

ON ISLAM



FROM VARIOUS SOURCES

BERSERKER

BOOKS



Islam, a secret society

In his thirty-ninth year, Mohammed met and befriended Abu Bakr, son of Abu Kahafah, a carpet merchant two years his junior. Gifted in commerce, he had acquired a considerable fortune and, as his father was blind, he was the head of the family. He was a kind and benevolent man, with charming manners and a fine mind, even if he sometimes said things that were not his own. obscene; and his company was much sought after. Like the Meccan tribes, like the others Arabs used to get together in the evening and some ladies held salons in the courtyards of their homes, there was no shortage of opportunities for conversation in Mecca.

Abu Bakr worshipped heroes like no other; he possessed a typically feminine quality that could be seen in all of us. Having believed a lot, all he wanted was to believe even more. Mohammed, a fine psychologist, perceived this quality and used it.

A year after they had become intimate, Mohammed called upon Abu Bakr and it was Abu Bakr and not Mohammed who proselytised. We do not know whether Mohammed had already tried to find out whether he could make disciples; what is certain is that he found in this person a man capable of believing that one of his fellow citizens had received a message from God, which it was up to him to welcome and promote. It is much easier to invite people to accept other people's claims than one's own. The proof of this is that in the history of Islam, the Mahdis who were the most successful were those who were able to remain hidden while some of their followers proclaimed their advent. But, in most cases, it was a case of collusion, with each party expecting a definite advantage. In the case of Abu Bakr, the hypothesis of collusion cannot be accepted. Muhammad said that if he had to take a man as a confidant (khalil), he would have taken Abu Bakr, but he did not take a confidant. Abu Bakr, although a valuable assistant, was not an accomplice. He never forgot the distance between himself and his master.

When a man pretends to produce messages from another world, he must attribute both their form and their substance to a supernatural origin. The problem for the medium is to produce a message without appearing to deliver it himself; and Mohammed had to solve this problem no less than any modern medium. When he had his first public revelations, it seems that he adopted instinctively (or, perhaps, following the example of the Kahins) (1) a procedure common to the prophets of all ages, (2) as well as to the Sibyl:

"talia fanti

Ante fores subito non voltus, non color unus,
Non comptae mansere comae; sed pectus
anhelum, Et rabie fera corda tument: majorque
videri
Nee mortale sonans, adflata est numine
quando Jam propiore dei, "

Mohammed would fall into a state of violent agitation, his face would become livid (3) and he would wrap himself in a blanket; when he took it off, he was covered in sweat (4) and all he had to do was write the message he had received. From time to time an unintelligible message seems to have preceded the message itself, the letters not forming words and curiously resembling the first movements of a planchette. We have already seen that there is good reason to believe that Mohammed had epileptic seizures at some point; the phenomena accompanying these seizures may have suggested a form that he could have reproduced artificially later. The process described, sometimes accompanied by snoring and facial flushing, (5) came to be recognized as the normal form of inspiration and could be acted out without any preparation; the Prophet would receive a divine communication in immediate response to a question addressed to him while he was eating and, having revealed it in this way, would finish the piece he was holding in his hand when he had been interrupted, or a revelation would be made to him in response to a question addressed to him while he was in the pulpit. (6) Following revelations that seem to have been his very first Mohammed was called "the man in the blanket" or "the man who is wrapped up". Whatever the recipe for this process, the Prophet seems to have learnt it by heart.

The other problems which the medium has to solve concern the substance of the revelation. Once he was head of state, Mohammed had a lot to say, but at the beginning of his career, the substance was not provided by circumstances. As a general rule, mediums who are in the same situation as Mohammed do not beat about the bush. They put into God's mouth words that are generally recognised as his, i.e. verses from the Old Testament or the New Testament. As these are recognised as the words of God, it costs nothing to repeat them. When Mohammed, driven by circumstances to produce more and more revelations, followed this sure method, he was able to declare that it was by a miracle that he was instructed in the contents of books he had never read. When his style of preaching had rightly won him the approbation of great audiences, he was able to change his tune and declare that the miracle lay in his incomparable eloquence.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves. The very first snippets of revelation that were communicated to Abu Bakr seem to have been imitations of speeches by preachers whom Muhammad had heard on his travels. According to one tradition, he had heard the sermons of the "most eloquent of the Arabs", Kuss, son of Sa'idah, who enjoined men to remember the ephemeral nature of life and to deduce the existence of the Creator of the phenomena of the world. The subjects addressed by these preachers were undoubtedly the Day of Judgement, the fire of Gehenna and the need to worship Allah rather than idols; for these were the ordinary themes of the evangelists. (7) Moreover, experience shows that the

(8) Those who describe the Prophet's early speeches say that they warned the Meccans of divine punishment and that the speaker compared himself to the one who sounds the alarm when the enemy attacks. (9) As we

As we shall see, this doctrine must not be dissociated from that of the resurrection; and the distinctive features of Mohammed's teaching, as opposed to the ideas of paganism, were in the main the doctrine of the future life and the unity of God. Arabic oratory seems to have been in some way rhymed, and Mohammed imitated it without understanding its nature.

To counter the supposition that Mohammed deliberately mystified his contemporaries, it has been argued, in ancient and modern times alike, that his character was upright, even earning him the name of "Faithful". The story that he had trained a pigeon to peck grains out of his ear aroused the indignation of Carlyle and others. In fact, Muslim tradition does not record that he ever received revelations from pigeons. However, it does mention events which seem to show that he had studied theatrical effects of a slightly less naive kind. In an empty room he claimed he could not find a seat - all the seats being occupied by angels. He modestly turned his face away from a corpse, for the sake of two hours who had come from heaven to look after their husbands. There is even every reason to suppose that he sometimes

to let some of his acolytes play the role of Gabriel or to let his disciples identify one of his interlocutors with this angel. The revelations he received resemble those of modern mediums who can be studied in the history of Spiritism by M. F. Podmore, whose researches cast the greatest doubt on the idea that an honourable man cannot mystify his fellow-men, and also show that the support which the performances of a medium carry is rarely shaken by their demystification. Referring to one of the mediums whose career he describes, the author remarks that he had won the friendship and full confidence of his audience, that he was helped by the religious emotions inspired by the words he uttered in trance, and that he could boast of an unblemished character and an honourable life. The possession of these advantages greatly helped this medium to make people believe in his sincerity; but the historian of Spiritism, even if he does not know how to account for all the phenomena and recognises the difficulties which accompany their explanation, is inclined to attribute to

all that is marvellous in the medium's performance. What is clear is that Mohammed possessed the same advantages as those listed by Podmore and that this is how he gained followers; that, nevertheless, the process of revelation was so dubious that one of the scribes responsible for writing down the effusions became convinced that it was an imposture and consequently gave up.

to Islam. But for those who confine themselves to studying the political effectiveness of supernatural revelations, it matters little whether the medium is sincere.

We therefore consider that it was Abu Bakr's receptiveness that explains why Muhammad was able to act as a medium. It was in Muhammad's character to bide his time - to wait for the right moment to act. But the new role he was about to play was not one that could be improvised - it is not possible to change one's life completely without a period of transition. This transition is a period of solitude for most mediums. Thus Joseph Smith, the founder of

the Mormon sect, was wandering in a wood, when an angel revealed to him the Book of Mormon. The seer from Poughkeepsie, in March, 1844, "was walking in the country under the protection of his master spiritual, when he spontaneously fell into a trance during which Galen and Swedenborg appeared to him in a cemetery and communicated the message he was to pass on to humanity". His work, *The Principles of Nature*, which he later gave birth to in a trance, was not quite as successful as the Koran, but it was published in thirty-four editions over a period of thirty years.

(10) That Muhammad's prophetic career began with a period of solitude seems attested, even if there are some contradictions between our authorities on the details. For one month - and it seems to have been that of Ramadan, which was later considered the Month of Fasting - the Meccans practised a rite called *tahannuth*, the exact meaning of which is unknown but which was apparently a form of asceticism. During this month, Mohammed used to retire to a cave on Mount Hira, five kilometres from Mecca in the direction of Ta'if. He seems to have taken his family there: it is likely, however, that they did not worship there as they did at Al-Lat and Al-'Uzza (11) in Mecca [...]. On a certain day of the month, Muhammad went down into the valley on his own and it was there that the theophany (or its equivalent) took place, marking the beginning of his career as a divine messenger.

Joseph Smith's idea was to communicate to the world the contents of certain secret tablets to which he alone had access and whose language he alone could translate "by the grace of God" of God". Mohammed's idea was similar; he was allowed (or, according to one account, forced) to read the contents of a well-guarded tablet - he had previously been unable to read or write. The miracle by which he became able to read without learning - an episode which may have been suggested by accounts of other prophets - he alludes to (12) but does not dwell on it. The idea of not being allowed The fact that Smith had only occasional access to the guarded tablet was better than Smith's, because it allowed him to legislate in case of need. In the traditions on this subject, the communication is made by Gabriel, the angel who transmits messages in the New Testament; but in the theophany recorded in the Koran, it seems that it was God himself who descended, that he spoke to the Prophet at a distance of a little less than two bowsticks (13) and that, the second time, the Prophet spoke to him at the distance of a little less than two bowsticks (14). saw "near the Lotus of the limit, not far from the Garden of the abode of the blessed". The fact that he later replaced Gabriel is probably due to the development of the Prophet's theology.

We will never know more about the beginning of revelation. In the first account, the Prophet is so distraught by his experience and so afraid of becoming a soothsayer (Kahin) or a poet that he almost commits suicide; Khadija, meeting him by chance, comforts him by assuring him that he will be the national Nabî (Prophet) - a word she could hardly have known - and has a conversation with Warakah, son of Nawfal, who spoke equally encouraging words. His words would have been, "Kaddosh, Kaddosh, this is the sublime Nomos." The first two words are Hebrew and mean "Holy, Holy!" The last is the Greek word for "Law". The curious and hybrid character of these expressions may make this story credible, but commentators translate "Nomos" as "the Holy One".

messenger of the King" and applies it to Gabriel, thus implying that the exclamation was not appropriate to the occasion on which it was supposed to have been uttered. In another version, Khadija does not consult Warakah but a Christian slave, who also recognises Gabriel in this name. Warakah does not appear in the rest of the story (14) and it would be rash to assert that the meeting between Khadija and him was historic; we know that Khadija had an enlightened relative and the legend could hardly have done less than make her recognise her husband's mission. Nor do we give any more historical value to the tradition according to which Mohammed dreamt that he saw Warakah after his death, dressed in white, which

(15) On the other hand, it is not improbable that Khadija may have been prepared by her cousin's speculations and studies for a revolt against the Meccan religion. In Khadija's case, we can also imagine a priori that the grief caused her by the death of her sons played a part in the conversion process, and this is confirmed by a story told in the Memoirs of Ali. (16) If idolaters go to hell, she asked her husband, were her parents in hell?

Mohammed replied that they were there and, seeing that she looked distressed, assured her that, if she could see them in their true nature, she would hate them too. She then asked him if his dead children were also in hell? In answer to this question, the Prophet had a revelation: "Those who believe and their descendants follow them in faith, We will make their descendants join them.

"A brilliant reply, (17) since the bereaved mother was thus assured that the eternal happiness of her dead sons was subordinate to her belief; she was thus given the chance not only to find them but to allow them access to the Garden of Delights. It is not surprising that Khadija would devoted himself body and soul to the mission and was promised a very special place in Paradise (18).

It is clear that some of the commandments of Islam must have been established from the moment the revelations were communicated to Abu Bakr and Khadija. For it is by no means sufficient to warn people of the terrors of the Day of Judgement; answers must be given to the question: What must I do to be saved? And this answer, to be satisfactory, must include certain injunctions. It seems that they were enjoined to wash their clothes and turn away from idols. The first of these commandments was an easy symbolic act - among many peoples, clothes are not a matter of course. one with the person who wears them; (19) the second was difficult to follow in a community where people socialised a lot; if we are to believe the stories we will tell, the worship of idols was widespread. It was difficult for a person to renounce idolatry without his family noticing, and so the secret of the Prophet's mission had to be revealed first to the two boys who were to become the first to renounce idolatry.

lived with Khadija, Zaid, son of Harithah, the adopted son, and Ali, cousin of the Prophet and son of Abu Talib, whom Mohammed had undertaken to support, because his uncle was finding it difficult to provide for his large family. (20) The latter was about ten years old, the former was ten years the youngest of the Prophet's two children.

Prophet (21) - according to the most likely version - but, as we shall see, entirely subject to the authority of the Prophet.

It is stated that the revelations ceased for some time after they had begun, a phenomenon which may be compared with the fact established by Starbuck in the cases of conversion he has studied: abjurations, he shows, are rare but periods of inactivity and indifference

many. It is reported that Khadija consoled the Prophet during the period when he ceased to be visited by God, which perhaps means that the resolute woman who enabled him to keep the faith during the years in which his dominant passion must have been the strongest forced him to follow the direction he had taken. But, in fact, he was forced to do so by Abu Bakr, who immediately began proselytising. There is no doubt that, at the Prophet's request, the mission was carried out in the greatest secrecy. Abu Bakr informed only those people whom he trusted and who were able to help him. had influence. But neither he nor the Prophet were impatient and they would have been satisfied if Abu Bakr's propaganda had converted three people in the first year. (22) There is every reason to believe that he was helped from the outset by an Abyssinian slave, Bilal, about whom we would like to know more. ancestors; for Omar declared that Bilal formed "a third of Islam"; (23) and, unless we misunderstand the meaning of the expression, another disciple took to calling himself a quarter of Islam (24) because, when he had visited Mohammed in Ukaz, he had found him in the company of a "man".

a free man (Abu Bakr) and a slave (Bilal). Tradition is clearly unable to say with

We do not know for certain whose slave he was. For want of better information, we are inclined to attribute to him some of the Abyssinian elements of the Prophet's productions. (25) After a while, he was bought and freed by Abu Bakr.

Abu Bakr's method has not been reported in many cases. There is, however, one anecdote that seems to be true and typical. Othman, son of Affan, six years the Prophet's junior, was a cloth merchant whose business partner was a cousin of Muhammad's; (26) he also indulged in usury, lending money to businesses from which he enjoyed half the profits; (27) he dealt with money matters with remarkable acuity. (28) His sister was a milliner, married to a barber (29) and he himself was exceptionally handsome, very fond of personal adornment and dignified; Mohammed himself did not dare to appear before him in a housedress (30) or allow slave girls to play the tambourine in his presence. (31) He did not like fighting, as history would later show, for he left one battlefield, fled another and was killed while ostentatiously reading the Koran. He loved Muhammad's daughter, Rukayyah, and learned to his great regret that she had been betrothed to another man. On hearing the sad news, he confided his grief to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr told him lent a sympathetic ear, then asked him if he didn't think the Meccan gods were just wood and stones. A question of dubious delicacy, it would seem, unless the lover had

called upon their services; but a conversation ensued, from which Othman deduced that, if he chose to declare that the Meccan gods were worthy of contempt and acknowledged that Mohammed had He had been given the mission of eliminating them, but he could still obtain the hand of Mohammed's daughter. Muhammad then passed by them, Abu Bakr whispered something in his ear and the matter was settled. Othman became a believer and Rukayyah became his wife.

In this case, the conversion process is obvious and presents no difficulty for the reader to understand. In each of the other cases, the skilful missionary must have seen an opening, even if we often do not know what it consisted of. Abu Bakr probably knew that women are more susceptible to conversion than men, foreign residents than natives, slaves than free men, people in difficulty than wealthy and prosperous people. When the existence of Islam was discovered, the modest situation of most of Muhammad's followers was a stumbling block for the aristocrats of Mecca, who asked him to chase away this rabble before they had anything to do with them. Indeed, the Koran so explicitly acknowledges that the Prophet's followers were the dregs of the people (32) that serious doubts hang over the ancient traditions which contradict this claim [...] And later, when the aristocrats were forced to convert to Islam, they took to reproaching their new brothers for their former condition. (33) More than one later claimed the honour of having been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr; and the length of time during which the mission remained secret made their claim difficult to verify. When one When asked what had brought them to Mohammed, they were capable of giving incredible answers; perhaps they had forgotten the real reason or preferred to hide it. Khalid, son of Said, the fourth or fifth convert, dreamt that his father was pushing him into a lake of fire, from which another man saved him. He asked Abu Bakr to interpret this dream. (34) Abu Bakr took him to his father's house. Mohammed, then made a retreat to Ajjad, near Safa, where the dreamer recognised his Saviour and converted. Do men really have such dreams? Flammarion and Myers would say yes. Abdallah, son of Massoud, a client and serf, declared that, while he was feeding the flocks of Ukbah, son of Mu'ait (who later became a fierce adversary of Muhammad), Muhammad and Abu Bakr had asked him for a bowl of milk; and Abdallah was converted at the sight of the goat's udder swelling and contracting to the great delight of the Prophet. (35) Uthman, son of Maz'un, (36) a man who had a The Prophet raised his eyes to heaven, stared at him in a certain place, went there, returned and raised his eyes to heaven again. When Othman said to him asked the meaning of this feat, he replied that he had been visited by a messenger of God, who had invited him to preach justice, goodness, chastity, etc., and Othman believed. Many declared that dissatisfaction with pagan beliefs was what had made them turn to the Prophet; and if there were If there was a trace of this feeling in a man, Abu Bakr would see to it that it did not escape him. One of those who may have been converted in this way was Sa'id, son of Amr Ibn Zaid; his father had rejected polytheism and idolatry before Muhammad's mission had begun, without however adopting Judaism or Christianity. Sa'id was an early convert but is not mentioned among Abu Bakr's proselytes. Another of these converts may have been 'Abd al-Kaaba (the servant of the Ka'ba), son of Auf, renamed 'Abd al-Rahman, because the Ka'ba had not yet been dissociated from paganism. (37)

This man was a merchant whose partner was a certain Rabah, whom his new friends called 'the Faithful'. He had a rare talent for making money, which he spent lavishly. Years later, (38) when he arrived in Yathrib with other destitute refugees, all he asked was to be shown the market; once at the market, he felt revived, even though he had no capital. (39) He would have been abstinent before his conversion; would have disapproved of fighting in the path of Islam, even after the practice had taken hold; would not have yielded it to anyone in courage. Such a man may not have seemed a promising match for Abu Bakr but he was about eight years Abu Bakr's junior and may have been subject to his influence. Or, in his case too, a lady may have played a part. There was in Mecca a certain Mikdad who, after committing a murder, fled from his tribe and was welcomed by the Kindah; among them too he shed blood; and he fled to the Mecca, where he was adopted by a man called Al-Aswad, from the tribe of Muhammad's mother. Abd al-Kaaba advised him (in the course of conversation) to marry, but he contemptuously refused his daughter; he was consoled, however, by Muhammad, who gave him the daughter of his late uncle, Zubair, in marriage, on the same terms (one would think) as those on which Othman had been forced to marry. submit. We do not know what other measures were taken to convince 'Abd al-Kaaba. With Mikdad was converted another man, Utbah, son of Ghazwan, probably a poor client.

Three of the other first converts were Al-Zubair, son of 'Awwam; Saad, son of Abu Wakkas and Talhah, son of 'Ubaidallah. The first of these, according to tradition, was eight, ten or seventeen at the time; he was a cousin of the Prophet, the son of a grain merchant and an apprentice butcher; and it is said that his his parents mistreated him. If his conversion did take place at this time, he may have been one of Ali's playmates, initiated into mysteries that he could not reveal because, as we have seen, their families were linked.

Talhah was certainly an adult and claimed to have been introduced to Muhammad by a monk he had met on a business trip to Syria. If this statement has any value, it probably means that he had heard there that Arab paganism was being ridiculed by the followers of the f a s h i o n a b l e creed; if their mockery had no effect on most minds, some were nonetheless sensitive to it. Later, his spending habits made him famous (40).

Saad claimed to have been the third Muslim for a whole week, in which case he would have been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr. He was an arrow-maker and it is said that he was the first to shed his blood for the new cause. He was seventeen years old at the time of his conversion. When they were brought to Muhammad, all the converts were repulsed, with the exception of Abu Bakr. The Prophet later acknowledged this: but he did not specify what it was that displeased the newcomers. And we do not know how these solemn scenes took place: at m o s t , we learn that the Prophet taught the proselytes to pray. Later, however, in order to be admitted to see the Prophet, the proselyte had to be prepared to swear allegiance and had to undertake to refrain from

certain immoral acts; for the commission of which he was punished in this life, if he wished to escape punishment in the Hereafter; (41) and, still later (in the case of men), he had to fight all the nations until they had adopted the new religion. There can be little doubt that, from the outset, the proselytes made commitments as serious as those made by those who are admitted to other secret societies; in general, these obligations are not specific actions in the present but a willingness to answer the call in the future. It would seem that, from At first, the Prophet established brotherhoods of believers, whose new relationships were to replace blood ties just as the Christianity of the Ibad tribe or the Christians of Hira had provided a different bond from tribal ties. The reluctance that the Prophet observed was probably due to the anguish that even young people felt at the idea of tying themselves to something in perpetuity, especially when that something was an unknown quantity, a path whose outcome was obscure.

The evolution of the Muslim ceremony known as salât, whose name derives from the Jewish or Christian term for "prayer", is not known in detail. In a form that later became stereotyped, the Jewish custom of standing prayer, the Christian practice of prostration (42) and that of bowing (the back horizontal and the hands on the knees) were combined and certain formulas were prescribed. In the beginning we used to," said one convert, "not knowing what to say when we prayed, just prostrate ourselves. The Prophet then taught us another formula". (43) A prayer similar to the Pater Noster was probably composed later: it contains polemical references to an unspecified sect or sects. (44) As we shall see, the salât was later used as a kind of military exercise: in the early days it had an ascetic character, the devotee "doing without a rope around the chest". (45) Tradition states that the division of the day into periods for the purpose of performing salât five times a day was an innovation from the end of the Meccan period and the elements of the legislation concerning ritual purity seem to have appeared even later. Yet the theory that God should only be approached by people in a state of purity was known in southern Arabia before Muhammad's time, which makes it likely that his early followers had been educated there, and indeed the washing of clothes, which marked conversion, belongs to the same line of thought.

During this first period, salât was performed in the strictest privacy, and there is no doubt that this was the case.

There is no doubt that meetings of believers were organised with great caution. Whatever the role which the converts had already begun to play in the Meccan cult, they undoubtedly continued to play it. We do not know whether the sanctity of the Kaaba was maintained at this time by the Prophet. It was probably rejected. And if the question of the direction in which the prayer should be made was envisaged at that time, there can be little doubt that the Temple of Jerusalem was the point to which Mohammed turned. The link between the myth of Abraham and the Kaaba seems to have been the result of later speculation and was only fully integrated when the need arose in the field of politics.

Much of the Qur'an must already have been in existence when Abu Bakr began his mission; he must at least have been able to assure the proselytes that his prophet was receiving divine communications which he could cite as proof of his personal relationship with the true God, and it is likely that as the number of believers gradually increased the Qur'an shifted from "mediumistic" communications to the powerful sermons which were employed in its second period. The series of phenomena produced by a medium is extremely effective with a very small audience. The need to exclude strangers keeps those present on their toes; the "superior state" which the medium demonstrates by dropping down heavily, demanding to be wrapped in a blanket, and then sweating profusely, makes a very strong impression; the processes which the medium uses to communicate with others are very effective. If there are non-believers present, the medium (in many cases) cannot act. If non-believers are present, the medium (in many cases) cannot take action: and, according to the biographers, the first converts testified of their faith before being brought into the presence of Mohammed.

The Prophet tried to live up to his role as he became more and more identified with it. It is said that he usually wore a veil, (46) a practice he perhaps adopted at the time of these mysterious sessions and which enabled him to increase their solemnity. Over time he adopted benign gestures and rustic habits: when he shook hands, he did not withdraw his first; when he looked at a man, he waited for the other to turn away before turning his head. (47) He took the greatest care of his person: every evening he put make-up on his eyes and his body was always perfumed. (48) He let his hair grow to his shoulders; and when he began to have grey hair, (49) he hid it with colouring substances. (50) He possessed the art of speaking appropriately to neophytes, of saying something that gratified the particular inclinations of each or showed that he knew his ancestors. It is difficult to say how many of these stories illustrating Mohammed's talents are true, but it is certain that he was familiar with the tricks known to modern mediums, which make it possible to obtain private information or to give the impression of possessing it. Moreover, in the early days, none of those whom Abu Bakr was not sure of or who had not been prepared to worship God were allowed to see the Prophet.

The demands of his profession do not seem to have allowed him any real study, yet there is no doubt that his knowledge of the biblical narratives became a little more precise as the Qur'an spread: and while this greater precision may sometimes have been due to the Prophet's memory, it is more likely that he acquired more information whenever an opportunity presented itself. The following story gives us an idea of his method. Jabr, a client of the Banu Abd al-Salam was a Jew (51) who worked as a blacksmith in Mecca. He and Yasar (also a Jew) used to sit down together when they were at work and read their holy book aloud. The Prophet used to pass by to listen to them. Jabr was converted when he heard the Prophet

(52) It has been suggested that the Christian content of the Koran may have been inspired by a disciple named Suhaib, a Greek from Mosul. (53) Tradition gives the names of several people supposed to have been the Prophet's mentors, but the Koran refutes this accusation, arguing that the people to whom it refers spoke a foreign language and therefore could not have been the authors of the Koran, since it is written in Arabic. This response is not the most convincing. The information contained in the Koran gives the impression of having been chosen at random rather than having been acquired through methodical study. (54) In a Medina sura which tells the story of Saul, Saul is referred to as Talut, obviously because of its consonance with Galut, the closest name to Goliath that the Prophet could find: Samuel's name is forgotten, he is confused with Gideon and the story of Gideon is badly told. This almost destroys the theory of a mentor, for no mentor could have been so little versed in the Bible. Moreover, the sources of the Koran are very numerous - Abyssinian and Syriac as well as Jewish and Greek. (55) Assuming, therefore, that the biblical accounts in the Koran were not modelled on what Mohammed had heard during his He probably gathered this information during the religious services he attended or the Bible readings he listened to. The djinns, according to him, listened to celestial advice in the same way and consequently they gathered information that was only partially true. correct. There was no way of avoiding this danger, short of hiring a teacher, which would have involved even greater risks.

Muhammad expressly forbade any publicity surrounding him. A Syrian ('Amr, son of Abasah) who later claimed to have been the fourth Muslim said that, after renouncing the cult of the idols, (56) he had gone to Mohammed who, according to what he had been told, held the truth; he found Mohammed determined to keep his mission secret: he proposed to Mohammed to join him openly but Mohammed forbade him, as he would serve the cause better by returning to his country and, it may be presumed, by playing the same role there as Abu Bakr. Some of the first revelations would have taken place in a cave, a natural form of hiding place (57) and, in anecdotes we have already related, Muhammad lived in seclusion; when Abu Dharr - who later became a famous ascetic - came to the Prophet to find out more about his thinking (according to one account), the Prophet replied hid in the mountains (58): but the obscurity which extends over the beginnings of his mission is not such that it does not allow the fact to emerge that Mohammed, after having made a few followers, entered into "the house of Al-Arkam, on Mount Safa". This Al-Arkam belonged to the Makhzoum tribe and must have been about seventeen years old when the mission began: some have made him the seventh, others the tenth convert. His house on Mount Safa seems to have served as a meeting place, where the Prophet could receive neophytes and hold sessions without fear of being disturbed. We are thus told of two converts, both Greek slaves, Suhaib, son of Sinan, and 'Ammar, son of Yasir, who met in the house of met by chance at the door of the house of Al-Arkam, where they were going to make their profession of faith and from which they slipped away at nightfall. (59) Several years passed before Mohammed was able to reward his faithful executor by offering him a house in Medina. Even if secrecy had not been desirable, the intense curiosity of the Orientals would have seriously hampered his sessions if he had held them in a populated city. But this curiosity did not incite them to make the short journey that separated Medina from Medina.

Mecca from Mount Safa, where Mohammed could hold his meetings in peace. As the first
At the time, the proselytism of his followers did not interfere with their professional lives, so it is likely
that these meetings were held at irregular intervals.

The people who went to Arkam's house were of all ages, the oldest being ten years older than the eldest.
Some were in their thirties or forties, others were very young. Many were slaves or freedmen, and
it is easy to understand that they were attracted by a new system offering the prospect of equality.
And, indeed, their condition improved rapidly, for the emancipation of believers was soon declared to
be a religious duty. (60) Some were metagods, who had no relations in Mecca. Hatib, son of Abu
Balta'ah, probably a Christian from Hira, is a specimen. Most of them, however, are simply names to
us. In some cases, the families were converted en bloc, three sons of Jahsh, three sons of Al-Harith
(Hatib,

Hattab, and Ma'mar), four sons of Al-Bukair, three sons of Maz'un, are mentioned among the new
followers of this period and, in several cases, the conversion of one brother was followed by that of the
other; thus Ali, the eldest brother of Jafar, joined the movement, in which he was destined to play a
role of some importance, albeit less eminent than that of the Prophet's son-in-law. The power to
rename disciples was one of the privileges enjoyed by other prophets, and Mohammed made use of it
whenever a proselyte bore the name of an idol or had an ominous name.

Titles of honour were also conferred, but probably a little later: Abu Bakr was called "the Truthful",
Zubair, "the Apostle", Abu Ubaidah, son of Jarrah, "the Faithful", Omar, "the
Saviour". These designations are like the distinctions awarded by modern sovereigns to people who have
either rendered a service to the State or been entrusted with an important mission.

The proselytes only sought out people whose composure they could rely on. Later, Mohammed was
reported to have recommended a certain procedure to people who, in order to save their lives, had to
perform idolatrous ceremonies; to look as if they were worshipping an idol, while at the same time
giving it the same treatment.

secretly showing contempt. Those who found that the idols did not take offence at their attitude
despised them even more. Meanwhile, the worship that was to replace the old rites was carried
out in the strictest privacy.

We do not know to what extent the secret society was aware of its possibilities. The obscurity it
enjoyed in the early years of its development was a great advantage to it. This obscurity prevented it
from being nipped in the bud. Derision and contempt could be defied more easily by a few hundred
people than by the Prophet himself. It also prevented him from taking on the persona of the eccentric
sage with whom Warakah and others had identified, giving him, from his first public appearance, the
role of party leader: it gave the

The Prophet had time to acquire the exceptional influence that he was able to exert on a large number
of people. It prepared him to lead people on a large scale. The specimens that

There were typical examples of devotees and dark fanatics - Othman, son of Maz'oon, seems to have been one of them; weak-minded and superstitious people; people who saw religion as a career opportunity. Abu Bakr and the Prophet showed what they were capable of by consolidating their hold on this slowly developing enterprise. They paid subsidies to the poor, and when Islam was condemned, the Prophet realised that he was in the wrong. He had to provide for entire families; but there is no doubt that the fortune that he controlled proved useful. Unlike the Christian missionaries, who had to be looked after by those they had led to adopt their religion, he could claim that he was not looking for a "good man". In fact, he always refused to live on alms and never allowed any member of his family to do so. The most popular mediums play this card. It enabled Mohammed to gain a place in the society of princes.

Like most of those who know humanity inside out, Mohammed supported and sometimes almost openly asserted the theory that every human being has his price, and even a price to be paid. estimate by camel.

But the promise of the Garden worked wonders for those who had no need of "temporal help". The vivid descriptions of the Garden in the Koran are still a powerful tool for Muslim missionaries. The history of Islam is a story of sacrifice. Volunteers to taste the pleasures that are so vividly described in this sacred book. Its character is reminiscent of certain wild paradises: "In the land of the Great Spirit, the women are prettier than any of your squaws, and the game is much more abundant." said a Crow to Beckwourth (61), urging him to fight. Its name was borrowed from the Jews or Christians, its description from Ta'if, where the rich Meccans had gardens, but various touches were added whenever it took place.

As soon as Islam had become strong, the rule in use in the secret society was explicitly formulated: anyone who became a member was in it for ever, because if he left it he was a dead man. This rule, which to this day makes the conversion of a Muslim practically impossible, is still in force today. impossible, is so intimately bound up with the nature of secret societies that it must have been established at an early date; and the presumption of its existence was probably what made many proselytes remain faithful despite persecution. Yet a religion that is adopted for sordid reasons is often retained for honourable ones; and early observers noted that some of the most sincere followers of Islam were people who had been lured into it by bribes (62).

On the other hand, some people are attracted by secrecy and take a certain pleasure in leading a double life. Secret societies still exist, whose members meet for reasons that we do not suspect, sometimes no doubt for mummies, sometimes to discuss much more far-reaching plans. One knowledgeable writer believes that Mohammed's first meetings focused on a socialist project, on a better distribution of wealth between rich and poor. (63) However, there is no evidence to prove this. It is extremely likely that the indictment of idol worship made at these meetings included the condemnation of the representatives of the official cult to the Mecca and the idea that the prophet should be an autocrat probably germinated very early on. But if one of the members of the secret society had asked another why he belonged to it, he would probably have replied: in order to gain Paradise and escape Gehenna. (64) Men were initiated into the mysteries of Eleusis for a similar reason. There is no shortage of examples of converts whose faith received a sudden shock or who (as unbelievers would say) suddenly became aware of the unreality of the whole system.

Members of new sects must be able to recognise each other by signs in the manner of the *Fremasons* (65) and the greeting "Peace be with you" was perhaps introduced at the very beginning of

Islam, even though a person who went to Medina fifteen years after the start of the mission declared that it was new. (66) This greeting was undoubtedly common among Jews and Christians; but it seems to have made a deep impression on Mohammed, who makes constant reference to it in the Koran. God addressed it to the prophets, the angels taught it to Abraham, and it is with this greeting that the blessed are welcomed into paradise, where it was the only form of conversation. By adopting this greeting, Mohammed practically assimilated his system to that of the Jews and Christians. Although this greeting was initially forbidden in public, Muslims were perhaps able to recognise each other by some particularity of dress.

back, whereas the pagans folded it down. (67) Later, the members of the main Islamic sects distinguished themselves in this way by the way they arranged their turbans (68).

Finally, a name had to be given to the new sect and the choice, whether deliberate or accidental, fell on the sect of "Muslims" or "Hanifs". Was this the name by which the followers of Maslamah, the prophet of the Banu Hanifa, had been known? Or was it that another sect, monotheistic and se openly claiming to be Abraham, some of whose descendants according to the Bible were Arabs, had been so designated? It is impossible to say; no Arab seems to have heard of the hanifs, even though they knew that Abraham was one and perhaps one of the two precursors of Mahommed Since in Hebrew the word means "hypocrite" and in Syriac "pagan", the pious disciples of Mahommed did not bother to study its etymology. The other name is "Muslim", meant "traitor" (69) and, when the new sect became an object of ridicule, it allowed the satirists to make a witticism of it; Mohammed showed a certain humour in adopting it but showed great ingenuity in giving it an honourable meaning: whereas it normally meant "one who surrenders his friends to their enemies", it took on the laudatory meaning of "one who surrenders himself to God" and if, like the term of

The name "Christian" may well have been invented by the enemies of the sect it designated, and divine authority was invoked as proof that the name had been invented by Abraham. Like the Jews, these The new Abrahamites called their pagan brethren "Gentiles", of Abyssinian origin. The pagans seem to have called the members of the new sect, once it was no longer secret, the Sabeans,(70) a word which means "militia" and from which is derived that of the Subas,(71) a community which still lives in the marshes of the Euphrates. The fact that this name was given to Mohammed's disciples may be due to the fact that they were the "Sabeans".

can be explained by ignorance - for example, the Arabs of our time call Doughty (72) a Jew because he is a Christian - or by the importance Mohammed attached to the ablution ceremony.

D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, Putnam and Sons, New York and London, 1905, translated from the English by B. K.

(1) The kahins were fortune-tellers. (EDITOR'S NOTE).

(2) One of the principal historians and exegetes of the Koran sometimes began his recollections of the prophet's words with a similar spectacle. Tabari, *Comm.* Xii, 9.

(3) Tabari, *Comm.* Xviii, 4.

(4) Bouveret, in *Les Sueurs morbides* (Paris, 1880), writes: "Adamkiewicz has shown that perspiration can be caused by artificial or voluntary stimulation of the muscles and nerves".

(5) Musnad, iv., 222. Bouveret, p. 47: "The skin can redden simultaneously", when perspiration is provoked by a violent emotion.

(6) *Ibid*, iii, 21.

(7) "(...) Allah is not the property of Muslims; (...) many generations of Arabs had been catechised in the name of Allah, before Mohammed and (...) many Arabs had converted to Christianity, invoking the Almighty Lord, the God of Moses under the name of Allah known throughout the Semitic world. H. Zakarias, *L'islam entreprise juive, de Moïse à Mohammed*, Cahors, published by the author. T I: Conversion of Mohammed to Judaism. *Les enseignements à Mohammed du rabbin de la Mecque*, p. 32. This author maintains that "the current Koran is nothing more than a Jewish preaching emanating from a rabbi of Pharisaic Talmudist tendency, whose aim was to Judaize Arabia and to extend Jewish hegemony throughout the Mediterranean basin". Thus "Islam is the great triumph of Israel". (EDITOR'S NOTE)

(8) *History of the Mormons*, London, 1851.

(9) "I am the one who gives the alarm", *Alif-Ba'*, i, 133.

(10) *Ibn Sa'd II*, ii, 52. Harithah Ibn Al-Nu'man claimed to have seen Gabriel twice.

- (10) Contemporary Rev, October, 1903.
- (11) Musnad, iv, 222.
- (12) Sura xxix, 47.
- (13) The original is obscure.
- (14) In Usd al-Ghabah, i, 207, he is said to have witnessed the torture of one of Muhammad's disciples.
- (15) Musnad, vi, 68.
- (16) Ibid, i, 135.
- (17) Sura lii, f 21.
- (18) Musnady iv, 356.
- (19) J. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen Heidentums, Berlin, G. Reimer, 1897, p. 196.
- (20) Nöldeke, Z.D.M.G., lii, p. 19, considers this account to be an invention.
- (21) Ibn Sa'd, iii, p. 30.
- (22) Isabah, ii, p. 162.
- (23) Jahiz, Opuscula, p. 58.
- (24) Musnad, iv, p. 385.
- (25) They are listed by Wellhausen, op. cit. p. 232.
- (26) Isabah, i, p. 1036.
- (27) Ibn Sa'd, iii, III.
- (28) Al-Waqidi, p. 231.
- (29) Isabah, i, p. 714.
- (30) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 234.
- (31) Musnad, iv, p. 353.
- (32) Sura xi, p. 27.
- (33) Al-Waqidi, p. 118.
- (34) Abu Bakr often interprets dreams. J. Wellhausen, op. cit. p. 14.

- (35) Musnad, i, p. 462.
- (36) Ibid, p. 318.
- (37) His original name is disputed; others make him a servant of Amr.
- (38) Alif-Ba', i, p. 437.
- (39) Isabah.
- (40) Ghurar al-Khasa'is, p. 245.
- (41) Tabari, i, p. 1213.
- (42) A. von Krenter, *Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf Dem Gebiete des Islams*, Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1873, p. 15.
- (43) Musnad, i, p. 423.
- (44) Al-Tirmidhi reproduces it as follows: "Lead us in the right path, the path of those towards whom You have been kind and not of those against whom You are angry [the Jews?] and of those who go astray [the Christians?]."
- (45) Tabari, *Comm*, xvi, 90. The other end of the rope was probably attached to the ceiling; *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xiii., p. 312.
- (46) *Jahi*, Bayan, ii, 79, 84.
- (47) Al-Tirmidhi, p. 410 (ii, 80).
- (48) Alif-Ba', ii, p. 29.
- (49) Musnad, iv, p. 188.
- (50) Ibid, iv, 163. This point is disputed.
- (51) Or a Christian; Muslims make no distinction.
- (52) Isabah, i, p. 452; Al-Waqidi (IV), p. 349.
- (53) O. Loth, *Zwei arabische Papyrus*. Z. D. M. G., xxxv, p. 621.
- (54) T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, London and Edinburgh, A. and C. Black, 1872, c. ii.
- (55) The best proof of this is provided by the form of proper nouns. S. Sycz, *Ursprung Und Wiedergabe Der Biblischen Eigennamen Im Koran*, 1903, does not take sufficient account of this.
- (56) Musnad iv, III.

(57) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 194.

(58) Isabah, iii, p. 1173.

(59) Ibn Sad, iii, p. 162.

(60) So Abu Bakr bought and emancipated Amir Ibn Fuhairah.

(61) Autobiography, p. 161.

(62) Sahih Muslim, ii, 212; Musnad, iii, 175.

(63) The priests also described Mohammed as a person sent to get the rich to do justice to the poor. Hariri, p. 328.

(64) See Tabari, i, p. 1218, 10.

(65) On the hypothesis of the Muslim origin of Freemasonry, see J. M. Aractingi and C. Lochon, *Secrets initiatiques en Islam et rituels maçonniques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008. See also C. Lochon, *L'initiation dans les confréries musulmanes et la franc maçonnerie*, <https://archive.org/download/LinitiationDansLesConfrriesMusulmanesEtLaFranc-masonryInitiationInMuslimConfraternitiesAndFrancMaonnerieLaConfrence.htm> (NDE.)

(66) Isabah, iii, p. 70; but Wellhausen interprets it differently. In Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 255, Abu Dharr claims to have invented it. See also Goldziher. Z.D.M.G., xlvi, p. 22.

(67) Hariri, Schol, 346.

(68) Hamadhani, Makamas, 199. So do the Kassites and Yemenites today (Goldziher, M. S., i, p. 84). Everything seems to indicate that Mohammed first wore his hair in the Jewish style and it is probable that his disciples did the same.

(69) In a line of Arabic poetry (qâla z-Zubairu wa aslamathu Mûgasi'û / la haira fi danisi t-tiyâbi gadûri] the verb aslama - which means, today as it has for at least a millennium, "to become a Muslim" - unequivocally means "to betray, desert, abandon". Ibn Ishaq, the first known biographer of Mahommed, wrote: "I will not be a traitor [Muslim] to the prophet." Khubayb, one of the first martyrs of Islam, declared: "What do I care if I am killed as a traitor (Muslim), because of the schism that could arise? Schism with Christianity. For it seems that Christians described the followers of the nascent Islam as "muslimum", "traitors": traitors to Christianity. In fact, while the first Muslims were not afraid to die for their religion, they were afraid of being accused of being "traitors" by the Christians. Cf. G. Lüling, *A Challenge to Islam for Reformation: Reconstruction of a Comprehensive Pre-Islamic Christian Hymnal Hidden in the Koran under Earliest Islamic Reinterpretations*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2003, p. 151.

(70) Also known as the Christians of Saint John the Baptist. From the Hebrew tzaia (militia, army, army of the stars), the term "Sabaeen" refers to a number of Gnostic sects, including the Mandaeans of

the Euphrates and especially the Manichaeans known at the time of Mohammed". A. Caizzo, *Images du ciel d'orient au moyen âge: une histoire du zodiaque et de ses représentations dans les manuscrits du Proche-Orient*, Paris, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003 p. 137 (N. D. E.)

(71) Soubbas would mean "baptisers". (N. D. E.)

(72) Charles Montagu Doughty, poet, writer and great English traveller of Jewish origin, whose main work is *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (1888). (N. D.E.)

Islam, a secret society

In his thirty-ninth year, Mohammed met and befriended Abu Bakr, son of Abu Kahafah, a carpet merchant two years his junior. Gifted in commerce, he had acquired a considerable fortune and, as his father was blind, he was the head of the family. He was a kind and benevolent man, with charming manners and a fine mind, even if he sometimes said things that were not his own. obscene; and his company was much sought after. Like the Meccan tribes, like the others Arabs used to get together in the evening and some ladies held salons in the courtyards of their homes, there was no shortage of opportunities for conversation in Mecca.

Abu Bakr was a hero worshipper like no other; he possessed a typically feminine quality that could be seen in all of us.

Having believed a lot, all he wanted was to believe even more. Mohammed, a fine psychologist, perceived this quality and used it.

A year after they had become intimate, Mohammed called upon Abu Bakr and it was Abu Bakr and not Mohammed who proselytised. We do not know whether Mohammed had already tried to find out whether he could make disciples; what is certain is that he found in this person a man capable of believing that one of his fellow citizens had received a message from God, which it was up to him to welcome and promote. It is much easier to invite people to accept other people's claims than one's own. The proof of this is that in the history of Islam, the Mahdis who were the most successful were those who were able to remain hidden while some of their followers proclaimed their advent. But, in most cases, it was a case of collusion, with each party expecting a definite advantage.

In the case of Abu Bakr, the hypothesis of collusion cannot be accepted. Muhammad said that if he had to take a man as a confidant (khalil), he would have taken Abu Bakr, but he did not take a confidant. Abu Bakr, although a valuable assistant, was not an accomplice. He never forgot the distance between himself and his master.

When a man pretends to produce messages from another world, he must attribute both their form and their substance to a supernatural origin. The problem for the medium is to produce a message without appearing to deliver it himself; and Mohammed had to solve this problem no less than any modern medium. When he had his first public revelations, it seems that he adopted instinctively (or, perhaps, following the example of the Kahins) (1) a procedure common to the prophets of all ages, (2) as well as to the Sibyl:

"talia fanti

Ante fores subito non voltus, non color unus,
Non comptae mansere comae; sed pectus
anhelum, Et rabie fera corda tument: majorque
videri
Nee mortale sonans, adflata est numine
quando Jam propiore dei, "

Mohammed would fall into a state of violent agitation, his face would turn livid (3) and he would wrap himself in a blanket; when he took it off, he was covered in sweat (4) and all he had to do was write the message he had received. From time to time an unintelligible message seems to have preceded the message itself, the letters not forming words and curiously resembling the first movements of a planchette. We have already seen that there is good reason to believe that Mohammed had epileptic seizures at some point; the phenomena accompanying these seizures may have suggested a form that he could have reproduced artificially later. The process described, sometimes accompanied by snoring and facial flushing, (5) came to be recognized as the normal form of inspiration and could be acted out without any preparation; the Prophet would receive a divine communication in immediate response to a question addressed to him while he was eating and, having revealed it in this way, would finish the piece he was holding in his hand when he had been interrupted, or a revelation would be made to him in response to a question addressed to him while he was in the pulpit. (6) Following revelations that seem to have been his very first Mohammed was called "the man in the blanket" or "the man who is wrapped up". Whatever the recipe for this process, the Prophet seems to have learnt it by heart.

The other problems which the medium has to resolve concern the substance of the revelation. Once he was head of state, Mohammed had a lot to say, but at the beginning of his career, the substance was not provided by circumstances. As a general rule, mediums who are in the same situation as Mohammed do not beat about the bush. They put into the mouth of God words that are generally recognised as his, i.e. verses from the Old Testament or the New Testament. As these are recognised as the words of God, it costs nothing to repeat them. When Mohammed, driven by circumstances to produce more and more revelations, followed this reliable method, he was able to declare that it was by a miracle that he was instructed in the contents of books he had never read. When his style of preaching had rightly won him the approbation of great audiences, he was able to change his tune and declare that the miracle lay in his incomparable eloquence.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves. The very first snippets of revelation that were communicated to Abu Bakr seem to have been imitations of speeches by preachers whom Muhammad had heard on his travels. According to one tradition, he had heard the sermons of the "most eloquent of the Arabs", Kuss, son of Sa'idah, who enjoined men to remember the ephemeral nature of life and to deduce the existence of the Creator of the phenomena of the world. The subjects addressed by these preachers were undoubtedly the Day of Judgement, the fire of Gehenna and the need to worship Allah rather than idols; for these were the ordinary themes of the evangelists. (7) Moreover, experience shows that the

(8) Those who describe the Prophet's early speeches say that they warned the Meccans of divine punishment and that the speaker compared himself to the one who sounds the alarm when the enemy attacks. (9) As we

As we shall see, this doctrine must not be dissociated from that of the resurrection; and the distinctive features of Mohammed's teaching, as opposed to the ideas of paganism, were in the main the doctrine of the future life and the unity of God. Arabic oratory seems to have been in some way rhymed, and Mohammed imitated it without understanding its nature.

To counter the supposition that Mohammed deliberately mystified his contemporaries, it has been argued, in ancient and modern times alike, that his character was upright, even earning him the name of "Faithful". The story that he had trained a pigeon to peck grain out of his ear aroused the indignation of Carlyle and others. In fact, Muslim tradition does not record that he ever received revelations from pigeons. However, it does mention events which seem to show that he had studied theatrical effects of a slightly less naive kind. In an empty room he claimed he could not find a seat - all the seats being occupied by angels. He modestly turned his face away from a corpse, for the sake of two hours who had come from heaven to nurse their husbands. There is even every reason to suppose that he sometimes

to let some of his acolytes play the role of Gabriel or to let his disciples identify one of his interlocutors with this angel. The revelations he received resemble those of modern mediums who can be studied in the history of Spiritism by M. F. Podmore, whose researches cast the greatest doubt on the idea that an honourable man cannot mystify his fellow-men, and also show that the support which the performances of a medium carry is rarely shaken by their demystification. Referring to one of the mediums whose career he describes, the author remarks that he had won the friendship and full confidence of his audience, that he was helped by the religious emotions inspired by the words he uttered in trance, and that he could boast of an unblemished character and an honourable life. The possession of these advantages greatly helped this medium to make people believe in his sincerity; but the historian of Spiritism, even if he does not know how to account for all the phenomena and recognises the difficulties which accompany their explanation, is inclined to attribute to

all that is marvellous in the medium's performance. What is clear is that Mohammed possessed the same advantages as those listed by Podmore and that this is how he gained followers; that, nevertheless, the process of revelation was so dubious that one of the scribes responsible for writing down the effusions became convinced that it was an imposture and consequently gave up.

to Islam. But for those who confine themselves to studying the political effectiveness of supernatural revelations, it matters little whether the medium is sincere.

We therefore consider that it was Abu Bakr's receptiveness that explains why Muhammad was able to act as a medium. It was in Muhammad's character to bide his time - to wait for the right moment to act. But the new role he was about to play was not one that could be improvised - it is not possible to change one's life completely without a period of transition. This transition is a period of solitude for most mediums. Thus Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon sect, was wandering in a wood, when an angel revealed to him the Book of Mormon. The seer from Poughkeepsie, in March, 1844, "was walking in the country under the protection of his master spiritual, when he spontaneously fell into a trance during which Galen and Swedenborg appeared to him in a cemetery and communicated the message he was to pass on to humanity". His work, *The Principles of Nature*, which he later gave birth to in a trance, was not quite as successful as the Koran, but it was published in thirty-four editions over a period of thirty years.

(10) That Muhammad's prophetic career began with a period of solitude seems attested, even if there are some contradictions between our authorities on the details. For one month - and it seems to have been that of Ramadan, which was later considered the Month of Fasting - the Meccans practised a rite called *tahannuth*, the exact meaning of which is unknown but which was apparently a form of asceticism. During this month, Mohammed used to retire to a cave on Mount Hira, five kilometres from Mecca in the direction of Ta'if. He seems to have taken his family there: it is likely, however, that they did not worship there as they did at Al-Lat and Al-'Uzza (11) in Mecca [...]. On a certain day of the month, Muhammad went down into the valley on his own and it was there that the theophany (or its equivalent) took place, marking the beginning of his career as a divine messenger.

Joseph Smith's idea was to communicate to the world the contents of certain secret tablets to which he alone had access and whose language he alone could translate "by the grace of God" of God". Mohammed's idea was similar; he was allowed (or, according to one account, forced) to read the contents of a well-guarded tablet - he had previously been unable to read or write. The miracle by which he became able to read without learning - an episode that may have been suggested by accounts of other prophets - he alludes to (12) but does not dwell on it. The idea of not being allowed the fact that Smith had only occasional access to the guarded tablet was better than Smith's, because it allowed him to legislate in case of need. In the traditions on this subject, the communication is made by Gabriel, the angel who transmits messages in the New Testament; but in the theophany recorded in the Koran, it seems that it was God himself who descended, that he spoke to the Prophet at a distance of a little less than two bowsticks (13) and that, the second time, the Prophet spoke to him at the distance of a little less than two bowsticks (14). saw "near the Lotus of the limit, not far from the Garden of the abode of the blessed". The fact that he later replaced Gabriel is probably due to the development of the Prophet's theology.

We will never know more about the beginning of revelation. In the first account, the Prophet is so distraught by his experience and so afraid of becoming a soothsayer (Kahin) or a poet that he almost commits suicide; Khadija, meeting him by chance, comforts him by assuring him that he will be the national Nabî (Prophet) - a word she could hardly have known - and has a conversation with Warakah, son of Nawfal, who spoke equally encouraging words. His words would have been, "Kaddosh, Kaddosh, this is the sublime Nomos." The first two words are Hebrew and mean "Holy, Holy!" The last is the Greek word for "Law". The curious and hybrid character of these expressions may make this story credible, but commentators translate "Nomos" as "the Holy One".

messenger of the King" and applies it to Gabriel, thus implying that the exclamation was not appropriate to the occasion on which it was supposed to have been uttered. In another version, Khadija does not consult Warakah but a Christian slave, who also recognises Gabriel in this name. Warakah does not appear in the rest of the story (14) and it would be rash to assert that the meeting between Khadija and him was historic; we know that Khadija had an enlightened relative and the legend could hardly have done less than make her recognise her husband's mission. Nor do we give any more historical value to the tradition according to which Mohammed dreamt that he saw Warakah after his death, dressed in white, which

(15) On the other hand, it is not improbable that Khadija may have been prepared by her cousin's speculations and studies for a revolt against the Meccan religion. In Khadija's case, we can also imagine a priori that the grief caused her by the death of her sons played a part in the conversion process, and this is confirmed by a story told in the Memoirs of Ali. (16) If idolaters go to hell, she asked her husband, were her parents in hell?

Mohammed replied that they were there and, seeing that she looked distressed, assured her that, if she could see them in their true nature, she would hate them too. She then asked him if his dead children were also in hell? In answer to this question, the Prophet had a revelation: "Those who believe and their descendants follow them in faith, We will make their descendants join them.

"A brilliant reply, (17) since the bereaved mother was thus assured that the eternal happiness of her dead sons was subordinate to her belief; she was thus given the chance not only to find them but to allow them access to the Garden of Delights. It is not surprising that Khadija would devoted himself body and soul to the mission and was promised a very special place in Paradise (18).

It is clear that some of the commandments of Islam must have been established from the moment the revelations were communicated to Abu Bakr and Khadija. For it is by no means sufficient to warn people of the terrors of the Day of Judgement; answers must be given to the question: What must I do to be saved? And this answer, to be satisfactory, must include certain injunctions. It seems that they were enjoined to wash their clothes and turn away from idols. The first of these commandments was an easy symbolic act - among many peoples, clothes are not a matter of course. one with the person who wears them; (19) the second was difficult to follow in a community where people socialised a lot; if we are to believe some of the stories we will be telling, the worship of idols was widespread. It was difficult for a person to renounce idolatry without his family noticing, and so the secret of the Prophet's mission had to be revealed first to the two boys who were to become the first to renounce idolatry.

lived with Khadija, Zaid, son of Harithah, the adopted son, and Ali, cousin of the Prophet and son of Abu Talib, whom Mohammed had undertaken to support, because his uncle was finding it difficult to provide for his large family. (20) The latter was about ten years old, the former was ten years younger than the latter.

Prophet (21) - according to the most likely version - but, as we shall see, entirely subject to the authority of the Prophet.

It is stated that the revelations ceased for some time after they had begun, a phenomenon which may be compared with the fact established by Starbuck in the cases of conversion he has studied: abjurations, he shows, are rare but periods of inactivity and indifference many. It is reported that Khadija consoled the Prophet during the period when he ceased to be visited by God, which perhaps means that the resolute woman who enabled him to keep the faith during the years when his dominant passion must have been the strongest forced him to follow the direction he had taken. But, in fact, he was forced to do so by Abu Bakr, who immediately began proselytising. There is no doubt that, at the Prophet's request, the mission was carried out in the greatest secrecy. Abu Bakr informed only those people whom he trusted and who were able to help him. had influence. But neither he nor the Prophet were impatient and they would have been satisfied if Abu Bakr's propaganda had converted three people in the first year. (22) There is every reason to believe that he was helped from the outset by an Abyssinian slave, Bilal, about whom we would like to know more. ancestors; for Omar declared that Bilal formed "a third of Islam"; (23) and, unless we misunderstand the meaning of the expression, another disciple took to calling himself a quarter of Islam (24) because, when he had visited Mohammed in Ukaz, he had found him in the company of a "man". a free man (Abu Bakr) and a slave (Bilal). Tradition is clearly unable to say with We do not know for certain whose slave he was. For want of better information, we are inclined to attribute to him some of the Abyssinian elements of the Prophet's productions. (25) After a while, he was bought and freed by Abu Bakr.

Abu Bakr's method has not been reported in many cases. There is, however, one anecdote that seems to be true and typical. Othman, son of Affan, six years the Prophet's junior, was a cloth merchant whose business partner was a cousin of Muhammad's; (26) he also indulged in usury, lending money to businesses from which he enjoyed half the profits; (27) he dealt with money matters with remarkable acuity. (28) His sister was a milliner, married to a barber (29) and he himself was exceptionally handsome, very fond of personal adornment and dignified; Mohammed himself did not dare to appear before him in a housedress (30) or allow slave girls to play the tambourine in his presence. (31) He did not like fighting, as history would later show, for he left one battlefield, fled another and was killed while ostentatiously reading the Koran. He loved Muhammad's daughter, Rukayyah, and learned to his great regret that she had been betrothed to another man. On hearing the sad news, he confided his grief to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr told him lent a sympathetic ear, then asked him if he didn't think the Meccan gods were just wood and stones. A question of dubious delicacy, it would seem, unless the lover had

called upon their services; but a conversation ensued, from which Othman deduced that, if he chose to declare that the Meccan gods were worthy of contempt and acknowledged that Mohammed had given him the mission of eliminating them, he would still be able to obtain the hand of Mohammed's daughter. Muhammad then passed by them, Abu Bakr whispered something in his ear and the matter was settled. Othman became a believer and Rukayyah became his wife.

In this case, the conversion process is obvious and presents no difficulty for the reader to understand. In each of the other cases, the skilful missionary must have seen an opening, even if we often do not know what it consisted of. Abu Bakr probably knew that women are more susceptible to conversion than men, foreign residents than natives, slaves than free men, people in difficulty than wealthy and prosperous people. When the existence of Islam was discovered, the modest situation of most of Muhammad's followers was a stumbling block for the aristocrats of Mecca, who asked him to chase away this rabble before they had anything to do with them. In fact, the Koran so explicitly acknowledges that the Prophet's followers were the dregs of the people (32) that serious doubts hang over the ancient traditions which contradict this claim [...] And later, when the aristocrats were forced to convert to Islam, they took to reproaching their new brothers for their former condition. (33) More than one later claimed the honour of having been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr; and the length of time during which the mission remained secret made their claim difficult to verify. When one was asked what had brought them to Mohammed, they were capable of giving incredible answers; perhaps they had forgotten the real reason or preferred to hide it. Khalid, son of Saïd, the fourth or fifth convert, dreamt that his father was pushing him into a lake of fire, from which another man saved him. He asked Abu Bakr to interpret this dream. (34) Abu Bakr took him to his father's house. Mohammed, then made a retreat to Ajjad, near Safa, where the dreamer recognised his Saviour and converted. Do men really have such dreams? Flammarion and Myers would say yes. Abdallah, son of Massoud, a client and serf, declared that, while he was feeding the flocks of Ukbah, son of Mu'ait (who later became a fierce adversary of Muhammad), Muhammad and Abu Bakr had asked him for a bowl of milk; and Abdallah was converted at the sight of the goat's udder swelling and contracting to the great delight of the Prophet. (35) Uthman, son of Maz'un, (36) a man who had a The Prophet raised his eyes to heaven, stared at him in a certain place, went there, returned and raised his eyes to heaven again. When Othman said to him asked the meaning of this feat, he replied that he had been visited by a messenger of God, who had invited him to preach justice, goodness, chastity, etc., and Othman believed. Many declared that dissatisfaction with pagan beliefs was what had made them turn to the Prophet; and if there were a trace of this feeling in a man, Abu Bakr would see to it that it did not escape him. One of those who may have been converted in this way was Sa'id, son of Amr Ibn Zaid; his father had rejected polytheism and idolatry before Muhammad's mission had begun, without however adopting Judaism or Christianity. Sa'id was an early convert but is not mentioned among Abu Bakr's proselytes. Another of these converts may have been 'Abd al-Kaaba (the servant of the Ka'ba), son of Auf, renamed 'Abd al-Rahman, because the Ka'ba had not yet been dissociated from paganism. (37)

This man was a merchant whose partner was a certain Rabah, whom his new friends called 'the Faithful'. He had a rare talent for making money, which he spent lavishly. Years later, (38) when he arrived in Yathrib with other destitute refugees, all he asked was to be shown to the market; once at the market, he felt alive again, even though he had no capital. (39) He would have been abstinent before his conversion; would have disapproved of fighting in the path of Islam, even after the practice had taken hold; would not have yielded it to anyone in courage. Such a man may not have seemed a promising match for Abu Bakr but he was about eight years Abu Bakr's junior and may have been subject to his influence. Or, in his case too, a lady may have played a part. There was in Mecca a certain Mikdad who, after committing a murder, fled from his tribe and was welcomed by the Kindah; in their house too he shed blood; and he fled to the Mecca, where he was adopted by a man called Al-Aswad, from the tribe of Muhammad's mother. Abd al-Kaaba advised him (in the course of conversation) to marry, but he contemptuously refused his daughter; he was consoled, however, by Muhammad, who gave him the daughter of his late uncle, Zubair, in marriage, on the same terms (one might think) as those on which Othman had been forced to marry. submit. We do not know what other measures were taken to convince 'Abd al-Kaaba. With Mikdad was converted another man, Utbah, son of Ghazwan, probably a poor client.

Three of the other first converts were Al-Zubair, son of 'Awwam; Saad, son of Abu Wakkas and Talhah, son of 'Ubaidallah. The first of them, according to tradition, was eight, ten or seventeen at the time; he was a cousin of the Prophet, the son of a grain merchant and an apprentice butcher; and it is said that his his parents mistreated him. If his conversion did take place at this time, he may have been one of Ali's playmates, initiated into mysteries that he could not reveal because, as we have seen, their families were linked.

Talhah was certainly an adult and claimed to have been introduced to Muhammad by a monk he had met on a business trip to Syria. If this statement has any value, it probably means that he had heard there that Arab paganism was being ridiculed by the followers of the f a s h i o n a b l e creed; if their mockery had no effect on most minds, some were nonetheless sensitive to it. Later, his spending habits made him famous (40).

Saad claimed to have been the third Muslim for a whole week, in which case he would have been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr. He was an arrow-maker and it is said that he was the first to shed his blood for the new cause. He was seventeen years old at the time of his conversion. When they were brought to Muhammad, all the converts were repulsed, with the exception of Abu Bakr. The Prophet later acknowledged this: but he did not specify what it was that displeased the newcomers. And we do not know how these solemn scenes took place: at m o s t , we learn that the Prophet taught the proselytes to pray. Later, however, in order to be admitted to see the Prophet, the proselyte had to be prepared to swear allegiance and had to undertake to refrain from

certain immoral acts; for the commission of which he was punished in this life, if he wished to escape punishment in the Hereafter; (41) and, still later (in the case of men), he had to fight all the nations until they had adopted the new religion. There can be little doubt that, from the outset, the proselytes made commitments as serious as those made by those who are admitted to other secret societies; in general, these obligations are not specific actions in the present but a willingness to answer the call in the future. It would seem that, from At first, the Prophet established brotherhoods of believers, whose new relationships were to replace blood ties just as the Christianity of the Ibad tribe or the Christians of Hira had provided a different bond from tribal ties. The reluctance that the Prophet observed was probably due to the anguish that even young people felt at the idea of tying themselves to something in perpetuity, especially when that something was an unknown quantity, a path whose outcome was obscure.

The evolution of the Muslim ceremony known as *salât*, whose name derives from the Jewish or Christian term for "prayer", is not known in detail. In a form that later became stereotyped, the Jewish custom of standing prayer, the Christian practice of prostration (42) and that of bowing (the back horizontal and the hands on the knees) were combined and certain formulas were prescribed. In the beginning we used to," said one convert, "not knowing what to say when we prayed, just prostrate ourselves. The Prophet then taught us another formula". (43) A prayer similar to the Pater Noster was probably composed later: it contains polemical references to an unspecified sect or sects. (44) As we shall see, the *salât* was later used as a kind of military exercise: in the early days it had an ascetic character, the devotee "doing without a rope around the chest". (45) Tradition states that the division of the day into periods for the purpose of performing *salât* five times a day was an innovation from the end of the Meccan period and the elements of the legislation concerning ritual purity seem to have appeared even later. Yet the theory that God should only be approached by people in a state of purity was known in southern Arabia before Muhammad's time, which makes it likely that his early followers had been educated there, and indeed the washing of clothes, which marked conversion, belongs to the same line of thought.

During this first period, *salât* was performed in the strictest privacy, and there is no doubt that this was the case.

There is no doubt that meetings of believers were organised with great caution. Whatever the role which the converts had already begun to play in the Meccan cult, they no doubt continued to play it. We do not know whether the sanctity of the Kaaba was maintained at this time by the Prophet. It was probably rejected. And if the question of the direction in which the prayer should be made was envisaged at that time, there can be little doubt that the Temple of Jerusalem was the point to which Mohammed turned. The link between the myth of Abraham and the Kaaba seems to have been the result of later speculation and was only fully integrated when the need arose in the field of politics.

Much of the Qur'an must already have been in existence when Abu Bakr began his mission; he must at least have been able to assure the proselytes that his prophet was receiving divine communications which he could cite as proof of his personal relationship with the true God, and it is likely that as the number of believers gradually increased the Qur'an shifted from "mediumistic" communications to the powerful sermons which were employed in its second period. The series of phenomena produced by a medium is extremely effective with a very small audience. The need to exclude strangers keeps those present on their toes; the "superior state" which the medium demonstrates by dropping down heavily, demanding to be wrapped in a blanket, and then sweating profusely, makes a very strong impression; the processes which the medium uses to communicate with others are very effective. If there are non-believers present, the medium (in many cases) cannot act. If non-believers are present, the medium (in many cases) cannot take action: and, according to the biographers, the first converts testified of their faith before being brought into the presence of Mohammed.

The Prophet tried to live up to his role as he became more and more identified with it. It is said that he usually wore a veil, (46) a practice he perhaps adopted at the time of these mysterious sessions and which enabled him to increase their solemnity. Over time he adopted benign gestures and rustic habits: when he shook hands, he did not withdraw his first; when he looked at a man, he waited for the other to turn away before turning his head. (47) He took the greatest care of his person: every evening he put make-up on his eyes and his body was always perfumed. (48) He let his hair grow to his shoulders; and when he began to have grey hair, (49) he hid it with colouring substances. (50) He possessed the art of speaking appropriately to neophytes, of saying something that gratified the particular inclinations of each or showed that he knew his ancestors. It is difficult to say how many of these stories illustrating Mohammed's talents are true, but it is certain that he was familiar with the tricks known to modern mediums, which make it possible to obtain private information or to give the impression of possessing it. Moreover, in the early days, none of those whom Abu Bakr was not sure of or who had not been prepared to worship God were allowed to see the Prophet.

The demands of his profession do not seem to have allowed him any real study, yet there is no doubt that his knowledge of the biblical narratives became a little more precise as the Qur'an spread: and while this greater precision may sometimes have been due to the Prophet's memory, it is more likely that he acquired more information whenever an opportunity presented itself. The following story gives us an idea of his method. Jabr, a client of the Banu Abd al-Salam was a Jew (51) who worked as a blacksmith in Mecca. He and Yasar (also a Jew) used to sit together when they were at work and read their holy book aloud. The Prophet used to pass by to listen to them. Jabr was converted when he heard the Prophet

(52) It has been suggested that the Christian content of the Koran may have been inspired by a disciple named Suhaib, a Greek from Mosul. (53) Tradition gives the names of several people supposed to have been the Prophet's mentors, but the Koran refutes this accusation, arguing that the people to whom it refers spoke a foreign language and therefore could not have been the authors of the Koran, since it is written in Arabic. This response is not the most convincing. The information contained in the Koran gives the impression of having been chosen at random rather than having been acquired through methodical study. (54) In a Medina sura which tells the story of Saul, Saul is referred to as Talut, obviously because of its consonance with Galut, the closest name to Goliath that the Prophet could find: Samuel's name is forgotten, he is confused with Gideon and the story of Gideon is badly told. This almost destroys the theory of a mentor, for no mentor could have been so little versed in the Bible. Moreover, the sources of the Koran are very numerous - Abyssinian and Syriac as well as Jewish and Greek. (55) Assuming, therefore, that the biblical accounts in the Koran were not modelled on what Mohammed had heard during his He probably gathered this information during the religious services he attended or the Bible readings he listened to. According to him, the djinns listened to celestial advice in the same way, and consequently gathered information that was only partially true. correct. There was no way of avoiding this danger, short of hiring a teacher, which would have involved even greater risks.

Muhammad expressly forbade any publicity surrounding him. A Syrian ('Amr, son of Abasah) who later claimed to have been the fourth Muslim said that, after renouncing the cult of the idols, (56) he had gone to Mohammed who, according to what he had been told, held the truth; he found Mohammed determined to keep his mission secret: he proposed to Mohammed to join him openly but Mohammed forbade him, as he would serve the cause better by returning to his country and, it may be presumed, by playing the same role there as Abu Bakr. Some of the first revelations would have taken place in a cave, a natural form of hiding place (57) and, in anecdotes we have already recounted, Mohammed lived in isolation; when Abu Dharr - who later became an famous ascetic - came to the Prophet to find out more about his thinking (according to one account), the Prophet replied hid in the mountains (58): but the obscurity which extends over the beginnings of his mission is not such that it does not allow the fact to emerge that Mohammed, after having made a few followers, entered into "the house of Al-Arkam, on Mount Safa". This Al-Arkam belonged to the Makhzoum tribe and must have been about seventeen years old when the mission began: some have made him the seventh, others the tenth convert. His house on Mount Safa seems to have served as a meeting place, where the Prophet could receive neophytes and hold sessions without fear of being disturbed. We are thus told of two converts, both Greek slaves, Suhaib, son of Sinan, and 'Ammar, son of Yasir, who met in the house of met by chance at the door of the house of Al-Arkam, where they were going to make their profession of faith and from where they slipped away at nightfall. (59) Several years passed before Mohammed was able to reward his faithful executor by offering him a house in Medina. Even if secrecy had not been desirable, the intense curiosity of the Orientals would have seriously hampered his sessions if he had held them in a populated city. But this curiosity did not incite them to make the short journey that separated Medina from Medina.

Mecca from Mount Safa, where Mohammed could hold his meetings in peace. As the first
At the time, the proselytism of his followers did not interfere with their professional lives, so it is likely
that these meetings were held at irregular intervals.

The people who went to Arkam's house were of all ages, the oldest being ten years older than the eldest.
Some were in their thirties or forties, others were very young. Many were slaves or freedmen, and
it is easy to understand that they were attracted by a new system offering the prospect of equality.
And, indeed, their condition improved rapidly, for the emancipation of believers was soon declared to
be a religious duty. (60) Some were metagods, who had no relations in Mecca. Hatib, son of Abu
Balta'ah, probably a Christian from Hira, is a specimen. Most of them, however, are simply names to
us. In some cases, the families were converted en bloc, three sons of Jahsh, three sons of Al-Harith
(Hatib,

Hattab, and Ma'mar), four sons of Al-Bukair, three sons of Maz'un, are mentioned among the new
followers of this period and, in several cases, the conversion of one brother was followed by that of the
other; thus Ali, the eldest brother of Jafar, joined the movement, in which he was destined to play a
role of some importance, albeit less eminent than that of the Prophet's son-in-law. The power to
rename disciples was one of the privileges enjoyed by other prophets, and Mohammed made use of it
whenever a proselyte bore the name of an idol or had an ominous name.

Titles of honour were also conferred but probably a little later: Abu Bakr was called "the Truthful",
Zubair, "the Apostle", Abu Ubaidah, son of Jarrah, "the Faithful", Omar, "the
Saviour". These designations are like the distinctions awarded by modern sovereigns to people who have
either rendered a service to the State or been entrusted with an important mission.

The proselytes only sought out people whose composure they could rely on. Later, Mohammed was
reported to have recommended a certain procedure to people who, in order to save their lives, had to
perform idolatrous ceremonies; to look as if they were worshipping an idol, while at the same time
giving it the same treatment.

secretly showing contempt. Those who found that the idols did not take offence at their attitude
despised them even more. Meanwhile, the worship that was to replace the old rites was carried
out in the strictest privacy.

We do not know to what extent the secret society was aware of its possibilities. The obscurity it
enjoyed in the early years of its development was a great advantage to it. This obscurity prevented it
from being nipped in the bud. Derision and contempt could be defied more easily by a few hundred
people than by the Prophet himself. It also prevented him from taking on the persona of the eccentric
sage with whom Warakah and others had identified, giving him, from his first public appearance, the
role of party leader: it gave the

The Prophet was given time to acquire the exceptional influence he was able to exert on a large number
of people. It prepared him to lead people on a large scale. The specimens that

There were typical examples of devotees and dark fanatics - Othman, son of Maz'uni, seems to have been one of them; weak-minded and superstitious people; people who saw religion as a career opportunity. Abu Bakr and the Prophet showed what they were capable of by consolidating their hold on this slowly developing enterprise. They paid subsidies to the poor, and when Islam was condemned, the Prophet realised that he was in the wrong. He had to provide for entire families; but there is no doubt that the fortune that he controlled proved useful. Unlike the Christian missionaries, who had to be looked after by those they had led to adopt their religion, he could claim that he was not looking for a way out. In fact, he always refused to live on alms and never allowed any member of his family to do so. The most popular mediums play this card. It enabled Mohammed to gain a place in the society of princes.

Like most of those who know humanity inside out, Mohammed supported and sometimes almost openly asserted the theory that every human being has his price, and even a price to be paid. estimate by camel.

But the promise of the Garden worked wonders for those who had no need of "temporal help". The vivid descriptions of the Garden in the Koran are still a powerful tool for Muslim missionaries. The history of Islam is a story of sacrifice. Volunteers to taste the pleasures that are so vividly described in this sacred book. Its character is reminiscent of certain wild paradises: "In the land of the Great Spirit, the women are prettier than any of your squaws, and the game is much more abundant." said a Crow to Beckwourth (61), urging him to fight. Its name was borrowed from the Jews or Christians, its description from Ta'if, where the rich Meccans had gardens, but various touches were added whenever it took place.

As soon as Islam had become strong, the rule in use in the secret society was explicitly formulated: anyone who became a member was in it for ever, because if he left it he was a dead man. This rule, which to this day makes the conversion of a Muslim practically impossible, is still in force today. impossible, is so intimately bound up with the nature of secret societies that it must have been established at an early date; and the presumption of its existence was probably what made many proselytes remain faithful despite persecution. Yet a religion that is adopted for sordid reasons is often retained for honourable ones; and early observers noted that some of the most sincere followers of Islam were people who had been lured into it by bribes (62).

On the other hand, some people are attracted by secrecy and take a certain pleasure in leading a double life. Secret societies still exist, whose members meet for reasons that we do not suspect, sometimes no doubt for mummies, sometimes to discuss much more far-reaching plans. One knowledgeable writer believes that Mohammed's first meetings focused on a socialist project, on a better distribution of wealth between rich and poor. (63) However, there is no evidence to prove this. It is extremely likely that the indictment of idol worship made at these meetings included the condemnation of the representatives of the official cult to the Mecca and the idea that the prophet should be an autocrat probably germinated very early on. But if one of the members of the secret society had asked another why he belonged to it, he would probably have replied: in order to gain Paradise and escape Gehenna. (64) Men were initiated into the mysteries of Eleusis for a similar reason. There is no shortage of examples of converts whose faith received a sudden shock or who (as unbelievers would say) suddenly became aware of the unreality of the whole system.

Members of new sects must be able to recognise each other by signs in the manner of the *Fremasons* (65) and the greeting "Peace be with you" was perhaps introduced at the very beginning of

Islam, even though a person who went to Medina fifteen years after the start of the mission said that it was new. (66) This greeting was undoubtedly common among Jews and Christians; but it seems to have made a deep impression on Mohammed, who makes constant reference to it in the Koran. God addressed it to the prophets, the angels taught it to Abraham, and it is with this greeting that the blessed are welcomed into paradise, where it was the only form of conversation. By adopting this greeting, Mohammed practically assimilated his system to that of the Jews and Christians. Although this greeting was initially forbidden in public, Muslims were perhaps able to recognise each other by some particularity of dress.

back, whereas the pagans folded it down. (67) Later, the members of the main Islamic sects distinguished themselves by the way they arranged their turbans (68).

Finally, a name had to be given to the new sect and the choice, whether deliberate or accidental, fell on the sect of "Muslims" or "Hanifs". Was this the name by which the followers of Maslamah, the prophet of the Banu Hanifa, had been known? Or was it that another sect, monotheistic and se openly claiming to be Abraham, some of whose descendants according to the Bible were Arabs, had been so designated? It is impossible to say; no Arab seems to have heard of the hanifs, although they knew that Abraham was one and perhaps one of the two precursors of Mahommed Since in Hebrew the word means "hypocrite" and in Syriac "pagan", the pious disciples of Mahommed did not bother to study its etymology. The other name is "Muslim", meant "traitor" (69) and, when the new sect became an object of ridicule, it allowed the satirists to make a witticism of it; Mohammed showed a certain humour in adopting it but showed great ingenuity in giving it an honourable meaning: whereas it normally meant "one who surrenders his friends to their enemies", it took on the laudatory meaning of "one who surrenders himself to God" and if, like the term of

The name "Christian" may well have been invented by the enemies of the sect it designated, and divine authority was invoked as proof that the name had been invented by Abraham. Like the Jews, these The new Abrahamites called their pagan brethren "Gentiles", of Abyssinian origin. The pagans seem to have called the members of the new sect, once it was no longer secret, the Sabeans,(70) a word which means "militia" and from which is derived that of the Subas,(71) a community which still lives in the marshes of the Euphrates. The fact that this name was given to Mohammed's disciples may be due to the fact that they were the "Sabeans".

can be explained by ignorance - for example, the Arabs of our time call Doughty (72) a Jew because he is a Christian - or by the importance Mohammed attached to the ablution ceremony.

D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, Putnam and Sons, New York and London, 1905, translated from the English by B. K.

(1) The kahins were fortune-tellers. (EDITOR'S NOTE).

(2) One of the principal historians and exegetes of the Koran sometimes began his recollections of the prophet's words with a similar spectacle. Tabari, *Comm.* Xii, 9.

(3) Tabari, *Comm.* Xviii, 4.

(4) Bouveret, in *Les Sueurs morbides* (Paris, 1880), writes: "Adamkiewicz has shown that perspiration can be caused by artificial or voluntary stimulation of the muscles and nerves".

(5) Musnad, iv., 222. Bouveret, p. 47: "The skin can redden simultaneously", when perspiration is provoked by a violent emotion.

(6) *Ibid*, iii, 21.

(7) "(...) Allah is not the property of Muslims; (...) many generations of Arabs had been catechised in the name of Allah, before Mohammed and (...) many Arabs had converted to Christianity, invoking the Almighty Lord, the God of Moses under the name of Allah known throughout the Semitic world. H. Zakarias, *L'islam entreprise juive, de Moïse à Mohammed*, Cahors, published by the author. T I: Conversion of Mohammed to Judaism. *Les enseignements à Mohammed du rabbin de la Mecque*, p. 32. This author maintains that "the current Koran is nothing more than a Jewish preaching emanating from a rabbi of Pharisaic Talmudist tendency, whose aim was to Judaize Arabia and to extend Jewish hegemony throughout the Mediterranean basin". Thus "Islam is the great triumph of Israel". (EDITOR'S NOTE)

(8) *History of the Mormons*, London, 1851.

(9) "I am the one who gives the alarm", *Alif-Ba'*, i, 133.

(10) *Ibn Sa'd II*, ii, 52. Harithah Ibn Al-Nu'man claimed to have seen Gabriel twice.

- (10) Contemporary Rev, October, 1903.
- (11) Musnad, iv, 222.
- (12) Sura xxix, 47.
- (13) The original is obscure.
- (14) In Usd al-Ghabah, i, 207, he is said to have witnessed the torture of one of Muhammad's disciples.
- (15) Musnad, vi, 68.
- (16) Ibid, i, 135.
- (17) Sura lii, f 21.
- (18) Musnady iv, 356.
- (19) J. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen Heidentums, Berlin, G. Reimer, 1897, p. 196.
- (20) Nöldeke, Z.D.M.G., lii, p. 19, considers this account to be an invention.
- (21) Ibn Sa'd, iii, p. 30.
- (22) Isabah, ii, p. 162.
- (23) Jahiz, Opuscula, p. 58.
- (24) Musnad, iv, p. 385.
- (25) They are listed by Wellhausen, *op. cit.* p. 232.
- (26) Isabah, i, p. 1036.
- (27) Ibn Sa'd, iii, III.
- (28) Al-Waqidi, p. 231.
- (29) Isabah, i, p. 714.
- (30) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 234.
- (31) Musnad, iv, p. 353.
- (32) Sura xi, p. 27.
- (33) Al-Waqidi, p. 118.
- (34) Abu Bakr often interprets dreams. J. Wellhausen, *op. cit.* p. 14.

- (35) Musnad, i, p. 462.
- (36) Ibid, p. 318.
- (37) His original name is disputed; others make him a servant of Amr.
- (38) Alif-Ba', i, p. 437.
- (39) Isabah.
- (40) Ghurar al-Khasa'is, p. 245.
- (41) Tabari, i, p. 1213.
- (42) A. von Krenter, *Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf Dem Gebiete des Islams*, Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1873, p. 15.
- (43) Musnad, i, p. 423.
- (44) Al-Tirmidhi reproduces it as follows: "Lead us in the right path, the path of those towards whom You have been kind and not of those against whom You are angry [the Jews?] and of those who go astray [the Christians?]."
- (45) Tabari, *Comm*, xvi, 90. The other end of the rope was probably attached to the ceiling; *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xiii., p. 312.
- (46) *Jahi, Bayan*, ii, 79, 84.
- (47) Al-Tirmidhi, p. 410 (ii, 80).
- (48) Alif-Ba', ii, p. 29.
- (49) Musnad, iv, p. 188.
- (50) Ibid, iv, 163. This point is disputed.
- (51) Or a Christian; Muslims make no distinction.
- (52) Isabah, i, p. 452; *Al-Waqidi (IV)*, p. 349.
- (53) O. Loth, *Zwei arabische Papyrus*. Z. D. M. G., xxxv, p. 621.
- (54) T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, London and Edinburgh, A. and C. Black, 1872, c. ii.
- (55) The best proof of this is provided by the form of proper nouns. S. Sycz, *Ursprung Und Wiedergabe Der Biblischen Eigennamen Im Koran*, 1903, does not take sufficient account of this.
- (56) Musnad iv, III.

(57) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 194.

(58) Isabah, iii, p. 1173.

(59) Ibn Sad, iii, p. 162.

(60) So Abu Bakr bought and emancipated Amir Ibn Fuhairah.

(61) Autobiography, p. 161.

(62) Sahih Muslim, ii, 212; Musnad, iii, 175.

(63) The priests also described Mohammed as a person sent to get the rich to do justice to the poor. Hariri, p. 328.

(64) Cf. Tabari, i, p. 1218, 10.

(65) On the hypothesis of the Muslim origin of Freemasonry, see J. M. Aractingi and C. Lochon, *Secrets initiatiques en Islam et rituels maçonniques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008. See also C. Lochon, *L'initiation dans les confréries musulmanes et la franc maçonnerie*, <https://archive.org/download/LinitiationDansLesConfreriesMusulmanesEtLaFranc-masonryInitiationInMuslimConfraternitiesAndFrancMaonnerieLaConfrence.htm> (NDE.)

(66) Isabah, iii, p. 70; but Wellhausen interprets it differently. In Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 255, Abu Dharr claims to have invented it. See also Goldziher. Z.D.M.G., xlvi, p. 22.

(67) Hariri, Schol, 346.

(68) Hamadhani, Makamas, 199. So do the Kassites and Yemenites today (Goldziher, M. S., i, p. 84). Everything seems to indicate that Mohammed first wore his hair in the Jewish style and it is probable that his disciples did the same.

(69) In a line of Arabic poetry (qâla z-Zubairu wa aslamathu Mûgasi'û / la haira fi danisi t-tiyâbi gadûri] the verb aslama - which means, today as it has for at least a millennium, "to become a Muslim" - unequivocally means "to betray, desert, abandon". Ibn Ishaq, the first known biographer of Mahommed, wrote: "I will not be a traitor [Muslim] to the prophet." Khubayb, one of the first martyrs of Islam, declared: "What do I care if I am killed as a traitor (Muslim), because of the schism that could arise? Schism with Christianity. For it seems that Christians described the followers of the nascent Islam as "muslimum", "traitors": traitors to Christianity. In fact, while the first Muslims were not afraid to die for their religion, they were afraid of being accused of being "traitors" by the Christians. Cf. G. Lüling, *A Challenge to Islam for Reformation: Reconstruction of a Comprehensive Pre-Islamic Christian Hymnal Hidden in the Koran under Earliest Islamic Reinterpretations*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2003, p. 151.

(70) Also known as the Christians of Saint John the Baptist. From the Hebrew tzaia (militia, army, army of the stars), the term "Sabaeen" refers to a number of Gnostic sects, including the Mandaeans of

the Euphrates and especially the Manichaeans known at the time of Mohammed". A. Caizzo, *Images du ciel d'orient au moyen âge: une histoire du zodiaque et de ses représentations dans les manuscrits du Proche-Orient*, Paris, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003 p. 137 (N. D. E.)

(71) Soubbas would mean "baptisers". (N. D. E.)

(72) Charles Montagu Doughty, poet, writer and great English traveller of Jewish origin, whose main work is *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (1888). (N.D.E.)

The "new" world of Islam

Of the nineteen books published by the American historian, journalist and politologue Lothrop Stoddard Only two have been translated into French, *The Rising Tide of Color Against White World-Supremacy* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), under the title *Le Flot montant des peuples de couleur contre la suprématie mondiale des blancs* (Payot, 1925 [2014]) et *The New World of Islam* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921), sous le titre *Le nouveau monde de l'islam* (Payot, 1923), dans lequel, page 4, était annoncée la publication de la traduction de *The Revolt Against Civilization: The Menace of the Under Man* (New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1922) under the title *La révolte contre la civilisation: La menace du sous-homme*, which was never published.

French at <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2014/04/11/le-leurre-de-la-primitivite> and another at <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2014/04/30/la-nemesis-de-linferieur>. Below, in a new translation, are the introduction and the first chapter of the *New World of Islam*.

INTRODUCTION

THE DECLINE AND FALL OF THE OLD ISLAMIC WORLD

The rise of Islam is perhaps the most astonishing event in human history. From a previously neglected land and people, Islam spread over half of the world in the space of a century. earth, shattering great empires, toppling long-established religions, reshaping the souls of races and building an entirely new world - the world of Islam.

The closer we look at this development, the more extraordinary it becomes. The other major In the end, they triumphed with the help of powerful monarchs converted to the new faith. Christianity has had its Constantine, Buddhism its Asoka and Zoroastrianism its Cyrus, each lending its culte the powerful force of authority. The same cannot be said of Islam. Born in a desert country, sparsely populated by a nomadic race that had never distinguished itself in human history, Islam embarked on its great adventure with the least human support and against the most material obstacles. important. However, Islam triumphed with seemingly miraculous ease and, in the space of two years, it was able to win the war. generations, the Crescent of Fire has raced from victory to victory, from the Pyrenees to the Himalayas and from the deserts of Central Asia to the deserts of Central Africa.

This astonishing success is due to a number of factors, the main ones being the character of the Arab race, the nature of Mohammed's teachings and the general state of the contemporary oriental world. Although the Arabs had not yet distinguished themselves, they constituted a people of remarkable potential who were clearly seeking to fulfil their potential. For several generations before Mohammed, Arabia had been alive with exuberant vitality. The Arabs had surpassed their paganism and instinctively aspired to something better. In this upheaval of spirit and thought, Islam rang out like a clarion call. Mohammed, an Arab among Arabs, was the incarnation the very soul of his race. Preaching a simple and austere monotheism, devoid of priesthood or elaborate doctrine, he drew on the sources of the religious zeal still present in the hearts of the people. Semites. Overcoming the chronic rivalries and blood feuds that had consumed their energies in internecine battles and welded into an incandescent unity by the fire of their new faith, the Arabs poured out of their deserts to conquer the land for Allah, the only true God.

This is how Islam, the irresistible breath of the sirocco, the wind of the desert, left Arabia and found itself in a spiritual void. The neighbouring Byzantine and Persian empires, so imposing in the naked eye, were nothing more than dried-up envelopes, devoid of any real vitality. Their religions were nothing but impostures and simulacra. The culte ancestor of Zoroaster in Persia had degenerated into "magism", a pompous, tyrannical and persecuting priesthood, hated and secretly despised. As for Oriental Christianity, cluttered up in the trappings of paganism and weighed down by the folle theological speculations of the decadent Greek spirit, it had become a repulsive caricature of the teachings of Christ. Magism and Byzantine Christianity were both torn apart by major heresies that gave rise to savage persecutions and furious hatred. In addition, the Byzantine and Persian empires were harsh despotisms that crushed their subjects and killed off any love of homeland or any desire to defend one's country. loyalty to the State. Finally, the two empires had just fought a terrible war from which they had emerged mutually bled out and totally exhausted.

Then the world was forced to face up to the deluge of lava from Islam. Resignation was inevitable. Once the disjointed force of the Eastern Roman legions and the Persian cuirassiers had collapsed before the fierce onslaught of the fanatical sons of the desert, it was all over. There was no patriotic resistance. The oppressed populations passively accepted the new masters, while the many heretics rejoiced at the overthrow of their fellow persecutors, whom they hated far more than their foreign conquerors. In a short time, most of the subjugated peoples accepted the new faith, which was refreshingly simple compared to their own degenerate faiths. The Arabs, in turn, were able to consolidate their domination. They were not bloodthirsty savages who swore by pillage and destruction. On the contrary, they were a race gifted with an innate talent, eager to learn and appreciative of the cultural gifts that the oldest civilisations had to offer. As the conquered and the conquerors intermarried and professed a common

The ancient cultures of Greece, Rome and Persia were revitalised by Arab vigour and synthesised by Arab genius and the Islamic spirit. For the first three centuries of its existence (650-1000), the kingdom of Islam was the most civilised and progressive part of the world. Dotted with splendid villes, graceful mosques and peaceful universities where the wisdom of the ancient world was preserved and appreciated, the musulman East offered a striking contrast to the Christian West, then plunged into the night of the Dark Ages.

However, in the 19th century, Saracen civilisation began to show clear signs of decline. At first, this decline was gradual. Until the terrible disasters of the thirteenth century, Saracen civilisation remained vigorous and ahead of the Christian West. However, by the year 1000, its golden age had come to an end. There are several reasons for this. Firstly, the inveterate factionalism that had always been the hallmark of the Arab race soon reappeared. Rival factions fought over the leadership of Islam, and their quarrels degenerated into bloody civil wars. In these fratricidal battles, la fervour of the early days cooled and virtuous men such as Abu Bakr and Omar, the first standard-bearers of islam, gave way to rulers attached to the goods and pleasures of this world, who saw their position as "Khalifa"[1] as a means of exercising despotic power and glorifying themselves. The seat of government was moved to Damascus, in Syria, and then to Baghdad, in Mesopotamia. The reason for this is obvious. In Mecca, despotism was impossible. The Arabs of the desert, fierce and free, had no masters and their natural democracy had been sanctioned by the Prophet, who had explicitly decreed that all believers were brothers. The he Meccan califate was a theocratic democracy. Abu Bakr and Omar were elected by the people and held themselves accountable to public opinion, subject to divine law as revealed by Mohammed in the Koran.

The situation was different in Damascus and even more so in Baghdad. There, pure-blooded Arabs were just a handful among swarms of Syrian and Persian converts and "neo-Arab" half-breeds. These people, imbued with traditions of despotism, were quite prepared to obey the califes obediently. The califs in turn relied more and more on these complaisant subjects, drawing from their ranks courtiers, civil servants and ultimately soldates. Shocked and irritated, the proud Arabs gradually returned to the desert, while the government fell back into the old ruts of traditional oriental despotism. When the califate was transferred to Baghdad after the founding of the Abbasid dynasty (around 750), Persian influence became predominant. The famous calife Haroun-al-Rashid, he hero of the Arabian Nights was a typical Persian monarch, a true successor to Xerxes and Chosroes, as different from Abu Bakr or Omar as it is possible to imagine. And, in Baghdad as ailleurs, despotic power was fatal to its holders. Under his sway, Mohammed's "successors" became capricious tyrants or degenerate harem puppets, whose weak hands were totally incapable of guiding the great Muslim empire.

The empire gradually disintegrated. Shaken by the civil wars, deprived of strong leaders and With the invigorating influence of the desert Arabs, political unity could not last. Everywhere, suppressed racist or partilarist tendencies reawakened. The very speed of Islam's expansion turned against this religion, now that the sources of this expansion had dried up. Islam had made millions of converts, who belonged to many sects and races, but he didn't know them. had only very imperfectly digested. Mohammed had actually converted the Arabs, because he had only expressed ideas which were germinating obscurely in Arab minds and he had appealed to impulses innate in Arab blood. However, when the islam was accepted by non-Arab peoples, they instinctively interpreted the prophet's message according to their racial tendencies and cultural background, thus distorting or perverting the primitive islam. The most extreme example is Persia, where the austere monotheism of Mohammed was transformed into an elaborate mystical cult known as Shi'ism, which cut the Persians off from all communion with the orthodox Muslim world. The same tendency towards syncretism can be seen at a later stage. To a lesser degree, in the cult of the saints of the Berbers of North Africa and in the pantheism of the Hindu Muslims, two evocations that Mohammed would have unquestionably abhorred.

These doctrinal fissures in Islam were accompanied by a breakdown in political unity. The The first formal split occurred after the Abbasids came to power. A member of the deposed Umayyad family fled to Spain, where he established a rival califate in Córdoba, recognised by the Abbasids. not only by Spanish Muslims, but also by the Berbers of North Africa. Later, another califate was established in Egypt, the Fatimid califate, which takes its name from Fatima, the fille of Mohammed. As for the Abbasid califates of Baghdad, they gradually lost their power, until they became mere puppets in the hands of a new, racially powerful power, the Turks.

Before describing the passage of power from the hands of the Neo-Arabs to those of the Turks, which was so important for the history of the Islamic world, let us examine the decline of cultural vigour in the second and third centuries.

In the final stages of the neo-Arabic period, the political and religious unity was broken.

The Arabs of Mohammed's time were a pure and entire people, in full vigour and eager to learn. They were not immune to Semitic fanaticism. They were not immune to Semitic fanaticism, but although they were fanatics, they were not bigots, in other words they were not closed-minded. They held fast to the principles of their religion, but their religion was extremely simple. The heart of Muhammad's teaching was theism, not certain practices. A strict belief in the unity of God, an equally strict belief in Mohammed's divine mission [2] as set out in the Koran, and certain clearly defined duties - prayer, ablutions, fasting, alms-giving and the like - were the basis of Mohammed's theism.

It was this and this alone that constituted the Islam of the Arab conquerors of the Eastern world.

Such a simple theology could not seriously hinder the Arab mind, which was alert, curious, eager to learn and ready to adapt to conditions that were broader and more complex than those prevailing in the arid environment of the desert. The Arabs were not content to simply enjoy the advantages of the desert.

They also appreciated the art, literature, science and ideas of the older civilisations. The effect of these new stimuli was the remarkable cultural and intellectual flourishes that make up the history of Saracen civilisation.

For a while, thinking was relatively free and produced a multitude of ideas.

origins and daring persecutions. These were the work not only of Arabs, but also of Christian, Jewish and Persian subjects, many of whom were heretics who had been persecuted by Byzantine orthodoxy and Magism.

Gradually, however, this ecstatic era came to an end. Reactionary forces emerged and grew in power. The liberals, generally known as "Mutazilites",

not only clung to the doctrinal simplicity of primitive Islam, but also maintained that the criterion of all things should be reason. On the other hand, conservative schools of thought affirmed that the criterion should be precedent and authority. These men, many of whom were Christian converts imbued with the traditions of Byzantine orthodoxy, undertook an immense work of Koranic exegesis, associated with an equally elaborate codification and interpretation of the parables or 'traditions' attributed to Muhammad, as transmitted by his immediate disciples and followers. The result of this work has been the gradual emergence of a theology and a musulman scholastic philosophy as rigid, elaborate and dogmatic as those of the medieval Christian West.

Naturally, the battle between the fundamentally opposed tendencies of traditionalism and rationalism was long and bitter. However, the final outcome was almost a foregone conclusion. All was conducive to the triumph of dogma over reason. The entire historical tradition of the East (a tradition largely determined by racial and climatic factors [3]) was oriented towards absolutism. This tradition had been interrupted by the irruption of the wild libertarianism of the desert. But the older trend was reaffirmed, stimulated by the political transformation of the califate, which went from a theocratic democracy to a despotism.

This triumph of absolutism in the field of government has in fact ensured its triumph in the long term in all other fields. Indeed, despotism can no more tolerate the liberty of

thought than freedom of action. Some of the califes of Damascus were certainly sympathetic to mutazilism, the Umayyads being mainly men of secure mind rather than free thought. attracted them. But then the califes became aware of the political implications of the liberianism. The Mutazilites did not limit themselves to the realm of pure philosophical execution. They also ventured into more dangerous territory. Mutazilite voices have been raised to recall the democratic era of the Meccan califate, when the Commander of the Believers, instead of being a hereditary monarch, was elected by the people and accountable to public opinion. Some daring spirits even entered into relations with the fanatical and ferocious sects of Arabia, such as the Kharijites, who, faithful to the ancient spirit of independence of the desert Arabs, refused to recognise the califate and proclaimed theories of advanced republicanism.

As a result, the califes turned more and more towards the conservative theologians rather than the liberals, just as they favoured the monarchist Neo-Arabs over the pure-blooded desert Arabs. Under the Abbasids, the government came out squarely in favour of religious absolutism. Standards of dogmatic orthodoxy were established, the Mutazilites were persecuted and put to death and, in the twelfth century, the last vestiges of Saracen Iberianism were extirpated. The canons of Muslim thought were fixed. All creative activity ceased. Even the memory of the great Mutazilite physicians has faded. The Mussulman mind closed in, never to be opened again. only reopen today.

By the beginning of the eleventh century, the decline of Saracen civilisation had become so pronounced that change was clearly in the air. Having lost their initiatory vigour, the Neo-Arabs were about to lose their political power. The political heirs of the Neo-Arabs were the Turks. The Turks were a western branch of that congregation of nomadic tribes who, from time immemorial, roamed the endless steppes of eastern and central Asia and who are known collectively as the "Ural-Ataic" or "Turanian" peoples. The Arabs had been in contact with the nomadic Turks since the Islamic conquest of Persia; the Muslim generals had noticed that the Turks were relentlessly attacking the north-eastern frontiers of Persia. At the time of the califat, the Turks were not dreaded. In fact, they were often very useful. A dull people with no ideas, the Turks knew how to do two things superlatively well: obey orders and fight like hell. In other words In other words, they made perfect mercenaries. The califes were delighted and recruited more and more of them as soldiers and bodyguards.

Everything was fine as long as the califat was strong, but when it weakened, the situation changed. Once they had obtained positions of responsibility everywhere, the Turkish mercenaries began to dictate their law. They opened up the eastern frontiers of the empire and let in new waves of their compatriots, who now came not as individuals, but in tribes or "tribes".

hordes' under their hereditary chiefs, roaming at will, settling wherever they pleased and spoiling or expelling the region's inhabitants.

The Turks quickly gave up their ancestral paganism in favour of Islam, but Islam did little to change their nature. In judging these new Turkish arrivals, we must not think of them as the current Ottoman Turks of Constantinople and Asia Minor. The modern Osmanis are soaked in European and Near Eastern blood and have been soaked in Western and Saracen ideas that they are a very different people from their distant immigrant ancestors. And yet, Even so, the modern Osmani have enough of those detestable Turanian traits that characterise the Turks of Central Asia, often called "Turkmens", to distinguish them from their Ottoman relatives in the west.

What was the primitive nature of the Turks? First and foremost, it was the nature of the professional state. Discipleship was the watchword of the Turk. No originality of thought and little curiosity. Few ideas penetrated the mind of the Turk, and the few that did were received as humanitarian orders, to be obeyed without question and adhered to without thought. You were the one who ousted the weakened Saracen at the head of Islam.

There could be no greater happiness for Islam and for the world in general. For Islam, the result was the domination of narrow-minded bigots under whom any economic progress was impossible. It is true that Islam gained a great warrior force, but this new power was so little used that it had disastrous repercussions on Islam itself. The first notable exploits of the immigrant Turkish hordes were the conquest of Asia Minor and the capture of Jerusalem towards the end of the eleventh century. Until then, Asia Minor had remained part of the Christian world. In the seventh century, after invading Syria, the Arab armies were stopped by the barrier of the Taurus mountains; The Byzantine Empire had recovered and, subsequently, despite the border disputes, the Byzantine-Saracenic frontier remained virtually unchanged. However, the Turks broke through the Byzantine barrier, invaded Asia Minor and even threatened Constantinople, the eastern bulwark of Christianity. As for Jerusalem, although it had been in Muslim hands since the Arab conquest of 637, the Caliph Omar had carefully respected the Christian "holy places", and his successors had neither persecuted the Christians of the region nor mistreated the many pilgrims who flocked to Jerusalem every year from all parts of the Christian world. But the Turks changed all that. Greedy for booty and driven by a fanatical hatred of "miscreants", they ransacked the holy places, persecuted Christians and made pilgrimages impossible.

The effect of these two disasters on Christianity, which occurred almost simultaneously, was enormous. The Christian West, at the height of its religious fervour, shook with fear and anger. Myriads of fanatics, in the image of Peter the Hermit, ravaged the whole of Europe. Fanaticism begat fanaticism, and the Christian West poured huge armies of warriors into the Muslim East on the extraordinary expeditions that were the Crusades.

The Turkish conquest of Islam and its aftermath, the Crusades, were an immense misfortune for the world: they permanently damaged relations between East and West. In the year 1000, relations between Christians and Muslims were fairly good and had every chance of being restored. improve. The hatreds engendered by the first eruption of Islam were dying out. The borders of The relationship between Islam and Christianity was apparently settled, and neither side showed any desire to encroach on the other.

The only real bone of contention was Spain, where Muslims and Christians were but, after all, Spain was mutually considered a unique case. Between Islam and Christianity, on the whole, relations were becoming increasingly strained. more and more frequent. These friendly relations, if they had continued, could have had a major impact on the progress of humanity. At that time, the Muslim world was still well ahead of Western Europe in terms of knowledge and culture, but Saracen civilisation was stagnating, while the Christian West, despite its ignorance, coarseness and barbarism, was brimming with life and clearly yearning for something better. If the budding friendship between East and Had the West continued to develop in the 11th century, both sides would have benefited greatly. In the West, the influence of the Saracen culture, which had inherited the ancient knowledge of Greece and Rome, could have stimulated our Renaissance much earlier, while in the East the influence of the West would have had a greater impact on the Renaissance. Mediéval, brimming with vigour, could have saved Muslim civilisation from the paralysis that was invading it.

But this was not to be. In Islam, the refined and easy-going Saracen gave way to the bigoted and brutal Turk. Islam became aggressive again - not, as in its early days, for the sake of ideals, but out of sheer thirst for blood, pillage and destruction. From then on, it was a war to the death between the only civilisation possible and the most brutal and appalling barbarism. Moreover, this war was destined to last for centuries. The Crusades were merely the West's counter-attacks against a Turkish assault on Christendom that continued for six hundred years and was only finally repulsed under the walls of Vienna in 1683. Naturally, these centuries of incessant fighting gave rise to furious hatred and fanaticism, which continue to poison relations between Islam and Christianity. The atrocities committed by Mustapha Kemal's Turkish 'nationalists' and the atrocities committed by Greek troops in Asia Minor, which we wrote about in our morning papers, are not unlike the atrocities committed by the Turks and the Crusaders in Palestine eight hundred years ago.

This book is not directly concerned with the details of these ancient wars between Turks and Christians. The wars themselves must simply be seen as a permanent barrier between the Turks and the Christians. East and West. As for the Muslim East, whose Saracen civilisation was in decline, bent under the brutal yoke of the Turks, it was exposed to even more terrible evils. These evils have also been caused by the Turanian race. Towards the end of the twelfth century, the eastern branches of the Turanian race were temporarily unified by the genius of a powerful leader named Genghis Khan. Under the sinister title of "Inflexible Emperor", this archetypal savage set out to take over the world. First he invaded northern China, which he ravaged horribly, then he turned his devastating hand to the West. It was the advent of the terrible 'Mongols', whose name still stinks in the nostrils of civilised mankind. Assisted by skilled Chinese engineers who used gunpowder to reduce the fortified cities, Genghis Khan and his cavalerie proved irresistible everywhere. The Mongols were the most appalling barbarians the world had ever seen. Their aim was not to colonise or to rule. The main purpose was to satisfy a satanic thirst for blood and destruction. They devoted themselves to massacring entire populations, destroying lives and devastating the countryside.

Genghis Khan died only a few years after he began his advance westwards, but his successors continued his work with uninterrupted zeal. Christendom and Islam were struck by the Mongolian scourge. The whole of Eastern Europe was ravaged and plunged back into barbarism; the Russians still bear visible traces of the Mongol imprint. But the evils of Christianity had nothing in common with Islam. The Mongols never got beyond Pologne and Western Europe, the seat of Western civilisation, was spared. The same could not be said for Islam. Moving in from the north-east, the Mongolian armies swirled like a cyclone over the Isthmus of Suez, from India to Egypt, trampling, murdering and destroying. The nascent civilisation of medieval Persia, which was striving to emerge from the darkness in which it was immersed, was the victim of the war of harassment by the Turks, was crushed by the Mongols, who then attacked the Turks. Then to the centre of Muslim culture, Baghdad. Baghdad had declined considerably since its heyday under Haroun-al-Rashid, when legend has it that it numbered a million souls. However, it was still a great city, the seat of the califate and the undisputed centre of Saracen civilisation. The Mongols stormed it (1258), massacred its entire population and wiped the city off the face of the earth. The worst was yet to come. Baghdad was the capital of Mesopotamia. This "land between the rivers" had, at the dawn of history, been plucked from the marshes and deserts by the patient efforts of half-forgotten peoples who had created a marvellous system of irrigation. This irrigation system that had made Mesopotamia the garden and granary of the entire world. Centuries had passed and Mesopotamia had known many masters, but all these conquerors had respected, even cherished, the irrigation works that were the source of all prosperity. These works, the Mongols methodically destroyed them without a care in the world. The oldest civilisation in the world, the cradle of human culture, was irretrievably ruined. At least eight million years of continuous human effort were reduced to nothing, and Mesopotamia became the stinking land it had always been.

is still dry during periods of low water, transformed into putrid marshes during the flood season, occupied only by a few half-breed fellahs who live in miserable mud villages, and used by nomadic Bedouins who graze their herds on the former fields.

The destruction of Baghdad was a major blow to Saracen civilisation, especially in the East. But even before this terrible disaster, Saracen civilisation had suffered a terrible blow in the West. Islam, after having traversed the whole of North Africa in its early days, had inevitably taken hold in Spain, where it had developed to such an extent that the Spanish Muslim culture was perfectly equal to that of the Muslim East. The capital of Spanish Islam was Cordoba, seat of the Western califate, a powerful city, perhaps more marvellous than Baghdad itself. For centuries, Spanish Islam lived in security, confining Christians to the mountainous regions of the north. However, as the Saracens lost their strength, the Christians pressed the Muslims southwards. In 1213, the Spanish Islam was irretrievably broken in the formidable battle of Las Navas de Tolosa. From then on, the victorious Christians had to pick up the pieces. Cordoba itself was soon

The Spanish fanatical Christians extirpated Saracen civilisation as effectively as the pagan Mongols did at the time. It is true that Spanish Muslims remained in Granada, in the far south, until the year of the discovery of America by Christopher Columbus, but this was only a temporary circumstance. The Saracen civilisation of the West was practically destroyed.

Meanwhile, the Muslim East continued to suffer under the yoke of the Mongols. Wave after wave of Mongol invaders followed; the last notable invasion was that led by the famous (or rather infamous) Tamerlan in the early fifteenth century. By this time, the Western Mongols had accepted Islam, but this did little to change their behaviour. To show that Tamerlan was a true descendant of Genghis Khan, and it's worth noting that his guilty pleasure was pyramids of human skulls, one of which, erected after the capture of the Persian city of Isfahan, contained 70,000 of them. After the end of the Mongol incursions, the Muslim East, ravaged and depopulated, fell under the control of the Ottoman Turks.

The Ottoman Turks, or "Osmani", were originally just one of the many Turkish hordes that penetrated Asia Minor after the end of Byzantine rule. They owed their greatness mainly to a long line of inhabited sultans, who had gradually absorbed the neighbouring Turkish tribes and used this extra strength to undertake ambitious conquests to the east and west. In 1453, the Osmanis wiped out the old Byzantine Empire by taking Constantinople and, one year later, Constantinople.

A century later, they conquered the Muslim East, from Persia to Morocco, subjugated the entire Balkan peninsula and advanced through Hungary to the walls of Vienna. Unlike their Mongolian cousins, the Ottoman Turks built a lasting empire. It was a barbaric empire, for the

The Turks didn't understand much about cooking. The only things they could appreciate were military improvements. But they appreciated them and kept abreast of the latest developments. the latest developments in this field. At the time of their rise, the Turks had the best artillery and the most stable infantry in the world and were the terror of Europe.

In the meantime, Europe was awakening to true progress and superior civilisation. At the same time, the Mongols' war of harassment and Turkish militarism were putting an end to the Muslim East, The Christian West was vibrating to the rhythm of the Renaissance and the discoveries of America and the Indian sea route. The impact of these discoveries cannot be overestimated. When Christopher Columbus and

Vasco de Gama's memorable voyages at the end of the 15th century, Western civilisation was confined to the narrow confines of central-western Europe and was waging an almost hopeless defensive struggle against the forces of Turkish barbarism. Russia was under the yoke of the Tatars mongols, while the Turks, then at the height of their military vigour, swept triumphantly up from the south-east and threatened the very heart of Europe. These Turkish barbarians, who held Asia, North Africa and Eastern Europe in their grip, were so powerful that Western civilisation had difficulty in maintaining itself. Western civilisation was, in fact, fighting with its back to the wall - the wall of an ocean without enemies. It's hard to imagine how our medieval ancestors saw the ocean. For them, it was a numbing, oppressive presence, the abode of darkness and horror.

It's not surprising that medieval Europe was static, facing a ruthless and aggressive Asia that would stop at nothing. Then, in the twinkling of an eye, the dam burst. Europe, with no future, became master of the ocean and therefore of the world.

The greatest strategic shift in the history of mankind had just taken place. Instead of hopelessly facing the most ferocious Asians, whom it seemed impossible to defeat by a direct attack, the Europeans could now outflank them at will. What's more, the balance of resources shifted in Europe's favour. Entire worlds were unravelled in Europe.

Europe could draw on untold riches to stimulate its inner life and embark on a path of progress that would soon place it immeasurably above its once-dreaded Asian assailants. What were the resources of the stagnant Muslim East compared with those of the Americas and the Indies? This is how Western civilisation, invigorated, energised and making giant strides forward, got rid of its mediaeval fetters, seized upon the talisman of science and set out on its own. in the light of modern times.

All this left Islam indifferent. Stripped of the remnants of Saracen civilisation, the Muslim East continued to fall behind. Even its military power disappeared, as the Turk sank into lethargy and ceased to cultivate the art of war. For a time, the West, busy by internal conflicts, hesitated to attack the East, so great was the prestige of the Ottoman name. But

he crushing defeat of the Turks in their rash attack on Vienna in 1683 showed the West that the Ottoman Empire was in the throes of decline. From then on, the empire was mercilessly harassed by It was only saved from collapse by the mutual jealousies of the Western powers as they fought over the Turkish booty.

It was not until the nineteenth century, however, that the Muslim world as a whole felt the weight of Western attacks. Throughout the eighteenth century, the West attacked the extremities of the Muslim front in Eastern Europe and India, but the bulk of Islam, from Morocco to Central Asia, remained virtually untouched. The Muslim world did not benefit from this respite. It was plunged into lethargy, Despising European "miscreants" and accepting defeats as the impenetrable will of Allah, Islam continued to live its old life, knowing nothing of, and wishing to know nothing of, the ideas and progress of the West.

It was the decadent musliman world that faced nineteenth-century Europe, energised by industrial revolution, armed as never before by modern science and invention, which was to become the world's leading industrial power.

had unlocked nature's secrets and placed hitherto unsuspected weapons in its aggressive hands. The outcome was predictable. One after the other, the Muslim States, in a state of decay, would be crushed under the onslaught of the West and the entire Islamic world was rapidly divided between the European powers. England took India and Egypt, Russia crossed the Caucasus and took Central Asia, France conquered North Africa, while other European nations took minor parts of Muslim lands. The Great War marked the final stage in this process of subjugation. According to the terms of the treaties that brought it to an end

Eventually, the Ottoman Empire was dismembered and no Mohammedan state retained any real independence. The subjugation of the Muslim world is complete - on paper.

On paper! Because, at the very moment of its apparent triumph, Western domination was being called into question as never before. During these hundred years of Western conquest, a powerful internal change had taken place in the Muslim world. The rising tide of aggression

The West had at last deprecated the "unbearable" East. Islam at last became aware of its decadence and, with this awareness, a vast feeling, obscure but profound, began to stir the world.

250 million followers of the Prophet, from Morocco to China and from Turkestan to the Congo. It was in the Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam, that the first sparks flew. It was there, at the dawn of the nineteenth century, that the Wahhabi movement to reform Islam was born, which later gave rise to the "Mohammedan Revival".

"This, in turn, gave rise to the movement known as "panislamism". In addition, these

These were ideas such as parliamentary government, nationalism, scientific education, industrialism and even ultramodern concepts such as feminism, socialism and Bolshevism. Stimulated by the interaction of all these new forces, and driven by the pressure of the times

In the face of relentless European aggression, the Muslim world has become increasingly alive and active. The Great War was a shock of terrible proportions, and today Islam is abuzz with powerful forces that are shaping a new Muslim world. What are these forces shaping the Islam of tomorrow? The body of this book is devoted to their analysis and evaluation.

CHAPTER I

THE MAHOMETAN RENAISSANCE

By the eighteenth century, the Muslim world had fallen into the depths of its decadence. Nowhere was there any sign of healthy vigour, everywhere was stagnation and decadence. Manners and morals were atrocious. The last vestiges of Saracen culture had disappeared in the barbaric luxury of a few and in the equally barbaric degradation of morality. Education was all but dead, for the few universities that had survived had fallen into a dreary decadence and were no longer in existence.

Poverty and neglect. Government had become a despotism tempered by anarchy and assassination. Here and there, a great despot like the Sultan of Turkey or the Indian "Great Moghol" maintained a semblance of state authority, but the provincial pashas were constantly trying to set up independent governments based, like those of their masters, on tyranny and murder. Extortion. The pashas, in turn, relentlessly attacked the indiscriminate local chiefs and the swarms of brigands who infested the countryside. Under this sinister hierarchy, the people groaned, oppressed and crushed. Peasants and city dwellers had lost all desire to work or take the initiative, and agriculture and trade had fallen to the lowest level compatible with mere survival.

As for religion, it was as decadent as the rest. The austere monotheism of Mohammed had been overlaid by a multitude of superstitions and a puerile mysticism. The mosques were deserted and in ruins, abandoned by the ignorant multitude which, adorned with amulets, charms and I'd listen to sordid fakirs or ecstatic dervishes and go on pilgrimages to the tombs of "holy men", worshipped as "intercessors" with this Allah who was a "god". had become too remote for the direct devotion of these unfortunate souls. As for the moral precepts of the Koran, they were ignored or defied. The consumption of wine and opium was almost universally, prostitution was endemic and the most degrading vices were flaunted without shame. Even the holiest cities, Mecca and Medina, were pits of iniquity, while the "Hajj", or pilgrimage ordered by the Prophet, had become a scandal through its abuses. In short, Islam had apparently lost its vitality, leaving behind only a dry envelope of soulless rituals.

and degrading superstitions. If Mohammed had returned to earth, he would undoubtedly have anathematised his followers, calling them apostates and idolaters.

However, in those darkest hours, a voice emerged from the vast Arabian desert, the cradle of Islam, to call the faithful back to the true path. This puritan reformer, the famous Abdelwahhab lit a fire that spread to the most remote corners of the Muslim world, purifying Islam of its laziness and rekindling the fervour of yesteryear. The great Mohammedan revival had started.

Mohammed ben Abdelwahhab was born around 1700 in the heart of the Arabian desert, in the region known as the Nejd. The Nejd was the only place in the Muslim world that had been preserved from decadence. We have already seen how, with the transformation of the califate from a democracy The Arabs, with their free spirit, had returned with contempt to their deserts. There they retained their savage freedom. Neither calife nor sultan dared to venture far into these vast solitudes of sable burning with a suffocating aridity, where the reckless invader was a threat. drawn towards sudden death in a whirlwind of sharp spears. The Arabs knew no master, roaming at will with their herds and camels or settling here and there in verdant oases hidden in the heart of the desert. In the desert, they preserved their political virtues and religious primitives. The nomadic Bedouins lived under the authority of "sheiks"; the sedentary inhabitants of the oases generally recognised the authority of a ruling family. But these The rulers had very little authority, tightly circumscribed by well-established customs and a jaundiced public opinion against which they acted at their peril. The Turks had certainly succeeded in acquiring a precarious authority over the holy viii and the littoral of the Red Sea, but the Nejd, the vast interior, was free. In religion as in politics, the Arabs of the desert kept the faith of their fathers. Rejecting with contempt the corruptions of decadent Islam, they stuck to the simple theology of primitive Islam, so close to their Arab nature.

Abdelwahhab was born into this atmosphere of an earlier and more important era. Endowed from childhood with a studious and exacting mind, he quickly acquired a reputation as a scholar and saint. While still a young man, he made the pilgrimage to Mecca, studied in Medina and travelled as far as Persia, before returning to the Nejd. On his return, he burned with a holy passion for what he had seen and decided to preach Puritan reform. For years, he travelled all over Arabia, eventually converting Mohammed, head of the great clan of Saud, the most powerful ruler in the whole of the Nejd. Abdelwahhab thus benefited from a moral prestige and material strength that he used to his advantage. Little by little, the Arabs of the desert formed a political and religious unity similar to that achieved by the Prophet. In reality, Abdelwahhab was the faithful homologue of the first califes, Abu Bakr and Omar. When he died in 1787, his disciple, Saud, proved a worthy successor. The new Wahhabi state was the counterpart of the Meccan califate. Although he had great military power, Saud always kept to his own rules.

considered accountable to public opinion and never encroached on the legitimate freedom of his subjects. The government, although severe, was capable and fair. The Wahhabi judges were competent and honest. Voi was almost unknown, as public peace was well maintained. Education was carefully encouraged. Each oasis had its own school and teachers were sent to the Bedouin tribes.

Having consoled the Nejd, Saud was now ready to undertake the more important task of subjugating and purifying the Muslim world. His first objective was, of course, the holy viii. This objective was achieved in the early years of the nineteenth century. Nothing could stand in the way of the rush of Wahhabi armies burning with fanatical hatred against the Turks, who were hated as both musulman apostates and as usurpers of the supremacy of islam which, according to all Arabs, should remain in Arab hands. When Saud died in 1814, he was preparing to invade Syria. For a moment, it was thought that the Wahhabis were going to sweep through the East and impose their rule on the whole world in one fell swoop.

l'islam of puritan beliefs.

But nothing came of it. Unable to stem the Wahhabi tide, the Sultan of Turkey appealed to his powerful vassal, the famous Mehemet Ali. This habitual adventurer from Albania had previously made himself master of Egypt. Frankly recognising the superiority of the West, he called in many European officers, who quickly put together a formidable army, made up l a r g e l y of hardy Albanian mountain men, trained and equipped according to European models.

Méhémet Ali was quick to respond to the summons from the sultan and it soon became clear that even Wahhabi fanaticism was no match for European muskets and artillery manned by seasoned veterans. Before long, the holy cities were retaken and the Wahhabis were pushed back into the desert. The nascent Wahhabi empire vanished like a mirage. The political role of Wahabism was over [5].

However, the spiritual role of Wahhabism had only just begun. The Nejd remained a hotbed of puritanical zeal from which the new spirit radiated in all directions. Even in the holy places, Wahhabism continued to set the religious tone and the many "Hajjis", or pilgrims, who travelled there every year from all parts of the Muslim world, returned home as zealous reformers. Soon, the Wahhabi levain began to cause profound disturbances in the most remote regions. For example, in northern India, a Wahhabi fanatic, Seyid Ahmed [6], so aroused the Mohammedans of the Punjab that he established a theocratic state, and only his fortuitous death prevented a possible Wahhabi conquest of northern India. This state was destroyed by the Sikhs around 1830, but when the English conquered the country, they had endless problems with the smouldering embers of Wahhabi sentiment, which in fact survived, contributed to the Indian Mutiny and permanently fanatised Afghanistan and the savage tribes of India's north-western frontier [7]. It was during these years that the famous Seyid Mohamed ben Senussi left his native Algeria.

to travel to Mecca and imbibe the Wahhabi principles that led to the founding of the great Pan-Islamic brotherhood that bears his name. Even the Babist movement in Persia, well doctrinally removed from Wahhabi teaching, was undoubtedly a secondary consequence of the Wahhabi movement [8]. In fact, in the space of a generation, Wahhabi rigorism had This movement was itself at the origin of numerous currents of thought, of which the main one was the movement generally known as panislamism. I will deal with this movement, particularly its political aspect, in the next chapter. For the moment, let us examine the other aspects of Mohammedan revival, in particular its religious and cultural aspects.

The Wahhabi movement was a strictly puritanical reform. Its aim was to reform abuses, abolish superstitious practices and return to primitive Islam. All subsequent additions - the writings and interpretations of medieval theologians, ceremonial and mystical innovations, the cult of the saints, in fact all changes - were condemned. The austere monotheism of Mohammed was preached in all its uncompromising simplicity and the Koran, interpreted literally, was considered the only guide to human action. This doctrinal simplification was accompanied by a code of conduct. Prayers, fasts and other practices prescribed by Mohammed were scrupulously observed. The most austere lifestyle was imposed. Silk clothing rich food, wine, opium, tobacco, coffee and all other pleasures were severely proscribed. Even religious architecture was practically taboo; the Wahhabites dismantled the tomb of the Prophet in Medina and the minarets of the mosques, which they considered to be impious innovations. The Wahhabis were therefore, despite their moral seriousness, excessively narrow-minded, and it is fortunate for Islam that they quickly lost their political power and were forced to limit their efforts to teaching morality.

Many of Islam's detractors see the Wahhabi movement as proof that Islam is essentially retrograde and intrinsically incapable of evoking. These criticisms, however, seemed unjustified. The initial stage of any religious reform is an uncritical return to the primitive cult. For the religious reformer, the only way out is to reject all innovations. ulter, whatever their character. Our own Protestant Reformation began in exactly this way, and humanists like Erasmus, repelled and disgusted by the puritanical narrowness of the Protestantism, saw nothing good in this movement, declaring that it threatened all truthful culture and did nothing more than replace an infallible Pope by an infallible Bible.

In fact, the Puritan beginnings of the Mohammedan revival took on more constructive characteristics, some of which were tinged with unquestionable liberianism. The Muslim reformers of the early nineteenth century have not had to dig very deep into their religious past to discover mutatism. We have already mentioned the great battle that pitted reason against dogma in the early days of Christianity.

Islam and in all the dogma had triumphed so competently that the very memory of mutazilism had faded. Today, these memories have been revived and the liberal reformers have been delighted to find such striking confirmation of their ideas, both in the writings of the mutazilite doctors and in the sacred texts themselves. The principle that reason, not blind prescription, should be the criterion made possible all the reforms they held most dear. For example, the reformers discovered that, in traditional writings, Mohammed is said to have said: "I am nothing more than a man; if I give you orders in matters of religion, receive them; if I give you orders on world affairs, I am nothing more than a man". And again, as if he foresaw the day when radical changes would be necessary. "You are at a time when, if you do not do a tenth of what is ordered, you will be lost. After that, there will come a time when those who He who observes the tenth part of what is ordained today will be redeemed". [9].

Before discussing the ideas and efforts of modern Muslim reformers, it would be useful to examine the assertions of many Western critics that Islam is, by its very nature, incapable of reforming itself and gradually adapting to the expansion of the modern world. human knowledge. This was the view not only of Christian polemicists[10], but also of rationalists such as Renan and European administrators of Muslim populations such as Lord Cromer. Lord Cromer summed up this critical attitude in his statement: ". Islam cannot be reformed, i.e. reformed Islam is no longer Islam, it is something else"[11].

These criticisms, which come from specialists close to Islam and who often have a personal and intimate knowledge of Muslims, deserve to be taken into consideration with respect. However, a historical study of religions, and in particular a study of the thoughts and achievements of the Muslims, is not enough. Muslim reformers over the last hundred years seem to refute these pessimistic accusations.

First of all, it should be remembered that Islam today is in much the same position as Christianity was in the fifteenth century, at the beginning of the Reformation. We find the same supremacy of dogma over reason, the same blind adherence to prescriptions and authority, the same suspicion and the same "blind faith". hostility towards freedom of thought or scientific knowledge. There is no doubt that a study of Mohammedan sacred texts, in particular the 'Sharia' or canon law, and a glance at the Muslim history of the last half-century, reveal an attitude which, on the whole, is totally incompatible with modern progress and civilisation. But was it not the same for the Christianity in the early fifteenth century? Compare Sharia law with Christian canon law. The spirit is the same. Take, for example, the Sharia's ban on lending money at interest; a ban which, if respected, makes any kind of trade or industry in the modern sense of the term impossible. This is the example most often cited to prove the innate incompatibility of Islam with modern civilisation. But Christian canon law also forbade interest and referred to it as a "right".

the Jews had a monopoly on business in Europe for centuries, while the first Christians who dared to lend money (the Lombards) were punished. considered almost as heretics, universally hated and frequently persecuted. Take again the question of Muslim hostility to freedom of thought and religion. scientific investigation. Can the islam show anything more revolting than that scene i n Christian history where, less than three hundred years ago [12], the great Galilée was dragged before the Papale Inquisition and forced, under threat of torture, to recant the damnable heresy seloning that the earth revolved around the solet?

In fact, Mohammed revered knowledge. His own sayings are eloquent testimony to this. Here are a few of his sayings:

"Seek knowledge, even, if necessary, at the frontiers of China.

"Seek knowledge from the cradle to the grave.

"A word of science is worth more than the recitation of a hundred prayers.

"The ink of the wise is more precious than the blood of the martyrs.

"A single word of wisdom, learned and communicated to a Muslim brother, outweighs the prayers o f a whole year.

"The wise are the successors of the Prophet.

"God created nothing better than reason.

"In truth, a man may have prayed, fasted, given alms, performed the pilgrimage and all the other good works; nevertheless, he will only be rewarded to the extent that he has used his common sense.

These quotations (and there are others of the same order) prove that the liberian attitude of the modern Muslim reformers is well supported by the Scriptures. Of course, I do not mean to suggest that the The reform movement in Islam, simply because it is ideological and progressive, is ipso facto guaranteed to succeed. History reveals too many sad examples of the contrary. Indeed, we have already seen how, in Islam itself, the promising liberian movement of its beginnings simply disappeared. What history shows is that, when times are favourable to progress, regimes are not.

adapt to this progress by reforming and liberalising themselves. No human society on the move has ever gone backwards because of a belief. It can be held back, but if the progressive elan persists, the doctrinal obstacle is either overcome, undermined, circumvented or defeated. It is not possible for the Muslim world to be deprived of progressive influences. It is in close contact with Western civilisation and is increasingly imbued with Western ideas. Islam cannot detach and isolate itself, even if it wants to. So everything points to a profound change. Of course, critics like Lord Cromer claim that this modified Islam will no longer be the Islam. But why not? If people continue to call themselves Mohammedans and to be spiritually nourished by Mohammed's message, why should they be denied that name? Modern Christianity is certainly very different from medieval Christianity, and the various Christian churches vary considerably from one another from a doctrinal point of view. However, all those who consider themselves to be Christians are considered to be such by all, with the exception of bigots, who are out of step with the times.

Let us now examine the Muslim reformers, judging them not according to the texts and chronicles, but according to their parables and deeds; for, as one of them very pertinently remarks an Algerian, "men must be judged, not by the letter of their sacred books, but by what they actually do" [13].

Modern Muslim liberalism, as we have seen, was first encouraged by the discovery of the almost half a century old Mutazilite literature. Of course, Islam has never been entirely devoid of liberal minds. Even in its darkest days, some voices were raised against the prevailing obscurantism. For example, in the sixteenth century, the famous El-Gharani wrote: "

It is not at all impossible that God reserves for men of the future perceptions that have not been granted to men of the past. God's munificence never ceases to pour out blessings and gifts. lumières dans les cœurs des sages de l'époques [14]". These isolated voices from the dark period of Islam helped to encourage modern reformers, and by the mid-nineteenth century every Muslim country had its own group of forward-looking men. At first, of course, their numbers were insignificant, and they attracted the anathemas of fanatical Muslims [15] and the hatred of multitude.

ignorant. The first country where the reformers definitely exerted their influence was India. A group led by the famous Sir Syed Ahmed Khan launched an important Iberian movement there, founding associations, publishing books and newspapers and establishing the famous college of Aligarh. Sir Syed

Ahmed is a good example of the first liberal reformers. Conservative by temperament and perfectly orthodox in his theology, he nevertheless denounced the present decadence of Islam with true Wahhabi fervour. He also had a frank appreciation of Western ideas and was keen to assimilate the many good things the West had to offer. As he wrote in 1867: "We must study European scientific works, even if they are not written by Muslims and we may find in them things contrary to the teachings of the Koran. We should imitate the Arabs of old, who were not afraid to shake their faith by studying Pythagoras" [16].

This nucleus of Indian Muslim liberals rapidly grew in strength and produced a number of leaders such as Moulvie Cheragh Ali and Syed Amir Ali, whose scholarly works, written in impeccable English, are known the world over [17]. These men call themselves "neo-Mutazis", and boldly advocate reforms such as a complete overhaul of the Constitution. Sharia and a general modernisation of Islam. Their point of view is well expressed by another of their leading figures, S. Khuda Bukhsh. "Nothing was further from the Prophet's mind," he wrote, "than to hinder the spirit or to establish fixed, immutable and unchangeable laws for his disciples. The Koran is a book of guidance for the faithful, not an obstacle to their social progress, moral, juridical and intellectual". He deplores the current backwardness of Islam, because, he continues, "Modern Islam, with its priestly hierarchy, its fanatical fanaticism, its appalling ignorance and its practices superstitious, discredits the Islam of the prophet Mohammed". He concluded with the following confession of faith: "Is Islam hostile to progress? I will answer this question categorically in the negative. Islam, stripped of its theology, is a perfectly simple religion. Its cardinal principle is belief in one God and in Mohammed as his apostle. The rest is accretion, superfluity" [18].

Meanwhile, liberals exercised their influence in other parts of the Muslim world. In Turkey, liberals led the government for much of the generation between the Crimean War and the despotic regime of Abdul Hamid [19] and Turkish liberal ministers such as Reschid Pasha and Midhat Pasha made sincere, if unsuccessful, efforts to liberalise and modernise the Ottoman Empire. Even the terrible Hamidian tyranny did not succeed in killing Turkish liberalism. It took refuge in hiding or exile and, in 1908, successfully led the revolt that deposed the tyrant and brought the "Young Turks" to power. In Egypt, liberalism took root so fully represented by men like Sheikh Mohammed Abdou, rector of El Azhar University and a respected friend of Lord Cromer. Even isolated fragments of Islam, such as the Russian Tatars, have awakened to the new spirit and produced men who are liberal and forward-looking [20].

The liberal reformers I have described are, of course, part of the evocative progress of Islam. They are, in the best sense of the word, conservatives, receptive to healthy change, while at the same time preserving their own traditions.

hereditary equilibre. Sincerely religious, they believe in Islam as a living, moral force, and it is from Islam that they continue to derive their spiritual sustenance.

However, there are other groups in the Muslim world who have succumbed so much to Western influences that they have more or less lost touch with their spiritual and cultural past. In all the most civilised parts of the Muslim world, particularly in countries long under European control such as India, Egypt and Algeria, there are many Muslims, educated and imbued with Western culture, who have drifted towards an attitude which ranges from religious indifference to the "Western". to avowed agnosticism. The former musliman zeale has completely disappeared from their minds. The Algerian Ismaël Hamet describes the attitude of this class of his compatriots well when he writes: "European scepticism is not without influence on Algerian Muslims who, while they have retained some attachment to the external forms of their religion, are generally unaware of the human excesses of sentiment.

religious. They do not abandon their religion, but they no longer dream of converting all those who do not practise it; they want to pass it on to their children, but they are not concerned about the safety of others. This is not belief, it's not even free thought, it's half-heartedness" [21].

Beyond these lukewarm intellectuals, there are other groups of a very different character. Here we find the most contradictory feelings: young people whose brains are full of radical Western ideas - atheism, socialism, Bolshevism and so on. And yet,

Curiously, these fanatical radicals tend to join with the fanatical reactionaries of Islam in a common hatred of the West. Seeing themselves as the born leaders (and exponents) of the ignorant masses, radicals crave political power and rage against domination.

their ambitious pretensions. That's why they are most often "

nationalists, but also pan-Islamic reactionaries. Indeed, we often see the strange spectacle of atheists masquerading as Muslim fanatics, and displaying an unmistakable anti-Muslim attitude.

truly dervish-like. M. Bukhsh describes this type well when he writes: "I know a gentleman, of Mohammedan profession, who owes his success in life to his faith. Although outwardly he conforms to all the precepts of Islam and sometimes presents himself in public as the champion and spokesman of his co-religionists, I discovered, to my horror, that he had on his religion and on his founder of opinions that even Voltaire would have rejected with indignation and Gibbon with pitying contempt" [22].

We shall examine the activities of this coterie more closely in the chapters devoted to pan-Islamism and nationalism. What I wish to emphasise here is its pernicious influence on the prospects for the future.

of a true Mohammedan reform, as envisaged by the true reformers I have described. Their fanatical desire to arouse the fanatical passions of the ignorant masses and their equally fanatical hatred of all that is Western, with the exception of humanitarian improvements, are revealed by protests such as the following, taken from the pen of an eminent "Young Turk". "Yes, la

The Mohammedan religion is openly hostile to your whole world of progress. Learn, observers European, that a Christian, whatever his position, by the simple fact that he is a Christian, is in our eyes a being deprived of all human dignity. Our reasoning is simple and definitive. We say: a man whose judgement is so perverted as to deny the evidence of the one God and to fabricate different kinds of gods can only be the most ignoble expression of human stupidity. To deny it would be to humiliate our reason and offend the greatness of the Master of the Universe. The worshipper of false gods is a monster of ingratitude; he is the execration of the universe; to fight him, convert him or annihilate him is the holiest task of the faithful. These are the eternal commandments of our one and only God. As far as we are concerned, there are only believers and unbelievers in this world; love, charity, the love of God and the love of God are the only things that exist in this world. disgust, hatred and war for the disbelievers. Among the unbelievers, the most odious and the most criminal are those who, while recognising God, create earthly parents for him, give him a son and a mother; such a monstrous aberration exceeds, in our eyes, all the bounds of iniquity; the presence of you unbelievers among us is the cornerstone of our existence; their doctrine is a direct insult to the purity of our faith; their contact is a punishment for our bodies; any relationship with them a torture for our souls.

"While hating you, we have studied your political institutions and your military organisations. In addition to the new weapons that Providence has provided for us through your own means, you have also- They themselves revived the unquenchable faith of our heroic martyrs. Our Young Turks, our Babis, our new fraternities, all these sects in their various forms, are inspired by the same thought, the same objective. To what end? Christian civilisation? Never! [23] "

Unfortunately, such harangues found a strong echo among the Muslim masses. Although liberal reformers represent a growing power in Islam, but it should not be forgotten that they are still only a minority, a small minority, below which lie the ignorant masses, still suffering from the scourge of secular obscurantism, enveloped in the admiration of their own world, which they consider to be the highest idea of human existence, and hating They are fanatical about everything outside the country, which they regard as evil, contemptuous and deceitful. Even when they are forced to admit the superiority of the West, they hate it. even more. They blindly reject the spirit of change that compels them to leave their homes. Their misery is compounded by the omnipresence of Western domination, which presses in on them from all sides. These people are like clay in the hands of pan-Islamic and nationalist rulers who are shaping the world to their own sinister ends.

In fact, Islam today is torn between the forces of liberal reform and those of chauvinist reaction. The liberals are not only the hope of an evocative reform, they are also favoured by the trend of the times, since the Muslim world is still impregnated by Western progress and must continue to be so unless Western civilisation collapses. However, the

although the final triumph of the liberals seems probable, what delays, what setbacks, what new barriers of war and fanaticism are the chauvinist reactionaries likely to erect! Nor the Neither the reform of Islam nor relations between East and West are immune to the perils we shall examine later.

What is encouraging is that, throughout the Muslim world, a large and powerful minority, made up not only of westernised people but also of orthodox conservatives, is aware of the decadence of Islam and is convinced that a thorough reform in an ideological and progressive spirit is both a practical necessity and a sacred duty. The legal modalities of this reform have not yet been determined and it is not necessary to examine them in detail.

technical mechanisms [24]. History teaches us that, where the desire for reform is strongly present, reform is achieved in one way or another.

One thing is certain: the spirit of reform, in its various manifestations, has already produced profound changes throughout Islam. The Muslim world today is very different from what it was a century ago. The Wahhabi faith has destroyed abuses and revived a more pure, religious faith. Even its fanatical zeal was not without moral counterparts. The spread of liberal principles and Western progress continues apace. If there is much to fear for the future, there is also much to hope for.

Lothrop Stoddard, *The New World of Islam*, New York, Charles Scribner's Sons, 1921, translated from the American by B. K.

[1] "Successor"; anglicised in the word "Calife".

[2] To be carefully distinguished from divinity. Not only did Mohammed make no claim to divinity, but he expressly renounced any such attribute. He saw himself as the last of a series of divinely inspired prophets, stretching from Adam and Moses to Jesus and himself, the bearer of God's last and most perfect revelation.

[3] The influence of the environment and heredity on human evolution in general and on the history of the Orient in particular, although of great importance, cannot be dealt with in a summary such as this. The influence of climate and other environmental factors has been well treated by Professor Ellsworth Huntington in his various works, such as *The Pulse of Asia* (Boston, 1907); *Civilization and Climate* (Yale Univ. Press, 1915) and *World-Power and Evolution* (Yale Univ. Press, 1919). See also Chapter III in Arminius Vambéry-*Der Islam im neunzehnten Jahrhundert*. Eine

culturgeschichtliche Studie (Leipzig, 1875). For a summary of racial influences in oriental history, see Madison Grant, *The Passing of the Great Race* (N.Y., 1916).

[4] The Turkish invasion of Asia Minor followed the destruction of the Byzantine army in the great battle of Manzikert in 1071. The Turks took Jerusalem in 1076.

[5] On the Wahhabi movement, see A. Le Chatelier, *L'Islam au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1888); W. G. Palgrave, *Essays on Eastern Questions* (London, 1872); D. B. Macdonald, *Muslim Theology* (London, 1903); J. L. Burckhardt, *Notes on the Bedouins and Wahabys* (2 vols., London, 1831); A. Chodzko, "Le Déisme des Wahhabis", *Journal Asiatique* IV, Vol. London, 1831; A. Chodzko, "Le Déisme des Wahhabis", *Journal Asiatique*, IV, Vol. II, pp. 168 ff.

[6] Not to be confused with Sir Syed Ahmed d'Aligarh, the Indian musulman of the mid-nineteenth century.

[7] On the concern of the Anglicans with the latent fanaticism of the North Indian Muslims up to the mid-nineteenth century, see Sir W. W. Hunter, *The Indian Musalmans* (London, 1872).

[8] On the Babist movement, see Clément Huart, *La Religion de Bab* (Paris, 1889); Comte Arthur de Gobineau, *Trois Ans en Perse* (Paris, 1867). A good summary of all these early movements of the Mohammedan revival can be found in Le Chatelier, *op. cit.*

[9] *Mishkat-el-Masabih*, I., 46, 51.

[10] The best recent examples of this poetic literature are the writings of the Reverend S. M. Zwemer, a well-known missionary to the Arabs. M. Zwemer, a well-known missionary to the Arabs, in particular his *Arabia, the Cradle of Islam* (Edinburgh, 1900) and *The Reproach of Islam* (London, 1915). See also *The Mohammedan World of To-day*, a collection of documents from the Protestant Missionary Conference held in Cairo, Egypt, in 1906.

[11] Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Vol. II, p. 229 (London, 1908). For Renan's attitude, see *L'Islamisme et la science* (Paris, 1883).

[12] In 1633.

[13] Ismaël Hamet, *Les Musulmans français du Nord de l'Afrique* (Paris, 1906).

[14] Quoted by Dr Perron in his book *L'Islamisme* (Paris, 1877).

[15] The Mollahs are the Muslim clergy, which does not correspond exactly to the Christian clergy. Mohammed was opposed to any form of priesthood, and Islam does not provide for a priestly caste. priests, as is the case in Christianity, Judaism, Brahmanism and other religions. religion. In theory, any Muslim could perform religious services. Over time, however, a class of men developed who mastered Muslim theology and law. These men practically became priests, even though they were theoretically considered to be theological jurists. Religious orders of dervishes, etc. also developed.

[16] According to Léon Cahun in Lavis et Rambeaud, *Histoire Générale*, tome XII, p. 498. This article gives an excellent overview of the intellectual development of the museum world in the nineteenth century.

[17] In particular, his best-known book, *The Spirit of Islam* (London, 1891).

[18] S. Khuda Bukhsh, *Essays: Indian and Islamic*, pp. 20, 24, 284 (London, 1912).

[19] From 1856 to 1878.

[20] For the liberian movement among the Russian Tartars, see Arminius Vambéry, *Western Culture in Eastern Lands* (London, 1906).

[21] Ismaël Hamet, *Les Musulmans français du Nord de l'Afrique*, p. 268 (Paris, 1906).

[22] S. Khuda Bukhsh, *op. cit.*, p. 241.

[23] Sheikh Abd-ul-Haak, in *l'organe de Sherif Pasha, Mecheroutiette*, August 1921. Quoted by A. Servier, *Le Nationalisme musulman, Constantine, Algérie*, 1913.

[24] For a telle discussion of legal methods, see W. S. Blunt, *The Future of Islam* (London, 1882) ; A. Le Chatelier, *L'Islam au dix-neuvième siècle* (Paris, 1888); Dr. Perron, *L'Islamisme* (Paris, 1877) ; H. N. Brailsford, "Modernism in Islam", *The Fortnightly Review*, September 1908; Sir Theodore Morison, "Can Islam be Reformed? The Nineteenth Century and After, October 1908; M. Pickthall, "La Morale islamique", *Revue Politique Internationale*, juillet 1916; XX, "L'Islam après la Guerre", *Revue de Paris*, 15 January 1916.

In the only French-language account of this book to date, we read: "Here then comes the much-debated question of the adaptation of Islam to modern life. Some say it is impossible: 'Islam cannot be reformed, that is to say, reformed Islam is no longer Islam, it is the same as it was before.

(M. Pernot, in his latest work *La Question turque*, has very objective views on this subject). Our author believes that this pessimism is not justified. Unfortunately, the comparisons he draws are taken from a period of history of which he has only a very confused notion. As for what this adaptation of Islam to modern life might be, he has neglected to tell us. (i). Far from neglecting it, Stoddard has specified it, it is true - as summarily as clearly - by espousing liberianism and progressivism, two doctrines favoured by the author.

The highly apologetic Allahs Sonne über dem Abendland - Unser arabisches Erbe appeared ten years; the equally apologetic Islamic Contributions to Civilization (ii) thirteen years; Charlemagne, Muhammad, and the Arab Roots of Capitalism (iii) fifty-six years after his death. However, since he knew their traditions very well, he could have seen for himself that there is no trace of belief in the continuous and ascending progress of man or in economic or political liberalism among them.

Norsemen - whom, like Evola, he considers to be the superior race - no more so than the ancient Greeks, and the first to appear in the "West" only in the third century AD.

Our era under the pen of Christian theologians, notably under that of the Jew Paul of Tarsus (Epistle to the Hebrews) (iv).

In the same vein, no more than the Ottoman Turks, the "barbarian" Germanic tribes of the 4th century "understood little about cooking", when they discovered it shortly after invading a Rome which, invaded as it had been by Hellenic culture after having invaded Greece in the second century B.C., no longer presented anything more than "deliquescent forms" of Romanity, by the "external splendeur" of which the "barbarians" were nonetheless immediately "éblouis" (v). "Citizens of Rome," said Cato, "you have often heard me deplore the expenses of women and often those of men, not only ordinary citizens but also magistrates, and I am sure that you will agree with me.

This is because the State is undermined by two opposing vices, avarice and luxury, the ideals that have destroyed all great empires. The more the State's position grows, the more its domination extends - we have already penetrated Greece and Asia, where we find all the attractions of the State.

Even now we are touching the treasures of kings, but I fear that we will not seize these things, but that they will seize us. It is for a hostile purpose, believe me.

I, that the statues of Syracuse have been introduced into this seventh century. I hear too many people praising and admiring the ornaments of Corinth and Athens and making fun of the clay antefixes of the times of our gods. As for me, I prefer these gods which are favourable to us and which I hope will continue to be so if we

les laissons à leur place (vi)". Half a century later, when "feudalism depended [in the crusade] on an immense warrior apparatus, which would only increase through the imitation of oriental pomp" (vii), no one in Europe - apart from Philip IV, whose sumptuary laws (1284) were only intended to maintain the distinction between classes - seemed to be moved by "all the poisons" that the "Luxus d'orient" "inocule [...] chez nombre des [croisés] puissants" (viii) et qui continuera naturellement à couler dans leurs veines une fois de retour au pays, où "les éléments du luxe" que les croisades avaient augmentés hâtèrent, par le "développement relatif de liberté et de sécurité" (ix) qu'ils favoraient, "les progrès de l'égalité, de l'propriété mobilière, du tiers état" (p. 146), ainsi que l'essorment des villes au détriment des campagnes, sans compter, sous l'influence des auteurs arabes nés en Espagne, le the revival of literature and the arts, the foundation of what we have come to understand as "culture" since the "Renaissance".

Renaissance". Indeed, "[w]hat remained to be done, in the midst of the pompous [prosperity] that would soon spread from the sumptuous Saracen palais of Granada, Toledo and Seville to the Christian courts? L]a culture of the arts" and... "[t]rade" (xi). trade" (xi). The impact of the Arabs on the development of literature, on "the arts" and on "trade" (xi).

la pensée poétique", in Europe is attested to in "the chronicles of the time and the accounts of the most serious authors, the Speculum historiale of Vincent de Beauvais, of the preceptor of Saint Louis", which bear witness to

l'impression des contes orientaux sur l'esprit des gens de France et d'Italie" (xii), in particular the Mille et une Nuits, dear to Gerbert. "In the tenth century, Gerbert, this learned man, after studying in the monastery of Aurillac, wishing to extend his knowledge and delve into the profound arts of the East, went to Tolède. There, for three years, he studied mathematics, legal astrology and magic under the Arab doctors. On his return from this learned pilgrimage, he was appointed superior of Bobio, that of the

From there, he became tutor to the son of Hugues-Capet, then bishop of Reims, from where he moved on to the service of the emperor of Germany, who was to become his successor.

was made bishop of Ravenna, and then pope, under the name of Sylvester II. A pope from the Arab world" (xiii). Civilisation" even came out of the Arabian school, since it was poetry

lyrique, invented by the Catalans and the Provençals under the influence of Arabo-Andalusian poetry (xiv), gave birth to la cortezia, the code of courtly love, by means of which le rude fervestu, transformed en

by the Église, would gradually be policé and domestiqué by les dames (xv).

A multiracial society could not have developed without real opposition in the societies of Eastern Europe. In the last third of the twentieth century, miscegenation occurred in the West only because minds had been prepared for it generation after generation by cultural propaganda which semiticised them without their being aware of it. Apart from the significant traces of Semitic blood in the Mediterranean branch of the White race, miscegenation was only able to take on a biological character because it had already taken place in the psychic order.

From then on, the question which, before being posed formally for the first time by Sir Theodore Morison (1863-1936), a British pedagogue who was a member of the Indian Council and Director of the Institute of the University of London in Paris, was, as early as the Second Empire, a source of concern to many of the early French colonists, who "considered that France's role was [...] to reform a 'degenerate islam'".

to make it compatible with French citizenship; in other words to 'civilise' it" and, as soon as

In the first third of the nineteenth century, in the midst of the Ulemas in Tunisia, Egypt and Bilâd al-Shâm (Syria) (xvi), the question "Can Islam be reformed? appeared almost secondary, even derisory: an Arab or a black, whether Muslim or not, remained an Arab or a black. In any case, this question only arises in the countries of Western Europe because they each have an increasingly large minority of Arabs and Blacks.

These are black people, who, as everyone knows, are already in the majority in some of their regions, before becoming so in a more or less short time in each of them. Theodore Morison posed this question as early as 1908, because he must have seen the danger coming from his own country, where in 1889, when there were "a good number of Africans and Chinese" (xvii), William Henry Quilliam, a lawyer from

Liverpool and convert to Islam, who had himself converted hundreds of British middle-class men and women to this religion, had built the first fully functioning mosque at the back of the house he had bought to make it the headquarters of the Liverpool Muslim Institute.

Angleterre, where in 1910 it was estimated that there were 10,000 muslims, a tenth of whom were converts (xviii); France, where the first waves of North Africans arrived from Kabylia at the beginning of the nineteenth century, hired as seasonal agricultural labourers or on a permanent basis.

as tipper loaders in the mines. Soon, with the help of the state, the industry began to hire recruiters directly from the shore: 5,000 each year from 1910 onwards, working in the Mediterranean region, the Paris region and the mines of Nord and Pas-de-Calais. That same year, General Mangin published a four-volume essay entitled "La Force noire" (The Black Force), in which he developed the colonial thesis that "our colonial empire could be merged with France itself and our power to expand throughout the world would increase" (xix).

la Guerre et de William Ponty, gouverneur générale de l'Afrique occidentale française (AOF), il undertook the creation of a coloniale army, in anticipation of a conflict that was to pit 39 million French against 60 million Allemands, who would call it a "black shame". When the time came, it would be necessary not only to

In addition to "providing fresh troops for the devouring Moloch" (xx), it was also necessary to win back mobilised French workers. Between 180,000 and 300,000 sewing workers were imported into France. Between 600,000 and 700,000 soldiers were recruited into the French army as a result of a propaganda campaign conducted in the French West Indies by the Senegalese Blaise Diagne (the first black deputy in the French Parliament).

la Assemblée nationale et sous-secrétaire d'État aux Colonies en 1931) avec le concours (plus ou moins zélé) des chefs de village. "In this campaign, France was presented as Islam's best friend in the face of Turkish barbarism. Equality under the flag as well as at work was emphasised".

(xxi). "The interpreting officers (there was as yet no corps of Muslim affairs officers) noted that attachment to Islam increased in situations of exile and intense stress. So, during the war, the military authorities decided to bring in imâms, people qualified to guide prayers and t'âlaba representing various religious brotherhoods. The laic Republic set up prayer halls in warehouses and hospitals. The first large Muslim cemeteries were created (there were some in the Middle Ages in the southern villes: for example, in the north, in the south and in the north-east).

for example, found a tombstone written in Arabic quite by chance while digging in the ground at Montpellier). The army went so far as to build a wooden mosque at the Zossen camp, which was later moved to the colonial garden at Nogent-sur-Marne. However, the soldiers often lost interest in the wooden structures built for them. In Nogent, for example, they pray in the open air next to the mosque that was intended for them" (xxii). At a time when there were around 30,000 Nord-

According to official figures, there were 36,300 Africans in France on the eve of the First World War in 1921 and 69,800 in 1926 - "[...] Algerians are not counted as foreigners, [...] these figures do not take account of these hanging migrants and even less of immigration".

clandestine workers, and even young people under the age of 20" (xxiii). Even though "the First World War and the massive participation, in particular, of West Africans and North African Muslims [...] [did] not lead to the almost unquestioned recognition of Islam in France [...]" (xxiii).

métropolitain"? (xxiv), "[t]here is no real demand for the construction of mosques among these workers and when mosques are built in France, such as the wooden mosque in Toulouse, it is always on the initiative of French bosses anxious to create a good atmosphere in their companies [sic].

Gambling and the development of prostitution are the daily realities of these deprived peasants, most of whom only knew forms of popular Islam in their countries of origin" (xxv).

Reports from the offices of indigenous affairs (1916) and the gendarmerie noted "the very weak religious practices of these ex-peasants turned workers, who are rather tempted to celebrate the feast of Bacchus" (xxvi). We also note that they "multipl[ia]nt [...] modèles of misconduct" (xxvii). More than a century later, Stoddard would certainly make amends. Surely?

In 2015, the publisher who republished *The New World of Islam* described the book as follows: This 1921 book by America's greatest racial thinker was the first to warn the West against the "Islamic" world. Islamic revival which began in the nineteenth century and which is said to have found its expression in the mass immigration and Islamic extremism to which the world has been subjected since the 1980s. It provides a precise history of Islam, from its foundation, flourishing and sophistication, to its demise under the fervour and domination of the Ottoman Turks.

Stoddard explains the roots of the Wahabbite revival and the springtime of Arab, Indian and Middle Eastern nationalism unleashed in the wake of the First World War, and warns that these events will have a major impact on the future of the Arab world.

Stoddard warns that the foreign policy of the white world towards the Islamic world is [...] dangerous and provides ammunition for Islamic extremists. Stoddard warns that the foreign policy of the white world towards the Islamic world is [...] dangerous and provides ammunition for Islamic extremists - a wise statement, given the wars waged by the United States against Muslim nations since 2001 and the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. Could it be that Ostara Publications - which seems to have been behind the notorious supremacist website <https://white-history.com> - has mistaken its desires for realities?

The black American writer, orator, educator, critic and political militant Hubert Harrison (1883-1927), with whom Stoddard was in epistolary contact, wrote in his review of *The New World of Islam* (xxviii): "Mr Lothrop Stoddard has been interested in people of colour for some time now and in their recent history. He gave us a very respectable and well documented study in *The French Revolution in San Domingo*. Only last year, in *The Rising Tide Of Color Against White World-Supremacy*, he traced the downward curve of the contacts of the White race with the races of colour in Asia, Africa and America. Just over a month ago, Scribners published *The New World of Islam*, an in-depth and detailed study of the various ferments at work in the Near and Middle East, where millions of brown Mohammedans are preparing for the final fight against the domination of the white men of the Western world (xxix). Plus loin, he added: "[...] [la] domination mondiale de

In many respects, Islam was superior to the white man in terms of moral and spiritual values. First of all, it was not eaten away by the corrosive canker of racial prejudice. In political and civic affairs, character counted for a great deal, while race and heart counted for nothing at all. As Mr Stoddard remarked, 'all true believers were brothers'. Blacks, browns and yellows were not, as in the Christian system, brothers only in theology, but in practice before magistrates and in all aspects of daily life.

"

"All citizens of the world are brothers", says the website of UNESCO, the organisation responsible for the educational aspects of globalisation. "[...] [T]ous les citoyens sont frères" (All citizens are brothers), declared the republican and French president. socialiste Louis Blanc, à l'Assemblée nationale le 10 mai 1848, au lendemain des journées de février.

Who said that Islam is incompatible with the religion of the Republic, secularism? (xxx)

(i) P. Pezaud, Lothrop Stoddard, *Le nouveau monde de l'islam* (translated from English by A. Doysié), *Échos d'Orient*, t. 22, n° 130, 1923 [pp. 252-253], pp. 252-253.

(ii) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2015/09/08/les-racines-arabes-de-la-rennaissance>.

(iii) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2021/01/01/les-racines-arabes-du-capitalism-liberal>.

(iv) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2019/01/31/le-pouvoir-panique>.

(v) Julius Evola, *Introduction générale à la doctrine fasciste de la race*, Quimper, Cariou Publishing, p. 172.

(vi) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2011/08/10/discours-de-caton-lancien-for-le-maintien-de-la-lex-oppia>.

(vii) Henri-Joseph-Léon Baudrillart, *Histoire du luxe privé et public depuis l'antiquité jusqu'à nos jours*, t. 3, Paris, Hachette et Cie, 1880, pp. 139-140.

(viii) *Ibid*, p. 143.

(ix) *Ibid*, p. 148.

(x) *Ibid*, p. 146.

(xi) M. Villemain, *Cours de littérature française*, Bruxelles, Méline, Cans et Compagnie, 1840, p. 562.

(xii) *Ibid*.

(xiii) *Ibid*.

(xiv) See, for example, Emilio García Gómez, *La poésie lyrique hispano-arabe et l'apparition de la lyrique romane*, *Arabica*, t. 5, fasc. 2, 1958, pp. 113-144 ; E. Dermemhghem, *Les grands thèmes de la poésie amoureuse chez les Arabes précurseurs des poètes d'oc*, *Les Cahiers du Sud*, pp. 28 et sqq. ; Charles Camproux, *Joy d'amor : Jeu et joie d'amour*, Montpellier, 1965.

(xv) See Chinweizu, *Anatomie du pouvoir féminin : une dissection masculine du matriarcat*, Quimper, Cariou Publishing, forthcoming.

(xvi) See Mohamed Amer Meziane, 'Do we need to reform Islam?' Brève histoire d'une injonction, *Multitudes* 2015, vol. 2, n° 59, pp. 53-60 and Mohamed Fayçal Haddad, *Le réformisme musulman, une histoire critique*, Nimesis Edizioni, 2013. See also, since this question cannot be separated from the notion of taqiyya, Daniel De Smet, *La pratique de taqiyya et kitmān en islam chiite : compromis ou hypocrisie?*, in Mohamed Nachi (sous la dir.), *Actualité du compromis*, Armand Colin, 2011, pp. 148-161 Aziz Hilal, Recension du livre de Daniel De Smet, *Les Fatimides. De l'ésotérisme en islam*, *Midéo*, 39, 2024; Mourim Khosro E., *La Taqiyya comme stratégie idéologique et politique (note de recherche)*, *CEMOTI*, n°6, 1988, pp. 177-185.

(xvii) Yasmin Alibhai-Brown, *Exotic England The Making of a Curious Nation*, Portobello Books Ltd, 2015.

(xviii) Ibid.

(xix) Quoted in Lothrop Stoddard, *Racial Realities in Europe*, New York, C. Scribner's Sons, 1924, p. 91, forthcoming under the title *Les Réalités raciales en Europe*, Quimper, Cariou Publishing.

(xx) Jean-Paul Gourevitch, *Les Africains de France*, Acropole, 2009.

(xxi) Ibid.

(xxii) Jean-François Clément, *L'Islam en France - Les cinq migrations musulmanes de 716 à nos jours*, *Horizons Maghrébins - Le droit à la mémoire*, n° 18-19, 1992 [pp. 88-97], p. 95.

(xxiii) Jean-Paul Gourevitch, op. cit.

(xxiv) Jocelyne Dakhli, *Musulmans de France, l'histoire sous le tapis*, *Multitudes*, 2006, vol. 3, n° 26, pp. 155-163.

(xxv) Jean-François Clément, op. cit. p. 95.

(xxvi) Ibid.

(xxvii) Ibid.

(xxviii) Hubert Harrison, *The Brown Man Leads The Way*, Part I, *Negro World*, 5 November, 1921, p. 5, cited in Jeffrey B. Perry, *A Hubert Harrison Reader* Middleton, CT, Wesleyan University Press, 2001, p.

311. Curiously, as David Walker points out, *Cultural Decline and Survivalist Narratives: The Battle for Civilization*, in Fethi Mansouri and Shahram Akbarzadeh (eds.), *Political Islam and Human Security*, Newcastle, Cambridge Scholars Press, 2006, p. 36 et seq., Stoddard believed that islam constituted a danger for the white peoples on the political landscape.

(xxix) Quoted in *ibid.*

(xxx) Vincent Peillon: 'Pour Jaurès, la laïcité était une religion', philomag, 5 May 2021,
<https://www.philomag.com/articles/vincent-peillon-pour-jaures-la-laicite-etait-une-religion>.

Islam, a secret society

It was in his thirty-ninth year that Mohammed met and befriended Abu Bakr, son of Abu Kahafah, a carpet merchant two years his junior. Gifted in commerce, he had acquired a considerable fortune and, as his father was blind, he was the head of the family. He was a kind and benevolent man, with charming manners and a fine mind, even if he sometimes said things that were not his own. obscene; and his company was much sought after. Like the Meccan tribes, like the others Arabs used to get together in the evening and some ladies held salons in the courtyards of their homes, there was no shortage of opportunities for conversation in Mecca.

Abu Bakr worshipped heroes like no other; he possessed a typically feminine quality that could be seen in all of us. Having believed a lot, all he wanted was to believe even more. Mohammed, a fine psychologist, perceived this quality and used it.

A year after they had become intimate, Mohammed called upon Abu Bakr and it was Abu Bakr and not Mohammed who proselytised. We do not know whether Mohammed had already tried to find out whether he could make disciples; what is certain is that he found in this person a man capable of believing that one of his fellow citizens had received a message from God, which it was up to him to welcome and promote. It is much easier to invite people to accept other people's claims than one's own. The proof of this is that in the history of Islam, the Mahdis who were the most successful were those who were able to remain hidden while some of their followers proclaimed their advent. But, in most cases, it was a case of collusion, with each party expecting a definite advantage. In the case of Abu Bakr, the hypothesis of collusion cannot be accepted. Muhammad said that if he had to take a man as a confidant (khalil), he would have taken Abu Bakr, but he did not take a confidant. Abu Bakr, although a valuable assistant, was not an accomplice. He never forgot the distance between himself and his master.

When a man pretends to produce messages from another world, he must attribute both their form and their substance to a supernatural origin. The problem for the medium is to produce a message without appearing to deliver it himself; and Mohammed had to solve this problem no less than any modern medium. When he had his first public revelations, it seems that he adopted instinctively (or, perhaps, following the example of the Kahins) (1) a procedure common to the prophets of all ages, (2) as well as to the Sibyl:

"talia fanti

Ante fores subito non voltus, non color unus,
Non comptae mansere comae; sed pectus
anhelum, Et rabie fera corda tument: majorque
videri
Nee mortale sonans, adflata est numine
quando Jam propiore dei, "

Mohammed would fall into a state of violent agitation, his face would turn livid (3) and he would wrap himself in a blanket; when he took it off, he was covered in sweat (4) and all he had to do was write the message he had received. From time to time an unintelligible message seems to have preceded the message itself, the letters not forming words and curiously resembling the first movements of a planchette. We have already seen that there is good reason to believe that Mohammed had epileptic seizures at some point; the phenomena accompanying these seizures may have suggested a form that he could have reproduced artificially later. The process described, sometimes accompanied by snoring and facial flushing, (5) came to be recognized as the normal form of inspiration and could be acted out without any preparation; the Prophet would receive a divine communication in immediate response to a question addressed to him while he was eating and, having revealed it in this way, would finish the piece he was holding in his hand when he had been interrupted, or a revelation would be made to him in response to a question addressed to him while he was in the pulpit. (6) Following revelations that seem to have been his very first Mohammed was called "the man in the blanket" or "the man who is wrapped up". Whatever the recipe for this process, the Prophet seems to have learnt it by heart.

The other problems which the medium has to resolve concern the substance of the revelation. Once he was head of state, Mohammed had a lot to say, but at the beginning of his career, the substance was not provided by circumstances. As a general rule, mediums who are in the same situation as Mohammed do not beat about the bush. They put into the mouth of God words that are generally recognised as his, i.e. verses from the Old Testament or the New Testament. As these are recognised as the words of God, it costs nothing to repeat them. When Mohammed, driven by circumstances to produce more and more revelations, followed this reliable method, he was able to declare that it was by a miracle that he was instructed in the contents of books he had never read. When his style of preaching had rightly won him the approbation of great audiences, he was able to change his tune and declare that the miracle lay in his incomparable eloquence.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves. The very first snippets of revelation that were communicated to Abu Bakr seem to have been imitations of speeches by preachers whom Muhammad had heard on his travels. According to one tradition, he had heard the sermons of the "most eloquent of the Arabs", Kuss, son of Sa'idah, who enjoined men to remember the ephemeral nature of life and to deduce the existence of the Creator of the phenomena of the world. The subjects addressed by these preachers were undoubtedly the Day of Judgement, the fire of Gehenna and the need to worship Allah rather than idols; for these were the ordinary themes of the evangelists. (7) Moreover, experience shows that the

(8) Those who describe the Prophet's early speeches say that they warned the Meccans of divine punishment and that the speaker compared himself to the one who sounds the alarm when the enemy attacks. (9) As we

As we shall see, this doctrine must not be dissociated from that of the resurrection; and the distinctive features of Mohammed's teaching, as opposed to the ideas of paganism, were in the main the doctrine of the future life and the unity of God. Arabic oratory seems to have been in some way rhymed, and Mohammed imitated it without understanding its nature.

To counter the supposition that Mohammed deliberately mystified his contemporaries, it has been argued, in both ancient and modern times, that his character was upright, even earning him the name of "Faithful". The story that he had trained a pigeon to peck grain out of his ear aroused the indignation of Carlyle and others. In fact, Muslim tradition does not record that he ever received revelations from pigeons. However, it does mention events which seem to show that he had studied theatrical effects of a slightly less naive kind. In an empty room he claimed he could not find a seat - all the seats being occupied by angels. He modestly turned his face away from a corpse, for the sake of two hours who had come from heaven to look after their husbands. There is even every reason to suppose that he sometimes

to let some of his acolytes play the role of Gabriel or to let his disciples identify one of his interlocutors with this angel. The revelations he received resemble those of modern mediums who can be studied in the history of Spiritism by M. F. Podmore, whose researches cast the greatest doubt on the idea that an honourable man cannot mystify his fellow-men, and also show that the support which the performances of a medium carry is rarely shaken by their demystification. Referring to one of the mediums whose career he describes, the author remarks that he had won the friendship and full confidence of his audience, that he was helped by the religious emotions inspired by the words he uttered in trance, and that he could boast of an unblemished character and an honourable life. The possession of these advantages greatly helped this medium to make people believe in his sincerity; but the historian of Spiritism, even if he does not know how to account for all phenomena and recognises the difficulties that accompany their explanation, is inclined to attribute to

all that is marvellous in the medium's performance. What is clear is that Mohammed possessed the same advantages as those listed by Podmore and that this is how he gained followers; that, nevertheless, the process of revelation was so dubious that one of the scribes responsible for writing down the effusions became convinced that it was an imposture and consequently gave up.

to Islam. But for those who confine themselves to studying the political effectiveness of supernatural revelations, it matters little whether the medium is sincere.

We therefore consider that it was Abu Bakr's receptiveness that explains why Muhammad was able to act as a medium. It was in Muhammad's character to bide his time - to wait for the right moment to act. But the new role he was about to play was not one that could be improvised - it is not possible to change one's life completely without a period of transition. This transition is a period of solitude for most mediums. Thus Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon sect, was wandering in a wood, when an angel revealed to him the Book of Mormon. The Poughkeepsie seer, in March, 1844, "was walking in the country under the protection of his master spiritual, when he spontaneously fell into a trance during which Galen and Swedenborg appeared to him in a cemetery and communicated the message he was to pass on to humanity". His work, *The Principles of Nature*, which he later gave birth to in a trance, was not quite as successful as the Koran, but it was published in thirty-four editions over a period of thirty years.

(10) That Muhammad's prophetic career began with a period of solitude seems attested, even if there are some contradictions between our authorities on the details. For one month - and it seems to have been that of Ramadan, which was later considered the Month of Fasting - the Meccans practised a rite called *tahannuth*, the exact meaning of which is unknown but which was apparently a form of asceticism. During this month, Mohammed used to retire to a cave on Mount Hira, five kilometres from Mecca in the direction of Ta'if. He seems to have taken his family there: it is likely, however, that they did not worship there as they did at Al-Lat and Al-'Uzza (11) in Mecca [...]. On a certain day of the month, Muhammad went down into the valley on his own and it was there that the theophany (or its equivalent) took place, marking the beginning of his career as a divine messenger.

Joseph Smith's idea was to communicate to the world the contents of certain secret tablets to which he alone had access and whose language he alone could translate "by the grace of God" of God". Mohammed's idea was similar; he was allowed (or, according to one account, forced) to read the contents of a well-guarded tablet - he had previously been unable to read or write. The miracle by which he became able to read without learning - an episode which may have been suggested by accounts of other prophets - he alludes to (12) but does not dwell on it. The idea of not being allowed The fact that Smith had only occasional access to the guarded tablet was better than Smith's, because it allowed him to legislate in case of need. In the traditions that deal with this subject, the communication is made by Gabriel, the angel who transmits messages in the New Testament; but in the theophany recorded in the Koran, it seems that it was God himself who descended, that he spoke to the Prophet at a distance of just under two bowsticks (13) and that, the second time, the Prophet spoke to him at the distance of just under two bowsticks (14). saw "near the Lotus of the limit, not far from the Garden of the abode of the blessed". The fact that he later replaced Gabriel is probably due to the development of the Prophet's theology.

We will never know more about the beginning of revelation. In the first account, the Prophet is so distraught by his experience and so afraid of becoming a soothsayer (Kahin) or a poet that he almost commits suicide; Khadija, meeting him by chance, comforts him by assuring him that he will be the national Nabî (Prophet) - a word she could hardly have known - and has a conversation with Warakah, son of Nawfal, who spoke equally encouraging words. His words would have been, "Kaddosh, Kaddosh, this is the sublime Nomos." The first two words are Hebrew and mean "Holy, Holy!" The last is the Greek word for "Law". The curious and hybrid character of these expressions may make this story credible, but commentators translate "Nomos" as "the Holy One".

messenger of the King" and applies it to Gabriel, thus implying that the exclamation was not appropriate to the occasion on which it was supposed to have been uttered. In another version, Khadija does not consult Warakah but a Christian slave, who also recognises Gabriel in this name. Warakah does not appear in the rest of the story (14) and it would be rash to assert that the meeting between Khadija and him was historic; we know that Khadija had an enlightened relative and the legend could hardly have done less than make her recognise her husband's mission. Nor do we give any more historical value to the tradition according to which Mohammed dreamt that he saw Warakah after his death, dressed in white, which

(15) On the other hand, it is not improbable that Khadija may have been prepared by her cousin's speculations and studies for a revolt against the Meccan religion. In Khadija's case, we can also imagine a priori that the grief caused her by the death of her sons played a part in the conversion process, and this is confirmed by a story told in the Memoirs of Ali. (16) If idolaters go to hell, she asked her husband, were her parents in hell?

Mohammed replied that they were there and, seeing that she looked distressed, assured her that, if she could see them in their true nature, she would hate them too. She then asked him if his dead children were also in hell? In answer to this question, the Prophet had a revelation: "Those who believe and their descendants follow them in faith, We will make their descendants join them.

"A brilliant reply, (17) since the bereaved mother was thus assured that the eternal happiness of her dead sons was subordinate to her belief; she was thus given the chance not only to find them but to allow them access to the Garden of Delights. It is not surprising that Khadija would devoted himself body and soul to the mission and was promised a very special place in Paradise (18).

It is clear that some of the commandments of Islam must have been established from the moment the revelations were communicated to Abu Bakr and Khadija. For it is by no means sufficient to warn people of the terrors of the Day of Judgement; answers must be given to the question: What must I do to be saved? And this answer, to be satisfactory, must include certain injunctions. It seems that they were enjoined to wash their clothes and turn away from idols. The first of these commandments was an easy symbolic act - among many peoples, clothes are not a matter of course. one with the person who wears them; (19) the second was difficult to follow in a community where people socialised a lot; if we are to believe the stories we will tell, the worship of idols was widespread. It was difficult for a person to renounce idolatry without his family noticing, and so the secret of the Prophet's mission had to be revealed first to the two boys who were to become the first to renounce idolatry.

lived with Khadija, Zaid, son of Harithah, the adopted son, and Ali, cousin of the Prophet and son of Abu Talib, whom Mohammed had undertaken to support, because his uncle was finding it difficult to provide for his large family. (20) The latter was about ten years old, the former was ten years younger than the latter.

Prophet (21) - according to the most likely version - but, as we shall see, entirely subject to the authority of the Prophet.

It is stated that the revelations ceased for some time after they had begun, a phenomenon which may be compared with the fact established by Starbuck in the cases of conversion he has studied: abjurations, he shows, are rare but periods of inactivity and indifference many. It is reported that Khadija consoled the Prophet during the period when he ceased to be visited by God, which perhaps means that the resolute woman who enabled him to keep the faith during the years in which his dominant passion must have been the strongest forced him to follow the direction he had taken. But, in fact, he was forced to do so by Abu Bakr, who immediately began proselytising. There is no doubt that, at the Prophet's request, the mission was carried out in the greatest secrecy. Abu Bakr informed only those people whom he trusted and who were able to help him. had influence. But neither he nor the Prophet were impatient and they would have been satisfied if Abu Bakr's propaganda had converted three people in the first year. (22) There is every reason to believe that he was helped from the outset by an Abyssinian slave, Bilal, about whom we would like to know more. ancestors; for Omar declared that Bilal formed "a third of Islam"; (23) and, unless we misunderstand the meaning of the expression, another disciple took to calling himself a quarter of Islam (24) because, when he had visited Mohammed in Ukaz, he had found him in the company of a "man". a free man (Abu Bakr) and a slave (Bilal). Tradition is clearly unable to say with We do not know for certain whose slave he was. For want of better information, we are inclined to attribute to him some of the Abyssinian elements of the Prophet's productions. (25) After a while, he was bought and freed by Abu Bakr.

Abu Bakr's method has not been reported in many cases. There is, however, one anecdote that seems to be true and typical. Othman, son of Affan, six years the Prophet's junior, was a cloth merchant whose business partner was a cousin of Muhammad's; (26) he also indulged in usury, lending money to businesses from which he enjoyed half the profits; (27) he dealt with money matters with remarkable acuity. (28) His sister was a milliner, married to a barber (29) and he himself was exceptionally handsome, very fond of personal adornment and dignified; Mohammed himself did not dare to appear before him in a housedress (30) or allow slave girls to play the tambourine in his presence. (31) He did not like fighting, as history would later show, for he left one battlefield, fled another and was killed while ostentatiously reading the Koran. He loved Muhammad's daughter, Rukayyah, and learned to his great regret that she had been betrothed to another man. On hearing the sad news, he confided his grief to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr told him lent a sympathetic ear, then asked him if he didn't think the Meccan gods were just wood and stones. A question of dubious delicacy, it would seem, unless the lover had

called on their services; but a conversation ensued, from which Othman deduced that, if he chose to declare that the Meccan gods were worthy of contempt and acknowledged that Mohammed had He had been given the mission of eliminating them, but he could still obtain the hand of Mohammed's daughter. Muhammad then passed by them, Abu Bakr whispered something in his ear and the matter was settled. Othman became a believer and Rukayyah became his wife.

In this case, the conversion process is obvious and presents no difficulty for the reader to understand. In each of the other cases, the skilful missionary must have seen an opening, even if we often do not know what it consisted of. Abu Bakr probably knew that women are more susceptible to conversion than men, foreign residents than natives, slaves than free men, people in difficulty than wealthy and prosperous people. When the existence of Islam was discovered, the modest situation of most of Muhammad's followers was a stumbling block for the aristocrats of Mecca, who asked him to chase away this rabble before they had anything to do with them. Indeed, the Koran so explicitly acknowledges that the Prophet's followers were the dregs of the people (32) that serious doubts hang over the ancient traditions which contradict this claim [...] And later, when the aristocrats were forced to convert to Islam, they took to reproaching their new brothers for their former condition. (33) More than one later claimed the honour of having been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr; and the length of time during which the mission remained secret made their claim difficult to verify. When one When asked what had brought them to Mohammed, they were capable of giving incredible answers; perhaps they had forgotten the real reason or preferred to hide it. Khalid, son of Said, the fourth or fifth convert, dreamt that his father was pushing him into a lake of fire, from which another man saved him. He asked Abu Bakr to interpret this dream. (34) Abu Bakr took him to his father's house. Mohammed, then made a retreat to Ajjad, near Safa, where the dreamer recognised his Saviour and converted. Do men really have such dreams? Flammarion and Myers would say yes. Abdallah, son of Massoud, a client and serf, declared that, while he was feeding the flocks of Ukbah, son of Mu'ait (who later became a fierce adversary of Muhammad), Muhammad and Abu Bakr had asked him for a bowl of milk; and Abdallah was converted at the sight of the goat's udder swelling and contracting to the great delight of the Prophet. (35) Uthman, son of Maz'un, (36) a man who had a The Prophet raised his eyes to heaven, stared at him in a certain place, went there, returned and raised his eyes to heaven again. When Othman said to him asked the meaning of this feat, he replied that he had been visited by a messenger of God, who had invited him to preach justice, goodness, chastity, etc., and Othman believed. Many declared that dissatisfaction with pagan beliefs was what had made them turn to the Prophet; and if there were If there was a trace of this feeling in a man, Abu Bakr would see to it that it did not escape him. One of those who may have been converted in this way was Sa'id, son of Amr Ibn Zaid; his father had rejected polytheism and idolatry before Muhammad's mission had begun, without however adopting Judaism or Christianity. Sa'id was an early convert but is not mentioned among Abu Bakr's proselytes. Another of these converts may have been 'Abd al-Kaaba (the servant of the Ka'ba), son of Auf, renamed 'Abd al-Rahman, because the Ka'ba had not yet been dissociated from paganism. (37)

This man was a merchant whose partner was a certain Rabah, whom his new friends called 'the Faithful'. He had a rare talent for making money, which he spent lavishly. Years later, (38) when he arrived in Yathrib with other destitute refugees, all he asked was to be shown the market; once at the market, he felt revived, even though he had no capital. (39) He would have been abstinent before his conversion; would have disapproved of fighting in the path of Islam, even after the practice had taken hold; would not have yielded it to anyone in courage. Such a man may not have seemed a promising match for Abu Bakr but he was about eight years Abu Bakr's junior and may have been subject to his influence. Or, in his case too, a lady may have played a part. There was in Mecca a certain Mikdad who, after committing a murder, fled from his tribe and was welcomed by the Kindah; in their house too he shed blood; and he fled to the Mecca, where he was adopted by a man called Al-Aswad, from the tribe of Muhammad's mother. Abd al-Kaaba advised him (in the course of conversation) to marry, but he contemptuously refused his daughter; he was consoled, however, by Muhammad, who gave him the daughter of his late uncle, Zubair, in marriage, on the same terms (one might think) as those on which Othman had been forced to marry. submit. We do not know what other measures were taken to convince 'Abd al-Kaaba. With Mikdad was converted another man, Utbah, son of Ghazwan, probably a poor client.

Three of the other first converts were Al-Zubair, son of 'Awwam; Saad, son of Abu Wakkas and Talhah, son of 'Ubaidallah. The first of them, according to tradition, was eight, ten or seventeen at the time; he was a cousin of the Prophet, the son of a grain merchant and an apprentice butcher; and it is said that his his parents mistreated him. If his conversion did take place at this time, he may have been one of Ali's playmates, initiated into mysteries that he could not reveal because, as we have seen, their families were linked.

Talhah was certainly an adult and claimed to have been introduced to Muhammad by a monk he had met on a business trip to Syria. If this statement has any value, it probably means that he had heard there that Arab paganism was being ridiculed by the followers of the f a s h i o n a b l e creed; if their mockery had no effect on most minds, some were nonetheless sensitive to it. Later, his spending habits made him famous (40).

Saad claimed to have been the third Muslim for a whole week, in which case he would have been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr. He was an arrow-maker and it is said that he was the first to shed his blood for the new cause. He was seventeen years old at the time of his conversion. When they were brought to Muhammad, all the converts were repulsed, with the exception of Abu Bakr. The Prophet later acknowledged this: but he did not specify what it was that displeased the newcomers. And we do not know how these solemn scenes took place: we learn a m o s t that the Prophet taught the proselytes to pray. Later, however, in order to be admitted to see the Prophet, the proselyte had to be prepared to swear allegiance and had to undertake to abstain from

certain immoral acts; for the commission of which he was punished in this life, if he wished to escape punishment in the Hereafter; (41) and, still later (in the case of men), he had to fight all the nations until they had adopted the new religion. There can be little doubt that, from the outset, the proselytes made commitments as serious as those made by those who are admitted to other secret societies; in general, these obligations are not specific actions in the present but a willingness to answer the call in the future. It would seem that, from At first, the Prophet established brotherhoods of believers, whose new relationships were to replace blood ties just as the Christianity of the Ibad tribe or the Christians of Hira had provided a different bond from tribal ties. The reluctance that the Prophet observed was probably due to the anguish that even young people felt at the idea of tying themselves to something in perpetuity, especially when that something was an unknown quantity, a path whose outcome was obscure.

The evolution of the Muslim ceremony known as salât, whose name derives from the Jewish or Christian term for "prayer", is not known in detail. In a form that later became stereotyped, the Jewish custom of standing prayer, the Christian practice of prostration (42) and that of bowing (the back horizontal and the hands on the knees) were combined and certain formulas were prescribed. In the beginning we used to," said one convert, "not knowing what to say when we prayed, just prostrate ourselves. The Prophet then taught us another formula". (43) A prayer similar to the Pater Noster was probably composed later: it contains polemical references to an unspecified sect or sects. (44) As we shall see, the salât was later used as a kind of military exercise: in the early days it had an ascetic character, the devotee "doing without a rope around the chest". (45) Tradition states that the division of the day into periods for the purpose of performing salât five times a day was an innovation from the end of the Meccan period and the elements of the legislation concerning ritual purity seem to have appeared even later. Yet the theory that God should only be approached by people in a state of purity was known in southern Arabia before Muhammad's time, which makes it likely that his early followers had been educated there, and indeed the washing of clothes, which marked conversion, belongs to the same line of thought.

During this first period, salât was performed in the strictest privacy, and there is no doubt that this was the case.

There is no doubt that meetings of believers were organised with great caution. Whatever the role which the converts had already begun to play in the Meccan cult, they undoubtedly continued to play it. We do not know whether the sanctity of the Kaaba was maintained at this time by the Prophet. It was probably rejected. And if the question of the direction in which the prayer should be made was envisaged at that time, there can be little doubt that the Temple of Jerusalem was the point to which Mohammed turned. The link between the myth of Abraham and the Kaaba seems to have been the result of later speculation and was only fully integrated when the need arose in the field of politics.

Much of the Qur'an must already have been in existence when Abu Bakr began his mission; he must at least have been able to assure the proselytes that his prophet was receiving divine communications which he could cite as proof of his personal relationship with the true God, and it is likely that as the number of believers gradually increased the Qur'an shifted from "mediumistic" communications to the powerful sermons which were employed in its second period. The series of phenomena produced by a medium is extremely effective with a very small audience. The need to exclude strangers keeps those present on their toes; the "superior state" which the medium demonstrates by dropping down heavily, demanding to be wrapped in a blanket, and then sweating profusely, makes a very strong impression; the processes which the medium uses to communicate with others are very effective. If there are non-believers present, the medium (in many cases) cannot act. If non-believers are present, the medium (in many cases) cannot take action: and, according to the biographers, the first converts testified of their faith before being brought into the presence of Mohammed.

The Prophet tried to live up to his role as he became more and more identified with it. It is said that he usually wore a veil, (46) a practice he perhaps adopted at the time of these mysterious sessions and which enabled him to increase their solemnity. Over time he adopted benign gestures and rustic habits: when he shook hands, he did not withdraw his first; when he looked at a man, he waited for the other to turn away before turning his head. (47) He took the greatest care of his person: every evening he put make-up on his eyes and his body was always perfumed. (48) He let his hair grow to his shoulders; and when he began to have grey hair, (49) he hid it with colouring substances. (50) He possessed the art of speaking appropriately to neophytes, of saying something that gratified the particular inclinations of each one or showed that he knew his ancestors. It is difficult to say how many of these stories illustrating Mohammed's talents are true, but it is certain that he was familiar with the tricks known to modern mediums, which make it possible to obtain private information or to give the impression of possessing it. Moreover, in the early days, none of those whom Abu Bakr was not sure of or who had not been prepared to worship God were allowed to see the Prophet.

The demands of his profession do not seem to have allowed him any real study, yet there is no doubt that his knowledge of the biblical narratives became a little more precise as the Qur'an spread: and while this greater precision may sometimes have been due to the Prophet's memory, it is more likely that he acquired more information whenever an opportunity presented itself. The following story gives us an idea of his method. Jabr, a client of the Banu Abd al-Salam was a Jew (51) who worked as a blacksmith in Mecca. He and Yasar (also a Jew) used to sit together when they were at work and read their holy book aloud. The Prophet used to pass by to listen to them. Jabr was converted when he heard the Prophet

(52) It has been suggested that the Christian content of the Koran may have been inspired by a disciple named Suhaib, a Greek from Mosul. (53) Tradition gives the names of several people supposed to have been the Prophet's mentors, but the Koran refutes this accusation, arguing that the people to whom it refers spoke a foreign language and therefore could not have been the authors of the Koran, since it is written in Arabic. This response is not the most convincing. The information contained in the Koran gives the impression of having been chosen at random rather than having been acquired through methodical study. (54) In a Medina sura which tells the story of Saul, Saul is referred to as Talut, obviously because of its consonance with Galut, the closest name to Goliath that the Prophet could find: Samuel's name is forgotten, he is confused with Gideon and the story of Gideon is badly told. This almost destroys the theory of a mentor, for no mentor could have been so little versed in the Bible. Moreover, the sources of the Koran are very numerous - Abyssinian and Syriac as well as Jewish and Greek. (55) Assuming, therefore, that the biblical accounts in the Koran were not modelled on what Mohammed had heard during his He probably gathered this information during the religious services he attended or the Bible readings he listened to. According to him, the djinns listened to celestial advice in the same way, and consequently gathered information that was only partially true. correct. There was no way of avoiding this danger, short of hiring a teacher, which would have involved even greater risks.

Muhammad expressly forbade any publicity surrounding him. A Syrian ('Amr, son of Abasah) who later claimed to have been the fourth Muslim said that, after renouncing the cult of the idols, (56) he had gone to Mohammed who, according to what he had been told, held the truth; he found Mohammed determined to keep his mission secret: he proposed to Mohammed to join him openly but Mohammed forbade him, as he would serve the cause better by returning to his country and, it may be presumed, by playing the same role there as Abu Bakr. Some of the first revelations would have taken place in a cave, a natural form of hiding place (57) and, in anecdotes we have already recounted, Mohammed lived in isolation; when Abu Dharr - who later became an famous ascetic - came to the Prophet to find out more about his thinking (according to one account), the Prophet replied hid in the mountains (58): but the obscurity which extends over the beginnings of his mission is not such that it does not allow the fact to emerge that Mohammed, after having made a few followers, entered into "the house of Al-Arkam, on Mount Safa". This Al-Arkam belonged to the Makhzoum tribe and must have been about seventeen years old when the mission began: some have made him the seventh, others the tenth convert. His house on Mount Safa seems to have served as a meeting place, where the Prophet could receive neophytes and hold sessions without fear of being disturbed. We are thus told of two converts, both Greek slaves, Suhaib, son of Sinan, and 'Ammar, son of Yasir, who met in the house of met by chance at the door of the house of Al-Arkam, where they were going to make their profession of faith and from which they slipped away at nightfall. (59) Several years passed before Mohammed was able to reward his faithful executor by offering him a house in Medina. Even if secrecy had not been desirable, the intense curiosity of the Orientals would have seriously hampered his sessions if he had held them in a populated city. But this curiosity did not incite them to make the short journey that separated Medina from Medina.

Mecca from Mount Safa, where Mohammed could hold his meetings in peace. As the first
At the time, the proselytism of his followers did not interfere with their professional lives, so it is likely
that these meetings were held at irregular intervals.

The people who went to Arkam's house were of all ages, the oldest being ten years older than the eldest.
Some were in their thirties or forties, others were very young. Many were slaves or freedmen, and
it is easy to understand that they were attracted by a new system offering the prospect of equality.
And, indeed, their condition improved rapidly, for the emancipation of believers was soon declared to
be a religious duty. (60) Some were metagods, who had no relations in Mecca. Hatib, son of Abu
Balta'ah, probably a Christian from Hira, is a specimen. Most of them, however, are simply names to
us. In some cases, the families were converted en bloc, three sons of Jahsh, three sons of Al-Harith
(Hatib,

Hattab, and Ma'mar), four sons of Al-Bukair, three sons of Maz'un, are mentioned among the new
followers of this period and, in several cases, the conversion of one brother was followed by that of the
other; thus Ali, the eldest brother of Jafar, joined the movement, in which he was destined to play a
role of some importance, albeit less eminent than that of the Prophet's son-in-law. The power to
rename disciples was one of the privileges enjoyed by other prophets, and Mohammed made use of it
whenever a proselyte bore the name of an idol or had an ominous name.

Titles of honour were also conferred but probably a little later: Abu Bakr was called "the Truthful",
Zubair, "the Apostle", Abu Ubaidah, son of Jarrah, "the Faithful", Omar, "the
Saviour". These designations are like the distinctions awarded by modern sovereigns to people who have
either rendered a service to the State or been entrusted with an important mission.

The proselytes only sought out people whose composure they could rely on. Later, Mohammed was
reported to have recommended a certain procedure to people who, in order to save their lives, had to
perform idolatrous ceremonies; to look as if they were worshipping an idol, while at the same time
giving it the same treatment.

secretly showing contempt. Those who found that the idols did not take offence at their attitude
despised them even more. Meanwhile, the worship that was to replace the old rites was carried
out in the strictest privacy.

We do not know to what extent the secret society was aware of its possibilities. The obscurity it
enjoyed in the early years of its development was a great advantage to it. This obscurity prevented it
from being nipped in the bud. Derision and contempt could be defied more easily by a few hundred
people than by the Prophet himself. It also prevented him from taking on the persona of the eccentric
sage with whom Warakah and others had identified, giving him, from his first public appearance, the
role of party leader: it gave the

The Prophet had time to acquire the exceptional influence that he was able to exert on a large number
of people. It prepared him to lead people on a large scale. The specimens that

There were typical examples of devotees and dark fanatics - Othman, son of Maz one, seems to have been one of them; weak-minded and superstitious people; people who saw religion as a career opportunity. Abu Bakr and the Prophet showed what they were capable of by consolidating their hold on this slowly developing enterprise. They paid subsidies to the poor, and when Islam was condemned, the Prophet realised that he was not the only one to be able to help the poor. had to provide for entire families; but there is no doubt that the fortune that he control proved useful. Unlike the Christian missionaries, who had to be looked after by those they had led to adopt their religion, he could claim that he was not looking for a "good man". In fact, he always refused to live on alms and never allowed any member of his family to do so. The most popular mediums play this card. It enabled Mohammed to gain a place in the society of princes.

Like most of those who know humanity inside out, Mohammed supported and sometimes almost openly asserted the theory that every human being has his price, and even a price to be paid. estimate by camel.

But the promise of the Garden worked wonders for those who had no need of "temporal help". The vivid descriptions of the Garden in the Koran are still a powerful tool for Muslim missionaries. The history of Islam is a story of sacrifice volunteers to taste the pleasures that are so vividly described in this sacred book. Its character is reminiscent of certain wild paradises: "In the land of the Great Spirit, the women are prettier than any of your squaws, and the game is much more abundant. "said a Crow to Beckwourth (61), urging him to fight. Its name was borrowed from the Jews or Christians, its description from Ta'if, where the wealthy Meccans had gardens, but various touches were added whenever it took place.

As soon as Islam had become strong, the rule used in the secret society was explicitly formulated: anyone who became a member was in it for ever, because if he left it he was a dead man. This rule, which to this day makes the conversion of a Muslim practically impossible, is still in force today. impossible, is so intimately connected with the nature of secret societies that it must have been established at an early date; and the presumption of its existence was probably what kept many proselytes faithful in spite of persecution. Yet a religion that is adopted for sordid reasons is often retained for honourable ones; and early observers noted that some of the the most sincere followers of Islam were people who had been lured into it by bribes (62).

On the other hand, some people are attracted by secrecy and take a certain pleasure in leading a double life. Secret societies still exist, whose members meet for reasons that we do not suspect, sometimes no doubt for mummies, sometimes to discuss much more far-reaching plans. One knowledgeable writer believes that Mohammed's first meetings focused on a socialist project, on a better distribution of wealth between rich and poor. (63) However, there is no evidence to prove this. It is extremely likely that the indictment of idol worship made at these meetings included the condemnation of the representatives of the official cult to the Mecca and the idea that the prophet should be an autocrat probably germinated very early on. But if one of the members of the secret society had asked another why he belonged to it, he would probably have replied: in order to gain Paradise and escape Gehenna. (64) Men were initiated into the mysteries of Eleusis for a similar reason. There is no shortage of examples of converts whose faith received a sudden shock or who (as unbelievers would say) suddenly became aware of the unreality of the whole system.

Members of new sects must be able to recognise each other by signs in the manner of the *Freemasons* (65) and the greeting "Peace be with you" was perhaps introduced at the very beginning of

Islam, even though a person who went to Medina fifteen years after the start of the mission declared that it was new. (66) This greeting was undoubtedly common among Jews and Christians; but it seems to have made a deep impression on Mohammed, who makes constant reference to it in the Koran. God addressed it to the prophets, the angels taught it to Abraham, and it is with this greeting that the blessed are welcomed into paradise, where it was the only form of conversation. By adopting this greeting, Mohammed practically assimilated his system to that of the Jews and Christians. Although this greeting was initially forbidden in public, Muslims were perhaps able to recognise each other by some particularity of dress.

back, whereas the pagans folded it down. (67) Later, the members of the main Islamic sects distinguished themselves in this way by the way they arranged their turbans (68).

Finally, a name had to be given to the new sect and the choice, whether deliberate or accidental, fell on the sect of "Muslims" or "Hanifs". Was this the name by which the followers of Maslamah, the prophet of the Banu Hanifa, had been known? Or was it that another sect, monotheistic and se openly claiming to be Abraham, some of whose descendants according to the Bible were Arabs, had been so designated? It is impossible to say; no Arab seems to have heard of the hanifs, even though they knew that Abraham was one and perhaps one of the two precursors of Mahommed Since in Hebrew the word means "hypocrite" and in Syriac "pagan", the pious disciples of Mahommed did not bother to study its etymology. The other name is "Muslim", meant "traitor" (69) and, when the new sect became an object of ridicule, it allowed the satirists to make a witticism of it; Mohammed showed a certain humour in adopting it but showed great ingenuity in giving it an honourable meaning: whereas it normally meant "one who surrenders his friends to their enemies", it took on the laudatory meaning of "one who surrenders himself to God" and if, like the term of

The name "Christian" may well have been invented by the enemies of the sect it designated, and divine authority was invoked as proof that the name had been invented by Abraham. Like the Jews, these The new Abrahamites called their pagan brethren "Gentiles", of Abyssinian origin. The pagans seem to have called the members of the new sect, once it was no longer secret, the Sabeans,(70) a word which means "militia" and from which is derived that of the Subas,(71) a community which still lives in the marshes of the Euphrates. The fact that this name was given to Mohammed's disciples may be due to the fact that they were the "Sabeans".

can be explained by ignorance - for example, the Arabs of our time call Doughty (72) a Jew because he is a Christian - or by the importance Mohammed attached to the ablution ceremony.

D. S. Margoliouth, *Mohammed and the Rise of Islam*, Putnam and Sons, New York and London, 1905, translated from the English by B. K.

(1) The kahins were fortune-tellers. (EDITOR'S NOTE).

(2) One of the principal historians and exegetes of the Koran sometimes began his recollections of the prophet's words with a similar spectacle. Tabari, *Comm.* Xii, 9.

(3) Tabari, *Comm.* Xviii, 4.

(4) Bouveret, in *Les Sueurs morbides* (Paris, 1880), writes: "Adamkiewicz has shown that perspiration can be caused by artificial or voluntary stimulation of the muscles and nerves".

(5) Musnad, iv., 222. Bouveret, p. 47: "The skin can redden simultaneously", when perspiration is provoked by a violent emotion.

(6) *Ibid*, iii, 21.

(7) "(...) Allah is not the property of Muslims; (...) many generations of Arabs had been catechised in the name of Allah, before Mohammed and (...) many Arabs had converted to Christianity, invoking the Almighty Lord, the God of Moses under the name of Allah known throughout the Semitic world. H. Zakarias, *L'islam entreprise juive, de Moïse à Mohammed*, Cahors, published by the author. T I: Conversion of Mohammed to Judaism. *Les enseignements à Mohammed du rabbin de la Mecque*, p. 32. This author maintains that "the current Koran is nothing more than a Jewish preaching emanating from a rabbi of Pharisaic Talmudist tendency, whose aim was to Judaize Arabia and to extend Jewish hegemony throughout the Mediterranean basin". Thus "Islam is the great triumph of Israel". (EDITOR'S NOTE)

(8) *History of the Mormons*, London, 1851.

(9) "I am the one who gives the alarm", *Alif-Ba'*, i, 133.

(10) *Ibn Sa'd II*, ii, 52. Harithah Ibn Al-Nu'man claimed to have seen Gabriel twice.

- (10) Contemporary Rev, October, 1903.
- (11) Musnad, iv, 222.
- (12) Sura xxix, 47.
- (13) The original is obscure.
- (14) In Usd al-Ghabah, i, 207, he is said to have witnessed the torture of one of Muhammad's disciples.
- (15) Musnad, vi, 68.
- (16) Ibid, i, 135.
- (17) Sura lii, f 21.
- (18) Musnady iv, 356.
- (19) J. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen Heidentums, Berlin, G. Reimer, 1897, p. 196.
- (20) Nöldeke, Z.D.M.G., lii, p. 19, considers this account to be an invention.
- (21) Ibn Sa'd, iii, p. 30.
- (22) Isabah, ii, p. 162.
- (23) Jahiz, Opuscula, p. 58.
- (24) Musnad, iv, p. 385.
- (25) They are listed by Wellhausen, *op. cit.* p. 232.
- (26) Isabah, i, p. 1036.
- (27) Ibn Sa'd, iii, III.
- (28) Al-Waqidi, p. 231.
- (29) Isabah, i, p. 714.
- (30) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 234.
- (31) Musnad, iv, p. 353.
- (32) Sura xi, p. 27.
- (33) Al-Waqidi, p. 118.
- (34) Abu Bakr often interprets dreams. J. Wellhausen, *op. cit.* p. 14.

- (35) Musnad, i, p. 462.
- (36) Ibid, p. 318.
- (37) His original name is disputed; others make him a servant of Amr.
- (38) Alif-Ba', i, p. 437.
- (39) Isabah.
- (40) Ghurar al-Khasa'is, p. 245.
- (41) Tabari, i, p. 1213.
- (42) A. von Krenter, *Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf Dem Gebiete des Islams*, Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1873, p. 15.
- (43) Musnad, i, p. 423.
- (44) Al-Tirmidhi reproduces it as follows: "Lead us in the right path, the path of those towards whom You have been kind and not of those against whom You are angry [the Jews?] and of those who go astray [the Christians?]."
- (45) Tabari, *Comm*, xvi, 90. The other end of the rope was probably attached to the ceiling; *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xiii., p. 312.
- (46) *Jahi*, Bayan, ii, 79, 84.
- (47) Al-Tirmidhi, p. 410 (ii, 80).
- (48) Alif-Ba', ii, p. 29.
- (49) Musnad, iv, p. 188.
- (50) Ibid, iv, 163. This point is disputed.
- (51) Or a Christian; Muslims make no distinction.
- (52) Isabah, i, p. 452; Al-Waqidi (IV), p. 349.
- (53) O. Loth, *Zwei arabische Papyrus*. Z. D. M. G., xxxv, p. 621.
- (54) T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, London and Edinburgh, A. and C. Black, 1872, c. ii.
- (55) The best proof of this is provided by the form of proper nouns. S. Sycz, *Ursprung Und Wiedergabe Der Biblischen Eigennamen Im Koran*, 1903, does not take sufficient account of this.
- (56) Musnad iv, III.

(57) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 194.

(58) Isabah, iii, p. 1173.

(59) Ibn Sad, iii, p. 162.

(60) So Abu Bakr bought and emancipated Amir Ibn Fuhairah.

(61) Autobiography, p. 161.

(62) Sahih Muslim, ii, 212; Musnad, iii, 175.

(63) The priests also described Mohammed as a person sent to get the rich to do justice to the poor. Hariri, p. 328.

(64) See Tabari, i, p. 1218, 10.

(65) On the hypothesis of the Muslim origin of Freemasonry, see J. M. Aractingi and C. Lochon, *Secrets initiatiques en Islam et rituels maçonniques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008. See also C. Lochon, *L'initiation dans les confréries musulmanes et la franc maçonnerie*, <https://archive.org/download/LinitiationDansLesConfreriesMusulmanesEtLaFranc-masonryInitiationInMuslimConfraternitiesAndFrancMaonnerieLaConfrence.htm> (NDE.)

(66) Isabah, iii, p. 70; but Wellhausen interprets it differently. In Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 255, Abu Dharr claims to have invented it. See also Goldziher. Z.D.M.G., xlvi, p. 22.

(67) Hariri, Schol, 346.

(68) Hamadhani, Makamas, 199. So do the Kassites and Yemenites today (Goldziher, M. S., i, p. 84). Everything seems to indicate that Mohammed first wore his hair in the Jewish style and it is probable that his disciples did the same.

(69) In a line of Arabic poetry (qâla z-Zubairu wa aslamathu Mûgasi'û / la haira fi danisi t-tiyâbi gadûri] the verb aslama - which means, today as it has for at least a millennium, "to become a Muslim" - unequivocally means "to betray, desert, abandon". Ibn Ishaq, the first known biographer of Mahommed, wrote: "I will not be a traitor [Muslim] to the prophet." Khubayb, one of the first martyrs of Islam, declared: "What do I care if I am killed as a traitor (Muslim), because of the schism that could arise? Schism with Christianity. For it seems that Christians described the followers of the nascent Islam as "muslimum", "traitors": traitors to Christianity. In fact, while the first Muslims were not afraid to die for their religion, they were afraid of being accused of being "traitors" by the Christians. Cf. G. Lüling, *A Challenge to Islam for Reformation: Reconstruction of a Comprehensive Pre-Islamic Christian Hymnal Hidden in the Koran under Earliest Islamic Reinterpretations*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2003, p. 151.

(70) Also known as the Christians of Saint John the Baptist. From the Hebrew tzaia (militia, army, army of the stars), the term "Sabaeen" refers to a number of Gnostic sects, including the Mandaeans of

the Euphrates and especially the Manichaeans known at the time of Mohammed". A. Caizzo, *Images du ciel d'orient au moyen âge: une histoire du zodiaque et de ses représentations dans les manuscrits du Proche-Orient*, Paris, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003 p. 137 (N. D. E.)

(71) Soubbas would mean "baptisers". (N. D. E.)

(72) Charles Montagu Doughty, poet, writer and great English traveller of Jewish origin, whose main work is *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (1888). (N. D.E.)

Islam, a secret society

In his thirty-ninth year, Mohammed met and befriended Abu Bakr, son of Abu Kahafah, a carpet merchant two years his junior. Gifted in commerce, he had acquired a considerable fortune and, as his father was blind, he was the head of the family. He was a kind and benevolent man, with charming manners and a fine mind, even if he sometimes said things that were not his own. obscene; and his company was much sought after. Like the Meccan tribes, like the others Arabs used to get together in the evening and some ladies held salons in the courtyards of their homes, there was no shortage of opportunities for conversation in Mecca.

Abu Bakr worshipped heroes like no other; he possessed a typically feminine quality that could be seen in all of us. Having believed a lot, all he wanted was to believe even more. Mohammed, a fine psychologist, perceived this quality and used it.

A year after they had become intimate, Mohammed called upon Abu Bakr and it was Abu Bakr and not Mohammed who proselytised. We do not know whether Mohammed had already tried to find out whether he could make disciples; what is certain is that he found in this person a man capable of believing that one of his fellow citizens had received a message from God, which it was up to him to welcome and promote. It is much easier to invite people to accept other people's claims than one's own. The proof of this is that in the history of Islam, the Mahdis who were the most successful were those who were able to remain hidden while some of their followers proclaimed their advent. But, in most cases, it was a case of collusion, with each party expecting a definite advantage. In the case of Abu Bakr, the hypothesis of collusion cannot be accepted. Muhammad said that if he had to take a man as a confidant (khalil), he would have taken Abu Bakr, but he did not take a confidant. Abu Bakr, although a valuable assistant, was not an accomplice. He never forgot the distance between himself and his master.

When a man pretends to produce messages from another world, he must attribute both their form and their substance to a supernatural origin. The problem for the medium is to produce a message without appearing to deliver it himself; and Mohammed had to solve this problem no less than any modern medium. When he had his first public revelations, it seems that he adopted instinctively (or, perhaps, following the example of the Kahins) (1) a procedure common to the prophets of all ages, (2) as well as to the Sibyl:

"talia fanti

Ante fores subito non voltus, non color unus,
Non comptae mansere comae; sed pectus
anhelum, Et rabie fera corda tument: majorque
videri
Nee mortale sonans, adflata est numine
quando Jam propiore dei, "

Mohammed would fall into a state of violent agitation, his face would become livid (3) and he would wrap himself in a blanket; when he took it off, he was covered in sweat (4) and all he had to do was write the message he had received. From time to time an unintelligible message seems to have preceded the message itself, the letters not forming words and curiously resembling the first movements of a planchette. We have already seen that there is good reason to believe that Mohammed had epileptic seizures at some point; the phenomena accompanying these seizures may have suggested a form that he could have reproduced artificially later. The process described, sometimes accompanied by snoring and facial flushing, (5) came to be recognized as the normal form of inspiration and could be acted out without any preparation; the Prophet would receive a divine communication in immediate response to a question addressed to him while he was eating and, having revealed it in this way, would finish the piece he was holding in his hand when he had been interrupted, or a revelation would be made to him in response to a question addressed to him while he was in the pulpit. (6) Following revelations that seem to have been his very first Mohammed was called "the man in the blanket" or "the man who is wrapped up". Whatever the recipe for this process, the Prophet seems to have learnt it by heart.

The other problems which the medium has to resolve concern the substance of the revelation. Once he was head of state, Mohammed had a lot to say, but at the beginning of his career, the substance was not provided by circumstances. As a general rule, mediums who are in the same situation as Mohammed do not beat about the bush. They put into the mouth of God words that are generally recognised as his, i.e. verses from the Old Testament or the New Testament. As these are recognised as the words of God, it costs nothing to repeat them. When Mohammed, driven by circumstances to produce more and more revelations, followed this sure method, he was able to declare that it was by a miracle that he was instructed in the contents of books he had never read. When his style of preaching had rightly won him the approbation of great audiences, he was able to change his tune and declare that the miracle lay in his incomparable eloquence.

But let's not get ahead of ourselves. The very first snippets of revelation that were communicated to Abu Bakr seem to have been imitations of speeches by preachers whom Muhammad had heard on his travels. According to one tradition, he had heard the sermons of the "most eloquent of the Arabs", Kuss, son of Sa'idah, who enjoined men to remember the ephemeral nature of life and to deduce the existence of the Creator of the phenomena of the world. The subjects addressed by these preachers were undoubtedly the Day of Judgement, the fire of Gehenna and the need to worship Allah rather than idols; for these were the ordinary themes of the evangelists. (7) Moreover, experience shows that the

(8) Those who describe the Prophet's early speeches say that they warned the Meccans of divine punishment and that the speaker compared himself to the one who sounds the alarm when the enemy attacks. (9) As we

As we shall see, this doctrine must not be dissociated from that of the resurrection; and the distinctive features of Mohammed's teaching, as opposed to the ideas of paganism, were in the main the doctrine of the future life and the unity of God. Arabic oratory seems to have been in some way rhymed, and Mohammed imitated it without understanding its nature.

To counter the supposition that Mohammed deliberately mystified his contemporaries, it has been argued, in ancient and modern times alike, that his character was upright, even earning him the name of "Faithful". The story that he had trained a pigeon to peck grain out of his ear aroused the indignation of Carlyle and others. In fact, Muslim tradition does not record that he ever received revelations from pigeons. However, it does mention events which seem to show that he had studied theatrical effects of a slightly less naive kind. In an empty room he claimed he could not find a seat - all the seats being occupied by angels. He modestly turned his face away from a corpse, for the sake of two hours who had come from heaven to look after their husbands. There is even every reason to suppose that he sometimes

to let some of his acolytes play the role of Gabriel or to let his disciples identify one of his interlocutors with this angel. The revelations he received resemble those of modern mediums who can be studied in the history of Spiritism by M. F. Podmore, whose researches cast the greatest doubt on the idea that an honourable man cannot mystify his fellow-men, and also show that the support which the performances of a medium carry is seldom shaken by their demystification. Referring to one of the mediums whose career he describes, the author remarks that he had won the friendship and full confidence of his audience, that he was helped by the religious emotions inspired by the words he uttered in trance, and that he could boast of an unblemished character and an honourable life. The possession of these advantages greatly helped this medium to make people believe in his sincerity; but the historian of Spiritism, even if he does not know how to account for all the phenomena and recognises the difficulties which accompany their explanation, is inclined to attribute to

all that is marvellous in the medium's performance. What is clear is that Mohammed possessed the same advantages as those listed by Podmore and that this is how he gained followers; that, nevertheless, the process of revelation was so dubious that one of the scribes responsible for writing down the effusions became convinced that it was an imposture and consequently gave up.

to Islam. But for those who confine themselves to studying the political effectiveness of supernatural revelations, it matters little whether the medium is sincere.

We therefore consider that it was Abu Bakr's receptiveness that explains why Muhammad was able to act as a medium. It was in Muhammad's character to bide his time - to wait for the right moment to act. But the new role he was about to play was not one that could be improvised - it is not possible to change one's life completely without a period of transition. This transition is a period of solitude for most mediums. Thus Joseph Smith, the founder of the Mormon sect, was wandering in a wood, when an angel revealed to him the Book of Mormon. The seer from Poughkeepsie, in March, 1844, "was walking in the country under the protection of his master spiritual, when he spontaneously fell into a trance during which Galen and Swedenborg appeared to him in a cemetery and communicated the message he was to pass on to humanity". His work, *The Principles of Nature*, which he later gave birth to in a trance, was not quite as successful as the Koran, but it was published in thirty-four editions over a period of thirty years.

(10) That Muhammad's prophetic career began with a period of solitude seems attested, even if there are some contradictions between our authorities on the details. For one month - and it seems to have been that of Ramadan, which was later considered the Month of Fasting - the Meccans practised a rite called *tahannuth*, the exact meaning of which is unknown but which was apparently a form of asceticism. During this month, Mohammed used to retire to a cave on Mount Hira, five kilometres from Mecca in the direction of Ta'if. He seems to have taken his family there: it is likely, however, that they did not worship there as they did at Al-Lat and Al-'Uzza (11) in Mecca [...]. On a certain day of the month, Muhammad went down into the valley on his own and it was there that the theophany (or its equivalent) took place, marking the beginning of his career as a divine messenger.

Joseph Smith's idea was to communicate to the world the contents of certain secret tablets to which he alone had access and whose language he alone could translate "by the grace of God" of God". Mohammed's idea was similar; he was allowed (or, according to one account, forced) to read the contents of a well-guarded tablet - he had previously been unable to read or write. The miracle by which he became able to read without learning - an episode that may have been suggested by accounts of other prophets - he alludes to (12) but does not dwell on it. The idea of not being allowed The fact that Smith had only occasional access to the guarded tablet was better than Smith's, because it allowed him to legislate in case of need. In the traditions on this subject, the communication is made by Gabriel, the angel who transmits messages in the New Testament; but in the theophany recorded in the Koran, it seems that it was God himself who descended, that he spoke to the Prophet at a distance of a little less than two bowsticks (13) and that, the second time, the Prophet spoke to him at the distance of a little less than two bowsticks (14). saw "near the Lotus of the limit, not far from the Garden of the abode of the blessed". The fact that he later took Gabriel's place is probably due to the development of the Prophet's theology.

We will never know more about the beginning of revelation. In the first account, the Prophet is so distraught by his experience and so afraid of becoming a soothsayer (Kahin) or a poet that he almost commits suicide; Khadija, meeting him by chance, comforts him by assuring him that he will be the national Nabî (Prophet) - a word she could hardly have known - and has a conversation with Warakah, son of Nawfal, who spoke equally encouraging words. His words would have been, "Kaddosh, Kaddosh, this is the sublime Nomos." The first two words are Hebrew and mean "Holy, Holy!" The last is the Greek word for "Law". The curious and hybrid character of these expressions may make this story credible, but commentators translate "Nomos" as "the Holy One".

messenger of the King" and applies it to Gabriel, thus implying that the exclamation was not appropriate to the occasion on which it was supposed to have been uttered. In another version, Khadija does not consult Warakah but a Christian slave, who also recognises Gabriel in this name. Warakah does not appear in the rest of the story (14) and it would be rash to assert that the meeting between Khadija and him was historic; we know that Khadija had an enlightened relative and the legend could hardly have done less than make her recognise her husband's mission. Nor do we give any more historical value to the tradition according to which Mohammed dreamt that he saw Warakah after his death, dressed in white, which

(15) On the other hand, it is not improbable that Khadija may have been prepared by her cousin's speculations and studies for a revolt against the Meccan religion. In Khadija's case, we can also imagine a priori that the grief caused her by the death of her sons played a part in the conversion process, and this is confirmed by a story told in the Memoirs of Ali. (16) If idolaters go to hell, she asked her husband, were her parents in hell?

Mohammed replied that they were there and, seeing that she looked distressed, assured her that, if she could see them in their true nature, she would hate them too. She then asked him if his dead children were also in hell? In answer to this question, the Prophet had a revelation: "Those who believe and their descendants follow them in faith, We will make their descendants join them.

"A brilliant reply, (17) since the bereaved mother was thus assured that the eternal happiness of her dead sons was subordinate to her belief; she was thus given the chance not only to find them but to allow them access to the Garden of Delights. It is not surprising that Khadija would devoted himself body and soul to the mission and was promised a very special place in Paradise (18).

It is clear that some of the commandments of Islam must have been established from the moment the revelations were communicated to Abu Bakr and Khadija. For it is by no means sufficient to warn people of the terrors of the Day of Judgement; answers must be given to the question: What must I do to be saved? And this answer, to be satisfactory, must include certain injunctions. It seems that they were enjoined to wash their clothes and turn away from idols. The first of these commandments was an easy symbolic act - among many peoples, clothes are not a matter of course. one with the person who wears them; (19) the second was difficult to follow in a community where people socialised a lot; if we are to believe the stories we will tell, the worship of idols was widespread. It was difficult for a person to renounce idolatry without his family noticing, so the secret of the Prophet's mission had to be revealed first to the two boys who were to become the first to renounce idolatry.

lived with Khadija, Zaid, son of Harithah, the adopted son, and Ali, cousin of the Prophet and son of Abu Talib, whom Mohammed had undertaken to support, because his uncle was finding it difficult to provide for his large family. (20) The latter was about ten years old, the former was ten years younger than the latter.

Prophet (21) - according to the most likely version - but, as we shall see, entirely subject to the authority of the Prophet.

It is stated that the revelations ceased for some time after they had begun, a phenomenon which may be compared with the fact established by Starbuck in the cases of conversion he has studied: abjurations, he shows, are rare but periods of inactivity and indifference many. It is reported that Khadija consoled the Prophet during the period when he ceased to be visited by God, which perhaps means that the resolute woman who enabled him to keep the faith during the years when his dominant passion must have been the strongest forced him to follow the direction he had taken. But, in fact, he was forced to do so by Abu Bakr, who immediately began proselytising. There is no doubt that, at the Prophet's request, the mission was carried out in the greatest secrecy. Abu Bakr informed only those people whom he trusted and who were able to help him. had influence. But neither he nor the Prophet were impatient and they would have been satisfied if Abu Bakr's propaganda had converted three people in the first year. (22) There is every reason to believe that he was helped from the outset by an Abyssinian slave, Bilal, about whom we would like to know more. ancestors; for Omar declared that Bilal formed "a third of Islam"; (23) and, unless we misunderstand the meaning of the expression, another disciple took to calling himself a quarter of Islam (24) because, when he had visited Mohammed in Ukaz, he had found him in the company of a "man". a free man (Abu Bakr) and a slave (Bilal). Tradition is clearly unable to say with We do not know for certain whose slave he was. For want of better information, we are inclined to attribute to him some of the Abyssinian elements of the Prophet's productions. (25) After a while, he was bought and freed by Abu Bakr.

Abu Bakr's method has not been reported in many cases. There is, however, one anecdote that seems to be true and typical. Uthman, son of Affan, six years the Prophet's junior, was a cloth merchant whose business partner was a cousin of Muhammad's; (26) he also indulged in usury, lending money to businesses from which he enjoyed half the profits; (27) he dealt with money matters with remarkable acuity. (28) His sister was a milliner, married to a barber (29) and he himself was exceptionally handsome, very fond of personal adornment and dignified, Mohammed himself would not dare to appear in his housedress before him (30) or allow slave girls to play the tambourine in his presence. (31) He did not like fighting, as history would later show, for he left one battlefield, fled another and was killed while ostentatiously reading the Koran. He loved Muhammad's daughter, Rukayyah, and learned to his great regret that she had been betrothed to another man. On hearing the sad news, he confided his grief to Abu Bakr. Abu Bakr told him lent a sympathetic ear, then asked him if he didn't think the Meccan gods were just wood and stones. A question of dubious delicacy, it would seem, unless the lover had

called upon their services; but a conversation ensued, from which Othman deduced that, if he chose to declare that the Meccan gods were worthy of contempt and acknowledged that Mohammed had He had been given the mission of eliminating them, but he could still obtain the hand of Mohammed's daughter. Muhammad then passed by them, Abu Bakr whispered something in his ear and the matter was settled. Othman became a believer and Rukayyah became his wife.

In this case, the conversion process is obvious and presents no difficulty for the reader to understand. In each of the other cases, the skilful missionary must have seen an opening, even if we often do not know what it consisted of. Abu Bakr probably knew that women are more susceptible to conversion than men, foreign residents than natives, slaves than free men, people in difficulty than wealthy and prosperous people. When the existence of Islam was discovered, the modest situation of most of Muhammad's followers was a stumbling block for the aristocrats of Mecca, who asked him to chase away this rabble before they had anything to do with them. Indeed, the Koran so explicitly acknowledges that the Prophet's followers were the dregs of the people (32) that serious doubts hang over the ancient traditions which contradict this claim [...] And later, when the aristocrats were forced to convert to Islam, they took to reproaching their new brothers for their former condition. (33) More than one later claimed the honour of having been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr; and the length of time during which the mission remained secret made their claim difficult to verify. When one When asked what had brought them to Mohammed, they were capable of giving incredible answers; perhaps they had forgotten the real reason or preferred to hide it. Khalid, son of Said, the fourth or fifth convert, dreamt that his father was pushing him into a lake of fire, from which another man saved him. He asked Abu Bakr to interpret this dream. (34) Abu Bakr took him to his father's house. Mohammed, then made a retreat to Ajjad, near Safa, where the dreamer recognised his Saviour and converted. Do men really have such dreams? Flammarion and Myers would say yes. Abdallah, son of Massoud, a client and serf, declared that, while he was feeding the flocks of Ukbah, son of Mu'ait (who later became a fierce adversary of Muhammad), Muhammad and Abu Bakr had asked him for a bowl of milk; and Abdallah was converted at the sight of the goat's udder swelling and contracting to the great delight of the Prophet. (35) Uthman, son of Maz'un, (36) a man who had a The Prophet raised his eyes to heaven, stared at him in a certain place, went there, returned and raised his eyes to heaven again. When Othman said to him asked the meaning of this feat, he replied that he had been visited by a messenger of God, who had invited him to preach justice, goodness, chastity, etc., and Othman believed. Many declared that dissatisfaction with pagan beliefs was what had made them turn to the Prophet; and if there were If there was a trace of this feeling in a man, Abu Bakr would see to it that it did not escape him. One of those who may have been converted in this way was Sa'id, son of Amr Ibn Zaid; his father had rejected polytheism and idolatry before Muhammad's mission had begun, without however adopting Judaism or Christianity. Sa'id was an early convert but is not mentioned among Abu Bakr's proselytes. Another of these converts may have been 'Abd al-Kaaba (the servant of the Ka'ba), son of Auf, renamed 'Abd al-Rahman, because the Ka'ba had not yet been dissociated from paganism. (37)

This man was a merchant whose partner was a certain Rabah, whom his new friends called 'the Faithful'. He had a rare talent for making money, which he spent lavishly. Years later, (38) when he arrived in Yathrib with other destitute refugees, all he asked was to be shown to the market; once at the market, he felt alive again, even though he had no capital. (39) He would have been abstinent before his conversion; would have disapproved of fighting in the path of Islam, even after the practice had taken hold; would not have yielded it to anyone in courage. Such a man may not have seemed a promising match for Abu Bakr but he was about eight years Abu Bakr's junior and may have been subject to his influence. Or, in his case too, a lady may have played a part. There was in Mecca a certain Mikdad who, after committing a murder, fled from his tribe and was welcomed by the Kindah; in their house too he shed blood; and he fled to the Mecca, where he was adopted by a man called Al-Aswad, from the tribe of Muhammad's mother. Abd al-Kaaba advised him (in the course of conversation) to marry, but he contemptuously refused his daughter; he was consoled, however, by Muhammad, who gave him the daughter of his late uncle, Zubair, in marriage, on the same terms (one might think) as those on which Othman had been forced to marry. submit. We do not know what other measures were taken to convince 'Abd al-Kaaba. With Mikdad was converted another man, Utbah, son of Ghazwan, probably a poor client.

Three of the other first converts were Al-Zubair, son of 'Awwam; Saad, son of Abu Wakkas and Talhah, son of 'Ubaidallah. The first of them, according to tradition, was eight, ten or seventeen at the time; he was a cousin of the Prophet, the son of a grain merchant and an apprentice butcher; and it is said that his his parents mistreated him. If his conversion did take place at this time, he may have been one of Ali's playmates, initiated into mysteries that he could not reveal because, as we have seen, their families were linked.

Talhah was certainly an adult and claimed to have been introduced to Muhammad by a monk he had met on a business trip to Syria. If this statement has any value, it probably means that he had heard there that Arab paganism was being ridiculed by the followers of the f a s h i o n a b l e creed; if their mockery had no effect on most minds, some were nonetheless sensitive to it. Later, his spending habits made him famous (40).

Saad claimed to have been the third Muslim for a whole week, in which case he would have been the first to be converted by Abu Bakr. He was an arrow-maker and it is said that he was the first to shed his blood for the new cause. He was seventeen years old at the time of his conversion. When they were brought to Muhammad, all the converts were repulsed, with the exception of Abu Bakr. The Prophet later acknowledged this: but he did not specify what it was that displeased the newcomers. And we do not know how these solemn scenes took place: we learn a m o s t that the Prophet taught the proselytes to pray. Later, however, in order to be admitted to see the Prophet, the proselyte had to be prepared to swear allegiance and had to undertake to abstain from

certain immoral acts; for the commission of which he was punished in this life, if he wished to escape punishment in the Hereafter; (41) and, still later (in the case of men), he had to fight all the nations until they had adopted the new religion. There can be little doubt that, from the outset, the proselytes made commitments as serious as those made by those who are admitted to other secret societies; in general, these obligations are not specific actions in the present but a willingness to answer the call in the future. It would seem that, from At first, the Prophet established brotherhoods of believers, whose new relationships were to replace blood ties just as the Christianity of the Ibad tribe or the Christians of Hira had provided a different bond from tribal ties. The reluctance that the Prophet observed was probably due to the anguish that even young people felt at the idea of tying themselves to something in perpetuity, especially when that something was an unknown quantity, a path whose outcome was obscure.

The evolution of the Muslim ceremony known as salât, whose name derives from the Jewish or Christian term for "prayer", is not known in detail. In a form that later became stereotyped, the Jewish custom of standing prayer, the Christian practice of prostration (42) and that of bowing (the back horizontal and the hands on the knees) were combined and certain formulas were prescribed. In the beginning we used to," said one convert, "not knowing what to say when we prayed, just prostrate ourselves. The Prophet then taught us another formula". (43) A prayer similar to the Pater Noster was probably composed later: it contains polemical references to an unspecified sect or sects. (44) As we shall see, the salât was later used as a kind of military exercise: in the early days it had an ascetic character, the devotee "doing without a rope around the chest". (45) Tradition states that the division of the day into periods for the purpose of performing salât five times a day was an innovation from the end of the Meccan period and the elements of the legislation concerning ritual purity seem to have appeared even later. Yet the theory that God should only be approached by people in a state of purity was known in southern Arabia before Muhammad's time, which makes it likely that his early followers had been educated there, and indeed the washing of clothes, which marked conversion, belongs to the same line of thought.

During this first period, salât was performed in the strictest privacy, and there is no doubt that this was the case.

There is no doubt that meetings of believers were organised with great caution. Whatever the role which the converts had already begun to play in the Meccan cult, they no doubt continued to play it. We do not know whether the sanctity of the Kaaba was maintained at this time by the Prophet. It was probably rejected. And if the question of the direction in which the prayer should be made was envisaged at that time, there can be little doubt that the Temple of Jerusalem was the point to which Mohammed turned. The link between the myth of Abraham and the Kaaba seems to have been the result of later speculation and was only fully integrated when the need arose in the field of politics.

Much of the Qur'an must already have been in existence when Abu Bakr began his mission; he must at least have been able to assure the proselytes that his prophet was receiving divine communications which he could cite as proof of his personal relationship with the true God, and it is likely that as the number of believers gradually increased the Qur'an shifted from "mediumistic" communications to the powerful sermons which were employed in its second period. The series of phenomena produced by a medium is extremely effective with a very small audience. The need to exclude strangers keeps those present on their toes; the "superior state" which the medium demonstrates by dropping down heavily, demanding to be wrapped in a blanket, and then sweating profusely, makes a very strong impression; the processes which the medium uses to communicate with others are very effective. If there are non-believers present, the medium (in many cases) cannot act. If non-believers are present, the medium (in many cases) cannot take action: and, according to the biographers, the first converts testified of their faith before being brought into the presence of Mohammed.

The Prophet tried to live up to his role as he became more and more identified with it. It is said that he usually wore a veil, (46) a practice he perhaps adopted at the time of these mysterious sessions and which enabled him to increase their solemnity. Over time he adopted benign gestures and rustic habits: when he shook hands, he did not withdraw his first; when he looked at a man, he waited for the other to turn away before turning his head. (47) He took the greatest care of his person: every evening he put make-up on his eyes and his body was always perfumed. (48) He let his hair grow to his shoulders; and when he began to have grey hair, (49) he hid it with colouring substances. (50) He possessed the art of speaking appropriately to neophytes, of saying something that gratified the particular inclinations of each or showed that he knew his ancestors. It is difficult to say how many of these stories illustrating Mohammed's talents are true, but it is certain that he was familiar with the tricks known to modern mediums, which make it possible to obtain private information or to give the impression of possessing it. Moreover, in the early days, none of those whom Abu Bakr was not sure of or who had not been prepared to worship God were allowed to see the Prophet.

The demands of his profession do not seem to have allowed him any real study, yet there is no doubt that his knowledge of the biblical narratives became a little more precise as the Qur'an spread: and while this greater precision may sometimes have been due to the Prophet's memory, it is more likely that he acquired more information whenever an opportunity presented itself. The following story gives us an idea of his method. Jabr, a client of the Banu Abd al-Salam was a Jew (51) who worked as a blacksmith in Mecca. He and Yasar (also a Jew) used to sit together when they were at work and read their holy book aloud. The Prophet used to pass by to listen to them. Jabr was converted when he heard the Prophet

(52) It has been suggested that the Christian content of the Koran may have been inspired by a disciple named Suhaib, a Greek from Mosul. (53) Tradition gives the names of several people supposed to have been the Prophet's mentors, but the Koran refutes this accusation, arguing that the people to whom it refers spoke a foreign language and therefore could not have been the authors of the Koran, since it is written in Arabic. This response is not the most convincing. The information contained in the Koran gives the impression of having been chosen at random rather than having been acquired through methodical study. (54) In a Medina sura which tells the story of Saul, Saul is referred to as Talut, obviously because of its consonance with Galut, the closest name to Goliath that the Prophet could find: Samuel's name is forgotten, he is confused with Gideon and the story of Gideon is badly told. This almost destroys the theory of a mentor, for no mentor could have been so little versed in the Bible. Moreover, the sources of the Koran are very numerous - Abyssinian and Syriac as well as Jewish and Greek. (55) Assuming, therefore, that the biblical accounts in the Koran were not modelled on what Mohammed had heard during his He probably gathered this information during the religious services he attended or the Bible readings he listened to. According to him, the djinns listened to celestial advice in the same way, and consequently gathered information that was only partially true. correct. There was no way of avoiding this danger, short of hiring a teacher, which would have involved even greater risks.

Muhammad expressly forbade any publicity surrounding him. A Syrian ('Amr, son of Abasah) who later claimed to have been the fourth Muslim said that, after renouncing the cult of the idols, (56) he had gone to Mohammed who, according to what he had been told, held the truth; he found Mohammed determined to keep his mission secret: he proposed to Mohammed to join him openly but Mohammed forbade him, as he would serve the cause better by returning to his country and, it may be presumed, by playing the same role there as Abu Bakr. Some of the first revelations would have taken place in a cave, a natural form of hiding place (57) and, in anecdotes we have already related, Muhammad lived in seclusion; when Abu Dharr - who later became a famous ascetic - came to the Prophet to find out more about his thinking (according to one account), the Prophet replied hid in the mountains (58): but the obscurity which extends over the beginnings of his mission is not such that it does not allow the fact to emerge that Mohammed, after having made a few followers, entered into "the house of Al-Arkam, on Mount Safa". This Al-Arkam belonged to the Makhzoum tribe and must have been about seventeen years old when the mission began: some have made him the seventh, others the tenth convert. His house on Mount Safa seems to have served as a meeting place, where the Prophet could receive neophytes and hold sessions without fear of being disturbed. We are thus told of two converts, both Greek slaves, Suhaib, son of Sinan, and 'Ammar, son of Yasir, who met in the house of met by chance at the door of the house of Al-Arkam, where they were going to make their profession of faith and from where they slipped away at nightfall. (59) Several years passed before Mohammed was able to reward his faithful executor by offering him a house in Medina. Even if secrecy had not been desirable, the intense curiosity of the Orientals would have seriously hampered his sessions if he had held them in a populated city. But this curiosity did not incite them to make the short journey that separated Medina from Medina.

Mecca from Mount Safa, where Mohammed could hold his meetings in peace. As the first
At the time, the proselytism of his followers did not interfere with their professional lives, so it is likely
that these meetings were held at irregular intervals.

The people who went to Arkam's house were of all ages, the oldest being ten years older than the eldest.
Some were in their thirties or forties, others were very young. Many were slaves or freedmen, and
it is easy to understand that they were attracted by a new system offering the prospect of equality.
And, indeed, their condition improved rapidly, for the emancipation of believers was soon declared to
be a religious duty. (60) Some were metagods, who had no relations in Mecca. Hatib, son of Abu
Balta'ah, probably a Christian from Hira, is a specimen. Most of them, however, are simply names to
us. In some cases, the families were converted en bloc, three sons of Jahsh, three sons of Al-Harith
(Hatib,

Hattab, and Ma'mar), four sons of Al-Bukair, three sons of Maz'un, are mentioned among the new
followers of this period and, in several cases, the conversion of one brother was followed by that of the
other; thus Ali, the eldest brother of Jafar, joined the movement, in which he was destined to play a
role of some importance, albeit less eminent than that of the Prophet's son-in-law. The power to
rename disciples was one of the privileges enjoyed by other prophets, and Mohammed made use of it
whenever a proselyte bore the name of an idol or had an ominous name.

Titles of honour were also conferred, but probably a little later: Abu Bakr was called "the Truthful",
Zubair, "the Apostle", Abu Ubaidah, son of Jarrah, "the Faithful", Omar, "the
Saviour". These designations are like the distinctions awarded by modern sovereigns to people who have
either rendered a service to the State or been entrusted with an important mission.

The proselytes only sought out people whose composure they could rely on. Later, Mohammed was
reported to have recommended a certain procedure to people who, in order to save their lives, had to
perform idolatrous ceremonies; to look as if they were worshipping an idol, while at the same time
giving it the same treatment.

secretly showing contempt. Those who found that the idols did not take offence at their attitude
despised them even more. Meanwhile, the worship that was to replace the old rites was carried
out in the strictest privacy.

We do not know to what extent the secret society was aware of its possibilities. The obscurity it
enjoyed in the early years of its development was a great advantage to it. This obscurity prevented it
from being nipped in the bud. Derision and contempt could be defied more easily by a few hundred
people than by the Prophet himself. It also prevented him from taking on the persona of the eccentric
sage with whom Warakah and others had identified, giving him, from his first public appearance, the
role of party leader: it gave the

The Prophet was given time to acquire the exceptional influence he was able to exert on a large number
of people. It prepared him to lead people on a large scale. The specimens that

There were typical examples of devotees and dark fanatics - Othman, son of Maz'oon, seems to have been one of them; weak-minded and superstitious people; people who saw religion as a career opportunity. Abu Bakr and the Prophet showed what they were capable of by consolidating their hold on this slowly developing enterprise. They paid subsidies to the poor, and when Islam was condemned, the Prophet realised that he was in the wrong. He had to provide for entire families; but there is no doubt that the fortune that he controlled proved useful. Unlike the Christian missionaries, who had to be looked after by those they had led to adopt their religion, he could claim that he was not looking for a "good man". In fact, he always refused to live on alms and never allowed any member of his family to do so. The most popular mediums play this card. It enabled Mohammed to gain a place in the society of princes.

Like most of those who know humanity inside out, Mohammed supported and sometimes almost openly asserted the theory that every human being has his price, and even a price to be paid. estimate by camel.

But the promise of the Garden worked wonders for those who had no need of "temporal help". The vivid descriptions of the Garden in the Koran are still a powerful tool for Muslim missionaries. The history of Islam is a story of sacrifice. Mohammed volunteers to taste the pleasures that are so vividly described in this sacred book. Its character is reminiscent of certain wild paradises: "In the land of the Great Spirit, the women are prettier than any of your squaws, and the game is much more abundant." said a Crow to Beckwourth (61), urging him to fight. Its name was borrowed from the Jews or Christians, its description from Ta'if, where the wealthy Meccans had gardens, but various touches were added whenever it took place.

As soon as Islam had become strong, the rule in use in the secret society was explicitly formulated: anyone who became a member was in it for ever, because if he left it he was a dead man. This rule, which to this day makes the conversion of a Muslim practically impossible, is still in force today. This rule is so intimately connected with the nature of secret societies that it must have been established at an early date; and the presumption of its existence was probably what kept many proselytes faithful in spite of persecution. Yet a religion that is adopted for sordid reasons is often retained for honourable ones; and early observers noted that some of the most sincere followers of Islam were people who had been lured into it by bribes (62).

On the other hand, some people are attracted by secrecy and take a certain pleasure in leading a double life. Secret societies still exist, whose members meet for reasons that we do not suspect, sometimes no doubt for mummies, sometimes to discuss much more far-reaching plans. One knowledgeable writer believes that Mohammed's first meetings focused on a socialist project, on a better distribution of wealth between rich and poor. (63) However, there is no evidence to prove this. It is extremely likely that the indictment of idol worship made at these meetings included the condemnation of the representatives of the official cult to the Mecca and the idea that the prophet should be an autocrat probably germinated very early on. But if one of the members of the secret society had asked another why he belonged to it, he would probably have replied: in order to gain Paradise and escape Gehenna. (64) Men were initiated into the mysteries of Eleusis for a similar reason. There is no shortage of examples of converts whose faith received a sudden shock or who (as unbelievers would say) suddenly became aware of the unreality of the whole system.

Members of new sects must be able to recognise each other by signs in the manner of the *Fremasons* (65) and the greeting "Peace be with you" was perhaps introduced at the very beginning of

Islam, even though a person who went to Medina fifteen years after the mission began said that it was new. (66) This greeting was undoubtedly common among Jews and Christians; but it seems to have made a deep impression on Mohammed, who makes constant reference to it in the Koran. God addressed it to the prophets, the angels taught it to Abraham, and it is with this greeting that the blessed are welcomed into paradise, where it was the only form of conversation. By adopting this greeting, Mohammed practically assimilated his system to that of the Jews and Christians. Although this greeting was initially forbidden in public, Muslims were perhaps able to recognise each other by some particularity of dress.

back, whereas the pagans folded it down. (67) Later, the members of the main Islamic sects distinguished themselves by the way they arranged their turbans (68).

Finally, a name had to be given to the new sect and the choice, whether deliberate or accidental, fell on the sect of "Muslims" or "Hanifs". Was this the name by which the followers of Maslamah, the prophet of the Banu Hanifa, had been known? Or was it that another sect, monotheistic and se openly claiming to be Abraham, some of whose descendants according to the Bible were Arabs, had been so designated? It is impossible to say; no Arab seems to have heard of the hanifs, although they knew that Abraham was one and perhaps one of the two precursors of Mahommed Since in Hebrew the word means "hypocrite" and in Syriac "pagan", the pious disciples of Mahommed did not bother to study its etymology. The other name is "Muslim", meant "traitor" (69) and, when the new sect became an object of ridicule, it allowed the satirists to make a witticism of it; Mohammed showed a certain humour in adopting it but showed great ingenuity in giving it an honourable meaning: whereas it normally meant "one who surrenders his friends to their enemies", it took on the laudatory meaning of "one who surrenders himself to God" and if, like the term of

The name "Christian" may well have been invented by the enemies of the sect it designated, and divine authority was invoked as proof that the name had been invented by Abraham. Like the Jews, these The new Abrahamites called their pagan brethren "Gentiles", of Abyssinian origin. The pagans seem to have called the members of the new sect, once it was no longer secret, the Sabeans,(70) a word which means "militia" and from which is derived that of the Subas,(71) a community which still lives in the marshes of the Euphrates. The fact that this name was given to Mohammed's disciples may be due to the fact that they were the "Sabeans".

can be explained by ignorance - for example, the Arabs of our time call Doughty (72) a Jew because he is a Christian - or by the importance Mohammed attached to the ablution ceremony.

D. S. Margoliouth, Mohammed and the Rise of Islam, Putnam and Sons, New York and London, 1905, translated from the English by B. K.

(1) The kahins were fortune-tellers. (EDITOR'S NOTE).

(2) One of the principal historians and exegetes of the Koran sometimes began his recollections of the prophet's words with a similar spectacle. Tabari, Comm. Xii, 9.

(3) Tabari, Comm. Xviii, 4.

(4) Bouveret, in *Les Sueurs morbides* (Paris, 1880), writes: "Adamkiewicz has shown that perspiration can be caused by artificial or voluntary stimulation of the muscles and nerves".

(5) Musnad, iv., 222. Bouveret, p. 47: "The skin can redden simultaneously", when perspiration is provoked by a violent emotion.

(6) *Ibid*, iii, 21.

(7) "(...) Allah is not the property of Muslims; (...) many generations of Arabs had been catechised in the name of Allah, before Mohammed and (...) many Arabs had converted to Christianity, invoking the Almighty Lord, the God of Moses under the name of Allah known throughout the Semitic world. H. Zakarias, *L'Islam entreprise juive, de Moïse à Mohammed*, Cahors, published by the author. T I: Conversion of Mohammed to Judaism. *Les enseignements à Mohammed du rabbin de la Mecque*, p. 32. This author maintains that "the current Koran is nothing more than a Jewish preaching emanating from a rabbi of Pharisaic Talmudist tendency, whose aim was to Judaize Arabia and to extend Jewish hegemony throughout the Mediterranean basin". Thus "Islam is the great triumph of Israel". (EDITOR'S NOTE)

(8) *History of the Mormons*, London, 1851.

(9) "I am the one who gives the alarm", *Alif-Ba'*, i, 133.

(10) *Ibn Sa'd* II, ii, 52. Harithah Ibn Al-Nu'man claimed to have seen Gabriel twice.

- (10) Contemporary Rev, October, 1903.
- (11) Musnad, iv, 222.
- (12) Sura xxix, 47.
- (13) The original is obscure.
- (14) In Usd al-Ghabah, i, 207, he is said to have witnessed the torture of one of Muhammad's disciples.
- (15) Musnad, vi, 68.
- (16) Ibid, i, 135.
- (17) Sura lii, f 21.
- (18) Musnady iv, 356.
- (19) J. Wellhausen, Reste arabischen Heidentums, Berlin, G. Reimer, 1897, p. 196.
- (20) Nöldeke, Z.D.M.G., lii, p. 19, considers this account to be an invention.
- (21) Ibn Sa'd, iii, p. 30.
- (22) Isabah, ii, p. 162.
- (23) Jahiz, Opuscula, p. 58.
- (24) Musnad, iv, p. 385.
- (25) They are listed by Wellhausen, op. cit. p. 232.
- (26) Isabah, i, p. 1036.
- (27) Ibn Sa'd, iii, III.
- (28) Al-Waqidi, p. 231.
- (29) Isabah, i, p. 714.
- (30) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 234.
- (31) Musnad, iv, p. 353.
- (32) Sura xi, p. 27.
- (33) Al-Waqidi, p. 118.
- (34) Abu Bakr often interprets dreams. J. Wellhausen, op. cit. p. 14.

- (35) Musnad, i, p. 462.
- (36) Ibid, p. 318.
- (37) His original name is disputed; others make him a servant of Amr.
- (38) Alif-Ba', i, p. 437.
- (39) Isabah.
- (40) Ghurar al-Khasa'is, p. 245.
- (41) Tabari, i, p. 1213.
- (42) A. von Krenter, *Culturgeschichtliche Streifzüge auf Dem Gebiete des Islams*, Leipzig, F. A. Brockhaus, 1873, p. 15.
- (43) Musnad, i, p. 423.
- (44) Al-Tirmidhi reproduces it as follows: "Lead us in the right path, the path of those towards whom You have been kind and not of those against whom You are angry [the Jews?] and of those who go astray [the Christians?]."
- (45) Tabari, *Comm*, xvi, 90. The other end of the rope was probably attached to the ceiling; *Histoire du Bas-Empire*, xiii., p. 312.
- (46) *Jahi, Bayan*, ii, 79, 84.
- (47) Al-Tirmidhi, p. 410 (ii, 80).
- (48) Alif-Ba', ii, p. 29.
- (49) Musnad, iv, p. 188.
- (50) Ibid, iv, 163. This point is disputed.
- (51) Or a Christian; Muslims make no distinction.
- (52) Isabah, i, p. 452; *Al-Waqidi (IV)*, p. 349.
- (53) O. Loth, *Zwei arabische Papyrus*. Z. D. M. G., xxxv, p. 621.
- (54) T. Nöldeke, *Sketches from Eastern History*, London and Edinburgh, A. and C. Black, 1872, c. ii.
- (55) The best proof of this is provided by the form of proper nouns. S. Sycz, *Ursprung Und Wiedergabe Der Biblischen Eigennamen Im Koran*, 1903, does not take sufficient account of this.
- (56) Musnad iv, III.

(57) Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 194.

(58) Isabah, iii, p. 1173.

(59) Ibn Sad, iii, p. 162.

(60) So Abu Bakr bought and emancipated Amir Ibn Fuhairah.

(61) Autobiography, p. 161.

(62) Sahih Muslim, ii, 212; Musnad, iii, 175.

(63) The priests also described Mohammed as a person sent to get the rich to do justice to the poor. Hariri, p. 328.

(64) Cf. Tabari, i, p. 1218, 10.

(65) On the hypothesis of the Muslim origin of Freemasonry, see J. M. Aractingi and C. Lochon, *Secrets initiatiques en Islam et rituels maçonniques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008. See also C. Lochon, *L'initiation dans les confréries musulmanes et la franc maçonnerie*, <https://archive.org/download/LinitiationDansLesConfreriesMusulmanesEtLaFranc-masonryInitiationInMuslimConfraternitiesAndFrancMaonnerieLaConfrence.htm> (NDE.)

(66) Isabah, iii, p. 70; but Wellhausen interprets it differently. In Sahih Muslim, ii, p. 255, Abu Dharr claims to have invented it. See also Goldziher. Z.D.M.G., xlvi, p. 22.

(67) Hariri, Schol, 346.

(68) Hamadhani, Makamas, 199. So do the Kassites and Yemenites today (Goldziher, M. S., i, p. 84). Everything seems to indicate that Mohammed first wore his hair in the Jewish style and it is probable that his disciples did the same.

(69) In a line of Arabic poetry (qâla z-Zubairu wa aslamathu Mûgasi'û / la haira fi danisi t-tiyâbi gadûri] the verb aslama - which means, today as it has for at least a millennium, "to become a Muslim" - unequivocally means "to betray, desert, abandon". Ibn Ishaq, the first known biographer of Mahommed, wrote: "I will not be a traitor [Muslim] to the prophet." Khubayb, one of the first martyrs of Islam, declared: "What do I care if I am killed as a traitor (Muslim), because of the schism that could arise? Schism with Christianity. For it seems that Christians described the followers of the nascent Islam as "muslimum", "traitors": traitors to Christianity. In fact, while the first Muslims were not afraid to die for their religion, they were afraid to die being accused of being "traitors" by the Christians. Cf. G. Lüling, *A Challenge to Islam for Reformation: Reconstruction of a Comprehensive Pre-Islamic Christian Hymnal Hidden in the Koran under Earliest Islamic Reinterpretations*, Delhi, Motilal Banarsidass, 2003, p. 151.

(70) Also known as the Christians of Saint John the Baptist. From the Hebrew tzaia (militia, army, army of the stars), the term "Sabaeen" refers to a number of Gnostic sects, including the Mandaeans of

the Euphrates and especially the Manichaeans known at the time of Mohammed". A. Caizzo, *Images du ciel d'orient au moyen âge: une histoire du zodiaque et de ses représentations dans les manuscrits du Proche-Orient*, Paris, Presses de l'Université de Paris-Sorbonne, 2003 p. 137 (N. D. E.)

(71) Soubbas would mean "baptisers". (N. D. E.)

(72) Charles Montagu Doughty, poet, writer and great English traveller of Jewish origin, whose main work is *Travels in Arabia Deserta* (1888). (N. D.E.)

Racial mixing in Islam

Jamaican historian, anthropologist, novelist and journalist Joel A. Rogers (1883 - 1966) is considered the father of Afrocentrism. A specialist in the history of blacks, he was responsible for the first works on the negroid presence on the European continent from antiquity to the 18th century and on the contribution of blacks to the development of modern 'Western' civilisation, two taboo subjects which, despite his anti-racism, unsurprisingly led him to assimilate blacks and their consciences with those of other peoples, unsurprisingly equates racial consciousness with 'prejudice', he has been ignored by an academic community that maintains the dogma of the white intellectual origin of modern civilisation and the myth of the decisive, even exclusive, role of the white man. in the formation of this monstrosity. On the contrary, this author's research is one of the most important in the world.

rare anti-racist works that benefit from being studied by those with a racial conscience, because, a contrario, they reinforce the latter in their racial geostrategic analysis of the contemporary world, in their certainty that only the adoption of the racial point of view in the analysis of the current upheavals makes it possible to understand them exactly.

The text we are presenting below sheds light, a contrario and involuntarily, on one of the essential reasons why the scum from above, fanatical propagators of miscegenation and themselves, are so keen on the idea of a "new world".

even when mixed, began to make Islam fashionable again among the scoundrels down below, from the end of the 1970s onwards. Like all universalist projects, Islam is born of a melting pot and naturally tends to expand the melting pot as much as possible as it expands.

One of the main characteristics of Islam throughout the centuries has been its almost total indifference to race and class; the opportunity it has given to any able and ambitious disciple to rise to the highest possible rank, regardless of colour or social status. From Slaves became sultans, female slaves favoured by the ruler and mothers of heirs to the throne. At times, the slave himself held great power and was feared by rich and powerful free men.

Christianity, which was also an Eastern religion, had the same attitude in its early days. God," says Saint Paul, "made all men of one blood". Racial distinctions were unknown in primitive Christianity. The first great leaders of Christianity, apart from St Paul, were all born in parts of Africa where black stock was abundant in the population and were very probably black themselves. This is true of St Augustine, Tertullian, Origen, Cyprian and Clement of Alexandria. Tertullian and Saint Athanasius (296-373) were certainly black.

Who was Mohammed?

Was Mohammed, the founder of Islam, an Arab? What is an Arab?

The Encyclopaedia Britannica (11th edition) says of the present inhabitants of Arabia: "Arabia has a very large free black population, and here again, by intermarriage with the whites of the neighbouring regions, has filled the country with a mulatto race of all shades, so much so that, in the east and southern provinces in particular, white skin is almost an exception." Arabia, There is no prejudice against alliances with blacks; no social or political line separates the African from the Arab.

There is every reason to believe that the picture above represents the Arab as he has been for several thousand years. Arabia is merely an extension of Africa, where the black population of the south-west and the white, or almost white, people of the north-west met and mixed their culture and blood.

Muhammad himself, according to all accounts, was black. One of his contemporaries described him as with "a wide mouth" "bluish in colour", "hair (...) neither straight nor curly", i.e. hair that was probably frizzy. "It so happens that certain natives of the Sudan with strongly Negroid features have bluish skin. Mohammed's mother was African. His grandfather, Abd al Muttalib, had "very dark" skin. He could have been a slave, "Abd" or "Abd al Muttalib".

Abd" originally meant "slave". Therefore, when Dermengham (1b) says that the Negro background "hardly seemed perceptible" in Mohamed, he is obviously wrong.

Most of Mohammed's first disciples were black slaves. His second convert and closest and most esteemed friend until his death was Bilal, a former Ethiopian slave. Muhammad had So great was his regard for Bilal that he confided to him that he had "heard the sound of [his] sandals before [him] in Paradise. Muhammad also adopted another black man, Zayd Ibn Harithat, as his own son.

third convert, who became one of his greatest generals (2). Later, to show his respect for Zayd, he took as his wife one of Zayd's wives, the beautiful Zainab... One of Muhammad's first injunctions was as follows: "And among his signs (the signs of God), there is also the Creation of the heavens and the earth, the diversity of your colours and of your languages". (Koran, XXX, 21).

Arabia at the time of Mohammed was, as it still is today, a land of mulattoes. These mulattoes considered themselves superior to both whites and blacks. This characteristic

was not peculiar to the mulattoes of Arabia and is by no means a thing of the past. Some old mulatto families in the West Indies, West Africa and Ethiopia still feel superior to whites and blacks. The Arab considered those with white skin to be inferior, perhaps it would be better to say that he had a certain repulsion for white skin, as is the case today in practically all of Africa and South Asia. Gobineau says that Mohammed "was naturally too advantaged to show white skin to his followers" (3). Professor Toynbee also says: "The Arabs, the ruling element of the Umayyad caliphate, were called 'the people'. This feeling of superiority on the part of the mestizos was based on the fact that they were "the swarthy people" with a racial connotation of superiority and their Persian and Turkish subjects "the red people" with a connotation of racial inferiority...". This feeling of superiority on the part of mestizos was probably reinforced by the highly underdeveloped culture of the Nordic countries at the time (4).

The Zenghs, or Zends, very dark-skinned African natives who were imported in large numbers as slaves into Arab countries, were also despised, probably for the same reason. A book by al-Jahiz, a black writer whom Christopher Dawson calls "the greatest scholar and stylist of the ninth century" (5) leaves little doubt about this. The book is entitled *Wa al Kitab Soudan I- Bidan*, or "The Superiority in Dignity of the Black Race over the White Race", a title that speaks for itself. even. By "white race" we do not mean light-skinned whites, but dark-skinned whites and mulattoes.

In certain regions of the East, such as Ethiopia, the fair-skinned white man is called the "red man". Moreover, in his essay, Jahiz includes Indians among the blacks.

Another writer from this period, al-Mas'ûdî, wrote extensively about these blacks (6).

They were so badly treated by their masters, some of whom were black themselves, that they fomented what was undoubtedly the biggest slave revolt in history, even bigger than the one in Haiti. Led by their leader Al Burkhui (The Veiled Prophet), they seized Baghdad, the capital of the Muslim world. capital of the most powerful empire in the world at the time, and occupied it for thirteen years (870 - 883).

The Zenghs killed more than half a million of their oppressors, a huge number for that time. They beheaded their masters and threw their heads into the canals of the Tigris, leaving them to drift to worried relatives waiting downstream to see whose turn it would be (7).

Several passages in Arabic literature also reveal a certain prejudice against non-mixed blacks. In the great classic of Arab erotic literature, *Er Roud el aater fi nezaha el khater* (The Perfumed Garden), the Caliph's remarks about the sexual prowess of the black man Al Durgham, which he witnesses and His meticulous investigation into the cause of his powers leaves little doubt (8).

In addition, the poet An-Nami, whose grey hair was mocked by one person who told him that he did not have the same hair as the other poets, was the only person to have a grey hair. A black African wife will not stay long in a house where the second wife is white. (Note that "white", in the East, as in Africa, means "black". Brazil, is sometimes synonymous with "mulatto").

Abu Ishak, a poet who wrote extensively in favour of his black slave Youmn, also says: "Dark-skinned Youmn said to a person whose colour equalled the whiteness of his eye, 'Why does your face boast of its fair complexion? Do you think that such a light complexion makes it more dignified? A mole of my colour would make it more beautiful, but a trace of white on my cheek would disfigure it' (9).

Two of the greatest of all Eastern rulers, Antar and Kafur, initially suffered from racial prejudice. Antar, the son of an Ethiopian slave, was initially despised by the Bedouins, who were themselves negroid, because of his blackness. Kafur, "a black man with soft, shiny, very dark skin" who, as a slave from Sudan, later became ruler of Egypt and Syria, was first mocked by his fellow slaves and called "the moon of darkness" by the famous poet al-Mutanabbi (10).

The expression "black but beautiful" also shows a certain opposition to black. This feeling still exists to some extent in the East. I remember seeing a man in Cairo once. very black with short frizzy hair, but with an almost Greek profile. As this racial type was unknown to me, I asked my companion, a Bedouin, at least three quarters black himself, if the man was an Egyptian. No," he replied, "he's what the Egyptians call a bougnoule". He told me that his father had people like him as slaves, but quickly added that they were very well treated.

This prejudice against non-mixed whites and non-mixed blacks has long existed in Ethiopia too (11).

Count Gleichen rightly observed that Ethiopians "hate the white man" and do everything to keep him out of their country. The Amharas, who generally resemble blacks more than most African-Americans, despise the Chankalas, an archaic black people. A good number of great Ethiopians are of Chankala origin. Such was the case of the great emperor Menelik, whose skin was as black as coal. His mother, Edgig-aiehou, was a Chankala slave. In Egypt too, dark-skinned blacks, some of them even displaying their tribal signs, held high rank in the Egyptian army. The late King Fouad's chamberlain was a black man, Sammi Bey, while the Prime Minister, Nahas Pasha, was a mulatto. In short, prejudice against people of colour in the East cannot be explained in the same way as in the United States. It is cultural rather than racial. It is reminiscent of the prejudice that Negroes in the North have against most Negroes in the South in the United States.

Colour has never been a serious obstacle in Muslim countries, nor in the East. Many of the leaders of the Muslim Empire at the height of its glory were not only mulattoes, but blacks. One of them was Ibrahim al-Mahdi (Islam's most famous singer) and the half-brother of Haroun al-Rachid, the caliph of the Arabian Nights. Ibrahim describes himself as a "negro" in his autobiography.

His uncle and rival to the throne, Mamoun the Great, also called himself a "Negro". Ibrahim's mother was the daughter of a Persian king. Ibn Khallikan, a 13th-century Arab historian, says of Ibrahim that, "Being of a dark complexion which he had inherited from his mother, Shikla or Shakla, a Negress, he was given the name of Al-Thinnin - the Dragon (because of his size and the blackness of his skin). He was proclaimed Caliph in Baghdad under the title of Al Mubarak (The Holy One)" (12). At least two of the other caliphs, al-Muktafi and Rashid, had a black mother, according to Suyuti.

The renowned Kafur, ruler of Egypt, was a Negro slave of chankala birth; Haroun al-Rachid made Khusabeb, another former black slave, the master of Egypt (13). Mahmud of Ghazni, the greatest of the Muslim conquerors, was the son of a slave.

The Mamluks, some of whom were white slaves from the Caucasus and others black slaves from the Sudan, ruled Egypt for three centuries (1250-1517) and still wielded a great deal of power, when Napoleon invaded Egypt. Muslim India also had many great leaders of black origin, including Malik Ambar (14), a former slave, who became Prime Minister of the Sultanate. of Ahmadnagar - and Malik Andeel, another former slave, Sultan of Bengal (15).

The nababs, the great Muslim princes of India, were of Ethiopian origin (16). They were extremely powerful until the early 19th century.

Blacks top the list for their sexual abilities

As far as sexual relations were concerned, blacks were not ostracised either. Blacks, some of whom were eunuchs, sometimes had large harems with women of various races.

One of these, Sunbullu (the black hyacinth), made a gift of one of his white wives to the Sultan. In When it comes to sexual skills, which are much admired in the Arab world, the Arab gave first place to the black man, and apparently did so without any malice whatsoever.

In the sexual orgy described in *L'Histoire de Zohra dans Le Jardin Parfumé*, the honour of opening the hostilities is awarded to Mimoun, a black man who alone could satisfy the nymphomaniac Mouna. Mimoun outdid himself, in return for which Princess Zohra granted her favours to her master and he was able to marry Mouna (17).

In Arab fairy tales, too, black hair is generally reserved for "queens and women of high rank". In the above-mentioned classic of erotic literature by Sheikh Nafzawi we find the *Story of the Black al-Durgham and the Beautiful al-Budoor*, in which some of the greatest women of the empire, such as the Prime Minister, the Secretary of State, the State Treasurer and her own the caliph's daughter meet, in scenes of oriental splendour, to enjoy the embraces of vigorous black men. Al Durgham had women "that not even the king had in his palace". In fact, the blacks in the harems were overworked in every way. As al-Durgham sang,

"We blacks are fulfilled by women

We're not afraid of their tricks, however subtle they may be.

Sir Richard Burton, in an English translation of this work, declares that these scenes have nothing of singular. He adds: "Cairo society in the 1860s was quick to hush up a major scandal about the sexual prowess of a black man who was in charge of a pasha's harem... he had supplanted his The pasha, it seems, thought he had bought a black eunuch, but he had been duped by the slave trader. The pasha, it seems, thought he had bought a black eunuch, but he had been fooled by the slave trader.

Burton's translation of the Thousand and One Nights contains several stories which are generally expurgated, such as The Story of King Shahryar and His Brothers, The Story of the Eunuch Buhkayt, The Man of Al Yemen and His Six Slave Daughters and The Story of the Bewitched Prince. In the first story, the queen's ladies-in-waiting, women who are white or almost white, go out into the garden and each chooses a man of the same colour as themselves as a partner, but the queen chooses a man of the same colour as herself.

a black man with ebony skin, over whom she poured all her affection. But the queen, who "had been left alone, cried out: 'Come here, come close to me, Oh my lord Saeed'", and that's when a tall, slobbering black man with revolting eyes sprang from one of the trees, a truly abominable sight. He stepped forward

boldly towards her and jumped on her neck, while... " The rest of the story is not for everyone.

In a note to the second story, in which the master's daughter gives herself to a black man, Burton declares:

"This familiarity with young black slaves is common in the East and often ends as it did in history.

"In my time no honest Indian Muslim would have taken his wives with him to Zanzibar because of the enormous temptations to which they exposed themselves on that island." (Burton is referring here to muscular black men who roamed the streets naked) (18).

Napoleon on racial mixing in the East

When Napoleon invaded Egypt in 1798 and saw that the different races of mankind were living in harmony in Islam, whereas in Christian Haiti, whites, mulattoes and blacks were killing each other, he was so impressed that he tried to pass laws to introduce racial mixing. He wrote: "Asia and Africa are inhabited by several colours of men, and polygamy is the only effective means of confusing them so that the white man does not persecute the black man, or the black man the white man. Polygamy means that they are born of the same mother or father. Black and white, being brothers, sit and see each other at the same table. Also in the East, no colour affects superiority over the other."

"The legislators thought that in order for the whites not to be enemies of the blacks, the blacks of the whites, the coppers of both, it was necessary to make them all members of the same family, and thus to fight against man's tendency to hate everything that is not himself. Mohammed thought that four

women were enough to achieve this objective, because each man could have one white, one black, one copper and one woman of another colour."

"When we want to give freedom to the blacks in our colonies and destroy the prejudices of the coloureds, the legislator will have to authorise polygamy and allow them to have a white wife, a black wife and a black wife at the same time.

black and a mulatto. From then on, the different colours belonging to the same family will be confused in the opinion of each; otherwise, no results will ever be obtained. The blacks will either be more numerous or more skilful, and then they will keep the whites down: and vice versa."

"As a result of this general principle of the equality of colours established by polygamy, there was no difference between the individuals making up the house of the Mamluks. A black slave whom a bey had bought from an African caravan became katchef and equal to the handsome white mameluke from Circassia; it was not even suspected that it could be otherwise.

"In the East, slavery has never had the same character as in the West. The slavery of the East is that which we see in the Holy Scriptures; the slave inherits from his master, he marries his daughter. Most pashas have been slaves; many of the great viziers, all the Mamluks, Ali-Bey, Murad-Bey, have been slaves and began by fulfilling the lowest offices in their master's house, rising through merit or favour. In the West, on the other hand, the slave was always below the servant; he occupied the lowest rank" (19).

In short, black people have not been discriminated against on the basis of their skin colour alone in any country.

phase of Mohammedanism. Islam is the largest and freest of all the great melting pots. And it has brought racial mixing throughout the largest empire the world has ever known. At the height of its power, Islam extended from the centre of France to the south of the Mediterranean, on both shores of the Mediterranean as far as the Levant, and from there to India, China, the Pacific islands and Asian Russia.

The sultans in this vast region were of all colours, from blond to coal black, and there were women of all colours in their harems. Islam took white prisoners of both sexes in Europe and dispersed them in North Africa and Asia, and at the same time dispersed white men and women in their harems. black captives of both sexes in Europe and Asia. Over time, the differences in colour between Muslims came to count for as little as the different colours of flowers in a flower garden (20).

Negroid blood, more or less predominant, runs in the veins of all Muslims. As Keane puts it, "All those who accepted the Koran mingled with the victors to form a population with Negroid blood in common" (21).

It was this empire, founded by the black Mohammed with the help of brown, yellow and white mongrels, that awakened proud Europe from the sleep of the Dark Ages and laid the foundations of its present culture. Modern science owes much to the great Arab chemists, architects, mathematicians, physicians and scientists.

Egypt today

The racial composition of the Egyptian population today can be summarised as follows: Alexandria and the delta are a little more white than black due to European immigration; in Cairo there are also many Europeans, but the indigenous population is mulatto; these mulattos are dark-skinned; in Thebes most of the inhabitants are rather dark-skinned mulattos, with a high percentage of blacks and, in the Anglo-Egyptian Sudan, there are many more blacks than mulattos and very few whites, most of them Europeans. Some of these blacks do not have the general characteristics of blacks from West Africa: their hair is woolly. A number of jet-skinned blacks with frizzy hair have an almost Greek profile. A Levantine component is also visible in part of the population. In short, this black population is extremely mixed.

The inhabitants of southern Persia are still mostly negroid. Some are pure black, like the Bombassis. The Susians in the lower Euphrates valley are also very black. negroid. Throughout this region of the Near East, the slave trade has always produced "pure" blacks. "Black women continue to enter harems in large numbers. Blacks in this region also marry white women.

J. A. Rogers, *Sex and Race, Negro-Caucasian Mixing in All Ages and All Lands, Volume I: The Old World*. New York, J. A. Rogers, 1941, excerpt, translated from the American by B.K.

(1a) David Samuel, *Margoliouth, Mohammed*, London, 1927, p. 63.

(1b) Emile Dermenghem, *The Life of Mohamet*, p. 5, London, 1930.

(2) *Islamic Review*, vol. 20, p. 220, June-July 1932.

(3) *A Study of History*, vol. I, London, 1934, p. 226; here is the full quotation: "The different races have not doubted that the ancient author of the species had precisely their characters. On this point, on

On this alone, their traditions are unanimous. The whites have made themselves an Adam and an Eve that Blumenbach would have declared Caucasian; and a book, frivolous in appearance, but full of accurate observations and exact facts, *The Thousand and One Nights*, relates that certain negroes give Adam and his wife as black; that, these authors of humanity having been created in the image of God, God is black too, and the angels of even, and that the prophet of God was naturally too favoured to show white skin to his followers."

(4) *Intellectual Development of Europe*, New York, 1863, p. 348. The ancient Norse had no use for 'culture' and its abstract knowledge and values, whose development in a society is proportional to the importance it attaches to the feminine, lunar, aphrodisian element.

"When I hear the word 'culture'," said Baldur von Shirach in 1933, echoing the words of Friederich Thiemann and putting his money where his mouth was, "I pull out my revolver.

(5) *The Making of Europe*, p. 152. New York, 1932; Philip Khuri Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, London, 1937, p. 382.

(6) *Al-Mas'ûdî, The Golden Meadows*, vol. I, p. 163-67; vol. III, chap. 33, Paris, 1863.

(7) Philip Khuri Hitti, *op. cit.* pp. 467-68.

(8) Nefzawi, *Le Jardin Parfumé. History of the Negro*, pp. 44-72, Paris, 1927.

(9) Ibn Khallikan, *Biographical Dictionary*, (trans. MacGuckin de Slane), Vol I no 32 111. Paris, 1842-71.

(10) Ibn Khallikan, *Biographical Dictionary*, (MacGuckin de Slane), Vol II, pp 524 et seq, Paris. 1842.

(11) Job Ludolphus. *A New History of Ethiopia*, book I, chap. 14, Samuel Smith, London, 1682.

(12) Ibn Khallikan, *op. cit.*, vol. 1, p. 17.

(13) Saadi, *Golistan*, ed. Sir Edward Arnold, p. 80-1, 1899.

(14) See note 39.

(15) See note 40.

(16) Morié, Louis-J., *Histoire de l'Ethiopie*, Vol. II, p. 33, Paris, 1904.

(17) P. 281-297, Paris, 1927.

(18) Vol. 1, pp. 1-16, 6. 71 : Vol. II. p. 49: Vol. IV, p. 245-60, 253, 278.

(19) *Memoirs*, vol. III. p. 152-54, 259-76. Paris, 1904.

(20) It should be pointed out that the population of the Arabian Peninsula was already fairly mixed, according to an author quoted by Rogers himself, Margoliouth (Editor's note).

(21) Augustus Henry Keane, *Man, Past and Present*, Cambridge, 1920, p. 64.

Racial mixing in North Africa took an almost opposite direction to that in the United States. In the Maghreb, light-skinned whites were introduced as slaves and light-skinned whites as concubines of mulattoes, dark-skinned whites and blacks.

By the 8th century, this process had probably been going on for thousands of years. From the time before Julius Caesar to the first part of the 19th century, privateers, most of whom were Negroid, plundered the ships and coasts of Europe as far north as the British Isles.

With the invasion of Spain by the Moors in 711, the number of white prisoners in Africa increased (...) For four centuries, from 1400 to 1800, European sovereigns had to pay the ransom of white Christians enslaved in Africa.

Holland, Sweden, Denmark, Spain and even the United States, once they became independent, had to pay ransoms to these Negroid corsairs. White Americans were captured on the high and taken as slaves to Sudan. The United States repeatedly sent warships to Africa to free them.

Abbé Busnot, sent by Louis XIV to negotiate with Moulay Ismaël, Emperor of Morocco, for the release of French prisoners, describes their fate and numbers with compassion. Pidou de Saint-Olon, another Frenchman who visited Morocco at the time, says of Moulay Ismaël: "[He] beckoned the French slaves to come closer, and [they all] threw themselves belly down at his feet..." (22). The Africans treated their white slaves as harshly as the American colonists treated the blacks, except that the Christians always had the option of converting to Islam, a step that most of them were reluctant to take.

J. G. Jackson, another writer of the time, says: "They [the Moors] took the Christian captives into the desert to sell them at the various markets held there, for they soon realised that they were useless, or very inferior to the black slaves of Timbuktu." After taking three days to get to one market, five days, sometimes two weeks, to another, they were finally put in the hands of the Christians.

Jewish itinerant merchants, who came from Wedinooon to sell their goods, arranged to exchange them for tobacco, salt, cloth or anything else they could get their hands on and returned to Wedinooon with their purchases (23).

Frederick Moore says: "All historical sources agree that thousands of Christian slaves, most of them British, were sold on Salli's white slave market. The features of many of the present inhabitants of this town are distinctly European. There seems to be less admixture of black blood here than in other towns [in the region]; many of the inhabitants are as white as Europeans (24)."

Jackson adds, with regard to the Métis of this region: "The colour of their skin, due to marriages or sexual relations with members of the Sudanic race, has a wide range of shades, from black to white: whenever people come across a Mauritian woman with blue or grey eyes, they suspect her of being the descendant of a Christian renegade".

Adolphe Bloch gave this precise description of the present-day race of Moors: "In fact, the race that gave birth to the Moroccans can only be that of the African Negroes, because the same black type, in the with more or less Caucasian features, can be found as far as Senegal, on the right bank of the river, not to mention that it has also been recognised in various parts of the Sahara, in Tafilett, Touat, Oued-Righ, in Nefzaouâ, in Fezzan, and that is why there are black Moors who still have thick lips, the result of negroid descent and not of mixing".

"As for the white, swarthy or tanned Moors, they are nothing other (apart from the Arabs) than close relatives of the black Moors with whom they form varieties of the same race; and just as among Europeans one can see blonds, browns and chestnuts in the midst of the same population, so one can see Moroccans of all colours in the same town, without there being any reason to consider them as true mulattoes (25).

This is a fact that is overlooked by those who speak of "Hamites". The "Hamite" and even the Semite is only one type of mulatto. My impression of the population of the native districts of the cities Moroccans is that, apart from the clothes and customs, it is very similar to those of black neighbourhoods in the United States.

Voltaire, a contemporary of Moulay Ismaël, also wrote about white slaves in Morocco in the eleventh chapter of *Candide*. One of the characters in this novella is the beautiful daughter of Pope Urban X and the Princess of Palestrine, who has been captured by a Moorish privateer, an abominable "Negro" who makes her his mistress and "still [thinks] he is doing [her] much honour.

These Moorish privateers had dominated the coasts of north-west Scotland for centuries. Allan McRuari, the dark-skinned pirate of the Hebrides in the fifteenth century," writes David McRitchie in a book about these pirates. corsairs, is a remarkable example of these black invaders". George Hardy says: "The Merindes (Moors) took advantage of their maritime position to create a powerful fleet and wage a fierce battle against the Christian countries of the Mediterranean."

"From their ports departed armed ships manned by crews of proven bravery and equipped by local companies. These "privateers" would unexpectedly descend on the coasts or islands of the Mediterranean and sell as slaves the sailors and passengers they captured en route. A veritable terror reigned in the Mediterranean... They ravaged the coasts of Portugal, Spain and Portugal. Spain and the south of France. And they even reached as far as Great Britain (26).

George I of England, in his Speech from the Throne on 19 October 1721, spoke of the "great number of my subjects delivered from slavery" by virtue of a treaty concluded with Moulay Ismaël According to C. B. Driscoll, these privateers captured Baltimore Castle in 1631 and their black leader, A. H. Krussa, kidnapped Mary, daughter of Sir Fineen O'Driscoll, master of the castle (27).

Some of these white European women ended up in the harems of the sultans and rose to important positions. One of the best known was Shams Ed Douha (The Morning Sun), the favourite wife of Abu Hassan Ali, the famous "Black Sultan". Their joint tomb in Sheila is one of Morocco's architectural gems (28).

Moulay Ismaël, the "African Louis XIV", the most famous ruler of Morocco and the son of a black slave with an unattractive physique, had one of the largest harems in history. The Abbé Busnot who visited him said that his favourite wife was a huge woman as black as coal; his second favourite was an Englishwoman who had been captured at the age of fifteen; and his third favourite was another black woman, whose son succeeded Moulay Ismaël.

Moulay Ismaël's greatest general was a Negro, Empsaël, whose favourite, Zoraïde, was French. Bernardin de Saint-Pierre, the author of *Paul et Virginie*, was inspired by this mixed marriage to write a satire on the treatment of blacks in America and the conviction of whites that their colour makes them superior. In his play *Empsaël et Zoraïde ou les blancs esclaves des noirs au Maroc*, two of Empsaël's generals discuss their leader's marriage to a white woman:

Annibal.

It is Zoraïde who is the cause of the disorder among our people. Every day she obtains some new grace for them from Empsaël. I don't know why our great general married a woman of this colour. She must have seduced him with some charm. Our black women are more beautiful, better made, more cheerful, livelier, stronger, and yet more submissive to their husbands than white women.

Balabou.

You mustn't despise Zoraïde just because she's white. God has given her a soul like he has given me and you.

Annibal.

I don't despise her for that. It's enough that she's our general's wife. But how can he to have had so little taste? We see white men falling in love with black women, but very few black men loving white women.

Balabou.

You're right. Black is the natural colour of men and women. It comes from the sun and never fades. White, on the other hand, is a diseased colour that never fades. in the shade. All these European whites have effeminate faces (29).

A West Indian named Aimée also became very influential in the Orient. Captured on the high seas in 1789 on her way back to Martinique, she was sold into slavery. Later, she was bought by the Sultan of Turkey and became Sultana Validé and the mother of the heir to the throne (30).

Incidentally, Moulay Ismaël made an offer of marriage to the Princess of Conti (...), essentially, apparently to seal his friendship with the King of France. The princess refused, arguing that the Moroccan ruler already had enough wives.

Morocco was the scene of a mixture of black and white blood as great as that which occurred in the southern United States, except that it was the blacks who imposed their law. And yet, As already mentioned, there were no untoward consequences for the whites, except for those who refused to embrace Islam. Moulay Ismaël's great admiral was a white man, Abdalla Ben Aicha, who captured hundreds of European ships and was later appointed ambassador to the court of Louis XIV.

Moulay Ismaël also brought hundreds of thousands of unmixed blacks and their wives from the south across the desert and settled them in his empire. He made them into a praetorian guard of 150,000 loyal blacks (the Bukharis), with whom he dominated his subjects and neighbours. These blacks were forbidden to have relations with the population. After his death, they ruled the empire for a long time.

Moulay Ismaël also had a smaller army of white slaves.

The brother of the last sultan, who is still alive, is black with coal.

Algeria and Tunis

What Flournoy says about the mixture of races in Morocco, namely that a considerable part of the Moroccan population is made up of women, is also true. population, in particular the aristocracy and the royal family, has black blood in its veins (31), is also true of Algeria and Tunis, albeit to a lesser extent.

A large number of white prisoners were also taken to Algiers, one of the great strongholds of African privateers. Algeria and Tunisia were formerly under Moroccan rule.

Morgan, in his History of Barbary and Algiers, mentions Hamida, a "mulatto", ruler of Ténès, who conquered Tunis in 1544 and who was "a fine talker, placid and fearless" (32). He also names other black rulers of North Africa. Blacks and Negroids still made up the majority of the Algerian population, particularly the soldiers. The proportion is slightly lower in Tunis, but just as high or even higher in Tripoli (Libya). When the late Professor H. B. Moens showed the Bey of Tunis photographs of young Negro-American girls, he asked, "How come they look like some of my subjects?" This fact is confirmed by the 174 portraits of North Africans reproduced by Bertholon and Chantre (33).

The Byzantine Empire (later the Turkish Empire)

The Byzantine Empire, or Eastern Roman Empire, included what is now Asian Turkey, European Turkey, Bulgaria, Greece, Romania, Albania, Yugoslavia, Sicily, the tip of the Italian boot and Sardinia, with Constantinople as its capital.

This empire was also a great melting pot. Arabs, Greeks, Armenians, Jews, Nordic peoples and blacks all came together and mingled. Byzantium had close cultural and commercial links with Ethiopia.

(34) The Byzantine rulers borrowed their title of Basileus (35) from Ethiopia and took charge of the Christianisation of the empire. Later, at the request of Byzantium, Abreha, emperor of Ethiopia, sent an army to Yemen across the Red Sea to rescue Christians persecuted by the Jewish ruler Dhu Nowas. This intervention was at the root of the war that has pitted Islam against the Jews for over a thousand years.

Christianity (36).

Steven Runciman says of the Byzantine period that "Races from all over the Mediterranean amalgamated here... The Byzantines were virtually free of racial prejudice. While it is true that Justinian II caused a stir when he married his black cook to a lady of the nobility In his view, this was less for racial than for social reasons (37).

Byzantium's greatest ruler, Nicephorus Phocas (912-969) was a black Arab. Luitprand, Bishop of Cremona, who met him, declared that he was "black" (38). As for the southern part of the Byzantine Empire, which extended as far as Sicily, it was long under the domination of African privateers.

In 904, Leo the African invaded southern Greece with 54 ships and 10,800 blacks and occupied it until Nicephorus Phocas drove him out (39). Greek kings still bear the title of Basileus.

In 1453, Constantinople, the capital and last bastion of Christianity in the East, was taken by the Turks. Under the Turks, blacks rose to the highest positions. Some of their most valiant generals were black. It was a gigantic Negro, Hassan, who was the first to scale the walls of Constantinople during the siege and open the breach that allowed the Turks to take it. Later, the Turks penetrated Hungary, Switzerland and Austria as far as the gates of Vienna, mingling their blood with that of the vanquished as they advanced. The Negroid blood visible in a number of Hungarians and Austrians is undoubtedly due to the Turkish invasion.

The genealogical line of Goethe, the greatest of all German writers, goes back to this stock Turkish negroid. In addition, there are two Mohrs - "negroes" in German - in his family tree (39a). Goethe was swarthy and had full lips, as his early portraits show. As for the Bulgarians, the word itself means "the black people". Anyone who has travelled to this region of Eastern Europe cannot help but be struck by the Negroid features of a number of its inhabitants.

Large numbers of blacks, mainly women, were brought from Sudan and Ethiopia to Turkish harems. Sultan Abdul-Hamid was so fond of Negroes that, when the slavery of blacks in Egypt was condemned, he founded a Turkish village made up entirely of "pure" blacks, whom he made his servants and eunuchs.

Some of the Turkish Negroes enjoyed quasi-royal power until 1907. Others only needed the title to become sultans. This was because blacks were renowned for their loyalty.

India

A large number of black Africans also went to India as mercenaries, slaves or traders under Islam. Some of them became prime ministers, great generals, great admirals and, in the case of several, great sultans. The Nababs, or Nabobs, are of Ethiopian descent. The hard work, skill and political acumen of the Ethiopians contributed to the rise of the Nabobs. to a large extent in making India the rich and prosperous country that the Portuguese and, later, the French and English found when they arrived in this part of the world (40).

One of India's greatest black rulers was Malik Ambar (41), governor of Bombay and the Deccan until his death in 1628. Another was Malik Andeel (42), who ruled Bengal from 1481 to 1494. The Moors of Spain and Morocco were also powerful in India before the arrival of the Europeans.

The Portuguese mixed so much with the natives that they soon became more Indian than European. According to Campos, "the number of marriages between Portuguese and Indians was enormous throughout India (43)". The same was true, to a large extent, of the French. When the English arrived in India in 1628, they too, having left their wives behind, willingly married natives. In this way, a large quantity of white European blood flowed into the Indian population.

Today, there are hundreds of thousands, if not millions, of mixed-bloods, the Eurasians, in India and Burma. Some groups of Eurasians, such as the Burghers of Ceylon, have their own castes.

Cedric Dover, an expert on the subject, gives an impressive list of great Indians of white stock, famous Europeans who married Indian women and Eurasians who married upper-class white women. Lord Liverpool, Prime Minister of England for fifteen years during the struggle against Napoleon, had a Eurasian mother. In the Proceedings of the Victoria Society, one of the speakers speaks of an "extraordinary contemporary British genius" who "has Oriental blood in his veins" (he does not give his name). Some English aristocrats married into Mogul families, who, as has been said, were originally of Black African descent. Dover says: "The story of these Eurindian alliances could be the subject of a romantic book which would throw light on the history of many aristocratic families who are now suspected of having been affected by miscegenation (44)."

As for some of the more modern aspects of race mixing in the East, in particular the white slave trade, we will deal with these in due course.

J. A. Rogers, *Sex and Race, Negro-Caucasian Mixing in All Ages and All Lands, Volume I: The Old World*. New York, 1941, excerpt, trans. from the American by B.K.

(22) See J.A. Rogers, *100 Amazing Facts About The Negro*, 18th ed, pp. 37-45.

(23) James Grey Jackson, *An Account of the Empire of Morocco*, London, 1809, p. 272-81.

(24) Frederick Moore, *The Passing of Morocco*, Houghton Mifflin & co, London, 1908, p. 133-4.

(25) http://www.persee.fr/web/revues/home/prescript/article/bmsap_0037-8984_1903_num_4_1_6539. [Editor's note]

(26) Georges Hardy and Paul Aurès, *Les Grands Etapes de l'Histoire du Maroc*, Paris, 1921, p. 50-4.

(27) Charles B. Driscoll, *Doubloons*, New York, 1930, p. 290-304.

(28) V.C. Scott O'Connor, *A Vision of Morocco*, T. Butterworth, London, 1923, p. 99-100.

(29) In Maurice Soumeau, Caen, 1905.

(30) Morton, B. A. *The Veiled Empress*, New York, 1923, p. 291.

(31) Francis R. Flournoy, *British Policy Towards Morocco in the Age of Palmerston (1830-1865)*, Baltimore, 1935, p. 17.

(32) *Ibid*, p. 245, 345, 370, 384, 1728.

(33) L.J. Bertholon, *Recherches Anthropologiques dans la Berbérie orientale*, vol. II. Lyon, 1913.

(34) Frobenius, *Voice of Africa* (chapter on Byzantium, Vol. II), London, 1910-12.

(35) *Ibid*; Charles Diehl, *L'Afrique Byzantine*, Paris, 1896.

(36) W.B., Harris, *Yemen*, Edinburgh, 1843, p. 317-321; William Muir, *Life of Mahomet*, London, 1894.

(37) Steven Runciman, *Byzantine Civilization*, London, 1933, p. 180-2.

(38) Charles Diehl, *Byzantine Portraits*, (trans. Harold Bell), New York, 1927, p. 215; "This Nicephorus seemed to me a real monster. He has the stature of a Pygmy, a large head, small eyes, a short, broad, thick beard, interspersed with white and black, a very short collar, very long and very black hair, a n Ethiopian complexion that would frighten anyone who met him in the dark of night, long thighs, short legs, a faded and worn habit, a foreign shoe, a prickly tongue &

<http://remacle.org/bloodwolf/historiens/liutprand/ambassade.htm>. [Editor's note]

(39) Gustave Schlumberger, *Un Empereur Byzantin au Xe Siècle*, Paris, 1911, p. 34.

(39a) Carl Knetsch, *Goethes Ahnen*, p. 19 and Table 12, Leipzig, 1908, pp. 28-31; Robert Sommer, *Familienforschung und Vererbungslehre*, Leipzig, 1907, pp. 107-206. Other sources on Goethe's ancestry can be found in *Nature Knows No Color-Line*, p. 131.

(40) D.R. Benaji, *Bombay and the Sidis*, London, 1932.

(41) J.D.B. Gribble, *History of the Deccan*, Vol. I, p. 51, 100, 104-5, 125-6, 251-62.

London, 1896. Balfour, *Encyclopedia of India* (see Negro Races); Ferishtah, *Rise of the Mohammedan Power in India*, vol. IV, p. 341.

(42) Charles Stewart, *History of Bengal*, London, 1813, pp. 100-8.

(43) J.J.A. Campos, *History of the Portuguese in Bengal*, Calcutta, 1919, pp. 171-2, 177-203 (it should be pointed out that the Portuguese language was already mixed with Semitic at the time Portugal embarked on its colonial adventure, following the invasion of the Iberian Peninsula by Arab armies from 711 onwards; see "The Genetic Legacy of Religious Diversity and Intolerance: Paternal Lineages of Christians, Jews, and Muslims in the Iberian Peninsula", [http://www.cell.com/AJHG/abstract/S0002-9297\(08\)00592-2](http://www.cell.com/AJHG/abstract/S0002-9297(08)00592-2); similarly, since a stream of Semitic blood was already flowing in the veins of the oldest families of the British aristocracy in the "Middle Ages", as Sir Burton reminds us in *The Jew, the Gypsy and El Islam*, it is hardly surprising that, "When the English arrived in India in 1628, they too, having left their wives behind, [willingly] married natives...". Here is a list of the families in question: <http://www.big-lies.org/jews/jews-thorkelson.html>. What about the French? (Editor's note)

(44) Cedric Dover, *Half Caste*, pp. 117-120, 178-80, London, 1937. The famous Lord Fisher, Admiral of the Fleet 1841-1920, had Indian blood in his veins.

Globalists and Islamists (I)

When Machiavelli observes that "... dissension in a republic often comes from the idleness that follows peace; the first cry of war also becomes the signal for union", he may be right about what he calls the "Roman republic", but he is wrong about the Italian republics, the Italian merchant republics, of his time.

The dissensions that reign there stem from the fact that their main activity is trade, for, as René Guénon remarks, "Matter... is essentially multiplicity and division, and therefore a source of This is why, as Aristotle shows (although he calls it an oligarchy), plutocracy is, along with tyranny, the least stable of governments. This is essentially why plutocracy, as Aristotle shows (though he calls it oligarchy), is, along with tyranny, the least stable of governments. The lack of stability in this political system is compounded by a psychological characteristic of the people who hold power in it because of their wealth: "the mutual distrust they inspire in each other", combined with a deep distrust of the people. ... in the eyes of the Florentine bourgeoisie," Machiavelli wrote of his native city, "the fear of the people has always prevailed over the fear of foreigners, the fear of the enemy within over the fear of the enemy without. Thus, for political reasons, the defence of the city was left in the hands of condottiere and mercenary troops instead of being entrusted to those whose interest it was to fight for their freedom". Similarly, seven centuries later, it is less and less rare for the key posts in European republics to be occupied by civil servants or politicians of foreign origin, or even of colour, all of them lackeys of the real holders of power, who also happen to be the holders of wealth. These republics are therefore de facto plutocracies. Worse still, the holders of the wealth, like an increasing number of the civil servants and politicians they parachute into positions to slavishly carry out the 'globalist' policies they have devised behind the scenes, are, in a growing proportion, not only of foreign origin, but of coloured race, not to mention women. They represent what F.P. Yockey calls the "cultural distorter", the enemy within the "globalist" movement.

The aim is the "spiritual and physical annihilation" of the white European peoples and, more specifically, of the last rare representatives of the white race.

That Europe's enemy has become strictly internal since the end of the Second World War is abundantly clear from the spirit of all the measures taken by the presidential lackeys, ministers and bureaucrats of the "cultural distorter" since then, in e v e r y field, be it economic, social or cultural. The closer we get to the total destruction of Europe, the more it is

It was in the interests of Europe's internal enemy to make the populace believe that the enemy of what remained of Europe was external. He first resorted to the stratagem of the "Cold War"

("холодная

война") (1954 - 1975), which became "fresh" following the economic crisis of the mid

1970 in the 'Western' countries, and ended, without breaking out, with the implosion of the USSR in 1991, organised by the financial circles for which the United States acted as a smokescreen. The philosopher

German Machiavellian politician of Jewish origin and putative pope of neo-conservatism Leo Strauss (1899 - 1973), whose doctrine was well summarised by one of his main biographers as follows "If there is no external threat, then we must create one from scratch", did not live long enough to see the second concrete application of his principle: the "Islamic threat". The "Islamic threat" was fabricated by Europe's enemy within at the end of the 1970s, and the "Soviet threat" was soon consigned to the proverbial dustbin.

The collusion between globalists and Islamists to destroy what may be left of Europe is no longer a secret to patriots worthy of the name. It has been highlighted by Alexandre Del Valle in *Islamisme et Etats-Unis, une alliance contre l'Europe* (1997) The book, not surprisingly, received a very mixed reception from authorised critics, some justified, others absurd and tinged with jobardism. The former focused on points of detail; the latter on substance.

Across the Atlantic, the book was unsurprisingly branded anti-American. (<http://www.meforum.org/1249/islamisme-et-etats-unis-une-alliance-contre>), without going so far as to describe it as "primary".

On the substance, it has been rightly deplored that the author "uses very few American sources". The essay published below amply remedies this shortcoming. Written some five years after *Islamism and the United States, an alliance against Europe*, it consolidates Del Valle's thesis by relying either on primary sources that had appeared in the meantime, or on documents that Del Valle had not used. It has two major flaws, which we should try to overlook and which, in any case, do not detract from the thesis it supports: the first, which he is far from alone in having, is to consider that the Middle East policy of each of the "Western" protagonists is the expression of their own "political" and "economic" interests. geostrategic objectives of sovereign political authorities acting in their national interests In fact, it only responds to the strictly private interests of the representatives of stateless high finance who operate behind the scenes. Instead of "Great Britain", "the United States" or "France", it would be more accurate to refer to N. M. Rothschild & Sons Limited, N. M. Rothschild & Sons LLC and Rothschild Frères.

The second, which generally follows on from the first, is the guilt-inducing demonisation of the "West".

Let's be clear: Islam, like any proselytising, universalist ideology, is expansionist and conquering.

No sooner was the Koran revealed to Mohamed than Arab armies set out to conquer the Byzantine Empire, conquering Syria in 635, conquering Armenia and Egypt in 639, laying siege to Constantinople in 717-718; in 651, Persia was conquered after 15 years of war; the conquest of Afghanistan was completed in 709, as was that of North Africa; in 712, the Muslim Arabs Their armies landed in Spain in 711 and are said to have been halted at Poitiers in 732. Crete was conquered around 824, Sicily in 827, Malta in 870, the Balearic Islands in 902 and Cyprus in 965. Converted to Sunnism in the tenth century, the Seljuks, a nomadic tribe from Central Asia, began their conquest of Anatolia in 1060, completing it three centuries later. The Ottoman Turks conquered Thrace in 1366, Macedonia in 1371, Bulgaria in 1394, Thessaly in 1399, part of Serbia and central Albania in 1467, Montenegro in 1499, took Belgrade in 1521, took Rhodes in 1522, took Buda and most of Hungary in 1526, took Bosnia, Croatia, the Czech Republic and Hungary in 1527, and took the Czech Republic in 1528. Slavonia and Dalmatia in 1527, laid siege to Vienna in 1529 and again in 1683; a Muslim state was established by force of arms in 1725 in West Africa, a slave state, with slaves making up two-thirds of its population (<http://www.britannica.com/blackhistory/article-24157>), not to mention the countless jihads in modern times, from Vietnam to the Caucasus via Somalia.

However, an Arab invasion of Europe by armed force is no longer an option. Times have changed, and so have the political personnel who, because they do the bidding of the "distorter culture", have opened the doors of Europe wide to the Arabs - among others. We have," Gaddafi told Al Jazeera in April 2006, 50 million Muslims in Europe. There are signs that Allah will grant us a great victory in Europe, without swords, without guns, without conquests. The 50 million Muslims in Europe will make it a Muslim continent in a few decades. Allah mobilises the Muslim nation of Turkey and brings it into the European Union. That's 50 million more Muslims. There will be 100 million Muslims in Europe. Albania, a Muslim country, has already joined the European Union. Bosnia, a Muslim country, has already joined the European Union. 50% of its citizens are Muslims. Europe is in an unfortunate situation. And so is America. They [the Western nations] should accept to become Muslims in time or declare war on the Muslims". (<http://www.memri.org/report/en/0/0/0/0/0/1676.htm> (note the consummate hypocrisy of the former Libyan leader, who, in the alternative he leaves, feigns to ignore the fact that the "Islamisation" of Europe is part of the programme of its pseudo-elites; it should also be noted, not without deploring the culpable lukewarmness of their media interventions (*), that the parties Europeans who present themselves as opponents of the "Islamisation" of Europe are not using the ammunition regularly supplied to them by a number of Arab personalities. "There are fifty million Muslims in Europe. 80% of these Muslims are beggars, who live by their wits. Western welfare. In other words, Europeans pay taxes and the state gives money to Muslims to buy food. Muslims in the West do not earn their daily bread. If he were in the Islamic world, he'd die - even cows and goats can't support themselves in the Islamic world... In Sweden, there are 500 associations

and only one Jewish association. Every mosque in Europe is a den of thieves. At In accordance with European laws on the support of religions and cultural diversity, Muslims are financed by the State and the people in charge of the mosques steal these funds". (Yahya Abu Zakariya, Mayadeen TV, October 12, 2012 (<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2nFFq9CkG4k>) it hardly needs to be said that this journalist has not been sued by any kind of "association").

In short, while the threat of the institutionalised "Islamisation" of Western European countries is objectively real, the "Islamic terrorist threat" is a decoy, designed to further facilitate the ongoing "Islamisation" of Western European countries by diverting the attention of the international community from the "Islamisation" of Western Europe.

The aim is to turn the spotlight on the exotic regions where Arab, black or yellow Islamists are based, while, with the blessing and complicity of government and technocrat henchmen, they are forced to take to the streets. In practical terms, this means turning the spotlight on the exotic regions where Arab, black or yellow Islamists are based, while, with the blessing and complicity of the government henchmen and technocrats of the "culture distorter", thousands of their racial brothers and sisters are being killed. Every day, they blithely cross the sieves that are the borders of the EU, bound for the Allocations Familiales and CAFs closest to their point of arrival in Western Europe.

As the problem is much more racial than religious, the term "Islamisation" is used here in inverted commas.

I. Great Britain takes over the Middle East

As indicated in F. William Engdahl's book *A Century of War - Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*, Great Britain began to take a real interest in the Middle East when its leaders realised that oil would soon replace coal as a source of energy.

energy. At the turn of the century, Britain was entirely dependent on America, Russia and Mexico for its oil supplies. This situation was soon judged and the pressure exerted on the geologist by the British spy Sidney Reilly.

Australian engineer William Knox d'Arcy enabled Great Britain to obtain drilling rights from the Persian monarch Reza Khan. D'Arcy paid him the equivalent of \$20,000 in cash for the rights.

to exploit Persian oil until 1961 and contracted to pay a 16% royalty on all sales. The British company with which Reilly persuaded d'Arcy to form an alliance took over the business.

then the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, the forerunner of the powerful British Petroleum (BP).

However, the fact that Britain had succeeded in obtaining supplies of Persian oil did not mean that it had got its hands on the Middle East's oil reserves. In the
Before the First World War, Germany had experienced an astonishing economic boom, due in part to its alliance with the Ottoman Empire and the vast oil reserves to which the latter had given it access. In 1889, the Germans worked on an agreement with the Turks to finance, through Deutsche Bank, a railway from Constantinople to Anatolia and, ten years later, they signed an agreement with them to build a railway from Berlin to Baghdad.

Great Britain ensured that the rail link was never completed, using its ally Serbia to block Germany's alliance with Austria-Hungary, Bulgaria and the Ottoman Empire. The First World War is generally considered to have been triggered by the assassination of the Austrian Archduke Ferdinand by Serbs. Serbia played a key role in the First World War, but the conflict was not simply the result of Serbia alone. event. The truth is that the First World War was fomented by the British, who geostrategic experts predicted would become the world's most important resource (1).

In 1916, at the height of the First World War, the British drew up agreements with France, with the backing of Italy and Russia, which provided for the division of the Middle East into zones of influence between the first two powers, in anticipation of a victory over the Ottoman Empire. These secret agreements, known as the Sykes-Picot Agreement, created the arbitrary borders of what are now Jordan, Syria, Lebanon, Iraq and Kuwait. Great Britain would control the Gulf Persian through Iraq and Kuwait and would also receive Palestine and Jordan. The French would receive Syria and Lebanon, Italy was promised parts of Anatolia and certain islands in the Mediterranean, and Russia was to obtain parts of Armenia and Kurdistan.

During the war, Britain transferred more than 1.4 million soldiers from the Western Front to the East to fight the Ottomans. While 1.5 million Frenchmen died and 2.6 million were wounded in the trenches, Britain went from strength to strength in the Middle East. After the war, Britain kept more than a million soldiers in the region and, in 1918, British General Allenby found that he had de facto absolute military authority over virtually the whole of the Arab Middle East (2).

While T.E. Laurence was leading the Arab revolt against the Ottomans on behalf of the British, he had assured his Arab allies that Britain would respect their desire for independence, but after the war these promises were ignored. In 1917, in an open letter to Lord Lionel Walter

Rothschild, Lord Balfour promised that Great Britain was ready to officially recognise a Jewish state in Palestine.

In its fight against the Ottoman Empire, Great Britain obtained the support of two important Arab leaders. The first was Hussein bin Ali of the Hashemite dynasty, which claimed direct descent from the Prophet Muhammad. He ruled over the Hijaz region, which included Mecca and Medina. The British played on his status as a "holy" figure to widen his popular support as much as possible. The second prominent Arab ruler the British brought into their fold was Mohammed Ibn Saud, leader of the Wahhabi tribal sect from Central Arabia. Ibn Saud used the money given to him by the British to strengthen his position as a religious figure and buy the support of the Bedouins.

After the defeat of the Ottomans and the publication of the Sykes-Picot Agreement and the Balfour Declaration, Hussein bin Ali, realising that he had been betrayed, abdicated. His three sons, Ali, Faisal and Abdallah then tried their hand at politics.

Ali was King of Hijaz and Sherif of Mecca from October 1924 until December 1925, when he was ousted by Ibn Saud's pro-British forces. The Saudis have ruled Arabia ever since. Britain's greatest mistake (3) was to lose interest in the Saudis and the deserts of Arabia, allowing California's Standard Oil to buy the rights to explore for oil in Saudi Arabia for 250,000 in 1933 (4). Since then, the Saudi royal family has maintained a very special relationship with the United States.

Fayçal had worked with T.E. Lawrence and taken Damascus from the Ottomans. On 7 March 1920, the Syrian National Congress voted for Syrian independence and proclaimed him "constitutional king" of the Syrian Arab Kingdom under the name of Faysal I. However, he was forced to abdicate a few months later after Syria was placed under French mandate. However, he was forced to abdicate a few months later, after Syria was placed under French mandate. He went into exile in Great Britain and, a year later, this Sunni prince was parachuted in as king of the predominantly Shiite territory of Iraq. Faysal I reigned until his death in 1933, his son Ghazi until his death in 1939, followed by his son, Faysal II, the last king of Iraq, who was killed in a military coup in 1958.

Abdallah ascended the throne of the Emirate of Transjordan in 1921 and, as king, he kept a close relationship with the Emirate of Transjordan.

He was openly pro-British, despite the betrayal of his father. Abdullah understood that he had nothing to gain by putting himself at odds with the British, and the British used him to calm the fury of his people at the unofficial announcement of the creation of a Jewish state.

in Palestine. King Abdullah was killed in the Al-Aqsa Mosque in 1951 and his sixteen-year-old grandson Hussein ascended the throne. King Hussein reigned until his death in 1999 and his son now rules the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan as Abdullah II.

In *A Brutal Friendship - The West and the Arab Elite*, the Arab historian Saïd Aburish identifies three distinct phases in relations between Islam and the West in the twentieth century (5).

The first phase, according to Aburish, was the years immediately following the First World War. The Arab leaders may have been deceived and betrayed by the British (6), but they were powerless to exercise any authority over the Arab masses without British support.

Ibn Saud was the leader of the Wahhabi sect and Great Britain, aware of his influence as a religious figure, financed his conquest of the whole of Arabia.

The Hashemites were the greatest traditional Arab force until Ibn Saud drove them out of Mecca and Medina. In their "mercy", the British then placed Abdallah and Faysal on the throne of Jordan and Iraq respectively. These Hashemite princes were foreigners, to say the least, but the British played the "mercy" card to the full.

religion, using the Hashemites' religious prestige to justify their actions to the Arab peoples. Any Arab would be happy to be governed by a "holy" clan like the Hashemites.

The British used Islam in Palestine too, when, in 1921, they had one of their own elected Haj Amin Hussein, a descendant of Mohammed, to the post of Grand Mufti of Jerusalem. In Palestine, almost all the major Arab families quickly found it in their interests to be pro-British, and the Grand Mufti maintained this attitude at least until 1936, when the imminent establishment of a Jewish state in Palestine forced him to finally support the will of his people (7).

Regarding the first phase of relations between Islam and the West, Aburish writes: "All the political leaders of the time derived their legitimacy from Islam and all the political leaders were pro-British. Islam was an instrument to legitimise the rule, tyranny and corruption of the Arab rulers. For the West, Islam was acceptable, it could be used and, of course, it was the right thing to do. In fact, he was (8).

The Arab elites could not continue indefinitely to use Islam as a factor of power. to subjugate their peoples. The force that rose to oppose this was secular Arab nationalism, embodied in the person of Gamal Abdel Nasser. This movement sought to liberate the Middle East from Western domination and at the same time despised Islam, which had been successfully used to support and justify the authority of the elites. Before moving on to the second phase of relations between the West and Islam, which began with the rise of Arab nationalism, we need to look briefly at the history of Egypt.

II. Great Britain and Egypt

At the outbreak of the First World War, Egypt had been controlled by Britain for over thirty years. While the British had used Islam to bring down the Ottomans and support their client states, they realised that Islam was not a very malleable resource in Egypt, at least not for as long as Britain remained the coloniser.

Western influence on Egypt began in 1798, when Napoleon invaded Egypt to threaten Britain's trade routes to India. It was the first major and decisive conquest of an Arab-Muslim nation in the history of Islam and marked the beginning of a slow decline in Muslim pride and influence. Napoleon's rule did not last long, as the British, temporarily allied with the Ottomans, drove the French out of Egypt a few years later.

Out of this chaos emerged an Albanian commander in the Ottoman army by the name of Mohammed Ali, who helped expel the British from Egypt and later became governor of Egypt under Ottoman rule. Ali neutralised the threat of the Egyptian Mamluks and then devoted himself to modernising Egypt. After Ali's death, his successors, Abbas and Said Pasha, governed Egypt. Said Pasha initiated the Suez Canal project and his successor Ismail Pasha completed it in 1869. The canal was financed mainly by French investors, but at that time France was firmly controlled by Great Britain. British influence in Egypt grew slowly but surely, not militarily but economically. The British ideology of "free trade" was adopted and Egyptian industry suffered. Egypt soon found itself heavily in debt.

In 1879, Ismail was ousted from power and replaced by his son Tufik Pasha, who wearily relinquished control of the Egyptian economy to the British. In 1882, British troops landed and took over the whole of Egypt. They occupied Egypt until 1956, when they were driven out by President Nasser.

At the outbreak of the First World War, Khedive Abbas felt it was possible to get rid of Britain and encouraged the people to support the Ottomans. Britain quickly deposed him and put his uncle Hussein Kamal in power. At the end of the war, Egyptian nationalist forces continued to campaign for independence from the British occupiers. Their hopes were dashed when the United States sided with Great Britain.

In 1922, Great Britain relinquished its "protectorate" over Egypt, while retaining responsibility for the "defence" of Egypt and the protection of foreigners in Egypt. Egypt had obtained the independence" and King Fouad I, a descendant of Mohammed Ali, took power, despite the fact that the country remained under British occupation.

In 1928, the Muslim Brotherhood was founded by an Egyptian schoolteacher named Hasan el-Bannâ (1906 - 1949). The Brotherhood was a secret religious society known to the public for its the importance it attached to Islamic education and for its charitable activities. Before the Second World War, British intelligence services established links with the Brotherhood through the agent Freya Stark, a British adventurer and writer (9), with the aim of monitoring the growing German presence in North Africa and keeping abreast of the various political movements emerging there. The Muslim Brotherhood spread throughout the Muslim world and became a kind of Muslim equivalent of the Western Masonic fraternities. (10). It also became one of the first fundamentalist Islamic terrorist organisations.

In the years leading up to the Second World War, the intrigues pursued by Great Britain and the United States were the focus of a great deal of attention. Britain's efforts in Egypt to retain control of its colony and the Suez Canal were essentially concentrated in three cliques: the royalists, allied with King Fouad and, after 1935, his son King Farouk; the nationalist Wafd party, which was supported by the people through the Egyptian Parliament, which had been established by the British.

When the Second World War broke out, the Wafd, at least publicly, supported the Allies because that they had led the nationalists to believe that full independence would be granted to Egypt

immediately after the war. However, King Farouk was more reserved in his support for the Allies and privately made no secret of his Axis sympathies, while many core members of the Muslim Brotherhood were also known to lean towards Germany. But Germany was not destined to liberate Egypt from British occupation. The German army in North Africa was defeated at the battle of El Alamein in October 1942, then gradually pushed back out of Africa.

After the war, the Muslim Brotherhood and the Wafd campaigned against the repressive monarchy of King Farouk and against the British, who kept postponing their withdrawal from Egyptian territory. In 1949, el-Bannâ was assassinated by the Egyptian government, unleashing the wrath of the fundamentalists. In 1952, the Wafd won a major victory in the parliamentary elections, as a result of which Prime Minister el-Nahhas Pasha denounced the 1936 agreements by which Farouk had allowed Britain to take control of the Suez Canal. Farouk immediately thanked el-Nahhas and violent anti-British riots immediately broke out throughout Egypt. High-ranking Egyptian army officers seized the opportunity to stage a coup. They seized control of the country and ousted King Farouk.

The "Free Officers", as they called themselves, were under the command of General Muhammad Naguib and included Gamal Abdel Nasser and Anwar Sadat. Naguib was soon ousted and Nasser emerged as the country's strongman in 1954. He soon banned the Wafd and the Muslim Brotherhood and began to rule as dictator.

Nasser was swift and bold in his initiatives to modernise and industrialise Egypt and assert his nation's independence. He reached out to the United States and the World Bank to help finance the construction of the Aswan Dam, but they refused and he was forced to withdraw to the Soviets. He also sought to improve his army, and the West offered to supply him with arms on condition that he involved his country in British-controlled regional military alliances. Nasser refused and signed an arms contract with Czechoslovakia in 1955.

On 26 July 1956, Nasser expelled the British from the Suez Canal Zone and returned it to Egyptian control for the first time since 1882. Three months later, the Suez War began. Israel took control of Gaza in five days and British and French troops retook the Canal Zone. The United Nations condemned the military operation and a ceasefire was agreed on 6 November. The canal was then returned to Egypt.

Following this war, Nasser became the hero of the Arab peoples and the nationalist movements in the Middle East. In 1958, Egypt merged with Syria to form the United Arab Republic, which was joined by North Yemen. This pan-Arab movement was as popular with the Arab masses as it was feared by their leaders. Aburish writes: "In the 1950s and later, the West opposed the secular Arab nationalist movement for two reasons: it challenged its regional hegemony and threatened the survival of the leaders of its client states. Nothing prevented a secular movement from cooperating with the USSR. In fact, most of these movements were slightly socialist. Moreover, they advocated Arab unity in one form or another - a union or a common policy - which threatened the traditional pro-Western regimes of Arabia, Egypt, Lebanon, Syria and Turkey. Saudi Arabia, Jordan and other client states. The West saw it as a challenge (11).

This brings us to the second phase of relations between the West and Islam, as defined by Aburish. It was a period during which the West used Islamic fundamentalism to destabilise or overthrow regimes that refused to be dominated by the West.

III. The overthrow of Iran's first democracy

From the outset, the Central Intelligence Agency maintained very close relations with the British secret services, as demonstrated by the details of the coup against Mossadegh in 1953, which marked the start of the second phase.

Dr Mohammad Mossadegh never ceased to be a leader of the Iranian nationalist movement against the imperialism of the British Empire. Born into the Iranian ruling class, he was elected to the Iranian parliament in 1906, but refused the post because, legally, he was too young to be a member. (he was not yet 30). He studied in France and Switzerland and obtained his doctorate in law in 1913. He returned to Iran, where he first worked as a university professor, before being appointed Deputy Minister of Finance and then Minister of Justice. He was Finance Minister in 1921, when a British-backed coup d'état made Mohammad Reza Pahlavi the country's strongman.

In the years that followed, Mossadegh served the Iranian people in a number of capacities, before finally being forcibly removed from public office towards the end of Reza's reign, due to his criticism of his corrupt regime. In 1941, the government changed again and Reza Pahlavi, shah since 1925, was forced to flee to South Africa, where he lived until his death. Mossadegh was then able to return to Tehran, where he took an active part in parliamentary debates, in particular by clashing with Reza's son, Mohammad Reza Shah.

Despite obstruction and fraud, Mossadegh was elected Prime Minister of Iran by Parliament in 1951. One of his first initiatives as Prime Minister was to nationalise Iran's oil, which until then had belonged to the Anglo-Persian Oil Company. In 1901, as mentioned above, Great Britain had bought the rights to Iranian oil from Reza Khan for 60 years. It granted the Shah another 60-year lease in 1933. Following the nationalisation of the Anglo-Persian Oil Company, Great Britain decided to take the case to the International Court of Justice, which forced the Shah to sign a new lease. Mossadegh went to The Hague, then to the UN, then to The Hague, to argue that the contracts signed with previous governments were invalid. Mossadegh "s campaign was a great success and the international community declared that Iran had the right to take control of its oil.

The nationalisation was not without causing the British to fear that their interests would be threatened. The Iranian government promised to pay 25% of the profits from oil sales to Great Britain. Britain as compensation and guaranteed British jobs. Nevertheless, Great Britain Britain refused to negotiate and responded with a naval show of force, followed by embargoes, boycotts and the freezing of Iranian assets (12).

In previous years, growing Iranian hostility to the British had not made the task of British intelligence in Iran any easier. effectively against Mossadegh, the British turned to their buddies in the CIA. Stephen Dorril documents this affair in his book MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service. He writes: "Despite British propaganda, the Mossadegh government was It was generally democratic and moderate, and seemed likely to succeed in making the middle class the mainstay of the State. It was officially seen by the Truman administration as popular, nationalist and anti-communist (13)."

To change the American position on Mossadegh, British strategists played on America's communist paranoia and tried to portray the Iranian regime as weak and susceptible to Soviet manipulation. In the last days of the Truman administration, the head of the CIA's Middle East Office, Kermit Roosevelt, met with John Sinclair and other MI6 representatives to "propose a joint overthrow of Mossadegh" (14). Once Eisenhower was in the White House in January 1953, the CIA was free to act, which it did, when the British promised to give American oil companies a 40% stake in Iranian oil in exchange for the CIA's help in overthrowing Mossadegh and getting its hands on the Iranian oilfields. Iranian oil reserves (15).

The British and Americans finally agreed to make Reza Khan's son, Mohammad Reza Shah, an incompetent, the new ruler of Iran. The young Shah initially refused the offers made to him by the conspirators, even after a visit from American Colonel H. Norman Schwarzkopf on 1 August 1953 and a subsequent meeting with Kermit Roosevelt. Dorril writes that "The Shah finally agreed to support the plan only after official confirmation of British and American participation in a special radio broadcast". A coded message was broadcast on BBC Persia to allay the doubts of the Shah, who had been informed of the code beforehand (16).

In preparation for the coup, the Americans financed Ayatollah Bihbani and Great Britain gave \$100,000 to a group led by Ayatollah Qanatabadi to stir up unrest against the regime. Mossadegh. The CIA gave \$10,000 to Ayatollah Kashani, whose supporters played a major role in the demonstrations in central Tehran. Another group of fundamentalist agitators was led by Tayeb Haj-Rezaei, a figure who later became a supporter of Ayatollah Khomeini (17).

In mid-August 1953, Mossadegh's government was undermined by a multitude of demonstrations and plots financed by the CIA and the British. On 15 August, Mossadegh's foreign minister was kidnapped in an attempt to intimidate the government. The next day, the Shah published a communiqué declaring that he was deposing Mossadegh, while propaganda material was distributed falsely claiming that the mullahs were going to be hanged by members of the communist party, the Tudeh (18). On the 17th and 18th, crowds of religious fanatics and supporters of the Shah converged on Tehran to spread chaos and terror. On the 19th, in collusion with the police chief, these mobs were able to reach the Prime Minister's residence and, after a fierce battle, Mossadegh was ousted from power. Several days later, the Shah returned from Italy. 25 years later, he would be ousted from power by the same fundamentalist fanatics who had helped him to the throne. The British were involved in his downfall, as we shall see. Radical Islam is a useful tool for the British. Their manipulation of radical Islam only served to get started.

IV. Britain's war against Nasser

In their dealings with Nasser, the British used all necessary means, including espionage, diplomacy, corruption and even armed force, to maintain control of the country. Egypt and the Suez Canal. The newly created CIA also began to take an interest in Egypt when Nasser appeared to want to draw closer to the Soviet Union. Aburish explains how this new complex case evolved: "According to CIA agent Miles Copeland, the Americans went to the

search for a Muslim Billy Graham (19) around 1955... When the search for, let alone the creation of, a Muslim Billy Graham proved problematic, the CIA began to cooperate with the Muslim Brotherhood, a Muslim mass organisation founded in Egypt, but with followers throughout the Arab Middle East... This cooperation marked the beginning of an alliance between traditional (Arab) regimes and mass Islamic movements against Nasser and other secular forces (20). "

The CIA followed the example of the British intelligence services and sought to use Islam to achieve its aims. It wanted to find a charismatic religious leader it could promote and control, and it began to cooperate with groups such as the Muslim Brotherhood. The rise of Nasser meant that the Brotherhood was also courted more seriously by the pro-Western Arab regimes of Saudi Arabia and Jordan. They needed to mobilise the people against the rise of Nasser-inspired Arab nationalism in order to preserve their regimes.

The Muslim Brotherhood was an obvious ally of these regimes against Nasser, who had banned them from Egypt after they tried to assassinate him in 1954. The Brotherhood rejected Nasser's policies because, on the whole, they sidelined religion from politics.

Officially, the Brotherhood was an illegal organisation, but it remained influential and opposed actively supported the secular Egyptian regime, often hand in hand with the Intelligence Service. In June 1955, MI6 approached the Brotherhood in Syria to encourage them to demonstrate against the new government, which made no secret of its sympathy for socialism and expressed a desire to unite with Egypt (21). The

Fraternité became an even more important asset after Nasser announced Egypt's takeover of Suez. Dorril tells us how this decision was perceived in Britain:

"On 26 July in Alexandria, in a calm speech that was described by London as hysterical, Nasser announced the nationalisation, which from a strictly legal point of view was n o t h i n g more than "a share buy-back". That night in Downing Street, Eden [the Prime Minister British] did not hide from his guests the bitterness he felt at this decision... Eden called a council of war, which lasted until 4am. An agitated Prime Minister told his colleagues that it was out of the question to let Nasser "grab us by the throat". The "Muslim Mussolini" must be "defeated". destroyed". Eden added: ". I want him removed from power and I don't care if there is anarchy and chaos in Egypt (22)."

Former Prime Minister Churchill had added fuel to the fire, advising Eden to tell the Egyptians that, "if they continue to be insolent towards us, we will throw the Jews at them a n d throw them into the gutter, from which they should never have emerged" (23).

Sir Anthony Nutting, a member of the Foreign Office at the time, recalls a telephone conversation in which Eden, unhappy with the slowness of the campaign against Nasser finally snapped out of it: "What's all this nonsense you've been sending me? What's all this nonsense about isolating Nasser, or "neutralising" him, as you call it? I want him destroyed, do you understand? I want him assassinated (24)..."

In preparation for the coup, the Information Research Department (IRD) was put into action. The British stepped up their efforts to control radio broadcasts in Egypt and instructed the BBC, the London Press Service and the Arab News Agency to circulate false rumours. False documents were created which suggested that Nasser intended to take over the entire Middle East oil trade and a bogus report was circulated which alleged that dissidents Egyptians were sent to a concentration camp run by former Nazis (25).

Britain was struggling to decide who would take over in Egypt after Nasser's removal. MI6 organised meetings with members of the Wafd and allies of former Prime Minister el-Nahas Pasha. The former leader of the "Free Officers", General Naguib, kidnapped and placed under house arrest by Nasser, was considered a possible president and some British circles even advocated that Prince Mohammed Abdel Moneim, the most "presentable" member of the Egyptian royal family, should be made king (26).

According to Dorril, the most important recruit to the British plot to overthrow Nasser was a Egyptian intelligence officer Mahmoud Khalil Issam Eddine, to whom, in order to make him a reliable contact, they provided information on Egypt's most direct enemy: Israel. Dorril reports the the following comment from a Mossad chief: "Endangering Israel's security by handing over secret information about Israel apparently did not trouble Britain's conscience." The British situation was complicated by the fact that they were working with Israel on a coordinated military attack against Egypt. This attack finally took place in October (27).

The fact that there was no clear candidate to succeed Nasser did not bother the coup plotters. Dorril concludes that "MI6 did not believe that it was absolutely necessary to have an alternative. The service was confident that once Nasser had been overthrown, suitable candidates would come forward" (28).

At the end of August, Nasser reacted to the growing threat from the British secret services. The offices of the Arab Press Agency were raided and a number of employees were arrested.

who later confessed to being British agents. Two British diplomats were expelled; one of them, J.B. Flux, had "been in contact with" students from a certain family. religious" with the aim of inciting them to "foment fundamentalist riots that could serve as a pretext for military intervention to protect the lives of Europeans". Other British "businessmen" and "diplomats" were arrested or expelled and, because of the effectiveness of Nasser's offensive, Dorril wrote that, just before the Suez war, the British secret services had discovered that they "no longer had any assets in the country," and that "MI6 had to use outside agents for its assassination plan" (29).

In the end, Britain's subversive actions in Egypt came to nothing, even after it decided to invade the country militarily at the end of 1956. Nasser enjoyed widespread support among the Egyptian people and the international community sided with him against the British, forcing them to return the Suez Canal to Egypt. Nasser became the leader of an Egypt finally free of British control.

Since then, Great Britain has not ceased to wage a low-intensity secret war against Egyptian governments: against Nasser until his death, against his successor, Sadat, and even against the Egyptian government itself.

against Mubarak after him. The secular Egyptian government has always been one of the toughest enemies of Islamic terrorism, while the biggest financial backer of the terrorist groups Egyptians was Britain. This last point goes completely against the preconceived ideas of most British and American citizens, but in the following pages we will prove it.

V. Islam turns against the West

As we have said, Said Aburish identified three stages in the relationship between the West and Islam. The first was a period during which Britain used Islam to try to legitimise the puppet dictators it had installed in its Arab colonies after the First World War. The second phase was a period in which Britain (along with the U S) used militant Islam to help overthrow governments like Mossadegh and Nasser, who were trying to fight Western domination. Aburish writes: "The struggle between Nasser and the Muslim Brotherhood and its offshoots... continued until the 1967 war. Western support for Islam was provided openly to the leaders of the Islamic movements, who accepted it unreservedly (30)."

Aburish notes that Islam had a good image in Western countries up until that time. The Islamic movement was best known for its anti-communist stance and the possibility that conservative Islam might turn against the West did not cross many minds.

Aburish describes the third phase as follows: "The third stage in the development of Islamic movements began after the 1967 war. Nasser's defeat was a defeat for the forces he represented, secularism, and with Nasser weakened, the Islamic movements began to take over the political leadership of the Arab masses in the Middle East (31)."

The 1967 war made Islamic movements much more powerful. Islamic theology took over from secularism and a more powerful form of Arab nationalism emerged. The Six Day War saw the West allow Israel to defeat its Arab neighbours and take possession of Sinai, the West Bank and the Golan Heights, without lifting a finger. It then became clear to most Muslims that the West had sided with Israel against the Arabs, and their resentment of the West grew. This third phase of relations between the West and Islam began when factions of this largely anti-Western fundamentalist Islamic movement began to exert political influence in all parts of the Muslim world.

After Nasser's death in 1970, Anwar Sadat, the new Egyptian president, attempted to mitigate the threat of militant Islam by releasing all imprisoned members of the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the fact that the Brotherhood had been involved in at least four separate assassination attempts against Nasser in sixteen years. Sadat made agreements with King Faysal of Saudi Arabia and they became sponsors and promoters of the Islamic university Al-Azhar as well as Islamic movements such as Al Dawa and Al-i'tisam. These leaders understood that it was better to at least pretend to support the rise of Islamic movements (32).

On 6 October 1973, Egypt and Syria launched a surprise attack on the Israeli army in Sinai and the Golan Heights. On the 16th, OPEC raised the price of a barrel of oil by 70% and, the next day, the Arab leaders of OPEC announced that they were declaring a progressive embargo against Europe and the United States and that they would not lift it until Israel was forced to return to its pre-1967 borders. A Century of War recounts how US National Security Adviser Henry Kissinger managed to convince Germany not to remain neutral, while Britain "was allowed to declare itself neutral". Britain remained neutral throughout the 6-Day War and was one of the few Western countries not to be embargoed by the Arab oil-producing countries (33).

The Yom Kippur War ended on 26 October. The Arab regimes emerged stronger in several respects. Firstly, they had finally beaten Israel militarily and recovered part of their territory. Secondly, they had largely restored their image among their people and the voice of Islamic militants was temporarily silenced. Finally, the Arab countries suddenly benefited from the enormous increase in oil revenues, the price of a barrel of oil being rose from \$3.01 at the beginning of 1973 to \$11.65 at the beginning of 1974 (34).

Engdahl points out that the rise in oil prices had been planned by the Anglo-American establishment and mentioned at the Bilderberg conference in May 1973 in Saltsjöbaden, Sweden. Kissinger had been instrumental in orchestrating the Arab-Israeli conflict as a pretext for raising oil prices, which saved Britain's North Sea oil projects, which were seen as risky investments. The most catastrophic consequence of the rise in energy prices was to bring the industrialisation of Third World countries to an abrupt halt, by forcing many of them to borrow heavily over the years to pay for their energy, and thus to become chronically indebted to Anglo-American banks (35). After the war, the establishment awarded Kissinger the Nobel Peace Prize and, in 1995, Queen Elizabeth made him an honorary knight of the British Empire, for the devoted services he had rendered to the Crown throughout his life.

Although the Arab regimes suddenly became extremely wealthy as a result of rising oil prices, the threat of Islamist movements remained. King Faysal of Saudi Arabia feigned support for Islam, but was often forced to crack down on religious leaders and organisations that seemed to be a constant critic of the royal family's ostentatious greed, luxury and corruption. Faysal was assassinated in 1975 by his nephew, Prince Faysal ibn Musad, in retaliation for Faysal's execution of ibn Musad's brother, a fanatical Muslim who had attacked a television station on the grounds that television was a violation of Islam (36).

In Egypt, the Sadat regime came under enormous pressure from Islamist movements after it signed the Camp David Accords with Israel in 1978. This led to Sadat's assassination by members of the Islamic Jihad, a branch of the Muslim Brotherhood, on 6 October 1981.

In 1982, a major conflict broke out between the Muslim Brotherhood and the Syrian government in Hama, Syria. It claimed 20,000 victims. Syrian President Assad revealed that the Muslim Brotherhood forces were equipped with American-made weapons.

Aburish observes that none of these events seemed to change anything in the way militant Islam was used. "Hama, the assassinations of Sadat and Faysal and other lesser acts did not interrupt the support of Western regimes and their Arab client states for Islamic movements. Moreover, Saudi Arabia and Egypt allowed the Islamists to use their state apparatus to propagandise in favour of Islam... And Israel, always inclined to support factious movements, appeared as another defender of Islam and began to finance the Muslim Brotherhood and the Palestinian Islamist movement Hamas (37)."

The most remarkable success of the Islamic movement at that time was, of course, the overthrow of the Shah and the rise to power of Ayatollah Khomeini. The British secret services had used their contacts with the Iranian mullahs and ayatollahs to overthrow Mossadegh and bring the Shah to power. In 1953, when the Shah came to power, they retained these contacts and used them again to overthrow the Shah, when his regime was no longer in the odour of sanctity.

The official story of Iran's Islamic revolution is that the uprising that brought Khomeini to power in power was spontaneous and popular, and that it was directed against a repressive dictatorship hated by the people but unreservedly supported by the United States. It is true that the Shah's government was not a democracy and that its secret services, trained by the CIA, were one of the most effective intelligence services in the world. But what is not reported is that, before the huge British-sponsored media campaign on behalf of the Ayatollah, the Shah's government was loved by the vast majority of the population.

After Mossadegh was deposed, the Shah implemented a number of nationalist policies which made him very popular at home, but which in some cases worried the Anglo-American establishment. First of all, he signed oil agreements with the Italian oil company ENI. Then, in 1963, he launched a series of reforms that became known as the "White Revolution". The Shah became a nationalist whose orientation was too similar to Nasser's to be to the liking of the establishment:

- He bought land from the upper classes and sold it at low prices, along with Crown land, to farmers. This enabled more than a million and a half people to become landowners and put an end to the old feudal system.
- He gave women the right to vote and banned the wearing of veils, a "Western"-inspired initiative that was badly received by the religious sector.
- He launched a \$90 billion nuclear energy development programme.

- He eliminated the lucrative opium industry, which had been built up a hundred years earlier under the impetus of the British Empire (38).

In 1973, The Economist devoted one of its covers to Iran, with the following caption: "Iran, the next Japan of the Middle East? The Iranian economy had grown at an annual rate of 7-8% from 1965 to 1973 and had become a model for developing nations. For the Anglo-American establishment, this could not continue. The establishment's main objectives were depopulation and deindustrialisation (39). They had been formulated by policy-makers such as Lord Bertrand Russell and advocated by establishment stooges such as

Kissinger, Brzezinski and McNamara (the head of the World Bank), as well as the British elites who controlled the World Wildlife Fund and other international conservation and environmental organisations. Iran had to be brought down.

The attack on the Shah's government came from the Muslim Brotherhood and the mullahs and ayatollahs of Iran, supported and manipulated by the British secret services. John Coleman, a former British intelligence officer and author of several books and monographs detailing the creation of a socialist world government, states in his report on the Islamic Revolution in Iran (40) that the Muslim Brotherhood was created by "the great names of British intelligence in the Middle East, T.E. Lawrence, E.G. Browne, Arnold Toynbee. St. John Philby and Bertrand Russell" and that their mission was to "maintain the Middle East in its backward state, so that its natural resources, oil, continue to be plundered..."

Coleman writes that in 1980 Radio Free Iran's broadcasts divided the Shah's enemies into four groups categories: 1. Iranian politicians bought by the Israeli Shin Bet, 2. networks of CIA agents, 3. The feudal landowners, 4. Freemasonry and the Muslim Brotherhood (considered to be the same enemy).

In his report, Coleman writes that the Iranians "at one point even joked about the mullahs, saying that they should have been stamped 'Made in Britain'". When the Shah presented his
In 1963, Ayatollah Khomeini was modernised and established himself as the leader of the religious opposition. Until his exile in 1964, Khomeini lived in the holy city of Qom. Coleman reports that Radio Free Iran claimed that, in Qom, Khomeini received a "monthly allowance from Great Britain and is in constant contact with his masters, the British".

Khomeini was expelled from Iran and settled in Iraq. He lived there for several years, until he was arrested by the Iraqi government and deported in 1978. D'Estaing was then pressured into offering Khomeini asylum in France, where he could continue his "Islamic studies". In France, he became a celebrity throughout the West, and the symbol of the Islamic revolution against the Islamic dictatorship.

Shah. Coleman writes: "Once Khomeini was installed at Château Neauphle-le-Château, he never stopped receiving visitors, many of whom were from the BBC, the CIA or the British secret service (41)."

At the same time, Amnesty International continued its intense campaign against the Shah's government, accusing it of torture and other terrible human rights violations. This information was picked up by the international press and spread throughout the world.

The BBC then became the Ayatollah's main promoter. Coleman writes: "It was the BBC that prepared and distributed to the mullahs in Iran all the recordings of Khomeini's speeches, which inflamed the peasants. Then the BBC began broadcasting stories of the use of torture by the Shah's SAVAK to the four corners of the world... in September and October 1978, the BBC began broadcasting a series of "torture" stories.

broadcast Khomeini's incendiary rants in Iran, in Farsi. The Washington Post declared: "The BBC is Iran's public enemy number one" (42).

The BBC's Persian service came to be known in Iran as the "Ayatollah BBC" because it constantly echoed Khomeini's every word (43). Soon a large part of the Iranian population, mostly impressionable young students, became convinced that the Shah was truly evil and that a return to pure Shiite Islam under the Ayatollah's leadership was the only way to save their country. The Carter administration, manipulated by Britain's lackey Brzezinski then collaborated with the British to overthrow the Shah and replace him with Khomeini.

Coleman reports that Carter appointed Trilateralist George Ball to head a commission on US policy in the Persian Gulf. Ball's recommendation was that the US should withdraw its support for the Shah's regime. The Shah's memoirs, quoted by Coleman, confirm that the United States followed her, contrary to what the establishment's media propaganda would have us believe: "I didn't know it then and maybe I didn't want to know it - but it's clear to me now that the Americans wanted me out. How was I to interpret Ball's sudden appointment as White House adviser on Iran? I knew that Ball was no friend of Iran. I was aware that Ball was working on a special report on Iran. But nobody ever told me what the report was about, let alone what its conclusions were. I found out about it a month later, when I was in exile and my friends were in Iran.

worst fears were confirmed. Ball was one of those Americans who wanted to abandon me and ultimately my country".

After the Shah's abdication and exile in 1979, his "strong ally", the United States, even refused to grant him asylum, forcing him to settle with his family in Egypt. During the seizure of the American embassy, where the Ayatollah's supporters held around fifty Americans hostage for 444 days, it became clear to the whole world that the Islamic anti-Islamic movement was not the only one to be involved. democratic, anti-Israeli, was also very anti-Western. Nevertheless, the Anglo-American establishment continued to support and promote radical Islam.

In 1977, Bhutto was kidnapped; in 1979, the Shah was kidnapped; Sadat was assassinated in 1981 and, in 1982, the Muslim Brotherhood revolted in Syria. Before 1977, the Middle East was on the verge of a c h i e v i n g stability and catching up with Western countries industrially and economically, thanks to nationalist policies and high oil prices. By the early 1980s, the Middle East was on fire. Egypt was shaken, Mubarak was consolidating his power as best he could. Iran and Iraq, both armed by the West, began a long war. Israel and Syria invaded a Lebanon in the throes of civil war, and Russia invaded Afghanistan, where the rebels were supported by Pakistan. The programme of depopulation and de-industrialisation advocated by Great Britain and adopted by the Americans had got off to an excellent start.

VI. Afghanistan, Pakistan, the ISI and the BCCI

On 3 July 1979, at the insistence of advisers such as Brzezinski, President Carter signed a directive authorising secret aid to fundamentalist opponents of the communist regime in Afghanistan (44). This decision was interpreted as an act that was likely to lead to direct Soviet intervention, and this is exactly what happened on 24 December of that year when, after hen invited by the Afghan government, the Russian army took up a position to protect public property against rebel attacks.

From the start of the war in Afghanistan, the CIA collaborated with the Pakistani secret service (ISI) and financed the rebel mujahedin. Today, it is generally accepted that the jihad waged by the mujaheddin against Soviet forces was the trigger for radical Islam and that, when the Soviets took control of Afghanistan, the CIA's role was to support the rebels. withdrew from Afghanistan in early 1989, the country was left with tens of thousands of unemployed Islamic mercenaries, who soon began to take an interest in the West.

The history of Afghanistan has always been closely linked to that of Pakistan, a region formerly colonised by Great Britain. British involvement in the subcontinent dates back to the early years of the seventeenth century, when the Mughal emperor of India, Jahângîr, allowed the merchants of the British East India Company to establish trading posts there. British domination of India is generally considered to have begun in earnest in 1757, when BEIC forces led by Robert Clive defeated the army of the Mogul of Bengal at the Battle of Plassey. In 1803, the British control of the subcontinent increased further when the rulers of the Mughal Empire became dependent on the BEIC. The Indus Valley, the centre of modern Pakistan, came under British control after the British conquered the Sikh Empire and with it the Punjab in 1848-1849. The regions that today form India and Pakistan were governed by Great Britain without interruption, until the British Empire withdrew and created these two countries in 1947.

A number of British officers remained in the region to advise (and control) the young Pakistani army. One of them was Major General Walter Joseph Cawthorn who, as Deputy Chief of Staff of the Pakistani Army, created the Inter-Services Intelligence (ISI) Directorate in 1948, Cawthorn was an Australian-born MI6 officer who had led operations in the Middle East, India and South East Asia from 1939 to 1945. He became Sir Cawthorn in 1958, after being knighted by the Queen of England and, in 1960, he returned to Melbourne, where he was appointed head of the Australian Secret Service (45). The ISI was set up to enable Pakistan to settle its dispute with India over Kashmir and other borders shared by the two countries and, over the years, it developed from a military intelligence agency into a fully-fledged Pakistani CIA, which from the outset maintained close relations with the British secret services.

The power of the ISI grew steadily over the next twenty years, until the election by universal suffrage of Pakistan's first president from civil society, the socialist Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, in 1971. Bhutto immediately displayed the same nationalist tendencies as Nasser, Mossadegh and the Shah and his regime fell out of favour with the British government and the West. In 1972, Bhutto withdrew his country from the Commonwealth and drew closer to Russia, China and the Arab states.

In 1977, the inevitable coup took place and President Bhutto was overthrown by General Zia-Ul-Haq, who had been appointed Chief of Army Staff by Bhutto in 1976 at the request of Gulam Jilani Khan, the irremovable Director General of the ISI. In his book *If I am Assassinated*, which he wrote in prison, Bhutto commented at length on his constant struggles with the ISI and the betrayal the ISI used against him. He also recounts how Kissinger threatened him for providing Pakistan with a

We're going to punish you for setting an example! In fact, Bhutto was executed in 1978, after being subjected to a sham trial, despite the objections of heads of state from around the world (46).

A spokesman for the Muslim Brotherhood made this statement a few years later: "The Brotherhood has taken over Iran and Pakistan. Bhutto was the West's intrusion into Islam. Bhutto was everything that Pakistan was not. That's why we killed him. And we're going to use his death to as a warning to others (47).

In retrospect, the BCCI scandal reveals Britain's close relationship with the Pakistani underworld. The Bank for International Credit and Commerce was the first multinational bank in the Third World. Created in 1972 by Pakistani banker Agha Hasan Abedi, it was initially financed by Sheikh Zayed of Abu Dhabi to the tune of \$2,500,000. It was worth \$23 billion when it closed in 1991. It was created just in time to take advantage of the money flowing into the Middle East from the oil industry.

One of BCCI's first initiatives to establish itself on the international scene was the purchase in 1976 of 85% of Banque de Commerce et Placements (BCP) in Geneva. BCCI put Alfred Hartmann in charge. Hartmann went on to become CFO of BCC. Holding and thus one of BCCI's most influential executives. Hartmann was also a member of the Board of Directors of NM Rothschild and Sons, London and Chairman of Rothschild AG, Zurich (48).

BCCI was incorporated in Luxembourg, famous for its accommodating banking legislation, and soon opened branches and holding companies all over the world: in the British Isles, in the United Kingdom and in the United States.

Cayman Islands, the Netherlands Antilles, Hong Kong, Abu Dhabi, Washington D.C., etc. However, in By 1980, when BCCI finally applied for and received a licence from the Bank of England, it already had more branches in the UK than in any other country. In fact, one of BCCI's main economic advisers was the former British Prime Minister (1976-1979) Lord James Callaghan.

(49). The BCCI may have been set up by a Pakistani, but in the end it was a bank based in England and controlled by Great Britain.

Over the years, the BCCI has been involved in almost every type of illicit transaction a bank can be involved in, including money laundering from the sale of drugs and arms, corruption, fraud, etc. The CIA did not shy away from using it. The CIA was not above using it. Nor did the Medellin cartel. It played a role in the Iran-Contra affair. It even opened a branch in Panama to enable Noriega to get his business out of the country.

his money out of the country. After the BCCI was closed, the Guardian reported that the terrorist Abu Nidal had opened several accounts there. Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, the Times journalists who investigated the scandal, wrote: "According to Guardian sources, the Abu Nidal group used long used a London branch of BCCI to transfer the money it needed to launch attacks on Western targets and MI5 knew about the existence of these accounts. There seemed to be no doubt that the BCCI bankers knew exactly who they were dealing with: one of the bankers at the London branch recounted how anxious they were to provide every possible service to terrorists, in order to retain clients whose accounts contained several billion dollars (50)."

However, the main purpose of the BCCI and the reason for its meteoric rise were its links with the ISI and the Mujahideen fighting against the Soviet Union in Afghanistan. In 1978, after Zia had replaced Bhutto as head of Pakistan, he appointed his friend Fazle Haq governor of the North West Province, an area bordering Afghanistan through which tonnes of drugs and arms were smuggled into Pakistan. Fazle Haq was a friend and major backer of the BCCI founder Abedi and the BCCI was used to launder the millions that the ISI made from drug trafficking (51).

Coincidentally, in 1983, the World Wildlife Fund suggested that two national parks should be created in north-west Pakistan. Although they were not very rich in fauna, their soil proved excellent for growing poppies and organising Mujahideen incursions into Afghanistan (52).

Former Senate investigator Jack Blum said of BCCI's role in the war in Iraq Afghanistan, when he testified before the US Congress: "This bank was a product of the war in Afghanistan, and people very close to the Afghan Mujahideen have said that many Pakistani military officials deeply involved in aiding and supporting the Afghan rebel movement were stealing the money we were sending them as international aid and using the BCCI to hide the money they were stealing, to market the US arms shipments they were stealing and to manage the funds that came from the sale of heroin, which was apparently manufactured by a group of mujahideen (53)."

When General Zia took power, all the elements were in place to launch the gigantic operation of drug trafficking, fraud and swindling that was the war in Afghanistan. According to Beaty and Gwynne, Zia had a "close working relationship" with BCCI founder Agha Hasan Abedi even before he came to power (54). General Zia's triangular structure, comprising the government, the ISI (which had brought him to power) and the BCCI, began to prepare for the war in Afghanistan.

Afghan Mujahideen uprising on behalf of the CIA, with the assistance of the British intelligence. During the war in Afghanistan, around \$5 billion of US taxpayers' money was spent on the war effort and the ISI trained some 83,000 Muslim mujahideen.

Britain's role in the development of the Afghan experience was crucial, although it is often overlooked today. Almost immediately after the invasion of Afghanistan by the Soviet Union, Lord Nicholas Bethell, a career British intelligence officer, launched Radio Free Kabul, the voice of the mujahideen. Bethell had been involved in operations in the Middle East throughout his career and was a good friend of British spy Kim Philby. Radio Free Kabul's staff also included Winston Churchill III, former Foreign Secretary Baron Chalfont, Lord Morrison of Lambeth, former head of the Foreign Office, and British intelligence officer Ray Whitney. In 1981, Lord Bethell accompanied Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher to the United States to raise funds for the rebels, and together they met more than 60 of the world's top rebel leaders, members of Congress and Senators, leading to the creation of a Committee for a Free Afghanistan, which constantly lobbied on behalf of the Mujahideen.

Another British creation was Afghan Aid UK, set up in Peshawar by the wife of British journalist John Fullerton. The main sponsor of this group was Viscount Cranbourne, who later testified before the Special Joint Congressional Task Force on Afghanistan to the following effect: "I obtained the support of the United States. His organisation received substantial financial support from the British government and the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) (55).

Britain was lobbying for a war in Afghanistan, it wanted American taxpayers to fund it, it was manipulating the BCCI's financial situation in order to get the most out of it. The BCCI was closed by the Bank of England in 1991, after and only after the Russian withdrawal, due to the courageous campaign of a handful of American investigators. Beaty and Gwynne wrote: "Although the Bank of England held its party at BCCI on 5 July 1991, thereby triggering a global chain reaction that shattered Agha Hasan Abedi's toy into a thousand pieces, she did so reluctantly and only after waiting an extremely long time. She had not been heroic, but cowardly. It had moved only under the compulsion of a formidable American alliance between the Federal Reserve Bank and the Manhattan district attorney (56)."

The final report of the US Congress on the BCCI affair states: "By convention, the Bank of England had effectively implemented a plan with the BCCI, Abu Dhabi and Price Waterhouse, which consisted of hiding the BCCI's true situation, while cooperating together to try to

to avoid a catastrophic loss of several billion dollars. From April 1990, the Bank of England unwittingly participated (57) in the cover-up of the BCCI's criminal activities (58)."

The BCCI was the bank of choice for Middle Eastern terrorists, arms and drug dealers, South American cartels, organised crime gangs and even the security services.

intelligence agencies such as ISI, Mossad, MI6 and the CIA. In fact, CIA Deputy Director Robert Gates jokingly called the BCCI the "Bank of Bandits and Criminals" (59). For at least a decade, the British authorities allowed it to operate in a nonsensical manner and, after its closure, important documents were sealed and hidden from investigators.

the United States. When the scandal broke, the media focused mainly on the links between the BCCI with the United States and the CIA, so opaque is the British establishment that it is unsurpassed in damage control. It is likely that the whole truth will never be known.

As the war in Afghanistan drew to a close and Russian withdrawal became inevitable, the situation became much more complex. American support for the Mujahideen diminished as the CIA was trying to oppose the establishment of a fanatical Afghan government. New warlords were emerging and drug trafficking was increasingly taking new routes, notably through Iran and the southern republics of the Soviet Union. Reduced funding and arms supplies from the US government, coupled with a decline in the flow of money from drug trafficking, contributed significantly to the decline of the BCCI.

This brings us to the pharmaceutical industry and its impact on the Afghan conflict. Peter Dale Scott, Alfred W. McCoy and Michael C. Ruppert are three authorities in this field. In a nutshell, their research has led them to the conclusion that drugs (particularly cocaine and heroin) are products controlled, just like oil, gold and diamonds, by "warlords".

complex systems of production, distribution and Western financial flows (60). Today, the global pharmaceutical industry generates around \$600 billion a year and much of this money is injected (laundered) into Anglo-American banks and/or Wall Street. These researchers claim that one of the most important tasks of Western intelligence services is to ensure that drug-related financial flows continue to feed the Anglo-American financial system.

In any case, it is worth pointing out that opium production in Afghanistan exploded once the country became the playground of Great Britain and the CIA. Opium production rose from 100 tonnes a year in the early 1970s to 300 tonnes in 1982 and 575 tonnes in 1983. By the end of the

In the 1980s, towards the end of the war, Afghan opium poppy production had reached around 1,600 tonnes a year (61).

The CIA's racket was so effective that in 1981 Afghanistan supplied around 60% of the heroin consumed in the United States, compared with an almost negligible amount two years earlier. Poppies were grown in Afghanistan, processed into heroin in laboratories on both sides of the Pakistan-Afghanistan border, and the heroin was then smuggled into the United States and Europe. General Zia's government was also steeped in heroin, despite being praised by the international community for reducing poppy cultivation on the Pakistani side of the border and the fact that the number of heroin addicts in Pakistan had risen from 5,000 in 1981 to over 1.2 million in 1985 (62).

Furthermore, it is interesting to note that the US aggression against the Taliban regime followed the relative success of the poppy eradication plan that this regime had implemented (63). In July 2000, Mullah Omar had banned poppy cultivation and, in February 2001, UN drug control officials were able to confirm that poppy production hardly increased in Taliban-controlled areas. Could it be that the prospect of a drop in income from drug sales was an additional incentive for the West to eliminate the Taliban? Could this be the reason for the rapid return of Afghan farmers to their land? the favourite cash crop encountered few obstacles after the Taliban were ousted from power (64)?

When the CIA began its intrigues in Afghanistan, it depended almost entirely on its contacts within the ISI. They were the only ones who could provide intelligence and direct the war effort. The US, at the request of the ISI, supported a group of seven independent Afghan Mujahideen warlords, the "Peshawar Seven".

Eventually, one of the seven, a warlord by the name of Gulbuddin Hekmatyar, became the main recipient of American aid, despite his communist past (65), his extremist vision of Islam and his blatant anti-Americanism. Hekmatyar studied engineering at the University of Kabul, and then went on to become an engineer. trained at the Kabul Military Academy before being expelled. Hekmatyar joined the Muslim Brotherhood in the early 1970s and, at the time of the war in Afghanistan, he was a member of the Muslim Brotherhood. had established himself as the leader of a group called Hezb-i-Islami, or Party of Islam, even though he had never attended a traditional Islamic education course. Over the years, his followers made a name for themselves for their fanaticism (they became infamous for throwing acid in the faces of women who refused to wear the veil) and Hekmatyar became Afghanistan's biggest opium producer. He

owned thousands of hectares of poppy fields and, according to McCoy, had at least six heroin laboratories on the Pakistani side of the Khyber Pass (66).

In March 1990, the Republican Research Committee of the House of Representatives Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare presented a 19-page report that criticised the CIA for developing a relationship with Hekmatyar's Islamic Party and for covering up the problems his group had created. Over time, it emerged that Hekmatyar was an agent of the ISI, laundered money through the BCCI and also collaborated with the KGB to ensure that he retained his status as the most powerful warlord among many rivals. Jeffrey Steinberg of EIR sums it up this way: "Although American diplomats and

intelligence officers based in Pakistan often warned of Hekmatyar's anti-Western and pro-Iranian views, speculated that he had links with the KGB and even acknowledged his undisputed status as the "heroin king" of Afghanistan, his forces received the lion's share of US and international military support throughout the war in Afghanistan. Reports from

The information provided to Washington on the course of the war was indisputably biased and full of misinformation, portraying Hekmatyar's Mujahideen as the most accomplished fighters. Pentagon and CIA reports were often identical to those produced by the British secret services - with the same spelling mistakes and typographical errors. More reliable reports from the field indicated that Hekmatyar devoted more time and energy to the fight against terrorism.

time and effort fighting rival Mujahideen groups than fighting the Soviets (67).

The distorted image that the ISI gave of the situation can be seen in the book "Afghanistan: The Bear Trap". "Hekmatyar is described by Chief Brigadier Mohammed Yousaf, former head of the Afghan Bureau of the ISI, as "scrupulously honest" and the toughest and most vigorous Mujahideen leader (co-authored with a former British army officer). Yousaf argues that the war lasted longer than it needed to because the US did not give Hekmatyar and the Islamists enough support, and that this support even began to wane in the late 1980s, when the Soviets still occupied Afghanistan. Yousaf resented the fact that the CIA had not allowed the Islamists to win a crushing victory, even though the Taliban prevailed after several years of civil war (68).

Yousaf's point of view can be compared to the report presented to the House of Representatives by the Republicans in 1990, which International News journalist Imran Akbar discusses in an article entitled

(69), which also reports on the KGB's alleged links with Hekmatyar.

Hekmatyar was forced to flee to Iran after the Taliban took power in 1996, but the Iranian government soon put an end to his operations in Iran and expelled him to Afghanistan. More openly anti-American than ever, he began offering cash rewards for the assassination of American soldiers and declared the new Afghan government installed by the United States to be illegitimate. In March 2002, the CIA allegedly tried to assassinate him with a missile fired from a Predator drone, as he was travelling with his entourage near Kabul. This ISI protégé remains one of the most dangerous actors in Afghanistan today (70).

In his book, Yousaf also does his best to explain that American personnel never took part in the training of Afghan mujahideen: "Until the Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan in early 1989, no American or Chinese instructors trained mujahideen in the use of weapons or military equipment. Even for the heavier, more sophisticated weapons systems... it was always our Pakistani teams who trained the mujahideen. This was a deliberate, well-thought-out political decision, to which we have remained resolutely committed, despite increasing pressure from the CIA and later the US Ministry of Defence to let them take over. From the outset, the Americans wanted to participate directly involved in the distribution of weapons, the operational planning of operations and the guerrilla training. From the beginning until the last Soviet soldier left the country, we managed to stand up to them (71).

The CIA was the funder and the arms supplier, full stop. It was Yousaf's ISI that led the Afghan jihad against the Soviets, and it was the ISI that channelled CIA support to the more disreputable Afghan warlords. It is clear from the dossier that the objectives of the ISI and of the war in Afghanistan in general were set by the British much more than by the CIA. The British had methodically encouraged the Americans to become involved in the war. They had close links with the ISI, which was conducting the war; they controlled a large part of the bank, which profited greatly from them and, when the war was over, they welcomed into Britain the many former Mujahedin fighters who sought a safe haven there.

Ossama bin Laden was one of these veterans and, in early 1994, he bought a property and lived for a short time in the London suburb of Wembley. During his stay in London, he set up a Consultancy and Reform Committee to oversee his financial network and strengthened his propaganda in the Western world through his relations with Sheikh Omar Bakri in London and with Abdel Bari Atwan, the editor-in-chief of Al-Quds al-Emirates, one of the most influential Arabic-language newspapers in the world. Yossef Bodansky, author of the best-selling biography of Bin Laden, writes (in 1999): "By the time Bin Laden left London, he had consolidated an extensive system of entities that provided him with a substantial - but clandestine - source of

funding. This data distribution system is still operating effectively from London.
(72). "

Peter Goodgame, *The Globalists and the Islamists: Fomenting the Clash of Civilizations for a New World Order*, 2002, translated from the American by B.K.

(*) So it is that, on television, their representatives can even be heard giving the "Sir" or "Madam" to the scum in fancy dress with whom they chat, with whom they behave rather like the owner of a house who, catching the same thief in the act for the fifteenth time in a row, as he prepares to take possession of his last piece of furniture, would ask him to be careful not to damage it.

(1) Frederik W. Engdahl, *A Century of War: Anglo-American Oil Politics and the New World Order*, Pluto Press, 1st edn, 2004, pp. 30-36.

(2) *Ibid*, p. 50-52.

(3) "Error" or exchange of courtesies? [EDITOR'S NOTE]

(4) Saïd K. Aburish, *A Brutal Friendship: The West and the Arab Elite*, Victor Gollancz Ltd, London, 1997, p. 76.

(5) *Ibid*, p. 57.

(6) The "betrayal" would be short-lived, as all the Arab countries would gain their independence over the next five decades [N.D.E.].

(7) Saïd K. Aburish, *op. cit.* p. 57, p. 59.

(8) *Ibid*, p. 57.

(9) Stephen Dorril, *MI6: Inside the Covert World of Her Majesty's Secret Intelligence Service*, Free Press, New York, 2000, p. 622.

(10) As already indicated in another article, it is not impossible that Freemasonry has an Arab origin; see J. M. Aractingi and C. Lochon, *Secrets initiatiques en Islam et rituels maçonniques*, Paris, L'Harmattan, 2008. See also <https://archive.org/download/LinitiationDansLesConfrriesMusulmanesEtLaFrancmaonnerieLa/LinitiationDesConfrriesMusulmanesEtLaFrancMaonnerieLaConfrence.htm> (Editor's note.)

- (11) Saïd K. Aburish, *op. cit.* p. 60.
- (12) William Blum, *Killing Hope - U.S. Military and CIA Interventions Since World War II*, Common Courage Press, Monroe, ME, p. 65.
- (13) Stephen Dorril, *op. cit.* p. 575.
- (14) *Ibid*, p. 580.
- (15) *Ibid*, p. 583.
- (16) *Ibid*, p. 589.
- (17) *Ibid*, pp. 592-593.
- (18) *Ibid*, p. 592.
- (19) Billy Graham was an American Protestant theologian and preacher from the evangelical movement.
- (20) Saïd K. Aburish, *op. cit.* p. 60-61.
- (21) Stephen Dorril, *op. cit.* p. 622.
- (22) *Ibid*, p. 623.
- (23) In Evelyn Shuckburgh and John Charmley, *Descent to Suez: diaries, 1951-56*, Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1986, p. 28-29.
- (24) Stephen Dorril, *op. cit.* p. 613.
- (25) *Ibid*, pp. 624-625.
- (26) *Ibid*, p. 629.
- (27) *Ibid*, pp. 629-630.
- (28) *Ibid*, p. 630.
- (29) *Ibid*, pp. 632-633.
- (30) Saïd K. Aburish, *op. cit.* p. 61.
- (31) *Ibid*, p., 61-62.
- (32) *Ibid*, p. 62 (the least we can say is that they pretended very effectively) [N.D.E.].
- (33) W.F. Engdahl, *op. cit.* p. 151.
- (34) *Ibid*, pp. 151-152.

(35) As we know, these loans have never been and never will be repaid, except by the European and American taxpayer. In fact, a debt is never purely and simply repaid. When a debt is cancelled, the taxpayers of the country that granted it are indirectly responsible for repaying it. The ultimate swindle, since it is akin to embezzlement, it should come as no surprise to anyone that the concept of debt cancellation originated in the Gospel according to Matthew 18.

The region of the world for which the rise in energy prices was truly catastrophic was the "West".

(36) W.F. Engdahl, op. cit. p. 150-156.

(37) Saïd K. Aburish, op. cit. p. 62.

(38) Ibid, p. 62.

(39) The de-industrialisation of Europe, that is. In retrospect, the thesis that the "Anglo-American establishment" takes a dim view of the emergence of the economies of the so-called "underdeveloped" countries, which were wiped out by the phenomenon of economic relocation that began in the 1980s. It may well be that the Anglo-American establishment judged in the 1970s that the time for offshoring had not yet come.

As for the so-called "depopulation" programme and the statements to that effect made by several members of the scoundreocracy in the 1980s and 1990s (see

What the Malthusians Say, in The American Almanac, 1994 - http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/malthsay.htm), the world's population was 6.2 billion in 2002, rising to 7.1 billion in 2014. We repeat: the exponential growth of the population in parallel with the reproduction of the most degenerate individuals of the white race, the world population, namely the world population of colour, is one of the necessary conditions, not for the success of the pseudo-elites' plan for world domination, since this domination is virtually a state of affairs, but for its perpetuation.

(40) John Coleman, The Conspirators' Hierarchy: Committee of 300, WIR, 1997, p.129.

(41) See Houchang Nahavandi, La révolution iranienne : vérité et mensonges, L'Âge d'Homme, Lausanne, 1999, Chap. IX.

(42) Ibid, Chap. XI.

(43) John Coleman, "What Really Happened In Iran?", World In Review, 1984.

(44) Le Nouvel Observateur, 15-21 January 1998, p. 76, available at <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165889.html>.

It should also be pointed out that Brzezinski only came out of the woodwork after former CIA director Robert Gates asserted in his memoirs that the American secret services had begun helping the Afghan mujahedin six months before the Soviet intervention.

(45) "First Supplement to A Who's Who of the British Secret State" Lobster magazine, n° 19, May 1990 ; "Pakistan's Inter Services Intelligence in Afghanistan", Sapra India (<http://www.freedomfiles.org/war/isi.htm>); see also There to the Bitter End, Anne Blair, Allen & Unwin, 2001.

(46) Zulfikar Ali Bhutto, If I am Assassinated, Vikas, New Delhi, 1979 - available at <http://bhutto.org/Acrobat/If-I-am-assassinated-by-Shaheed-Bhutto.pdf> ; Maj Gen Yashwant Deva , "ISI and its Chicanery in Exporting Terrorism", The Indian Defence Review, 1995 - <http://www.bharat-rakshak.com/LANCER/idr00006.htm>.

(47) John Coleman, op. cit. p. 16, 1984.

(48) Bill Engdahl and Jeff Steinberg "The Real Story of the BCCI", EIR, Vol. 22, N° 41, 13 octobrr - http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_bcci.html. See also <http://scribbleguy.50megs.com/bcci.htm>.

(49) Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, The Outlaw Bank: A Wild Ride Into the Secret Heart of BCCI, 1993, Random House, New York, p. xv.

(50) Ibid, p. 118.

(51) Ibid, p. 48-49.

(52) Scott Thomspson and Joseph Brewda, "Sadruddin Aga Khan: Mujahideen Coordinator", EIR, Vol. 22, N° 41, 13 October 1995 - http://www.larouchepub.com/eiw/public/1995/eirv22n41-19951013/eirv22n41-19951013_025-sadruddin_aga_khan_mujahideen_co.pdf.

(53) Bill Engdahl and Jeff Steinberg, op. cit.

(54) Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, op. cit. p. 146, p. 251, p. 262, p. 279, p. 286-287, p. 324, p. 346.

(55) "The Anglo-American Support Apparatus Behind the Afghani Mujahideen", Adam K. East, EIR, Vol. 22, N° 41, 13 October 1995.

(56) Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, op. cit. p. 101 (The explanation is not lacking in naivety. In reality, the BCCI was closed down because it had fulfilled its objectives. [Editor's note])

(57) "Unintentionally", it goes without saying.

(58) Jonathan Beaty and S.C. Gwynne, op. cit. p. 106.

(59) Ibid, p. 346; see also "The BCCI. Affair" - <http://www.apfn.org/apfn/BCCI.htm>.

(60) Here are two articles that clearly show the extent to which these "complex systems" are "complex". Westerners: http://en.metapedia.org/wiki/Jews_and_the_narcotic_drugs_trade; <http://www.chabad-mafia.com/drugs>.

(61) Alfred McCoy, "Opium History, 1979 To 1994" - <https://www.mail-archive.com/ctrl@listserv.aol.com/msg32623.html>.

("Before the Soviet-Afghan war (1979-1989), opium production in Afghanistan and Pakistan was directed towards small regional markets. There was no local production of heroin (Alfred McCoy, 'Drug Fallout: the CIA's Forty Year Complicity in the Narcotics Trade', The Progressive, 1 September 1979). August, 1997)". It cannot be stressed enough that "the Afghan drug economy was a project carefully conceived by the CIA and supported by US foreign policy". Michel Chossudovsky, "The Spoils of War: Afghanistan's Multibillion Dollar Heroin Trade ashington's Hidden Agenda: Restore the Drug Trade", Global Research, February 15, 2014; June 14, 2005 - <http://www.globalresearch.ca/the-spoils-of-war-afghanistan-s-multibillion-dollar-heroin-trade/91>) [N.D.E.]

(62) Alfred McCoy, Drug Fallout.

(63) Michael C. Ruppert, "The Lies About Taliban Heroin", FTW - http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/10_10_01_heroin.html.

(64) The Taliban are less fussy today: <http://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2007/07/09/the-talibans-opium-war%5D>.

(65) "In spite of" or because of "its communist past"? After all, most of the neo-cons in the G.W. Bush administration are former Trotskyites.

(66) William Blum, op. cit. pp. 338-52; see also Michael C. Ruppert, "Osama Bin Laden - A CIA Creation and its Blowback," (http://www.fromthewilderness.com/free/ww3/08_01_98_osama_bin_laden.html and Imran Akbar, "Gulbuddin Hekmatyar Had Links With KGB," The News International 8 October 1992 - <http://www.rawa.org/gul-kgb.htm>.

(67) Jeffrey Steinberg, "War In Afghanistan Spawned A Global Narco-Terrorist Force," EIR, Vol. 22, N° 41, October 13, 1995 - http://www.larouchepub.com/other/1995/2241_afghansi_intro.html.

(68) Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, Afghanistan- The Bear Trap, the Defeat of a Superpower, Jang Publishers, Lahore, 1993, p. 115 - available at <http://www.afghanasamai.com/Dscutions-poeticalculture/Afghanasamai-2012/BATTLESAfghanistanTheBearTrapDefeatofaSuperpowerMohammedYousaf.pdf>

(69) Imran Akbar, op. cit.

(70) "CIA tried to kill Afghan warlord", BBC, 10 May, 2002 - http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/south_asia/1978619.stm

(71) Mohammad Yousaf and Mark Adkin, op. cit. pp. 40-41, pp. 233-235.

(72) Yossef Bodansky, Bin Laden - The Man Who Declared War On America, Forum Prima, 1999, p. 101- 102.

I. The roots of Islamic terrorism

As we explained in Part One, the British used Islam to legitimise their puppet rulers in Jordan, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Palestine after taking over the Middle East in the First World War. Islam came to be seen by many Arabs as just another aspect of the corrupt colonial establishment. This is why legitimate anti-colonial movements, such as those of Nasser, Mossadegh and Bhutto, were essentially secular in nature. When the independent regimes that grew out of these nationalist movements began to make inroads outside the British sphere of influence, the British called on their Islamist allies to overthrow them. The Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the counter-revolutionary movement of this period in the Middle East and as one of the most important strategic assets of the globalists. They have become "the largest and most important Sunni traditionalist organisation of the twentieth century".

As mentioned above, it was founded by Hassan al-Bannâ, the eldest son of a respected sheikh who was also a writer and head of the local mosque. Hassan was born in 1906 and grew up immersed in Islam under the tutelage of his father. He memorised the Koran and, at the age of twelve, founded an organisation called the Association for Good Morals. Shortly afterwards, he set up another group, the Association for Combating Unlawfulness. He was a fervent Muslim devoted to his faith and, at the age of sixteen, enrolled in an Islamic teacher training college in Cairo. In his teens, al-Bannâ joined the Sufi order of the Hasafiyya Brothers. Very active in the order, he read all the Sufi works he could get his hands on and founded a Sufi group, the Hasafiyya Benevolent Society (1).

In the first part of this study, we reported on several allegations that the Muslim Brotherhood had been, if not created and infiltrated, at least encouraged by the British Secret Service and/or British Freemasonry. Coleman claims that they were created by "the big names in British intelligence in the Middle East" and Stephen Dorril writes that the Brotherhood was linked to British intelligence through Freya Stark before the Second World War and that the Shah's regime regarded them as an instrument of Freemasonry.

Although some Muslims may find these statements hard to believe, they should not be dismissed out of hand. Al-Bannâ was a fervent Muslim for whom Islam came first, but he is not

not inconceivable that he was influenced by the Masonic Fraternity, nor that he accepted British help to advance the cause of his movement, at least in the early days. Indeed, Britain used Islam effectively outside Egypt, so why wouldn't it have tried to use it in Egypt too?

Freemasonry appeared in Egypt shortly after Napoleon conquered the country in 1798. General Kléber, a French Freemason and commander-in-chief of Napoleon's army, set up the Isis Lodge there. French Freemasonry dominated Egypt until Great Britain occupied the country in 1882 and British lodges were established there. Freemasonry was very fashionable in the first half of the twentieth century and many prominent Egyptians were Freemasons, not to mention the British occupiers, aristocratic or otherwise. In fact, Egyptian monarchs from Ismail Pacha to the king Fouad, were made honorary Grand Masters at the beginning of their reign. From 1940 to 1957, there were nearly seventy official Masonic lodges throughout Egypt. At one point, the leaders of the nationalist parties and many members of the Egyptian parliament were Freemasons and, as such, frequented the British military commanders and aristocrats who were close to the occupiers (2).

In Egypt, two great Islamic leaders, Djemâl ad-Dîn al-Afghâni (1838 - 1897) and Mohamed Abduh (1849 - 1905), were also Freemasons. Al-Afghâni was a foreigner who had been Prime Minister of Afghanistan, before becoming active in Iran and Russia. He is considered "the founder of the pan-Islamic political movement" and his movement is known as Salafism. He campaigned against British imperialism, while advocating the modernisation of the Muslim world. He became an influential figure at Al-Azhar University in Cairo, and his most important disciple was Mohamed Abduh. Throughout his life, he was a militant of Muslim self-determination. He made several trips to London, where, according to his biographer, "he renewed links with the members of his lodge". When al-Afghâni died in 1897, he left behind a large body of political and religious writings that were to serve as the basis for the ideology of later Islamic movements (3).

After al-Afghâni was expelled from Egypt in 1879, Abduh continued to promote his message. He was also expelled in 1882. In exile, he met al-Afghâni in Paris, where they published a Muslim newspaper together and extended their contacts within the Brotherhood. Freemasonry. Four years later, the British did an about-face and allowed Abduh to return to Egypt. He was appointed professor at Al-Azhar University, where he set about reforming this prestigious Islamic institution. He quickly rose through the ranks to become a judge in the national courts. Only eleven years after his return from exile, the British governor, Lord Cromer, appointed him Grand Mufti of Egypt in 1899. He was now the Pope of Islam (4). At the time, he was already Grand Master of the Unified Lodge of Egypt (5).

Of course, Abduh's appointment to Islam's highest dignity was not without ulterior motives. In 1898, the Governing Council of Al-Azhar University had reaffirmed that usury and banking at This was unacceptable to Lord Cromer, whose surname was Evelyn Baring. This was unacceptable to Lord Cromer, whose surname was Evelyn Baring - he was a leading member of the prestigious Baring family of British bankers, who had made their fortune in the opium trade in India and China. Once Grand Mufti, Abduh took advantage of a loophole in the law to make usury legal again by means of a very free and ingenious interpretation of the Koran (6). British banks then had free rein to dominate Egypt. Lord Cromer later wrote of him: "I believe my friend Abduh was in reality an agnostic" and of Abduh's Salafist movement: "He is the natural ally of the European reformer." Even Cromer realised that the Islamic movement could be used to Britain's advantage (7).

Two of Abduh's students contributed significantly to the growth of the movement after his death in 1905. One of them was Ahmad 'Abd al-Rahmân al-Bannâ, the father of Hassan al-Bannâ. The other was the Freemason Mohammed Rachid Rida (1865-1935), a close friend of Abduh and editor of the monthly magazine *Le Phare*. This organ of the Salafist movement was first published in 1897 and Rida remained its editor for 37 years. Rida was part of the circle of influence and his publication reflected the British viewpoint, campaigning against the Ottoman Empire. He was a fervent admirer of the Young Turk Masonic movement, but, after the In the First World War, he castigated Atatürk's nationalist revolution (8).

The young Hassan al-Bannâ was influenced by all these factors: by the Islamic movement, by the British occupation, by his father and by his most important mentor, Mohammed Rachid Rida. Al-Bannâ grew up reading Rida's publication and, through his family connections, they became good friends. By the time of his death in 1935, Rida had pinned all his hopes for a renaissance of Islam on al-Bannâ's Muslim Brotherhood. Another factor was Freemasonry. Al-Bannâ rubbed shoulders with many religious sects and political groups before becoming a member of the Masonic Fraternity. At the time, this was quite normal for someone growing up in the classes of Membership of Freemasonry was not considered a betrayal of Islamic values, as it would be today (9).

In 1927, at the age of twenty-one, he was appointed to teach Arabic at a school in Ismailia. Ismailia was the capital of the British-occupied Canal Zone and the headquarters of the Suez Canal Company. Hasan al-Bannâ founded the Muslim Brotherhood a year later. The Company helped finance the Muslim Brotherhood's first mosque, which was built in Ismailia in 1930. (10).

An important question is how, in the midst of a multitude of competing Islamic organisations, the Muslim Brotherhood was able to expand to include more than five hundred thousand active members just a decade later. Al-Bannâ was only twenty-two years old when the Muslim Brotherhood was founded and he lived for four years in the heart of British-occupied territory. Contemporary accounts attribute the Brotherhood's success entirely to al-Bannâ's sense of organisation: "

The most important factor that made this spectacular expansion possible was the leadership provided by al-Bannâ's organisational and ideological structure. He sought to bring about the changes he hoped for through institution-building, relentless activism at local level and recourse to the mass communication. He began to build a complex mass movement that included sophisticated governance structures; sections responsible for promoting the values of the Confraternity among peasants, workers and professionals; units entrusted with key functions, including propagation of the message, liaison with the Islamic world, the press and translation; and specialised committees for finance and legal affairs. To anchor this organisation in Egyptian society, al-Bannâ skilfully drew on pre-existing social networks, particularly those built around mosques, Islamic charitable associations and neighbourhood groups. This weaving of traditional ties into a structure is at the root of its success (11).

However, the success of the Muslim Brotherhood would not have been possible without the approval of the British ruling class, and al-Bannâ's association with the Masonic Fraternity goes a long way towards explaining why it was so successful.

This is partly due to the efficiency of its organisation and its perfect integration into Egyptian society. Like the Masonic Fraternity, it was created as a charitable organisation. However, whereas Freemasonry was liberal and members of all faiths could join, the Muslim Brotherhood was a specifically Islamic association. It was a Freemasonry reserved for Muslims. Like Freemasonry, the Muslim Brotherhood cultivated secrecy and its command structure was pyramidal. The foot soldiers at the base had no idea what they were doing, the real objectives of the leaders at the top.

Although the Muslim Brotherhood was established with the approval and support of the British establishment, this popular mass movement proved difficult to control. The Egyptian people were deeply resentful of the British and the Muslim Brotherhood was no exception. They ceased to be a purely charitable and religious organisation in the late 1930s, when they entered the political arena to support the Palestinian Arab uprising against the British and the growing influx of Jewish immigrants. The anti-British activities of Brotherhood members soon began to escalate and, at the outbreak of the Second World War, al-Bannâ was briefly imprisoned by the pro-British regime for allowing his organisation to escape its control.

At the end of the Second World War, al-Bannā discovered that he was one of the most powerful leaders in Egypt. He was engaged in a power struggle against the monarchy and the secular Wafd and his organisation was considered the most militant, radical and dangerous. In 1948, members of the Muslim Brotherhood were involved in the assassination of the chief of police of the The government retaliated by issuing a decree, through Prime Minister Mahmoud an-Nukrashi Pasha, dissolving the Muslim Brotherhood in December of the same year. Their headquarters and branches were closed, and their assets and funds seized. Hundreds of members were arrested and imprisoned, and the Muslim Brotherhood went underground. A few weeks later Later, an-Nukrashi Pasha was assassinated by the Brotherhood, and on 12 February 1949, al-Bannā was murdered by the Egyptian secret police.

In May 1950, the government tried to reconcile with the Brotherhood and released most of its members. members. The following year, the ban on the Brotherhood was repealed, but it was forced to submit to a new law adopted to regulate Egyptian societies, groups and organisations.

As the monarchy continued to lose popularity because it was moving too slowly away from Britain for public taste, two subversive groups were plotting behind the scenes to take control of Egypt's destiny: the "Free Officers "In the end, the army got the upper hand. The army eventually gained the upper hand in Nasser finally emerged as the man capable of leading Egypt towards independence. At first, the Brotherhood supported the army and attempts were made to get some of its members into the new government, but the Brotherhood overestimated its strength and influence and was too demanding. After Nasser won his power struggle against General Naguib, the Brothers knew to expect harsh treatment. Nasser was much less understanding than Naguib towards the fundamentalists and the rupture was consummated after the Brotherhood attempted to assassinate Nasser in October 1954. Many years later, the disgraced and embittered General Naguib claimed in his memoirs that the assassination was an undercover operation set up by Nasser to put an end to the Brotherhood once and for all. Confrérie, which had become a nuisance (12).

In any case, by the end of 1954, thousands of Brotherhood members, most of them leaders, had been imprisoned and six executed. It was this rupture that paved the way for a new relationship between the Muslim Brotherhood and the intelligence services of Britain and the United States, with all three parties united in their hatred of Nasser.

Unfortunately for the West, the Brotherhood remained largely ineffective in Egypt during Nasser's reign, despite several attempts on his life. On the run, a large number of its members were welcomed in London, where they established a presence that they still maintain today; a number of them settled in Syria, Jordan and Saudi Arabia.

Al-Bannâ had created an organisation that Arab historians describe as "the greatest modern Islamic movement". And he said: "We need three generations for our plans - one to listen, one to fight and one to win (13)".

He died young, aged 43. His generation was the one that "listened", but he was the orator. After his untimely death, several other leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood continued to train believers in militant fundamentalist Islam.

One of them was a man called Saïd Qotb (1906 - 1966). He came to be recognised as the "chief ideologist" of the Muslim Brotherhood after al-Bannâ, and his many writings justify the beliefs of today's radical Islamists. It is rare for a Muslim to embark on the path of Islamic radicalism without having read at least a few lines by Qotb.

Saïd Qotb was the same age as al-Bannâ and was also a Freemason. He only joined the Brothers after al-Bannâ's death. He had become a critic of the West after living in the United States for some time and, on his return to Egypt, he embraced fundamentalism. He quickly rose through the ranks of the Brotherhood. He served as ambassador to Syria and Jordan, before becoming editor-in-chief of the Brotherhood's official periodical in 1954. However, after the assassination attempt on Nasser, he was arrested along with several of his compatriots, cruelly tortured and sentenced to fifteen years hard labour. A year later, a representative of Nasser offered him amnesty if he asked for forgiveness. Qotb refused and remained in prison, where he wrote studies on the role of Islam in the modern world. It formulates the idea that, according to Islam, modern Arab states such as Egypt have been invaded by Jâhilîya, "barbarism", mainly due to the influence of Western cultures and political systems on Islamic countries. Qotb writes: "It is not in the nature of Islam to come to terms with the concepts of Jâhilîya that are current in the world or to coexist in the same country with a Jahili system... It draws its system from its laws and rules, from its On the other hand, Islam is submission to Allah. On the other hand, Islam is submission to Allah and its function is to turn people away from Jâhilîya towards Islam. Jâhilîya is the veneration of certain people by others, i.e. certain people acquire a position

dominate and make laws for others, without worrying about whether these laws are against the injunctions of Allah and whether they are using their authority well or badly. Islam is about people worshipping Allah and Him alone and which derives its concepts and beliefs, its laws and rules from the authority of Allah and which frees itself from the servitude to become the servant of Allah. This is the very nature of Islam and the nature of its role on earth. There can be no agreement between Islam and Jâhilîya. It will be Islam, or Jâhilîya... no half measures are possible. Command belongs to Allah, or else to Jâhilîya. Either Allah's sharia will prevail, or it will be individual desires (14)...".

Qotb believed that Arab states governed by a law other than Sharia law were perverted by Jâhilîya and advocated the violent overthrow of this political system, in particular Nasser's regime, in order to eradicate Jâhilîya. Qotb wrote: "The first duty of Islam is to rid the Jâhilîya of man's leadership (15)."

In 1964, Qotb was pardoned and released at the request of the Iraqi head of state, who was visiting Egypt. Qotb went on to publish what is perhaps his most important work, a book entitled Milestones. Nasser took advantage of the militant language in this book to imprison him once again. At the same time, fearing that the reorganised Brotherhood was plotting against his regime, he had another twenty thousand people arrested.

members of the Brotherhood. On 29 August 1966, he had Qotb hanged as an example to others.

During his lifetime, Qotb published twenty-four books and a thirty-volume commentary on the Koran. Today, his work inspires Muslim fundamentalists in Egypt and around the world, and his life is held up as an excellent example of how Islam should behave in the face of persecution and misfortune.

Another of the "interpreters" of the first generation of revolutionary Islamic militants was Moustapha Siba'i (1915 - 1964). Born in Syria, he studied at the Islamic university of Al-Azhar. It was there that he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. He was imprisoned for a time by the British, then returned to Syria, where he was arrested and imprisoned again for his revolutionary activities, this time by the French. In 1946, after serving his sentence, Siba'i formed the Syrian Muslim Brotherhood Association.

Siba'i's career in Syria was ultimately a brilliant one. He obtained his doctorate in Islamic law and began teaching Arabic and religion in Damascus. In 1951, he married into a powerful Damascus family. He travelled throughout the West, published books, gave lectures and was one of the leaders of the Muslim Brotherhood until his death (16). Siba'i was one of the most eloquent spokesmen for the

Islamic movement. He understood the situation in the Middle East very well. In one of the many articles he wrote on Western business interests in Arab countries, he said: "They are the direct cause of foreign intervention in the internal affairs of the country and the greatest obstacle to our independence and dignity. On the one hand, the [oil] concessions are the heritage of the Turks; on the other hand, the concessions were granted to them on the pretext that they would be a guarantee of economic prosperity for the country and the people. But history has shown that these ventures are the beginning of colonisation (17)."

Sayyid Abul Ala Maududi is considered to be the father of Pakistan's Islamic movement. Born in 1903, he made a name for himself in 1937 when he became director of the Islamic Research Institute in Lahore.

For opposing the secular nature of Pakistan's British-influenced government at independence in 1948, he served a prison sentence in 1948 and another in 1952. The great

Maududi's work, in addition to his eighty books and pamphlets, is the Jamaat-e-Islami, or Islamic Society. Maududi and his group forged close links with the Muslim Brotherhood and Dietl wrote that "the two organisations still consider themselves to be branches of the same movement. At one point, the Muslim Brotherhood even recognised Maududi as the legal successor of its ideologues, al-Bannâ and Qotb" (18).

Maududi is known as the theorist of the ideal Islamic state, the definition of which is accepted by the majority of Muslims within the Islamic movement. In the following passage, he comments on democracy: "The difference between Islamic democracy and Western democracy is, of course, that while the latter is based on the concept of the sovereignty of the people, the former is based on the concept of the sovereignty of the people.

based on the principle of caliphate [rule] by the people. In Western democracy, the people are sovereign; in Islam, sovereignty belongs to God and the people are his caliph or subject. In

In the West, the people themselves make the law; in Islam, the people must conform to and obey the laws that God has revealed through his prophets. In one of these systems, the government carries out the will of the people; in the other, the government and the people must translate God's intentions into action. In short, Western democracy is a kind of absolute authority that exercises the will of the people. power freely and uncontrollably, while Islamic democracy is governed by the law of the land.

and exercises its authority in harmony with God's commandments and within the framework established by God (19).

The last of the revolutionary Islamic ideologists to be mentioned is an Iranian by the name of 'Alî Sharî'atî (1933 - 1977). The fact that he was a Freemason confirms the existence of links between the Islamic movement and Freemasonry. His father, the preacher Muhammad Takî Sharî'atî, also a Freemason, was, at least at one time, an agent of the Eastern section of the British intelligence services (20).

Alī Sharī'atī went to school in Mashhad and grew up in the shadow of his father, who led a revolutionary Islamic movement, the Centre for the Propagation of Islamic Truth. After Prime Minister Mossadegh was overthrown and the Shah ascended the Iranian throne, Alī Sharī'atī joined the National Resistance Movement. In 1957, he was arrested along with his father and a handful of others and spent six months in prison.

Alī Sharī'atī's family had powerful friends in high places, so he was able to enter the Sorbonne. There he began his studies in 1960, earning a doctorate in sociology and Islamic history. During his stay in France, he was captivated by the existentialists. He also began to appreciate Marxism.

When he returned to Iran in 1965, he was immediately arrested. The Iranian authorities knew that, in France, he had been involved with groups seeking to overthrow the Shah and had helped to create the Iranian National Front for Europe. However, he was soon released and took up a teaching post near Mashhad. For the next five years, he concentrated on writing, promoting his vision of Islam and his links with the Muslim Brotherhood and other resistance groups.

In the early 1970s, Dr Sharī'atī began to give lectures on politics and political science. religion, in which he publicly promoted ideas diametrically opposed to those of the Shah, who was busy developing an industrial infrastructure, encouraging economic development and defending modern secular education. Sharī'atī wrote: "Come then, my friends, let us abandon Europe, let us put an end to this nauseating and simian imitation of Europe. Let us leave behind this Europe that always talks about humanity, but destroys human beings wherever it finds them (21).

Ayatollah Khomeiny would never have succeeded in taking power if Sharī'atī had not prepared the ground for him by constantly campaigning against the Shah under the guise of intellectual activity and in the name of Iranian students and fundamentalists. At one point, Sharī'atī was considered to be the most influential orator in Tehran. Dietl writes: "Sharī'atī's importance showed that the Iranian revolution was favoured not only by the old mullahs and ayatollahs, but also by restless young people who were influenced to some extent by other models... up to five thousand people attended Sharī'atī's public lectures. More than a hundred thousand copies of his writings were distributed, despite the fact that those found in possession of them were arrested and tortured. Often, the modest and calm Sharī'atī would speak from the rostrum all day long, and then discuss his ideas with his audience. his listeners late into the night. He had already given more than a hundred lectures when the Savak [police

tried to arrest her. Sharī'atī fled and only surrendered to the police after they had taken his father hostage. For two years, he was subjected to horrible torture in Komiteh prison. After his liberation, he was no longer allowed to teach, nor to maintain relations with factious groups. The secret police kept track of him (22).

Finally, in 1976, Sharī'atī was able to flee to London, where he died of a cerebral embolism just before boarding a plane for the United States, where he was going to visit members of his family. The Savak was accused of murdering him with a dart poisoned with cobra venom. The whole world agrees on this version. The fact remains that, although the Shah hated Sharī'atī and the repressive philosophies he advocated, Sharī'atī's cerebral embolism has never been proven.

Al-Bannā had predicted that it would take three generations for the Islamic movement to take hold of the Middle East. He said that the first generation would require "listeners" and he, Qotb, Siba'i, Maududi and Sharī'atī were those who laid the ideological foundations of the modern Islamic movement. The next generation was the generation of "combat".

II. The creation of the Arc de crise

In the 1970s, establishment intellectuals and globalist institutions singled out population growth and industrial development as humanity's two most formidable enemies. The United Nations, the Club of Rome, the Tavistock and Aspen Institutes and many other organisations that served as mouthpieces for the establishment all began to claim that the environment was being destroyed and that industrialisation was becoming a terrible threat. Technology, science and human progress were falling from grace (23).

Lord Bertrand Russell stated that "the white population of the world will soon cease to increase. The Asiatics will be more numerous and the negroes still more numerous, before their birth-rate falls sufficiently for their numbers to stabilise without the aid of war and pestilence. Until then, the benefits that socialism aims to bring can only be partial, and the less prolific races will have to defend themselves by methods that are disgusting, even if they are necessary".

Russell was also in favour of world government: "I have already spoken of the problem of the population, but I must add a few words about its political aspect... It will be impossible to

feel that the world is in a satisfactory situation as long as there is not a certain equality and a certain general acquiescence to the power of world government, and this will only be possible if the population of the poorest nations of the world... is more or less stationary. The conclusion to which the facts we have just considered lead us is that, if great wars cannot be avoided until there is a world government, a world government cannot be stable until all the great and important countries have an almost stationary population." For Russell, population control is a prerequisite for world government (24).

As early as 1947, a leading Australian scientist suggested, in a secret report to the Australian Department of Defence, that "... the most effective counter-offensive to the threat of invasion posed by the overpopulated Asian countries would be the destruction by biological or chemical means of tropical food crops and the spread of infectious diseases capable of propagating in regions but not in the Australian climate". This scientist was Sir Frank MacFarlane Burnet, knighted by the British crown in 1951 and awarded a Nobel Prize in 1960 (25).

In 1968, Paul Ehrlich, a biologist at Stanford University and admirer of Bertrand Russell, published *The Population Bomb*, which quickly became a bestseller. He wrote: "A cancer is an uncontrolled multiplication of cells, the population explosion is an uncontrolled multiplication of people... We must devote our efforts, no longer to treating the symptoms of cancer, but to eradicating it. The operation will require apparently brutal and ruthless decisions". In his book, he advocated putting contraceptive chemicals in food (26).

Sir Julian Huxley, the British scientist and intellectual who played a leading role in the creation of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organisation (UNESCO), said much the same thing. He saw scientific progress, like penicillin, DDT and water purification, as a double-edged sword. He wrote: "... we can and must devote ourselves with truly religious devotion to the cause of the progress of the human race. And that means tackling the population problem in a violent and concerted way, because population control is ... a prerequisite to any radical improvement in the human condition (27)."

In 1972, the Club of Rome published a report entitled *Stop Growth*. This report, based on studies by the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, concluded that industrialisation had to be halted to save the planet from ecological disaster. Since then, even the most loyal

Admirers of the club, such as Maurice Strong, admitted that the report was "premature" and did not take account of advances in technology (28).

The Club of Rome has been one of the most influential architects of world government since it was founded in 1970 by Dr Alexander King, a British scientist and diplomat, and the Italian industrialist Aurelio Peccei. In 1973, the club published a report entitled Regionalized and Adaptive Model of the Global World System, which presented a model for a ten-region system of world government.

The Aspen Institute and the World Wildlife Fund are two other globalist think tanks.

The Aspen Institute was founded in 1949 by three Chicago natives: a businessman, the president of the University of Chicago and one of its professors.

The University of Chicago was founded with Rockefeller money and the Aspen Institute has always been within the Rockefeller sphere of influence. One of the highlights of the Aspen Institute's history was a conference entitled Technology: Social Goals and Cultural Options in 1970, as a hors d'oeuvre to the UN Earth Summit in Stockholm in 1972. The World Wildlife Fund was created by Prince Phillip, the Queen's husband. He famously said that, if he were reincarnated, he would like it to be as a killer virus, to help solve the problem of overpopulation (29). Since then, other WWF leaders have expressed the same concerns to the on the subject of overpopulation (30).

Arne Schiotz, Director of the WWF, said: "Malthus has been rehabilitated, but reality has finally caught up with Malthus. The Third World is overpopulated, it's an economic mess and it's impossible for these countries to get by when their population keeps growing. Our philosophy is as follows: return to village (31).

Sir Peter Scott, former Chairman of the WWF, warned: "If we consider the principle of causality, the biggest problem in the world is population. We need to put a ceiling on the human population. Development aid should be conditional on the existence of solid family planning programmes.

Thomas Lovejoy, former vice-president of the WWF, made no bones about it: "The biggest problems are the damned national sectors of developing countries. These countries think they have the right to exploit their resources as they see fit. They want to become powers (32).

Robert McNamara, President of the World Bank, warns: "There are only two possible ways of avoiding a world population of ten billion. Either current birth rates fall quickly. Or current mortality rates will have to rise. There is no other way. Of course, there are many ways to increase the death rate. In a thermonuclear age, war can do this very quickly and decisively. Nature has been doing this for a long time to put it simply: excessive population growth is the greatest obstacle to the economic and social advancement of most societies in developing countries (33)".

These views were finally accepted among those responsible for foreign policy in the United States. In 1974, Secretary of State Henry Kissinger submitted National Security Study Memorandum 200 (NSSM 200), entitled The Implications of World Population Growth for the International Interests and Security of the United States. The memorandum concluded: "Everyone in the government recognizes that population growth is currently the most serious threat to the international security of the United States. [rapid population growth] poses a significant risk of serious damage to the world's economic, political and ecological systems and, as these systems fail, to our humanitarian values."

The NSSM 200 was due to be made public in 1979, but was kept secret until 1989. During its career, Kissinger ensured that population control remained a cornerstone of his foreign policy strategy and, after him, Brzezinski, who was ideologically very close to Kissinger, pushed forward with population control. same ideas in the Carter administration. Both are closely linked to the Rockefeller family and both had William Elliott Yandell, a philo-British Oxfordian, as a professor at Harvard.

The Worldwatch Institute was set up in 1974 thanks to a grant from the Rockefeller Foundation, while the NSSM 200 was making its way among US foreign policy decision-makers. Since 1984, its annual publication, State of the World, has featured prominently in the media, and its hundreds of alarmist documents and pseudo-scientific reports are regularly used as ammunition by the Left in its war against industrialisation (34).

As we reported in the first part of this study, the first attack on the Third World came in the form of a premeditated massive increase in oil prices following the 1973 Yom Kippur War. An economy cannot develop without energy supplies, and the quadrupling of energy prices was a major setback for countries such as India, Brazil, China and India. Pakistan, Indonesia and Mexico. When Pakistani President Benazir Bhutto tried to

Kissinger threatened him: "We will punish you as an example" (35). The Shah, even though Iran had abundant oil resources, also launched a programme to develop nuclear energy. Both leaders were quickly eliminated.

As energy prices rose, Third World development came to a screeching halt, while the Arab Middle East became immensely wealthy. It was then that the globalists turned to their allies, the Islamists, to remedy the situation. Islam would be used to attack industrialisation and modernisation under the false pretext that human progress was un-Islamic and a plot by the West against the servants of Allah.

In England, the Islamic Foundation was set up by Professor Khurshid Ahmad in Leicester in 1973. It was a branch of the Jamaat-e-Islami. When General Zia took power in Pakistan, he appointed Ahmad Minister for the Economy (36). In 1973, the Islamic Council of Europe was created. Its headquarters is in London. Salem Azzam, Secretary General of the Council, was a leading Muslim Brother. We'll be talking about him again.

Another project, Islam and the West, was set up in Cambridge in 1977 by the Muslim Brother and former Syrian Prime Minister Maarouf al-Dawalibi in collaboration with Peccei and Lord Caradon of the Club de Rome and the International Federation of Advanced Studies of Dr Alexander King. Islam and the West is quick to define Islam as a backward religion at odds with science and technology. The globalists were determined to promote only the minority current of repressive anti-Western Islam, and the Muslim Brotherhood enabled them to make the world accept their definition of Islam (37).

In Iran, the members of the Aspen Institute and the Club of Rome were in direct contact with the ideological opponents of the Shah's regime. Shar'i'atî, Abolhassan Bani Sadr and many eminent educators in Iranian universities fell within their circle of influence. The destabilisation campaign of the globalists against the Shah is documented by Robert Dreyfuss in his book *Hostage to Khomeini*.

The Fedayeen group, the Iranian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood created in the 1940s, played a crucial role in the overthrow of the Shah. It was led by the fanatical Ayatollah Sadeq Khalkhali (1927 - 2003) and Ayatollah Khomeini was a long-standing member. The students who stormed the American embassy in Tehran after the overthrow of the Shah were also members of the group.

members of the Fedayin. Khalkhali was able to exercise his political power personally during the Iranian revolution as a judge in the trials of thousands of political prisoners, the majority of whom were sentenced to death (38).

The Fedayin also controlled the opium production and drug trafficking network in Iran, which, towards the end of the Shah's reign, was increasingly threatened by the Iranian ruler's anti-drug campaign. When Khomeini came to power, Khalkhali was cynically put in charge of the national anti-drug programme and, during his tenure, opium production soared. According to the rules laid down by Khomeini, "wine and other alcoholic beverages are impure, but opium and hashish are not" (39).

In Pakistan, the Jamaat-e-Islami supported the overthrow of Prime Minister Zulfikar Ali Bhutto by General Zia-ul-Haq. Bhutto was hated by British globalists because he had withdrawn Pakistan from the Commonwealth, implemented nationalist policies, turned to the He had sought to develop nuclear energy. When General Zia announced Bhutto's death sentence, fifty-four heads of state protested. Zia went ahead and had Bhutto executed in 1979, only after receiving assurances from the Jamaat-e-Islami leadership that the execution would not lead to internal unrest (40). In the years that followed, the Jamaat-e-Islami became Zia's biggest financial backer and the nation was subjected to a brutal process of Islamisation.

In Afghanistan, the CIA, encouraged by the British secret services, began funding Islamic opponents of the pro-Soviet regime even before the Soviet invasion.

Carter's National Security Adviser, Brezinski, advocated inciting the Mujahideen to subversion in order to provoke a Soviet invasion. It took place on 24 December 1979 (41). General Zia and the Jamaat-e-Islami in Pakistan played a crucial role in the success of the Mujahideen revolt in Afghanistan. Their takeover of Pakistan was necessary to draw the Soviets into the Afghan conflict. As mentioned, an Afghan warlord affiliated to the Muslim Brotherhood emerged as the main beneficiary of American military aid, despite his well-known anti-Western stance and radical conception of Islam. He was Gulbuddin Hekmatyar

(By the time the US Congress finally decided to put an end to this aid, it was already too late. In 1996, Hekmatyar was at the height of his career, becoming, albeit briefly, Prime Minister of Afghanistan. He was eventually ousted from Afghanistan by the Taliban, but,

Today, he is back and campaigning against Hamid Karzai's government. In May 2002, the British took the initiative of sending agents into Hekmatyar's stronghold. The stated aim of Operation Buzzard was to destroy Hekmatyar's forces: to this day, Hekmatyar is still at large and his forces are suspected of the recent terrorist attacks in Kabul. Perhaps the stated aim of Operation Buzzard concealed another).

In Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood enjoyed a resurgence after President Sadat eased restrictions on the organisation in the early 1970s. Publicly, the Muslim Brotherhood sought to soften its image by presenting itself as a "moderate" Islamic organisation, but behind the scenes they spawned a number of violent extremist groups. Islamic Jihad, the Islamic Group and Takfir wal Hijra are just some of the groups in the terrorist nebula that began campaigning more openly against Sadat after he signed the Camp David peace accords with Israel in 1978. Militants linked to these groups assassinated Sadat in 1981 and martial law was introduced, while the new leader, Mubarak, ordered a vigorous crackdown on Islamists.

In Syria, the Muslim Brotherhood revolted against the Assad regime and recaptured the city of Hamah. The Syrian government laid siege to the Brotherhood stronghold for three weeks, three weeks of intense fighting during which six thousand soldiers and twenty-four thousand civilians were killed. Ten thousand inhabitants were arrested and placed in internment camps. The Syrian government then provided proof that the Muslim Brotherhood forces had been armed by the West.

This explosion of violence throughout the Middle East in the late 1970s and early 1980s was referred to by Brzezinski as the "Arc of Crisis". Far from being a spontaneous internal conflagration, it was caused by the implementation of the plan drawn up by globalist strategists such as Dr King, Kissinger, Brzezinski and the British agent Bernard Lewis.

III. The Muslim Brotherhood expands

At the start of the Second World War, members of the influential Egyptian Azzam family joined the Muslim Brotherhood, enhancing its reputation. Abdul Rahman (1893 - 1976) was the most famous of them. All his life, he had been in the service of the British Empire. After the First World War, he worked with British intelligence to organise the political activity of the Sanussi Brotherhood in Libya (42). His work was very effective and, in 1951, the leader of the Sanussi Brotherhood was proclaimed King of Libya at a ceremony attended by the top brass of the United Nations.

(Initially the darling of the British Empire, King Idris I ruled Libya before being ousted by Muammar Gaddafi in 1969. Gaddafi founded his own revolutionary organisation in London in 1966 (43), but his regime soon fell out of favour with Britain).

After the Second World War, Abdul Rahman Azzam became the first Secretary General of the World Health Organization.

League of Arab States. Azzam's prestige is demonstrated by the fact that his daughter Muna married Mohammed, the eldest son of the former king of Saudi Arabia, Faysal (44).

In 1955, after General Nasser cracked down on the Muslim Brotherhood, the organisation moved its base of operations to London and Geneva. The Geneva base was under the control of Saïd Ramadan (1926 - 1995), married to al-Bannâ's daughter. Ramadan created the Institute of Islamic Studies and, under his direction

As a result of this control, Geneva became a major Islamic base in Europe. Today, it is where King Fahd (c. 1923 - 2005) of Saudi Arabia flees whenever he feels his life is in danger in his kingdom.

The following story illustrates Ramadan's close relationship with underground Islamic organisations around the world:

Shortly after the Iranian revolution, a man named Ali Akbar Tabatabai became the most prominent representative of the opposition to the Ayatollah's regime. Under the Shah, he had worked as an information adviser at the Iranian embassy in Washington D.C. and, after the fall of the Shah, he established the Freedom Foundation in Iran. In July 1980, he was assassinated by David Belfield, also known as Daoud Salahuddin. Belfield was a black Muslim who was part of a gang linked to Bahram Nahidian, who was believed to be the head of the Ayatollah's secret service (Savama) in Washington D.C. Less than two hours after the assassination, Belfield made a call with advance notice to Saïd Ramadan in Geneva, and then, using different passports, fled the United States to Switzerland (45).

Geneva has always been a useful base for the Muslim Brotherhood, but its London headquarters has become the most important. Its head is Salem Azzam, a relative of Abdul Rahman Azzam. As mentioned earlier, he became Secretary General of the Islamic Council of Europe, formed in London in 1973 in close collaboration with Saïd Ramadan. Dreyfuss explains the Council's role: "[The Council] runs the Ikhwan [Brotherhood] from Morocco to Pakistan and India and controls hundreds of centres

"They are also a source of inspiration for thousands of fundamentalist students and Muslim clergy in both the Middle East and Europe (46).

In 1978, the Islamic Institute of Defence Technology (IITD) was created to support the "arc of crisis" of the Islamic revolution. The first seminar was held in London in February 1979. The Institute was to working hand in hand with NATO. It was led by Salem Azzam and the members of his Islamic Council of Europe. Pakistan and Afghanistan were at the top of the agenda, and the IITD was the first of its kind. in charge of coordinating massive arms deliveries to the Muslim Brotherhood fighting in these two countries and in the Middle East (47).

Outside Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood succeeded in creating a number of respectable organisations and became widely perceived as a moderate institution that had renounced violence. But, in Egypt, the Muslim Brotherhood remained determined to overthrow the regime and install a state of peace. They used terrorism as a means to this end.

When Sadat became President of Egypt in 1970, he campaigned to distance his country from Nasser's pro-Soviet policies and move closer to the West. Initially, one of his most formidable opponents in this task was the Arab Socialist Union. Sadat reconciled with the Muslim Brotherhood to put pressure on the Arab Socialists and consolidate his regime and, in the course of his Duration his first years in power, he freed hundreds of Muslim Brotherhood members.

To date, the Muslim Brotherhood has had eight supreme guides. Al-Bannâ led the organisation until his death in 1949. He was replaced by Hassan al-Hudaibi after a brief period of chaos in 1951, Al-Hudaibi headed it until his death in 1976, although he was often imprisoned under Nasser. He was replaced by Omar el-Telmisani. When Omar el-Telmisani died in 1987, he was succeeded by Hamid Abdul Nasr. Both Talmisani and Nasr had been thrown into prison in 1954 during Nasser's purge against the organisation. Sadat released Talmisani in 1971 and Nasr in 1972. Mustafa Mashhour was Supreme Guide from 1996 until his death on 14 November 2002. He was succeeded by Maamoun al-Hudaibi, the son of the second Supreme Leader, Hassan al-Hudaibi. Mohammed Mahdi Akef was head of the Muslim Brotherhood from 2004 until his death.

2010. Mohammed Badie has been its Supreme Guide since then (on Tuesday 20 August 2013, he was placed "in preventive detention, reports Le Monde in its edition of the day, for a period of fifteen days for "He is being prosecuted, along with two of his deputies, after eight demonstrators were killed while attempting to attack the headquarters of the powerful Brotherhood in Cairo on 30 June. The White House criticised his arrest, saying it was "contrary to the idea of a judiciary that is independent of politics" (emphasis added). The Supreme Leader still has his residence and offices in Egypt, although the vast majority of his members and most of his staff are based there.

of its leaders are based abroad. For the most part, the Supreme Guide is simply a figurehead and the Muslim Brotherhood's clandestine operations are directed from London and Geneva.

Sadat tried to reconcile with the Islamists, even though he knew that they were still a threat to the country. Moreover, he never lifted the ban on the Brotherhood. This did not prevent the Brotherhood from establishing itself as a political force.

Takfir wal Hijra is one of the largest groups in the Muslim Brotherhood nebula. It was founded in 1971 by a former member of the Muslim Brotherhood, Chokri Ahmed Mustafa (1942 - 1978). Its existence was made public by the Egyptian daily Al Ahram in 1975, after the arrest of a number of its members. In 1977, the group kidnapped a former minister of religion, Sheikh Mohammed Hussein al-Dhahabi, demanding a ransom of 200,000 Egyptian pounds and the release of sixty prisoners. The Egyptian government refused to accede to his demands and the Sheikh was found dead; several targeted attacks followed. On 8 July 1977, Mustafa, the group's leader, was arrested along with a number of his followers. Mustafa and four of his lieutenants were executed on 19 March 1978, but his terrorist organisation continued to exist (48).

The Islamic Liberation Organisation is another terrorist cell set up by a former Brother Dr Saleh Siriyya, a Palestinian agronomist. In 1974, the members of this group tried to take over a military school, seizing weapons and going to an assembly to which Sadat was giving a speech. The plan failed, eleven people died and Siriyya was killed. captured, then executed (49).

In 1974, the security forces discovered another group, the Islamic Liberation Party, founded in Jordan in the 1950s by Sheikh Taquiuddin al-Nabhani (1909-1977), a Muslim Brother and a judge from Haifa. Its activities were mainly aimed at Israel. Sadat had the members of the group living in Egypt arrested and questioned (50).

The two most important Egyptian terrorist organisations linked to the Muslim Brotherhood are the Jamaat al-Islamiyya (the Islamic Group) and the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, also known as Jihad al-Djihad. Both were closely associated with Sadat's assassination.

Jamaat al-Islamiyya was created in 1971 to fight Sadat for his cooperation with Gaddafi. It was led by a Muslim Brother, Dr Helmi al-Gazzar, and initially did not resort to violence, mainly campaigning in universities. It was not long before change, when a blind sheikh, Dr Omar Ahmed Mohamed Abdel Rahman, established himself as the leader of the organisation (51).

Islamic Jihad came to prominence in 1977, when Al Ahram reported that eighty members of this fighting organisation had been arrested. One of the members of Islamic Jihad at the time was Ayman al-Zaouahiri, a young man from the Muslim upper classes related to the Azzams.

His grandmother was the sister of the illustrious Abdul Rahman Azzam and his uncle was Salem Azzam of the Islamic Council of Europe. Al-Zaouahiri was first arrested in 1966 at the age of 16 because of his affiliation with the Muslim Brotherhood, and his militancy only increased over the years.

In early 1980, the government arrested seventy members of Islamic Jihad. The public prosecutor of Egypt described the organisation as a "fanatical terrorist group" and declared that it was "financed from abroad and possessed weapons, explosives and technical equipment" (52). However, arrests and investigations failed to prevent its members from taking action again. Dietl describes: "Jihad hit the headlines again on 6 October 1981, when a commando led by Khaled Islambuli shot Sadat. Following difficult investigations in the summer of 1982, the

Cairo learned that Islamic Jihad was part of the Muslim Brotherhood's large family business. The Muslim Brotherhood confirmed this to me. At the same time, in a statement Unanimously, the Jihad "condemned to death" Sadat's successor, Mubarak. In September 1982, the three most important Jihad leaders were hunted down and arrested (53)."

Just two years before Sadat's assassination, the International Committee of the Muslim Brotherhood held a summit meeting in London. Brotherhood leaders from Egypt, Sudan, Jordan, Pakistan and Afghanistan attended, as did the head of Saudi Arabia's secret services, to discuss what had just been achieved in Pakistan and Iran and the future of Afghanistan, Syria and Egypt (54).

In Egypt, Sadat continued to try to reconcile with the Muslim Brotherhood. In 1978, he authorised them to distribute their publication, Al Dawa, again. In 1979, he even met twice with Supreme Guide Omar el-Telmisani, but nothing positive came out of the dialogue and the Muslim Brotherhood continued to verbally attack him in their publications and in the mosques. Finally, a few weeks before Sadat's assassination, el-Telmisani was arrested and distribution of Al-Dawa was banned.

When Sadat was shot, Kemal al-Sananiry was the most prominent representative of the Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt. He was arrested and interrogated and died in prison a few weeks later. The government clumsily claimed that he had committed suicide. His wife, Amina, rejected this explanation. She was Said Qotb's daughter.

The blind sheikh was also arrested, but later acquitted. He had encouraged the perpetrators of the assassination, judging that the government was run by atheists and heretics. He had also allowed them to steal to finance their cause and had even suggested that they could fuck the wives of government officials if they succeeded in overthrowing it (55). In 1993, he was implicated in the World Trade Center bombing, tried, convicted and sentenced to prison. He is still serving his sentence. His two sons continue the jihad as members of al-Qaeda and close followers of Osama bin Laden. The Islamic Group still recognises Sheikh Rahman as its spiritual leader and its members have vowed to take revenge on America if the diabetic sheikh dies in his American prison.

Al-Zaouahiri was also arrested following Sadat's assassination. After spending three years in prison, he was released, after which he quickly rose to the top of Islamic Jihad, which he has led since 1993, at which time he established links with Osama bin Laden in Sudan. After fleeing Egypt, he set up his base of operations in Geneva, where the branch of the Muslim Brotherhood known as Saïd Ramadan's Islamic Centre (with whom Malcolm X corresponded a few weeks before he was killed) was based. assassinated by Elijah Muhamamd of the Black Muslims) was used as cover for his activities (56). Al-Zaouahiri established himself as the so-called "number two" of the al-Qaeda "organisation". His brother Mohamed al-Zaouahiri is currently leading Muslim attacks against Serbia and Macedonia. Reports indicate that he is working in a NATO-controlled region of Kosovo (57). The two Azzam brothers have always maintained their links with the Muslim Brotherhood, despite the fact that al-Zaouahiri has publicly criticised the Brotherhood for not supporting the revolution in Egypt sufficiently. His criticism has been useful to the Brotherhood, which is trying to project the image of a "moderate" group.

Another important figure in the al-Qaeda "organisation" is the brother of the assassin Khaled Islambuli, executed on 15 April 1982. Involved in the assassination of Sadat, Ahmad Chawki al-Islambuli left Egypt for Karachi, where he helped set up a smuggling network. Later, in Sudan, al-Islambuli worked with bin Laden to set up a militant base in Somalia, and then, in 1998, he became a member of bin Laden's World Islamic Front Against Jews and Crusaders (58).

The latest of the Muslim Brotherhood-linked organisations is the Palestinian group Hamas, which came to prominence in 1988 with the publication of its Islamic Pact by Sheikh Ahmed Yassin (1937 - 2004). For a number of years, he had been the leader of the Muslim Brotherhood in Gaza, where, in 1978, he had founded an Islamic association called Al-Mujamma Al-Islami, which can be considered as the outline of Hamas. In its 1988 Islamic Pact, the group clearly presented itself as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood (59)."

Dreyfuss sums up the character of the Muslim Brotherhood organisation in the paragraphs below. These words were written in 1980, but they have lost none of their accuracy: "The real Brotherhood is not the fanatical sheikh and his equally fanatical followers, nor even the great mullahs and ayatollahs who Khomeini, Gaddafi and General Zia are extremely well-designed puppets.

"The real Muslim Brotherhood are those who never get their hands dirty. They are the reserved bankers and financiers behind the scenes, the members of the old Arab, Turkish and Persian families whose genealogy places them in the oligarchic elite, in close business relations with the "Muslim Brotherhood".

Europe's "black nobility" and, in particular, the British oligarchy, through the intermediary of the intelligence services."

"And the Muslim Brotherhood is all about money. The Brotherhood probably controls several tens of billions of dollars in liquid assets and controls billions more through its operations.

They are also partners in a powerful global financial empire that extends from bank accounts to the world's largest bank accounts. By allying themselves with the Muslim Brotherhood, the Anglo-Americans are not simply investing in a racket organised by terrorists for hire; they are partners in a powerful global financial empire that stretches from anonymous bank accounts in Switzerland to tax havens like Dubai, Kuwait and Hong Kong (60)."

I hope that the reader is beginning to grasp that the radical Islamic movement is really small, that all the organisations within it are closely interrelated and that they are dependent on all from the Muslim Brotherhood. An analysis of Osama bin Laden's career helps us to understand him even better.

IV. Osama bin Laden: the early years

Osama, seventeenth son of Yemeni construction magnate Mohamed bin Awad bin Laden (1908 - 1967), was born around 1957. Over the years, Mohamed became a trusted friend of King Abdul Aziz and King Faysal of Saudi Arabia, and his construction company was chosen to restore the holy sites of Mecca and Medina, including the Great Mosque of Mecca. He was also awarded the contract to renovate the Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem in 1969.

When he died in 1972, his family had become the richest in Saudi Arabia after the royal family, and his succession fell to his 54 children. His son Salem took over as head of the company, Bakr Abdelaziz, Ali Yahya and Yeslam also played a leading role in the management of the bin Laden empire. These heirs have always maintained close relations with the Saudi royal family, and have trained many of its young princes in the subtleties of global finance and industry. Fahd ben Abdallah ben Mohammed al-Saoud and Nayef ben Abdelaziz al-Saoud are two of the princes who owe their current status as global tycoons to the bin Laden brothers (61). The Saudi royal family has always had a close relationship with the heads of the bin Laden family, which is not the case for some of Mohamed bin Laden's younger sons.

On 20 November 1979, the Great Mosque of Mecca was stormed by several hundred militants, the Imam assassinated and, in the ensuing chaos, thousands of worshippers trampled to death. The militants took hundreds of them hostage and holed up in the vast cellars of the mosque. The Saudi forces reacted quickly and organised a counter-attack, which was however easily repulsed by the well-armed and well-protected militants. For days, the rebels held out against the government forces, destroying tanks and a helicopter that was flying too low crashed into a minaret. King Khaled turned to the French government and French special forces arrived with chemical weapons. The Great Mosque was finally liberated on 4 December. For a fortnight, Islam's holiest shrine had been occupied by radical fundamentalists. Hundreds of soldiers and over a hundred rebels were killed, along with most of the hostages. On 9 January, sixty-three of the captured rebels were paraded in the main squares of several Saudi Arabian towns and beheaded in public. Hundreds more were arrested and interrogated in the course of the investigation (62).

Among those arrested was Mahrous bin Laden, son of Sheikh Mohammed bin Laden. In his biography of Osama bin Laden, Jacquard writes: "The terrorists had established contact with Mahrous several years before, when he was studying in London and had His friends included the son of a dignitary in southern Yemen who led a very active fundamentalist group. As a result of this academic relationship, Mahrous bin Laden became involved with a group of Syrian Muslim Brotherhood activists in exile in Saudi Arabia. The investigation by the secrets will reveal that by cynically exploiting this network of old friendships of the young Mahrous, the terrorists had taken advantage of the bin Laden group's lorries to organise their attack, without the young man's knowledge (63)...".

Bin Laden's company was responsible for renovating the Grand Mosque, so its lorries were allowed to come and go freely, without being searched. The terrorists had used the trucks to smuggle weapons, which they then hid inside the mosque. Mahrous was declared innocent of any involvement in this plot, but his honour

would remain tainted forever and he knew that he would never be able to do as well as his elder brothers. Had he belonged to another family, it is likely that he would have been executed, if only for having maintained relations with some of the fundamentalists linked to the terrorists. In the end, it was the bin Laden family itself that sorted things out, as it provided the authorities with the plans for the mosque, which helped them to plan the successful attacks on the rebels. In the end, the case did little harm to the bin Laden family. They retained their reputation for integrity and their close relations with the Saud (64).

Osama, one of the youngest sons of the bin Laden family, always had the impression of being a bit of a "child".

outsider and, like his brother Mahrous, turned to fundamentalist Islam. Adam Robinson, one of his biographers, claims that in his teens, Osama led a social life and denied himself nothing, particularly in Beirut from 1973 to 1975, when he was at secondary school. Others, like Jacquard, maintain that this was not the case. Whatever the case, it is clear that he embraced Islam unconditionally when he was studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah. There he

He enrolled in 1976 and, the following year, undertook the Hajj, the two-week pilgrimage that all Muslims must make to Mecca. Robinson writes that, following this experience, Osama bin Laden grew a beard and showed sincere piety. What Robinson does not disclose is that bin Laden's conversion was due to the fact that he was then a member of the Muslim Brotherhood.

Mohammed Qotb, the brother of Saïd, the "chief ideologist" of the Muslim Brotherhood who was executed in 1966, emigrated to Saudi Arabia to escape the repression that the Brotherhood was facing in Egypt. In the 1960s, he accepted various teaching posts at several universities to accomplish the Brotherhood's mission. It was during his stay in Saudi Arabia that Mohammed Qotb conceived the organisation now known as the World Assembly of Muslim Youth (WAMY), which became a reality in 1972 thanks to donations from the bin Laden family.

Omar bin Laden was at one time its executive director, as was another of Osama bin Laden's brothers, Abdullah, was its director (65). The FBI was investigating the AMJM until the Bush administration interrupted the investigation at the start of its term in office in 2001. The FBI suspected it of being a source of terrorist financing.

The AMJM's perspective on Islam is the same as that which the globalists value so highly in the Muslim Brotherhood: Islam is threatened by the West, must remain suspicious of science and technology and return to its primitive roots. The AMJM's current headquarters are in Riyadh and it has major offices in Falls Church, Virginia and London. According to reporter Greg Palast, there are more than twenty similar organisations in Great Britain (66).

While studying at King Abdul Aziz University in Jeddah, Osama bin Laden befriended Mohammed Qotb and was introduced to the Muslim Brotherhood. Malise Ruthven, author of *Islam in the World* and former BBC Arabic editor, notes that Qotb was Osama bin Laden's "mentor" during this period (67).

Another important figure in Osama bin Laden's university life was a professor called Sheikh Abdallah Youssouf Azzam. Nothing to do with the Egyptian Azzams, Professor of Religion of Palestinian origin, he was an active member of the Muslim Brotherhood in the West Bank. He later continued his studies in Jordan and Damascus, before obtaining his doctorate in Islamic jurisprudence from the University of

Al-Azhar in 1973. In Cairo, he met the family of Saïd Qotb and was "drawn into the ranks of the Egyptian Islamist militants" (68). Shortly afterwards, he moved to Saudi Arabia, having been invited to teach at King Abdul Aziz University, where he met Mohammed Qotb. Osama bin Laden attended Azzam's classes and was very attracted by his militant ideology. Azzam's famous motto was "Jihad and the gun and nothing but Jihad and the gun: no negotiation, no conference and no dialogue" (69).

In 1979, Dr Azzam left Saudi Arabia and was one of the first Arabs to join the Afghan jihad. He was the main Arab/Palestinian representative of the Muslim Brotherhood. The then 22-year-old Osama bin Laden joined him shortly afterwards and together they created the Maktab al-Khidamat, MAK, or Mujahideen Services Bureau, in Peshawar. Their organisation joined forces with Pakistan's Muslim Brotherhood, the Jamaat-e-Islami. The MAK set about recruiting fighters ready to join the jihad and, by the end of the 1980s, the MAK, also known as the Al Kifah Organisation, had branches in around fifty countries. The Muslim Brotherhood network, with money from the bin Laden family, made the MAK a huge success.

Militants from all over the world flocked to Afghanistan, but Azzam and bin Laden realised that most potential mujahideen lacked the training and weaponry needed for the Afghan campaign. To remedy this, they set up the Masadat 'Al-Ansar central base in Peshawar, both a training centre and a weapons depot, to help the thousands of Arabs who would come to fight in Afghanistan. the jihad in Afghanistan (70). Al-Qaeda (the base) was born. Dr Saad al-Faqih was one of the many Saudis who passed through the Peshawar base. In an interview with PBS, he explained how al-Qa'ida was formed and that it was not destined to become Osama bin Laden's terrorist organisation: "Well, it [really] makes me laugh when I hear the FBI describe al-Qa'ida as Bin Laden's organisation ... [It's really a] very simple story. If Bin Laden was going to receive Arabs from Saudi Arabia and Kuwait - and other countries - he [was] going to receive them in the reception centre in Peshawar. They went to fight and came back, without being registered... Neither the arrivals nor the departures were recorded... Neither was the length of stay... They were all [well received]. You go there, to such and such a battlefield... Well, he was harassed by a lot of families, who

called him to find out what had happened to their son. He doesn't know. Because there's no file. There's no register. Well, he asked some of his staff to record the comings and goings of all the Arabs who joined his ranks... It's established [that they] arrived on such and such a date and stayed here or there... Many of them had only come for a fortnight, three weeks, and then they disappeared. This file was called the Al-Qaeda register. That was al-Qaeda. There was nothing sinister about al-Qaeda. It wasn't an organisation... I don't think he gave his underground group a name. If you want to give it a name, you can call it the bin Laden group. Well, they use the term Al Qaeda... Al Qaeda is simply the name of the register on which those who came to Peshawar and travelled back and forth between the theatre of operations and the reception centre were recorded. Before returning to their country (71).

It was essentially from Pakistan that bin Laden led the war in Afghanistan, and he played a particularly important role there.

role as funder and organiser, even though he travelled there several times with his mentor, Sheikh Azzam, the "Emir of Jihad", who used to make fiery speeches to boost the morale of the Mujahideen warriors. In Afghanistan, bin Laden's resources as a building contractor were also put to good use, and on more than one occasion he sent heavy equipment there to fortifying Mujahideen strongholds and repairing supply routes. The question remains of Whether or not bin Laden and Azzam took part in front-line fighting. In any case, both have been mythologised as active and courageous warriors.

During the years bin Laden spent in Afghanistan, the MAK forged close links with the Pashtun warlord and Muslim Brother Hekmatyar. Both Azzam and Hekmatyar were hostile to the United States, although Hekmatyar's anti-Americanism was more pronounced, even though it is estimated that his group, Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin, received up to 40% of US aid.

to the mujahideen by the CIA and the ISI (72). During the 1980s, Azzam travelled to the United States to meet American Muslim groups, raise funds and recruit fighters for the jihad. He set up major Al Kifah centres in Atlanta, Boston, Chicago, New York and Jersey City, Pittsburgh, Tucson and small branches in thirty other American cities (73). In this way, the message of the militant Muslim Brotherhood was disseminated across the United States and the jihad gained followers.

According to the respected Pakistani journalist Ahmed Rashid, the war in Afghanistan intensified in 1986, when the CIA took three strategic decisions (74). Firstly, to supply the Mujahideen with missiles American-made Stinger. At the height of the war, it is estimated that the Mujahideen were shooting down an average of 1.5 Soviet Afghan aircraft a day. The second decision, inspired by the British secret service and the ISI, was to launch guerrilla attacks in the Soviet territories of Tajikistan and Uzbekistan. Unsurprisingly, the mission was entrusted to Hekmatyar's forces, who scored a symbolic success, to which the Soviets responded by

dropping incendiary bombs on all the neighbouring villages. The CIA considered this type of operation counter-productive and put an end to it. Thirdly, the CIA began to support the Arab initiative of recruiting jihad warriors from all over the world. Rashid describes the conduct of this campaign by recruitment: "Pakistan had given standing instructions to all its embassies abroad to issue visas, no questions asked, to all those who wanted to come and visit the country. fighting with the Mujahideen. In the Middle East, the Ikhwan ul Muslimeen (Muslim Brotherhood), the Muslim World League and the Palestinian Islamic Extremists organised the recruitment and deployment of the Mujahideen. put the recruits in contact with the ISI. The ISI and the Pakistani Jamaat-e-Islami party set up committees to receive, house and train the foreign militants. They then invited the militants to join mujahideen groups, usually Hezb-e-Islami Gulbuddin. This undertaking was largely financed directly by the Saudi Arabian secret services, with some of the funds channelled through the Arab extremist Osama bin Laden, who was based in Peshawar at the time. At the time, Olivier Roy described the company as a joint venture set up by the ISI between the Saudi Arabian, Muslim Brotherhood and Jamaat-e-Islami (75)".

These three decisions escalated the conflict and made it clear to Gorbachev that his country was fighting a war it could never win. On 14 April 1988, the Geneva Accords were signed, requiring the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan. By early 1989, the Soviet army had left Afghanistan, but not before installing a resolutely communist and well-armed regime in Kabul.

American aid to the Mujahideen ceased almost completely after the signing of the Geneva. The Soviets were leaving and the West was congratulating itself on its victory. For the United States, the war was over and the CIA did not want to participate in the creation of an Afghan Islamic regime that would undoubtedly be anti-American. As a result, Hekmatyar, Azzam, bin Laden and the Islamic warlords felt betrayed and manipulated.

The Mujahideen suffered a major setback on 17 August 1988, when the C-130 carrying General Muhammad Zia-ul-Haq, mentor to the Mujahideen, crashed a few minutes after take-off from Bahawalpur airport. In addition to the general, a number of generals and the American ambassador were killed. In November, Benazir Bhutto, daughter of Zulfikar Bhutto, executed by General Zia, was elected Prime Minister. She introduced policies hostile to fundamentalists and warlords, including laws designed to crack down on drug trafficking.

In March 1989, the Mujahideen were persuaded by Saudi and ISI advisers to launch a large-scale attack on the communist stronghold of Jalalabad. They had explained that taking

of Djalalabad would enable President Najibullah's forces to rapidly liberate Afghanistan. The assault turned out to be one of the greatest disasters ever suffered by the Mujahideen: the city was well defended and protected by a veteran army that included a large contingent of artillery. Thousands of mujahideen were killed.

In Peshawar, bin Laden and Azzam reacted with fury. They issued official statements accusing Pakistan and Saudi Arabia of being part of a perfidious American plot. It was the first time that bin Laden publicly expressed his growing resentment towards the resolutely pro-American regime in his country (76).

The assassination of his friend and father, Sheikh Abdallah Azzam, a few months later, left an even deeper impression on him. The account of this man's death by a Muslim website gave it a mythical dimension: "On Friday 24 November 1989 in Peshawar, in the In Pakistan, he and his two sons, Mohammed and Ibrahim, were killed by 20 kg of TNT, activated by remote control, on their way to Friday prayers (Jumma). His car was blown up in a busy street. The explosion was so powerful that fragments of his sons' bodies were found a hundred metres from the carnage. One of his son's legs was found hanging from an overhead telephone cable. Nevertheless, glory be to Allah, the Sheikh was found perfectly intact, except for the internal haemorrhage that caused his death. Many of those present will confirm the musky smell emanating from his body (77)."

In the early days, Sheikh Azzam helped to create the Palestinian organisation that later took the name Hamas. Today, the military branch of Hamas in the West Bank is officially known as the Abdallah Azzam Brigades (78). In London, the Azzam Organisation was founded in his name and his subsidiary Azzam Publications (www.azzam.com) describes itself as "an independent media offering news and authentic information about Jihad and the Mujahideen around the world". The site closed after 11 September 2001 (79).

At the end of 1989, Osama bin Laden returned to Saudi Arabia. He was welcomed there as a celebrity and a hero, but he was still bitter about the infighting that was devouring Afghanistan and cynical about the Saud family. He turned to his family and occupied briefly a job in the bin Ladens' road construction company. At 32, he was almost a veteran of the Afghan war, but his jihad was just beginning. The Muslim Brotherhood still had plans for him.

V. Bin Laden in exile

On 2 August 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait and the quiet life that bin Laden had led since his return to Saudi Arabia was turned upside down. Suddenly, he had to respond to a new threat and undertake a new mission. On the day of the invasion, bin Laden left his home in Jeddah and flew by private jet to Riyadh. He went straight to the offices of King Fahd and was welcomed by Prince Sultan. He handed the Prince a memorandum of around ten handwritten pages, in which he proposed raising an army of ten thousand seasoned former Mujahideen fighters to reinforce the Saudi army, to liberate Kuwait and drive out Saddam Hussein's army. Robinson describes the situation: "Members of his family remember that, in the days that followed, Osama did not leave his mobile phone, as he was expecting a reply from King Fahd. He called the monarch's office several times, contacted several of his colleagues to reiterate his offer, sent several faxes and loaded members of his staff to deposit copies of his letters in the King's office. Meanwhile, he worked day and night in his office to gather his forces and mobilise them for action, convinced that they would be essential if he was to win the war that lay ahead. But on 7 August he received a slap in the face that has consumed and incensed him ever since (80)."

That day, it was announced that King Fahd had agreed to allow a coalition of forces led by the Americans to occupy Saudi Arabian territory to protect his regime and prepare to liberate Kuwait. The Bush administration had panicked King Fahd with reports containing satellite photos showing Saddam Hussein's forces massed on the border with a view to invading Saudi Arabia. The reports were entirely false, the satellite photos doctored and the threat a pure fabrication. Iraq had no intention of invading Saudi Arabia, as the Iraqi regime was trying to make out through diplomatic channels and the international media. Nevertheless, King Fahd, frightened, imagined that his regime was in danger and authorised the United States to mass troops in Saudi Arabia in preparation for Operation Desert Storm (81).

Osama bin Laden, along with the leaders of the Islamic movement in Saudi Arabia and around the world, regarded this foreign occupation of Muslim holy places as an abomination. Bodansky describes the problem encountered by King Fahd: "At the beginning of August 1990, King Fahd asked the ulama - the country's main religious leaders - to approve the deployment of American forces. "The ulemas were all categorically opposed to the idea," according to a Saudi official quoted in a study by the exiled Saudi scholar Nawaf Obaid: "it was only after lengthy discussions with the King that, reluctantly, the Grand Mufti, Abd al-Aziz ibn Abd Allah ibn Baaz, gave his approval, on condition that solid proof of an [Iraqi] threat was provided"... News of this conflict between the Court and the ulama spread like wildfire in Islamic circles in Saudi Arabia (82). "

This is what bin Laden said about King Fahd in an interview in 1998: "Any government that sells out the interests of its people and betrays its people and takes measures that exclude it from the Muslim nation is doomed to failure. We announce that the ruler of Riyadh and those who, like him, are on the side of the Jews and Christians, be they Americans or others, will collapse. They have abandoned the Muslim nation. We announce that, like the Iranian royal family, the Shah, they will be annihilated and disappear. After Allah made them owners of the holiest lands and gave them previously unknown wealth from oil, they continue to sin and do not value Allah's gift. We announce their destruction and annihilation (83)..."

Operation Desert Storm came to an end on 28 February 1991, but, as foreign occupation continued, bin Laden did not stop openly criticising the Saudi regime. He made speeches at meetings and in mosques and, as a result, he began to be closely watched by the Saudi secret police. Bin Laden eventually received threats and Robinson writes that some of his relatives recall that he was even surrounded and beaten by a group of "youths" (possibly Saudi secret service agents) for criticising the government (84). Bin Laden began to realise that he was not welcome in his homeland and that he would be better able to pursue his objectives abroad. In April 1991, he managed to leave Arabia Saudi Arabia on the pretext of signing a business contract in Pakistan. He had no intention of returning.

Bin Laden spent around eight months in Pakistan and Afghanistan, but even there he did not feel completely free. The Pakistani government was not particularly Islamist-friendly at the time and bin Laden heard rumours that Saudi intelligence was working with the ISI to arrest him and bring him back to Saudi Arabia. His close relationship with Hekmatyar was also a problem, because Hekmatyar had angered the Saudis with his strong support for Saddam Hussein during Desert Storm. Throughout the Middle East, the Islamists were retreating. Afghanistan was in the throes of civil war, Saudi Arabia and Pakistan were cracking down on them, Egypt was too, and Iran was Shia and hostile to Sunnis. As a result, many of the most fanatical Islamists took refuge in London, where they were always well received, or in the fledgling Islamic Republic of Sudan, where Bin Laden was invited.

Sudan became the official bastion of Islamic fundamentalism on 30 June 1989, when General Omar Hassan Ahmed el-Bechir seized power in a military coup. A few months later, in August, Sudan's role was confirmed at a meeting of the International Muslim Brotherhood in London. The Sudanese delegate was a man called Hassan al-Tourabi. He would emerge as Sudan's real strongman and Osama bin Laden's mentor.

Hassan al-Tourabi, born in 1932, was educated in English-language schools in Sudan and indoctrinated into Islam by his father. He obtained a law degree from Gordon College in Khartoum in 1955 and it was around this time that he joined the Muslim Brotherhood. He was a scholarship student at London University, where he obtained a master's degree in law. Al-Tourabi then attended the Sorbonne, where he obtained his doctorate in 1964. Back in Sudan, he emerged as the intellectual leader, spokesman for the Islamic movement and head of the Sudanese branch of the Muslim Brotherhood. He was nicknamed the Black Pope of Africa (85).

At the Muslim Brotherhood meeting in London in 1989, it was decided that Sudan would be the new base for the Islamic movement and a n i n e t e e n - m e m b e r Muslim Brotherhood Leadership Council was subsequently established in Khartoum under the chairmanship of al-Tourabi. This council contributed to In April 1991, a Popular Arab-Islamic Conference was held in Khartoum. It was a congress of Islamists and terrorist groups from all over the world. It led to the creation of the International People's Organisation. The IPO established then in Khartoum, another council of around fifty members, each representing a country involved in the Islamic struggle (86).

The International Muslim Brotherhood is not content with creating endless councils. It also controls the International Legion of Islam, or Islamic Legion, which emerged in the 1980s and is based mainly in Pakistan, Afghanistan and Tehran. In the 1990s, the Islamic Legion operated very effectively from Khartoum. The Islamic Legion is simply an unofficial network of military organisations aimed at coordinating the global jihad. Bodansky, director of the Congressional Task Force on Terrorism and Unconventional Warfare and author of the bin Laden biography often cited in this study, calls the Islamic Legion the Armed Islamic Movement.

The Islamic movement suffered a terrible setback on 5 July 1991, when the Bank of International Credit and Commerce was finally closed down by the Bank of England. It had been an important part of the global Islamic movement's financial network. In order for the movement to To exploit its full potential, its leaders knew that a new financial network had to be put in place. This is perhaps one of the reasons why bin Laden was invited to Sudan, as bin Laden was married to Khalid Bin Mahfouz's sister. The authors of "Bin Laden: The Forbidden Truth" (p. 289) describe Mahfouz as follows: "Between 1986 and 1990, Khalid Salim Bin Mahfouz was one of the main directors of the BCCI, of which he was operational director. His family held around 20% of the bank's capital. Khalid Bin Mahfouz was indicted in the United States in 1992 for tax fraud in connection with the BCCI affair. In 1995, held jointly and severally liable for the BCCI's bankruptcy, he agreed to be released.

a transaction consisting of the payment of a fine of 245 million dollars to the bank's creditors, [allowing them to compensate some of the bank's customers. The charges against the bank were embezzlement and violation of US banking laws, Luxembourg and the United Kingdom] (87).

In 1999, the French Parliament set up a Commission of Inquiry into money laundering throughout the world. After making public its reports on Liechtenstein, Monaco and Switzerland, on 10 October 2001 it published the conclusions of its in-depth investigations into the banking system of Great Britain. Brittany: "The City of London... (is) very attractive to money launderers" and Gibraltar and the Crown Dependencies are "the very best of the specialist offshore financial havens". (88). "

A 70-page appendix to this 400-page report, entitled "Osama bin Laden's Business Environment", focused specifically on Osama bin Laden's London financial network. The report concludes that some forty British banks, companies (including organisations in London, Oxford, Cheltenham, Cambridge and Leeds) and individuals were associated with this network.

The author, Jean-Charles Brisard, offers this conclusion in his book *La vérité interdite*: "The financial network identified around Ossama bin Laden and his investments corresponds to his general architecture to the network set up in the 80s by BCCI for its operations fraud, often with the identity of the players (former directors or executives of the bank and its subsidiaries, arms and oil merchants, Saudi investors and sometimes structures (NCB, Attock, BAI))."

"The study notes the survival of the BCCI's financing networks despite the parallel support enjoyed by Ossama Bin Laden from the political and terrorist movements of the Islamist movement. The convergence of financial and terrorist interests, particularly in Great Britain and Sudan, does not seem to have been an obstacle to the objectives pursued. The combination of a terrorist network backed by a vast financing structure is the dominant feature of the operations carried out by Ossama Bin Laden (89)."

And now I'm going to present you with a thesis that we'll be coming back to frequently in the rest of this study. Quite simply, Osama bin Laden is not the head of this secret financial network, which surfaces from time to time as a source of funding for bin Laden's terrorist activities. Osama bin Laden is not and never has been the leader of the Islamic movement.

which, in reality, is run by the International Muslim Brotherhood. Osama bin Laden has been effectively used as the figurehead of the Brotherhood's militant wing to assume the leadership of the International Muslim Brotherhood.

responsibility for the atrocities committed, but he is not the mastermind of the entire operation, or even of the operations he is asked to carry out.

In the same way, the Muslim Brotherhood is being instrumentalised by the globalists, whose main objective is to overthrow the established world order and create a system of global governance. This second, even more extraordinary thesis will be presented later.

The International Muslim Brotherhood had used the BCCI to finance its activities. When it closed in July 1991, after the Islamists had held the aforementioned summit meetings in Sudan, they called Osama bin Laden to the rescue, to help them organise the rebuilding of the network. Bin Laden had built up a reputation as an excellent organiser during the years he had spent running the MAK in Peshawar, so he was the man for the job, and their close relationship with his brother-in-law Khalid Bin Mahfouz was an added advantage. Mahfouz knew the British banking system like the back of his hand and knew exactly which British banks and bankers he could trust to rebuild the secret network almost legally. Robinson writes of the resurrection of this network, which owes much to bin Laden's organisational skills: "After a few months, Osama revealed to an astonished al-Tourabi what he called the Brotherhood Group. It was a network of 134 Arab businessmen whose interests, put together, formed a business empire that spanned the globe. They had bank accounts in almost every country and collectively moved billions of dollars on a regular basis as part of their legal activities. It was the perfect front. The Brotherhood Group came to be used by terrorist groups around the world. Osama was the darling of his sector (90)."

Bin Laden also helped to boost the banking industry in Sudan, where he invested fifty million dollars to operate the Shamal Islamic Bank El Khartoum. This was bin Laden's bank, which he owned in partnership with the National Islamic Front of Sudan, the Sudanese branch of the International Muslim Brotherhood.

After helping the Muslim Brotherhood rebuild its financial network, bin Laden was kept in Sudan by projects linked to his profession as an entrepreneur. A company was set up jointly by bin Laden, the Sudanese army and the National Islamic Front of Sudan. It was called Al-Hijra for Construction and Development Ltd. Major projects were undertaken, including the development of Port Sudan by building an airport and a 1050 km four-lane motorway to

Khartoum, the widening of the Blue Nile and the construction of the Rosaires dam. Railway lines were improved, several small airports built and roads tarred throughout the country. (91).

While bin Laden was building the infrastructure of Sudan, the International Muslim Brotherhood was preparing to take on the US army in Somalia. Although the intention to engage Although the American forces in Somalia for "humanitarian reasons" were not made public until the end of 1992, it seems that the International Muslim Brotherhood had anticipated the American intervention from the fall of the Somali government in January 1992. It also seems that everything had been planned so that the American army confronts the Islamists in Somalia and its mission fails.

As mentioned earlier, Sudan announced its intention to become a base of an International Muslim Brotherhood activist at the 1989 meeting in London. In the weeks that followed, organisations such as Abu Nidal's, Hamas and the Iranian Hezbollah in Lebanon established offices in Khartoum. Shortly afterwards, training camps were opened and bin Laden was invited to attend. At the end of 1991, Iran and Sudan formed a strategic alliance. This cooperation between Shia and Sunni fundamentalists immediately attracted the attention of the Egyptian and Saudi regimes and it was understood that Sudan was becoming a threat.

Al-Tourabi then toured Western capitals. According to Jacquard, in 1992 he went to London, where he was invited to the Royal Institute of International Affairs. This is the headquarters of the British globalists and the parent organisation of the Council on Foreign Relations. After this visit, he travelled to the United States, where he was officially received in Washington (92). On his return to Sudan, al-Tourabi established relations with Somali warlord Mohamed Farrah Aidid. Bodansky explains: "The Somali terrorists were given equipment and weapons for the militias they were to train and supervise. Some of these militias had emerged directly from the ranks of the main Somali parties, while others were totally independent, answering only to Khartoum... Tehran, which controlled and financed these Somali terrorists via Sudan, planned to use them against the United States, the United States of America and the United States of America. in the same way that Teheran, together with Syria, used Hezbollah against American peacekeepers in Beirut in the early 1980s (93).

At the end of 1992, the International Muslim Brotherhood asked Sheikh Tarek al-Fadli to leave London, where he was living comfortably, and return to Yemen to organise a terrorist cell. against the American forces who were soon to be stationed there before going on to Somalia. Bin Laden had met al-Fadli in Afghanistan and, in any case, helped to put the sheikh in touch with the thousands of "Afghan" Yemenis who had returned home. Al-Fadli smuggled into Yemen

According to Bodansky, this was "in mid-November", whereas the Clinton administration did not reveal its intention to commit American forces to Somalia until 28 November (94).

American forces landed on the beaches of Somalia on 9 December 1992, ridiculously filmed by the hordes of international media awaiting them there. The majority of American citizens, particularly the military, wondered why on earth the American army was trying to enforce order in a chaotic and ungrateful Islamic country like Somalia.

The operation initially appeared to be a success, and humanitarian aid was allowed in. The Islamists were simply biding their time. Their first attack took place in Yemen on 29 December, when Al-Fadli's brand new organisation, the Yemeni Islamic Jihad, carried out a series of attacks. exploded bombs at the Hotel Aden and the Golden Moor, killing three people and injuring five. One of the bombs exploded shortly after a contingent of one hundred Marines had passed by on their way to Somalia.

Another team, armed with grenade launchers, also missed their target and were captured near the fences of an airport where US Air Force transport planes were stationed. Al-Fadli and some of his supporters surrendered on 8 January 1993. The rest of the "Afghan" Yemenis were airlifted to Somalia by Osama bin Laden in mid-1993; bin Laden later boasted in an interview that the operation had cost him three million dollars of his own money (95).

On 5 June 1993, on their return to Mogadishu, General Aidid's forces ambushed a Pakistani detachment of UN forces, killing twenty-three peacekeepers. Aidid left Somalia and arrived in Khartoum in June to take part in a summit meeting organised by the Islamists. Al-Tourabi, bin Laden, a number of Iranian agents and the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, al-Zaouahiri, were also present. The meeting was about expelling the US and the UN from Somalia. Bodansky writes that the operation was led by al-Tourabi and al-Zaouahiri, along with several other "Afghan" Arabs serving under them as military commanders. Bin Laden, as usual, was responsible for logistical support. In the autumn of 1993, al-Zaouahiri entered Somalia, where he coordinated operations with Aidid's military commanders (96).

Resistance to Operation Restore Hope reached its peak on 3 October 1993. The events of that day were unforgettably recreated in the Hollywood film *Blackhawk Down*. On that day, Aidid's forces succeeded in shooting down two Blackhawk helicopters, wounding seventy-eight American soldiers, killing eighteen and capturing one. A thousand Somali fighters and civilians were killed in the carnage. After this incident, it became clear to the Clinton administration that

that the Somali operation should come to an end. By March 1994, almost all US forces had withdrawn, leaving the Islamists in power.

Bin Laden saw this as another great victory for Islam. First the Soviets had been defeated and expelled from Afghanistan and now the United States had been defeated and expelled from Somalia. Two superpowers had been defeated by the force of the arms of Islam. Robinson reports this extract from an interview with bin Laden: "The so-called superpowers have disappeared. We believe that the United States is very much weaker than Russia. From the reports we have received from our brothers who took part in the jihad in Somalia, we have learned that they have been the weakness, fragility and cowardice of American troops. Only eighty American soldiers were killed. Nevertheless, they fled into the heart of darkness, frustrated, having given the designers of the new world order a cold sweat (97)...".

VI. The World Trade Center

Under al-Tourabi's leadership, Sudan had won a major victory for the Muslim Brotherhood, expelling the United States from Somalia. But even before its involvement in Somalia, the Muslim Brotherhood had struck at the heart of the United States. On 26 February 1993, the attack on the World Trade Center killed six people and injured a thousand, not to mention c o s t i n g over 250 million dollars. The intention of the perpetrator, Ramzi Youssef, was to make the towers collapse on top of each other and, at the same time, to spread a cloud of cyanide gas over New York. Fortunately, the explosion in the underground car park structure was not powerful enough to shake the tower, but it was enough to burn off the cyanide gas.

The mainstream media focused their attention on the blind sheikh, Omar Abdel Rahman, who was arrested, tried and convicted for his part in the conspiracy. Head of the Jamaat al-Islamiyya (Islamic Group), he had been imprisoned in Egypt for his moral support for Sadat's assassins. When he was released in 1985, he went to Pakistan, where he met Hekmatyar and Abdullah Azzam. He became a very famous cleric in Islamic circles, well known for his courageous militant preaching and hatred of Mubarak. At the end of the 1980s, he spent his time preaching in Islamic centres, in all over Saudi Arabia and even in Great Britain, Germany and the United States, with the blessing of the CIA. He also met al-Tourabi on several occasions in Khartoum and London (98).

In May 1990, he obtained a visa from the American consulate in Khartoum, despite the fact that his name was on a State Department list of suspected terrorists. His visa was issued by a CIA agent posing as a government official. Rahman settled in New Jersey, where he began preaching the same militant message he had always preached. In November 1990, the State Department cancelled Rahman's visa and advised the INS to keep an eye on him. Five months later, instead of deporting him, the INS issued him with a green card (99).

Sheikh Rahman's installation in the United States had been financed by the Muslim Brotherhood through at least two people. One was Mahmoud Abou Halima, a member of the Brotherhood who had worked with the CIA in Afghanistan and established a network of contacts with Muslim extremists and the Black Panthers in the United States. The other was Moustapha Chalabi, director of Abdullah Azzam's Al Kifah Centre in Brooklyn (100).

After Rahman opened his mosque in New Jersey, he and his associates began to put pressure on Chalabi to let Rahman take control of the Al Kifah Centre and its \$2 million in assets. Chalabi gave in to this threat and left Brooklyn for Peshawar in March 1991, the man chosen to succeed him as director of the Centre was a Lebanese-American by the name of Wadih el-Hage, a man closely linked to the Muslim Brotherhood (he was probably a member) who was living in Arlington, Texas at the time. But the transition was complicated by Chalabi's assassination on 26 February and, although el-Hage was in Brooklyn at the time, he did not take over from Chalabi as head of the Al-Kifah Centre. He returned home to Arlington, where he continued his work exporting cars to the Middle East. About two years later, he was called to Sudan, where he worked for Osama bin Laden, exporting the agricultural goods that the companies. He eventually became his personal secretary. Today, he is imprisoned in the United States for his links with al-Qa'ida and his alleged role in the 1998 bombings of US embassies in Africa - it should be noted that this is conditional. because it turns out that he had returned to the United States in 1997 (101).

In Brooklyn, the Al Kifah Centre came under the control of Sheikh Rahman's network. In September 1992, the network brought Ramzi Youssef to the United States. Youssef is now generally recognised as the mastermind of the World Trade Center attack and his case presents an interesting challenge. He entered the United States on an Iraqi passport in the name of Ramzi Youssef. He did not have a visa, but was granted political asylum. A few months later, he went to the Pakistani consulate and, having presented the required documents, he was given a passport in the name of Abdul Basit Karim. The US government's investigation of Ramzi Youssef concluded that Abdul Basit Karim was indeed his passport holder. true identity.

Abdul Basit Karim was born in Kuwait in 1968 to a Pakistani father and a Palestinian mother. His father was an employee of Kuwait Airlines. In 1984, Karim moved to the UK and began his studies. He took English courses at the Oxford College of Further Education and attended the West Glamorgan Institute in Swansea, where he obtained a degree in electronic engineering in 1989. By his own admission, made after he had finally been arrested and extradited to the United States in 1995, he was recruited

into the Islamic movement in 1987, while living in Swansea, after being approached by some local members of the Muslim Brotherhood. In the summer of 1988, he travelled to Pakistan, where he stayed in one of the many Mujahideen training camps financed by the Brotherhood. After obtaining his A graduate in 1989, he was injured in a bomb explosion in Karachi that he had made himself. During the invasion of Kuwait, he was in that country, where, according to the Minister of Defense before Desert Storm, he fled to the Philippines, where he put his bomb-making skills to work for the new Islamic groups that were beginning to make a name for themselves in that country. Abdul Basit Karim, alias Ramzi Youssef, was an agent of the Muslim Brotherhood and an expert bomb-maker, and the network brought him to the United States at the end of 1992 with the sole aim of destroying the World Trade Center (102).

Another theory about Ramzi Youssef's true identity, which unfortunately has received a great deal of publicity, should be mentioned. In the aftermath of the 1993 bombing, many Conservatives tried to blame Saddam Hussein's Iraq for the attack. This theory had been built up by the highly respected analyst Laurie Mylroie and taken up by CIA Director James Woolsey, who was prepared to grasp at anything that might conceal the CIA's involvement in the attack. According to this theory, Abdul Basit Karim was an affable academic who was murdered by the Iraqi secret services during the Iraqi occupation of Kuwait in 1990, and Karim's identity had been usurped by the super-agent, Iraqi Ramzi Youssef. This theory is based almost entirely on the fact that Kuwaiti papers had clearly been falsified before 1993, when they were discovered during the investigation into the WTC bombing. Mylroie and company concluded that the Iraqis must have falsified them to enable Youssef to assume Karim's identity. Like the fingerprints that his passport matched those of Youssef, Mylroie argued that this confirmed that the passport had been forged. This theory was soon supported by a number of Conservatives in the United States and by several well-known journalists in Great Britain. Bretagne (103).

Mylroie does not consider the possibility that the documents were altered to conceal Karim's collaboration with the Iraqi invaders and with the Muslim Brotherhood, which supported Iraq during the invasion of Kuwait. The theory developed by Mylroie was naturally supported by several members of Swansea University. Ken Reid, the deputy headmaster, said that Karim was not the same height or weight as Youssef. He also said that Karim, unlike Youssef, had a deformed eye and that his ears and mouth were smaller than Youssef's (104).

Brad White, a CBS journalist and former Senate investigator, took up Mylroie's cause and interviewed

the teachers who had known Karim. "Two people remember Abdul Basit well, but were unable to formally identify him from the photos they were shown. They had the impression that, although there was a certain resemblance between them, it was not the same person. We have a feeling," they told White, "that Ramzi Youssef is probably not Basit" (105). However, these alleged differences can be explained by the bomb that exploded in his face while he was making it in Karachi in 1989...

A British journalist described Youssef's English as "appalling" and speculated that he would not could not be the Karim who had lived in Britain for four years and taken language courses at Oxford (106). The way Youssef behaved at his trial, however, seems to undermine this hypothesis: "he insisted on representing himself at his first trial, looked good in his tailor-made double-breasted jacket, frequently played up his charm and represented himself surprisingly well, even getting hostile witnesses to contradict himself (107)". If his English had been "appalling", could he have represented himself so well at his trial?

Simon Reeve, in his book *The New Jackals*, confronts the allegations that Youssef was not Karim. He mentions Neil Herman, the man in charge of the FBI investigation into the 1993 bombing, and also quotes several of Basit's friends at Swansea: "... Neil Herman and the FBI are convinced that Youssef and Karim are one and the same person, and several former students remember and identify Ramzi - their 'whimsical' and 'feisty' former classmate. "Sometimes he was your friend, sometimes...", said one Welsh student. Another student from Swansea University recalls that a friend of his - an Englishman of Asian origin - who also happened to be Youssef's, mentioned having had a political conversation with him. He said, "He's a real nutcase". Another student kept newspaper articles about Youssef's trial. At the time when Youssef was still on the run, he remembers comparing the photos of him published in the newspapers with those in his albums. She's my friend Jane, she's a teacher," he told his friends as he leafed through the album. Phil, he's an engineer and [turning to the articles], this is my friend Ramzi, the international terrorist and the most wanted man in the world (108)."

In any case, it's understandable that Swansea University wanted to distance itself from a terrorist mastermind like Youssef, and it's also understandable that Tories like Mylroie have been so keen to blame a "higher power" for the WTC bombing. There was a higher power, but it wasn't Iraq and most Tories are so Anglophile that it's impossible for them to look critically at Britain, where the Muslim Brotherhood is based.

The question of Youssef's true identity was finally settled in the weeks following 11 September 2001, when former CIA chief James Woolsey was sent to London to gather all possible evidence that Iraq was at least partially responsible for the attacks. His trip was independently funded by Paul Wolfowitz, the hawkish Deputy Secretary of Defence, which caused a rift in the Bush administration and angered the State Department and the CIA.

(109). Woolsey focused on allegations that hijacker Mohammed Atta had met with Iraqi intelligence in Prague and also looked at the

Youssef's alleged links with Iraq: "One of the other leads Woolsey followed in Britain was that of a Kuwaiti terrorist now in prison known as Ramzi Youssef, whose real name is Abdul Basit. Woolsey claimed that Youssef was an Iraqi agent who had kidnapped Basit and impersonated him. Woolsey's investigation has made him a laughing stock with the British police and secret service, who are now trying to find him.

are "astounded" by his activities, according to one British official. But Woolsey's lack of credibility has not stopped the mainstream media from quoting him at length to whip up anti-Iraq hysteria.

(110). "

Woolsey met members of British intelligence who, to his dismay, agreed with the conclusion reached by the American investigators in the Youssef trial and confirmed that Ramzi Youssef was really Abdul Basit and not an Iraqi impostor.

The case has since been dropped, although Mylroie continues to believe that the British are doing all they can to cover up for Saddam Hussein (111), even as Tony Blair struggles to find reasons to support the US plan to invade Iraq.

Abdoul Basit Karim, alias Ramzi Youssef, fled the United States for Karachi immediately after the attack on 26 February 1993. By 1994, he was back in the Philippines, where he joined the Muslim Brotherhood cell that had been set up to support the new Abu Sayyaf terrorist group in Mindanao. Karim met Mohamed Jamal Khalifah, Osama bin Laden's brother-in-law, who had helped finance the creation of the Abu Sayyaf Group. This group takes its name from the Islamist militant Rasul Sayyaf Abdurrah (112). Dr Sayyaf obtained his doctorate from Al Azhar University and became one of Afghanistan's leading theologians. He founded Sawala al-Jihad University in Peshawar around 1990 and is now a fierce militant critic of the new Karzai government and an enemy of the United States. Abu Sayyaf is seen by many as a front for al-Qa'ida, but in reality it is a Muslim Brotherhood group that was conceived long before Osama bin Laden was introduced. as the "mastermind of international terrorism".

In the Philippines, Abdoul Basit Karim, alias Youssef, worked closely with his uncle Khaled Cheikh Mohammed, now perceived as the operational mastermind of the 11 September attacks and suspected mastermind of the WTC attack. Like Karim, Mohammed was born in Kuwait, but he settled in Pakistan (113) Kuwaiti records show that Karim's entire family left Kuwait.

Kuwait for Pakistan on 26 August 1990, during the Iraqi occupation (114). The Indian secret services believe that the whole family originates from the Pakistani province of Baluchistan and that Karim only grew up in Kuwait (115). In any case, Karim and his uncle Khaled, a former student of a higher education institution in North Carolina (116), are the terrorists who are at the origin of the operation that was finally carried out on 11 September. The Philippine police discovered the plot, known as Operation Bojinka, when, alerted by an alarm, which turned out to have been triggered by an incident in the making of a bomb, they searched Karim's flat. A computer was seized containing plans for eleven American airliners and instructions for planting bombs set to explode simultaneously. One of the captured members of the cell, Abdoul Hakim Murad, later admitted under interrogation that the second phase of the plan was to hijack two airliners and crash them into targets such as CIA headquarters, the White House, the Pentagon and possibly some skyscrapers. Murad was sure of this because he had attended several American flight schools in Texas, New York and North Carolina and was expected to be one of the suicide bombers (117).

The discovery of the plot and the disorganisation of the terrorist cell was a triumph for the Philippine intelligence services, and the CIA awarded Chief Inspector Aida D. Fariscal a certificate of merit. In recognition of your outstanding personal efforts and cooperation" (118). The CIA was then quick to forget Operation Bojinka.

Karim, alias Ramzi Youssef, had great difficulty avoiding arrest and escaping from the Philippines, but he left behind several specialist reference books that he had stolen from the Swansea University library (confirming that he was indeed "Karim") (119). He returned to Pakistan, where he easily disappears into the vast Islamic network that was there. He would have continued to play a leading role in the global terrorist network had he not been betrayed by one of his closest associates. collaborators. A South African Muslim recruited by Karim gave information about his whereabouts in exchange for the \$2 million reward offered by the US government for his arrest. Karim was arrested in his flat by American and Pakistani security services on 7 February 1995. The informant received the reward and now lives with his family in the United States under a new identity, as part of the Karim was extradited to the United States, tried and convicted for the WTC attack. "Ramzi Youssef" is now serving a 240-year sentence.

Karim's uncle also fled the Philippines. However, in 1996, while he was staying in Qatar, the government of that emirate and the FBI signed an agreement whereby the Qatari authorities would arrest Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and hand him over to the United States. The FBI sent a team to Qatar. Khaled Sheikh Mohammed was to be delivered to them in a hotel. But at the last minute, everything was cancelled. Apparently, a "higher power" had intervened at the last minute and Khaled Sheikh Mohammed had been taken into custody.

Mohammed was sheltered. He fled to Prague, where he set up his new headquarters and took control of the country.

the name of Mustafa Nasir. Who could have intervened to torpedo an important agreement between two sovereign governments at the last moment? The person who intervened in the affair would have been the Qatari Minister for Religious Affairs (121). The other factor that must be taken into account is that Qatar is the place of residence of one of the Muslim Brotherhood's most eminent and vociferous theologians, Dr Youssef al-Qaradâwî, Dean of Islamic Studies at Qatar University, who also heads the Islamic Council of Europe (122). Khaled Sheikh Mohammed's visit to Qatar could not but have been organised by the Muslim Brotherhood, and only the Muslim Brotherhood had the influence and the resources to organise it.

power needed to derail an extradition agreement between Qatar and the United States.

Khaled Sheikh Mohammed is the man who can expose the entire conspiracy that led to September 11, but no investigative journalist has been able to uncover anything about the man's life. Wall Street Journal reporter Daniel Pearl was abducted and brutally murdered for investigating him in Pakistan, and the heavily censored high-tech video of his execution by beheading was broadcast worldwide on the internet as a warning.

When the US Congress began its investigation into the events of 11 September, it found that the head of the CIA, George Tenet, had prevented the declassification of all information concerning Khaled Sheikh Mohammed and that Mohammed's name had not even been allowed to be mentioned in the investigation report. Tenet knew that a critical examination of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed's background would reveal his close links with the Muslim Brotherhood and, subsequently, the Brotherhood's links with the Muslim Brotherhood.

with Western intelligence services. Mohammed was a CIA agent,

as was Ramzi Youssef. They were part of the Muslim Brotherhood, but

were Muslims in name only (123). The investigation by the Philippine intelligence services revealed that Mohammed and his nephew "Youssef" liked to drink, party and go to bars.

erotica and chasing local girls (124). The same was true of most of the 9 / 11 hijackers in the weeks leading up to the operation. Their behaviour contrasts with that of Osama bin Laden who, in Sudan, plugged his ears whenever he heard music being played in public (125). Osama bin Laden was only vaguely involved in the events of 11 September, and did not even know what was going on.

However, it played virtually no role in the planning and execution of the operation. The discovery of the he truth about 11 September requires an examination of Khaled Sheikh Mohammed's itinerary, and many powerful interests are determined to conceal this truth.

VII. Bin Laden's money problems

At the end of 1993, after serving al-Tourabi and the Muslim Brotherhood dutifully for two years, bin Laden began to run out of money. He was not allowed to withdraw funds at will from the financial network of the Brotherhood Group, which he had helped to set up after the fall of the

BCCI, because it was not his network. He was financially dependent on his masters and, at the time, the Brotherhood saw no reason why bin Laden needed funds.

The main reason for bin Laden's money problems was that the Saudi government had frozen all his assets and bank accounts. This is confirmed by a number of sources, including Robinson and the anonymous author (I have reason to believe it is Dr Saad al-Faqih) of a biography of bin Laden published on the PBS website.

To remedy this situation, bin Laden did what many other Saudi dissidents have done over the last few decades: He moved to London and set up an organisation to do the following
his group and accept substantial donations from wealthy Muslims living in Great Britain.
Brittany. The aforementioned Dr Saad al-Faqih, after fleeing Saudi Arabia, created the Movement for Islamic reform in Arabia and Dr Mohammed al-Massari, who had also fled Saudi Arabia, created the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights (CDDL).

Bin Laden's short stay in London received a great deal of publicity with the publication in 1999 of Yossef Bodansky's book *Bin Laden - The man who declared war on America*. Bodansky's assertion was challenged by several London journalists, most notably CNN's London correspondent and terrorism 'expert' Peter Bergen, author of *Holy War, Inc.* who did not take it seriously. However, bin Laden's stay in London has since been confirmed by journalist Adam Robinson in his book *Bin Laden - Behind the Mask of Terrorism*. His biography, published at the end of 2001, is based on interviews with Osama bin Laden's immediate family and details the three months he spent in England in early 1994.

On his arrival, bin Laden bought a house "at or near Harrow Road in the London Borough of Wembley. He paid cash for it, but put it in the name of an intermediary" (126). Bin Laden's most important task was to set up his own organisation, the Committee for the Advice and Protection of the Islamic Revolution.
reform, to send out his press releases and receive donations. Bin Laden put the Saudi dissident Khaled al-Fawwaz at its head, who kept in touch with him by satellite telephone and sent his statements to London's many Arabic-language newspapers. As mentioned in the
In the first part, bin Laden established relations with two London residents who were to play a key role in shaping his image as the spokesman and mastermind of the Islamic movement. The first was Abdel Bari Atwan, editor-in-chief of the newspaper *Al-Quds Al-Arabi*, and the other was the religious extremist and Muslim Brother Omar Bakri Muhammad, who called himself "the voice of Osama bin Laden" and ran the Islamic Liberation Party and the Al-Muhajiroun organisation from his London mosque.

Robinson recounts that bin Laden found time to do a bit of sightseeing. He writes: "Osama liked to send postcards. This investigation shows that he visited the Tower of London and the Imperial Museum. the war. He left the south of England at least once and was among the millions who visit Edinburgh Castle every year (127)."

Bin Laden attended two important Arsenal matches, including one on 15 March when the London football club beat Turin to reach the semi-finals of a European tournament. Bin Laden noted the excitement and passion of the fans and later told his friends and family that he had never seen anything like it. He took souvenirs back to Sudan, including a shirt for his fifteen-year-old son, Abdullah (128).

However, bin Laden's trip to London was short-lived. Bin Laden was not a "mastermind" "But he was a high-level militant agent of the Muslim Brotherhood and the most influential Saudi to have publicly turned against his government. According to Robinson, pressure was brought to bear on the Saudi regime by Yemen and then, in early 1994, by Mubarak (129). The Both governments had been informed that Sudan was helping terrorists to destabilise their regimes. Robinson describes Saudi Arabia's response to the problem posed by bin Laden: "In April 1994, his Saudi citizenship was withdrawn for 'irresponsible behaviour' and he was informed that he was no longer welcome in his native country: because he had 'committed acts that affected relations fraternal relations between the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and other countries (130)."

The Saudi government demanded that Great Britain hand him over. Instead, he was allowed to leave the UK quietly and return to Sudan. Bin Laden's first act after returning to Sudan was to issue a statement denouncing Saudi Arabia's decision to strip him of his citizenship. He added that he did not depend on his Saudi nationality to define him. as a Muslim. A few weeks later, its Committee for Advice and Reform was launched in London. In its first press release, it defined itself as "a political group aimed at building an effective opposition inside and outside the one-party system of Saudi Arabia" (131).

In Sudan, bin Laden continued to have financial problems for several years. The costs The operating costs of his businesses were very high and therefore required continuous cash flow. In an interview with Abdel Bari Atwan of Al-Quds Al-Arabi in 1996, he claimed to have lost more than "\$150 million in agricultural and construction projects" during his time in Sudan (132). He never ran out of money, but he was more careful with his spending. The Brotherhood Group may have been a financial network that never ran out of money, but bin Laden's personal accounts

were not inexhaustible, as demonstrated by the testimonies of several al-Qaeda operatives arrested following the attacks on African embassies in 1998 and those of al-Qaeda defectors.

Jamal al-Fadl, a defector who at one point worked in the payroll department of bin Laden's companies, complained that he only earned \$500, whereas some Egyptian employees earned more. 1,200. Bin Laden explained that they were paid more because they could demand higher salaries in Egypt and that he wanted to keep them in his group. Al-Fadl defected after stealing \$110,000 from bin Laden (133).

Another defector, L'Houssaine Kerchtou, was angry with bin Laden because he had refused to pay for his wife's emergency caesarean section. He testified that, "Since the end of 1994/95, Al Qaeda was in crisis, Osama bin Laden himself told us that he no longer had any of money, that he had lost everything... and he had reduced salaries". Kerchtou also stated that bin Laden refused to pay to renew his pilot's licence (134).

At the end of 2001, Al-Quds Al-Arabi published a series of reports on bin Laden's life in Sudan. The reports described his stay as "negative" and indicated that it had come at a terrible financial cost to him: "The Sudanese period was important despite its negative impact on bin Laden. The Sudanese saw him as an investor who had come to support the Islamic project of Dr Hasan al-Tourabi, the spiritual leader of the Sudanese Islamic revolution... on the one hand, it was a bitter experience for bin Laden, which cost him a lot of money, but, on the other hand, it was at this time that many of his ideas and initiatives were born (135).

Other problems arose within al-Qa'ida while bin Laden was resident in Sudan. When Sheikh Rahman was taken into American custody following the WTC bombing, a number of bin Laden's Egyptian employees demanded that he take revenge on America, but he refused. Disgusted, several of them left Al Qaeda. Later, as a result of Libyan pressure on the In Sudan, bin Laden tried to send some of his Libyan operatives home. He explained the situation to them and offered them and their families plane tickets, but they were so disgusted to see him give in to political pressure that they declined his offer and left him (136).

The trial of the embassy bombings did much to shake the idea that Osama bin Laden and his al-Qa'ida "organisation" were an extremely wealthy, invincible and secretive terrorist machine. capable of striking anywhere in the world. Until June 2001, the New York Times published

articles such as Benjamin Weiser's 31 May article, "Trial Poked Holes in Image of bin Laden's Terrorist Group", but these investigations were not enough to shatter the illusion, and 11 September reinforced it more than ever.

Bin Laden's financial worries and other internal problems may explain in part the apparent betrayal of al-Tourabi and the Sudanese government towards him. According to the American businessman Mansoor Ijaz, who met al-Tourabi in July 1996, Sudan made several offers to al-Tourabi and the Sudanese government.

United States to hand over bin Laden in exchange for the lifting of economic sanctions (137). The first offer was made in February 1996, but was ignored by the Clinton administration, even though a report by the

Patterns of Global Terrorism, described bin Laden as "one of the most important funders of Islamic extremist activity in the world today".

The offer was repeated in May 1996, when bin Laden was preparing to move his organisation into Afghanistan, but was again ignored. Even after bin Laden had left Sudan, the Sudanese government offered to provide the Clinton administration with information about him. According to an article published on Newsday.com, Ijaz passed on the offer, but the White House did not respond: "During a subsequent visit to Sudan, he said, he met with the head of Sudanese intelligence, al-Mahdi Gutbi. "If you can convince your government to come here, here's what can be made available," said al-Mahdi, pointing to three stacks of files in front of him. "We have the whole network, not just bin Laden or Hezbollah. We understand everything what is happening in the Islamic world (138)." "

According to an article in the Sunday Times on 6 January 2002, at a post-9/11 dinner in Manhattan, Clinton admitted that letting Osama bin Laden go had probably been "the biggest mistake of my presidency".

But the question is whether the offer was sincere. Was Sudan prepared to betray the "network"? of militant Islam? Ijaz had met with National Security Council deputy Sandy Berger and Susan Rice, senior adviser for African affairs, to pass on the offer. Rice explained that it had been ignored because of Sudan's known duplicity,

"The Sudanese government is one of the most dishonest and elusive in the world. The only thing that counts is what they do, not what they say they are going to do. They excel at saying one thing and doing another" (139).

Sudan may have been prepared to hand over bin Laden, but if it had actually done so, it would not have done much good.

dealt a terrible blow to the Islamic movement. The International Muslim Brotherhood would have retained control over the financial network set up in part by bin Laden and it would have had little or no influence over the movement.

difficulty in continuing its war against the moderate regimes of the Middle East and against the West. Osama bin Laden was not indispensable.

VIII. The Brotherhood's revolution continues

After bin Laden's return from England in 1994, things began to heat up in the Muslim world. After publicly withdrawing bin Laden's citizenship, the Saudi regime had to do something about it. in the face of fundamentalist unrest. The House of Saud was walking a tightrope - supporting the jihad and the spread of Islam around the world and taking advantage of its role as guardian of the holy places, but at the same time, the decadence, corruption and immorality of the royal family were becoming more and more apparent in the kingdom. It was only a matter of time before this hypocrisy became a problem and the jihad turned its back on the man who had created it.

One of the strongest voices of dissent in Saudi Arabia was a militant sheikh called Salman Ibn Fahd Al-Oadah. He was well known to bin Laden and the thousands of "Afghan" Saudis who had been languishing in the kingdom since their return from Afghanistan. The Saudi regime increasingly saw the Sheikh as a threat and, in September 1994, had him arrested. Only a few days later, an organisation called the Battalions of Faith hit the headlines after issuing an ultimatum to the Saudi government demanding the Sheikh's release within five days, on pain of a campaign against the regime. against the Saudi and US governments.

The Saudi government ignored the warnings and the threat was not carried out, but Bodansky writes that the matter was notable because it was the "first initiative taken by the Saudi Islamic system... the first threat of violence against the house of al-Saud". The ultimatum was the first "direct communication from an Islamist terrorist organisation inside Saudi Arabia" (140).

In April 1995, Saudi Islamists were galvanised by listening to a recorded message from Al-Oadah. It had been smuggled out of prison and distributed to his supporters. Bodansky describes the importance of this message: "The conference, entitled 'The Manufacture of Death', developed the entire

the logic of the relationship between Islamists and Western civilisation and amounted to a declaration of armed jihad against the house of al-Saud. It provided the justification for a perpetual confrontation...".

"The "manufacture of death" was tantamount to a fatwa, a religious decree, ordering the declaration of jihad against the Saudi royal family. Al-Oadah decreed that any rejection of jihad in favour of another form of resistance was apostasy, a capital offence under Muslim law. The believer had no choice but to fight (141)...".

The Sheikh's message was the starting point for resistance to the Saudi regime, both in the kingdom and in the rest of the world.

the world. According to Bodansky, the Committee for the Defence of Legitimate Rights is "the largest and best-organised Islamic group in opposition to the Saudi regime" and the publication of Sheikh al-Oadah's message determined the organisation to abandon its moderate and diplomatic front and become a proponent of armed resistance to the Saudi regime, a change reflected in its statements and press releases at the time.

The Saudi Islamic network struck for the first time on 13 November 1995, when a car bomb exploded in Riyadh, destroying a building rented by the United States and killing six people, including five Americans. Robinson writes that the bomb had been made from 200kg of high-grade Semtex.

and smashed windows within a one-mile radius. A number of underground Islamic groups immediately claimed responsibility for the attack.

Bodansky writes that the Armed Islamic Movement, the unofficial jihadist organisation of the Muslim Brotherhood network, claimed responsibility "by publishing through one of the subsidiaries of the Armed Islamic Movement a communiqué from a hitherto unknown group calling itself the militant Partisans of

God's organisation. The Armed Islamic Movement's communiqué also stressed that the Riyadh operation was "the first of our jihadist operations (142).""

The Muslim Brotherhood was taking advantage of the Saudi political climate and had joined the movement to overthrow the Saudis, even if this overthrow was secondary for them. The objective The main aim of the Muslim Brotherhood in 1995 was to destroy its historic enemy, the secular Egyptian government.

In March 1995, al-Tourabi convened a meeting in Khartoum with four of Egypt's main Islamic leaders: Dr al-Zaouahiri, the leader of the Egyptian Islamic Jihad, Mustafa Hamza and Ahmed Refai Taha, both of al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah. Zaouahiri lived in Geneva, where he ran his organisation from a Muslim Brotherhood mosque. Mustafa Hamza lived in London and Khartoum. that Ahmed Refai Taha was based in London and Peshawar. It was at this meeting that the plan to assassinate Mubarak was adopted. It would be carried out during a diplomatic visit by Mubarak to Addis Ababa at the end of June (143).

A few weeks later, the plan was presented at an Islamic meeting in Khartoum. The assassination of Mubarak was supposed to provide a diversion for an Islamic coup in Egypt, quickly followed by the fall of the Saudis and the overthrow of the Persian Gulf regimes. Mustafa Hamza was chosen as coordinator of the uprising in Egypt and al-Zaouahiri as operational director of the attack against Mubarak (144).

At the end of May, al-Tourabi travelled to Paris to "receive medical treatment". During his stay in the French capital, he made a secret lightning trip to Geneva to meet al-Zaouahiri again. Two weeks later, al-Zaouahiri made an "inspection visit" to Khartoum and, using a false passport, he was also able to travel to Ethiopia to scout out the area. He returned then to Geneva, where the last meeting of the operational managers was held in complete safety on 23 June (145).

The plan was to use three teams to attack Mubarak's convoy as it reached the Congress Centre, 800m from the airport. The first team, positioned on the roofs of the houses near the airport, would attack the convoy with machine guns. This attack would slow down the convoy, allowing the second team, armed with grenade launchers, to blow up the President's car and/or other official Egyptian vehicles. If Mubarak's vehicle managed to escape, it would be blown up. would have to face the third team, a suicide bomber driving a car packed with explosives. Al-Zaouahiri's contacts in the secret services had informed him that Mubarak's driver had been ordered to go full throttle at the slightest problem. The car bomb was therefore the terrorists' last chance to carry out the attack.

The plan failed for several reasons. Firstly, Mubarak's entourage was slow to coordinate the convoy, giving the Ethiopian police time to secure the route: and the terrorists ordered the first team to pack up their rockets for security reasons (sic). Then, without warning, Mubarak announced that those who were ready could leave with him for the Palais des Congrès. He was not prepared to wait for the whole convoy to assemble before giving the go-ahead.

This took the first team, which had stowed its rocket launchers, by surprise. Finally, what saved Mubarak's life, when the first small arms fire was heard and the convoy came to a halt, was the decision by the driver of Mubarak's car to turn around and head for the airport. The suicide bomber was not even able to get close to the limousine, which happened to be a Bullet- and rocket-proof Mercedes special (146).

Bodansky describes the consequences of the failure of this plot: "The attack on President Hosni Mubarak in Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, on 26 June 1995, marked a turning point in the evolution of the Islamic struggle for control of the Arab world and the Centre of Islam. Operations on such a scale, even if they end up being claimed by, or attributed to, obscure terrorist organisations, are in fact instruments of State policy and are carried out on behalf of the highest levels of government. spheres of states that support terrorism. The assassination attempt, instigated by Sudan and Iran for strategic reasons, had long-term consequences for the region. A l t h o u g h President Mubarak survived, and the popular Islamic uprising envisaged by the conspirators did not occur in Egypt, it gave a strong impetus to the Islamic movement in the region (147)."

On 4 July, the attack was claimed by the Islamic Group (al-Jamaah al-Islamiyah), the terrorist organisation of imprisoned Sheikh Omar Abdoul Rahman. It was claimed that the attack had been launched in honour of an Islamist commander killed by the Egyptian police in 1994.

Egypt soon accused Sudan of masterminding the attack and Ethiopia and the United States, followed by the UN, also accused Sudan. The evidence was overwhelming that Sudan had harboured, trained and financed the terrorists, and Sudan's guilt was confirmed by its refusal to hand over three of the terrorists accused of carrying out the operation. As a result of this refusal, the UN imposed sanctions on Sudan.

The United States evacuated its embassy in Khartoum, expelled a Sudanese diplomat and imposed diplomatic and economic sanctions on Sudan. The time had passed when Sudan could serve as a refuge for the militant Islamic movement. Al-Tourabi had to change his policy quickly to avoid any serious measures being taken against Sudan and to preserve its Islamic regime. One of his conciliatory gestures, whether sincere or not, was to offer to hand over Osama bin Laden to the United States. The Clinton Administration, as we have seen, refused.

The next attack on the Egyptian government took place on 19 November 1995, just six days after the Riyadh attack on American soldiers. A small car crashed into the door of the Egyptian embassy in Islamabad and, a few seconds later, there was a small explosion.

in an area where visitors were queuing to obtain visas. The explosion, possibly a grenade thrown by a suicide bomber who jumped from the car after it hit the embassy door, was merely a diversion: in the commotion, the door was hit by a van carrying 400 kg of explosives. The huge explosion left a crater six metres wide and three metres deep. Nineteen people were killed and dozens more injured.

Shortly afterwards, the three main Egyptian terrorist groups claimed responsibility for the attack. Sheikh Rahman's Islamic Group, led by Mustafa Hamza and Ahmed Refai Taha, claimed that the attack was directed against Mubarak. The Islamic Group later retracted its claim. The second claim came from al-Zaouahiri's Islamic Jihad, which provided the names of the attackers, the "martyrs" who had carried out the attack. The final claim came from the Group for International Justice, close to al-Zaouahiri, which declared that the attack had been carried out by "the squad of the martyr Khaled Islambouli", Sadat's executed assassin (148).

Bodansky comes to the following conclusions about the perpetrator of this attack on the Egyptian government: "

Like the attempted assassination of President Mubarak, the Islamabad terrorist operation was financed by and carried out under the close control of the Islamic movement's headquarters in Western Europe. - al-Zaouahiri in Geneva and his new second-in-command, Yassir Tawfiq Sirri, in London (149)".

At the end of 1995, Sudan felt the full impact of the support it had given to the Islamic movement. The economy was in a lamentable state and the sanctions prevented it from making significant investments and receiving aid from outside, not to mention the fact that Egypt and Saudi Arabia were about to intervene militarily. As a result of these pressures, General Bashir began to reduce his support for al-Tourabi's Islamic experiment and asked him to declare the game for a while. The time when Sudan was the base of the Muslim Brotherhood was coming to an end. They had foreseen this development and, even before the attack on Mubarak, had transferred their assets to Hekmatyar's camps in Afghanistan. A year later, Osama bin Laden took them there. He followed suit. He landed in Jalalabad on 18 May 1996.

Peter Goodgame, *The Globalists and the Islamists: Fomenting the Clash of Civilizations for a New World Order*, 2002, translated from the American by B.K.

(1) <http://www.arabies.com/Special%20Report/Hasan%20al-Banna.htm>. The page is no longer online.

(2) Sami Rafat, "Freemasonry In Egypt", Insight Magazine, 1 March 1999 - <http://www.egy.com/community/99-03-01.php>.

(3) Iraj Bashiri, "Jamal al-Din al-Afghani", 2000 - <http://www.angelfire.com/rnb/bashiri/Afghani/Afghani.html>.

(4) Robert Wuthnow, Encyclopedia of Politics and Religion. 2 vols, Congressional Quarterly, Inc, Washington, D.C., 1998 - 537. http://www.cqpress.com/context/articles/epr_muhammadabduh.html.

(5) The reference is to a commentary by Shaykh Abdul Hadi of the Italian Muslim Association, published at <http://digilander.libero.it/islamic/questions1.html>. The page is currently empty.

(6) The issue is much more complex than the author seems to think.

Ar-riba is strictly forbidden by the Koran and the Sharia. However, we need to agree on the meaning of this term. Promoters of Islamic finance maintain that it means "interest", w h a t e v e r the rate, whereas for a number of Muslim scholars, such as Yusuf Ali, Maulana Muhammad Ali, ar-riba means only "usury", i.e. "an abusive rate of interest, obtained from a capital loaned or a commodity sold on credit above the rate fixed by custom or law"; and this is how it was rendered in the first translation of the Koran into an Indo-European language. The issue is made even more complex by the fact that the term "usury" only came to take on this meaning relatively recently. For a long time, it simply meant "interest earned on money lent", whatever the rate, abusive or not.

As far as Islam is concerned, in practice the Muslim banking system has always found ways of getting round the ban on "usury". In fact, "Islamic banks are familiar with interest-bearing loans, but call them by other names, such as 'commissions' or 'profits' (riba)".

(Clement M. Henry, The Politics of Islamic Finance, 2004, Edinburgh University Press, p. 2), at rates which, in some cases, could be considered usurious. See also <http://archive.thedailystar.net/forum/2010/april/islamic.htm>.

The Knights Templar are rightly regarded as the ones who laid the foundations of modern banking and, in general, of the "great operations of international capitalism" (Prosper Boissonnade, Le Travail dans l'Europe chrétienne au Moyen Age, p. 206-7, Alcan Paris, 1921), by introducing into Europe, in their desire to generate added value, the letter of credit, the letter of exchange.

Some researchers have speculated that they were introduced to these financial instruments by Arabs and/or Jews during the Crusades. The more we know about the commercial mechanisms at work in the Islamic world of the "Middle Ages", the more this hypothesis proves to be well-founded. "Long before the West... Muslim merchants had at their disposal recognised legal mechanisms for granting credit and transferring and exchanging currency over long distances. The hawala (in Arabic), the suftaja (in Persian), or letter of credit, enabled a merchant to advance or transfer a sum of money.... money to a business associate who was in a distant country, "with the absolute certainty that the transfer would be completed quickly". The letter of credit was regularly used to avoid

the transport of large quantities of capital over long distances. By chance, Braudel believes, bills of exchange from Jewish merchants in Cairo from the time of the first crusade (1090) have come down to us.

the forms of commercial association were already known and were therefore not invented later in Europe, as many have claimed". ("The Islamic Fundamentals of Trade" - http://alfutuhah.com/islamiccivilization/Trade/Fundamentals.html#_ftn20) Furthermore, the saqq is, both etymologically and functionally, the origin of the cheque. As A. L. Udovitch ("Trade", in *The Dictionary of the Middle Ages*, vol. 12, Scribner's Sons, New York, 1989, pp. 105-8; p. 106), it was Islamic law and customary practice in the Muslim world that provided merchants and traders with the commercial techniques that structured and facilitated the trade. trade and exchange, techniques whose refinement would be responsible for the advent of stateless financial capitalism.

In this area too, White Europe has no lessons, moral or wise, to receive. [Editor's note].

(7) Evelyn Baring Earl of Cromer, *Modern Egypt*, Volume 2, The Macmillan company, 1908, p. 180.

(8) Wilhelm Dietl, *Holy War*, Macmillan, New York, 1984, p. 26; Robert Dreyfuss, *Hostage To Khomeini*, New Benjamin Franklin House, New York, 1980, p. 139-40 - <http://www.wlym.com/archive/pdf/iclc/hostage.pdf>.

(9) That's a bit hasty. On the one hand, Islamic countries such as Turkey, Malaysia and Morocco have numerous lodges and, on the other, Freemasonry is considered by Muslims to be an equivalent of Sufism, the esoteric doctrine of Islam. For a historical overview, see *Handbook of Freemasonry*, chap. XIII, Brill, Leiden, 2014. [Editor's note]

(10) Robert Dreyfuss, op. cit. p. 143.

(11) See note 1.

(12) Wilhelm Dietl, op. cit. p. 56

(13) *Ibid*, p. 32.

(14) In Saïd Qotb, *The Right To Judge*. The book is no longer available at <http://islamworld.net/docs/justice.html>.

(15) See note 14 above.

(This reasoning is not very coherent. Indeed, if, as Qotb asserts, the very nature of Jâhiliya is the direction of man, it is vain and even absurd to try to rid him of it. [Editor's note])

(16) Wilhelm Dietl, op. cit, p.37-39.

(17) *Ibid*, p. 38.

(18) Ibid, p. 42.

(19) Ibid, p. 43.

(Since, in order to explain anything, it is always necessary to go back to its roots, it should be emphasised that the concept of natural equality between men derives directly from the Christian conception of equality.

equality between men before God. Yet Christianity is a lunar cult of Semitic origin, both geographically and conceptually. It is unknown in the countries of the Near and Middle East,

Moreover, in most parts of the world, this virus was introduced by the "Culture distorter" into European countries as a weapon to destroy European civilisation. [Editor's note])

(20) Robert Dreyfuss, op. cit. p. 106-108.

(21) Ibid.

(22) Wilhelm Dietl, op. cit. p. 45.

(23) Progress' in itself has since been largely rehabilitated and has fully returned to the totemism it was in its early days, even though the stigmatisation of its consequences and the blaming of The ecological mafia is increasingly exploiting its followers, to the point of taking on a biblical dimension. Every individual, or at least every 'Westerner', in ecstasy in front of their plasma screen, feels personally guilty for the 'global warming' whose terrible ravages their plasma screen projects 24 hours a day. A psychic disorder known as split personality means that the riff-raff down below are capable of simultaneously worshipping what they are driven to hate (Editor's note).

(24) http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/malthsay.htm.

(25) "Nobel winner supported biological warfare as form of population control", The Interim - <http://www.theinterim.com/2002/april/02nobelwinner.html>.

(26) http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/malthsay.htm.

(27) In Julian Huxley, *Essays of a Humanist*, Harper & Row, New York, 1964. It is also worth quoting the beginning of the sentence: "I would say that the new point of view we are arriving at, the vision of 'a To think that the mundialists are merely instrumentalising the Islamists would be a mistake. It would be a mistake to think that the globalists are merely instrumentalising the Islamists, because, apart from the fact that it is hard to see why the person who believes he is being instrumentalised should not himself be instrumentalised, both the Islamists and the globalists, whatever the Abrahamic entity they worship, share the same vision of life, based on the same Middle Eastern beliefs in universalism". [Editor's note]

(28) Maurice Strong, *Where On Earth Are We Going?* 1st edition, Texere, 2001, p. 119.

(So advances in technology, which were endangering the planet, were now saving it. Undoubtedly, the reasoning is sound. [Editor's note])

(29) The intention is laudable. What is less laudable is the fact that he has incarnated himself as a virus that kills the white race. [Editor's note].

(30) http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/malthsay.htm.

(31) http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/malthsay.htm.

These comments are incoherent, as it is true that a village can be overcrowded.

(32) It seems to have escaped Lovejoy's notice that the "sectors" he describes as "national" are in fact controlled by multinationals which fund front organisations such as the WWF. [Editor's note]

(33) http://members.tripod.com/~american_almanac/malthsay.htm.

(34) It is difficult to understand what these paragraphs have to do with this chapter, because the 'Malthusian' positions they contain have little to do with the creation of the 'arc of crisis', if only because they do not relate specifically to the Muslim world, while the 'Malthusian' positions they contain have little to do with the creation of the 'arc of crisis'.

that the "arc of crisis" theory concerns US policy towards the Muslim world; unless the author is unconsciously suggesting that "Islamic terrorism" is being used to implement the so-called depopulation plan...

Be that as it may, either these declarations were indeed the expression of a desire to implement a depopulation plan, or they were merely what is now commonly referred to as a "show of strength". disinformation". Given the authors of these reports, who lie through their teeth and do exactly the opposite of what they say, the second hypothesis is arguable. But, it may be objected, they were made in the context of more or less confidential reports. The fact is that, twenty years later, they were beginning to spread on the Internet, where, through the magic of cut and paste, they are now available on the Internet.

Thousands, if not tens of thousands, of websites now exist, the majority of whose owners firmly believe that a depopulation plan is underway, despite the blatant denial of the facts.

(The language closest to the one in which all these statements were made seems to be English. In translating them, we have endeavoured not to lose any of its peculiarities. [Editor's note])

(35) See <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2014/09/19/les-mondialistes-et-les-Islamists>, note 46.

(36) Wilhelm Dietl, op. cit. p. 72.

(37) That Muslims who want to do away with the "West" are a minority group in Islam, that's what's perfectly obvious, just as the French who wanted to do away with the Ancien Régime were a minority and the Russians who wanted to do away with Tsarism were a minority, and so on. That didn't stop the so-called "French" revolution. It didn't stop the arrival of the

to the power of the Bolsheviks. History is made by minorities, and majorities follow once the minorities have seized power.

The average Muslim who wants to do away with the "West", which is now no more than the distilled spirit of Hollywood, which is in turn, to paraphrase W. Sombart, no more than a distilled Semitic spirit, if he succeeded in doing so, would only destroy himself and that is precisely why, even if he were given the chance, he would not do it. [Editor's note].

(38) Robert Dreyfuss, *op. cit.* pp. 72-83.

(39) *Ibid.*, pp. 92-95.

(40) <http://pakistanspace.tripod.com/1979.htm>, from which these facts are taken, is no longer online.

(41) *Le Nouvel Observateur*, 15-21 January 1998, p. 76 - available at <http://www.voltairenet.org/article165889.html>.

(42) Robert Dreyfuss, *op. cit.* p. 133.

(43) The website from which this information was taken is no longer online.

(44) <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman.htm>.

(45) Robert Dreyfuss, *op. cit.* p. 174-175.

(46) *Ibid.*, p. 160.

(47) *Ibid.*, p. 164.

(48) Wilhelm Dietl, *op. cit.* p. 64-66.

(49) *Ibid.*, p. 66.

(50) *Ibid.*, p. 67.

(51) *Ibid.*

(52) *Ibid.*, p. 68; see also <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ayman.htm>.

(53) *Ibid.*, p. 68.

(54) *Ibid.*, p. 61.

(55) *Ibid.*, p. 87.

(56) Yossef Bodansky, *op. cit.* p. 101 , p. 125.

(57) *Ibid.*, p. 298.

(58) Ibid, p. 13, p. 405.

(59) <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/docs/970824.htm>; a complementary source is no longer available at <http://www.ict.org.il/404.aspx>.

(60) Robert Dreyfuss, op. cit. pp. 164-165.

(61) Rolland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden*, Duke University Press Books, 2002, p.12-13.

(62) Wilhelm Dietl, op. cit. pp. 211-227.

(63) Rolland Jacquard, *Au nom d'Oussama Ben Laden : dossier secret sur le terroriste le plus recherché du monde*, J. Picollec, 2001, p. 37.

(64) Rolland Jacquard, *In the Name of Osama Bin Laden*, p.13-14.

(65) Qotb's personal correspondence with the Italian Muslim Association. The page of the website referred to (<http://village.flashnet.it/users/fn034463/>) is no longer available.

(66) The page of the website given as a reference (<http://www.gregpalast.com/detail.cfm?artid=103&row=0>) is no longer available. However, in a Another article, available at <http://www.gregpalast.com/fbi-and-us-spy-agents-say-bush-spiked-bin-laden-probes-before-11-september/>, on the AMJM, the journalist writes: "The FBI and the people in charge of the Military intelligence officials in Washington claim that Chambers was not authorized, for political reasons (sic), to conduct in-depth investigations into members of the bin Laden family in the United States prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks." [Editor's note.]

(67) <http://www.theguardian.com/world/2001/oct/10/afghanistan.terrorism28>.

(68) Yossef Bodansky, op. cit. p. 11.

(69) Ibid, p. 11.

(70) Ibid, p. 12.

(71) <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/binladen/interviews/al-fagih.html>.

(72) Rolland Jacquard, op. cit. p. 57.

(73) Steve Emerson, "Osama bin Laden - the Past", <http://www.iacsp.com/itobli2.html>.

(74) Ahmed Rashid, *Islam and Central Asia: An Enduring Legacy or an Evolving Threat?*, Center for Political and Strategic Studies, Washington D.C., 2000, p. 213-214.

(75) Ibid, p. 214.

(76) Adam Robinson, *Bin Laden: Behind the Mask of the Terrorist*, Arcade Publishing; 1st edition, 2002, p. 112

- (77) http://www.religioscope.com/info/doc/jihad/azzam_defence_2_intro.htm.
- (78) Steve Emerson, "Abdullah Assam: The Man Before Osama Bin Laden" - <http://www.iacsp.com/itobi3.html>
- (79) The source, a study entitled Radical Islam in the UK, is no longer available at <http://www.ict.org.il/404.aspx>.
- (80) Adam Robinson, op. cit. p. 130.
- (81) Jon Basil Utley, "Unanswered Questions About the Supposed Iraqi Threat to Saudi Arabia in 1990", 1990.
- (82) Yossef Bodansky, op. cit. p. 130.
- (83) In Adam Robinson, op. cit. p. 131.
- (84) Ibid, p. 132.
- (85) Yossef Bodansky, op. cit. p. 32.
- (86) Ibid, p. 36.
- (87) Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquié, Forbidden Truth, Nation Books, p. 192.
- (88) No one would ever have suspected that "the City of London... (is) very attractive to money launderers" and Gibraltar and the Crown Dependencies are "the very best of the specialist offshore financial havens". So a report was needed on the subject. In the Senate alone, more than 300 reports are produced every year (<http://www.senat.fr/rapsen.html>). The pseudo-national Assembly does even better (http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/14/liste/rapport_information.asp). It is extremely difficult to know the amount of the allowances paid to public rapporteurs, but, a priori, it is not extravagant to see a causal link.
- (89) Jean-Charles Brisard and Guillaume Dasquie, op. cit. p. 273.
- (90) Adam Robinson, op. cit. p. 139; see also Yossef Bodansky, op. cit. p. 43.
- (91) Yossef Bodansky, op. cit. p. 46, Adam Robinson, op. cit. p. 139-140.
- (92) Rolland Jacquard, op. cit. p. 32.
- (93) Yossef Bodansky, op. cit. p. 43.
- (94) Ibid, p. 71.
- (95) Ibid, p. 74.

(96) Ibid, p. 76-78.

(97) Adam Robinson, op. cit. p. 153.

(98) Mary Ann Weaver "Blowback", 1 May 1996, The Atlantic - <http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1996/05/blowback/376583/#Weaver>.

(99) William Norman Grigg, "Enemies and 'Assets'", 3 March 1997, The New American - <http://www.thenewamerican.com/usnews/crime/item/16144-enemies-and-assets>.

(100) William Norman Grigg, op. cit.

(101) Steve Emerson, "Osama bin Laden - the Past", <http://www.iacsp.com/itobli2.html>.

(102) Russ Baker, "The Past As Prologue", 29 October 2001, salon.com - <http://www.russbaker.com/archives/Salon%20-%20The%20Past%20As%20Prologue.htm>.

(103) Laurie Mylroie , "Who is Ramzi Yousef? And Why It Matters", Winter 95/96, National Interest - <http://fas.org/irp/world/iraq/956-tni.htm>.

(104) Daniel McGrory, "Terrorists' trade in stolen identities", 22 September 2001, The Times - <http://www.freerepublic.com/focus/f-news/530341/posts>.

(105) The website page for the referenced article ("Of Passports and Fingerprints") is no longer available.

(106) Daniel McGrory, op. cit.

(107) Russ Baker, op. cit.

(108) Simon Reeve, The New Jackals, Vol. 1, Northeastern , 1999, p. 251.

(109) "Hawks try to implicate Iraq by hunting for evidence in UK", October 2001, DAWN.com. The article is no longer online.

(110) See supra note 108.

(111) PBS Frontline - <http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/gunning/interviews/mylroie.html>.

(In this respect, among others, the following Guardian article is not uninteresting:

"The British education services paid large sums of money to an al-Qa'ida cell in Libya in a failed assassination attempt on Colonel Gaddafi in 1996, have thwarted efforts to bring Osama Bin Laden to justice.

The recent accusations against MI6 of collusion with the dreaded Islamic Group fighting in Libya, which is linked to one of Bin Laden's loyal lieutenants, are going to embarrass the

government, which had described similar accusations by former MI5 agent David Shayler as "pure fantasy".

The allegations emerged in the book *Forbidden Truth*, published in America by two French intelligence experts, who reveal that the first Interpol arrest warrant for bin Laden was issued by Libya in March 1998.

According to journalists Guillaume Dasquié and Jean-Charles Brisard, an adviser to Chirac, the British and American intelligence agencies concealed the fact that the arrest warrant had come from Libya and played down the threat. Five months after the warrant was issued, al-Qaeda killed more than 200 people in truck-bomb attacks on the US embassy in Kenya and Tanzania.

The arrest warrant was issued in connection with the assassination in March 1994 of two counter-terrorism agents.

Silvan and Vera Becker, who are responsible for missions in Africa. According to the book, the indifference of Western intelligence agencies to Libyan concerns can be explained by MI6's involvement in the al-Qaeda plot.

The al-Qaeda cell in Libya includes Anas al-Liby, who remains on the US government's wanted list, with a \$25 million reward for his capture. He is wanted for his involvement in attacks on African embassies. Al-Liby was with bin Laden in Sudan before the return of the al-Qaeda leader to Afghanistan in 1996.

Amazingly, despite suspicions that he was a senior Al Qaeda operative, al-Liby was granted political asylum in Britain and lived in Manchester until May 2000. At that time, he escaped a police raid and fled abroad. Police discovered a 180-page "Jihadist Handbook" at his home containing instructions for carrying out terrorist attacks.

The Observer was not allowed to publish details of the allegations during the trial of David Shayler, who was sentenced last week to six months in prison for disclosing documents he obtained during his time as an MI5 agent. The argument that he had made the disclosures in the public interest was ruled inadmissible.

In his final plea, Shayler repeated that the "crime" he had been prevented from speaking about was "so heinous" that he had no choice but to tell the press. The "crime" is the alleged involvement of MI6 in the plot to assassinate Gaddafi at the end of 1995.

Shayler claims that he was informed of the plot during formal meetings with his colleagues at the MI6's Foreign Intelligence Service, while working in MI5's Libya office in the mid-1990s.

The Observer can now reveal that the MI6 agents involved in the alleged plot were Richard Bartlett - previously known only by the code name PT16 and who had led and coordinated the operation - and David Watson, codenamed PT16B. Shayler's counterpart at MI6, Watson was responsible for managing a Libyan agent, "Tunworth", who was part of the cell and supplied it with information about her. According to Shayler, MI6 passed on £100,000 to the Al Qaeda plotters.

The attempt on Gaddafi's life was planned for early 1996 in the Libyan coastal city of Sirte. It is believed that the Islamic Fighting Group's operation there was foiled in March 1996 and that several militants were killed in the ensuing shoot-out. In 1998, Libyans televised footage of a grenade attack on Gaddafi which they claimed had been carried out by a British agent.

Shayler, who acted in his own defence, intended to call Bartlett and Watson as witnesses, but the narrow-mindedness of the trial prevented him from doing so.

During the Shayler trial, Home Secretary David Blunkett and Foreign Secretary Jack Straw issued immunity certificates in the public interest to protect national security. Journalists were unable to report on the Gaddafi allegations during the trial.

These restrictions provoked a dispute between the Attorney General and the D-Notice Committee, which advises the press on national security issues.

The D-Notice Committee, formally known as the Defence, Press and Broadcasting Advisory Committee, opposed the prosecution's application to retrospectively apply the Official Secrets Act to conceal information already published or broadcast following Shayler's revelations. Committee members, who include editors of major national newspapers, said they were horrified by the unprecedented attempt to censor the media during the trial.

Shayler claims that Watson went on to boast about MI6's involvement in the Libyan operation. Shayler also intended to call a witness to the conversation in which the MI6 agent had claimed that the British intelligence services had been involved in the coup attempt.

According to Shayler, the woman [i.e. the witness in question], an Arabic translator for MI5, was also shocked to hear Watson admit that money had been paid to the plotters.

Despite the myth of James Bond, MI6 does not have a licence to kill and must obtain direct authorisation from the Foreign Secretary for highly sensitive operations. Malcolm Rifkind, the Secretary
Minister of Foreign Affairs at the time, has repeatedly stated that he gave such authorisation.

It is thought that Watson and Bartlett have been put on the back burner and given new identities as a result of the
Shayler's revelations. MI6 has now resigned itself to the disclosure of their names and has put in place new measures to ensure their safety.

A top-secret MI6 document leaked onto the internet two years ago confirmed that British intelligence was aware that a plot hatched by five colonels, Libyan students and "Libyan veterans who served in Afghanistan" was going to take place in 1995.

Ashur Shamis, a Libyan specialist in radical Islam, said: "There has been an upsurge in Islamic Fighting Group activities in 1995, but many in Libya would be shocked, if MI6 had anything to do with it."

<http://www.theguardian.com/politics/2002/nov/10/uk.davidshayler>. [Editor's note]

(112) John Moy, "The Terror Lurking Within Asia", 11 October 2001, SCMP.com.

(113) Daniel Rubin and Michael Dorgan, "Terrorist Plot Years in the Making", Knight Ridder Newspapers.

(114) See supra note 104.

(115) "Antecedents of Ramzi Ahmed Yousef", October 1996, SAPRA INDIA.

(116) David Harsanyi, "The Left's Acrobatic Logic on Terror", 11 June 2002, Capitalism Magazine.com - <https://www.indybay.org/newsitems/2002/06/10/1323231.php>.

(117) Reed Irvine, "Dropping the Ball", 15 September 2001 World Net Daily.com - <http://www.wnd.com/2001/09/10885/>

(However, at his trial, Murad claimed that his confession had been obtained under torture and was therefore inadmissible. [Editor's note])

(118) Matthew Brzezinski, "Operation Bojinka's Bombshell", 2 January 2002, The Toronto Star - http://propagandamatrix.com/operation_bojinkas_bombshell.html.

(119) Simon Reeve, op. cit. p. 89.

(120) Russ Baker, op. cit.

(121) Bill Gertz, Breakdown: How America's Intelligence Failures Led to September 11, Regnery Publishing; 1st edition, 2002.

(122) The two articles referencing this information, at <http://www.ict.org.il/404.aspx> and <http://www.washingtoninstitute.org/watch/policywatch/policywatch2001/567.htm>, are no longer available.

(123) The statement is gratuitous. [Editor's note].

(124) "Dancing girls and romance on road to terrorist attacks", 25 June 2002, Los Angeles Time - <http://www.smh.com.au/articles/2002/06/24/1023864553460.html>

(In other words, a Muslim who likes to "drink a lot, party a lot, go to erotic bars and chase girls" is not a "real" Muslim. This insinuation is based on the crude prejudice, subtly spread and maintained by the media to which 'Westerners' are exposed, that the Muslim man is 'pure', particularly in comparison with the 'Westerner', who is 'corrupt', so to speak, by definition. All this is obviously not serious. As far as Iran is concerned, everything

The average Iranian knows that the mullahs and ayatollahs are the first to appreciate the Caspian riviera, and not just for its climate. [Editor's note].

(125) As we shall see below, he preferred the cavernous bellowing of football supporters. [Editor's note].

(126) Adam Robinson, *op. cit.* p. 168.

(127) *Ibid.*, p. 169.

(128) *Ibid.*

(129) *Ibid.*, p. 172.

(130) *Ibid.*

(131) *Ibid.*, p. 173.

(132) Ms Yael Shahar, "Tracing Bin Laden's Money. Easier Said Than Done" 21 September 2001, ICT - <http://www.ict.org.il/Article.aspx?ID=811>.

(133) Benjamin Wesier, "Trial Poked Holes in Image of bin Laden's Terrorist Group", 31 May 2001, New York Times - <http://ellen-bomer.com/Trial/Holes.html>; The second reference (http://pcpafg.org/news/Afgghan_News/year2001/2001_02_12/Cross_examination_of_bin_Laden_aide_set_to_begin.shtml), is no longer available.

(134) "Trial Reveals a Conspiracy..." CNN.com, is no longer available at <http://edition.cnn.com/CRIME/trials.and.cases/case.files/0012/embassy.bombing/trial.report/trial.report.04.16/index.html>.

(135) "Bin Ladin's Life in Sudan", Al Quds Al Arabi, is no longer available at <http://fas.org/irp/world/para/ladin-sudan.htm>.

(136) Benjamin Weiser, *op. cit.*

(137) S. Mitra Kalita, "Missed Chance - - Sources: U.S. ignored Sudan's overtures on bin Laden", 2 December 2001, Newsday.com - <http://pqasb.pqarchiver.com/newsday/doc/279489255.html?FMT=A&FMTS=A&FT&type=current&date=Dec%20,%202001&author=S.%20Mitra%20Kalita.%20STAFF%20WRITER&pub=Newsday&edition=Combined%20editions&startpage=A.03&desc=Missed%20Chance%20/%20Sources:%20U.S.%20ignored%20Sudan%27s%20overtures%20on%20bin%20Laden>.

(138) *Ibid.*

(139) *Ibid.*

(140) Yossef Bodansky, *Bin Laden: The Man Who Declared War On America*, Blackstone Audiobooks, 2002, p. 117.

(141) *Ibid*, p. 117-118.

(142) *Ibid*, p. 141.

(143) *Ibid*, p. 123, 125.

(144) *Ibid*, p. 124.

(145) *Ibid*, p. 125.

(146) *Ibid*, p. 130-131.

(147) *Ibid*, p. 121.

(148) *Ibid*, p. 144

(149) *Ibid*.

The Arab roots of the Renaissance

Cato was already an old man when Carneades, a philosopher and academician, and Diogenes, a member of the Stoic sect, came from Athens to Rome to ask the Athenians to be relieved of a fine of five hundred euros.

the Sicyonians had condemned them in absentia, in pursuit of the inhabitants of Oropos. They had scarcely arrived when all the young Romans who had a taste for literature came to see them, were enraptured with admiration and could not stop listening to them. The grace of Carneades, the force of his eloquence, his reputation which was not below his talent, the advantage he had of having the most distinguished and the most polite Romans as listeners, made the greatest noise in Rome; it was like an impetuous blast which resounded throughout the seventeenth century: It was said everywhere that a Greek of marvellous knowledge had arrived, who charmed and attracted all minds, who inspired in young men such a love of science that, renouncing all other pastimes and occupations, they were seized with a kind of enthusiasm for philosophy. All the Romans were in They were delighted to see their children taking up the study of Greek literature and eagerly seeking out these admired men.

But Cato watched with sorrow as this love of the Letters made its way into Rome. He feared that youth Roman, turning towards this study all his emotion and all his ardour, did not prefer the gloire to parler well to that to do well and to distinguish oneself by arms. But when the reputation of these philosophers had spread throughout the seventh century, and their first speeches had been translated into Latin by one of the leading senators, Caius Atilius, who had been asked to do this work, and who himself had been the author of the first book on the subject, it was clear that these philosophers had a great deal to learn.

He went to the senate and reproached the magistrates whom he had detained for so long. He went to the senate, and reproached the magistrates whom he had detained for so long.

long time these ambassadors, without giving them an answer. They are," he added, "men capable of persuading anything they want. It is therefore necessary to know their case as soon as possible, and to decide it, so that these philosophers return to their schools to teach the children of the Greeks, and so that the young Romans obey, as before, only the magistrates and the kings". In this he was acting, not, as has been believed, out of personal enmity with Carneades, but out of a resolute opposition to philosophy, out of an affected contempt, which he made a point of showing, for the Greek muses and disciples.

He called Socrates himself a babler, a violent and unjust man, who had undertaken, as much as he he had been able, to become the tyrant of his country, by overthrowing the accepted traditions, by drawing the citizens into opinions contrary to the laws. He mocked Isocrates for his eloquence, and said that his disciples were living next to him, as if they were to practise their art and help him only in the underworld. To divert his son from the study of Greek literature, he raised his voice far above his age and told him, as if inspired by a prophetic spirit, that the Romans would lose all their power once they had recovered from this Greek erudition.

Plutarch, Life of Cato the Elder.

l) How Islamic culture was passed on to the Spaniards

How is it that the splendid Moorish civilisation of Spain decayed to the point where it offered virtually no resistance to the robust Christian warriors of the North, who for centuries... had hardly practised anything other than the profession of arms? The same factors that had diminished Islamic power in Baghdad were at work in Muslim Spain.

Let us examine these factors, already discussed in the previous chapter: - The spirit of individualism of the Arab and his loyalty to variable geometry, if not to the Koran and Allah; the undermining of the character and energy of the rulers by a system of harems which not only allowed but encouraged extreme sensuality; the debilitating effect of the gentle and pleasant climate of Andalusia, the very charms of what was dangerous for the maintenance of morality and an energetic character; the growing discontent of the Christians, who formed a large part of the population of the califate, where, as second-class citizens, they were subjected to an increasingly oppressive tax system; all this made them lose their identity and their identity. little by little, what little loyalty they might previously have had towards their Muslim leaders.

In the titanic battle of Las Navas de Tolosa near Córdoba in 1212 AD, as mentioned above, the Muslims were wiped out by the zealous Christian army of Alfonso of Castile, made up of soldiers from Aragon, Navarre, Portugal and France. Only a half of the tens of thousands of Moors escaped. Although this battle marked the end of Moorish political domination in Spain, the Moorish influence continued to be felt in other areas of Spanish life for almost three centuries.

Why didn't Alfonso clean house and expel the Moors from Spain?

Probably because he was better prepared for military victory than for government. What he did in fact was to divide Spain between various petty Christian rulers and local Muslim dynasties, many of whom preserved and even enriched the civilisation of Islam.

Curiously, it was during the period of the political decline of Islam that Islamic culture exerted the greatest and most benevolent influence on Spain and subsequently on the whole of civilisation. Europe. Once the Spanish conquerors had satisfied their burning desire to reconquer Spain to the infidels, they apparently lost to a large extent their fanatical hostility to the infidels.

They learnt to live side by side and to lead to an extraordinary degree the same daily life as the industrious Moors.

There were practical reasons for this friendship. The Christians were desperate to learn from the Muslims they had conquered the arts of living that had evolved over the centuries. The Moors possessed a technology that could only be passed on to the rugged Spanish conquerors through long personal instruction.

The Christians needed the Moors to learn how to cook silkworms and weave silk and other textiles. They needed them to learn the arts of ceramics and the technology of metallurgy. They needed Moorish carpenters and masons to learn the art of building. They needed all these Moorish farmers for their knowledge of the land.
Irrigation, horticulture et la stirpiculture.

As a result, Moors and Christians continued to live peacefully together for more than two and a half centuries, a great period of progress for the Spanish. This was the first and it was the last time that Christians and Muslims maintained friendly relations. In many ways, it was an idyllic time, an episode in the history of mankind that deserves to be treated more carefully by historians and romantic writers (1).

For almost three centuries, the Moorish kingdom of Granada remained the centre of Islamic culture in Spain. Its climate was excellent and its soil fertile. Abundant streams provided water for irrigation, baths and fountains. The air itself was full of perfume.

Here, for a time, the rulers revived the memory of the Córdoba caliphate. By encouraging the trade, they made Granada the most prosperous city in Spain. On a nearby hill in this second century, al-Ghalib built a splendid palace, adorned with superb decorations and arabesque mouldings. The Alhambra, as it was later known, is still a sanctuary for admiring tourists.

The patronage accorded to artists and scientists by the rulers attracted many students to the court. Many Jews - an ethnic minority that enjoyed privileged treatment because of its great contributions to science and the art of medicine - had already taken up residence there. The

Muslim refugees from areas of Spain under Christian rule also f l o c k e d to Granada, so much so that its population reached half a million.

A composite group of citizens now lived in all the villes principales of Spain: (1) Christian conquerors from the north of Spain; (2) Christians from Andalusia who had remained Christian, but who lived and lived like Muslims and spoke and understood Arabic; (3) Mussulmans descended from formerly Christian families who returned to the religion of their ancestors and became Christians again; (4) Mussulmans descended from formerly Christian families who remained Mussulmans; (5) Moorish Mussulmans, for the most part Berbers whose language was Arabic.

their blood was, however, more or less mixed with Arab blood and their faith was ardent and unshakeable; and

(6) Jews, who had played an important role in the spread of Islamic civilisation in Spain.

What a potpourri of races and religions! It was a rich mixture favourable to progress [Indeed, a nauseating mixture, a sub-race at the service of the myth of "progress" and the building of a great Afro-Asian Tower of Babes in Europe]. The Christian ruling class, accustomed to the obscure castles and harsh expanses of the arid North, soon succumbed to the amenity of Muslim life - just as the Mongol conquerors of China gradually adopted the comforts of Chinese life. A fusion almost took place. It was under the influence of the Moors that the Castellans began to adopt the Chinese way of life. appreciate the refinements of city life.

It was this close association between Christians and Muslims, in Spain as in Sicily, that gave Europe the awareness and the instruments of its future civilisation, which it was to borrow, just as the Muslims had borrowed and developed the culture of the ancient classical world half a millennium earlier.

"From the ninth to the eleventh centuries, the only civicalisation known to the West was Islamic civicalisation", wrote

Salvador de Madariaga, Spanish historian and philosopher, now in exile. "Christianity was in the dark, while Islam was shining in Baghdad and Cordoba with all the lights of science, art, poetry, culture and refinement. During this period, Northern Spain was

divided into small barbarian kingdoms that the powerful and refined calife of Cordoba despised in much the same way as the French of the 19th century must have despised the Moroccan tribes, degenerate descendants of the Moors".

"Islamic Spain gave the world its philosophers, its astronomers, its mathematicians mystics, poets and historians. One of Andalusia's smallest kingdoms numbered five million inhabitants. looms, which artisans used to make all sorts of fabrics: from brocade and silk to wool and cotton; and the Prime Minister of another small state had 400,000 pounds in his pocket. bibliothèque - at a time when the most famous of the Christian bibliothèques in Spain, in the monastery of Ripoll, boasted of its meagre 192 volumes. (1a)

The influence of Moorish culture was not confined to Spain. Many Christians from other countries went to study in the hospitals and universities of Moorish Spain and returned home with a greater knowledge of medicine, astronomy and mathematics (2) - fields of science between which, fortunately, religious differences made no difference. barrier. The two famous monks Gregory of Cremona and Adélarde of Bath were among those who made a study trip to Spain.

More importantly, when Cordoba, Toledo and Seville were conquered one after the other by the Many of the Jewish doctors associated with the Moorish universities of these centuries migrated to Italy and the south of France, where they contributed greatly to the development of the medical schools of the newly founded Christian universities.

The Spaniards of the Reconquista absolutely needed everything that these hospitals and these universities had to offer. The spread of books, facilitated by the invention of paper, renewed knowledge.

Books, in fact, were the most important factor in the influence of Islamic literature on the Inculte Christian world of Spain and Europe. Muslim Spain had collected the literary and scientific wealth of all periods in its libraries. Then began a period thanks to translations from Arabic into Latin, this treasure trove of human knowledge and of the philosophy spread from Spain to Italy and France, sowing the seeds of modern European civilisation, as we shall see in detail in a later chapter.

The lives of ordinary people in Spain were profoundly influenced by the skills and habits of the Moors, and Moorish culture left an indelible imprint on Spanish life at that time. In d e d , Moorish blood itself still flows generously through the veins of the Spanish people.

Moorish culture is discernible even today in the music of the Spanish people. The atmosphere, tempo and cadence of Spanish music are closer to Arabic music than to the Moorish. The guitar, the most 'Spanish' of all instruments, was an Arab invention.

"While the Christian population was accepting the lyrical models of the Muslims, Arabic music was becoming increasingly popular throughout the peninsula. Muslim musicians flourished at the court of the kings of Castile and Aragon. Long after the fall of Granada, Moorish dancers and singers continued to entertain the natives of Spain and Portugal. Ribera's recent research tends to prove that the popular music of Spain and, in fact, of the whole of south-western Europe, was still very much alive. Europe, in the thirteenth century and thereafter, goes back, as do the lyrical and historical works in vernacular of this region, to Andalusian sources through Arabic, Persian, Byzantine and Greek sources".
(3)

It was a happy time for the Spanish people. Relieved of the tension caused by the ongoing wars, they were able to relax and enjoy the radiant culture of the Moors, soaking up their art and knowledge. The Moorish culture was a joyful one, and the whole of Andalusia, the whole of Spain and the whole of Europe was a joyful one. Muslim and Christian alike, shared for a time in this serene joie de vivre.

Not since the diaspora has Jewish literature reached such a high level. The Spanish history of this period reveals that the Jews contributed greatly to religious thought, philosophy, poetry and science. The Jews were prosperous, honoured and happy, and the reputation of their achievements spread to all European capitals.

Nothing concrete, no serious tension between the various peoples of this Judeo-Islamic Spain. The end of this happy era. The disaster that struck Spain was mainly ideological in nature.

When in 1469 AD. Ferdinand of Aragon married Isabelle la Catholique, their union sounded the death knell of Muslim power in Spain. The local rulers were no match for this new power. Christian power, which conquered Granada in 1492 and thus established its powerful domination over the whole of Spain.

These intrepid conquerors, under Ferdinand and Isabelle, were driven by a religious zeal as great as that which had inspired the Arabs; an adventurous spirit that ultimately led them to conquer and colonise South America and to found a great Hispanic culture there.

But while they were enriching the culture of the New World, they set about destroying the remains of the great Islamic culture in Spain. They also founded that terrifying engine of fanaticism: the Inquisition. The process of forcibly converting Muslims began. Arabic books were withdrawn from circulation and huge numbers of Arabic manuscripts were burnt at the stake.

In 1556 AD, Philip II passed a law strictly prohibiting Muslims from practising their religion, language and customs. Public baths - very common in Spanish cities abundantly supplied with water from the neighbouring mountains and much appreciated by Muslims and Christians alike - were destroyed. From then on, any Spaniard who wanted to take a bath was suspected of heresy and liable to be interrogated by the Inquisition!

In 1609 AD, Philip III signed a decree of expulsion and practically all the Muslims who remained on the Spanish mainland were forcibly deported. Some three million Moors had been executed, exiled or deported since the fall of Granada in 1492. How different this policy was from that of Alfonso XII of Castile, who in the thirteenth century had been a benevolent and compassionate protector of Moorish scholars and artists!

The definitive expulsion of the Moors in the name of Christianity was a rare tragedy. This expulsion was positive from a racial point of view. When Prime Minister Lerma, at the instigation of the Church, announced to the King that the exile of the Moriscos [Moors who had converted to Christianity]. [Philip replied, "This resolution is excellent. Let it be carried out.

"And she was executed," says Buckie in History of Civilization, "with indefectible barbarity. About a million of Spain's most industrious inhabitants were hunted like wild beasts because of doubts about the sincerity of their forced conversion to Christianity. Many were killed as they approached the coast. The others were beaten and trampled, and most ran for their lives. During the crossing, the crew often massacred the men, kidnapped the women and threw the children overboard.

In addition to the Moors, all the Jews of Spain were soon expelled - this dispersion was almost as tragic as the diaspora. For the second time in history, the vast world opened up to the "wandering Jew". (4)

Islamic civilisation never recovered from this blow. Morocco, to which the Moors fled in exile, did not provide a favourable environment for the culture that had flourished in Moorish Spain. The Moroccan Moors turned to piracy and harassed European trade in the Mediterranean for several centuries.

If this obliteration of Islamic culture was a disaster for Islam, it was also a disaster for Spain. Agriculture suffered from the loss of the skills and entrepreneurial spirit of the Moors. The irrigation system fell into disrepair and the gardens of the world became a semi-arid, semi-sterile country. The arts of living languished. And the cheerfulness, carefreeness and joie de vivre that had characterised Moorish life disappeared in the thick shadow of the Inquisition.

The mines, which had always been a source of wealth for Spain, were either abandoned or inefficiently exploited. Weaving collapsed. In Sevilla, one of the richest cities in Spain, the number of looms fell from 16,000 to 300, and Toledo lost virtually all its wool and silk factories, which had employed 40,000 people. The manufacture of Spain was famous for, came to a standstill. Trade came to a halt. Maritime trade and fishing declined, because the Spanish did not have a sufficiently in-depth knowledge of navigation.

In fact, the dislocation suffered by the Spanish economy following the expulsion of the Moors and Jews was so severe that poverty and famine reigned in many places.

"The Moors were banished", says Lane-Poole, in *Les Maures en Espagne*, "and for a short time Spain was still shining, but in a light that was not its own. Then came the collapse, and since then Spain has always crawled in this darkness".

II) Summary of Arab-Islamic contributions

In retrospect, we can still marvel at both the dynamism and the scale of our activity. the Arab-Islamic period - "without parallel in the history of the world", according to George Sarton.

"The Muslim empire was created in collaboration with the Greeks, Persians, Copts, Christians, Magi, Sabaeans and Jews. But this help does not explain precisely what can be called the miracle" in the sense that we are unable to explain the almost unbelievable achievements of this science. There is nothing like it in the history of the world, except for the Japanese assimilation of modern science and technology during the Meiji era. But the Japanese had the great advantage of having the marvellous tools of modernism at their disposal, which enabled them to assimilate more quickly.

These two peoples had the best teachers: necessity, which mobilises a type of energy spiritually capable of overcoming insurmountable difficulties. In fact, they didn't have enough experience or enough patience to take difficulties into account and be afraid of them. They simply went for it headlong". (5)

Reviewing the most important activities of the Arabs, and considering their impact on a global economy. Europe, still grappling with the barbarism of the Dark Ages, gives us a better idea of the immensity of their contribution to the civilisation of Europe.

Medical science

It is probably because of its importance to human well-being that medicine has continued to progress since ancient times, and that the barriers of race and religion, which have sometimes been a barrier to progress, have been overcome. the progress of other sciences, have never constituted obstacles to it.

The Arab contribution in this field was immense. The Muslim world eagerly assimilated all available medical knowledge, starting with that of the Greeks, Persians and Egyptians. Aware of the importance of the science of medicine, the Arabs taught physicians a great deal. and rewarded them with greatness. Medicine - linked to the study of philosophy in both the Muslim and the Hellenistic worlds - flourished in all the kingdoms and courts of the Islamic empire.

Stimulated by the care they received, Arab scientists made major advances in the art of healing, particularly in the use of curative medicines. These discoveries greatly enriched pharmacopoeias throughout the world. The Arabs set up hospitals all over the world and even provided medical care in some prisons. They made clinical observations detached from the maladies. They were inventive in the field of optics.

It was, however, in the encyclopaedic field that medieval Islamic scientists contributed most to the civilisation of Europe in the Middle Ages. Al Razi (Rhazes) (865-925) - a Persian who lived near the present-day eighth century Tehran - wrote an important encyclopaedia of medicine, *al Havi*. This reviews all the medical knowledge of Greek, Persian and Hindu origin that the Arabs of the tenth century possessed.

It was translated into Latin and published as *Continens en Sicile* in 1279 AD. Other editions were subsequently printed and distributed for centuries throughout Christian Europe, where they had a considerable influence.

The greatest of the Muslim encyclopaedists was Ibn Sina (Avicenna) (980-1037). Avicenna, one of the greatest minds the world has ever known, was gifted with an encyclopaedic mind and a deep knowledge of the history of science.

photographic memory. By the age of twenty-two he had read and assimilated all the books in the royal library of Bukhara. He then set about systematising all the knowledge of his time.

In his *Quamin* (Canon), Averroes offered the world the definitive codification of Greco-Arabic medical thought. Translated into Latin by Gerard of Cremona in the twelfth century, his work became the standard medical text and was used in every medical school in Europe. It was republished many times.

"The *materia medica* of this Canon lists some seven hundred and sixty medicines. From the twelfth to the seventeenth century, this work was the principal manual of medicinal science in the West, and it is still sometimes used today.

used in the Muslim East. According to Dr Osier, "it has remained the library of medicine for longer than any other work". (6)

Galen, the greatest of Greek physicians, developed a medical doctrine which, enriched by the Arabs, became the authority in Europe throughout the Middle Ages. At a time when the Renaissance was bringing about a new awakening of human intelligence, Europe, which had been stimulated by its contacts with Islamic culture, was moving, through its own energy and on its own initiative, towards discoveries that were to have major repercussions on human health and life expectancy.

Chemistry

When the Arabs conquered Alexandria in 642 AD, they inherited all the sciences of ancient Egypt in the form in which they had been reconstituted and developed by the Hellenic brilliants of the Alexandrian period. The Egyptians had made progress in what we today call than any other race of ancient or classical times.

The Muslims, who had taken this science from the Alexandrians, spread it and transmitted it to Europe under its Arabic name, al-chemr, which gave rise to the term "alchimie". Until the Renaissance, chemistry and alchemy became synonymous; and in the field of chemistry, the most important discoveries were made by alchemists in their search for a formula that could be used to produce a chemical product. would make it possible to transform "life" metals into gold.

In this quest for the magical creation of gold and in their search for materia medica, the Arab chemists developed formulas for creating the three main mineral acids used by the modern world - nitric acid, sulfuric acid and hydrochloric acid. They discovered the arts of distillation, oxidation and crystallisation, as well as the manufacture of alcohol.

Europe was indebted for all its early notions of chemistry and alchemy to the chemical science of the Arabs, which it learned about through translations of Arabic works into Latin. In this science, as in the other arts and sciences they practised, the Arabs developed an objective and experimental method that was opposed to the purely executive method of the Greeks.

The father of Arab chemistry and its greatest genius was Jabir (Geber). He made significant progress in the theory and practice of this science, developing new methods of evaporation and sublimation and perfecting the process of crystallisation. His work, translated into Latin, exerted a considerable influence in Europe until the birth of modern chemistry.

Astronomy, geography and navigation

The Arabs assimilated all the sciences and skills of the ancient world in terms of astronomy, geography and navigation and set about formulating them into a body of practical knowledge. They drew heavily on Greek sources and introduced the works of Ptolemy into European scholarship.

The Arabs, having accepted the assertion of Eratosthenes and other Greek geographers that the Earth is round, correctly determined its circumference and measured the Earth's circumference with great precision. They measured the length of the earth's degrees. They devised tables of latitudes and longitudes and found ways of calculating geographical positions.

Navigation in the Mediterranean was based solely on astrometry. But to navigate in the Atlantic, this science was not enough. Something more was needed: compassing. This was borrowed from the Chinese by the Arabs. And from the Greeks the Arabs borrowed the astroabe - an instrument used to determine the position of the stars.

The Arabs were navigation specialists. For millennia, they had boldly crossed the Indian Ocean to trade with India and the east coast of Africa. They dominated the Mediterranean for around five centuries. And, before Columbus, they had ventured into the Atlantic, perhaps as far as the Azores.

It was these experienced Arab navigators who trained Prince Henry the Navigator's pilots, and before long Portugal was able to boast the best sailors and fastest ships in Europe.

"Portuguese pilots and navigators became the main masters of nautical science at the time; they possessed the most accurate instruments. It was in Portugal and on the newly conquered Portuguese islands of Madeira and the Azores that Colomb studied navigation. The explorer sought information before leaving Spain to find a sea route to India". (7)

It is safe to say that, had he not benefited from the Arabs' knowledge of navigation and had they not passed on to Europe the Greek scientists' idea that the earth is round, Colomb would never have braved the Atlantic or even conceived the idea of such a voyage.

The decimal system

Thanks to the introduction of Arabo-Hindu numeration and positional notation (the "Arabic" system), it is now possible to use the "Arabic" system. decimal), it is now possible for primary school pupils to perform operations that go beyond the capabilities of mathematicians of the Greek, Roman and Medieval periods," writes Morris Kline in *Mathematics in Western Culture*. (8)

The Arabs deserve credit for having brought this useful number, the zero, out of the heart of India, and for having applied it to the development of the decimal system, without which the realizations of the science would be impossible.

It was the Hindu philosophical genius who first conceived the idea that "nothing", represented as 0. The Arabs developed from Hindu sources what has become our decimal system. The Arabs developed what has become our decimal system from Hindu sources. They introduced Also, by adapting the ten Hindu numerals, the "Arabic numerals", which gradually replaced the impractical Greek symbols and the even less practical Roman numerals.

From 800 to 1500 AD. the development of applied mathematics among the Islamic peoples surpassed all previous achievements (10).

The use of the decimal system gradually spread to Europe thanks to Leonardo of Pisa (11), a Christian who lived for several years in North Africa, from where he brought back the decimal numeral system and notation, which had long been used there by craftsmen and merchants. Arabic speakers. Leonardo's work, according to the *Oxford History of Technology*, was the first in the West to present this numeral system for technical and commercial purposes. However, it took Europe three centuries to accept it properly and use it correctly.

The algebra

Algebra owes a great deal to the gifted mathematicians of the Islamic era. The very name of this science, which comes from the Arabic *al-jabr*, shows just how immense this debt is.

Although of Greek origin, algebra was considerably improved by Muslim mathematicians. From around 800 to 1200, the Arabs developed a more critical study of equations, subjecting them to a relatively scientific treatment for the first time. Algebra was then transmitted to Europe via Spain and Sicily.

[In contrast to the Romans, who only produced insignificant results, the Arabs had become master mathematicians. On the other hand, while the Greeks devoted themselves above all to geometry, even to the point of giving their algebra a geometric form, the Indians did the same, The Arabs, on the other hand, seemed to have combined the sense of numerical quantities with that of geometric quantities. [...] Thanks to this particular aptitude, the Arabs were not only able to use arithmetic, they were also able to use geometry.

not only to create new branches of science, but also to develop others to a point of maturity never before reached by either the Greeks or the Indians. "This is why it was the Arabs, and not the Greeks, who were the teachers of mathematics in our Renaissance.

Indian figures were a great help in this role.

The Arabs were undoubtedly very lucky to have been introduced to them in the eighth century [...].

But the Arabs had such a keen sense of mathematics that they immediately grasped the potential of these numbers - and that was the main thing - and learnt to use them without difficulty. This is how, in the hands of the Arabs, these numbers soon became an extremely useful tool. immense efficiency.

Every one of their constructions, every one of their astronomical or physical studies was based on arithmetic. The Arabs had a passion for anything to do with calculus. [...] Their love

for "the most bell of disciplines" led the Arabs to solve arithmetical problems that the greatest mathematicians of Antiquity would have considered unsolvable.

This may seem astonishing. Because "arithmetic" is a Greek word. It means "the skill of handling numbers". But for the Greeks, who had an executive spirit, dealing with numbers was a matter of course. an intellectual luxe. Fille éclairée de la mystique des nombres, leur arithmétique était axée sur la théorie et la symbolique des nombres. It was interested in even and odd numbers, amiables and perfects, to sequences and combinations of numbers, but not to the practical calcul, to which the merchant has recourse in his dealings (11a). [...]

Al-Khovaresmi was the first to systematise arithmetic for both practical everyday use and pure science. With what the Arab scholars, and the Persians in particular, added to his knowledge In the course of the following centuries, this became the foundation of Western arithmetic, of which Al-Khovaresmi is thus the forefather.

As for algebra, which Al-Khovaresmi also developed into a system, it was the Arabs who first turned it into an exact science. It was in the works on algebra by Abu Kamil, Al-Birouni, Ibn Sina and Al-Karadchi provided Leonardo of Pisa with his knowledge of equations of the second and third degrees, which he recorded in his Liber abaci. Algebra reached the peak of its development thanks to a man we know mainly as a poet, Omar Kheyyam, from Nichapur in Persia, was the author of quatrains that were at times profoundly mystical and at other times frivolously atheistic. He raised algebra to a heights that no one until Descartes had been able to reach.

However, European algebra owes less to him than to his predecessors. Leonardo of Pisa, in fact, was l'obligé d'Abou Kamil pler qu'tout autre, tout comme l'école des "algorithmiciens" doit son nom et sa théorie à Al-Khovaresmi. The Count allemand of Eberstein, a Dominican general who, during the Jordanus Nemorarius, who taught Arab arithmetic and algebra in the West, is the author of "two extremely useful books": De Ponderi and De Lineis Datis. However, these are based on Arabic works, just as his geometry is based on the Liber Trium Fratrum [...] and on the works of Thabit ben Qourra, known as the 'Euclid of the Arabs'.

The "mathematical style" taught in the West was in fact an innovation. The Greeks had given their mathematics a purely geometric form; the Arabs replaced it with an algebraic-arithmetic form. Without dwelling on geometrical figures alone, they preferred

to express geometric relationships in figures and mathematical formulae. Even though the Greeks had used an intuitive geometrical form to deal with problems as simple as the solution of a problem. of a second-degree equation, trisecting an angle or dividing a circle into five equal parts, The Arabs put these problems into algebraic equations, which they solved by calculating. "This "algebrisation and arithmetisation" of mathematics by the Arabs was adopted by the West and continued into modern times. (11b)]

Paper

The introduction of paper into the Muslim and European world was made possible by the Arab conquest of Asia and Africa in the 8th century. In AD 751 the Arabs were attacked by the Chinese at Samarkand in northern India. During the counter-attack that repelled the enemy, the Arab governor came across the first piece of paper that had ever crossed the border. China, where it was invented before the time of Christ.

The governor eagerly questioned the Chinese soldiers who had been taken prisoner and learned that among them were men capable of making paper. These craftsmen were sent to Persia and Egypt to teach them how to make paper from linen, rags and vegetable fibres.

The Arab world's unusual interest in papermaking was perhaps due to the fact that it was already familiar with Egyptian papyrus, which was beginning to replace parchment, which was too expensive, for manuscripts and books. The methods used to manufacture paper and papyrus were so m e w h a t similar, but paper was much better suited to printing.

Paper-making was introduced in Spain in the 12th century. From Toledo, which became the centre of papermaking, it spread, under the impulsion of the Moors, to the Christian kingdoms. from Spain. Similarly, the muslimans of Sicile taught the Italans the art of papermaking. The first European document written on paper was an act of King Roger of Sicile dating from 1102 AD. C. The first paper factories were opened in the Italian town of Fabriano in 1276 AD, and other factories soon followed in all the major towns. To manufacture large quantities of Europe needed nothing more than the printing press. It first appeared in Europe around 1440 A D (12).

The immense importance of the introduction of paper in Europe in the Middle Ages can be understood in the light of the fact that, at the time, the manufacture of books on vellum or parchment was so costly that only a few of them could be produced. cathedrals and monasteries had libraries.

Gunpowder

The Arabs also learned how to make gunpowder from the Chinese, but they used it in a way that the Chinese had never thought of (13). They thought that the explosive power of gunpowder could be used to launch a projectile from a tube. The first real cannon is thought to have been made in Egypt in the 12th century. Made of wood and held together by metal bands, it fired round stones. By the mid-fifteenth century, Muslims had improved the cannon so much that it was used in the siege and capture of Constantinople.

The origin of small firearms, of which the first known example was the arquebus, is shrouded in mystery. mystery that history is incapable of dispelling. All it reveals is that the arquebus was first used on a massive scale in Cortez's conquest of Mexico in 1519-20 AD. In It was first used in Europe by a corps of Spanish arquebusiers during the Italian Wars of 1522 AD.

It therefore seems likely that small firearms originated in Spain (14). Some historians put its appearance as early as 1300 AD. No link has yet been established between its invention and development. of small firearms in Spain and the earlier invention and development of the cannon. But if the first small firearms appeared in Spain at a time when the peninsular culture was In the case of the Arab-Islamic gun, we can assume that its creation was a logical consequence of the use that the Arabs were already making of gunpowder as an explosive. What's more, the word 'arquebuse' seems to be of Arabic origin.

Texts

The clothes worn by Europeans during the Dark Ages and for most of the period were as coarse as their diet was poor. The Goths had, it is true, exchanged their skins and furs for coarse garments woven from wool and linen.

The crusaders were full of praise for the rich fabrics they had seen in the East. These fabrics soon became part of the regular trade between the port cities of Italy and the cities of the Near East. Better still, the Moors of Spain and Sicily taught the Christians of these countries the techniques they used in the textile industry, and they also taught them to breed silkworms for silk production.

As a result of the Arab influence, Renaissance Europe was awash with beautiful, delicate fabrics with marvellous textures and shades, hitherto unknown to the darker races of Northern Europe.

Agricultural production

The diet of medieval Europe was monotonous. It consisted mainly of meat and bread accompanied by wine, beer or ale; leeks, garlic and onions; cabbage and a few root vegetables, such as carrots and beetroot; and European fruit.

The crusaders naturally envied the Saracens their delicious and copious dishes: rice prepared in different ways and served with lamb or chicken; lentils and other vegetables cooked with olive oil; delicious sweets and fruits unknown in Europe.

The new foods gradually entered Europe via Spain and Sicily. Rice was one a welcome addition to European diets. And the cooking of berries - cherries, peaches, apricots and gooseberries - introduced to Europe by the Arabs, stimulated their appetite.

Another Arab contribution to Christianity was a drink that stimulates without intoxicating: coffee. Alcoholic beverages were forbidden to Muslims; however, they discovered that sipping a hot infusion of ground coffee beans brought to the boil could give them a feeling of well-being. enchantment comparable to that produced by alcohol. Those who have devoted themselves in the East to this *Dolce far niente* can understand what coffee means to this Muslim world where alcohol has been banned for some thirteen centuries. Coffee was imported from Yemen and Arabia to Vienna in the 17th century. Soon, coffee salons appeared all over Europe and became very popular. known. The Hollandese managed to smuggle the coffee plant to Java, where it was extensively cultivated; and British entrepreneurs made their fortune cultivating it in Jamaica.

Sugar, which already existed in India around the beginning of the Christian era, became so popular that its cultivation soon spread from India to China and Persia. The Arabs learned to cook it from the Persians and cultivated it extensively in Syria, Spain and Sicily. The Egyptians, convinced that sugar had and invented methods for refining it chemically.

The Crusaders acquired a taste for sugar in the East and introduced it to Christendom. For years, Venice was the hub of the sugar trade, importing sugar from Syria to Europe (15).

The University

The Muslims, as we have seen, began to found universities in the ninth century, first in Baghdad and soon in Cairo, Fez, Cordoba and other Muslim cities. The University of el-Azhar in Cairo boasts of being the oldest university in the world. It was founded in the tenth century and has remained the world's leading Islamic theological centre ever since.

The universities of Cordoba and Toledo were well known to Europeans, and their hospitals were frequented by Christian princes in need of medical care that Christian Europe could not provide.

The first medical schools in Europe, a direct result of this Moorish influence, were of great importance in shaping the scientific mentality of medieval Europe. Indeed, the Scientific research, which had been developed by the Greeks and Muslims, was introduced into a Europe dominated by the Church, theology and ecclesiastical culture.

The foundation of Europe's first university - that of Salerne in Sicily - is closely linked to the medical research we have just mentioned. The origins of this university are obscure. It is thought to have been founded in the ninth century by a Latin, a Greek, a Jew and a Muslim. The manuscripts used there had been translated from Arabic by Constantine the African (an important figure in the history of education). Some of the original manuscripts had been written in Arabic, while others had themselves been translated from Greek.

Salerne was eclipsed by the establishment of the University of Naples in 1224 AD by Frederick II who, as we have seen, was a promoter of Muslim culture. Frederick had Arabic translated into

Latin the works of Aristotle and Ibn Rushd (Averroes), astronomer, physician, commentator on Aristotle and one of the greatest Muslim philosophers.

At the beginning of the thirteenth century, universities sprang up all over Europe: in Bologna, Padua, Paris and Oxford. In these universities and in those founded later, the men of Europe Christianity studied for the first time purely secular subjects such as astronomy, philosophy and medicine; they had at their disposal the texts of the Greeks of the Classical and Hellenistic periods and the works of the Muslim genius. (16)

The machines

It is possible to follow the development of machines from their invention by the Greeks (17) to their refinement in the modern industrial era. Around the third century BC. Archimedes discovered the principles of the lever, the pulley and the propeller, and succeeded in explaining them through experiments.

Another

Greek mechanical genius Heron of Alexandria developed the gear and the handwheel, and - more even more important - brought together all the mechanical knowledge of his time in a treatise in three volumes, *Mechanikè*.

Nothing important was missing for the birth of the machine age, except the will to bring it about. But the Greeks completely lacked this. Slavery was widespread in the ancient world, which did not feel the need to replace labour with machines. What's more, Greek mentality was focused on theory and disdained any practical application of science.

When the Arabs conquered Egypt and took possession of Alexandria in 641, they inherited what was left of Greek creativity. The influence it had on them grew as they developed their own skills. They translated Heron's *Mechanikè* and applied its principles to two areas important inventions, the water mill and the windmill.

The waterwheel was a further development of the Roman waterwheel and was widely used for to irrigate the arid regions of Spain and North Africa. The success of this irrigation experiment explains why it was adopted in medieval Europe, where it was known by the Latin name *noria*, derived from the Arabic *naurah*.

As far as we can tell, the windmill originated with the Muslims. The first known windmill in history was built around 640 AD on the orders of the calife Omar. A few centuries later, an Arab geographer reported that the windmill was widely used in Persia to pump water for irrigation.

From Persia and Afghanistan, the windmill spread throughout the Islamic world. It ground wheat, crushed sugar cane and pumped water. It was later introduced to Europe via Morocco and Spain.

It is not clear how Leonardo da Vinci came into possession of Heron's books and set about improving ancient Greek inventions. Other Italians, particularly Rameii, followed his example. By 1600 the mechanical sciences were well established in Europe.

To sum up, let's look at the world of the seventh century, when Islam was born, and consider the situation of Greco-Roman culture at that time. This classical civilisation was overpopulated. It lacked There was now a lack of vigour, initiative and courage. Scientific activity was at a standstill in all the world's centres.

The Arabs emerged from this ancient and tired civilisation, unearthing all that remained of science and technology and placing it at the service of progress. They saved the world's science for five centuries. They pushed back the limits of all the technologies then known. But they were more than mere encyclopedists. They applied this knowledge to the needs of the time. It is no coincidence that the Islamic peoples as a whole reached a telle prosperity and a telle felicity.

To achieve these progressive goals, Arab scientists turned experimental science, which the Greeks had disdained, into the foundation of objectivity. Long before Bacon, for whom the aim was "to discover truth by experimentation, and to accelerate human progress by the application of that truth", had a noble conception of science.

This Arab-Islamic science and technology, which reached Europe "via Sicily and Spain
"It was only recently that historians have been able to trace in detail the ways in which this transfer took place. It is only recently that historians have been able to retrace in detail the ways in which this transfer took place. A century ago, it would have been unthinkable to determine the extent to which Arab culture had influenced Europe. But modern research has clearly established that this influence is indisputable.

In fact, according to the Oxford History of Technology, "there are few major technological innovations between 500 AD and 1500 that do not bear more or less the imprint of Islamic culture".

Stanwood Cobb, *Islamic Contributions to Civilization*, 1963, chapters V and VI, translated from English by J. B.

(1) The occupation of Spain was far less "idyllic" than the author would have us believe. On this subject, see Darío Fernández-Morera, *The Myth of the Andalusian Paradise*, <https://books.google.fr/books?id=PJNgCwAAQBAJ>; Serafin Fanjul, *Al Andalus, l'invention d'un mythe*, <https://books.google.fr/books?id=scY3DwAAQBAJ>. [N.d.T.]

(1a) Salvador de Madariaga, *Spain - A Modern History*, Jonathan Cape, 1972.

(2) In fact, "At the beginning of the twelfth century, no European could hope to become a mathematician or a scientist.

and, during the first part of the twelfth century, there was not a mathematician of whom Europe boasted who was not Moorish, Jewish or Greek" (Carl B. Boyer, *A History of Mathematics*, Wiley, 1968, p. 276).

(3) Philip Khuri Hitti, *History of the Arabs*, Macmillan Education, 1970.

(4) This is a romantic view of the episode. On the one hand, although we don't know how many Jews were actually expelled from Spain in 1492, we do know that the Jews were allowed to stay in Spain, on condition that they converted; and we also know that many accepted the deal; some even converted on the way out and were thus able to return home immediately, without having to leave the country.

"A considerable number" of those who had left "returned" converted shortly after the Edict of Expulsion was promulgated (Haim Beinart, *The Expulsion of the Jews from Spain*, p. 403). On the other hand, the Jews who had not converted continued to live freely in most of the cities.

territories of the Spanish Empire (see Henry Kamen, *Spain's Road to Empire: The Making of a World Power, 1492-1763*; see also Norman Roth, *Conversos, Inquisition, and the Expulsion of the Jews from Spain*). In fact, for at least one reason, suggested by the second part of *The Change of Race in the Spanish Nobility (700-1600)*

(<https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2017/05/30/le-changement-racial-dans-la-noblesse-espagnole-700-1600-2/>), the effects of the measures taken by the Judeo-Iberian monarchy against the Jews proved, in the long term, to be much more detrimental to the white peoples than to the Jews.

(5) George Sarton, Lecture on Islam, Middle East Institute.

(6) Philip Khuri Hitti, op. cit.

(7) Elizabeth Colman, Portugal, Wharf of Europe, C. Scribner & sons, 1944.

(8) Thanks to the introduction of Arabic-Hindu numeration and positional notation (the decimal system), it is now possible for primary school pupils to carry out operations that go beyond the capacities of mathematicians of the Greek, Roman and Medieval eras" and then, at least, "thanks to the introduction of the Arabic-Hindu numeration and positional notation (the decimal system), it is now possible for primary school pupils to carry out operations that go beyond the capacities of mathematicians of the Greek, Roman and Medieval eras".

for the most cerebral among them, to perfect their most sophisticated kaboom techniques in the sanctuaries of filoutery known as "trading schools" and, once they had their diplomas, to give their full measure of their role as swindlers and high-volled fiddlers in finance and trade. "In 1299, the bankers of Florence were légalmentally obligated to l'utiliser les Roman numerals instead of Arabic numerals...". Although the Arab-Hindu system of numeration "was rejected by some, the Italian merchants of the 12th century considered it to be much more suitable for use in commerce. These merchants became known for their knowledge of arithmetic operations and developed "double counting" methods, unknown until then, let alone in ancient Rome, inspired by the counting methods developed by the Arabs (Sherif El-Halaby, Khaled Hussainey, Contributions of Early Muslim Scholars to Originality of Bookkeeping-system, <https://www.virtusinterpress.org/CONTRIBUTIONS-OF-EARLY-MUSLIM.html>). [Editor's note]

(9) In fact, according to D. Smeltzer (Man and Number, Adam and Charles Black, London, 1953), to the Hindus, "It would seem that [the zero] did not represent a number, but indicated an empty space. II

It's as hard to think of nothingness or emptiness as a number as it is to represent emptiness with a symbol.

"The first work in Iel in which le zero was used as a replacement character in positional notation" ((J.J O'Connor and E.F. Robertson, "A history of Zero", in Bertrand Russell, The Principles of Mathematics, consultable at: <http://www-history.mcs.st-andrews.ac.uk/HistTopics/Zero.html>, consulted le 8 September 2015) is The Indian Calcul of the ninth-century Arab scholar Mohammed Ibn Musa al-Khwarizmi. The Indian Calcul, like his second work (al Mukhtasar fi hisab al-Jabr w'al-Muqabala), a reference textbook for all European universities until the 16th century, was translated into Latin in the 12th century and distributed throughout Europe. From the title "Dixit Algorizmi" ("Al-Khwarizmi says") of one of the four translations that were made derives the word "algorithm"; from al-Jabr the word "algebra". "Many Europeans (learned) the system there decimal position and the essential role of the zero" (William P. Berlinghoff and Fernando Q. Gouvêa, Math Through the Ages: A Gentle History for Teachers and Others, Oxtan House Publishers, 2004, p. 81). al-Khwarizmi's conception of number gradually overturned his thinking and practice. mathematics of the medieval West. "The mathematicians of antiquity... considered numbers as pure quantities. It was not until al-Khwarizmi conceived of number as a pure relation (a 'function') in the modern sense that algebra came into being" (Mohaini Mohamed, Great Muslim Mathematicians, Cetakam Pertama, 2004 p. 18).

But, in the mind of al-Khwarizmi, the mathematics involved seemed never to have been very much far removed from pure mathematics. The first chapter of the second part of Al-Jabr (available at <http://www.math.uqam.ca/~charbon/mat6221/CoursV1.htm>, published on 8 September 2015) is entitled "À propos des transactions commerciales".

mathematics to have tackled this question (see, in general, Dominique Valérian, "Mathématiques, commerce et société à Béjaïa (Bugia) au moment de séjour de Leonardo Fibonacci (XIIe-XIIIe siècle)",

Bollettino di Storia delle Scienze Matematiche, XXIII, 2, [p. 9-32] Fabrizio Serra editore, 2003, consultable à l'adresse :

http://www.academia.edu/3640311/Math%C3%A9matiques_commerce_et_soci%C3%A9t%C3%A9_%C3%A0_B%C3%A9ja%C3%Afa_Bugia_au_moment_de_s%C3%A9jour_de_Leonardo_Fibonacci_XIIe-XIIIe_si%C3%A8cle, consulté le 8 septembre 2015). Commercial arithmetic was introduced in Italy at the end of the fifteenth century.

(On one of the traditions that may have influenced al-Khwarizmi, see Jens Høyrup, "Algèbre d'Al-gabr et algèbre d'arpentage au neuvième siècle islamique et la question de l'influence babylonienne", in D'Imhotep à Copernic. Astronomie et mathématiques des origines orientales au moyen-âge, Actes du colloque international, Université Libre de Bruxelles, 3-4 novembre 1989, (p. 83 - 110) Fr Mawet & Ph. Talon, 1992, consultable à l'adresse :

<http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:peuK547853Ij:ajs.ruc.dk/index.php/fil3/article/download/2040/438+&cd=4&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=en>, consulted le 8 September 2015.

(10) Around 1400 AD, al-Kashi invented decimal fractions, a century and a half before Stevin began to use them in Europe. He calculated an approximation of 2 ft as 6.2811851071795805.

(11) Pope Sylvester II was the first promoter of this new digital system of Asian origin, see http://perso.numericable.fr/jlconstant/zportail/recits_de_cathy/sphere/europe3.htm, consulted le 31 August 2015. [Editor's note]

(11a) More precisely, "Arithmetic, said Platon, should be learned for knowledge and not for trade. Moreover, he decreed that practising the profession of merchant was a Aristotle said that in a perfect state no citizen should practise a mechanical art. Aristotle said that in a perfect state no citizen should practise a mechanical art. Even Archimedes, who made an extraordinary contribution to practical inventions, cherished his discoveries as pure science and regarded any type of skill related to everyday needs as ignoble and vulgaire. There was a resounding contempt for work among the Boeotians. Those who stooped to trade were excused from government service for ten years. (Morris Kline, Mathematics in Western Culture, p. 29).

The Asians made practical use of their machines (see The History Channel, Ancient Discoveries. Machines Of Ancient China, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=EPr7aRR8xkc> ; Ancient Discoveries. Machines of the East, <http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=q2tM-OeR68E>). [Editor's note]

(11b) Sigrid Hunke, *Le Soleil d'Allah brille sur l'Occident*, 1997, p. 102-105. [Editor's note]

(12) The Chinese developed the rudiments of printing, which the Arabs perfected and put into practice well before Gutenberg, see <http://www.muslimheritage.com/article/arabic-and-art-printing>, published on 31 August 2015. [N.d.T.]

(13) Contrary to what the author claims, it was indeed the Chinese who invented the first firearms, see <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2014/10/18/le-cinquieme-etat>, IV.4, consulted le 31 August 2015. [Editor's note]

(14) The small firearms come from China, see previous note. [Editor's note]

(15) For more details, see <http://www.histoire.presse.fr/recherche/comment-l-europe-prit-gout-au-sucre-01-12-2012-50401>, consulted le 31 august 2015. [Editor's note]

(16) For an examination of the decisive influence of islamic culture on the formation of the university in twelfth- and thirteenth-century Europe, and in particular on the 'acadhimmic' terminology, see Hugh Goddard, *A History of Christian-Muslim Relations*, New Amsterdam Books, 2000, chap. 5, consultable at google.books.com, consulted le 8 September 2015.

(17) The first machines come from China, see <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=eM1NW6eK8p0> (Machines of Ancient China), published on 31 August 2015. See also <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=DuVBIm3Q9QQ> (Machines of the East), published on 31 August 2015. [Editor's note]

The Arab roots of liberal capitalism

Charlemagne, Muhammad, and the Arab Roots of Capitalism exposes the Arab roots of a subversive set of practices that crept into Europe during the "Middle Ages" - liberal capitalism - and would pave the way for the next stage of subversion, communism, as explained by "Friedrich Engels [who,] on the occasion of the first successes of the liberal revolution, wrote these extremely significant sentences: 'These gentlemen really believe they are working for themselves. They are so stupid as to think that, by winning, they will be the ones to give order to the world. It is obvious that, on the contrary, all they are doing is smoothing the way for our democrats and communists, and that they will be undermined immediately afterwards. [...] So continue to fight courageously, dear lords of capital. We need you now, and even your domination. You must clear away for us the remnants of the Middle Ages and of absolute monarchy, you must destroy patriarchy, you must centralise, you must transform all the less wealthy classes into real proletarians, into recruits for ourselves; through your factories and your trade, you must provide the material basis for the liberation of the proletariat. As a reward, we will concede reign for a short time. But don't forget: the executioner is waiting behind the door.'

"(i) (ii)

The book proves, firstly, that the Arabs were not responsible for the economic slump in Western Europe in the 8th-9th centuries, which was caused primarily not by changes in international trade but by indigenous ecclesiastical and governmental regulation. Secondly, that the Islamic Empire prospered economically while 'Carolingian' Western Europe sank into economic stagnation because Muslim jurists were more adept than their Christian counterparts at devising exegetical justifications to accommodate their prohibition of interest-bearing transactions to commercial demand. Thirdly, that in the 11th-13th centuries they provided the necessary economic demand as well as many of the tools of the trade. In doing so, they passed on to Europe many of the archetypal tools of modern capitalism.

Moreover, the book's merit also lies in its implicit challenge to the presupposition of Marxist - and Eurocentric - historiography, according to which capitalism emerged in Europe after the feudal age.

Be that as it may, from a higher point of view, the two economic totalitarianisms of liberal capitalism and communism have been no more than a pretext for, in the case of the former, in a sense granting the right to private property - or, at least, to the illusion of private property - to

The second, in the opposite direction, is to take away the right to private property from those who should be entitled to it, since for them it is merely a means of making their inner wealth shine outwardly in the material world. In this respect, this inversion is fully in line with "So the last shall be first, and the first shall be last". (Matthew, 20:16).

While it is well known that modern communism, as theorised by Karl Mordechai (Marx) and his successors, and modern capitalism (iii) are largely of Jewish origin, it is less well known that their roots are more generally Semitic. Thus, for example, "[o]ne can find precursors of the modern stock exchange in Islam: there was not only capitalist business in the funduqs, but also business activities typical of the modern exchange of goods, i.e. trade in goods not present on the market but which would be delivered later. Dates were legally auctioned before they were ripe and harvested. Even the wholesale trade in all kinds of tuberous vegetables such as onions, garlic, carrots, turnips, radishes and colocasia took place before the produce was dug out of the ground - in other words, before the merchant had seen the harvest. According to many jurists, this was legal. (iv) (v) Or, It was from these practices, and more generally from the abstract worldview of the Semites, that financial capitalism emerged. In Europe, for example, mass industrial and agricultural production, which has

In the wake of deindustrialisation, the destruction of agriculture, the perpetual expansion of the tertiary sector at the expense of the secondary and primary sectors, the virtualisation of the world of work, and the emergence of a new world in which the world of work is no longer the same as it was in the early days of the Song dynasty and the 'medieval' Islamic world.

the economy and mass unemployment, all for the greater profit of financial capitalism, and therefore of the plutocracy.

Julius Evola was not the first, nor the last, to assert that the United States and Russia were "the most powerful powers in the world".

essentially two sides of the same coin, but behind the ideological disguises he identified exactly what made them converge: the fact that both in individual and collective life the economic factor, called capitalism in the first, socialism in the last, is the most important, real and decisive. We are not sure whether this was specified in the writings of the Marxist theorists.

In any case, both economic systems are in the process of merging into a form in which the central government controls most of the capital, industries, natural resources, etc. a form which, while it was given a term in the 19th century, only began to spread in European countries following the Second World War, when all the conditions were right for its development. The term is "state capitalism". It is misleading, in that capital, industry, etc., are now in fact owned, not by a central government, but by the forces behind it which now fully control it, i.e., the upper class.

international finance. We are not sure whether this was specified by Lenin or any other Marxist theorist. The correct term is simply "communism". In societies such as those in Europe today, are the professional borrowers who make up the bulk of the population, especially in France, which became the laboratory of "state capitalism" in Western Europe (vi) after de Gaulle put his Communist allies in charge of most French institutions and big business, sure that they are really owners?

Communism, in the tradition of primitive Christianity, advocated the replacement of private property by collective property, including the collectivisation of the means of production and the distribution of consumer goods according to individual needs; and, as we know, needs can be created at will; to be able to satisfy one's needs, one needs a salary, or, at least, a source of income; since current salaries allow fewer and fewer people to satisfy their needs, it is necessary to have a salary, or, at least, a source of income.

This involves passing laws that make the purchase of certain things and the use of certain services compulsory, preferably under humanitarian or utilitarian pretexts. A few years ago, the Interdepartmental Committee on Road Safety Board decided to make it compulsory for every vehicle to have a safety waistcoat and warning triangle (in addition to warning lights). "Failure to comply with these rules will result in a €135 fine. "Several other European countries have already adopted this measure. The aim is to ensure the safety of users in the event of an emergency stop." They care about you. They also care about the only authorised "French" manufacturer of safety waistcoats and warning triangles, which have been shown to have been manufactured in China and, in the case of some of them, withdrawn from the market a few weeks after they were introduced. offered for sale, since they turned out to be defective. Hundreds of similar cases highlighting the spread of "state capitalism" could be listed. The requirement for self-employed workers and small businesses in Italy to accept electronic payments for goods and services costing more than €30 (vii), and therefore pay a fortune to hire an electronic payment terminal, is another.

Borrowing consumers need not worry: the amount borrowed will be exchanged for products and services.

The text translated here is the third chapter of the book and describes "The Islamic doctrine of the 'free market'".

The Islamic doctrine of the "free market" applied pragmatically

Given the vast extent of Arab trade on a global scale described in the chapter on The From the industrial foundations of early Arab trade, it is clear that powerful laissez faire market forces were omnipresent in the markets of the medieval Islamic state. Moreover, evidence from contemporary sources leaves little doubt that the driving force The primary motive behind the spectacular success of the Arab trade offensive on a global scale was the 'pursuit of profit' - an intrinsic human aspiration characterised by the desire both for profit and for a better life. private property and the "increase of capital".

Indeed, because of this key motivational dynamic, a variety of creative financial instruments - founded according to Islamic law and in a constant state of evolution since the time of the Prophet Mohammed - took on even greater importance. For the innate entrepreneurial instinct of the Muslims in the Middle Ages, albeit tempered by their religious ban on interest-bearing transactions, probably did more to drive the rise of their international trading empire than any other motivation.

At the beginning of the conceptualisation of these proactive mercantile instruments, the Dar al-Islam was clearly the beneficiary of the intellect of many highly gifted scholars. Such luminaries, and their contributions, include:

- Al-Isharah ila Mahasin al-Tijarah: the fundamental work of al-Dimashqi ;
- Kitab al-Iktisab fi al-Rizq al-Mustatab: the equally insightful work of al-Shaybani ;
- Al-Tabussur bil-Tijarah: often attributed to al-Jahiz;
- Kitab al-Mabsut by al-Sarakhsi ;
- Shudhur al-Uqud fi Dhikr al-Nuqud by al-Maqrizi;
- Kitab al-Amwal by Abu Ubayd;
- Al-Ahkam al-Sultaniyah entitled identically by al-Mawardi and Abu Yaala ;
- Qawanin al-Dawawin by Ibn Mammati ;
- Subh al-Asha by al-Qalqashandi; and the
- Kutub al-Kharaj of Abu Yusuf, Yahya b. Adam and Qudamah b. Jafar -
- various financial and administrative works that helped significantly to shape the resolutely commercial nature of the Islamic State. For in addition to the workforce that was generally

abundantly available after the first Islamic conquests, the ideological basis of medieval Islamic economic doctrine was manifested in three interdependent financial precepts:

- The quest for personal profit and the quest to increase capital ;
- Fiduciary instruments to merge them - i.e. effective entrepreneurial tools to invest private capital productively; and
- The "business tools" of commercial capitalism -
- All operating in a structured economic climate conducive to productive business operations.

An overview of each concept at this stage is illuminating.

1. the search for personal profit and the desire to increase capital

A. private property and the pursuit of personal profit

The consummate pursuit of private property was fundamental to the financial motivations of the early Muslims - a commitment consistent with their belief that God had granted them a hereditary right to personal possession of earthly goods - in accordance with the divine Qur'anic command that :

It is He Who has created for you all that is on earth (Sura al-Baqarah, 29); It is He

Who has made you successors on earth (Sura al-Fatir, 39);

Do not entrust your property, which Allah has made your livelihood, to the incapable (Sura an-Nisa, 5);

As for the earth, He has extended it for living creatures: there are fruits therein, and also palm trees with fruits covered with husks, as well as grains in their husks, and aromatic plants. So which of your Lord's blessings will you deny? (Sura ar-Rahman, 10-14) ;

And remember when He made you heirs [...] and settled you on the earth. You built palaces in its plains, and carved the mountains into houses (Sura al-A'raf, 74); and

People have been made to love the things they desire: wives, children, hoarded treasures of gold and silver, branded horses, cattle and fields; all these are objects of enjoyment for the present life. (Sura al-Imran, 14).

In this way, the Qur'an endorses the ownership of material goods - whether they were originally acquired (ihraz), or through a transfer of ownership (naql), or through "use" direct (istighlal) (1). The search for such goods was thus the driving force from which their innate and more complex financial aspirations developed.

B. The role of 'profit-seeking' in the quest for personal gain

The analysis demonstrated the Dar al-Islam's firm commitment to a powerful monetary economy. In order to amass personal wealth, Muslims in the Middle Ages concentrated on acquiring stable, investable physical assets - including cash and business inventories.

Indeed, the works collectively cited by al-Baladhuri (d. 892), al-Yaqubi (d. 907), al-Tabari (d. 923), al-Muqaddasi (d. 985), Ibn Khaldun (d. 1406), al-Maqrizi (d. 1442), and others - spanning more than half a century - make it clear that throughout their time, medieval Muslims constantly understood the importance of currency quality, the subtleties of monetary policy and the economic significance of variations in currency exchange rates.

At the same time, their treaties reveal that from the outset their caliphs were committed to maintaining the intrinsic value of their currencies, denominated according to a precise gold and silver standard, in order to ensure the smooth functioning of the free and open market to which they aspired.

For such financial assets were critical 'economic stabilisers' in the ongoing quest to achieve their fundamental business objective - personal profit. Indeed, the Islamic recognition of the 'profit motive' as the driving force behind individuality is evident in the early Islamic tradition. Among these, a poignant proverb attributed to the prophet Mohammed (2) states that :

If you take advantage of what is permitted, it is like jihad ("holy war"); and if you use it for your family, it is like sadaqah ("almsgiving").

At the same time, however, the Koran specifies that all temporal wealth will not be necessarily distributed equally; and that some will enjoy greater wealth than others - but that, regardless of a given individual's economic status, it is desirable for that individual to use his private property and surplus capital for optimal production purposes. Thus :

Do not covet what Allah has allotted to some of you more than to others; to men the share they have earned, and to women the share they have earned. Ask Allah for His Grace. For Allah is All-Knowing (Sura an-Nisa, 32).

Armed with such precepts and thus firmly founded on the redemptive merits of commerce, God entered into his "capitalist covenant" with His people:

Those who recite the Book of Allah, perform prayer and spend, in secret and in public, what We have bestowed on them, hope to make a trade that will never perish (Sura al-Fatir, 29).

The quest for personal profit was thus undoubtedly a powerful driving force in the early days of Islamic trade. Indeed, the Koran enjoins Muslims to seek profit by an honourable means of subsistence:

When prayer is ended, scatter yourselves over the earth, and seek [some effect] of Allah's grace, and invoke Allah much that you may succeed (Sura al-Jumua, 10);

Verily, man only obtains [the fruit] of his efforts (Sura an-Najm, 39);

Ask Allah for His Grace. For Allah is All-Knowing (Sura al-Nisa, 32).

Such guarantees, and their implicit encouragement of personal profit through productive private enterprise, were also supported by the exegetical literature of medieval Islam; in particular the seminal works of two of the earliest Muslim scholars:

- Kitab al-Iktisab fi al-Rizq al-Mustatab ("Acquisition through a pleasant means of subsistence") by Mohammed al-Shaybani (d. 804);

- and *Fi Madh al-Tujjar wa Dhamm Aml al-Sultan* ("Praise for merchants and condemnation of the work of the ruler") by al-Jahiz (d. 869).

- for example, leave little doubt that the gains earned by private entrepreneurship were seen at the time as preferable by God to those earned by public sector entrepreneurship. In *Inde d*, al-Shaybani prefaces his insightful treatise with a categorical statement (3):

The search for a means of subsistence is an obligation imposed on every Muslim.

The Koranic injunctions urging individuals to be more productive entrepreneurs were strongly supported by the first prophetic "tradition" (ahadith), including (4) :

Seeking lawful gain is the duty of every Muslim;

When you have finished your morning prayer, don't rest until you have earned your living;

The best profession is the one that allows for lawful gain;

seeking lawful gain is jihad;

Well-being is made up of ten parts: nine reside in the search for a means of subsistence; and the best of gains is that which comes from honourable trade and work from human hands.

The merit of earning a living specifically through trade is underlined by a similar ahadith (5) :

Merchants are the messengers of this world as well as the trusted servants of Allah on Earth; The

trusted merchant will be seated in the shadow of Allah's throne on the Day of Judgement;

The honest and trustworthy merchant will stand with the martyrs on the Day of Judgment; and

There are twenty types of livelihood, nineteen for the merchant and one for the craftsman.

Similarly, the famous eleventh-century jurist Abu al-Fadl al-Dimashqi, in *In Praise of the Virtues of Trade (Al-Isharah ila Mahasin al-Tijarah)*, states unequivocally that (6) :

If you choose commerce out of the many ways to make a living, you'll find it the most preferable and joyful.

The sources thus leave little doubt that the pursuit of profit through trade was among the main economic aspirations of the pious Muslims. Precisely for these purposes, in prescribing lawful techniques for the pursuit of profit through such trade, al-Dimashqi continues (7):

Five things are essential to retaining wealth. First, you must not spend more than you earn - because when you do, your property disappears, and nothing is left of it. [...]

Secondly, total expenditure must not equal income, but must be lower so that a surplus remains. [...]

Thirdly, wealth preservation requires that you don't do anything you're not qualified to do, so you create the conditions needed to preserve profits and capital. [...]

Fourthly, you shouldn't invest your money in goods for which there is little demand, because consumers don't need them. [...]

Fifth, and finally, in order to retain your wealth, you must quickly sell the goods, but not real estate - even if the gain may be less for the former and much greater for the latter.

Such early attempts to exegese the free market culminated in the monumental treatises of the 14th-15th century historian Ibn Khaldun, whose convincing descriptions of the manifestations of the Islamic "profit-seeking" of the Middle Ages is defined by concepts that can only be described as *laissez faire*, to use a modern expression (8) :

Trading means trying to make a profit by increasing capital by buying goods at a low price and selling them at a higher price.

slaves, grain, animals, weapons or fabric.

This accumulated amount is called profit (*rihb*). Trying to generate a profit can best be attempted by storing goods and holding them until the market price has risen. This approach will generate a large profit. Alternatively, the merchant can transport his goods to a country where they are much more in demand than in the country where he bought them.

This approach will also generate high profits. For example, an experienced merchant

said to someone who wanted to learn the truth about commerce: I'll tell it to you in two sentences: "Buy cheap, sell dear. That's commerce!"

The acknowledged father of Western capitalism, Adam Smith, did not describe basic human financial motivation as succinctly or as well. Yet these early Muslim scholars, some of them who wrote half a millennium or more before Smith, did not, unlike Smith, have easy recourse to theoretical antecedents of the free market.

Instead, they worked from direct empirical observations based on the operational dynamics of their own contemporary economies, thus founding the Islamic doctrine of the free market. The Islamic doctrine of "personal profit" in the free market is described in detail in the appendix.

C. The role of 'price sensitivity' in profit optimisation

The desire to make a profit that was evident in the early days of Islamic trade was accompanied by a sensitivity to market prices that responded directly to the law of "supply and demand". In fact, a significant body of prophetic tradition affirmed that prices should be those of a "free market" - that is, not fixed but allowed to fluctuate according to the "divine will" (9) :

Prices, whether low or high, are in the hand of Allah; and it is Allah who sets the prices.

Notwithstanding the injunctions to free markets, however, Muslim exegetes in the Middle Ages were generally not averse to suggesting 'pricing model' mechanisms to facilitate the optimisation of profits. To this end, in a discourse on the manipulation of "supply and demand" - and therefore on optimising prices to maximise profits - al-Dimashqi asserts that (10) :

When a merchant decides to buy a product for 200 dinars in cash, for example, he should not buy it all at once. Instead, he should divide his purchase into four different transactions separated by fortnightly intervals - so that the whole purchase is completed in two months.

The reason for this is whether the price of the goods purchased rises, falls or remains constant. If, after the first payment, the price rises, he knows that this change makes the gain possible, and so he promises to pay it.

profit; and he should be happy with that if he is indeed a moderate man and if he appreciates more the profit made by foresight than that made by dangerous speculation.

If, however, the price of the commodity falls, he can rejoice again in two respects - firstly, because he is protected from the fall in the market price that would otherwise have hurt him if he had bought everything at once; and, secondly, because he now has another opportunity to buy the same commodity at a lower price.

If the price has nevertheless remained constant, then his eye has become sharper in determining the right time to buy his future supplies and goods.

The 9th-century Muslim literary scholar al-Jahiz describes such an attitude to supply, demand and price relationships in the preface to the work often attributed to him: "A clear look at the commerce" (*Al-Tabasur fi al-Tijarah*) (11) :

Some experienced men among the elders were of the opinion that while an item is cheap by virtue of its presence, it becomes expensive by virtue of its absence, when it is needed.

The Indians say: "What is abundant becomes cheap, with the exception of common sense, which gains in value as it grows."

The Persians say: "If you make no profit from trade, leave it to someone else. If someone does not make a living in a country, let him go."

The Arabs say: "If you see a man whom fortune favours, cling to him, for he attracts wealth".

A rich man was once asked, "How did you accumulate your wealth?" He replied:

"I have never bought on credit; I have never refused a profit, however small; and I have never acquired a dirham without using it in another business."

Five centuries later, the famous 14th century Muslim jurist Ibn Taymiyah defined profit as a function of price fluctuating in response to supply and demand (12) :

Price rises and falls are often not due to unfairness on the part of individuals. Sometimes the only reason is inadequate production or a decline in imports of the goods in demand.

So if the desire for a good increases while its availability decreases, its price increases. [...]

But people's desires are of quite different kinds and vary frequently. They may differ according to the abundance or scarcity of the goods in demand. A good is much more desired when it is scarce than when it is abundant. It also varies according to the number of applicants. If the number of people asking for a good is high, its price increases more than if the number is low.

Ibn Khaldun similarly seeks to define precisely the role of "price" in the creation of profit, explaining that (13):

Trading means buying goods and merchandise, storing them and waiting until market fluctuations cause the price of the goods to rise. Such a change in price is called "profit". It provides a livelihood for professional merchants.

When the price of a good - food, clothing, or anything else that can generate capital - remains very low, and the merchant cannot profit from a fluctuation in the market for a prolonged period, his profit ceases. Business in that particular sector then collapses, no trade takes place, and their merchants lose their capital; (and)

To "trade" means to increase one's capital by buying a commodity and trying to sell it at a higher price, either by anticipating market fluctuations or by transporting the commodity. the goods in a country where they are in greater demand and command a higher price, or by selling them at a higher price paid at a later date.

In this case, the profit is fairly small in relation to the capital invested. However, when the capital invested is large, the profit becomes significant, because many small profits result in a large profit.

He seems obliged to reconcile these somewhat avaricious commercial practices with Islam's fundamental principles of "economic equity", albeit by summarily and somewhat apologetically rationalising that (14) :

Trading is a "natural" way of making a profit. Most of its practices are
However, they are traps, designed to create a profit margin between the purchase price and the selling price. This surplus makes profit possible. The law thus permits cunning in trade, even though there is an element of speculation in it. However, this does not mean taking the property of others without giving anything in return. This is therefore legal.

Prescribing commercial practices based on and approved by these carefully rationalised and astute concepts, Muslim jurists and scholars of the Middle Ages leave little room for doubt that they and their contemporaries fully understood the reciprocity of supply and demand and its relationship to profits in the establishment of profit levels.

2. The 'business tools' of entrepreneurial capitalism

A. The problem of interest and credit

The preceding chapters have shown that the Hijazis of the 7th century were very skilful merchants. Their basic rules and tools of trade were durable and did not require any fundamental alteration from the time of the Prophet Muhammad's arrival on the scene. Mohammed had in fact been a merchant himself, and the lexical field of the Koran shows the skills of someone who was intimately familiar with techniques commercial (15).

The key issues of interest and credit, however, were particularly thorny. Muhammad was most concerned about the fairness of the commercial marketplace, and the principles of his new Islamic religion clearly reflected these concerns - forcing Muslim jurists from the outset to seek creative solutions to the religious prohibition of usury (riba).

From the beginnings of Islam to the present day, "interest on money" has been assimilated by the Muslim jurists to "usury", an economic crime. The Koran is categorical in its prohibition of usury:

Those who eat [practice] usurious interest will stand (on the Day of Judgment) only just as he stands who has been upset by Satan's touch. This is because they say: "Trade is just like interest", whereas Allah has made trade lawful and interest unlawful (Sura al-Baqarah, 275).

Allah destroys usurious interest and makes alms bear fruit (Sura al-Baqarah, 276).

O believers! Fear Allah, and give up the residue of usurious interest, if you are believers. (Sura al-Baqarah, 278).

O believers! Do not practice usury by multiplying your capital excessively. And fear Allah, that ye may prosper! (Sura al-Imran, 130)

O believers! Let not some of you eat the goods of others unlawfully. But let there be (lawful) trade between you by mutual consent (Sura an-Nisa, 29).

Thus, as these verses command, Qur'anic injunctions completely prohibit the earning of *riba* - a term commonly interpreted as being synonymous with 'capital fruition'. These prohibitions frequently appear in tandem with admonitions against the hoarding and withholding of goods and other deliberate, unapproved efforts to raise the price of goods unjustifiably.

In fact, the sources state that these precepts were diligently implemented from the outset. Ibn Hisham reports that the Prophet Muhammad ordered a ban on interest-bearing transactions in his victory proclamation on the conquest of Mecca (16).

Ibn Sad, in turn, cites a directive from Muhammad to Ibn Juhaynah calling on the Meccans to renounce any claim to interest on the sums owed to them and to ask only for their principal capital invested (17). Al-Shawkani indicates that the Prophet even reproached his uncle Abbas for practising usury (18).

Quite naturally, a radically new financial doctrine of this nature could have disastrous effects on a community based on commerce - forcing those involved to choose between making a commercial profit or obeying the economic teachings of a religious prophet.

Indeed, one of the main reasons why the Prophet Muhammad was forced to move his headquarters from Mecca to Medina in 622, according to early sources, was that the fundamental principles of his new religion - in particular its ban on interest-bearing transactions - posed a direct threat to the entrepreneurial operations of the Umayyads, the mercantile elite. cut off from Mecca. Faced with reprisals, Mohammed wisely chose a more fertile soil for his preaching (19).

However, with the victory of Islam over the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula in the following decade, the economically conflicting problem of usury would once again come to the fore. Indeed, the threat it posed to trade - the cornerstone of the Meccan community - was so important that a serious effort was made to find a rational basis for engaging in profitable commercial transactions in an efficient and legal manner.

Such efforts included attempts by leading Muslim jurists to draw a subtle distinction between 'commercial gain' and interest-bearing 'capital gain'. To this end, they argued that not all productive financial gain was absolutely forbidden by Islam - that the religion in fact authorised their "increase through trade" even though it prohibited the granting of a capital loan to a debtor.

Moreover, such dichotomies, though rationalised, soon led to two significant ancillary economic developments in the embryonic Islamic community which, over time, would acquire monumental pragmatic ideological and commercial importance. These were (20):

- The evolution of a great deal of "creative exegesis" on the part of Muslim jurists to legally conceptualise the formation of a lawful commercial entrepreneurship capable of pooling collective capital to more profitably finance large-scale, long-distance economic ventures; and
- The resulting devolution of most bank lending functions to the Jews, who literally took the authorisation granted to them in Deuteronomy from the Torah :

You shall not lend to your brother at interest: neither interest on money, nor interest on food, nor interest on anything that earns interest. To a foreigner you shall lend interest. (Deuteronomy 23:19-20)

These successive developments are at the heart of the analyses that follow.

B. Entrepreneurial mechanisms for raising capital

As the preceding analysis makes clear, the first Muslim merchants were deeply motivated by the desire to generate a profit (tahsil al-ribh) in their quest for productive trade. The

The 11th century Muslim scholar al-Ghazali succinctly captured this financial motivation, stating (21) :

Commerce is the pursuit of profit through buying and selling, not through crafts and industry.

His contemporary al-Sarakhsi makes a similar statement (22):

Profits can only be achieved through trade, whether local or long-distance.

But medieval Islamic trade, whether it crossed international borders or took place within the domain of the Dar al-Islam, required major capital investment in order to cover the costs of the initial purchase of the goods, sometimes at distant locations - and then to store them in inventory and/or ship them for later repurchase, hopefully at a profit.

So meeting the market demands of the huge global business empire described in chapter The evolution of Islamic trade required a complex, highly sophisticated system of business credit services that could be readily used by merchants engaged in that trade. Indeed, the jurist al-Sarakhsi identified commercial lending as a quintessential imperative of trade characterized by a certain professional collegiality (23) :

Obtaining a loan so that it can be used in trade is one of the reciprocal aspects of trade from which the merchant cannot escape. [...] He who does not grant loans so that they can be used by others will not obtain them when he needs them.

But in some cases, even with the benefit of such a group loan, no solo entrepreneur could finance a particularly large-scale business from his personal assets. immediate. In such a case, new entrepreneurial structures were then created. necessary to enable merchants to combine financial resources in a common speculative venture; or alternatively, to enable their own capital to grow in the hands of others, thereby pooling immediate risks in anticipation of future profits.

Due to the growing demand for huge amounts of capital to finance initiatives businessmen from the Dar al-Islam, it soon became imperative that they should that wealthy non-marketers with surplus capital are also being offered the right to participate in a form of capitalisation that promises mercantile entrepreneurship.

Thus, from the end of the 8th century, this demand for efficient entrepreneurial fiduciary instruments to enable the aggregation of investment capital that could be used to finance a This major commercial venture led to the writing of a number of complex and creative exegetical works by Muslim jurists now generically entitled "kutub al-hiyal wa-al- makharij" (Books of Tricks and Circumventions).

Promulgated in the Islamic empire by the then-dominant Hanafi legal school, these theses were particular exercises in legal sophistry by which the promulgators sought to create legal circumventions of certain practices which, on the surface, seemed to violate their prohibition of any interest-bearing transaction. The Islamic law specialist Joseph Schacht defines these arrangements as follows (24):

In short, they can be described as the use of legal means to achieve 'extra-legal' ends - ends that could not have been achieved directly with means provided by the shariah, whether or not such ends were in themselves unlawful. Such "legal devices" enabled people who would otherwise have had to break the law, or under the pressure of circumstances would then have had to act against its articles, to achieve the desired result while still in accordance with the law.

Thus hiyal (tricks) were, as their name suggests, legalistic accommodations - legal techniques designed specifically to enable the legalisation of certain capital lending practices - or similar bartering arrangements that resulted in an individual's increased possession of a given commodity - whereby these practices were not interest-bearing commercial transactions.

Although there were, at times, various permutations in their individual methodologies, collectively, such 'jurisprudential accommodations' were generically classified as muamalat, meaning simply 'transactions' - that is, practices derived, in a tradition attributed to the prophet Mohammed by Ibn Ishaq, according to which (25) :

Sell gold for gold, from hand to hand, at an equal rate according to weight, because any inequality in relation to weight is usury.

Such a condition, of course, was subject to a great deal of creative exegesis by early Muslim jurists. Some argued that the sale of gold for silver at an unequal rate was permissible. Others claimed that any amount of dirham could be exchanged for a dinar, although this view was not universally accepted. Claiming that a bushel of apples could be exchanged for two bushels of oranges, but not for two bushels of apples, a Muslim jurist contemporary with the formative era of Islamic economic doctrine claimed that (26):

There is a way to avoid usury. For example, Zayd sells Amr a bushel of flour in exchange for something else, while Amr sells Zayd two bushels of flour in exchange for something else.

When the goods exchanged for the flour have little value and are given in payment for the flour, there is no wear and tear because the goods exchanged are not identical in kind or weight.

It is the same as when two goods of the same kind but of different weight are bartered as borrowed goods, or when the party handing over a larger amount than he originally received gives up the excess amount as a "free gift" - always provided that these different transactions are not subject to a special agreement to circumvent the law.

There were also other creative permutations of the 'double exchange contract' (bayatayn fi al- bayah), several of which, such as the mukhatarah, as well as the mudarabah contract, are described in the appendix The early evolution of the 'Mudarabah' and 'Mukhatarah' contracts. With them, through For example, while a financier clearly couldn't lend ten cows and get twelve cows in return, his loan could, in fact, be rewarded with the 'value equivalent' of twelve cows in horses, chickens, camels or other key commodities.

Indeed, over time, this 'double exchange' mechanism would frequently become nothing more than a numeraire - an artificial indicator of the money specified in written contracts, notwithstanding that no exchange of goods actually took place. Witness the fact that although a merchant could contractually lend ten cows to be repaid later with eight horses,

For example, he would in fact lend the equivalent in money of ten cows, to be repaid later once again in an equivalent in a specific currency, of eight horses equal in value to twelve cows.

Thus, although a commercial exchange in money had de facto taken place, because the contract had been denominated in two separate goods, the formal prohibition of usury had been legally circumvented. It is mainly the misinterpretation of the intention of such contracts - confusing a fictitious exchange of goods to disguise what was in reality a capital transaction - that has led some scholars to claim that the economy of the medieval Near East (and also of Europe medieval period) was dominated by a trading system characterised by barter.

Among the most important legal works describing such commercial techniques are The most frequently misappropriated were the Kitab al-Makharij fi al-Hiyal (27) by al-Shaybani (d. 843) and the Kitab al-Hiyal wa al-Makharij (28) by al-Khassaf (9th century). The chapter on 'association' in al-Shaybani's legal compendium Kitab al-Asl (29), parts of al-Kasani's Badai al-Sanai fi Tartib al-Sharai (30) (d. 1191) and al-Muwatta (31) by Malik b. Anas (d. 795) deal with similar problems concerning interest, which were extended to the problems of commercial credit at the same time.

Above all these various works in importance, however, is the Kitab al-Mabsut by Shams al-Din al-Sarakhsi (d. 1090), a decisive Hanafi work in Islamic business jurisprudence. (32). For as subsequent analysis proves, there is little about the need for an entrepreneurial structure or a circumvention of the prohibition of interest in medieval Islam that this extensive and detailed exegesis neither anticipates nor remedies. Making licit credit one of the main objectives of his attention, al-Sarakhsi thus argues for user-friendly credit in transactions commercial (33) :

We believe that selling on credit is part of merchant practice, and that it is the quickest way for merchants to achieve their profit targets. Generally speaking, profit can only be achieved by selling on credit and not in cash.

A proof that selling on credit is a sine qua non of trade is found in His (Allah's) statement that: "unless it is a local trade that you conduct among yourselves."
This statement shows that trade can also take place over long distances, and there can be no transaction for this way of trading except by selling on credit.

Al-Sarakhsi also stresses several times that there is a greater profit to be made from such credit transactions than from those carried out in cash. For example (34):

An item is sold on credit at a higher price than it would be if sold for cash.

Al-Shaybani, in turn, presents one of the first business formulas for selling on credit by defining the various advantages of the principle of creating bilateral commercial credit partnerships (35) :

They become partners in all aspects, acquisitions and skills of a total investment partnership. They may buy or sell in cash or on credit at their discretion. Their capital is of a definite value, and whatever is in their possession belongs equally to them all. Whatever benefit Allah bestows on them must be shared equally among them, and whatever loss they suffer must be shared equally among them.

Islamic sources from the Middle Ages thus leave little doubt that through their careful structuring of commercial partnerships, Arab entrepreneurs were indeed able to engage in creative "term lending" operations using legal devices specifically designed to finance commercial transactions in accordance with the principles of their religion.

In fact, it was the great vitality of such approved "capital companies" that would generate the enormous commercial expansion that Muslim merchants would promote. This study will now move on to an in-depth analysis of the operations of these commercial entities.

C. Commercial partnerships and companies

Muslims in the 7th century were not the first to discuss the need to establish more efficient business structures to provide capital and credit to finance enterprises. commercial partnerships. The various commercial partnerships that prevailed in ancient Mesopotamia, the tappatu, the Greco-Roman maritime loan *societas maris*, the Byzantine *chreokoinomia* and the Jewish *isqa* all also represented the first efforts to tackle the critical issue of financing a company's business.

future mercantile transactions, an economic imperative that emerged in Antiquity and continued into the Middle Ages (36).

Merchants in ancient Greece, for example, were involved in commercial transactions. international trade almost exclusively by long-distance shipping - requiring large sums of capital to finance the cost of ships, freighters and operations on long commercial voyages. Because when they were at sea, they were at great risk from storms, reefs and piracy. To cope with these constant challenges, the risks were distributed in different ways. Ownership of a boat or the cost of a voyage, for example, could be divided into shares, each owned by a separate person.

In commercial journeys, at least two parties were usually involved - one engaged in marketing and the other, or others, providing finance. While the merchant ran a risk to his physical safety, the investors also ran a risk to their capital. If the journey failed because the ship sank or was seized, the financial investment was lost.

If successful, they received their 'maritime loan' in return, either at a high rate of interest or with a predetermined share of the profit. Thus the constant virtues of these early attempts at commercial capitalism were that not only did they offer capital when commercial money supply was inadequate, but they also 'mutualised the risk' of capital committed to risky entrepreneurship (37).

Arabic sources from the Middle Ages, as described in the appendix The early evolution of the 'Mudarabah' and 'Mukhatarah' contracts, provide important evidence that by the advent of Islam, merchants in Mecca had also created similar useful credit mechanisms to facilitate the conduct of their long-distance trade. Al-Tabari and Ibn Sad, by example, frequently refer to various distributions of capital allocated to merchants and investors in the commercial centre of Mecca (mal muttafariq fi tujjar ahl Makkah) (38).

The technical financial terms qirad ('commercial loan') and istiqrad ('raising a commercial loan') also often appear in conjunction with commercial transactions, frequently with an indication that the resulting profits were to be shared equally (qirad ala al-nisf) between the merchant and the investors (39).

It seems that the Caliph Omar b. al-Khattab even attempted a creative 'public sector solution' to contemporary commercial credit needs by endorsing a state-sponsored system of interest-free loans. Several sources indicate, for example, that when his sons invested the tax revenues entrusted to them to be paid into the state treasury through a private commercial transaction involving the sale of goods purchased in Iraq, the caliph decided that their transaction was in fact a 'capital loan' (qurud); and allowed them to keep half of the
The remaining half is paid to the State (40).

It seems, however, that these early efforts to "delegate" the commercial credit function as they may have occurred during the reign of Caliph Omar ended with him - for after his death the sources no longer refer to any attempt to use such indirect public sector credit mechanisms.

On the other hand, useful credit arrangements in the private sector continued to evolve. Among the forms of business organisation authorised by Islam and employed by merchants
Since the advent of the Dar al-Islam, Muslims have been involved in rudimentary "commission-based business" relationships and simple partnerships, as well as the more complex joint-stock companies (qirad/mudarabah).

Because the various schools of Islamic jurisprudence sometimes disagreed about which of these different kinds of entrepreneurial organisations were actually lawful and what specific forms they should take, attempts were made to reconcile or synthesise the various concepts of a given school into particular prototypes for specific analytical purposes.
became an arduous undertaking.

The most comprehensive body of commercial case law available for this study is that of the "Hanafi school", chosen here for analytical purposes. In Hanafi law, partnerships were generally divided into two categories: "ownership partnerships" (sharikat al-milk) and "contractual partnerships" (sharikat al-aqd). The first, property partnerships, were formed specifically for the purpose of establishing property. In their formulation, the 11th century Hanafi jurist Ahmad b. Muhammad states that (42):

There are two types of partnership: an ownership partnership and a contractual partnership. A property partnership occurs when two parties inherit or buy a property together. Neither party can dispose of the other's share without permission.

Al-Sarakhsi further explains that (43):

A property partnership occurs when two parties are in joint possession of a property. [The benefit is shared in proportion to the share of ownership.

In this way Islamic jurisprudence provides specific legal investment mechanisms for speculative real estate and other tangible properties.

The second category of lawful commercial relationships - partnership contracts - is, however, more relevant to the present study of the evolution of medieval commercial capitalism in the Dar al- Islam. Here, at least four types of partnership were permitted:

- Capital partnerships" (sharikat al-amwal), where each partner agrees to invest a certain amount of capital in the form of money as well as skills or labour;

- Working partnerships" (sharikat al-amal), where the common good was made up of joint skills and work;

- credit partnerships" (sharikat al-wujuh), where partners who did not own capital agreed to buy and sell on credit and share future profits; and

- Commenda" companies (mudarabah), the predominant form in which some partners provided financial capital while others provided skills and labour.

According to al-Sarakhsi, each form of business association had to be evidenced by a written contract (44) :

The partnership is a contract that extends over a fixed period, and a clarification document is needed in such a case to resolve disputes. [...] This document is both a guarantee and a means of resolving disputes.

a precaution. It must be drawn up in a legally valid format to avoid recriminations.

It then goes on to detail precise models for such written contracts, specifying formulas for the equitable distribution of profits, expenditure and accounting procedures, and explicit procedures for as to how partnerships should ultimately be dissolved. In various classifications of partnerships, it appears that certain modifications and permutations are permitted. The 'universal' or 'general liability' partnership (*sharikat al-mufawadah*), for example, prescribed absolute equality in capital, contribution, profit and loss. As indicated by al-Quduri, such a partnership occurred when (45):

Two independent individuals with equal wealth and a common religion enter into a partnership. It is entered into with the full "power to be agent" by both parties, each serving as the fundamental "guarantor" for the other. Apart from basic family necessities, all purchases are made in the name of the partnership. Both parties are thus equally liable for any obligation incurred in the name of the partnership.

Al-Sarakhsi explains that the basis of the authority of such a partnership "derives from the 'delegation of authority' (*tafwid*, 'power of attorney') from each partner to the other to act independently with all the capital of the partnership", but that "as far as the profession of trading is concerned, they are like one person" (46). Al-Kasani similarly argues that "although they (the parties) are two distinct individuals, they are only considered as one individual in the commercial sphere" (47).

Islamic jurisprudence also permits certain 'limited liability' partnerships (*sharikat al-inan*). Al-Kasani states that such a partnership can take two basic forms - a "general form" for general trade and a "specific form" when the partners have joined together to sell a specific category of goods or provide a particular type of service (48).

In such a limited liability partnership, all partners do not have to contribute equally or share losses and profits equally. Rather, losses and profits are shared in proportion to their contribution. According to al-Sarakhsi, in this form of partnership, the delegation of agency to a partner to act on behalf of the partnership could be specifically circumscribed (49) :

The power of agents can be limited by certain specifications. If it specifies a certain type of goods, then each partner is not encumbered by goods purchased by its partner other than those specified; and such goods belong exclusively to the buyer. Where as the specified goods, their purchase for resale, whether for cash or on credit, is binding on the other party.

Al-Shaybani, quoting Abu Hanifah, prescribes additional conditions according to which (50):

If two partners in a limited liability partnership agree that the profit and loss are proportional to the investment, this is fully permitted. If one receives a proportionately larger share of the profit than his colleague, this is also permitted. But if one assumes a greater share of the loss than his partner, this is not permitted.

Al-Kasani points out that the sharing structure of the *inan* contract was malleable, explaining that it is strictly determined by the imperatives of the particular business opportunity for which it was created (51). Al-Sarakhsi, in turn, proposes explicit formulas for distributing capital, a proportional profit and loss once the initial capital investment is structured (52) :

To calculate the profit, we determine the value of each party's capital contribution when the partnership is entered into. To allocate the ownership of the goods purchased with the capital of the As a partner, the value of each investment must be determined at the time of purchase. To determine the profit on individual shares, the fundamental value of the investment at the time of distribution is calculated, because the profit cannot be determined until the investment has been deducted.

Another highly utilitarian form of contemporary private entrepreneurial structure was the "working partnership". It is cited in the sources under a wide variety of names: "work" partnership (*sharikat al-amal*); "body" partnership (*sharikat al-abdan*); and "craftsmen" partnership (*sharikat al-sanai*); as well as the partnership of "acceptance" (*sharikat al-taqabbul*), and so on.

The main purpose of the working partnership was to pool not capital but rather specific individual skills to undertake construction work or a craft that could not be carried out effectively or efficiently by a single person. In other words

highly specialised manual skills were invoked when engaging in this particular form of entrepreneurial association in a business contract. Al-Sarakhsi points out that (53) :

A "partnership of acceptance" occurs when two craftsmen form a partnership to do a certain job, such as sewing. It is similarly called a "body partnership" because the parties work with their bodies; and "craft partnership" because craft is their capital.

Extending this equation to crafts and capital, al-Shaybani explains that (54):

If both parties to such a partnership work with their hands, their work must be considered in the same category as dirhams. Consequently, everything that is permitted in a partnership established with dirhams is also permitted in a partnership based on manual labour.

Al-Sarakhsi thus states that profit-seeking investments in labour are as legitimate as those based on capital, asserting (55):

The right to a profit from a partnership arises in some cases from the money and in other cases from the work itself. The latter case is illustrated by the contract in which the investor is entitled to his share of the profit by virtue of his money, and the worker by virtue of his work. [...]

Therefore, if a partnership between two individuals through money is valid, then such a contract is also valid on the basis of the investment of labour. For the right to a profit is equally guaranteed by either of the two forms of investment.

Another useful form of business organisation permitted by Islam, as mentioned, was the 'credit partnership' (sharikat al-wujuh). The important merit of this form of entrepreneurial association lay in its ability to facilitate trade by capitalising on the acquisition of wholesale goods which could then be resold in retail. All partners participated equally, and the partnership could be formed without any initial capital investment on their part. Al-Sarakhsi says of its usefulness that (56):

Credit partnerships are also known as "bankrupt partnerships" because they occur when two individuals form a partnership without any capital in order to be able to buy on credit and then sell their assets. resell.

It is also known as an "appearance partnership" (sharikat al-wujuh) because the initial capital of the parties consists solely of their good reputation, since credit is only granted to those with a good reputation.

Al-Kasani similarly confirms that the primary objective of the "credit partnership" was not to invest capital, but rather to create it - referring to it as "a production procedure". capital with the aim of either accumulating it or increasing it" (57) :

We consider that a cash partnership is permitted in order to facilitate the accumulation of capital. As for labour and credit partnerships, their main purpose is not to increase capital but rather to create capital itself. This is because the need for an initial creation of capital precedes the need to increase it.

So, if the ultimate goal of commercial capitalism is indeed the 'increase of capital', then the motivations behind Islamic credit partnerships in the Middle Ages can, almost by definition, retrospectively be described as 'capitalist'.

Finally, Islam also authorised the mudarabah contract. This flexible financial instrument did not define a partnership per se but rather formal business entrepreneurship in a quasi-modern sense. In it, one party provided the capital and the other the labour. Profits were then divided between the parties according to the specific terms of the written contract establishing the entrepreneurial relationship.

It was therefore de facto a 'profit-sharing' enterprise, with dividends distributed in proportion to the capital and labour provided by the individual participants. It was this mudarabah, as a later analysis will show, that came closest to the commenda contract, which was then used to great effect by Western merchants during the Renaissance. of Western Europe in the late Middle Ages (11th-13th centuries).

There were two forms of mudarabah contract - the 'mudarabah proper', which involved 'trust funding' and the musharikah, which used 'participant funding'. In the 'mudarabah proper', the capital holder (rabb al-mal) provided the funds while the 'workforce' (al-mudarrib) provided both the management of the business and the labour.

The investor of the capital then received a predetermined share of the profits, if any, and assumed all losses incurred, except those resulting from breach of contract or negligence on the part of the mudarrib, which were then assumed by the mudarrib (58).

The musharikah, on the other hand, was a form of joint venture established for a specific period of time in which both parties provided the capital, and one or both managed the business. The Profits were shared according to ratios predetermined by the contract, but losses, if any, were assumed in proportion to the total capital invested.

Thus, a fundamental difference between the "mudarabah proper" and its musharikah variant was that while in the former the losses of capital and money were borne only by one party, the investor of the capital, in the latter the losses of capital and money were borne by all parties. As a testament to their usefulness, the sources present documentary evidence that both business structures were widely used in the halcyon days of the supremacy of medieval Islamic trade (59).

Al-Sarakhsi asserts that the mudarabah contract appeared in direct response to a contemporary market demand (60) :

The mudarabah is allowed because there is a popular demand for it. For the possessor of capital may not have the means to engage in profitable trade, and those who can engage in it may not possess capital. However, profit can only be achieved by combining capital and commerce. With this contract, both objectives are achieved.

Although al-Dimashqi (61) and al-Ghazali (62) cite mudarabah contracts as the principal means to carry out commercial transactions in their time of the 10th-11th centuries, it seems that a first version of these was already widely used before the appearance of Islam. Indeed, according to a commonly quoted prophetic tradition (63) :

The "Messenger of God", blessings and peace be upon him, was sent at a time when people commonly used mudarabah contracts in their commercial affairs, and he confirmed them in this practice.

As the appendix The Early Evolution of "Mudarabah" and "Mukhatarah" Contracts demonstrates, in fact, many individuals close to the Prophet Muhammad, including his wife Khadijah, are reputed to have employed such entrepreneurial structures in order to capitalize their commercial affairs (64). The caliphs Omar and Otman, as well as the prophet's uncle Abbas b. Abd al-Muttalib, from whom the Abbasid dynasty takes its name, were also parties to such contracts. (65).

Hanafi jurists made considerable efforts to define the multifaceted legal parameters of the mudarabah contract as a cash investment mechanism. Al-Shaybani, who cites Abu Hanifah as his authority, emphasises its capital structure by stating that it could only operate on the basis of cash (66) :

You cannot have a mudarabah without using dinars and dirhams. It cannot be formed with anything other than these, including any other object that can be measured or weighed or any kind of merchandise. It may only be formed with dinars and dirhams.

Another unique feature of the mudarabah contract, from the Hanafi point of view, was that the merchant was explicitly designated as the fiduciary agent of the investing capitalist. For one of its main characteristics, explains al-Shaybani, was that the financier completely separated himself from his investment (67) :

A mudarabah is only valid if the investor hands over his money to the agent - and if the agent is free to trade with the money without the investor having stipulated that he must coordinate with him.

He adds, in defining the fiduciary responsibilities of the agent, that (68) :

Anything he acquires with such mudarabah capital belongs to the investor, except that if there is an increase in value, the agent is entitled to a share of the increase in proportion to his profit.

Under this fiduciary authorisation, the merchant acting as fiduciary agent was given *carte blanche* to engage in a wide and flexible range of commercial activities.

including :

- Buying and selling all kinds of goods;
- Buying and selling for cash or on credit ;
- Combining entrepreneurial capital with your own;
- Involvement in other partnerships or contracts with third parties; and
- Hiring staff capable of carrying out the mudarabah's business.

Al-Sarakhsi specifies that the agent was only forbidden to lend the capital of an investor to another commercial enterprise (69) :

If an investor says to his agent: "deal with the investment as you see fit", then he can clearly do all of these things except repossession. This is because the investor has granted the agent full discretionary rights in relation to the capital invested, with the intention of including everything that is familiar to the usual practices of merchants.

The agent thus has the right to become involved in the mudarabah of another partnership and to integrate its capital with his own, as this is the practice of merchants.

Al-Dimashqi, in turn, explained that such an agent should not be held liable for any financial loss resulting from force majeure or any other natural determinant of the market (70) :

The agent is not obliged to compensate the investor for any accidental financial loss as it does not exceed the commercial jurisdiction specified in the contract.

Indeed, it is only in the case where the agent had engaged in transactions rendered unprofitable due to his own incompetence, according to al-Shaybani and al-Sarakhsi, that an investor could intervene to force the agent to sell the consigned goods in order to recover his capital (71).

But al-Sarakhsi also points out that even in such a case, this guarantee was designed to protect both parties - in that an agent could be compelled to sell only that part of the inventory that would be necessary to repay the financier's original investment and his share of the profit. This reservation was mandatory because (72) :

Profit is an inherent right and an agent cannot be forced to sell his personal assets just to satisfy his partner's objectives. For just as it is necessary to compensate an investor for a loss, it is also necessary to compensate the agent for his share. In this way, the capital interests of both parties are fairly distributed.

In theory, there were three lawful uses for mudarabah contracts:

- To invest capital ;
- To trade in goods; and
- For production (manufacturing) companies.

In practice, however, they appear to have been used mainly to finance commercial ventures - in other words, to generate profits from trading by exploiting differences in the price of goods. Some Muslim jurists in the Middle Ages were even of the opinion that its use in production companies was openly forbidden.

Maliki and Shafii jurists, in particular, rejected any "productive investment" application of mudarabah, arguing that since the agent would be engaged in production, traditionally paid at a fixed wage rate, profits and losses should be borne solely by the investor (73).

The Hanafi jurist al-Sarakhsi, however, believed that there were in fact lawful procedures for producers to circumvent this prohibition simply by engaging in the sale as well as the manufacture of goods (74) :

If the investor asks his agent to use his capital to buy hides and skins - and make boots, belt buckles and bags out of them - this is all part of the practice of profit-seeking merchants and is permitted by the mudarabah contract.

Hence, from this point of view, the mudarabah could, in fact, be legally used in production operations - but only if the producer of the good was also its distributor.

Mudarabah contracts were thus supported by a vast body of financial law defined by the religion. As in the case of contractual partnerships, Muslim jurists specified that these more complex forms of entrepreneurship also had to be set down in writing and made explicit. In their intention - with al-Shaybani even providing a written format for such 'contract wording' (75). Not only were methods for equitably sharing profits to be clearly described (76), it stipulates, but the procedures for expenditure and reimbursement (77), the responsibilities and obligations of the agent (78) and the termination of the contract (79) also had to be precisely specified.

In short, "entrepreneurial credit" - as will be demonstrated by a real-life application under the Fatimid dynasty in the chapter on The perfection of "commercial capitalism" in Fatimid Egypt - is a form of credit that can be used to finance a wide range of projects.

It played a key role in facilitating trade in the economic world of medieval Islam. It financed the commercial activities of those who lacked sufficient funds to set up independently.

It also provided a means for wealthy non-merchants to invest their surplus capital productively. It also enabled "trade by proxy" - providing the means for merchants to complete transactions at times when their funds might be insufficient and/or intended to operate in regions where transporting large sums of money might otherwise be risky.

To achieve these objectives, the entrepreneurial structures prescribed by Islamic law were extremely versatile administrative mechanisms. Because by using credit as a type of As a valid form of commercial investment, the various forms of entrepreneurial associations set up by Muslim merchants in the Middle Ages served as a means of both financing business ventures and promoting trade. and to exploit the capabilities of those who had commercial skills but lacked capital.

The consummate success of the Islamic Empire's vast global trading initiatives, described in detail in The Industrial Foundations of Early Arab Trade, was in fact due in large part to the great versatility offered to its merchants by their shariah - the corpus juris of its theocratic governance - which allowed for visionary entrepreneurial financial instruments that became a powerful driving force behind its remarkable economic dynamism.

D. The bank and ancillary fiduciary instruments

Muslim merchants in the Middle Ages were also supported by a wide variety of auxiliary financial tools, now considered "modern", which facilitated their vast commercial expansion immensely.

Among them, references are commonly made in contemporary Arab sources to the "bank draft" or "letter of credit" (suftajah), the "bond" (khatt), the "transfer of credit" (hawalah), the "bank deposit" (ibdaah/wadiah), the "promissory note" (ruqah), as well as various forms of "bank draft" or "letter of credit" (suftajah). chèques bancaires" (khatt/tawqi/sakk) (80). Several modern specialists have even claimed that the French and English terms "chèque" and "check" derive from their Arabic equivalent: shakk or sakk (81).

What is irrefutable, however, is that although the first Muslims did not invent the Since there is evidence that cheques were used in Greece, Rome, Egypt and the Levant long before the Arab conquests of the 7th century, it is certain that cheques were used to transfer ownership of capital from the earliest days of Islam.

Ibn Abd al-Hakam states, for example, that the second caliph, Omar b. al-Khattab (d. 644), paid the grain delivered to his state warehouses by cheque (82). He also indicates that this sovereign paid government salaries with cheques prepared by his treasurer, Zayd b. Thabit, which were written

on papyrus and certified on their reverse by a seal (83) - and that this practice continued until the time of the Umayyads (84). Indeed, the contemporary use of such cheques in business Ibn Abd al-Hakam claims that taxes to the government were also commonly paid in this way (85).

For such a cheque to be valid, sources indicate that it had to be co-signed by at least two witnesses (86). Indeed, by the 8th-9th centuries it seems that cheques had become a common feature of everyday economic life - since bankers cashed cheques for a fee of one dirham for each dinar of value. Depending on the current rate of exchange, however, this fee could amount to ten percent or more (87).

The actual transactional range of such financial instruments also seems to have been impressive. The 10th-century geographer Ibn Hawqal claims to have witnessed sales of first-hand goods in North Africa that were paid for by cheques from a Sijilmasah banking institution. One of these cheques was for the considerable sum of 42,000 dinars (88).

The 11th-century Persian geographer Nasir-i Khusraw describes a similar contemporary use of cheques in Aswan in southern Egypt; and further relates that in the middle of that century most commercial transactions in al-Basrah were then negotiated by cheque (89). The city of al-Basrah, in fact, seems to have been fairly well known for its bankers at this time - who are even said to have routinely cashed cheques from oriental banks, called hundis, referring to merchants from the Far East (90).

The 'transfer of credit' (hawalah) was also a very flexible monetary instrument. Often used in conjunction with the mudarabah, the medieval Muslim investor could employ it as a debt transfer mechanism as well as a credit documentation tool - using it to allow an agent to collect a loan payment from one of his debtors, then immediately commit the sum to a mudarabah investment, thereby creating a contract.
hybrid debt/credit business.

Al-Shaybani explains that a commercial agent could legitimately use such a document because it was part of "a conventional commercial practice" - and it also appears to have been a "conventional commercial practice".
a highly effective instrument for facilitating capital flows in international commercial transactions (91).

The "letter of credit" (suftajah) was similarly a financial instrument commonly used not only in conventional private commercial transactions, but also to transfer money from one country to another. public sector funds. Sources suggest that because of this flexibility, they were widely used.

They could be issued in Mecca or Medina, for example, and then cashed in a distant city such as al-Basrah or al-Kufah - and because they were certified, and recognised as valid only when officially signed and stamped by the issuer, they were readily negotiable instruments of credit that could be used to carry out transactions in distant places (92).

Muslim merchants in the Middle Ages seem to have used safatij not only as a means of transport, but also as a means of communication.

letters of credit, but also as a very useful spending credit facility, in the same way that travellers' cheques are used today (93).

There are indications that they were also useful tools in the "public sector" of the financial diplomacy. In 926, for example, the Abbasid provincial government of Egypt is said to have sent emissaries to Baghdad to hand over the tax revenue in the form of three letters of credit (safatij) amounting to 147,000, 80,000 and 400,000 dinars respectively.

Sources also indicate that the later Ikhshidid administration in Egypt transmitted also received his tax revenues in Baghdad in this way (94). Similarly, there are documents to the effect that in 928 the Abbasid tax authorities received 900,000 dirhams of revenue from their Persian provinces through such letters of credit from local banks (95).

The use of these various financial instruments by Muslims in the early Middle Ages was at the same time supported by a vast network of "money changers" (sarraf/sayarifah) located in the major urban areas who, over time, came to constitute a rudimentary banking industry. These money changers, it seems, financed commercial transactions using their capital - and simultaneously accepted bank deposits, granted short-term loans, and issued letters of credit to finance key commercial activities (96).

Although interest was forbidden on such loans by the fundamental principles of Islam, various artificial pricing methods, such as the mukhatarah contract, described in the appendix T h e early development of the "Mudarabah" and "Mukhatarah" contracts nevertheless enabled bankers to

merchants running small businesses to make substantial profits from such transactions (97).

["This contract was [...] a 'double sale contract' involving goods as well as cash [...].

Shortly after the Prophet Muhammad's ban on usury, it seems, this contract was widely used to borrow capital without an interest-bearing transaction. Its operating principle was rudimentary. If a person proposed to take out a loan of 800 dirhams to be repaid within a year at a rate of 1000 dirhams, the repayment of the loan would result in an increase in capital and would thus contravene the prohibition of usury.

de jure to the religious prescription.

But if the lender sold the borrower a camel for 1,000 dirhams, secured by a promissory note requiring payment within a year - and then immediately repurchased the camel for 800 dirhams in cash - this double transaction was considered legal while fulfilling the objectives of both parties.

The borrower received his 800 dirhams. The camel's owner recovered his animal, and was now due to receive full repayment of the 800 dirhams of its purchase price, as well as a premium of 200 dirhams in the year. But he had not lent at interest. He had only "bought and sold".
" (98)]

Some are also said to have been involved in arbitrage activities - buying and selling precious metals and other valuable commodities in order to increase their financial returns (99).

At the same time, a more formal banking industry developed during the formative years of the Dar al-Islam - due to the increasing demand for credit brought about by its very rapid commercial expansion, the function of "money-changer" (sarraf) would evolve, over time, into a banker (jhabdh) in his own right. It seems that such bankers were not only involved in financing private sector economic enterprises, but also in granting "tax anticipation notes" to the government - advancing large sums of money to pay for ongoing bureaucratic expenditure, the repayment of which was guaranteed by privileges on the future tax revenues (100).

In order to administer these financial functions and to collect various ad valorem taxes levied on bankers' assets (mal al-jahbadhah) - as well as to supervise the activities of private banks in general - the Abbasid government created a central state banking agency in 928, known as the diwan al-jahbadhah (101). Indeed, following the vigorous expansion of

As a result of the commercial boom that accompanied the advent of Islam, banks rapidly proliferated in his empire in a variety of entrepreneurial forms. According to Nair-i Khusraw, in 1052 there were more than 200 banks engaged in both financing commercial activities and trading in ingots of precious metals in Isfahan alone (102).

Al-Basrah, as mentioned, was also a major financial centre, and because many of its bankers were Jewish, its main banking quarter was known as the "Jewish Quarter (al- Yahudiyah)" (103).

On an even larger commercial scale, "al-Awn Street", in the centre of the Abbasid imperial capital, Baghdad, now seems almost literally to have become the "Wall Street of the Middle Ages", with numerous bank branches and bureaux de change located on its premises (104).

Indeed, because the Jewish religion endorsed interest-bearing loans to foreigners, and because Muslims were allowed to pay interest but not to collect it, this synergy of mutual financial interest soon led to the emergence of several major Jewish banking institutions in the Medieval Near East.

For example, in describing contemporary financial communities in Egypt and Syria around 985, the geographer al-Muqaddasi states that most contemporary bankers were Jewish (105). Two individuals in particular, Yusuf b. Finhas and Harun b. Umran, whom medieval Arabic sources repeatedly refer to as "the two Jewish bankers" (al-jahbadhan al-yahudiyan), were of great financial importance at the Baghdad court of the Abbasid caliph al-Muqtadir (106).

As testimony to their great prestige, they bore the imposing title of "official court bankers" (jahbidhat al-hadrat) (107). The sources provide evidence, in fact, that not only were these two financiers engaged in facilitating the government's economic transactions, but that they also granted loans to senior government officials that extended up to the level of the prime minister and the caliph (108).

Such bankers, it seems, not only operated in the public sector, but also granted credit to private entrepreneurs. Indeed, one of their main functions would have been to provide "letters of credit" (safatij) to merchants. They also appear to have been deeply involved in granting private loans and accepting bank deposits - as well as performing many other key fiduciary functions associated with modern banking.

It is therefore to the analysis of the subsequent development and deployment on the ground of these comprehensive financial systems in the new economic superpower of the medieval Near East, Fatimid Egypt, that this study now turns (109).

Gene W. Heck, Charlemagne, Muhammad, and the Arab Roots of Capitalism, Walter de Gruyter, 2006, chapter 3.

- (i) Neue Brüsseller Zeitung, 23 January 1848, in Heinrich von Srbik, Metternich, 1925, II, p. 275.
- (ii) Julius Evola, Révolte contre le monde moderne, part two, chapter 15, note 4.
- (iii) See Werner Sombart, Les Juifs et la vie économique.
- (iv) Subhi Y. Labib, Capitalism in Medieval Islam, The Journal of Economic History, vol. 29, n° 1, 1969, p. 94.
- (v) On communism, see <https://elementsdeducationraciale.wordpress.com/2012/09/30/les-racines-asiatiques-du-mondialisme/>.
- (vi) http://www.vedegylet.hu/fejkrit/szvggyujt/schmidt_frenchCapitalism.pdf.
- (vii) <http://www.ilmattino.it/PRIMOPIANO/CRONACA/bancomat-pagamento-obbligatorio/notizie/771737.shtml>.

(1) On this subject, see J. Schacht, 1964, pp. 134-143.

(2) See al-Tirmidhi, 1875, vol. 1, p. 145; Zayd b. Ali, 1919, nos. 539, 544.

(3) Al-Shaybani, 1938, p. 14.

- (4) See al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, 1894, vol. 1, pp.193 ff.
- (5) Cf. al-Tirmidhi, 1875, 12:4; Ibn Majah, 1895, 12:1 ("tijarah"); al-Darimi, 1919, 18:8; Ahmad b. Hanbal, 1895, vol. 3, p. 466; al-Tayalisi, 1894, vol. 2, pp. 193 ff.
- (6) Al-Dimashqi, 1977, p. 45.
- (7) Al-Dimashqi, 1977, pp. 80-82.
- (8) Ibn Khaldun, 1978, chapter 5:9, pp. 394-395.
- (9) See al-Muttaqi al-Hindi, 1894, vol. 1, pp. 193 ff.
- (10) Al-Dimashqi, 1977, pp. 49, 71.
- (11) Al-Jahiz, 1935, p. 8.
- (12) Ibn Taymiyah, 1961-1966, vol. 8, p. 583, vol. 29, pp. 523-525.
- (13) Ibn Khaldun, 1978, chapters 5:14, p.398 and 5:15, p. 399.
- (14) Ibn Khaldun, 1978, chapter 5:2, p. 383.
- (15) On this subject, see C. C. Torrey, 1892, *passim*.
- (16) Ibn Hisham, 1858, p. 821; M. Watt, 1956, p. 297.
- (17) Ibn Sad 1904-1927, vol. 1, pt. 2, p. 25; M. Watt, 1956, p.297.
- (18) Al-Shawkani, 1979, vol. 1, p. 299.
- (19) On this subject, see M. Watt, 1974a, pp. 58 ff; P. Hitti, 1970, p. 113.
- (20) Deuteronomy, 23:10; see also M. Rodinson, 1978, pp. 37-38; L. Massignon, 1931, pp.3-12.
- (21) Al-Ghazali, 1889, vol. 2, p. 221.
- (22) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 2, p. 75.
- (23) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, pp. 180-181.
- (24) J. Schacht, 1955, p.78.
- (25) Ibn Ishaq, 1955, no. 759, p. 512; M. Grice-Hutchinson, 1978, pp. 24 ff. The latter (p. 26) states that :

The most complicated hiyal normally consisted of several transactions between the parties, each of which was perfectly legal, and the combined effect of which produced the desired result. Each transaction was recorded in a separate document.

The binding documents, together with an unofficial accompanying document that set out the real relationship between the parties and the true purpose of the contract, were then placed in the hands of a trusted intermediary. Such an accompanying document was called *muwatta* ('agreement').

- (26) M. al-Hilli, 1839, p. 170; see also Malik B. Anas, 1985, pp. 452 ff. for further examples.
- (27) Al-Shaybani, 1930, *passim*.
- (28) Al-Khassaf, 1923, *passim*.
- (29) Al-Shaybani, n.d., *passim*.
- (30) Al-Kasani, 1910, *passim*.
- (31) Malik b. Anas, 1985, *passim*.
- (32) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, *passim*.
- (33) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, pp. 180-181, citing the Qur'an (2:282) as the basis of his argument.
- (34) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 48.
- (35) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fols. 61, 66; see al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 177.
- (36) A. Udovitch, 1962, pp. 119 ff; R. S. Lopez, 1966, p. 141; *idem*, 1986, pp. 160 ff; G. Artuse, 1913, *passim*.
- (37) On this subject, see H. Heaton, 1948, p. 32.
- (38) Al-Tabari, 1879-1901, vol. 1, pp. 1339, 1586-1587; Ibn Sad, 1904-1927, vol. 1, pt. 2, pp. 770-771; See also al-Waqidi, 1855-1856, p. 181.
- (39) See al-Waqidi, 1855-1856, p. 21; Ibn Hisham, 1859-1860, pp. 469-470; C. C. Torrey, 1892, p. 7.
- (40) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p.18; Malik b. Anas, 1951, vol. 2, p.88; M. Hamidullah, 1961, p. 35.
- (41) For an excellent description of some of these entrepreneurial forms, see A. Udovitch, 1970b, *passim*; A. A. al-Duri, 1974, pp. 127 ff.
- (42) Al-Quduri, 1901, p. 53.
- (43) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 151.
- (44) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 155.
- (45) Al-Quduri, 1901, p. 53; see also A. A. al-Duri, 1974, pp. 127-128.

- (46) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, pp. 74, 152.
- (47) Al-Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, p. 73; see also al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 74.
- (48) Al-Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, p. 62.
- (49) Al-Sarakhsi 1986, vol. 11, pp. 173-174; see also al-Quduri, 1901, p. 53.
- (50) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 61.
- (51) Al-Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, pp. 69-70.
- (52) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 165.
- (53) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 152.
- (54) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 76; see also al-Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, p. 64.
- (55) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 1, p. 155.
- (56) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 11, p. 152; see also A. A. al-Duri, 1974, p. 128.
- (57) Al-Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, pp. 57-58 ("tariq istinma al-mal aw tahsilihi").
- (58) Pakistani and Gulf Economist, Karachi, 22 December 1984, p. 12.
- (59) See previous note.
- (60) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 19; see also al-Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, p. 79; A. A. al-Duri, 1974, pp. 130-131.
- (61) Al-Dimashqi, 1977, pp. 33-39, 75.
- (62) Al-Ghazali, 1957, vol. 2, p. 66.
- (63) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, pp.18-19.
- (64) Al-Nawawi, 1955, vol. 2, p. 309; al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 42; al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 18.
- (65) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 42 (A and B); al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 18; Ibn Sad, 1904-1927, vol. 2, pt. 1, p.41; al-Zurqani, n.d., vol. 3, p. 345.
- (66) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 43A.
- (67) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 96.
- (68) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 175B.
- (69) Al-Sarakhsi 1986, vol. 22, pp.39-40; see also al-Shaybani, n.d., fols. 57A, 64, 109B, A; al- Kasani, 1910, vol. 6, p.78.

- (70) Al-Dimashqi, 1977, pp. 33-39, 75.
- (71) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 83A; al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 127.
- (72) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 72.
- (73) A. Udovitch, 1970c, p.186.
- (74) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, p. 54.
- (75) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 140B.
- (76) See al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, pp.27, 54-55, 105-106; al-Shaybani, n.d., fols. 45A, 46A, 47, 70, 112.
- (77) Al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, pp. 62-64, 67; al-Shaybani, n.d., fols. 76, 77A, 80B, 81A.
- (78) See al-Sarakhsi, 1986, vol. 22, pp. 55, 71, 169; al-Shaybani, n.d., fols. 71, 74A, 82, 161, 162B, 168B; al-Dimashqi, 1977, pp. 33-39, 75.
- (79) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fols. 134B, 135A.
- (80) On the medieval Islamic use of these financial instruments, see Ibn Hawqal, 1938, p. 99; al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 63B; J. Schacht, 1964, pp. 148 ff; R. Grasshof 1899a, pp. 70 ff; E. A. Ashtor, 1986, p. 555; idem, 1976, p. 145.
- (81) E. A. Ashtor, 1986, p. 555.
- (82) Ibn Abd al-Hakam, 1922, p. 166; see also A. A. al-Duri, 1974, p. 170, citing al-Yaqubi; V. Fisk, 1931, pp. 10 ff.
- (83) Ibn Abd al-Hakam, 1922, p. 223; see also al-Tanu khi, 1921-1931, vol. 1, pp. 90-93, 103, vol. 2, p. 680; al-Sabi, 1904, pp. 93 ff.
- (84) Ibn Abd al-Hakam, 1961, p. 223.
- (85) Ibn Abd al-Hakam, 1961, p. 244.
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- (87) W. Fischel, 1968, p. 21; A. Lieber, 1968, p.233.
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- (89) Nasir-i Khusraw, 1881, p. 64.
- (90) See S. B. Samadi, 1955, p. 245; R. Grasshof 1899a, *passim*.
- (91) Al-Shaybani, n.d., fol. 63B.

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- (97) Al-Isfahani, 1927-1974, vol. 13, p. 223; al-Zubayri, 1953, p. 304.
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- (99) See Malik b. Anas 1905, vol. 8, p. 430.
- (100) On this subject, see Yaqut, 1907, pp.385, 399; al-Tanukhi, 1921-1931, vol. 8, pp.23-24, 57; al-Sabi, 1904, pp. 10-11, 79; Miskawayh 1920-1921, vol. 1, p.158; see also A. A. al-Duri, 1974, pp. 157 ff. ; W. Fischel, 1968, pp. 2 ff; *idem*, 1933, pp. 581 ff.
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- (103) On this subject, see Miskawayh, 1920-1921, pp. 247-248; al-Tanu khi, 1921-1931, vol. 1, p. 204 ; Yaqut, 1907, vol. 1, p. 399; W. Fischel, 1933, p. 351; E. A. Ashtor 1976, p. 145; B. Lewis 1966, p.91.
- (104) Al-Muqaddasi, 1906, p. 183. See also al-Jahshiyari, 1926, pp. 33, 79-80, 124, 158, 306-307; Miskawayh, 1920-1921, pp. 44, 66, 79-80, 112, 128; al-Tanukhi, 1921-1931, vol. 2, pp. 81 ff; Yaqut, 1907, vol. 1, pp. 74, 91; W. Fischel, 1933, p. 345.
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- (107) Al-Jahshiyari, 1926, pp. 80, 124; Miskawayh 1920-1921, p. 128; al-Tanukhi, 1921-1931, vol. 2, pp. 80-81, 84-85.
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- (109) See al-Jahshiyari, 1926, p. 81; Miskawayh, 1920-1921, pp. 44, 66, 164, 213, 220, 229, 329; al-Tanukhi, 1921-1931, vol. 2, pp. 82-85; Ibn Sad, 1904-1927, vol. 4, p. 5.

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