.), *Mystical Theology and Continental Philosophy: Interchange in the Wake of God*, Routledge, London and New York, 2017 [pp. 30-52]; S. J. McGrath, *Boehme, Hegel, Schelling, and the Hermetic theology of evil*. In *Philosophy and Theology*, vol. 18, no. 2, 2006 [pp. 257-26]; Joseph B. Maier, Judith Marcus and Zoltan Tarr, *German Jewry: Its History and Sociology: Selected Essays by Werner J. Cahman*, Transactions Publishers, New Brunswick and Oxford, 1989, pp. 228 ff; Glenn Alexander Magee, *Hegel and the Hermetic Tradition*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2001.

(198) Chr. Bartholmess, *Giordano Bruno et la philosophie au XVIe siècle*, *Revue des deux mondes*, vol. 18, XVIIe année, nouv. série, 1847, Paris, p. 1085.

(199) Jean-Joseph Thonissen, op. cit. p. 160-2.

(200) Guillaume De Greef, op. cit. p. 172.

(201) *Ibid*, p. 171.

(202) Johann Gottfried Herder, *Philosophie de l'histoire de l'humanité*, vol. 2, new edition, A. Lacroix et Cie, Paris, 1874, p. 84. For the Orphic image of the golden chain, see <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2018/06/29/chevaucher-le-bouc/>.

(203) Jean-Joseph Thonissen, op. cit. p. 156-7.

(204) Ibid, p. 165.

(205) E. Caro, The two Germanys. - Madame de Staël and Henri Heine. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 2nd period, t. 96, 1871 [p. 5-20], p. 16.

(206) Simone Goyard-Fabre, L'interminable querelle du contrat social, Éditions de l'Université d'Ottawa, 1983, p. 292; see also Guy Thuillier, Une philosophie de l'Administration : Hegel. In *La Revue administrative*, 8e Année, n° 45, mai-juin 1955 [p. 276-279].

(207) Quoted in Émile Aollas, Philosophie de la science politique, A. Marescq Aîné, Paris, 1877, p. 348.

(208) According to Hegel, "(t)he consciousness of a people is not transmitted to the individual as a r e a d y - m a d e lesson, but is formed by him: the individual exists in this substance. This general substance is not the course of the world; on the contrary, the world is powerless against it. No individual can go beyond the limits assigned to him by this substance. He may distinguish himself from other individuals, but not from the Spirit of his people. He may be more intelligent than others, but he cannot surpass the Spirit of his people. Only those who are aware of the Spirit of their people and conform to it are intelligent. They are the great men of this people and they lead it according to the general Spirit. Individuals disappear for us, and have value only insofar as they have achieved what the Spirit of the people demands. In the philosophical consideration of history, we must avoid expressions like: this State would not have collapsed if there had been a man who etc... Individuals disappear before the substantiality of the whole, which forms the individuals it needs. Individuals do not prevent what must happen from happening" (emphasis added) (quoted in W. Biemels et al, *Qu'est-ce que l'homme? : Hommages à Alphonse de Waelhens [1911-1981]*, Publications des Facultés universitaires Saint Louis, Brussels, 1982, p. 237).

(209) J. B. Bury, p. 113, p. 114.

(210) Memoirs of the time bear witness to the spread of education. "Doesn't Abbé Dubos also say that, from the first years of the eighteenth century, there was not a lackey who did not know how to read and write? Even women, somewhat out of pedantry and preciosity, applied scientific concepts to the most practical things, and translated their feelings into terms of abstract science. Some of them will even support theses on Newton's philosophy; and society is no longer frivolous, assimilate philosophical problems; salon life will not be incompatible with the progress of reason; on the contrary, one will help this progress while frequenting theatres, concerts and social gatherings: one will know how to mix enlightenment with a life of pleasure" (Garet, *Mémoires historiques* t. 1, p. 3 et seq).

(211) Guillaume De Greef, op. cit. p. 171.

(212) The term "obscurantism" did not appear until 1819.

(213) François Quastana and Pierre Serna, *Le républicanisme anglais dans la France des Lumières et de la Révolution : mesure d'une présence*, *La Révolution française* [Online], 5, 2013, online: 31

December 2013, accessed on 10 October 2020. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/lrf/984> ; DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/lrf.984>.

(214) In frail health, like Spinoza, Toland died on 10 March 1722 in London, where he had been living since leaving Ireland. "He died (...) as he had lived, in great poverty, among his books, pen in hand" (The Encyclopaedia Britannica: Latest Edition. A Dictionary of Arts, Sciences and General Literature, vol. 26, A. Constable, 1911, p. 1049). His "great poverty" did not prevent him from travelling around Europe from 1707 to 1710, particularly Germany and Holland, where he made the acquaintance of Eugène de Savoie, commander of the Habsburg armies, whose "generosity was not in vain"... (Jacques André Naigeon Encyclopédie méthodique, t. 3, Paris, 1791, p. 656). Eugène de Savoie's right-hand man, Baron von Hohendorff, commissioned Toland to acquire works to add to (Stephen H. Daniel, John Toland: His Methods, Manners, and Mind, McGill-Queen's University Press, Kingston and Montreal, 1984, p. 11) the Prince's collection of rare and clandestine books, whose library was in Vienna, to which Toland was invited. The man who had facilitated Toland's travels in northern and central Europe was the politician Robert Harley (1661-1724) who, having begun his career with the Whigs, had found it more advantageous to switch to the Tories. Appointed Secretary of State in Queen Anne's government in 1704, he reorganised the British secret service in his own way. For Harley, espionage meant much more than clandestine intelligence gathering. It also involved monitoring public opinion and trying to shape it. The two men who best embodied his ideal were the writer Daniel Defoe (1660-1731) and, specifically, John Toland. In 1701, Great Britain had gone to war against Louis XIV to curb the political ambitions of the French king; Harley was a leading member of the ruling coalition government; in 1705, Toland, a warmonger, had offered him his services, travelling to Germany to act for him "not as a minister or a spy", but as an observer (J. G. Simms, War and Politics in Ireland, 1649-1730, edited by D. W. Hayton and Gerard O'Brien, The Hambledon Press, London and Ronceverte, p. 40). Harley declined his offer, but employed him as a propagandist. Around 1707, however, Harley, now Secretary of State, appointed Toland to spy on British government envoys to the courts of Hanover, Berlin and Ronceverte. of Düsseldorf (Sir John H. Davis, Robert Harley as Secretary of State, 1704-1708, The University of Chicago Libraries, Chicago, IL, 1934). When Harley was dismissed the following year, Toland did not complete his mission and did not report back. In 1710, after Anne had overthrown his Whig cabinet and replaced it with a Tory ministry, Harley was made Chancellor of the Exchequer and Chairman of the Treasury Commission, and Toland contacted him again to offer his services (Michael Brown, A Political Biography of John Toland, 2015, Routledge, London and New York, 2011, p. 114). Harley took no further action and put him up in his country house at Epsom (Albert Lantoiné, Un précurseur de la Franc-Maçonnerie : John Toland, 1670-1722 : suivi de la traduction française du Pantheisticon de John Toland, Librairie critique Émile Nourry, 1927, p. 41). Given that Toland, despite his unconditional support for the Whigs, lent his support for several years to the policy of a Tory who had abandoned the Whigs to join the opposing party, it would be reasonable to suppose that he may have been a double agent: there is nothing to confirm this, either in his correspondence or in his papers. The ideological gap between the parties was already being bridged by the unflinching opportunism of their members, which could explain many apparently unnatural alliances.

- (215) See Wayne Hudson, *The English Deists: Studies in Early Enlightenment*, Routledge, 2016 [2009], p. 82.
- (216) Ian Leask, *Unholy Force: Toland's Leibnizian 'Consummation' of Spinozism*. In *British Journal for the History of Philosophy*, vol. 20, no. 3, 2012 [pp. 499-537].
- (217) The Newtonian mathematician Joseph Raphson (c. 1648-c. 1715) had used the terms 'pantheonum nomen' and 'pantheismus' in *De spatio reali, seu ente infinito Conamen Mathematico-Metaphysicum* (1702), but Toland was the first to use the term 'pantheism' (Mara van der Lugt, *The True Toland? Inquiry Into the Religious Writings of an Irreligious Mind*, p. 84, note 101, 2010, available at https://www.academia.edu/2086323/The_True_Toland_Inquiry_Into_the_Religious_Writings_of_an_Irreligious_Mind, accessed 25 January 2019).
- (218) J. T. Gilbert, *History of the City of Dublin*, vol. 3, Dublin, 1861, p. 66.
- (219) Quoted in Albert Lantoine, *Un précurseur de la Franc-Maçonnerie : John Toland, 1670-1722 : suivi de la traduction française du Pantheisticon de John Toland*, Librairie critique Émile Nourry, 1927, p. 202.
- (220) See John Toland, *Pantheisticon: A Modern English Translation*, translated by Jason Cooper, Open Archive Books, 2014.
- (221) See Mara van der Lugt, 'I will utter dark sayings of old': John Toland, pantheism and pathos of secrecy, 2010, available at https://www.academia.edu/2642502/I_will_utter_dark_sayings_of_old_John_Toland_pantheism_and_pathos_of_secrecy, accessed 25 January 2019.
- (222) *Ibid.* In fact, only a few dozen copies of the *Pantheisticon* were printed, which Toland distributed underhand to his freethinking friends.
- (223) N. Deschamps, *Les sociétés secrètes et la société, ou Philosophie de l'histoire contemporaine*, t. 1, Seguin Aîné, Avignon, 1874, p. 453.
- (224) Quoted in Mara van der Lugt, *op. cit.*
- (225) Albert Lantoine, *op. cit.* p. 247.
- (226) Jacques le Brun, *Le père Pierre Lalemant et les débuts de l'Académie Lamoignon*. In *Revue d'histoire littéraire de la France*, 61e année, n° 2, avril-juin 1961, Armand Colin, p. 166.
- (227) Miguel Benítez, *La face cachée des Lumières: recherches sur les manuscrits philosophiques clandestins de l'âge classique*, Universitas, 1996, p. 192.
- (228) Margaret C. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans*. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 155, quoted in Thomas Duddy, *A History of Irish Thought*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 96.

(229) Myriam-Isabelel Ducrocq, 1649 En Angleterre : La République à inventer, available at: https://www.academia.edu/17613407/1649_EN_ANGLETERRRE_LA_RÉPUBLIQUE_À_INVENTER, accessed on 20 December 2018.

(230) Stephen H. Daniel, *op. cit.* p. 214.

(231) *Ibid.*, p. 218. The minutes of the meeting, found in Toland's papers, do not mention his name, but the description given of the meeting is very similar to Toland's descriptions of the pantheist gatherings he attended. While it is impossible to determine whether or not the society was founded under his auspices, there is no doubt that before 1711 Toland made at least one visit to the Netherlands, where he studied at the University of Leyden and came into contact with Charles Levier (Philip McGuinness, Alan Harrison, Richard Kearney [eds.] *John Toland's Christianity not mysterious: text, associated works and critical essays*, Lilliput Press, 1997, p. 272) and, most likely, other future members of the Knights of Jubilation.

(232) Margaret C. Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment: Freemasonry and Politics in Eighteenth-Century Europe*, Oxford University Press, London and New York, 1993, p. 93.

(233) Christophe de Brouwer, *La Loge Française*, 2 May 2017, <http://sifodierisinvencies.overblog.com/2017/05/la-loge-francoise.html>.

(234) On Toland's links with the network of Charles Levier, the Huguenot publisher who first published the sulphurous *Traité des Trois Imposteurs* under the title *La vie et l'esprit de Spinoza* (1719), see Michael Brown, *op. cit.* p. 95; see also Rachel Hammersley, *The English Republican Tradition and Eighteenth-Century France*, Manchester University Press, Manchester, 2013, p. 38 ff. See also Justin A. I. Champion, *Toland and the Traité des trois imposteurs c. 1709-1718*. In *International Archives of the History of Ideas*, vol. 148, 1990 [p. 333-356] and Patrick Marcolini, *Le De Tribus Impostoribus et les Origines arabes de l'athéisme philosophique européen*. In *Les Cahiers de l'ATP*, October 2003. The *Treatise on the Three Impostors* presents Moses, Jesus and Mohammed as impostors who seduced the people with lies and false miracles. "Stigmatising the foundations of Christianity in the name of natural religion, this text vituperates Moses, Jesus and Mohammed as the most dangerous impostors history has ever known. In particular, they are accused of having fooled mankind for centuries into believing that divine judgement was beyond the reach of the human mind. This lie was all the more necessary as the survival of the Churches and monarchies depended on it. Moses and Jesus, the authors' favourite targets, are denounced, one as a Machiavellian 'magician' who took duplicitous advantage of the Hebrews' incredulity, the other as a 'miracle-worker' and a 'corrupter of republics'. The *Treatise* therefore advocates a general revolution of the mind: substituting the religion of knowledge for that of fear, the main support of these two tyrannies, and recognising the materiality of the soul and that other god, nature" (Ran Halévi, *Les origines des Lumières : un nouveau regard ?* In *Annales. Économies, sociétés, civilisations*, 37^e année, no. 3, 1982 [pp. 489-92], p. 490). The *Treatise* was criticised by Voltaire for being "rather insipid"; he even wrote a poem *A l'auteur du Livre des Trois Imposteurs* (1769), in which he lists what he considers to be the benefits of deism over

atheism (see Pierre Retat, *Traité des trois imposteurs : manuscrit clandestin du début du XVIII^e siècle*, Universités de la Région Rhône-Alpes, Saint-Étienne, 1973 [1st ed. 1777]).

(235) While on the Continent Walpole manipulated the radical republicans of the Society of the Knights of Jubilation to counter the Jacobites, in England he persecuted the former (see Ran Halévi, *op. cit.*, p. 490).

(236) Margaret C. Jacob, *The Newtonians and the English Revolution, 1689-1720*, Gordon and Breach, 1990, pp. 206-7; 217-31; see, on the Hermetic and Brunian aspects of Toland's thought and that of the Society of the Knights of Jubilation, Chiara Giuntini, *Panteismo e ideologia repubblicana: John Toland, Il Mulino*, Bologna, 1979; id, Toland e Bruno: ermetismo rivoluzionario? In *Rivista di filosofia*, no. 66, 1975, p. 199; Giancarlo Carabelli, *Tolandiana: materiali bibliografici per lo studio dell'opera e della fortuna di John Toland (1670-1722)*, La Nuova Italia Editrice, Florence, 1975.

(237) Apart from the similarity between the rituals (see *Allgemeines Handbuch der Freimaurerei*, s. v. *Pantheistische Bruderschaft*, t. 2: M-Z, Max Hesse's Verlag, 1901, p. 525), the statutes and regulations of the Knights and those of Freemasonry, officially founded in 1717, it is precisely the fact that the Knights of Jubilation was at the time one of the very few associations to use concurrently that has led some (Margaret C. Jacob, *op. cit.*, p. 91) to claim that the Society of the Knights of Jubilation was a precursor of the Masonic lodges. This thesis is supported by the fact that Toland "was not a Mason but (...) had many 'antiquarian' friends (...) who were" (*La Lettre clandestine n° 16. Voltaire et les manuscrits philosophiques clandestins*, PUPS, Paris, 2008, p. 275, note 38) were opposed by arguments (Christiane Berkvens-Stevenlinck, *Cénacles libertins ou premières loges? Les débuts de la franc-maçonnerie hollandaise*. In *Dix-huitième Siècle*, n° 29, 1997. *Le vin*, [p. 303-13] ; idem, *Les Chevaliers de la Jubilation : Maçonnerie ou Libertinage ? A propos de quelques publications de Margaret C. Jacob*. In *Quaerando*, vol. 13, no. 2, 1983 [pp. 124-48]), particularly the assertion that the bawdy libertinism that characterised the meetings of the Knights of Jubilation was the antithesis of the Masonic spirit, shows a lack of understanding of lodge life in the eighteenth century. In France, "the libertine spirit (reigned) in most French lodges at the end of the 18th century" (*Historia, Francs-maçons : mythes et réalités*, 2015). Casanova bears witness to this when, in his memoirs, he recounts that "(i)t was in Lyon that a respectable personage, whose acquaintance I made at M. de Rochebaron's, obtained for me the grace of being admitted to participate in the sublime trifles of Freemasonry. Having arrived in Paris as an apprentice, a few months later I became a companion and master (...) A well-born young man who wants to travel and get to know the world and what is called the great world, who does not want to find himself in certain cases the inferior of his equals and to be excluded from taking part in all their pleasures, must be initiated into what is called Freemasonry, even if it is only to know, even superficially, what it is" (*Memoirs of Jacques Casanova de Seingalt*, t. 1, Paulin, Paris, 1843, p. 541). As far as England was concerned, from the first months after the foundation of the Grand Lodge of London in 1717, there was evidence that Freemasons indulged unrestrainedly in the pleasures of the flesh (David A. Shugarts, *Secrets of the Widow's Son: The Real History Behind the Lost Symbol*, Orion Books Limited, 2006, p. 63). The same was true of the Netherlands. The Council of Holland, Zeeland and Friesland, on 12 December 1735, issued a proclamation on the subject of Freemasonry, in which it was emphasised that "it is not necessary to

in no way suppose that the study of architecture is the sole and principal object of its meetings" (*Ars Quatuor Coronatorum: Being the Transactions of the Quatuor Coronati Lodge No. 2076*, vol. 44, W. J. Parre H, Limited, London, 1934, p. 68).

In fact, the existence of proto-Masonic lodges is attested long before the creation of the Society of the Knights of Jubilation. In his *Natural History of Staffordshire* (Oxford, 1686, p. 316), Robert Plot mentions a society of Freemasons, whose admission ceremony consists "chiefly in communicating certain secret signs, by which they recognize each other throughout the Nation"; in his *Natural History of Wiltshire* (p. 277), written between 1656 and 1691, John Aubrey states that on the day after Rogation Sunday in 1691 a convent of adopted Masons would meet at St Paul's Church (see, for further references to proto-Masonic societies, James Orchard Halliwell-Phillipps, *The Early History of Freemasonry in England*, 2nd ed, John Russell Smith, London, 1844).

(238) Ran Halévi, op. cit. pp. 489-92.

(239) Ibid, p. 491. See also Gilles Bancarel and Gianluigi Goggi, *Raynal, de la polémique à l'histoire*, Voltaire Foundation, 2000, p. 2; Margaret Hunt, *Women and the Enlightenment*, Psychology Press, 1984, p. 74. Rousset de Missy took the lead in this movement even though he was in the service of Willem Bentinck van Rhoon (1704-1774), a politician and diplomat who supported William IV of Orange-Nassau, for which he was immediately dismissed. Toland, on the other hand, was not a democrat and had no sympathy for the people. He "insisted that the word 'commonwealth' did not mean a form of democracy, or even a particular form of government, but 'an independent community, where the common good of all is conceived and pursued independently of the form (of government)' (...). It was perfectly possible for a monarchical government to produce the conditions of a 'free state', when regulated and limited" (quoted in Justin Champion, *Republican Learning: John Toland and the Crisis of Christian Culture, 1696-1722*, Manchester University Press, Manchester and New York, 2013, pp. 123, 124).

(240) *Journal et mémoires du Marquis d'Argenson*, t. 6, Mme Ve Jules Renouard, Paris, p. 464.

(241) See Christiane Berkvens-Stevelinck, *Un cabinet de livres européen en Hollande : La Bibliothèque* by Prosper Marchand, in Christiane Berkvens-Stevelinck, H. Bots, P. G. Hoftijzer and O. S. Lankhorst (eds.), *Le Magasin de L'Univers : The Dutch Republic as the Centre of the European*, E. J. Brill, Leiden, 1992 [p. 11-23].

(242) *Études sur le XVIIIe siècle*, vol. 14, Université libre de Bruxelles. Groupe d'étude du XVIIIe siècle, Éditions de l'Université de Bruxelles, 1974, p. 11.

(243) The manuscript of the *Pantheisticon* in the Bibliothèque municipale de Vire, one of the oldest and best preserved, bears the following annotation on the title page: "Jean Tolland, an English philosopher famous for the singularity and boldness of his systems, is the author of this work composed for a select company of the finest minds and the greatest Lords of the Court of London, where it was printed in 1720 in 8° in a volume of 90 pages in the house of the author, who had only fifty copies printed.

Copies of which he was paid 50 guineas each. The Earl of Stairs, English ambassador to the French Court, presented one of these copies to the Duke of Orleans, Regent of the Kingdom. It was on this copy (which is) the only one that was brought that a copy was made in the space of one night in 1720 on which this translation was made" (Pierre Lurbe, *op. cit.*, pp. 107-19. See also Miguel Benítez, *op. cit.* p 47). The manuscript is in Latin, the language in which the book was written. Part of it was translated into English and commented on in 1740 by Arthur Ashley Sykes, one of Toland's refuters, in *The Principles and Connexion of Natural and Revealed Religion Distinctly Considered*. It was translated in full into English in 1751, and into German in part in 1856 and in full in 1897. In the years following its publication in Latin, parts of the French translation circulated in print or manuscript, but it was not published in full in French until 1927 (Gianni Paganini, Margaret C. Jacob and John Christian Laursen (eds.), *Clandestine Philosophy: New Studies on Subversive Manuscripts in Early Modern Europe, 1620-1823*, The University of Toronto Press, 2020, p. 238, note 7). In fact, two French translations were published simultaneously, one in Belgium, the other in France, both by Freemasonic organisations (Pierre Lurbe, *John Toland et la pensée française*, in Paul Brennan and Michael O'Dea [eds.], *Entrelacs franco-irlandais. Langue, mémoire, imaginaire* [p. 107-19], PUC, Caen, 2004).

(244) John Toland, *Clidophorus*, translation by Tristan Dagron, Éditions Allia, 2002, p. 20.

(245) Pierre Lurbe, *op. cit.*

(246) *Ibid.*

(247) Edward Jay Watts, *City and School in Late Antique Athens and Alexandria. Hypatia and pagan philosophical culture in the later fourth century*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2006, p. 197-8.

(248) Alan Charles Kors, *The Age of Enlightenment*, in Stephen Bullivant and Michael Ruse (eds.), *The Oxford Handbook of Atheism*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013, p. 201.

(249) At least one of the French 'Enlightenment' knew Toland personally: Voltaire, who, according to Condorcet, one of his close friends, asserts that he was initiated into secret societies during his exile in England in 1726, where he made friends with the author of the *Pantheisticon* and with deists such as Tindal, Collins and Bolingbroke (N. Deschamps, *op. cit.* 6th edn, t. 2, entirely recast and continued up to the present day, Séguin Aîné et Oudin, Avignon, 1882, p. 16).

(250) Magalie Journot. *A Socratic theatre? An attempt to interpret the figure of Socrates in modern Western theatre: from sources to myth*. Littératures. Université Bourgogne Franche-Comté, 2017.

(251) Jean-Pierre Aubrit and Bernard Gendrel, *Literature: literary movements and schools*, Armand Collin, 2019.

(252) *Freemasonry and the Druids*, <http://freemasonry.bcy.ca/texts/druid.html>. Toland is said to have founded the Ancient Druid Order (ADO) in 1717.

(253) Margaret C. Jacob, *The Radical Enlightenment: Pantheists, Freemasons and Republicans*. George Allen and Unwin, London, 1981, p. 155, quoted in Thomas Duddy, *A History of Irish Thought*, Routledge, London and New York, 2002, p. 96.

(254) Margaret C. Jacob, *Living the Enlightenment...*, p. 78.

(255) Yowann Byghan, *Modern Druidism: An Introduction*, McFarland, 2018, p. 89 ff.

(256) In 1773, the rite of the Philalètes or Philalèthes, a mixture of the dogmas of Swedenborg and Pasqualis, was founded in the Amis-Réunis lodge in Paris by Savalette de Langes, guard of the royal treasury, the physiocrat and liberal Protestant Court de Gébelin, the financier de Saint-James, the Viscount de Tavannes, the President d'Héricourt and the Prince of Hesse (Jean-Emmanuel-Hector Le Cousteulx de Canteleu, *Les sectes et sociétés secrètes politiques et religieuses*, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1863, p. 14). Among its one hundred and thirty members were Condorcet (see note 280 below) and Mirabeau, who, according to Robison (*Preuves de conspirations*, translated from the English after the third edition, London, 1793, pp. 64-5), "took great pains to (...) get the Irish philosopher's work - the Pantheisticon - adopted" by the sect. Twelve years later, on 15 February 1785, at a general convent convened in Paris by the Lodge of United Friends, "the French Revolution and its propagation throughout Europe were resolved, and regicide was decided upon as a means of execution. The following year, this point was clarified in a more secret meeting continuing that of Paris" (V. Davin [abbé], *Les Jansénistes politiques et la franc- maçonnerie : Didier (Bossuet) 1699-1700 : d'après des documents inédits de la bibliothèque vaticane et de la bibliothèque des Minimes de la Trinité-des-Monts: La Loge de la candeur, 1775-1783, d'après le registre de la Loge*, A. Denti, Paris, s.d., p. 104).

"Philalèthe" means "friend of truth", and this is precisely how Toland presented himself in the warning to the Pantheisticon: "Lectori Philomuso et philalethi Janus-Junius Eoganesius", possibly in homage to Eyrenaei Philalethes (G. P., *Le Journal des sçavans*, t. 6, Amsterdam, 1678), p. 474-5; other hermetic treatises were published at the time under the names Philaletha or Philalethes and the first names Irenaeus, Cyrenaeus or Eyrenacus [*Dictionnaire des sciences médicales : biographie médicale*, vol. 7, Panckoucke, Paris, 1825, p. 406]; see, for an exhaustive list of these variants,

<http://onlinebooks.library.upenn.edu/webbin/book/browse?type=atitle&key=Philalethes%2C%20Eirenaeus&c=x>. Eyrenaei Philalethes, "natu Angli, habitatione cosmopolitae", is the pseudonym under which a hermetic treatise entitled *Enarratio methodica trium Gebri medicinarum*, etc. was published in 1678, reproducing the alchemical treatise *Le Testament de Raymond Lulle* (Antoine-Joseph

Pernety, *Les fables égyptiennes et grecques dévoilées & réduites au même*, vol. 2, Paris, 1786, p. 421).

For some, the pseudonym Eyrenaei Philalethes was a hidden name (Jennifer Speake, Vaughan, Thomas, in *Oxford Dictionary of National Biography*, Oxford University Press, 2004,

<http://www.oxforddnb.com/view/article/28148>; Alan Rudrum, Vaughan, Henry, *The Brill Dictionary of Gnosis and Western Esotericism*. t. II, Brill, Leyden, 2005, p. 1157-9) the Welsh pastor, philosopher and alchemist Thomas Vaughan (1621-1666) or, for others (William R. Newman and Lawrence M. Principe, *Alchemy Tried in the Fire: Starkey, Boyle, and the Fate of Helmontian Chemistry*, University of Chicago, Chicago, 2002) the English physician and alchemist George Starkey (1628-1665), a native of Bermuda who

emigrated to London in 1650 to work with the Irish physicist and chemist Robert Boyle (1627- 1691) on the chemical and physical aspects of the Great Work (Henrik Bogdan, *Western Esotericism Rituals of Initiation*, State University of New York Press, Albany, 2007, p. 118; Peter Levenda, *The Tantric Alchemist. Thomas Vaughan and the Indian Tantric Tradition*, This Press, Lake Worth, FL, 2015, <http://avalonlibrary.net/ebooks/Peter%20Levenda%20-%20The%20Tantric%20Alchemist%20-%20Thomas%20Vaughan%20and%20the%20Indian%20Tantric%20Tradition.pdf>), who argue that the *Enarratio methodica trium Gebri medicinarum* deals with the composition of the elixir of long life and the universal panacea, where as Vaughan's alchemical writings emphasise the philosophical and mystical dimension of alchemy.) The treatise was of particular interest to Isaac Newton (Jean Zafiropulo and Catherine Monod, *Il 'Sensorium Dei' dans l'hermétisme et la science*, Les Belles lettres, 1976, p. 63).

Other seventeenth-century authors took the pseudonym Philalethes: Henry More (1614-1687), English cabalist philosopher (Gershom Scholem, *Kabbalistes chrétiens*, Albin Michel, 1979, p. 104) of the Platonic school of Cambridge and friend of Franciscus Mercurius van Helmont (1618-1699), son of the famous Dutch physician Batista van Helmont, the first to use the term "Christian Kabbalah" (Jean-Christophe Attias, David Banon, Esther Benbassa, Dominique Bourel et al, edited by Esther Benbassa and Pierre Gisel, with the collaboration of Lucie Kaennel, *L'Europe et les juifs*, Labor et Fides, Geneva, 2002, p. 75); Lewis Du Moulin, (1606-1680), a French Huguenot physicist who emigrated from Holland, where he taught at the University of Leyden, to England, where he became Professor of History at Oxford University and befriended Milton (David Masson, *The Life of John Milton and History of his Time*, 1654-1660, vol. 5, Macmillan and Co, 1977, p. 216); the Italian heretic physician and alchemist Girolamo Donzellini (c. 1513-1587) (Leandro Perini, *La vita e i tempi di Pietro Perna*, Edizioni di storia e letteratura, Rome, 2002, pp. 68, 84, 157, 239); the Jesuit and professor of philosophy and theology at the University of Douai Jacques Platelle (1698-1684), author, under the pseudonym of Germanus Philalethes Eupistinus, of a work that was accused of Molinism; George Hornius (1620-1670), professor of history at Leyden, where, after being non-sexually abused by an alchemist, he sank into madness (<http://words.fromoldbooks.org/Chalmers-Biography/h/hornius-george.html>); James Jurin (1684-1750), an English scientist and physician known for having carried out the first vaccination trials against smallpox and who was an ardent supporter of Isaac Newton's work; and, if it is true that it was he who translated, under the title of *Long Livers: A curious History of Such persons of both Sexes who have liv'd several Ages and grown Young again : With the Rare Secret of rejuvenescency of Arnoldus de Villa Nova*, And a great many approv'd and invaluable Rules to prolong Life : as also, how to Prepare the Universal Medecine (1722), *Histoire des personnes qui ont vécu plusieurs siècles et qui ont rejjeuni, avec le secret du rajeunissement, tiré d'Arnauld de Villeneuve, par Harcouet de Longeville* (Paris, 1715) (Arnauld de Villeneuve [1245-1313] was a French theologian, physician and alchemist. Harcouet de Longeville [1660-1720] was a French clergyman versed in alchemy who became a lawyer), Robert Samber (1682-c. 1745), translator of Charles Perrault's *Histoires ou contes du temps passé* (see, for evidence that he was indeed the translator of *Histoire des personnes*, under the pseudonym Eugenius Philalethes, Peter Kebell, *The Changing Face of English Freemasonry*,

1640-1740, unpublished thesis, University of Bristol, 2009, p. 95; note 261, <https://research-information.bristol.ac.uk/files/34504807/509580.pdf>; <https://www.hiram.be/blog/2019/01/25/qui-etait-robert-samber/>; see also, still on the subject of "Philalèthe", Louis Figuier, *L'alchimie et les alchimistes*, Victor Lecou, Paris, 1854, chap. VI).

The Rosicrucian-inspired preface to *Long Livers* (Denys Roman, René Guénon et les destins de la franc-maçonnerie, Éditions de l'Œuvre, 1982, p. 65) was addressed "To the Grand Master, Masters, Wardens and Brethren of the Most Ancient and Honourable Fraternity of Free Masons of Great Britain and Ireland" and had a certain impact in British Masonic circles. A few months after the publication of *Long Livers*, Anderson's *Constitutions* (1723) appeared.

As the aim of Savalette de Langes and his Philalètes (or Philalèthes) was, in addition to the decapitation of the king, the regeneration, not only moral but also physical, of man (Auguste-François Lecanu [abbé], *Dictionnaire des prophéties et des miracles*, t. 1, J. -P Migne, 1852, p. 864), it was natural that they should take as the name of their sect a pseudonym favoured by many alchemists.

(257) Pierre Lurbe, op. cit. p. 115.

(258) Uan Leask, *Only natural: John Toland and the Jewish question*. In *Intellectual History Review*, vol. 28, no. 4, 2018 [pp. 515-28]; Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *The Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution: The Making of Modern Universalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2005, pp. 62 ff. On the subject of Abbé Grégoire's affiliation with Freemasonry, see Rita Hermon-Belot, *L'abbé Grégoire, la politique et la vérité*, Le Seuil, 2000, p. 43), Alyssa Goldstein Sepinwall, *The Abbé Grégoire and the French Revolution: The Making of Modern Universalism*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2005, p. 251, note 36. As regards the decisive influence of the lodges in the emancipation of Jews in France, which was not viewed favourably by some of them, see Patrick Girard, *Les Juifs de France de 1789 à 1860 : De l'émancipation à l'égalité*, Calmann-Lévy, Paris, 1976; Abel Clarin de la Rive, *Les Juifs dans la Franc-Maçonnerie*, Pierret, Paris, 1895, who publishes the discussions that took place on this subject at the lodge.

the National Assembly.

(259) Pierre Lurbe, *Matière, nature, mouvement chez d'Holbach et Toland*. In *Dix-huitième Siècle*, n° 24, 1992. *Le matérialisme des Lumières* [p. 53-62], p. 54.

(260) *Lettres philosophiques sur l'origine des préjugés : du dogme de l'immortalité de l'âme, de l'idolâtrie & de la superstition ; sur le système de Spinoza & sur l'origine du mouvement dans la matière*, translated from English by J. Toland, Marc-Michel Rey, London, 1768, p. 215.

(261) Quoted in Pierre Lurbe, op. cit. Of course, without Toland, no one would ever have realised that "everything is movement in the universe".

(262) Charles Renouvier, *Esquisse d'une classification systématique des doctrines philosophiques*, vol. 1, *Au Bureau de la critique philosophique*, 1885, p. 221.

(263) Entretien entre d'Alembert et Diderot, Texte établi par J. Assézat et M. Tourneux, Garnier, Œuvres complètes de Diderot, vol. II, p. 137-8.

(264) "... for nothing is created, either in the operations of art or in those of nature, and we can posit in principle that, in any operation, there is an equal quantity of matter before and after the operation; that the quality and quantity of the principles is the same, and that there are only changes and modifications" (Antoine Lavoisier, *Traité élémentaire de chimie*, 2nd ed, t. 1, 1793, p. 140-1), a formula better known in its popularised form: "nothing is lost, nothing is created, everything is transformed", which should be compared with that of Anaxagoras: "Nothing is born or perishes, but things that already exist combine, then separate again" (Auguste Morel, *Histoire de la sagesse et du goût*, Paris, 1864, p. 151).

(265) Henri Bergson, *Écrits et paroles : 1878-1904*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1957, p. 41.

(266) R. Dujarric de la Rivière, *Lavoisier économiste*, Masson & Cie, Librairie Pion, Paris, 1949; Fernand Paitre, *Diderot biologiste*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1971, p. 85.

(267) See Ernest Haeckel, *Le monisme, lien entre la religion et la science: profession de foi d'un naturaliste*, preface and translation by G. Vacher de Lapouge, Schleicher frères, Paris, 1897, p. 16.

(268) *Ibid*, p. 16.

(269) Martin S. Staum, *Cabanis: Enlightenment and Medical Philosophy in the French Revolution*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 28. Cabanis belonged to the Neuf Sœurs lodge, where he was raised to the rank of Master (M. L. - Théodore Juge [ed.], *Globe: archives générales des sociétés secrètes non politiques*, Paris, 1830, p. 428).

(270) Transformism has been wrongly attributed to Lamarck. "Numerous works on the history of transformism or evolutionism have brought to light the partial ideas that preceded the emergence of a truly general theory of the transformation of species. What Jacques Roger has called 'restricted transformism' developed mainly in the eighteenth century, among authors such as Benoît de Maillet, Buffon, Diderot, Robinet, Bonnet and Maupertuis. However, it is generally agreed that Lamarck invented the first general theory of transformism, in texts written between 1800 and 1809, half a century before the success of the Darwinian theory of natural selection (1859). However, the first general theory of the transformation of species was not written by Lamarck, but by Rétif de la Bretonne (1734-1806), a completely unknown author in the history of evolutionary theories. Rétif formalised this first general theory a few years before Lamarck, in a theoretical text of 1796, *Physique*, which takes up and completes the ideas of his 'physical novel', a utopian and scientific fiction entitled *La découverte australe* and published in 1781" (Laurent Loty, *L'invention du transformisme par Rétif de la Bretonne* [1781 & 1796]. In *Alliage*, No. 70, July 2012, online 26 September 2012, URL: <http://revel.unice.fr/alliage/index.html?id=4055>, p. 1). "Among Enlightenment writers, Rétif demonstrates, even more than any other, a hypersensitivity to temporality. In a period that favoured encyclopaedism, he was also one of the most undisciplined and imaginative polygraphers. Rétif is the author of one of the most remarkable autobiographies,

Monsieur Nicolas (1796-97), which tells the story of an exceptional career: the son of a well-off peasant, he went to boarding school at a Jansenist school, became a typographer, a printer and then, in Paris, the author of more than two hundred works. His obsession with the passage of time led him to engrave dates on stones, which he transcribed in his autobiography, and to celebrate anniversaries of anniversaries.

As an observer of self-transformation, Rétif was also interested in the evolution of peasant and urban society. In *Le paysan perversi* (1775), he analysed the effects of the rural exodus. Before Balzac, he investigated Parisian mores and took as his model Buffon's history of animal mores, which had envisaged the degeneration of certain species in response to a change in the environment. Lastly, Rétif was the author of numerous utopian fictions, in which the imagination of a political transformation of society could contribute to the theorisation of a transformation of nature. He wrote the first anticipatory utopia set in a history rethought on the basis of the revolutionary rupture (*L'an 2000*, 1789). He invented the neologism 'communism' (1797) and devised a 'senato-communist' system with a hierarchical order based on natural and temporal criteria: sex, age and merit, with age bonuses. Having first lived on his parents' farm, Rétif had an empirical knowledge of nature (and perhaps of the plant and animal improvement practices being developed at the time). He drew his inspiration from Maillet, who explained that marine animals had become terrestrial as a result of the change in sea level, and from Buffon's *Histoire naturelle*, which was a huge success. But he had also read the chemist Lavoisier and the astronomer Laplace, and quoted from many scholarly texts that are today little known. As a novelist, he developed a theory of the imagination in his *Physique*. Transformism requires a great deal of imagination to invent what cannot be observed - the transformation of natural forms over a very long period of time - and to escape the religious dogmas that prevent the invention of hypotheses that are dangerous (sic) for an order founded on the idea of the stability of nature (...). (T) emerge, transformism needed a contradictory dual heritage: Epicurean materialism, which grants power and autonomy to Nature, and, at the same time, a Christian philosophy, through the Leibnizian idea of a continuous chain of beings, according to which God created a gradation leading (sic) from the simplest being to man (or the angels). This idea would have made it possible to escape the chaos of the materialists, and to attribute a meaning, a temporal dynamic to the transformation of species. Rétif inherited both these tendencies, in the form of a kind of pantheism according to which God is everywhere in Nature" (emphasis added) (*ibid.*, pp. 6-7).

(271) Rétif de la Bretonne did not invent the term 'protoplasm', but the notion it covers of The "elementary living substance itself" (Gaston Tissandier, *La Nature - Revue des sciences*, n° 288 to 313, 1879, p. 209) from which all species are formed and transformed is the basis of his theory: "Everything is substance in nature" (Rétif de La Bretonne; or, *Le siècle prophétique*, Marc Chadourne, Hachette, 1958, p. 343; Pierre Testud, *Rétif de la Bretonne et la création littéraire*, Droz, Geneva and Paris, 1977, p. 650 et sqq.).

(272) Daniel Becquemont, Herbert Spencer: progress and decadence. In *Mil neuf cent*, n° 14, 1996. Progress and decadence [p. 69-88], p. 70.

(273) As Jean Demoor, Jean Massart and Émile Vandervelde note (*L'Évolution régressive en biologie et en sociologie*, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1897, quoted in André Lalande, *Les illusions évolutionnistes*, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1930) "(l)e mot évolution n'implique par lui-même aucune idée de progrès ou de régress; il désigne toutes les transformations soit favorables, soit défavorables. The authors have applied themselves to studying the latter; thanks to their special competence and their personal research on the same subject, in the social and biological fields, they have been able to coordinate their results. The evolutionary analogies between biology and sociology result from the fact that the evolution of societies, as much as of organisms, is the result of two factors: resemblance and adaptation. Without exaggerating the assimilation between social organisms and plant or animal organisms, Messrs Demoor, Massart and Vandervelde have succeeded in discovering very curious analogies in the study of regression in these three orders of phenomena". It was Spencer who, by popularising the term "evolution", managed to convince many people, though not necessarily Darwin, that it was synonymous with a progressive process (Peter J. Bowler, *Evolution: The History of an Idea*, 3rd ed. entirely revised and expanded, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2003, p. 220).

(274) Paul Valéry, *Degas, danse, dessin*, Ambroise Vollard, Paris, 1936, p. 138.

(275) Similarly, Toland is not mentioned in any of the many histories of the theory of progress (see, for the literature on the subject in the English-speaking world, David Spadafora, *The Idea of Progress in Eighteenth-century Britain*, Yale University Press, New Haven and London, 1990; Arnold Burgen, Peter McLaughlin and Jürgen Mittelstraß [eds.] *The Idea of Progress*, de Gruyter, Berlin, 1997; John Bagnell Bury, *The Idea of Progress: An Inquiry Into Its Origin and Growth*, Macmillan and Company, limited, 1921; Morris Ginsberg, *The Idea of Progress: A Revaluation*, Greenwood Press, 1972; Wm L. Gill [ed.], *Evolution and Progress*, New York, 1875). What does this mean, if not that Toland and, to a certain extent, the 'Enlightenment', without being progressive, were ahead of their time, possessed as they were by the 'demon of change-for-change' that Valéry was already evoking in the 1930s (see body of text).

(276) Jules Delvaille, *op. cit.* p. 609.

(277) *Les Pamphlets de Marat, Supplément de l'offrande à la patrie*, Charpentier et Pasquelle, Paris, 1911, p. 50.

(278) J. B., Bury, *op. cit.* pp. 144-5. See also Valérie Cossy and Deidre Dawson (eds.), *Progrès et violence au XVIIIe siècle*, Honoré Champion, 2001.

(279) *Ibid.*, p. 145.

(280) Franck Alengry, Condorcet. Guide to the French Revolution. Théoricien du Droit constitutionnel et Précurseur de la Science sociale, V. Giard et E. Brière, Paris, 1904, pp. vii-viii. Was he a Freemason? Brother Louis Amiable's assertion (*Une loge maçonnique d'avant 1789 : la R. L. Les neuf sœurs*, J. - B. Baillière, Paris, 1897) that he had been initiated into the Neuf Sœurs lodge around 1784 has not been formally proven (Henri Prouteau, *Littérature et franc-maçonnerie*, H. Veyrier, 1991, p. 162). In

(Jean-Guillaume Gyr [abbé], *La Franc-Maçonnerie en elle-même et dans ses rapports avec les autres sociétés secrètes de l'Europe*, Paris, 1859, p. 304).

(281) Henri de Ferron, *op. cit.* p. 258.

(282) "Public education was one of the major challenges of the French Revolution. The political renewal it brought with it called for men and women who were politically cultured and politicised, free from prejudice and ignorance. They must also be sensitive to the principles of liberty, equality and fraternity on which the new institutions are founded. This requires a vast educational operation, which the revolutionary elites feel to be a sacred duty. This operation must ensure the dissemination of knowledge, which must be made available to all citizens so that they can be useful to society and aspire to happiness. It must also ensure the dissemination of new mores, so as to instil in the hearts and minds of citizens habits that are in harmony with the new institutions.

"The attention paid to educational issues by the men of the Revolution intensified over the years. Public education was not mentioned in the 1789 Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen. However, it did appear in the Constitution of 1791, Title I of which announced the creation and organisation of free public education for all citizens; it then appeared in the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 1793, which, in Article 22, defined education as a need of all, which society must promote using all the means at its disposal. It is also present in the Constitution of Year I (art. 122), as well as in the Constitution of Year III, which makes education a condition for the exercise of civil rights (art. 16) and which devotes five other articles to public education.

"The subject of education also played an increasingly important role in the debates of the assemblies, from the Legislative Assembly onwards and especially under the Convention. Specific committees were set up: in October 1791, the Legislative Assembly set up a Public Education Committee to work on a programme for reforming public education. Reorganised and renewed Under the Convention (13 October 1792), the Committee produced a considerable body of work until it was abolished (26 October 1795), ranging from plans for the school system as a whole to the creation of scientific establishments and cultural institutions and the reform of the decimal system and the calendar.

The political events and turmoil that swept France during the revolutionary period did not discourage statesmen and intellectuals from continually putting forward new educational proposals. For example, on 21 January 1793, the day Louis XVI went to the scaffold, the Convention decided that 'finance, war and public education would continually be on the agenda'; on 6 February, it decided to devote every Thursday to discussions on the subject of public education. The interest and importance that the issue of public education gradually acquired also stemmed from the fact that debates on this subject were not confined to the institutional arena. In fact, society as a whole was expressing its views on the construction of a

new system of public education, as shown by the interest shown by popular societies and the countless publications devoted to this question (...). The educational mission of the Revolution consisted (...) not only in the dissemination of knowledge, but also of morals. This dual objective is reflected in a binomial that is constantly found in the drafts on public education drawn up at this time: instruction and education. The first term refers to the knowledge needed to enlighten men, the second to the learning of morals, which is essential to make men virtuous" (Corinne Doria, *L'éducation morale dans les projets de loi sur l'instruction publique pendant la Révolution : un miroir des antinomies des Lumières*, La French Revolution [Online], 4, 2013, online 15 June 2013, accessed 13 October 2020. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/lrf/852> ; DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/lrf.852>). Many reports were presented on this subject in the early years of the Revolution. The main ones were all more or less inspired by Condorcet, himself the author of a *Rapport et projet de décret sur l'organisation générale de l'instruction publique* (Report and draft decree on the general organisation of public education), which he presented on behalf of the Comité d'Instruction Publique (Public Education Committee) to the Assemblée Législative on 20 and 21 April 1792. For him, as for Louis-Michel Le Peletier, whose Plan d'éducation nationale was presented by Robespierre on 13 July 1793, moral education, the key to In their view, education is achieved through constraint and discipline. This part of life," declared Le Peletier, "is truly decisive for the formation of a man's physical and moral being. It must be devoted entirely to daily and constant supervision (...). Continuously under the eye and in the hand of an active supervisor, every hour will be marked for sleep, rest and relaxation. meals, work, exercise, relaxation; the whole regime of life will be invariably regulated" (quoted in *ibid.*). "(In the public institution) the child's entire existence belongs to us" (quoted in Pierre- Eugène Muller, *De l'instruction publique à l'éducation nationale*. In *Mots*, n° 61, December 1999. *L'École en débats* [p. 149-56], p. 152), he adds. Condorcet went even further on this point when, in line with his thesis of the indefinite perfectibility of the human mind and humanity, he declared, thereby laying the foundations of "continuing vocational training" (1971) and therefore of the "training" market: "Instruction should not abandon men the moment they leave school." (quoted in Corinne Doria, *op. cit.*) Public education is an "explicitly totalitarian enterprise" (*ibid.*). The Freemason Jules Ferry's "law of 28 March 1882 on compulsory primary education" crowned the wish of the Freemason d'Holbach (see Monique and Jean-Marc Cara and Marc de Jode, *Dictionnaire universel de la Franc-Maçonnerie*, Larousse, 2011; see, on the subject of the Judeo-Masonic hold on pseudo-education-pseudo-national education before the war, Jean Bertrand and Claude Wacogne, *La Fausse Éducation nationale*, C . A . D ., Paris, s . d .) "to take away from negligent and unreasonable parents the right to bring up their children, of whom they can only make inconvenient members of society, and unpleasant for those who gave birth to them (...)" (quoted in Jules Delvaile, *op. cit.* p. 666).

(283) Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, Paris, 1794-1795, p. 5.

(284) Robert Nisbet, *op. cit.* chapter 5.

(285) it should be emphasised, in view of the considerations developed earlier on the relationship between the idea of progress and the search for the elixir of long life in alchemy, that Condorcet envisaged the indefinite perfectibility of the human spirit "not only as the continuation of perfection

of methods, of the ever-increasing extent of the mass of known truths, but as a truly physical perfection" (A. Condorcet O'Connor and M. F. Arago, *CŒuvres de Condorcet*, vol. 4, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1847, p. 287).

(286) Condorcet, *Esquisse d'un Tableau historique des progrès de l'esprit humain*, new edition, Paris, 1829, p. 69: "... Condorcet, starting out, like Descartes, from individualism and the autonomy of individual and collective reason, arrives at a kind of 'vision in common reason' that recalls the illumination of individual reasons by the divine immanent reason of which Descartes sometimes spoke, and which would lead in Malebranche to the intellectualist pantheism of 'vision in God'. - Condorcet's sociological pantheism was transformed and became, in Auguste Comte, the unity of being personified in the unity of methods (and not that of particular processes, because the different portions of reality are irreducible), in the unity of minds, and finally in the absorption of all individualities in the one, eternal, immense being, Humanity, the Great Being which has replaced the Great Whole of the ancient pantheists" (Franck Alengry, *op. cit.*, p. 849, note 2).

(287) Condorcet attributed the authorship of the doctrine of the indefinite perfectibility of the human mind partly to his friend Turgot, partly to Richard Price (1723-1791) and partly to Joseph Priestley (1733-1804). It was actually sketched out by Priestley (Joseph Priestley, son, *Memoirs of Joseph Priestley*, vol. 2, London, 1806, pp. 344 ff), then taken up and expanded by Price (Lyndall Gordon, *Vindication: A Life of Mary Wollstonecraft*. Little, Brown Book Group, 2014, p. 50), but, as far as Turgot is concerned, it is not to be found in his writings (see, on this subject, J.-P. Schandeler, *Condorcet et l'invention de la perfectibilité indéfinie : une contribution aux sciences morales et politiques*, in Bernard Binoche [sous la dir.], *L'Homme perfectible*, 2004, Champ Vallon, Coll. "Milieux" [p. 221-51]. See, on Priestley's "quasi-materialist pantheism", Jincheng Shi, *Pantheism and Science in Victorian Britain*, thesis, The University of Leeds, 2018).

(288) During his lifetime, Condorcet's discourse also found attentive ears in the United States. Jefferson, the future president of that country, wrote to one of his correspondents that he was one of those who thought well of human nature in general, and added: "I also believe, with Condorcet (who had probably been introduced to him by the Freemason Benjamin Franklin, who was stationed in Paris from 1786 to 1785), that the human mind is perfectible to a degree now inconceivable" (quoted in Norman Doidge, *Les Étonnants Pouvoirs de transformation du cerveau*, new ed., Place des éditeurs, 2019).

(289) Jean-Joseph Thonissen, *op. cit.* p. 136-9.

(290) Jack Fruchtman, *The Apocalyptic Politics of Richard Price and Joseph Priestley*, The American Philosophical Society, Philadelphia, 1983, pp. 33-4.

(291) Quoted in Jean-Joseph Thonissen, *op. cit.* p. 139.

(292) J. B. Bury, *op. cit.* p. 166.

(293) In an article dated 28 November 1835 entitled *The Religion of the Millennium* (New Moral World (1834-1836) Owen wrote: "I. (...) an eternal existence, without cause, has always filled the universe and (...)

is therefore omnipresent; 2. (...) this eternal, causeless, omnipresent Existence possesses attributes that enable it to 'direct the atom and control the whole of nature', i.e. to govern nature as it is governed; 3. (...) these attributes, being eternal and infinite, are powers that are incomprehensible to man (...); 11. (...) for the convenience of the discourse, it is necessary to adopt a concise term to designate this eternal, causeless, omnipresent Power and (...) 12 (...) therefore, this eternal, causeless, infinite, incomprehensible power, we shall call God" (quoted in Jincheng Shi, op. cit., p. 52).

(294) J. B. Bury, op. cit. p. 166: "The terms of religious development are fetishism, polytheism, monotheism and finally pantheism. The terms of religious development are fetishism, polytheism, monotheism, and finally pantheism. Fear characterises the first religious period; man forms the crudest ideas of the Divinity, sees in his fellow man only a stranger and a prey, confines his benevolent feelings within the confines of his family, and does not even have the idea of a future. In this age, the exploitation of man by man presents a particular challenge.

It is the reign of anthropophagi. Under polytheism, fear, which is always the dominant feeling, is nevertheless mixed with some love. The idea of the gods was purified; respect for the gods increased. Man no longer eats his fellow man, content to reduce him to slavery. He extends the circle of his moral feelings; the city is founded, public life begins. Monotheism

The city became a nation, and slavery was gradually softened and transformed until it was replaced by serfdom. The exploitation of man by man gradually diminished. Christian monotheism, which grew out of Jewish monotheism, determined these developments above all by the principles of fraternity and human equality. The Church has brought about an immense improvement for the human race; it has replaced the principle of force with the moral principle, and set an example of peaceful association in which all exploitation of man by man has been banished. The further back we go, the narrower we find the sphere of association, and the more imperfect the association itself within that sphere. These various associations offer us a perpetual struggle between them; each offers it to us in its own bosom; so that the past is the time of antagonism, a necessary antagonism, and which has been the condition of the development of humanity (...) Catholicism has so far been the highest development of human intelligence and association.

But however excellent he was, there was something incomplete in him. Christianity is imbued with the ancient and primitive dogma of the two principles, in other words, of universal antagonism. For it, evil is the flesh, matter. The material order is the empire of evil. If we look for the origin of this aversion to matter, we will find it in the dogma of a God who is pure spirit. Hence the maxim: My kingdom is not of this world; hence the separation of the two powers, the abandonment by the Church of everything to do with the material order, and all the precepts of penance and mortification. However, the part of our nature that was placed under probation by Christianity could neither abdicate nor be destroyed. The material element, expressed in poetry, science and industry,

This struggle gave rise to intellectual and moral anarchy, the source of all the evils that afflict our modern society. This struggle gave rise to intellectual and moral anarchy, the source of all the evils that plague our modern society.

century. But a better future is on the horizon; the destinies of mankind are about to be fulfilled; universal and peaceful association is about to become a reality. The most striking aspect of the progress that

What remains to be done is the rehabilitation of matter, which can only take place when a new religious conception has brought back into the providential order and into God himself this element, or rather this aspect of universal existence, which Christianity has reproved. All the religions that preceded Christianity were material. Fetishism, polytheism and Jewish monotheism, whatever their differences, all share the common feature that it is above all under the material aspect that existence is felt, understood and practised. Christianity, on the other hand, focuses on the spiritual aspect.

is revealed to man, and becomes the dominant object of his love, his meditation and his activity. Hence the great advantages for humanity, but also the great disadvantages. These disadvantages can be summed up in the persistence of antagonism. In society, we find the struggle of the individual, that of flesh and spirit. The result of this state of affairs is that the unquestionable material progress brought about by Christianity has nevertheless remained disproportionate to the spiritual progress. The progress to be made in religious conception and in political institution, therefore, consists in bringing together these two points of view, at each of which man has hitherto been exclusively placed. In this way, man is constantly tending towards unity. Thus the terms of intellectual progress are expressed by the following historical series: fetishism, polytheism, monotheism, pantheism. Once this basis has been laid, we can foresee the general characteristics of the society of the future; these characteristics consist in the cessation of all antagonism both in society and in the individual. Antagonism will cease in society, by the end of the exploitation of man by man; this end itself will be brought about by the abolition of all privileges of birth and fortune, by classification according to ability, and reward according to works. Antagonism will cease in the individual by the abolition of the struggle between spirit and flesh, and by the harmony of their development. This future society will constantly tend towards universal association in a peaceful direction. The globe, man's domain, will be exploited alone, and will undergo happy transformations. Continual progress in love, science and wealth will be brought about by this social constitution. This society, which will offer the true realisation of the unity that has been vainly attempted until now, will be divided into priests, scientists and industrialists, a division that corresponds to that of the human faculties of love, intelligence and material activity. It will form a veritable hierarchy; all men will be classified in these three divisions, according to their vocation as manifested by their abilities, and rewarded according to their works. Women will become the equal of men in all things, and the authority of marriage will belong to them as soon as they are the most capable. Marriages, being of both reason and inclination, may be dissolved by mutual consent; children, brought up in common, will receive the functions that are appropriate to their intelligence and physical strength. As supreme head of the society, the high priest will govern the scientist and the industrialist. Each society will offer a small society organised according to the general type, and will correspond, through the intermediary of larger associations, with the general association. All property will be entrusted to the person most capable of making it prosper. Thus, instead of having owners, industrialists and shopkeepers, we will have agricultural, industrial and commercial civil servants. Everything will thus become a function, and each civil servant will receive a salary proportionate to his work, and a pension after having sufficiently worked. Wealth will be distributed by the priest; the priest will also direct education, which will prepare man for the new association. Legislation will sanction the precepts of education. The new association will therefore be an immense advance in love, the sciences, the arts and industry. All needs will be satisfied; man will have nothing to desire" (Henri de Ferron, op. cit., pp. 63-8). Indeed, according to Saint-Simonism and socialism, "(o)nce man's needs are fully satisfied, he will have nothing to desire.

satisfied in a harmonious environment, there is no longer any stimulus to provoke new changes and history loses its dynamism".

(295) *Ibid*, p. 66-7.

(296) Paul Janet, *Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale*, 2nd edn, revised, reworked and considerably expanded, t. 2, Ladrangé, 1872, p. 737.

(297) J. B. Bury, p. 196.

(298) Quoted in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon & d'Enfantin: précédées de deux notices historiques*, t. 1, E. Dentu, Paris, 1868, p. 113.

(299) *Ibid*, p. 115, 116.

(300) Quoted in Franck Alengry, *Condorcet, Slatkine Reprints*, Geneva, 1971, p. 794.

(301) *Œuvres choisies de C.- H. de Saint-Simon, précédées d'un essai sur sa doctrine*, t. 2, Fr. Van Meenen et Cie, Brussels, 1839, p. 328.

(302) The term 'sociology', which Comte claimed as his own (*Cours de philosophie positive*, t. 4, Bachelier, Paris, 1839, p. 252), had been coined by Sieyès in the mid-1770s (Jacques Guilhaumou, *Les manuscrits linguistiques du jeune Sieyès [1773-1776]*, *Archives et documents de la Société d'histoire et d'épistémologie des sciences du langage*, vol. 8, no. 1, 1993, p. 53-86).

(303) Saint-Simon's revolutionary economic and social programme was based on what he called "social physiology" (see Vidal Daniel, *Saint-Simon, œuvre ouverte*. In *Sociologie du travail*, 9^e année n° 4, octobre-décembre 1967 [p. 448-461]), "science, not only of individual life, but also of general life, of which the lives of individuals are but cogs" (Saint-Simon, *Opinions littéraires, philosophiques et industrielles*, Paris, 1825, p. 231)

(304) "Society was henceforth to be conceived as an organism more vast and more complex than ordinary organisms, and this superior point of view was then to be supplemented by analogies borrowed from the physiological sciences and in particular from the hierarchical coordination of nerve centres, the highest type of which is the human nervous system" (Guillaume De Greef, *op. cit.*, p. 181).

(305) See Claude Blanckaert, *La nature de la société : Organicisme et sciences sociales au XIX^e siècle*, L'Harmattan, 2004.

(306) Aristide Quillet, *Encyclopédie socialiste: Un peu d'histoire*, 1812, p. 110.

(307) *Ibid*.

(308) *Ibid*. "(The 'organicists') (have) made of it," notes the encyclopaedist, "a theoretical commentary to the Menenius Agrippa's famous fable about the need for the so-called inferior organs of society to submit to the so-called superior organs, for the dominated classes to submit to the dominating classes, in the interests of the common good.

obviously apologetic for the social status quo" (emphasis added) (304). It is not by chance that Saint-Simon and, following him, the Saint-Simonians "(legitimised) the seizure of power by the bankers" (Pierre Musso, *La distinction saint-simonienne entre réseaux 'matériels' et 'spirituels'*. In *Quaderni*, no. 39, autumn 1999. *Transport matériel et immatériel* [p. 55-76], p. 69), some of whom (Olinde Rodrigues; Émile and Isaac Péreire, founders under the Second Empire of *Crédit Mobilier* and numerous industrial or transport businesses, such as the *Compagnie Générale Transatlantique* and the *Compagnie du Chemin de Fer de Paris à Saint-Germain*; see Pierre Miquel, *L'argent*, Bordas, 1971) are very close. Michel Chevalier, a Saint-Simonian, wrote: "The politics of the future will have as its object the administration of the material interests of society; the general men of industry, the bankers and engineers, will then be politicians in at least the same capacity as the reasoners, the regulators (as if 'politicians' were not also 'reasoners, regulators'). regulators"! N. D. E.). Our efforts must be directed from now on to revealing to them the political character which is in them and which they do not feel" (quoted in *ibid.*); see also Claude-Henri de Saint-Simon, *l'industrialisme et les banquiers*. In *Cahiers d'économie Politique* 2004, vol. 1, no. 46 [pp. 147-74].

(309) Claude-Henri de Rouvroy (Comte de Saint-Simon), *Opinions littéraires, philosophiques et industrielles*, 1825, Paris, p. 244-5.

(310) H. L. C. Maret, *op. cit.* p. 56-7.

(311) Quoted in *Œuvres de Saint-Simon & d'Enfantin: précédées de deux notices historiques*, t. 1, E. Dentu, 1868, p. 115.

(312) Georg-Gottfried Gervinus, *Histoire du dix-neuvième siècle depuis les traités de Vienne*, translated from the German by J.-F. Minssen, vol. 20, Paris, A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie, 1869, p. 10.

(313) Quoted in Jean François E. Robinet, *Notice sur l'œuvre et sur la vie d'Auguste Comte*, Dunod, Paris, 1960, p. 404.

(314) Alphonse de Boissieu, *Les Saint-Simoniens*, Lyon, 1831, p. 8. Pantheism itself is "a hypothesis constructed with a great effort of abstraction, verbal transformations and argumentation, in the blindness of thought drunk with itself; Under the breath of pantheism, all real and personal beings disappear and are replaced by an abstraction which in turn becomes a being, the being par excellence, the only being, but without personality and without will, absorbing all things into a bottomless abyss where it is itself absorbed and where everything that we have tried to explain is annihilated. Is there, in the mythological conceptions and mystical dreams of the human imagination, anything so factitious and vain as this hypothesis which, from its very first steps and throughout its course, ignores the most proven facts about man and the world..." (François Guizot, *Méditations sur la religion chrétienne*, 2nd series, Michel Lévy Frères, Paris, 1866, p. 311).

(315) Georg-Gottfried Gervinus, *op. cit.* p. 11.

(316) Before joining the Saint-Simonian sect around 1825, Armand Bazard (1791-1832) had taken part in the founding of French Carbonarism, which he led "as head of high sales and the

vente-suprême". He led the Belfort conspiracy in January 1822 (Nouvelle biographie générale, s.v. Bazard, Armand, vol. 4, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1853, p. 883).

(317) Georg-Gottfried Gervinus, op. cit. pp. 11-4; see also C. De Coux, Sur la perfectibilité. In A. Dechamps and P. De Decker (eds), Revue de Bruxelles, July 1837, p. 91; Christian Rutten, Essai sur la morale d'Auguste Comte, Presses Universitaires de Liège, Liège, 1972, p. 44-5.

(318) The implementation of the pre-globalist project of the Saint-Simonians would undoubtedly have been delayed if, through their proselytism, they had not succeeded in winning over to their political, social and economic theories those who today are known as "decision-makers": Economists, industrialists, bankers, politicians, senior civil servants, magistrates, military personnel, scientists, engineers, many of them polytechnicians (*), many of them adhered to the sect and, each in his own field, initiated reforms and implemented economic or industrial projects inspired by Saint-Simonism that were to revolutionise French society in the medium term, although it was not until the end of the twentieth century that the most disastrous consequences were felt (**).

From 1825 onwards, the Public Works sector was dominated by Saint-Simonism, not only in France but throughout the world (Françoise Fichet-Poitrey, Jean Bureau and M. Kaufmann. Le corps des ponts et chaussées du génie civil à l'aménagement du territoire. [Rapport de recherche] 0159/82, Ministère de l'urbanisme et du logement / Comité de la recherche et du développement en architecture [CORDA], 1982, p. 53). The infiltration of the Ecole Polytechnique by the Saint-Simonians from 1826 onwards quickly paid off and many polytechnicians "adhered to Saint-Simonian ideas and took part in the major industrial operations of the Second Empire (...) (***)"; (leur action was decisive in setting in motion all the major industrial projects of the second half of the (twentieth) century, as well as in opening up French capitalism to international competition" (emphasis added) (L'École polytechnique. Les polytechniciens et la société française, L'Ouvert. n° 73. p. 42-46, IREM de Strasbourg, Strasbourg, 1993). The banking and industrial activities of the Pereire brothers (of the eleven directors of Crédit mobilier, founded by them in 1852, eight were Saint-Simonians [Françoise Fichet-Poitrey, Jean Bureau and M. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 53]) "had a considerable influence on the economic development of Europe" (John C. Eckalbar, The Saint-Simonians in Industry and Economic Development. In The American Journal of Economics and Sociology, vol. 38, no. 1, January 1979 [p. 83-96], p. 83; the Saint-Simonians had in mind a world economic association headed by a gigantic bank). By the end of the century, the Saint-Simonians were "in charge of all the major orders in industry and finance" (Françoise Fichet-Poitrey, Jean Bureau and M. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 53; the authors of this report, written for the Ministry of Town Planning and Housing, state that as a result, "the Saint-Simonian fraternity would be taken over by Freemasonry" (****). "Liberals, republicans, socialists, philosophers - almost all of them, without knowing it, draw from Saint-Simon's wallet", declared the politician Hippolyte Carnot cynically in 1887, congratulating himself on having attended the school (*****).

Long after the piteous dissolution of the Saint-Simonian Church and the death of the last of its leaders, their views were perpetuated, albeit in diverse and sometimes contradictory forms, in the works of influential philosophers and economists and in the policies of political and economic administrators.

On the other hand, "they have not ceased (...) to inspire protests against the status quo of ideas and institutions". On the other hand, 'they have not ceased (...) to inspire protests against the status quo of ideas and institutions' (Ralph P. Locke, *The Saint-Simonians and Music*, p. 350; see also Rushdī Fakkār, *The International Influence of Saint-Simon and His Followers*.

Bilan en Europe et portée extra-européenne, 1967; Georges Weill, *L'école saint-simonienne : son histoire, son influence jusqu'à nos jours*, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1896; François Leblond, *Ces Saint-Simoniens qui ont construit la France moderne*, Librinova, 2015). In particular, the Saint-Simoniens contributed to

"(Promote) resolutely the transfer of power to the benefit of the senior civil service" (Roland Cayrol, *Le président sur la corde raide : Les enjeux du macronisme*, Calmann-Lévy, 2019; see also Laurent Mauduit, *La caste : Enquête sur cette haute fonction publique qui a pris le pouvoir*, La découverte, 2018), the citadel of the Republic and thus to fulfil Enfantin's dream of seeing the "(Œuvres de Saint-Simon, vol. 8, E. Dentu, Paris, 1875, p. 131). For the Saint-Simoniens, technical data is everything, human factors are non-existent, and the individual exists only insofar as he or she is networked (their "technocratic and liberal industrialism is based solely on the multiplication of communication networks". Pierre Musso, *Télécommunications et philosophie des réseaux*, PUF, 1997). The training and preparation of senior civil servants for the "government of things" was in their hands. The founder of the ENA, Hippolyte Carnot, was a Saint-Simonian (Romuald Szramkiewicz and Jacques Bouineau, *Histoire des institutions. 1750-1914*, 4th edn, LITEC, 1998; the school, which opened in 1848, was closed in 1852 before being revived in 1945). The teaching of economics at the *École libre des Sciences Politiques*, better known today as Sciences Po (Alain Garrigou, *Les élites contre la République :*

Sciences Po et l'ENA, Éditions La Découverte & Syros, Paris, 2001), which, as soon as it was founded in 1871, "immediately (...) influenced the configuration of the academic field and the functioning of the political and administrative system" (Dominique Damamme, *D'une école des sciences politiques*. In *Politix*, vol. 1, no. 3-4, summer-autumn 1988. *Science politique* [p. 6-12], p. 6), was entrusted to heirs of Saint-Simonism (François Leblond, op. cit.). Moreover, Saint-Simon was the first to propose the creation of a European Society (Bruno Arcidiacono, *Un précurseur de l'Union européenne? Le comte de Saint-Simon et la réorganisation de l'Europe en 1814*. In Andre Liebich and Basil Germond [eds], *Construire l'Europe, Mélanges en hommage à Pierre du Bois*, Graduate Institute Publications, The Graduate Institute, Geneva, 2009, p. 55-70), i.e. a super-bureaucracy. Still on the subject of institutions, just after the founding of the CNPF (Conseil National du Patronat Français) in 1945, when "a latent spirit of Saint-Simonism circulated between the organisational, technocratic and even dirigiste spirit of Vichy and the desire (of Jean Monet and de Gaulle) for industrial renewal, by the

modernization and planning" (Serge Sur, *La vie politique en France sous la Ve République*, Éditions Montchrestien, 2016), it was Saint-Simoniens who took the initiative of creating ACADI (Association des cadres dirigeants de l'industrie pour le progrès social et économique) (Acadia was evangelized by the Jesuits) (*****). This "insolent incarnation (of) the 'technocratic boss', the fifth column of statism in business", was joined by most of the major private groups in heavy industry and all the nationalised companies (Henri Weber, *Le Parti des patrons : Histoire du C.N.P.F. [1946-1986]*, Seuil, Coll. "L'épreuve des faits", 2015).

(*) Jean-Pierre Callot, *Enfantin, le prophète aux sept visages*, Jean-Jacques Pauvert, Paris, 1963, p. 34 ff. "It is necessary," wrote G. D'Eichthal, writer, Hellenist, ethnologist, political theorist and son of Baron Louis d'Eichthal, founder of the Louis d'Eichthal bank in Paris, to the Polytechnique graduate Léon Talabot, "for the Ecole Polytechnique to be the channel through which our ideas spread throughout society (...). You know that it is among this class of men in particular that we must hope to recruit apostles" (quoted in Françoise Fichet-Poitrey, Jean Bureau and M. Kaufmann, op. cit., p. 54). Enfantin insisted: "It (the Ecole Polytechnique) must be the channel through which our ideas spread throughout society: it is the milk we have sucked at our beloved school that must nourish generations. We learned there the positive language and the methods of research and demonstration which today must make the world work. sciences positives" (quoted in *ibid.*, p. 55). In 1830, sixty Saint-Simonian polytechnicians took part in the days of 30 and 31 July.

(**) Today, Saint-Simonians are still very much represented among engineers and academics and in the world of high-flying parasites, whether they be senior civil servants, businessmen, heads of large public or private companies - if the distinction is still valid - etc. (see François Gallice, *Les ingénieurs saint-simoniens : Le mariage de l'utopie et de la raison?* In *Recherches contemporaines*, n° 2, 1994 [p. 5-24] ; Alexandre Moatti, *La figure de Saint-Simon dans les discours technocratiques français*, 21e Journées d'Histoire du Management et des Organisations [21e JHMO], "Les Utopies managériales" 16, 17 et 18 mars 2016. UTBM Sevenans). A Fondation Saint-Simon was set up in 1982 with the aim of bringing together "certain people (academics, senior civil servants, heads of major public or private companies, businessmen, etc.) within an ideological space ranging from the intelligent right to the intelligent left", in order to "(convert) the governing left to liberalism" (Denis Souchon, Pierre Rosanvallon, un évangéliste du marché omniprésent dans les médias, acrimed.org, 6 October 2015). It was dissolved in 1999, once its mission had been "accomplished", in the words of one of its founders, a living historian and sociologist described as the "architect of social liberalism". During the seventeen years of its existence, a large number of members of the Fondation Saint-Simon worked with successive governments as technical advisers, members of commissions, project managers, etc.

(***) From the 1840s, the Saint-Simonians maintained relations with the officers of the Arab offices in Algeria, with Louis-Philippe and his senior ministers, with leading politicians such as Lamartine and intellectuals such as Michelet and Edgar Quinet and their networks. Their tentacles extended into business circles (Jean-François Figeac, *Le saint-simonisme après Saint-Simon, ou la pérennisation d'un réseau par la Question d'Orient*. In *Enquêtes*, n° 3, October 2018, p. 6; on the tangible influence of the Saint-Simonians on Napoleon III's politics, see Georges Weill, *Les Saint-Simoniens sous Napoléon III*. In *Revue des études napoléoniennes*, 1913 [p. 391-406]; Bernard Jouve, *L'épopée saint-simonienne : Saint-Simon, Enfantin et leur disciple Alexis Petit de Suez au pays de George Sand*, Guénégaud, 2001 and *Napoléon III et les saints-simoniens*, <http://www.napoleontrois.fr/dotclear/index.php?post/2006/03/25/8-napoleon-iii-et-les-saint-simoniens>).

(****) "A number of Saint-Simonians were or remain Masons. Starting with Saint-Simon, membership of a Masonic order is proven for Bazard, Buchez, Charton, Carnot and Chevalier,

d'Eichthal and Leroux. The historian Pierre Chevallier even mentions a Grand-Orient lodge called 'Les Saint-Simoniens', which operated until at least 1831" (Philippe Régner, *Le saint-simonisme à travers la lettre et l'image : le discours positif de la caricature*, in Philippe Régner, Raimund Rütten, Ruth Jung and Gerhard Schneider (eds.), *La Caricature entre République et censure. L'imagerie satirique en France de 1830 à 1880: un discours de résistance?* Presses universitaires de Lyon, Lyon, 1996). Together with Freemasonry, the Saint-Simoniens had a certain influence on the founding of the Alliance israélite universelle (1860) (Jean-Philippe Schreiber, *Les élites politiques juives et la franc-maçonnerie dans la France du XIXe siècle*. In *Archives Juives*, vol. 43 [pp. 58-69]), whose first president, Isaac-Jacob Crémieux, was their lawyer (Simone Mrejen-O'Hana, Isaac-Jacob Adolphe Crémieux, *Avocat, homme politique, président du Consistoire central et de l'Alliance israélite universelle* [Nîmes, 30 April 1796 - Paris, 10 February 1880]. In *Archives Juives*, vol. 36, 2003 [p. 139-46]. One painting depicts Enfantin in a Masonic posture, with his feet at right angles and his hand over his heart [Magali Morsy, *Les Saint-Simoniens et l'orient : vers la modernité*, Centre national des lettres Édusud, 1989, p. 202]).

(****) In the Saint-Simonian Church, Carnot was responsible for writing a four-volume exposition of the doctrine and a two-volume propaganda summary, which was revised by Bazard and Enfantin and widely distributed. Later recalling this mission, he said: "Is there any ideal more seductive than this one: universal association as the successor to the rivalry of peoples? Is there anything more attractive than the Master's prophecy: the Golden Age is before us? Is there anything more encouraging than his motto: All social institutions must aim at the moral, intellectual and physical improvement of the largest and poorest class? Many others, before Christ, exhorted men to love one another, without creating a religion. The general formulas of Saint-Simonism contained a principle more active than Christian charity. They did not confine themselves to recommending help for the poor.

For the poor, it is the duty of the strong to lift up the weak. Universal association is also something quite different from universal peace. Finally, Saint-Simonism has the great merit of having glorified work. Saint-Simon proposed to base morality on this maxim: man must work.

"(quoted in Paul Carnot, Hippolyte Carnot et le Ministère de l'instruction publique de la IIe République : 24 février-5 juillet 1848, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 1948, p. 23) Given Saint-Simon's feminism, we might wonder about the meaning of the word "man" here.

(*****) ACADI (is still is?) supported by Jesuit fathers (Marie-Emmanuelle Chessel, Nicolas de Bemond d'Ars and André Grelon, *L'entreprise et l'Évangile : Une histoire des patrons chrétiens*, Presses de Science Po, Paris, 2018). In the nineteenth century, Saint-Simoniens were regularly associated with Jesuits by liberals (Eugène Fournière, *Histoire socialiste de la France contemporaine. Texte établi par Jean Jaurès*, t. VIII: *Le Règne de Louis-Philippe [1830-1848]*, Jules Rouff, 1908, p. 200-1), but not only by liberals. For example, according to Charles Fourier (*Pièges et charlatanisme des deux sectes Saint-Simon et Owen*, Bossange Père, Paris, 1831, p. 2), "(t)he Jesuits and the Saint-Simoniens are two theocratic-political associations tending to control governments and capture inheritances: the difference between them is that the Jesuits disguise their ambitious views, they do not claim to have the right to direct the government and to invade inheritances, a right that the Saint-Simoniens boldly arrogate to themselves, by virtue of some economic amphigouris published by their divine master Saint-Simon".

who has often said the exact opposite of the nonsense his disciples say...". A "friend of the order", an observer of the Canuts revolt (1827-1832), noted: "On top of all that, male and female Jesuits of a different race arrived in Lyon, called Saint-Simonians, after a great lord, a very bad subject, who died a few years ago and who was a bit crazy" (quoted in Fernand Rude, *Le mouvement ouvrier à Lyon de 1827 à 1832*, E. Jolibois, 1944, p. 699). However polemical and metaphorical this comparison may have been, the fact remains that there are similarities between the government of the Jesuits and the government of the Saint-Simonians (Gabriel Gabet, *Traité élémentaire de la science de l'homme considéré sous tous*, vol. 3, J. - B. Baillière, Paris, 1842, p. 332 et seq.) Moreover, the effective link between Jesuitism and Saint-Simonism was confirmed in 2017 by the election of one of the Rothschilds' (per)roquets to the presidency of the Republic (see Frederic Rouvillois, *Liquidation - Emmanuel Macron et le saint-simonisme*, Éditions du Cerf, 2020).

(319) The Saint-Simonians did not deny that they were pantheists (see Henri-Louis-Charles Maret, *op. cit.*, p. 58), but they did not accept the term because they did not want their doctrine to be assimilated to previous pantheistic systems, which they criticised for never having been given, or even conceived to be given, a social application (see *ibid.*, p. 59).

(320) "Rationalist pantheism, which proceeds from a priori rational principles, which passes through an immediate and concrete intellectual intuition into the being of absolute realism, where it imagines itself to find the absolute identity of all beings, of nature and spirit, of the ego and the non-ego, of the subject and the object, of pure thought and pure being. He therefore prides himself on possessing the absolute science of all things and the understanding of absolute being" (Giovanni Perrone, *Théologie dogmatique*, Paris, Louis Vivès, 1858, vol. 6, p. 501). Historical pantheism is that of Hegel. "Like Schelling, Hegel did not seek nature in God, but spirit; he did not envisage God ('the Idea') as a being that exists eternally in its absolute identity, but as a being that develops and, in the various degrees of its evolution, has constituted various and successive orders of existence in various orders of beings. God ('the Idea'), in logic, conceives of himself in the eternity of his fundamental essences. But since he cannot remain in this state, he must necessarily develop extra se, outside himself, in the external multiplicity of the beings of nature; hence the philosophy of nature. But it cannot remain in this state of exteriority and transition, and it must return from this multiplicity to the unity of its being, and emerge a spirit; hence the philosophy of spirit. Then, finally, absolute being acquires knowledge or consciousness of itself, and becomes infinite personality. This is Hegel's continuous logical trinity. God ('the Idea'), through this logical progression, first or immediately reveals himself to the whole of nature, then immanently in the consciousness of man, and there completes himself, so that Hegel affirms that without the world and man God ('the Idea') would not be complete, and that he would not yet be God ('the Idea')" (*ibid.* p. 501-2). Like

The "Idea" develops according to a necessary law, history is governed by an absolute necessity: "as Hegel considers God in a state of continuous evolution in the world and in humanity, he It follows that the history of man embraces the necessary manifestations of God himself. Hence history contains all science, all life, morality, religion, art, considered in their multiple forms, and consequently all the moral and religious errors that history records are nothing but necessary evolutions of God. This is why history has been called a geometry

inflexible, in which every era and every doctrine develops immutably by virtue of a kind of fatal law. Hence the apotheosis of all man's errors to God ('the Idea'). God ('the Idea') is in all things, he does everything, he is everything; hence the system of indefinite progress, of the indefinite perfectibility of humanity; hence, finally, the perpetual law of transformations and changes, as progress of means" (Ibid., p. 502-3). Since, finally, the "Idea" is a pure abstraction, "it follows that men and peoples are no more than ideas, revolutions than theorems" (Théophile Desdouts, *De la liberté et des lois de la nature*, Ernest Thorin, Paris, 1868, p. 103; see infra, note 340).

(321) The son of a banker in bankruptcy, Enfantin graduated from the *École Polytechnique* and became an executive at the *Caisse Hypothécaire*, whose director, Olindes Rodrigues, introduced him to Saint Simon, whose disciple he became. After Saint-Simon's death, Enfantin founded, with the financial support of the bankers who had already helped Saint-Simon, a newspaper intended to propagate Saint-Simonism. The newspaper fizzled out, but Enfantin and his assistants, determined to keep their master's doctrine alive, presented it in the form of lectures. The lectures were more successful. They soon founded a church, and Enfantin was appointed its Supreme Father (see Hippolyte Castille, *Le Père Enfantin*, E. Dentu, Paris, 1859). In 1832, he was prosecuted along with a number of his associates, including the economist and politician Michel Chevalier (1806-1879) (*) and found guilty, like them, of illegal association and fraud. Enfantin was sentenced to a year's imprisonment and a 100 franc fine (Trial at the *Seine Assize Court* on 27 and 28 August 1832, Prosper Enfantin). During his imprisonment, "Enfantin meditated at leisure on the affinities between East and West. In a letter to [a co-religionist], he reaffirmed the need to go and look for 'rapprochements, Eastern and Western, Mohammedan and Christian injunctions'. From then on, each of the followers prepared to leave for the countries of the Levant. The adventure began with an expedition to Egypt in March 1832. After his

After leaving prison, the Father went there himself. He took part in the preparation of a project to build the Suez Canal, which he saw as a link between East and West, both symbolic and physical, even economic, in keeping with Saint-Simon's theme of communication through technical networks. *Le Père* and his companions were the real promoters of the canal project, even if they eventually lost control of operations from 1855 onwards to Ferdinand de Lesseps, who remained close to their ideas but did not approve of their route. The same desire to unite the two cultures led the Saint-Simonians to found the Egyptian Polytechnic School in 1834. Charles Lambert became its director, adapting his teaching to local realities. His influence in the country was all the greater as it extended to the whole field of public education. It should be pointed out, however, that the stay of Enfantin and his disciples also benefited from the invaluable legacy of the engineers and scientists who had accompanied Napoleon's expedition in 1798. Generally speaking, the material difficulties encountered on the spot dampened the enthusiasm of the Enfantinian missionaries. They were brought back to the economic and social realities of Saint-Simonian industrialism, but the mysticism that had motivated their departure continued to guide them in their work. After three years' work in Egypt, Enfantin returned to France to turn his attention to the new French possession in Africa. He left for Algeria in the company of several disciples following his appointment in 1839 to the Scientific Commission. His stay lasted only two years..." (Saïd Almi, *Urbanisme et colonisation*:

présence française en Algérie, Mardage, 2002, p. 26). In 1845, Enfantin was parachuted in as administrator of the railway from Lyon to the Mediterranean, a post he held until the end of his life.

(*) Michel Chevalier was one of the first, if not the first, to recognise the usefulness of railways in creating the "ASSOCIATION OF PEOPLES WITH EACH OTHER AND OF HUMANITY WITH THE GLOBE".
"To

In the eyes of men who believe that humanity is moving towards universal association, and who are dedicated to leading it there, he declared, (...) the railway is the most perfect symbol of universal association. Railways will change the conditions of human existence (...). The introduction, on a large scale, of railways on the continents, and of steamships on the seas, will be a revolution, not only industrial, but political" (Michel Chevalier, *Système de la Méditerranée*, Paris, 1832, p. 36, 38).

(32) *Cœuvres de Saint-Simon & d'Enfantin*, vol. 42, Ernest Leroux, Paris, 1877, pp. 293-4.

(323) *Doctrine Saint-Simonienne: exposition*, Librairie Nouvelle, Paris, 1854, p. 490. See Giovanni Perrone, *op. cit.* pp. 503-4. Enfantin's mystical pantheism has a false air of millenarian pantheism "medieval". The following passage, in which he talks about Saint-Simon, is symptomatic: "The world was waiting for a saviour... Saint-Simon appeared. Moses, Orpheus and Numa organised material work. Jesus Christ organised spiritual work. Saint-Simon organised religious work. So Saint Simon summed up Moses and Jesus Christ. Moses would in the future be the head of worship, Jesus Christ the head of dogma, Saint-Simon would be the head of religion, the Pope. - Children, and all of you who hear our voice, learn that the God-man of Christians has become in Saint-Simon the people-man; under this divine name, one and multiple at the same time, the sovereigns of the future, the popes of the new church will finally realise this sovereignty of the people, an impracticable dream for those who never see in the people anything but a multitude without a leader; truth for the Saint-Simonian pope, for the people are within him, loving, wise and powerful, marching as one man towards the future that God has destined for them" (quoted in *Émile-Justin Menier, L'avenir économique*, t. 1: *Partie politique*, Paris, 1875, p. 136; see, on the subject of the aspects millénaristes et gnostiques des élucubrations saint-simoniennes, Marc Angenot, *Gnose et millénarisme : Deux concepts pour le 20ème siècle, followed by Modernité et sécularisation*, <http://marcangenot.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/04/Gnoses-et-mill%C3%A9narisme-restructur%C3%A9.pdf>.

(324) *Ibid.*

(325) *Doctrine of Saint-Simon. Exposition. First year, 2nd edition*, Paris, 1829, p. 107.

(326) *Ibid.*, p. 149.

(327) *Saint-Simonian Doctrine. Exposition*, Librairie Nouvelle, Paris, 1854, p. 432.

(328) *Doctrine of Saint-Simon. Exposition. Première année, 3rd ed. revised and enlarged*, Paris, 1831, p. 113.

(329) *Ibid.*, p. 107.

(330) De Cues was seeking to know the infinite, God, by relying on geometric figures, while Enfantin was simply looking for "the general formula of the human mind and [the] curve".

(Philippe Régnier, *Du Saint-Simonisme comme science et des Saint-Simoniens comme scientifiques : généralités, panorama et repères*. In *Bulletin de la Sabix*, n° 44, 2009 [p. 45-52]). He specified that "[t]his curve and its formula will have an indefinite character, a representation of the human indefinite, but they will have two limits. Would these limits be obtained by successively introducing into an abstract equation terms such as $\varepsilon\pi$ and $\pi\varepsilon$, that is to say by successively subjecting it to symmetrical modifications with respect to π and ε " (quoted in id., *Le Livre nouveau des Saint-Simoniens : manuscrits d'Émile Barrault, Michel Chevalier, Charles Duveyrier, Prosper Enfantin, Charles Lambert, Léon Simon et Thomas-Ismaÿl Urbain [1832-1833], Édition, introduction et notes par Philippe Régnier, Éditions du Lérot, 1992, p. 173*). Apparently not satisfied with his research, he sought the help of other Saint-Simoniens. Charles Lambert, the future founder and director of the Polytechnic School of Cairo, wrote for him "a 'work' in which (, in the attempt to define the 'human indefinite') epistemological speculations (were intermingled) with logarithmic equations" (id., *Du Saint-Simonisme...*). If the writer, journalist, playwright and member of the "Young Germany" movement Karl Ferdinand Gutzkow (1811-1878) had been aware of these attempts to equate the individual, what term would he have used to describe the Saint-Simoniens, who in 1836, after reading the Saint-Simonian programme for the emancipation of women, wrote that they "were madmen" (quoted in J. V., [Zur Philosophie der Geschichte [on the philosophy of history], Karl Gutzkow. In *Revue française et étrangère*, t. 1, Paris, 1837, p. 127; on this programme, see Paola Ferruta, *L'utopie féministe saint-simonienne : perspectives de genre et vues architecturales autour de 1830*. In *Esercizi Filosofici*, no. 2, 2007 [pp. 222-39])? What bird's name would he have used to describe Leibniz, if he had known that the Saint-Simoniens were merely taking up and extending his project of mathematising reality and the world?

thought (Herbert H. Knecht, *La Logique chez Leibniz : essai sur le rationalisme baroque, L'Âge d'Homme, Lausanne, 1981, p. 10*)?

When, in 1832, Enfantin, in Ménilmontant, declared to his disciples, after paying a heartfelt tribute to Descartes, that the work of Saint-Simonism "must consist in the application of algebra and geometry to morality", "he was, roughly speaking, in the same perspective" (Philippe Régnier, op. cit) as that of Hippolyte Margerin, a Polytechnicien from the class of 1817, whose *Leçon sur les mathématiques*, a manuscript written at the end of 1830 and "[r]eserved for internal use, and probably the point of (unvalidated) discussions by a fraction of the leaders", "tends [, not only overturns [the] [Saint-Simonian] hierarchy of disciplines in favour of mathematics, which is thus placed in first place and even promoted as the pilot science for all the others", but "also and above all [offers] an epistemological key for reinterpreting the interminable debate inherited from the Enlightenment, between materialism and spiritualism" (ibid.). In the conclusion to the Lesson, he "(proposes) a scientific strategy consisting of seizing on Leibniz's achievements in order to go beyond him...". Leibniz," he describes, "was the first to conceive of the generation of quantities by means of the Infinite, and is therefore the true inventor of infinitesimal mathematics. His conception has borne such fruit that from Leibniz to the present day science has made far more progress than from the earliest antiquity to Leibniz. Towards the middle of the last century, geometers unwittingly came under the influence of the philosophy of Locke and Condillac began to doubt the Infinite, and without coming to deny it

formally, they endeavoured to banish it from science as a vain chimera that had to be restored to metaphysics. Deprived of the most powerful instrument available to human thought, they were unable to sustain science at the level at which Leibniz had placed it; hence the state of languor and discredit to which it has fallen. Nowadays, Wronski has set out to rehabilitate the Infinite, but his energetic contribution has not been understood, and has met with nothing but misery and ridicule. Leibniz's conception had served its purpose. It will be replaced and justified by a new, broader and more fruitful conception of the generation of quantities, a conception that must entirely change the face of mathematical science, and which it is up to doctrine to produce" (ibid.; see also Patrick Gilormini, *Vers une conception saint-simonienne de l'entreprise et de la société industrielle. Économies et finances*. Université Grenoble Alpes, thesis defended on 25 October 2018, <https://tel.archives-ouvertes.fr/tel-02012113/document>).

He was right. "The reflections of the German philosopher and mathematician on the nature of logic mark (...) an essential stage in the idea that thought can manifest itself inside a machine. Leibniz came close to automating reason by developing binary arithmetic (1679) and a calculus ratiocinator or 'arithmetic machine' (1673). A more advanced calculator than Blaise Pascal's. Discovering a 'point' from which everything can be put back into order: this was the principle that guided Leibniz in his search for 'new compasses of knowledge'. His project to compress information in order to economise thought is also at work in indexes and catalogues, which he envisages as a tabular space with multiple entries. Leibnizian mathematics, which takes into account both subsets and relations, represents both an early theory of complexions and an early philosophy of 'complication': the multiplicity and variety of numbers and beings can be organised, classified and hierarchised. Leibniz (and Newton independently of him) created differential and integral calculus by reducing the fundamental operations of infinitesimal calculus (***) to an algorithmic approach (*). For the algorithm, or ordered sequence of elementary operations drawn from a finite repertoire of operations that can be executed in a given time, to become a fundamental concept of automatic information processing, it was necessary to wait for the mediation of algorithmic writing. Formulated in 1854 by the Irishman George Boole, it would enable computer science to establish itself as a discipline a century later. The new attitude to time and space that stimulated the search for faster methods of calculation corresponded to the demands of the formation of modern capitalism. With operations, a market emerged for the collection, archiving, bureaucratic processing and dissemination of data for traders, financiers and speculators" (Armand Mattelart, *Histoire de la société de l'information. I. Le culte du nombre, La Découverte, 2009 [p. 5-16]*). "The idea of a society governed by information (***) is, so to speak, written into the genetic code of the society project inspired by the mystique of numbers. It therefore dates from well before the notion of information entered the language and culture of modernity. This project, which took shape over the course of the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, enthroned mathematics as the model for reasoning and useful action. Thinking in terms of the quantifiable and the measurable became the prototype of all true discourse, while at the same time establishing the horizon for the quest for the perfectibility of human societies. The French Revolution was a high point in the materialisation of the language of calculation, and made it the yardstick for civic equality and the values of universalism" (Armand Mattelart, op. cit.). The Leibnizian project of automating reasoning, regulating the

the functioning of thought organised by a mechanism made explicit by mathematical representations' (was) (itself) part of the quest for an ecumenical language. It reflects a cosmopolitical humanism, embedded in religious [pantheistic] thought. The philosopher's wish was to help bring peoples closer together, to unify not just Europe but the entire human race. For," he wrote, "I regard Heaven as the Fatherland and all men of good will as fellow citizens in Heaven" (quoted in Armand Mattelart, op. cit.).

A combinatorial system similar to Leibniz's was in use four thousand years earlier in China, as he himself noted in the account he gave in 1703 of the mechanism for reducing numbers to the simplest principles, such as 0 and 1 (see *ibid.*). The binary coding system, linked to the algorithm through the chain of compilation and execution, in particular the assembly phase (<https://www.geekforgeeks.org/introduction-of-assembler/>), constitutes the mathematisation of monistic pantheism: the creature is nothing (0). God is everything (1).

(*) The term 'algorithm' comes from the name of Abu Ja'far Mohammed ibn Mūsā al-Khawārizmi, a ninth-century Arab mathematician who wrote a treatise entitled *Kitab al-jabr w'al-muqabala* (Rules of Replacement and Reduction), from which the word 'algebra' in turn derives (see Herbert H. Knecht, op. cit, p. 180, note 334, who indicates that, in the "Middle Ages", "algorithm" referred to the decimal numeration system using Arabic numerals as opposed to arithmetic calculations using the abacus, and who refers, on the subject of Leibniz's contribution to the development of the algorithm, to Paul Schrecker, Leibniz and the Art of inventing algorithms. In *J. Hist. Ideas*, vol. 8, no. 1, January 1947 [p. 107- 116]. One of the most notable trends in governmentality in the last decade or two has been the growing use of algorithms in public decision-making processes, whether bureaucratic, legislative or legal (see A. Aneesh, *Virtual Migration: The Programming of Globalization and Neutral Accent: How Language, Labor, and Life Become Global*, 2006, which forged the term "algocracy", or government by algorithmic systems; see also Nicoletta Boldrini, *Algocracy and surveillance capitalism: we live in a world governed by algorithms*, 30 May 2017, <https://medium.com/@NicBoldrini/algocracy-and-surveillance-capitalism-we-live-in-a-world-governed-by-algorithms-abd1f158186a> and Adam Clair, *Rule by Nobody. Algorithms update bureaucracy's long-standing strategy for evasion*, 21 February 2017, <https://reallifemag.com/rule-by-nobody/>; James Hughes, *Algorithms and Posthuman Governance*, *Journal of Posthuman Studies*, vol. 1, no. 2, *Journal of Posthuman Studies*, 2017 [pp. 166-184]; see also, transhumanism and algocracy being intertwined, <https://algocracy.wordpress.com/>)

(**) As Leibniz himself acknowledged, infinitesimal calculus was largely inspired by the "law of large numbers" discovered by the Bernoulli brothers (Yadolah Dodge, *Statistics: An Encyclopaedic Dictionary*, Springer Verlag France, Paris, 2004, p. 53). Galileo had proclaimed that "the book of nature is written in mathematical language" (*Il Saggiatore*, 1623). Leibniz hammered home the point, saying: "When God made the world, he calculated". And," says a writer who quotes him in a book with a particularly apt title (Arnaud-Aaron Upinsky, *La perversion mathématique : L'œil du Pouvoir*, 3rd ed, Éditions du Rocher, 1985), "to calculate you need an administration" (see, on the hermetic aspects of Leibniz's mathematical "rationalism", Bernardino Orio de Miguel, *Some hermetic*

aspects of Leibniz's mathematical rationalism [p. 111-24], in Marcelo Dascal [ed.], *Leibniz: What Kind of Rationalist?*, Springer, 2008).

(***) The American mathematician and philosopher Norbert Wiener made no mistake when he chose Leibniz as the "patron saint of cybernetics" (Norbert Wiener, *Cybernetics: Or Control and Communication in the Animal and the Machine*, 2nd ed. The MIT Press and Wiley, New York, 1961 [1948],

Cybernetics is the culmination of the Saint-Simonian concept of the 'network' (see <http://tierney.chez.com/cadre2.html>; Pierre Musso, *Télécommunications et philosophie des réseaux*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris 2015, chap. 3).

(331) Quoted in Hans Hörling Metzlersche, *Die französische Heine-Kritik*, t. 2: Rezensionen und Notizen zu Heines Werken aus den Jahren 1835-1845, Verlag J. B. Metzler, Stuttgart, 2001. *Enfantin* then asked Heine this question: "Has pantheism entered the (German) masses, and if it has, does it not greatly need powerful excitement to develop there?" (quoted in *ibid.*, p. 7).

(332) Gioacchino Ventura di Raulica (T. R. P.), *Essai sur le Pouvoir Public*, Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, Paris, 1859, p. xxv.

(333) Eugène Loudun, *La politique révolutionnaire*. In *Revue du monde catholique*, vol. 4, 16e année, t. 49, Paris, 1877, p. 496-7.

(334) "The Republic," said M. Poule in 1894, "is the daughter of the Grand Orient. M. Desmons, in 1895, spoke in the same terms. Freemasonry," said Mr Gadaud at the Convent of 1894, "is the Republic under cover, and the Republic is Freemasonry in the open. And M. Lucipia, in 1895, did not hesitate to proclaim that Freemasonry and the Republic are precisely the same thing" (Patrice Morlat, *La République des Frères : Le Grand Orient de France de 1870 à 1940*, Perrin, 2019; see also Jean-Paul Lefebvre-Filleau, *Franc-maçonnerie au cœur de la république. De 1870 à nos jours*, Éditions De Borée, Collection "Histoire et documents", 2016; Jean-Michel Reynaud, *République et franc-maçonnerie*, B. Leprince, 2002).

(335) Pierre Leroux, *Discours sur la situation actuelle de la société et de l'esprit humain*, vol. 1, new ed., A Boussac, 1847, p. 160: "Que le souverain soit tous, je le veux bien," Leroux then ironises, referring to the democratic theory according to which power emanates from the consent of the governed; "but on condition that everyone gets along and agrees" (quoted in Pierre Lasserre, *Le romantisme français: essai sur la révolution dans les sentiments et dans les idées au XIXe siècle*, new ed., Mercure de France, Paris, 1907, p. 501).

(336) So, for example, the "Supreme Being" is defined by the Trois-Points brothers as "both the Intelligence that directs the universe and the Great All that moves through space" (Léo Taxil, *Révélations complètes sur la franc-maçonnerie*, Les frères Trois-Points Letouzey et Ané, 1886, p. 325). For our Anglo-Saxon brothers," says the ritual of the Grand Orient, "this initial represents creative power, and therefore supreme knowledge. For us, it is the initial for : Gravitation, Geometry, Generation, Genius, Gnosis... It is the synthesis of all sciences, of all forces, it symbolises the Great Whole" (Alain Guichard, *Les Francs-maçons*, Grasset, 1969, p. 29). "GOD IS EVERYTHING

WHAT IS, says (another) Ritual. Each part or division of what is, is a part of God, but is not God himself. God is the highest intelligence. Each of the parts that make up the Great Whole or God is endowed with a portion of his intelligence, because of his destiny. The union of all these parts forms the whole of the worlds, the Universum, that is to say the Great Whole or God. T h e r e i s no religion other than natural religion. These words need no comment, especially as all the Rituals of the sect agree that God is Nature itself, the Universe, the Great Whole, from which all creatures, man and animals alike, emerge, only to return to it through death, decomposing and reproducing themselves unceasingly in other forms" (François Ignace Joseph Labis

[canon], *Le libéralisme, la franc-maçonnerie et l'église catholique*, Bruxelles, 1869, p. 42-3); see, a s r e g a r d s the republican cult of the Supreme Being, Albert Mathiez, *Robespierre et le culte de l'Être suprême*. In *Annales révolutionnaires*, t. 3, no. 2, April-June 1910 [p. 209- 238].

(337) M** B**, *Institutes du droit naturel privé et public et du droit des gens*, t. 2, 2nd edn, Paris, 1876, p. 339.

(338) National sovereignty, a concept developed by Abbé Sieyès, is the quality proper to the Nation which possesses supreme power in law, the Nation being considered as a legal person distinct from the individuals who make it up and expressing itself through its representatives who act collectively in its name and not each one respectively in the name of the fraction of the population which elected him; popular sovereignty, a Rousseauist concept, is the specific quality of the people considered as all citizens and possessing supreme power in law, which they exercise either directly or through representatives acting by virtue of an imperative mandate. "In France, the process of the representative mandate made it possible after 1789 for popular sovereignty to give way to national sovereignty" (Gérard Bélorgey, *Le gouvernement et l'administration de la France*, Armand Colin, Paris, 1967, p. 13).

(339) See François Lombard, *Les jurés : Justice représentative et représentation de la justice*, Éditions L'Harmattan, Paris, 1993, p. 8.

(340) Eugène Loudun, *La Politique révolutionnaire*. In *Revue du monde catholique*, 16e année, t. 49, Paris, 1877, p. 497.

(341) "Hegel's logical, pantheistic mysticism reduces the real subject of history, the people, to the rank of a mere object and subordinates it to the domination of an abstraction, the State" (René Heyer, *Économie et symbolique*, Presses Universitaires de Strasbourg, 1994) (see infra, note 340).

(342) Alexis de Tocqueville, *The Ancien Régime and the Revolution*. *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 4, 7th edn, Michel Lévy, 1866, p. 19. The Aufklärer, led by Hegel, "saw the revolutionary movement as the practical realisation of their intellectual (pantheistic) theses: the French revolutionaries would have put into practice the theoretical theses they had begun to develop at the beginning of the 18th century. For them, what manifests itself in History is the Power of Reason, which then only has to be deployed in the republican remodelling to conquer another part of reality, to practically embed itself in anthropological reality" (Gaëlle Demelemestre. *Les métamorphoses du concept de souveraineté [XVIème-XVIIIème siècles]*. Philosophie. Université Paris-

Est, 2009, p. 227) Their opponents, including the Irish politician and philosopher Edmund Burke (1729-1797) "(pointed out) that the man to whom the Declaration refers... does not exist, because it begins by recognising that he has natural rights, which are not distinguished from 'rights of nature', and that man never exists in the state of 'nature' to which they refer. Man never exists in abstracto, and it makes no sense to start thinking about man as if he were being constructed from a tabula rasa. A fortiori, it is absurd to try to build a political community on the basis of these 'pure' elements, which have no degree of reality" (ibid.) (see note 208 above).

(343) Ibid, p. 214.

(344) Strangely enough," observed de Tocqueville ironically, "while each individual, exaggerating his own value and independence, was tending towards individualism, the public mind was moving more and more, in a general and abstract way, towards a kind of political pantheism which, stripping the individual of even his own existence, threatened to finally merge him entirely into the common life of the social body" (Discours de M. de Tocqueville prononcé dans la séance de 21 avril 1842, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, p. 16). de Tocqueville, delivered at the session of 21 April 1842, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, p. 16). The Swiss theologian, philosopher, journalist, literary critic and historian Alexandre Vinet (Mélanges, Paris, 1869, pp. 94-5) echoed him: "In (democratic) society [...] individualism is on the throne and individuality is outlawed! The real, living being, with a heart and a conscience, is very close to being denied; he is allowed to feel alive only in the great whole of which he is a part; this social pantheism leaves him no more personality than a drop in the ocean has; he is no longer a man, he is a figure, a quantity, a function, at most an ingredient; individuals were once medals whose very rudeness had its price : Individuals used to be medals, whose very rudeness had its price: today they are écus or large pennies, and the merchant does not amuse himself by looking at their imprint as they slip through his fingers piece by piece, and piece by piece they rise again. It seems advisable that qualities that are too pronounced should be erased and that all sharp angles should become inward angles, that each person should cultivate himself only in the direction of society, which needs his talents, his wealth, his strengths, and not himself."
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(345) CH. Levêque, le mysticisme oriental. In Revue des cours littéraires, 5th year, Germer Baillière, Paris, 1867-1868, no. 1, p. 19. The neantisation of the finite in relation to the divine infinite is not, however, the same as the neantisation of the finite in relation to the divine infinite.

specific to pantheism. "Mosaic monotheism (...) bears the same imprint. Jehovah is everything and man is but dust. The God of the East, compared to man, is what the princes of the East are. He is the creator and men are his creatures. He is the creator and men are his creatures: he can therefore dispose of them, he can bring them into being and bring them to death, he can lower them and raise them, according to his own pleasure; man is to God what the earthen vessel is to the potter, no more and no less. There can be no question of human freedom or spontaneity. It is from God that comes not only the execution, but even the will; it is God who enlightens and it is God who hardens hearts; it is God who predestines both to good and to evil. With all power on one side, all that remains on the other, that is to say for man, is radical powerlessness, moral apathy and dreary resignation. The God of the East is Saturn or Moloch, who devours his children; he is the infinite who, precisely because he is the infinite, cannot tolerate an independent existence alongside him. In its presence, creation is but a shadow, an appearance destined to disappear, a wave that rises and is lost forever in the Ocean of infinite Being. Feeling, on the one hand, a real existence, convinced, on the other hand, that this existence apart and in-

outside God is unpleasant for the Supreme Being because it limits him, the individual is driven, by this contradiction which he finds in his conscience, to annihilate himself either by a violent death or by a slow martyrdom, or by a complete resignation and an absolute abdication of personality" (ibid. p. 545-46). It is true that, in Judaism, we can console ourselves by meditating on concepts such as "herout" (freedom) and, in Christianity, on the Augustinian notion of "free will", which nineteenth-century theologians did not fail to oppose systematically to pantheistic fatalism.

(346) Neoplatonism taught man that the purpose of his earthly existence was to prepare his return to the divine unity through ecstasy, i.e. intellectual abstraction and asceticism, and that the end of this evolution was constituted by "the identification of the soul with the abstract unity... by the loss of activity, of thought, of consciousness itself, that is, by the radical annihilation of (the individual) himself" (CH. Levêque, op. cit., p. 19).

(347) It is not for nothing that the sociologist and normalien Jean Izoulet (1854-1929) entitled one of his works *Le panthéisme d'Occident ou le Super-laïcisme et le fondement métaphysique de la République* (1928). See Emile Bocquillon, *Izoulet et son œuvre, L'Alliance Universitaire Française, nouv. série, n° 1 juillet 1920* [p. 3-30],

https://www.tpsalomonreinach.mom.fr/Reinach/MOM_TP_129969/MOM_TP_129969_0001/PDF/MO_M_TP_129969_0001.pdf. This title goes perfectly with that of one of his other works: *Paris: Capitale des religions ou la mission d'Israël* (Albin Michel, 1926).

(348) The first traces of administrative and political centralism can be found in the Mesopotamian despotism of the 3rd millennium BC and in the pre-Aryan matriarchal civilisation of the Indus Valley (c. 2600 BC - c. 1900 BC) (see Jacques Bêthemont, *Sur les origines de l'agriculture hydraulique. In L'Homme et l'eau en Méditerranée et au Proche Orient. II.*

Water developments, the State and legislation. Research seminar 1980-1981. Maison de l'Orient et de la Méditerranée Jean Pouilloux, Lyon, 1982. Travaux de la Maison de l'Orient, 3 [p. 7-30]; C. C.

Lamberg-Karlovsky [ed.], *Archaeological Thought in America*, Cambridge University Press, 1991, p. 365). In Europe, the Church, having experimented with it as early as the fourth century AD (see Olivier Bobineau, *L'Empire des Papes. Une sociologie du pouvoir dans l'église*, CNRS Editions, 2013, Paris; Antoine Darest de La Chavanne, *Histoire de l'administration en France et des progrès du pouvoir royal, t. 1*, Guillaumin et Cie, 1848, Paris, p. 107 et sqq), was the first institution in Europe to adopt a centralised bureaucratic government from the eleventh to the seventeenth century, and it was on this model that the centralised system of administrative powers under the Ancien Régime was formed (see Harold J. Berman, *Le Droit et la Révolution: La formation de la tradition juridique occidentale*, Librairie de l'université d'Aix-en-Provence, Aix-en-Provence, 2002; see also

<https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2020/02/11/le-droit-et-la-revolution/> and Robert B. Ekelund, Robert D. Tollison, Gary M. Anderson, Robert F. Hébert and Audrey B. Davidson, *Sacred Trust: The Medieval Church as an Economic Firm*, Oxford University Press, New York and Oxford, 1986; see also Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution. Œuvres complètes*, 7th ed. 4, Michel Lévy, Paris, 1866, p. 49 ff). It was consolidated under the Revolution of 1789. Then, "(t)he actions of Napoleon made France a paradise of bureaucracy, and it still is today (...). Twenty times, in this State, freedom has been decreed and proclaimed, and yet the forms that the army of the

(emphasis added) (Joseph Olszewski, *Bureaucratie*, Stuber, Würzburg, 1904, p. 51 et seq. Quoted in Andreas Anter, *L'histoire de l'État comme histoire de la bureaucratie*. In *Trivium*, no. 7, 2010, note 61). Saint-Simon himself called for "a social institution (...) in possession of all the instruments of production" (*Doctrine de Saint-Simon*. Exposition, 1st year, 1829, 2nd edition, Paris, 1830, p. 193).

The fact that "decentralisation" laws have been passed in democracies, as was the case in France in 1982-1983, does not mean that decentralisation has taken place in practice. Their main effect, which is what parliamentarians are actually aiming for, is to multiply the number of hideouts at all levels of the republican pseudo-hierarchy, in particular but not exclusively through the "territorial civil service" (see Raymond Couderc, *La République dévoyée*, Privat, 2001). But what of Hitler's Germany, which Julius Evola (*Fascismo e Terzo Reich*, 6th ed., corrected, Edizioni Mediterranee, p. 189) - and he is not alone - criticises for having been centralising.

First of all, Germany - and it seems we have to keep hammering away at this open door - was not born in 1933. When Adolf Hitler came to power, it had been more than a century since Germany had been subjected to the administrative centralisation imposed on it by Napoleon Bonaparte and his large family (see Jacques Droz, *Histoire de l'Allemagne*, PUF, Coll. "Que sais-je?", 2003, chap. 1).

Secondly, studies on the subject that are even remotely detailed are as rare as the preconceptions are widespread. Edward Norman Peterson, in *Limits of Hitler's Power* (2015), has begun to fill this gap, and it does not show that Germany under Hitler was particularly more centralised than under Weimar. Two first-hand accounts provide food for thought in this regard: the first is that of Hans Gisevius, a former Gestapo officer and opponent of Hitler, who, in an article, speaks of "our so-called highly centralised Führer-State" (p. 103); the second is by a German sociologist who emigrated to the United States before the Second World War and who, in one of his books, describes the decentralisation that the National Socialist State had set in motion in the final years of the war (Thomas Schaarschmidt, *Multi-Level Governance in Hitler's Germany: Reassessing the Political Structure of the National Socialist State*, *Historical Social Research / Historische Sozialforschung*, vol. 42, no. 2, 160, 2017 [pp. 218-42]).

Thirdly, Hitler believed that no matter should be decided in detail by the central authority, but independently of it and on the spot. Although he was not opposed to the general trend towards centralisation that was taking place at the time, he warned against hyper-centralisation, which, he rightly said, prevented the development of independent thought at the lowest levels of the hierarchy (see Rainer Zitelmann, *Hitler: The Policies of Seduction*, London House, 1999, p 402).

(349) Eugène Loudun, op. cit. p. 672.

(350) *Ibid*, p. 674.

(351) Alexis de Tocqueville, op. cit. 13th ed. t. 2, Pagnerre, Paris, 1864, p. 32: "L'État social". democratic society breaks down social bonds and places all individuals on the same level. Everyone is seen as

a unity of the social body, equal and similar to the others. It follows that what affects man in other words, what is democratic can be immediately generalised to the whole of society, and what affects society as a whole is seen as capable of affecting each particular individual. The affective motive in such a situation is the presumed identification of each with all and of all with each. Anything that prevents or appears to prevent, hinders or appears to hinder this identification is a source of anxiety. What undermines this identification is inequality and anything that reminds us of it or prefigures it. What an individual values in another individual or in the social body as a whole is not this or that quality or opinion, but the quality or opinion that is also his or her own. It is the relationship of equality or similarity between him and the other(s). What he hates, conversely, is difference and inequality in itself. What he loves is an abstraction; what he hates is also an abstraction" (Pierre Manent, *Tocqueville et la nature de la démocratie*, Fayard, 1993).

[*Tocqueville and the Nature of Democracy*, translated by John Waggoner, Bowman and Littlefield Publishers, Inc, 1996, p. 62]. According to de Tocqueville (*L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, *Œuvres complètes*, 7th ed. 4, Michel Lévy, Paris, 1866, p. 216-7) it was in the seventeenth century that abstraction came into vogue, and it was by the so-called upper classes, particularly among the literati and legal scholars: "When we study the history of our revolution, we see that it was conducted in precisely the same spirit that led to the writing of so many abstract books on government. The same attraction for general theories, complete systems of legislation and exact symmetry in laws

The same contempt for existing facts; the same confidence in theory; the same taste for the original, the ingenious and the new in institutions; the same desire to redo the entire constitution according to the rules of logic and a single plan, instead of seeking to amend its parts. It was a frightening sight, for what is good in the writer is sometimes bad in the statesman, and the same things that have often led to fine books can lead to great revolutions. The language of politics itself then took on something of that spoken by the

It was filled with general expressions, abstract terms, ambitious words and literary turns of phrase. This style, aided by the political passions that employed it, penetrated all classes and descended with singular ease to the lowest. Long before the Revolution, the edicts of King Louis XVI often spoke of natural law and the rights of man. I find peasants who, in their petitions, call their neighbours fellow citizens; the intendant, a respectable magistrate; the parish priest, the minister of the altars, and the good Lord, the Supreme Being. These new qualities have been so well incorporated into the old foundation of the French character that people have often attributed to our naturalness what only came from this singular upbringing. I have heard it asserted that the taste or rather the passion which we have shown for sixty years for general ideas, systems and big words in political matters, was due to some attribute peculiar to our race, to what was somewhat emphatically called the French spirit: as if this supposed attribute could have suddenly appeared towards the end of the last century, after having been hidden for all the rest of our history. The strange thing is that we have kept the habits we had acquired in literature while almost completely losing our former love of letters. I have often been astonished, in the course of my public life, to see people who scarcely read the books of the eighteenth century, any more than those of any other, and who had great contempt for authors, retain so faithfully some of the principal defects which the literary spirit had revealed before they were born.

(352) Hence, among other things, mental disorders such as 'depersonalisation' and 'derealisation', the symptoms of which appeared at the time when, in the 1970s, the number of people exposed to television increased considerably and exposure to the Internet amplified and generalised (Philippe Engelhard, *Internet change-t-il vraiment nos sociétés? t. 3: L'Internet, la science, l'art, l'économie et la politique*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2012, p. 291), "decorporalisation" has recently been added, to the great profit of psychologists and psycholeptic salesmen (Charline Zeitoun, *Peut-on se noyer dans le virtuel?*, 9 November 2016, <https://lejournal.cnrs.fr/articles/peut-se-noyer-dans-le-virtuel>).

2

Like Priape, Pan has two faces, depending on whether he appears in popular worship and mythology or in the theological-philosophical systems of the various philosophical schools of antiquity. For pre-Hellenic peoples and poets, he was an essentially rustic and pastoral divinity. For the Pythagoreans and Orphics, he symbolised universal substance. In some respects, these two faces overlap, because the *materia prima* of the philosophers is the principle of what we commonly refer to as nature or matter.

The centre of the cult of Pan in Greece was Arcadia. The Arcadians considered themselves to be autochthonous and maintained that their country was older than the moon (1), in other words that it had an origin older than that star; hence they called themselves "proselênoi" ("predating the moon", a star that was one of their most ancient divinities) (2). One of their tribes even bore the name Selenoi, and the Peloponnese, at the centre of which lay Arcadia, was reputed to be the same size as the moon. (3). The Greeks took a slightly different view, deriving the name *proselênoi* from the verb *proselein* (to attack, to brutalise) (4), in the sense of *hybrizein* (to insult). In fact, Lycophron thus that Aristotle descended the Arcadians from the Dryopes, a tribe of violent brigands who took their name from their ancestor, Dryops, son of Dia, daughter of Lycaon. According to Pausanias, Lycaon founded the world's first city, Lykoseura; in the genealogy handed down by the Greek geographer, Lycaon is given as the son of Pelasgos, 'born of the soil'. What's more, since Lake Symphale, whose birds had been killed by Hercules, was located in Arcadia and the source of the River Styx was also in Arcadia, the Arcadians were regarded as the inhabitants of a hellish region (5).

The Arcadians were a people of shepherds and farmers. They exported the products of their land to industrial nations: wood, grain, minerals, herds of goats, goats, horses and donkeys, and medicinal plants. Vigorous, they didn't use the latter, their only source of energy. remedy being the milk from their herds. The nickname "balanêphagoi" ("acorn eater"), which was given to the

had been given by their neighbours, does not necessarily indicate that they were poor; on the contrary, it could indicate that they were greedy, as roasted acorns are presented as delicacies by Aristophanes and Plato (6). It is more likely, however, that he was referring to their antiquity. Gallen (De alimen. Facult., II, C, 38), on the basis of Diodorus of Sicily (Bibl. Hist., I, 8) and Ælian (Var. Hist., III, C, 39) reports that, in the earliest times, men fed only on acorns and that the Arcadians remained faithful to this custom, whereas the Greeks abandoned it w h e n they received agriculture from Demeter. Balanophagy therefore defines a social and political state that predates civilisation (7).

This is an extremely important point for understanding the rich symbolism of Pan, the Arcadians, like all shepherds, grazed their flocks in what the Greeks called the eschatiai (confines, extremities) (8). "The scarcity of sedentary farming practices and the weakness of the population, dominated by a culture of mobility, often led the Ancient Greeks to dismiss the men who lived in the eschatiai as marginal and to suspect them of delinquency or even barbarism" (9). What's more, the eschatiai brought together flocks and herdsman from different towns (10). Artemos, patroness of wild beasts, reigned over the eschatiai, where Pan, as hunter, was subordinate to her (11). In this respect, Pan is therefore halfway between nomos and physis - we would say nature and culture respectively - an antithesis introduced by the sophists (12). This in-between position is symbolically expressed by his half-man, half-animal appearance; as for "[the] animal whose form he [partly] assumes [, he] is not quite wild. For the ancients, the goat is at an equal distance between the wild and the domestic" (13). What's more, it acts as a sort of mediator between gods and men (14).

The Arcadians were defiant, suspicious and yet hospitable. Although deeply attached to their valleys and mountains, they had no difficulty in moving abroad. The fact t h a t they were passionate about their freedom did not prevent them from seeking their fortune abroad as mercenaries. They were particularly sought after by foreign courts because - a point that will come into its own in the third part of this essay - as shepherds, they were familiar with the "fringe areas" that were the eschatiai. They were preferably employed as "information providers on the state of the frontiers", in short as spies (15). They loved war and plunder.

In spite of, or because of, their rough and uncouth ways, they had a great love of music; favoured b y the solitude and wandering of their lives, the love of music is found in all pastoral peoples. In battle, the Arcadians marched to the sound of the pipe or the flute, whose sharp, piercing notes were apt to arouse anger. Their legislators forced them to study music from childhood to the age of thirty, in order, according to Polybius (IV, 20), to "soften what was too rough and savage in their nature". Their dances and songs were among the best in the world.

most famous. One of these dances, probably of Phrygian origin (16) and very popular from the Archaic period throughout the Peloponnese, was the sicinnis (17), performed by pans and satyrs with goat heads and beards who imitated the jumps and leaps of goats on rocks (18). According to Polybius (IV, 20), an Arcadian tribe, the Cynaethians, totally neglected these institutions and ended up becoming so savage that crime was more rampant in their region than in any other part of Greece.

From the Arcadians, whose protective deity he was, Pan received his attributes, his features and habits and perhaps even his name (19). They had built many temples for him, including the one at Akakésion, near Megalopolis (20), which housed an oracle whose priestess Erato had been (21) and where a perpetual fire burned. They regarded him as a kind of supreme divinity. In any case, they considered him to be the most ancient of their gods and it was for him that they had the most veneration (22), so much so, according to Stephen of Byzantium, that his name caused the land of the Pelasges to be called Pania (23). The guardian of flocks and protector of the family, he also presided over hunting and music. According to Macrobius (Saturnalia, I), the Arcadians called Pan "Master of Matter", in the cosmogonic sense of sovereign ruler of all the material principles that form the essence of celestial bodies, or "matter".

The Egyptians named him Khem and Amon-Re, representing the generative and nutritive power of nature (25). According to Diodorus Siculus (I, 18), Pan was originally from Egypt, where, according to Herodotus (I. 2), he was one of the first eight gods.

For the Greeks, Pan, again according to Herodotus, was one of the lesser divinities and a modern invention. Unknown to Homer and Hesiod, he was no longer so to the Athenians at the time of the Battle of Marathon (490 BC). Shortly before they went into battle with the Persians, the Athenians had decided to ask the Lacedaemonians for help, and to this end had sent them the hemerodist Philippides, to whom, while en route, Pan had appeared in the region of Mount Parthenon and, after calling him "aloud by his name [...] ordered him to come to the aid of the Lacedaemonians".commanded him to ask the Athenians why they did not worship him, who was kind to them, who had already been useful to them on several occasions, and who would continue to be so in the future. The Athenians believed Phidippides' report and, when their business prospered, they built a chapel to Pan below the citadel. Since that time, they have made this god favourable to them through annual sacrifices and the running of torches" (26). The sacrifices made to him were the same as those made to Dionysus and the nymphs. (27). Cows, rams, lambs, milk and honey were offered to him (28). From there his cult spread throughout the Greek world as far as Illyria, Delphi and Thrace. In most of the places where he settled, he was worshipped in caves, w h i c h , it should be pointed out, was not the case in Arcadia (29).

The first mention of Pan in literature is in the Homeric hymns (7th-3rd century BC). The hymn dedicated to him (late 4th-early 3rd century BC) (30) refers to the

presents him as the son of Hermes and a daughter of Dryope and endows him with the attributes of the god of herds and, by extension, of the hunt, which he was, as we saw above, for the shepherds of Arcadia. At the sight of the newborn, who had come into the world with the legs, thighs and feet of a goat, two horns and a long beard, the nymphs of Arcadia cried out in horror, He wrapped him in a hairy hare skin and went to present him to the gods. "They were all overjoyed, especially Dionysus, and named the child Pan, because he had amused them all" (31). He was brought up by nymphs (32). According to Euripides (*Ion*, 501) and Ovid (*Metamorphoses*, XIV, 515), he lived in caves; according to Aeschylus (*The Persians*, 448) (33), he wandered on mountain tops or in valleys, where, dressed in a goatskin, he sometimes hunted wild animals and sometimes frolicked with the nymphs while playing the flageolet. God of flocks, wild animals and domestic pets, it was his job to look after them and make sure they multiplied (34); bees were also under his protection (35). God of hunters and fishermen (by extension, the coasts were also under his protection), he could allow them to make a good catch, just as he could prevent them from doing so (36); in Arcadia, hunters used to whip his statue if they came up empty-handed (37). The slob-god was himself a hunter-god: "The pastoral function and the hunting function go hand in hand: it is the task of a god who ensures the biological balance of the animal world to sanction the rules governing activities that could jeopardise that balance (38)". This also explains why he was a god of fertility and, more specifically, of fecundity and, consequently, of material wealth, herds being one of the main sources of abundance for Arcadians and other peoples alike (livestock farming was more developed in Arcadia than in other regions of Greece). In this respect, he is described as both the "husband of the goats" and the herdsman.

A progeny of Hermes, Pan was, like Hermes, a god of healing and a prophet. One of Pan's genealogies presents him as the son of Jupiter and Thymbris, a water nymph who is said to have passed on to him the art of prophecy, in which he then instructed Apollo, the Thymbrean Apollo, i.e. from Phrygia (39). According to Pausanias (*VIII*, 32, 11) and Apollodorus (*I*, 4, 1), he gave oracles at the temple of Akakésion through the nymph and priestess Erato.

Pan could cure the sick by incubation, i.e. by appearing to them in a dream at their request (40).

The profound reason for these two complementary attributes of prophecy and thaumaturgy is that, for the Pelasges who were the Arcadians, the earth, "the last resort of logic in search of an origin and an end, containing within itself all the principles of life and taking up all the debris left by death, was the arbiter of the growth or degeneration of all organisms. She alone possesses the talismans, stones, herbs, and various drugs, in which the vital forces are hidden.

relaxes, life or death" (41). This is why Pan, like Demeter, Pluto, Dionysus and, in general, all the deities who descended into the underworld, were healers, and why the Chthonic gods were also linked to divination, particularly in its medical application, which was incubation.

There are no representations of the god before the time when his cult spread outside Arcadia, but it is not impossible to think that the Arcadian shepherds represented him with features similar to his functions: the feet and horns of a goat, a crook and a rough air (42). The first image of him, a bronze dating from the middle of the 5th century BC, shows him slightly humanised, standing on one of his hands, like one of Priape's, probably held a lagobolon, a stick used to kill small wild animals, while the other was placed in a visor like a hunter on the prowl or a vigilant shepherd. In later times, Pan was depicted in two main forms: as a bearded goat with large horns, often with a tail and cloven hooves, who was only human in posture and general body structure, and as a brown-skinned adolescent whose only animal features were small horns or pointed ears, a characteristic of fauns and satyrs, barely distinguishable through the hair that fell elegantly over his forehead. In his animal representations, he has a disproportionate sex (43), which artists understood less as an emblem of nature's generative and reproductive force than as the mark of the unbridled penchant it was reputed to have for sexual pleasures (44). This reputation for unbridled lustfulness stemmed from the fact that the goat was known for its lasciviousness and that the shepherd himself was said to have a particular tendency towards the pleasures of the flesh.

Hence the etymology of his name given by the historian Douris of Samos (c.340-c.270 BC). According to him, the god was born of Penelope and all her suitors and it was precisely because all those who courted Penelope in Odysseus' absence had contributed to his birth that he was called Pan. (45). Like mother, like son: he is debauched (lagnos), erotomaniac (erôtikos), as lecherous as a donkey (kêlôn), has abundant sperm (polusporos) and is constantly in pursuit of prey, whether nymphs, whom he rapes in the caves, or young shepherds, consenting or not (46); in the absence of a partner, he takes pleasure himself. According to Diogenes (47), Hermes taught him masturbation, which he then taught to the shepherds. Pan is very close to goats, whose lustfulness was proverbial; he is even "the one who copulates with goats" (aigibatês); it is true that, according to one tradition, he is the fruit of the love affair between Penelope and Hermes transformed into a goat (48). The sexual act extra-marital, in all its brutality and savagery, was so closely associated with this divinity that his name was used in the composition of several appropriate expressions. "Ton Pana timan" meant "to practise male homosexuality" (49); "to do the work of Pan" referred to the act by which several men honoured a single woman (50); Euripides called the rape of a pure young girl "panos gamos" (51). Imbued with extreme savagery, Pan's sexuality was in fact

all the characteristics of madness. According to a character in Aristophanes, he could drive the entire population of an ithyphallic city mad. In the case of Menander, the passion that Pan inspires in the young Sostratus for the daughter of Cnemon is akin to possession (52).

Pan made many conquests (53), including that of Selene, whom he seduced under the guise of a ram, but he was also unsuccessful: Pitys, Echo, Syrinx.

In the three corresponding myths, Pan appears as a musician and dancer. To shed some light on their meaning, we first need to say a few words about what music and dance meant to the peoples of antiquity, and in particular those of Egypt, where four deities presided over this art (Thoth, Horus, Osiris and Hathor) and where, as mentioned above, Pan originated. The backbone of our presentation will be the theory of French musicologist Jules Combarieu (1859-1916) on the origin and evolution of music.

magical, the second religious, the third profane (54).

Technically, music, like poetry, derives from magical incantation (55). According to ancient authors, magic originated in Persia and Egypt, from where it spread to the Jews and later to Greek civilisation. Among the Persians, according to Herodotus (I, 23), the magician was responsible for interpreting a special chant, without which sacrifices were not permitted. Among the Egyptians, the word "hosion" ("sacramental conjuration") was used to designate certain incantatory formulas in the sense of "song" (56) that bewitches (57). The purpose of magical incantations was to cure illnesses, act on animals, people, things and time, provoke or thwart love, produce pregnancy, suspend or hasten childbirth, produce amnesia, evoke ghosts, bring the dead back to life, appease demons, chase them away or, on the contrary, evoke them in order to harm others. But the magical chanting eventually degenerated. In the first state, that of incantation, "(t)he morality of the operator was of no importance. But the repeated failures that result from this chimerical duel between man and the invisible spirits soon force man to become aware of his weakness and to lower his ambition. A second state then succeeds the first

The last state is represented by the use of sung prayer, which, however, is not yet conceived in the theistic sense of humility and adoration. The last state is represented by the use of sung prayer, which, however, is not yet conceived in the theistic sense of a work of humility and adoration. In pre-Christian antiquity, sung prayer "was never an act of moral sanctification; it always had a practical and self-interested purpose" (58).

Thoth, Horus and Hathor would represent music in its first (magical) phase, the first two in its demetrian aspect, the third in its aphrodisiac aspect, while Thoth would also represent it in its second (scientific-religious) phase. Brother of Osiris and related to Apollo as the god of light and the sun and identical to Bacchus, Horus was the god of harmony (59). Of all the gods, he was the one most often evoked by the practitioner, the magician, to cure a patient (60).

Thoth, for his part, "created the universe, not by thought or gesture, but by voice alone. He opened his mouth, emitted sounds with the right voice, and from his lips, as if created by the power of song, came four other gods who organised the world" (61). He was the lord of the voice, the master of words and books, the possessor or inventor of magical writings to whom nothing resisted on earth, in heaven or in Hades [...] All beings to whom he communicated incantations with his voice

Words and the voice exerted a creative power that nothing could surpass: they did not remain immaterial when they came out of living lips, but took on, as it were, tangible substances, bodies themselves animated by life and creative virtues, gods and goddesses who created in their turn" (62).

From very early on, song, music, words and dance were united. Dance obeys two of the essential laws of magic: mimicry and repetition. By imitating the person, thing or animal that is the subject of their movements, dancers exert power over it (63); and this is why it is said that Thoth taught men the "art of propriety in the movements of the body" (64). As for Hathor, mother and nurse of all the gods, sometimes daughter, sometimes wife, sometimes mother of Ra, whose "eye" she is, a female power conceived as the principle of the moist element, associated, in a relationship of domination, with the male power as the creative principle of the universe, she taught women: she presided over motherhood, eroticism, love and prostitution, as well as the activities (dance and music) associated with these last three functions (65). Her cult, which dates back to ancient times, combined orgiastic practices and fertility rituals to the sound of syrinxes, Basque drums, cymbals and crotales. "The dominant idea seems to be that of violent action exerted by the gods.

The excitement of the demonstrators ends up making them see the demons or spirits that preside over these events and putting them in some sort of contact or communion with them. The Bacchic orgy would have had the same character; its purpose would not have been to represent an accomplished fact, to rejoice in the birth or deplore the death of the god of vegetation, but rather to perform a kind of magical action, a sorcery, in order to obtain fertility in the coming year" (66).

As dance, like music, was considered to be of divine origin, the second phase in the evolution of music led to it being related, according to the principles of astronomy, to the laws of the world. The astronomical dance, which the Egyptians are said to have invented, was intended "to represent celestial movements and the harmony of the universe; the movement of the world being circular, people danced in a circle around the altar, placed in the middle of the temple like the sun in the middle of the celestial sphere; in this way, they reproduced the zodiacal circle, i.e. the series of twelve signs in which the star of the day makes its annual revolution" (67). What links Thoth to the scientific-religious phase of music is that, according to Diodorus Siculus (I, 16), the Egyptians attributed to him,

not only the invention of arithmetic, geometry and surveying, but also the discovery of the art of building instruments and the laws of music, through observation of "the order of the revolutions of the stars, and (of) the harmony produced by voices and natural sounds" (Diodorus Siculus, I, 16). In the Egyptians' conception of music, it was thus brought into contact with astronomy; "... the order of the revolutions of the stars, and the harmony produced by voices and natural sounds.

to know music, Thoth said to Asclepius, is to know the order of all things, and the place assigned to these things by the divinity" (68); "[it] seems," says Plato, "that, as the eyes were made to astronomy, the ears were for harmonic movements, and that these two sciences, astronomy and music are sisters, as the Pythagoreans say..." (69), for whom, moreover, music was a scientific speculation, a branch of mathematics: the harmonic science, also called harmony of the spheres: "[...] the same musical formulas expressed the system of sounds and the system of the universe. The interval between intonations was related to the distance between stars, just as their movements were related to the harmonic laws of music" (70).

The Egyptian priests recognised seven main sounds, which they associated with the seven vowels of the Egyptian language and the seven planets; to each of these they attributed a day, thus forming the week (71). The syrinx is made of seven pipes of different lengths. By playing, as an Orphic hymn puts it, this "playful flute", Pan "tunes" the seven planets and maintains universal harmony (72). In this theory, Pan, conceived as it were as the motor of the universe, was placed in the middle of the zodiac, either playing the chalumeau in front of a flaming altar surmounted by a star, on which a billy goat is leaning with its front legs on its hind legs, or playing the double flute seated next to a tree (73). As Egyptian, Pan was represented by the constellation Capricorn, in the form of a goat with a fish tail (74).

The laws of music came to be identified, not only with the laws of the world, but with those of man's moral life, with those that enable him to conform to life in society. This lowering of standards is illustrated by the myth according to which Osiris brought civilisation and happiness everywhere without resorting to armed force, but by "attracting and winning over most peoples by gentle persuasions and admonitions hidden in songs and all kinds of music" (75). In Egypt, although music was part of the education of priests and certain people in the service of kings, according to Diodorus of Sicily (I, 81, 92), it was illegal for nobles to learn it, as it was considered "not only useless, but harmful, because it weakens the soul and makes men effeminate" (76). For Plato, on the other hand, it was a privileged instrument for educating the soul to social harmony, provided it was subordinated to singing (77). For the Pythagoreans, too, music was "one of the purest forms of exposition of moral ideas".

(78). In classical times, young Greeks, whose aim was to develop not only their bodies but also their minds, after learning to read and write, were taught to play an instrument, flute or lyre, by a citharist; musical education was held in such high esteem that those who did not know how to tune an instrument were mocked (79). The intellectual and moral education of the young Greek continued, after adolescence, under the aegis of Dionysus, the god reputed to have civilised and liberated mankind through theatre and music. The art of music had penetrated the theatre, which was still religious and was becoming institutionalised. It was at this time that incantation "was [transformed] into religious lyricism

socially organised" (80). In the choral performances and lyrical dramas to which the great Dionysia were dedicated, imitation of divine legends was gradually replaced by the imitation of human legends and that of real life, for the sake of edification (81). In tragedy, much to Aristotle's regret, the chorus, made up of "mere mortals, increasingly took precedence over the actors, who represented heroes. Tragedy was becoming an entirely secular form of entertainment (82).

Of course, music was a pleasure from quite ancient times, as the following passage from Diodorus of Sicily (I, 35) (83) illustrates to some extent: "While Osiris was in Ethiopia, it is said that he was presented with a race of satyrs whose loins are covered with hair, and that he admitted them to his retinue; for, being a lover of joy and taking pleasure in musical choruses, he had with him a large troop of musicians. In the midst of this troop were nine young girls skilled in the art of singing and possessing various sciences. The Greeks called these maidens the Muses and placed them under the guidance of Apollo, who called them Musagela. Osiris received these satyrs in his procession, whose dancing, songs and games brightened the moments devoted to rest". In Egypt, as we have already seen, it was forbidden to teach music publicly, but members of the ruling classes, whose musical education was limited to the few songs they had learnt by heart from the priests and who "never thought it appropriate for their rank to acquire the slightest skill in this genre themselves" (84), were allowed to include music in their public and private entertainments and to welcome into their homes musicians who could entertain them and whom they paid generously. After Alexander's conquest of the country and the transformation of Alexandria into a cosmopolitan and, therefore, intellectual and commercial capital, the taste for music increased and musicians sometimes acquired such great influence that it was through their intermediary that the most sought-after favours and jobs were sought from kings and queens (85). The

The Ptolemies strongly protected and encouraged music and in particular the art of the flute. Nero before his time, the eleventh of the Ptolemies, a cruel, debauched and cowardly prince, was not afraid to appear in public in clothes similar to those worn by flute-players (86). The Alexandrians in particular were so practised at playing the flute that "the lowest class of people, who did not even know their letters, would immediately grasp the slightest mistake that could be made, either in plucking the zither or in playing the flute. The art of playing the flute was brought to such a degree of perfection in Alexandria that Alexandrian flute-players were sought after and called upon from all quarters; people were happy to have them; they never thought they were paying too much for their art; their fame and glory were celebrated by the poets" (87).

In Greece, the aedes, who were originally priests from Thrace, were generally attached to a court - similarly, in Egypt, most musicians were attached to a patron or a nobleman, a temple or a palace (88). At the time of the Trojan War, "poetic inspiration was everywhere. There was no land without its aedes. They still sing of the gods, but above all they celebrate the glory of heroes: they charm the kings' guests with marvellous tales, and they prelude

to the splendid creations of the epic. All minds are open to these delicate pleasures: the peoples are no less sensitive to them than the shepherds of the peoples themselves. The aedic is no longer a god, nor the son of a god: he no longer gives birth to the prodigies of the aedes of old; but he is still a divine man, and universal respect surrounds the favourite of Apollo and the Muses. Ulysses slaughtered all Penelope's pursuers; he inflicted the same fate on his unfaithful servants; but he left the life of the aede who had sung at the feasts where the absent man's heritage was devoured. When Agamemnon left for Troy, he entrusted the care of Clytemnestra to a devoted aedic; and Aegisthus only succeeded in corrupting Agamemnon's wife by removing the guardian of her virtue. After the kings and the heroes, after the priests and the soothsayers, interpreters of the divine will, or rather alongside them, the aedists dominate, with all the height of genius and thought, the swarm of free men and slaves". (89). They also surpassed it in their vanity, which was not appeased by the institution of music competitions at the beginning of the sixth century BC, when they seem to have been replaced to some extent by rhapsodies. In classical times, the names of great musicians were handed down to posterity through public archives, and statues were erected to them (90).

Having given an overview of the functions of music and the status of musicians in ancient Egypt and Greece, we can move on to examine the myths relating to Pan as a musician and dancer.

In the writings of Theocritus, Propertius, Longus and Lucian, the nymph Pitys, loved and pursued by both Pan and Boreas, gave her preference to Pan, so that the latter, in a rage, threw her off a rock. Gaia, moved by pity, turned her into a pine tree, in other words, if we may use this neologism, cybelled her (91). Since then, the story goes, the pine has been animated by the same feelings that the virgin had had for her two lovers; it crowns Pan with its foliage: it moans when Boreas blows (92); and it sheds tears (the resin that it lets flow out and deposits on its trunk or branches when it is agitated by the north wind). The rustle of the wind in the boughs of the forest is repeated by the echo of the mountains.

Hera, having realised that one of the nymphs in her retinue was trying to occupy her attention with her chatter while Jupiter was in pursuit of the nymphs, punished her by turning her into an echo, "that is to say, into a person who is not master of her tongue, who does not know how to speak first, who cannot keep quiet when spoken to, who only repeats the last sounds of the voice that she hears". (93). Perhaps," suggests the author of these lines, "the imagination of the Latin poet [Ovid] had something to do with this too witty explanation" (94). According to an older fable, which the Greeks may have invented to explain the origin of this acoustic phenomenon that occurs in the mountains, where they believed the nymphs lived, Echo was "a beautiful virgin, nourished and brought up by the Nymphs, instructed by the Muses in the art of song, the flute and the syrinx; friend of the solitude, she shunned the society of gods and men and refused their love. The jealous god Pan

of her musical talent, angered at not being able to enjoy her beauty, one day incited all the shepherds of the region to a furious frenzy, who rushed upon the virgin, tearing her to pieces and scattering her limbs all over the earth. Gaea gathered up her remains and buried them. Since then, Echo has had no more. She is everywhere. But in the midst of death, she has retained the gift of music, the ability to imitate and reproduce all the sounds that strike her ears" (95). In the Orphic Hymn to Pan, which predates both the *Metamorphoses* and the writings of Longus, Pan is described as the one "who [loves] [...]. This complicity is echoed by Nonnus, who says that at the start of the battle between the Indians and the army of Dionysus, which Pan had accompanied to India, "syrinx who leads the army mixes her 130 accents; leaving her rocky voice, the Echo of Pan becomes Echo of the sea; she sends back the warlike echoes that she repeats last" (96). The bond between Pan and Syrinx is the same as that between Pan and Pitys and Echo. "In the valleys, the whistling of the zephyr through the reeds has taught the men of the fields, as Lucretius says, to fill hollow chalumeaux. Pan is therefore a musical god, the inventor of the syrinx. In mythology, the shepherds' chalumeau became the nymph Syrinx who, pursued by Pan, fell into the river Ladon: where she fell, reeds grew that the god cut to make an instrument to which he gave the name of his beloved'. When the distant rustle of the wind whistling through the pine forests of Menale reached the ears of the Arcadian shepherds, it was Pan's music they thought they were hearing" (97).

If, as the nineteenth-century French Hellenist Paul Decharme suspects, Ovid's imagination "may [...] have had something to do with [the] all-too-spirited explanation" of the myth of Echo, then perhaps it is not only Ovid's imagination that is at work here.

He himself indulges his fantasy, identifying Pan with a wind that has so little to do with the violent character of this divinity as the "gentle zephyr". In Nonnus of Panopolis, where (II, 115-119) Pitys, closely associated with Syrinx and Echo (98), is not only not in love with Pan, but also spurns him; no mention is made of Boreas, even if "her absence is [...] compensated for by the fact that Pitys appears as a companion of the breezes" (99) and Pan, implicitly, as a representation of the violent winds. In fact, "[i]n general, mythology has used the billy goat (norr. buckr, to hit; cf. lat. pugnus, fist; pugna, fight) to symbolise the sudden and violent gust of wind; all the more so as these gusts of wind are as sudden and capricious as the jumps and horn blows of billy goats. In Greek mythology, the gusts of wind that frequently rise unexpectedly in the mountains of Arcadia were personified in the god Pan, who was represented in the form of a goat, and whose name, derived and contracted from Paian (p. Pavians, Heurtant; cf. lat. pavio, to strike), designated both the wind that strikes and the goat that blows its horn. As a personification of gales, the god Pan is said to be the Lover of Echo (who responds to gales of air or wind), and he plays the Syrinx, a wind instrument symbolising the caverns (gr. Suringes) of Arcadia, which resounded when gusts of wind blew into them" (100). Both the syrinx and the echo can be seen as extensions of Pan - in the Homeric Hymn to Pan, Pan seems to be presented as the very source of the acoustic phenomenon of the echo (101) - extensions of a sexual nature, due to the ithyphallic nature of the pipes that make up the syrinx (102). Pan uses them as bait to hide the fury of his desire from his prey. The

The preference that the stupid Midas gives Pan over Apollo at the end of the famous musical joust between them suggests, however, that the lure is as crude as the sound of the flute is sweet. "Ironically, the flute, symbol of frustrated and sublimated premarital desire, was played during the pre-marital rites of passage for young girls (103). The aim was to make them fertile, but also, perhaps, to prepare them for the Bacchanalia, at whose ceremonies, says Abbé Bertrand, "the flute was played as a symbol of the sublimation of frustrated premarital desire, "married women of commendable gravity presided...". (104), where the drums were beaten by the hands of the women (105) and those of the priests, while the latter "[also] sounded [...] the concave cymbals, [striking] the spirit [of the followers] with terror by the hoarse and threatening sound of the cornet combined with the accents of the high flute" (106); and, why not, the orgies of Bendis and Cotito, or Cotys, celebrated in Thrace and which seem to have been reserved for women (107). "The muse Euterpe carries a flute in her mouth. Aristotle says in the Politics that the muse has her mouth busy and her hands occupied just like a prostitute who, using her lips and fingers, inflates her client's physis in order to raise it to the bottom of his belly, so that he emit his seed" (108). Erato, who, as mentioned earlier, had been the priestess of an oracle in a temple dedicated to Pan on the side of Mount Akakésion (109), was the mousa of erotic poetry and mimicry.

Lyres and zithers, upright, transverse or double flutes and, from the New Kingdom (110) onwards, drums and guitars - these were the main instruments used in Egypt and the rest of the world. with the exception of the guitar, in Greece (111). The flute, which we will focus on here (112), is certainly one of the very first musical instruments introduced into Egypt (113), where Herodotus (II, 69 and 48) says he heard it played at the festivals of Bubastis and, by men and women, at the orgiastic festivals of Bacchus-Osiris (114). It has been said that music originated in man's particular taste for noisy demonstrations (115), a taste that made Pan Cybele's minister and companion - Pan's flute was an attribute of Attis (116), Cybele's goddess and an attribute of Dionysus (117). Temple priests marched to the sound of the flute and the people were summoned to ceremonies and sacrifices by the sound either of lotus flutes or of a horn-shaped instrument whose invention was attributed to Osiris. According to legend, music, or at least the study of music music, had been introduced into Greece (118) by the companions of Cadmus, called Curetes in Phoenicia and Corybantes in Phrygia, after Rhea had brought this son of Agenor, king of Tyre, from Phoenicia to Crete to watch over and educate the young Zeus. In the Iliad and the Odyssey, music accompanies song; there is no mention of instrumental music. The Dactyli, as Cadmus' companions in Crete were called, introduced the flute to Greek music and the music to the cult of Greek divinities. The flute was used from the outset in the worship of the mother goddess on Mount Ida and in other mountainous regions of the country (119). The flute tops the list of instruments proscribed by Aristotle, on the grounds that it "is not a moral instrument" and that it "is good only for arousing the passions" (120). Now, it is very interesting that, according to Horapollon, "flute" in Egyptian meant "insane man", while a word from the same family referred to insanity (121).

It is remarkable that, in ancient times, insanity and the apparitions and frightening phenomena that could provoke it were sometimes attributed to the wrath of Pan (122). Pan was even considered to be the cause of nightmares (123) and, according to Artemidorus of Daldis (second century AD) (I, 37), he was later equated with the demon Ephialtês (nightmare), because "panic terror (124) holds the middle ground between hallucination and nightmare" (125): a waking nightmare. In most myths relating to nightmares or hallucinations, these states are attributed to the influence of satyrs or demons in the form of goats and have a very pronounced sexual character.

The expression "panic terror" comes from the fact that Pan, in the Titans' war against Jupiter, used a conch shell as a trumpet to frighten the Titans (126). Anyone terrorised by Pan is called panoleptos, and his symptoms are those of epilepsy (127). The Greeks believed that goats were particularly prone to epilepsy and that eating goat meat and wearing goatskin clothing encouraged the development of this nervous disease (128). Epilepsy was considered to be a particular form of theolepsy. It could be inflicted by

Pan, the mother goddess or other divinities, but never by Apollo, Eros, the nymphs or the muses (129).

In the Cratylus, Socrates examines two opposing positions on language: that of the disciple of Heraclitus, who "claims that everything has a name of its own and is appropriate to it by its nature, and that the name is not a conventional sign made up of articulated sounds", and that of Hermogenes, for whom the correctness of names is merely a matter of convention. To Cratylus he replies that the relationship of words to things is fluctuating and that words can therefore be misleading, while to Hermogenes he suggests the opposite, namely that words correspond to the things they express. He then examines the etymology of a hundred or so words, both common and proper, including, in the case of the latter, 'Pan' and 'Hermes'. According to him, 'Hermes' comes from 'éiréin' ('to speak') and 'Pan' means 'all', 'all things', following in the footsteps of the philosophers of the Pythagorean school, the first to 'speak'. interested in etymology, who had identified Pan with the universality of things by virtue of a pun on pân, the singular neuter of the adjective pâs ("all") (130). Hence Socrates characterises Hermes as the inventor of language and discourse, and Pan, his son, as the word or the brother of the word, in a tirade which also makes the god the father of the sophists: "Well, but this name of Hermes seems to relate to speech; the characters of interpreter, messenger, skilful thief, deceiver of words and skilful merchant, it is to the power of speech that all this activity is linked [...] To speak (éiréin) is to make use of speech, and the word that Homer uses in many places - mēsato (he imagined), he says, this word is equivalent to scheming. It is on the basis of these two elements that the god we are talking about, the one who imagined language and speech - [now, legéin is éiréin] - the lawgiver prescribes that we call him, so to speak: "Men," he tells us, "the one who imagined speech (to éiréin émēsato), you would rightly call him Eirémês. But we think we are embellishing his name by calling him Hermes (131).

What interests Socrates here is the dual nature of Pan, the word or brother of the word. Like Pan, half-man half-goat, the logos unites two natures. "...[T]he true part of speech has something smooth and divine about it, it dwells up there among the Gods; the false part dwells down here in most men, it is rough and has the nature of a goat..." (132). But the distinction is soon blurred by one of Socrates' customary semantic sleights of hand. "The goat, tragos, is a foul and hideous animal. But from tragos came tragedy, tragedia, a kind of poem in which the expression of myths (at least that's Plato's opinion) rises to the highest point of nobility. So the absolute distinction between the two natures, the express disapproval of one, the exclusive praise of the other, are still only illusions..." (133). All things considered, then, divine things and earthly things, truth and lies, are identical. Hence the hypothesis that the logos of Cratylus constitutes the first formulation of the logos of the cosmogony of the Hermetic books (134): "What is above corresponds to what is below and what is below corresponds to what is above".

In Socrates' etymology of Pan (all), the archaeologist and philologist Georg Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1856) sees an allusion to the symbol of universal substance that was the symbol of the divinity Egyptian deity with which the Arcadian divinity had been identified by Herodotus and therefore believes, even if there is nothing about it in the invocation Socrates makes to this divinity at the end of the Phaedrus (135), that he has grasped its higher cosmological aspect, which is particularly evident in the Hymn to Pan. This hymn is one of a series of texts dealing with theological subjects that spread throughout Greece from the sixth century B C onwards under the names of the most famous aedists, including Orpheus (hence the name Orphic hymns). Their authors' aim was to revolutionise Greek religion by introducing mystical and ascetic ideas that were linked to the religious traditions of Phrygia, Phoenicia, Syria, Assyria, Persia, Egypt and India and were unknown to the Greeks, except to those initiated into the mysteries, where the corresponding doctrines were taught (136).

Here is the Hymn to Pan: "I invoke Pan, universal substance of the world, the sky, the deep sea, the earth of varied forms and the imperishable flame. These are but scattered members of Pan. Goat-footed Pan, wandering god, master of storms, who makes the stars roll and whose voice represents the eternal concerts of the world, god loved by herdsmen and shepherds who love the clear fountains, swift god who dwells in the hills, friend of sound, god cherished by the nymphs, god who begets all things, procreative power of the universe, inhabitant of the underworld, irascible god, armed with the horns of a goat by the will of Jupiter ; on you rest the solid limits of the generating earth, the roaring waves of the eternal sea and the ocean that envelops the earth with its salty waves; on you rest a portion of the air and fire, the powerful element of all things, the base of the eternal flame; to you are subjected all the divine elements: Your powerful commands change the laws of nature, and you can increase the number of years of mortal life as you please. Almighty Father, triumphant father, accept these libations; allow my life to have a just and favourable end, and remove from the bounds of the earth all panic-stricken terrors (137)." In another Orphic text (138), Pan is called "omnipotent Nature, alive for all, eternal virgin, the end of the world".

infinite of all things, common to all and unknown in its secret depths, born of itself without a father, bearing within itself all the divinities, father and mother of all". As the principle of the universal generation of beings, Pan was also called Phanes (139). Most often, however, in the Orphic fragments, it is Jupiter, the androgynous Pelasgic Jupiter, who is substituted for Pan and Nature: "Jupiter, the god who commands the thunderbolt, unites all the gods in himself; Jupiter is the first and the last, the beginning and the centre of everything, and nothing was made without Jupiter. Jupiter is the immortal father and mother of nature; the earth and the starry sky have no other source and no other base than Jupiter. Jupiter is the breath that animates the world, the soul of fire that spreads everywhere. Jupiter is the source of the sea, the sun and the moon. Jupiter is the sovereign God, the true Father of all that is.

is the only strong one, the only God, the great principle of all being, the only supreme Being, in whom all is contained, fire as well as water, earth as well as air, day as well as night, and the Intelligence that preceded all things, and the Love that charms all things" (140). In yet other Orphic fragments, the supreme god is Dionysus (-Zagreus) (141), also a symbol of universal life, a divine and sensitive personification of the soul of the world.

What characterises Orphic theology, then, is a mystical-rationalist background, a pantheism coupled with a strong monotheistic tendency (142), a cosmogony in which the mythical narratives are no more than a pretext for scientific conjunctures (143), a morality based on both asceticism and eudemonism, and a palingenesis doctrine of the future life.

The whole of Orphic thought can be described as rationalist, firstly because it follows in the footsteps of Hesiod's efforts to resolve the problem of the origins of the world and of man and to systematise a cosmogony in which, at the time he wrote it, was in a state of chaos, due to the proliferation of often disparate myths (144) and, secondly, because it is the origin of the critical spirit, which in turn gave rise to historical thought (145).

The pantheism of the Orphics is mystical-scientific in the sense that they "returned the gods to the elements from which they were born, fire, water, air, sun, moon, day, night and the stars. They also said that the primitive physical agents had given birth to the divine generations. Since all these cosmic elements were born of the creative and eternal principle, the gods were reduced, in the final analysis, to a single god or single cause, the beginning, middle and end of all beings. This god was conceived as being spread throughout the universe; he was a pantheic divinity who merged with the soul of the world" and who bore different names, including, as we have just seen, Pan, Zeus, Dionysus (146). The monotheistic pantheism of the Orphic doctrine was summed up in formulas such as "Zeus is one, Hades is one, Helios is one, Dionysus is one; there is one god in all things" or "Zeus is the first, Zeus with the dazzling lightning is the last; Zeus is the head, Zeus is the middle; everything comes from Zeus".

To the view that the supreme divinity is the soul of the world, the vital principle, the Orphics added a moral doctrine, the dualism of which is also indicative of the many borrowings they made from Phoenician-Syrian and therefore Semitic religious traditions (147). "Just as the principle of life that leads all beings to their development and their end, the principle of goodness, is personified in the god, so everything that hinders their progress is represented by their enemies, the Titans. For Hesiod and Homer, the Titans were natural forces in their primitive, brutal and unbridled expansion; they had been tamed but not destroyed by the intelligent power of Jupiter: by becoming the enemies of Bacchus, this second Jupiter, they now represent only the energy of evil, hateful and malevolent passions. The history of the world is thus summed up in the struggle between Bacchus and the Titans, the two opposing principles that it originally contained within itself" (148). Man reproduces this mixture of good and evil of which the world is composed, for, according to another Orphic myth, he was born from the ashes of the Titans, who, after devouring the limbs of Dionysus, were consumed by lightning. These ashes contained fragments of the god's substance. He is a composite of Bacchus and the Titans, of good and evil. "We must consecrate ourselves to Bacchus, fill ourselves with his divinity, devote ourselves to his law, in order to achieve, with his help, the fullness of life. and, consequently, to that happiness of which it is the source" (149). The human soul, which is immortal, strives to regain its original purity. In the meantime, it is condemned to earthly life, imprisoned in a body that is its tomb. "As long as it remained imprisoned in its shell, it resembled the dead man at the bottom of the tomb, the prisoner in his dungeon. Conceived in this way, life looked very different to the Orphics than it did to the Greeks of Homeric times. From As long as the soul was considered to be imprisoned in the body, it had to be admitted that it underwent a punishment; life was therefore offered as a punishment inflicted for previous offences, for sins committed in another existence; and, on leaving its envelope, the soul had to pass into other bodies and go through a whole cycle of existences, intended to purify it gradually" (150). The theory of palingenesis, part of a movement of religious ideas born in post-Vedic India, had spread to Assyria and Egypt, then to Greece, where it was popularised by Pythagoras, who had borrowed it from the Syro-Phoenician cosmogonies (151). Orphism made it its own in all its egalitarian connotations (152).

Here on earth, therefore, man had above all to think about freeing himself from the "circle of generation", and the only way for him to achieve this was to atone for his sins once and for all. Hence the need for initiation, which, according to the Orphics, was the only way to understand their dogmas. "When the time comes to die, the soul of the initiate will know how to guide itself through the Underworld, thanks to the instructions of the funeral ritual and the formulas it has learnt. It will avoid the fountain of Lethe, where the profane are imprudent enough to quench their thirst; it will drink only from the life-giving fountain of Mnemosyne. She will repeat the words that disarm the infernal gods and enable them to recognise the initiates. If she is completely purified, she will find favour with Dionysus-Hades and with Coré-Perséphone; she will come out of the 'circle of generation' to mingle with the heroes, to return to the gods and herself become a 'goddess'.

divinity. If it has not yet erased the original stain, it will have to start a new earthly life and, in the meantime, it will dwell in the Underworld. But during this interval between two existences, the initiate's soul will already be privileged. In the beautiful meadows and sacred woods of Persephone will lead a calm and pure life, enlivened by conversation and games, in the company of the subterranean gods. The profane, on the other hand, will be plunged into a mire of darkness. Criminals will be relegated to the depths of Tartarus, and no doubt tortured by demons; or else, like the Danaids, they will be condemned to constantly draw water from a sieve. Moreover, these infernal punishments, like the rewards of the initiates, are only relative and temporary: the true punishment lies in the indefinite return to earthly existences, just as true happiness lies in the return to heaven after complete expiation" (153).

The central elements of the Orphic mysteries, which were celebrated at night, were as follows: "a series of purifications and prayers, in particular a prayer in the form of a hymn in which a priest implored the protection of the gods for all present; bloodless sacrifices and libations (thuèpoliè, spondè, loibai, epiloibai); the revelation or representation of sacred legends, such as the myth of Zagreus, the abduction of Persephone, or the descent into Hades (ieroi logoi); finally, the rite of omophagy (154) and the revelation of the liturgical formulas that were to guide the soul to the Underworld" (155), enabling it to be recognised by the infernal divinities and thus to attain bliss by merging with this "blessed race" (156). Two similar Orphic initiation formulas are of particular interest to us: "Fortunate and blessed, you will be a god instead of a mortal. - Goat, I have fallen into milk" and "From mortal, you have become god; goat, you have fallen into milk" (157); which "goat" seems to refer to Dionysus-Eriphios (158).

According to Maury, the Orphic teachings entered the Mysteries and became their doctrine (159). They spread far and wide. Plato, while casting doubt on the efficacy of the Orphic purification rituals and even presenting the Orphic priests as impostors (160), recognised that their conception of the soul and the post-mortem contained a kernel of truth, which he incorporated into his own exposition of the nature and destiny of the soul (161); not even his theory of love is unaffected by this. was not influenced by the Orphic conception of Eros as universal harmony, a force capable of reconciling opposites (162). The Orphic theogony then passed into the Neoplatonic school of Alexandria and, from there, into orthodox Christianity, via Clement of Alexandria, who was already deeply influenced by Alexandrian Neoplatonism (as well as by Stoicism) (163).

There are in fact remarkable similarities between Christianity and Orphism, which were first highlighted by the Italian archaeologist Vittorio Macchioro (1880-1958) (164). " Orphism, he declares, is in fact a revealed religion, with its own prophets and holy books. Zagreus, its god, is a god whose martyrdom is followed by a resurrection. It is also a mystical resurrection, at the same time as the atonement for an original sin, which is promised to those who receive it.

initiation. While the latter will live after death in union with the divinity, eternal torments are reserved for the uninitiated. Life is a trial that must be passed by purifying oneself through asceticism" (165). Moreover, like Christianity, Orphism taught the immortality of the soul and Providence and, in Europe, perhaps even before Pythagoreanism, with which it has many points in common (166). As Voltaire was quick to point out (167), it was the first doctrine to proclaim the existence of a single, supreme god: "Walk in the path of justice, worship the only master of the universe; he is one, he is alone in himself, all beings owe their existence to him; he acts in them and through them; he sees everything, and never has he been seen by mortal eyes" (168). But isn't Orphism pantheistic? It is; but, contrary to a very widespread view, there is no solution of continuity between the pantheist doctrine and the monotheist doctrine: from the idea of the existence of a soul of the universe, "an expression that sums up pantheism in its entirety" (169), there necessarily followed that of the unicity of God and finally that of a single god.

During the second and third centuries AD, mainly as a result of the increasingly massive influx of Eastern populations into Rome (170), there was a resurgence of pagan beliefs relating to the various Eastern cults that had invaded Rome at the beginning of the Empire, of which Christianity was an integral part. The mysteries, which had been neglected, came back into vogue, starting with those of Eleusis. The mysteries of Mithras appeared and soon rivalled those of Isis and Serapis in importance. Under the influence of Alexandria, which had become the main centre of literature and philosophy, the myth of Isis and Osiris, enlarged and spiritualised, fired the imaginations and hearts of those who, unable to live in this world, were particularly inclined to believe in an afterlife. The revival of mystical passion for the cult of Cybele can be explained in the same way. The magicians had taken over from the philosophers. The cult of demons flourished. Founded by the philosopher Ammon Saccas (born at the end of the second century AD), whom tradition has made an apostate Christian, Neoplatonism attempted to reconcile philosophical thought with the needs of faith and, through its pantheism and dualism, anticipated the Christian heresies. Against Christianity and Christians, the philosophers, whether neo-Platonists or others, drew up an indictment using philosophical, religious, historical and literary arguments: their doctrine was judged incomprehensible, their morality impracticable. Their faith was described as "insana" and "dementia", and their writings were mocked for their plethora. They were accused of being foolish, ignorant, bores, villains, sissies and magicians, and of using their fables to set women against their husbands, children against their fathers and slaves against their masters. Their morals themselves were considered dissolute, even inhuman (171). "Those who continued to turn towards the East to receive its light seemed to be saying that it had not yet dawned on the world; they were proclaiming insufficient the divine response that Judea had given to the passionate questioning of the Jews.

They set the pagan East against the Christian East, and sought rival beliefs for the new religion as close as possible to its birthplace. Thus the trend which had been so favourable to the spread of nascent Christianity", namely, on the one hand, philosophy, which had undermined the cult of the Hellenes before undermining the foundations of the mos maiorum, and, on the other, the

mystery cults, "soon became an obstacle to its spread; the ally of the early days became an adversary" (172). The Christians sought to muzzle it through negative apologetics, i.e. polemics. The time had not yet come when, with Christianity established as the state religion, they would be able to demand that the emperors close down "pagan" temples once and for all.

Two c u r r e n t s emerged in apologetic literature in the first centuries of our era, many of whose arguments were borrowed from Judeo-Hellenistic literature (173): The first, represented by Justin and Hippolytus, attacked "paganism" in its entirety, while conceding a general analogy between ancient wisdom and the teachings of the Gospels, discovering in the myths a presentiment of certain Christian dogmas and, in the philosophical theory of logos, an anticipation of the idea of the Incarnate Word (174) and admitting certain similarities between the divinities and heroes of "paganism" and the characters of biblical history. Of all these heroes, Orpheus was undoubtedly the one who seemed most useful to the apologists, because o f his immense popularity among the Gentiles.

Orpheus' name appears for the first time in a fragment by the lyric poet Ibycos (6th or 7th century BC), who lived at the court of Polycrates of Samos and who, despite the fact that Orpheus is not mentioned by either Homer or Hesiod, describes him as "illustrious" (175).

Orpheus was the son, according to tradition, either of Apollo and the Muse Clio, or of Oeagros, King of Thrace, and the Muse Calliope. As a child, Apollo, or Hermes, had given him a lyre, which the Muses had taught him to play. Pindar (Pythicus, IV) called him "the father of the lyre and of song". Aristophanes (c. 445-c. 380 BC) describes him as one of the earliest poets. With his song and his lyre, he charmed wild animals and the infernal powers, and set rivers, trees and stones in motion. The power of his music prompted the Argonauts to ask him to accompany them on their expedition to Colchis. He performed a number of vocal and musical feats, one of which made a decisive contribution to the success of the expedition. When the sirens tried to attract the Argonauts with their song, Orpheus made them forget them with the melodious chords of his lyre. On his return to Thrace, he settled in a cave in a region inhabited by the Ciconians, a savage tribe of people cannibal. He civilised them (176), teaching them to live on fruit. He became their king and married Eurydice, or Agriopè (177), with whom he had a child, Museum, who became the first priest of the mysteries.

of Eleusis (178). Orpheus had been initiated into the mysteries by his father, who had learned them from his own father, Tharops. According to other sources (179), it was from Egypt, where he had stayed, that Orpheus brought back the institution of the mysteries, the doctrine of the expiation of crimes, the cult of Hecate Chthonia, the principles of astronomy and the doctrine of the other life, as well as, according to the Byzantine writer Tzetsès, the "mysteries of the gods".

magic, i.e. witchcraft (180). Pliny the Elder is not far from referring to him as a sorcerer, in a passage of his Natural History on which mythologists prefer to cast a discreet veil (181).

In the whole of Greco-Latin literature, Strabo is the only one, along with Pliny, not to paint a flattering portrait

d'Orphée, in Géographie (VII, 21) even less commented on and even less quoted than Hist. Nat. XXX, 2: "At the foot of Olympus is the city of Dion. Next to it is a village called Pimpleia. It is said that Orpheus the Cicon lived there: a charlatan (goês) who began by begging, making use of music and, at the same time, divination and celebrations of mysteries; then, believing himself worthy of greater things, he acquired a crowd of followers and assumed power."

To return to the story of Orpheus and Eurydice, Eurydice died a few days after her wedding, bitten on the heel by a snake as she fled along a river from Aristaeus (182). Orpheus' most famous journey, immortalised by Virgil but already known to Plato, Pindar and Euripides (183), is his descent into the underworld in search of his dead wife. Catabasis seems to be nothing other than the mythological transposition of the practice of evoking the shadows of the dead (184).

Moved by the chords of his lyre, the infernal divinities agreed to give her back to him, on condition that he did not look back until he had escaped from the underworld. Impatient to see her again, Orpheus could not help but look back: Eurydice disappeared forever. However, according to the elegiac poet Hermesianax of Colophon (3rd century BC), Orpheus succeeded in bringing Eurydice back from the underworld. In fact, Orpheus triumphs over death in all versions of the legend prior to that of Virgil (185), with the exception of Plato. Plato tells us that Orpheus returned from the underworld empty-handed, the local deities having shown him only the ghost of his wife, on the grounds that he had not had the courage to offer his life in exchange for hers, after she had been bitten by a snake (186). Plato adds that he died precisely as a punishment for not offering to die in his wife's place. In other traditions, he dies of grief at having lost Eurydice, or is struck down by Zeus for having revealed the mysteries to men, or retires to Mount Rudolph in the sole company of the animals, which he attracts with his songs and his lyre. The most widespread myths have him dying on the banks of the River Hebre, in Thrace, torn apart by the Maenads, either because he had abandoned the cult of Dionysus, or because he had become a misogynist and given in to unnatural inclinations, or because he refused to reveal the mysteries, and so on. The Maenads gathered up his scattered limbs and buried them at the foot of Olympus, then threw his head and lyre into the river, whose waters carried them as far as Lesbos (in the same way as the waves of the Nile had carried the head of Osiris as far as Byblos) (187), where they were placed in a temple of Apollo at Antissa. His head gave oracles there; his lyre, placed by Zeus among the stars at the intersection of Apollo and the Muses, formed the constellation of the lyre. The age of his death is not known.

By the end of the fifth century, the Orpheus legend was almost complete.

For poets and the general public alike and, as we saw above, for most philosophers and historians, Orpheus was a real person, a theologian, poet, musician and prophet who lived before the Trojan War, because of the prodigious diversity of his talents, the unusual variety of his knowledge and the unusual number of his wonders and exploits, some concluded that there had been not one, but several historical figures bearing the name Orpheus. On the contrary, Herodotus implicitly disputed the existence of Orpheus, arguing that he knew of no poet before Homer and Hesiod.

(188). What seems beyond doubt is that at least one Orpheus existed and that he was not the author of the texts which, from the sixth century onwards, were spread in Greece under his name and later called Orphic writings. Some of these texts were written in collaboration with members of the Pythagorean school (189) by the chresmologist Onomacritus (6th century BC), who was based at the court of the Roman Emperors.

of Hipparchus, son of Pisisstratus; Herodotus considers him to be an "arranger", i.e. a forger (190), of oracular poetry (191). Whatever the case, the aim of this literature was to replace Hellenic worship with religious traditions borrowed from the East, by mixing them with conceptions of which themselves originated in the East, but were more familiar to the Greeks.

Around the middle of the third century BC, it was the turn of Alexandrian Jewish circles to use Orpheus for their own apologetic purposes. The opinion, spread by Diodorus of Sicily (192) and alluded to above, was that Orpheus had travelled to Egypt, been initiated into the mysteries of Isis and transported this institution to Greece, combining it with the mysteries of Dionysus. The Jewish apologists of Alexandria seized upon this legend and modified it on one essential point, recounting that the teachings Orpheus had received during his journey to Egypt were not those of the Egyptian priests, but those of Moses, who had converted him to monotheism and that, on the point of dying, he had left his son a testament in which he confessed to never having ceased, contrary to what his writings might have led one to believe

theological doctrine and urged him to convert to Judaism himself. Fortunately, the manuscript of the "Testament", a poem written in Greek hexameters, was discovered shortly after the Alexandrian Jews revealed its existence (193). Justin, Clement of Alexandria, Eusebius and Theodoret were among the many ecclesiastical writers who considered it authentic.

(194). In the second century BC, the Jewish historian Artapan of Alexandria still referred to Moses as the master of Orpheus.

The Testament of Orpheus was written for two purposes: firstly, to persuade the Greeks to abandon polytheism and embrace monotheism, which Orpheus had been the first to spread, albeit in a veiled manner, in Greece; and secondly, to strengthen the faith of the Jews by showing them that the theology of Greece, whose civilisation they admired, could be traced back to a disciple of Moses (195). The Jews of the Hellenistic period had likened Orpheus to Moses because they were both theologians and prophets, and both had founded a religion of the book; the representatives of Roman Judaism likened Orpheus to David mainly because of their common gifts for the arts.

singing, music and poetry and therefore prophecy: "not only were they both celebrated by their respective peoples as exceptional poets, singers and musicians, not only did they both play a plucked string instrument, but in certain traditions, admittedly marginal, they were even said to have made their instrument themselves. But the kinship doesn't stop there.

Just as Orpheus was supposed to have composed a poetic and theological work in which he sang of the genealogy of the gods and the creation of the world, David was regarded as the author of sung poems, the Psalms, *tehillim*, which the Jews venerate as the highest and most worthy expression of divine piety and praise. In the same way that song and music

The Scriptures tell us that God conferred a similar power on David's harp and song, a power that enabled him to free King Saul from the evil spirit that had seized him and made him melancholy (1 Samuel 16:23). But above all, because of its peaceful and reconciling effects on human beings and the most hostile animal species, the song and music of Orpheus can be likened to the

The universal reconciliation of animal species and the peace that is supposed to be established by the coming of the Messiah announced in the prophecy of Isaiah 11:1-9: 'A shoot will come from the stock of Jesse (David's father), a branch will grow from its roots [...]'"; under his reign "the wolf will live with the lamb, the leopard will lie down next to the kid, the calf and the young lion will be fed together [...]. The cow and the bear will be friends, their young will share the same bed. The lion will eat straw like the ox. The infant will play on the cobra's hole; the child will lay his hand on the viper's lair. There will be no harm or destruction [...], for the land will be filled with the knowledge of Adonai, as the waters fill the sea" (196).

Early Christianity took on the Orphic heritage of Judeo-Hellenic syncretism. Not that Christian apologetics was without its discordant voices in this respect. Some apologists (pseudo-Clement, Athenagoras) considered Orpheus' theology and theogony sacrilegious, his catabasis illusory (Origen) and, as the founder of the mysteries, he was considered (pseudo-Hippolytus, Epiphanius) to be the inspiration of all heresies. On the whole, however, the figure of Orpheus is valued. Cyril of Alexandria made him the forerunner of orthodoxy; Didymus blinded him, the herald of the Trinitarian doctrine (197). The pseudo-Justine, Clement and Theophilus quote the Testament to prove that Orpheus was a monotheist. By showing that he had been profoundly influenced by Mosaicism, the Christian apologists intended to make him an example for all those who had not yet converted to Christianity: since such an important and famous figure of "paganism" as Orpheus professed belief in a single god, pagans would necessarily imitate him. To encourage them to do so, two episodes from the Orpheus story were taken up in Christian literature and mosaics. The legend of Orpheus and Eurydice, dealt with mainly in the first and early second centuries AD, refers to Jesus Christ's own descent into hell (but also to "Christ also suffered once for sins, he who was just for the unjust, that he might bring us to God, having been put to death in the flesh, but having been made alive in the Spirit, in whom also he went and preached to the spirits in prison", 1 Peter, 3:19); to reinforce the comparison between the two figures, Orpheus' undertaking is crowned with success: just as Jesus resurrects, Orpheus brings Eurydice back from the underworld.

(198). The theme of Orpheus charming the wild beasts with the sounds of his lyre, less common than that of his catabasis in the first two centuries of our era, becomes more frequent from the third century onwards. They are linked: just as Orpheus had used his eloquence to persuade the infernal divinities to return Eurydice to him, so, like Christ "taming the hearts of rebellious men by the power and grace of his word" (199), like the "branch (that) shall come forth from the stock of Jesse, the father of David" and through which "the wolf shall dwell with the lamb, the leopard shall lie down with the kid, the calf and the young lion shall be fed together, a little boy shall lead them" (Isaiah, 11:1, 16), Orpheus, by his song, appeases the ferocious animals, symbols of the baser instincts, the lower nature of man. Both are conceived as peacemakers. In the Protreptic of Clement of Alexandria, "Christ, the new Orpheus [...] is presented, one might say, in 'bucolic' terms in the most Virgilian sense, I mean as the most parietal of those singer-enchanters whose song creates cosmic peace, and re-establishes in the universe a transcendent harmony between man and divinity: Alone in truth," says Clement, speaking of Christ, 'he tamed the most difficult animals that ever were, human beings [...], he ordered the universe with measure, and subjected the elements to the discipline of harmony, to make of the whole world a harmony [...]; having tuned this microcosm, man soul and body, he uses this instrument of a thousand voices to celebrate the divinity, and he himself sings in harmony with this instrument [...].

In Christian funerary art, Orpheus is "no longer the tamer of wild and ferocious animals, but the guardian of a flock of peaceful sheep that represent the people of God, docile and submissive to the charming words of Christ" (201). The "good Shepherd" (John, 10:11) - Peter (I, 2:25) calls Christ "the shepherd and bishop of our souls" (202) - is the one who watches over the salvation of souls and leads them to salvation (203). Orpheus is thus endowed with a soteriological dimension that had hitherto been completely absent from the myths about him (204),

even though, as mentioned above, Orphism was a religion of salvation. From the third century AD, Jesus Christ is sometimes depicted with a panpipes in his hand (Gregory of Nazianzus calls the pastoral staff the "shepherd's flute") (205).

Once Christianity was declared the state religion by the decree of Theodosius I (392), Orpheus lost his usefulness in spreading Christian monotheism.

The pastoral representation of Christ in the form of Orpheus, which, perhaps also under the influence of Hellenistic Judaism's assimilation of David to Orpheus (206), appeared in Christian engravings, mosaics and funerary paintings as early as the third century AD (207), was not the least passed on to the High Middle Ages, "where typological treatments of pagan myth began to appear in the form of the myth of Christ" (208).

took hold universally of Christian writers and [...] the instructive analogies between [these two figures] would [either] evolve towards other moral and didactic conceptions" of the Orpheus legend (208), or extend those that were current in the primitive Church.

From late antiquity onwards, the main sources for Orpheus's adventures are the *Mitologiarum libri* (late fifth or early sixth century AD) by the African bishop Fulgentius, Boethius's highly renowned *Consolation of Philosophy* (c. 524 AD) (209), Ovid's *Metamorphoses*, the *Noces de Philologie et Mercure* (fifth century AD) by the African from Carthage Martianus Capella and Servius' scholies to the works of Virgil (late fourth century AD). Until the fifteenth century, all this literature gave rise to commentaries in Latin, then translations into the vernacular, in the form of didactic allegories, which were no longer condemned by the Church (210). Their subject is the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice. Two main currents of interpretation can be distinguished, one moral, the other rhetorical, which often intersected and to which a "courtly" reading was added towards the beginning of the fourteenth century.

In *De Oratore* (211), Cicero declares, contrary to the rhetors of the time, for whom all means were good for persuasion: "... wisdom without eloquence is of little use to States, but [...] eloquence without wisdom is often only too fatal, and can never be useful". In his view, the art of expressing oneself with persuasive elegance is nothing without the ability to reason and instruct according to the principles of philosophy. The Ciceronian formula was taken up by Augustine (212), and exploited by Martianus Capella in his *Noces de Philologie et de Mercure* (213), an encyclopaedic manual from which he drew his inspiration.

the trivium and the quadrivium. "The education of man, like the formation of the world, was reduced to two things, speech and numbers, and to two all-embracing ends, eloquence and wisdom. Three paths led to eloquence: the art of speaking correctly, of thinking rightly and of saying well; or speech elaborated by grammar, sharpened by dialectic, expressed and embellished by rhetoric; the word in all its purity, force and beauty: that was eloquence. It took a longer and more arduous path to arrive at wisdom or science, which were identical. But everything was summed up in numbers. There was the number, multiplying or decomposing into infinite combinations, arithmetic represented by the unit; there was the abstract, absolute number, immutable in the ideal expanse, or geometry, whose emblem was the binary; there was the number moving through the spaces created, and carrying the celestial bodies and the world in the orbs of an immense whirlpool, astronomy of which a sphere was the symbol. Finally, the seven strings of the lyre were still missing one. When all these chords resounded together, harmony was awakened in the soul, music appeared, like the concerts that Pythagoras heard in the distant worlds and in the depths of his soul. This was man's complement, the consummation of wisdom" (214). From the sixth century, with Fulgentius, to the sixteenth century, with the Venetian poet Niccolò degli Agostini, Orpheus and Eurydice were invariably associated with eloquence and wisdom respectively (215).

From the moral point of view, adopted by Boethius and, in his wake, by many exegetes throughout the "Middle Ages", Orpheus represents the man who turns away from the supreme good to enjoy material goods and Eurydice represents desire (216), in other words, according to the Platonic theory of the soul on which Boethius drew, the soul which, unable to fight the immoral passions that arise in its body, gives in to concupiscence.

Virgil, in Book IV of the *Georgics*, was the first to describe Orpheus as a lover, human and desperate - but also, it should be noted, as a homosexual (217). In the *Banquet*, two types of love are distinguished: "legitimate and celestial love, that of the muse Urania" and "vulgar love", "which is that of the muse Polymnia", two types of love that Plato equates, because he believes that love governs music, with two types of music. In a passage in the *Phaedrus* about lovers who have been separated from their wives, "Orpheus is accused of not having the courage to die for his wife and of having descended alive into Hades to bribe the infernal gods. As a result, all they agreed to give him was a phantasm (phantasma) of his wife, not his wife herself. In this short story, it is first and foremost the poor quality of Orpheus' love that is criticised, but Phaedra attributes this defect to the fact that his soul was weak, because he was a citharède. For Phaedra, then, Orpheus' taste for music and song is a sign of the weakness of his soul, which explains his lack of courage. As a result, the Thracian singer is not admitted to the ranks of true lovers, for his *erôs* is as illusory as his art. The spectral apparition (phantasma) that Orpheus receives confines his power to the realm of illusion and shows that, for Plato, this form of art is incapable of representing 'reality', which is attained by the highest *erôs*, discussed in the speech by Diotime" (218). Since, in *De Consolatione Philosophiae*, Boethius, in line with Plato, himself recognises two forms of love, and makes Orpheus' love for Eurydice directly responsible for his failure, it is logical to think that he also follows Plato's judgement on the quality of the citharède's love.

These two interpretations, one moral, the other rhetorical, of Orpheus's *catabasis* coexist among certain writers of the period. Thus, for the philosopher and grammarian Guillaume de Conches (1080-1154), Orpheus represents "sapiens", "eloquens optima vox" and Eurydice "concupiscentia naturalis" and "boni iudicatio" ("the judgment of the good" or "of what is good") (219), qualities which the writer makes a point of explaining to us are in no way contradictory. This is because "natural concupiscence" is "the judgment of the good", "because what each one judges to be good, whether it is or not, he ardently desires" (220). Orpheus' enterprise may have failed, but it is *nonetheless* a quest for the highest good. Just as, for Plato (*Republic*, 436-441), peace is the result of a balance between the three parts of the soul, the *thumos* (its concupiscible part), For de Conches, who reduces these elements to two, the soul's union with God can only be achieved through the combined efforts of the intellect (Orpheus) and the passions (Eurydice). In his commentary on Boethius's *Meter* 12, the Dominican monk Trivet (c. 1258-c. 1334) suggests that, even if "Orpheus's ascent to heaven is difficult" (221), it continues. The path that the Renaissance would resolutely follow was thus open to a positive re-evaluation of the myth of Orpheus in the underworld. This path had been paved throughout the "Middle Ages" by a courtly reading, characterised by the rehabilitation of the two protagonists and, to begin with, their humanisation. This was already apparent in Virgil, and was enshrined by Alfred the Great in his translation of the *De Conciliatione* around 900. As the essayist and professor of literature and civil servant Guillaume Guizot (1833-1892), Boèce "glided" over Orpheus's pain, "using antitheses", while Alfred concentrated "on the true inner drama of the human soul".

(222). But," Alfred whines with an inverted lyricism that foreshadows the sentimental complications of the roman courtois, "love may hardly, nay, cannot be denied! Alas and well-a-day (223)!"

Pierre Bersuire's commentary (c. 1290-1362) of the *Metamorphoses* and *L'Ovide moralisé* (early 14th century), the first vernacular translation of Ovid's poem and also the first commentary on the myth of Orpheus' descent into hell, in which Eurydice is identified with Eve, marked a return to the apologetic method of certain Church fathers, the first by explaining that the myth of Orpheus' descent into hell was an allegory of Christ's marriage to the human soul, killed by the poison of sin in the same way that Eurydice had died bitten by a snake, the second by equating Orpheus with both David and Christ and comparing Orpheus' catabasis with Christ's descent into hell (224). The great popularity enjoyed by the moralized Ovid in courtly circles at the time (225) shows, however, that he was also susceptible to a completely secular interpretation, and as for Bersuire's Orpheus Christus, who descends into hell to save humanity by singing a verse from the Song of Songs, he saves Eurydice because he does not look back and then makes perfect love to her.

The *Roman de Perceforest* (c. 1330) makes Orpheus the force of love. The author of the *Règles de la seconde rhétorique* (early fifteenth century) describes Orpheus as a loyal lover (226). In the Middle English narrative poem *Sir Orfeo* (c. 1300), which combines the myth of Orpheus and Eurydice with elements from the

In Celtic mythology, the King of England (Orfeo), an accomplished harpist, loses his wife, who is kidnapped by the king of the underworld, sets out to find her after abdicating, wanders for ten years in the woods, discovers the entrance to the underworld, charms the king with the sound of his harp to such an extent that he agrees to return Lady Heurodis to him, with whom Orfeo then returns to court, where he is once again crowned king. Nobility of language, politeness, humility, devotion, loyalty, courage, intelligence, moderation - there is hardly a virtue of courtly love that is not found in *Sir Orfeo*, with this exception

that they fall within the framework of marriage and that, presented as a source of misfortune when practised outside this framework, as is the case in *Tristan and Isolde*, they are synonymous with happiness (227). From the twelfth century onwards, all the novels of Chrétien de Troyes, with the exception of *Le Chevalier à la Charrette*, attempted to reconcile love and marriage, as did his epigones in the thirteenth century. However, this was merely the novelistic translation of the principle of mutual consent of the spouses to marriage, a principle - introduced into canon law in the thirteenth century - which, along with that of pure and simple exogamy, was at the root of the model of marriage that the Church sought to replace the traditional system of alliances specific to the aristocracy, whose aim was rather "to unite property than persons", to strengthen lineage ties and to contract alliances (228). Villon (1431- c. 1463) complained that "foolish loves make foolish people" (229), among whom he included Salomon, Samson and Orpheus.

Ignored throughout the "Middle Ages" (230), Pan re-emerged in art and literature in the 15th century. Formerly hosts, according to an ancient belief that persisted until the 5th century and well into the future, of "places inaccessible to men [...] forests, woods, sylvan sanctuaries, lakes, springs and rivers" (231), fauns, satyrs, silenias, sylvas, fonts, etc., now decorated, painted or sculpted, the castles. The image of Pan "asserted itself in society and the aristocrats did not fail to have a few examples sculpted to adorn their palaces; the name 'Pan' spread everywhere among the noble classes..." (232). The Orphic hymns were in fashion.

The rediscovery of Pan in the 15th century was entirely due to the patronage of the Medici family. After the fall of Constantinople, Greek scholars had fled to Italy, where, welcomed by this family of merchants and bankers, they introduced Italian scholars to the works of antiquity that the "Middle Ages" had ignored, starting with Plato, Plotinus, the neo-Platonic Proclus, the Corpus Hermeticum and, in particular, the Hymns of Pan, the neo-Platonic Proclus, the Corpus Hermeticum and, specifically, the Orphic Hymns, which the philosopher, poet, priest and canon of Florence cathedral Marsilio Ficino, appointed by Cosimo de' Medici to head the Platonic academy he had founded in Florence, was commissioned to translate.

I had the impression that Orpheus had been resurrected ("Pensai che Orfeo al mondo ritornasse")," wrote Lorenzo de' Medici - who, like his no less illustrious ancestor (233), was himself paragonized to Pan (234) - in his poem "Altercazione", after hearing Ficino play the lyre (235), while Poliziano (1454-1494) declared that "his lyre [...] much more effective than that of the Thracian Orpheus, has brought back from the underworld what constitutes [...] the true Eurydice, that is to say Plato's wisdom in all its extent and in all its forms".much more effective than that of the Thracian Orpheus, brought back from the underworld what constitutes [...] the true Eurydice, that is to say Plato's wisdom in all its extent and aspects" (236).

I, an unworthy priest," writes Ficino in the preface to Vita, "had two fathers, Ficino the physician and Cosimo de' Medici.

The first recommended me to Galen, physician and Platonist, the second to the divine Plato. Thus, both dedicated Marsilio to a doctor: Galen, doctor of bodies; Plato, doctor of souls" (237). After studying medicine and theology, Ficino cultivated music. Medicine, theology and music were one and the same for him: "You must remember," he said to a friend who was devoting himself to philosophy, "that nature has united in us the body and the spirit with the soul. The body is indeed cured by medical remedies. But the spirit, which is an aerial vapour of the blood and like a knot linking the soul and the body, is tempered by aerial perfumes and sounds and nourished by them. Finally, as the soul is divine, it is purified by the divine mysteries of theology. In nature, a single being is composed of a soul, a body and a spirit. Among the Egyptian priests, one and the same faculty was held by those who had faith in the doctors and the mysteries.

May we acquire this natural and Egyptian faculty with a success as great as the efforts and good will with which we seek it (238)!" Music and song seemed to him to be a means of bringing the human soul into contact and harmony with the cosmic soul, in order to relieve the suffering of the human spirit.

symptoms of afflictions of the spirit, in particular melancholy, from which he himself was afflicted and, ultimately, to free the soul from the prison of the body, so that it could reunite with the divinity, from which it emanated

(239). He was simply developing the views of Boethius and the Neoplatonists of Alexandria on the *musica mundana* (music of the spheres) and the *musica humana* (human music) (240), views which would remain predominant until the seventeenth century (241). But singing and music were still just instruments of love, a fundamental concept in Ficino's philosophy, because it "explains the relations between the different levels of reality, between the macrocosm and the microcosm, between man and his fellow men, between man and God"; love is "that power which, by its magic, communicates and maintains harmony within the universe" (242). In the Orphic Hymn to Venus, love is presented as the principle that governs the universe. In the Orphic and, in all probability, Phoenician-inspired (243) theogony of Pherecydes, Pythagoras' teacher, the world does not begin with formless, obscure chaos, as in the ancient Greek poets, but, as in the Phoenician cosmogonies (244) that inspired Abraham (245), with a living, creative god: Zeus, "the first principle [...] the principle of union and love, Eros, who fecundates nature; he is the Demiurge, the architect who harmoniously lays out the edifice" (246). "God [is] love" (1 John 4:7-12, 13-17) (247) ?

To bring the human soul into unison with this unique divinity, Ficino recommended singing the Orphic Hymns in particular. Orpheus, he claimed, was convinced that the Thracian was the author of these hymns, in which he "proclaims that Apollo by his vital rays sustains health and life over all, and drives away disease" (248). Ficino was convinced that both Pythagoras and David had practised what we now call music therapy (249). According to him, Orpheus was, after Hermes Trismegistus, the second link in a golden chain whose others were Moses, Pythagoras, Plato, Plotinus, Proclus, etc., who had basically taught the same morals and dogmas in different forms, and whom Ficino, with the blessing of the Pope (250), was keen to bring back into unity and reconcile with Christianity. According to Ficino, knowledge of God, the ultimate goal that all religions set for human beings, is based on four conditions, which he calls "furores": there is a *furor poeticus* (poetic or musical), *mysterialis* (Bacchic or mysterious), *vaticinium* (Apollonian or prophetic), and *amatorius affectus* (amorous), all of which are embodied by Orpheus, poet, theologian, prophet and lover, all at once. What all four figures have in common is that they act solely through words, and more specifically, through skilful speech designed to charm, seduce or indoctrinate. The Orpheus they remember, he and Polydore Virgil, in their *De rerum inventoribus* (1499), reprinted many times from 1499 onwards (251), is therefore not the Orpheus whom Pliny suspects of having introduced witchcraft to Thrace, nor the charlatan whom Strabo saw in him, but the civilising hero whom Horace had celebrated in the Poetic Art: "Priest and interpreter of the gods, Orpheus turned men living in the woods away from murder and a degrading life; it is said that he softened tigers and lions. full of rage" (252) with his lyre.

From Hermetic philosophy and the courtly novel, the character of Orpheus was transported at the end of the 15th century to music, and more particularly to lyrical theatre.

In 1480, Le Politien, drawing his inspiration from the *Bucolics*, the *Georgics*, the *Metamorphoses* and the *Amours*, composed *La Favola d'Orfeo*, said to have taken two days to write.

Aristaeus' love for Eurydice, her flight and death, Orpheus' lamentations, his descent into the underworld and, having become homosexual, his death at the hands of the Bacchae. The groundwork had been laid for a theatrical genre that can be considered to have been laid with the first performance of Monteverdi's *L'Orfeo* (1607), and which has its roots in the Dionysian tragedies: opera. " *L'Orfeo, favola in musica, da Claudio Monteverdi, rappresentata in Mantova l'anno 1607 & novamente data in luce, al serenissimo signor D. Francesco Gonzaga, principe di Mantova, & di Monferato, &c, patron of the Italian composer, was the original version of L'Orfeo, favola in musica, da Claudio Monteverdi, rappresentata in Mantova l'anno 1607 & novamente data in luce, al serenissimo signor D. Francesco Gonzaga, principe di Mantova, & di Monferato, &c, patron of the Italian composer. Very quickly, the conviction took hold that opera "increases the prestige of the sovereign and the prosperity of the States" (254). It was considered a political instrument (255), a veritable form of political discourse, and Orpheus, whose myth, since *L'Orfeo*, has served as the theme for nearly two hundred operas (256), as the "model of the prince of peace to come" (257), the new politician whom The Prince portrays and compares to an artist (258). Had Orpheus not himself held political office (259)?*

Of the sophist Protagoras, this "professional of knowledge" (260), Plato (261) says that he "charms people [most of them foreigners] in the manner of Orpheus, by the sound of his voice, and it is by his voice that they follow him, once they are under his spell" (emphasis added), and "charm" is to be taken here in the etymological sense of "enchantment", a magical operation (262). Presented in all the operas in which he appears during the "Renaissance" both as a musician and poet and as a civiliser and initiate for an audience which, until the beginning of the nineteenth century, consisted essentially of aristocrats, and therefore statesmen (263), Orpheus is precisely the prototype of the sophist in whom contemporary theorists such as Machiavelli see the ideal statesman He imposes good government (264) through "the magic of art".

(265) and this art is that of speech and song (266). "Orpheus is the statesman or legislator who, through his gentle speech (*dolce parlare*), adapts men to life in society" (267) and, above all, obtains the consent of the people. In Chapter IX ("How a captain must be learned and a fine talker to know how to dissuade or persuade") of Book IV of *The Art of War* (268), the power to "enchant" a crowd is precisely related to speech: "To make a small number of individuals adopt or reject an opinion is not very difficult; for if words are not enough, force and authority are employed; The real difficulty is to destroy in the minds of the multitude a fatal error, contrary to the public interest and to your [the Prince's] designs (for Machiavelli, "the interests of the people do not necessarily coincide with the interests of the 'republic'") (269). "The prince must practise demagoguery and manipulate opinion through skilful rhetoric, which appeals more to the imagination than to reason, which spares the public mind and pretends to respect its prejudices in order to deceive it better" (270). This success can only be achieved through a discourse which, if everyone is to be

persuaded, must be heard by all" [emphasis added] (271). Soon, in Great Britain, the poet and courtier Sir Philip Sidney (1554-1586), the writer and literary critic George Puttenham (1529-1590) and the poet Edmund Spenser (c. 1552-1599) were extolling the virtues of Orpheus, who, they claimed, had shown that poetry could be used in the service of politics (272). The playwright and poet Thomas

Middleton (1580-1627), in *The Triumph of love and antiquity* (1619), written on the occasion of the investiture of the new Mayor of London, Sir William Cokayne, addressed him as follows: "Every one of the magistrates who govern us might well be called a mighty Orpheus (273)". Almost two centuries later, the man of letters and politician de Boissy d'Anglas (1756-1826) probably had Horace's Orpheus in mind, when he wrote about one of the most spirited orators of the 1789 Revolution, in the *Essay on national celebrations* that he addressed to the Convention in 1794: "

Robespierre, speaking of the Supreme Being to the most enlightened people in the world, reminded me of Orpheus teaching men the first principles of civilisation and morality (274).

Until the end of the 17th century, Orpheus was portrayed as a diplomat, an aristocrat or a courtier. (275) and, like Cosimo de' Medici, portrayed as Orpheus around 1539 by Agnolo Bronzino (1503-1572), more than one European monarch dreamt of, or was compared to, Orpheus (276). Courtiers, nobles or the sons of downgraded nobles were expected to know how to "play the pen as well as the foil, [to be] able to sing, dance, paint and write poetry, to court women in the fashionable language of neo-platonic love" and to be "universal" (277) and, above all, to know how to pretend in order to succeed, rather like the Orpheus mentioned by Strabo (278).

Now that we have examined the use made of Orpheus by the first current of Christian apologetics in the first centuries of our era and its philosophical, artistic and literary extensions into politics in later periods, it remains for us to look at the fate reserved for the Orphic figure of Pan by the second current.

Represented by Tertullian and Tatian, among others, it

"This does not prevent him from drawing weapons against idolatry and anthropomorphism, the main criticisms levelled by Christians against "pagans" (279).

philosophers" (280), "auxiliaries of Christians without knowing it, and working not for the same purpose, but often perhaps for their own benefit" (281).

As early as the sixth century BC, several historians had suggested that certain divinities in the Greek pantheon were men deified after death; the Stoics followed suit (282), and Evhemerus simply applied this theory to all these divinities, thus denying their supernatural nature and consequently their very existence (283). The sceptic Lucian of Samosata (c. 125-180 AD) had ridiculed the practices and divinities of "paganism" (284) as well as the... philosophers and... Christianity. In fact, sceptics had been demonstrating since

The contradictions between the various philosophical systems and the opposition between the schools that professed them have long been apparent.

Their third imputation against "paganism", namely the demonisation of the gods, the first Christians borrowed from Judaism. Deuteronomy, 32:17 said, "They have sacrificed to idols (shedim) which are not God." In Psalm 96:5, "all the gods of the people (elohim) are idols (elilim; literally 'naught')". Now, in the Septuagint, "elilim" was translated as "daemonia".

" (285). 1 Corinthians 10:20 drove the point home: "I say that what is sacrificed is sacrificed to demons and not to God; and I do not want you to have fellowship with demons." Electrified by these The Christian apologist and philosopher Athenagoras (133-190) opened the hostilities by equating the gods of "paganism" with material images devoid of any divine character, whose names were taken over by demons, and with statues used to deceive men and lose them (286). In the "West", at the same time, identical arguments were put forward by Tertullian (c. 155-c. 220). Two centuries later, Augustine explained that "the gods of the nations are foul demons who, taking advantage of the opportunities offered them by the souls of the dead, or taking the form of creatures of this world, aspire to pass for gods" (287). At the beginning of the fourth century, Eusebius of Caesarea (265-339) interpreted the "death of Pan" in this way, as Plutarch had echoed in his treatise *On the disappearance of oracles*. Of all the stories of polytheistic antiquity, it is the one that has "given rise to [the most] interpretations in the field of European-Christian culture" (288).

Plutarch tells us: "When evening came, as we were within sight of the Echinades Islands, the wind died and the ship was carried by the waves close to the Paxas Islands. Most of the crew were awake; many were still drinking and had finished their supper. Suddenly a voice was heard from one of the islands of Paxas, calling loudly for someone called Thamus. Everyone was astonished. This Thamus was an Egyptian pilot, and there were not many among the passengers who knew him even by name. The first two times he heard his name called, he remained silent; but the third time, he answered. Then the invisible interlocutor, giving intensity to his voice, said: 'When you reach Palodes, announce that the great Pan is dead. When we heard these words," continued Epitherses, "we were all terrified, and we consulted each other as to whether it would be better for Thamus to carry out this order, or whether he should ignore it and disregard it.

Finally, it was agreed that if the wind blew, Thamus would pass by without saying anything, but that if they were held up by a dead calm, he would repeat the words he had heard. When the ship was When he came to Palodes, as there was not a breath in the air and the waves were calm, Thamus, looking down from the stern, repeated the words he had heard being spoken: 'The great Pan is dead'". The first, Eusebius of Caesarea (289), based on the etymology of the name of the deity, understands "Pan" as "the totality of the demons, that is to say the gods or demi-gods of Greco-Roman polytheism, driven out by Christ". The "death of the great Pan" therefore attested to Christ's triumph over the "pagan" deities. This was the interpretation that prevailed until the end of the fifteenth century, when it was brutally overturned.

Throughout the sixteenth century, idylls, epigrams and epitaphs continued to refer only to Pan and the other divinities sung by Ovid and Virgil (290). Many great figures are identified with Pan in literature. In an eglogue by Claude Roillet to congratulate the Cardinal of Lorraine on his return from a trip to Italy, Thyrcis, Lycidas and Menalque, three shepherds in the style of Virgil, recount the journey of Daphnis (the cardinal) to Rome, where, led by a favourable wind, he receives the most gracious welcome from the god Pan (the pope). Pan promises to take care of the flock of Paris (the city of Paris) and, as a token of his word, gives him first rank after himself. Daphnis returned to his homeland filled with glory and Menalchus offered him a song, which was the most flattering gift for the cardinal (291).

Marot composed, in the manner of Virgil, an Eglogue to the king under the names of Pan and Robin. Nicolas Goulu and Bertaut, in *Discours sur le trespas de Monsieur de Ronsard* (292), compare the poet's death to that of Pan in the Christianised form (293) that he had been tending more and more to adopt since, in 1497, in his commentary on the *Fastes*, the humanist Paolo Marso (1440-1484) had asserted that the death announced by the mysterious voice in Plutarch's "Death of the great Pan" was in fact that of Jesus Christ (294). What led him to make this "abhorrent interpretation", as Rabelais ironically described it fifty years later in chapter 27 of the Fourth Book (1552), was the fact that he thought he recognised in Plutarch's account traces of the Osirian cult and that, as he pointed out, there were many points in common between the Egyptian deity and Christ (295) and even, more generally, between the Egyptian deity Adonis and Christ (296). Marso also justified this connection by the phonetic similarity between Thamos, the name of the Egyptian sailor to whom the death of the great Pan was announced, and Tammuz, the name given to Adonis in Syria. The idea was taken up again in *Silva de varia leccion* (1542) by the Spanish poet and chronicler Pedro Mexia (1497-1552) (297), and then by a friend of Cardinal du Bellay, Guillaume Bigot, in his *Christianae Philosophiae Praeludium* (1549) (298).

that the "whole" whose death had been proclaimed under Tiberius was Christ himself would be popularised, in France, by Rabelais and Marguerite de Navarre in her *Comédie de la Nativité de Jésus Christ* (1540) and, in England, in E. K.'s commentary on Spenser's *Shepherd's Calendar* (1579) (299), as well as in Milton's *Hymn of Nativity* (1629), and ended up competing with (300), or even obliterating, the reading of Eusebius, including in esoteric Christian circles, where, however, Pan, Jupiter's goddess, generally continued to be conceived, as in Orphism, as the symbol of nature's creative power (301).

The sixteenth century "reacted against Christianity by rehabilitating flesh and life; it reacted against it by becoming passionately attached to the universe, which it enlarged through science; - it reacted against it by conceiving of a progress that would have the earth itself as its theatre : and it was therefore natural to represent him by this satyr [Pan], so crudely sensual at first and so eager to live, like a character from Rabelais, but whose poetry is so fiery afterwards, and who revolts against the old beliefs, and who announces the emancipation of man, and who adores the world, the universe, the All" (302): this is what Victor Hugo did, three centuries later, in "Le Satyre", inserted in the section of *La Légende des siècles* entitled "Sixteenth century: Renaissance. - Paganism".

It is true that "the Renaissance was in reality [...] the death of many things; on the pretext of returning to Greco-Roman civilisation, we took from it only what had been most external, because that alone had been able to be expressed clearly in written texts ; and this incomplete restitution could only be highly artificial, since it involved forms that had ceased to live their true life centuries ago" (303), on condition that it be specified that the Greco-Roman civilisation that was supposed to be resurrected was no more than a shadow of its former self, Phagocytosed as it had been by Semitism, and that, as a result, what had been making a comeback in Europe since the fourteenth century, in a much purer form than that conveyed by the Church, was a Semitic vision of the world and, with it, a Semitic way of leading men (304). "Politics [began to be] seen as a sheepfold affair" (305).

France, tired of the Wars of Religion and the civil war they had provoked, was longing for peace and quiet. A new genre of novels, the pastoral, fulfilled this longing by singing of the happiness of the inhabitants of the countryside. In an idyllic natural setting, shepherds and shepherdesses live out their days happily in innocent simplicity; "[having] nothing to do [...] [their] sole and capital concern will consequently be social relations" and, to begin with, the "social relations" of their lives.

love (306), most often platonic, occasionally disturbed only by the sensual irruption of a satyr, among others Pan. "These men and women desire each other, pursue each other, avoid each other, and finally practise the profession of love. War plays just as much a part as is necessary to mark the nobility of the characters; Celadon would not be the ideal lover if he never had a sword in his hand. But he quickly puts it back: he is a gentleman, not a soldier" (307).

As a deterrent to the alienation and corruption of worldly life, the pastoral was read precisely in the city and at court (308).

The most widely read pastoral novel of the time was *L'Astrée* (1610-1627).

The *Astrée* has a temple, built by a Pan or an Egyptian, who, with Syrinx, stands at the entrance to the fountain of the Truth of Love. D'Urfé's shepherds offer him sacrifices. In the pastoral drama, the character of the rapist is present, either in the form of the satyr, who, like Pan, fails and appears somewhat ridiculous, or in the guise of the shepherd, who does not make us laugh because he is not as clumsy as the satyr, but in *L'Astrée*, the shepherd never imposes sexual intercourse by violence; Rape is committed either by a barbarian or a tyrant, or by a monstrous stranger, who, by contrast, values the "honest friendship" which, for d'Urfé, faithful in this to neo-Platonism and the moral programme of the Catholic counter-reformation, love relationships should consist of (309). In Virgil's novel, the shepherds were already very talkative and polite with the "weaker sex". "The shepherds of the pastoral novels were already beings almost devoid of any apparent vital 'imperialism', driven by a desire to be with the 'weaker sex'.

the only courtly eroticism, and, for the most part, artisans of delicate poetry. Urfé also turned them into aristocratic salon talkers and metaphysicians of love. In so doing, he succeeded in transporting the most refined culture under the thatch and suggesting that the state of nature is an accomplished social state".

(310). From the first half of the sixteenth century, L'Astrée had a great and lasting influence on French society, "profoundly modifying the relations between the various classes of society, regulating manners and habits, and creating, so to speak, the politeness and urbanity of our nation. One of the most remarkable effects of this novel was to bring men of letters closer to high society and even to the court. The great lords no longer required proof of nobility from those they admitted to their salons. The only conditions required to claim this honour were the practice of those gentle and delicate virtues which shed such a calm and pure light on the novel of L'Astrée, and a knowledge of those formulas of exquisite politeness, of which the shepherds of Lignon and the knights of Marcilly became the gracious models" (311). The upper classes of society were Boverian before their time. The romantic conception of life and human nature that had formed over the centuries became a conception of life and human nature tout court (312).

L'Astrée, which was still the delight of Rousseau a few years before his death (313), was, in the mid-seventeenth century, one of the bedside books (314) of the romantic Jeanne Guyon (1648-1717), known as Madame de Guyon, the main apologist for quietism in France and mentor of Fénelon (315).

Countryside, birdsong, hills, villages, valleys, meadows, streams, shepherds and flocks are as much a part of Madame Guyon's poetry and spiritual canticles as the pastoral novels she devoured. Guyon and his disciples, led by Fénelon, "consider the objects

Their 'childlike' hearts, which turn all their feelings into hymns of gratitude to God, cannot but be joyful in the face of God's presence.

Nature; creation appears to them beautiful and radiant, reflected in their 'purified' souls. In other words, what they love about Nature is the thousand opportunities it gives them to see and feel God at their ease, and the abundant 'freedom' they find there to communicate with Him" (316). Everything," she writes in *Les torrents spirituels*, "is God to this soul which, having annihilated itself, is full of God"; "[a]ll creatures, celestial, earthly, pure intelligences, all disappear and vanish, and all that remains is God himself as He was before creation. This soul sees only God everywhere, and everything is God to it" (317). In quietism, nature is not far from being represented as a divine being (318).

Quietism is a mystical doctrine inspired by the works of the Spanish theologian Molinos (1628-1696), according to which Christian perfection resides in quietude, i.e. "pure love" and self-annihilation through contemplation of God, meditation or mental prayer. Madame Guyon pushed the Molinist doctrine to its ultimate consequences, substituting the idea of

For her, the whole of the spiritual life was summed up in the docility to follow the inner impulse that she felt came from God. For her, the whole spiritual life was summed up in docility in following the inner impulse that she felt came from God, to the point of absolute annihilation or disappropriation and continual union with God through contemplation and love. Through prayer," she says in *Les torrents spirituels*, "this divine life becomes quite natural to the soul. As the soul no longer feels itself, no longer sees itself, no longer knows itself, it sees nothing of God, understands nothing of God, distinguishes nothing of God. There is no more love, no more light, no more knowledge. God no longer seems to her, as he once did, something distinct from her, but she knows nothing except that God is, and that she is no longer, no longer subsists, no longer lives except in him. Here prayer is action, and action is prayer; everything is equal, everything is indifferent to this soul, for everything is also God to it" (319). In the past," she adds, in the libertarian tradition of the millenarian sects of the "Middle Ages" (320), "you had to practise virtue in order to do virtuous deeds. Here, all distinction of action is removed, actions no longer having their own virtues, but everything being God to this soul, the lowest action as well as the highest, as long as it is in the order of God and in the divine movement. It allows itself to be carried away by whatever it is drawn to, without worrying about anything, without thinking about, wanting or choosing anything, but remains content, without care or concern for itself, no longer thinking about it, no longer distinguishing its inner self. to talk about it. The soul no longer has any. So this soul does not bother to seek or to do anything. It remains as it is and that is enough. But what does it do? Nothing, nothing and still nothing. It does what we make it do. It suffers whatever it is made to suffer. Her peace is all unalterable, but all natural. It is as if it has passed into nature" (321). Madame Guyon could therefore write to Fénelon: "I no longer know either sin or justice" (322). The tendency of Guyon's Quietist metaphysics to operate a "purely divine systematisation of all impressions, if need be of all the social failings of the 'interior' Christian; [...] to substitute the notion of trial, sent from heaven, for that of temptation, coming from Hell and simply permitted or tolerated by God to confound human pride [...] leads [...] leads [...] to the elimination of the Tempter, to the negation of concupiscence, the heritage of Adam's sin, to the rehabilitation of instinct in all its affective forms, and finally to the proclamation of the natural goodness that man would have preserved after as well as before the original fall" (323), a "natural goodness" that, according to his teachings, is very easy to restore to its primitive purity, which amounts to implicitly rehabilitating human nature (324). The passions, willed by God, are divine (325). "Divinism", fanaticism, optimistic fatalism, these are the three stages of mystical pathology, of which Guyon offers a perfect example: in believing himself to be united with God - Nature -, the mystic believes himself to be God - Nature -; he imagines that it is God - Nature - who is the source of all that is divine. He feels within himself a kind of superior, irresistible power, to which he gives in and which, in his eyes, legitimises all his passionate transgressions (326).

The rights of passion are not yet explicitly asserted in *Telemachus*, a sequel to *The Odyssey* written by the clergyman, theologian and writer Fénelon to teach Louis XIV's grandson, the Duke of Burgundy, whom he was tutoring, the proper way to govern. The model of government presented to the future Louis XV in the novel is that of the Betic, a country "of which so many marvels are told that they can scarcely be believed", and which the brother of a ship's captain, the Duke of Burgundy, had told him about.

encountered by Telemachus and his tutor Mentor on the outskirts of Calypso's island. Its inhabitants, "simple and happy in their simplicity", are "almost all shepherds". "Everywhere, on every occasion, Fénelon never tires of admiring the benefits of tastes that conform to nature, and of the life that flows in the middle of the fields. Calypso's home is not in a palace but in a cave; Telemachus is served a simple meal; Egyptian architecture is simple and noble; Telemachus enjoys innocent and lively pleasures in the midst of the solitudes of Egypt; the fertility of the Tyrian countryside delights him; Mentor recommends agriculture to Idomeneus; he sings of the happiness of the farming peoples of Betica; this happiness is not just the joy of wealth and abundance : No, "simple nature has taught them wisdom" by making them aware of the true goods that are "the foundation of human life". She makes the shepherds "innocent and peaceful", ridding them of ambition, distrust and artifice. Through her, 'everything' becomes 'tranquil, laughing', and it is in her that the delights of the golden age will perhaps one day be reborn, when 'the wolves were seen playing among t h e sheep' with 'the lions and the tigers'; while a 'little shepherd led them together under his leadership'" (327).

The philosophical optimism that emerges from this passage stems directly from the rehabilitation of human nature by Guyonian quietism (328). In the impulses of nature, the quietists seek and find a moral principle. For Fénelon, to be happy, one must, as the Cynics and Stoics had already advocated in antiquity (329), follow nature (330) and, consequently, one's nature, one's heart - "instincts and natural inclinations [...] lead [souls] to God.

"(331), preached Madame Guyon. While, until the seventeenth century, all theologians and moralists taught that man was naturally fallen and corrupt, Fénelon "was already thinking, of his fellow men, around 1690, as many a Rousseauist gentleman would think a hundred years later, on the eve of the Revolution" (332). The first Fénelon suggested a philosophy based on moral optimism, faith in the natural and original goodness of man, which would turn in the eighteenth century to the cult of Nature and the "Good Savage" and, in the nineteenth century, to the cult of Humanity, Woman and the Black Man (333).

The philosophers of the Enlightenment saw this pastoral Betic as a model of a moderate, "natural" monarchy.

Naturism seems, it is suggested, to have as its first condition "a certain ease, a certain trusting abandonment towards it, to believe it to be good or at least pacified and purified from now on, to believe it to be salutary and divine, or at least close to God in the inspirations it exhales, legitimate in its sacred in its hymens" (334). This first condition would rather be the taste for the factitious that is peculiar to romantic souls, for the nature in which the characters of the pastoral novels and Telemachus frolic and rant is just as artificial as their feelings and morals are false. Telemachus is even "one of the most accomplished models of the false genre [...] a mythological tale [...] entirely imbued with Christian sentiments. It is the work of a Catholic priest and

the latter, to recommend Christian morality, finds nothing better than to entrust teaching the pagan deities. It is an account of ancient life and everything in it bears the modern stamp. All the antitheses meet there with all the anachronisms. But," continued the man of letters, journalist and great literary critic René Doumic (1860-1937), "what I find even stranger in this strange novel is that it is a novel of education. It is intended to warn a young man against all the seductions of passion, and from the very first lines, the passion speaks the most touching language: love insinuates itself through sadness and melancholy reverie. Thanks to Calypso and her nymphs, our young man is now on the same level as the women in the flat, where he is likely to enjoy himself more than Mentor. The Emile of this educational novel is a prince; he is destined one day to reign over France, - and he is taught to legislate for Salente! But apparently this romance itself, this widespread sentimentality, this smiling optimism, this artificial colouring of conventional antiquity, lends him a prestige that outlasts the very cult of antiquity and the preoccupation with Christian morality" (335). "The seventeenth century had been persuaded that reason, which subordinates the particular to the general and the individual to the whole, should dominate, regulate, contain and discipline all the faculties. The eighteenth century was going to hand over command to the most personal, the most changeable, the most capricious and the most tyrannical of the faculties: this is sensibility", which it would continue to decorate with the name of "sensibility". "reason" (336). The following "profane prayer", uttered by Diderot in *Système de la nature* (1770) (337) - in which the beginning of the Homeric Hymn to Pan is quoted, to "make it clear that it was the great whole, the universe, the nature of things that was the true object of the cult of Pagan antiquity" (338), "was on the lips of all the philosophers of the eighteenth century" (339) and had first been on those of Guyon and Fénelon in the seventeenth century: "O Nature! Sovereign of all beings! And you her adorable daughters, virtue, reason, truth! Be forever our only divinities; to you are due the incense and homage of the earth. Show us, then, O nature! What man must do to obtain the happiness you make him desire" (340).

Nature, Reason, Humanity - this, according to the professor of literature Louis Ducros (1846-1927), is the motto that could be inscribed on the pediment of the *Encyclopédie* (it could just as easily be inscribed on the pediment of the lodges) (341). Distilled in Rousseau's cerebral and sickly sensibility, these abstractions would turn respectively to naturalistic mysticism, passionate mysticism and social mysticism, all of which "receive their colouring from amorous passion" (342) conceived and experienced, à la Ficin, as a divine fury.

Rousseau and his contemporaries, avid readers of *L'Astrée* and *Télémaque*, which remained one of the most reprinted and widely read books from its publication in 1699 to 1914 (343), did not take them for novels.

Combined with the myth of the "Bon Sauvage" and quietist mysticism, the novel's conception of life and human nature gave rise to what the writer, journalist and critic Ernest Seillière (1866-1955) called "naturalist mysticism" (344), an attitude based on the feeling of being perpetually, directly and intimately united with a good and favourable divinity and of doing nothing but submitting to His will.

will by yielding to all natural inclinations and, as a result, a "system of feeling, thinking and acting in accordance with the so-called primitive nature of mankind" (345). Hence Rousseau's morality, by "[making] the instinctive impulse, especially the erotic impulse in our soul, the voice of a God whose will we are authorised or even compelled to carry out" (346) and "who would have taken upon himself all the responsibility for our 'natural' aspirations", preparing for "passionate mysticism" (347). But this good God has not made an alliance with all his creatures, only with those who have remained as he made them, that is to say, in his likeness, a likeness that is maintained to a greater extent in two human types: the poet and the common man.

In the atmosphere charged with Enlightenment in the decades leading up to the Revolution, the "men of the century", like the mystics who predicted a "new reign", a new "golden age" and the end of the world, believed they were on the verge of regenerating their fellow human beings through the "progress of enlightenment" (349). The way was open to the "social mysticism" of Romanticism and, from there, to from socialist and liberal humanitarianism to democratic mysticism. Since man is naturally good and it is society that perverts him, Rousseau concludes that the people, closer to primitive humanity and less subject to the influence of civilisation, is better than the cultivated classes. "The man of Nature, instinctive and not spoiled by the intensive culture of the mind - that is to say, the savage throughout the world, and, in Europe, the common man, less affected by civilisation than the bourgeois - the man of Nature is allied to God by privilege, and therefore good by instinct and endowed with a good sense of humour. the inspiration from on high when it comes to regulating the interests of the social body by taking over the government of public affairs" (350). Vox populi vox dei, the god in question being the artist.

An "aesthetic mysticism" was not long in coming to the fore in the first generations of Rousseauists, who presented the poet and the artist as the ally, the messenger and the favoured interpreter of an inspiring god and, consequently, as the appointed guide of societies in their march towards progress, by virtue of "the conviction (very old in the human mind, by the way) which confuses lyrical inspiration with prophetic inspiration" (348).

This aesthetic-passionate mysticism gave rise to revolutions (352) in generations where "mental equilibrium is no longer intact, that of Diderot and Rousseau" (351). As a crystallisation of the Rousseauist sensibility, Romanticism "[declared] passions holy (willed by the allied goddess)" (353) and consequently at war with the social order. From sentiment, love, goodness, "natural reason", or even "innate wisdom" (in L'Astrée, love is presented as the supreme activity of reason and will), in short from "passion" (354), considered as the voice of a benevolent divinity in the heart of man, all the exalted people of Europe, whether artists, politicians or theoreticians, socialists or liberals, expected the social harmony of tomorrow. (355). Passion is anarchic individualism, the spirit of revolt. "... The state of overexcitement and outburst (Byronism) is henceforth considered to be the noblest to which creatures can rise.

human. Big words are used for everything. The generation of 1830 lived in an atmosphere of perpetual verbal exaggeration, of excessive gestures that were not always sincere, but aimed to conform to the prevailing fashions. The normal and the rational (the bourgeois) were despised or even reviled. The imagination, freed from all discipline, delights in the spectacle of excess and crime (Stendhal in *Le Rouge* and his Italian short stories, as well as the revolutionary melodrama from which Hugo's theatre partly derives). From the day after the July Days, therefore, the new French socialism found an atmosphere very favourable to its expansion: it was to be, to a large extent, the source of Marx's more brutal German socialism. In the demagogic preaching of the agitators of the time," insisted M. Reynaud, "we encounter once again the whole range of impulses created and developed by mystical naturism at the end of the previous century: the need for emotion and noise, the search for advantageous attitudes, the taste for the extraordinary, the dark... enthusiasm, sometimes without a clearly defined purpose; above all, blind faith in the divine mission of the popular masses to govern France, and in that of revolutionary France to transform the world" (356).

"It is Pan who makes the revolution. He is the revolution", declared one of the "educated and intelligent" young people who toasted the god at a banquet commemorating the February 1848 revolution, in "*L'école païenne*". What did Pan mean to them? George Sand, a republican and socialist, exclaimed that "the time of the people has come" and, with it, the time of Pan (357). Charles Nodier, "religious under the Republic, Girondin and Vendéen together under the Consulate, liberal and sulky under the Empire, then a lukewarm royalist" (358), prophesied, through the mouth of the Illyrian bandit leader Jean Sbogar, a character in the novel of the same name (1818), that "all the voices of the earth once announced that the great Pan was dead. That was the emancipation of the slaves. When you hear them a second time, it will be the emancipation of the poor - and then the usurpation of the world will begin again" (359). The chthonic nature of the people is underscored by Gérard de Nerval in a passage from an article entitled "*Le Diable rouge*" (The Red Devil), where, after noting that the words "devil" and "demon" are both derived from "demos" ("people"), he points out that "[Father Kircher's] image" of demogorgon (360) - whom the French writer and poet mistakenly takes to be a deity from Greek mythology and whom he associates with Lucifer and precisely with the entity he calls the "Red Devil" - "would seem rather to represent the great Pan, that is to say the spirit of the earth to which modern pantheism relates its adoration and homage" (361). Representative for Saône-et-Loire in the Legislative Assembly (1850-1851), elected on 7 June 1869 to the National Assembly, where he sat on the extreme left (having resigned, he was re-elected on 8 February 1871), Alphonse Esquiros (1812-1876) had entered the world of letters with a collection of poems that Victor Hugo, who "sometimes abused the incense burner in his generous sympathy" (362), had praised. He rose to fame with two novels, *Le Magicien* (1834) (363) - he was into occultism and advocated the "plurality of existences of the soul" (364) - and *Charlotte Corday* (1840), only to be imprisoned for eight months for the publication of *L'Évangile du peuple* (1840), in which he had unwisely portrayed Jesus as a social reformer. Even more feminist than his wife (365), he declared that "God [...] is the infinite Pan from which humanity springs". The theosophist and disciple of Jacob Boehme, Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin and Antoine Fabre

d'Olivet (366) Pierre-Simon Ballanche (1776-1847), whose "heart [...] has never ceased to burn with Christian sentiments" (367) - in his eyes, "true Christianity is humanity; gentility is the exclusion of humanity. Thus Christianity is the religion of the human race" (368) - celebrated in Orpheus a "new man [...] a plebeian hero [...Bacchus, the brilliant Phanes of the active principle made accessible to all, the unknown god of plebeian emancipation, [who] will come in his turn to dethrone the fearsome patricians to whom, according to the immutable laws of progress, the pacified empire of the Titans has been handed over" (369), so, he writes in *Orphée*, that, according to the no less immutable laws of "social palingenesis", "[t]he world deranged by a fallen intelligence [will] recover its primitive harmony by that same intelligence" (370). For Victor Hugo, Pan is the archetypal revolutionary ("Place à Tout! Je suis Pan; Jupiter! à genoux", "Le Satyre" [1859]) and, consequently in this context, the very "principle" of the Republic, "one and indivisible": thanks, he prophesies, to the "glorious democratic instinct", "man has gone beyond fraternity to achieve adherence.

Adhesion to what? With Pan; with Everything. For the very essence of solidarity is that it admits of no exclusion" (371); the sensation of witnessing the birth of a social "great whole" was so general that Alfred de Vigny, while judging pantheism to be an "interior barbarism" (372), felt that "a moral communion was being formed throughout the world, which did not prevent the rebirth or preservation of spiritual communions, but which, imposing on them the restraint and dignity of freedom, obliges them to behave among themselves as sisters, and to give a new extension to the biblical principle, to the Christian principle of human brotherhood" (373).

The universalist Republic needed a universal religion. Sketched out, as we saw above, by Ficino, developed in the sixteenth century by the Italian bishop, philologist and philosopher Augustinus Steuchus and his *De perenni philosophia* (1540), in the seventeenth century by Leibniz (374), systematised on the eve of the Revolution by the Freemason Antoine Court de Gébelin, Fabre d'Olivet, the archaeologist and philologist Friedrich Creuzer (1771-1858) and, above all, the anti-Masonic mythographer, deputy to the Convention (1792-1795), then to the Conseil des Cinq-Cents (1795-1799), Charles-François Dupuis in

l'Origine de tous les Cultes, ou la Religion universelle, denounced shortly afterwards as a "new system of atheism" (375), the conception of a "general religion of the human race whose more or less formal dogmas, more or less obscured, rest in all beliefs" (376) - taken up again at the end of the 19th century by the Theosophical Society, then, seasoned with the concept of initiation, by René Guénon and Fritjof Schuon, by René Guénon and Fritjof Schuon and its transcendent unity of religions, popularised by Aldous Huxley and given the name of "perennialism" or "sophia perennis", the religious aspect of globalism, in the last decades of the twentieth century - enjoyed the support of many prominent republican propagandists, including Hugo who, in "Sagesse" (1840), implicitly prophesied its advent Pan does not need to be prayed to or loved / O wisdom! pure spirit! supreme serenity! / Zeus! Irmensul! Wishnou! Jupiter! Jehova! / God whom Socrates sought and Jesus found! / One God! true God! one mystery! one soul!" A Republican like Hugo, but, unlike him, from the very beginning, the historian, poet, philosopher, politician (he was elected deputy for the Ain to the Constituent Assembly in 1848, then re-elected in 1849) and member of the Grand Orient Edgar Quinet (1803-1875) "affirm[ed] the unity of the human race from its point of departure and indicated the goal of its long journey through the centuries, the

fraternal renewal of the primitive unity; gathering the living idea contained in each of the religions of the past, he has grouped together all these divine conceptions of humanity and, in this way, prepared the superior dogma which, in the future, will be able to dominate and reconcile the enemy dogmas" (377) and, in the same year as the publication of "Wisdom", caused an uproar in the Catholic press, after, in the courses he was giving in Lyon, he had solemnly declared that Pan was not dead (378).

Pan almost entered the Panthéon a few weeks after the liberal and progressive Lamartine, laudator of a "mysterious, insoluble Pan" ("Harold", 1836), having been charged with proclaiming the Second Republic, had been appointed Minister of the Interior in the Provisional Government (24 February - 9 May 1848). The Director of Fine Arts had commissioned the painter Chenavard to decorate the Panthéon, and the project had been adopted by the government of the freemason Ledru-Rollin. The sketch included "the names, symbols and forms of all the divinities, their cults, myths and prophets, peoples and heroes, [who] were to make up the unity of the great Pan whom all humanity worships under a multitude of pseudonyms. The immense representation, episode by episode, of the religious history of the world, is summed up in the 'idol', or 'plastic image' expressing, through the centuries, the feeling of collective man adoring a collective god" (379). Gautier approved without reserves the sketches, in particular the main altar of "this pantheistic temple, for pantheism's mission is to absorb into its vast bosom all ideas and all forms; it does not exclude any religion, it assimilates them all" (380).

Christian apologists accused all the Romantic authors, who were not all socialists (381), of "paganism" (382) and "pantheism", without seeing or wanting to see either that their paganism was strongly tinged with Christian religiosity (383), that their humanitarianism, their social progressivism was merely an extension of the millenarian communism of the still unpolished Eastern cult that was early Christianity (384), nor that, as the Scottish theologian and pastor John Hunt (1827-1907) showed, "not only the Church Fathers but even the Biblical writers spoke of the super-personality of God and his immanence in the world in words often as striking as those of the so-called pantheists" (385). In fact, the pantheism of the nineteenth-century "neo-pagans" was, as you might expect, more sentimental than theological. That was all it needed to be transmittable to the masses, to make of them a "democratic whole" in which individuality tends to be absorbed, to disappear, "a democratic whole, but fractional, which can be represented neither by a man, nor by a government, but only by an administration".

(386). We call the corresponding power "panic power", not only because it is exercised over a "totality", but also because it is modelled on the way a shepherd leads his flock, and fear is one of its main driving forces. It has its origins in oriental royalty.

B. K., July 2019 (edited on 24 December 2020)

(1) Apollodorus, *Library*, I, 4, 264; Nonnus, *Dionysaca*, I, 41, 90; Ovid, *The Fastes*, II, 2, 290. See Raoul-Rochette, *Histoire critique de l'établissement des colonies grecques*, t. 1, Treuttel et Würtz, Paris, 1815, p. 331, on the subject of the settlement of the Arcadians in this region of central Peloponnese, which is thought to have taken place around 1500 BC.

(2) Stephen of Byzantium claims that Hippias of Rhegium (early fifth century BC) - the first, according to Suidas, to write a history of Sicily - was the first to call the Arcadians *proselénoi*, regarding them, and not, like other ancient writers, the Egyptians, as the oldest people in the world (David Smith, *Hippias of Rhegium* (BNJ 554), 2013, https://www.academia.edu/3596368/Hippias_of_Rhegium_BNJ_554). Arcadia is also called the "land of the giants" ("Gigontex") by Stephen of Byzantium, because it was in the valley of Bathos, in Arcadia, that the last battle between the gods and the giants took place, and all the giants were killed.

massacred; in commemoration, the Arcadians went there to sacrifice to storms, lightning and thunder, imitating the sound of these meteorological phenomena (Pierre-Nicolas Rolle, *Religions de la Grèce*, t. 1, Châtillon-sut-Seine, 1828, p. 482).

(3) Babinet, *La Terre avant les époques géologiques*. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 2e série de la nouvelle période, t. 10, 1855 [p. 702-26], p. 723.

(4) Laurent Gourmelen, *Le crime de Lykaon : enjeux et significations d'un récit de la mort* (Pausanias, VIII, 2), in Gérard Jacquin (ed.), *Le Récit de la mort*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, OpenEdition Books, 2016 [p. 15-38]; David Smith, *op. cit.*

(5) Angelo De Gubernatis, *Mythologie zoologique, ou, Les légendes animales*, translated from English by Paul Régnaud, A. Durand and Pedone Lauriel, Paris, 1874, p. 414.

(6) See Philippe Borgeaud, *Recherches sur le dieu pan : thèse*, Droz, 1979, p. 31. It seems that the Arcadians fed on the acorn of a variety of oak called *quercus aegilops*, renowned for its nutritive and febrifuge virtues (F. V. Mérat and A. J. de Lens, *Dictionnaire universel de matière médicale et de thérapeutique*, vol. 5: O-Q, H.- B. Baillièrre, Paris, 1833, p. 579; see also Olivier Aurenche. *Balanophagie: myth or reality?* In *Paléorient*, 1997, vol. 23, no. 1 [p. 75-85].

(7) See François Hartog, *Mémoire d'Ulysse. Récits sur la frontière en Grèce ancienne*, Gallimard, "Essais" series, 1996.

(8) "In ancient Greek, the word means the limit of what is within sight and, by extension, the regions that were out of sight. If we look at the relief of Greek countries, these borderlands often correspond to mountainous areas, but not only. They can include all the regions of the land furthest from the heart of the city: the steepest lands, but also marshes, flood plains or small uninhabited islets. However, these areas should not always be considered as being uncultivated. The word can refer to isolated farms in the countryside, far from the urban centre. When it refers to areas that are actually

However, this does not mean that this part of the land is not farmed. Land of (Marie-Françoise Baslez, *Economies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne 478-88*, Atlande, 2007, p. 233) "In addition, the eschatiai often seem to escape the system of private property which, for the Greeks, was based primarily on sowing and planting. The status of the eschatiai was therefore that of public land (chora dêmosia), which Aristotle made one of the two main categories of land in cities" (Christophe Chandezon, *Déplacements de Troupeaux et cités grecques [Ve-Ier S. av.J. C.]*, in Pierre-Yves Laffont [ed.], *Transhumance et estivage en Occident des origines aux enjeux actuels*, Presses Universitaires du Mirail, Toulouse, 2006, p. 56).

(9) Ibid. At the end of the eighteenth century, a gang of thieves ran riot in the province of South Limburg. The villagers they terrorised nicknamed them "Bokkerijders" because, according to them, they rode through the air on the backs of goats. In the Velvet Cave [at the castle] in Valkenburg [<https://www.atlasobscura.com/places/kasteelruine-fluweelengrot>]," recounts a contributor to one of the "Bokkerijders".

(T. Pluim, *Wetenswaardig Allerlei*, 2nd enlarged ed., P. Noordhoff, Groningen, 1922, p. 29).

"The captain, dressed in a long black robe, stood in front of the altar and next to him was a Bokkerijder with a book containing the text of the oath and recommendations. Other members of the gang were watching. Two candles, or a lamp, were lit on the altar, at the foot of which was a crucifix and an image of the Blessed Virgin. The impetrant waited in the background until everything was ready, then he was led to the place of prayer, around which he sometimes had to crawl three times. He was made to drink copious amounts of brandy, then entered the chapel backwards; he gave his surname, first name, age and profession, raised his left arm and the first two fingers of his right hand. left foot on the crucifix or image of the Lady. In this position, he took the oath I renounce God and his saints, I promise to remain faithful to the band and never to reveal anything, even on the grid, and if I had to make a confession under torture, I would withdraw it afterwards. I will behave like a good Christian, I will confess and go to communion, but I will not confess anything to the confessor about thefts, burnt letters or murders. I undertake to be present at all night meetings to which I am invited and not to commit any theft without orders from my superiors.'

"This formula and the circumstances in which it was pronounced may differ slightly from region to region and locality to locality, but the oath is essentially the same throughout the Land of Loon and the overseas countries...". (Jan Juliaan Melchior, *De bokkerijders: feiten en verhalen*, De Lijster, 1981). Like all gangs, the bokkerijders had their own gobbledygook, a mixture of Gypsy terms and Hebrew words (<https://archeoroutelimburg.nl/en/evenement/archaeological-site-nederweert-prison#content>). Their booty was usually sold to Jews (Louise Nelson, *Bokkerijders*, http://www.caans-acaen.ca/Journal/issues_online/Issue_V_ii_1984/NELSON.pdf, p. 3). This is because the bokkerijders, like other groups of bandits operating in northern Europe at the time, were mainly made up of Jews and Gypsies (Letizia Paoli, *The Oxford Handbook of Organized Crime*, Oxford University Press, 2014, p. 64).

The most famous mythical brigand in modern history, Robin Hood, was surrounded by a caprine aura, through his identification with Puck, an identification which, contrary to what Mathias Lehn, *Le Personnage de Puck* (Publibook, 2012), claims, is not attributable to Shakespeare, who, to build the character of Puck in *A Midsummer Night's Dream*, drew on pre-existing popular traditions (see William Bell, *Shakespeare's Puck and His Folklore*, vol. 1, London, 1852). The Puck is the Anglo-Saxon equivalent of the goblin. The word 'puck' is a variant of 'buck', as shown by the traditional English expression 'hairy as a puck-goat's hair' (see P. R. Wilkinson, *Thesaurus of Traditional English Metaphors*, 2nd edn, Routledge, 2003; the etymology of "buck/puck" proposed by William Bell, *op. cit.* p. 119, is of interest here: "balk", all. "Balken, "roof anchoring beam", especially as the corresponding Latin word is caprificus, "wild fig tree", a tree dedicated to Bacchus).

It would be interesting to know whether other gangs of thieves have (had) the goat as their totemic animal. In any case, one of the most famous gang members of the last three centuries has a soft spot for goat symbolism: <https://themindcircle.com/rare-photos-1972-rothschild-illuminati-party/>; <https://illuminatisymbols.info/baroness-philippine-de-rothschild-baphomet/>; <https://i.redd.it/13pt59511t001.jpg>.

(10) *Ibid.*, p. 62.

(11) Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 100.

(12) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2014/07/01/la-liberte-un-concept-desclaves-3> and Edouard des Places, *Nature et Loi*. In *L'antiquité classique*, t. 16, fasc. 2, 1947 [p. 329-36].

(13) Philippe Borgeaud, *The Cult of Pan in Ancient Greece*, translated by Kathleen Atlas and James Redfield, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1988, p. 68.

(14) See *ibid.*, p. 252.

(15) Sylvie Vilatte, *Espace et temps : la cité aristotélicienne de la Politique*. In *Annales Littéraires de l'Université de Besançon*, vol. 141, p. 149.

(16) Aubin-Louis Millin, *Monumens antiques, inédits ou nouvellement expliqués*, t. 1, Paris, 1802, p. 176.

(17) Philippe Borgeaud, *Recherches...*, *op. cit.* p. 135.

(18) Charles Magnin, *Les origines du théâtre moderne*, vol. 1, L. Hachette, Paris, 1838, p. 50. Vases found in the temple of Artemis Orthia in Sparta and dated to the seventh or sixth century BC depict goats standing on their hind legs in the attitude of dancers (George A. Christopoulos, *The Archaic Period*, Pennsylvania State University Press, 1975, p. 92).

(19) The etymologies of the name 'Pan' are almost endless. In addition to those mentioned in the body of the study, we should mention the one according to which it comes from the Greek verb "páein" ("to graze").

) or from the Greek noun "pa", a contracted form of "peacock" ("shepherd") (Christopher P. Long, *Socratic and Platonic Political Philosophy: Practicing a Politics of Reading*, Cambridge University Press, 2014, pp. 128, note 1), or from the Indo-European root "*pa" ("to watch over, protect, feed") (Judith Peraino, *Listening to the Sirens: Musical Technologies of Queer Identity from Homer*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, p. 23); see, for yet another etymology of this name, *infra*, note 92.

(20) Pausanias, VIII, 30, 2; III, 31, 1.

(21) *Id.* at VIII, 37, 8 et seq.

(22) Victor Bérard, *De l'origine des cultes arcadiens: essai de méthode en mythologie grecque*, Thorin et Fils, Paris, 1894, p. 61.

(23) *Ibid.*

(24) Report presented to His Excellency the Minister of Public Education and Religious Affairs by M. Delacoulonche, former member of the *École française d'Athènes*, on the history, manners and customs of the peoples of ancient Arcadia. In *Revue des Sociétés Savantes de la France et de l'Étranger*, vol. 2, Paris, 1857, p. 346-7. Adonis (Atys), Osiris, Hermes, Aesculapius, Bacchus (Dionysus), Hercules Janus, etc., The Numidian writer, philosopher and philologist Macrobius identified almost all the gods with the sun, the value of the identification of Pan with the sun by the Orphics, who, in addition to Pan, also identified a plethora of gods with the sun (J. Garnier, *The Worship of the Dead*, Chapman & Hall, London, 1904, p. 52).

(25) Edward William Lane, *Description of Egypt: Notes and Views in Egypt and Nubia, Made During the*, The American University in Cairo Press, 2000, p. 516; Georg Friedrich Creuzer, *Religions de l'Antiquité*, translated from the German, partly recast, completed and expanded by J. D. Guigniaut, t. 3, 3rd part, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1851, p. 948.

(26) *Histoire d'Hérodote*, translation by Pierre-Henri Larcher, t. 1, VI, 105, Charpentier, 1850, p. 50. "This is what this race consisted of. A man, with a torch in his hand, would run from the altar of the god in whose honour this race was being held, to a certain goal, without extinguishing his torch. If the torch of the first runner was extinguished, he gave it to the second runner, and the second to the third, if the same accident happened to him. If the third is equally unfortunate, the prize is not awarded to anyone. This festival was celebrated in honour of several deities, such as Minerva, Vulcan, Prometheus, Pan, Aesculapius, etc. In the Panathenaeus, or festivals of Minerva, the lampadophores set out from Piraeus, and from the Ceramics, or the Academy, in those of Vulcan and Prometheus. In the Academy there was a statue of Love, consecrated by Pisistratus, where the sacred torch was lit during the races held in honour of these gods." (*ibid.*, note 1)

(27) Pausanias, II, 24, 7; *Palatine Anthology*, VI, 154.

(28) Theocritus, V, 58; *Palatine Anthology*, II, 630, 697; VI, 96, 239; VII, 59.

(29) Philippe Borgeaud, op. cit. p. 79 et seq.

(30) Homère, Hymnes, texte établi et traduit par Jean Humbert, Les Belles Lettres, 1936, p. 209. Others (Peter McDonald, *The Homeric Hymns*, Fyfield Books, 2016, p. 16) believe that it was written no earlier than the beginning of the fifth century. Still others (Nicholas Richardson [ed.], *Three Homeric Hymns: To Apollo, Hermes, and Aphrodite*, Cambridge University Press, 2010, p. 24) put it as early as the fifth century BC.

(31) Henri Hignard, *Des hymnes homériques*, Auguste Durand, Paris, 1864, p. 121, see also chap. 1: Comment ces hymnes nous sont parvenus and chap 2: Des témoignages anciens sur les hymnes homériques.

(32) Pausanias VIII. 30, 2.

(33) Aeschylus, *The Persians*, v. 448; Homeric Hymn, VI, 6, 13, 20; Pausanias, VIII, 42, 2.

(34) Homeric Hymn, VII, 5; Pausanias, VIII, 38, 8; Ovid, *The Fastes*, II, 271, 277; Virgil, *Bucolics*, i., 33.

(35) Theocritus, V, 15, *Anthologie Palatine* VI, 239, x, 10.

(36) *Hesychii Alexandrini Lexicon* (ed. Kurt Latte; 1953), t.1, p. 30, s.v. Ἀγρεύς.

(37) Theocritus, VII, 107.

(38) Philippe Borgeaud, op. cit. p. 100.

(39) Apollodorus, I, 4, 1. Pan's musical and prophetic gifts are related to the link between music and prophecy in ancient Near and Middle Eastern civilisations, particularly Israel (Martti Nissinen, *Ancient Prophecy: Near Eastern, Biblical, and Greek Perspectives*, Oxford University Press, 2017, pp. 178, 188, 190).

(40) Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, *Histoire de la divination dans l'antiquité*, Éditions Jérôme Millon, Grenoble, 2003, p. 533-4; Françoise Ruzé, Pierre Sineux (1961-2016). In *Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*, vol. 42, no. 1, 2016 [p. 19-26]. The first forms of incubation seem to have appeared in antiquity, in Assyria, Babylonia and Egypt (André Taffin, *Comment on rêvait dans les temples d'Esculape*. In *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*, no. 3, October 1960 [p. 325-66], p. 326). In the Near and Middle East, however, incubation was not conceived, as it was later to be in Greece, once it had been imported into that country, as a therapy, but as "a method of divination consisting of obtaining divine directives relating to the proper conduct of daily life or success in exceptional matters, such as the building of a temple (Gudea), going to war (Assurbanipal), a divine vocation (Samuel), etc." (Toufic Fahd, "The Incubation of the Dead", p. 326). "(Toufic Fahd, *La Divination arabe : études religieuses, sociologiques et folkloriques sur le milieu natif d'Islam, Sindbad*, 1987, p. 367).

(41) Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, op. cit. p. 727-8.

(42) Thierry Tiedemann, *Mémoire sur le dieu Pan*. In *Mémoires de la Société des antiquités de Cassel*, vol. 1, 1780, Société des antiquités de Cassel, p. 169.

(43) Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 82-3.

(44) Isabelle Tassignon, *Iconographie et religion dionysiaques en Gaule Belgique et dans les deux Germanies*, Droz, Geneva, 1996, p. 97; Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 115.

(45) Serv. ad Virgil, *Georgics*, I, 16; Schol, ad, Lycophron, 766; Schol, ad, Theocritus, I, 3. Quite early on in the literary tradition, the portrayal of Ulysses' wife began to vary from one extreme to another. A model of marital fidelity and chastity in Homeric literature and later in popular writers, she was portrayed by philosophers as the worst of libertines (Marie-Madeleine Mactoux, *Pénélope. Légende et mythe*, Université de Franche-Comté, Besançon, 1975, p. 98, quoted in Barbara Dell Abate-Çelebi, *Penelope's Daughters*, Zea Books, Lincoln, NB, 2016, <https://digitalcommons.unl.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?referer=https://www.google.fr/&httpsredir=1&article=1038&context=zeabook>, p. 19).

(46) Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 117.

(47) Dion Chrysostom, *Discourses*, VI, 20.

(48) Yves Bonnefoy (ed.), *Greek and Egyptian Mythologies*, edited by Wendy Doniger, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, pp. 204-5.

(49) Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 117.

(50) *Ibid*, p. 118.

(51) *Ibid*, p. 120.

(52) *Ibid*, p. 132.

(53) Ovid, *Metamorphoses*, I, 691; Serv, ad Virgil, *Bucolics*, II, 31; Virgil, *Georgics*, 391, Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, v. 22.

(54) Combarieu sets out his theory in *Histoire de la musique des origines au début du XXe siècle*, 3 vols, A. Colin, Paris, 1913-1919. We do not take it literally. It is all too obvious that the evolution of incantation in music is not as clear-cut as he claims, and that incantation may have survived in its primitive form after music entered its religious phase, in the same way that religious music did not disappear at the birth of secular music, and that it cannot be ruled out a priori that the most mawkish modern melodies distil antediluvian spells. The correspondence that we venture to establish between the four divinities who presided over music in Egypt and the different stages in the evolution of music according to Combarieu has no demonstrative value. It is simply a way of framing the presentation of this interesting theory.

(55) Magic is, to use Julius Evola's definition (*Rivolta contro il mondo moderno*, Edizioni Mediterranee, Rome, 2013 [1st ed.: 1934], p. 88) "a binding and determining action on invisible forces and inner states, similar to that which [...] is exerted in the present age on physical forces and states of matter". Similarly, for the British ethnologist Frazer, there is nothing mystical about magic; it is based on the idea of "the regularity of the phenomena of nature, an order of facts that occur in an invariable succession, without any human intervention. In fact, "the magician is absolutely convinced that the same causes will produce the same effects without ever being contradicted", and his conception is thus "similar in every respect to that of modern science". From then on, this natural order is interpreted in such a way that things act on each other at a distance through 'sympathy'. (Brigitte Sitbon-Peillon *Religion, métaphysique et sociologie chez Bergson : Une expérience intégrale*, Presses Universitaires de France, Paris, 2009). Frazer distinguishes between two forms of magic, imitative and sympathetic. The first is based on the law of similitude, whereby like begets like, and an effect is similar to its cause. The second is based on the law of contact and contagion, according to which things that have been in contact with each other and have ceased to be so continue to have the same influence on each other as if their contact had persisted. "From the first of these principles, the (sorcerer) deduces that he can produce what he desires by imitating it; from the second he deduces that he can influence from afar, at his will, any person and any object of which he possesses a mere fragment" (J. G. Frazer, *Le rameau d'Or, Étude sur la magie et la religion*, translated from English by R. Stiébel and J. Toutain, 3 vols, Schleicher, Paris, 1903-1911, quoted in Albert Dufourcq, *L'avenir du christianisme : Le passé chrétien ; vie et pensée*, 5th revised edition, Bloud et Cie, Paris, p. 62).

With regard to music in particular, it is interesting to note that, in an article entitled *Dell'opposizione contingente allo sviluppo spirituale (Introduzione alla magia, t. 2, Edizioni Mediterranee, 1992, p. 303)*, Piero Negri lists it among the obstacles to the effectiveness of magical practices.

(56) Jules Combarieu, op. cit, t. 1, A. Colin, Paris, 1913, p. 7. Among the Romans, the Law of the Twelve Tables provided for severe penalties against those who "enchanted" the harvest of others (Ibid.).

(57) *L'Âge Nouveau*, 1938, p. 160.

(58) Jules Combarieu, op. cit. p. 67.

(59) Plutarch, *Isis and Osiris*, I, 12.

(60) Frédéric Rouffet, *Le rituel magique égyptien comme image du tribunal*. In *Droit et cultures*, n° 71, n° 1, 2016 [p. 163-78]. We are talking here about Horus the Elder, but the fact that Horus the Child was represented with his finger in front of his mouth does not contradict his association with music as an adult, if we accept the hypothesis that this sign of silence indicates the occult powers of music.

(61) Gaston Maspéro, *Études de Mythologie et d'archéologie égyptienne*, t. 1, p. 372-85, quoted in Jules Combarieu, *La musique et la magie* (2e Leçon). - (Based on *La Sténographie De M. Flachet*, À Montreuil Sous-Bois). In *La Revue Musicale*, vol. 5, no. 18, 1 October 1905.

(62) Ibid.

(63) See Jules Combarieu, *Histoire...*, p. 22-3.

(64) J. Adrien de La Fage, *Histoire générale de la Musique et de la Danse*, vol. 2: Antiquité, Paris, 1844, p. 20.

(65) On the close association between music and sexuality in the cult of Hathor, see Gay Robins, *Gender and Sexuality*, in Melinda K. Hartwig (ed.), *A Companion to Ancient Egyptian Art*, Wiley Blackwell, 2015 [p. 120-41], p. 130 and Lise Manniche, *Music and Musicians in Ancient Egypt*, British Museum Press, 1991, chap. 9: Music and sexuality; in Egyptian art, female musicians, wearing heavy wigs and accompanied by monkeys, often adopt lascivious poses, Carolyn Graves-Brown, *Dancing for Hathor: Women in Ancient Egypt*, Continuum, London, 2010, <https://epdf.tips/dancing-for-hathor-women-in-ancient-egypt.html>). Around mid-July, when the heat was at its hottest, the orgiastic festival of Hathor was celebrated, "the solemnity of 'she who has returned' or 'she who has been brought back'. The beautiful festival of Hathor began and its essential moment was 'the appeasement of her blazing heat' or 'the ritual of the appeasement of the Mighty One, Sekhmet'. In all the sacred workshops, alcoholic beverages were used to prepare the red liquid that would be offered to Sekhmet-Hathor amidst singing, dancing and the frenzied music of sistres and lutes. Sacred drunkenness reigned supreme on these days and, extending far beyond the walls of the sacred precincts, allowed the good people to drink as much as they liked without anyone being able to object, for it was in honour of Hathor, the lady of drunkenness, the lady of music and song. It was also an opportunity for all those who had to appeal to divine justice or, more simply, demonstrate their clairvoyance, to use the beverage offered to Hathor-Sekhmet-the Eye of Ra. Others will one day write about the actual contents of the *vasQ-menou*, which was solemnly consecrated to the divine Eye and the liquid from which was then absorbed by the interpreter of oracles or the litigant. Suffice it to say that it combined all the resources of antiquity, before alcoholic distillation was known, to ensure that the drink reached the highest possible degrees" (Jean-Claude Goyon, *Hahtor, L'ivraie et l'ivresse*, p. 10-1, https://www.mom.fr/image_carto/ServiceImage/loret/loret_0990-5952_1992_bul_6/PDF/loret_0990-5952_1992_bul_6_p7-16.pdf). For oriental influences on the sexual mores of the ancient Greeks, see Hans Licht, *Sexual Life in Ancient Greece*, Constable, 1994.

(66) *La grande encyclopédie: inventaire raisonné des sciences, des lettres et des arts*, vol. 21, H. Lamirault, 1885, p. 610.

(67) Ibid, p. 156. The "astronomical dance" was performed in Egyptian temples to honour Apis. It is said to have been introduced to Greece by Orpheus. In imitation of him, the Israelites are said to have devised the dance around the golden calf (Fortunato Bartolomeo De Felice, *Encyclopédie*, t. 12, 1772, p. 710).

(68) Hermetis Mercurii Trismegisti, quoted in Dominique Marie Joseph Henry, *L'Égypte pharaonique : ou, Histoire des institutions des Égyptiens sous leurs rois nationaux*, vol. 2, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1846, p. 357.

(69) *Ibid.*

(70) *Id. op. cit.* 1, p. 411. In chapter 9 of his *Treatise on Heaven*, Aristotle criticises the theory of the harmony of the spheres, introduced into Greece by the Pythagorean Philolaus around 400 BC (C. Huffman, *Philolaus of Croton*, Cambridge University Press, 1993, p. 283; Charles H. Kahn, *Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans*, Hackett Publishing Company, 2001, p. 26), as false and insufficient.

(71) Nicolas-Etienne Framery and Ginguené, *Encyclopédie méthodique, Musique*, t. 1, Panckoucke, Paris, 1791, p. 503; Jean-Baptiste Labat, *Études philosophiques et morales sur l'histoire de la musique*, vol. 1, Paris, 1852, p. 62.

(72) See Georges Kastner, *La harpe d'Éole et la musique cosmique*, p. 15. The seven pipes correspond to the seven planets, the shortest to the moon, the longest to Saturn. The same breath, originating from the fire of the ether and the sun, which merge in Pan, circulates through the seven planets and brings about the tuning of the seven concentric spheres. This is the sacred range of the seven sounds that the wise priests of Egypt personified in their seven primordial powers. From the union of the seven spheres with the sky of fixed stars, of the seven great gods with an eighth, results the complete octonary, and Pan is this eighth god who completes it. Hence his name Eschmoun or Schmoun, which means the eighth. Pan is the great god of Chemmis, the artist of the speaking dance, as understood by the priestly system, whereas popular belief generally stuck to the hog-god, appearing in spring in the sign of the Goat" (Georg Friedrich Creuzer, *op. cit.*, p. 170).

(73) *Ibid.*, p. 15.

(74) Charles-François Dupuis (*Origine de tous les cultes*, nouv. éd., t. 3, H. Agasse, Paris, 1794, p. 67-8) summarises the various fables relating to Aegypan as follows: "Le Capricorne ressemble à Egypan (Germanicus). His lower part is a fish, and the front part is the body of the Goat or Caper. He deserved to be placed in the heavens because he had been fed with Zeus by the Goat, his mother, who is also placed there. His head is armed with horns (Eratosthenes).

"Epimenides says that Zeus and this goat were fed on the Ida. It should be remembered that the birth of the god of light, Zeus, like that of Dionysus and Jesus, was placed at the winter solstice (Macrobius), a place that Capricorn occupied for a long time.

"The goat went off with Zeus to fight the Titans, and inspired them with the terror we call panic by blowing the marine conch shell he had discovered (Eratosthenes). Zeus, in gratitude, placed him in the heavens. It is said that it was this discovery of the conch shell that gave him a fish tail; some say it was because he had hurled shells instead of stones at the enemies of the gods (Hyginus, Theon). Others look for the origin of this form borrowed from the fish in the

rain of this season; symbol repeated in Aquarius and Pisces, wet signs (Isidore of Seville, *The Origins*).

"There is another religious tradition about this sign. The Egyptian priests and the poets after them relate that several gods had gathered in Egypt, when Typhon, their cruel enemy, suddenly appeared, and that the gods, seized with fear, sought their salvation in flight and in a sudden change of form. Hermes (or rather Thoth) metamorphosed into an ibis, Apollo into a crane and Artemis into a cat. They add that this is even the origin of the cult that the Egyptians pay to animals, which they regard as images of the gods. At the same time, Pan rushed into the river. The hind part of his body changed into a fish, and the upper part into a goat. In this monstrous form, he escaped Typhon. Zeus / Jupiter, charmed by his cunning, placed his new form in the heavens (Hyginus).

"Germanicus recounts this myth in greater detail and tells us, according to Nigidius, that when Python or Typhon was living in a cave in Taurus, Zeus called a meeting of the gods to decide how to resist their common enemy. In this form, the gods were completely ignored by their enemy. This, it is said, is the origin of the respect that Egyptians still have for these animals. Python, finding the field clear, reigned tyrannically, proud of the fear he had inspired in the gods. But after eighteen days, the gods deliberated on how to destroy him. Every year, these eighteen days have become festival days, the memory of which has been perpetuated in Egypt. Apollo, armed with a thunderbolt, killed the monster in the temple of Apis in Memphis, where the kings of Egypt were inaugurated.

"After the gods had punished Typhon, they placed in the heavens the image of Pan, or Egepan, who had taken the form of the Goat (Theon), and they erected a superb Temple to him at Panople."

(75) Plutarch, *Isis and Osiridus*, chap. XIII, quoted in J. Adrien de La Fage, *op. cit.* p. 20. Related to this myth, as well as to the Pythagorean concept of numbers as the essence of music, is the theory that music developed as a form of "grooming", to maintain the cohesion of various human groups which, having become too numerous, threatened to lose it. This evolution would have occurred during prehistory (Sandra Garrido and Jane W. Davidson, *Music, Nostalgia and Memory: Historical and Psychological Perspectives*, Springer International Publishing, 2019, p. 2).

(76) Plato, *Laws II*, 656d - 657 b is often cited to cast doubt on Diodorus' testimony. J. Adrien de La Fage (*op. cit.*, p. 58-61) has tried to show that there is no contradiction between these two passages. "To reconcile these two authors, there is not even the need to resort, as Villoteau does, to differences of period. Nor should we adopt absolutely Martini's idea, which assumes that the Egyptians banned soft, effeminate music likely to corrupt morals, and not male, generous music capable of shaping and correcting them; the Egyptians did not ban any music, but they did not allow such and such melodies to be used inconsiderately and inappropriately, or substituted for those used from time immemorial. We must also reject the opinion of Wilkinson, who thinks that Diodorus has

only meant to say that the priests and the great ones never studied music as an art for pleasure, but applied themselves to it for a higher purpose; obviously this interpretation is too forced. To remove any appearance of contradiction, it is sufficient to impute to Plato and Diodorus only what each of them actually wrote. Plato in no way claimed that music in general was highly esteemed and generally taught in Egypt, nor that artists enjoyed great credit there; he simply spoke of certain special melodies that were very beautiful, according to him, and had been handed down from age to age for many centuries, to which it was expressly forbidden to make the slightest change, and much less to replace them with others.

"Assuming with the philosopher, or better still with Strabo, that these melodies were learned by young people who received a good education, does this mean that music proper was one of the branches of education? In truth, there is no reason to say so, and it is an abuse of a writer's text to give such an extension to an idea which, taken quite naturally, provides data that is absolutely consistent with other positive and respectable testimonies. Diodorus was therefore quite right to say that the study of music was forbidden to the Egyptians, because a few pieces learned by ear do not constitute the art of music.

"Nor is Diodorus in contradiction with Plato when he says that the Egyptians regarded music not only as useless, but also as harmful; the existence of ancient melodic types really proves nothing against this opinion, and here we find yet another example of how the Egyptians regarded music.

This is not to be compared with modern habits. Haven't many priests in the Catholic religion often criticised music in word and writing, even anathematising it and wanting to banish it from temples, even though they had no difficulty in admitting plainchant, which is only a branch of the musical tree? This is precisely what happened among the Egyptian priests. They had their own melodies and considered all music outside of these to be blameworthy or harmful: They had succeeded in making these ideas shared, not only by their whole caste, but also by that of the warriors who came after them; consequently, the latter did not study music, they left the task of learning it to the people of the third class; it was the latter who practised the musical profession more or less as a trade which served to entertain the rich on several occasions [.....] It is on these occasions that the musicians sculpted or painted on the ancient monuments are represented, and not one of them shows a private individual, an amateur singing or playing an instrument for fun or amusement. The ancient Egyptians looked upon music in the same way as do the modern inhabitants of the country; these peoples take pleasure in listening to musicians who occupy their idleness for a moment, they even seem very sensitive to the charms of melody, but not one of them thinks of cultivating the musical art himself by acquiring the necessary practice, and all profess the greatest contempt for those who practise it".

(77) François Daumas, E. Moutsopoulos. La musique dans l'œuvre de Platon. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. 159, n° 1, 1961 [p. 103-4]. Montesquieu (*Œuvres complètes*, t 3, Garnier frères, Paris, 1876, p. 162) gives the following explanation for the introduction of music into Greek education: "The Greek republics were therefore greatly embarrassed. They did not want their citizens to work in trade, agriculture or the arts; nor did they want them to be idle. They found an occupation in the exercises that depended on gymnastics, and in those that depended on the arts.

had to do with war. The institution gave them no other. We must therefore look at Greeks as a society of athletes and fighters. These exercises, which were so conducive to making people hard and savage, needed to be tempered by others that would soften their morals. Music, which connects with the mind through the organs of the body, was very suitable for this. It should also be pointed out that "[m]usic in Greece did not simply consist in the art of singing, either alone or in a choir, and in the art of drawing sounds from the lyre or other instruments; it also included the art of learning and repeating poetry, of expressing oneself in an exact and elegant manner, in short a whole series of objects which diversified and multiplied as general knowledge increased: In the fifth century BC, in Athens, masters of music taught astronomy, geography and physics, and held dialectical discussions on all the questions debated by those involved in the movement of ideas [...]....] music contained everything that the Greeks personified in the nine Muses, goddesses of the sciences and the arts, i.e. history, comedy, tragedy, light poetry and elegy, epic, astronomy, eloquence and lyric poetry, dance, and music proper" (E. van der Rest, *Platon et Aristote. Essai sur les commencements de la Science politique*, Brussels, 1967, p. 151).

(78) Anthelme Édouard Chaignet, *Pythagoras and Pythagorean Philosophy*, vol. 1, 2nd edn, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1874, p. 5.

(79) Annie Bélis, *Music in Ancient Greece*. In *École pratique des hautes études. 4e section, sciences historiques et philologiques*. Book 11, 1995-1996, 1997 [p. 85-89], p. 85.

(80) Jules Combarieu, op. cit. p. 100; a similar phenomenon occurred in the 18th century with the invention of the "public concert" (David Ledent, *L'institutionnalisation des concerts publics*, *Appareil*, no. 3, 2009, available at <http://journals.openedition.org/appareil/809>, consulted on 03 June 201).

(81) For example, Aristophanes, in *The Acharnians*, "boasts (v. 630 ff.) of enlightening his audience about the evils of demagogues, and in *The Cavaliers* (v. 503 ff. and 1111 ff.) [...] he hopes to make the demos more reasonable and lucid" (Adalberto Giovannini, *Les relations entre états dans la Grèce antique: du temps d'Homère à l'intervention romaine [ca. 700-200 BC]*, Steiner, 2007, p. 9).C.), Steiner, 2007, p. 9).

(82) See Henri-Joseph-Guillaume Patin, *Études sur les tragiques grecs : Eschyle*, 4th ed. revised and corrected, Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1871, p. 355; Émile, Egger *Essai sur l'histoire de la critique chez les Grecs*, A. Durand, Paris, 1849, p. 211.

(83) Quoted in François-Joseph Fétis, *Histoire générale de la musique depuis les temps les plus anciens jusqu'à nos jours*, vol. 1, t. 1, Paris, Firmin Didot Frères, 1869, p. 192. On the subject of the Muses, it should be noted that they were initially regarded as oracles; it was only relatively recently that they were each assigned a particular art (Camille Semenzato, *A l'écoute des Muses en Archaic Greece*, De Gruyter, Berlin and Boston, 2017, p. 29, 251). Now, as indicated in the body of our study, one of Pan's genealogies presents him as the son of Jupiter Lyceus, or Arcadian, and of Thymbris, a water nymph who is said to have imparted to him the art of prophecy, which he then learned from Pan.

Apollo (this is Apollo Thymbrea, named after the town in Phrygia where a temple was erected to him) (Pseudo-Apollodorus, *Bibliotheca* 1. 4. 1).

(84) *Ibid*, p. 62-3.

(85) *Ibid*, p. 61.

(86) Collective, *Description de l'Égypte*, t. 1, Paris, 1809, p. 423.

(87) *Ibid*.

(88) Egyptian musicians attached to a palace or temple had a status comparable to that of civil servants (David Salvador, *Quand l'art agit dans la Cité : vers un nouveau statut du musicien*. Music, musicology and the performing arts. Université Charles de Gaulle - Lille III, 2016. French, p. 38-9). Despite the Egyptians' taste for music, the profession of musician and singer was only practised by individuals from the lowest class of the people who, like artisans, were declared incapable of any other occupation. They were supposed to be succeeded by their children (F.-J. Fétis, *op. cit.*, p. 200), of whom there appear to have been many (Adrien de La Fage, *op. cit.*, p. 63). In Greece, the social status of professional musicians varied widely (Kalliopi Papadopoulou, *Profession musicien : un 'don', un héritage, un projet ?*, L'Harmattan, 2004, p. 25). In classical Greece, as in Egypt, there were quite a few professional women musicians, who were generally courtesans who exercised their talents at feasts and banquets; some women musicians were attached to temples, which gave them the status of civil servants (David Salvador, *op. cit.*, p. 45). In Pharaonic Egypt, as in the civilisations of the Near and Middle East at the time, it was not uncommon for female musicians to be employed at festivals and banquets.

that priestesses were also musicians and dancers (see Georges Colonna Ceccaldi, *Monuments antiques de Chypre, de Syrie et d'Égypte*, Didier et cie, 1882). In ancient Rome, female musicians were usually also courtesans, but were not attached to a temple. From the second century B.C. onwards, if not earlier, they learned their trade in schools which seems to have been reserved for them (Valérie Péché, *Tibicinae, fidicinae, citharistriae, psaltriaae : femmes musiciennes de la comédie romaine*. In *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, t. 80, fasc. 1, 2002. *Antiquité - Oudheid* [p. 133-57], p. 146).

(89) Alexis Pierron, *Histoire de la littérature grecque*, L. Hachette et Cie, 1850, p. 21-2.

(90) Fr. Aug. Gevaert, *Histoire et théorie de la musique de l'antiquité*, t. 1, Ghent, 1875, p. 30.

Magical incantation was already no more than prayer, even if it was not yet prayer in the mystical, Christian sense (on the subject of what separated sung prayer in antiquity from prayer as "elevation of the soul", as practised in Christianity and Islam, see Jules Combarieu, *op. cit.*, p. 68).

(91) "Among the ancient peoples [who worshipped this goddess], the pine tree was consecrated to Cybele, and is usually depicted with this goddess. When the priests celebrated her mysteries, they ran around armed with thyrses, the ends of which were adorned with pine cones and ribbons. Atys, a young and handsome Phrygian, who, according to the fable, was passionately in love with Cybele, having vowed to

chastity to this goddess, and having betrayed her by marrying the nymph Sangaride, Cybele punished him, according to Ovid, in the person of his rival, whom she destroyed, and, according to others, by inspiring the unfortunate Atys to such a frenzy that he mutilated himself. The goddess, moved by her belated compassion for this unfortunate man, changed him into a pine tree, which was consecrated to her. Pine cones were also an attribute of Bacchus, and were used in the sacrifices and orgies held in his honour. The pine tree was also consecrated to the god Sylvain, who is often depicted carrying a branch or pine fruit in his left hand [...] The light produced by the burning of pine trees always illuminated the sacrifices made to Isis and Ceres, and Ceres was said to have used it to direct her steps when she was searching for her daughter Proserpine, who had been kidnapped by the god of the underworld. Newly-weds took their new wives into their homes only at night and by the light of torches made from pine wood, and these torches were almost the only ones used in the ancient cities. expiatory ceremonies" (quoted in Elie-Abel Carrière, *Traite général des conifères*, Chez l'auteur, Paris, 1855, p. 409-10).

(92) Paul Decharme, *Mythologie de la Grèce antique*, Garnier Frères, Paris, 1886, p. 486. Max Müller (*Essais sur la mythologie comparée : les traditions et les coutumes*, translated from English by Georges Perrot, Didier et Cie, 1873, p. 206) derives "Pan" from "panos" ("the wind that purifies" or "that sweeps away").

(93) *Ibid*, p. 356.

(94) *Ibid*.

(95) Longus, III, 23, according to Moschus, *Idyll*, VI, quoted in *ibid*.

(96) Nonnos of Panopolis, *The Dionysiacs: Songs XXXVIII-X*. Text compiled and translated by Francis Vian. *Les Belles Lettres*, 1999, p. 102.

(97) Paul Decharme, *op. cit.* p. 486. It should be noted that, again according to Nonnus (*Les Dionysiaques, ou Bacchus, rétabli, traduit et commenté par le comte de Marcellus*, XVI, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1856, p. 147), even if Pan calls Syrinx "barbarous in her refusals" and it is "for having despised the quiver of fire, (that) Syrinx, who cherished her virginity, was punished for her arrogance, that, having become a plant, taking on the aspect of a reed, she escaped Pan's love", she "continues to sing Pan's desires...". (Nonnos de Panopolis, Francis Vian, *Chants XLI - XLIII*, *Les Belles Lettres*, 1976, p. 93). In Ovid (*Metamorphoses*, 1, 568-779), the "balance of power" between Pan and Syrinx is reversed: "Pan already believed Syrinx to be at his mercy, but in his hands he seized only reeds from the marsh and not the body of the nymph. And as he sighs, the air he has moved through the reeds makes a light sound, a kind of complaint. Seduced by this novelty and the sweetness of the melody, Pan said: 'For me, this will remain a means of conversing with you.' And so, thanks to the uneven reeds linked together by a wax joint, he perpetuated the name of the young girl."

(98) Marie-Christine Fayant, *La musique dans les Dionysiaques de Nonnos de Panopolis*, in *Musique et poésie dans l'antiquité : actes du colloque de Clermont-Ferrand, 23 mai 1997, textes réunis par Georges- Jean Pinault*, Presses Universitaires Blaise Pascal, Clermont-Ferrand, 2001 [p. 71-83], p. 80.

(99) Philippe Borgeaud, op. cit. p. 124.

(100) Frédéric Guillaume Bergmann, *La Fascination de Gulfi (Gylfa Ginning): traité de mythologie scandinave*, composé par Snorri fils de Sturla, Treuttel et Würtz, Paris and Strasbourg, 1861, p. 256.

(101) Apostolos N. Athanassakis and Benjamin M. Wolkow (eds.), *The Orphic Hymns*, The John Hopkins University Press, 2013, p. 97.

(102) On the sexual nature of the syrinx, see Apostolos N. Athanassakis, *Music and Ritual In Primitive Eleusis*. In *Platon*, no. 28, 1976 [p. 86-105]. Among certain wild peoples, the number of pipes varies according to the age and development of the sexual organs of the player (Dale A. Olsen, *World Flutelore: Folktales, Myths, and Other Stories of Magical Flute Power*, University of Illinois Press, Champaign, 2013, p. 44).

(103) Judith A. Peraino, *Listening to the Sirens: Musical Technologies of Queer Identity from Homer*, University of California Press, Berkeley, Los Angeles and London, 2006, p. 23. On the subject of music in the pre-marital rites of wild peoples, see Roland-Manuel, *Histoire de la musique*, vol. 1, Gallimard, 1960, p. 202 ff.

(104) François-Marie Bertrand (abbé), Migne (abbé) (ed.), *Dictionnaire universel, historique et comparatif, de toutes les religions du monde*, t. 1, 1848, p. 393.

(105) E.-J. Fétis, op. cit. 3, Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie, 1872, p. 306.

(106) Lucretius, *De rerum nat.*, II.

(107) See Hans Licht, op. cit. p. 500.

(108) Pascal Quignard, *La haine de la musique - petits traités - Calmann-Lévy*, 1996, p. I2-3.

(109) Auguste Bouché-Leclercq, op. cit. p. 533.

(110) Moustafa Gadalla, *Egyptian Musical Instruments*, 2nd expanded ed., Tehuti Research Foundation, 2018, p. 50.

(111) François-Joseph Fétis, op. cit. p. 248. On the subject of instruments, including the flute, which were (Anthony M. Snodgrass, *Archaic Greece: The Age of Experiment*, University of California Press, Berkeley and Los Angeles, 1981, p. 177). This is why it is not wrong to say that "[t]he music of the Greeks, considered as the source of the modern tradition, is [...] only an appendix or a particular case of oriental music" (Jules Combarieu, op. cit., p. 47). Most of the professional musicians practising in Greece were of Asian origin.

(112) Hyagnis, a priest of Cybele, is credited with inventing the Phrygian flute and the nomos, low tunes similar to plainchant that were sung in honour of Cybele, Bacchus and Pan (William Cooke Stafford, *Histoire de la musique*, translated from English by Adèle Fétis, Paulin, Paris, 1832, p. 122).

According to other mythological traditions, the inventor of the flute was the son of Hyagnis, the shepherd Marsyas.

He is said to have taught Cybele to play it, unless it was invented by Cybele herself, who taught Marsyas the art of playing it (F.-J. Fétis, *op. cit.*, p. 12). According to Lucretius (*De rerum nat.*, V), the observation of the whistling of the wind in the reeds on the banks of the Nile gave rise to the idea of wind instruments. It is possible that the flute was one of the first instruments to be introduced into Egypt (*Collective, op. cit.*, p. 422).

(113) If the perforated cave bear femur found in the Divje Babe archaeological park in north-west Slovenia and dated to 40,000 BC and the carved vulture radius with five holes found in the Hohle Fels cave in the Swabian Jura and dated to 35,000 BC are indeed flutes, the flute would be the oldest known instrument (Sandra Garrido and Jane W. Davidson, *Music, Nostalgia and Memory: Historical and Psychological Perspectives*, Springer International Publishing, 2019, p. 1).

(114) Adrien de La Fage, *op. cit.* p. 24. The music played inside the temples, where, in ceremonies directly linked to the cult, it was played exclusively by musicians from the order of priests or musicians affiliated with it, differed from that played at open-air festivals, the former being as mournful as the latter was sonorous and joyful. The flute and trumpet were honoured in the cult of Osiris, but only in certain ceremonies and in certain cities; in some phases of this cult, music was forbidden (Jacques Porte, *Encyclopédie des musiques sacrées*, vol. 4, Éditions Labergerie, 1968, p. 319). Strabo (*Geography*, I. XVII) reports that, in the temple of Osiris at Abydos, no singer, flautist or stringed instrument player was allowed to play during the sacrifices, which suggests that this prohibition did not apply outside the hours of the sacrifices. The priests of Abydos, for their part, "rejected all kinds of music: they claimed that the sound of the trumpet was too much like the voice of a donkey". They replaced music with the cadenced repetition of the seven vowels of the Egyptian alphabet (Aélien, *de animalibus*, X, 28; Frédéric-Louis Norden, *Voyage d'Égypte et de Nubie*, nouv. éd., t. 1, Paris, 1795, p. 233-4).

(115) Quoted in Jules Combarieu, *op. cit.* p. 40.

(116) *Thesaurus Cultus et Rituum Antiquorum (ThesCRA)*. II, Los Angeles, The J. Paul Getty Museum, p. 410.

(117) Valerius Flaccius, III, 47; Pindar, *Fragments*, 63, Ed. Boeckh; Lucian, *Dialogue of the Gods*, 22.

(118) Victor Magnien, *Les mystères d'Éléusis : leurs origines. - Le rituel de leurs initiations*, 2nd revised and expanded ed., Payot, Paris, 1938, p. 51.

(119) George Grote, *Histoire de la Grèce*, translated from English by A. - L. Sadous, vol. 4, A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie, Paris, 1865, p. 287.

(120) Aristotle added, more pragmatic than dogmatic - the flute must have been very popular in Greece at the time - that its use should be "limited to circumstances where the aim is to correct rather than to instruct".

(121) Heinrich Julius Klaproth, *Lettre sur la découverte des hiéroglyphes acrologiques*, J. -S. Merlin, Paris, 1827, p. 11. According to Ivan Aleksandrovich of Gulīānof (*Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. 3, Leipzig, 1879, p. 273, note 1), "... the flute, tibia, fistula, called in the Egyptian language (chébi) (chèbé), is, in this allegory, only the mystical paronym of its homophones (cheb), (chab), (chub), which signify corrupere, contaminare, polluere, violare virginem". This Russian Egyptologist also points out (op. cit., p. 271) a paronymy between the Egyptian word for goat and the word for demon.

(122) Pan, like the other forest deities, was feared by travellers, who were struck with terror by his terrifying voice (Valerus Flaccius, III, 31) when he suddenly appeared to them in the middle of the night.

(123) Petrus Van Limburg Brouwer, *Histoire de la civilisation morale et religieuse des Grecs*, vol. 5, 1841, p. 331, notes 101-5.

(124) The adjective 'panic' was first used in *Anciens Mémoires sur du Guesclin* (s. D. G. ch. 32), in the sense of "sudden and unfounded terror", which it retains in *Gargantua* (1534) ("ainsi fuyoient ces gens, de sens desproveuz, sans çavoir cause de fuyr; tant seulement les poursuivuyt une terreur Panice qui avoient conceue en leurs ames"), in *Corneille* (*Le Cid*, II, 7), in *La Fontaine* (*Fables*, v, 19) and, in the 18th century, in *Voltaire* (*Dict. Phil.*, s. v. Locke), while *Madame de Sévigné* (8 Sept. 1680) uses it to mean "terror that loses its alarming character". The noun did not appear until 1828 (*Vidocq*, *Mémoires*, t. 1, p. 299) in the sense of "sudden and unreasoning terror, often unfounded, which most often affects a group or crowd and causes great disorder". In English, the adjective "panic" has been used since the early 17th century to refer to collective fear. In his *Letter on Enthusiasm* (1708), which was to form the first treatise on Characteristics and was written in defence of a group of Huguenots known as the "Cevennes Illuminati" who, in 1707, had published prophecies about, among other things, the imminent destruction of London, Lord Shaftesbury draws on the various mythical episodes relating to Pan that have just been mentioned, to make reflections that anticipate those of *Gustave le Bon* on mass psychology: "We read that Pan, when accompanying Bacchus on his expedition to the Indies, found a way to strike terror into the enemy camp with the help of a small handful of people, whose cries he was able to make resound in a valley full of caves and rocks. The bellowing of the caves and the frightful aspect of this desert so frightened the Indians that they imagined they heard voices, and certainly ghosts more than human, while the uncertainty of what they feared increased their consternation, and redoubled their fears with secret illusions that cannot be described; and this is what has been called panic terror. This adventure characterises quite well the nature of this passion, which never goes off without a mixture of enthusiasm, and which the horrors of superstition almost always accompany."

"Any passion may legitimately be called panic, when it is excited in a multitude, and when it is propagated by sight, or, as it were, by a contact of sympathy. This is how panic may be called the fury of the people, when the rage it carries to excess as we have sometimes seen, and especially when Religion enters into it" (*Les Œuvres de Mylord comte de Shaftesbury*, t. 1, Genève, 1769, p. 12-3). In the mid-eighteenth century, when "panic" took on the meaning of "widespread

apprehension about financial matters" ("inquiétude financière générale") (<https://www.etymonline.com/word/panic>), the historian and philosopher David Hume (1711-1776), probably with the passage just quoted in mind, wrote of the so-called "Papist plot" of 1678: "The moment was perfectly chosen to carry to extravagance the fears and apprehensions of a jealous people disposed to welcome all suspicions. This cry: 'A plot!' suddenly strikes the ears; and all at once, like frightened men in the dark, take every figure for a spectre. The terror of one becomes a cause of terror to another, and a universal panic suddenly spreads, reflection and reasoning, common sense and humanity, lose all influence over them." (History of England, Charles II, quoted in Cyrille-Jean Destombes [abbé], *La Persécution religieuse en Angleterre sous les successeurs d'Élisabeth*, J. Lecoffre et Cie, Paris, 1864, p. 375). It is interesting that Shaftesbury notes that panic spreads "by sight".

"Panic" entered the medical vocabulary in the 1970s to designate a particular form of anxiety neurosis. Panic attacks include the following symptoms: 1) dyspnoea; 2) palpitations; 3) chest pain or discomfort; 4) sensations of choking or strangulation; 5) dizziness, vertigo or feelings of instability; 6) sensations of unreality; 7) paresthesias (tingling in the hands or feet); 8) hot and cold flushes; 9) sweating; 10) feeling faint; 11) tremors and muscle twitches" (see Jean Garrabé, *Dictionnaire taxinomique de psychiatrie*, Elsevier Masson, 1989). It was also in the 1970s that the term entered the jargon of sociology.

In 1830, *The Quarterly Christian Spectator* (Dr. Cox on regeneration, in Alexander Campbell, *Millennial Harbinger*, vol. 1, 1830 [pp. 546-550] p. 548); see B. Fahs, M. Dudy and S. Stage [eds], *The Moral Panics of Sexuality*, Palgrave Macmillan, 2013, pp. 2-3) had published an article in which a Dr. Cox argued that the regeneration of the soul must be an active process and declared "... if it be true that the soul is as active in regeneration as in anything else [...] then what shall we call that sort of orthodoxy which proposes to make men better by teaching them the reverse?".

Paralysing the soul, or striking it with moral panic, is not regeneration" (p. 546). After quoting New Testament passages such as "Seek and you shall find", he asked: "Is it not obvious that these expressions indicate that the mind is as far as possible from stagnation, from torpor, from 'moral panic'" (p. 548). The expression was taken up at the end of the 1960s by the British sociologist Jock Young, inspired by *Understanding the Media* (Michael Welch, *Scapegoats of September 11th: Hate Crimes & State Crimes in the War on Terror*, Rutgers University, London).

Press, New Brunswick, New Jersey and London, p. 21), before being popularised by his colleague Stanley Cohen in *Folk Devils and Moral Panics: The Creation of Mods and Rockers* (London, 1972), which explores the role of the mass media, politicians and the British public in exacerbating anxiety about youth in the 1960s, and shows in particular how the mass media, in collusion with the Establishment, used the 'moral panic' they had created on this subject to justify the extension of police powers and the strengthening of the judiciary. Societies," he writes, "seem to be subject, from time to time, to periods of moral panic. A situation, an event, a person or a group of people is brought to the fore and is defined

as a threat to society's values and interests; the mass media present it in a stylised and stereotyped way; moral barricades are held up by editors, bishops, politicians and other do-gooders; socially approved experts set out their diagnoses and solutions; ways of coping are developed or (more often than not) resorted to; or the situation ceases, calms down or deteriorates and becomes more visible. Sometimes the subject of the panic is completely new, sometimes it's something that's been around for quite a long time, but suddenly becomes the media's favourite topic. Sometimes the panic passes and is forgotten, except in folklore and the collective memory; sometimes it has more serious and lasting repercussions and can produce changes in legal or social policy or even in the way society sees itself.

" (p. 9). Moral panic" can be defined as an irrational emotional state that the mass media arouse in the public by portraying a minority section of the population as a threat or danger to their physical or moral safety. Today, in "Western" countries, this minority section is made up of patriots. However, the first cases of "moral panic" recorded in the United States, which were to spread to many other countries, starting with Great Britain, concerned an area in which Pan stands out in particular: sexuality. These were rumours of "Satanic ritual abuse" (SRA). "Sex crimes" are particularly well-suited to entertaining the masses in every sense of the word.

Kenneth Thompson (*Moral Panics*, London, Routledge, 1998, p. 8-9) expands on Cohen's diagnosis as follows. The use of the two words 'moral panic' implies that the threat is to something that society considers sacred or fundamental to it. Moral panic is used precisely to indicate that the perceived threat is not due to something trivial - such as economic performance or the quality of education - but is a threat to the social order itself or, at any rate, to an idealised ('ideological') conception of part of it. The threat and its perpetrators are seen as evil folk devils and inspire strong feelings of righteousness. Events are more likely to

be perceived as fundamental threats and provoke moral panics, if society, or a significant part of it, is in crisis or undergoing changes which, because they worry it, subject it to stress. The response to such threats is likely to be a demand for greater regulation or social control and a return to 'traditional' values. Much of the literature on moral panic seeks to explain the motivations of those who demand or impose social regulation in such cases: the media, pressure groups, politicians, sections of the public, the police and the judiciary."

To sum up, there are five elements or stages in the making of a moral panic: "1. someone or something is defined as a threat to values or interests; 2. this threat is described by the media in an easily recognisable form; 3. public concern grows rapidly; 4. the authorities or opinion-makers respond to this concern; 5. Panic fades or leads to social and/or legal changes.

In the third edition of *Folk Devils* (2002, p. xxv), Cohen argues that 'moral panics' have, to some extent, had their day, with other tactics of mob management now favoured by what we call 'panic power'; 'some of the social space occupied by

moral panics," he writes, "has been filled by latent social anxieties, insecurities and fears that are fuelled by specific risks: the rise of 'techno-fears' (nuclear, chemical, biological, toxic and ecological risks), disease risks, food poisoning, fear of travelling by plane or train and fear of international terrorism. The 'risk society' - to use Becker's well-known expression - combines the generation of risk with complex levels of risk management and disputes over how that management is carried out. The construction of risk is not just about raw information about dangerous or unpleasant things, but also about the ways in which they are assessed, classified and responded to. New risk prediction methods (such as actuarial tables, psychological profiling, safety assessments) are subject to cultural scrutiny. If these methods lead to completely different conclusions - Prozac is a safe drug; Prozac is a dangerous drug - the discourse turns to the evaluation criteria or to the authority, reliability and relevance of the claimant (*). Deviating even further from the starting point, the orientation takes a moral turn: an examination of the personality and moral integrity of the claimants: Do they have the right to say so? Is their in-depth knowledge just another form of moral enterprise?

(*) We have translated "claims maker" by the generic term "réclamants" so as not to have to choose between the various translations, all equally eloquent, offered by the specialist literature, of which the following are the main ones: "entrepreneur de cause" (see Claude Gilbert and Emmanuel Henry, *La définition des problèmes publics : entre publicité et discrétion*. In *Revue française de sociologie*, vol. 53, no. 1, 2012 [p. 35-59]; "one who is engaged in advocacy activities" [Martin Barker, *La campagne britannique des video nasties. Panics, claims-making, risk and politics*. In *Recherches sociologiques et anthropologiques* [Online], 43-1, 2012, online 11 March 2013, accessed 20 December 2020. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/rsa/837> ; DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/rsa.837>) ; or "moral entrepreneur" (Howard S. Becker, *Outsiders: Studies in the Sociology of Deviance*, The Free Press, New York, 1963, p. 147). Moral entrepreneurs are people who "on the one hand [...] try to increase general awareness of disturbances in the social order by formally thematising social problems - or to put it another way, [who] try to create 'moral needs' - and [...] recommend that these problems be dealt with at the professional level, and in particular [...] propose that the product of their professional work or that of the organisation into which they are integrated should cover their moral needs". To do this, they have to "impose themselves on the market of professional achievements, in the face of the work that competing professions can do" and succeed in definitively attributing to themselves the monopoly of dealing with problems through "the social construction of expertise" and, in particular, through "the institutional and cognitive separation between experts and non-specialists" (B. Giesen, *Moralische Unternehmer und öffentliche Diskussion. Überlegungen zur gesellschaftlichen Thematisierung sozialer probleme*, *Kölner Zeitschrift für Soziologie und Sozialpsychologie* 1983, XXXV [p. 230-54], p. 234. quoted in Sébastien Scheerer, *L'entrepreneur moral atypique*. In *Déviance et société*, vol. 9, no. 3, 1985 [p. 267-89] p. 269). In everyday language, we would say "The moral enterprise". It goes without saying that, like any business, the "moral enterprise" is not disinterested. The market for morality is juicy and its resources inexhaustible. Journalists

Politicians, presenters, sportsmen and women, artists and experts, all the guests on television are "moral entrepreneurs", salesmen of good feelings.

(125) Auguste Bouché-Leclerc, *op. cit.* p. 533, note 47; see Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 119.

On the subject of myths relating to nightmares and hallucinations and, more generally, to panic terror, see Wilhelm Heinrich Roscher and James Hillman, *Pan and the nightmare*, Spring Publications, 1972, particularly the second part, which is a translation of an essay by Roscher entitled *Ephialtes, eine pathologisch-mythologische Abhandlung über die Alpträume und Alpdämonen des klassischen Altertums* (Teubner, Leipzig, 1900), in which all the interest of the work lies, but which does not appear in its French edition (James Hillman, *Pan et le cauchemar - Guérir de notre folie*, translated from the American by Marie-Jeanne and Thierry Auzas, Imago, 1979). Roscher begins by outlining modern theories about the nature and origin of nightmares, then examines ancient beliefs on the subject, before making an etymological study of the Greek terms for nightmare and reviewing the main demons that the Greeks and Romans blamed for nightmares. He points out that the Greeks and Romans had noticed that nightmares were often associated with digestive disorders caused by excess food and/or alcohol, or the ingestion of inedible foods, through which demons entered the bodies of the unfortunate.

(126) *Dictionnaire universel françois et latin*, t 5: M-PIR, Paris, 1752, p. 93. It was by this same musical stratagem, which spread terror among Mithridates' army, that Pan won the battle of Marathon for the Athenians (see *Argonautics* by Valerius Flaccus, *Or The Conquest of the Golden Fleece*, vol. 2, published by Michaud frères, Paris, 1811, p. 90 et seq.) According to other traditions, the expression is based on the fact that Pan, one of Bacchus' captains on his expedition to India, "ordered all the men of the sea to take part in the expedition".

the army, in the silence of the night and at a given signal, to utter a loud cry. The surrounding rocks and the hollows of the forest echoed the sound and made the enemy fear that their forces were infinitely more numerous than they were; seized with anguish, they abandoned their camp and fled" (Polyen, *Stratagems*, I, 2).

Incidentally, the first literary reference to 'panic' is found at the beginning of *Rhésus* - a play attributed either to Euripides or to the Alexandrian school (see *Tragédies d'Euripide*, translated by M. Artaud, 3rd revised and corrected ed. 2, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1837, p. 63) - in which Hector, in the camp he has set up in front of besieged Troy, asks the guard who woke him to bring him contradictory news: "Is it the whip of Pan, son of Cronos, that has so panicked you that you have abandoned the guard and thrown the army into disorder?" (Euripides, *Tragédies*. t. 7, 2nd part: *Rhésos*. Texte établi et traduit par François Jouan, Les Belles lettres, 2004, p. xcvi). Similarly, Polybius (*Hist.*, XX, 6, 12) relates that, during the war of the Allies in 217 BC, the Boeotians, who were besieging Megara, "were making their approaches, when, seized with panic terror, based on the rumour that Philopœmen arrived with his troops, they left their ladders against the walls and withdrew in disorder to their country"; Plutarch (*Life of Caesar*, L), that, on the eve of the battle of Pharsalus, Caesar "was himself visiting the guards, when, at midnight, a streak of fire was seen in the air which, passing over Caesar's camp, suddenly changed into a bright, shining flame and went to fall

in Pompey's camp. When the morning guards were put down, it was recognised that a sort of panic terror had spread among the enemies..."; Pausanias (X, 23), that the Gauls, having set up camp for the night after being routed by the Delphians, "were seized by a panic terror (it is believed that fears that have no real cause come from Pan). At first there were only a few who, confused and out of their senses, imagined they heard the sound of horses coming towards them, and that of an enemy army: this confusion of mind soon became general. Taking up their weapons and dividing up, they killed each other, no longer recognising each other by their language, their faces or the shape of their shields; but each platoon believed, by its voice and its weapons, that those against whom it was fighting were Greeks. This madness, inspired by the gods, caused the Gauls great loss by making them kill each other".

(127) Marten Stol, *Epilepsy in Babylonia*, Brill, Leiden, 1993, p. 51. The symptoms of panoplepsy also resemble those of sleep paralysis (see Brian A. Sharpless, *Isolated Sleep Paralysis and Affect* Kimberly Babson and Matthew Feldner [eds.], *Sleep and Affect: Assessment, Theory, and Clinical Implications*, Elsevier, 2015, p. 187), one of many disorders affecting more and more people.

(128) Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.*, p. 118: "Panics," says the Stoic Cornutus, "are sudden and thoughtless fright; this is how one sees herds of oxen or flocks of goats flee in panic and terror, when these animals have suddenly heard a noise coming from a forest or the depths of a ravine" (*De natura deorum*, XXVII, ed. Osanii, quoted in Paul Decharme, *Mythologie de la Grèce antique*, Garnier Frères, 1884, p. 489).

(129) *Ibid.* The belief that there was a direct link between epilepsy and Pan in man is reflected in Euripides' *Medea* (v. 1169 et seq.). In accordance with the principles of homeopathy, epileptics were advised to sleep on goatskins and eat goat meat.

(130) Jean Daniel Pierre Étienne Levade, *Recueil de mots français dérivés de la langue grecque*, A. Fischer and Luc Vincent, Lausanne, 1804, p. 87.

(131) Plato, *Cratylus*, 407e-408b.

(132) *Ibid.*, 408c.

(133) Charles Lenormant, *Commentaire sur le Cratyle de Platon*, Athens, 1861, p. 155.

(134) Th. Zielinski, *Hermes und die Hermelik*. In *Archiv für Religionswissenschaft*, IX, 1906 [p. 25-60], p. 36.

(135) "O, dear Pan, and you, divinities of these places, give me inner beauty, and make all that I have outwardly agree with what is inward to me. Let me appear rich and wise, and let me have only the right amount of gold that no one but a wise man could carry or carry with him!"

(136) It is a little-known fact that most of the so-called Greek myths, which depict the gods as dissolute beings and which Christian apologists later used to discredit Greek religion, are Orphic productions.

(137) Ernest Falconnet, *Petits poèmes grecs*, Desrez, 1838, p. 40.

(138) O. F. 54, quoted in Jean Rudhardt, *Opera inedita: Essai sur la religion grecque. Recherches sur les Hymnes*, Presses Universitaires de Liège, 2013, p. 299.

(139) In the mystery cults of the Hellenistic period, Pan as demiurge, primordial god of creation, driving force of reproduction in the primitive cosmos, is equated with Phanes/Protogonos, Zeus, Dionysus and Eros (M. L. West, *The Orphic Poems*, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 1983, p. 205).

(140) Fragment quoted in part by Aristotle and preserved by Stobaeus, quoted in Henri Brunel, *Avant le christianisme*, Paris, 1852, p. 290-1.

(141) The ancients knew more than one Dionysus. For Diodorus Siculus, there were three distinct Dionysuses: the Indian, the oldest, inventor of the art of cultivating vines and fruit trees; the Cretan, son of Zeus and Demeter or Coré, i.e. Zagreus, inventor of agriculture and, for this reason, depicted with bull's horns; the Theban, the most recent, son of Zeus and Semele, young and beautiful, who conquered the world at the head of an army of women, instituted initiations, festivals and musical games, established peace and harmony and whose mysteries Orpheus organised. For Cicero, who summarised the findings of mythographers who claimed that the name Dionysus referred to several distinct gods who had appeared at different times and in different regions, there had been five successive Dionysuses: the first, the Cretan Zagreus, son of Jupiter and Proserpine (Coré); the second, born in Egypt, son of Nilus and murderer of his nurse Nysa, was the Egyptian Osiris; the third, son of Jupiter and the Moon, was born in Thebes; the fourth, son of Cabirus and king of Asia Minor under the name of Sabazios, was the Phrygian god of the moon (Alfred Maury, *Histoire des religions de la Grèce antique*, t. 3, Ladrangé, Paris, 1859, p. 104. Sabazios was confused with Attis and was associated, like him, with Cybele; some historians even think that Attis was merely a nickname or epithet of Sabazios. But the Greeks gave him a different appearance from Attis, portraying him as a son of Zeus and Persephone, associated with Demeter and protector of the vine. He was also likened to Dionysus-Bacchus, DAGR, Bacchus, t. 1. 1re partie, Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1877, p. 603); finally, the fifth, born of Nysus (an unknown mythological character) and Thyoné (one of the names of Sémélé), was the god of orgies (Trieterica) on Mount Cithéron. Whatever the origin attributed to him in the sources, they give him as a deity from a region outside Attica: "Dionysus is not a god of Hellenic origin" (Paul Foucart, *Le culte de Dionysos en Attique*. In *Mémoires de l'Institut national de France*, t. 37, 2^e partie, 1906 [p. 1-204], p. 20). It is generally accepted that the cult of this divinity came from Thrace, where it bore the name Sabazios (see François Lenormant, *Sabazius*, *Revue archéologique*, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1875) and where it was mainly women who worshipped it; Sabazios was also worshipped by the Phrygians, who were of the same race as the Thracians. For these two peoples, he was the genius presiding over vegetation, more specifically that of the mountains. Later, his power extended to the plains, to fruit trees and vines,

fig trees and annual plants. "Dionysos-Sabazios lives in fierce isolation; there are no The Greek mythographers who tried to establish the genealogy of the various Dionysus were unable to name the goddess who gave birth to him and only know of his father Cabiros. It is a native religion; the nature of its god corresponds to that of the country. At the same time, it is a complete religion; the rites it practises find their explanation in the elements, and it draws from its own beliefs enough to satisfy the aspirations of its followers: the result it promises and ensures in the *óργια*, is the one that the East has always greedily pursued by various means, physical or psychic: it is divine delirium, the ecstasy where the soul freed from the body enters into direct communication with the divinity. We can therefore consider the Thracian Dionysus to be a national god, whose cult borrowed nothing from abroad either to originate or to develop" (ibid., p. 26). His cult, rejected by the Scythians because it drove men mad, spread rapidly to Macedonia and northern Greece, where its two most important centres were Thebes and Delphi. The Theban Dionysus is the Thracian god; at Delphi, there were "two distinct Dionysus, neither of whom is the son of Semele. Coming from the most opposite points, they met at the foot of Parnassus. One is the Thracian god of prophetic delirium, associated with the honours of Apollo, whom he preceded in possession of the oracle. The other is the dying and reborn god, whom we shall call [...] the Cretan Dionysus (see ibid., p. 33 et seq.), but whose cult we shall find again in Attica, and whose [...] primary origin we must seek in Egypt" (ibid., p. 29). In Attica and Eleusis, Dionysus has all the features of the Cretan Dionysus, a deity who dies and is reborn; attempts to introduce Sabazios with his national cult into Attica in the fifth and fourth centuries BC were poorly received there and he found favour only with the lower classes and slaves (see ibid., p. 53 et seq.). Sabazios is "a god *μαϊνόμενος*, delighting in disorderly runs on the wooded heights, where he lives solitary; he attracts to himself the dishevelled troop of the Maenads and animates them with his voice. The purpose of his worship is to provoke the ecstasy that brings the faithful into contact with their invisible god [...whereas] in the religion of the Dionysus of Eleusis [he] is a mysterious god, but peaceful and beneficent; with Demeter, his inseparable companion, he spreads the arts from which civilisation springs; In particular, he invented and propagated wine-making, whereas even in Homeric times, the Thracian Dionysus had nothing in common with the vine" (ibid., pp. 54-5); the Dionysus of Eleusis "is also distinct from the Theban Dionysus, who has retained the main features of the Thracian god, but softened them and blended in the legend of Semele, with the Baroque fable of his double birth" (ibid., p. 55). To come back to the Dionysus of the Orphics, as the myth of his birth shows (*), he took after both Sabazios and the Cretan Dionysus.

The identification of Theban Dionysus on the one hand with Sabazios and on the other with Osiris, made first by Hecataeus of Miletus (Giorgio Colli, *La sagesse grecque*, translated from the Italian by Marie-José Tramuta, vol. 1, Editions de l'Eclat, 1990, p. 409), Diodorus's main source and a major source of information on the subject.

of Herodotus, to whom Mazzarino (*Il pensiero storico classico*, vol 1, Laterza, 1983 [1st ed.: 3 vols., Rome and Bari, 1965-66], p. 27 ff) attributes a decisive influence on the formation of Orphism, contributed to the vogue for the Dionysian cult. "In Greece, the Dionysian or Bacchus festivals were basically simple celebrations, reflecting the naivety and rusticity of people's occupations. which this god presided over [...]. But among the Thracians, that fierce people, the cult of

Bacchus was part of the barbarity of customs [...]. The cult of Sabazius in Phrygia bore a striking resemblance to [their] bacchanalia. There were the same orgiastic scenes, the same noisy disorders. The god himself also seems to have been a personification of the sun, of the force of maturation and germination, and it is not impossible that the Bacchus of Thrace had long shared a common origin with him, since Thrace and Phrygia had been populated by the same race, the Bryges. Be that as it may, when the Sabazi were brought to Greece, they soon merged with the Dionysiacs. The licentious and furious character of the Phrygian festivals was initially an obstacle to their naturalisation among the Greeks of the Peloponnese and Attica, which leads us to believe that in these regions the festivals of Bacchus still retained the simplicity of the early ages; but the Greeks' taste for new and exotic cults eventually won out: The Bacchanalia, which were now transformed into scenes of debauchery, noisy orgies and sometimes even theatrical events, became a veritable revolution in the cult of Bacchus. secret ceremonies of depravity and bloodshed, precisely because of their strange character, acquired a popularity that the laws had great difficulty in combating [...]. The myths associated with the figure of Zagreus, which also originated in Phrygia, became mingled with the Hellenic legend of Dionysus; the new god, personification of the sun, producer of germs, symbol of the solar rays that penetrate the soil and, as it were, descend underground to bring forth plants, was associated with Proserpine, the wife of Pluto, whose place he took. This new

Dionysus was first called Iacchus, then [again] Zagreus: they tried to link him by a filial link to Jupiter and to the Theban Bacchus himself" (Noël des Vergers, Léon Renier and Édouard Carteron [ed.], *Compléments de l'Encyclopédie moderne*, t. 1, Firmin Didot Frères, Fils et Cie, Paris, 1858, p. 385-90). On what basis did the Orphics succeed in identifying two divinities apparently as dissimilar as Zagreus, the infernal god, and Dionysus, the god of vegetation, festivals, pleasure and sacred delirium? Dionysus was conceived as the god of the future life and of a future life happier than earthly life: an almost ecstatic post-mortem (M. J. Lagrange [Père], *op. cit.*, p. 78), which the Orphics promised to initiates.

(* According to the Phrygian myth, at least in the Hellenised form it took when the cult and initiations of the god were established in Greece, "Sabazius [...] burned with love for his mother (Cybele), but he dared not satisfy his guilty passion; he took the form of a bull and tried to satisfy his amorous ardour, to the indignation of the goddess, the victim of her son's salacity. It was because Cybele had been equated with Demeter in the Orphic myths that Arnobius gave her the name Brimo, which belonged to Demeter in the Eleusinian myths. Sabazius tried in vain to calm his mother's irritation. So he cut off the testicles of a ram, wrapped them in a sheet and tied them up with wool. Pretending to come and beg forgiveness from the woman he had offended, he threw the testicles into her womb. After ten months, Cybele gave birth to a daughter whose beauty further aroused Sabazius, and to seduce her he took the form of a dragon. He entered the womb of the beautiful child, whom Arnobius, along with the Orphics, likens to Proserpine. Impregnated by her father, the goddess gave birth to a bull-headed god [...]. The whole of this myth has an obviously oriental character that is completely foreign to Greek myths; it explains the formula pronounced in the Sabazies: The bull begat the serpent, and the serpent the bull". (Alfred Maury, *op. cit.*, p. 103-4, note 4).

Foreign to Phrygian mythology, the second part of the Orphic myth of the birth of Sabazios, introduced by Onomacrite, the Greek chresmologist who collected the beliefs of the Pelasges and Thracians in the so-called Orphic hymns (see Sarrasi, *L'Orient dévoilé*, 4th ed, Ernest Leroux, Paris, 1881, p. 197), had been taken from a Cretan and, ultimately, Egyptian source ("In truth, Orpheus was said to have been born in [Egypt]; but the Orphics acknowledged that he had borrowed his Dionysus, torn to pieces by the Titans, from Crete. Some even thought that he had brought back from Egypt the mysteries of Isis and Osiris, transformed into those of Demeter and Dionysus", Paul Foucart, *op. cit.*, p. 54). Here it is

The birth of Sabazios: Zeus had Sabazios guarded at birth by the Curetes in an isolated cave. Hera succeeded in arousing the Titans against the child, so that one day, having managed to elude the watchful eye of his guardians by using a disguise, they sneaked up on him and offered him toys to distract him. While Sabazios was enjoying himself, they pounced on him and tore him to pieces, before boiling his limbs in a cauldron. However, Athena had had time to tear out the victim's heart, which was still beating, and had taken it to Zeus ("You [Athena] who rescued the intact heart of the Lord from the folds of the ether, the heart of Bacchus torn to pieces by the Titans, and who, bringing it to his father, Proclus, Hymn 7 to Athena, 11-15, quoted in Jean Rudhardt, *Les deux mères de Dionysos, Perséphone et Sémélé, dans les 'Hymnes orphiques'*. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, vol. 219, no. 4, *L'orphisme et ses écritures : Nouvelles recherches*, 2002 [p. 483-501], p. 494). Zeus, having left the young god's heart to macerate, made Semele drink it, and she gave birth to him again (*ibid.* See also M. J. Lagrange [Père], *Critique historique, t. I, Les mystères : l'orphisme, Études Bibliques*, J. Cabalda et Cie, Paris, 1937, p. 72), though not before he had spent the time in Hades between his death and resurrection (*ibid.*, p. 74). Clement of Alexandria's version of this myth is quite different: Athena entrusts the heart of Dionysus to Zeus, who instructs Apollo to bury the young god's limbs on Parnassus. Like other Christian sources on the death of Dionysus, Clement is careful to omit the episode of his resurrection (Pierre Bonnechere, *Le sacrifice humain en Grèce ancienne* [Kernos. Supplément 3], Centre International d'Étude de la Religion Grecque Antique, Athens and Liège, 1994, p. 184, note 160). This legend was popularised by the Orphics. Using a symbolic interpretation, they derived a whole cosmogonic and theosophical doctrine from it.

(142) See Orphic Hymn XI, 1; Cornutus 27; Macrobius, *Saturnalia*, I, 22, 3. In Philippe Borgeaud, *op. cit.* p. 113. The Stoics showed the same tendency towards monotheistic pantheism by identifying Pan with their Zeus-Cosmos, the breath that sustains and unifies the whole universe, the "god of cosmic totality".

". W.H. Roscher hypothesised that "the idea of totality was grafted onto the traditional image of Pan from Egyptian influences (the original goat god Chnoum-Mendès, according to him, was identified with Pan as early as the seventh or sixth century BC). This syncretism led to the concept of Pan-totality reaching Orphism first, and later Stoicism; the false etymology Pan-Pân only served to support the process). Herbig [...] thinks, on the contrary [...] that the phenomenon is of Greek origin. He assumes that it is due to the tendency (evident from the 5th century onwards) to replace the plurality of great gods that were no longer believed in with a central being endowed with powers over the whole. This theological evolution would be matched by a political evolution: the rise of the lower social strata (e.g. Cleon) would be matched by the elevation to Olympus of lesser deities such as Hecate or Tyche" (*ibid.*). All

suggests that the phenomenon spread to Greece in the Near and Middle East. It has been demonstrated that monotheism is of Semitic origin (see Z. Arnal, *De la race comme explication du monothéisme sémitique*: thèse, Strasbourg, 1864; Jan Assmann, *Monotheism and its Political Consequences*, in Bernhard Giessen and Daniel Šuber [eds.], *Religion and Politics. Cultural perspectives [International studies in religion and society 3]*, London, 2005 [p. 141-59]).

(143) On the subject of Orphic doctrine, see Oreste Salamone, *Le Papyrus de Derveni de la Formation du Cosmos à la genèse des mots*. Introduction, critical edition, translation, notes and monographic study of the Fragments du papyrus, vol. I, thesis presented in view of obtaining the grade of Doctor of the University of Aix-Marseille and defended in public and contradictory session on 6 December 2016, *Le Papyrus de Derveni*, translated and presented by Fabienne Jourdan, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2003 and, for

a worthy attempt at clarifying and ordering the various Orphic cosmogonic systems, *Biographie universelle, ancienne et moderne. Mythological part: MA - ZY*, t. 55, L.- G. Michaud, Paris, 1833, p. 229 et seq.

(144) Lucie Buchère, *L'idée de progrès chez Hésiode*, edited by Christian Bouchet. - Lyon: Université Jean Moulin (Lyon 3), 2016.

(145) Santo Mazzarino, *op. cit.* p. 207. From an analysis of the primary sources, the author deduces that the Orphic doctrine was the expression of a social group whose members had made their fortune in trade and were thus able to bring their full weight to bear on the politics of Greek cities. Similarly, Kerényi (*Pythagoras and Orpheus. Geschichte der Orphik und des Pythagoreismus*, 1950) considers that Orphism represented the aspirations of the lower classes (Boyancé Pierre. *Karl Kerényi, Pythagoras und Orpheus [Albae Vigiliae, N. F., H. IX]*, 1950. In *Revue des Études Anciennes*, t. 54, 1952, no. 3-4 [p. 365-368], p. 306).

(146) L.-F. Alfred Maury, *op. cit.* t. 3, Ladrangé, Paris, 1859, p. 315. Still on the subject of the Orphic doctrine, see E. Prosper Biardot, *Les terres cuites grecques funèbres dans leur rapport avec les mystères de Bacchus*, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1872, pp. 139-42.

(147) Georg Friedrich Creuzer, *op. cit.* p. 975.

(148) Jules Girard, *Le sentiment religieux en Grèce d'Homère à Eschyle, étudié dans son développement moral et dans son caractère dramatique*, 2nd edn, Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1869, p. 261.

(149) *Ibid.*, p. 251.

(150) L. - F. Alfred Maury, *op. cit.* p. 313.

(151) *Ibid.*, p. 313-4.

(152) About the Net (*diktuon*), the title of a poem by a Pythagorean (Brontinos or Zopyros) (Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, *Redefining Ancient Orphism: A Study in Greek Religion*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2013, p. 279), Jules Girard writes (*op. cit.*, pp. 260, 261) that "they [the Orphics] designated by

This is the work of nature, whose indefatigable activity, in spite of obstacles and death, weaves the fabric of the world indefinitely through a series of existences that is but a perpetual transformation of the beings it gives birth to"; "Each individual of the human race is but a link in the great net of nature, and if he has a right to respect, it is because the life whose breath he carries within him is something divine and sacred; and the same reason should make him respect other beings. Moreover, as life cannot be extinguished, it animated other bodies before its own, and afterwards it must animate others still". Aristotle tells us that the Orphics compared the birth of a being to the weaving of a net - the image of the net, the soul being made up of air occupying the interstices of a material body. The same image is found in the Timaeus (Radcliffe G. Edmonds III, op. cit.).

(153) DAGR, s. v. Orphici, t. 4, 1st part, Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1873-1879, p. 251-2.

(154) Omophagy, which probably originated in Crete, was a sacrifice in honour of Dionysus, after which the initiates ate together the raw flesh of a live butchered bull. "It presents a strange contrast with the other prescriptions of the Orphic life, all abstinence and purity" (ibid., p. 253). In another "strange contrast", the Orphics, according to Plato (Republic, 364c), "[obtain] from the gods, by certain sacrifices and enchantments, the power to [...] forgive crimes [...]" (ibid., p. 253). [...], through games and festivities". The two tendencies, one ascetic, the other orgiastic, can only be reconciled if we admit that the first was, so to speak, a preparation for the second. It was not a question of dominating instincts, pleasures and passions - if, indeed, a human type who, as was the case for the followers of Orphism, had simple moral perfection in mind could succeed in dominating instincts, pleasures and passions - but of curbing them as much as possible, so that, having become irrepressible, they could be released and unleashed with tenfold violence.

(155) DAGR, s. v. Orphici, p. 253.

(156) The expression "blessed race", which refers to the infernal deities, is used in the formula engraved on one of the tablets found at Thourioi, in Magna Graecia, from which the following extract is taken: "I come pure from among the pure, O Queen of the lower regions, O Eucles and Euboleus, and the other gods and genii; for I am proud to belong to your blessed race, and I have paid the penalty for my unjust deeds, tamed by my fate or struck by lightning. I have escaped the gloomy cycle of pain and, with swift steps, I have reached the desired crown. I have descended into the bosom of the Sovereign, the subterranean queen.

"Fortunate and blessed, you will be a god instead of a mortal.

"Chevreau, je suis tombé dans du lait" (quoted in Yves Dacosta, Initiations et sociétés secrètes dans l'antiquité gréco-romaine, Berg international, 1991, p. 74). When the initiate died, these tablets were buried with him, to help him remember the formulas of salvation that he had been given.

(Pierre Anglès, Etudes des rapports entre le mythe et la politique chez Platon, Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 1999, p. 261).

(157) Gérard Lambin, À propos de formules dites orphiques. In *Gaia : revue interdisciplinaire sur la Grèce Archaique*, no. 18, 2015 [p. 507-519], p. 508 ; René Pichon, À propos des tablettes orphiques de Corigliano. In *Revue des Études Grecques*, t. 23, fasc. 101, 1910 [p. 58-6] ;

Outi Lehtipuu, *The Afterlife Imagery in Luke's Story of the Rich Man and Lazarus*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2007, chap. 5. Some (see, for example, W. K. C. Guthrie, *Orpheus and Greek Religion: A Study of the Orphic Movement*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, p. 194, p. 207, 209) argue Seriously, this formula was pronounced by the student during an initiation ritual that required him to throw himself into a pot of boiling milk, in memory of the mythical episode in which the Titans boiled the young Dionysus in a pot.

(158) Eriphios (goat) was one of the titles of Dionysus.

(159) L.-F. Alfred Maury, op. cit. p. 331. If, therefore, for Maury, the Orphic teachings entered into the Mysteries and became their doctrine, Jules Girard (op. cit.) is of the opinion that, on the contrary, the Orphic doctrine constituted a sort of vulgarisation of the teachings given in the Mysteries.

(160) Plato depicts the orpheotheles, the itinerant priests of the sect, knocking on the doors of the rich, their books under their arms, offering to purify them, by means of expiatory formulae and rituals, of the crimes that they or their ancestors might have committed, or even, by anticipation, of those that their grandchildren might commit; the greatest torments, they claimed, awaited in hell those who neglected the sacrifices they had instituted. Taking their charlatanism even further, "the orpheotelestes traded in charms and philtres, sold so-called secrets to anyone who came along to deliver them from their adversaries, whoever they were, evil or good" (L.-F. Alfred Maury, op. cit., p. 331). Many commentators, in order to explain the discrepancy between Orphic dogma and the portrayal that Plato's account of the members of the sect, have argued that, at the time the philosopher wrote these lines, Orphism had changed in its doctrine and that the Orphics were no longer at the moral height of their predecessors. Thus, Saglio and Daremberg (op. cit., p. 254) assert that "Orphism was distorted in two different directions: in the direction of charlatanism, and in the direction of pantheistic speculations". This is a risky assertion, given that the texts of Orphic literature were for a long time very difficult to date (James Talboys Wheeler, *The Life and Travels of Herodotus*, vol. 2, Longman, Brown, Green, and Longmans, 1855, p. 112) and that they remain so despite the discovery, in 1962, at Derveni, near Thessalonica, of a manuscript, dated to the 4th century BC, which provides an allegorical commentary on Orphic writings dated to the 5th or even 6th century BC (Claude Calame, Philippe Borgeaud and André Hurst, *L'orphisme et ses écritures. Nouvelles recherches: Présentation*. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. 219, n° 4, 2002. *L'orphisme et ses écritures. Nouvelles recherches* [p. 379-83]). In their commentaries on the writings of early Orphism, the Stoics, and later the Neoplatonists of the Alexandrian school, only accentuated the pantheistic tendencies they presented (Dwayne A. Meisne, *Orphic Tradition and the Birth of the Gods*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 48; Pierre Boyancé, *Remarques sur le papyrus de Derveni*. In *Revue des Études Grecques*, t. 87, fasc. 414-8, 1974 [p. 91-110], p. 95; Miguel Herrero de Fàuregui, *Orphism and Christianity in Late Antiquity*, De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 2010, p. 311). And, since, doctrinally,

There is no gap between the early and later Orphic writings, so why shouldn't the same be true of their practices?

(161) Alberto Bernabé, *The soul after death: Orphic models and Platonic transposition*. In *Études platoniciennes* (4. Les puissances de l'âme selon Platon), no. 4, 2007 [p. 25-44]; id. in *Platón y el orfismo. Diálogos entre religión y filosofía*, Madrid, 2011; see also James K. Feibleman, *Religious Platonism: The Influence of Religion on Plato and the Influence of Plato on Religion*, Routledge, 2013 (1st ed.: 1959).

(162) See Pierre Boyancé. *Platon et les cathartes orphiques*. In *Revue des Études Grecques*, t. 55, fasc. 261-263, 1942 [p. 217-35].

(163) See F. Martinez (S. M.), *L'ascétisme chrétien pendant les trois premiers siècles de l'église*, chap. 1: *La philosophie grecque et l'école d'Alexandrie*, Gabriel Beauchesne, Paris, 1913.

(164) See Vittorio Macchiario, *Zagreus. Studi intorno al Orfismo*, Florence, 1930. The work was criticised by André Boulanger (*Orphée: rapports de l'orphisme et du christianisme*, F. Rieder et Cie, 1925) and by Père M. J. Lagrange (op. cit.). Lagrange attacks him mainly on three points: union with the dying and suffering god; sin; sacrifice and communion.

Lagrange admits that "in Orphism there is indeed a suffering god [...] But the suffering of the god is precisely the fault and not the atonement for it. They are at the origin of the history of souls, not at its end. These sufferings are not voluntary; they are not the fruit of a supreme act of charity. They have no moral value; on the contrary, they are evil itself. Orphism, which remained purely Greek, did not divinise suffering; the asceticism of the 'Orphic life' does not include it" (Pierre Boyancé, *Sur l'orphisme*, on a recent book. In *Revue des Études Anciennes*, vol. 40, 1938, no. 2 [p. 163-72]). Leaving aside the fact that Orphism could never "remain purely Greek", not being of Greek origin, it is undeniable that Dionysus, unlike Christ, neither suffers nor dies "for men". The Greeks of the fourth, third and second centuries BC were not yet ready to swallow such empty words.

As far as sacrifice and communion are concerned, it is established that union with the divinity exists in Orphism (W. K. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 194, p. 207) and even that it "becomes explicit [in Greece] only in the Orphic doctrines, where the soul rediscovers its original divine essence and returns to the divine milk that nourished it" (Roland Crahay, *La religion des Grecs*, Éditions Complexe, 1991 [1st ed.: 1966], p. 138). 1 Corinthians 6:17 ("But he who clings to the Lord is one spirit with him") says no different.

A formula from the Mysteries says: "Many take the thyrses, but few are inspired by the god" (Olymp. Ad Phaedon), in other words, few achieve union with the divinity. In the same way, "there are many called and few chosen" (Matthew 22:1-14), a verse that Clement of Alexandria (*Œuvres complètes de Platon*, traduites par Victor Cousin, t. 1, Rey et Gravier, Paris, 1846, p. 211, note**) quotes, likening it to the above-mentioned formula.

Lagrange (op. cit., p. 207) can do no less than recognise a similarity between omophagy (which Werner Goossens, *Les origines de l'eucharistie sacrament et sacrifice*, Beauchesne, 1931, p. 294 et seq. denies, without convincing arguments, to exist in Orphism)

and the Eucharist: "In both cases [...] the worshipper eats the god (theophagy): he feeds on his flesh, he drinks his blood, in order to appropriate his divine virtue". But this is just to sidestep the point: "It is the supreme act of religion (it would be more accurate to say: "religions of Negro-African origin", see Doumbi-Fakoly, *L'origine négro-africaine des religions dites révélées*, Menaibuc, 2004, p. 73-4): how can one unite more closely with God than by assimilating him as food? (ibid.)

(Another point in common between Orphism and Christianity, which Lagrange does not mention, concerns the species. In the early centuries of the Christian church, milk mixed with honey was offered along with wine to the neophyte ("As newly-born children ([by baptism], be reasonable and without pretence, long for milk" (Peter, 2, 2) (J.-B. Thibaut, *L'initiation chrétienne aux premiers siècles*. In *Échos d'Orient*, t. 21, n° 127-128, 1922 [p. 323-334], p. 334); a formula of blessing of the Roman liturgy mentions water with milk and honey, *ibid.*, note 3). Honey and milk were also used in the Orphic mysteries (Porphyry, *The Nymphs' Lair*, 15, 18; Stian S. Torjussen, *Metamorphoses of Myth: A Study of the 'Orphic' Gold Tablets and the Derveni Papyrus*, Dissertation, University of Tromsø, 2008, available at

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/33418520_Metamorphoses_of_myth_a_study_of_the_Orphic_gold_tablets_and_the_Derveni_papyrus, accessed on 02 July 2019). The Orphic mysteries, however, were not the only ones to offer honey and milk: every manifestation of Dionysus was preceded by rivers of honey, milk and wine (Euripides, *Bacch.*, 112); honey and milk were also offered, as Porphyry points out [op. cit.], in the mysteries of Mithras, whose establishment, it is true, clearly post-dates those of Dionysus and Orphism).

On the subject of sin, Lagrange's argument is specious: "To attribute an original sin to the Orphics is to play with words". Let's quote his own (op. cit., p. 207): "there is indeed a single original sin, but far from being the cause of the bad nature of the Titans, it rather stemmed from it. Man has therefore inherited a bad nature, which predates the sin committed on Zagreus, and which is not the consequence of a fault, since the Titans were born bad. There is still no original sin. Who plays on words? The scholar Pierre Boyancé (op. cit., p. 169), who is sympathetic to Lagrange's work but less of a theologian than he is, has no difficulty in recognising that the Orphic system "assumes a congenital impurity in every human being. Orphism [...] not only has a theory of original sin, but it is from this theory that it was born": Orphism assumes that sin is congenital to every man or, more precisely, to the titanic part of his nature (W. K. C. Guthrie, op. cit., p. 183).

If there is a distinction to be made in this respect, it is the one made by the historian of religions Ugo Bianchi (1922-1995) (*Péché originel et péché 'antécédent'*. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, vol. 170, no. 2, 1966 [p. 117-26]) between antecedent sin and original sin. Original sin is that which, committed by Adam and Eve, is transmitted to every human being at birth. Antecedent sin is the sin committed by a man in a previous life: for example, the Titans dismembered Dionysus, the

devour and are struck down, their guilt is inherited by the souls, which, in order to atone for it, find themselves confined to human bodies throughout a process that will continue in different bodies (see Alberto Bernabé, *La toile de Pénélope : a-t-il existé un mythe orphique sur Dionysos et les Titans ?* In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, vol. 219, no. 4, 2002. *L'orphisme et ses écritures. Nouvelles recherches*. p. 401-3; see also Radcliffe Edmonds, *Tearing Apart the Zagreus Myth: A Few Disparaging Remarks On Orphism and Original Sin*, <https://pdfs.semanticscholar.org/6c05/97c96922c8cd5978fb4d5aaeb3435167da09.pdf>).

No point of doctrine passes from one religion to another unchanged. There is no reproduction, only transposition. The dogmas of Orphism did not enter Christianity as they were, but were adapted to it. Moreover, it would seem that the early Church Fathers knew of Orphism only indirectly, through the syncretic doctrines from which they drew and of which they synthesised, as it were (see Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, *op. cit.* for an overview). The "genius of Christianity" is that it "moralized" and humanized the figure, common to all Eastern cults, of the god who dies and rises again.

(165) Quoted in Léon Robin, André Boulanger. *Orphée. Rapports de l'Orphisme et du Christianisme* (a booklet in the collection *Christianisme*, published under the direction of P. L. Couchoud). In *Revue des Études Grecques*, t. 40, fasc. 184-188, 1927 [p. 463-6], p. 464.

(166) Given the current state of knowledge, it is impossible to determine whether Pythagoreanism preceded Orphism or whether, on the contrary, Orphism preceded Pythagoreanism (see Claude Louis-Combet, *Ascétisme et eudémonisme chez Platon*, pp. 36 et seq. In *Annales littéraires de l'Université de Franche-Comté*, no. 626, 1997 and especially Karl Kerényi, *Pythagoras und Orpheus, Präludien zu einer zukünftigen Geschichte der Orphik und des Pythagoreismus*, coll. "Albae Vigiliae" (N. F.) 9, Zürich, 1950 [1940, 1938], a comparative historical study of the two schools.

(167) Voltaire, *Essai sur les Mœurs, Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, Garnier, Paris, 1878, vol. 11, p. 128.

(168) Quoted in Brian Juden, *Traditions orphiques et tendances mystiques dans le romantisme français*, Slatkine, 1984, p. 80; see also Miguel Herrero de Jáuregui, *op. cit.*, chap. IV, *Orphic Tradition in Christian Apologetic Literature*; James K. Feibleman, *Religious Platonism*, Routledge, London, 2016, p. 152; André Ragot, *Orphisme et christianisme*. In *Cahiers Renan*, no. 69, 1971 [p. 20-4].

(169) Colins, *De la justice dans la science hors l'église et hors la révolution*, t. 1, Paris, 1860, p. 122.

(170) See Ernest L. Martin, *The People That History Forgot*, Academy for Scriptural, 2nd edn, 1994. A study carried out in June 2017 by scientists at North Carolina State University on the shape of skulls and skeletons found in Roman tombs dating from the first three centuries AD era has confirmed that mass immigration from other regions around the Mediterranean caused a racial shift in the Roman population during this period (S. M. Hens, *Cranial Variation and Biodistance in Three Imperial Roman Cemeteries*, *International Journal of Osteoarchaeology*, vol. 27, no. 5, June 1, 2017), <https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/full/10.1002/oa.2602>.

(171) The accusations of immorality did not come from their opponents alone. "Here are some of St Cyprian's accusations; they are not always as light as that of having married non-Christian women. Consumed by an insatiable greed," he says, "we thought only of accumulating treasures, forgetting both what we should believe and what we should do, what our ancestors had done and believed, and what we should never have stopped believing and practising. No more religion among the priests, no more faith, no more charity, no more morals. The hearts of simple people were prey to fraud and corruption.

perfidy. People swore without reason, or perjured themselves without fear. Ecclesiastical authorities were despised, slandered and torn apart by hatred. The bishops, destined to serve as an example to others, in spite of their divine mission, meddled only in secular affairs; they abandoned their see and their flock; they travelled the provinces and the markets; they wanted to have a lot of money, while their brothers were dying of hunger; they stole in fraud the property of others; they multiplied their treasures by infamous usury. - S. Cyprian. *de lapsis*, p. 182. They did not become any better afterwards. Saint Jerome calls the priests of his time inhospitable, running after women and insinuating themselves by a thousand means into their good graces, capturing inheritances to the point of provoking against them and their families.

The priests give something to the poor so that the faithful will give them a hundredfold; they beg for riches by giving alms, which is more a kind of hunting than true charity. The priests give something to the poor to make the faithful give them a hundredfold; they beg for riches by giving alms, which is more a kind of hunting than true charity: for this is how wild animals, birds and fish are caught; and the bait that the priests put on the hook serves to make them empty the pockets of the matrons into their own. The priests also courted the powerful and the great lords; they never missed a meal or a festival; they loved life and good food, when particular reasons did not temporarily require them to observe ridiculous fasts: in addition, they were slanderers and intriguers, to the point of acting as matchmakers in marriages, and so on. Made in this way," adds the holy father, "it was not difficult for them to dazzle with their chatter and to deceive an ignorant and coarse people, who had no idea what they were talking about.

admires above all what he does not understand (*nihil tam facile quam vilem plebeculam et indoctam concionem linguae volubilitate decipere, quas quidquid non intelligit plus miratur*). - S. Hieronymus. *ad Nepotian. epist.* 34, t. 4, p. 259 ad 262. Saint Augustine, a contemporary of Saint Jerome, tells us that the church and clergy of Africa were given over to debauchery and scoundrels. They committed all sorts of

of impurities and got drunk in the cemeteries, on the very tombs of the martyrs and in their honour. - S. Augustine. *epist.* 64 ad Aurel. t. 2, p. 120. Let our ministers of religion take into serious consideration, says St. Sulpice Severus, the prohibition which was made to the Levites of the ancient law to own land, so that they would be more suitable for the service of the altars. Our priests have not only forgotten this precept, but even seem to ignore it entirely, so dominated are they by the epidemic gangrene of greed.

They roll in gold, buy and sell, and think only of acquiring more. If there are any who are more moderate, who neither own nor trade, they wait quietly for their wages, which is much more shameful; and they wither all the honour of their life by the rewards they seek, wanting in this way only a venal and lucrative holiness. - S. Sulpit. Sever. *hist. sacr.* 1. 1, cap. 25, p. 74" (Louis Joseph A. de Potter, *Histoire philosophique, politique et critique du christianisme et des églises chrétiennes*, t. 2, Paris, 1836, p. 448-9; see also, on the subject of the imputations of cannibalism with which the first Christians were charged, Andrew McGowan, *Eating People: Accusations of*

Cannibalism Against Christians in the Second Century, *Journal of Early Christian Studies*, Johns Hopkins University Press, vol. 2, no. 4, 1994 [pp. 413-42] and Albert Henrichs, *Pagan Ritual and the Alleged Crimes of the Early Christians*, in P. Granfield and J. A. Jungmann [eds.], *Kyriakon. Festschrift J. Quasten I*, Aschendorff, Münster, 1970 [p. 18-35], who do not conclude from their examination that they were mere slanders.

(172) Edmond de Pressensé, *Histoire des trois premiers siècles de l'église chrétienne*, 1861, 2nd series, t. 2, Paris, 1861, p. 3.

(173) Jean-Marie Mayeur, Luce Pietri, André Vauchez and Marc Venard (eds.), *Le nouveau peuple (des origines à 250): Histoire du Christianisme*, Desclée de Brouwer, 2000, p. 833.

(174) The idea of an incarnate Word, which was unknown to the early Church but first appeared in the writings of Justin (100-165 CE) and the apologists, owes everything to the philosophical theory of logos (see Jean-Baptiste Thomas, *Études critiques sur les origines du Christianisme*, Victor Palmé, Paris, 1870, p. xvii).

(175) M. Owen Lee, *Virgil as Orpheus: A Study of the Georgics*, SUNY Press, 1996, p. 3.

(176) William Godwin, *Lives of the necromancers: or, An account of the most eminent persons in successive ages, who have claimed for themselves, or to whom has been imputed by others, the exercise of magical power*, Chatto and Windus, London, 1876, p. 67.

(177) In the earliest versions of the legend, Orpheus' wife has no name (see Brian Juden, *op. cit.*, p. 17); the name Eurydice only appears later (Eva Kushner, *Le Mythe d'Orphee dans la littérature française contemporaine*, Nizet, Paris, 1961, p. 34).

(178) Friedrich Wilhelm Joseph von Schelling, *Philosophie de l'art*, translated from the German by Caroline Silzer and Alain Pernet, Jérôme Millon, Grenoble, 1999, p. 113. Pausanias makes Musée a pupil of Orpheus.

(179) André Jean Festugière, *Études d'histoire et de philologie*, J. Vrin, "Bibliothèque d'Histoire de la Philosophie", Paris, 1975, pp. 489-90.

(180) Jacques Collin de Plancy, *Dictionnaire infernal*, Henri Plon, Paris, 1863, p. 511.

(181) It is Orpheus," he says, "whom I would accuse of having brought these superstitions, as well as the idea so quickly popularised of medicine, from Thrace to Thessaly, if the first of these regions had not always been alien to magic"; "if the first of these regions had not always been alien to magic"? During Pliny's lifetime, Thracian women already had a reputation for being "magical". witches (De Résie [comte], *Histoire et traité des sciences occultes*, t. 2, Louis Vivès, Paris, 1857, p. 326). Be that as it may, it is appropriate to reproduce Pliny's passage (XXX, I, 1-2) in its entirety, for the parallel he draws between medicine, witchcraft, religion and astrology: "In the earlier parts of our work, magic has more than once, and wherever we have thought it necessary, been singled out for the blame it deserves; we will finish by showing its frivolity. However, it is

few of the follies that need to be emphasised, if only because his impostures
It has spread to a thousand lands and many centuries. What is more, why should we be surprised by its
vogue, if we consider that it embraces and combines the three arts best suited to mastering the
human mind? Firstly, it is undeniable that it owes its birth to medicine, and that, apparently concerned
with maintaining health, it has been introduced as a higher and holier form of therapy. To these
flattering and seductive promises has been added the imperative idea of religion, in the presence of
which the human race can see only through a cloud. These two elements have been joined by
mathematics; and there is no one who does not wish to know his future, or who doubts that this future
is inscribed in the heavens. Thus enslaving the human mind by means of a triple link, magic soon came
to dominate the nations, and in the East had the kings of kings as its subjects" (Pliny's Natural History.
Traduction nouvelle par M. Ajasson de Grandsagne, C. L. F. Panckoucke, t. 18, p. 4-5; see Fabienne
Jourdan, Orphée, sorcier ou mage ? In Revue de l'histoire des religions [Online], 1, 2008, online 01
March 2011, accessed 15 October 2018. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/rhr/5773> ; DOI :
<https://doi.org/10.4000/rhr.5773>).

(182) In the oldest accounts, the cause of Eurydice's death is not mentioned. As for Aristaeus,
Virgil is responsible for introducing him into this mythical episode.

(183) Brian Juden, op. cit. p. 17-8. The first dated document to mention Orpheus' descent into the
underworld is Euripides' *Alcestis* (438 BC) (Jacques Heurgon Jacques, *Orphée et Eurydice avant Virgile*.
In *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, t. 49, 1932 [p. 6-60], p. 11).

(184) *Œuvres de G. Filangieri, traduites de l'italien, nouv. éd. t. 5, P. Dufart, Paris, 1822, p. 246, note 2.*

(185) Jacques Heurgon's attempt to explain why Orpheus was forbidden to look back is no better than
that of other authors who have tackled this enigma, but we feel that some credence should be given to
the working hypothesis he puts forward regarding the element that may have prompted Plato to give a
version of Orpheus' catabasis that is radically different from that of his predecessors. After pointing out
that there are countless testimonies to the links between Orphism and the Eleusinian mysteries, he
formulates his conclusions as follows (ibid., pp. 57-9): "The legend of Orpheus and Eurydice did not
emerge from popular imagination; on the contrary, elaborated by theologians and poets, it presents
itself to us, above all, in the heroic and optimistic form that the disciples of Orpheus imposed on the
public. In the theatre and among orators, in the verses of the Alexandrian poets and on the funerary
vases of Magna Graecia, Orpheus appears as the triumphant victor over death. With no weapon other
than his zither, he descended into the Underworld and, through the power of his songs, forced
Persephone to return his wife to him. - But at the same time as this pious, admiring and devout legend
was taking shape, some of the theologians who had presided over its birth, those who probably
represented, to a particularly irreducible degree, Eleusinian doctrine, invented a dissident tradition
which, without brutally denying the official version, tried to insinuate doubt in the minds of the faithful
as to the success of the undertaking: Of course, they said, Orpheus descended into the Underworld and
persuaded the gods below. But you don't tell the end of the story: Orpheus had triumphed and won his
prey when, at the last moment, he committed a ritual error that wiped out his victory'. This tradition,
little known to ordinary people, was passed on to the rest of the world.

a poet (Pindar?) collected it, adding, as a natural conclusion, that Orpheus had killed himself in grief. But, on the other hand, preferring, like all poets, the human to the sacred, and what offered psychological meaning to what remained inexplicable, he changed the value of Orpheus' respectus. Outside the mysteries, the tradition of failure was undoubtedly propagated by the enemies of Orphic charlatanism; a malicious hostility made the citharède not just a victim, but a coward. And it was in this capacity that Plato gave him access in his Banquet...".

(186) W. K. C. Guthrie, op. cit. p. 31.

(187) The practice of cephalomancy is attributed to the Jews and Syrians. "It would seem that this method of divination is not merely legendary, but that it was actually practised in the West, where it is accepted that a freshly severed head, particularly that of a child, placed on a host, prophesies. Charles IX tried out this oracle to find out his future, a horrifying scene that has been reported with some variations by several authors, starting with Bodin, who was contemporary with the event. The magical operation took place at midnight in 1574. After the ritual conjurations, the Jewish child, aged between 6 and 10, was brought to the altar where the priest cut off his head. Placed on a large black host, she murmured the words: "Vim patior". Charles IX fainted, and when he regained consciousness, he cried out

The man said: 'Get that head away, get that head away! She died shortly afterwards. For a detailed account of this magical operation, see Defrance [Catherine de Médicis, ses astrologues et ses magiciens envoûteurs, Mercure de France, 1911, p. 230 et seq.

'astrologie à la cour de Catherine de Médicis" (Waldemar Deonna. Orpheus and the oracle of the severed head. In *Revue des Études Grecques*, vol. 38, fasc. 174, January-March 1925 [pp. 44-69], pp. 52, 53-4).

(188) At least two Orpheus are generally distinguished, Orpheus of Thrace, who is said to be the theologian and poet who went to Egypt to learn from the priests, and Orpheus of Crotone, who is said to be the author of the *Argonautiques* (François Grudé La Croix du Maine and Antoine Du Verdier, *Les bibliothèques françaises de La Croix du Maine et de Du Verdier*, t. 3, Paris, 1772, p. 170, note). In his *Histoire d'Homère et d'Orphée* (1789), Jean Claude Izouard Delisle de Sales attempts to prove, on the contrary, that there was only one historical figure by the name of Orpheus.

(189) M.- J. Lagrange (Père), op. cit. p. 23.

(190) See F. Collincamp (ed.), *Critique littéraire sous le premier empire*, vol. 1, Didier et Cie, 1863.

(191) See Gregory Nagy, *Éléments orphiques chez Homère*. In *Kernos* [Online], 14, 2001, online 14 April 2011, accessed 21 October 2018. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/kernos/760> ; DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/kernos.760>). In fact, it seems that most of the Orphic poems were composed in the first century AD by "followers of the mystical poetry of the Pythagoreans united with the Platonists" (F. Collincamp, op. cit., p. 21) and possibly to Christians and/or Jews (Emil Schürer, *The History of the Jewish People in the Age of Jesus Christ* [175 B. C. - A. D. 135], nouv. revised and edited by Geza Vermes, Fergus Millar and Martin Goodman, vol. 2, Part 1, Bloomsbury, London, 1973, p. 670, note 264).

- (192) Ferdinand Hoefler, *Bibliothèque historique de Diodore de Sicile*, t. 1, 2nd edn, L. Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1865, p. 25.
- (193) John Block Friedman, *Orpheus in the Middle Ages*, Translated from the English by Jean-Michel Roessli. With the assistance of Valérie Cordonier and François-Xavier Putallaz, Editions Universitaires de Fribourg, 1999, p. 15.
- (194) Louis Ellies Dupin, *Bibliothèque universelle des historiens*, Amsterdam, 1708, p. 79.
- (195) See Fabienne Jourdan, *Poème judéo-hellénistique attribué à Orphée : production juive et réception chrétienne*, Les Belles lettres, Paris, 2010.
- (196) John Block Friedman, *op. cit.* p. 302-3.
- (197) See Fabienne Jourdan, *Orphée et les chrétiens. La réception du mythe d'Orphée dans la littérature chrétienne grecque des cinq premiers siècles*, t. 1 : du repoussoir au préfigurateur du Christ. Réécriture d'un mythe à des fins protreptiques chez Clément d'Alexandrie, Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2010 *op. cit.* t. 2: Pourquoi, Orphée ? Les Belles Lettres, Paris, 2011.
- (198) Jean-Michel Spieser, *Images du Christ: Des catacombes aux après-matins de l'icône*, Droz, Geneva, 2016, p. 86.
- (199) James Spencer Northcote and William Robert Brownlow, *Rome souterraine*, translated from the English, with additions and notes, by Paul Allard, Didier et Cie, Paris, 1872, p. 263-4; Jérôme Cottin, *Jésus-Christ en écriture d'images*, Labor et Fides, 1990, p. 263.
- (200) Jacques Fontaine, *La conversion du christianisme à la culture antique : la lecture chrétienne de l'univers bucolique de Virgile*. In *Bulletin de l'Association Guillaume Budé*, n° 1, mars 1978 [p. 50-75], p. 63.
- (201) Jérôme Cottin, *op. cit.* p. 87.
- (202) James Spencer Northcote and William Robert. Brownlow, *op. cit.* p. 264.
- (203) Jérôme Cottin, *op. cit.*, p. 86.
- (204) See Laurence Vieillefon, *La figure d'Orphée dans l'Antiquité tardive : Les mutations d'un mythe : du héros païen au chanteur chrétien*, De Boccard, 2003.
- (205) Interestingly, the mythological figure most often identified with Christ in Spanish literature in the "Middle Ages" was Orpheus, followed by Pan: partly because of the homophony between the name of this god and "pan" ("bread") (Alice Brooke, *The Autos Sacramentales of Sor Juana Inés de la Cruz*, Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 39).
- (206) Rāḥēl Ḥākīfī, *Ancient Jewish Art and Archaeology in the Diaspora*, Brill, Leiden, Boston and Cologne, 1998, p. 247.

(207) John Block Friedman, op. cit. p. 43.

(208) Ibid, p. 43-4.

(209) More than four hundred manuscripts of the Consolation have survived (ibid., p. 115).

(210) Jean-Marie Mayeur, Luce Pietri, André Vauchez and Marc Venard (eds.), op. cit. p. 835.

(211) Cicero, *Œuvres complètes*, Nisard, 1864, t. I, p. 89.

(212) Augustine, *De Doctrina Christiana*, IV, 5, 7: "The speaker who is able to discuss or speak, if not eloquently, at least wisely, must approach the task I am dealing with with a view to being useful to the hearers, even if he is less useful than he would be if he were also able to speak eloquently. On the other hand, anyone who overflows with unwise eloquence should be all the more avoided, as the listener takes more pleasure in hearing him expound useless things and even imagines, on the pretext that he is speaking eloquently, that he is telling the truth". The Bishop of Hippo also borrowed from Cicero his distinctions between the three purposes of eloquence, the three kinds of subject and the three kinds of style.

(213) Birger Munk-Olsen, *L'Humanisme de Jean de Salisbury, un cicéronien au 12e siècle*, in Maurice Gandillac and Edouard Jeuneau (eds.), *Entretiens sur la Renaissance du 12e siècle*, Mouton and Co, Paris, 1986, p. 56.

(214) Jean Baptiste Pitra (R. P. Dom.), *Histoire de Saint Léger*. Waille, Paris, 1846, pp. 63-4; see, on the importance of the eloquence/sagesse pair in rhetoric in the "Middle Ages", J. Ward, *The date of the commentary on Cicero's De Inventione by Thierry of Chartres and the Cornifician attack on the liberal arts*, *Viator*, no. 3, 1972 [pp. 219-73], p. 268; John O. Ward, *Classical Rhetoric in the Middle Ages*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2018, p. 274.

(215) John Block Friedman, op. cit. p. 309-31.

(216) See Glynnis M. Cropp, *Böece de confort remanié : Edition critique*, Modern Humanities Research Association, London, 2011, p. 182.

(217) See Thomas Bein, *Orpheus als Sodomi. Beobachtungen zu einer mhd. Sangspruchstrophe mit (literar)historischen Exkursen zur Homosexualität im hohen Mittelalter*. *Zeitschrift für deutsche Philologie*, no. 109, 1990 [pp. 33-55] as well as Robert Mills. *Seeing Sodomy in the Middle Ages*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 2015.

(218) Jean-Michel Roessli, *Nature et signification du mythe d'Orphée dans le Consolatione philosophiae de Boèce*, In *Archivum Bobiense: rivista degli Archivi Storici Bobiens*, n° 21, 1999 [p. 27-72] p. 55-6.

(219) John Block Friedman, op. cit. p. 312.

(220) Ibid, p. 133.

(221) Quoted in ibid, p. 137.

(222) Guillaume Guizot, *Alfred le Grand ou l'Angleterre sous les Anglo-Saxons*, L. Hachette et Cie, Paris, 1856, p. 216, p. 219.

(223) Quoted in Walter John Sedgefield (ed.), *King Alfred's Version of the Consolations of Boethius: Done Into Modern English, with an Introduction*, Clarendon Press, Oxford, 1900, p. 117.

(224) John Block Friedman, op. cit. p. 151: "... Orpheus' ascent out of Hades is compared to the works of the prophets and early Christian preachers, even St Peter, who sat 'sor le hault mont de sainte yglise' (X, 2556-2562). The seven strings of Orpheus' lyre are explained as being the seven virtues, and even the pegs to which the strings are attached a r e g i v e n a Christian interpretation" (ibid.).

(225) Sarah-Jane Muray, *Du désespoir à l'espoir : le dépassement de la tragédie dans l'Ovide moralisé (Livre I et II)*, in Laurence Harf-Lancner, Laurence Mathey-Maille and Michelle Szkilnik (eds.), *Ovide métamorphosé: les lecteurs médiévaux d'Ovide*, Presses Sorbonne Nouvelle, 2009, p. 184.

(226) Françoise Joukovsky, *Orphée et ses disciples dans la poésie française et néo-latine du XVI^e siècle*, Droz, Genève, 1970, p. 15.

(227) Sian Echard et al (eds.), *The Encyclopedia of Medieval Literature in Britain*, Wiley Blackwell, 2017, p. 567.

(228) Alexis De Tocqueville, *On Democracy in America*, vol. 4, 2nd ed. by Charles Gosselin, Paris, 1840, p. 87. The following lines are well worth adding to the record of Christian marriage, whose model was opposed to the aristocracy's lineage-based policies of inheritance transmission
Consent already existed in Roman law. But [...] canon law goes further than Roman law as far as the consent of parents is concerned. Roman law recognised the priority of the father's consent over that of the fiancés. For Romanists, this was a way of protecting the daughter from seducers and also of safeguarding the interests of the family. But for the theologians and canonists, marriage was created by the will of the spouses. And this will was free for both the woman and the man. Pierre Lombard (1100-1160) was the first to say that paternal consent was not a condition for marriage (Gaudemet, 1993:208). He wrote For the Church, consent, or the agreement of a father or guardian, is a sign of desirable deference, but has no bearing on the validity of the bond, whereas Roman law attributed a decisive role to the consent of those who had power over each of the spouses. [...] The Church refuses to grant a decisive role to the entourage, whoever it may be (Basdevent & Gaudemet, 2001:46). In Roman law, marriage is not a sacrament. Defining it as such means that marriage is solely a matter for the two people who unite. This concept enabled the Church to attack the structure of the feudal family by rendering paternal authority unnecessary to establish the validity of marriage: not only did the legitimating authority pass from the father to the priest, but above all the decision-making authority passed from the father to the son or daughter.

"Roman law legitimised the power of the family over the individual; canon law delegitimises it. J. T. Noonan explains that 'affectio maritalis' expressed a forced or at least fabricated consent,

which in no way implied the freedom of the individual from the interests and pressures of the family. In Rome, a son or daughter was expected to obey their father. On the other hand, mutual consent, as established by Gratian (mid-twelfth century), undermined paternal authority and filial piety. Noonan writes: Roman law itself, while making consent central to marriage, did not employ the doctrine to prevent parental decision-making. Marital consent was contrasted with mere coitus and with ravishment. It was not a concept to undermine filial piety. In these matters a son was expected to obey his father. The notion that a boy or girl must consent did not exclude their being made to consent (1973:425).

"It may be objected that the same applied to sons and daughters in the twelfth century. The persistence of the old practices and the perseverance of the ecclesiastics in the fight against the customs in This is proven by the fact that such marriages take place on the fringes of legal norms. How many young girls, fearful and respectful of an authoritarian father, have not been forced to marry a parent much older than themselves, and moreover with the complicity or acquiescence of the priest or bishop? But also, how many did not succeed in marrying the one they loved, either in a clandestine union or by being abducted by him? For the Church recognised the legitimacy of unions in which the girl, in order to escape the constraints of her marriage, was forced to marry her husband. family, was kidnapped by her fiancé. Certain decrees of Pope Lucian III (1181-1185) attest to this (cf. Gaudemet, 1993:209). And yet, how many young girls did not prefer celibacy to marital and family oppression and became either nuns or beguines. The Church has succeeded in removing from feudal practices their basis of legitimisation and sustenance. The father's consent was unnecessary; the fundamental principle was matrimonial freedom.

"This is not about the liberation or full realisation of the individual. The point is that the rise of a bureaucratic, impersonal and universal institution like the Gregorian Church enabled the emergence of the subject beyond his membership of a particular community, in this case the lineage. The substitution of the priest for the father (the spiritual, symbolic father) creates the conditions for the subject to break away from the immanence of the solidarities and pressures of the family that determine him. This is a subject without a place in the world, deterritorialised, fundamentally indeterminate - in short, a knight errant. It is the subject with no content or substance other than his desire, the subject who barely exists. This is the lyrical 'I' based on William IX's *dreit nien: farai un vers de dreit nien:/non er de mi ni d'autra gen,/non er d'amor ni de joven,/ni de ren au,/qu'enans fo trobatz en durmen/sus un chivau*. These are the pensive knights whose being evaporates in a crisis of absence from the world, where daydreaming, melancholy, madness and savagery are all in continuity, and are reborn from this nothingness where identity and belonging are annulled, this annulment subsequently being staged in the motif of the incognito knight.

"In its canonical version, mutual consent opens the door to the introduction of love into marriage. Of course, you can consent to marry someone without loving them, but we have to ask ourselves whether the modern notion of a marriage of love would have come into being in the absence of the principle of mutual consent as understood in canon law. It has been noted that the word 'love' does not appear in the texts of jurists and canonists. Love' in ecclesiastical Latin, 'amore(m)', means 'virile desire', 'concupiscence'. The word used for love is 'dilectio', meaning affection and pleasure: 'dilectio' was introduced into matrimonial legislation with all that it implied in terms of a claim to happiness and autonomy (Payen 1981:221). Similarly, J.-Cl. Bologne asserts that in the south of France, where

fin'amors was born, matrimonial rites included the priest asking the engaged couple, who were not yet married, to give their consent.

only if they were there of their own free will, but also if they loved each other (Bologna, 1999:114)" (Cristina Alvares, *Mariage, littérature courtoise, et structure du désir au XIIème siècle*. In *Medievalista*. no. 8, 2010, available at em

<http://www2.fcsh.unl.pt/iem/medievalista/MEDIEVALISTA8\alvares8008.html>, accessed 16 August 2018).

(229) François Villon, *Œuvres*, Librairie H. Champion, 1974, p. 628.

(230) There is no mention of Pan in the Middle Ages, except in Remi d'Auxerre and Guillaume de Conches. In keeping with the Orphic tradition, both represent him allegorically as the universe. For them, "the name of the God [...] evokes the notion of totality or universe. The nebride, the variegated skin he wears around his neck, signifies the different stars that shine in the firmament. If Pan's face is red, it represents fire; if his legs are hairy, it symbolises the forests. And if he has goat's feet, it's to show that solidity is a characteristic property of the earth. Pan's flute evokes the concert of the planets and cosmic harmony [...] His pastoral staff (pedum) - the prerogative of old men bent by years - reminds us of the cyclical nature of time and the seasons" (Édouard Jeuneau, *L'usage de la notion d'Integumentum à travers les gloses de Guillaume de Conches*, in *Archives d'histoire doctrinale et littéraire du Moyen Âge*, vol. 24, 1956, p. 59). The pantheistic nature of this allegory should come as no surprise, either from Rémi d'Auxerre who, as a disciple of Scotus Erigena, whose system is pantheistic at heart (Jacques Matter, *Histoire de la philosophie*, Paris, 1854, p. 108 et seq.), was not far from professing a doctrine similar to that of his master, when he defined humanity as "the substantial unity of human individuals" (quoted in E. Rodier de Labruguière, Cupély [M. l'abbé de], *Esprit de la philosophie scolastique*, vol. 2, Paris, Hachette, 1867, p. 169; each time one makes the individual disappear into the genus, one ends up with a pantheistic conception of the universe), nor on the part of Guillaume de Conches who was accused of pantheistic naturalism by the abbot Guillaume de Saint-Thierry (c. 1085 -1148) (see Georges Minois, *Abélard, Héloïse et Bernard : Passion, raison et religion au Moyen Âge*, Perrin, 2019).

(231) Martianus Cappela, *De Nuptiis philologiae et Mercurii*, II, 34, quoted in Claude Lecouteux, op. cit.

(232) Michela Landi, *On the innocence of nature: the god Pan and the Revolution*. In Giovanna Angeli, Patrizio Collini and Claudio Pizzorusso (eds.), *Rivista Di Letterature Moderne e Comparate*, 2013 [pp. 49-67], p. 51. Among the great figures nicknamed Pan during the Renaissance were Pierre de Bourbon, an important figure at the court of Charles VIII, and Antoine Sanguin de Meudon, known as the Cardinal de Meudon (1493-1559), the great chaplain of Francis I (ibid., pp. 35, 38). Later, many great figures, including Richelieu, Louis XIV and Voltaire, were nicknamed Pan or called themselves Pan (Michela Landi, op. cit.).

(233) Cosimo de' Medici (1389-1464), founder of the Medici financial and political dynasty, was identified with Pan in bucolic literature, by virtue of a pun on "Kosmos", the Greek equivalent of Cosimo (Eleonora Bairati and Anna Finocchii *Arte in Italia: L'Italia nel Rinascimento*, Loescher, 1988, p. 234).

(234) At the request of Lorenzo de' Medici, Luca Signorelli painted *The Education of Pan*, in which the god, "seated on a rock overlooking a severe landscape [...] is surrounded by shepherds, nymphs and satyrs, some of whom, like him, are blowing their reed flutes, while others are listening to this rustic concert. Only animal skins or garlands of pampers hide their nakedness. Further on, two nymphs rest under a clump of tall trees. At the far end, horsemen can be seen beside a triumphal arch and, on the right, the entrance to a cavern cut into the rocks. The austere appearance of the composition is hardly in keeping with the ideas evoked by the name of Pan [...] the painter, at the same time as giving Pan hairy legs and goat's feet, has given his upper body the elegance and beauty of a superior being. With the long curls of hair that frame him, his inspired face looks like that of Apollo. His companions, beautiful like him, in attitudes full of nobility, display their chaste nudity under a dazzling sky and blend in with the lines of the landscape in the most natural and harmonious way" (Émile Miche, *Les musées de Berlin: organisation, description*. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 1882, p. 122). In another painting, now lost, he had "represented the political sense of a Medicean pan around which the Florentine countryside was identified with Arcadia, and Lorenzo's intimates with shepherds governed by Medici laws. In addition to a number of ancient images of the god, the figure of Pan Medicus, microcosm, image and centre of a macrocosm, was based on a few lines from Virgil's *Eglogue II*, commented on by Servius: 'For Pan is a rustic god, "formed" like nature from which he derives his name, which means all: he has horns like the rays of the sun and the horns of the moon His face is red in imitation of the air (ether); on his chest, he has a starry skin like the sky studded with stars; the lower half of his body is polluted, because of the trees, branches, and wild beasts; he has cloven feet, to show the solidity of the earth; he has a flute with seven pipes because of the harmony of the heavens, in which are the seven sounds [...he has a shepherd's cross because of the year that turns back on itself'" (Mauri Servii *Honorati grammatici in eadem commentarii*, op. cit, p. 10, quoted in Laurence Giavarini, *La distance pastorale : usages politiques de la représentation des bergers [XVIe - XVIIe siècles]*, J. Vrin, Paris, 2010, p. 34-5).

(235) Peregrine Horden (ed.), *Music as Medicine: The History of Music Therapy Since Antiquity*, Routledge, London and New York, 2016 (1st ed.: 2000), p. 155.

(236) *Ibid*, p. 154.

(237) Quoted in *Le Nouveau Conservateur Belge*, t. 4, Louvain, 1831, p. 325-6.

(238) See Marsilio Ficino, *Correspondence*, Book I (from Petrarch to Descartes), J. Vrin, Paris, 2014.

(239) Matteo Soranzo, *Platonic hymns and their role in premodern spirituality*, in Eva Kushner (ed.), *The Renaissance Era (1400-1600)*, t. 2: *The New Culture (1480-1520)*, John Benjamins Publishing Company, Amsterdam and Philadelphia, 2017, p. 31.

(240) Jean-Michel Roessli, *La magie thérapeutique du chant poétique d'Orphée dans l'œuvre et la pensée de Ficin et de quelques auteurs de la Renaissance*, <https://nouveauxmodernes.files.wordpress.com/2017/02/nouvelle-version.pdf>, p. 15.

(241) Ibid.

(242) Ibid, p. 16.

(243) L-F. Alfred Maury, op. cit. p. 249.

(244) Ibid, p. 250.

(245) Albert Réville, La religion des Phéniciens. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, t. 105, 1873, p. 381; Mourane, *Les dix commandements : la Phénicie*, s. l., s. d., p. 6.

(246) Jules Girard, op. cit. p. 267.

(247) See also Psalms 136:1; 86:15.

(248) Quoted in Myriam Jacquemier, *Les académies au XVIe siècle*, in Jean-Claude Colbus and Brigitte Hébert (eds.), *Les outils de la connaissance : enseignement et formation intellectuelle en Europe entre 1453 et 1715*, Publications de l'Université de Saint-Étienne, 2006, p. 228, note 30.

(249) George W. McClure, *Sorrow and Consolation in Italian Humanism*, Princeton University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1991, p. 151.

(250) "The space given to Egypt, and even its integration into post-Tridentine Catholicism, can only be understood in terms of the *prisca teologia* on which it is based. The wisdom of the ancient theologians was recuperated in the service of Catholicism, which it exalted all the more: Sixtus V had the obelisks surmounted by his arms and the cross so that the hierarchy was visible to all. Rome integrated Egypt by recovering it" (Laurence Wuidar, *Canons énigmes et hiéroglyphes musicaux dans l'Italie du 17e siècle*, Peter Lang, Brussels, 2008, p. 182).

(251) Françoise Joukovsky, op. cit. p. 157.

(252) Ep. ad Pisones, 391. Quoted in *Revue de l'art chrétien*, 20th year, 2nd series, vol. 6, 1877, p. 22.

(253) John Bokina, *Opera and Politics: From Monteverdi to Henze*, Yale University Press, New Haven, CT, 1997, p. 17; Iain Fenlon, *Le prime rappresentazioni dell'Orfeo di Monteverdi*, *Philomusica on-line* 8/2 - 50-63, *Atti del Convegno Internazionale "Quattro secoli di mito. L'Orfeo di Claudio Monteverdi nel quarto centenario"*.

(254) F. Poperno, *Le système de production jusqu'en 1780*, in L. Bianconi, G. Pestelli (eds.), *Histoire de l'opéra italien*, vol. IV: *Le système de production et ses implications professionnelles*, Liège, 1992 [p. 3-81], p. 14.

(255) "Vocal music, which developed in the Italian courts in the second half of the 16th century, was not just a way of staging and putting power into sound. If the prince (or the In the case of the Republic (in Venice), the musical spectacle and its accompanying speeches (descriptions of festivities, prefaces and dedications to works) were used to great effect to declare its glory, but music was not limited to representing power. Thus, by studying the relationship between vocal art and the mode of

The study of government and, more generally, the political organisation of societies in four principalities in northern Italy at the end of the sixteenth century (Florence, Ferrara, Mantua and Venice) shows that music - both the practice of music and the discourse on music - was used as a political instrument whose effectiveness could be measured, and that it was regarded by the men of the Cinquecento as a necessary language for describing and explaining the political workings of states. Once the hegemony of music in the principalities has been highlighted, a comparison of sources as diverse as reports of performances, dedications of scores, treatises on musical theory, as well as treatises on political theory and chronicles of cities, allows us to consider the way in which vocal art was understood in the 16th century as a form of political discourse. It was a discourse that was not content to simply make people know (the glory of the prince, his valour, and to make them believe (in the necessity of certain Venetian political choices, in the immutability of political systems), but above all sought to make people do things: for the men of the Cinquecento, vocal music was a means of political action that ensured the continuity of the organised community of men" (Florence Alazard, *Art vocal, art de gouverner : la musique, le prince et la cité en Italie du Nord 1560-1610*, Minerve, 2002, 4th cover; see also, on the political instrumentalisation of opera, both by the established powers and, from the 18th century onwards, by their adversaries, <http://www.linflux.com/musique/opera-et-politique-le-peuple-et-les-tyrans>; <https://www.levoyagelyrique.com/blog/opera-et-politique>.)

(256) D. Pistone and P. Brunel (eds), *Musiques d'Orphée*, Paris, Presses Universitaires de France, 1999, p. 185-90.

(257) Henri Stern, *Un nouvel Orphée-David dans une mosaïque du VIe siècle*. In *Comptes rendus des séances de l'Académie des Inscriptions et Belles-Lettres*, 1970, 114e année, n° 1 [p. 63-79], p. 76.

(258) Machiavelli's two main works, *The Prince and Discourse*, open with a reference to artists. In several important passages of the former, the statesman is compared to an architect, a physician or an artist (see Niccolò Machiavelli, *The Portable Machiavelli*, translated by Mark Musa and Peter Bondanella, Penguin Classics, 1979; Alejandro Barcenas, *Machiavelli's Art of Politics*, Brill and Rodopi, Leiden and Boston, 2015).

(259) In Apollodorus (I, 3,2) and the *Argonautics*, he is the son of a king. See Max Célérier, *Regards sur la symbolique de la Toison d'or*, Éditions du Bien public, 1990, p. 106. Several paintings on vases dating from antiquity show Orpheus as the son of Oeagre casting a spell on Thracian warriors (Malcolm Kenneth Brown, *The Narratives of Konon*, Saur, 2002, p. 304).

(260) The sophists can rightly be described as "knowledge professionals", because they made a living out of teaching. Moreover, they did more than make a living, as their lessons were (see Gilbert Romeyer Dherbey, *Les Sophistes*, 8th edn, Presses Universitaires de France, "Que sais-je?" collection, Paris, 1995).

(261) Plato, *Protagoras*, 2316d. In *Lives of the Sophists*, Philostratus says of Prodicus, one of the representatives of the first Sophistic, that he "peddled [the song] from town to town, and sold it for money, thus charming the cities in the manner of Orpheus or Thamyris" (quoted in *Annuaire de*

l'Association pour l'encouragement des études grecques en France, vol. 14, A. Durand and Pedrone Lauriel, Paris, 1880, p. 131).

(262) Sophistic, which destroyed the values of the aristocracy in ancient Greece (Dominique Côté, *Aristocratie et démocratie : idéologies et sociétés en Grèce ancienne*, Alain Fouchard, s. d., p. 331 et seq.) and was thus the crucible of Athenian democracy, had its roots in prophecy and mantics (Dominique Côté, *La prophétie et les fondements de la sophistique*,

http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:mbeB9sRfMyk:www.academia.edu/8287599/La_proph%25C3%25A9tie_et_les_fondements_de_la_sophistique+&cd=1&hl=fr&ct=clnk&gl=at.

Philostratus notes, for example, that, like the oracles of Pythia, the speeches of the sophists began with formulas such as "I know", "I know" or "I have long since drawn the line".

clear" (quoted in *Annuaire de l'Association pour l'encouragement des études grecques en France*, op. cit., p. 128).

(263) Pierre Brunel, Stéphane Wolff, *L'opéra*, Bordas, 1980, p. 10 et seq. In the eighteenth century, opera was still one of the main venues for the public life of the London and Paris elites, who, as monarchical festivities became less and less common, were looking for other distractions. Its audience gradually broadened to include all other social strata during the second half of the nineteenth century (Hans Erich Bödeker, Patrice Veit and Michael Werner [eds], *Le concert et son public : Mutations de la vie musicale en Europe de 1780 à 1914* [France, Allemagne, Angleterre], Éditions de la maison des sciences de l'homme, OpenEdition Books, 31 March 2017, DOI: 10.4000/books.editionsmssh.6740, chap. 5: Audiences, Listening and Behaviour), where the concert became an instrument of social discipline (see Richard Leppert, *The Social Discipline of Listening*, in *ibid*; many opera houses and concert halls were decorated with representations of Orpheus, Linda Hutcheon and Michael Hutcheon, *Opera: The Art of Dying*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, Mass. and London, 2004, p. 216, note 32).

(264) Françoise Joukovsky, op. cit. p. 15. For the author of *Échecs amoureux* (c. 1400), Orpheus was already ensuring the smooth running of political life through the influence of music.

(265) André Chastel, *Marsile Ficin et l'art*, 3rd edn, Droz, Geneva, 1996, p. 190.

(266) Martin Dawes, *Milton and the Politics of Orphic Enchantment*, 2009, doctoral thesis, p. 12, http://digitool.library.mcgill.ca/webclient/StreamGate?folder_id=0&dvs=1560425640165~213. The Chinese seem to have been among the first to attribute political virtues to music. "The word music was generally understood by the imperial and royal families of China to mean the science of civil and political laws. The Chinese, like the Egyptians and Greeks, once regarded music as the most sublime and perfect science, and the foundation of all the others. Among the ancient Chinese, no one could attain an important position unless he had distinguished himself by great erudition in this science: a prince could not even lay claim to the empire unless he had acquired a profound knowledge of music" (G. A. Villoteau, *Recherches sur l'analogie de la musique avec les arts*, t. 2, Paris, 1807, p. 301). In *Des représentations en musiques anciennes et modernes* (Paris, 1681, p. 59-60), Menestrier tells us that the Chinese, "who have among them, of

From time immemorial, most of the things that are in use in Europe, gave the name of music to their laws and to the political maxims of their government, of which the reigning houses alone had the secret and the song. Their history tells us," continues the same author, "that under the empire of King, son of Ling, U, who was king of the southern part of China, wishing to adapt himself to the ways of the country, and to learn the laws and form of government in order to conform to them, sent ambassadors to King Lu in Xantung, so that these envoys could learn the music of the Chévé family, who have the secret and who teach it to the sovereigns, so that by entertaining themselves they can learn what they need to know to lead their people. Yum-hius was the inventor of this music". (G. A. Villoteau, op. cit., p. 301-2). The first musical systems seem to have been developed by the Chinese, the Hindus, the Assyro-Chaldeans and the Egyptians.

(267) John Warden, *Orpheus, the metamorphoses of a myth*, University of Toronto Press, 1982, p. 90.

(268) Machiavelli's art of war is based entirely on cunning and must therefore be brought back to the Eastern conception of war (see <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2014/10/18/le-cinquieme-etat>, *chao. IV: War*).

(269) Roberto Miguelez, *Les règles de l'interaction : essais en philosophie sociologique*, Presses de l'Université Laval et L'Harmattan, "Coll. Zêtêsis", Quebec and Paris, p. 76.

(270) Roger-Gérard Schwartzberg, *La politique mensonge*, Éditions Odile Jacob, Paris, 1998, p. 24.

(271) *Œuvres complètes de N. Machiavelli*, vol. 1, Auguste Derez, 1837, p. 367.

(272) See Adam Kitzes, *The Politics of Melancholy from Spenser to Milton*, Routledge, New York, 2006.

(273) Heinrich F. Plett, *Rhetoric and Renaissance Culture*, De Gruyter, Berlin and New York, 2004, p. 40, who quotes other authors comparing British personalities of the time to Pan.

(274) Joseph Gaume, *La révolution. Recherches historiques. L'origine et la propagation du mal en Europe*, 2nd part: *Révolution française*, Gaume Frères, 1856, p. 158. Six years after Robespierre had been guillotined, a certain Gabriel-Raimond-Jean-de-Dieu François d'Olivier, first a law professor in Avignon, then, as his father had been, chancellor of the supreme court of the rectory of the comtat Venaissin and finally councillor at the imperial court of Nîmes, published, under the name of citoyen Olivier, a work that bears witness to the interest his contemporaries took in the "mission of Orpheus", to use Fabre d'Olivet's expression (*De l'état social de l'homme : ou, Vues philosophiques sur l'histoire du genre humain*, vol. 1, Paris, 1822, p. 334): *L'esprit d'Orphée: ou De l'influence respective de la musique, de la morale* (Paris, 1800). The book was distributed in nearly twenty major European cities. In the preface, the author recounts that Orpheus "appeared to him in a dream" (*ibid.*, p. 3) and showed him "the course [...] to follow in the study of the theory of the art of music" (*ibid.*, p. 12): "[to investigate] the influence of music on morals; [to observe] above all the extent to which music increases the intensity of religious feelings; [to examine] the aspect in which the ancient philosophers recognised that music was the queen of the sciences" (*ibid.*, pp. 12-3), without "[neglecting] [...] the study of laws likely to improve the human condition" (*ibid.*, p. 13). After lamenting the fact that music is no longer

He recalls that "Hermes regarded music so highly as the first of all the sciences that, in the sort of religious procession he instituted, in which the secret doctrine was indicated by signs or hieroglyphs, each of which was arranged according to the degree of pre-eminence of each particular science, the first sign related to music" (ibid., p. 22-3); that, according to Boethius, the effects of music develop moral sentiments ("Men singing together [...] contract a kind of friendship sown with the sweetness that sounds spread, and there is no age in which one is not likely to taste this pleasure") (quoted in ibid., p. 27); that Plato recommended educating children in music, because "[t]he rhythm [...] and harmony penetrate the interior of his soul, making strong impressions; and these deep traces are, so to speak, the figures and models of all that is beautiful and fitting; from which it follows that the soul of a young man is formed to moral propriety and beauty", whereas "without music, he is exposed to contracting bad morals" (ibid.); that the Pythagoreans taught that music softened ferocious men; that Athenaeus of Naucratis denied that, as Ephorus of Cumae claimed, music had been "introduced among men in order to soften them" (ibid.); and that Athenaeus of Naucratis denied that, as Ephorus of Cumae claimed, music had been "introduced among men in order to soften them" (ibid.).

illusionner et comme une supercherie" (in François Lasserre, Plutarque. De la musique. Texte, commentaire, précédés d'une étude sur l'éducation dans la Grèce antique, Urs Graf, Olten and Lausanne, 1954, p. 82); that, in many peoples, the earliest legislators attached great importance to the study of music and that their laws were constantly transmitted through sung poems, a tradition that Paul (Colossians, 3-15-17) expressly recommended to Christians. According to the author, it is precisely "because we have almost entirely lost sight of all the relationships that composer-musicians or political governments should have maintained between the effects of music and the sensations or moral ideas generally prevalent (Olivier [citoyen], op. cit, p. 47-9), but also "by the lack of use of large-scale performances of music offered to the assembled people" and "by the misuse made of it" (ibid.), which explains "why popular crowds in Europe are now only imperceptibly susceptible to being subjugated by the effects of music" (ibid.). Concerned with the discovery of "[t]he general means by which music takes an ascendancy over large assemblies of citizens" (ibid. p. 56), he describes some of them, while acknowledging that "their perfection is still a long way off" (ibid.). Le Citoyen Olivier thus appears to be one of the first, if not the first, to have given thought to music as a n instrument of social engineering, even though it did not yet exist. Many of his contemporaries would have disagreed with him, not about the fact that music could be a means of manipulating crowds, but about the effects it produced on them. Pierre Paganel (Essai historique et critique sur la Révolution Française, vol. 1, Paris, 1810, pp. 120-1), priest and father of Camille Paganel (1795-1859), deputy for Lot-et-Garonne, wrote as follows: "The French Revolution began with songs; bloody uprisings were preluded by light tunes, and elevated or profound thoughts were circulated with vulgar songs. From 1789 until the constitution of the third year, intriguers, ambitious people and party leaders stirred up and directed public opinion with the help of a chansonnier. In the same year, 1789, the tune *ça ira*, so similar to the national lightness and gaiety, singularly hastened the progress of the revolution. The peddlers of this song fulfilled a kind of apostolate; by celebrating a few lantern executions, they prepared the French for more tragic scenes. What proves that a powerful hand presided over the brilliant destiny of this song is that it was heard almost at the same time from north to south, from east to west. It

it seemed that, struck at once, all the echoes of the provinces were responding at the same time to the songwriters on the Pont-Neuf,

"The intention and motives of the revolutionary Orpheus are no more than a point of history: but the air triumphs over time and outlives the words; it is reproduced in memory (and memory commands the voice), in all the moments when the people abandon themselves to their natural gaiety. The birth, progress and victories of the revolution were celebrated in song. The glory and triumphs of the Republican phalanxes share their immortality with the hymns that preceded and even enlivened the battles. Inspired by freedom, these songs will cease with it. The Marseillaise and the Chant du départ lit the sacred fire among us, a fire which, now more moderate, must never be extinguished". The soldier and man of letters Amédée de Bast (1795-1892) (*Merveilles du génie de l'homme*, Paul Boizard, Paris, 1852, p. 103-5) is even less conciliatory: "Poets, and after them a few philosophers, have given currency to the ingenious fiction that music softens morals and disarms evil passions. The fable of Orpheus subduing the ferocity of tigers, lions and panthers with the power of the chords of his lyre was the mysterious consecration of the empire of music over men and even over brutes themselves. But poets are not philosophers, and not all philosophers are moralists. This marvellous influence of music on the soul and on human passions does not exist, has never existed. The Greeks who, as it were, gave a second life and a second origin to the art cultivated by Chiron and Demodocus, the Greeks did not cease, for fourteen years, to create music, to create music. Civil war was the normal state of Greek republics; and from the moment when the furrows of the Peloponnese and Attica were no longer moistened with the blood of the citizens of Athens, Sparta, Thebes or Corinth, freedom faltered and ended up being expatriated along with the music whose heroic fury it inspired. The Hebrews, whom we shall not be foolish enough to compare with the Greeks, who had learned from their ancient masters the love and cultivation of music, and who took particular care to perfect the modes, the songs and the instruments of the temple of Jerusalem and the palace of Solomon and his successors, the Hebrews were the most implacable and cruel enemies when they were victorious. It is true to say that they were not often victorious. In the Middle Ages, the Italians were the only musicians in Europe, and we still shudder when we hear of the bloody proscriptions and appalling quarrels between the Guelphs and the Ghibellines, the Capulets and the Montagues. Finally, over the last twenty years in France, music has become in a way the art of the people, the daily recreation of the factory, the factory and the workshop, and over the last twenty years our crossroads battles, our street fights, have taken on a character of relentlessness, of implacable savagery, of a ferocity hitherto unknown and of which our old wars of religion would scarcely offer an example at long intervals. What are we to conclude from this? That music has only a very weak [softening] influence on the souls of men who have reached a certain degree of civilisation; that a starving lion or a rampaging mob cannot be lulled to sleep and disarmed by the chords of a lyre, even one held by Orpheus ; and that an orchestra of three thousand musicians, even if Strauss were at its head, marching through the deserts of Libya, or through our public squares on a day of revolt, despite the sparkling sprays of harmony that would escape from its lungs of copper, wood and brass, would be crushed under the claw of the lion or under the claw of the roaring people. "

(275) Daniel T. Rogers, *The Voice of No-Body* in Stefano Landi's 'La morte d'Orfeo', in Karen Christianson and Andrew K. Epps (eds.), *Newberry Essays in Medieval and Early Modern Studies* 9, The Newberry, Chicago, IL, p. 47.

(276) In addition to Lorenzo de Medici, this was also the case for James I of England (Robin Headlam Wells, *Shakespeare's Politics: A Contextual Introduction*, Continuum, 2009, p. 59). As early as the 13th century, Alfonso X, King of Castile and Leon, an astromagus nicknamed 'el sabio' ('the wise'), thought he was Orpheus (Daniel Grégorio, *Du mythe à la pratique, la musique dans l'astromagie alphonsoine*. In *Bulletin hispanique* [Online], vol. 112, no. 2, 2010, DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/bulletinhispanique.1254> ; Wilfrid Mellers, *The Masks of Orpheus: Seven Stages in the Story of European Music*, Manchester University Press, 1987, p. 7).

(277) Eugenio Garin (ed.), *Renaissance Characters*, translated by Lydia G. Cochrane, University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, 1991, p. 107.

(278) See below.

(279) Edmond de Pressensé, *Histoire des trois premiers siècles de l'église chrétienne*, 2e série, t. 2, Ch. Meyrueis et Cie, Paris, 1861, p. 164.

(280) "Saint Clement of Alexandria, Tertullian, Arnobius, Saint Justin Martyr, Saint Chrysostom, Saint Gregory of Nazianzus, Saint Augustine and others often made use of Lucian's writings. They have drawn from it their strongest arguments against idolatry; they have taken from it the substance and details of their homilies, and of their various Treatises in favour of Religion", says Abbé Massieu in his preface to *Lucian's Works* (1781) (Christiane Lauvergnat-Gagnière, *Lucien de Samosate et le lucianisme en France au XVIe siècle : athéisme et polémique*, Droz, Genève, 1988, p. 11).

(281) Benjamin Aubé, *Saint Justin, philosophe et martyr : étude critique sur l'apologétique*, Ernest Thorin, Paris, 1875, p. 326.

(282) René Hoven, *Stoïcisme et stoïciens face au problème de l'au-delà*, Bibliothèque de la Faculté de Philosophie et Lettres de l'Université de Liège, fasc. CXCVII, 1971, p. 89 ff.

(283) On the origins of Évhémérisme, see Raymond de Block, *Évhémère : son livre, sa doctrine*, Hector Manceaux, Mons, 1876, chap. IV: *La doctrine d'Évhémère*.

(284) Edmond de Pressensé, *op. cit.* p. 95.

(285) Jean-Marie Mayeur, Luce Pietri, André Vauchez and Marc Venard (eds.), *op. cit.* p. 833.

(286) Bernard Pouderon, *Athénagore d'Athènes*, Beauchesne, 1989, p. 307 ff.

(287) Quoted in Claude Lecouteux, *Démons et Génies du terroir au Moyen Âge*, Imago, Paris, 1995.

(288) Philippe Borgeaud, *La mort du grand Pan. Problèmes d'interprétation*. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. 200, n° 1, 1983 [p. 3-39], p. 3.

- (289) Eusebius of Caesarea, *Praeparatio Evangelica*, V, 18, 13.
- (290) In the early sixteenth century, Pan and the satyrs appeared not only in literature, but also on a number of rustic tombs (Françoise Lavocat, *La syrinx au bûcher : Pan et les satyres à la Renaissance et à l'âge baroque*, Droz, Geneva, 2005, p. 144).
- (291) Gautheret-Comboulot, *Études sur les écrivains beaunois du XVIe siècle*, Mémoires, Beaune, 1883, p. 52.
- (292) Prosper Blanchemain, *Étude sur la vie de P. de Ronsard*, A. Franck, Paris, 1867, p. 254 et seq.
- (293) Andersson Benedikte. Ronsard en grand Pan : l'imaginaire du dieu Pan dans les hommages rendus à Ronsard dans l'édition posthume de ses Œuvres (1587). In *Seizième Siècle*, n° 3, 2007 [p. 177-205], p. 187-8.
- (294) Françoise Lavocat, op. cit. p. 169.
- (295) See John S. Stuart-Glennie, *Christ and Osiris*, Thomas Scott, London, 1876.
- (296) See Charles-François Dupuis, *Origine de tous les cultes ou religion universelle*, t. 7, Louis Rosier, Paris, 1835.
- (297) Philippe Borgeaud, op. cit. p. 19.
- (298) Ibid.
- (299) Françoise Lavocat, op. cit. p. 191.
- (300) In South America, the Christian authorities used the figure of Pan to evangelise the population. A didactic dialogue entitled *El Dios Pan*, written for the celebration of the Corpus Christi festival in Charcas (Bolivia) "... establishes that Christ, present in the form of water during Eucharistic communion, is the true god Pan [...] [, that] the god Pan was a pastoral figure and that Christ is known as the Good Shepherd; [...] [, that] the god Pan was a pastoral figure and that Christ is known as the Good Shepherd.] [, that] the god Pan was a pastoral figure and that Christ is known as the Good Shepherd; moreover, the Christian character in the dialogue points out that Christ, like Pan, was the god of Arcadia, for he had two 'arcas', or 'arches', built: Noah's and Moses'" (Carolyn Dean, *Inka Bodies and the Body of Christ: Corpus Christi in Colonial Cuzco, Peru*, Duke University Press, Durham and London, 1999, p. 17). At the beginning of the nineteenth century, in a similar vein, the Hungarian poet Minka Czobor, in her collection *Opalok* (1903), sings of Pan and Christ crucified side by side, with Pan placing flowers at the foot of the Cross. Abbé Constant, alias Eliphas Lévi, conceived of a Christ uniting Pan, Adonis and Apollo (as well as a Virgin and Child prefigured by Venus and her son) (Elise, *Radix, L'homme-Prométhée vainqueur au XIXe siècle*, Atelier national de reproduction des thèses, 2004, p. 446). Following the publication of his *Pan in America* (1924), D. H. Lawrence was portrayed in two, lending his face, in the same image, to both the goat god and the crucified Christ (Philippe Borgeaud, op. cit., p. 22).
- (301) Marsilio Ficino (1496), the Franciscan kabbalist Francesco Giorgi Veneto (1525) ("If Giorgi can be described as a Christian kabbalist, it is not because he was vaguely influenced by the

Kabbalistic literature, but because he believed that the Kabbalah proved, or rather had already proved, the truth of Christianity", Frances Yates, *The Occult Philosophy in the Elizabethan Age*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, Boston and Henley, 1999 [1st ed.: 1979], p. 29), the Kabbalist Giulio Camillo (1550), whose great project was the construction of a great "theatre of the world" (Jean-Claude Margolin and Sylvain Matton [eds.], *Alchimie et philosophie à la Renaissance : actes du colloque international de Tours*, J. Vrin, 1993, p. 193), the orientalist and Christian Kabbalist Guy Le Fèvre de la Boderie (1578) (for a bibliography of Le Fèvre de La Boderie, see Guy Le Fèvre de La Boderie, *Diverses meslanges poétiques*, Droz, Geneva, 1993, pp. 449-55), with the alchemist, close to Henri III and the Duke of Alençon Clovis Hesteau de Nuysement (1621) (failing to transmute base metals into gold, he was imprisoned in 1584 for fraud and forgery, Clovis Hesteau de Nuysement, *Les œuvres poétiques*, Livre III et dernier, Droz, Paris, 1996, p. 177) and, unsurprisingly, Athanasius Kircher (1653), whose description of Pan is quoted almost verbatim in the ritual of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, which had a great influence on the Wicca movement. Pan, who, as in Orphism, is the goddess of Jupiter, represents the symbol of nature's creative power. The idea that Pan and Jupiter were both representations of this power goes back to the following Orphic fragment, quoted by Macrobius (370-430 AD) (Charles-François Dupuis, op. cit., nouv. éd., t. 4, Louis Rosier, Paris, 1835, p. 272, note 105) in the Saturnalia: "Inclyte Jupiter Dionysie , pater maris, pater terra, Sol ornnium genitor, omnivarie, auro radians." In his scholia to Ecl, 10, 27, the grammarian Servius (4th century AD) writes: "minio autem quia facie rubra pingitur Pan propter aetheris similitudinem : aether autem est Jupiter." (Quoted in Franck Collin - *L'Arcadie virgilienne dans les Commentaires de Servius*, Alessandro Garcea, Marie-Karine Lhommé and Daniel Vallat (eds.), *Fragments d'érudition. Servius et le savoir antique*, Georg Olms Verlag, Hilldesheim, Zürich

and New York, 2016, p. 272).

(302) Eugène Rigel, *La signification philosophique du 'Satyre' de Victor Hugo*, in *Melanges Chabaneau*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1973, p. 207.

(303) René Guénon, *La crise du monde moderne*, Éditions Gallimard, Paris, 1946, p. 26.

(304) From the time when Jehan de Brie published *Le bon verger ou le vrai régime et gouvernement des bergers et bergères* (1379), "a curious little book which is at once a practical treatise on meadow management, as Olivier de Serres would later say, and an allegorical lesson provoked by Charles V for the shepherds of peoples, as Homer had said" (), France is described as a park or an enclosure in numerous texts, such as *Bergerie de l'agneau de France* with five characters (last third of the 15th century), in which the child king is represented by a lamb, and his regent uncles by shepherds; most royal entries in the Middle Ages and Renaissance included representations of sheepfolds (Laurence Giavarini, *La distance pastorale : usages politiques de la représentation der bergers [XVIe - XVIIe siècles]*, J. Vrin, Paris, 2010, p. 31, 32).

(305) Michel Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population. Cours au Collège de France 1977-1978*, Gallimard- Seuil, Paris 2004, p. 134.

(306) Gustave Lanson, *Histoire de la littérature française*, 1895, Paris, Librairie Hachette et Cie, p. 370.

(307) Ibid.

(308) See Michel Brix, *Histoire de la littérature française*, De Boeck Sup, 2015.

(309) Marie-Gabrielle Lallemand, *Le viol dans L'Astrée d'Honoré d'Urfé : représentation et enjeux*, *Tangence* [Online], 114, 2017, online 01 October 2018, accessed 21 December 2020. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/tangence/375> ; Jacqueline Cerquiglini-Toulet et al (ed.), *La littérature française : La littérature française: Moyen âge*, Gallimard, Paris, 2007, p. 544.

(310) Ernest Seillière, *Les origines romanesques de la morale et de la politique romantiques*, *La Renaissance du livre*, 1910, pp. 143-4.

(311) Norbert Bonafous, *Etudes sur L'Astrée et sur Honoré d'Urfé*, Firmin Didot Frères, Paris, 1846, p. 246.

(312) "... it is significant that the first readers of *L'Astrée* were quick to translate the dramatic character of the world evoked in the novel back into reality. *Céladon*, *Astrée* and their kind make a shepherd character? Now these readers, in turn, are trying to create a pastoral figure in an idyllic setting. According to Tallemant des Réaux, Vauquelin des Yveteaux liked to pose in his garden: 'Sometimes he was dressed as a satyr, sometimes as a shepherd, sometimes as a god, and forced his nymph to dress like him. Sometimes he represented Apollo, chasing after Daphne, and sometimes Pan and Syringue.

"It's a complicated exercise, requiring a wardrobe in proportion to the number of characters to be portrayed. Witness the unfortunate woman who had taken it into her head to play Vauquelin: 'I had to find out from the man every morning how she would wear her hair, Greek-style, Spanish-style, Roman-style, French-style, etc.; what habit she would wear; whether she would be a queen or a goddess, a nymph or a shepherdess'.

This was far from an isolated case. The pastoral activity of the Cardinal of Lyon sometimes took an unexpected turn, as in the heart of the Lyonnais, "in a place where there was good company [...], he disguised himself like the others, and had all the ladies disguised as shepherdesses" Pastoral novels and a crisis of values in early 17th-century France. Jean-Pierre van Elslande. In *Dix-septième siècle*, vol. 2, no. 215, 2002 [p. 209-19].

(313) Norbert Bonafous, *op. cit.* p. 254.

(314) "As a young girl, Madame Guyon was so enamoured of these works that she spent entire days and nights reading them. Much later, she would say: 'The books I read most often were novels. I loved them madly: I was hungry to find the end, believing I would discover something, but all I found was a hunger to read', quoted in P. E. Coudert, *Aspects de la doctrine secrète de Madame Guyon*. In *Papers on French Seventeenth Century Literature*, XXII, 1993 p. 119 - 134, p. 119).

(315) "Fénelon met Mme Guyon at the home of her friends and protectors, the pious duchesses, daughters of Colbert, at the very moment when their influence, backed by the doctrinal authority of Bossuet, was making him the most influential of his contemporaries.

the tutor of the future king. Mme Guyon was not a Précieuse trained by reading Uféan novels, which were still very much in vogue in the provinces when she was a teenager. As a widow, she only turned her romantic aspirations towards divine love, like the mystics of the Middle Ages.

...] Before her marriage, she read novels day and night, and we know to what extent the novels based on the *Astrée* were a school of illusion about human nature. She was a pious woman, moreover, and so once again she was to bring the romance into Christian theology, skilfully adapting this mixture to the taste of her time [...] Driven by the pride aroused by a supposed mystical alliance, when the illusion of this alliance advises the chosen one to break the rational frameworks imposed by the Church on his conduct and his thoughts, Mme Guyon set about

In her dreams and self-indulgent visions, she sees herself as the equal of the Virgin Mary, who is the mother and spouse of Christ; which is really taking the metaphors of medieval mysticism too seriously! She presents herself to those who listen to her as loved by all creation and as appointed by God to restore (or reform once again) his degenerate Church. She thus identifies herself with the pregnant woman of the Apocalypse, pregnant with a whole regenerated humanity, and with the cornerstone on which the edifice of the Church, brought back to the right path, will soon stand. She drew Fénelon into her footsteps by the seduction of her doctrine of pure love, but also by encouraging his ambitions for power, for she promised him a sublime destiny, and first of all, the preceptorship of the children of France, which was the surest guarantee of it for him: her court connections had no doubt enabled her to foresee the abbot's imminent elevation. But it is he who will be the arm of the Most High when the third covenant comes into being (after the Old and the New), the modern Testament over which the Holy Spirit will preside after the Father and the Son have had theirs. Yes, God wanted to make the Gascony priest the father of a great people, which he would no doubt interpret by seeing himself in advance as a new Richelieu to the future King of France, his pupil; a hope that he would not abandon, as we know, until after his death.

premature retirement of this docile disciple; and yet it was to dream, nonetheless, of some new-found influence during a Regency that was about to begin. - To the tonic suggestions of his spiritual mother, he responded by affirming his confidence in God's plan for him through her, - which could be understood in temporal as well as spiritual terms. (Henk Hillenaar, *Nouvel état présent des travaux sur Fénelon*, 2000, Rodopi, Amsterdam and Atlanta, GA, 2000, p. 63).

(316) A. Chérel, *L'Idée du 'naturel' et le sentiment de la nature chez Fénelon*, p. 825; see also Albert Chérel, *op. cit.*

(317) Quoted in *Madame Guyon, Les Torrents; Commentary on the Song of Songs*. Text compiled, presented and annotated by Claude Morali. Jérôme Millon, 1992, p. 150.

(318) Albert Chérel, *Fénelon, or, La religion du pur amour*, Denoël et Steele, 1934, p. 179.

(319) Quoted in *Madame Guyon, Les torrents and Commentaire au [sic] Cantiques des cantiques de Salomon*, p. 133, edited, presented and annotated by Claude Morali, Éditions Jérôme Millon, 2004.

(320) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2019/01/31/le-pouvoir-panique>.

(321) Madame Guyon, op. cit. p. 133-4.

(322) Quoted in Jules Paquier, *Qu'est-ce que le quiétisme?* Librairie Bloud et Cie, Paris, 1910, p. 27.

(323) Ernest Seillière, *Mme Guyon et Fénelon: précurseurs de Rousseau*, F. Alcan, 1918, p. 224.

(324) *Ibid*, p. 339.

(325) "When the soul is disempowered, it can, it must, give everything to inner movements and impulses, because from then on these impulses are no longer human, they come directly from God" (Jules Paquier, op. cit., p. 71).

(326) See Louis Guerrier, *Madame Guyon: sa vie, sa doctrine et son influence*, Orléans, 1881, p. 505.

(327) Albert Chérel, *Fénelon au XVIIIe siècle en France, 1715-1820 : son prestige - son influence*, Hachette et Cie, 1917, p. xv.

(328) Ernest Seillière. *Essays and Notices. La Généalogie de la doctrine démocratique*. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. 52, no. 1, 1 July 1939 [p. 195-206], p. 197). Hence "philanthropy", a term first used by Fénelon in *Le Dialogue des morts* (1712), where he wrote: "Il faut aimer les hommes" (*Dialogues des morts, Œuvres complètes de Fénelon*, t. 6, Gaume Frères, Paris, 1850, p. 258). Throughout the 18th century, Fénelon received "outrageous praise" for his "philanthropy" (*Histoire de Fénelon*, 3rd ed. revised, corrected and augmented, vol. 4, 1817, p. 4; Carole Masseys-Bertonèche, *Philanthropie et grandes universités privées américaines*, Presses Universitaires de Bordeaux, Pessac, 2006, p. 19).

(329) Cécile Bost Pouderon, *Dion Chrysostom: three speeches to the cities* (Orr. 33-35), *Helios*, 2006, p. 314.

(330) Ernest Seillière, Jules Lemaître, *historien de l'évolution naturaliste*, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1935.

(331) *Les opuscules spirituels de Madame J. M. B. de La Mothe-Guyon*, nouv. éd., corrigée et considérablement augmentée, t. 1, Paris, 1790, p. 157.

(332) Ernest Seillière, Jules Lemaître, *historien de l'évolution naturaliste*, Éditions de la Nouvelle Revue Critique, 1935.

(333) It could not be more revealing that the cult of the Woman, "a spontaneous idealisation of Humanity after the apotheosis of the Woman" (*Lettres d'Auguste Comte, Apostolat positiviste*, Paris, 1889, p. 7), was initiated in the nineteenth century by the positivist Auguste Comte. In the *System of Positive Politics*, Comte wrote: "Man's knee will no longer bow except to woman"; and in the *Preliminary Discourse*, addressed to Clotilde: "Your personal consecration is more directly guaranteed in the solemn adoration of woman, which the final religion sets up as the necessary prelude to and continuous stimulus of the systematic worship of Humanity". Text which means, stripped of this gangue of learned jargon: Clotilde de Vaux is indeed guaranteed immortality; but only because she will symbolise

the divinised Woman, who in turn represents Humanity divinised and imposed like a god on the living members of which it is composed. Just as angels or eons were conceived, in times of superstition, as intermediaries between God and mortals, so too women, who are by nature a kind of mediator, saints of a higher essence than individuals.

But why? Because they embody the forces of the heart - love, altruism and devotion - which alone can save the world. But why? Because they embody the forces of the heart - love, altruism, devotion - which alone can save the world, whereas males are intellectuals, egotists or equally dried-up cooks. They are poetry, he is prose. They are finesse, he is geometry. They are, in any case, the resting place of the warrior, the secret garden of the polytechnician. Auguste Comte later delivered a funeral oration for a friend, a Polish mathematician named Junzill who had just died in the prime of life, in which he said in substance: "This young man, like the troubadour Jaufré Rudel, in love with a distant princess, had conceived a suave affection for a young lady he had never seen, and who was the sister of one of his students. Thus, instead of being a sterile scientist, he had received the Function of Love, and had risen to human sanctity. For the positivist, enslaved to a highly regulated society, the veneration of femininity served as sufficient grace. If he had not dreamt of the beautiful Dulcinea of Toboso, Don Quixote would have been a simple fool. And all the knights, without their Ladies, what then? The brutal volunteers of a supplementary gendarmerie" (André Thérive, Auguste Comte mystique. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 15 June 1957, [p. 600-12], p. 602-3). Following Ernest Seillière, it is impossible not to speak of mental illness here.

(334) Henri Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, *Paul et Virginie*, new edition, Garnier Frères, Paris, 1883, p. vii. Fénelon's naturalism naturally extends into a Stoic-Christian universalism ("[each people]," he writes, "owes infinitely more to the human race, which is the great homeland, than to the particular homeland into which it was born" [quoted in Léon Crouslé Fénelon et Bossuet: *études morales et littéraires*, t. 1, Honoré Champion, Paris, 1894, p. 248]). Strictly speaking, this is not cosmopolitanism, since it does not recognise any man's right to choose his homeland as he pleases and does not admit any right of the citizen against his homeland, placing him in a state of absolute subjection towards it: "Children born in a country do not choose their homeland: the gods give it to them, or rather give them to this society of men which is their homeland, so that this homeland possesses them, governs them, rewards them, punishes them like its children", in which it is rather a question of a motherland, a possessive mother), in a state of absolute subjection. Stoic-Christian universalism and 'philanthropy' (see note 330 below).

(335) René Doumic, *Revue littéraire - Récentes études sur Fénelon*, *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 5e période, t. 58, 1910 [p. 446-57], p. 452. He adds: "I remember that I was once a member of an official commission which sat at the Ministry of Public Instruction, to draw up the programme of books to be placed in the hands of our schoolchildren. I suggested crossing out *Télémaque*. I would have been better off keeping my mouth shut: Fénelon's novel was included in the syllabus for two classes instead of one.

(336) *Ibid.*, p. 450.

(337) (André Cazes, *Grimm et les Encyclopédistes*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1970, p. 149; see Diderot - *Œuvres complètes*, ed. Assézat, IV, p. 117). D'Holbach, for his part, abhorred all mysticism and pushed atheism to the point of wanting to erase even the

(Friedrich Albert Lange, *Histoire du matérialisme et critique de son importance à notre époque*, translated from the German by B. Pomerol, C. Reinwald et Cie, Paris, p. 405). To give d'Holbach his due, it should also be pointed out that, unlike most of the "Enlightenment", he did not place his own ideas at the centre of his work.

the golden age of savage life ("It is claimed," he says, "that the savage is a happier being than civilised man. But what does his happiness consist of, and what is a savage? He is a vigorous child, deprived of resources, experience, reason and industry, who continually suffers hunger and misery, who is forced at every moment to fight against the beasts, who knows no other law than his whim, no other rules than his passions of the moment, no other right than force, no other virtue than recklessness. He is a fiery, inconsiderate, cruel, vindictive, unjust being who wants no restraint, who does not foresee tomorrow, who is at any moment exposed to becoming the victim, either of his own folly, or of the ferocity of the stupid who resemble him.

"La Vie Sauvage or the state of nature to which chagrined speculators have tried to bring mankind back, the golden age so extolled by poets, are in truth nothing but states of misery, imbecility and folly. To invite us to return to this is to tell us to return to childhood, to forget all our knowledge, to give up the enlightenment that our minds have been able to acquire: whereas, to our misfortune, our reason is still only very slightly developed, even in the most civilised nations.

[...]

"The advocates of the Savage Life boast of the freedom it affords, while most civilised nations are in chains. But can savages enjoy real freedom? Can beings deprived of experience and reason, who know no reason to restrain their passions, who have no useful purpose, be regarded as truly free? A savage only exercises a dreadful licence, which is as harmful to himself as it is to the unfortunate people who fall into his power. Freedom in the hands of a being without culture and without virtue is a sharp weapon in the hands of a child", *Système social*, t. 1, 1822, p. 275-6, p. 285) - unlike Diderot (*op. cit.*, p. 256): "- Do you want to know the abridged history of almost all our misery? Here it is. There was a natural man: an artificial man was introduced into this man; and there arose in the cave a civil war that lasts a lifetime. Sometimes the natural man is the most
In either case, the sad monster is torn, torn, tormented, stretched on the wheel, ceaselessly groaning, ceaselessly unhappy, where a false enthusiasm for glory sweeps him off his feet and intoxicates him, or a false ignominy bends him and brings him down. However, there are extreme circumstances which bring man back to his original simplicity.

(338) D'Holbach, *Système de la Nature*, Seconde Partie, 1777, p. 316-7. "The Greeks, according to d'Holbach, called Nature a divinity with a thousand names. All the Divinities of Paganism were nothing other than Nature considered according to its different functions and from its different points of view"; they divinised it as a "great whole" and personified its parts (*ibid.*, p. 316, note 1). Only those who were "deemed worthy of initiation into the mysteries knew" (*ibid.*, p. 318) Nature as a "great whole", Pan, while the common people were only able to worship its parts; some worshipped "the Mother of the Gods", others "Venus, [...] Ceres, [...] Minerva, etc." (*ibid.*).

(339) Louis Ducros, *Les Encyclopédistes*, Honoré Champion, 1900, p. 17.

(340) D'Holbach, *op. cit.* p. 615.

(341) Paul Benoît, *La franc-maçonnerie*, t. 2, Paris, 1886, p. 469 ff; see also Daniel Beresniak, *Franc-maçonnerie et romantisme*, Chiron, 1987.

(342) Ernest Seillière, *Vers le socialisme rationnel*, Plon, Paris, 1923, p. 41.

(343) Nathalie Ferrand, *Les circulations européennes du roman français, leurs modalités et leurs enjeux*, in Pierre-Yves Beaurepaire and Pierrick Pourchasse (eds.), *Les Circulations internationales en Europe, années 1680-années 1780*, Presses Universitaires de Rennes, Rennes, 2010, p. 404.

(344) Seillière sees Plato as the precursor of naturalistic mysticism. "In particular, Plato was one of the pioneers of naturalistic mysticism, since he was the first to look theoretically for a moral principle in the impulses of nature and in the impulses of passion. The most popular aspect of his doctrine is undoubtedly the theory of moralising Love, which he developed above all in one of his most perfect Dialogues, the *Banquet*. - There is nothing in the world," says one of the characters in this famous conversation, "neither birth, nor honour, nor riches, which is capable to the same degree as love of inspiring in a man what he needs to behave well, that is to say, shame for evil and emulation for good. If a man who loves had committed an evil deed or borne an insult without demanding reparation for it, there would be no father, no relative, no one before whom he would be so ashamed to appear as before what he loves: and it is the same for him who is loved. - With his principle laid down in these terms, the philosopher-poet deduced, as we know, a whole doctrine of moralisation engendered by the cult of Beauty, first of all material and corporeal Beauty, then of the Beauty of the soul, and finally of supreme Beauty, marvellous, eternal, unbegotten and non-perishable. - In this way, he was the father of a kind of ancient romance, rather bizarre in the Dorian elements that mingle with it, echoes of which can still be found, five centuries later, in the *Essais de Plutarch's morality*

"This mystical dream, in some ways so noble, but also in others so suspect, has had far-reaching consequences. Through Neoplatonism, it influenced, at least in form, the teachings of nascent Christianity and provided effective suggestions for all subsequent Christian mysticism. Then, through its survival in the Hellenised and Romanised environment of the Gallic Provincia - our present-day Provence - it gave rise, in my opinion, to a very interesting concept of aristocratic morality, that of courtly or romantic love, around the 11th century AD, in their system of chivalrous gallantry, as in Plato's Dialogues, love is proclaimed the principle of all bravery and virtue. Exaltation in love, the mainspring of this erotic morality that has had such a lasting influence, was referred to in the Romance language of Provence by the masculine word *joy*, which conveyed a state of energetic expansion, a certain exaltation.

the feeling of life, tending to manifest itself in the lover through acts or efforts worthy of the object loved.

"However, the courtly or romantic theory of moralising love differs from Athenian Platonism in its strictly feminist aspect, and from Christian doctrine - although the latter incorporated certain elements of Alexandrian mysticism - in that it proclaims love to be incompatible with marriage. Passionate exaltation was considered to be the motive for noble actions only if, perfectly spontaneous in a soul, it accepted laws only from itself. Anything that seemed likely to dampen, blunt or exhaust this exaltation also compromised its moral character. She had to avoid at all costs the depressing influences of everyday vulgarity and discard anything that seemed likely to restrict the lover's opportunities to give full rein to his most generous faculties.

"It was therefore proclaimed that a woman could only exercise her empire of beauty with dignity and retain her virtue as a moral inspiration through gallant relationships in which everything on her part was a gracious gift, a voluntary munificence. But this was impossible in an association such as marriage, where the

woman has nothing to refuse. A court of love, presided over by the famous Eleanor of Guyenne, who was Queen of France for a time before becoming Queen of England through a second marriage, was called upon to judge the case of a lady who, already in possession of a servant knight, had promised another to "retain" him, i.e. to accept him as her servant, if she lost the first. Shortly afterwards, she married the first, who fell in love with her charms, and the second immediately demanded the privilege of loving her in the courtly way. She resisted at first, but was condemned by the court of love to keep the word given to this gallant servant in expectation or survivorship; and all because she had truly 'lost' her former lover the day she had taken him for her husband! - Such views were becoming an obvious danger of immorality for this subtle doctrine whose claims had been so highly moral at its inception.

"In fact, she often led the courtly lover to simply listen to the movements of nature after pretending to resist them for a while. In fact, it often led the courtly lover to simply listen to the movements of nature after pretending to resist them for a while, and to give them a kind of mystical consecration by the moral importance it wished to confer on them. The spirit of romance, which stems from the courtly theory, as I shall say, and which has survived it to the present day, has continued to show the same disadvantages alongside the same advantages.

"It seems that Chrestien de Troyes, mainly this storyteller who was one of the most famous at the end of the thirteenth century, took courtly theory from lyric poetry to epic poetry and created the novel of chivalry. The delightful tale of Tristan and Yseult, and that of Lancelot of the Lake, took the romance thesis - and the glorification of adultery - to the very ends of Europe. - Almost immediately, Christian mysticism seized upon these theses of refined love to refine the relationship between the faithful soul and its God. The Provençal troubadours declared themselves knights of the Virgin, mother of Christ, and created the courtly cult of the Madonna, whose name alone, *Ma Dame*, speaks of its romantic origins. The German mystics of the 14th century - Eckardt, Tauler, Suso - owed much to the novel conception of passion for the development of their more or less orthodox aspirations towards the Beyond. Francis of Assisi, Dante, Petrarch and Boccaccio were the avowed disciples of our Provençal lyricists, whose influence they extended in every direction. As the seventeenth century approached, and during its course, the romance retreated to its Platonic source in Italy [...] The seventeenth century in France was to give a new lease of life to the romance spirit in the heroic novel.

and gallant of Urfé, la Calprenède, Scudéry and in the salons of precious society, which sought its most characteristic inspiration in the fictions of these writers".

"However, the spirit of romance continued to blend with the speculations of a certain Christian mysticism, shaping them more and more in its own image. The Reformation, advocated by Luther and Calvin, was a great mystical movement in its origin, but it was mainly inspired by history and scholarship in its effort to go back to the ways of the primitive Christian Church. This movement therefore remains energetic and male in its leaders or representatives. - At about the same time, however, a more feminine mystical evolution was taking place within Catholicism, more concerned with satisfying the emotional appetites of the soul while turning them towards things beyond (Towards Rational Socialism, pp. 10-4, 16). This was Quietism, the forerunner, "in many respects, of Romanticism.

Advising conduct by "slopes and instincts", he worked for the benefit of naturist mysticism. Attacking, under the name of devotionalism, rational Christian morality and its moderate asceticism, he heralded aesthetic mysticism, which would often combat the doctrines of order and method in the organisation of life. Excusing, on the pretext of supreme perfection, the outbursts of eroticism in its adherents, it will work in concert with the spirit of romance, for the triumph of passionate mysticism in the modern soul. Finally, announcing the coming of a new era that will establish the reign of He was preparing the topical millenarianism which, in secularised forms, would become social mysticism and romantic socialism". (ibid., p. 17) According to Seillière, these are the main stages in "naturist mysticism".

(345) Pierre Lasserre, *Le romantisme français. Essai sur la révolution dans les sentiments et dans les idées au XIXe siècle*, 1907, p. 16.

(346) Ernest Seillière, *Vers le socialisme...*, p. 36.

(347) Idem, *Les Étapes du mysticisme passionnel, de Saint-Preux à Manfred, La Renaissance du livre*, 1919, The "mysticism of passion", "an essential principle of Rousseauist morality which has conquered most contemporary souls and continues to govern us, in such a way that it gradually creeps into our codes" (id., *Vers le socialisme*, p. 24), is expressed in full in this page from the *Dialogues*: "Imagine an ideal world, similar to ours and yet quite different. Nature is the same there as on earth, but the economy is more sensitive, the order is more marked, the spectacle more admirable, all the objects more interesting... The passions are, as here (as on earth) the motive of all actions, but more lively, more ardent or only simpler and purer, they take on, by that very fact, a very different character. All the first movements of nature are upright and good; they tend as directly as possible to our own preservation and happiness (but not to that of others)... Perhaps in these parts we are not more virtuous than those around us, but we know better how to love virtue there, and, the true inclinations of nature being tons of good, by indulging in them, the inhabitants of this other world are good too! (quoted in ibid.). According to Seillière and

Other critics of Rousseau argued that his Christianity had gone astray; others argued that Catholicism was a deviation from primitive Christianity; "[...] the thought of the Savoyard Vicar is undoubtedly a Christian thought. To the *Encyclopaedia*, Rousseau opposes the Gospel as his Calvinist conscience interprets it; to science, he opposes tradition and authority; his primitive and ideal man

was not only born virtuous, he was born Christian, and civilisation has not only made him vicious, it has also made him a philosopher. Bringing him back to himself, to nature, will mean bringing him back to Christianity, not Roman Christianity, but pure and original Christianity" (François-Alphonse Aulard, *Culte de la raison et le culte de l'être suprême [1793-1794] : essai historique*, Félix Alcan, Paris, 1898, p. 252).

(348) Ernest Seillière, *Les Étapes du...*, p. 3.

(349) Auguste Viatte, *Les sources occultes du romantisme, illuminisme-théosophie, 1770-1820*, t. 1, Honoté Champion, 1965 [1922], p. 232).

(350) Idem, *Vers un socialisme...*, p. 37.

(351) Ernest Seillière, *Une Théorie d'Hippolyte Taine sur la Révolution française*. In *Revue des Deux Mondes*, 6e période, t. 43, 1918 [p. 338-65], p.361.

(352) Robespierre's entourage was teeming with "extremists" or "maximalists", such as Catherine Théot (1716-1794), "a kind of mystic, who called herself the Mother of God" (Wladimir Guettée [abbé], *Histoire de l'Eglise de France*, Paris, 1856, p. 326) and who had built up a following, or Suzette Labrousse (1747-1821) (*ibid.*, p. 360), author of *Prophéties concernant la révolution française, suivies d'une prédiction qui annonce la fin du monde* (1790).

(353) Ernest Seillière, *Essais et notices. La Généalogie de la doctrine démocratique*. In *La Revue des Deux Mondes*, vol. 52, no. 1, 1 July 1939 [p. 195-206], p. 202

(354) For Rousseau, passion and reason are not opposites; indeed, passion is at the origin of reason. rationality: "Whatever the moralists may say, human understanding owes a great deal to the passions, which we all admit also owe a great deal to it. It is through their activity that our reason is perfected; we seek to know only because we desire to enjoy; and it is impossible to imagine why someone who had neither desires nor fears would bother to reason. The passions in turn derive their origin from our needs and their progress from our knowledge. For we can only desire or fear things on the basis of the ideas we have of them, or by the simple impulse of nature...". Already in Racine, by a process similar to the so-called catharsis, the passions, carried to extremes, are eventually purified and give way to reason. According to Hume, "reason is and can only be the slave of the passions, and can claim no other role than to serve and obey them" (quoted in John P. Wright, *Hume's 'A Treatise of Human Nature': An Introduction*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge, 2009, p. 268); "it is not contrary to reason to prefer the destruction of the world to a scratch on my finger" (quoted in Annette C. Baier *A Progress of Sentiments: Reflections on Hume's Treatise*, Harvard University Press, Cambridge, MS and London, 1991, p. 165). Similarly, for Pascal, "[t]he name of reason has been wrongly taken away from love, and they have been opposed without a good foundation, for love and reason are one and the same thing. It is a rush of thoughts that goes one way without properly examining everything; but it is always a reason, and we must not and cannot wish that it be a reason.

Otherwise we would be very unpleasant machines. So let us not exclude reason from love, since it is inseparable from it. So the poets were not right to depict love in this way

like a blind man: we must remove his blindfold and give him back the enjoyment of his eyes" (quoted in Colette E. Aragon, *Platonisme de L'Astrée? In Cahiers de la littérature du XVIIe siècle*, n°6, 1984. Tribute to René Fromilhague. [p. 11-22] p. 1).

(355) See Ernest Seillière, *Les mystiques du néo-romantisme; évolution contemporaine de l'appétit mystique*, Plon-Nourrit et Cie, 1911, p 370.

(356) Id. in *Essais et notices*, pp. 202-3.

(357) "Crawl into your grave, you pagan antiquity! Pan! the great Pan is not dead! The festivals of Ceres are coming back, and the sheaf offering, and the peoples prostrating themselves before the sacred gifts of Cybele, and the priest invoking your infinite fecundity, O earth, nurse and mother of immortal humanity. The leaders of the new Republic had already tried it; we saw, in the early days of the revolution that promised socialism, the chariots of Ceres, the oxen with golden horns, and the virgins singing the hymns of nature! Today the priest, facing the sheaf, stretches out his arm and, in a slow voice, pronounces anathemas against the dying society and the laws of the new society: corrupt and rotten is this world, founded on inequality, where the poor, "after great toil and effort, have only death". The time of the people has come: 'The rich work for their children; but the poor are God's children. God does not know the rich; 'to feed the poor he makes work his sun. Life is not a trial and the earth an exile; 'work is not man's punishment, it is his reward,' and humanity, imbued with that powerful, all-embracing life, spread everywhere, which we call God, imbued with that force which unites God, man and the earth in a single being, advances gloriously towards happiness and indefinite perfection" (George Sand, *Claudie*, in *Le correspondant*, vol. 27, Paris, 1851, pp. 468-79). See Ernest Seillière, *George Sand, mystique de la passion, de la politique et de l'art*, F. Alcan, 1920.

(358) Charles Nodier, *Description raisonnée d'une jolie collection de livres*, J. Techener, 1844, p. 12.

(359) He adds significantly, as proof of the freedom-lover's irrepressible penchant for servitude: "Of all governments, the one that revolts my heart the least, the one that degrades me the most, is the one that has the greatest influence on my life.

(Romans de Charles Nodier, nouv. éd., revue et accompagnée de notes, Charpentier et Cie, Paris, 1873, p. 193).

(360) Quoted in Keiko Tsujikawa, *Nerval et les limbes de l'histoire: lecture des Illuminés*, Droz, Geneva, 2008. The first mention of demogorgon, a word made up of "gorgon" and "daemon", is found in a scholia by a Christian grammarian of the fifth century AD on Stace's *Thebaid*, where he is presented as a diabolical, infernal deity, the father of all gods. In a chapter of *La Sorcière* entitled "Satan triumphs in the 17th century", Michelet positively associates the shepherds' god with the Christian incarnation of the devil: "People had foolishly said: 'The great Pan is dead. Then, seeing that he lived, they made him a God of evil; through the chaos, it was possible to deceive oneself. But here he is, living, and living harmoniously in the sublime fixity of the laws that govern the star and no less govern mankind. The deep mystery of life". (Jules Michelet, *La Sorcière*, 2nd ed. revised and expanded, A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven et Cie, Paris and Leipzig, 1863, p. 283).

(361) Dupuis (op. cit., new ed, t. 5, Émile Babeuf, Paris, 1822, p. 439), quoting from L'Histoire des Juifs by the French Reformed pastor, author, theologian, historian and diplomat Jacques Basnage de Beauval (1653- 1723), indicates that it is "absolutely in the taste of the Orientals" to depict "Pan with a fiery face [...] holding seven circles in his left hand and having wings on his shoulders" and that this is exactly how Kircher describes him (ibid., p. 440), Phornutus (50 B.C.) already said that Pan was painted "[surrounded by] seven golden candlesticks, with a luminous figure, or rather red and inflamed with the ethereal substance represented by his head [...], which contained the thinking part of the world, or the etheric fire that guides and directs it wisely" (quoted in ibid.). In Virgil's 10th Eglogue, Pan is depicted painted in vermilion ("sanguineis ebuli baccis minioque rubentem").

(362) La Revue de Paris et de Saint-Pétersbourg, 15 April 1888, p. 27.

(363) Ernest Bosc, Petite encyclopédie synthétique des sciences occultes : Hermétisme, magie, Bureau de la Curiosité, 1904, p. 244 gives a less than engaging account.

(364) On Esquiros's spiritualist theories, see Brian Juden, op. cit. pp. 568-9 and, on his life and work, Anthony Zielonka, Alphonse Esquiros (1812-1876), Champion and Slatkine, Paris and Geneva, 1985.

(365) Anthony Zielonka, Le féminisme d'Adèle Esquiros, Studi Francesi, 1988. The following passage, taken from Esquiros's novel Les Vierges sages (2nd ed., Comon, Paris, 1849, p. 5), shows that his knowledge of women's hearts was infinitely better than his knowledge of Latin, in which "plebs" means "plebeian, rabble" and not "people": "The ancients had made the people of the female gender Plebs. There are in fact secret moral affinities between the suffering class and the suffering sex. The people are women, just as women are people. Democracy, against which a handful of dark intriguers who call themselves republicans and who have neither suffered nor fought for the Republic are now rising up; democracy, I say, will have its day. That day will be the day of the weak, the poor and the oppressed [...]. What brings women closer to democracy is their hearts. Esquiros was a member of the "La Réforme" lodge, where Gambetta was initiated on 3 April 1869 and became Master on 18 October 1869 (Sudhir Hazareesingh and Vincent Wright, Francs-maçons sous le Second Empire : les loges provinciales du Grand- Orient à la veille de la Troisième République, Presses universitaires de Rennes, 2001, p. 202).

(366) Félix Nève, Éloge de Ballanche, Louvain, 1850, p. 56.

(367) Œuvres de M. Ballanche, t. 4, Paris, 1830, p. 55.

(368) Œuvres de M. Ballanche, t. 5, Addition aux prolégomènes. Orphée, Paris, 1833, p. 153-4. For Ballanche, this "new man" was Napoleon (Œuvres de M. Ballanche, t. 3, Paris, 1833, p. 38).

(369) Œuvres de M. Ballanche, t. 6, Paris, 1833, p. 211. Ballanche, of whom universalis.fr says, not without reason, that "it is difficult to grasp the guiding ideas" (Emile Faguet, Politiques et moralistes du XIXe siècle. Saint-Simon ; Fourier ; Lamennais ; Ballanche ; Edgard Quinet ; Victor Cousin ; Auguste Comte, 2e série, Paris, 1898, managed the feat of clearly isolating and following them), was strongly influenced by the Freemason doctrines of the enlightened Louis-Claude de Saint-Martin (see Joseph Bûche, L'école

mystique de Lyon [1776-1847]. The great Ampère, Ballanche, Ch.-Julien Bredin, Victor de Laprade, Blanc S. Bonnet, Paul Chenavard. With a preface by Edouard Herriot. F. Alcan, Paris, 1935). Ballanche was not a politician, but his crypto-Christian fads had a decisive influence on people who, through the networks they wove in the economy, administration, banking and industry, played a large part in shaping the republican France we know today. Indeed, it was after reading his *Essais de palingénésie sociale* (Barbezat, Paris, 1827) that the Saint-Simonians, led by Enfantin, turned to religion (see Carolina Armenteros, *The French Idea of History: Joseph de Maistre and His Heirs, 1794-1854*, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 2011, p. 276).

(370) Pierre-Simon Ballanche, *Essais de palingénésie sociale*, t. 1, Paris, 1827, p. 353.

(371) Victor Hugo, *Œuvres complètes*, vol. 12, Club français du livre, 1969, p. 50; the same political pantheist view had already been expressed, in a more analytical way, by the physiocrat Mably: " [To [these] citizens, born with different characters, temperaments and inclinations [...], the republic must give common principles of union, peace and concord, to have, if possible, only one same spirit ..." (emphasis added). (emphasis added) (*Œuvres complètes de l'Abbé de Mably*, Lyon, 1796, p.. 309) and by Rousseau: "Good social institutions are those which best know how to denature man, to take away his absolute existence and give him a relative one, and to transport the self into the common unity; so that each individual no longer believes himself to be one, but part of the unity and is no longer sensitive except in the whole" (*Œuvres complètes de J. -J. Rousseau*, t. 3: Émile, Lefèvre, 1859, p. 11).

(372) Quoted in Adolphe Franck, *Des rapports de la religion et de l'Etat*, 2nd edn, F. Alcan, Paris, 1885, p. 186. While being, or because he was, "the man who was least aware of reality and existing things" (Charles Augustin Sainte-Beuve, *Portraits contemporains*, nouv. éd., revue, corrigée et très augmentée, vol. 2, Michel Lévy Frères, Paris, 1870, p. 80), de Vigny "shared with his contemporaries the elation of the first months [of the 1848 Revolution] [...] agreed to be nominated" (Georges Bonnefoy, *La Pensée religieuse et morale d'Alfred de Vigny*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1971, p. 345).

(373) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 187.

(374) William W. Quinn, *The Only Tradition*, SUNY Press, Albany, N.Y., 1996, p. 76 ff. Leibnitz associated *philosophia perennis* with the concept of perpetual progress (Charles B. Schmitt, *Perennial Philosophy*. In *Journal of the History of Ideas*, vol. 27, no. 4, 1966 [p. 505-32]).

(375) Pierre-Denis Boyer, *Défense de l'ordre social contre le carbonarisme moderne*, t. 1, Le Clere et Cie, Paris, 1835, p. 346. Dupuis, mentor to the archaeologist Alexandre Lenoir (1761-1839) (Dominique Poulot, *L'Égypte imaginaire d'Alexandre Lenoir*, in Chantal Grell [ed.], *L'Égypte imaginaire de la Renaissance à Champollion : colloque en Sorbonne*, Presses de l'université Paris-Sorbonne, 2001, p. 132), condemned Freemasonry, in which he included, no doubt not wrongly, the Christian Church (Claude Rétat, *Lumières et ténèbres du citoyen Dupuis*, *Chroniques d'histoire maçonnique*,

n° 50, 1999, [p. 5-68]). *Origine de tous les cultes* was placed on the index in 1818 (Louis Veuillot, *Œuvres complètes*, t. 11: *Les odeurs de Paris*, P. Lethielleux, 1926, p. 47, note 1).

(376) *Œuvres de M. Ballanche*, t. 3, Paris, 1830, p. 13.

(377) Charles-Louis Chassin, *Edgar Quinet: sa vie et son œuvre*, Pagnerre, Paris, 1859, p. 465.

(378) Michela Landi, op. cit. p. 54. Clémenceau, who sat with Quinet on the extreme left of the National Assembly from 1871 to 1875, published a collection of articles previously published in various newspapers under the title *Le Grand Pan* (1896). It was at this time that Pan reappeared on the German art scene (*) and in British literature, particularly in the Gothic novel and in novels for young people (See Eva Valentová, *The Graeco-Roman God Pan and Decadence*, thesis, 2018, Masaryk University, <https://is.muni.cz/th/msagf/CompleteThesis.pdf>), where, with the Scottish writer J. M. Barrie, a member - along with Arthur Machen (1863-1947), author of the horror tale *The Great God Pan* and *The Inmost Light*, and Alesteir Crowley, who recounted in *The World's Tragedy*, dedicated to Pan, that the god had appeared to him (**) - of the Hermetic Order of the Golden Dawn, he took on traits in which, nearly eight decades later, the psychoanalyst Dan Kiley would recognise those of the 'puer

aeternus" and which cinema, comic strips and television would exploit ad nauseam throughout the 20th century (***)). It was also around this time that Pan was elected supreme god of the emerging neo-pagan movement (****).

Le Grand Pan was a great success when it was published (Camille Ducray, Clémenceau, Payot et Cie, 1918, p. 91). The preface, more than eighty pages long, begins with an erudite presentation of the myth of Pan, a symbol, in Clémenceau's eyes, of paganism, and continues, based on Plutarch's account of Pan's death, with a celebration of democratic and 'pagan' Greece, (George Clémenceau, *Le Grand Pan*, Charpentier, Paris, 1896, p. xxix) (****) and closes with a feverish hymn to the artist and the scientist.

That Pan is a non-Hellenic deity, and that Helladia, as he calls it, before being overthrown by Christianity, had been undermined by Asian cults, including, precisely, that of Pan. Like Quinet, he rejoiced in the resurrection of this divinity during the "Renaissance", a resurrection that he conceived, not, like Quinet, as artistic, but as interior: "we, who are of him, we, once stunned before the mystical personification of eternal fatalities, now freed from mad terrors, we feel him moving within us, evolving, growing, expressing himself in an ever more vast, ever more beautiful, ever better formula. It is the Great Pan which, through us, is made and grows. The total conception of which man is the dwelling, with man grows and ascends towards a higher mentality, eternally aspiring to the growth of all life: the growth of individual life in a more understanding man, the increase in life associated with man as a function of social evolution. In this sense, what is the Great Pan that stirs within us, if not the growing expression of total energy, life and its evolutions, the spirit itself, the highest form of life, in which the harmonic order of the world is summed up" (ibid?, p. lxxiv-lxxv.). For Clémenceau, Pan represented, not the people, "a mobile mass of changing interests floating on the wind of prejudices, atavistic dreams, passions and hopes".

(*****), but the principle of action: "Pan commands us. We must act. Action is the principle, action is the means, action is the goal. The obstinate action of the whole man for the benefit of all, disinterested action, superior to puerile glories, to the remuneration of dreams of eternity, as well as to the despair of lost battles or inescapable death, action in the evolution of the ideal, the only force and total virtue" (emphasis added) (ibid, lxxxi.). Pan's dual nature serves the politician to illustrate his evolutionism, his belief in the simian origin of man (*****), in one of the articles in the collection, entitled "Homme des villes et des bois" (emphasis added).

(*) PAN magazine, published in Berlin between 1895 and 1900, was considered one of the most important voices of Art Nouveau in Germany. Edited by Otto Julius Bierbaum and Julius Meier-Graefem, the magazine published a large number of illustrations by young international artists - Peter Behrens, Franz von Stuck, Max Klinger, Käthe Kollwitz, Auguste Rodin, Paul Signac and Félix Vallotton, etc. - or by unknown artists (<https://www.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/helios/fachinfo/www/kunst/digilit/artjournals/pan.html#volumes>).

(**) Aleister Crowley, *The World's Tragedy*, Paris, 1910, p. xx. In this anti-Christian hymn to "free love", this unrepentant sodomite declares, among other things (p. xxiii): "I will seduce the boys of England and the old men will then be able to stagger to their graves. These boys, becoming men, will bring forth the new heaven and the new earth." In a number of English novels of the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Pan is closely associated with "homoeeroticism".

(***) Although the character of Peter Pan is not half-man, half-goat, but half-man half-bird, any reference to the goat is not absent from Barrie's first novel in which it appears. In *The Little White Bird* (1902), every night in Kensington Gardens, Peter Pan rides and plays his flute on a billy goat given to him by a young girl called Maimie (a name not far removed phonetically from "Mummy"). When she gave it to him, it was a fake goat; in a letter she had left next to the animal in Peter's room, she had asked him to pray to the fairies to give him life. "In 1904, Peter Pan made his debut on the London stage in front of a mainly adult audience, in a play entitled first *Anon*, a Play, then *The Great White Father*, and finally, on the sound advice of the American producer, *Peter Pan*. It was a pantomime - traditional Christmas entertainment in England - an extravagant show in three acts, combining theatre, music, song, ballet, acrobatics and a host of special effects. The cast includes no fewer than fifty actors. The set and its changes were so complex that the first performance, postponed until 27 December, was prepared in such a feverish state that the author was extremely worried. In the pit, a full orchestra played music by the famous John Crook, while in the air, thanks to highly sophisticated machinery and a whole team of technicians, the dancers of the London Flying Ballet moved about. Peter appears as a young flying boy, dressed in dead leaves and cobwebs, who lives in his imaginary Neverland. There, domestic stories, mythology, legend, fairy tales, robinsonnades, with a touch of history and school stories, meet and clash. There are families, mermaids, fairies, pirates, redskins, birds, a pack of wolves and a crocodile; an eagle and an ostrich were originally planned. Peter plays the pipe like his namesake, the god Pan in Arcadia; in the first performances, he [the young boys' roles were then played by young girls] enters the stage accompanied by a

living goat. He poses as a fearsome captain, a tyrannical father, but is always on the lookout for a mother. He calls himself a little bird, an eternal child, the embodiment of youth and joy. The Indians, in recognition, call him 'Great White Father'. Following the pantomime tradition, his role is played by an actress, as are those of the lost boys; Mr Darling and Hook are played by the same actor, which helps to blur genders and identities" (Monique Chassagnol, *De Black Lake Island à Neverland*. In *Belphegor* [Online], 10-3, 2011, online 10 January 2013, accessed 25 December 2020. URL : <http://journals.openedition.org/belphegor/381> ; DOI : <https://doi.org/10.4000/belphegor.381>.

(****) See James R. Lewis, *Witchcraft Today: An Encyclopedia of Wiccan and Neopagan Traditions*, ABC- CLIO, Santa Barbara, Calif, 1999, p. 138 ff. Rediscovered in Great Britain by Shelley (1792-1822), Keats (1795-1821) and Wordsworth (1770-1850), for whom it was, sarcastically writes Barbara Jane Davy (Introduction to *Pagan Studies*, AltaMira Press, Lanham, 2007, p. 21) "t h e personification and guardian of the English countryside as imagined by holidaying city dwellers: A land of delights where it is always summer and there is no sign of agricultural labour"; later celebrated by Swinburne (1837-1909), Walter de la Mare (1873-1956) and Oscar Wilde, Pan was chosen by the neo-pagan movement as the personification of nature and the enemy of Christianity, which was presented as the civilising force par excellence (Ronald Hutton, *The Triumph of the Moon: A History of Modern Pagan Witchcraft*, Oxford University Press, 1999).

(*****) Clemenceau's criticism of Christianity has Nietzschean overtones: "The search for the kingdom of God, he says, for example, contempt for the earth, its beauties, its joys, its power over itself by the man who has come from its bosom, hatred of an ideal of living life, disgust for action This is what triumphs, this is what the West will call life from now on. We are no longer going to live except with a view to death" (George Clémenceau, op. cit., p. xxxvii). And yet, make no mistake: Clemenceau was more anti-clerical than anti-Christian. In *Au Soir de la pensée* (vol. 2, 1927, p. 356), he recalled that he "[had] written a long time ago that if men who professed Christianity took it upon themselves to practise their own doctrine, there would be no social question" (Samuël Tomel and Sylvie Brodziak [eds], *Dictionnaire Clemenceau*, Robert Laffont, 2017).

(******) The passage from which the quotation is taken is worth quoting: "What then is democracy? ? By definition: the government of the people. I beg to be shown the government of the people, and to be told where, how and where it manifests itself.

"What we call the people, for the sake of convenience, is apparently the mobile mass of changing interests floating on the wind of prejudices, atavistic dreams, passions and hopes. Who would dare to claim that these people govern, or have ever governed? Who does not know that from the earliest known times to the present day, they have been, I would not say led, but driven by the whims, the sophisms, the good or bad feelings, of a noisy minority of action? Soldiers, priests and talkers have, willingly or unwillingly, hustled it into battle; and there it has gone, that is its story. Empires, kingdoms, republics, this is the backdrop.

"The background has remained so well that only yesterday we went to war with Germany without a single Frenchman having premeditated it, wanted it or asked for it. Mr de Bismarck's traps were ones that average skill could easily have avoided. Ask Emile Ollivier and Napoleon III, who were great democrats; they will tell you that the event took place against their will. The Germans, no more than we, had no intention of being massacred. The result, however, was the most appalling war in history, with Europe still in turmoil. Where is the will of the people in all this? In the midst of the Democratic Republic, didn't the democrat Jules Ferry take us to Tonkin without our consent? And if, the other day, by chance, England and Japan had faced Russia, what business would we find ourselves involved in without our knowledge" (George Clémenceau, *op. cit.*, p. 327).

Clémenceau could only see, and probably only wanted to see, part of the "scenery": that of states with conscript or professional armies. In Rome and the Greek cities of antiquity, war, whether for defence or attack, was waged only by free men.

Elsewhere in *Le Grand Pan*, he declares, still on the subject of democracy: "it is the fatal, profitable but incoherent growth of governing minorities. The ancient oligarchies of soldiers and priests, who brutally brought us destinies they had not foreseen, have been joined by reasoners who put into maxims, after the fact, the observed effects of all human conflicts. They, dethroning God, who has not appeared on earth for at least two thousand years, have ended up proclaiming the kingship of the people, prudently contained by Palace Mayors of various denominations. The People are king. They reign. But they do not rule. Like Homer's gods, it has the smoke of slaughter. The clerics share the rest. (George Clémenceau, *op. cit.*, p. 357). At the end of his life, he confided to the political journalist Emile Buré, on the subject of the democrats: "they are rats in a sewer.

"(Charles d'Ydewalle, *Vingt ans d'Europe, 1919-1939*, E. Flammarion, 1939, p. 41; which, given that he lent himself to the democratic game, made him a rat) The most famous of Clémenceau's critical statements about democracy, the source of which no one, including his biographers, is able to provide, is that it is "[t]he power for lice to eat lions". However, Gustave le Bon (*Bases scientifiques d'une philosophie de l'histoire*, E. Flammarion, 1931, p. 290), who had asked the "Tiger" as well as Herriot, Mussolini and Jean de Castellane to give him their definition of democracy, he gave an answer that was hardly in keeping with the statements quoted above: "I'm racking my brains and this is what I can come up with: the growth of the parts of the intelligence from above filtered by the growth of the intelligence from below, to return to their starting point in general directions, acceptable and practicable for the nation as a whole".

(*****) "The idea of being able to translate the Discourse on Universal History into monkey onomatopoeia delighted me to no end. I was no less happy to think that I would soon have a qualified interpreter on hand to transpose into romantic verse the grunts of the cynocephalus, the cries of the baboons, macaques and guenons that adorn the Jardin d'Acclimatation. "One day in Amsterdam I met an orang-utan who certainly had something to tell me. The intensity and humanity of his gaze struck me deeply, and I dreamt about it for a whole day. We were each in our own cage: I, in the largest, bounded by the horizon; he, in a modest cell in the Garden.

zoological. Finding ourselves alone, as men, we looked at each other for a long time" (George Clémenceau, op. cit., p. 142).

(379) Brian Juden, op. cit. pp. 57-8. The sketch for the decoration of the cupola was a circular composition divided into three registers: "The Past dominated by the supreme divinity, The Present, with the

Finally, L'Avenir (on the site of the section that was cut off) was intended to represent the return of chaos, the prelude to the rebirth of humanity.

http://www.mba-lyon.fr/mba/sections/fr/collections-musee/peintures/oeuvres-peintures/xixe_siecle/la_palingenesie_sociale/). It featured more than one hundred and fifty figures or symbols, "strongly influenced by Freemason ideas" (ibid.; Chevanard's father was himself a Freemason, Théophile Silvestre, *Les artistes français : études d'après nature*, Blanchard, Paris, 1861, p. 263; Marie-Claude Chaudonneret, *Paul Chenavard : le peintre et le prophète*, Musée des Beaux-Arts de Lyon, 2000, p. 109). It was entitled "La palingénésie sociale", a title that Chevanard had borrowed from Pierre Ballanche (1776-1847). "The whole of the left-hand side would be devoted to the great phases of ancient history; the whole of the right-hand side would be reserved for the Christian era; and the back of the temple was to be occupied by a painting representing Christ's preaching on the mountain. The Gospel would thus mark the end of ancient times and the beginning of modern times, which would end with the French Revolution. I remember seeing on this table, sometimes in light sketches, sometimes in finished drawings, a series of heroic or historical scenes: the beginnings of Rome, the siege of the Roman Empire, etc.

of Carthage, the death of Socrates, which had to be redone after David's famous composition, and which is otherwise beautiful; Caesar crossing the Rubicon, the times of Augustus, the stable in Bethlehem, the Christians in the catacombs, a piece whose invention is sublime; and Pope Leo stopping Attila at the gates of Rome by sheer force of mind. Then come the Italian poets of the Renaissance, then Luther in Wittemberg, then the century of Louis XIV in the gardens of Versailles, then the age of the Encyclopaedists, represented by Voltaire's staircase, which the philosophers of his century climb up and down; finally, the French Revolution, as depicted in the unfinished painting of Mirabeau apostrophising Dreu-Brézé, and in the drawing of the National Convention now in the possession of Prince Napoleon" (Charles Blanc, *Les artistes de mon temps*, Firmin-Didot et Cie, Paris, 1876, pp. 202-3).

"The coup d'état of 2 December and the return of the Panthéon to the Catholic faith as payment for the support given by the clergy to the perpetrator of this crime interrupted the work of M. P. Chenavard; was he condemned to give it up? That depended on the archbishop of Paris, M. Sibour. Chenavard went to see him: 'My Lord,' he told him, 'it is up to you to make sure that in a work intended to present the abridged history of all religions, Christianity has the place it deserves and which the artist's respectful hand has insisted on giving it. Mr Sibour showed no reluctance. Sibour showed no reluctance to accept this invitation; after a few days he went, accompanied by a few ecclesiastics and learned laymen, to the studio of M. P. Chenavard at the Louvre, where various members of Prince Louis-Napoléon's court, officers attached to him, generals and inspectors from the Ministry of Fine Arts were already present. The archbishop carefully examined the compositions on display and, struck by the grandeur of the work he had before his eyes, expressed his regrets to the artist for being obliged to leave the studio.

I believe so, my lord," replied Father Chenavard, "but instead of a Christian church, I wanted to make a church. Perhaps," he continued, "not much would suffice for that. I believe so, Monsignor," replied Father Chenavard, "but instead of a Christian church, I wanted to make a church.

in which Christianity occupies only its rightful place in the history of human doctrines, and I could not lend myself to anything contrary to my thought'. One of the people who were part of the archbishop's retinue hastened to add: 'Your thinking is indeed too clear for anyone to misunderstand, you are not this atheist, this Hebertist of whom we had been told, you do not insult us, you throw us out with your hat in your hand'". (Taxile Delord, *Histoire du second empire*, vol. 6, Germer Baillière, Paris, 1875, p. 17-20). The project was shelved by Napoleon III.

(380) Théophile Gautier, *Le Panthéon*, wall paintings by Chenavard. In *Revue de Paris*, nouv. série, 1848, t. 10, Bruxelles, p. 150. See also *id.*, *Le Pantheon, peintures murales par Chenavard*, La presse, 9 septembre 1848; then in *L'art moderne*, 1856.

(381) Victor Hugo was "'socialist' before the word was invented" (Victor Hugo raconté par un témoin de sa vie, t. 2, A. Lacroix, Verboeckhoven, Paris et Leipzig, 1863, p.407) and George Sand declared herself a communist in 1848 (Francine Mallet, *George Sand*, Grasset, 1995 ; Jacques-Noël Pérès, *George Sand, entre socialisme évangélique et messianisme social*. In *Autres Temps. Cahiers d'éthique sociale et politique*, n° 63, 1999 [p. 49-60])." Théophile Gautier had taken the socialist programme of progress through revolution at its word. He believed very sincerely in the 'reds', and his royalist upbringing added to this belief family memories that were not very reassuring" (Émile Bergerat, *Théophile Gautier: entretiens, souvenirs et correspondance*, G. Charpentier, Paris, 1879, p. 19); "Lamartine was certainly not a socialist, but he was open-minded and open-hearted enough to listen to socialists without recoiling in fright, and at least to approve of their intentions, which for the time was already quite bold. As early as 1833, he had written to a correspondent that, although he did not share his illusions, he at least shared his 'noble desires for social improvement'. And this correspondent was precisely a Saint-Simonian, Cognat. Although Lamartine criticised Saint-Simonism at the time, he inspired enough confidence in the Saint-Simonians that it was to him, and to him alone among all the victors of February 1848, that Enfantin wanted to turn to obtain some immediate social reforms. In short, even more than George Sand, Lamartine was before 1848 the great moral guarantor of the advanced intelligentsia, even advanced to the point of touching socialism" (Maurice Aghulon, *Une ville ouvrière au temps du socialisme utopique : Toulon de 1815 à 1851*, Mouton, Paris et La Haye, 1970, p. 259); see, on the subject of de Vigny, Gustave Charlier and Pierre Flottes, *La pensée politique et sociale d'Alfred de Vigny*. In *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, t. 7, fasc. 2, 1928 [p. 633-637].

(382) Among these Romantic writers was the Fourierist Leconte de l'Isle (see Caroline De Mulder: *Leconte de Lisle, entre utopie et république*, Rodopi, Amsterdam and New York, 2005) who, four years after the Revolution of 1848, which he had "welcomed with unbounded enthusiasm" and "called for with all his heart" (Edmond Estève, *Leconte de Lisle: l'homme et l'œuvre* Boivin & Cie, éditeurs, p. 66), in articles which had "[revealed] in him, not only a republican, but a revolutionary, who does not boast when he declares himself 'ultra jacobin'" (Jean Dornis, *Essai sur Leconte de Lisle*, Librairie Paul Ollendorff, Paris, 1909, p. 111), published a *Pan à la Théocrite*, that is to say bucolic yet threatening, followed, nine and seventeen years later respectively, by a translation of the *Idylles* and the *Orphic Hymns*.

(383) See Auguste Viatte, *Le Catholicisme chez les romantiques*, E. De Boccard, Paris, 1922.

(384) Less pampered, the first German communists, as early as the 180s, explicitly referred to primitive Christianity, which Engels strongly disliked (see *Politica Hermetica*, no. 9: Esotérisme et socialisme, *L'Âge d'Homme*, Lausanne, 1995, p. 104).

(385) John Hunt, *Pantheism and Christianity*, Wm Isbister, 1884, p. iv. 354).

(386) Félix, *Des préjugés sur les Etats-Unis d'Amérique*. In *La libre recherche*, 3rd year, t. 11, Bruxelles, 1858, p. 385.

3

We can say that the Christian pastorate has introduced a game that neither the Greeks nor the Hebrews had imagined. A strange game whose elements are life, death, truth, obedience, individuals, identity; a game that seems to have nothing to do with that of the city that survives through the sacrifice of its citizens. By succeeding in combining these two games - the game of the city and the citizen and the game of the shepherd and the flock - in what we call modern states, our societies have revealed themselves to be truly demonic.

Michel Foucault, *Omnes et singulatim*

Today's despots don't rule with their fists or their sticks, but, disguised as market analysts, they herd their flocks along the paths of utility and comfort.

Marshall McLuhan, *The Mechanical Bride*

For Aristotle, the State has its origins in the family, which is the natural association of man and woman. An association of families forms a village, and an association of villages a state. The State is the last of the associations and the end of them all. Each of these associations is founded on an interest, namely the satisfaction of a need: to live well, to live virtuously, to live happily. Their perfection is to be self-sufficient. The State is the only association that is self-sufficient, because it satisfies all needs. Thus the State is "a fact of nature [...]"; [...] man is naturally a sociable being, and [...] he who remains savage by organisation, and not by chance, is certainly either a degraded being, or a being superior to the human species" (emphasis added) (1). To this important

With one exception, it is only as a fully-fledged member of a city that man can fully realise his nature.

Since the State is made up of families, to understand the State we need to examine the family. The family has four parts: wife, children, slaves and property. The head of the family is therefore, depending on how you look at it, husband, father, master or owner. Of the four types of relationship that characterise the family, that of master to slave is the one that first attracts Aristotle's attention. In his view, slavery is necessary because slaves are the means by which the master ensures his subsistence. Moreover, slavery is just: nature has made authority and obedience necessary, and has provided that the most perfect individuals should command those who are less perfect; in other words, some individuals are slaves by nature, while others are masters by nature. It is therefore unjust to enslave, by war or other means, those who are not slaves by nature. Although some people are predisposed to rule and others to be ruled, slavery is only just when the master's rule over the slave benefits both parties. Aristotle compares the relationship between master and slave to that between soul and body: the master possesses rational command faculties, while the slave, who lacks them, is only capable of performing elementary duties.

Since the slave does not own himself, it is at least in his interest to belong to someone who does.

The study of slavery leads to the study of property. Two modes of acquiring property are distinguished, one natural, whose sole purpose is subsistence, the other unnatural, whose sole purpose is money and the accumulation of money. A commentator on Aristotle notes: "A singular protest [...] against trade, interest, the movement of capital, everything that makes up the life and civilisation of modern peoples" (emphasis added). In addition to the master's relationship with his slave and that of the

There is that of the owner with his property, that of the husband with his wife and that of the father with his children. As husband and father, the man naturally has authority in the family; marital authority and paternal authority are not the same as that of the master over his slaves. Marital authority is similar to that of a magistrate in a state; paternal authority is similar to that of a king (and not to that of a despot).

It is sovereign, but not arbitrary. The difference between despotic power and royal power is that the former has only its own interests in mind, while the latter has the interests of its subjects in mind.

Aristotle notes that these three types of family power have their counterparts in the different constitutions he identifies at the beginning of Chapter IV of Book III of the Politics.

He classifies the latter into two main categories: pure constitutions and constitutions that are a corruption of the former. The latter all have the general interest in view, while the former aim only at the common good.

the personal interests of those in power. Pure constitutions are suitable for a city, which is an association of free men, while vitiated constitutions are akin to the power of the master over the slave.

Aristotle recognises six different forms of government, depending on whether sovereignty is exercised by a single individual, or by a minority, or by the mass of citizens, in the interests of all or in the interests of the rulers alone. The government of a single individual that tends only to the general interest is called royalty (3); under the same conditions, the government of a small number of elite individuals is called aristocracy and the government of the multitude is called a republic. When power is exercised by a single person for his or her own benefit, it is called tyranny; when it is exercised by the minority for the benefit of the rich alone, it is called oligarchy; when it is exercised for the benefit of the poor alone, it is called demagoguery, or democracy.

Aristotle distinguishes two types of tyranny: elective tyranny (aesymnetia), freely consented to for a more or less long time and for a specific purpose, and tyranny in which the king is master of all powers, in the same way as the father possesses them all in the family; to the latter and to aesymnetia he adds a species of kingship, which "in general [...] has more or less the same powers as tyranny, although it is legitimate and hereditary" and "is found established among some barbarian peoples". (4); it "is composed of the elements of extreme oligarchy and demagoguery, that is to say of two bad governments, and [...] presents together the shortcomings, the disadvantages and the vices of one and the other: tyranny, like oligarchy, is concerned only with wealth, the only means capable of guaranteeing it the loyalty of its satellites and the enjoyment of luxury; it has the same mistrust of the people, whom it is consequently careful to disarm; harming the multitude, banishing citizens, making them "the enemy", and so on.

On the other hand, tyranny borrows from democracy this system of continual war against eminent or powerful citizens, this secret or declared struggle which destroys them, these exiles which strike them, under the pretext that they are rebels, enemies of authority; for it knows that it is in the upper classes that conspiracies will be hatched, hatched by some with the intention of seizing power for themselves, and by others to escape enslavement" (5). Having set out the many causes of ruin that tyranny finds within itself, Aristotle goes on to examine its means of preservation.

It has two very different means: violence and cunning on the one hand, and an affectation of solicitude for public affairs on the other. The first category of means employed by tyranny to maintain its power includes the following: "Suppressing any superiority that arises; getting rid of people of good heart; defending common meals and associations; forbidding instruction and everything that has to do with enlightenment, that is, preventing everything that usually gives people courage and self-confidence; preventing leisure activities and all meetings where one might find common amusements; doing everything possible to ensure that subjects remain unknown to one another, because relationships lead to a "false sense of security".

mutual trust" (6); "knowing the slightest movements of citizens, and forcing them in some way never to cross the gates of the city, so as to always be aware of what they are doing, and accustoming them by this continual slavery to lowliness and timidity of soul: such are the means used by the Persians and the barbarians, tyrannical means that all tend towards the same goal. Here are some others: to know everything that is said and done among the subjects; to have spies like the women in Syracuse known as "delatrices"; to send people, like Hieron, to listen in on everything in societies and meetings, because people are less frank when they fear spying, and if they speak out, everything is known" (7); to "sow discord and slander among the citizens; to pit friends against each other; to irritate the people against the upper classes, who are divided among themselves"; "to impoverish the subjects, so that, on the one hand, [the tyrant's] guard costs him nothing to maintain, and on the other, busy earning their daily living, the subjects don't find the time to conspire" (8). All the "profoundly perverse" (9) manoeuvres that tyranny uses to maintain itself can be reduced to three main factors: the moral degradation of subjects, because debased souls are never tempted to conspire; the mutual distrust of subjects, because tyranny can only be overthrown by individuals united enough to work together to this end; the weakening and impoverishment of subjects, because it is not possible to bring down tyranny without having the means necessary for such an undertaking. As for the second method by which the tyrant maintains himself in power, it consists in appearing to be solicitously concerned with the public good, in endeavouring to inspire not fear but respect, in not flaunting his licentiousness in the eyes of all the subjects, in displaying a piety

In short, to show himself to be virtuous. Aristotle sums up all these stratagems by saying that the tyrant must ensure that his subjects see him not as a despot, but as a king, or rather as an administrator; not as someone who does his own business, but as someone who manages the affairs of others. In support of his thesis, he cites the examples of the tyrants of Persia and those of the Greek colonies (10), who, in the case of the latter, were

presented as the heirs of the first in this respect. "Peoples impelled by a natural spirit of servitude, a disposition much more pronounced in barbarians than in Greeks, in Asians than in Europeans, endure the yoke of despotism without pain and without the slightest difficulty.

murmurs" (11). This is because "[...] nature, among them, has not made a being to command.

Between them, there is really only the union of a slave and a slave; and the poets are not mistaken when they say: Yes, the Greek to the Barbarian has the right to command, since nature intended Barbarians and slaves to be one and the same" (12). Nor would they be wrong to say, in line with this statement by the Greek philosopher, that among them, power is exercised, more than by the master over the slave, by the slave over another slave.

Aristotle thus laid the theoretical foundation for the idea, which had already been expressed by authors such as Aeschylus (525-456 BC) or Isocrates (436-338 BC), that the Greeks were superior to barbarians in general and to their great enemy the Persians in particular, in the same way that that naturally free men are superior to naturally enslaved men.

laid the foundations for the political concept that would later come to be known as "Oriental despotism", and which is the subject of this study. This "species of kingship", which is the second of the five types of kingship he identifies and describes, is not named by Aristotle. According to him, it differs from tyranny in three respects: firstly, it is based, as mentioned above, on law and heredity; secondly, the guard surrounding kings of this type has a truly royal character and in no way corresponds to that of tyrants: those charged with ensuring the king's protection are armed citizens, whereas the tyrant entrusts his only to strangers (in other words, the king has a guard of citizens, whereas the tyrant has a guard against citizens) (13); finally, in kingship, obedience is legal and voluntary, whereas in tyranny it is forced. It should also be noted that he describes this "species of kingship" not only as tyrannical, but also as despotic,

as if he considered the two terms to be synonymous. The distinction between tyranny and despotism is therefore not clearly established. Even today, very few make this distinction, even among those who present themselves as political scientists, whether professional or amateur, to say nothing of the ignorant casualness with which the term 'dictatorship' is abused.

Classical Roman law recognised four powers: the *potestas dominica*, the power of the master over his slaves; the *patria potestas*, the power of the father over his children; the *manus*, the power of the husband or a third party over his wife; the *mancipium*, the power of a free man over another free man who had been mancipiated from him. The person to whom these powers belong is the *dominus* - or, in the last two cases, the *domina*, since these two powers were accessible to women. "*Dominus*" is precisely the term that Cicero chose, transposing it from private law to public law, to describe Tarquin the Superb, in Book II of the Republic, written shortly after Mark Antony, to whom, seeing him as a tyrant, he applied the same adjectives (*crudelis, taeter, regius*) as those by which the seventh and last king of Rome was described by his contemporaries, had succeeded Caesar. Do you see then," he laments (II, 25-6), "how the king [Tarquin the Superb] gave way to the despot [*de rege dominus extiterit*], and how, through the perversity of one, one of the best forms of government became the most odious of all? This is indeed the character of the despot, whom the Greeks call a tyrant; for they only give the title of king to someone who looks after the interests of the people like a father, and who constantly strives to make the condition of his subjects as happy as possible. As I have said, kingship is a highly commendable form of government, but unfortunately it is always on a very rapid and singularly dangerous downward slope. As soon as royal authority has been transformed into unjust domination, there is no longer a king, but a tyrant, that is to say the most horrible, hideous monster, the most abhorrent to Gods and men, that one can conceive; he has the features of a man, but his heart is crueler than a tiger's. How can one recognise as a man the one who is not a king? How can we recognise as a man one who does not wish to enter either into the community of rights which makes up societies, or into the community of feelings which unites the human race? The ruler who deprives free men of their freedom, or to be more precise, the ruler who enslaves Roman citizens, is therefore "*dominus*", because for Cicero (Philippics, VI, 19), "Other nations may suffer servitude, but freedom belongs to the people Roman". Originally, *libertas* referred to the use of citizens' rights and, in its legal sense (14), to the status of the free man from an economic point of view (14bis). Under the *res publica*, the term

For some, freedom means the absence of any legal constraint on the private life of the citizen; for others, it means the condition of a person who is not subject to his passions and has the capacity to act in favour of the community; for still others, including Cicero, it means acting in accordance with virtue and, above all, justice; In this last conception, freedom is no longer linked to positive laws; it is an ethical notion; it resides in the individual's adherence to natural law, a law that is inscribed in reason, which all men enjoy and the enjoyment of which makes them equal: it is therefore moral and universalist

(15). Ironically, this conception of freedom as an entirely internal state leads not only to pure moralism but also to the tyranny of reason.

During the Empire, the term "dominus" became a title of honour. Rejected by the first emperors, whether Augustus or Tiberius, because it implied the idea of a slave master, but accepted by Caligula and Domitian, its formal use was established with the introduction of Eastern etiquette under Diocletian (16) and it was generally taken by all emperors from Septimius Severus onwards, including Constantine, before being adopted by the Eastern emperors. Constantine V definitively abandoned the title dominus on the coinage and inscribed either basileus or despotes (17), a title that would be worn by all Byzantine emperors, then by members of their families and finally, at the beginning of the thirteenth century, by the princes or hospodars of the Danubian provinces. However, the term 'despotes' was not used in the political theory of the Middle Ages, one of the most important of which, from Gregory the Great (540 - 604), Isidore of Seville (c. 565 - 636) and Fulgence of Ruspe (9th century) to John of Salisbury (12th century), was the distinction between the king and the tyrant. The most complete is

is found in John of Salisbury's Policraticus. The only and, at the same time, supreme difference between the tyrant and the prince is that the latter governs the people according to the law and obeys the law, whereas the former oppresses the people by violence and is never satisfied until he has rendered the law null and void and reduced the people to slavery. The essence of kingship is respect for the law, for the legitimate rights and liberties of the people, without which a man may be sovereign in name, but not in fact (18).

The word "despot" reappeared in the 13th century as part of a new conception of law. Where a law had hitherto been regarded as the custom, or declared will, of the community, the idea emerged among the jurists of the Bologna school that the prince was the sole source of law (19). The theories of the Bolognese jurists on the sources of political and legislative authority had two aspects. They all accepted the principle of Roman law that the emperor had the power to make law, and they all maintained that this authority was derived from the Roman people, who had conferred on the emperor his own legislative power. They disagreed as to whether the Roman people had alienated their authority from him to such an extent that he retained no legislative power and could not have it. This concept, transposed from legal texts into political literature, gave rise to the theory of absolute monarchy at the end of the thirteenth century. This concept, transposed from legal texts into political literature (20), gave rise to the theory of absolute monarchy at the end of the thirteenth century. Two hundred years later, it was on this basis that the British lawyer, judge, juriscult and political theorist John Fortescue (c. 1397 - 1479), whom we shall be discussing again when, in a forthcoming

study, we will examine a doctrine as crucial to the development of the theory of sovereignty as that of the "two bodies of the king" (20bis), which draws a clear distinction between the "regimen politicum et regale" of England and the "regimen regale" of France, between the realm where the king governs according to the laws made by the community and the realm where the king makes the laws himself. In fact, a

A similar distinction had already been made by the Italian theologian and chronicler Ptolemy of Lucca (c. 1236 - c. 1327) in *De Regimine Principum*, a treatise begun by Thomas Aquinas. Ptolemy attributes to Aristotle the distinction between two forms of government, the political and the despotic, "despoticus", a term he borrows from William de Moerbeke's translation of Aristotle's *Politics* around 1260 ; In Latin, "despotès" had previously been translated as *dominus* or *tyrannus* (21). He describes the former as that in which the country or community is governed, either by many or by one, according to its own laws (*ipsorum statuta*), whereas in the latter, which Ptolemy believes has the advantage of being more like God's government, the prince governs according to a law engraved in his heart. On the other hand, despotic government, which in its nature resembles that of the master over the slave, is intrinsically arbitrary, which Ptolemy illustrates in the terms Samuel uses to describe the nature of kingship to the Israelites and to make them understand the advantages of the "regimen politicum" under which he and his judges made them live. Ptolemy argues that each of these forms of government, which he now calls "regimen politicum" and "dominium regale", brings a good. The former is suited to the state of innocence or to the rule of wise and virtuous men, such as the ancient Romans; the latter to the government of those who are perverse and foolish. He also insists, following in Aristotle's footsteps, on the fact that the characteristics of the peoples who inhabit the different parts of the world are different, and that some of them seem made for slavery and some for freedom (22).

The term "despoticus" was also used by Gilles of Rome (1247 - 1316) to describe the "dominium regale", but, like the other political theorists of the "Middle Ages", with the exception of Marsilio of Padua (1275-1342), he was not referring to Eastern sovereigns when he spoke of despots. Distinguishing, more or less in the wake of Aristotle, between military monarchy, despotic hereditary monarchy, elective tyranny, heroic monarchy, exercised for the common good, and paternal monarchy (*dominus*) (23), the Padovian physician and political theorist, in *Defensor Pacis*, refers to the second form of government only in relation to the kings of Asia, who "exercise their authority by hereditary succession and govern in accordance with a despotic law that aims at his particular and personal profit. Various Asian nations, he adds, following the lesson of Aristotle, accept without protest this government because of their barbaric and servile nature and the influence of custom". (24). Like d'Ockham and the philosopher Nicole Oresme (24bis), however, he also uses the expression of He used the term "regimen politicum" to criticise papal claims to absolute power (25).

While political theorists of the time were keen to draw a distinction between "despotism" and "tyranny", the clearest distinction was that proposed by the theologian and philosopher William of Ockham (c. 1285 - 1347) in his typology of forms of government (26). According to d'Ockham

There are three main pure forms of moderate and just constitutions: the royal principate, the despotic principate and the tyrannical principate. In the principatus regalis, power is exercised over free men by a single person for the common good and not for his own profit and benefit. In the principatus despoticus, the "prince (principans) [is] one who possesses such power that he can use it over his slaves and over the property of all those who depend on his principate, not only for the common good, but also for his own good, insofar as he does not derogate from divine law or natural law" (26bis). It is more imperfect than the principatus regalis, because it is preferable to work for the good of all than for one's own good; the principatus tyrannicus is the perversion, or corruption, of the principatus regalis, because it does not have in view the common good, except accidentally, but the sole good of the tyrant (27). After having argued to establish that the principate d'Ockham explains what separates these last two forms of government: "Whether a king commands according to his will or according to the law, if he first governs non-consenting subjects in his own interest, he becomes a tyrant; if he begins to govern consenting subjects in his own interest, he becomes, strictly speaking, a despot (fit proprie despotes). Sometimes this principate is called tyranny by Aristotle because of its resemblance to the despotic form (ad despotismam), but strictly speaking tyranny is not despotism (non tamen tyrannis proprie est despotia)" (28).

The 1373 translation of the *Defensor Pacis* into Florentine, respecting the terminology of Marsilio of Padua, renders "despoticus" as "dispotia", "dispositia" and "dispotise". In French, the neologisms "The terms "despot", "despotic" and their derivatives were introduced by Oresme, tutor to King Charles V before becoming Bishop of Lisieux, in his translations of *Politics*, *Nicomachean Ethics* and *Economics*, around 1370 (29). Like the authors just mentioned, he distinguished between tyranny and despotism. The former can be recognised by two marks: "One is that the prince governs for his own benefit; the other is that he oppresses his subjects by force and violence and holds them in contempt. servitude against their will" (30), while "despotism is domination or lordship over serfs" (31). Without asserting, as Marsilio of Padua did, that this prince is typically the one who has sovereignty in Asian countries, he alludes to Aristotle's statement to this effect. He also notes that the term "despot" is "not commonly used" (32). It would take a long time for it to enter common parlance and even the political lexicon, due to the veto imposed on it by the humanists, who incorporated other terms into their terminology that were also unusual in classical Latin, such as monarchia, democratia, olygarchia, oeconomia, monarchizare, etc. In Italian, neither "dispotis" nor "despots" were used. In Italian, neither "dispotismo" nor its derivatives appear in Machiavelli's writings.

The emergence of the Ottoman Empire at the end of the 13th century brought back to the fore the idea of a radical opposition between the Eastern system of government and the practice of authority and power in European monarchies. Half a century after the Sultan, who had been conquering Europe since the end of the 14th century, had conquered the Balkans and the Danube plain, Machiavelli wrote: "[...] all the principalities of which some trace remains in history are governed in two ways

The latter do not govern by the favour of the prince, but only by a right inherent in the seniority of their race. They also have states and particular subjects who recognise them as their lords and who have a particular affection for them" (33). The example he gives of the first principalities is that of "the whole Turkish monarchy", "governed by one master, to whom all the others are slaves. He divides his kingdom into different Sangiacs and sends various administrators; he changes them and recalls them as he pleases; but the King of France is placed in the midst of a crowd of ancient nobility, with subjects who recognise them and are attached to them. They have prerogatives which the king could not take away from them without danger" (34); the mitigated judgement which is made here on the government of the Ottoman Empire, it was necessary of much that all those, in Europe, counted, shared it (35).

Machiavelli, who was well informed about the socio-political structure of the Ottoman Empire, was not mistaken when he stated that "the sovereign [there] is omnipotent, master and owner of everything and everyone, goods as well as individuals [, that] no good or land [there] is definitive property, no office is transmissible, [that there are] no lords who dominate regions, no nobility that can challenge the authority of the sultan", that "the agents of power were entirely in the hand of the master, incapable of constituting a counterweight to his omnipotence" (36). It is no less true that "[. . .] European political scientists [of the time] were less concerned with an accurate knowledge of Turkish (or Persian, or Muscovite, or Mongolian) institutions than they were with using them as a foil to develop, for internal use [...] an acceptable model of monarchy.an acceptable model of monarchy" (37) and, going further, to divert the attention of European observers from the flaws in government that were beginning to become apparent in European monarchies, by turning the spotlight on exotic despotic regimes where these same flaws were flagrant, in the same way that, today, the mass media operating in so-called Western countries, by broadcasting programmes about endemic corruption in Africa or Asia, aim to give white viewers the illusion that corruption is much less rampant in so-called Western countries than in those lands. Nevertheless, the contrast that Machiavelli drew between the "monarchy of the Great Turk" and the kingdom of France did not mean that he saw the latter as the negative of the former. Indeed, Turkey, in his eyes, had at least one advantage, which was that it was difficult to conquer. Moreover, in Discourse 2:2, he states that it is less hard to be the slave of a prince than to be enslaved by a foreign republic (38). In any case, the point of departure for thinking about the notion of just and independent power is the following
Machiavelli's distinction between the European monarchies and the Oriental system of government provides the basis for the distinction between legitimate power and arbitrary and illegitimate power.

In France, Loys Le Roy, a reader of Machiavelli's, in his commentary on the Politics in his translation of this work, published in 1568 under the title of Aristotle's Politics, also showed his concern to link the various systems of government identified by the Greek philosopher to a particular area.

precise geographical location. Of the type we have seen corresponds more or less to what we call despotism, he says that it is "like the kingdoms of the barbarians, which, although they are legitimate and hereditary, nonetheless retain a lordly empire, as is the state of the Turk, the Muscovite and the Pretejan, as was once the kingdom of Persia according to Plato of the Laws, and Isocrates in Panagyrus (39)". Referring to Leonardo Bruni Aretino's Latin translation of Aristotle's work, which had rendered "despotés" as "dominus" and its derivatives as "dominator", "dominicus", Le Roy renders "dominus" as "seigneur" and the corresponding adjective as "seigneurial". The term "despoticum" did not catch on in French either, and the words "seigneur" and "empire seigneurial" continued to be used in its place. In *Les six livres de la République* (1576), Bodin translated "despoteia" as "seigneurial monarchy". In addition to "seigniorial monarchy", Bodin considers "tyrannical monarchy" and "royal monarchy". Taking up the distinction that William of Ockham and Marsilio of Padua (40) had established a distinction between "principatus regalis" and "principatus despoticus", in an attempt to show that royal power is not despotic and that, in a monarchy, subjects are free, he asserted that "[d]onc la Monarchie Royale, ou legitime, est celle où les sugets obeissent aux loix du Monarque, & le Monarque aux loix de nature, demeurant la liberté naturelle & propriété des biens aux subjects. The Seigneurial Monarchy is one in which the Prince is made lord of the biés & persons by the right of arms, & of good war, managing his subjects like the father of a family his slaves. A tyrannical monarchy is one in which the monarch, disregarding the laws of nature, abuses free people as if they were slaves, and the biases of subjects as if they were his own. (41). Like Machiavelli, Le Roy and, as we saw earlier, many of his predecessors, Bodin considers what we call "despotism" to be a legitimate system of government. And, like the Florentine thinker, he identifies it very closely with that of Ottoman Turkey.

In Knolle's English translation (1606) of Bodin's Republic, "monarchie seigneuriale" is rendered as "lordly monarchy", just as the English translation of Aristotle published in London in 1598 and based on Le Roy's translation had rendered "empire seigneurial" as "maisterlike sway" (42). "Despoticall" and "despotic" occur in Hobbes's *Elements of Natural and Political Law* (1640) and *Leviathan* (1651) (43). As Hobbes knew, Aristotle used the term "despotikon" Despoticall" is used pejoratively to distinguish deviated forms of constitutions, based on the selfish rule of the master (despotés) over the slave, from constitutions oriented towards the common good. Understood to mean either "seigneurial" political power or the domination of the master over the slave, "despoticall" is sometimes used as a synonym for arbitrary political power in the works of the English proponents of popular sovereignty in the 17th century. Hobbes, on the other hand, used it in an apparently neutral (44) but implicitly positive sense.

Leviathan argues that civil peace and social unity can only be truly achieved by establishing a community through a social contract. Hobbes' ideal republic is governed by a sovereign power charged with protecting the security of the republic and endowed with

absolute authority to ensure the common defence. Hobbes's politics, it has been said, is "a theory and justification of despotism" (45). Let's take a closer look at whether this assertion is justified.

Although the laws of nature require human beings to seek peace and maintain that contracting is the best way to achieve it, man's natural thirst for power always threatens the security of the contract. There must therefore be a common power, a sovereign authority, to force people to respect the contract. Within the framework of the contract, the sovereign would be established by the individuals as a whole, who would transfer their powers and will entirely to him, thereby authorising him to punish anyone who breached the pact. The sovereign governs through fear; the threat of punishment reinforces the mandates of the laws of nature, thus ensuring the continued application of the social contract. Now, "[t]he contract which constitutes the political state creates a legal person out of a multitude of individuals, a person who, by his absolute sovereignty, makes of these individuals both citizens and subjects who, living in peace, can henceforth work to ensure their preservation and lead a happier life. The representative of all the contracting parties embodies the common will of all, namely the desire for peace. At the same time, on a conceptual level, the representative stands above the parties to the contract, because, in this respect, the representative acquires a materially and temporally unlimited authority" (45bis). The representative, i.e. the sovereign, whether he is, as in a monarchy, an individual or, as in a democracy, an assembly, is composed of the will of this multitude of individuals; he forms a "legal person" in the sense that this expression has in

At the end of the day, therefore, it has no corporeal existence. This artificial person is a metaphor for the state as a whole, and Hobbes calls it "Leviathan". In Book II, he states: "The only way to erect such a common power, as may be able to defend men from the invasion of strangers, and from the wrongs they may do to each other, and thereby secure their safety so that, by their own industry and by the fruits of the earth, they may feed themselves and live contentedly, is to gather all their power and strength upon one man, or upon one assembly of men, who can reduce all their wills, by a majority of votes, to one will; In other words, designate one man, or an assembly of men, to act as their person; and let each one recognise as his own (let him recognise that he is the author of) everything that the person who thus acts as his person does, or causes to be done, in those matters that concern the common peace and security; let all, in this, submit their individual wills to his will, and their judgements to his judgement. It is more than consenting or agreeing: it is a real unity of all in one and the same person, achieved by an agreement of each with each, in such a way that it is as if each had to say to each: I authorise this man, or this assembly of men,

I surrender my right to govern myself to this man, or to this assembly, on condition that you surrender your right to him, and authorise all his actions in the same way. Once this is done, the multitude thus united in a single person is called a REPUBLIC, in Latin CIVITAS. This is the generation of this great LEVIATHAN, or rather, to speak more deferentially, of this mortal god to whom we owe, under the immortal God, our peace and protection" (46). The purpose of establishing a community is to escape the state of nature and ensure the peace and common defence of the people; the sovereign is charged with ensuring this defence. The sovereign may be an individual or a group of

persons, but Hobbes always speaks of the sovereign in the third person singular. The power conferred on the sovereign allows him to do whatever he deems necessary to protect the Republic. All the rights of the individual have been transferred to the sovereign to make this protection possible, and the only right the individual retains is the right to self-preservation, which was the very reason for the establishment of Leviathan. There are two ways of establishing a republic: by acquisition (force) or by institution (agreement).

"The domination acquired by conquest, or victory in war, is that which some authors call DESPOTIC, from despotes, which means a lord or master, and it is the domination that the master has over the servant. And this dominion is then acquired by the victor when the vanquished, in order to avoid the mortal blow, agrees, either by express words or by other sufficient signs of the will, that as long as he is granted life and the freedom of his body, the victor will have the use of it as he pleases (47). Contractual sovereignty is like the power of a parent over a child. In the natural state, a child belongs to both parents, but because a subject cannot obey two masters, only one parent can have absolute dominion over the child. In the absence of matrimonial laws in the state of nature, the mother alone knows who the father of her children is, and consequently the father has no right to paternal authority. Family power in the state of nature is naturally maternal. However, on the other hand, Hobbes suggests that, just as the natural man escapes the state of nature by making a contract with a sovereign and sacrificing his personal rights in exchange for security and peace, so two parents in the state of nature make a contract with each other to give the father power over the family, also in order to ensure security and peace. This contract subjects mother and child to the father and, because the father has sovereign power by contract, the sovereign power instituted is therefore called "Paternal". On the other hand, Hobbes argues that sovereign power does not naturally reside in the father, but in the mother. Only the contract determines sovereignty, and Hobbes goes against the patriarchal discourse by suggesting that paternal authority is an accident of history, which depends on the fact that, once in power, men favour men over women, rather than a diktat of nature or religion (48).

A sovereign who comes to power by institution, or by universal consent, obtains the support of the people because the members of the people fear each other.

On the other hand, a ruler who comes to power by acquisition, or by force, gains the support of the people because the people fear the ruler himself.

Yet both types of sovereignty are agreed by social contract, and both types of contract are always established by fear.

The establishment of a republic by force means that a sovereign power takes control of a group of people who - if they do not resist acquisition and depose the sovereign - must consent to his control over them. So, as we have just seen, a sovereign instituted by force is as much part of the social contract as a sovereign instituted by agreement. Both have the

Both have the same function - to protect society and keep the peace - and both have the same rights in relation to their subjects. The rights of a sovereign are as follows: 1) Subjects owe him exclusive loyalty;

2) Subjects cannot be released from their obligations to him; 3) Dissenters must yield to the majority in the choice of a sovereign; 4) The sovereign cannot be unjust to or harm an innocent subject; 5) The sovereign cannot be put to death; 6) The sovereign can determine which ideas are acceptable (he is the ultimate judge of fundamental philosophical/scientific principles) and can censure doctrines contrary to peace, ideas that may cause disagreement among the population; 7) The sovereign prescribes legislative rules; 8) The sovereign has judicial power in all controversies, civil and intellectual; 9) The sovereign can make war and peace with

other republics; 10) The sovereign can choose his advisors; 11) The sovereign has the power to reward and punish; 12) The sovereign can make all civil appointments, including that of militiamen; and 13) The sovereign has the right of life and death over his subjects and has a right over their property.

(49). All the rights of the sovereign correspond to the laws of nature deduced by Hobbes in Book I and to the philosophical methods he employs throughout his argument. The sovereign is both the foundation of all true knowledge and the embodied power that enforces civil peace.

Hobbes considers the nature of liberty under absolute sovereign power and states that liberty means the ability to act according to one's will without being physically prevented from doing so. Only chains or imprisonment can prevent a person from acting, so all subjects enjoy absolute freedom by virtue of sovereignty. Although the contract and the civil laws instituted by the sovereign are "artificial chains" preventing certain acts, absolute freedom still exists because the subjects themselves created the chains. The subjects write the social contract and are the authors of the sovereign's power. In this way, Hobbes argues that the subject is responsible for all the obstacles to his acts and therefore cannot complain.

In the state of nature, freedom did not exist, because actions were hindered by the fear of death and the fear of the power of others. In *Leviathan*, fear and power are still present, but because the subject has consented to cede them to the sovereign to use as tools, the subject has achieved absolute freedom. In other words, the subject is the author of the sovereign's power and is therefore responsible for his actions. So even if the sovereign imprisons or kills the subject, the latter is personally responsible for his own fate. Hobbes concludes that freedom can only truly exist under an absolute sovereign power authorised by its subjects (50).

Everything," wrote Alexis-François Artaud de Montor (1772-1849), "is of the gravest boldness in [Hobbes's advice]. First of all, although apparently starting from a point of divine right, he recognises the sovereignty of the people. But supporters of this opinion should not trust the bold Englishman [...] because after worshipping the people, he immediately and ruthlessly dethrones them with the greatest imprudence. So the people made themselves one person [...]. This person has spoken, he has chosen; he whom he has chosen has not bound himself to anyone, whatever oath he may have taken and whatever authority he may have received. The people ceased to be a person; the person having perished, all obligations towards him perished. This is more than perfidy, it is shameless despotism, which is hypocritically based on the most democratic principle" (51). Is the term "despotism", as precisely defined above as opposed to "tyranny", misused by the French diplomat, historian, translator and collector? Not at all. The people who accept democracy are slaves.

"Democracy alone cannot constitute a government, and if it ever did, it would form the worst kind of state: the reason for this seems obvious to us.

"Since the people are sovereign, the law is the work of the general will; since the people also form the government, any act of the executive is also an act of the general will, and therefore a law. We can already see that executive power absorbs and destroys legislative power; that the permanent will of the latter is constantly subordinated to the daily and mobile will of the former.

Thus democracy has no legislation as such; the law, being only the present will of the magistrate, applied to a single particular case, cannot regulate either the universality of the city or the future; and the liberty of the citizen would be without any safeguard, since the law which protects it could be violated by the judgement, which would be a true posterior law. Democracy, confusing the legislator and the minister, would constitute the most despotic form of government; it would not even form a government of its own.

government; the magistrate without a law to direct and limit him, the citizen without a law to guide and reassure him, would each day see liberty exposed to new outrages; for, if liberty does not exist where laws are not respected, it cannot exist where laws are not [...].

"A State that forces everyone to govern can only live as long as everyone wants to obey. The citizen is both prince and subject at the same time: prince, he is a despot; subject, he is a slave. But his power is in the sovereign, as one is in the number of citizens of whom the sovereign is composed, and his servitude as one is in the law or in unity. That is why his obedience is difficult, and why he fights so fiercely against any will that is not his own, because it offers him both the shame of defeat and the domination of an alien will. This is why diversity of opinion produces political enmity, civil war and the loss of the State.

"The whole people, always occupied with public affairs, must be constantly assembled as a whole. As a sovereign, as a government or as a magistrate, he can only possess a small territory that becomes the prey of a neighbouring state. Constantly busy, all industry must be foreign to him; he therefore needs a people of slaves to feed him. The sovereignty of some, living on the slavery of others. In other words, it would cease to be a democracy and would become nothing more than a monster. Every citizen, having an equal right, must exercise it with equal means: absolute equality would therefore be necessary. But it is impossible in wealth, in strength, in talent; democracy is therefore unsuitable for any people. There is no State where wealth is more audacious and poverty more shameless; Marius had bags of money taken to the Forum to buy votes, it was an office of public corruption.

For Locke, as for Bodin and Hobbes - who, however, unlike the French jurist and English philosopher, makes no distinction between just and unjust war - conquest is the foundation of despotic government. On Civil Government discusses three kinds of power: paternal power, a "natural government" which "in no way extends to the rights, ends and jurisdiction of the Power and Government called Politics" (53), which "is that Power which every man has in the state of nature, which has been gathered into the hands of a Society, and which this Society has handed over to Conductors who have been chosen, with this assurance and this condition, either express or tacit, that this Power will be used for the Good of the Body politic, and for the conservation of what belongs properly to its members" and with a view to which it will be necessary "to cut off those parts and members alone that are so corrupted, that they greatly endanger what is healthy" (54). The third power, namely despotic power, is "an Absolute and Arbitrary Power which one man has over another, and which he may use to take his life, whenever he pleases" (55). Locke defines slavery in precisely the same terms: arbitrary, absolute and despotic. Despite the fact that he rejects and condemns slavery, he admits that it is right to use despotic power in one case: "that is when one has been unjustly attacked by people who have put themselves in a state of war, and have exposed their lives and property to the power of those whom they have thus attacked. In fact, since these kinds of attackers have abandoned the Reason that God has given them to settle disputes, and have not wanted to use the gentle and peaceful ways, and have used force and violence to achieve their ends, they are in the position of having to take the law into their own hands. they have exposed themselves to the same treatment as they had resolved to do to others, and deserve to be destroyed, as soon as the opportunity arises, by those they had intended to destroy; they must be treated as harmful and brutish creatures, which would not fail to destroy, if they were not destroyed themselves" (56). Hobbes goes further, making no distinction between despotic command and political command (57): "There is COMMAND when a man says Do this, or Don't do this, and no other reason can be expected than the will of the one who says it. From this it clearly follows that he who command claims in this way to his own advantage, because the reason for his command is his personal will alone [sic], and the proper object of every man's will is some good for him-.

itself" (58). Despotic command is thus seen as one of the forms of political government.

A few decades earlier, Grotius, in *De Jure Belli ac Pacis* (1625), had gone so far as to justify despotism by refuting "the opinion of those who claim that sovereign power always and without exception belongs to the people, so that they have the right to repress and punish kings whenever they abuse their authority", to the point of justifying despotism, arguing that, if "[i]t is permissible for every man to make himself the slave of whomever he wishes, as appears from the law of the ancient Hebrews and that of the Romans [?] [...] [w]hy then could not a free people submit to one or more persons, in such a way as to transfer to them entirely the right to govern without reserving any part of it for themselves?" (59).

De Jure Belli ac Pacis (1625) was dedicated to Louis XIII; Grotius, who had been imprisoned for his religious opinions in the United Provinces, where he had been born, had found refuge in France, where the king had given him a pension. While helping to bury the vestiges of feudalism, Louis XIII, the monarch whom the Prince of Condé described as an imbecile despot (60), had laid the foundations of absolute monarchy.

(61). The Fronde broke out at the beginning of the reign of his successor, for reasons that were not only fiscal (increase and multiplication of taxes) and economic (bad harvests, epidemics, etc.), but also, precisely, political (concentration of political power in the hands of the king, desire to bring officers and magistrates to heel) (62). Whereas in England, the establishment of parliamentary monarchy and the introduction of individual liberty, guaranteed by the Act of Habeas Corpus (1679), had been the result of revolutions carried out in the name of the (pseudo) "free people".

Despite the liberal oil thrown on the fire by English agents (63), it seems that the Fronde was motivated by caste interests (64) rather than democratic aspirations. Following the bloody fighting between the frondeurs and the royal troops in Paris in October 1652, "[m]any peaceful citizens, who appreciate liberty only insofar as it is compatible with order, considered the return of Cardinal Mazarin (who had taken refuge with the Queen at Saint-Germain since 6 February 1651) and the establishment of despotism a lesser evil than the renewal of these scenes of carnage" (65). Machiavelli's apologist, publicist and Toulouse canon Louis Machon (1603-1672?) tried to reassure them, writing in "Les véritables maximes du gouvernement de la France justifiées par l'ordre des temps depuis l'établissement de la Monarchie jusques à présent servant de réponse au prétendu arrêt de cassation du conseil du 18 janvier 1652": "[l]es monarchies ne sont pas toutes d'espotiques, il n'y a que celle du Turq. All the others that we have today are tempered by a kind of Aristocracy, which maintains and preserves them".

(66). The following year, Louis-Adrien Le Paige (1712-1802), a radical Jansenist, lawyer at the Paris parliament, eminence grise and pamphleteer of the parliamentary opposition to the monarchy and Grand Bailiff of the Temple, i.e. adviser and superintendent of the archives of the Prince of Conti, Grand Prior of the Order of Malta and a Freemason (67), who had had him appointed to this post and granted him his protection (68), went further, declaring without cynicism: "[...] the essence of our monarchy is to be pure of all leaven of despotism (69)".

On the death of the cardinal, instead of appointing a new minister, as everyone expected, Louis XIV announced that he would rule alone. He set about reducing the role of the parliaments to that of He abolished their right of remonstrance, muzzled publishing and the press, and domesticated the nobility by turning them upside down. He turned the police, which until then had been no more than an auxiliary resource of justice, into a means of government. The royal will took the place of everything; "the royal will" and not "the king's will", because the influence exerted by his mistresses and favourites on his private conduct and his politics was as imperious as it was harmful (70).

To this extent, we can say that Louis XIV, "in all the acts of his reign, pursued He wanted to turn France into an absolute monarchy which, through its unity, would become the centre and heart of Europe. All justice, all favours, all privileges emanated from the throne; France was personified in a single man, passive obedience became a political axiom, servitude became dogma, the king was exalted as a god" (71). And he was the State. "Everything that had an existence outside of him was in his shadow: 'He wanted greatness only as an emanation of his own; anything else was abhorrent to him'. And so it was that by constantly elevating the parliamentarians, the bourgeois, the people of dress and finance, whom he believed he had nothing to fear, by granting the nobility little more than court offices, which ruined them without giving them any real power, he put everyone on the same level, or, to use Saint Simon's word, 'under the same press', and made everyone, great and small, 'a vile people in all equality'" (72). The royal authority, "we read in *Les Soupirs*, "has risen so high that all distinctions disappear, all lights are absorbed; for, in the elevation to which the monarch has taken himself, all humans are but the dust of his feet" (73). Precisely, "*Les soupirs de la France* esclave qui aspire après la liberté" (1689), attributed to Michel Le Vassor (1646-1718) or to the Calvinist pastor, theologian, writer and prolific pamphleteer Pierre Jurieu (1637-1713), stigmatises "the oppression & la tyrannie, sous laquelle gémissent tous les ordres de la France, et la misère à laquelle ils sont réduits sous une Puissance Despotique" (74) and likened the power of Louis XIV (1638-1715) to that of the Grand Turk. Not even the flats in which he housed his mistresses were compared by the pamphleteers to the harems of the Orient because they were so close to one another (75).

In this context, it is not surprising that the definition of the terms "despotique" and "despotisme", which appeared in the *Dictionnaire de Trévoux* in 1721, was expanded. In the Lorraine edition of Trévoux's dictionary (1738-1742), "despotic" is defined as "absolute sovereign; who feels like a master; who takes after the master and despotism. Summum imperium. The princes of the East are absolute and despotic" and "despotism" as "absolute authority. Despotic form of government, or government in which the sovereign is absolute master. As the Moguls govern their states with complete despotism", the *Trévoux Dictionary* of 1771 gives

respectively: "absolute sovereign; who feels like a master; who takes after the master and despotism. Summum imperium. Eastern princes are absolute and despotic. It is a despotic government, where the prince does whatever he wants, without being accountable to anyone. In a despotic state, there is no interest in one's homeland; glory and the prince's service make up for it" and "[f]orm of government

despotic, or government, in which the sovereign is absolute master, has unlimited authority, arbitrary power, which is governed solely by his will. Such is the government of Turkey, the Mogul, Japan, Persia, and almost all of Asia. The principle, character and evils of despotism are sufficiently developed in our best writers. The despotism he had sucked at birth had made him forget that Sweden had once been free. Volt. Precisely, it was Voltaire who, in the first half of the eighteenth century, helped to bring the term "despotism" into use, which he generally used, not pejoratively, as in the extract just quoted from the *Siècle de Louis XIV* (1751), but melioratively, applying it, for example, to Louis XIV and Catherine of Russia (76).

The use of the term "despot" spread in the sense "of monarchy or simply [...] [of] any unjust, unconstitutional or discriminatory practice and [in that of] a rational system of institutions necessary for the general interest. In the first semantic series, despotism determines an indefensible situation or system [...]; in the second [...] this situation can be desired and desirable" (77), under certain conditions that we will specify below.

Some contemporaries wanted it but did not want it. Bayle "denounced despotism en bloc, but justified it in detail" (78). D'Holbach sometimes criticised it, in *Recherches sur l'origine du despotisme oriental et des superstitions* (1761) (79), a political treatise written by Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger

(80) to serve as an introduction and commentary to *L'Esprit des lois*, which was incorporated into the *Encyclopédie* in an abridged form in the article 'Oeconomie politique' and which the baron reworked for publication, sometimes advocating it in certain circumstances (81). Montesquieu himself, whose work we shall be examining later

"At the end of his life, "as it is always very dangerous for monarchy not to turn into despotism", he wanted "to make despotism itself useful" and "with this in mind, [had] drawn the most cheerful picture of a despot who makes his people happy", "with this in mind, [had] drawn the most cheerful picture of a despot who makes his people happy" and "[flattered himself] perhaps that one day, on reading his work, a prince, a queen, a minister, would wish to resemble Arsace, Isménie or Aspar, or to be themselves the models of an even more beautiful picture" (82). The lawyer and man of letters Simon-Nicholas Linguet (1736-1794), who was imprisoned in 1779 and whose defence of slavery was similar to that of Aristotle, had the merit of denouncing in advance the disastrous consequences that the Revolution of 1789 would have for the little people (83). weakest part of a nation, the Government that our indiscretion has branded with the odious name of despotism, that is to say, one in which there are no intermediaries between the Prince and the subjects powerful enough to stifle the complaints of the former, and to enchain the influence of the latter.

the other" (84), knowing that there are limits to the power of such a prince, which are constituted by his own interest (as the owner of everything in his kingdom, he has no reason to destroy everything there) and (85) the ability of the people to shake off his yoke, if the prince abuses his authority (86), only to deny himself in the following terms: "I am not a supporter of despotism, because I said that European despotism dates from the suppression of domestic servitude" (87). His admiration for the Asians, and in particular the "Muslims" (88), was certainly in no way inferior to that shown for them by the physician, translator, philosopher and populariser of science and translator of Hobbes Samuel Joseph Sorbière (c. 1610-1670) (89), who was categorically in favour of absolute or despotic monarchy, on the grounds that the despotic empires of Asia, in particular the Ottoman Empire, enjoyed peace and prosperity, whereas the Western monarchies, because of the political freedoms they granted, were plagued by unrest and insecurity.

Like Sorbière, the physiocrats were clearly in favour of despotism. Like many eighteenth-century reformers, they saw it as the one and only way to ensure the success of their economic and social theories: - relatively - absolute freedom for trade, industry and personal property. "Preoccupied above all with material improvements, the physiocrats were indifferent to receiving them from the absolute king or from the sovereign people, from aristocracy or democracy, from monarchy or republic" (90), but they were firmly convinced that they could only be brought about by a single, strong power, acting resolutely and without appeal. This monarch would govern "despotically" (91), i.e. without privileged orders restricting his power on the pretext of acting as intermediaries between him and the nation. Hence the first of the general maxims of du Quesnay (1694-1774): "Let sovereign authority be unique and superior to all individuals in society and to all the unjust undertakings of private interests, because the object of domination and obedience is the safety of all and the lawful interest of all. The system of counterforces in a government is a fatal opinion, which reveals only the discord between the great and the oppression of the small (92). This maxim contains the formula for the unity of absolute power, virtually without counterweights, almost without limit. However, the prince will never be able to govern "arbitrarily", because he will govern in accordance with the laws of natural order, as revealed by Quesnay and his followers. This "good despot" will have as his subjects men trained by the physiocrats, citizens who are perfectly educated and for whom the economic principles of Mercier de la Rivière will be axioms, which will be "self-evident" to sensible minds. Following the example of Plato and Aristotle, they believed that it was through education that the State could maintain itself by preventing revolutions. Once the education of all classes of society had been achieved, the "good despot" would be the guarantor of public happiness, which would itself result from the - relatively - absolute freedom of trade and industry, and the institution and free enjoyment of private property. De Quesnay and the colonial administrator Lemercier de la Rivière (1721-1801) therefore hoped for the establishment of what they called "legal despotism", as opposed not only to constitutional monarchy, parliamentary government and the principle of the separation of powers, but also to what they called "arbitrary despotism", i.e., as the Trévoux Dictionary put it at the time, "which is not fixed by law or by statute". "The emperor is absolute, it is

True, they admit, but he is absolute in upholding the law that guarantees the rights of society as a whole, and this law that he must uphold binds him too; it is a brake on his individual wills that might try to contravene the general law" (93). "The laws therefore oppose the emperor's despotism by subjecting him to their power and removing from him any means of doing evil, if he wished to do so. But he cannot even wish to do so, because if he were to forget the obvious principles of the natural order on which his empire is founded, the mandarins, the learned men who have been instructed for many years in the science of government, are there to warn him to "stop".

the mistake he makes" (94). In short, it was, as Henri Ripert rightly remarked, a "despotism of laws" (95). The canon, theologian, economist, journalist and physiocrat thinker Nicolas Baudeau (1730-1792) proclaimed: "[...] There is no good government but the legal despotism, i.e. the absolute execution of laws given by the Despot who makes us breathe

"He goes on to say that "evidence alone must be the Despot of the Universe" (96). What did the physiocrats mean by "evidence"? According to du Quesnay, "the term evidence signifies a certainty so clear and so manifest in itself that the mind cannot deny it" (97); according to de la Rivière, who borrows the definition from Descartes, "Evidence [...] is a clear and distinct discernment of the feelings we have and of all the perceptions that depend on them". In a word, it is reason, "the supreme and only infallible magistrate of men", "the minister of the author of nature among men and the organ of his will", says Mably (98). We will be able to clarify the meaning that the physiocrats attributed to the term "evidence" after quoting the following passage from a letter in which Mirabeau, disregarding the order that Rousseau had given him to, "whatever happens, do not [talk to him again] about [his] Legal Despotism. I cannot appreciate it or even hear it; and I can only see there two contradictory words, which together mean nothing to me" (99): "You do not understand our laws, we have none other than personal, movable and landed property, from which derive all possible liberties that do not harm the property of others. It is from the knowledge of this general law, applicable to all cases, that we derive our legal despotism, which frightens you, and which should not, however, surprise you any more than the despotism of calculation, which, since it has been received, decides all accounts made and to be made... The figure arrives, decides the case despotically and without appeal: for, tell me, what are the counter-forces of addition and subtraction? In this state of affairs, there is no point in arguing about the kind of hand that holds authority and is responsible for exercising legal despotism. You fear the authority of a single person, as being more likely to degenerate into arbitrariness: we believe that the cooperation of several people is likely to combine particular interests against legal despotism. But it must be considered... that as soon as the essential laws of the natural order are generally known and taught, they alone will be despotic, and the consent of all will ensure their execution (99bis). Where Le Vauguyon, a minor physiocrat, had spoken of "the evidence of geometrical truths" (100), Mirabeau was implicitly speaking of the evidence of mathematical truths. In fact, the aim of du Quesnay's economic theory was "to put a pre-established truth into figures" (101). Everything, after their passage, becomes "science" (102). The physiocratic model of the despot is a geometer: "Euclid is a true despot, and the geometrical truths he has handed down to us are truly despotic laws: their legal despotism and the personal despotism of this legislator are but one, that of the irresistible force of evidence : by this means, for centuries the despot Euclid has reigned without contradiction over all enlightened peoples; and he will not cease to exercise the same despotism over them, so long as she has no contradictions to experience on the part of ignorance (103). " De la Rivière

acknowledged that "the very word personal despotism inspired a certain horror that could not be avoided" (104), because it brought to mind arbitrary power. Nothing of the sort, he tried to reassure us, is to be feared from personal despotism, because "it is the evidence that commands before the sovereign commands" (105). The fact remains that legal despotism becomes personal despotism because legal despotism must necessarily manifest itself and can only do so through sovereign authority. In the words of de la Rivière, "[t]he public force that constitutes authority can do nothing by itself & without the ministry of an agent who gives it the direction it must follow: by itself it is blind; it needs a guide to prevent it from going astray. The nature of this force is therefore to remain motionless until the will, which is entitled to command it, makes it act. By this means this same force becomes personal to the will that puts it into action; it is in this will that it resides in its entirety" (106). We emphasise this because the expression is very reminiscent of the Tao-Te-King's definition of the Tao, "which does not act but through which all things are done" (107). In fact, the physiocrats' model of government was China (108), because of its economic regulation and its social, political and administrative rules, as well as its religion, Confucianism, which was effectively integrated into the political order. The ideal type of despot they wished for was the Chinese emperor (109), who governed according to the Taoist principle of acting-without-acting; for Lao-Tseu and Confucius, this was the best technique of government (110). A particularly felicitous comparison has been made between this sovereign, who, at least on paper, has no role other than to serve as an organ for higher laws that he has not established, and a "conductor [, who] uses his sceptre only as a stick to beat the beat. It is true that the despotism of a conductor is more rigorous than that of the czar, for each of the musicians must obey, without deviating a tenth of a second, every gesture of his hand, but it does not resemble tyranny, since each of the performers obeys freely and anyone who would dare to make a false note, out of a spirit of opposition, would not be a rebel but simply a fool" (111). Whoever came up with this comparison is right to point out that this despotism has nothing to do with absolute power as characterised by the ancient legists ("Quod principi placuit legis habet vigorem", "what pleases the prince has the force of law"), nor with the regime of the "(112) In the eighteenth century, he called himself a "good despot", who had to make people happy in spite of themselves, "by the superiority of his genius", and who, "as a whole", had "his eyes fixed on" [c]his ideal king (113), Peter the Great, Catherine the Great or Frederick II of Prussia. It was an administrative, even scientific despotism

The history of Peter the Great, arranged by Voltaire, then the living example of Frederick, of Catherine, of the enlightened despots, the semi-anarchy in which the French monarchy was slipping, the memories of the great century, the Polish disorder, the faults of the better-known English liberalism, the discovery of a despotism...".

The idea of a beneficent absolutism was reinforced by a more acceptable oriental attitude, the idea that a strong power facilitates reforms and that progress is the work of great sovereigns, and finally a certain indifference to political forms [...]. It was accepted that there could be a useful form of despotism, in which the State was not made for the despot but the despot for the State. It was thought that the system, if it offered dangers, could also offer advantages. The idea of a power that could impose the necessary reforms on itself was accepted. The

he great fault of almost all those who govern, says Voltaire, in *Conversation de M. l'Intendant des menus en exercice avec M. l'abbé Grizel* (1761), is to have only half wills and half means'. People who are masters in their own house are never persecutors: that is why a king who is not contradicted is always a good king, as long as he has common sense" (114). Voltaire liked the Russian government because "far from thinking, as Montesquieu says, 'of e s t a b l i s h i n g intermediate bodies, of diminishing its authority', it puts itself 'at the head of finance, armies, magistracy and religion'. Absolutism or anarchy: for Voltaire, this was the dilemma. What he dreams of is a monarchical society in the most violent sense of the word, and to the extreme, where the king pays judges, soldiers and priests alike; has everything in his own hands'. Including people of letters. What a way," exclaimed Diderot, speaking of the theatre, "if the government knew how to use it and if it were a question of preparing the change of a law or the abrogation of a custom! The sovereign must hold the priest in one sleeve and the man of letters, but especially the dramatic poet, in the other. They are two preachers who must be at his command, one to say only what he wants, the other to say what he wants'. Letters at the service of power, that was the end of the doctrine. Turgot, without going that far, would at least like education to be directed by a "Conseil de l'Instruction nationale" "with public aims, according to uniform principles, in a single spirit. In this spirit, he would have the classic books composed according to a consistent plan'. This was the subjugation of education to an official 'truth'. D'Holbach wanted to entrust the State not only with the task of teaching morality, but also with that of teaching it. Rousseau claimed to impose a kind of state religion, on pain of banishment or even death. Yet Rousseau and d'Holbach were seen as anti-despotic! We turn our backs on personal despotism only to fall into collective despotism. Sickened, France i s experiencing a surge of anti-liberalism.

"We are weary of 'joist kings', 'thrones occupied by ghosts' (Linguet), and many would willingly repeat after Hobbes: 'He whose authority is limited would not be king, but subject of he who would have limited his power'. For every Montesquieu who worries about the encroachments of the monarchy, there are ten writers or publicists who think only of extending its power. They were all those irritated by the influence of the Church, the paralysing action of parliaments, subordinate despotisms, anything that slowed down the machinery of power and stood in the way of progress. The faults and abuses of strong power, such as the revocation of the Edict of Nantes, do not appear to be linked to the regime, but rather to 'superstition' and a lack of 'enlightenment'. Absolutism remains t h e ideal instrument of progress. [...] Absolute authority, that instrument so formidable in itself, becomes the salutary instrument of the most fortunate changes in the hands of a sovereign who is educated, courageous and inclined to great things. Louis XIV, according to Voltaire, showed that an absolute king, who wants the good, can achieve everything without difficulty. All he had to do was command, and his administrative successes were as rapid as his conquests'. The same Voltaire summed up the history of Peter the Great by saying: 'Il n'y a qu'à vouloir', and that meant: 'Il n'y a qu'à l'imposer, faire le bonheur des peuples malgré eux, ne tenir pas compte des résistances et, selon le mot de Frédéric, travailler sur les men 'like etching on iron'. This was the opinion of d'Argenson, who concluded on government

de la France par un hymne à l' "autorité despotique' seule assez forte pour renverser tous les obstacles" (115).

Despotism, as Grotius thought in the previous century, seems justified as long as the despotic system is rational and the people consent (116). Psychologically, what contributes to the acceptance of this conception of despotism, which nineteenth-century German historians called "enlightened", "is the conviction that history is the work of great men - great statesmen above all, great sovereigns, great ministers. Even those who, like Voltaire, claim to no longer confine themselves to the history of monarchs, attribute the leading role to Titans of sorts who mould men and things as they please, either because they seem to draw everything from themselves and act alone, like Peter the Great, or because, acting as animators, they group together and encourage talents: this is the case of Louis XIV. He never

almost nothing great has ever been achieved in the world except through the genius and firmness of a single person who fights against the prejudices of the multitude or who gives them some... We saw after the death of Henry IV how much the power, consideration, morals and spirit of a nation often depend on a single man... Our nation needs the eye of the master to be encouraged. Twenty times Voltaire returned to this idea and twenty others took it up after him" (117). One of these is Helvétius, who, once he has distinguished legitimate power from arbitrary power by arguing that the latter "uses public force to satisfy his whims", while the former uses it for "general advantage", paradoxically describes the reign of Tullius, seventh King of Rome, as despotic, because "he had the courage to set his own limits on royal authority" (118). There is nothing better," he says, echoing the words of Frederick II in a speech delivered at the Berlin Academy, "than arbitrary government, but under just, humane princes.

virtuous: nothing worse under common kings" (119).

In this century, which, while keeping its eyes fixed on the "good despot", had only the word "liberty" on its lips, only Montesquieu seemed to condemn despotism with the same intransigence that Fénelon had shown towards this political system several decades before the publication of *De L'Esprit des Lois* (1748) (120). Above all, in *Essai philosophique sur le gouvernement civil* (1721), he had alerted his contemporaries to the fact that "[t]he despotism of Tarquin and William the Conqueror was at the root of all the evils of Rome and England" (121) and, tacitly (122), that Europe was not immune from a return to this form of government which, according to Aristotle, suited the nature of the Asiatics. Remember," he warned them as early as 1794 in *Télémaque*, "that the countries where the domination of the sovereign is most absolute are those where sovereigns are least powerful. They take, they ruin everything, they alone possess the whole state; but the whole state also languishes [...]" (123) Montesquieu, for whom *Telemachus* was the "divine work of this century" (124), remembered this.

Montesquieu's inspiration for *De L'Esprit des lois* came mainly from the works of René Descartes, Nicholas de Malebranche and Machiavelli, all of whom he regarded with a certain degree of respect.

Montaignesque scepticism. He drew from it not his conclusions, but his method: a rational, descriptive and analytical approach to the problem of the nature of the good constitution of society. Montesquieu, like most of the early political thinkers after Machiavelli, was essentially interested in the problem of the relationship between law and power. Most of these thinkers, starting with those who opposed what they saw as the perversity of Machiavelli's approach to politics, framed these problems from a moral point of view. They sought to find the basis for a good constitution of society, taking into account good and evil and a natural law of right and wrong. This approach was alien to Montesquieu. For him, political society had to be based on civil law. The law should reflect what individuals consider to be right and wrong.

as right or wrong, but subjective morality and objective law are two different things. Morality, like law, is relative; what one society considers just and legal, another may well consider unjust and illegal. Similarly, there is no such thing as a universally valid government, only governments adapted to a particular people. To support his theory, Montesquieu used a wide range of sources, from the works of ancient historians and those of the

These range from orientalist works such as Thomas Hyde's *Historia religionis veterum Persarum* (Oxford, 1700) to the accounts of 17th-century travellers such as Rycaut's *Histoire de l'état présent de l'Empire ottoman* (1670), *Les Voyages en Perse* (1686) by Jean Chardin, the reports on the Orient by François Bernier, doctor at the Faculty of Medicine in Montpellier, philosopher and disciple of Gassendi, and *Les Six Voyages* by Jean-Baptiste Tavernier (1676) (125).

In *De L'esprit des lois* (1748), Montesquieu divides governments into three types: republics, monarchies and despotisms (126). Montesquieu associates each of the three types of government with a fundamental principle: the republic with virtue, the monarchy with honour and despotism with power.

with fear. For Montesquieu, the type of government is not determined by the form of power, but by the way in which it is exercised. This is why he distinguishes between monarchy, where a set of institutions and men of honour ensure the rule of law, and despotism, where everyone is essentially the slave of the sovereign. In his view, the latter is embodied by the three rulers of contemporary Muslim empires: the Grand Lord of the Sublime Porte, the Shah of Persia and the Great Khan of Hindustan.

Although the expression "Oriental despotism" was canonised by *Recherches sur l'origine du despotisme oriental*, to which we referred earlier, it was Montesquieu who established the characteristics of "Oriental despotism" in its nature and principle.

The nature of this government is that one person, with no law and no rules, drives everything by his will and his whims. The prince is everything, and his will is the law. Since he himself is not subject to the law, the despot can do as he pleases. His subjects are no better than slaves, equal in servitude. They are poor, their property is precarious,

usury is common practice (think here of all the current companies, subsidiaries of major banks, which specialise in "credit sold and managed remotely"). Education is not necessary; if it exists, it is designed to lower and break the spirit (think here of pseudo-Education-pseudo-Nationale). Honour and virtue are unknown to the subjects of a despotic state; virtue is not necessary and honour could be dangerous: "[p]eople capable of esteeming themselves highly would themselves be in a position to start revolutions. Fear must therefore destroy all courage and extinguish even the slightest sense of ambition".

(127). Fear, servile fear, is the principle of the despotic state. Mutual suspicion, even denunciation, is encouraged to prevent any insurrection or revolution. "The division of men, as of beasts, is instinct, obedience, punishment" (128). Punishment is severe; obedience to the prince must be passive, even if he gives unjust orders, because, considered as the law, he cannot contradict himself. "There is no temperament, no modification, of accommodations, of terms, of equivalents, of talks, of admonitions; nothing equal or better to propose, man is a creature who obeys a creature who wills" (129). Religion alone, which exerts a powerful hold on souls, can be opposed to his will. But, because of the superstitious nature of the people and the subtlety with which the despot exploits it, it is "fear added to fear" (130) (which is why Islam is the true religion of the republic).

"The principle of despotic government is constantly corrupting itself, because it is corrupt in its nature" (131). This is true in more than one respect. Since the state is the largest landowner and recognises private property rights only conditionally, trade cannot flourish. The despot's subjects must be kept in a state of fear by the threat of punishment; however, over time, punishments tend to become more and more severe, until they reach a limit; threats to become more and more terrifying, until they lose their force. More importantly, the despot is not "made [...] to command" because, in the Aristotelian sense, he is not a master but a slave. "Extreme obedience presupposes ignorance in the one who obeys; it even presupposes ignorance in the one who commands: he does not have to deliberate, doubt or reason; he only has to will" (132). This is why he has never felt the need to develop any intelligence or to strengthen what little character he has. "A man whose five senses constantly tell him that he is everything and that others are nothing is naturally lazy, ignorant and voluptuous" (133). "Such a prince has so many faults that we should fear to expose his natural stupidity. He is hidden, and no one knows what state he is in. Fortunately, men are such in this country that all they need is a name to govern them" (134). This name is that of the vizier, to whom the despot, having no taste for business, delegates it, so that "[t]he vizier is the despot himself; and every private officer is the vizier" (135) (think here of our prefectural parasites). But in the prince's absence, intrigues against him multiplied, all the more so because his government was necessarily odious to his subjects. To protect himself, he can hardly count on anything but his army, at the risk, if he entrusts too much power to the generals who are capable of defending him, of seeing them overthrow him. Now, "a free nation can have a liberator; a subjugated nation can only have another oppressor" (136). According to Montesquieu, despotism is the

the most effective way of governing vast empires where the population has no parliamentary tradition and where the climate inclines the people passively to accept arbitrary power. But," remarked the philosopher in *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence* (1734), "in the accord of Asiatic despotism, that is to say of any government that is not moderate, there is always a real division; the labourer, the man of war, the merchant, the magistrate and the nobleman are only united because some oppress the others without resistance: & if there is union, it is not citizens who are united, but dead bodies buried next to each other" (137) A chilling image.

Barely off the presses in Geneva at the end of October 1748, *De L'Esprit des lois*, distributed with difficulty, without an author's name, in Paris, "has turned the heads of all the French" (138), while the work is quickly "forgotten".

reprinted in London, Amsterdam and Geneva. Montesquieu was quoted in the British Parliament, English translations of *De l'Esprit des lois* were published, and the third chapter of the ninth book inspired part of the Constitution of the United States. The encyclopaedists' enthusiasm for "*L'Esprit des Lois*", barely tempered by the criticism levelled at it by some of them for being favourable to the aristocracy, was as lively as the criticism it received. Gathered around two highly critical articles published in the Jansenist journal *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques*, a flurry of articles and pamphlets descended on Montesquieu in the spring of 1749. In response to the diatribe in the *Nouvelles Ecclésiastiques*, Montesquieu published "*La Défense de l'esprit des lois*" in Geneva at the beginning of 1750, which only added fuel to the fire. Jesuits, Jansenists and theologians from the Sorbonne, who found

that its author "[reasons] as if there had been no Revelation, [...] does not [...] [distinguish] among the religions the only true one, [...] [gives] reason to doubt that he is truly Christian" (139), in short that he was an atheist and a deist, succeeded in having the work put on the index in 1751. After taking a theological turn, the dispute shifted to theory and method. The literature for and against *De L'Esprit des Lois* was so abundant that it was brought together in a collection published in

In Geneva the following year, while Montesquieu was constantly correcting and reworking his text for new editions, the final one was published in 1757, two years after his death; Diderot had followed his funeral procession and made this known. The attacks subsided, before picking up again with the publication in 1764 of *Observations sur le livre de l'esprit des lois* by Grévier, a professor of rhetoric at the Collège de Beauvais. The *Observations* are divided into two parts: 1. lack of accuracy in historical facts and in the interpretation of texts; 2. false principles in matters of metaphysics, morals and religion (140). In the first part of his criticism, which, being directly linked to the question of "oriental despotism", is the only one of interest to us here, Grévier is, to believe even one commentator well disposed towards Montesquieu, "often right", "the liveliness of imagination [of the author of *L'Esprit des lois* having] sometimes led him to see in Titus Livius or Tacitus what was not there" (141). Although Laboulaye is only commenting here on Montesquieu's reading of the historians of antiquity, there were colonial officials and orientalist in Montesquieu's own lifetime who spoke out against his interpretation of the travellers' writings on which he based himself. also support and even contradict the testimony of their authors (142).

In *Le Supplément au siècle de Louis XIV* (1753), Voltaire attacked *De L'Esprit des Lois* for its historical method and its sources, the veracity and even authenticity of which he roundly contested (143). The Indianist, first translator of the Avesta, pioneer of French Orientalism and precursor of anti-colonialism Abraham Hyacinthe Anquetil-Duperron (1731-1805) (144) followed a similar procedure in a work he had originally entitled *Le Despotisme considéré dans les trois états où il passe pour être le plus absolu : la Turquie, la Perse & l'Indoustan, Ouvrage dans lequel on prouve* 1. That the manner in which despotic government has hitherto been represented can only give an absolutely false idea of it; 2. That in the three states just named there is a code of written laws which bind the prince as well as the subjects; 3. That in these three states private individuals have property, both movable and immovable, which they enjoy freely and that the considerable modifications and corrections he made to it during the course of printing led him to consider it preferable to publish it under the title *Législation orientale* (1778), with a subtitle almost identical to that of his first draft (145).

Législation orientale, on the one hand, denigrates the testimony of the travellers on whom Montesquieu's theory is based and likens them, at best, to gatherers of clouds, at worst to opportunist liars (146); on the other hand, he presents Montesquieu as a blind dreamer stale with dogmatism (147) and ends by "asking [...] if a Government where the Ministers go to the Palace every day, where the Sovereign confers with them, where the places to be given, what is happening in the various Provinces of the Empire, foreign affairs of interest to the State, are reported regularly every day to the Prince's Council; where an account is given to this same Council of military expenditure, of the use of the Prince's income; where the Great, the people, the whole Empire is informed of this form of administration : I wonder if such a government is the restless, devouring monster that M. de M. paints for us. de M. However, this government is the Despotism of Indoustan" (148). In today's academic circles, it is almost useless to say that there is no doubt that "Anquetil-Duperron is [...] right against Montesquieu" (149), whose portrait of the Orient is described as "fantastical". "or, at best and more subtly, "plausible", as opposed to "true".

"(150) "The inadequacies of [his] method [...], the obsolete or incomplete nature of his information [...], too often [bookish], [revealing] a great prejudice, based on a great ignorance of Arab-Muslim civilisation, have long been recognised" (151).

Anquetil-Duperron played a large part in creating it, continually repeating in his various works that "the culture of Asian, African and American peoples was simplified through generalising concepts, which ended up falsifying reality while confirming prejudices" (152). A *Droitdelhommiste* before his time, his opposition to the theory of "Oriental despotism" was part of a wider critique and even denunciation of the power relations between the West and the East. He accused the proponents of this theory of using it to justify the conquest and enslavement of Eastern countries by the European powers, and in this respect, as mentioned above (153), was the precursor of anti-colonialism. It is true that "*Législation orientale*" was only published once, and never translated, and that it met with little response from his contemporaries, who were critical of it (154) (in response to the objections that had been raised here and there against the documents that he

presented as evidence in support of his criticism of *De L'Esprit des Lois*, he published *Recherches historiques et géographiques sur l'Inde* [P. Bourdeaux, 1786] and was preparing to publish a book for "(155) when he died in 1805). After his death, however, these sentimentalist musings had their way. The spread in high society of the feeling that civilisations are relative, and the gradual abandonment by the pseudo-elites of the idea that civilisation is the only thing that really matters, had a profound effect on the way he lived his life.

(156) is largely attributable to his writings and those of the English linguist William Jones (1746-1794), whose articles were regularly published in British freemason journals, which are known to have encouraged the development of Orientalism (157).

Justice has been done to Montesquieu's theory of "Asiatic despotism" by a critic who, "in order to be in a position to answer the question [of whether there are sources that contradict those provided by the modern authors cited by Montesquieu], [has] read most of the travel books published in French between 1650 and 1750". "From this reading [he] brings back the absolute conviction that - except on the subject of the treatment of slaves on the Guinea coast [...] - Montesquieu could not have added anything to his documentation. The other travel accounts confirm in every respect those he used. They add nothing. "He reproduces his sources faithfully and accurately; he does not contradict the general spirit of the authors from whom he borrows facts, and he does not interpret their ideas in his own way. [...] The insulting attacks by Voltaire, Dupin and Linguet on the veracity and authenticity of his sources are not justified" (158). More generally, one of the editors of Montesquieu's *Œuvres complètes* set the record straight in the following terms: "Some modern critics [...] have written whole books to criticise M. de Montesquieu's portrayal of despotism in the *Esprit des Loix*. In Asia they see inhabitants who own land or houses which they sell or pass on to their children; they copy contracts which designate them by the *tenans* and *aboutissans*, like ours: they see sultans who refrained from seizing a field which belonged to one of their subjects: and they conclude that despotism does not destroy all property, as M. de Montesquieu says. How could they think that M. de Montesquieu believed that in Asia, no house, no field belonged to any individual, and that the ownership of this house or this field could not be transmitted by laws or customs? Such a state, no doubt, could not exist, since only the law of the strongest could ensure the enjoyment of any property. But what M. de Montesquieu said, and what is true, is that these laws or these customs of property are silent before the will of the sovereign who makes the supreme law of the state, and that these laws and these customs are only in force between private individuals, as long as they do not contradict the will of the sovereign. For, if these laws could contradict his will, he would no longer be a despot, he would be a monarch. These critics extol the gentleness of Oriental government; it is gentle, no doubt, towards subjects who have only the bare necessities, but it is a forced gentleness: what can be asked of people who barely have enough to live on? Is it also gentle towards those who are rich, and whom the sovereign disposes of as he pleases, either by death or by despoilment? Is it not the danger of appearing rich, and the uncertainty of enjoyment, that make people neglect the cultivation of land? A few generous and just actions, the fruit of a disposition

natural, cited by these critics i will never be proof that honour is to be found in despotism, as in the monarchy of which it is the principle. M. de Montesquieu, with his vast mind, embraced the whole of a government; his critics, through particular facts, seek to judge this whole" (159). However, not all of his criticisms were caricatures, such as that made by de Bonald, following in Voltaire's footsteps (159bis), with regard to Montesquieu's definition of despotism ("A government in which a single individual, without law and without rule, shackles everything by his will and by his whims"), on the grounds that, as "it has been rightly observed [...] such a government, or rather such a government disorder, would not last two days. Despotism is no more lacking in laws and rules than any other state of society; and even [...] laws and customs are the object of a servile and superstitious respect. But the rules are false and the laws imperfect; without the despot knowing how to get out of this despotism which often, as Montesquieu says very well, 'weighs more heavily on him than on the people themselves; and far from dragging everything along by his will and his whims, he is often dragged along himself by the will of the people and the whims of the soldiers. The definition that this writer gives of the despotism of a single person could only be appropriate to the despotism of all, which is called democracy, a state of society without law and without rule, since the people always have the right to make new laws, and even to change the best ones, according to the principle of J.-J. Rousseau, and since they do not need to be right to validate their actions, they can drag everything along by their will and by their whims. Under the despotism of one, there is too much immobility in the laws; under the despotism of all, there is too much instability: the one is an imperfect monarchy, the other is only chaos and confusion; and if, under the first, man is a slave, under the second, he may fall below slavery, and, as Tacitus says, degenerate even from servitude" (159ter). This criticism was very accurate, as was the remark that the great weakness of Montesquieu's argument was that he could not prevent his contemporaries, who had not escaped the fact that the regime that the philosopher portrayed as "Asiatic despotism" was no more and no less than absolute monarchy (of Louis XIV Montesquieu says, in *The Persian Letters*: "Of all the governments in the world, that of the Turks or that of our august Sultan would please him best, so much does he value oriental politics"), to see that "the despotism of a Frederick, of a Catherine, [of a Louis XV] was far from matching these frightening descriptions, and that alongside this scarecrow despotism there was room for another, by whatever name it was called" (160). But most of the subjects of Louis XIV and Louis XV had not paid attention to Montesquieu's observation that, even in temperate monarchies, there was a tendency towards despotism. Even and especially in democracies, there is a despotism, infinitely more sophisticated and durable than "the arbitrariness of judgments and the despotism of terror". (161) reigned by the Terrorists of 1793 in the name of public salvation. In democracies, where the ruler inaugurates the chrysanthemums in the name of the people who, through the machinations they hatch behind the scenes, make his election possible, despotism is above all a ministerial and "administrative" despotism, to use the expression of Malesherbes who made it, quite rightly though he did not limit himself to this phenomenon, a synonym for "centralisation" (162). Inaugurated in France under Louis XIII by Cardinal de Richelieu, perpetuated under Louis XIV by Louvois in particular; firmly established in the eighteenth century, to the advantage of the taxman, by the combined arbitrariness of the magistrates and these "(163), whose "[t]he Revolution, which gave the administration the title of '(services of) public utility or public necessity'" (164bis), the foundation and justification of the Jacobin State, only made "[t]he power more skilful, stronger, more

(164), administrative despotism tightened its grip on civil society even further under "Napoléon Le Petit" (164ter) and, it would seem, irrevocably during the second half of the nineteenth century (166). "In "Dix-Huit Brumaire" (1851), Marx criticised the Revolution for having "perfected [...] this machine instead of breaking it" (167).

From Montesquieu, whom he had read as early as 1843, Karl Marx seems to have drawn only his analyses of money (168), yet the concept of the "Asiatic mode of production", which he began to develop in 1853 after being struck by François Bernier's *Voyages* containing a description of the States of the Great Mogul, *de l'Indoustan, du royaume de Kachemire* (Amsterdam, 1699), in particular Bernier's assertion that private land ownership did not exist in Mughal India, fits in perfectly with the concept of "Oriental despotism". In the theory of the stages of social development set out in the chapter of *Grundrisse* (1857-1858) on the 'formations preceding capitalist production', the Asiatic mode of production is presented as that which immediately followed the ancient mode of production and preceded feudalism, which in turn would give rise to capitalism, then socialism and, finally, communism (169). According to Marx, the Asian mode of production was peculiar to agricultural societies, in particular those that depended heavily on irrigation,

It is characterised by the absence of private land ownership, autonomous village communities and a despotic centralised state responsible for public works, particularly irrigation. To finance public infrastructure, the state extracts, mainly through coercion and control by the army, an economic surplus produced by local communities in the form of tribute and collective labour.

Firstly, private land ownership does not exist. Households and families can own and use land collectively, but the State retains ownership. The State's right to own land may not be enshrined in law, but it is nonetheless enshrined in the law of the State to levy taxes on village land. Just as, in England, all land has theoretically belonged to the Crown since the partition of England by William the Conqueror in 1066 (170), so the land in Israel belongs - an idea already expressed in the priestly narrative of Exodus 9:29 and 19:5 (171) - to Yahweh (Leviticus 25:23), even if the notion of "ancestral" and therefore individual ownership may coexist with it (172). Similarly, "[t]he Egyptian pharaoh theoretically exercised absolute rights of ownership over the lands and resources of Egypt as the living Horus and ruler of a centralised state. He had the right to grant lavish gifts of land and property to the institutions, establishments and individuals he favoured. At the same time, the king had the right to demand that the recipients of his largesse reward the state in the form of duties or taxes of all kinds on land and property. These 'taxes' could include a share of the products of the land and of the herds of all Egypt, as well as the human labour necessary for the realisation of the projects of the State [...] the king regularly distributed the land of Egypt between the

individuals and institutions, which generated all kinds of revenue for the State [...] (173). The situation was hardly any different in Mesopotamia, where from the period of Ur III, a bureaucracy developed "beyond measure" (174), except that the king, who was the largest landowner, did not own the land or, at least, had ceased to do so, at a time that is difficult to determine (until the beginning of the third millennium, during the period of Ur VI and IV, it was in fact the temple that owned the land) (175), but could, through its officials, requisition the land of any subject (176). The State, i.e. "a clique of despots established in the large cities" (177), which were nothing more than vast military camps, generated surpluses by subjugating the villages, They were largely self-sufficient and had to pay taxes, usually for religious reasons. Villagers were forced to perform military service and take part in public works. The State used this cheap labour to build major irrigation systems, administrative and religious buildings, defence works, roads, food warehouses, etc. (178). Carrying out these major public works required planning and therefore a sprawling bureaucracy (178bis).

Secondly, society was divided into two classes: the peasantry and the state bureaucracy, supported by the clergy and the army. "Above the tribe, the usufructuary community of the soil, [a state bureaucracy] an 'imaginary', mythical tribe, a superior community which holds authentic ownership of the soil and ends up existing as a person, and which is embodied in the despot, individual or collective, and in the God" (179). "In this mode of production, the functions of In fact, the government had to take on a whole range of functions. The authorities had to take on a host of functions: study astronomy for the tides, create the calendar, time the clock, measure, make all sorts of calculations, count the population, keep the accounts, organise the work, maintain discipline, distribute the water, appropriate the necessary resources by means of *corvée*, taxes and confiscations. This is the managerial state" (180): "No, really, we are not far removed from the time when the Egyptian priest guarded the secrets of his power and led society to believe that he alone, thanks to divine inspiration, was capable of conducting human affairs successfully. The bureaucracy, with its self-importance and mystifying jargon, in which the essence of its social prestige largely resides, is not, after all, very far removed from the Egyptian priesthood and its magical secrets. Is it not also, incidentally, very close to the Stalinist bureaucracy and its obsessive practice of concealment?" (181) The bureaucracy, in the socialist regimes of the twentieth century as in the countries subject to the Asian mode of production, forms "a ruling class which exploits the dominated classes, not as in capitalism, through ownership of the means of production, but through the control it exercises over them" (182), through the application to all social relations of innumerable norms, rules, techniques, procedures and formalities. increasingly formalistic and stifling. The most effective of these come from the management, organisational and "human resources" management methods used in corporate management, which themselves derive from research into parapsychology (183). Their effectiveness is increased tenfold by the fact that, at the same time as the State has been gradually privatised, private companies themselves have built up a veritable bureaucracy; neoliberalism has done away with the distinction between private and public. A "living machine" united with the "lifeless machine" that is the factory, which "has the power to make things happen".

to determine and dominate the daily lives" of the workers, the bureaucracy is busy "building the cage of this servitude of future times, in which one day perhaps, like the Fellahs in the State of ancient Egypt, people reduced to powerlessness will be forced to come and live, when the only value left to them will be, in the hands of civil servants, a purely technically sound, in other words rational, administration and stewardship, and when this ultimate and only value will decide how their affairs are to be conducted" (183bis). Incidentally, in connection with the traits Montesquieu attributes to the despot, Weber describes the officials of this rational administration as "[s]pecialists without vision and voluptuous without heart" (184).

Of all Marx's conceptions of the modes of production which, according to him, served as the basis for the various forms of society throughout history, this was undoubtedly the one he developed least and the one which was and continues to be the most controversial. After the publication of the first volume of *Capital* (1867), the concept of the Asiatic mode of production, which is not mentioned in Engels' *The Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State* (1884), virtually disappeared from his writings. In the early twentieth century, the socialist reformers of the Second International, who saw colonialism as a force for development and modernisation, seized on it as a metaphor for Asian underdevelopment. Lively disputes about the Asian mode of production broke out in Russia in the aftermath of the Revolution (1917). Lenin (1870-1924) had stigmatised the "Asiaticism" (economic backwardness) of Tsarist Russia. The Third International rejected the concept of an Asian mode of production in 1921, when, in colonial societies, it chose to support alliances between the proletariat and the nationalist bourgeoisies against imperialism and the indigenous ruling classes. The Comintern defined the latter as "feudal", thus erasing any reference to the concept of the Asian mode of production, considered too closely associated with political despotism and therefore likely to be used against the Stalinist regime. Dismissed by Stalin from the modes of production whose historical succession he codified (185), he ended up being dismissed from Marxist orthodoxy in the early 1930s.

In the 1950s, the sinologist and former Marxist Karl-August Wittfogel (1896-1988) used the original formulation of the concept of the Asian mode of production to indict the Soviet state, which he described as a manifestation of totalitarianism similar to "hydraulic societies". *Asia* (186). The thesis of his book, "Le Despotisme oriental" (1957), "which purports to be scientific, and which indeed bears witness to an impressive culture and reflection" (187), is that the existence of large irrigation systems gives rise, under certain conditions, to a centralised political authority and, eventually, to an autocratic and despotic government based on a tentacular bureaucracy. "Firstly, water is a substance with certain biophysical properties: it is a mobile, fluid and fugitive natural resource whose quantity and location are uncertain. For irrigation, specific quantities of water at specific times and in specific places are required [...] Secondly [...] to successfully install and operate an irrigation system it is necessary to

large-scale cooperation is needed [...]. A large workforce is not enough. It still needs to be coordinated, disciplined and directed [...] centralised authority therefore stems from the need to control conflicts, which are seen as inherent in vast irrigation systems.

Thirdly, Wittfogel's central idea is the process of transformation through 'mass labour', i.e. the predominance of large populations which can be transformed into labour by cooperative measures - but probably also by coercive measures - and which are willing to conform and submit to authority" (188). Thus, "cooperation and the division of

both produce hierarchical leadership. Hydraulic leadership itself tends to be transformed into political leadership, whether leaders alien to the hydraulic mode of production create or take over the hydraulic 'apparatus' or whether the leadership of this apparatus extends its power to other public functions. In his view, the origins of a hydraulic company are therefore multiple.

What unites them, however, is that the resulting regime is shaped by the specific form of governance and social control that hydraulic agriculture requires. Under certain conditions, this configuration can be transformed into an autocratic regime, which Wittfogel describes as 'despotic'. This implies the emergence of a leader who has the power to take all the important decisions, and is the consequence of 'cumulative tendencies towards uncontrolled power'. The power of the despot is total, and he reigns by physical and psychological terror over those who are subject to him" (189). Wittfogel's decisive contribution to the further development of the concept of the Asian mode of production is valuable and, indeed, invaluable to our study of "panic power" for two reasons.

The first is that, unlike Marx and Marxist historiography, he establishes and tracks the infiltration of the Asian mode of production and its political corollary, despotism, into the Greco-Roman world. The second is that it characterises better than most historians the essence of Asian-style government, which, given what has been said above about "administrative despotism", the reader can already suspect did not disappear from Europe with the fall of the Roman Empire.

Alexander the Great's fascination with Eastern despotism is well known; what is less well known is that the boomerang effect of his conquests was to transfer hydraulic forms of state and society from Asia to Greece. In Rome, this development began at the very start of the third century BC, when, in 211, Rome, once Syracuse had been subdued, made "the subtle and complex legal system [of this] essentially agrarian state organised according to the Egyptian and Hellenistic models", the fundamental principle of which was that the state was the holder of absolute power and the owner of the entirety of the land.

land, subject to taxation, "the basic organisation of its first provincial economy" (190). From the Roman point of view, the Hellenistic principle of general taxation was "an absolute innovation" (191) which succeeded because it was accompanied by a complete periodic census. "These external developments did not automatically create a state that was stronger than society in the mother country.

But the metropolis underwent internal transformations that disastrously weakened its power base.

the traditional aristocratic republic. On the one hand, endless wars of conquest enriched the senatorial class of large landowners, masters of ever-growing numbers of slaves; on the other, these wars ruined the peasantry. The ruined peasantry and land-hungry veterans provided an ideal base for the policies of the populares and victorious generals, who did not hesitate to confiscate and redistribute the estates of their former adversaries. The civil wars also increased the vulnerability of wealthy businessmen, the equites, some of whom, having become tax farmers, publicani, had profited greatly from the development of the Roman Empire. However, as the crisis continued, the equites did not enjoy greater security for their wealth.

The generals who dominated the political scene, particularly in the 1st century BC, only came to power because of the size and special characteristics of the territories they conquered. It was in these regions that they found

the material means they needed; and it was there that they tested the effectiveness of Hellenistic methods of government" (192). Absolute power was gradually established by political generals who, like Caesar, opposed the representatives of the senatorial class as "men of the people", in order to achieve their own political goals. "Augustus was not only the man who drove the old social powers into the grave, but also the pioneer of a modified administrative system. Despite his deep loyalty to the cultural values of Rome, the first emperor (princeps) modelled his absolutist state not on early Rome or classical Greece - indeed, Greece would have provided him with little inspiration - but on the Hellenistic East. By laying the foundations for a paid civil service, he was responsible for the development of a bureaucracy that rapidly grew in importance during the 1st century AD. Under the Republic, agro-directorial methods of acquisition and organisation had already been employed in the provinces.

But by the time of Augustus, they had been developed and used systematically. Confiscation became a normal part of the empire's economic and political life. General taxation was based on periodic population censuses, which under Augustus became a mere administrative routine. The initiator of the great non-hydraulic constructions that the name of Rome still evokes for us, Augustus began to put in place a network of roads that were genuinely agri-directorial. He created the state post office, the *cursus publicus*, and logically added a comprehensive intelligence service. These innovations were complemented by others: the employment of former slaves, the 'freedmen', in the service of the state, the use of eunuchs in political functions, the cult of the emperor, and the gradual decline of independent commercial and industrial enterprise.

Long before the end of the 2nd century AD, in other words before Septimius Severus, at the cost of massacres and confiscations, had made the centre of despotic power the owner of most of the good arable land of the empire", the old society had lost its identity" (193). Under this Semitic emperor, who despised Rome and spoke Latin with a Punic accent (194), and who called himself "dominus" ("master"), the Senate no longer had any power, and it is logical that the state became the owner of most of the arable land in the Empire. "During the second and third centuries... the state (or emperor) was not only the largest landowner, but also the richest possessor of mines and quarries, and in time became the leading industrial power'. In addition, 'trade - wholesale and retail - gradually came under state control' and 'transport was also to a large extent nationalised'. In this single-centre economic context, 'the idea of the omnipotence of the state' found ready-made ground. It developed

essentially 'under the influence of theories of the State of Hellenistic Orientalist and other origins'. The total 'replacement of one economic system by another, and the substitution of a new civilisation and a new attitude to life for the old conceptions, took more than a century and a half. By the end of the third century, this process was complete" (195). And it continued after the "great invasions". "Among the Iberians, Celts and Germanic peoples, there was no innate aspiration to freedom that prevented the ancestors of modern Western Europe from accepting - first under duress, then by habit - the yoke of a state that gave the non-governmental forces of society little chance of collaborating in shaping their own political and economic destiny. For several centuries, Eastern despotism in its Latin-Hellenistic form stretched from the forests of Germany to the Atlantic shores of Spain and Gaul, and all the way to the southern border of Scotland. These Eastern institutions did not disappear when, in the 4th century, the Roman West became practically independent of the hydraulic East. The despotic state, which had not tolerated a strong, organised economic class - although it did tolerate the existence of vast fortunes of all kinds - continued to exist, even though its managerial and bureaucratic apparatus was already decadent. In fact, to the very end, the government of the Roman West insisted on retaining its absolute power. Its last major political figure, Heraclius, a typical example of a hydraulic head of state, was a eunuch" (196) (emphasis added). Certain symbols of hydraulic government, such as the vassal's obligation to kiss his suzerain's foot, persisted for a very long time, even longer than the Merovingian period; but, lacking social foundations, they gradually disappeared of their own accord. Absolute government itself disappeared, giving way to the decentralised feudal system of government that characterised the High Middle Ages, until the establishment of the great Anglo-Norman land register (Domesday Book) on the initiative of William the Conqueror in 1068 - the great land register whose project had perhaps been inspired by those of his compatriots who, having conquered southern Italy shortly before, had been able to familiarise themselves with the methods of Arab-Byzantine administration that were in force in that kingdom -, make the Asian mode of production reappear in non-Muslim feudal Europe (197). The institutional effects of the Islamic conquest had anticipated and prepared for this return: "[...] Muslim Spain became more than marginally oriental. It became a veritable hydraulic society, despotically administered by appointed officials and subject to taxation according to agro-directorial methods. The Moorish army, which soon went from being tribal to mercenary, was just as much an instrument of the state as its counterparts in the Umayyad and Abbasid caliphates. A proto-scientific system of irrigation and cultivation was complemented by extraordinarily advanced knowledge in the typically hydraulic fields of astronomy and mathematics (51). Contemporary feudal Europe had nothing like it" (198). Again according to Wittfogel, the Reconquista, which began in Catalonia, Aragon and Navarre, which had remained free of the Saracen yoke, brought Spain back to the feudal system it had had before the Muslim invasion.

However, research carried out since the publication of *Despotisme oriental* has presented a very different picture: continuity, from the point of view of hydraulic techniques and institutions, between Spain under Moorish domination and Catholic Spain (199) and even an intensification of the

intervention and bureaucratic control (200). If, as we have seen above, "Oriental despotism" had taken root in Europe before the advent of Christianity, it was under the direct influence of this religion that this form of political power, which Europe first experimented with in its own institutions, starting with monasteries, became widespread, if not acclimatised, in Europe from the time when, in the sixteenth century, it became the norm, from the time when, in the sixteenth century, the Christian model of the sovereign was imposed in all its aspects, which correspond to the attributes of Oriental kingship.

In the ancient Near and Middle East, the head of state was regarded as a god, whether that person was a man or a woman. He "[...] is man and god at the same time. He lives and dies like every man and yet he is identified with the divinity and is like its earthly incarnation" (201), although a distance, greater (in Israel and Mesopotamia) or lesser (in Egypt), exists between him and the divinity. Hammurabi called himself "a god among kings" (202). Of Queen Hatshepsut it is said: "Her form is that of a god, her being is that of a god, she does all things like a god, she is excellent like a god [...]" (203). Like the godhead, the reign of his incarnation on earth is conceived as eternal. Yahweh promised David eternal kingship (for his lineage) (204). God, the king, is also the son of God, in Egypt since the Fifth Dynasty, and in Mesopotamia at least since the reign of Hammurabi, who calls himself "the royal descendant, whom Sin (the god of the Moon) begat" (205). The Lord said to David at his coronation: "You are my son, I have begotten you this day" (Psalm 2:7). The first duty of the monarch, of the "bêlum", "master", as he is called in Mari in Mesopotamia, where his power, theoretically absolute, is nevertheless counterbalanced by the authority of the "chief of the pastures" (206), is to render justice, a function that is closely linked to his status as legislator. In Babylon and Egypt, justice was considered to be embodied, by divine proxy, in the person of the king (207), with the result that legislation did not contain codes of laws, but only collections of positive law, whereas in the In Israel, on the other hand, the laws governed ceremonial and social life long before a king was elected and, in any case, the king was never regarded as the depository of divine law, with perhaps one exception: Melkisedek (208). Hammurabi announces in the prologue to the Code, in the epilogue of which he calls himself "King of Justice" (209), that he was chosen by the gods to "make justice prevail in the land" (mīšaram ina mātīm ana šūpīm raggam ū ṣēnam) and Darius declares that he has 'enforced the law in these lands'. The use of the plural 'the countries' is constant in Achaemenid chancery style to indicate the universality of the empire. The country' or 'the countries' refer to the same idea of the political unification of the king's territories of power by the same law" (210).

The fact that the right to punish was conceived as a divine delegation led to a cosmic conception of justice. By dispensing justice, the king "promotes the fertility of the soil and the herds" (211), not only the abundance of harvests, but also their equitable distribution. In Mesopotamia, as in Egypt and Israel, prosperity, well-being and happiness, particularly for the poor, were directly attributed to the sovereign (212). The king was seen as the protector of the weak and oppressed. Hence a moral conception of justice (213). From this dual tendency, both moral and cosmic (214)

and, among peoples who had a universalist conception of the divine, or at least for whom there was a tension between universalism and religious particularism (215), the idea of universal justice, particularly developed in Isaiah. This idea arose from the feeling that, because of its divine election, Israel would inevitably be taken as a model by all other peoples.

In India, the exercise of criminal justice was the first duty of royalty: one of the first acts of the reigning Mesopotamian king was to proclaim an edict of *mêsharum* ("justice") (216). The pharaoh was not obliged to judge the guilty himself; he had the right to do so, as did the priests (217). He set up the courts, appointed their members and required them to dispense justice independently; according to Plutarch, he even made them swear to disobey him if he claimed injustice from them (218). In Egypt, the kings, in pronouncing their judgments, were theoretically bound to act in accordance with the rules laid down by the laws for each particular case. There were, however, not a few cases in which "they sentenced all those who incurred their disgrace to imprisonment, exile, public labour or the ultimate torture, without observing any of the formalities in which the laws of the country had sought to guarantee a fair trial; they indulged in all the caprices of Asiatic despots" (219). As for the citizens, they had to refrain from taking revenge. The magistracy alone was responsible for distributing outrages; the Germans and Scandinavians of the "Middle Ages" (220) had no trace of the financial compensation owed by offenders to offended parties.

The king's justice was not based on evidence in the sense in which we understand that term; it was irrational in nature: what was involved was not human judgement, but divine judgement, "translated into acts whose logic was to show that the divinity was rendering justice itself, whether *divinatio* or *ordalia*" (221). "The king of justice in no way aims to restore the past as past. The 'proofs' of justice are ordalic in nature, meaning that there is no trace of a positive notion of proof: to submit to judgement is to enter the realm of the most formidable religious forces. Truth' is established by the correct, ritually accomplished application of the procedure. When he presides over the ordalic judgment in the name of the gods, the king "speaks the truth", or rather, he conveys "the truth" (*kittum*) (222), which the divinity has given him (223). From In a similar way, the Torah, revealed by Yahweh, "enunciates an assertoric truth that cannot be discussed or disputed demonstrates" (224). As Detienne rightly points out, "to possess the truth is also to be capable of deception" (225), whether this truth is presented as divine or, as later, human in origin (226). The king, however, could refer cases to the local courts, whose judges only resorted to ordination if they were unable to reach a decision by rational means (227). The judicial system in the Ancient Near East was inquisitorial (228).

From his power to dispense justice came the fifth quality of the Near and Middle Eastern monarch: wisdom, resulting from his knowledge of the cosmic, or rather cosmic-moral, order. "My lord the king is as wise as an angel of God; he knows everything that happens on earth" (II Samuel XIV, 20), said a woman from Tekoa to David. Gifted with the spirit of the divinity, he was best placed to mediate between it and mankind, both as architect (he knows the structure of the cosmos) and priest (he is in communication with the divinity).

All the royal qualities and functions are, so to speak, quintessentially represented in the metaphor of the shepherd-king. The analogical fusion of these two entities in the royal ideology of the Near and Middle East is largely explained by the essentially pastoral nature of the economy of this region and, consequently, by the central importance of the shepherd in the corresponding societies.

Domestication, which began in the Near East towards the end of the ninth millennium and the beginning of the eighth millennium, led to the emergence, around the seventh millennium, of a new way of life in regions whose aridity was already unfavourable to sedentary life: pastoral nomadism, characterised by a subsistence economy based on the rearing of goats (229). "Herds were the real wealth of Israel

". Psalm 144:13 speaks of flocks "multiplying by thousands, by ten thousands" in the Palestinian countryside. Goats were bred to provide a variety of products, including meat and milk and, principally, wool.

In Egypt, where livestock was so important economically that it is not impossible that the wealth it brought was used to finance the monumental constructions and splendours of the first pharaohs (230), the largest herds belonged to the priestly caste (231). In Israel, the first kings looked after their flocks themselves, whereas in Mesopotamia, almost all the herds belonged to the State, which had them grazed by shepherds (232), in the same way as, as we learn from the Bible, the Pharaoh entrusted shepherds with the management and care of their own flocks. The shepherds received a salary, paid in money or in kind, along with the products of the flock, including the wool. The shearing of the sheep took place every year in spring. It was an important and happy occasion for the sheep farmer - the equivalent of the harvest for the farmer. Even when the flocks were far from him, the owner went to supervise the work (Genesis 31:19-23; 38:12; 2 Samuel 13:23 ff). Relatives and friends took part in the shearing and the feast that accompanied it (1 Samuel 25:2-11, 36; 2 Samuel 13:23-29) (233).

Being a shepherd was a serious, demanding, exhausting and dangerous job. Nevertheless, the true shepherd was considered to be caring, gentle and resourceful.

Shepherds were responsible for ensuring the safety and health of the flocks. Unlike goats, sheep and goats depended on shepherds for pasture, and they n e e d e d still waters. The shepherds generally lived in tents made of water-repellent cloth of black goat's hair (Genesis 4:20; Exodus 36:14). Because of the lack of rain, they had to move around during the summer months and be prepared to be away from their supply base for days or weeks at a time. To protect himself from the cold, strong winds and rain, the shepherd wore a long robe that served as a blanket and even as a tent-like sunshade (Jeremiah 43:12). In his large goatskin sack (1 Samuel 17:40, 49), the shepherd carried all the food he needed while he was away. This food consisted of bread, olives, milk and cheese - milk and cheese supplied by the animals, creating a vital and existential interdependence between him and them. To protect himself and his herd, he carried a cane or a strong, straight stick with a knot or pommel at one end, topped with a sort of hook. Like any shepherd, Pan used his lagobolon - the term used in Greece to designate this stick - not only to pull up clods of earth and pick up stones, which he threw in such a way as to bring back into the herd any animals that strayed (234), but also as a projectile for hunting game; in fact, the houlette was originally a real throwing weapon (235). It was also used by shepherds to grab unruly animals by the scruff of the neck, or even to hit them. The shepherd would even sometimes - and we should remember this when we come to the question of "pastoral power" - frighten animals t h a t d i d not obey and that he found difficult to control (236). The staff came to symbolise the shepherd and acquire an almost magical significance for him (237). Not only for him, since it served as a model for the insignia of episcopal or abbatial dignity (238). It was called pedum or ferula, from the Latin ferio, I strike, "because it is with the ferula that the master governs his disciples" (239).

It was the shepherd's responsibility not only to mark out the flock's route, choose the passages and provide watering places, but also to be prepared for emergencies, such as when a sheep was injured (in which case ointment, olive oil or animal fat was needed as an ointment; Isaiah 1:6) or strayed into a dangerous area (Ezekiel 34:5; Matthew 12:11; Luke 15:4). In the absence of "still waters", the shepherd had to make the animals drink from a skin bucket or trough (Genesis 30:38; Exodus 2:16), because they had to be watered several times a day, especially at midday (Genesis 29:2-10). The long days and nights he spent in the fields without human company made him lonely. He amused himself by talking to his sheep until they all recognised his voice (John 10:4ff), and by playing a makeshift chanter (Judges 17). Sometimes he met other shepherds at a watering hole (Genesis 29:2, 7). They would spend the night watches together tending their flocks (Luke 2:8). When they parted, there was no difficulty in separating the animals, for each knew the voice of his own shepherd (John 10:4, 14, 27). Each flock consisted of about a hundred animals (Matthew 18:12; Luke 15:4). In the morning and in the evening, the shepherd had to count them, one by one, calling each one by name (John 10:3), because if he missed one or more, he had to inform the owner or owners (Genesis 31:39). When a beast was wounded or killed by a wild animal, he was obliged to bring proof of it to its owner (240) He was not allowed to finish off a wounded or sick beast, but was obliged to bring it back into the

as far as possible to its owner (241). A responsible shepherd did not kill or eat his animals, whatever the rigours of life (Genesis 31:38-40; Ezekiel 34:2, 10; Amos 3:12; Genesis 37:33). In principle, all the dangers to which his sheep were exposed also lay in wait for him. He understood that he could not be sure of returning alive.

Although shepherds, except in Palestine (242), were often accompanied by ferocious dogs, they did not use them to herd the sheep (Job 30:1). The shepherd controlled the flock with words, shouts or whistles (Isaiah 5:26). He usually led the sheep (Psalm 23:2; John 10:3), but sometimes under-shepherds followed the flock (Amos 7:15) to encourage the tired and help the heavily laden or the newborn lambs - in Israel it seems that the shepherd followed the flock most of the time (243). At night, the sheep were gathered in a fold to protect them from predators, thieves and the cold (Psalm 78:70; Micah 2:12; John 10:1). There were different types of sheepfold. Some were located in or near a cave (e.g. 1 Samuel 24:3), others were permanent enclosures with a stone roof and walls, while still others were temporary, consisting simply of an open pen surrounded by thorn bushes. The shepherd guarded the only opening with his own body (John 10:7-9).

In an essentially pastoral society, the image of the shepherd could hardly fail to influence ways of thinking, in particular the way in which the authority of those politically responsible for the community was conceived.

The adjective shepherd seems to have been applied at first to the divinity alone, before becoming an attribute and even a royal title (244) for the first time in Mesopotamia at the beginning of the third millennium (the list of Sumerian kings indicates as the profession of the three prehistoric sovereigns, Dumuzi, Etana and Lugalbanda, that of shepherd [Sumerian: sipa; Akkadian: re 'û]). then in Egypt.

The idea of a shepherd god dates back to the 3rd millennium, when it was associated with the god of Letopolis, Mekhenty-irti and Osiris in the Pyramid Texts (5th dynasty) (2686-2181 BC). In these texts, this (blind) god of the sky is called the shepherd of the stars. The shepherd-god is considered like the one who embraces the stars with his arms. According to the beliefs of the ancient Egyptians, the kings of Egypt became stars after their death. In these texts, the metaphor of the shepherd (mnjw) is used to express the relationship between the deity and the pharaoh after his death. The Lamentations of Ipu-Ur, a text written during the 12th dynasty (2700 - 2200 BC), at a time when Egypt was going through a political, social and moral crisis, says of the Creator (12, 1): "He is the shepherd of all; there is no evil in his heart. Even though his flock is few in number, he spends (all) the days of his life watching over them.

day" (245). The sage Ipu-ur questions the belief that the sun god is the shepherd of all the people. In this context, the shepherd metaphor is used to remind the deity of his responsibility to care for the people he created. By the end of the First Intermediate Period (2181-2040 BC), the pharaoh was no longer the only object of care for the pastoral deity, who was now described as the protector of all the people of Egypt. The

The Precepts of King Merikare (10th dynasty), for their part, remind the people that Ra does indeed take care of his people, "God's cattle", made "in his image and [...] from his members" (246), in the same way that a shepherd takes care of his flock. This text affirms that kings and princes were created for the good of the people, the Egyptian people in particular. The people are described as the property of the gods, while the kings and rulers are seen as the servants of the gods and as those who are entrusted with the careful care of the people. "God knows every name", Merikare told his son (247). Very rarely used during the Middle Kingdom (2033-1786 B C) (248), by the time it was disseminated again under the twentieth dynasty (1085-1069 BC), mainly in the hymns to Ra, its field of application had been extended; in addition to its anthropocentric meaning, which was still present in the four hymns to Aten (before 1365 BC) and in the Hymn to Mer-Sekmet, a second meaning had been added: cosmo-universalist: the divinity now cared not only for all Egyptians, but also for the whole of humanity and all living creatures (249). In a hymn in the Beatty IV papyrus to the sun goddess (1296-1186 BC), she is described as "the good shepherd of all mankind, who loves her flock and is full of compassion [...]" (250). "The king is the shepherd of mankind; he is not only the ruler of Egypt, but the true point of contact between God and mankind..." (251), even if he is first and foremost the shepherd of his own people, who were composed in part of nomadic or semi-nomadic tribes.

In Egypt, kings began to bear the title of shepherd from the XIIth dynasty (1991 - 1786 BC), in other words, once the pharaoh had been definitively conceived as the incarnation of Ra. As the shepherd of his people, the king, like the divinity, was responsible for looking after his flock. As in Mesopotamia, the title of shepherd was often linked to the notion of divine election.

For example, Queen Hatshepsut (1516-1484 BC) described herself as "the one he [the god Amun] chose to be a shepherd of Egypt and a protector of the people". And King Amenhotep II (1450-1425 BC) said of her: "He [the god Amun] made me shepherd of this land, because he knew that I would rule it for him". During the New Kingdom (1570-1085 BC), the title of shepherd was applied to people other than the king, in particular to chiefs.

military (252). The antiquity of the pastoral metaphor in Egypt is demonstrated by the fact that two of the most ancient attributes of authority of the pharaoh, as well as those of the royal officials and priests, are the two instruments of the shepherd: the staff and the flail, attributes of Osiris, but also, as far as

concerning the plague, of Ptah, Sokaris and Khnum (253). It is interesting to note that the Pharaohs continued to display these two pastoral attributes even after the Hyksos pastoral tribes had been driven out of Egypt in the middle of the second millennium BC.

Literary and pictographic sources show that the pastoral metaphor was already known in Mesopotamia in the 3rd millennium BC.

The Mesopotamian deities were called shepherds of the regions for which they were responsible. The main gods Enlil, Marduk and Shamash were considered to be the shepherds of all the people. The moon god Suen/Nanna was sometimes depicted as the shepherd of the stars. The fertility god Tammuz, husband of Ishtar, was the deity of the shepherds and was called "the shepherd" (Dumuzid sipad) (254). As the king was considered to hold his office from the gods, whether in Babylon, Sumer or Assyria, he was commonly called sipa or re'u ("shepherd"), sipa-zi or re'u kenu ("just shepherd"). (255). Shushin (circa 2030 BC) was "the king whom the god Enlil, in his heart, chose to be the shepherd of the country and of the four corners of the world" (256). The Code of Lipit-Ishtar (1900 B C), a precursor to the Code of Hammurabi, states in its prologue that Lipit-Ishtar was made king by Enlil and Anu. Similarly, Hammurabi is "the shepherd, called by Enlil"; in the prologue to the eponymous Code, he refers to himself as the "shepherd" and, in the epilogue, he declares: "[...] On my In my bosom I held the people of Sumer and Akkad" (257). Just as the king's relationship with the gods is likened to that of a herd with its owner, the bond between the people and the king is compared to the dependence of cattle on the shepherd; it was believed that the king had been called by the divinity to reign over his people and take good care of them. The city itself was likened to a shepherding in numerous texts, such as the epic of Gigamesh and the Lamentation over the destruction of Sumer and Ur (258). The concepts of kingship and shepherding were so closely linked in Mesopotamia that it was difficult to distinguish between them, so much so that in the twelfth century BC, the staff became the symbol of kingship. the main attribute of the holders of power, the king or his delegates, in Assyria and among the Hittites, in place of the spear or other weapons (259).

The shepherd-king had five functions: 1. to determine the destiny of his people; 2. to suppress hostility and rebellion by force of arms; 3. to ensure that justice prevailed in the country, and in particular that the strong did not oppress the weak; 4. to bring prosperity to his people, if not by providing them directly, at least by helping to provide them with an abundance of earthly goods (starting with food and water). Just as a shepherd had to be able to water his flock in a dry place, so the king was responsible for ensuring that the irrigation system worked properly; 5. to ensure, if necessary by coercion, the eternal happiness of the people. Hammurabi, among others, proclaimed himself to be "the shepherd who brings salvation and whose rod is just" (260); 6. "to gather the lost flock", because for half of them (Amorrites, Arameans, Gutis, Kassites, Suteans, Gutis, Chaldeans, etc.), the flock for which the "good shepherd" claimed to care was nomadic. As in Egypt, a universalist conception of the people seems to have formed in royal phraseology at a fairly early date, as suggested by the declaration of King Shushin quoted above and confirmed by the following address to Sargon II, king of Babylon from 709 to 705 and king of Assyria from 722 to 705 B C : "May the king, my lord, the good shepherd... truly care for and guide him [his people]....

May Ashur, Bel and Nabu add flocks to your flocks, give them to you and enlarge your vast herd; may the peoples of all lands come to you" (261).

In the Old Testament, "shepherd" (ro'iy) enters into the composition of numerous metaphors and images designating either political leaders, kings, of Israel or other nations, or prophets, spiritual guides, or Yahweh himself (262). In Genesis, the Psalms and the Prophets, they express in particular the relationship between the God of Israel and his people. Yahweh is often described as both shepherd and king. He is king as shepherd and king of the whole earth (263). In some passages, he is described as guarding and caring for his entire flock and as being its owner; in others, of a single sheep. The former reflect his concern for the people of Israel as a religious and political community; the latter his benevolence towards each member of that community. Benevolent and beneficent ("The Lord is my shepherd; I shall not want" [Psalm 23:1]), he feeds and protects his sheep (Exodus, 34, 12:13), all his sheep (Ezekiel, 34, 11:13), each of his sheep ("I will seek the lost and bring back the hunted, bind up the wounded and strengthen the sick" [Ezekiel, 34:16]), who, like, in part, those of Pharaoh and those of the Mesopotamian monarch, graze on a territory that is not fixed. He leads them all their lives (Genesis 48:15). The pastoral bond between Yahweh and his people is so strong that the imagery associated with it is also used to express negative feelings and describe unfortunate events for Israel. For example, death is portrayed as a shepherd who leads men, likened to beasts, to the grave (Psalm 49:14), and the defeated people of Israel blame Yahweh for the fact that they "slaughter us every day, and regard us as sheep for the slaughter" (Psalm 44:22). Yahweh's various activities as a shepherd can be classified into six basic roles, which, although distinct from one another, are interdependent and, as we have just seen, have both a collective and an individual dimension: to guide (nâhag, nâhal, nâhâh) (towards salvation), to feed, to watch over, to gather (to continue, seek, deliver and judge), heal (through tenderness and love) and know (yâda') (264).

In the New Testament, Yahweh is never called "shepherd" or "shepherdess", but he is compared in the parables of Jesus and in the first letter of Peter, where he speaks (5:2) of "God's flock" ("feed the flock of God which is with you, watching over it, not by constraint but willingly, nor for shameful gain but willingly"). God is the sole owner of the flock; Jesus, the "sovereign shepherd" (5:4), depends on Him. The New Testament (Matthew 18:12-13) and Luke (Luke 15:3-7) take up the idea, expressed in prophetic literature, that God is and remains the shepherd of his flock, which he entrusts to a shepherd - David - to look after in his name, even if the association between the Christian divinity and Jesus is so close that it is difficult to determine exactly which of the two (265) is represented by the figure of the shepherd in search of his lost sheep. "Just as the prophets present Yahweh as the shepherd of the flock, so the New Testament presents God as the owner of the flock, gathered together as the new People of Israel by the saving action of Jesus. Through the figure of Jesus in search of the lost sheep, God is

portrayed as a shepherd who is compassionate and caring towards each individual. The shepherd's joy when he finds her underlines this concern for every member of the community. Jesus, the promised Messiah, by his words and deeds, is the visible manifestation of the Father's behaviour among men; his own behaviour perfectly reflects that of the Father" (266).

The use of the pastoral metaphor to designate the divinity is not limited to the Semitic area. In India, among the Tamils, who are a people of shepherds, Krishna is called the "shepherd king" (mannar) (267) and the sixty-fourth Tamil king bore the title Kaalai Maipavan (the "shepherd king"), equivalent to the Sumerian Maa kaalai mavan (268).

Now, "in what is known as the classical political vocabulary of Greece, the shepherd metaphor is a rare one" (268bis). Applied to kings or military leaders, it is found in Homer, Hesiod, the Pythagoreans, Xenophon (*Xyropaedia*, I, I, 2) and above all Plato, notably in *The Republic*, *The Laws* (III, 694e-695a), where the kingship of Cyrus is discussed, and in *Politics*.

In Homer, "shepherds of the peoples" (poimena laôn) is a common metaphor applied to kings. For the Pythagoreans, the pastorate was an integral part of a political theory inspired by priesthood. Pythagoreanism proposed a political theology, an imitation of the gods in the political sphere and, ultimately, the establishment of a theocracy based on the oriental model. It was rejected by the Greeks because it ran counter to their family, tribal and patrimonial conception of the divine. Whereas, for them, each tribe and, later, each city was a cosmos in itself and, originally, each tribe had its own god, who had nothing in common with the god of this or that other tribe, the Pythagoreans wanted to impose a supreme god who, through the archè, exercised his supervision and benevolence not only over the whole world, but over each city in particular (268ter). The Greeks also rejected the Pythagorean pastoral model because, based on the idea of the mediation of the king, "law animate" and "God among men", as a fragment of the pseudo-Diotogenes puts it (128quater), between god and men, it denies the foundation of politeia, by "[subtracting] [...] power over men from any institutional dimension, and [rendering] law superfluous" (268quinquies). In short, the Pythagorean pastorate is a theocratic absolutism.

In the *Republic*, Thrasymachus argues that the political leader is to his subjects what the shepherd is to his sheep. Socrates radically contests Thrasymachus' position, not the analogy itself, but Thrasymachus' erroneous interpretation of it. For Socrates, in fact, the pastoral model is an adequate account of human government. Thus, at the end of Book III (416a-b), anticipating the community measures reserved for the guardians, developed in Book V, Socrates

points out that the gymnastic and musical education of the auxiliary guardians should not turn them into beasts of prey for the rest of the inhabitants of the ideal city: indeed, the role of shepherds is to raise guard dogs, not to harm their flocks, but, on the contrary, to protect them and ensure their prosperity. "Similarly, in Book IV (440d), when Socrates examines the role of the thumos, an intermediate part in the tripartite order of the soul and corresponding to the class of auxiliary guardians in

the political order of the city, he returns to this analogy to show that the thumos must ally itself with the rational, just as a guard dog obeys the orders of the shepherd who commands it. The class of producers is compared to the herd, the class of guardians to the dogs that are supposed to ensure that the herd is well fed, and finally the shepherd to the philosopher-king who looks after the good of the two above. The ternary relationship between shepherd - watchdog - herd thus makes it possible to describe, at least in part, the relationships between the three classes of the ideal city and the three parts of the soul that correspond to them. What Socrates rejects most vigorously is Thrasymachus' interpretation of the art of shepherding: as an art, as a *tekhne*, shepherding necessarily aims to benefit the flock. Through this exchange between Socrates and Thrasymachus, the Republic thus contrasts two antagonistic conceptions of the political pastorate: one, let us say tyrannical, in which the shepherd's own interests dictate the care he gives to the flock; the other, truly pastoral because benevolent and beneficent, in which the shepherd, because he has the competence that legitimises his title, aims at the good of his flock and not directly at his own interest" (268sexies). Plato's connection between pastorate and government is taken up again in the Politics, which emphasises "the irreducible difference between the divine pastorate and the human pastorate, and [clarifies] it by defining the new modalities of genuine political care, modelled on the divine care" (268septies). In the end, in this dialogue, the art of politics "is no longer thought of exclusively in terms of the shepherd's care for his flock, but in terms of the weaver's care for his cloth" (268octies). This is because, "the figure of the divine shepherd is too large for the measure of a king, whereas the politicians of this world and of the present are, by their nature, much more similar to those whose leaders they are" (268nonies). Even if Foucault's reading of Plato's pastoral metaphor is tendentious, and therefore, in the Greek philosopher's political thought, the "Greek magistrate" does not take precedence over, or retain primacy over, the "divine shepherd", Foucault's reading of Plato's pastoral metaphor is also tendentious.

"Even if "the paradigm of weaving [were] based on the pastorate rather than calling it into question, in order to extend its dimension as an art of care" (268undecies), all this would demonstrate is that Plato, here again, was subject to Eastern influences (268duodecies). In his *Histoire de la science politique*, Paul Janet "calls Machiavellianism any doctrine that sacrifices morality to politics, and Platonism any doctrine that sacrifices politics to morality" (268terdecies). He distinguishes between two types of Machiavellianism, namely princely Machiavellianism (the prince's lack of scruples in exercising power) and popular Machiavellianism (the "sovereign" people's lack of scruples in exercising power), and two types of Platonism, both of which establish that virtue is the end of the state as well as the end of the individual and place power in the hands of philosophers: "chimerical Platonism", which aims to obtain virtue without the aid of laws and by means of education alone, and "despotic Platonism", according to which "virtue is the work of the legislator, the effect of State supervision, in a word, of coercion" (268quaterdecies). The latter "delights in the contemplation of an impossible state, confuses politics with pedagogy, and believes in the omnipotence and infallibility of science", while the former "less confident in the perfection of men, does not shy away from the means..."

of politics, and sets itself the goal of making men happy and virtuous, without consulting them, whether they consent or not, by the authority of the State" (268quindécies) "Nothing [...] more seductive, at first sight, than this doctrine: the State must make virtue reign; nothing more dangerous in application. If the end of the State is virtue, it goes without saying that the citizen cannot be too virtuous, and, consequently, the State too scrupulous and too vigilant. Here is the State intervening in domestic life, in private life, in conscience itself: nothing is closed to it; it enters into the He sits at the citizens' table, and his surveillance does not spare even the marriage bed. The games of youth, the friendships, the attachments, the songs of poetry, the musical rhythms, the philosophical doctrines, the worship, in a word the spirit, the soul, the heart, the whole man becomes the slave of a narrow and oppressive censorship: the individual loses all spring by losing all initiative and all responsibility, or else a desiccating fanaticism makes him little by little alienated from all the feelings of humanity" (268sexdecies). Another form of Platonism is theocratic power, the purpose of which is to inculcate religious virtue in subjects with a view to salvation. "Is it not obvious that Plato's republic will turn into a theocratic republic, a democracy, an aristocracy or a monarchy, depending on the circumstances? Such was the government of the Jesuits in Paraguay; such was the government of Calvin in Geneva; such was the government of the Papacy aspired to be throughout Europe in the Middle Ages" (268septdecies).

By virtue of the analogy established in the phraseology of the theocracies of the Near and Middle East between the shepherd and his flock, it goes without saying that the king is supposed to show towards his subjects, his slaves, the same attitudes and dispositions as those shown by the shepherd towards his sheep and that his mode of government is supposed to reproduce the leadership techniques of the flock. The reality is far less idyllic.

The image of the shepherd king emphasises his concern and compassion for his people and, at the same time, the dependence of the people on the sovereign in everything that concerns the satisfaction of their needs. The king's first responsibility is to guarantee the prosperity of the people, who depend entirely on him. The despot's benevolence towards them knows no bounds, provided they obey him slavishly. "It was obstinacy and disobedience that the [Persian] kings feared most" (269). Philosophical centralism, which is based on "the denial of created substances and second causes, and the assertion that all beings are only modifications of one and the same being, or the instruments and occasional causes of the successive manifestations of that being", translates, in relation to the life of individuals in society, into "the denial of any independent personality with regard to the public ministry, and of any action proper to it; it is only the assertion that individuals As a result, the flock has no existence of its own: it "exists through the immediate presence and direct action of the shepherd" (271).

The people's feeling of dependence on the king was so strong that, in times of doldrums, it was natural for them to blame him and even hold him solely responsible for their misfortune: "[...] everything that goes wrong in society falls on the government; since it does everything, it is responsible for everything, and it is blamed as the cause not only of all moral disorders, but also of all physical calamities" (272). "Since it is the government that is supposed to know and do everything, it is also the government that must answer to public opinion for any abuse or disorder that occurs in government action. Now, all this wears him down, discomforts him, makes him fall further and further in the esteem of the people, alienates even his friends, increases the opposition of his enemies, and ends up making him odious, heavy, unbearable, making the prestige of his greatness disappear, making people doubt his right, and destroying all his authority. From that moment its fall cannot be uncertain, only the time may be delayed by the force of circumstances, or by the circumstances of force" (273). These lines were written, not by a specialist in the history of ancient Judaism, nor by a Sumerologist or an Egyptologist, but by a nineteenth-century Italian theologian, philosopher and preacher, in an indictment of the "philosophical centralism, pantheism", which he claimed had been spawned by the Revolution. The Oriental despot was not responsible for the natural disasters that destroyed harvests and decimated livestock, but for the misery and the outbursts of baser instincts provoked by mass unemployment and mass immigration, which those who elected them charged them with amplifying. Like the Eastern theocrat, however, they encourage the passivity of their subjects.

In what follows, we shall discuss the various techniques employed to maintain this status quo, not only in the Mesopotamian, Egyptian and Israelite kingdoms, but also - because, although the ruler is not compared to a shepherd, the same techniques are employed there - in the Chinese empire and in the monarchies of the Indian peninsula, pointing out the remarkable differences between them and the ways in which political affairs were run in Rome and Greece.

In return for the protection he claims to afford them and the care with which he claims to care for them, the Eastern despot demands absolute obedience from his subjects. "Common sense recommends only one response to the demands of total authority: obedience. And ideology has stereotyped what common sense merely advised. Under a despotic regime, obedience becomes the very basis of civic-mindedness. Naturally, all community life requires some form of coordination and subordination, and the aspiration to obey is never entirely absent. But in the great cities of the West, obedience is far from being a major virtue. In the democratic cities of ancient Greece, four major qualities were required of a good citizen: military courage, religious faith, civic responsibility and sound judgement. Prior to the democratic period

particularly physical strength and courage. But neither in Homeric times, nor in classical times, was unconditional obedience considered a virtue in a free man, except during his service in the army. Total submission was the duty [...] of the slave. The good citizen acted according to the laws of his community; but no absolute political authority controlled him absolutely. And the The loyalty that medieval knights owed their suzerains never became total submission. The feudal contract obliged him to follow his suzerain in limited and codified circumstances. The virtues of a good knight included, first and foremost, skill on horseback, the ability to handle weapons and courage. Unconditional obedience was completely excluded. (274). "If a Greek had to obey, he did so because it was his duty.

the law, or the will of the city. If he happened to follow the will of someone in particular (a doctor, orator or teacher), it was because that person had rationally persuaded him to do so. And this had to be for a strictly determined purpose: to heal oneself, to acquire a skill, to do the right thing.

In Christianity, as in Eastern despotism, "the relationship between the shepherd and his sheep [is conceived] as one of individual and complete dependence".

" (275). "The pastor's will is carried out not because it is in accordance with the law, but mainly because it is his will.

In Mesopotamia, a good life consisted in a life of obedience and the Mesopotamian was convinced that the authorities were always right (277). The individual found himself at the centre of concentric circles of authority that limited his freedom of action", each of which had "the right and the obligation to demand total obedience" (278). "Bend your back before your superior, the one who, from the palace [the government],

Opposition to a superior is a painful thing, [who] lives as long as he is submissive", advises an Egyptian teaching text (279).

This total and unconditional submission to the king is reflected in attitudes and gestures, the most demonstrative of which is prostration. This submission "is ritually manifested whenever a subject belonging to a [despotic] state approaches his sovereign or any other representative of authority. The subject, knowing that the wrath of the master may destroy him, tries to secure his good graces by showing himself humble; and the holder of power is only too willing to codify and impose these customary symbols of humility" (280). In the Hawaiian Islands, political power was terrifying enough to make common men grovel before their superiors. In Inca Peru, the highest dignitaries only approached their sovereign in the manner of tribute bearers, i.e. with their backs bent under a burden. The chronicles of Egypt under the Pharaohs describe the entire country 'crawling on its belly' before a representative of the king; subordinates crawled, kissed or sniffed the monarch's wake. In China, prostration was practised from the beginning of the Ch'ou dynasty and continued throughout the country's history. In India, during the classical Hindu period, the common man showed his respect for a person by kissing his feet, and it seems that the king was only approached in an attitude of prayer; at the end of the Hindu period, people prostrated before him, and this continued to be the case under Muslim rule. Prostration prevailed until the sultanate.

In Mesopotamia, it was customary to prostrate oneself before the gods, the sovereign and other gods.

It was the same in Achaemenid and Sassanid Persia, in the Hellenistic empires of the Seleucids and Ptolemies, and in the Eastern Roman Empire until the end of the Byzantine period. Some of this royal ceremonial was passed on to the Church (281). "No doubt habit made people insensitive to the humiliating significance of prostration, and aesthetic improvements made it more pleasant to perform. But whatever the degree of rationalisation of prostration, it remained throughout the centuries the symbol of abject submission" (282), a symbol which, moreover, "was not designed to earn the subject the respect of his superior".

(283). According to Herodotus (VII, 136; see also Arrien, 4.10 ff.), the Greeks refused to perform this gesture of submission before an Eastern despot, which they felt was only appropriate for a god (284).

To obtain the total submission of his subjects, the despot "demonstrated his supreme power by employing brutal methods of discipline and punishment" (285).

In Egypt, the whip was an adjunct to judicial practice and tax procedure, while in ancient Greece and Rome, citizens who were not subject to *corvée* and did not pay high taxes could not be subjected to torture, judicial, administrative or otherwise, at least initially. The influence of Asian customs on Roman law can be seen, however, in the fact that, at the end of the Empire and in the Byzantine period, judicial torture was extended to all free persons (286), just as it was introduced, in place of combat and ordeal, into the Salic law, "with the rise of despotic and centralised power at national or provincial level" (287) and, no doubt, also under the impetus of the Inquisition. Under the Abbasids, torture, although forbidden by the Koran, was used to collect taxes until 800 AD. In imperial China, the code of law condemned bad payers to the lash (288), so much so that, in the sixteenth century BC, the great tax reform, which, among other measures, commuted taxes in kind to silver, was referred to as the "single lash" (289). Arthashastra prescribed that police judges and courts should use force, if necessary, to collect taxes. In the Persian Empire, "civil servants were punished not only for acts of disobedience and actual crimes, but also for the negligence or carelessness with which they carried out the king's orders. One of the most lenient punishments was exile to the islands of the Persian Gulf; flogging, the death penalty and the death penalty were also imposed. mutilation, decapitation and crucifixion are very common punishments, even for satraps". (290).

Perhaps even more than through punishment, it was through fear of punishment that the sovereign ruled, whether or not the law was sanctioned by a religious text. In the first case, Persian despots considered that the terror inspired by punishment was essential to maintaining the state. As early as the fourth century BC, all civil servants were warned that their priority was not the accomplishment of their task: "A wise man's first and constant concern will be his own safety; for the life of a man in the service of the king may be compared to a life in fire; of

just as fire burns part or all of a body, the king has the power to destroy or promote the whole family" (291). In the second case, the "Cannibal Hymn" in the Pyramid Texts, which is certainly apt to inspire terror, not only here below but also beyond the grave, refers to "the day when the elders are slaughtered", who are cut up and cooked, and then the cannibal meal continues with the tasting of the elders' thighs and their wives' legs".

(292). The shepherd is as attentive to the good and happiness of his flock as he is ruthless towards those who rebel: in the Precepts of King Merikare, it is said that he "destroyed his own children because of what they thought..." (emphasis added). (293) (emphasis added). In Sumer, the "shepherd of the black heads" (humanity) (295), from whom the Mesopotamian rulers claimed to derive their power, "symbolises strength, the power to bend to one's will. Contrary wills are crushed, beaten and subdued'. Although he was supposed to use this cruel power only for good, 'one cannot never feel at peace before Enlil [nor, consequently, before the one who incarnates him on earth, i.e. the king], but feel an obscure fear'" (296). Maat, represented by the uraeus that the pharaoh wears on his forehead, has taken possession of the earth, which she floods with her blessings, through terror (297).

The tasks of the shepherd-king in Israel are quite special, and will inspire terror in his subjects when he "shall be great king over all the earth" (Zechariah, 14:9). They are "kabash" ("to subdue" (298) "Kabash", by extension, means "to trample", "to conquer", "to occupy conquered territory" and is used in the Bible to designate the action of raping (Esther 7:8; Nehemiah 5:5), enslaving (Jeremiah 34:11, 16) or invading a foreign country (2 Samuel 8:11).

(299). Radah", for its part, can also be applied either to the domestication of animals, to which, as we know, the Talmud compares non-Jews, or to the enslavement of Israel's enemies and is then associated with verbs like "destroy" (Numbers 24:19) or "attack" (Isaiah 14:6) (300). Sometimes Yahweh frightens his own people (Genesis 28:17; Amos 3:8), sometimes he inspires unlimited confidence (Isaiah 12:2).

Proverbs (14:26-27) links the two sentiments as if they were two sides of the same coin: "In the fear of Jehovah there is confidence, and for his children there is refuge. The fear of Jehovah is a fountain of life, to turn away from the snares of death"; it is presented as both "the beginning of wisdom" (Proverbs 9:10) and "the beginning of knowledge".

(Proverbs 1:7; Psalm 111:10). The "fear of the Lord", combined with love, is one of the highest biblical virtues. We will see in another study that it is still, in a "secularised" form "This is one of the main republican values.

To know his flock, the Oriental despot resorts not only to census-taking, but also to spying and conscientious direction.

As far back as antiquity, the central government carried out periodic censuses, first of the population and then of goods. Livestock" being a source of wealth, it was

It was of the utmost interest to the Eastern despotism to measure the elements of this wealth. In all the civilisations of the Near and Middle East, counting was a religious affair and was therefore accompanied by expiatory and purifying ceremonies (in Sumerian, the same word means "to count" and "to purify") (301), except in Israel, where these ceremonies were replaced by the levying of a tax: "When you count the children of Israel to enumerate them, every one of them shall pay to the Lord the redemption of his person, so that they will not be struck by any plague when t h e y a r e counted", says Exodus, 30:12. In Israel, the census was initiated by Yahweh (2 Kings XIV, 10-13) (302). More than a dozen verses in the Bible refer to the enumeration of the families of Israel; "of all the books of antiquity, it contains the most numerical terms" (303). The Bible "contains not only the Statistics of the population of the Hebrews, but also the Statistics of the heads of agricultural animals, with proof of the existence of an agricultural Statistics" (304); it contains "the most appropriate rules to serve even today as a basis for Statistics, i.e. all the rules that make it an administrative, economic and political science" (305). Around 2200 BC, the Chinese regime, which was populationist, "wanted to know the exact number of inhabitants in order to be able to distribute them throughout the territory, to distribute land, or to draw up roles for taxes, chores or military conscription. Much later (1600 BC), the 'sub-director of the multitudes' of the province of Cheuli recorded the number of men and women belonging to the nine classes of the population, distinguishing their age, condition and state of health. The great control, or general revision of the population, took place every three years" (306). In L'Arthashastra, the first census treatise, it is written that, "(i)n order to fulfil his planning role, he must be perfectly informed about the state of the kingdom, and for this purpose he must have recourse to censuses, statistics and the land register. He must know everything, from the size of the population to the number of wild elephants, with their size, age and sex, not forgetting the raw materials, the products prices and wages" (307). In Egypt, annual censuses, land registers, population movement tables and civil status registers existed at least as early as the Old Kingdom (308); under Ahmôsis II (Dynasty XXVI), a law was renewed requiring all subjects, on pain of death in the event of refusal, to appear every year before the provincial governor and declare their name, profession and means of subsistence (Herodotus II, 177).

"Don't you know that the king's ears and eyes are everywhere" (309), says an Egyptian text. These metaphorical expressions, which were used to designate royal officials first in Egypt (2nd millennium BC), then in China (7th century BC), India and Iran (2nd century BC) (310), accurately indicate their role in the corresponding political system (311). In the Hitopadesha ("useful instruction") (9th or 10th century BC), a collection of Indian fables derived from the Pañchatantra and which inspired La Fontaine, it is said: "You must have a spy in your country and in that of your enemy, to see what you should do and what you should not attempt. The spy is the king's eye: he who does not have one is blind" (312). Under Darius I, who brought the Persian Empire to its apogee from 522 to 486 BC, the minister of police was called "the king's eye" (313), while in Egypt the expression "the king's eye" applied to the king himself (314). Informers, spies, censors, secret agents, an "efficient and often discreet web, which, with constant vigilance and a

demonic efficacy, directs, controls and constrains the individual in his social environment", are considered, in certain sources, as supernatural beings, "either as demons, or as the messengers and servants of the 'eyes of the Lord'" (Genesis 16:13) (315).

The most effective way for a despot to keep an eye on his subjects is still to ensure that they keep an eye on themselves, by forcing them to examine their consciences and introspect. Ear confession was practised in China and ear and priestly confession in South-East Asia and Zoroastrian Persia before it was established by the Christians (316). "Each of the viceroys, governors and mandarins must, from time to time, sincerely and humbly confess the secret and public faults of which he feels guilty in the administration of his office, and send them in writing to the court".

(317). In Buddhism, particularly in the Theravada tradition, it is interesting to note that confession - not of sins, since Buddhism does not recognise this concept, but of "bad deeds" or "bad thoughts" - is considered a punishment and even the only punishment for them (318). In Japan, it was practised in a cruel manner and could lead to the death of the sinner (319). In addition to public confession, private confession was also used by the Jews (Ezekiel 33; Proverbs 28:15), as the writings of their teachers show. "The rabbis (...) have the power to bind and unbind consciences, to excommunicate and to impose fasts and other penances that can unbind sins and preserve from calamities. They gave confession the name viddui, a word each letter of which is the symbol or meaning of a mortal sin. These are the sins that the common people examine their conscience about: the more enlightened go into greater detail. This confession, which is made to God alone, takes place every young day. Certain days are also set aside for penance among the Jews; people who do not believe themselves enlightened enough to know what kind of penance they should undergo consult the rabbis, so as to be guided by them, as was the case among the first Christians, who turned to the priests for the same purpose" (320). Confession of sins was an integral part of the mysteries.

Total obedience is linked to "self-knowledge and confession". (321).

The benevolent terror spread by this "government of conduct" results in a polarisation of power and, by the same token, an atomisation of human relations, both of which generate widespread mistrust and loneliness.

The mutual distrust that seems to have existed in traditional China can be attributed to the people's fear of being dragged into difficulties. "In *The Thousand and One Nights*, a corpse passes from door to door, because each inhabitant is convinced that the authorities will hold him responsible for the stranger's death. The frequently observed reluctance to come to the aid of a drowning stranger

can be explained by the same reasoning: If I fail to save this poor devil, how will I prove to the authorities that I did not premeditate his death? 322. In such a climate, participation in public affairs can be extremely perilous, so much so that "[t]he fear of engaging in business with an uncontrollable government, with unpredictable actions, encourages the prudent subject to content himself with his own affairs, personal and professional. This fear effectively separates him from the other members of the larger community to which he also belongs" (323).

Just as the ordinary man has good reason to be afraid of being caught out at the drop of a hat, so the civil servant is not wrong to think that he is constantly living on the razor's edge: "[t]he senior civil servant is bound to be jealous of those below him, for it is among him that rivals are to be feared. "High officials are bound to be jealous of those below them, for it is among them that rivals are to be feared. Inferior officials, on the other hand, are no less afraid of those above them, for it is from them that they may fear dismissal at any time" (324). The perpetual mistrust that civil servants feel towards their colleagues is matched only by that of the king, who is always under the threat of being physically removed by a member of his entourage. "The formidable power of the state apparatus can destroy not only suspicious extra-governmental forces, but also completely annihilate individual members of the ruling group, including the sovereign himself" (325). Terror, here, is "the sole instrument for deforming every constituent element of society, for (sic) [ensuring that] [...] groups [remain

fragmented], [that] [...] the spontaneous links between them [remain broken] and [that] factitious antagonisms [persist]: terror aims to [maintain] an artificial social structure [...]" (326). Oriental despotism alienates the mind. "There were indeed isolated individuals among the free men of classical Greece; the same is true in the democratic countries of today. But these free individuals are generally isolated because they are neglected, not threatened by a power which, whenever it wishes, can reduce a man's dignity to nothing. An isolated person can maintain relations with relatives or friends; he can overcome his partial and passive alienation by widening the circle of his relations or by finding new ways of integrating into society.

The man who lives under total power has no such privilege. Unable to oppose such conditions, he takes refuge in resignation. Seeking to avoid the worst, he must be constantly ready to face it". (327). In a society of consumerism and democratic welfare, man takes refuge in hedonistic individualism, but, contrary to what Wittfogel argues, the result is the same: alienation. And the cause is the same: a power which, even though or, rather, because it has substituted freedom for coercion as a technique of government, embraces and penetrates, in an undoubtably even more total, albeit diffuse, way than did Eastern despotism, the public and private life of the citizen, in most cases at the more or less unconscious request of the latter. Five years after "[having] noticed during [his] stay in the United States that a democratic social state

similar to that of the Americans could offer singular facilities for the establishment of despotism, and [having] seen on [his] return to Europe how much most of our princes had already made use of these ideas, feelings and needs that this same social state gave rise to, to extend the circle of their power', Tocqueville, having at the same time seen his fears on this subject increase, declared: Tocqueville, who at the same time saw his fears on this subject increase, declared: "In past centuries, we have never seen a sovereign so absolute and so powerful who undertook to administer by himself, and without the help of secondary powers, all the parts of a great empire.

who descended beside each of them to govern and guide them. The idea of such an undertaking

had never presented itself to the human mind, and, had it occurred to any man to conceive it, the inadequacy of enlightenment, the imperfection of administrative procedures, and above all the natural obstacles created by the inequality of conditions would soon have stopped him in the execution of such a vast project (327bis).

By what sleight of hand is the Eastern ruler able to reconcile a desire for the good and happiness of others with despotic measures and violence towards them? In reality, the despot governs with words as benevolent as his actions are harsh, to such an extent that it is tempting to compare him to a "possessive mother", one who, in Jewish tradition, was already known, before psychology and psychoanalysis diagnosed this pathology, under the name of yiddishe mamé (328).

Oriental despotism, to use Wittfogel's absolutely fundamental definition, is characterised by surface benevolence and substantial tyranny.

As we saw above, the Asian mode of production, the Trojan horse of Oriental despotism, had succeeded in infiltrating Europe through the adoption by certain ancient European rulers of provisions of Oriental legislation. Christianity, in which it took on a form that Foucault calls "pastoral power" and which, according to him, "developed [...] above all in Hebrew society" (329), enabled it to gain a real and definitive foothold in the Greco-Roman world. "It is the Christian Church that has coagulated all these themes of power [...] into precise mechanisms and defined institutions; it is the Church that has really organised a power [...] that is both specific and autonomous; it is the Church that has implanted its mechanisms within the Roman Empire and organised, at the heart of the Roman Empire, a type of power that, I believe, no other civilisation had known" (330). However close it may be to the Jewish pastorate, the Christian pastorate is not a transfer of it. It takes it to its extreme consequences. Foucault defines it in terms of five characteristics, without however, as far as the first is concerned, specifying - and we will have to venture to do so - how it differs from the tendency of Judaism on which it is based, which it prolongs and radicalises. These five characteristics, to which we will add a sixth, are as follows:

1. It "is exercised not so much over a fixed territory as over a multitude on the move towards a goal" (331), or, more simply, "over a multiplicity on the move", "(i)n contrast, therefore, to the power that is exercised over the unity of a territory" (332). "The power of the shepherd is a power that is not exercised over a territory; it is a power that by definition is exercised over a flock, or more precisely over the flock as it moves, as it moves from one point to another. The power of the shepherd is essentially exercised over a multiplicity in movement. The Greek god is a god

A territorial god has his own privileged place, whether it's his city or his temple. The Hebrew God, on the other hand, is of course the God who walks, the God who moves, the God who wanders. Never is the presence of this Hebrew God more intense, more visible than when his people are on the move and when, in the wandering of his people, in their displacement, in the movement that takes them out of the city, the meadows and the pastures, he takes the lead and shows them the direction to follow. The Greek god appears on the walls defending his city. The Hebrew God appears precisely when you leave the city, when you leave the walls, and when you begin to follow the path that crosses the meadows. O God, when you went out at the head of your people", say the Psalms.

It is in the same way [...] that the Egyptian shepherd-god Amun is defined as the one who leads people along all the paths. And if, in this direction that the God provides for a multiplicity on the move, there is indeed a reference to territory, it is insofar as the shepherd-god knows where the fertile meadows are, which are the good paths to take to get there and which will be the favourable resting places. In Exodus, it says of Yahweh: "You have faithfully led this people whom you have redeemed, you have led them by your power to the pastures of your holiness" (333). The first Christians also dreamt of being led "to the pastures of holiness", as shown by the pastoral representations of "this nomadic mentality which readily imagines its master or god as the shepherd of the people who are journeying and searching".

realistic style on Christian sarcophagi from the first centuries of our era (334); it should be remembered that, for many, the first Christians were Jews or, in any case, Semites. Unlike their ancestors, they were also city-dwellers, so the melancholy regret to which these representations bear witness is not that of an existence that has been known, of an experience that has been made, but a desire to return to a past that, unlike their ancestors born in the countryside of the Near or Middle East, they did not have. The "multiplicity in movement" on which the Christian pastorate of the early days was exercised was that of the cities: "The countryside remained the place of occult powers, rites and archaic magic, rebellious to the City of God. The city alone was in essence truly receptive to the Spirit" (335).

2. He is "fundamentally good". Jesus is not described simply, as David had been, as a 'shepherd' or 'shepherdess', but as a 'good shepherd' or 'good shepherd' (John 10:11; Luke 12:32). Charity, which was only one of the many aspects of power in ancient Greece and Rome, is the stated "raison d'être" of pastoral power. "The essential objective of pastoral power is [...] the salvation of the flock. And in this sense, we can say, of course, that we are not very far from what is traditionally set as the objective of the sovereign, that is, the salvation of the fatherland, which must be the *lex suprema* of the exercise of power. But the salvation of the flock has a very precise meaning in this theme of pastoral power. Salvation essentially means sustenance. The sustenance provided, the food assured, is good pasture. The shepherd is the one who feeds and who feeds from hand to hand, or in any case who feeds on the one hand by leading to good pastures, and on the other hand by making sure that the animals eat and are fed as they should be. Pastoral power is a power of care. He looks after the flock, he looks after the individuals in the flock, he makes sure that the sheep don't suffer, he looks for those that stray of course, he

heal those who are wounded [...] Pastoral power initially manifests itself in zeal, devotion and unending application. What is the shepherd? He is the one whose power shines out in the eyes of men like sovereigns or like the gods, well the Greek gods, who appeared primarily through brilliance? Not at all. The shepherd is the one who keeps watch. Watching' in the sense, of course, of keeping an eye out for any harm that might be done, but above all as a vigilance against anything unfortunate that might happen. He will watch over the flock, warding off any misfortune that may threaten the least of the animals in the herd. He will see to it that things are as they should be for each of the animals in the flock.

" (336). He will see to it, even to the point of self-sacrifice. In societies subject to the Asian mode of production, what makes a good subject is servile obedience, resigned passivity, blind acceptance of sacrificing oneself in vain for the despot. So if, in Greco-Roman society, "what makes a good citizen is to be able to sacrifice oneself on the orders of the magistrate or to accept to die for one's king" [...] the opposite is true: it is the king, the shepherd, who accepts to die in order to sacrifice himself" (337). In Ezekiel's prophecy (34:23), Yahweh says: "I will raise them up a shepherd, a shepherd who will feed them". Jesus Christ applies this prophecy to himself: "I lay down my life for my sheep" (John 10), just as David did (1 Samuel 17.34-35) (338), even though he was not yet a king, laid down his life for his sheep (the title of shepherd is not given to him by the authors of the historical books of the Bible, but it is by the prophets) (339), something unthinkable, not only, as we have just seen, for a Greek or Roman ruler, but also, for other reasons, for a Pharaoh or for a king. Mesopotamian.

3. It demands obedience, and obedience of a very special kind. [...] the Greek citizen allows himself to be led, basically, and accepts to be led only by two things: by law and by persuasion, by the injunctions of the city or by the rhetoric of men. I would say, again in a very crude way, that the general category of obedience does not exist among the Greeks, or in any case that there are two distinct spheres which are not entirely of the order of obedience. So there is the sphere of respect for the law, respect for the decisions of the assembly, respect for the sentences of the magistrates, respect in short for orders that are addressed either to everyone in the same way, or to someone in particular, but in the name of everyone. So you have the zone of respect, and then you have the zone [...], let's say of insidious actions and effects: this is the set of procedures by which people allow themselves to be led, persuaded or seduced by someone else. These are the processes by which the orator, for example, convinces his audience, the doctor persuades his patient to follow such and such a course of treatment, the philosopher persuades the person who consults him to do such and such a thing in order to arrive at truth, self-control, and so on. These are the processes by which the teacher who teaches something to his pupil convinces him of the importance of achieving that result and of the means to be used to achieve it. In other words, to respect the laws, to allow oneself to be persuaded by someone: the law or rhetoric" (340). As for the Christian pastorate, it establishes "the instance of pure obedience, obedience as a type of unitary conduct, conduct which is highly valued and which has the essential reason for being in itself. Here's what I want to say: everyone knows - and here again, at the outset, we're not far removed from what the Hebrew theme was - that Christianity is not a religion of the law; it's a religion of God's will, a religion of God's wills for each individual. Hence,

of course, the fact that the pastor is not going to be the man of the law or even its representative; his action will always be situational and individual [...] The pastor is not fundamentally or primarily a judge, he is essentially a doctor who has to take care of each soul and the illness of each soul" (341). The relationship between the latter and the pastor is one of "[i]ntegral dependence", which implies three modalities. "Firstly, it is a relationship of submission, not to a law, not to a principle of order, not even to a reasonable injunction, or to some principles or conclusions drawn by reason. It is a relationship of submission from one individual to another. It is that the strictly individual relationship, the correlation between an individual who directs and an individual who is directed, is not only a condition, it is the very principle of Christian obedience. And the one who is led must accept, must obey, within this very individual relationship and because it is an individual relationship. The Christian places himself in the hands of his pastor for spiritual matters, but also for material matters and for everyday life [...] Secondly, it is a relationship that is not finalised, in the sense that when the Greek entrusts himself to a doctor or a gymnastics master or a rhetoric teacher or even a philosopher, it is to achieve a certain result. This result is going to be knowledge of a trade or perfection of some kind, or healing, and obedience is, in relation to this result, only the necessary and not always pleasant passage. So in Greek obedience, or at any rate in the fact that the Greek submits, at a given moment, to someone's will or orders, there is always an object - health, virtue, truth - and an end, in other words there will come a time when this relationship of obedience will be suspended and even reversed. After all, when we submit to a professor of philosophy in Greece, it is so that at some point we can become masters of ourselves, in other words, we can reverse this relationship of obedience and become our own masters. But in Christian obedience, there is no end, because what does Christian obedience lead to? Quite simply, it is obedience. We obey so that we can be obedient, to arrive at a state of obedience. I believe that this notion of a state of obedience is also something completely new, completely specific, which would not have been found before" (342). Thirdly, we find ourselves here in a "generalised field of obedience" (343), because Christianity makes several shepherds appear where there was only one: from the parish priest to Jesus by way of the bishop (344), at almost every level of the ecclesiastical hierarchy there is a shepherd, who is governed by his superior and who governs his subordinate.

4. It is a form of power that is "both globalising and totalising"; it is based on "a complex combination [...] of individualising techniques and totalising procedures". Whereas [in ancient Rome and Greece] the essential function of the king or magistrate is to save [it would be more accurate to say 'maintain'] the totality of the state, the territory, the city, the citizens as a whole, the good shepherd is capable of looking after individuals in particular, individuals taken one by one" (345). Like the Jewish pastorate, it "individualises by placing as much value, by an essential paradox, on a single sheep as on the whole flock"; it even "personalises", in the sense that this term has in the jargon of the science of education ("adapting teaching to take account of the individual, his abilities, his mental structures, his interests, motivations, needs", etc.), just as, in the Eastern despotism, the relationships

Even when the despot attacks a particular individual, he is not doing so because that person has specific characteristics, but because he has shown disobedience towards him and is therefore a threat to him. Pastoral power claims to be interested in each and every one of them, either to lavish benefits on them, to protect them, or, on the contrary, to "[drive] them from the flock", if, "by [their] illness or [their] scandal, [they are] likely to contaminate the whole flock" (346); "[.....] on the other hand, and this is the paradox, the salvation of a single sheep must be of as much concern to the shepherd as that of the whole flock; there is no sheep for which he should not, suspending all his other duties and occupations, abandon the flock and try to bring it back" (347). Omnes et singulatim ("all and one by one") is his motto: "singulatim", because Christianity is an individualistic ideology insofar as it attributes value to the soul only through its personal relationship with God and, even more so, through its divine election; "omnes", because Christianity, for which all men are all and one by one, is an individualistic ideology insofar as it attributes value to the soul only through its personal relationship with God and, even more so, through its divine election; "omnes", because Christianity, for which all men are all and one by one, is an individualistic ideology. equal in nature, regardless of their sex or race, before the divinity, in which they participate, is a universalist belief.

5. To fulfil his role, which is to provide the whole flock and each individual sheep with its sustenance, to watch over them daily and ensure their salvation, the shepherd must understand their behaviour. Pastoral power "cannot be exercised without knowing what goes on in people's minds, without exploring their souls, without forcing them to reveal their innermost secrets. [It] implies a knowledge of the conscience" of individuals and groups "and an ability to lead them" (348).

Hence, collectively, the Church's large-scale enquiries into individuals from the tenth century onwards, enquiries that were both administrative (into their property) and moral (into their faults and sins), and which, following in the footsteps of the Church, were carried out on a massive scale by the lay courts and officialdom from the twelfth century onwards (349); the Church's institution of the Inquisition ("research") in the thirteenth century; the Church's obligation, in the fourteenth century and even after the Lateran Council (1215) (350), for parishes to keep population registers, called libri status animarum (registers of the state of souls), in which births and deaths were recorded (351), These practices were the direct origin of demography (352), the statistical study of human populations in their fundamental biological, social, cultural and intellectual structures, and, at least indirectly, of two instruments of the modern State, namely the bureaucratic apparatus, which alone was capable of collecting data, to record, process and exploit the data required for this study, and the police, who are ultimately responsible for ensuring that bureaucratic order is respected (353).

Hence, in order to get to know each individual individually, the auricular confession, coupled with the guidance of conscience. The aim of the shepherd is not so much "to save [each of his sheep] as such, but to ensure for each Christian, precisely through the 'purification' of his worldly life, the eternity of the super-terrestrial life [...] attention to the conservation and safeguarding of the biological life of individuals-".

The care of the sheep is the act of taking care of their 'moral life', as attention to habits and bodily inclinations, with the supreme aim of guaranteeing access to the blessed and eternal life, of which, however, the only judge and artisan is God" (354).

Whereas among the Greeks and the early Romans, and even among the Hebrews, there was a certain community of destiny between the people and their leader(s), "[t]he Christian pastor acts in a subtle economy of merit and demerit, an economy which presupposes an analysis of specific elements, mechanisms of transfer, procedures of inversion, interplay between opposing elements, in short a whole detailed economy of merits and demerits between which, in the end, God will decide" (355). In order to moralise the faithful and rid them of their sins by every possible means, to moralise them, the pastor must "[have] a detailed and precise knowledge of his subject, both in terms of his material requirements and his spiritual needs, so that in the final analysis the subject submitted to him is completely "transparent", devoid of secrets both for him, pastor and earthly guide, and for God. Thus, anxious to know at all times the purity of the soul of his dear sheep and to measure its moral progress, the Christian shepherd" (356) uses three techniques: confession, examination of conscience and direction of conscience. Ear confession, as we saw earlier, was practised in Asian societies long before the advent of Christianity. Examination and guidance of conscience were not unknown to the ancient Greeks. However, in ancient Greece, they were voluntary and circumstantial, and even paid for (357). What's more, they had a specific purpose: self-control. Christian practice is different. "Firstly, because the direction of conscience is not exactly voluntary. It isn't always, and in the case of monks, for example, it's absolutely compulsory; you can't not have a director of conscience. Secondly, the direction of conscience is not circumstantial. It is not a question of responding to a misfortune, a crisis or a difficulty. The guidance of conscience is absolutely permanent, etc. It is about everything and for the whole of one's life that one must be guided. Finally, thirdly, the function of the examination of conscience, which is indeed one of the instruments of the direction of conscience, is not to ensure that the individual has control over himself, to compensate in some way for his dependence on the director. Quite the opposite is true. We examine one's conscience only to be able to tell the director what one has done, what one is, what one has experienced, the temptations to which one has been subjected, the bad thoughts one has left in oneself, that is to say that it is to better mark, to better anchor the relationship of dependence on the other that one makes one's examination of conscience". In short, "[t]he examination of conscience in classical antiquity was an instrument of mastery; here, on the contrary, it is going to be an instrument of dependence" (358), all the more so since that the "discourse of truth" that the Christian constantly forms about himself through the examination of conscience "will be the means by which [he] will be linked to the one who directs [his] conscience" (359). Moreover, the faithful, aware that their salvation depends on their ability to tell the whole truth about themselves, "develop a relationship with themselves that leads them to institute a 'mortified' identity, based on the renunciation of worldliness and self-determination, and ultimately to accept a reference

external foundational force - God or the shepherd - as a condition of possibility for one's own singular identity

"(360), which is never more than a form of alienation.

It is, at least since the obligation of private confession at the beginning of the thirteenth century and despite the trade in indulgences to which it gave rise, fundamentally intimidating (361). It is surprising, given the extent to which threat is an integral part of the economy of Christianity, that Foucault did not consider intimidation to be a characteristic of pastoral power. It is true that, in religion

Christian, "[a]ll the dimensions of terror and force or fearful violence, all those disquieting powers that make men tremble the power of kings and gods [...] all that vanishes when it comes to the pastor" (362), insofar as the leaders of the first Christian communities did not commit acts of aggression on the bodies of their flocks in order to subdue them, coerce them and get what they wanted from them. Pastoral power persecutes and terrorises by purely psychological means, which, as we saw above, Eastern despots were well aware of, although they did not have weapons as effective as those of "[a] terrible God who is more judge than father, despite the mercy with which he is credited; a divine justice likened to vengeance; the conviction that, despite the Redemption, the number of the elect will remain small, the whole of humanity having deserved hell through original sin; the certainty that every sin wounds and insults God; the rejection of all distraction and all concessions to nature because they lead away from salvation" (363), as well as the haunting of the devil. Christianity "on the one hand [...] reassures, since God forgives through Jesus and promises man faithful love; on the other hand, it provokes us to bad conscience" (364) through the "distrustful and repressive guilt" "that he imposes on his faithful [...] by means of sin. For nothing of this escapes the gaze of a demanding Judge who knows everything. How can the justice that justifies man and the justice that judges him be brought together in a harmonious synthesis? Especially since 'sin' weighs more heavily than 'fault', since it includes the notion of personal responsibility not only before men but also before "an Other who cannot be mystified".

". By making the confession of sin a fundamental requirement of the message of liberation, Christianity exposes man to morbid guilt" (365) and turns him into a neurotic.

6. Even if terrorism is not one of the characteristics that Foucault attributed to pastoral power, he shows that he was perfectly aware of the importance of this element in Christianity, when he states with redoubled perspicacity: "Fear, for the first time in history, - well, fear about oneself, fear of what one is, (...) and not at all the fear of destiny, and not at all the fear of the decrees of the gods - this fear is, I believe, anchored in Christianity from the turn of the first and second centuries, and will obviously be of absolutely decisive importance in the whole history of what can be called subjectivity, that is to say the relationship between oneself and oneself, the exercise of oneself over oneself and the truth that the individual can discover deep within himself".

(366). One of the mainsprings of Asian despotic government is to instil fear; the genius of Asian Christianity is to make people fear themselves. Instilling fear, even terror, in people is the foundation, the root, of Christian pastoral techniques.

These techniques were grafted onto the exercise of power from the end of the 16th century onwards.

Foucault distinguishes three types of state according to the form of power that mainly characterises them: "the State of justice, born in a feudal-type territoriality and which would correspond roughly to a society of law - customary laws and written laws -, with a whole interplay of commitments and disputes; secondly, the administrative State, born in the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries in a frontier-type territoriality and no longer feudal, an administrative State which corresponds to a society of regulations and disciplines; and, finally, a State of government which is no longer defined essentially by its territoriality, by the surface occupied, but by a mass: the mass of the population, with its volume, its density, with, of course, the territory on which it lives.

to which it is extended, but which is in some ways only a component of it. And this State of government, which is essentially based on the population and which refers to and uses the instrumentation of economic knowledge, would correspond to a society controlled by security devices (367).

In the 'state of justice', power was, in Foucault's sense, sovereign, that is to say, it was based on the right to life and death and on the right of deduction. The latter consisted of the right to appropriate a portion of the nation's wealth, a tax on products, goods and services, and the right to deduct services, bodies and ultimately life itself. The obligation to wage war in the name of the sovereign and the imposition of the death penalty for acting against his will were the clearest manifestations of his right to life and death. Foucault asserts that a very profound transformation of the mechanisms of power has taken place since the seventeenth century (368). Once the state became 'administrative', sovereign power was gradually supplemented and partly replaced by what he calls 'biopower', a form of power that claims to exert a positive influence on life by subjecting it to precise controls and complete regulation. Deduction and physical violence have their place in it, but on the one hand they are not its predominant characteristics, and on the other hand, as far as physical violence is concerned, "biopower" only resorts to it in cases where none of its pastoral techniques of government have enabled it to achieve its stated objective, which is to take care of the population and each individual within it by means of techniques, standards and procedures involved in the rational and scientific management of all aspects of the citizen's life, private and public, with the ultimate aim of monitoring him in order to better discipline and control him for economic purposes. In the "state of government", the "security state" if you like, "biopower" is no longer exercised solely by the state bureaucracy; it is also exercised at a second level by the private sector as a whole, which has been largely bureaucratised since the end of the twentieth century, and at a third level by the self-proclaimed moral authorities known as experts, specialists and associations, some of which are financed by the state; and finally, at the fourth level, by individuals themselves, who have each integrated the procedures, techniques, practices and standards used at the three higher levels to watch over them, i.e. the "public authorities".

to watch over them and get to know them so as to be able to control them completely.

They are all t h e m o r e flattered by the words and sometimes even the self-serving acts of kindness and love of which they are almost constantly the objects. Can we go any further in mothering the population than bludgeoning them with advertisements (paid for by taxes) advising them to drink water regularly on hot days?

The changes in pastoral power, derived from oriental despotism, which it refined and made more complex, will be the subject of the fourth part of this study (369). In the meantime, we leave the reader with these enlightening reflections on despotism :

"Despotism is not tyranny, and there is an immense difference between these two things, although they are often confused by the indiscriminate use of words to express them. [Despotism is not only tyranny, it is something more than tyranny.

"What, then, is despotism? Despotism is not the simple use of force, it is not the right that the strongest violently assumes over the weakest, the most skilful over the most ignorant, it is not the right that is based on force and fact. It is the right to command other men by virtue of a supernatural power and to impose obedience on them as a duty; it is the divine right to compel them, to punish them and even to kill them if they resist. What distinguishes despotism from tyranny is that it not only relies on a natural means, on the fact of force, an accident that has nothing stable about it, but that it seeks outside humanity and in order to act against it a right whose source cannot be within it; in a word, it is through superstition, through the hypothesis of the intervention of a supernatural power accepted as an article of faith, that the alleged right of despotism is founded. Through this fiction, tyranny, which was merely the abuse of force, is metamorphosed into despotism.

"The establishment of despotism is a work of art; it does not take place through the use of force alone, which cannot be a moral right and cannot impose duties, but it does take place through the use of cunning. Its means are error, credulity and superstitious fears. With the use of these means, the aim of political science and the art of governing men is no longer to ennoble them, to improve them, to instruct them, to establish among them a fair balance of rights and duties for the happiness of all, but to compress the growth of their intelligence, to reduce them to servitude, for the benefit of a privileged few.

"Under these conditions, art is no longer true art, it no longer deserves this noble name, it is nothing more than artifice, it acts in the opposite direction to its intended purpose, it corrupts, it deceives, it degrades man, it brings him back to his origins.

to the state of brute, and all his efforts tend to prevent him from getting out of it. Despotism thus characterised by the means it employs is no longer the simple, frank and open tyranny that relies on force.

It's tyranny combined with cunning and lies [...].

"Since man is not really free by instinct but by intelligence, despotism is not exercised by force alone, it is exercised by ideas, it is a learned and profound perfection of tyranny, and it attacks the principle of freedom in its sanctuary, before attacking it in its manifestation and in its external development. Its policy is first to enchain the intellect and the will in order to enchain the body, and there is this difference between it and tyranny: to be a tyrant you need only soldiers and to be a despot you need more than soldiers, you need priests.

"Despotism therefore has as the basis of its existence the art of deceiving men, or at least of profiting from their errors. [...]

"To achieve this culpable aim, the whole skill consists in employing the living forces of human nature, its intellectual and moral faculties, and in placing them in a false relationship to one another, in order to set them in opposition, to neutralise them, to destroy their unity and thus to divert them from their common goal, after having divided them. It is always the same fatal axiom: divide and rule, which despotism applies not only to political society, but to man himself, who, insofar as he is the being who sums up the world and bears within himself the image of the universal cause, is as much by his physical constitution as by his moral constitution a social being, a living society. It is through seduction, through the promise of infinite pleasures, through the fear of eternal torment, it is by appealing to these two fundamental motives for all self-interested and personal action, and by raising them to infinite proportions with the help of the imagination, that this art of neutralising man's faculties by themselves is principally exercised. In all cases, people do not accept beliefs that take away their freedom freely; they surrender themselves, sell themselves, as it were, for a price that is offered to them, or else, which produces the same result, they allow themselves to be subjugated by terror. Depending on the character, sometimes it is one of these means that succeeds, sometimes it is the other; more often than not, they both succeed at the same time. In truth, then, there is nothing noble or elevated about the bargain by which a man gives up his freedom and his reason in exchange for the promise of a future benefit; there is nothing noble or elevated about the capitulation by which he gives up his freedom under the influence of fear. In all this there is no feeling for the good, no love of good for its own sake, which characterises any truly moral act; there is only an application of the selfish rule of the well-understood interest: if the well-understood interest of man can be to sacrifice his noblest faculties to hopes and fears which, according to the conditions of the bargain he accepts, he no longer has the right even to doubt without becoming a criminal and without losing the benefits of the sacrifice he has made. And let it not be said that by giving up this cowardly abandonment of his freedom and his reason, man gains something directly and really, and that he receives as payment for his servitude

What he is given in return for his sacrifice and his intellectual suicide is not science, but mysteries that must be believed and not understood, in other words a science of darkness into whose sanctuary he can only be admitted on condition that he enters and remains blind. Thanks to this artifice, despotism, impossible in the natural order by force alone, finds a basis outside humanity, in a supernatural and fictitious order, and is founded on error and servile law. Man is dispossessed of his rights by his own belief, he abdicates himself or rather he sells for imaginary goods his natural right, his independence, his sovereignty, his reason, which are his real goods. Despotism, which is nothing more than a negation of human rights, is then created and has its basis.

with error, it settles there, and after the murder of reason, in which resides the

With the help of faith, it enslaves the will which, still dominated by fear and hope, ceases to be a free faculty. Thus constituted, despotism is no longer, like tyranny, a fact which has no other basis than force and which force destroys. By virtue of the supernatural source from which it is supposed to derive, it is inviolable, and by virtue of faith, which accepts its supernatural principle, it is sacred, and whatever the despot does, he always does right, because he is a God. Finally, there is this last difference between the tyrant and the despot: the tyrant who violates justice is recognised by reason as unjust, whereas the despot is always recognised as just by faith. So it is in error, in the fiction enshrined in faith, that the principle of despotism has its source. Every man who believes in the existence of supernatural beings carries within himself and riveted, so to speak, to his own thought the chain of slavery; he is no longer free by his intelligence, he no longer has rights, he has only

He is a slave in his will, and his conscience, no longer belonging to him, can no longer be regulated by his reason, since his reason is subject to his belief and his belief gives him a master and a law that he must blindly follow. When despotism is founded in this way, it exists in all its normal conditions, and a return to freedom is not possible for peoples. As long as man

is intellectually and internally free, he reacts or can react against tyranny with an enlightened sense of justice, with an awareness of his right and duty; but when intellectual freedom is destroyed by superstition, the moral spring is broken. In despotic states, when the yoke is too heavy, when the full measure of oppression is reached, there may be revolt against the person of the despot, but there is no revolt against despotism; only the despot is killed, despotism is not, for it lives not only in the person of the despot, but in the very minds of those who kill the despot. This truth is constantly demonstrated by experience: nothing is more common in despotic states than the killing of the despot, but despotism never dies. Again, this is because despotism is not tyranny, and there is a gulf between the two; it is because tyranny, for those over whom it is exercised, is merely the loss of liberty through physical force, whereas despotism is the loss of liberty through physical force.

intellectual and moral by error, superstition and blind faith, which enchain thought and make the will of man, misled and seduced, the instrument of his slavery (370)", unless he was born a slave in the Aristotelian sense.

B. K., November 2019

(1) Aristotle, *La Politique*, translated by Jules Barthélemy-Saint-Hilaire, Ladrance, Paris, 1874, p. 7.

(2) Paul Janet, *Histoire de la philosophie morale et politique dans l'antiquité et les temps modernes*, t. 1, Ladrance, Paris, 1858, p. 142.

(3) "Aristotle is often portrayed, and still is today, as a supporter of kingship. We believe that this is a mistake, and that, in order to make it, one must disregard everything he says about kingship, as well as the many ideas he expresses in various places in his work, which imply a formal condemnation of this kind of constitution. We will not, of course, say that he pronounces an absolute condemnation of kingship; in general, he is hardly the defender of such radical theses; he does not impose any form of government in an absolute manner, nor, on the other hand, does he reject any of them absolutely, except tyranny and the

demagogy, i.e. forms of government in which the principle of the sovereignty of the laws is disregarded; for him, a government must above all be related to the particular character of the people for whom it is intended, and to the special situation in which that people finds itself; with such a system, Aristotle had necessarily to admit monarchy to a certain extent, where particular circumstances make it the best or even the only possible government; he goes even further: he not only admits legal monarchy, consecrated, regulated and limited by law, he even admits absolute monarchy in favour of the one whom his genius would elevate above all other members of the State. But, despite this, we must recognise that Aristotle is opposed to kingship, and that, if he admits it, it is only in certain cases and under certain conditions, i.e. always as an exception; we will prove this sufficiently by recalling some of the ideas he puts forward, either when dealing with kingship or in other passages of the *Politics*. Thus, he vigorously defends the superiority of the empire of the laws over the empire of a single man, however virtuous; he formally declares that aristocracy, i.e. the government of several honest citizens, is much preferable to kingship, or the government of one; elsewhere, he points out the corrupting influence that omnipotence exerts on the character and conduct of the person who holds it in his hands, and the need for the establishment of a brake and a system of checks.

He also condemns the heredity of kingship, pointing out its disadvantages and dangers, and he does so with a precision that leaves nothing to be desired, even seeming to find in it an argument against kingship; in yet other passages, he expresses his contempt for rulers who owe their power, not to their personal merit, but solely to their birth, to mere chance; finally, he directs sharp criticism at Spartan kingship. One wonders how, after all this, Aristotle could have been considered and represented as a supporter of monarchical institutions" (E. van der Rest, *Platon et Aristote. Essai sur les*

commencements de la Science politique, Gustave Mayolez, Brussels, 1876, p. 470-1).

(4) Paul Janet, *op. cit.* p. 176.

(5) E. van der Rest, *op. cit.* p. 501.

(6) Aristotle, *op. cit.* p. 459.

(7) Ibid, pp. 459-60. Aristotle contradicts himself when he states that, in order to maintain himself, the tyrant is careful to "defend common meals and associations" and that he "sends people, like Hieron, to listen in on everything in societies and meetings, because people are less frank when they fear spying, and if they speak out, everything gets out". Let's just say that the imbecile tyrant effectively forbids meetings, while the informed tyrant authorises them, even encourages them, in order to,

To be precise, to have its subjects monitored by spies, so as to know everything about them. In the same vein, officials of the occupying forces in today's so-called Western countries have every interest in not shutting down patriotic websites and online discussion forums.

(8) Ibid, p. 460.

(9) Ibid, p. 462.

(10) E. van der Rest, op. cit. p. 544 et seq.

(11) Aristotle, op. cit. p. 176.

(12) Ibid, p. 5.

(13) See *ibid*, p. 176: "[t]he most reliable authors" (Mario Turchetti, *Droit de Résistance, à quoi? Unmasking despotism and tyranny today*. In *Revue historique* 2006/4, no. 640 [pp. 831-78], p. 833) may agree in defining despotism as a form of government which, while authoritarian and arbitrary, is nonetheless legitimate, even legal, i.e. in accordance with the legislation in force, and tyranny, while also constituting an authoritarian and arbitrary form of government, as a species of government that is illegitimate and illegal, because it is exercised without or against the consent of the citizens, but, if this was how Aristotle and his contemporaries understood these two terms, we would be able to say that despotism is a form of government that is legitimate, even legal, i.e. in accordance with the legislation in force, and tyranny, while also constituting a form of government that is authoritarian and arbitrary, as a species of government that is illegitimate and illegal, because it is exercised without or against the consent of the citizens.

It is difficult to understand how, contrary to Turchetti's assertion, the Greek philosopher managed to use the terms "despotic" and "tyrannical" almost synonymously; for example, he writes (IV, 2, 5) that "[t]he proponents of this opinion, opponents of the other, persist and maintain that there is no possible felicity for the State except through despotism and tyranny ('despotikon kai tyranikon') "And not, as the French translations say, "by domination and despotism".

"Turannos", a term of Lydian origin, was first applied to the rulers of the Mermnades dynasty, which ruled Lydia from 685 to 547 BC (*L'Idéologie du pouvoir monarchique dans l'antiquité: Actes du Colloque de la Société des Professeurs d'Histoire ancienne de l'Université [SOPHAU], Lyon et Vienne, 26-28 June 1989*, De Boccard, Paris, 1991, p. 20). Unknown to Homer, it was "generally applied by the ancients, especially in the Greek states, [to] any absolute ruler whose authority was not limited either by laws or by a constitution, as designated by the Greek word tyrannos instead of koirannos, derived from the Dorian dialect and synonymous with lord or sovereign. It is used more specifically to designate the man who, in a free state, once seized supreme power by violating the existing order and the will of the people; so that originally it referred less to an arbitrary and cruel way of governing than to the illegal and usurped acquisition of sovereign power. Now, since what had been usurped against all rights must by that very fact have seemed oppressive and criminal to a free people, the word was soon given an odious secondary meaning. We

understood by tyrant, as is still done today, a ruler reigning by violence, a cruel man, and by tyranny any arbitrary domination" (Dictionnaire de la conversation et de la lecture, t. LXVIII, Garnier Frères, Paris, 1851, pp. 284-5; in ancient literature, the *turannos* could be a god, such as Ares, in the Homeric hymn to Ares, v. 5: "ἀντιβίους τύραννε..., *antibiois turanne*", "you who impose yourself on opponents"). However, 'turannos' could be applied to good princes, for example Pisistratus of Athens (600-527 BCE), Gelon (540-478 BCE), his successor Hieron of Syracuse and Periander of Corinth (625-585 BCE), and in late fifth-century BCE Athens it could have a favourable connotation, especially in anti-democratic literature (Mary Nyquist, *Arbitrary Rule: Slavery, Tyranny, and the Power of Life and Death*, The University of Chicago Press, Chicago and London, p. 32), as well as "despotes".

"Despotès", first attested in the fifth century BC, etymologically means "master of the house" and therefore of the slaves, which is why Aristotle sometimes uses the term "despotès" in a positive sense; for example, he compares the domination of a master over his slave to that of the soul over the body (I, 2, 10). But for Aristotle, *despotikon*, which is legitimate in the *oikos*, ceases to be so in the *polis*. In the home, a master, as he should, dominates slaves, whereas in the city, the ruler has free men as subjects, and it is absurd to treat them like slaves.

(14) J. Hellegouarc'h, *Le vocabulaire latin des relations et des partis politiques sous la République*, Publications de la Faculté des Lettres et Sciences humaines de l'Université de Lille, XI, 1996, p. 7.

(14bis) For the early Romans, *jus* did not yet have the abstract meaning that it took on in the 'Middle Ages', where, moreover, it was mistakenly translated as 'law'. At that time, "faculties for the study of *jus* developed within the framework of universities. But the emphasis was, of course, on the study of rules (*regulae juris*). When the word *jus* had to be translated into the vulgar languages, the emphasis shifted from *jus* to *regula*. This is why the word *jus* was translated by the word *droit*. *Jus* then appears as that which conforms to the rule. But in translating *jus* by *droit*, have we not forgotten the concrete meaning of the word? In fact, jurists today make a distinction between subjective law and objective law. Subjective law corresponds to the first meaning of the word *jus*: the concrete right of such and such a person over such and such a thing. Objective law corresponds to the second meaning of the word *jus*: all the rules of law in force in such and such a community (Laurent Sentis, *De l'utilité des vertus*, Beauchesne, 2004, p.

146). The archaic Sanskrit term "*jos*", from which the Latin "*jus*" is derived, means "divine protection". ". "*Juro*" ("to swear") is to solemnly affirm the truth by invoking a witness regarded as superior to man, as particularly august and formidable" (Michel Bréal, *Mémoire sur l'origine des mots *fas*, *jus* et *lex**. In *Mémoires de l'Institut national de France*, t. 32, 2^e partie, 1891 [p. 1- 12], p. 8-9).

(15) See Valentina Arena, *Roman sumptuary legislation: Three concepts of liberty*. In *European Journal of Political Theory*, no. 10, 2011 [pp. 463-89]; id. in *Libertas and the Practice of Politics in the Late Roman Republic*, Cambridge University Press, Cambridge and New York, 2012, pp. 261-2. In antiquity, the culmination of this subjectivist degradation of the juridical notion (see *supra*, note 14bis) of *libertas* is to some extent constituted by Epictetus' theory of liberty, whose Christian overtones

(see J. Dourif, *Du Stoïcisme et du Christianisme*, Paris, 1863). "To be free is the supreme good; so let man first of all study the essence of freedom, and, in order to know it, let him 'know himself', according to the ancient precept no less dear to the Stoics than to the Socratics. First of all, he who by nature aspires to be free will realise that he is a slave to his body, to the goods he seeks, to the dignities he aspires to, to the men he flatters [...] This moral slavery constitutes both vice and misfortune, for 'as freedom is only a name for virtue, so slavery is only a name for vice'.

"Anyone who recognises himself as 'bad and a slave' will have taken the first step towards virtue and freedom. The Stoic only has to say to him 'Seek and you shall find [...]'. But man must not seek freedom in external things, in his body, in his possessions, for all these are slaves [...].

"Thus there exists in us, and in us alone, something independent of our power to judge and to will. The freedom of the soul is placed beyond all external reach [...] it escapes the power of things and men [...] What is more, it escapes the power of the gods Jupiter, who gave us freedom, cannot take it away from us; this divine gift cannot, like material gifts, be taken back. It is therefore there that man finds his point of support, it is from there that he must rise [...].

"The only obstacle for man, his only enemy, is himself; he sets up for himself, without knowing it, the pitfalls into which he falls. This is because in man, in addition to the faculty of judging and willing, there is the imagination: although things in themselves have no power over us, nevertheless, through the images or representations they send us, they have only too much power. These representations drag our will along with them, capturing it. This is evil, this is slavery.

"Fortunately this evil and this slavery are all internal; they carry their remedy with them. The power of sensible representations lies in the value we attach to them, the consent we give them: reject them and they can no longer have any influence on us [...].

"Sensible evil, which has no existence outside us, is reduced within us to two forms of our activity: desire and aversion.

"What makes death and pain painful, for example, is that on the one hand we dislike them, and on the other we desire their opposites. Fearing death and pain, we immediately come to fear the men who have pain and death at their disposal: we are slaves, 'waiting for our master': he will arrive sooner or later; for, says Epictetus, we have built the 'bridge' between external things and ourselves, over which he must pass. If, on the other hand, we desire and loathe only what it depends on us to obtain or to flee, we will thereby have placed our freedom above sensible evils and beyond our reach.

"To suppress all desire and aversion for external things, 'this is the main point, the most pressing point'. Anyone who wants to become wise must first of all stop the confused movements of desire or fear that were agitating him: he must, so to speak, return to rest. But will he be content with this inner rest, this apathy that he has achieved within himself? The Epicurean, when he no longer has any desires or fears, believing that he now possesses the supreme good, withdraws into himself, and, forever

The Stoic, on the other hand, sees this apathy only as the result of a lack of energy.

first stage of progress. If he has suppressed sensibility within himself, it is in order to leave all room free for his will. For," says Epictetus, "we must not remain insensitive like a statue, but we must fulfil our natural and adventitious obligations, whether in the name of piety, or as a son, as a brother, as a father, as a citizen. So it is the sense of duty, of the 'proper' to be fulfilled, that alone calls the Stoic from rest to action. Neither desire nor aversion impels him: he has removed them from himself beforehand and can no longer be driven by a movement from outside himself. and will replaces desire in him.

"However spontaneous our impulse may be, it may encounter obstacles on the outside: by what skill will the Stoic turn these obstacles to the advantage of freedom itself? - This is where the curious theory of 'exception' comes in. As Epictetus and Seneca put it, "When we set our mind on some external object, when we expect some event, we must cut out in advance, 'except' from our expectation everything in the expected event that may not conform to it. By this I mean For example, to make a sea voyage, but I foresee the obstacles that may arise, and I consent to it. I want to be a lender, but I want to do so with reservations, if nothing prevents me from doing so. In this way, I I try to bring into my will the very obstacle that would have stopped it; I foresee the unforeseen, and I accept it [...]" Moving too vehemently towards things, wanting too much or rejecting too reluctantly this or that event, these are all faults which, according to the Stoics, stem from the same error: we have a false idea of our power; we hope to be able to change, to upset nature, to conform it to our wishes. But this is impossible. We can do everything within us, nothing outside. Man possesses the best part of the whole of nature, the power to use representations for good or ill; but the power to shape things and divert events does not belong to us. By attributing this power to ourselves and believing that by doing so we are elevating ourselves, we are really demeaning ourselves. Let us remain free within ourselves and let necessity rule the world. Or better still, let us consent freely to what is necessary, and thereby turn the very necessity of things into freedom for us" (Jean-Marie Guyau, *Manuel d'Epictète*, Ch. Delagrave, Paris, 1875, p. i-xi). "Vos autem in libertatem vocati estis, fratres", said Epictetus; "For you, my brothers, have been called to freedom" (quoted in J. Dourif, *op. cit.*, p. 29).

(16) Edward A. Freeman, *The Development of the English Constitution*, translated from the English and preceded by an introduction by Alexandre Dehaye, 1877, Guillaumin et Cie, Paris, p. 181.

(17) J. Sabatier, *Description générale des monnaies byzantines*, t. 1, Paris and London, 1862, p. 75.

(18) R. W. Carlyle and A. J. Carlyle, *A history of mediaeval political theory in the West*, vol. 3, G. P. Putnam's Sons Edinburgh and William Blackwood and Sons, New York and London, 1916, pp. 127-8.

(19) *Id. op. cit.* vol. 2, G. P. Putnam's Sons Edinburgh and William Blackwood and Sons, New York and London, 1909, part. I, in particular chaps. 6 and 7.

(20) See *id. op. cit.* vol. 5, G. P. Putnam's Sons Edinburgh and William Blackwood and Sons, New York and London, 1950, p. 64.

(20bis) For the moment we refer to Jean Imbert, Kantorowicz (Ernest H.). *The King's two bodies. A study in Mediaeval Political Theology*. In: *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, t. 39, fasc. 3, 1961. *Langues et littératures modernes - Moderne taal- en letterkunde* [p. 894-5].

(21) Lucette Valensi, *The Birth of the Despot: Venice and the Sublime Porte*, translated by Robert Denner, Cornell University Press, Ithaca and London, 1993, p. 92.

(22) *Ibid*, p. 72-4; see also Michel Senellart, *Les Arts de gouverner. Du 'regimen' médiéval au concept de gouvernement*, Editions du Seuil, 2016.

(23) Sean Hannan, *Notes on Marsilius of Padua - Defensor Pacis*, https://www.academia.edu/31435490/Notes_on_Marsilius_of_Padua_-_Defensor_Pacis.

(24) See Vaileios Syros, *Marsilius of Padua at the Intersection of Ancient and Medieval Traditions of Political Thought*, University of Toronto Press, Toronto, Buffalo and London, 2012.

(24) On the subject of Oresme and the negative meaning he gave to the term "despot", see Sylvain Piron, *Nicole Oresme: violence, langage et raison politique*. 1997, <https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-00489554/document> and Francis Meunier, *Essai sur la vie et les ouvrages de Nicole Oresme*, Ch. Lahure, Paris, 1857, p. 173.

(25) See Michael Curtis, *Orientalism and Islam: European Thinkers on Oriental Despotism in the Middle East and India*, Cambridge University Press, 2009, p. 54.

(26) Aquinas's attempt is far less successful in this respect. "What is [, for him,] despotic power? It is the power of the master over the slave, *domini ad servum*. What is [, for him,] political power? It is the power established in certain cities or provinces, governed either by a single person or by several, but according to certain statutes, certain laws, certain conventions. Despotic power is therefore the same thing as tyrannical power, and political power the same thing as limited power. But [...] according to the author, tyrannical power is the worst form of government, and [...] to avoid degenerating into tyranny, royal power must be limited. If this is the character of political power, must we not conclude that it is political power, i.e. power limited by laws, that the author prefers? This is not so, however; and here comes a comparison full of ambiguity and confusion between despotic power, political power and royal power, which is very difficult to disentangle [...] Despotic power is the power of the master over the slave. Let us first examine whether such power is legitimate. The author of *De regimine principum* has not the slightest doubt on this subject. The authority of Aristotle and that of Saint Augustine are decisive for him. There are, he says, degrees between men, as between all things. Just as the soul is called upon to command the body, and among the powers of the soul some must command and others obey, so among men there are some who are naturally called upon to command others; there are others who lack reason, and who are fit only for servile work. There are therefore slaves by nature. This, says the author, is the opinion of the Philosopher in the first book of the *Politics*.

But he makes no objection to this opinion, and takes it as his own. Moreover, Aristotle had said that slavery born of war is unjust; the author, on the contrary, recognises it as legally just;

and he finds that this law has its reason: it is to inspire greater courage in combatants. Finally, the despotic power of the master over the slave would have been unjust in the state of innocence; but it has been justly introduced by sin: such is the opinion of Saint Augustine. Thus the author of *De regimine principum* admits slavery as far as it can be admitted, and for all the reasons for which it can be admitted. He admits with Aristotle that there is a natural slavery; with Saint Augustine, that slavery is born of sin; with the jurists, that slavery is born of war and convention. All the doctrines of the Apostles and the Fathers of the Church on the equality of men have completely disappeared: not a trace of them remains. The principle of inequality has regained all the force it had in antiquity, and it is even supported by new reasons. But if Saint Thomas admits the domestic power of the master over the slave, will he admit the despotic power of the ruler over his subjects? No, undoubtedly not, since, according to him [...] tyranny is the worst form of government. And indeed, Saint Thomas carefully distinguishes royal power from despotic power. The king is for the kingdom, and the kingdom is not for the king (*regnum non est propter regem, sed rex propter regnum*). The purpose of royal power is to ensure the prosperity of the kingdom and the salvation of its subjects. The goodness of the king is only a reflection of the goodness of God, through whom he is king. Now, God governs men not for his own sake, but for their salvation; this is what kings and masters of the universe must do. In a series of interesting chapters, Saint Thomas sets out the conditions and duties of royal power. Saint Thomas demonstrates the right and necessity of everything that this power was trying to conquer little by little from feudal anarchy. The king must have the necessary strength to do good; he must have fortresses, troops, personal property and a well-stocked treasury. In return, he recommends that the king make active and useful use of all his forces; and he sums up in two great works the duty of royal authority: 1° the defence of the territory; 2° the assistance of the weak and the relief of the unfortunate. Let us especially admire this new duty imposed on public authority [emphasis added]. This novelty is one of the great features of Christian politics. Neither Plato, nor Aristotle, nor Cicero, mention this duty of assistance and public charity, which in modern times has become one of the imperative obligations of governments. St Thomas cannot therefore be accused of confusing kingship with despotism; however, he seems to fall into this confusion when he wants to distinguish royal power, not from despotic power, but from political power. Political power is that which is regulated by laws. Royal power, on the other hand, is that which governs without laws, where the prince's wisdom is free, where he draws it only from his heart, and which consequently imitates divine Providence more closely. But such power is obviously absolute power. This is what Saint Thomas himself recognises when he declares that despotic power can be reduced to royal government (*quem principatum ad regalem reducere possumus*). Indeed, the royal laws given by Samuel to the people of Israel are at the same time despotic laws. Moreover, the author says that in the state of innocence, the power would have been political, and not royal; because in the state of innocence, there would have been no power which carried with it servitude: royal power therefore carries with it servitude. In the state of corruption, royal government is better, because nature needs to be restrained more energetically within its limits. It is therefore corruption and sin that have brought about the need for royal government.

royal government. But [...] according to Saint Thomas, sin was also the cause of despotic power. Thus, despotic power and royal power have the same cause. Finally, Saint Thomas establishes the necessity of royal power by the difference between peoples. Some, he says, are suited to servitude, others to freedom. Royal power therefore corresponds to servitude, and political power to freedom.

Isn't this once again confusing despotism with royalty? If royal power is born of sin, if it is suited to peoples born to servitude, how does it differ from despotic government? But if royal government does not differ in essence from despotic government, how then is one the best of governments, and the other the worst? If a just government is one that commands free men, how can the best government be one that results from the aptitude of peoples and human nature for servitude? There is undoubtedly a great confusion of ideas here, and it can be said that the publicist of the thirteenth century was not very clear about the principles he was proposing" (Paul Janet, *op. cit.*, pp. 346-50). In any case, the form of government preferred by Aquinas was neither royal power nor political power, but priestly power (*ibid.*, p. 352).

(26bis) Quoted in Mario Turchetti, *op. cit.* p. 847.

(27) Arthur Stephen Mc Grade and John Kilcullen (eds.), *William of Ockham: A Letter to the Friars Minor and Other Writings*, translated by John Kilcullen, Cambridge University Press, 1995, p. 139 ff.

(28) M. Turchetti, *op. cit.* p. 848.

(29) *Ibid.*, p. 849.

(30) *Ibid.*, p. 850.

(31) Lucette Valensi, *op. cit.* p. 92-3. The rest of the definition is clearly inconsistent: "If they are," he says, "serfs by nature, the prince is just. If they are unjustly held in servitude, by violence or trickery, the prince is despotic, oligarchic, tyrannical, etc.".

(32) Quoted in Lucette Valensi, *op. cit.* p. 92.

(33) *Œuvres politiques de Machiavelli: Le Prince, Les Discours sur Tite Live*, revised and corrected translation, Garnier Frères, Paris, 1855, p. 12-3.

(34) *Ibid.*, p. 13.

(35) "Whether courtier or merchant, the Italian traveller to the Levant in the early 17th century could not overcome the trauma caused by the spectacle of wealth and efficiency offered by the Ottoman Empire. In other words, the world that revolved around Constantinople is challenging, through these humble pages, the world that nominally still revolves around Rome, but which in reality is torn apart by national conflicts and internal struggles. And travellers who are men of average culture cannot help but suffer from this exhaustion of the ideal reasons for European superiority; they end up falling victim to the almost fairytale-like illusion of vitality [and 'good functioning'] communicated by images of Turkish magnificence" (Marziano Guglielminetti, *Introduction to Viaggiatori del Seicento*, Torino, UTET, 1967, p. 11, quoted in Valerio Vittorini. *L'image du monde arabe dans la littérature française et italienne du XIXe siècle: analogies, différences, possible influences*. Literature. Université Nice Sophia Antipolis; Università degli studi, Genoa, 2015, p. 74), unless, perhaps like Busbecq (1522-1592), ambassador of Ferdinand of Habsburg to the

the court of Suleiman the Magnificent, who took a positive view of the fact that "[h]e among the Turks will hold the first dignity after the Great Lord who does not know whose he is, nor who his father and mother are" and believed (wrongly) that "[e]ach man [in the Ottoman Empire] is rewarded according to his merits and offices are filled by men capable of holding them" (quoted in Roger Botte and Alessandro Stella, *Couleurs de l'esclavage sur les deux rives de la Méditerranée [Moyen Âge-XXe siècle]*, Karthala, 2012, p. 281), they conceived of slavery as an enviable condition for European peoples.

(36) İzzet Çıvgın, *From Empire to Nation-State. Islam in the political and social life of Turkey*, PhD thesis in Sociology, 2012, Amiens, p. 62.

(37) Jean-Claude Berchet, *Chateaubriand et le despotisme oriental*. In *Dix-huitième siècle*, n° 26, PUF, 1994 [p. 391 - 421], p. 394.

(38) See Joan-Pau Rubiés, *Oriental Despotism and European Orientalism: Botero to Montesquieu*. In *Journal of Early Modern History*, vol. 9, no. 2, p. 117, note 13.

(39) M. Turchetti, op. cit. p. 852.

(40) Charles Porset, *Despotisme: du mot à l'histoire*, in Simone Goyard-Fabre (ed.), *L'Etat moderne, 1715-1848*, Vrin, 2000, p. 55-6.

(41) Jean Bodin, *Les six Livres de la Republique*, 1599, p. 273.

(42) Lucette Valensi, op. cit. p. 93.

(43) Ibid.

(44) Mary Nyquist, op. cit. p. 309.

(45) Aristotle, op. cit. p. cxxxvii.

(45bis) Otfried Höffe, *Thomas Hobbes*, translated by Nicholas Walker, 2010, C. H. Beck, p. 148; see also Jean-Pierre Zarader, *Petite histoire des idées philosophiques: suivi d'un essai, Le statut de l'œuvre d'art chez André Malraux*, Edition Marketing, 1994, p. 42 et seq.

(46) See <https://philotra.pagesperso-orange.fr/hob17.htm>.

(47) See <https://philotra.pagesperso-orange.fr/hob20.htm>. Dans De Cive, Hobbes, in addition to paternal domination and despotism, identifies three systems of government: monarchy, aristocracy and democracy.

(48) "The conclusions to be drawn [from Hobbes's often incoherent considerations of who holds authority in the family] is that "wives [...] enjoy a privileged position, because they are spared the threat of patriarchal force, including the death sentence, to which subjects of absolute power are vulnerable. Whether the male head of household is considered as a subject within civil society or as the sovereign power within the family, the power of the husband over his wife has no access to a point of origin in the state of nature, where power is born

of life and death. Qua husband, the patriarchal head of the family is therefore not, strictly speaking, a holder of sovereign power [...]" (Mary Nyquist, op. cit., p. 314).

(49) "Outside a republic, anyone can kill or steal from anyone else; in a republic, this power belongs to only one [the sovereign]" (De Cive, 2.10.1, p. 116, quoted in Mary Nyquist, op. cit., p. 309).

(50) See <https://www.sparknotes.com/philosophy/hobbes/section3/>.

(51) Alexis-François Artaud de Montor, Machiavelli, son génie et ses erreurs, vol. 2, Firmin Didot Frères, 1833, p. 359.

(52) J.-P. P., Démocratie (Politique), in Eustache-Marie-Pierre Courtin, Encyclopédie moderne, ou Dictionnaire abrégé des hommes et des choses, vol. 8, 2nd edn, revised, corrected and expanded, Th. Lejeune, Brussels, 1828, pp. 203-4.

(53) John Locke, On Civil Government, 5th ed. exactly revised and corrected on the 5th London edition and augmented with some notes, Amsterdam, 1755, p. 231.

(54) Ibid, p. 231-2.

(55) Ibid, p. 233.

(56) Ibid, p. 233-4.

(57) Jean Terrel, Hobbes, matérialisme et politique, 1994, J. Vrin, Paris, p. 262.

(58) See <https://philotra.pagesperso-orange.fr/hob25.htm>.

(59) A. Ott, Dictionnaire des Sciences Politiques et Sociales, t. 2, 1854, J.-P. Migne, p. 981.

(60) Vie politique et privée de Louis Joseph de Conde, prince du sang, 1790, p. 56.

(61) Chantal Grell and Christian Michel, L'école des princes, ou, Alexandre disgracié: essai sur la mythologie monarchique de la France absolutiste, Les Belles Lettres, 1988, p. 79; Christian Bouyer, Louis XIII: la montée de l'absolutisme, Tallandier, 2006.

(62) Philippe Potel-Belner, Révoltes antifiscales et Fronde parlementaire de la première moitié du XVIIè, Books on Demand, 2018, p. 21-9.

(63) Laurent Curelly, 'Do look on the other side of the water': of Cromwell's foreign policy towards France, E-rea [Online], 11.2, 2014, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/erea/3751>, accessed 22 October 2019.

(64) "But despite the suffering of the people, the Fronde was not a democratic revolution. It was the aristocracy that led the movement, and in an incoherent way, as it was driven by personal interests and ungenerous passions. The great lords, who led the

In reality, all the rebels were thinking of was getting pensions and offices, re-establishing the power of the governors for their own benefit, and halting the progress of the monarchical state, which was undermining their authority. The Parliament, which relied on the Parisian bourgeoisie, represented the most serious aspect of the Fronde: It had some general ideas; it had some liberal aspirations; it wanted to limit and control royal authority; it demanded guarantees for individual freedom and also guarantees in financial matters; but its main concern was to increase its importance, to arrogate political power to itself; in a word, it was above all esprit de corps that animated it, and it thought less of the higher interests of the nation than of its own particular caste interests" (Caroline Le Mao, *L'échec, le temps et l'histoire : Reflections on the Bordeaux Parliamentary Fronde*. In *Histoire, économie et société*, 2006, 25^e année, n° 3. Failure and the judiciary [p. 311-34], p. 324)

(65) Louis Clair Beupoil de Sainte-Aulaire, *Histoire de la Fronde*, vol. 2, E. Ducrocq, Paris, p. 303.

(66) *Les véritables Maximes du gouvernement de la France justifiées par l'ordre des temps, depuis l'establisement de la monarchie jusques à présent, servant de réponse au prétendu arrêt de cassation du conseil du 18 janvier 1652, 1652*, p. 22.

(67) Étienne François Bazot, *Manuel du franc-maçon*, 3rd ed. 1817, p. 99 et seq.

(68) Catherine Maire, Louis-Adrien Le Paige between Saint-Simon and Montesquieu. In *Cahiers Saint Simon*, n° 27, 1999. *Idées d'opposants au temps des Mémoires* [p. 37-47].

(69) Louis-Adrien Le Paige, *Lettres historiques sur les fonctions essentielles du parlement*, vol. 1, Amsterdam, 1753, p. 54.

(70) See the two hundred pages Guy Breton devoted to the favourites and mistresses of Louis XIV in *Histoire d'amour de l'histoire de France*, t. 1, Omnibus, 1994.

(71) Amédée Gabourd, *Histoire de Louis XIV*, 7th edn, Tours, 1865, p. 143.

(72) Gaston Boissier, *Saint-Simon, 1675-1755*, Hachette, 1892, p. 153.

(73) Quoted in *Ibid*, p. 153

(74) *Les soupirs de la France esclave qui aspire après la liberté*, Amsterdam, 1690, p. 4.

(75) See Lucien Bély (ed.), *Dictionnaire Louis XIV*, Robert Laffont, "Bouquins" series, 2015.

(76) Sylvain Auroux, *Les notions philosophiques: dictionnaire*, vol. 2, Presses Universitaires de France, 1990. Voltaire (*Supplément au siècle de Louis XIV*, Dresden, 1753, p. 33, p. 36) later claimed not to have been aware of its meaning at the time: "I have a necessary observation to make about the word despotique, which I have sometimes used. I do not know why this term, which in its origin was only the expression of the very weak and very limited power of a small vassal of Constantinople, today means absolute and even tyrannical power [...] I do not wish to enter into a delicate detail which would take me too far; but I must say that I understood the despotism of Louis XIV to mean the always firm and sometimes excessive use he made of his legitimate power. If on some occasions he made the French

But I defy anyone to show me any monarchy on earth in which the laws, distributive justice and the rights of humanity have been less trampled underfoot, and where greater things have been done for the public good, than during the fifty-five years that Louis XIV reigned by himself.

(77) See Bernard Herencia, *L'optimum gouvernemental des physiocrates: despotisme légal ou despotisme légitime?* In *Revue de philosophie économique* 2013/2, vol. 14 [p. 119-49].

(78) See François Bluche, *Le despotisme éclairé*, Hachette Littérature, 2000.

(79) See Jean-Pierre Jackson (ed.), Paul Henri Thiry Holbach (baron d'), *Œuvres philosophiques, 1773-1790*, vol. 4, Coda, 2004. "That in one corner of Asia an impostor such as Mohammed should succeed in persuading a hundred imbecile Arabs and making them believe that he was a great prophet, this error seems at first to be of very little consequence. However, we find that after a century this error has flooded Asia and Africa with blood, and that it is the fatal cause of the stupid numbness in which we still see the unfortunate inhabitants of the most beautiful regions of the world groan, over which a terrible despotism exercises its destructive empire.

(80) According to John R. Hampton (Nicolas-Antoine Boulanger et la science de son temps, 1955, E. Droz, 1955, p. 38) "Recherches sur l'origine du despotisme oriental" was written in the last quarter of 1755.

(81) "Absolute power is very useful when it sets out to destroy abuses, abolish injustices, correct vice and reform morals" (Paul Henri Thiry Holbach [baron d'], *Éthocratie: ou le Gouvernement fondé sur la morale*, Marc-Michel Tey, 1776, warning). Towards the end of the book (p. 192), however, he writes: "Despotism, in whatever form it takes, degrades the soul or makes it rebel".

(82) Charles de Montesquieu, *Œuvres posthumes de M. de Montesquieu*, Lausanne, chez J. P. Heubach, 1784, p. 3, about his father, whose *Arsace et Isménie, histoire orientale* - completed by his father in the last years of his life - he published posthumously in 1787.

(83) Brigitte Burmeister, *Les paradoxes de Linguet*. In *Dix-huitième Siècle*, n° 7, 1975 [p. 147-155].

(84) Simon Nicolas Henri Linguet, *Annales Politiques, Civiles et Littéraires du Dix-Huitième Siècle*, vol. 7, London, 1779, p. 431.

(85) Id. in *Spirit and Genius*, p. 27, London, 1780.

(86) Albert Lortholary, *Le mirage russe en France au XVIIIe siècle*, Boivin et Cie, 1951, p. 138.

(87) *Les Paradoxes, ou Cinquième dialogue des morts de la Révolution* between Linguet and Charlotte Corday, 1795, p. 50. See, on the subject of the many other contradictions in which Linguet seemed to indulge, L. A. de Vérité, *Qu'est-ce que Linguet?*, 1795).

(88) "I will never be ashamed to say it: this Asia, whose customs we assess with such ignorance, and which we travel through with such greed, can provide us with treasures all the more precious than those we seek there. It is livers, diamonds and gold that we pride ourselves on gathering there. How much wiser would the beneficent traveller be, who would bring us back a theory followed by the useful truths that have been put into practice there from time immemorial! These Turks, these Persians who treat our merchants, and even the nations who send them, with such empire: these proud Muslims who have such haughty and just contempt for some and others: these peoples who are so famous, but so little known, and whom we so badly disfigure in our dealings, are worthy of becoming our teachers of morals, jurisprudence and all aspects of government. It is only among them that it is possible to learn them thoroughly, because they are the only ones who have preserved the original principles", *Théorie des loix civiles, ou principes fondamentaux de la société*, vol. 1, Simon-Nicolas-Henri Linguet, London, 1767, pp. 109-10; in "Les paradoxes", p. 50, he even claims to have "demonstrated that Asiatic servitude was a hundred times gentler than French Liberty").

(89) *In Trois discours sceptiques*, published in *Mémoires de M. de Marolles*, II, A. de Sommaville, Paris, 1656-1657; *Discours sceptiques de Samuel. Sorbière*, Champion, Paris, 2002.

(90) *Histoire de gouvernement parlementaire en France: 1814-1848*, t. 1, preceded by an introduction by Prosper Duvergier de Hauranne, Michel Lévy Frères, 1857, p. 40.

(91) *Mercier de la Rivière, The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies*, Jean Nourse, London, 1767, p. 168, p. 333.

(92) Eugène Daire, *Physiocrats : Quesnay, Dupont de Nemours, Mercier de la Rivière, l'Abbé Baudeau, Le Trosne*, Part 1, Guillaumin et Cie, Paris, 1846, p. 17.

(93) See Marius Roustan, *Les philosophes et la société française au XVIIIe siècle*, 1906, pp. 77-8.

(94) Virgile Pinot, *Les physiocrates et la Chine au XVIIIe siècle*. In *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, t. 8, n° 3, 1906 [p. 200-214], p. 209 et sqq.

(95) Henri Ripert, *Le Marquis de Mirabeau, ses théories politiques et économique*, Paris, 1901, p. 396, quoted in Léon Cheinisse, *Les idées politiques des physiocrates*, Arthur Rousseau, Paris, 1914, p. 99. The despotism of the law can also be found in the Nakaz, or Instructions addressed by Her Majesty the Empress of all the Russias established to work on the execution of a project for a new code of laws (1767). For example, article 12 states: "[...] it is more advantageous to obey the laws under a single master than to have to submit to the will of several"; article 38: "[...] the government must be such that no citizen can fear a citizen, and that all together fear the laws" (quoted in Serge Bianchi, *Des révoltes aux révolutions : Europe, Russie, Amérique (1770-1802)*. Essay d'interprétation, PUR, 2004, p. 113-4). Having understood the weakness of this provision from the point of view of pure and hard despotism, Lenin ensured that all citizens feared each other, while at the same time all feared the laws.

(96) Nicolas Baudeau, *Précis de l'ordre légal*, Amsterdam, 1768, p. 71-2.

(97) Quoted in Teyssandier de la Serve, Mably et Les Physiocrates, Potiers, 1911 (reimpr. Slatkine, Geneva, 1971), p.76; Georges Weulersse, Le mouvement physiocratique en France (de 1756 à 1770), F. Alcan, 1910, p. 120.

(98) Quoted in Teyssandier de la Serve, op. cit., p. 77.

(99) Quoted in Léon Cheinisse, p. 100-1.

(99bis) J. J. Rousseau, ses amis et ses ennemis, correspondance publiée par George Streckeisen-Moultou, vol. 2, Michel Lévy Frères, Paris, 1865, pp. 364-5.

(100) Quoted in Anthony Mergey. II. L'État des physiocrates: autorité et décentralisation. In Droit et gestion des collectivités territoriales, t. 29, 2009. L'action sociale des collectivités territoriales [p. 727-37], p. 730.

(101) see Catherine Larrère, L'Arithmétique des physiocrates : la mesure de l'évidence. In Histoire & Mesure, 1992, vol. 7, no. 1-2. History of economic thought [p. 5-24].

(102) "Almost all the uses of the term science in relation to political theories after the appearance of physiocratic political economy are to be considered as peddling physiocratic ideas. - ('la science de l'homme', 'science du gouvernement' in De l'Homme; 'sciences morales et politiques' in Éléments d'Idéologie; 'la science de la liberté' in De l'instruction publique by Mirabeau; 'la politique est une science' on numerous occasions in Sieyès's writings on the Art Social; 'la Morale philosophique ou naturelle... cette science' by Abbé Saury; a plethora of synonyms by Condorcet: 'l'analyse exacte des premiers principes de la physique, de la morale, de la politique', 'science nouvelle', 'doctrine nouvelle'; in d'Holbach's *Système de la Nature*, as well as in his *Catechisme*: 'Morality is a science whose principles can be demonstrated as clearly and as rigorously as those of calculus and geometry'; in Dupont de Nemours: 'the science of Physiocracy'; in the *Journal d'Instruction Sociale*: 'Art Social... science, which has as its general object the knowledge of the rights, duties and interests of man in the state of society'; in Cabanis: 'la liberté a été réduite en science véritable'...) - The fact, which comes back to the demand of philosophical materialism, from which the physiocrats initially took advantage, of 'treating Morality like all the other Sciences, and making a Morality like an experimental Physics' (Montesquieu, op. cit. t. I, p. 9). In all cases, it is a matter of a conscious demarcation, indicated by the term science, in relation to the accuracy of the physical sciences, against the speculative and 'metaphysical' element of the free will - founder of morality - in the authentic intention of Rousseau's Social Contract" (Reinhard Bach, *Les Physiocrates et la science politique de leur temps*. In *Revue Française d'Histoire des Idées Politiques* 2004/2, no. 20 [p. 5-35], <https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-histoire-des-ideespolitiques1-2004-2-page-5.htm>).

(103) Quoted in Bernard Herencia, L'optimum gouvernemental des physiocrates: despotisme légal ou despotisme légitime? In *Revue de philosophie économique* 2013/2, vol. 14 [pp. 119-49], <https://www.cairn.info/revue-de-philosophie-economique-2013-2-page-119.htm>.

(104) Eugène Daire, op. cit. p. 471.

(105) Ibid, p. 470.

(106) Pierre-Paul Le Mercier de la Rivière, *The Natural and Essential Order of Political Societies*, vol. 1, Jean Nourse, London, 1767, p. 218-9.

(107) Quoted in Brigitte Koyama-Richard, *Tolstoï et le Japon : la découverte de Tolstoï à l'ère Meiji*, Publications orientalistes de France, 1990, p. 65.

(108) See François du Quesnay, *Le Despotisme de la Chine*, 1767, in *Ephémérides du citoyen*, Delalain, Paris, t. 3 and 6, facsimile, Feltrinelli, Milan, 1969. According to du Quesnay, "Chinese doctrine [...] deserves to serve as a model for all states" (quoted in Marc Crépon [ed.], *L'Orient au miroir de la philosophie: Une anthologie*, Pocket, 1992); see also Ma Ying and Hans-Michael Trautwein (eds.), *Thoughts on Economic Development in China*, chap. 2: 'Physiocracy and the Chinese Model'.

(109) The Chinese," says Abbé Baudeau, "are the only known people whose philosophers seem always to have been imbued with this first truth: they call it the order or voice of Heaven, and they are the only people who have ever known it.

reduce the whole government to this one law, to conform to the voice of Heaven.

"In the same way, they say, that a single and supreme intelligence and will directs the whole of the natural order, a part of which is the well-being or the misfortune of humanity on earth; in the same way, a single and supreme intelligence and will must direct in the State all the sovereign works of social art, which bring the intelligences and wills of all men ever closer to the general goal towards which they are inclined by enlightened reason, for the prosperity of the whole species.

"It is in this sense that they call their emperor the eldest son of Heaven, who is the father and mother of the State.

"It is in this sense that they say in the simplest, yet most energetic and salutary way, that the duty of this eldest son of Heaven consists in forming his intelligence to that of Heaven, and his will to the will of Heaven, in all the order of justice and benevolence that concerns the propagation and well-being of the human race on earth.

"When Chinese scholars say that the emperor is the representative and agent of the supreme being, Chang-ti, they do not mean that his arbitrary will, which is purely human and variable, takes the place of the order of Heaven and the sovereign will that governs the whole universe: an error that characterises all arbitrary despotisms.

"They know, they teach all the people, they defend even at the risk of their lives, when necessary, this great and sublime truth, that there is a law from Heaven, containing eternal, immutable rules of justice and beneficence that must be known and observed.

"When they carry it out, they say that they are obeying the sovereign Lord Chang-ti, and his eldest son, who is the organ chosen by his providence alone.

"So that the empire of China is, through the education of the scholars who govern it, the closest state known in the world to true theocracy, which I call economic monarchy.

"That is to say, that economic moral teaching of the divine law of justice, of the divine order of beneficence, is the first and supreme legislator; that it constantly regulates and directs the public and private instruction of all men, especially and principally that of the representatives of the Church.

authority; the civil, military and political protection of all property, of all liberties; universal administration, both for the collection of the public revenues that provide the means to exercise the functions of authority, and for the employment of the forces and wealth combined for this purpose.

"Once we have established this first moral and political principle, to regard the head of a civilised society as the representative and agent of divine authority, whose job it is to pronounce the will of God himself, the law of what God wished to be just, the order of what God wished to be beneficent, we are inclined to leave the choice of his agent to Providence.

"It is certain that, in a people where the natural law of justice and the natural order of benevolence, considered as the will of the Supreme Being, are the object of a true religious cult, and where monarchy is considered, in the manner of the Chinese, solely as an organ and instrument of this celestial will, absolute heredity would seem to confirm this idea. Through absolute heredity, the providence of the Supreme Being alone chooses his lieutenant on earth.

"That the title and quality of first and supreme organ of this divine authority should be hereditary and patrimonial, even devolved by the rule of primogeniture, which the Chinese have not entirely admitted, is perhaps, in fact, a confirmation of the theocratic idea in the mind of the prince himself and of the peoples: it is, moreover, a greater and more intimate unity of interest between the sovereign and his agents on the one hand, and all classes of citizens on the other." (Eugène Daire, *Physiocrates*. Quesnay, Du Pont de Nemours, Mercier de la Riviere, vol. 2, Guillaumin, Paris, 1846, p. 798-9)

(110) Herrlee Glessner Creel, *What Is Taoism: And Other Studies in Chinese Cultural History*, p. 56 ff. It is most interesting that, according to the British sinologist and orientalist Arthur Waley (1889-1966), the state in which the person who 'acts-without-acting' finds himself is that of self-hypnosis, or trance, which is itself compared by the Taoists to the state of early childhood, which they considered to be when human beings were at their healthiest. It was supposed to enable the sage to enter into communication with the Tao (Gerald J. Gruman, *A History of Ideas About the Prolongation of Life*, Springer Publisher Company, 2003, p. 60 ff).

(111) Charles Gide and Charles Rist, *Histoire des doctrines économiques : depuis les physiocrates jusqu'à nos jours*, L. Larose & L. Tenin, 1909, p. 40-1.

(112) *Ibid*, p. 40.

(113) Marius Roustan, *Les philosophes et la société française au 18e siècle*, A. Picard et fils, Paris, 1906, p. 77.

(114) Albert Lortholary, *op. cit.* p. 139.

(115) Ibid, pp. 139-40.

(116) Robert Derathé, Jean-Jacques Rousseau et la science politique de son temps, 2nd updated edition, 6th printing, p. 71 et seq. ; see, on the subject of Pufendorf's contractualist legitimisation of despotism, Heinrich Albert Rommen, *Le droit naturel; histoire, doctrine: Traduction et introduction par Émile Marmy, Egloff, 1945* , p. 104 et seq.

(117) Ambert Lortholary, op. cit. p. 140-1.

(118) Helvétius, *De l'homme, de ses facultés intellectuelles et de son éducation*, t. 3, 1781, p. 354-5.

(119) Id. in *Œuvres complètes d'Helvétius, De l'Homme*, vol. 8, P. Didot, 1795, p. 222.

(120) Fénelon, in *Examen de conscience sur les devoirs de la royauté (1702)* (Fénelon, *Œuvres de Fénelon, Lefèvre, Paris, 1858*, p. 364), writes: "Love of the people, the public good, the general interest of society is [...] the immutable and universal law of sovereigns. This law is prior to any contract: it is founded on nature itself; it is the source and the sure rule of all other laws. He who governs must be the first and most obedient to this primitive law: he can have everything over the people, but this law must be able to have everything over him. The common father of the great family has entrusted his children to him only to make them happy: he wants one man to serve by his wisdom to the happiness of many men, and not so many men to serve by their misery to flatter the pride of one. God did not make him king for himself; he was made king only to be the man of the people; and he is not worthy of kingship.

as long as he forgets himself for the public good. The tyrannical despotism of sovereigns is an attack on the rights of human brotherhood: it overturns the great and wise law of nature, of which they should only be the preservers. The despotism of the multitude is an insane and blind power which is A people spoiled by excessive liberty is the most intolerable of all tyrants. The wisdom of any government, whatever it may be, consists in finding the happy medium between these two dreadful extremes in a liberty moderated solely by the authority of the laws. But men, blind and enemies of themselves, cannot confine themselves to this happy medium.

"Sad state of human nature! Sovereigns, jealous of their authority, always want to extend it: peoples, passionate about their freedom, always want to increase it. It is better, however, for the sake of order, to suffer the evils that are inevitable in all states, even the most regulated, than to shake off the yoke of all authority by constantly giving oneself over to the fury of the multitude, which acts without rule or law. When sovereign authority is therefore once fixed, by the fundamental laws, in one, in a few, or in many, we must put up with its abuses, if we cannot remedy them by means compatible with order.

"All these kinds of government are necessarily imperfect, since supreme authority can only be entrusted to men; and all kinds of government are good, when those who govern follow the great law of the public good. In theory, some forms seem better than others; but in practice, the weakness or corruption of men, subject to the same passions, exposes all states to more or less equal disadvantages. Two or three men almost always drag down the monarch or the senate.

"The happiness of human society will not therefore be found by changing and upsetting the forms already established; but by inspiring sovereigns that the security of their empire depends on the happiness of their subjects, and inspiring peoples that their solid and true happiness requires subordination. Freedom without order is a libertinism that attracts despotism; order without freedom is a slavery that is lost in anarchy". See also Sée Henri. Les idées politiques de Fénelon. In *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, t. 1, n° 6, 1899 [p. 545-65]

(121) Fénelon, *Œuvres de Fénelon*, vol. 3, Lefèvre, Paris, 1835, p. 397.

(122) In a letter to the Duc de Chevreuse on 4 August 1710, Fénelon wrote explicitly: "[le] despotisme [est la] cause de tous nos maux" (quoted in Frédéric Eugène Godefroy, *Histoire de la littérature française depuis le XVIe siècle jusqu'à nos jours*, t. 2, Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1860, p. 371).

(123) Fénelon, *op. cit.* p. 48.

(124) Coté in Frédéric Eugène Godefroy, *op. cit.* p. 331.

(125) On the sources of *L'Esprit des Lois* and the *Persian Letters*, see Paul Vernière, *Montesquieu et l'Esprit des lois ou la raison impure*. Paris, Société d'Édition d'Enseignement Supérieur, 1977, p. 45-6.

(126) "republican government is that in which the people as a body, or only a part of the people, have sovereign power; monarchical government is that in which a single person governs, but by fixed and established laws: whereas, in despotic government, a single person, without law or rule, controls everything by his own will and whim" (Charles Louis de Secondat, baron de La Brède et de Montesquieu, *Œuvres de Montesquieu*).

Monsieur de Montesquieu, nouv. éd. revue, corrigée et considérablement augmentée par l'Auteur, t. 1, Nourse, London, 1772, p. 10).

(127) *Ibid.*, p. 169. It has been rightly remarked that despotic government does not and cannot rest on anything but fear. "Indeed, man can sacrifice liberty only for the sake of rest. But rest is impossible without security, and security is incompatible with fear. Thus, a government which, by hypothesis, was based on extreme fear, would thereby destroy the very thing it was intended to destroy: security and peace. Despotism, as Montesquieu describes it, is therefore an absurd form of government, i.e. contradictory in its very terms.

"For a government based on fear to be possible and lasting, it is obviously necessary that fear not be universal and perpetual: not everyone must fear, and fear for everything they possess: for then what would be the use of them not belonging to themselves? In

In general, they find enough tranquillity and peace in private life not to be tempted to meddle in public affairs. In a word, fear should be only for those who wish to resist the State, and not for those who, content with the limits imposed on them, ask only not to be tormented within those limits. But if fear reaches that point, it is no longer government, it is brigandage. *Quid sunt regna,*" says Saint Augustine, "*remotâ justiciâ, nisi magma latrocinia* (1)?

"In despotism itself, fear is not the only principle of government. First, it is not always felt. First people obey out of fear; then they obey out of habit. After all, it would be a mistake to believe that a power is absolutely anxious to be feared.

If he succeeds without using fear, he reserves it for necessary cases. This is what happens in practice in despotic governments. Subjects obey out of habit; and they forget that they are under a terrible government.

The state of fear is too violent to be continuous. Habit is therefore a principle that tempers the action of fear" (Paul Janet, *Histoire de la science politique*, vol. 2, 2nd edn, Ladrance, 1872, Paris, pp. 474-5).

(128) *Ibid.*, p. 171.

(129) *Ibid.*

(130) *Ibid.*, p. 218.

(131) *Ibid.*, p. 306.

(132) *Ibid.*, p. 180.

(133) *Ibid.*, p. 154.

(134) *Ibid.*, p. 216.

(135) *Ibid.*, p. 224. P. Bourdieu (*De la maison du roi à la raison d'État*. In *Actes de la recherche en sciences sociales*, vol. 118, June 1997. *Genèse de l'État moderne* [p. 55-68], p. 60) and R. Mantran [(ed.)], *L'Histoire de l'empire ottoman*, Paris, Fayard, 1989, p. 27, 165-6; quoted in *ibid.*) have given a masterly account of the reason why, in dynastic states, whether Asian or, for that matter, European, the monarch came to rely on senior officials rather than on the "elite".

members of his lineage and why, as a result, administration developed there: "the law

This is the fundamental division of the work of domination between the heirs, dynastic rivals with reproductive power but reduced to political impotence, and the oblates, politically powerful but without reproductive power: to limit the power of the hereditary members of the dynasty, important positions were filled by individuals from outside the dynasty, *homines novi*, oblates who owed everything to the state they served and who could, at least in theory, lose the power they had received from it at any time ; but to protect themselves against the threat of monopolisation of power posed by any holder of power based on a specialised, more or less rare skill, These *homines novi* were recruited in such a way that they had no chance of reproducing (the limit being eunuchs or clerics vowed to celibacy) and thus perpetuating their power through dynastic channels or establishing their power over the long term in an autonomous legitimacy, independent of that which the State granted them, conditionally and temporarily, through their status as civil servants. " The fact remains that the monarch's mistrust of princes of the blood, although more or less justified depending on the time and place, bears witness to a despotic temperament and, what is even more serious, to a lack of homogeneity.

Indeed, in order to be adversaries, as princes of the blood often were, it is necessary not to be entirely of the same blood.

(136) Ibid, p. 646.

(137) Charles de Secondat baron de Montesquieu, *Considérations sur les causes de la grandeur des Romains et de leur décadence*, Pierre Mortier, Amsterdam, 1734.

(138) Catherine Volpilhac-Auger, *Débats et polémiques autour de L'Esprit des lois*. In *Revue Française d'Histoire des Idées Politiques* 2012/1, n° 35 [p. 3-11], <https://www.cairn.info/revue-francaise-d-histoire-des-idees-politiques1-2012-1-page-3.htm>.

(139) Céline Spector, 'Fénelon', in *Dictionnaire Montesquieu* [online], edited by Catherine Volpilhac-Auger, ENS de Lyon, September 2013, available at: <http://dictionnaire-montesquieu.ens-lyon.fr/en/article/1376474508/en>.

(140) See Catherine Volpilhac-Auger, *Montesquieu*, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, Paris, 2003, p. 5-13.

(141) Edouard Laboulaye, *Œuvres complètes de Montesquieu: De l'esprit des lois, avec les variantes des premières éditions*, t. 3 de *L'Esprit des Lois*, livre I-X, Garnier Frères, Paris, 1876, p. liv.

(142) Porter (*Etat général de l'Empire Ottoman, 1770*, p. 177, quoted in Rachida El Diwani, *Entre l'Orient et l'Occident*, Lulu Press, Inc., 2009), former British minister plenipotentiary in Constantinople, wrote:

"According to him, the despotism of the Great Lord absorbs the whole code of legislation in this Empire. If M. de Montesquieu had opened the Alcoran, the chapter on women alone would have shown him with what precision the properties of individuals are guaranteed by the Law, and how far they are beyond the reach and power of the Sultan"; in *Observations sur la religion, les lois, le gouvernement et les mœurs des Turcs* (translated from the English by Claude-François Bergier, J. Nourse, London, 1769 [1st ed. 1768]), vol. 1, pp. 129-131, quoted in Ann Thomson, *L'Empire ottoman, symbole du despotisme oriental?* in Isabelle Gadoin and Marie-Élise Palmier-Chatelain (dirs.), *Rêver d'Orient, connaître l'Orient, Visions de l'Orient dans l'art et la littérature britanniques*, pp. 177-196), he does, however, let slip a judgement that we will not insult the reader by explaining why we are underlining it: "People have let themselves be warned by the frightening things that are said about his despotism. Some have believed their religion to be interested in devoting their hatred and execration to such a Government & others, without being animated by this religious zeal, have believed themselves to see human nature outraged by the ideas that result from these accounts. However well understood the system of this haughty Court may be, some and others have attached to it an idea of barbarism, have assumed it to be devoid of any order or regularity and to be absolutely dependent on the caprice, cruelty and avarice of a tyrant.

who breathes nothing but the oppression of his subjects & as far as his power can extend, the destruction of mankind. To espouse such prejudices, you must never have looked around you, no doubt because of your proximity. For if one is willing to pay attention to what is happening before our eyes and to examine with impartiality the political bodies with which we are surrounded, one will find

that the Sultan is no more despotic than several Christian Sovereigns & less perhaps than some of them" (emphasis added)

(143) "We have managed to imagine a third form of natural administration to which we have given the name of despotic state, in which there is no other law, no other justice, than the caprice of a single man. It has not been realised that despotism, in this abominable sense, is nothing other than the abuse of the monarchy, just as in free states anarchy is the abuse of the republic. It has been imagined, on the basis of false reports from Turkey and Persia, that the mere will of a visir or a king is an abuse of monarchy.

itmadoulet takes the place of all laws, and that no citizen owns anything in these vast countries; as if men had assembled there to say to another man: we will

As if it were possible for a state to exist without individuals being masters of their own property. The abuses of these empires were deliberately confused with the laws of these empires. Some customs peculiar to the seraglio of Constantinople have been mistaken for the general laws of Turkey; and because the Porte gives timariots for life, as our ancient kings gave fiefs for life, because the Ottoman emperor sometimes divides the property of a bacha born a slave in his seraglio, it has been imagined that the law of the state was that no private individual should have property of his own. It was assumed that in Constantinople the son of a worker or merchant did not inherit the fruit of his father's industry. They dared to claim that the same despotism reigned in the vast empire of China, a country where kings, and even conquering kings, are subject to the oldest laws on earth. This is how a hideous phantom has been created to combat it; and by satirising this despotic government, which is only the right of brigands, we have satirised the monarchy, which is the right of fathers of families" (Voltaire, *Supplément*, p. 33-5).

(144) Franco Venturi, *Oriental Despotism*. In *Journal of the History of Ideas*, 24, no. 1, 1963, pp. 133-142.

(145) Id, *Europe des lumières : Recherches sur le 18ème siècle*, Mouton, Paris and The Hague, 2017, p. 136- 7.

(146) Nothing is more misleading than these portraits drawn by personal interest" (Anquetil-Duperron, *Législation orientale*, Marc-Michel Rey, Amsterdam, 1778, p. 43); the denigration goes as far as mockery in Linguet, who, in an issue dedicated to the King of his periodical *Annales politiques, civiles et littéraires du dix-huitième siècle* (vol. 4, London, 1778, p. 134), mocks "all the nonsense that has been spouted for so long about Turkish administration, about Oriental despotism; nonsense that has somehow become established, & has become a form of mockery" (Anquetil-Duperron, *Législation orientale*, Marc-Michel Rey, Amsterdam, 1778, p. 43). 134), laughed at "all the nonsense that has been spouted for so long about Turkish administration and Oriental despotism; nonsense that has become a kind of philosophical article of faith, since it pleased a Gascon writer to make it the basis of a system of laws, by maintaining that in all these vast countries there were no laws": "My astonishment was extreme at the portrait that travellers paint of the peoples of Asia, a portrait sometimes of fantasy, sometimes of interest or prevention [...]".

(147) "There is nothing more deceptive than these portraits [...] made in the Cabinet according to principles from which every seemingly possible consequence is drawn" (ibid).

(148) Ibid, p. 42-3.

- (149) Lucette Valensi. In praise of the Orient, in praise of Orientalism. Le jeu d'échecs d'Anquetil-Duperron. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. 212, n° 4, 1995 [p. 419-452], p. 422.
- (150) Rachida El Diwani, *op. cit.* p. 82.
- (151) Jean-Claude Berchet, Chateaubriand et le despotisme oriental. In *Dix-huitième Siècle*, n° 26, 1994. *Economie et politique* [p. 391-421], p. 397.
- (152) See also Simón Gallegos Gabilondo. Philosophy and colonialism in Anquetil-Duperron. In *Biblioteca elettronica su Montesquieu e dintorni* n° 2, CLUEB, 2010 [p. 127-41], p. 138.
- (153) Ibi
- (154) Lucette Valensi. In praise of the Orient, in praise of Orientalism. Le jeu d'échecs d'Anquetil-Duperron. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. 212, n°4, 1995. pp. 419-452.
- (155) Franco Venturi, *op. cit.* p. 140.
- (156) Marie-Cécile Revauger, Freemasonry and Orientalism in Great Britain. In *Dix-huitième Siècle*, n° 19, 1987, *La franc-maçonnerie* [p. 21-32], p. 25-6.
- (157) See Thierry Zarcone, *Orientalisme [et franc-maçonnerie]*. In P.-Y. Beaurepaire (ed.), *Dictionnaire de la franc-maçonnerie*, Paris, Armand Colin, 2014; id., *Le croissant et le compas : Islam et franc-maçonnerie, de la fascination à la détestation*, Editions Dervy, 2015; Daniel Reig, *Homo orientaliste : la langue arabe en France depuis le XIXe siècle*, Maisonneuve & Larose, 1988.
- (158) Muriel Dodds, *Les récits de voyages: sources de L'esprit des lois de Montesquieu*, Slatkine Reprints, Geneva, 1980 [1st ed.: H. Champion, 1929], p. 168, p. 173; Desonay Fernand. Dodds (Muriel). *Les Récits de Voyages, Sources de 'L'Esprit des Lois' de Montesquieu*. In *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, t. 8, fasc. 4, 1929 [p. 1242-4].
- (159) *Œuvres de Montesquieu*, new edition, vol. 1, Paris, 1788, pp. lv-lvi.
- (159bis) "A third form of natural administration has been devised, to which the name despotic state has been given, in which there is no law or justice other than the whim of one man. It has not been realised that despotism, in this abominable sense, is nothing other than the abuse of monarchy, just as in free states anarchy is the abuse of the republic. It has been imagined, on the basis of false reports from Turkey and Persia, that the mere will of a vizier or a ruler is an abuse of monarchy. itimadoulet takes the place of all laws [...]" (*Œuvres complètes de Voltaire*, t. 15, Garnier, Paris, 1878, p. 113-4).
- (159ter) J.- P. Migne (abbé) (ed.), *Œuvres complètes de M. de Bonald*, vol. 2, *Du divorce considéré au XIXe siècle*, J.- P. Ligne, 1864, pp. 588-9.
- (160) Albert, Lortholary, *op. cit.* p. 138.

(161) Ernest Praron, *Quatre années de la Révolution, 1790-1793*, Librairie Sandoz et Fischbacher, 1878, p. 201. " " That the despot governs by terror his stultified subjects, he is right as a despot.

Tame the enemies of liberty by terror, and you will be right as the founders of the republic. The government of the revolution is the despotism of liberty against tyranny. This virtue therefore becomes, like that of Machiavelli's Prince, a virtue, less moral than political, whose ultimate aim is to retain power" (Réimpression de l'ancien *Moniteur*: seule histoire authentique et inaltérée de la révolution française depuis la réunion des États-généraux jusqu'au Consulat, t. 19, Henri Plon, Paris, 1861, p. 404).

(162) Ed. Laboulaye, *De l'administration française sous Louis XVI*. In *Revue des cours littéraires de la France et de l'étranger*, 4th year, n° 27, 1st June 1867, p. 425.

(163) Tocqueville (*Œuvres complètes, L'Ancien Régime et la révolution*, vol. 4, 7th ed., Michel Lévy, 1866, p. 94) paints a penetrating portrait: "[...] almost all bourgeois, [they] already form a class with its own particular spirit, traditions, virtues, honour and pride. It is the aristocracy of the new society, which is already formed and alive: it is only waiting for the Revolution to empty the place". "Civil servants are the backbone of the new regimes. Leaders change, generals fall, leaders are exiled or guillotined, but the civil servants remain. They capture and embody the real power. They live through all the regimes, all the coups d'état, all the constitutional changes. They too take advantage of the weakness of regimes, because they can then flourish, spread their web and ensure their control. They have more power than ministers or heads of state. And with the law becoming ever more complex, civil servants have the advantage of knowing the legal rules, whereas managers are often relatively unfamiliar with the workings of the administration. They are the shadowy element that really runs the country, the so-called deep state. Tocqueville is one of

were the first to recognise this and to highlight their role and influence. Between 1789 and 1801, France experienced eight different political regimes. This political instability gave rise to the power of shadowy administrative officials. The danger, clearly perceived by Tocqueville, was that the class of civil servants would take complete control of the country, establishing an administrative despotism that in turn aggravated the consequences of government centralisation. This sometimes e n d l e s s power of the administration is the hallmark of democratic societies, the novelty and birth of which Tocqueville clearly perceived during the French Revolution" (Jean-Baptiste Noé, *Une lecture de la Révolution française par Alexis de Tocqueville : la continuité entre l'ancien et le nouveau régime*, http://www.jbnoe.fr/IMG/pdf/tocqueville_et_la_revolution.pdf, p.). With regard to the connivance between magistrates and "administrative officials," Malesherbes, first president of the Paris Court o f Aids, developed these ideas in his criticism of the arbitrary nature of the tax system by explaining that 'all the laws have been silenced in order to replace them with the variable principles of w h a t they wanted to call administration'. In the remonstrances drawn up on behalf of the Court of Aids on 20 June 1761,

Malesherbes denounced the concentration of judicial and administrative powers, for example in the hands of the intendants, and extended his criticism to the new bureaucracy as a whole. As he explained, administrative authority was not vested exclusively in the intendants but also in 'a multitude of men without names and titles, without commissions from Your Majesty, without

sufficient power to hand down regular judgements'. These reflections led Malesherbes to formulate a variation on Montesquieu's famous maxim according to which the concentration of executive or legislative powers with judicial power meant the death of liberty: 'administration combined with jurisdiction, Malesherbes specified, will always produce despotism, because administration combined with jurisdiction will always produce despotism, because the safety of citizens consists in being judged by those who know no other rule than the Law; and that the uncertain principles of (Remonstrances de la Cour des Aides de Paris du 23 juin 1761, Mémoires pour servir à l'histoire du droit public de la France en matière d'impôts, ou recueil de ce qui s'est passé de plus intéressant à la Cour des Aides depuis 1756 jusqu'au mois de juin 1775, Bruxelles, 1779, p. 149, quoted in La citoyenneté fiscale, Emmanuel de Crouy Chanel, p. 49 and in Julian Swann, Les parlementaires, les lettres de cachet et la campagne contre l'arbitraire de la justice au XVIIIe siècle).

"In the remonstrances of the Cour des Aides of 20 June 1761, Malesherbes developed an in-depth critique of the tax system, informing Louis XV that "against his intention despotism is established in his kingdom in matters of taxation", before going on to identify the four main characteristics of this "despotism" (1779, p. 128-129). They were defined by the character of the authority, i.e. by the fact of residing "in a single man, of not being restricted by law, of not being subject to any recourse; finally of not being counterbalanced by any other authority, which happens when administration and jurisdiction are in the same hand [...] that these four characters constitute precisely the authority granted to the commissaire départi" (Malesherbes, 1779, pp. 128-129.) There was nothing new in the parliamentary attacks on the intendants: "the almost absolute power [...] placed in the hands of a single judge, to the advantage of the fisc", was a fact already denounced at the height of the Fronde (Le Boindre, 1997, p. 160) But Malesherbes gave new vigour and originality to the argument by slightly modifying Montesquieu's maxim on the fusion of executive, legislative and judicial powers, which would mean the death of liberty. He added Administration combined with jurisdiction will always produce despotism, because the safety of citizens consists in being judged by those who know no rule other than the law, and uncertain principles of administration easily serve to colour injustices; and in general, because it is the fate of humanity, that any authority that is not counterbalanced by any other, becomes abusive (Malesherbes, 1779, p. 149). In other words, the administration of intendants, subdelegates and the many clerks employed to levy taxes sinned by exercising a power against which there was no legal recourse. Any citizen who wished to question the decision of one of the intendant's officers had to seek justice from the same intendant. If this request was rejected, the only alternative was to appeal to the Royal Council. But this very alternative was not justice, according to Malesherbes, since neither the king nor even his council could hear the appeal. In reality, such appeals were the preserve of the comptroller general and the intendant of finance, whose reports were authoritative in these matters, and there was obviously little chance that they would oppose the verdict of an intendant (1779, p. 129). This analysis applied even more vehemently to the administration of the Fermes générales, particularly in the remonstrances of 14 August 1770 and 6 May 1775" (Julian Swann, Malesherbes and the Parliamentary Critique of Despotism, Bureaucracy and the "Fermes générales").

la monarchie administrative, in Eric Brian, Loïc Charles and Christine Théré (eds.), *Le cercle de Vincent de Gournay. Savoirs économiques et pratiques en France au milieu du XVIIIe siècle*, Paris, 2011, [p. 111-29] p. 121-22),

(164) See in particular Articles 1 and 17 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen of 26 August 1789; Title I of the Constitution of 3 September 1791; Article 20 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen contained in the Constitution of 24 June 1793, in Jacques Godechot, *Les Constitutions de la France depuis 1789*, Paris, 1995, p. 33, p. 35, p. 36, p. 81 and p. 82. Quoted in Pierre- Olivier de Broux, *Une brève histoire de la notion belge de 'service public' : de la France à l'Europe*, in Dirk Heirbaut, Xavier Rousseaux et Alain Wijffels (sous la dir.), *Histoire du droit et de la justice / Justitie - en rechts - geschiedenis. Une nouvelle génération de recherches / Een nieuwe onderzoeksgeneratie*, UCL, Louvain, 2013 [p. 613-629], p. 614-5.

(164bis) "The French Revolution created a multitude of accessory and secondary things, but it only developed the germ of the main things; these existed before it. Among the French, central power had already taken over local administration more than in any other country in the world. The Revolution only made this power more skilful, stronger and more enterprising" (Alexis de Tocqueville, *L'Ancien Régime et la Révolution*, t. 1 ? Gallimard, Paris, 1964, p. 65.

(164ter) " The Conseil d'Etat, i.e. Bonaparte, drew up laws for a new administrative and judicial organisation - The municipal and departmental administrations, elected by the people, were replaced by Mayors, Sub-Prefects and Prefects (as requested by Louis XVIII, p. 337).), a Prefect of Police in Paris, with Councils of the Municipality and Prefecture, and General Councils of the arrondissement and department. All were elected by the First Consul, represented him and depended solely on him. - It is he who administers the communes, the arrondissements, the départements, the whole of France; it is he who judges, through the Councils of Prefecture and the Council of State, all disputes between himself and private individuals, in other words he is the judge in his own case.

This was truly administrative despotism. - Another law also replaces the Courts made up of judges elected by the People, with district Courts, a criminal court in each department, and 29 Courts of Appeal, all the members of which are appointed by the First Consul, who even appoints the *avoués*, or public prosecutors of the old regime, abolished by the Constituent Assembly and re-established by a beginning of monarchic Restoration. It was almost judicial despotism. - And what thousands of lucrative positions Bonaparte appointed, Prefects, Sub-Prefects, Mayors, Councillors, Judges, Government Commissioners! What an immense clientele paid to serve, advocate and defend him! The mute legislature adopts everything. The Tribunal contains only a timid opposition, of which the despotic spirit of Bonaparte has the weakness to be irritated to such a point that it meditates the destruction of the Tribunes.- In the meantime, the first session is closed on Germinal 9 " (Etienne Cabet, *Histoire populaire de la révolution française de 1789 à 1830*, t. 4, Pagnerre, Paris, 1840, p. 471-2; see also François Furet, *La Révolution française*, Gallimard, 2007, p. 237).

(165) "Where there had been life, movement, association, local freedom, communal spontaneity, there was administrative despotism. of patriots and citizens, there was the passive obedience of the soldier.

Jefferies, London, 1852, p. 385; among the crowned heads who, in the eighteenth century, had been the most important figures in the Christian faith, there was the Catholic priest; where there would have been justice, there was the judge.

elevated to the rank of "great men" by the Enlightenment, we dare say that more than one of them was actually small.

(166) Thierry Pfister, *La République des fonctionnaires*, Albin Michel, 1988; *La République des juges, Actes du colloque organisé par la Conférence libre du jeune barreau de Liège*, Liège, Editions du jeune barreau de Liège, 1997.

(167) Quoted in Pierre Boisseau, *La Commune de Paris de 1871 à l'épreuve du droit constitutionnel*, Presses universitaires de la Faculté de droit de Clermont-Ferrand, 2000, p. 309.

(168) Guy Dhoquois, *Critique du politique*, Anthropos, 1983.

(169) On the genesis of the concept of the "Asian mode of production", which we outline here, see Kimio Shiozawa, *Marx's View of Asian Society and his 'Asiatic Mode of Production'*, https://www.ide.go.jp/library/English/Publish/Periodicals/De/pdf/66_03_02.pdf and Thorner Daniel. *Marx and India: the Asian Mode of Production*. In *Annales. Economies, Societies, Civilizations*. 24^e year, no. 2, 1969 [pp. 337-69]. In this respect, the testimony of Wittfogel (op. cit., pp. 450-1), a member of the German Communist Party from 1920 to the end of 1932 or the beginning of 1933 (Institute of Pacific Relations:

Hearings, United States Government Printing Office. Washington, 1951, p. 274) amply deserves. The Marxian concept of Asian society was largely based on the theories of the classical economists Richard Jones and John Stuart Mill, who in turn developed and generalised the ideas of Adam Smith and James Mill. Adam Smith noted similarities between water enterprise in China and 'in several other Asiatic governments'; and he looked particularly closely at the purchasing power of rulers in China, ancient Egypt and India. James Mill regarded the 'Asiatic model of government' as a general institutional type; and he rejected forced analogies with European feudalism. Richard Jones drew a general sketch of Asiatic society in 1831, when Marx was thirteen. And John Stuart Mill placed this society in a system of comparisons in 1848, while the authors of the Communist Manifesto, despite an allusion to the 'Orient', showed no awareness of the existence of a specifically Asian society. It was only after he had resumed his study of the classical economists in London that Marx became a firm believer in the 'Asiatic' concept.

"From 1853 until his death, Marx defended the Asiatic concept as well as the Asiatic nomenclature of earlier economists. In addition to the formula 'Oriental despotism' he used to designate the term 'Oriental society', used by John Stuart Mill, and also (with a visible predilection) the term 'Asiatic society' used by Richard Jones, are used to refer to the institutional order as a whole. His specific interest in the economic aspect of Asian society is expressed in the terms 'Asian system', land ownership, the specific 'Asian mode of production' and, more concisely, 'Asian production'.

"From 1850 onwards, the notion of a specific Asian society struck Marx with the force of a discovery. Temporarily abandoning party politics, he applied himself intensely to the study of the

industrial capitalism conceived as a distinct socio-economic and historical phenomenon. His writings from this period - including the first sketch of *Capital*, dating from 1857-58 - show that extremely stimulated by the Asian concept. In this first draft, as in the final version of his magnum opus, he draws a systematic (sic) comparison between certain institutional features of the three great forms of agrarian society ("Asia", classical antiquity, feudalism), and of modern industrial society".

(170) According to Louis Phocion Todière, *William the Conqueror*, Tours, 1856, p. 184, "[t]here is proof in the register of the Norman conquest that William established as a general principle that any title to property predating his invasion was null and void, unless he himself had formally ratified it".

(171) Roy H. May, *The Poor of the Land: A Christian Case for Land Reform*, Orbis Books, 1991, p. 57.

(172) Richard H. Lowry, *The Reforming Kings: Cult and Society in First Temple Judah*, Sheffield Academy Press, 1991, p. 54. In Israel, "[...] the first kings [...] belonged to simply well-off families, who looked after their flocks and cultivated their land themselves. On the other hand, the emergence of the monarchy was to bring about a veritable social revolution, pitting a minority of civil servants [the 'stewards of King David's [movable] possessions' referred to in 1 Chronicles 27:27-31] or enriched landowners against the mass of the weak, those left behind by prosperity" (Freddy Raphaël, *Judaïsme et capitalisme : essai sur la controverse entre Max Weber et Werner Sombart*, Presses Universitaires de France, 1982, p. 63).

(173) Sally L. D. Katary, *Land Tenure and Taxation*, in Toby Wilkinson (ed.), *The Egyptian World*, Routledge, 2007 [p. 185-205].

(174) See Francis Joannès (ed.), *Rendre la justice en Mésopotamie: Archives judiciaires du Proche-Orient ancien (IIIe - 1er millénaires avant J. - C.)*, Presses Universitaires de Vincennes, 2000.

(175) John L. Mckenzie, S. J., *The Dictionary Of The Bible*, A Touchstone Book, New York, 1995, p. 848.

(176) Claude Hermann Walter Johns, *Babylonian Law - The Code of Hammurabi*, *Encyclopedia Britannica*, vol. 3, 9th ed. p. 117.

(177) Martin Lewis and Kären Wigen, *The Myth of Continents: A Critique of Metageography*, University of California Press, Berkeley, 1997, p. 94.

(178) Richard H. Lowry, op. cit. p. 53.

(178bis) The formation of the bureaucracy in Mesopotamia is linked to extreme urbanisation (Marc Van De Mieroop, *The Ancient Mesopotamian City*, Oxford University Press, 1997 p. 1-2) and to the development of accounting, itself a determining factor in the invention of writing (Aline Tenu, *Les débuts la comptabilité en Mésopotamie*. 1-2) and secondly to the development of accounting, itself a determining factor in the invention of writing (Aline Tenu, *Les débuts de la comptabilité en Mésopotamie*. In *Comptabilités [En ligne]*, no. 8, 2016, online since 20 June 2016, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/comptabilites/1877>, accessed 30 November 2019; Douglas Garbutt,

The Significance of Ancient Mesopotamia in Accounting History. In *The Accounting Historians Journal*, vol. 11, no. 1, Spring 1984 [p. 83-101]). In turn, accounting, in Mesopotamia as in Egypt, was developed by priests (John Richard Edwards and Stephen P. Walker, *The Routledge Companion to Accounting History*, Routledge, London and New York, 2009, p. 86).

(179) Pierre Vidal-Naquet, *History and ideology: Karl Wittfogel and the concept of the 'Asian mode of production'*. In *Annales. Economies, sociétés, civilisations*. 19^e year, no. 3, 1964 [pp. 531-49], p. 535.

(180) Giovanni Busino, *Elites et bureaucratie: une analyse critique des théories contemporaines*, Droz, Geneva, 1988, p. 117; "The masters of [this society] were great builders [...] because they were great organisers and great organisers because they were great calculators. As calculators and organisers, they were also great at war, which they turned into a science".

(181) Isaac Deutscher and Emmanuel Hérichon, *Les racines de la bureaucratie*. In *L'Homme et la société*, n° 14, 1969. *Sociologie et socialisme* [p. 63-8] p. 67.

(182) See Béatrice Hibou, *La bureaucratisation du monde à l'ère néolibérale*, La Découverte, 2012, in particular the second sub-section of Chapter III, entitled 'Plus on dérègle, plus on bureaucratise'.

(183) Etzel Cardeña and John Palmer (eds.), *A Handbook for the 21st Century*, McFarland & Co, Inc, 2015, p. 395.

(183bis) Max Weber, *Œuvres politiques, (1895-1919)*, translated by Jean-Philippe Mathieu, Elisabeth Kauffmann and Marie-Ange Roy, Albin Michel, 2004, p. 336, quoted in Aurélien Berlan, *La fabrique des derniers hommes: Retour sur le présent avec Tönnies, Simmel et Weber*, Editions La Découverte, coll. "SH/Théorie critique", Paris, 2012.

(184) This nothingness," he adds pertinently, "imagines itself to have climbed a degree of humanity never before attained" (Max Weber, *L'éthique protestante et l'esprit du capitalisme*, Plon, Paris, 1964, p. 251, quoted in <https://www.cairn.info/revue-societes-2008-2-page-15.htm>).

(185) See Robert Fossaert, *L'Avenir du socialisme*, Stock, 1996.

(186) Stephen P. Dunn, *The Fall and Rise of the Asiatic Mode of Production*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 2012; Maurice Godelier, *The Concept of the 'Asiatic Mode of Production' and Marxist Models of Social Evolution*. In David Seddon (ed.), *Relations of Production: Marxist Approaches to Economic Anthropology*, translated by Helen Lackner, Frank Cass, 1978, pp. 209-57; Barry Hindess and Paul Q. Hirst, *Pre-capitalist Modes of Production*, Routledge and Kegan Paul, London, 1975.

(187) Pierre Vidal-Nacquet, op. cit. p. 532.

(188) See J. Obertreis, T. Moss, P. Mollinga and C. Bichsel, *Water and the infra-structure of political rule: Introduction to the Special Issue*. In *Water Alternatives*, vol. 9, no. 2, 2016.

(189) *Ibid.*

- (190) Quoted in Karl August Wittfogel, *Oriental Despotism: A Comparative Study of Total Power*, Yale University Press, 1957, 'p. 253.
- (191) *Ibid*, p. 254.
- (192) *Ibid*.
- (193) *Ibid*, p. 255-6.
- (194) In Africa too, kings were "the true owners of all the land in their kingdom"
 "(Alain Testart, *Propriété et non-propriété de la terre*. In *Études rurales* [En ligne], 169-70, 2004, online 01 January 2006, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/etudesrurales/8060>, accessed 05 November 2019.
- (195) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 257.
- (196) *ibid*, p. 258.
- (197) *Ibid*, p. 259 et seq.
- (198) *Ibid*, p. 261-2.
- (199) See Thomas F. Glick, *Irrigation and Hydraulic Technology: Medieval Spain and its Legacy*, Harvard University Press, 1970.
- (200) Salvatore Ciriaco (ed.), *Eau et développement dans l'Europe moderne*, Editions de la Maison des sciences de l'homme, Paris, 2015, p. 6.
- (201)) K. II. Bernhardt, *Das Problem der altorientalischen Königsideologie im Alten Testament*, Leiden, 1961, p. 74, quoted in Zandee J. *Le Messie, Conceptions de la royauté dans les religions du Proche-Orient ancien*. In: *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, vol. 180, no. 1, 1971 [pp. 3-28], p. 6.
- (202) *Ibid*.
- (203) *Ibid*, p. 4-5.
- (204) The recitative of the Judaic ritual for the blessing of the new moon (levana) includes the following sentence: "David, King of Israel, is alive and well" (Rocha ha-Chana 25a). It means that the new moon has been sanctified" (quoted in *Le Zohar - Genèse*, t. 3: Vayéchev, Miqets, translation, annotation and foreword by Charles Mopsik, Verdier, 2001, p. 251). "The renewal of the Shekhinah (the Moon) reactivates the vitality of King David (the Messiah), who is closely associated with it" (*ibid.*). According to one commentary, "King David is alive and existing for eternity and for the eternity of eternities" (*ibid.*). Thutmose III (1479-1424 BC) is "enduring in kingship as Ra in heaven" (J. Zandee, *Le Messie. Conceptions de la royauté dans les religions du Proche-Orient ancien*. In *Revue de l'histoire des religions*, t. 180, n° 1, 1971 [p. 3-28], p. 7).
- (205) *Ibid*, p. 8.

(206) Jean-Marie Durand, L'autorité du roi en Mésopotamie, in Antoine Compagnon, De l'autorité: colloque annuel 2007, Odile Jacob, p. 59.

(207) Hendrik van Oyen, Éthique de l'Ancien Testament, translation by Etienne de Peyer, Labor et Fides, Geneva, 1974, p. 96.

(208) The name Sargon (Accadian Šarru(n)kin) means "king of justice" and the name Melkisédeq is probably a translation of Šarru(n)kin (see Martin Bodinger. L'énigme de Melkisédeq. L'énigme de Melkisédeq, in Revue de l'histoire des religions, vol. 211, no. 3, 1994 [p. 297-333] p. 309, note 40).

(209) Marie-Joseph Seux, Lois de l'Ancien Orient, Paris, Le Cerf, coll. "Cahiers Évangile", 1986.

(210) Sophie Démare-Lafont, dātu ša šarri. The 'law of the king in Achaemenid and Seleucid Babylonia'. In Droit et cultures, 52, 2006-2, online 29 June 2009, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/droitcultures/544>, 15, accessed 21 August 2019).

(211) Marcel Détiéne, L'olivier : un mythe politico-religieux. In Revue de l'histoire des religions, t. 178, n° 1, 1970 [p. 5-23], p. 14. In Greece, the figure of the nurturing king appears for the first time in the Odyssey, XIX, 109-114.

(212) J. Zandee, op. cit. pp. 14-5, p. 16.

(213) In Israel, "justice was conceived not only as a moral tendency, i.e. to render justice to the oppressed, but also as a cosmic tendency" (ibid., p. 14). In Mesopotamia too, even if in practice the monarch's duty was to dispense justice only within his own group (Jean-Marie Durand, op. cit.).

(214) On the subject of the cosmic-moral nature of justice in the Semitic region, see Georges Roux, La Mésopotamie. Essai d'histoire politique, économique et culturelle, Editions du Seuil, 1985. In ancient Greece and Rome, on the other hand, law, whose purpose is to organise life in society, was not confused with morality, which is an essentially internal, personal and unconditional matter. Roman law was concerned with the relationship between men within specific hierarchical social groups. Ledroidelhomisme, confusing subjective morality with law, drew from it a definition of duties towards all men and deduced from it a universal right, equal for all; see, on the subject of the aberration of "human rights" from the point of view of law, <https://www.contrepoints.org/2013/02/19/115304-droit-et-morale-la-confusion-des-liberaux> ; Le droit et les droits de l'homme, Michel Villey Presses universitaires de France, 200.

(215) For Israel, see Issa Diab, Universalisme et Particularisme dans le Judaïsme contemporain, https://www.academia.edu/7900418/Universalisme_et_Particularisme_dans_le_Judaïsme_Contemporain; A. Hultgård, L'Universalisme des Test. XII. Patr. in Ex Orbe Religionum. Studia GeoWidengren, E. J. Brill, Leiden, t. 1, [p. 192-207] ; Philip Alexander, Towards a Taxonomy of Jewish Messianisms in Revealed Wisdom, in John Ashton (ed.), Revealed Wisdom: Studies in Apocalyptic in honour of Christopher Rowland [p. 52-73], p. 71.

(216) See Georges Roux, *op. cit.*

(217) Jean Joseph Thonissen, *Études historiques sur la législation criminelle: mémoire sur l'organisation judiciaire, les lois pénales et la procédure criminelle de l'Égypte ancienne*, 1864, p. 13.

(218) O. Beaugregard, *La justice et les tribunaux dans l'ancienne Égypte*. In *Bulletins de la Société d'anthropologie de Paris*, 4e Série, t. 1, 1890 [p. 716-73].

(219) Joseph Thonissen, *op. cit.* p. 13.

(220) The *wergeld* was created in the 6th century AD (see André Kuhn and Joëlle Vuille, *La justice pénale: les sanctions selon les juges et selon l'opinion publique*, Presses polytechniques et universitaires romandes, Lausanne, 2010, p. 34).

(221) Caroline Foulquier, *La preuve et la justice administrative française*, L'Harmattan, 2013, p. 74.

(222) Marcel Détienne, *Les Maîtres de vérité*, François Maspero, 1981, p. 49, quoted in Luc De Meyer, *Vers l'invention de la rhétorique: une perspective ethno-logique sur la communication en Grèce ancienne*, Peeters, Louvain-La-Neuve, 1997, p. 84.

(223) Françoise Smyth, *De Sumer au livre de Job : entre vérité, violence et contrat, ou comment vivre au Proche-Orient ancien*, *Droit et cultures*, 71, 2016, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/droitcultures/3823>, accessed 21 August 2019. The soothsayer, who, with the king and the poet, are "masters of truth", as early as the Palaeo-Babylonian period, prays thus: "Shamash, master of the divinatory sentence (bel dīnim), Adad, master of the prayer of consecration... render the sentence (dīnam dīna)", quoted in Françoise Smyth, *op. cit.*) "Masters of truth" appeared in Greece from the sixth century BC onwards (see <http://journal.alinareyes.net/2014/12/29/les-maitres-de-verite-dans-la-grece-archaique-par-marcel-dettienne/>), i.e. at the same time as the development of philosophy, which is said to be a search for truth.

(224) See Marcel Détienne, *op. cit.* 2nd ed, François Maspero, Paris, 1973, especially chapters V and VI, quoted in Bernard Mouffe, *Le droit au mensonge*, Editions Larcier, 2017.

(225) See Marcel Détienne, *op. cit.* 1st ed. François Maspero, Paris, 1967, p. 75, quoted in Elena Pallantza, *Der Troische Krieg in der nachhomerischen Literatur bis zum 5. Jahrhundert v. Franz Steiner Verlag*, Stuttgart, 2005, p. 121; see also Pierre Rodrigo, *Aristote : une philosophie pratique : praxis, politique et bonheur*, J. Vrin, Paris, 2006, p. 73.

(226) And the two will remain inseparable for a very long time. Seneca, referring to theories about comets, asked: "Are they true? The gods alone know, they who possess the science of truth" and, much closer to home, Descartes was of the opinion that "the mathematical truths which you call eternal truths were established by God and do not depend entirely as well as everything else on creatures" (quoted in Caroline Foulquier, *op. cit.*, p. 50).

(227) Stephen Bertman, *Handbook to Life in Ancient Mesopotamia*, Oxford University Press, 2003, p. 70.

(228) F. Rachel Magdalene, Job's Compositional History One More Time: What Its Law Might Contribute, in Anselm C. Hagedorn and Reinhard G. Kratz (eds.), *Law and Religion in the Eastern Mediterranean: From Antiquity to Early Islam*, Oxford University Press, 2013, [pp. 311-47], p. 323.

(229) Hala Alarashi, Le nomadisme pastoral au Proche-Orient à la fin du Néolithique précéramique : état de la recherche, *Syria* [Online], 83, 2006, online 01 July 2016, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/syria/174>, accessed 30 October 2019.

(230) Andrew H. Gordon and Calvin C. Schwabe, *The Quick And The Dead: Biomedical Theory In Ancient Egypt*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, p. 52.

(231) *Ibid*, p. 53.

(232) Daniel C. Snell, *Life in the Ancient Near East, 3100-332 B.C.E.*, Yale University Press, 1997, p. 56.

(233) Geoffrey W. Bromiley (ed.), *The International Standard Bible Encyclopedia*, vol. 4, fully revised edition, Eerdmans, Grand Rapids (MI), p. 464.

(234) Luc Bordes, Prehistoric throwing sticks and their representations: Développement d'outils et de méthodes pour la mesure de leurs caractéristiques et l'évaluation de leurs fonctions, Master 2 Préhistoire, Paléoenvironnement et Archéométrie dissertation, June 2014, <http://revedeboomerang.free.fr/memoire-LucBordes.pdf>, p. 23; most shepherds were skilled with slingshots and slingshots.

(235) *Ibid*, p. 22.

(236) Perrine Mane, *Le Travail à la campagne au Moyen Âge: étude iconographique*, Editions A&J Picard, 2006, p. 362.

(237) Nicholas Cachia, *The Image of the Good Shepherd as a Source for the Spirituality of the Ministerial Priesthood*, Editrice Pontificia Università Gregoriana, Rome, 1997, p. 29.

(238) For illustrations, see <http://www.seraphim-marc-elie.fr/2017/10/les-etonnantes-crosses-episcopales-des-saints-veques-celtes-irlandais-et-ecossais.html>.

(239) Jean-Baptiste-Etienne Pascal (abbé), *Origines et raison de la liturgie catholique*, J. - P. Migne, 1844, p. 143. The ferule was also the name of the small wooden or leather paddle, with a flat, enlarged end, which was formerly used as a disciplinary instrument to hit the hands of offending schoolchildren).

(240) Nicholas Cachia, *op. cit.* p. 29.

(241) *Ibid*.

(242) See <http://www.icogsf.org/shepherd.html>.

(243) Nicholas Cachia, *op. cit.* p. 27, note 3.

(244) Willy Schottroff, *Le psaume 23. De la méthode d'une interprétation socio-historique de la Bible*, vol. 7, 1981, p. 129-61. Pierre Lévêque, *Œdipe le conquérant, Dialogues d'histoire ancienne*, Centre de recherches d'histoire ancienne, vol. 7, 1981, p. 136.

(245) Otto Hermann Pesch and Jean-Marie van Cangh, *L'homme, image de Dieu: données bibliques, historiques et théologiques*, Académie internationale des sciences religieuses, Brussels, 2006, p. 93.

(246) Pierre Lévêque, *op. cit.* p. 137.

(247) Otto Hermann Pesch and Jean-Marie van Cangh, *op. cit.*

(248) In fact, the only known use of the shepherd metaphor during this period is in the Lamentations of Iphouér, generally dated to the 12th dynasty (1991-1786/-1785/-1783 BC).

(249) Nicholas Cachia, *op. cit.* p. 31 et seq.

(250) *Ibid*, p. 33.

(251) Philippe de Robert, *Le Berger d'Israël: Essai sur le thème pastoral dans l'Ancien Testament*, Editions Delachaux et Niestlé, Neuchâtel, 1968, p. 11.

(252) D. Kroneman, *The LORD is My Shepherd An Exploration into the Theory and Practice of Translating Biblical Metaphor*, https://www.academia.edu/8130924/Shepherd_Text4, pp. 76-8.

(253) Percy E. Newberry, *The Shepherd's Crook and the So-Called 'Flail' or 'Scourge' of Osiris*. In *The Journal of Egyptian Archaeology*, vol. 15, no. 1/2, May 1929 [p. 84-94]. Middle Eastern shepherds also used their staffs, some of which resemble whips, to collect labdanum, a plant reputed at the time for its medicinal and aphrodisiac properties (William C. Hayes, *The Scepter of Egypt: A Background for the Study of the Egyptian Antiquities in The Metropolitan Museum of Art. Vol. 1, From the Earliest Times to the End of the Middle Kingdom vol. 1*, Metropolitan Museum of Art, New York (NY), 1978, p. 286.

(254) Philippe de Robert, *op. cit.*, p. 15, William L. Moran (ed.), Thorkild Jacobsen, *Toward the Image of Tammuz and Other Essays on Mesopotamian History and Culture*, Wipf and Stock Publishers, Eugene (OR), 2008, p. 83 et seq. "Shepherd" ("nnaqidu", "re'u", "utullu") seems to have become a technical term for the deified king, who was considered to be the manifestation of Tammuz. Shepherd ("nnaqidu", "re'u", "utullu") seems to have become a technical term for the deified king, who was seen as a manifestation of Tammuz. It expressed the king's religious authority as high priest and intermediary between the gods and the people (D. Koneman, *op. cit.*, pp. 73-6).

(255) The first king to use the title "shepherd" seems to have been Lugl-Zaggissi, ruler of Umma, around 2500 BC (see Cletus Chukwudi Imo, *The Ministry of the Shepherd and the Church in Africa: A Cognitive Insight*, iUniverse, Bloomington (IN), 2007). He said he was "born to be a shepherd" (Carlo Zaccagnini, *Sacred and Human Components in Ancient Near Eastern Law*. In *History of Religions*, 33,

1994 [pp. 265-86], p. 271; Young Sam Chae, 'Mission of Compassion: Jesus as the Eschatological Davidic Shepherd in Matthew's Gospel'. PhD thesis, Trinity Evangelical Divinity School, 2007, p. 27.

(256) Quoted in Carlo Zaccagnini, *op. cit.* p. 271.

(257) Ceslas Spicq, *Lexique théologique du Nouveau Testament*, Editions Universitaires de Fribourg, 1991, p. 212, note 2.

(258) Bernard Aubert, *The Shepherd-flock Motif in the Miletus Discourse (Acts 20:17-38) Against Its Historical Background*, Peter Lang, New York, 2009, p. 130. In this text, the gods are compared to shepherds who have abandoned their temples (the stables) and their people (the cattle); finally, the king confesses that he has caused the downfall of the city by his unworthiness.

(259) See Matthieu Demanuelli, *La montagne, la vigne et la justice : images et langages des pouvoirs en Cappadoce à l'âge du Fer (début du XII^{ème} - fin du VII^{ème} s. av. J.C.)*. Between permanence and mutation. Between East and West. Doctoral thesis in the sciences of antiquity (history, archaeology, languages and literature), 2015. The curved staff of Mesopotamian kings is the predecessor of the Etruscan lituus (Claus Ambos and Ingrid Krauskopf, *The curved staff in the Ancient Near East as a predecessor of the Etruscan lituus*, in Bouke van der Meer, (ed.), *Material Aspects of Etruscan Religion. Proceedings of the International Colloquium Leiden, May 29 and 30, 2008*, Babesch Suppl. 16. 2010 [p. 127-153] https://archiv.ub.uni-heidelberg.de/propylaeumdok/1649/1/Krauskopf_Ambos_The_curved_staff_2010.pdf), which itself inspired the shape of the episcopal crosier, first mentioned in the 5th century (see R. Aigrain [abbé] [sous la dir.], *Liturgia, encyclopédie populaire des connaissances liturgiques*, Editions Bloud et Gay, 1931, p. 335 et sqq.). The lituus was not unknown to the early kings of England (see Miles Russell, *Arthur and the Kings of Britain: The Historical Truth Behind the Myths*, Amberley Publishing, 2017). In the "Middle Ages", their sceptre was called "Aaron's orchard" (Brian Barker, *Symbols of Sovereignty*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, Incorporated, 1979, p. 97; see, on the subject of the sceptre as a badge of royal authority in ancient Egypt, Toby A. H. Wilkinson, *Early Dynastic Egypt*, Routledge, London and New York, 1999, p. 159 et seq.), the rod used by Moses' brother magically to inflict various plagues on Egypt before the exodus. The sceptre has long been regarded as one of the two true emblems of England (Henry H. Atton and Henry H. Holland, *The Kings Customs*, vol. 1, Frank Cass & Co, Ltd, London, 1967 [1st ed. 1908], p. 458). "In France, the king held in his right hand the long sceptre, like a shepherd's staff (fig. 11), the axis of the kingdom anchored to heaven; through it the beneficial and fertile graces descended upon France. In his left hand, he held a rod a cubit long, topped with an ivory hand (fig. 12): it is worth remembering that this very French insignia was a Davidic sceptre: according to Saint Jerome, repeated by the Fathers of the Church, David meant "strong hand". This rod obviously came from the Carolingians to emphasise that the king was the New David in the tribe of Judah of the New Israel that is the Church, as Pope Gregory IX wrote to Saint Louis in 1239 in the bull *Dei Filius cujus*" (Hervé Pinoteau, *Insignes et vêtements royaux*. In *Bulletin du Centre de recherche du château de Versailles* [Online], 2005, online since 05 January 2007, available at <http://journals.openedition.org/crcv/99>, consulted on 11 November 2019). In Hebrew, the same word (*sebèt*) designates both the shepherd's staff and the sceptre of the king.

roi (Augustin George, Pierre Grelot, *Introduction critique au Nouveau Testament: La liturgie dans le Nouveau Testament*, Desclée de Brouwer, 1991, p. 318).

(260) Lorenz Dürr, *Ursprung und Ausbau, der israelitisch-jüdischen Heilandserwartung. Ein Beitrag zur Theologie des Alten Testaments*, Schwetschke & Sohn, Berlin, 1925, quoted in Nicholas Cachia, *op. cit.* p. 30.

(261) Quoted in Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, *King and Court in Ancient Persia 559 to 331 BCE*, Edinburgh University Press, 2014. In a later text, *The Banquet of Assurbanipal (668-630/627 B C E)*, this king declares himself "the shepherd of all mortals". See also Bernard Aubert, *op. cit.* p. 237 et seq.

(262) Raymond De Hoop, *Genesis Forty-nine in Its Literary and Historical Context*, Brill, Leiden, Boston and Cologne, 1999, p. 203. Among other West Semites, the pastoral metaphor is much less frequent, especially in royal titles. As far as deities are concerned, Baal is called "shepherd" in several texts, including one describing the resurrection of the kings. A number of place names are formed from the Ugaritic root r'y ("shepherd"); for example, the city of "hdr'y" ("Hadad [Baal] is a shepherd") was dedicated to the Canaanite ancestor cult.

(263) Gérard Siegwalt, *Dogmatique pour la catholicité évangélique*, vol. 4, Labor et Fides, Geneva, 2006, p. 134.

(264) Nicholas Cachia, *op. cit.* p. 45-63. In the Mishnah, shepherds come in fifth place, preceded by dice players, usurers, those who race pigeons and those who trade in the products of the Sabbatical year, followed by tax collectors and "shepherds". tax collectors, on the blacklist of professions considered to be based on deceit (*ibid.*, p. 66), which does not prevent the rabbis from exalting Yahweh, Moses and David as "faithful shepherds" (*ibid.*, pp. 66-9).

(265) *Ibid*, pp. 76-8.

(266) *Ibid*, p. 84.

(267) T. Padmaja, *Temples of Kṛṣṇa in South India: History, Art, and Traditions in Tamilnāḍu*, Abhinav Publications, 2002, p. 70.

(268) See Anandurai Variankavalramasamy, *The Sumerian king list*, <http://etcsl.orinst.ox.ac.uk/section2/tr211.htm>.)

(268bis) Michel Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population*, Le Seuil, 2004, p. 142.

(268ter) Emmanuel Cattin, Laurent Jaffro and Alain Petit (eds.), *Figures du théologico-politique*, J. Vrin, 1999, p. 11.

(268quater) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 16.

(268quinquies) Ibid. p. 9.

(268sexies) Dimitri El Murr, *Adieu au pasteur ? Remarques sur le pastorat politique dans le Politique de Platon*, p. 177.

(268f) Ibid, p. 178 (268g) Ibid.

(268nonies) Quoted in Michel Foucault, *op. cit.* p. 162, note 34.

(268decies) See *ibid.* p. 167.

(268undecies) Dimitri El Murr, *op. cit.*, pp.183-195 ; Arnaud Macé, *Purifications et distributions sociales : Platon et le pastorat politique. Philosophie antique - problèmes, renaissances, usages*, Presses universitaires du Septentrion, 2017, *Plato et la politique*, p.101-123.

(268duodecies) On the subject of oriental influences in Plato, see Joseph Bidez, *Eos; or, Platon et l'Orient*, Brussels, 1945, who offers a non-systematic reconstruction of the influences of oriental myths and cosmological and religious traditions, most of which go back to the teachings of Zoroaster, founder of the Persian religion, on Plato's writings and on the intellectual environment of the Academy. On the one hand, he detects in Plato's texts direct and indirect references to the religion of the Persian magi and to ancient cosmological traditions and, on the other hand, he finds in the writings of the Academy a number of direct and indirect references to the religion of the Persian magi and to ancient cosmological traditions.

to a lesser extent, astrological, Chaldean and the myths and beliefs they inspired; on the other hand, he reconstructs from a biographical and geographical point of view the links between the Academy in Athens and the Eastern world, particularly with regard to Pythagoreanism and the travels of Plato and other members of the Academy to Egypt (see also *Plato et l'astronomie chaldéenne*, *Annuaire de l'Institut de philologie et d'histoire orientales et slaves*, IV, *Mélanges Franz Cumont*, Bruxelles, 1936 [pp. 129-142], p. 137-138).

(268terdecies) Paul Janet, *Histoire de la science politique dans ses rapports avec la morale*, vol. 1, 2nd ed. revised, reworked and considerably expanded, Ladrance, Paris, 1872, p. iv.

(268m) Ibid, p. x. (268n) Ibid.

(268sexdecies) Ibid. p. xi-xii.

(268septdecies) Ibid. p. xv.

(269) Lloyd Llewellyn-Jones, *King and Court in Ancient Persia 559 to 331 BCE. Debates and Documents in Ancient History*, Edinburgh University Press, 2003, p. 26.

(270) Gioacchino Ventura de Raulica (R. P.), *op. cit.* pp. 546-7.

(271) Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits: 1954-1988. 1980-1988*, t. 4, Gallimard, 1994, p. 138.

- (272) Gioacchino Ventura de Raulica (R. P.), *Le pouvoir politique chrétien*, Gaume Frères et J. Duprey, 1858, pp. 549-50.
- (273) *Ibid*, p. 551.
- (274) Karl-August Wittfogel, *op. cit.*, pp. 184-5.
- (275) Michel Foucault, *op. cit.* p. 145.
- (277) Karl-August Wittfogel, *op. cit.*, p. 185.
- (278) *Ibid*, p. 187; see also p. 417.
- (279) Quoted in *ibid*, p. 186; see also James B. Pritchard (ed.), *Ancient Near Eastern Texts Relating to the Old Testament*, 3rd edn, Princeton university Press, Princeton (NJ), 1969, p. 414.
- (280) Karl-August Wittfogel, *op. cit.*, p. 188.
- (281) *Ibid*, p. 188-90.
- (282) *Ibid*, p. 190.
- (283) *Ibid*.
- (284) The Romans were no less reluctant to do this than the Greeks (see *ibid.*, p 239-40).
- (285) *Ibid*, p. 417.
- (286) *Ibid*, p. 180.
- (287) *Ibid*, p. 181.
- (288) *Ibid*, p. 177.
- (289) Michel Cartier, *Institutions impériales et situations locales dans la Chine des Ming : régime fiscal et économie*. In *Revue d'histoire moderne et contemporaine*, t. 16, n° 2, avril-juin 1969 [p. 268-81], p. 276.
- (290) *Histoire ancienne des Ariens, d'après M. Max Duncker (suite et fin)*. In *Revue de l'instruction publique en Belgique*, 14e année, nouv. série, t. 9, Bruges, 1867, p. 483.
- (291) Quoted in Karl-August Wittfogel, *op. cit.* p. 191-2. In a different vein, the *Treatise on Chinese Officials* (7th century AD) gives "the highest mark to the one who has allowed the number of soldiers to decrease, thanks to whom the harvests are abundant, who has brought tranquillity to the people, in whom there is no cause for alarm, and who makes plans" and the lowest to the one who "has earned merit by fighting on the frontiers, who has known how to distribute taxes, who recognises the truth of accusations, who governs successfully and knows how to repair and build" (see Roland Schaer, *Répondre du vivant*. Editions Le Pommier, 2013)

- (292) Guy Rachet, *A la découverte de l'Egypte mystique et légendaire*, 1987, Sand, 1987, p. 48.
- (293) Pierre Lévêque, *op. cit.* p. 137.
- (295) Jean-Philippe Omotunde, *L'origine négro-africaine du savoir grec*, vol. 1, Editions Menaibuc, 2004, p. 46.
- (296) Quoted in Karl-August Wittfogel, *op. cit.* p. 171-2.
- (297) René Preys, *Les complexes de la demeure du sistre et du trône de Rê*, Peeters, Louvain, 2002, p. 402.
- (298) T. J. Wray, *What the Bible Really Tells Us: The Essential Guide to Biblical Literacy*, Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2011, p. 189 ff.
- (299) E. M. Conradie, *Christianity and Ecological Theology: Resources for Further Research*, Sun Press, 2006, p. 78; Matthias Reményi, *Weil der Mensch ein Mensch ist. Zum Spannungsverhältnis von Anthropozentrik und Thieretik*, in Patrick Becker and Christiane Heinrich (eds.), *Theonome Anthropologie?: Christliche Bilder von Menschen und Menschlichkeit*, Herder, Fribourg, 2016, p. 297.
- (300) Ernst M. Comradie, *op. cit.* p. 79.
- (301) Jacques Véron, *L'Homme dénombré : arithmétique des populations*, in *Université de tous les savoirs*, vol 1 : *La Géographie et la Démographie*. 1, Poches Odile Jacob, 2002.
- (302) Of all the problems of interpretation raised by the text of the Bible, the episode of David's census is undoubtedly the one that gives exegetes the most trouble. There are in fact two versions. 2 Samuel 24:1 ("And the anger of the Lord was kindled again against Israel, and he stirred up David against them, saying: Go, number Israel and Judah") implies that the numbering was decided by Yahweh, whereas 1 Chronicles 21:1, written, it seems, three centuries later, says: "Satan rose up against Israel, and stirred up David to number Israel". An angel passed by, so to speak. To get out of their predicament, the rabbis suggest that the Chronicler, reluctant to present Yahweh as the inciter, the tempter, as the writers of the second book of Samuel had done, made "Satan" bear responsibility for the iniquity (see Dominique Cerbelaud, *Le Diable*, Les Editions de l'Atelier, 1997, p. 21).
- (303) *Mémoires de l'Académie des sciences, belles-lettres et arts de Lyon*, vol. 3, Lyon, 1853, p. 113.
- (304) *Ibid.*
- (305) *Ibid.*, p. 111. In Greece, the first census we have of Athens was ordered by the Athenian orator and statesman Demetrios of Phaleros (circa 360-282 BC), who, once appointed head of the city in 306, strengthened centralisation, created various magistracies, including that of the magistracy of the city's governor. *agonothete*, a citizen commissioned by the State to organise a festival or competition, and *gynaeconomist*, a supervisor of women's dress and morals, responsible in particular for controlling the number of women invited to Korybantés cult events (Ioulía Velissaropoulou-Karakósta,

Droit grec d'Alexandre à Auguste [323 BC-14 AD] : personnes, biens, justice, vol. 2, Centre de recherche de l'antiquité grecque et romaine, Fondation nationale de la recherche scientifique, 2011, p. 219), initiated religious reforms, including the standardisation of the elite's burial practices, and the abolition of certain liturgies (Vincent Azoulay, *La gloire et l'outrage. Heurs et malheurs des statues honorifiques de Démétrios de Phalère*, *Annales HSS*, 64e année, n° 2, 2009 [p. 303-340], p.318) and gave a particular lustre to the Dionysia (ibid., p. 318, note 72). Driven from power by Demetrios Poliorcetes in 307, Demetrios of Phaleros fled to Thebes, from where he went to Alexandria, where, having become an adviser to Ptolemy I, he took an active part in establishing the cult of Serapis (Livia Capponi, *Serapis, Boukoloi and Christians from Hadrian to Marcus Aurelius*, in Marco Rizzi [ed. *Hadrian and the Christians*, De Gruyter, 2010, p. 126) and the founding of the Library of Alexandria. Ptolemy entrusted Hadrian with the task of finding competent people to translate the Bible.

In Rome, civil registers and the land register were instituted around 555 BC by Servius Tullius, the first king, according to Titus Livius, to have been elected without the consent of the *populus* (according to a tradition reported by the Latin annalists, he was the son of an Etruscan captive, Oresia, a slave of Tanaquil, wife of Tarquin the Elder). Censuses were taken every five years, and the law punished those who made false declarations with confiscation of property or even loss of liberty. A general census took place under Augustus, mainly, like the previous ones, for financial reasons. The aim was to "draw up, in each district of the territory, an inventory of households, houses or individuals, divided into a small number of simple categories according to the greater or lesser interest they held for the State" (Guillaume Wunsch, Graziella Caselli and Jacques Vallin [eds.], *Traité de démographie. Observation, auxiliary methods, teaching and research*, vol. 8, Le comptoir des Presses Universitaires, 2006, p. 508).

(306) Quoted in Catherine Girardeau, *La statistique, miroir de l'histoire*. In *Economie et statistique*, n° 83, November 1976 [p. 3-17], p. 7.

(307) Quoted in ibid, p. 7.

(308) See Jacques Pirenne, *De la fin de l'ancien empire à la fin du nouvel empire (+2200-1085 BC)*, La Baconnière, 1961.

(309) Waldemar Deonna, *Le symbolisme de l'œil*, E. de Boccard, 1965, p. 136.

(310) R.M. Sheldon, *Espionage in the Ancient World*, McFarland & Company, Inc, Publishers, Jefferson (NC) and London, p. 48.

(311) The first references to officials known as "the king's eyes" and "the king's ears" can be found in Egyptian sources dating from the second half of the second millennium B C (R. M. Sheldon, *op. cit.*, p. 48).

(312) *Hitopadésa, ou L'instruction utile collection of apologues and tales*, translated from Sanskrit by Édouard Lancereau, Paris, 1855, p. 137.

- (313) Histoire ancienne des Ariens, d'après Max Duncker (suite et fin). In Revue de l'instruction publique en Belgique, 14e année, nouv. série, t. 9, Bruges, p. 483, 1867.
- (314) Waldemar Deonna, op. cit.
- (315) Adilph Leo Oppenheim, Eyes of the Lord. In Journal of the American Oriental Society, vol. 88, no. 1, 1968 [p. 173-180] p. 180. Yahweh is "He who sees all" ("el rohe").
- (316) Charles-Philibert de Lasteyrie Du Saillant (comte), Histoire de la confession : sous ses rapports religieux, moraux et politiques, Pagnerre, Paris, 1846, p. 30, p. 36.
- (317) Ibid, p. 29.
- (318) See Richard F. Gombrich, Theravada Buddhism: A Social History from Ancient Benares to Modern Colombo, 2nd edn, Routledge, 2006.
- (319) Marie Auguste Alexis Pernet (abbé), Études historiques sur le célibat ecclésiastique, et sur la confession, Guyot Pères et Fils, Lyon, 1847, p. 333.
- (320) Charles-Philibert de Lasteyrie Du Saillant (comte), op. cit. p. 47-8.
- (321) Michel Foucault, op. cit. p. 147.
- (322) Karl-August Wittfogel, op. cit., p. 192.
- (323) Ibid, p. 192-3.
- (324) Quoted in ibid, p. 192.
- (325) Ibid, p. 191: "For obvious reasons, the intimate thoughts of sovereigns have received little publicity. But some obvious behaviour and a few sayings confirm our assumption. Egyptian papyri have preserved what is believed to be the advice of a pharaoh to his son. This message reads: 'Keep away from those who are subordinate to you, lest what no one had foreseen should happen. Do not approach them in your solitude. Do not abandon your heart to a brother, do not have any friends... [even] when you sleep, let your heart be guarded, for a man has no friend in the day of trouble'. The Arthashastra names the dangers that surround the sovereign and analyses the various ways of dealing with them.
out of the way. His home must be safe. He must take measures against poison. He must monitor and control all the members of his entourage. The king must spy on his prime minister. He must be wary of his close friends, his wives, his brothers, and especially of the heir apparent. According to a source frequently quoted by the classics of Indian despotism, "princes, like crabs, have a notorious propensity to devour their fathers". To prevent such an accident, the manual cites numerous ways of protecting oneself from one's son" (ibid, p. 191).
- (326) Quoted in Karl-August Wittfogel, op. cit. p. 119.
- (327) Ibid, 193-4.

- (327bis) Alexis de Tocqueville, *On Democracy in America*, vol. 4, Pagnerre, 1848, Paris, 1848, p. 309-10. Max Horkheimer (*Théorie critique*, Payot, 1978, p. 358), founder of the Frankfurt School, agrees with Tocqueville on this point, when he exclaims: "We have come to the conviction that society will evolve towards a totally administered world; that everything will be regulated, everything!" (see also J.-M. Besnier: *Histoire de la philosophie moderne et contemporaine. Figures et œuvres*, Grasset, Paris, 1993, p. 603-21 as well as Catherine Roux-Lanier, *Le Temps des philosophes*, Hatier, Paris, 1995, p.594-605 and Jean-Marc Ferry, *Théorie critique et critique du totalitarisme*. In *Revue française de science politique*, 34^e année, n° 1, 1984, p. 79-10). Before them, Spinoza had begun chapter XI of his *Political Treatise* as follows.
- In his own words: "I have finally arrived at the third form of government, characterised by its rigorous absolutism and called democracy.
- (328) Joseph Boyer et al, *Les religions modes de vie modes d'emploi*, Les Editions de l'Atelier, 2011, p. 72.
- (329) "It was in the East that the theme of pastoral power came into its own, especially in Hebrew society" (Michel Foucault, *Sécurité, territoire, population*, Le Seuil, 2004, p. 373).
- (330) *Ibid*, p. 134.
- (331) *Ibid*, p. 373.
- (332) *Ibid*, p. 130.
- (333) *Ibid*, pp. 129-30.
- (334) Jean Bayet, *Ideology and plastic III. Les sarcophages chrétiens à 'grandes pastorales'*. In *Mélanges d'archéologie et d'histoire*, t. 74, n° 1, 1962 [p. 171-213], p. 181.
- (335) *Les Cahiers de Fontenay* n° 30/31: *Villes, pouvoirs*, 1983, p. 31. When Christianity, as a result of its proselytism, began to spread into the countryside at the end of the 1st century, itinerant presbyters had to be created (Maxime de Sardes (métropolitaine), *Le Patriarcat Œcuménique*, translated from the Greek by Jacques Touraille, Editions Beauchesne, 1975, p. 53-5.
- (336) *Ibid*, p. 130-1.
- (337) Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits: 1954-1988*, vol. 2, Gallimard, 1994, p. 562. The revisiting of the Old Testament economy of self-sacrifice in Christianity (Acts of the Apostles 27:3; 28:2) cannot fail to be linked to the development of the concept of "philanthropy" from the fourth century BC onwards in so-called "Greek" philosophy. *Philanthropia* expresses a fairly general and generous ideal, common in [so-called] Greek philosophy, of kindness, humanity and respect for human beings. Human beings must be respected, whatever their social rank or race, simply because they are human" (Jérôme Cottin, *op. cit.*, pp. 25-6). In Plutarch, who was writing the Acts of the Apostles around 80-90 AD, "the hero does not manage public affairs, [but] evolves in the midst of fellow citizens, or subjects, whom he must listen to and help, and to whom he must even..." (Plutarch, *op. cit.*, p. 25).

smile and speak kindly in some ways" (Katell Berthelot, *Philanthrôpia Judaica*, Brill, Leiden and Boston, 2003, p. 33, note 79).

(338) At least in the first three centuries of our era, it was in the guise of a shepherd that Jesus Christ appeared.

Christ was most often depicted, albeit allusively (Jérôme Cottin, *Jésus-Christ en écriture d'images : premières représentations chrétiennes*, Labor et Fides, Geneva, 1990, p. 21). "In Rome alone, over five hundred representations of the shepherd have been found, in all kinds of media. The image of Christ can be found on the walls of catacombs, sarcophagi and pavement mosaics, as well as on small objects such as cups, lamps and rings. These images do not show Christ, they simply evoke him, often indirectly. Most of the time, we can only tell from the environment whether this shepherd is Christ, or whether he is this secular image that is so popular. But often he is not one without the other.

(339) Joel Willitts, *Matthew's Messianic Shepherd-king: In Search of 'the Lost Sheep of the House'*, De Gruyter, 2007, p. 53.

(340) Michel Foucault, *Security*, p. 177.

(341) *Ibid*, p. 177-8.

(342) *Ibid*, p. 180-1.

(343) *Ibid*, p. 182.

(344) "An ancient tradition, of cynico-stoic origin, attributed to the wise man, a model of the true king, the ability to watch over others (episkopein). It's only a short step from there to making it an anticipation of the bishop" (Florent Coste, *Le silence des agneaux. La normativité pastorale à la lumière de la prédication mendicante sur le Bon Pasteur* (Jean, 10, 11) aux XIIIe et XIVe siècles. In *Mélanges de l'École française de Rome - Moyen Âge* [Online], 129-1, 2017, online 28 September 2017, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/mefrm/350>. accessed 02 November 2019.

(345) Michel Foucault, *Dits et écrits*, p. 562.

(346) *Idem*, *Security*, p. 157.

(347) *Ibid*, p. 172.

(348) *id.* *Dits et écrits*, p. 229.

(349) Jean-Claude Monod, *Foucault: la police des conduites*, Editions Michalon, "Le Bien Commun" series, 1997, p. 62.

(350) Jacques and Michel Dupâquier, *Histoire de la démographe*, Preface by P. Chaunu, Librairie Académique Perrin, "Pour l'Histoire" series, 1985, p. 49.

(351) Emigh Rebecca Jean et al, *Precocious Censuses in the Italian Regional States*, in Rebecca Jean Emigh, Dylan Riley and Patricia Ahmed, *Antecedents of Censuses from Medieval to Nation States*, Palgrave

Macmillan US [173-203], 2016, p. 175). In France, civil registers were regulated by the Ordinance of Villers-Coteret, issued in 1539 by François I, but, it seems, for a different purpose: "no doubt... because it allowed him to control religious affiliation more easily at a time when the ideas of the Reformation were spreading like wildfire" (Hervé Hasquin, *Sur les préoccupations statistiques en France au XVIIe siècle*. In *Revue belge de philologie et d'histoire*, t. 49, fasc. 4, 1971 [p. 1095-118], p. 1098.

(352) Jean-Claude Monod, op. cit. p. 62: "Demography is to the modern bureaucratic state what genealogy was to the dynastic state: a tool for knowledge and a mode of representation of the place of social reproduction that is the family" (Rémi Lenoir, *Évidence démographique et mode de gestion bureaucratique des rapports sociaux*. In *Informations sociales* 2014/3, n° 183, p. 1). "The bureaucratic state has generally been presented as having been built against the dynastic state, for example by Max Weber and, more recently, Pierre Bourdieu, for whom the formation of the bureaucratic state presupposed a process of 'defeodalisation', which the author of *Sur l'État* likens to a dynamic of 'defamilialisation'. This involves a gradual breakdown in the personal ties and loyalties between rulers and ruled based on family membership, as was more or less the case in France until the sixteenth century. The transition from the dynastic state to the bureaucratic state was in fact accompanied by a process of 'depatrimonialisation' of what, at the same time, came under the management of 'the good' and 'public goods': The actions of the king are no longer patrimonial strategies, of which inheritance and matrimonial strategies are only one dimension; the body politic is no longer confused with the person of the king, nor taxes with donations, nor the national territory with the king's lands... What characterises the bureaucratic state in relation to the dynastic state ('l'État c'est moi') is the transcendence of the state in relation to the king.

"The dynastic state is associated with a way of thinking that Bourdieu calls 'familial': the family is the matrix for all forms of classification. This is evidenced, among other things, by the pre-eminence and multiplicity of family metaphors for thinking about the political or religious order of the social world, in this type of society where people believed in the reality of images and therefore identified themselves and acted according to the categories of kinship (alliance and filiation). The substitution of the mode of thought

The shift from the bureaucratic to the family mode corresponds to a change in worldview: the worldview is now based on a perspective that is both universalist and future-oriented, a future that, as Weber analysed, can be rationally calculated. As a result, not only the objective position of the family, but also the way it is represented and its biological and social reproduction, are based on foundations other than kinship and the domestic order associated with it. The transcendence of the bureaucratic state is matched by a way of managing populations classified in general, abstract and standardised categories. This has the effect of transmuting real and singular groups of people into aggregates of individuals defined by the rights they hold, from the most general ('citizens') to the most particular ('married women', 'people aged 65 and over', 'immigrants'...), but always determined according to universally applicable criteria. These are all administrative categories, with no 'social consistency', to use Maurice Halbwachs' expression, i.e. groups of individuals abstracted from the group to which they belong.

family what the notion of profession (CSP) is to that of corps (in the sense of 'large bodies') or guilds, or the notion of population to that of people. These two types of state correspond to different ways of thinking about and managing social order. Between the sixteenth and eighteenth centuries, a new form of government and a new approach to power, both political and economic, were gradually put in place in Western Europe - as evidenced, among other things, by the development of the first statistical knowledge (Brian, 1994) - corresponding to a change in the subject for whom to govern. This transformation of the 'arts of government' is indicative of a much more general transformation, that of the transition from a family mode of perpetuating the social structure to a mode of reproduction in which the family has to reckon with other institutions that contribute to it, in particular the school system, the labour market and social protection systems". (Ibid., p. 13-4).

(353) According to Max Weber, the Church began to develop a bureaucracy from the end of the 13th century (Tony Waters, 'Bureaucracy' by Max Weber, edited and translated by Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters, 2015,

https://www.researchgate.net/publication/314478190_Bureaucracy_by_Max_Weber_edited_and_translated_by_Tony_Waters_and_Dagmar_Waters,

p. 17; Tony Waters and Dagmar Waters (eds.), Weber's Rationalism and Modern Society: New Translations on Politics, Bureaucracy, and Social Stratification,

Palgrave MacMillan, 2015, pp. 73-128], i.e. three centuries before the gradual but nonetheless

relatively rapid transition from the dynastic state to the bureaucratic state. In the Catholic Church, 'it was first the suppression of local feudal powers, then the suppression of all independent local powers, and the transformation of these men of power into pure civil servants of the central authority that advanced the bureaucracy' (Tony Waters, op. cit., p. 51). The presbytery and the episcopate were the embryos of the Christian priestly bureaucracy. Just as, in Mesopotamia in the third millennium, "as temples grew in size and rituals became more complex, the service of the gods required an ever-increasing number of personnel [and] [just like] the civil administration, chieftaincies were established and hierarchies formed, a bureaucracy ... was born" (Waters, op. cit., p. 51).

(see Frédéric Lenoir, *Petit traité d'histoire des religions*, Plon, 2008). In the Church of the early centuries, an all-powerful administration of specialists was established as the liturgy became more complex and the sacraments more numerous. Yet these officials of the sacred, no more than the mandarins in China, were recruited on the basis of their family ties, in what Fukuyama calls 'the tyranny of cousins', which reigns in tribal political-administrative systems such as China's ("[...] the state that emerged in China," explains the Japanese-American scholar, "was much more modern in the Weberian sense than any of its counterparts. The Chinese created a uniform, multi-level administrative bureaucracy, something that never happened in Greece or Rome. The Chinese developed a political doctrine openly opposed to familism, and its early leaders sought to undermine the power of entrenched families and kinship groups in favour of impersonal administration [...]. The Chinese political and cultural space extended over a much larger population than that of the Romans. The Romans ruled an empire, initially limiting citizenship to a relatively small number of people in the Italian peninsula. Although this empire eventually stretched from Great Britain to North Africa, via Germany and Syria, it was made up of a heterogeneous group of peoples to whom the Romans gave citizenship.

granted a considerable degree of autonomy. By contrast, although the Chinese monarch called himself emperor rather than king, he ruled over something that was much more like a kingdom or even a state in its uniformity" (Francis Fukuyama, *The Origins of Political Order: From Prehuman Times to the French Revolution*, Profile Books, 2011, p. 92-3). Furthermore, the type of bureaucratic administrative management that the Church chooses is, to use a distinction made by Max Weber in *Economy and Society*, of a "rational" or "statutory" order. "There are three types of legitimate domination. The validity of this legitimacy can mainly take the form of : 1) A rational character, based on the belief in the legality of the regulations laid down and the right to issue directives held by those who are called upon to exercise domination by these means (legal domination); 2) A traditional character, based on the everyday belief in the sanctity of traditions that have always been valid and in the legitimacy of those who are called upon to exercise authority by these means (traditional domination) ; 3) A charismatic character, [based] on extraordinary submission to the sacredness, heroic virtue or exemplary value of a person, or [emanating] from orders revealed or issued by that person (charismatic domination). In the case of statutory domination [satzungsmäßig], one obeys the impersonal, objective, legally decreed order and the superiors it designates, by virtue of the formal legality of its regulations and to their extent. In the case of traditional domination, one obeys the person of the holder of power designated by tradition and subject (in his attributions) to it, by virtue of the respect due to him within the scope of custom. In the case of charismatic domination, we obey the leader as such, a leader qualified charismatically by virtue of personal confidence in his revelation, his heroism or his exemplary value, and to the extent of the validity of the belief in his charism" (quoted in Alain Gras [ed.], *Sociologie-ethnologie : auteurs et textes fondateurs*, 2nd ed. revised, corrected and completed, Publications de la Sorbonne, Paris, 2008, p. 109). Charism in the Church is "commodified", "reified". Weber speaks of Amtcharisma ("charism linked to the office"); "it is the ordination regularly conferred and not the spiritual quality of individuals that decides the effectiveness of the gift of grace"; in other words, there is "complete dissociation between the gift of grace and the qualification of those who communicate it" (see Enrico Cattaneo, *Les ministères dans l'Église ancienne*, Les Editions du Cerf, Paris, 2017).

(354) Rénata Brandimarte et al (eds), *Lexique de biopolitique. Les pouvoirs sur la vie*, translated by Pascale Janot, Érès, Toulouse, 2009, p. 266,
https://www.academia.edu/5473595/Lexique_de_biopolitique._Le_pouvoirs_sur_la_vie.

(355) Michel Foucault, *Security*, p. 176.

(356) Rénata Brandimarte et al (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 267.

(357) Michel Foucault, *op. cit.* p. 185.

(358) *Ibid.*, p. 185-6.

(359) *Ibid.*, p. 186.

(360) Rénata Brandimarte et al (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 267.

- (361) Jean Delumeau, *L'aveu et le pardon. Les difficultés de la confession XIIIe-XVIIIe siècles*, Paris, Fayard, 1990.
- (362) Michel Foucault, *op. cit.* p. 132.
- (363) Jean Delumeau, *Le Péché et la peur*, Fayard, 1983, p. 331.
- (364) *Ibid.*, p. 332.
- (365) *Ibid.*
- (366) See Michel Senellart, Michel Foucault: une autre histoire du christianisme? In *Bulletin du centre d'études médiévales d'Auxerre, BUCEMA* [Online], Hors-série n° 7, 2013, online 29 March 2013, available at: <http://journals.openedition.org/cem/12872>, accessed 03 November 2019.
- (367) Michel Foucault, *op. cit.* p. 113.
- (368) Johanna Oksala, *From Biopower to Governmentality*, in Christopher Falzon, Timothy O'Leary, Jana Sawicki (eds.), *A Companion to Foucault*, Wiley-Blackwell, 2013., http://www.researchgate.net/publication/285945514_From_Biopower_to_Governmentality.
- (369) For the moment we refer to Patrick Martin, *Pouvoir pastoral, normalisation et soins infirmiers: une analyse foucauldienne*. In *Aporia: The Nursing Journal*, 2, 2010, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/43019489_Pouvoir_pastoral_normalisation_et_soins_infirmiers_une_analyse_foucauldienne; Lorelei Jones, *Pastoral power and the promotion of self-care*. In *Sociology of Health & Illness*, vol. 40, 2018, https://www.researchgate.net/publication/324589660_Pastoral_power_and_the_promotion_of_self-care/citation/download; *Pastoral power techniques: the individual monitoring of unemployed people and RSA recipients*, 16 December 2013, <https://paris-luttes.info/techniques-de-pouvoir-pastoral-le>.
- (370) Charles Le Maire, *Initiation a la philosophie de la liberté*, t. 2, Pagnerre, Paris, 1843, p. 364-74

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