

EUROPEAN IDEOLOGY



DRAGOŠ KALAJIĆ

BERSERKER

BOOKS



Dragoř Kalajić

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Introduction

Our research was prompted by a single question posed in the face of the last historical movement towards the unification of European states: *is the European Union truly European?*

It may be superfluous to point out that this question also expresses a fundamental doubt, fuelled by a long series of conspicuous gaps in the official projects, agreements and definitions of the alliance of a growing number of states, beginning with the persistent omission of even a mere mention of the content of its fundamental adjective, to the also chronic lack of immediate statements on the ultimate or essential goals of unification, that is, on the purposes of establishing the common market.

In the Preamble to the *Treaty on European Union*, the "*need to establish a solid foundation for the construction of the Europe of the future*" is highlighted, but neither the nature of this foundation, nor the reason for the "*construction*", nor a single feature of the "*Europe of the future*" is set out. This is followed by the vague or ambiguous expression of a '*desire*' on the part of the signatories of the act to '*deepen the solidarity of their peoples, with respect for their history, culture and their tradition*'. If this is indeed a matter of an undertaking to '*deepen the solidarity*' of the European nations, which, among other things, are constituted precisely by '*their histories, cultures and their traditions*' - then the stated commitment to '*respect*' is entirely superfluous. It is not, however, superfluous, but rather rhetorical smoke and mirrors, if the ideal of '*solidarity*' in that statement of intent actually conceals the very opposite, which threaten the historical achievements, cultures and traditions of European nations.

Therefore, Gunter Maschke is right to point out the greatest ambiguity, which, as a complete contradiction, characterises the views of contemporaries on the goals of European unification: "*Duo quum faciunt idem - non est idem. If two men speak to each other about European unity, it will seem to them that they are of the same opinion. In fact, one will want the unity of Europe as a stage towards world unity, sealed by the uniforming socialisation of humanity, brought about by technology and the economy, two factors that make every politics superfluous. The other interlocutor, by contrast, will want a Europe united in such a way as to halt all universalist tendencies towards world unification and the destruction of all existing differences between nations and cultures. Europe needs to unite, but in order to fended off; she will have to forge a new political identity that will quickly enable her to distinguish friend from foe in a new way.*" (Maschke, 1995)

By all accounts, on the construction site of *the European Union*, proponents of European unification are overwhelmingly and constantly in the ascendancy as a mere '*stage towards world unity*', that is, towards a world market without borders, as if the economy, and particularly trade, constitute the supreme goal and meaning of human existence and not merely a mere means of human life. Here, however, the means in question is the posturing of a globalist pseudo-empire, called '*One World*'. The official self-proclamations of *the European Union*, as well as the statements of intent by its chief architects – from Jean Monnet to Jacques Delors – largely attest to a general and enduring aspiration to create a '*Single Market*'. The only fundamental difference between the '*founding father*' of the unification movement, Jean Monnet, and his most effective successor, Jacques Delors, lies in the realm of rhetoric. The former was much more cautious and reticent, operating from the shadows and creating the impression that *the 'common market'* was merely a cunning and the shortest path to a fully-fledged and high degree of union. The latter openly stated that the "*single Eraste*" was the main goal and purpose of the unification enterprise. Thus, for example, in

In the preface to *Completing the Internal Market*, he openly sets out the outcomes of creating the "Single Market":

The unification of the market of 320 million consumers requires that Member States accept the removal of every kind of barrier, in order to ensure that the market becomes flexible and allows the movement of human, material and financial resources to zones of greater economic advantage."

It does not take a great intellect to read into the aforementioned statement of intent, first and foremost, a major threat to the zones of lesser economic viability. It is, above all, a death sentence for the sovereignty of the member states and their respective economic policies, which are so deprived of the power to direct national resources towards their own well-being and to prevent their drain towards foreign 'zones of greater economic viability'. From the standpoint of the ideal of European unification, this would be a principled acceptable sacrifice if it were to strengthen the defences of the economy and the sovereignty of the common state-in-the-making. Unfortunately, the dismantling of the defences of national economies and the sovereignty of member states is not accompanied by the strengthening of common protective barriers and the establishment of federal sovereignty. On the contrary, all these sacrifices only accelerate the dissolution of *the European Union's* member states into a 'global market', under constant, blackmailing and threatening pressure from the Washington-based, pseudo-imperialist and anti-European strategy. Thus, *the European Union* is losing its external and internal defences piece by piece, enabling the outflow of its 'human, material and financial resources' towards non-European 'zones of greater economic profitability'. Even more devastating are the gradual but irreversible reductions in protections for domains of vital importance, such as food and agriculture. For instance, if in this domain *the European Union* meets all the demands of the Washington strategists, it will be left without its farming class and its corresponding cultural traditions, and without its own sources of food—in other words, without food self-sufficiency and unconditional security. Europeans will become blackmailable dependents of the industries producing genetically modified, 'Frankenfood'.

Nor was the first draft of its constitutional charter, offered only in 2003 after several decades of being without a constitution, any more specific regarding the meaning of *the European Union*, which is a clear testament to the fact that it is a political *provisorium*. Instead of clear definitions, the preamble to this act offers only failed, quasi-poetic substitutes, from the supposed decision (of the peoples of Europe, who were never actually consulted) to "*forge a common destiny*" to the conviction that Europe "*united in its diversities offers them the best possibilities to continue - with mutual respect for rights and an awareness of their responsibility towards future generations and the Earth - the great adventure that makes it a privileged space for human hope.*"

Observed gaps where ideological and legal, the spiritual and constructive foundations of the common home of Europeans - enable and cause numerous and diverse disagreements and conflicts among the entrepreneurs regarding the form and purpose, the floor plan and the speed of construction, and above all the 'house rules', that is, the rules of co-existence and co-decision, which greatly slows down and even jeopardises the entire undertaking. Generalising these disagreements, we arrive at the fundamental contradiction between the defenders of *the status quo* and the proponents of enabling *the European Union* to act as a sovereign, independent and

an invaluable force in the arena of the world. The forces that resist the growth of power and advocate for the maintenance of *the status quo*—that is, for a *union* deprived of essential autonomy and real decision-making capabilities—do not even hide their vassal-like submission to the wills or whims of the Atlantic Leviathan. These are the conscious or unconscious advocates of Europe's subjugation to a 'new world order', that is, to the forces of political *mondialism*, economic *globalism* and social *multiculturalism*, which together constitute the final, agonising avatar of Anglo-American, Atlantic colonialism and liberal capitalism.

In light of the fact that '*the new world order*' is being imposed and virtualised mainly by the force of the conquering and parasitic dreams and aspirations of the American plutocracy – which extorts ever-greater concessions from the world and from *the European Union* – one gains the firm impression that the dismantling and destruction of the remnants of sovereignty and identity of Europe- states and nations does not lead to the establishment of a common and higher economic, let alone political, organism, but to their reduction to the level of provinces of the American pseudo-empire.

However, given that *the European Union* is formally or ideally designated by an adjective derived from an implicit but not better defined concept (or idea) of Europe - any assessment of its manifestations and its possibilities, projects and performances, primarily requires the possession of a cognitive-value criterion, based on the presumed characteristics of Europeans in the world's historical-political arena. Thus, for epistemic progress, the aforementioned questioning of *the European Union* requires an answer to the fundamental question: do the peoples of Europe possess common characteristics in the political domain, and the corresponding needs and wills that can define, devise, and direct their movements towards unification? In summary, the question is: what is the European political identity on the world stage?

It is necessary to point out that *the Council of Europe* has devoted great but unsuccessful scholarly attention to the question posed.

a meeting in Strasbourg in April 2001. Instead of everyone, Ann-Marie Tijs, head of the relevant research at *the National Centre for Scientific Research*, explained the gravity of the task. "*The concept of a European identity is something none of us at this moment can define. But this should not discourage us today, for those who, two centuries ago, began to build national identities did not know, as we do today, what the results of their undertaking would be, an undertaking that occupied several subsequent generations.* (Politika, 20 April 2001)

DIMENSIONS OF THE OF EUROPE

The task of discerning European unity was undertaken, with groups of diverse experts, ideological and political proponents of European unification – from Arnold Toynbee and Denis de Rougemont, to Robert Schuman and Alcide De Gasperi – at the Round Table of *the Council of Europe*, in the Aldobrandini Palace in Rome, in 1953. Judging by a confession of disappointment from Denis de Rougemont, that gathering was marked by an almost universal indifference towards the existence of elements of European unity:

Most of those 'Europeans', although they supported the Union and were tasked with examining what I consider its most robust period – our shared cultural heritage – were in fact preoccupied with multiplying reservations and those dubious limitations, and warnings against the mysticism of unification... At that gathering, each group of experts declared that unification—undoubtedly desirable in other domains—had no reason to exist in theirs, and that the proposed measures were either premature or too late. Finally, someone asked in astonishment whether the very concept of European culture corresponds to reality, or if it is merely a slogan by some overzealous scholar." (De Rougemont, 1960)

With the intellectual acuity inherent to the school of elegant wit of French Classicism, De Rougemont proclaimed the failure of the said endeavour a success by the sheer force of the conclusion that it was precisely the scepticism towards the existence of a European cultural community that proved its reality:

Nothing is more European than these doubts and this scepticism, this habit of questioning things, of avoiding banalities and of emphasising differences. Nothing is more typical of a civilisation which has not developed the parallel ideas of originality and national character by chance, whose most brilliant minds have always harboured a kind of passion for differentiation, to the point that they have considered their differences sought their essential goal and were always ready to disregard what is common, what is accepted by all, that is, to repeat anything superfluously."

It may be superfluous to point out that the aforementioned quip cannot aid our inquiry, as it describes only one psychological or characterological trait of the **forma mentis** of prominent examples of the European human type. That trait is, at best, one of the expressions of his individual psychology, which does not provide us with broader insights into the multidimensional wholeness of the European being and the corresponding concept of *the European*. Although we are not informed as to what epistemological frameworks or methods the experts who denied any basis for European unification were using, we can assume from experience that this is an error inherent in overly short-term perspectives. Even in the eyes of members of a family, mutual differences usually appear so great as to obscure their view of what they have in common, especially over the perspective of several generations. On the other hand, any European who has lived far from Europe, where white people are a minority, for example in African or Asian lands-noms, has surely had the opportunity to observe in the societies of fair-skinned peoples how their national differences are overshadowed by a general feeling of European solidarity and of belonging to a unique supra-nation and matrix. That unique matrix was beautifully intuited by the poet Rainer Maria Rilke, through the vision of his ancestor, Christian von Rilke, and his military company in the service of the last form of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation, in the desolation of the Pannonian Plain, on the military road of liberating the European fatherland from Islamic invaders, in the year 1663:

"Then they are all close to one another, these gentlemen who come from France and Burgundy, from the Netherlands, from the valleys of Carinthia, from the castles of Bohemia and from the Emperor Leopold. For what one of them tells, the others have experienced, and in exactly the same way. As if there were only one mother." (Rilke, 1979)

After all, in foreign lands, the natives are able to see the unique qualities of the members of different European nations. This was lucidly observed by Denis de Rougemont in his polemic against those who deny the existence of a community called *Europe* or *the European*.

"Europe? Never heard of it!' ... *When Sartre, after Fanon, rubs his hands with pleasure because the Angolans massacred Europeans as soon as they spotted them' - you applaud him without noticing that he has just destroyed your liberty: they know very well who a European is.*" (De Rougemont, 1989)

"Who is Europe?"

The fact that the primary adjective of our subject is derived from the name of one of the continents points to the first step of the epistemic intention towards a geographical framework. In the series of definitions of the *European*, the geographical is certainly the weakest, allowing too much freedom for abuses and even for the questioning of the meaning of the political unity of European nations.

A good example of the possibility presented is provided by one of Bismarck's ironic remarks, written in the margin of a letter addressed to him by the Russian minister Gorchakov, in November 1876. To Gorchakov's serious and well-founded pointed out that the "*Eastern Question*" was in fact the "*European Question*", Bismarck replies: "*Qui parle Europe a tort. Notion géographique!*" Then in English: "*Who is Europe?*" As the historian Chabod rightly observed, the expression "*notion géographique*" Bismarck probably borrowed from Metternich, who more than half a century earlier had defined Italy as a mere '*geographical expression*', thereby seeking to render meaningless and disenfranchise any attempt by the Italian people to establish themselves as a political nation. (Chabod, 1967)

If all that is *European* and *Europe* are reducible exclusively to the framework of a '*geographical concept*', or if they originate solely from it, then any quest for their higher content and meanings is objectless and meaningless. The particular plight of the concept of '*Europe*' within the construction of the *European Union* is evidenced by the arbitrary and contradictory uses of its geographical meaning as the fundamental criterion for admission to such a union. For instance, from the position of Chancellor of a re-unified Germany, Helmut Kohl argued for the *EU's* principled closure to the Russian idea of a '*common European home*', and for Russia's accession being ruled out by the fact that it largely extends into Asia, concluding that it was therefore an Asian and not a European state. Such a literally earthly conception of the *European* did not prevent, and does not prevent, the same policy from advocating for the admission of Turkey to the *European Union*, using precisely the geographical criterion, or rather the excuse that this country, by a tiny fraction of its territory, also extends into Europe.

It is worth pointing out here that this is the shameful remainder of the spoils from the conquering campaigns of the Islamic, or rather Ottoman, pseudo-empire against Europe, but also a monument to the British and subsequently Anglo-American anti-European strategy, to which many European states blindly submitted, from participation in the centuries-long siege of Russia and the Crimean War, through the persistent support for the '*sick man of the Bosphorus*' and his parasitic rule over the Balkan peoples and the cradle of European civilisation, to supporting a series of geo-political inventions against the unity of Europe, such as the '*sanitary cordon*' and the '*iron curtain*', to a share in the aggression of the Atlantic forces against the Republika Srpska and Serbia and Montenegro.

On the particular, self-contained weakness of the geographical criterion for defining the framework of phenomena
of the *European phenomenon* also points to the light-toned narrative, which testifies to the mutability of the conception of the map,

that is, the border of the world or continent called *Europe*. For instance, the first Hellenic mentions of *Europe*, in a geographical sense, indicate that this toponym was used to denote only a narrow region north of the Aegean Sea. Already in the lexicon of the first Ionian geographer, Anaximander, the meaning of *Europe* encompassed all the territories north of the Mediterranean Sea, but not Hellas. Noting that "no one has yet explained whether *Europe* is surrounded by sea from the east and the north," Herodotus confesses that he does not understand why people see the single world landmass as three-part, with the three names, *Europe*, *Asia* and *Libya*. (*History*, IV, 45). For Aristotle and his contemporaries, Hellas was also an independent geographical world, situated between *Europe*, *Asia* and *Libya*, or *Africa*.

In the worldview of the ancient Greeks and Romans, the eastern and northern boundaries of *Europe* were open, or rather undefined, disappearing into the mists of legendary or mythical spaces, such as *Hyperborea*, to which, according to Pindar, renowned among poets, "mortals cannot reach, either by sea or by land. That ancient image is much closer to the world of supreme, that is to say, metaphysical truths, than are the most complete maps of *Europe* by modern cartographers. Defining the eastern border of *Europe* by the Ural Mountains is a more recent and entirely arbitrary convention, for that mountain range does not separate anything significantly different.

Therefore, the great geographer of the ancient world, Strabo, despite the scarcity of optics and knowledge at his disposal and the corresponding errors, was able to discern more deeply than many of today's *Euro-nationalists* how the different properties of European nations require unification to become harmonious parts of an ideal whole:

"Europe must be regarded as the foremost, for it possesses a great diversity of forms, being by nature better endowed with worthy people and political regimes, and because it has distributed the world's inherent goods... All of Europe's plains enjoy a temperate climate and are by nature predisposed to such a way of life: in a well-endowed country everything tends towards peace, whereas in a poor one everything leads to war and manly courage. But nations can point out their respective advantages to one another: some offer the aid of their arms, whilst others their produce, their technical knowledge, their moral education... Therefore, in war as in peace, Europe cannot be more self-sufficient: it possesses inexhaustible supplies of people for fighting, for cultivating the land and for administering its cities." (*Geography*, 11.4)

It is precisely the geographical definition of a continent that, indirectly but most convincingly, refutes any justification for excluding *Russia* from the European circle: among continents, *Europe* is an exception because it does not possess the geophysical properties that such a size demands. From this geographical standpoint, *Europe* is merely a peninsula of *Asia*, although it is in this very place that the geometric centre of the land hemisphere is located, serving as *the* geophysical counterpart to the historical and cultural-civilisational 'centrality' of Europeans. *Europe* acquired the status of a continent and this so-called 'centrality' primarily thanks to the metageographical properties that Europeans have created with their thoughts and deeds, their undertakings and exploits, for better or for worse.

This was well observed and most concisely expressed, with military simplicity, by the German general and geopolitician Heinrich Jordis von Lohausen:

"Europe is not an ordinary continent, in the same sense as Africa, Australia or Antarctica. It is a work of Europeans, not a gift of nature. Europe is not a plain, nor is it beyond the Urals, but precisely where it is defended"

Europe is defended by all its sons and daughters in the diaspora across other continents, who preserve and develop the heritage brought from their homelands, the language and its fruits, its fecundity, worldviews and

the customs, memories and hopes of the communities from which they originate. A truly European policy – the kind we can only aspire to for now – cannot and must not forget them and leave them to be absorbed into alien worlds and vanish, but must instead build transoceanic and intercontinental bridges of solidarity towards them and create the conditions for their return. The quest for *the European* cannot be confined to one space: Europe is the motherland whose diaspora is of planetary proportions.

" 's glory is imperishable"

If we take General von Lohausen's observation that Europe is where it is defended, *in the strictest sense*, then it directs us to seek expressions of European self-awareness, throughout history, primarily in the places of Europe's defence and its confrontations with the enemy and his challenges to its conquest. The application of Smith's definition of the *political*, or the *friend-enemy* criterion, is particularly recommended by the fact that the first known written record of the noun '*European*' originated on the battlefield of Poitiers, in 732, where united Germanic, Romance and Celtic forces – under the leadership of the uncrowned king Charles, henceforth called the Hammer – halted the advance of an Arab army at least twice their size. In that age, a Spanish monk, known only by the name of Isidore, describing that battle in his chronicle, used the word *Europeans* (*Europenses*) several times to highlight the victors: "*Emerging from the gorge, the Europeans found themselves before the drawn-up chateaux of the Arabs...*" (*Chronicon*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, *Autores Antiqui*, XI.2) According to the *Historia Longobardorum* of Paul the Deacon, the Europeans at Poitiers lost only one thousand and five hundred fighters, while the enemy left three hundred and seventy-five thousand souls on the battlefield, and the caliph Abd-ar-Rahman himself was killed in the rout. The figures cited are probably exaggerated, but one thing is certain: the onslaught of the Arab-Muslim masses threatened to penetrate deeply and perhaps overwhelm Europe, completely changing the gene pool and destiny of Europeans, permanently suppressing their **forma mentis** and Arabising their consciousness and soul. In other words, had the Arabs and not the Europeans been victorious at Poitiers, "*the Koran would today be taught at Oxford / from its pulpits to the circumcised people, the sanctity and truth of the revelation of Muhammad would be shown.*" (Gibbon, 1973)

However, as a continuation of policy by other, or rather, ultimate means, war by its internal and its internal and external fires usually cast into the shade many very significant, even political, contents and the driving forces of opposing powers, showing us, on the field of Mars, alongside the spectacles of war-craft, mainly the elemental impulses and forces, the psychological or characterological differences of the combatants. To discern something more through the fires and dust of war, we need the testimonies of very keen-eyed observers or extraordinarily inspired poets, such as Homer, who observed that at Troy, conflicting completely opposing cultures and the different gravitational forces of human gatherings—mechanical and spiritual—expressed and corresponding to the respective styles of combat:

"When the armies were all marshalled in their ranks, / the Trojans stood up and, shouting, rushed like birds; / as flocks of cranes are wont to wheel under the sky / when from the winter they flee the strong, unceasing north-winds / and fly southwards into the realm of the oceanic

water.../In silence they set to the fight, the Achaeans, burning with wrath, their hearts yearning eagerly to aid one another.
"(Iliad, III, 1, 1-9)

This pan-Indo-European (or, more precisely, Euro-Aryan) style of combat was maintained through the centuries and millennia, as attested to and clarified by the *Veles Book* of the northern Slavs, revealing to us the upright, religious dimension of the agon: "The gods will grant us eternal glory and nothing will stop us /from fighting like lions, each for the other, and / heeding our prince. And Perun / will remain with us until victory." From the treasury of national heritage, which contains multiple layers of poetic tradition but also crystallises historical memory, the creator of *I/jjadeja* revealed the age-old memory of the conflict between the Euro-Aryan conquerors of the Peloponnese and the shores of Asia Minor and the indigenous peoples.

This conflict is represented as the battle between the Achaeans and the Trojans, whose mutual differences—from physical and characterological to cultural and ideological—are perfectly matched with those revealed by historical and philological research into the traces of the conquering campaigns of Euro-Aryan warrior bands on the cities of the Mediterranean *melting-pot-A*. For example, when describing the appearance of the Achaean heroes, 'god-like' and 'tower-breakers', Homer very often emphasises that they are 'fair-haired' and 'blue-eyed'. Such almost obligatory adjectives for the epiced Achaians are, however, entirely absent from descriptions of the Trojan heroes, which leads us to the indirect conclusion that they belonged to the Melesian type of man, created by racial mixtures in the Mediterranean and, above all, the Near Eastern melting pot, attested by the dark-haired and dark-eyed figures from the frescoes of the palace at Knossos, from the Late Minoan period. This *melting pot*, or rather the multicultural composition of the Trojan army – as an embodiment of indigenous society and civilisation – is also expressed in the 'Babylonian' mixture of languages:

And the Trojans, like sheep in some cavernous pen /where they stand countless when their white milk is milked, /bleat just the same when they hear the lambs' soft bleating: /so the Trojan throng roared throughout the wide army, /for their speech was not alike in sound, /their tongue was a mixture, from many different lands." (IV.4, 433-438).

Such differences prompt the messenger of the gods, favourable to the Trojans, to advise through the mouth of Polites the most suitable battle formation: "Priam has many allies in the city, /and they speak in various tongues from scattered peoples; /let each command those whom he rules, /let him lead them into battle, arranging his citizens in order." (II, 9, 803-806).

The fundamental differences between the conflicting worldviews are expressed perfectly succinctly through the mutual addressings of Glaucus and Diomedes on the battlefield. Glaucus, the embodiment of the self-confident *ethos* of Euro-Aryan conquerors and the corresponding doctrine of genetic and *karmic* determinations of human differences, from the Olympian heights of a feeling of unity between gods and men in the same order of battle for the preservation of the Order, equally despising all that is merely human and transient, shouts to Diomedes, cruelly and proudly:

"Who ^{am} you, my darling, what sort of mortal man are you? /That maiden had not yet crossed the field in battle, in heroic fame, /I saw not, for she came far before the other fighters /with her boldness, when she reached my long-shafted spear: /the sons of hapless Ijidi meet my strength!" (V, 3, 123-127).

Diomedes, a worthy representative of the indigenous, "matrilineal" culture, responds with a beautiful metaphor that most succinctly expresses the essence of the religiosity of the Mother Earth cults, the belief in transience

of all things and phenomena, in the relentlessness of the 'circle of necessity', that is, in man's irredeemable subjection to the ceaseless flux of becoming and passing away:

Why, son of Tideo, O hero, do you ask me of my lineage? / As the leaves in the forest, so is the human tribe: / the wind scatters some leaves across the earth, others / the bountiful forest bears when spring's bright season dawns. / So it is with men: some grow up, others vanish." (VI,3,145-149)

Among the Hellenic heirs of Homer's legacy, it was Isocrates who most profoundly perceived the historical content of the *Iliad*, recognising in the war between the Achaeans and the Trojans the decisive opposition between *Asia* and *Europe*: "We judge correctly if we say that Helen was the reason we did not become slaves to the barbarians. Indeed, it was because of her that the Hellenes agreed and undertook a joint expedition against the barbarians, and it was then that Europe, for the first time, raised a trophy over Asia. After that war our race advanced so much that it recovered cities and a great extent of territory from the barbarians." (Praise of Helen, 67-68)

Pointing out the complete lexical and morphological correspondence of Homer's phrase 'imperishable glory' (*kleos aphthiton*) with the Sanskrit expression *śravaś akṣitam*, the great Serbian philologist and Hellenist Milan Budimir points out that epic art is much older than the appearance of the Achaeans in the Peloponnese and the Ari in India: "It belongs to a pan-Indo-European military aristocracy, whose name is mentioned in the 14th century BCE in the Caucasus, in written documents, and has been preserved among the Adriatic Slavs until the 11th century (CE)." (Budimir, 1965) This is just one of the multitude of historical facts which, in the perspective of understanding the peculiarities of the political being of the European, testify that his origins are much further or deeper than the horizons of ancient Athens, Rome, and especially Jerusalem.

Perhaps it is not by chance but by an intuition of a higher necessity that European science discovered the unique tree of the Indo-European languages just on the eve of the century of the greatest fratricidal wars, which assumed global proportions, threatening the very biological survival of the European human species. Judging by one of De Maistre's reflections, it was Bayer, in his *Museum Sinicum* of 1730—published in St. Petersburg—who first sensed this higher purpose: "one can never foresee what our works on language are for; but we shall soon see." *It is not without the design of Providence that the languages which, until two centuries ago, were completely unknown in Europe are now accessible to all. We can already conceive of this design; and our sacred task is to cooperate with it by investing all our strength.* (De Maistre, 1971)

Through hostility to f self-knowledge

Viewed in the wider context of the arena of conflict between *Asia* and *Europe*, the Crusades were very belated, cumbersome, sluggish and entirely unsuccessful responses to the challenges of militant Islam whose armies, with strategies of nomadic plunder and parasitism, had for centuries relentlessly ravaged European territories, from Gibraltar to Constantinople, often penetrating deep into the foothills of the Alps, seizing treasures, killing, raping and enslaving 'infidels'.

By all accounts, the Muslim invasions divided Europeans much more deeply than the Christian schism: "The invasion of Islam marked the final separation of East and West, ending the unity of the Mediterranean world. Africa and countries like Spain, which continued to be part of the Western community, began to gravitate towards Baghdad.

The western Mediterranean was turned into a Muslim lake, ceasing to be the route that had favoured trade and the exchange of ideas, as it had always been until then. "(Pirenne, 1937)

Admittedly, Pope Urban II, barely forty years after the great schism, launched the First Crusade from the pulpit of the Council of Clermont, calling on the Catholic world to come to the aid of the endangered Christians of the sister, Orthodox Church. Given that in that age there was an almost complete overlap between the European sphere and the Christian world, we can also interpret this call as one of the first great expressions of European consciousness and solidarity:

It is urgently necessary to provide aid to your brothers from the East, which we have promised so many times and which is now truly essential for them. The Turks and Arabs have attacked them and have penetrated into the territory of the Romans as far as a part of the Mediterranean called 'the Arm of St. George' (the Bosphorus). Advancing into the land of these Christians, they have defeated them seven times, slain and captured them by the thousands, destroyed their churches and laid waste to the empire. If you now allow this without resistance, they will extend their dominion over many faithful servants of God. Therefore I beg and exhort you—not I, but the Lord begs and exhorts you, as the messengers of Christ—the poor as well as the rich, to hasten to drive out this wretched race from the regions inhabited by our brethren and to provide proper assistance to the worshippers of Christ."

Within a century, the Crusades had degenerated into a plutocratic war against Orthodox Europeans. The extent of this hostility is attested to by Ansbert in his chronicle of Frederick Barbarossa's crusade: "*The entire army of Christ strove for the conquest (of Constantinople), and for the siege—if it were to require the might of the devout Roman emperor and the obstinacy of the Byzantine emperor—auxiliary detachments of Serbs and Vlachs, numbering over sixty thousand, were prepared.*" (*Historiae expeditione Friderici imperatoris*, in *Monumenta Germaniae Historica*, *Scriptores rerum Germanicarum*). For the account and money of the Venetian plutocracy and thalassocracy, the Fourth Crusade conquered not only all the geo-economic strongholds of maritime trade in the eastern Mediterranean but also the bulk of the Eastern Empire and Constantinople itself, violated and sacked, burnt and plundered in 1204. Thus, a fatal blow was dealt to Europe's eastern defences against the Asian invader.

The combination of religious exclusivity and the growing greed for power in the maritime and mercantile republics – such as Venice and Genoa – darkened European consciousness and prevented the realisation of the vital importance of the Eastern Empire for the defence of Europe. Thus, not even a poetic soul such as Petrarch's could resist expressing its delight at some new plundering raid by Genoese merchants on the ailing Byzantium, publicly calling on the Council of Genoa to "*eradicate their shameful empire and nest of errors with the punishment already undertaken by the Catholic world.*" In another letter he laments a series of examples of European discord and fratricidal wars but fails to notice that he himself is doing what he condemns by fostering intolerance towards the Greeks and Greece: "*Greece works for herself, reaps for herself, grinds for herself, feeds herself and, chewing badly the food of salvation, has abandoned our dwelling.*" (Petrarch, 1937)

However, the most enlightened spirits – from the Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen to Pope Urban II and Pope Aeneas Silvius Piccolomini – were far above such limitations, imbued with European self-awareness and a corresponding ethos of solidarity. When Constantinople finally fell and under

Turkish onslaught, Pope Enea Silvio Piccolomini – otherwise credited with the renewal and expansion of the European self-awareness and its corresponding ethos of *solidarity* after seven centuries of struggle – was able to perceive the European dimensions of that tragedy and its possible consequences:

Most honourable fathers, most illustrious princes, and you other men noble by birth and doctrine, the fall of Constantinople was a great victory for the Turks, the utter ruin of the Greeks, and the supreme shame of the Latins, which the more noble and virtuous you are—I believe—the more it torments and tears each of you. To tell the truth, let us say that for many centuries Christian society has not suffered a greater disgrace than this. In the past we were struck in Asia and in Africa, that is to say, in foreign lands, but now, right here in Europe, we have been struck in our very faith and put to death. Some say that many years ago the Turks crossed into Greece, the Tatars settled in Europe via Taznai, the Saracens crossed the Herculean Sea, occupying a part of Spain; yet we have never in Europe lost a city or place comparable to Constantinople." (*Epistolarum liber*, CXXX)

Although in the letter in question it is difficult to distinguish between religious and political, or rather European, sentimentality, the latter is certainly present, manifested in the pointing out of the different weight of the same shames if they are suffered 'in *foreign countries* or in Europe. The most pronounced European consciousness was arguably possessed by the defenders of Europe on its south-eastern borders, such as the Moldavian prince Stephen the Great, who, upon ascending the throne a few years after the fall of Constantinople, made it his sacred duty to restore the Eastern Empire. For years, repelling the onslaughts of a vastly larger and stronger Asian power, he vainly sent messages to the Pope and to the European sovereigns, seeking military aid for the common defence of Christian Europe:

Upon learning of the heavy defeat of his army, the pagan Emperor of the Turks decided to take revenge and return, in the month of May, at the head of his army against us, in order to take dominion over Our Land, which is the Gatekeeper of the Christian world and which God has spared. But if this Gatekeeper, which is Our Land, God forbid, should be violated, then the whole Christian world will fall into great danger. Therefore, we ask you to send your commanders, while there is still time, to help us in the fight against the enemies of Christendom. As for us, we pledge, swearing by our Christian faith, that we will resist and fight to the death for the Christian faith. And this you must also do, by sea and by land, so that, with God's help, we may not cut off the enemy's right hand." (Bogdan, 1913, Eliade, 1997)

In vain. Instead of heeding the call to liberate Constantinople together and finally push back the threatening force into its Asian territories, the European sovereigns entered into shameful agreements with the common enemy, waging war amongst themselves. In his final appeal, before his defeat, Stefan the Great warned that "*Christian princes are fighting one another instead of uniting in the fight against the Turks.*" From the Pope, he received only congratulations, apologetic assurances of the Church's destitution and the title *Athleta Christi*, while the money for the relief, somehow collected among the European sovereigns, was not handed over by the King of Hungary but was instead embezzled by him.

The fall of Constantinople and the growing Asian threat were merely a pretext for the Bohemian King George of Podiebrad to create a project of a confederation of new states to strengthen their independence against the German Empire and the Holy See. A draft of the confederation, with a common Assembly and obligations of united defence, was proposed to a "third party": the King of France, Louis XI, and the Doge

Venetian Republic, but without success. The ideological primacy, however, belongs to Pierre Dubois, a lawyer and adviser to King Philip the Fair, who as early as 1305, in 1305, under the pretext of the urgent need to unite European forces for the liberation of Christ's tomb, conceived a federation of European states as an alternative to their conflicts and wars and the dying dualism of the emperor and the pope:

For a sufficient number of people to be brought (to the Holy Land) and to remain there, it will be necessary for the Catholic princes to be at peace with one another and not at war; for once they are there, if they learn that their homelands are attacked and destroyed, they will forsake God's inheritance and return to their own to defend it, as has already happened to many. Therefore it is necessary that all Catholics—at least those who are loyal to the Roman Church—should sign a peace, so as to create a single republic, united in such a firm way that it can no longer be divided." (Dubois, 1956)

Although he was educated at the Parisian cathedrals of the revivers of Aristotelian logic, Saint Thomas Aquinas and Brabantio, Pierre Du Bois did not adopt the proper methods of knowledge and procedures of exposition, and his *De recuperatione Terrae Sanctae*, subtitled *A Treatise on General Politics*, turned out to be a jumble of diverse views and opinions, begun but left unfinished, contradictions and flights of fancy. Such qualities betray a person in whom passion and sentimentality prevail over reason and a sense of proportion. It seems that it was precisely these intellectual flaws and weaknesses that enabled Pierre Du Bois's thought to soar to spectacular heights, far beyond the limitations of his time. As a kind of intellectual medium, Du Bois absorbed, channelled, and expressed the secret, or as yet unseen, movements and impulses of the forces and power dynamics released by the erosion of papal and imperial authority, brought about by a mutually exhausting hostility. Thus, in D'Aubigne's worldview, we see foreshadowings and hints of a series of phenomena and institutions that would only mark the modern civilisation of the West centuries later, from anti-clericalism, that is, the demand that the secular power of the Pope be curtailed, the abolition of celibacy and the confiscation of the property of many monasteries and churches for the benefit of the kings, to a form of feminism, to proposals for the emancipation of the female sex through appropriate educational institutions; from rationalism and support for experimental science to absolutist monarchism and nationalism, and the advocacy of learning national languages. At this point in his analysis of the life and work of Pierre Dubois, the historian Bernard Vouilloux, on behalf of many, poses a question and provides an answer:

"And how, some will say, is it possible that this little Richelieu, this potential Robespierre, can be at the same time both a forerunner (of unification) Europe? We shall answer: precisely because he is a nationalist, De Gaulle is a Europeanist; he is still too opposed to Christianity not to see, at the same time, both that which he celebrates and that which he destroys. A fervent champion of the national cause, he is perfectly aware of what might be objected to him: "What sort of agreement can be reached between these sovereign nations? What brake can check their irrepressible ambitions?" It is precisely because he is a nationalist that De Gaulle feels the necessity of being, at the same time, an internationalist. There is a logic in these facts that should not escape the eye of a clear and ingenious mind. We shall often encounter the same phenomenon with the same internal necessity and sometimes with much less logic" (Voyenne, 1958)

Europe discord

The Asiatic threat spurred many an awakening of European self-awareness, though usually too late and too far from the scene of the great decisions. Thus, Giovanni Carlo Saraceni, in his history of the wars, published in Venice in 1600, on the occasion of the battle of Kosovo, observed that 'Christian discord' was the main cause of the success of the Turkish conquerors: "*9ra battle... ..the beginning of those preposterous conquests which the Turks little by little made in Europe, has its roots in Christian discord; and it is this same discord that later increased their empire, to the borders we see today...*" (Perilo, 1994)

A similar conclusion from historical experience was drawn by the Spanish humanist Juan Luis Vives, in the form of a literary dialogue where his *alter ego* blames the discord among European sovereigns for Europe's defeats:

The discord of Europe, especially that which raged among the princes of Constantinople, delivered Asia into the hands of the Turks and opened the gates of Thrace to them. Then the quarrels between the kings of Europe and the wars that sprang up one after another like the heads of a hydra encouraged the Turks to spread even further across Europe... If the wind should abate a little and if you turn your hatred and your wrath against the Turk, you will at once discover what the temple of the Asiatics is. Adversity will reveal what the unbroken series of successes has concealed and will make it plain that the Turks were not strong through their own strength and courage, but because of our mistakes." (Vives, 1964)

With extraordinary geopolitical instinct, Vives sensed the immense strategic importance of Germany's defence of Europe from the Asiatic onslaught: "*Let us fortify Germany, let us fortify it with citadels and walls, but above all let us act together so that the Turk does not master Germany. Otherwise, there is no hope that the whole of the West will not fall under the power of the Turk, and that those who do not wish to live under his yoke will not emigrate in fleets to the New World. But even there they will not be safe from the attacks of that tyrant, who has been goaded on by the gadfly of greed and ambition. It is true that Europe is very strong, but what purpose does that serve when the Turk possesses the best part of Europe?*"

Vives published his work in 1526, the year the Hungarians suffered a heavy defeat at Mohács and lost their homeland. Five years earlier, Belgrade had fallen, followed by Rhodes, the main stronghold of the Knights of Saint John. Four years later, the first wave of the Asian invasion struck the walls of Vienna, confirming Vives's fears. Yet, in all these and other expressions of European self-awareness, there are no significant answers to our fundamental question, with the exception of the emergence of a yet undefined or unconsciously *European nationalism*. When we turn our gaze from Europe's external defences to its internal, intra-European conflicts and wars, the cognitive task becomes incomparably more difficult. The map of European history is criss-crossed with the trenches of enmity, from the shortest, between ancient city-states, to the longest, between states or interstate alliances, nations and religions. Neither many societies, nor nations, despite the development of social or national consciousness and a sense of unity in shared memories and hopes, have not resisted the temptations of ideological, class or religious strife, succumbing, all too often and even frivolously, to the calls of enemies into civil and fratricidal wars. If statistics and the law of averages were the only indicators, then before the mass of inter-state and

international, inter-religious and civil conflicts and wars on the continent of Europe, one would have to conclude that European disunity is not only a chronic reality but the rule, and unity the exception and an ideal.

There is no doubt that one of the essential, indirect causes of the inexhaustible production of fratricidal conflicts and wars among Europeans, and of the immense destruction and suffering, is precisely the persistent lack of a strong European self-awareness in decision-making centres, as well as the equally lasting absence of a corresponding force of solidarity, capable of repelling, overcoming or at least limiting the temptations and challenges of internal contradictions and hostilities. It is therefore understandable that inter-European wars or threats of war were and remain the key drivers of almost all proposals, ideas and projects for the unification of European states. Thus, instead of an internal and natural impulse towards the union of kindred or similar states, external necessity has, over the course of many centuries, driven many minds to see salvation in some sort of league that would prevent inter-European wars, according to the formula of the famous plan of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre of 1713: *"The proposed European Society can provide all European sovereigns with sufficient security for a lasting peace, both within and beyond their states. Therefore, there will be none among them for whom not signing this Treaty would offer much greater advantage than signing it."* (De Saint-Pierre, 1986).

On the margins of editing the project of the Abbé de Saint-Pierre, Jean-Jacques Rousseau observed how Europeans, by preventing 'particular wars', were provoking the outbreak of 'general, a thousand times more dreadful wars', and by forming mutual alliances were becoming 'enemies of the human race': *"If there exists a means of removing these dangerous contradictions, it is a federal government which, uniting peoples by ties similar to those which unite the Jews, would subject both to the authority of the law."* (Rousseau, 1971) The debasement of the idea of European unification to its lowest common denominator, to a mere vehicle for the variously professed, desperate pacifisms, makes it easy prey for all manner of (mis)uses. For instance, in the mid-19th century, the Italian Masonic revolutionary Carlo Cattaneo yearns for and predicts the rise of nationalisms not so much for the benefit of the nations but for the destruction of the Eastern European empires he detests, and advocates the establishment of the *United States of Europe* and a corresponding peace only so that he might see a "pure American model" transplanted in Europe, that is, the political system of the United States of America: *"The principle of nationality, provoked and exaggerated by military oppression, which tends to destroy the dissolving occidental empire of Eastern Europe and transform it into federations of free peoples. We shall have true peace when we have the United States of Europe."* (Cattaneo, 1945)

It was, in fact, a provincial, belated echo of a certain Americanophilia among the French revolutionaries, who were 'actualising the libertarian principles of the 18th-century philosophers, adapted in the American fashion by English businessmen' (Vovenne, 1953). For the French revolutionaries, the United States of America were a model and an example of the feasibility of these ideas not only on a French but also on a European, and indeed a world, scale, as Lafayette succinctly confessed in a letter from Washington: *"I am a citizen of the eternal Republic. I see the human race as one great family, united by fraternal bonds. We have sown the seeds of liberty and Union which, little by little, will sprout throughout the entire land. One day, on the model of the United States of America, the United States of Europe will be established. The United States will be the legislators of all nations."*

In a series of such (mis)uses, it was inevitable that the ideas of *the United States of Europe* would also be seized upon by the leader of the anti-Russian revolution and ideological forerunner of the globalists, Leon Trotsky. And he, possessed by a secularised pseudo-messianism, seeing the whole world – and not just a piece of some Arab desert – as *the 'promised land'*, openly confessed the plan that the unification of Europe would serve only as *'one stage'* towards the establishment of a world pseudo-empire: *"The formula of a United Soviet State of Europe expresses the idea that socialism is impossible in a single country. It cannot reach its full development within the framework of a single continent's borders. The United Socialist States of Europe represent in themselves a stage of the historical slogan on the road to the World Socialist Federation"*. (Trotsky, 1962)

The Washington strategists of the undeclared war against Europe, the instigators of the process of uniting the Western European states, had a similar purpose in mind for their undertaking: *The European Economic Community* was intended to serve as a means of dismantling national sovereignties and all protections for national economies and markets, so that its member states would become completely and in every domain subject to conditioning and blackmail, starting with their openness to American goods. According to the conception of the Washington strategists, *the European Economic Community* was to be—just like *the European Union*—only *'one stage'* towards *'one world'*, towards a world under the indirect or direct rule of the Atlantic Leviathan, that is, the New York international of financial capital. As early as during the Second World War, Jean Monnet, an agent of the Washington strategy, and the official envoy of the US President Roosevelt and his advisers

— today better known as the unofficial *'founding father of the European Union'*— was tasked with winning over French politicians to establish such a *"European entity"*, which he did with an unheard-of shamelessness, mixing blackmail and promises, threats from the occupying government and assurances that France would be the leading power there. Witness his *'note for reflection'* of 5 August 1943, addressed to *the French Committee of National Liberation*

In a Europe that is liberated but in which Germany and Italy are in ruins, France returns to its position as the foremost continental power. What is more, its eastern past, its democratic traditions, will cause Europe to look to France and expect at least a hope. . Action must be taken immediately. The objectives to be achieved are: to restore or establish a democratic regime in Europe and the economic and political organisation of a 'European entity'. There will be no peace in Europe if states are to be rebuilt on the basis of national sovereignty with all that entails in terms of prestige politics and economic protections. If the countries of Europe are to protect themselves from one another again, the creation of large armies will once again be necessary." (Rieben, H. - Schuman, R. 1990)

General De Gaulle was the only champion who dared to stand up against the Washington project of subordinating Europe, and he steadfastly exposed Monnet's behind-the-scenes work to establish a *Eurocracy*, loyal to transatlantic masters. For example, on 21 December 1951, General de Gaulle publicly rose up against Monnet's invention of the European *'committee of wise men'*: *'What responsibilities do they bear? Who are these public officials, how did they become officials so suddenly, by what merit is unknown, to be elevated above their governments to govern and command? "*

A cynic endowed with irony might conclude that the Europeans fared very well with Jean Monnet. It could have happened that among Roosevelt's advisers, extreme Europhobes like Henry Morgenthau and Felix Frankfurter prevailed, who advocated for the eradication of all of Germany's scientific, technical and economic powers and for total genocide, or rather for *the castration* of the entire population.

"Balance of powers"

According to a very widespread belief, the idea and establishment of *the 'balance of power'* was a centuries-old, dynamic bulwark against inter-European wars which, after the Second World War, took on a global scale and a 'bipolar' form. *"The balance of power"* is certainly one of the most significant and long-lasting political creations of the Europeans, but it does not attest to the peculiarity of the European political being, but only to their skill. By all accounts, the first theoretical definition of this invention was provided by Francesco Guicciardini, describing the foreign policy of Florence under the rule of the Medici:

And knowing (Lorenzo de' Medici) that it would be very dangerous for the Florentine Republic and for himself if any of the greatest rulers were to overstep their authority, he strove by every means to keep affairs in Italy balanced, so that they would not tip one way or the other, and this could not be achieved without preserving peace and without supervision, with the greatest care, every part most minute appearance." (Guicciardini, 1974-1981).

The system of *'balance of power'* assumed European proportions during the reign of Charles V, gaining an ever-increasing number of supporters over time, from Enlightenment and idealist philosophers to the political arena and peace congresses, from Montesquieu and Fichte to the Chancellor von Metternich. Yet Montesquieu was deluded in his assessment of how *all the states of Europe were dependent on one another.*" Noting, however, precisely this lack of such dependence, Johann Fichte recommended *"the balance of power"* as the only available means of achieving peace, in his famous *Addresses to the German Nation*: *"Let no one acquire such power that they can destroy the peace; let everyone know that the opposing side is sufficiently armed for defence as well as for attack; therefore, let a balance be established, a counterbalance between all powers. Only in this way, having exhausted all other means, will everyone remain in what is now theirs and all will be at peace."* Admittedly, Fichte does not consider *the 'balance of power'* the best system of interstate relations in Europe, but only the one that remains after the collapse of the ideal, European Christian ecumenical state: *"Had Christian Europe remained united, as it ought to have remained and as it originally was—it would never have been driven to such an idea; that which is united rests upon its own being and simply maintains itself, not divided into distant powers which have a need to be set in mutual balance. Only when Europe became unjust and divided was that idea of any use to it."*

The opinion on the patent called *'balance of forces'* depends to a great extent on the point of view. For example, Guicciardini's contemporary and friend, Niccolò Machiavelli, without explicitly mentioning it, indirectly blamed a kind of *'balance of power'* (or weakness) in Italy for preventing the state-building unification and liberation of the Italian nation from foreign occupiers. Machiavelli laid all the blame on the Catholic Church *"because although it exercised and held secular power, it was not so powerful, nor so virtuous that it could occupy the rest*

Italy was such that it produced a ruler, and on the other hand was not weak enough for him, out of fear of losing his control over worldly affairs, to call upon some powerful man to defend it against what had become too powerful in Italy... "(Discorsi sopra la prima deca di Tito Livio, I, 11)

The philosopher Konstantin Franz, in the light of his experiences at the Prussian Foreign Ministry, observed how the system of *'balance of power'*, poetically called *the 'European concert of the great powers'*, based on the privileging of sheer force—with complete indifference to the high principles of history, morality and civilisation—produces or conditions processes that lead to the establishment of fatal internal imbalances. The endeavour to maintain *the 'balance'* is in fact an aspiration to increase the two most esteemed powers in this arena of the universe—military and economic—at the expense of all others. Thus, observes Franz, the development of peoples takes place in the Kasama and the Stock Exchange. Furthermore, sooner or later *'the balance'* must be ended, as the outcome of the arms race between the USA and the USSR shows, which exhausted the economic powers of the socialist system, bringing it to collapse, falsifying the outcome of the ideological competition between two models of social organisation.

After all, unlike *the Holy Alliance*, which for decades successfully preserved European peace, the system of *the 'balance of power'* largely produced inter-European wars. A particular cause of this paradox lies in the fact that the foreign policy of *perfidious Albion* took over the management of *the 'balance of power'* as a sub-variant of the *divide-and-conquer* strategy. While the European states and powers, incited by the secret or public inducements of *Albion's underworld*, were 'busy' establishing mutual *'balances'*, Great Britain was conquering the world. She was outside *the 'balance of power'*. According to Kissinger's cynical but candid explanation of Washington's foreign policy, "*empires have no interest in operating within an international system; they tend to be the international system. Empires have no need for a balance of power... Never in their history have the US participated in a balance of power system. Before both world wars, the US profited from the balance of power's operations but never meddled in its intrigues, enjoying the luxury of ultimately punishing them. During the Cold War, the US waged an ideological, political and strategic struggle with the USSR in which the two world powers acted according to principles entirely contrary to those of the balance of power system.*" (Kissinger, 1994).

It is necessary to point out that many signs also point to the pre-rational, psychological causes of the persistent and distinctly anti-European impulses of the British (and subsequently, above all, Washington's) political elite. It is therefore understandable that the great German historian Ludwig Dehio, in seeking to view the failure of British policy towards Germany through a historical retrospective—without even considering its other causes besides the rational ones—had to confess his touching astonishment:

But England ultimately decided to see in Germany its number one enemy, an opponent on a par with sixteenth-century Sparta or fifteenth- to nineteenth-century France, in short, a claimant to hegemony. And it felt threatened as never before in the intimate core of its political power, even though Germany, closed in on itself, did not possess any overseas sphere comparable to that of Spain or France. (Dehio, 1988)

When we assess that British foreign policy is distinctly *'anti-European'*, we have primarily in mind the fact that it has waged secret or public, direct or indirect wars against European states. Whether that policy is, in a deeper sense, anti-European, that is to say, contrary to the very European

political being? It is precisely the criterion I have been searching for that must answer this question. In order to be able to determine who is an essential friend and who is an enemy of Europe, to discern which forces have fought or are fighting, consciously or unconsciously, for or against Europe—we must first possess a criterion for defining *the European*.

When was the European born?

Following the rule of life for spiritual creations – from ideas to styles and artistic forms – we can conclude that the most reliable, the clearest if not the best manifestation of *the European* is revealed in its source. The problem of determining the time of the 'birth of Europe' or 'European society' - to which bolder historians are increasingly devoting themselves - is not as meaningless as it seems to Denis Rousmon, for the attempts to answer such a question at least indirectly illuminate the presumed nature of *the European*, by virtue of corresponding inclinations or idiosyncrasies.

For example, the curriculum of the European University Institute (*Istituto Universitario Europeo*) in Florence betrays a very widespread and prevailing intolerance of the official culture—imbued with liberalism—towards traditional Europe: here, the history of Europe is studied and taught only from the Renaissance and the Reformation onwards. In other words, *Europe* is reduced there to the exclusive history of the predominance of the forces of laicism and secularism, *rationalism* and *positivism*, with the sole concession to Christianity made for the sake of Protestantism, perhaps because of its undeniable merits in the birth of liberal capitalism.

From the *Annales* chair, Marc Bloch argued that '*Europe emerged precisely when the Roman Empire collapsed*', which his successor, Lucien Febvre, reformulated into *the* dynamic 'law of history whereby Europe is always born when its empires collapse.' (Febvre, 2000) Therefore, given the professed ideological intolerance towards any more complete manifestation of Europe in the arena of politics – in the form of a worthy and common state of Europeans – it is futile (or '*politically incorrect*?') to seek *the European* in all higher forms of political community, from the Roman Empire and the Holy Roman-German and Byzantine Empires to the Austro-Hungarian Empire and Tsarist Russia.

The counter-example, the power of overcoming personal ideological biases, is attested to by the Count of Saint-Simon in his famous 1814 project for the unification of European nations. Pointing out that peace cannot be created by peace treaties and congresses, which are as barren as the expectation that the "*social body* will be created by *force of conversation and agreement*", Count de Saint-Simon pays tribute to Charlemagne and the Middle Ages, "*the only epoch in which the system of Europe was founded on its true basis, on a general organisation*":

Charlemagne was the founder of the European Society: Through his extraordinary sword and his profound policy, he became the master of two peoples, the Latin and the barbarian. Having attained such a position, the only one that allows a lawgiver to realise his ideas, he set about organising the European Society: he unified and federalised parts of the two peoples. He made religion a federal bond... Before the end of the 15th century, all the European nations formed a single political body, reconciled

within itself and armed against the enemies of its establishment and its independence. The Roman Catholic faith, professed from one end of Europe to the other, was the passive bond of European Society and its clergy the active bond. Scattered everywhere and everywhere dependent only on itself, a fellow-countryman of all peoples, possessing its own government and its own laws, the clergy was the centre from which radiated the will that gave life to this great body and spurred it to action." (Saint Simon, 1967).

Before the above statement, we shall allow ourselves only one remark: European self-awareness certainly precedes the lauded undertaking of Charlemagne, as is attested by the aforementioned designation of the victor in the Battle of Poitiers as the defender of Europe and Europeans: '*Europenses*!.' Nevertheless, nothing prevents, and a multitude of facts confirms, the belief that Europeans, with a *European consciousness*, existed long before that designation and expression of self-awareness. After all, Europeans with a *European consciousness* certainly existed afterwards, although their common name languished for centuries, unknown, perhaps on the fringes of speech but certainly unrecorded, until it was snatched from the darkness of oblivion and proclaimed, only in the 15th century, by Pope Enea Silvio Piccolomini, also known as Pius II. For existence of some sort, it is not even necessary and appropriate self-awareness.

Besides the expansion of the *European* vocabulary, we also owe to Eneji Silvio Piccolomini the most popular definition of the source of Europe and *the European*, which he recognised in the confluence of values marked by Athens, Rome and Jerusalem, that is, in the marriage of Hellenic thought and Roman statecraft with Christianity. This definition was then passed down through a long succession of generations and through basic education, as some indisputable historical fact, right up to the present day. In the proposed formula, when viewed from a temporal perspective, the striking closure of the horizon at the locations of Athens, Rome and Jerusalem is entirely unfounded and illogical. Understood in the broadest sense of their manifestations, Athens and Rome are neither the first nor the only, but rather considerably late stations on the path of the great march of the Indo-European peoples, from prehistory towards transhistory.

As we can see when exploring the most ancient monuments of the Euro-Aryan worldview – from the essentially philosophical questions and answers of the *Vedic* poets and the Upanishadic exegeses, to Odin's all-seeing visions of the past, future, and the cause of the collapse of the divine powers of cosmogenesis, as well as the source of future rebirth; from the northern, Euro-Aryan house, the archetype of the Hellenic temple and the Gothic cathedral, fashioned after the perceived structure of the cosmos, to the "squaring of the circle" the cosmogram of the Euro-Aryan dwelling-place in the Central Asian stations of their anabases – essential and crucial insights and decisions were acquired and made many centuries earlier on that march, and in other spaces, perhaps already in the circum-Arctic homeland, which has been inspiredly, expertly and irrefutably illuminated for us, with the help of Vedic clues and signposts, Bal Gangadar Tilak (Tilak, 1987).

Jerusalem, however, is but one of the focal points through which the radiance of the fruits of Aryan, or Iranian, thought and tradition has been refracted, through the dust and ashes of collapsed Near Eastern cultures and civilisations, whipped up by desert winds – from the idea of the Saviour and his immaculate conception to the doctrine of liberation and love. (Autran, 1935)

Any impartial analysis of the content of this triple formula must discern the contradictions of the principles of its components, which are so numerous and irreconcilable that they make even its mere existence impossible, let alone

the successful action of the corresponding being, if it were to remain faithful to each and every one of the supposed constituent elements. It is not only the contradictions between the elements of this formula that are at issue, but also those within them. For example, there is the polar and irreconcilable contradiction between *the Old and New Testaments*, while the Old Testament Yahweh buys the slavish obedience of the 'chosen people' of believers by promising them other people's lands, *the New Testament* promises Heaven, calls for the overcoming of baseness and preaches love and freedom to all people of good will.

If we turn our gaze to the oldest component of that artificial triad, to Athens and the entire Hellenic world, we must observe that here the most ancient, or rather the first historically known monuments of culture, reveal the greatest power of the mind and heart. Works such as *the Iliad* and *the Odyssey*, and the thought of the Presocratics, for instance Heraclitus, certainly do not arise from *nothing* and cannot be the product of a momentary enlightenment and creative ability. These works and these thoughts attest that they are the fruits of very long journeys of maturation, perhaps begun already in the circum-Arctic, *Hyperborean* homeland of the Euro-Arians.

It is perhaps unnecessary to point out how the search for a European identity usually overlooks or even denies its Euro-Aryan components and foundations. Almost invariably, intellectual inquiry halts at the threshold of the Euro-Aryan perspective, as if it were taboo, or forbidden. Only occasionally, and in certain quarters, is a hasty attempt made to explain the denial of the Euro-Aryan origin of European nations and cultures: not all European nations speak an Indo-European language. These are the Magyars, Finns, Estonians and Basques... Such an explanation is doubly unfounded. The demographic share of these nations in the European population amounts to barely a few per cent, which is quite insufficient to challenge any generalisation. If such small exceptions within a whole were sufficient to dispute its nature, then it would not be possible to reduce the world of things and phenomena into species, categories, and concepts that are completely 'pure', without any admixture, existing only in a Platonic Heaven. Then, we are speaking of nations that have long been, and to a great extent, *Europeanised*, in every domain, from ethnic mixing to cultural assimilation.

The philosophical quest for the origin of Europe

In the domain of modern philosophy, the most ambitious theory of Europe's meaning was provided by Hegel, according to whom Europe begins where the millennia-long, universal history of *the 'great day of the Spirit'* comes to an end which follows the (apparent) path of the Sun, from East to West, from myth to logos, from the identification of the cognitive subject with the object of cognition to its separation and emancipation, from superstition and "*Oriental despotism*" to rationality, the Enlightenment (*Aufklärung*) and freedom.

Confronted with the crisis or *the 'apparent defeat of (that) rationalism'* caused by the descent into '*naturalism*' and '*objectivism*', Edmund Husserl posed a very difficult question to himself: '*what characterises the spiritual form of Europe?*' (Husserl, 1991) Such a generalisation is based on an insight into the fact that European nations, despite their mutual enmities, possess a "*special spiritual disposition which unites them and transcends all-national*

boundaries". By extending the gaze of his phenomenological "intentionality" to the "spiritual likeness of Europe" its corresponding characteristic—the leading of the universal and infinite quest for truth in itself—Husserl assures us that this adventure was initiated by "the personalities of the Greek oddballs", that is, in the first circle of Hellenic thinkers:

The spiritual telos of European humanity, which includes the special telos of individual nations and that of individual people, lies in the infinite, that is, the endless idea towards which the entire spiritual existence strives, so to speak, on a pneumatic level.

Despite the principle of 'intentionality', Husserl's findings are *a priori* predetermined by a cognitive perspective that stems from modern philosophy of becoming, precisely in the sign of a radical rejection of the tradition of classical, Hellenic thought, which was directed towards the cognition of eternal and constant principles of the intelligible world. Therefore, through the lens of the modern ideology of progress, Husserl observes that this characteristic of the 'spiritual likeness of Europe' also entails a 'struggle in the political sphere of power, between those who are content with tradition in a conservative manner and the philosophical book people'. Husserl's illumination does not capture the essence of the European on the political stage but only partially, or rather halfway, just one undeniable characterological trait of Europeans - which Lavrentievich Gumilyov would call "European passion" and Spengler "the Faustian spirit"- overlooking its 'conservative' dimension. Nevertheless, at this point it is instructive to consider Husserl's presupposition of the time and place of the beginning of the European, 'infinite' quest for truth in itself.

It is necessary here to point out the unfoundedness of a very widespread belief that what is most essential in the cognitive attitude of the European man - "the universality of the critical attitude, which is determined that it will accept no pre-given opinion, no tradition, without question, so as to immediately ask, concerning the entire traditionally given universe, about the truth in itself, about the ideal" - first proclaimed in the history of mankind by the first, known to us, circle of Greek thinkers. The most ancient monuments of the Indo-European worldview - from the Vedas and Upanishads to the Avesta - bear clear witness that such boundless questioning is an innate characteristic of the Indo-European man. One need only delve into the intellectual tournaments that constitute a significant part of the Upanishads to realise that the 'universality of a critical stance' is one of the fundamental characteristics of Aryan sages, such as the famous Yajñavalkya.

This was first observed by Schopenhauer, while reading a Latin translation of the Persian transmission of the Upanishads. The scale

his enthusiasm is well represented by a diction uncharacteristic of philosophical discourse: "Eternal philosophical truth will scarcely find a more resolute and convincing expression than that in the (Upanishadic) doctrine of the emancipation of knowledge from the atman" (atman = the subjective pole of reality, ed. D.K.)... Oh, how the soul is cleansed of the Jewish superstitions prematurely instilled in it and of the servile philosophy that springs from them. It is the most sublime literature in the world; it is the comfort of my life and will be my comfort on my deathbed. "Confirming the finding of 'eternal philosophical truths', Düschen then assessed that the Upanishads herald some of the essential ideas of German idealism, from Schopenhauer to Kant. According to the observation of a somewhat English-grumpy assessor of the philosophical achievements of the Aryan Brahmins and Kshatriyas, such as Arthur Keith, the wise Yajñavalkya teaches about the distinctions between the knowing subject and the object of knowledge, which is an essential prerequisite for philosophical thought. (Keith, 1925)

Indeed, even the most ancient voices of Aryan thought, hundreds and thousands of years before the Hellenic thinkers, were preoccupied with the question of truth in itself. Thus one of the creators of the Vedic hymns confesses his painful, thoroughly philosophical doubt and questioning, conscious that the world in which he lives precedes not only humankind but also the gods:

"By whom are the mighty heaven and earth upheld? Who has established the cosmic vault? And who has given the firmament its expanse? To which god shall I offer a sacrifice?"

Who knows for certain, who can tell us? From where does the family come, and from where does the origin come? The gods follow that origin, so who can know how it came about? How did that origin come about? Did the Lord establish it, or did he not, who watches over the highest heaven? He himself knows it, and perhaps he knows nothing at all. ^Rg- Veda, X, 121 -129)

Zarathustra expresses a similar questioning, at least a couple of centuries before the Hellenistic thinkers. Zarathustra's addresses to the supreme god of the Iranian Aryans, Ahura-Mazda, attest that the divine messages were not received as unconditional instructions for servile submission, but as subjects for reflection and consultation with (emanations) *Righteousness* and *Good Thought*, with new appeals to the Lord for clarification:

"Thus I ask you, tell me truly, O Lord, that I may understand your wise instructions, about which I have consulted with Righteousness/Good Thought, so that I may know the truth: to which good things should I direct my soul to attain them?"

"So I ask you, tell me the truth, O Lord! Who is righteous among those with whom I debate, and who is false? Am I false, or he who, being false, would deny your grace to me? How is it that his falsehood is not obvious?" (Yasna, XL, 8-12)

It is necessary here to point out the unfoundedness of Husserl's assumption that the objects of the first, Hellenic philosophical-cosmological reflections belong to the *'physico-bodily nature'*, for it is precisely at this point that the preceding, millennia-long tradition indirectly shines through. According to Husserl, Hellenic philosophical thought is *"primarily, self-evidently, in its theoretical interest, directed towards the physically corporeal nature, since everything spatio-temporally given in any case, at least insofar as it relates to the substrate, has the existential formula of physical corporeality."*

The situation is precisely the reverse: the Presocratic thought moves from the metaphysical to the physical given, from the deontological to the ontological level, from the intelligible world to the sensible world, as Plato subsequently set out this path most fully. For example, in the thought of pre-Socratic philosophers such as Heraclitus or Thales, the words *'fire'*, *'earth'*, *'water'* or *'air'* do not refer to a *'physically corporeal nature'* but to the metaphysical constitutive principles of the cosmos. Otherwise, if he were to wish to be even slightly consistent and not contradictory, Husserl would have to conclude—in accordance with his interpretation of the Presocratic thought—that the much-vaunted European rationalism had, from the very first moment of its appearance, found itself in a crisis, at the bottom of decadence, burdened by *'naturalism'* and *'objectivism'*. The fact that the first Hellenic thinkers known to us left no trace of the intellectual processes that led them to the cognition of these elements indicates that they actually received them, as a self-evident inheritance, from the preceding sources of the tradition to which they belonged.

isation of Christianity

The centuries-long overlap between the Christian and European worlds necessitates an inquiry into the role of Christianity in the development of the political being of the European man. In the political sphere, Christianity did not bring

Europe no new, positive institution, and its role was thus exhausted in the endeavour to establish, expand and maintain hegemony over pre-existing or spontaneously arising forms – in decline, such as the Roman Empire, or in their emergence and development, such as the feudal states and the Eastern Empire and the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation – by the force of spiritual authority and the value of the sovereign's consecration. After all, the fundamental Christian assumption of a universal human purpose for its messages precludes any such European limitation of religion: *"There is neither Jew nor Greek, there is neither slave nor free, there is neither male nor female: for you are all one in Christ Jesus."* (*Paul's Epistle to the Galatians*, 3:28) The historical coincidence of the Christian and European worlds is today explained by Cardinal Ratzinger as a kind of enforced necessity, conditioned by the Islamic conquests of the Christian Christianised territories in Asia and Africa. Otherwise, if the (Catholic) Church were to accept such an—even if only a completely temporary—identification with the European world, *"the renunciation of Eurocentrism would have to include the renunciation of missionary work."* (Ratzinger, 2003) The duality or dualism of temporal and sacred authority, which characterised the relationship between the Church and the medieval empires of Europe, is not the product of any positive determination but a distant and deep after--cision of the once-united world into a sacred and a profane part, fraught with contradictions that were only overcome for short periods by primacies or consents. It is unnecessary to point out that this schism was brought about by Christianity, deepening, by force of inertia, the former division of the ambiguous life of the faithful in their loathed empire – owing to the mismatch or opposition between *the civitas Christiana* and *the civitas Romana* – by the formula of paying due homage to both God and Caesar.

According to the official view of the Roman Catholic Church, as presented by Cardinal Paul Poupard, Director of the Cultural Affairs of the Holy See, the role of Christianity was vital to the survival of European nations:

"Transmitting the values of Hellenic-Roman civilisation whilst respecting national values, Christianity deepened the cultural identity of the European peoples which they could not have achieved without it. While laying the foundations of a common civilisation, Christianity emphasised the distinct identity of each nation. The structure of European unity must preserve this balance as a condition for harmony among peoples and for the vitality of the great community of solidarity." (Poupard, 1994.)

If we set aside the undeniably valid recommendation, we must conclude that the presented, self-satisfied picture of the role of Christianity bears little resemblance to historical reality. The largely violent spread of Christianity across Europe was marked by ruthless and zealous destructions of the material and, above all, spiritual monuments and traditions *of the 'old faith'*, and of the corresponding identities of the subjugated peoples. Many communities, refusing to be baptised, had only the choice between extermination and

persecution. It is to the pagan refugees in Iceland, and their oceanic seclusion, that we owe the preservation of the written traces of the only immediate tradition of Germanic religiosity.

Christianity is responsible for the eradication of the cultural identities of European peoples through the force of monotheistic intolerance and proselytism, unknown in the European and Euro-Aryan world. What survived of these identities the violence and persecutions, the massacres and the pyres, owes its survival only to its own combativeness, vitality and tenacity, which often forced the partisans of the 'new heaven' to give up, to make concessions, such as the rebranding of the Sun-god festival into a celebration of the supposed birthday of Jesus Christ. It is necessary to point out that the cultural identities of European peoples had much more favourable conditions and fates in the world of Orthodoxy, thanks to a number of its characteristics, from the extraordinary commitment to the postulates of the doctrine of human freedom and the cultivation of religious immediacy, to the absence of a centralised structure, characteristic of the Catholic Church.

The reform of Patriarch Photius was particularly beneficial and far-reaching in preserving the primordial virtues and values of national cultures, by legitimising and legalising the heterodox forms of professing the faith among the Slavs. It is essential to emphasise that cultural continuity in the Eastern Empire—unlike in Western Europe—was never interrupted, and that the thought and art of ancient Greece were ever-present and alive within the spheres of the Byzantine and, subsequently, the Slavic elite. The autocephalous nature of the churches, based on real, organic and irreplaceable national communities – before which each one responds to, from which it depends, and which it therefore seeks to protect – rather than on an abstract universality, or catholicity, whose spirit is, in principle, indifferent to the need to preserve and develop national needs and particularities.

It is certain that the advantages of Orthodoxy over Catholicism are the fruits not only of the religious policy of the Eastern Empire and its Hellenic heritage, but above all of the culture of the Slavic community and the character traits of the Slavic **forma mentis**. A number of the most ancient known monuments of the Slavic **forma mentis**, from the *Vlasov Book* to the Nestor's Chronicle, attest to a uniquely great, indeed magnificent, worldview whose uninhibitedness and boundlessness in space and time are direct signs of extraordinary spiritual freedom and magnanimity. For a person possessing such spiritual freedom and magnanimity, it is inconceivable to impose their faith and convictions on others, especially when the weight of duty demands the finest human material.

The relationship between Christianity and the European peoples ought also to be viewed from the opposite perspective, which reveals that many elements of the religion underwent significant, and in some cases complete, transformations in Europe. Many virtuous qualities, which are commonly but wrongly attributed to Christian civilisation or Christian influence, actually originate from pre-Christian Europe. This was well observed by the archaeologist Adriano Romualdi in an inspired essay on the European tradition:

In contrast to the barbarian, the Turk and the Levantine, the Christian is characterised by 'measure' in the professing of his faith and his behaviour. It would be wrong to believe that Christianity created such qualities, for the European is less a product of 'Christianity' than Christianity is a product of the European ethnic stock. A propensity for reasonable piety, imbued with a sense of balance, generosity and respect, was already present in the classical world. And the respect for the individual and for human life, which are characteristics of Europe and which represent a clear boundary towards the 'barbarians' - were already present in Hellenic humanism, before Christ. Many of the so-called Christian values are nothing other than a continuation of the ways of being, rooted in the ancient humanitas, of the same ethnicity and European culture." (Romualdi, 1972)

When the cognitive gaze, accustomed to distinguishing self from other, uplifts itself still further and surveys the horizon of the loftiest thoughts and deeds of Europeans, fashioned in the service of the Church - from the starry vault of the mausoleum of Empress Galla Placidia in Ravenna and the White Angel from the 13th-century monastery of Mileševa to the Gothic cathedrals, from the 'negative theology' from Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite to the teachings of Meister Eckhart on *the noble man*, from the holy warriors on the walls of the foundation of Despot Stephen Lazarević to the depiction of the Madonna and Child by Piero della Francesca, from Gregorian motets to the art of the fugues of Johann Sebastian Bach - one question arises: what is truly Christian here, and what is European?

And in the flower-like constellations of the Mausoleum of Galla Placidia, through which the Platonic longing for the starry homelands of man's celestial element shines through, as well as in the White Angel of Mileševa and the entire canon of Byzantine icon painting. Any optics of stylistic perception, however sensitive, must recognise the fruits derived from the late, senile simplification of Roman art's classicism, which Christians, upon taking control of the Roman Empire, adopted from the workshops they found and subsequently canonised. Gothic cathedrals arose from the experience of life under the canopy of dense European forests and from the primeval symbolism of the 'world tree', *Yggdrasill-di*, whose roots, according to the ancient Vedic image, originate in Heaven. *The 'negative theology'* of Dionysius the Pseudo-Areopagite, which had a fundamental influence on medieval aesthetics, is one of a series of expressions of the Euro-Aryan man's inclination - from the doctrine of the enlightenment of Prince Siddhartha to Heidegger's phenomenology, - that in epochs of great spiritual crisis, and of the upheaval and temptation of forgetting the source of tradition, speculative deceptions and degenerations prevail, boldly opening shortcuts to the original metaphysical truths, defining them and preserving them from contamination by the force of the negation of all appearances. Meister Eckhart's sermons on the divine nature of man originated directly from the worldview of *the 'old faith'* and were condemned as heretical for precisely that reason. The holy warriors from the walls of the Manasija Monastery, in the twilight of the Serbian medieval state, essentially renew the Euro-Aryan pedagogy which—according to Herodotus's observation—taught the young the skill of using bright arms and of gazing unflinchingly upon death and the sun of truth. Piero della Francesca's Madonna and Child is crystallised around an Apollonian, symmetrical and spherical structure of the world, and Gregorian motets transmit through the centuries the modes of the ancient songs of the Euro-Aryan highlanders, which can still be heard today, from the Caucasus to the high Alps. Music

Johann Sebastian Bach, "*clear and mysterious as the summer starry vault 7cc*" (Rebatet, 1981), with its magnificent, vertical dynamism and focus towards the Centre of all centres - is the very essence of

the very opposite of the original Christian chants, or rather the Near Eastern scales, and the corresponding horizontal wanderings and meanderings of the voices across the deserts of the human, deprived of a stable, gravitational centre not only for tones but also for thought and feeling.

Are not all those great works of Europeans a kind of pearl which the European spirit, consciously or unconsciously, crystallised around the dust deposits from the Levantine deserts, brought by the winds of history?

The myth of the Hyperboreans

That the story of the European man's adventure does not begin with Athens and Rome - but that we must extend our cognitive perspective to the Euro-Aryan homeland - is also indicated by a Hellenic memory of the long, Eurasian roads that led to a series of campaigns by Euro-Aryan tribes to the northern shores of the Mediterranean Sea. Admittedly, in the historical consciousness of the Hellenes, this memory became muddled and torn over time, and was thus distorted. For example, Plato frames the last, Dorian wave of Euro-Aryan conquests within the Homeric tradition of the siege of Troy, in an alleged conflict between the returning warriors and new generations of fighters who, upon their return, "did not receive them as they ought to have been received, but death and slaughter reigned everywhere, and many even had to flee into exile." (*Zakoni*, I, 682de).

Aeschylus's tragedies preserve and transmit the memory of the clash of cultures between the Euro-Aryan conquerors and the indigenous peoples through scenes of the victories of the 'new' Olympian and celestial deities over the 'old', chthonic and subterranean ones. It is also about the victory of the 'patriarchal' tradition over the 'matriarchal', about the triumph of the principle of universal Justice over the laws of blood solidarity and partiality. In *the Eumenides*, Aeschylus also highlights the aesthetic dualism of the two cultures, which is confirmed by the comparisons of figures from the respective pantheons, beginning with Apollo and Dionysus. The ugliness of the Erinyes, the indigenous deities, is described by Apollo in the speech in which he announces his verdict to Orestes:

"I will not leave you! I shall always be your guardian / whether near or far from you; / and I shall not be merciful to your enemies. / See now the mad ones, overcome by sleep; / and the girls, loathsome from the languor of their slumber; / and the old daughters of the Night, whom neither god nor man nor any beast loves." (I, 2, 65-70).

Athena also confesses this aesthetic aversion through her speech, which offers insight into the victory of the Achaeans, to whose calls she has responded:

"Far off on the Scamander I heard your call, / where I received and surveyed that land / which the Achaean dukes and princes / gave me as a great part of the war-booty for ever... / In this new land I perceive a new world, / I am not afraid, but it is a wonder to my eyes. / Who are you? (Addressing the 'old' deities, ed. D. K.) I speak equally to all of you / and to the stranger who sits at my side, / and to you; for you seem no kind of creature, / nor did a god see you when in the circle of goddesses, / nor is it right to mock a neighbour for being punished / fairly, nor does it befit justice." (IV, 1, 400-417)

The Chorus of Erinyes responds by confessing that menacing and unbridled vengeance which remained one of the fundamental characteristics of the **forma mentis** of the peoples of conquered cultures, taking its strongest expression, centuries later, through the mega-sadistic, *apocalyptic* visions of the theologian John:

"Young gods, old law / you have tested me, you have betrayed me. / Insulted, wretched, angry, / I will ravage this land. / Poison, poison that sorrow / again gives birth to, I will pour out. / Will lichens grow, so that without leaf / and without fruit all the fields, / alas, justice, will wither. / A plague of mankind will give birth." (V, 4, 782-791)

The memory of the Euro-Aryan migrations from the north to the south of the Eurasian continent is best preserved in the myth of the Hyperboreans, which demonstrates the advantages of such a form of transmission. This myth shines through all layers of Hellenic culture, right down to Pausanias's *Description of Greece*, which preserves a series of *Hyperborean* crystallisations. For example, according to the legend of the Celtic invasion – which targeted the treasure of the Temple of Apollo at Delphi – the Hellenic defenders invoked in their ranks not only the elemental forces of nature but also the Hyperborean warriors: "As soon as the armies clashed, not only did thunderbolts and fallen boulders from Pamassus begin to rain down on the Gauls, but terrifying phantoms in the shape of armoured warriors also rushed upon them. Two of the armoured warriors, Hyperochus and Amadokhos, they say, came from the Hyperboreans, and the third was Pyrrhus, son of Achilles." (I, 4).

Here is presented one of the many Hellenic attestations of a belief—widespread throughout the Euro-Aryan sphere—that in decisive battles, the shades of heroised, legendary, mythical or deified ancestors, often invoked by their descendants, enter the fray. Herodotus, in the eighth book of *his Histories*, provides a number of examples of such returns of illustrious shadows to the fields of battle, from the eponym of Marathon, from Theseus and Echelus, who took part in the Battle of Marathon, through Philacus and Autoonos, who defended Delphi from the Persians alongside the living, to Aias and Telaamon, whom their descendants summoned to aid them in the Battle of Salamis. This custom of summoning ancestors to battle was retained for the longest time among the Serbs. According to the testimony of the Serbian priest-combatant Ljuba P. Nenadović from the wars of liberation against the Asian invaders of the Balkan cradle of European culture and civilisation, "when they are fighting the Turks (Cmogorci), they shout the names of those heroes who in olden times slew Turks: Ha, Strahinjiću bane! Ha, poteci Obiliću! Ha, Mandušiću Vuče, đe si, evo Turaka!" (Čajkanović, 1973). In the essay *The Invocation of Ancestors*, the renowned Serbian ethnologist Veselin Čajkanović also recounts his own experiences of this custom during the Balkan Wars and the First World War, among which a striking example is a French exclamation of a unique, Euro-Aryan tradition: "In 1916, on a French sector, when a certain company, worn out and almost annihilated, from a trench which was full of fallen French soldiers, was to charge and take the enemy position, the commander called the remnants of the company to a 'junš', and, with the soaring spirit of a man who feels he must accomplish the task, shouted: 'Debout les morts!' ('Up, you dead men!')"

In the tradition in question, only the shades of one's own, blood relatives are invoked. It is unthinkable that any Hellenic person would invoke the shades of foreign, barbarian ancestors. We are therefore free to conclude from Pausanias's account that in the Hellenic consciousness, the Hyperboreans—despite the vast, indeed polar, expanse of distance, measured even by the etymological meaning of the ethnonym—were not perceived as foreigners but as kinsmen. The myth of the Hyperboreans preserves the memory of the millennia-long migration of the Hellenic ancestors through the Eurasian spaces, from the circum-Arctic homeland to the Peloponnese. The memory of the circum-polar homeland of the Hellenes also shines through the myth of the Hyperborean origin and subsequent southern migration of the goddess Leto, mother of Apollo and Artemis, who wanders the world in search of a place where she could give birth to a divine child, rejected by all for fear of Hera's jealousy. The rocky island of Delos,

where she finally finds the desired place and the birth of the divine twins therefore became the centre of the Hyperborean tradition.

Awareness of a blood, kinship connection with the Hyperboreans also shines through in the tradition that the goddess of childbirth, Eileithyia, also of Hyperborean origin, came to help Leto. Describing the Athenian sanctuaries, Pausanias informs us that not far from the sanctuary of Serapis there is a temple of Eileiteia: *"She, they say, came to Delos from the Hyperboreans and eased Leto's labours. The others learned her name from the Delians. The Delphians offer burnt sacrifices to this goddess and in her honour sing Olenus's Hymn to Eileithyia"* (I, 18)

This trans-European and meta-historical connection between the Hyperborean ancestral homeland and Hellas is also expressed by the tradition of the cultic transfer of sacrificial gifts, the first sheaf of the harvest, which the Hyperboreans send, every year, to the Hellenes. The first testimony was provided by Herodotus: *"The Delphians know the most about them, who claim that the Hyperboreans would wrap their votive gifts in rushes and send them to the Scythians, and from the Scythians the gifts would reach their neighbours, and so from nation to nation, until they reached far to the west to the Adriatic Sea, and from there south into Hellas, first to Dodona, and from there they descended to the Malis Gulf, then crossed to Euboea, and then proceeded from town to town until they reached Karista, and after this they passed by Andros without stopping at it. The inhabitants of Karista, in fact, carried them to Ten, and the Tenians to Delos."* (Strabo, VII, 33)

Pausanias's account of that journey of the relay of sacrificial offerings differs somewhat from Herodotus's: *"In Prusias is the temple of Apollo; Here, as the story goes, the first harvest arrives as a sacrificial gift from the Hyperboreans, and the Hyperboreans hand it over to the Arimaspi Isedonians, from whom the Scythians receive the first fruits and bring them to Sinope; from Sinope, Helen carries it to Prasia, and it is the Athenians who then transport it to Delos; they store the first fruits of the harvest in a wheat-shed, and no one has seen them."* (I, 31)

Fraser explains the differences between Herodotus's and Pausanias's descriptions of the route of the Hyperborean sacrificial offerings by a geo-economic factor: the discovery of a shorter route through the Bosporus, the Hellespont and the Aegean Sea—opened up by the establishment of Hellenic settlements on the Black Sea shores.

- which rendered the older and longer, overland route anachronistic. It should be borne in mind that the time difference between the accounts of Herodotus and Pausanias is almost six centuries. Thus, the Pausanias tradition attests to the adaptation of the rite to a new map of exchange, whilst preserving its essence and even the fundamental direction of the transfer of sacrificial offerings: north-south. The question remains: what experience does this myth preserve from oblivion for all future generations?

By all accounts, this too is a mythical tradition of the memory of Euro-Aryan migrations, from the far north of Eurasia to the Mediterranean south. This hypothesis is supported by the attribution of a primordial, 'golden age' character to Hyperborea. Herodotus relates how Aristides of Procones, inspired by Apollo and the tradition of his Hyperborean homeland—whither he goes every winter—set out in search of the Hyperborean god, arriving at Isedonia. According to Herodotus, in *the Arimaspians poems* Aristaeus teaches that *"beyond the Isedonians dwell the Arimaspi, one-eyed men, and beyond them the eagles, who guard the gold, and still further from these, to the edge of the seashore, dwell the Hyperboreans."* (IV, 13) The veracity of Aristaeus's testimony is indirectly confirmed by Herodotus's mistaken translation of the *Arimaspi's* name from *"one-eyed men"*: *"We call them*

with the Scythian name Arimaspi, because arima in the Scythian language means 'one' and spu means 'eye'" (IV,27) Only the light of Old Iranian lexicon allows us to grasp the correct meaning of *Anmaspi*. The word is actually *Aryannaaspa*, meaning "the horse-loving Asians".

In the light of Euro-Aryan symbology, in the eagles \ gold—of whom Aristaeus sings—we can easily recognise the hallmarks of the primordial essence and metaphysical sunshine of the Hyperborean proto-homeland, which, through the transference of space into time, is linked to the mythical "Golden Age", whose memory is preserved by almost all Euro-Aryan cultures. According to a series of Hellenic reminiscences, from the Hyperborean primordial homeland, the Achaeans brought the cult of Apollo and, according to the tradition related by Plutarch, in the arctic regions – where the sun only sets for one hour a day for an entire month and where even the night is not dark but is like twilight – Cronos, the god of the golden age, dreams. (*De facie in orbe lunae*, XXVI.)

Herodotus relates that in memory of the death of the Hyperborean maidens who first brought the gifts, "the Delian maidens and boys cut their hair; on the eve of the wedding the maidens cut off one a lock of hair; they wrap it around a spindle and place it on the grave... and all the young men of Dela wrap a lock of hair around a golden twig and place it on the grave." (IV, 34)

The ritual of depositing locks of hair belongs to the symbolism of participation in the Hyperborean tradition and of fidelity to its virtues and values. The aforementioned grain sheath, in which the Hyperborean gifts were placed, symbolises the eternity of those virtues and values. Herodotus's tradition that the Hyperborean gifts, wrapped in the grain-sack, "no one saw" (I, 31) indicates that it is not a question of a visible, and therefore material, but of an invisible, metaphysical value.

Kinship with *the barbarians*

The idea of spiritual purity is also linked to the Hyperborean homeland, and this is also carried over to the physical level. The idea of purity is introduced by Apollo's servant, Abaris the Hyperborean, who, bearing the apollonian sign of a golden bow, travels throughout the Hellenic world and miraculously cleanses cities and individuals of even the most severe diseases, establishing, as in Sparta, immunity from the plague. It was inevitable that the Hyperborean element would also intervene in the main and lasting spiritual war between the Euro-Aryan and indigenous strata, most strikingly manifested in the struggle of Apollo and Dionysus for supremacy, beginning in Delphi. Pausanias conveys to us the theory of the proponents of Delphi's Apollonian foundation: *Boio, the Muse, who composed the hymn for the inhabitants of Delphi, says that the oracle for the god (Apollo) was founded by men who came from the Hyperboreans, Olen and others, and that he was the first to give prophecies and to sing in hexameters. These are Boe's verses: 'Pagas, sons of the Hyperboreans, divine Agaeus / Truly established the oracle where memory is strong.' After listing other Hyperboreans, at the end of the hymn she names Olen: Olen, the first Phoenician prophet who was, / First of the verses of the ancients, truly make a song.'* (X,5)

Alongside the vertical, diachronic dimension of Hellenic consciousness of belonging to a wider, Indo-European community, there also exists a horizontal, synchronic one, which is capable of repeatedly bridging even the greatest divide between the Hellenes and *the Persian barbarians*. And in this domain, the consciousness of a common origin was preserved in

in the form of a myth. According to Herodotus's account, Xerxes referred to this myth when he sent a messenger to the Argives, telling them to form an alliance instead of wage war: *'It is said that this messenger, upon arriving in Argos, declared: 'Argives, King Xerxes sends you this message: We consider that Perseus, of whom we are descended, is the son of Danaë's Perseus, who was born of Andromeda, daughter of Cepheus. Accordingly, therefore, we would trace our descent from your city, and it would make no sense for us to wage war against our own ancestors, nor for you to help others in a war against us, but rather you should sit quietly at home.'*" (VII, 150).

Aeschylus expresses this same consciousness on the stage of the tragedy *The Persians* through a dream of Xerxes's mother, Atossa, in which Persia and Hellas, representing Asia and Europe, appear as twin sisters: *"In beautiful raiment two female figures appear - / one in a peplos was Perseus, / in a Dorian dress the other - they stood before my eyes. / In age they surpassed the women of today, / their beauty without blemish; they were sisters / of the same stock; by lot this one was allotted / Greece for her home, the other the barbarian land. / Some quarrel, it seemed to me in a dream, / a quarrel, in a dream, they began. / And my son, when he perceived it, / stops them, min, yokes the chariot, / takes them to a heavy yoke, and tightens it on their necks."* (I, 2, 181-191)

In *the Anabasis*, an account of the marvellous adventure of the Greek mercenaries who fought on the side of Darius's son Cyrus against his brother, the Persian king Artaxerxes, Xenophon provides several examples of the Persians' awareness of their kinship with the Greeks. When a great quarrel broke out among the Greeks, Cyrus rushed to their reconciliation, shouting: *'Cleargo, Proxeno, and all the Greeks, have you gone mad!? Do you not realise that if you kill one another, we shall all be cut down at that very moment, I first and then you. If our expedition is endangered, all these barbarians around us will leap upon us with a ferocity unknown to any barbarian in a royal army.'* (1.5)

Thus, the Persian prince uses the first-person plural for himself and Helen, and calls the army of his multiracial and multicultural state *'barbarian'*. When Cyrus, on the eve of the conflict, addresses the Greek mercenaries on his strategic plans, he describes his brother's Persian army as Homeric, but with a contempt unknown to the poet of the *Iliad*. *"You will face a far more numerous enemy who are in the habit of charging, screaming as if mad. You need only withstand this onslaught for a short time and then—I say this without any shame—you will realise what sort of men there are in this land."* (1,7) The mere feeling of spiritual kinship or of an ancient, Euro-Aryan sameness with the Hellenic

and Persian religions can explain the ease with which the Persian prince took part in the religious ritual of the European mercenaries, repeating with them the war-cry *"Zeus Saviour and Victory!"* and adding: *"I repeat this call, O Heaven, hear!"*



THE UPRIGHT OF THE TRINITY

In Jacques Le Goff's monograph, **The Medieval Civilization of Western Europe**, the tripartite society is illustrated by miniatures from the pages of the 12th-century chronicle of John of Worcester, which depict the terrifying dream of Henry I, King of England, in which he is threatened, with the corresponding instruments of torture, representatives of the three estates: the warriors, then the knights, and finally the clergy. We are free to conclude that here a sovereign rules, at the head of the community's tripartite structure, with the necessary support of all three estates. If we were to seek a pictorial representation of the European ideal and reality of the tripartite structure of the community with a broader perspective, the most complete testimony would be provided by Paja Jovanović's painting **The Migration of the Serbs**. However, to fully grasp its iconological meaning, we must also take into account the historical context of the migration.

The great counter-offensive of the European forces against the Asian invaders – which followed the successful defence of Vienna in 1683 – aroused in the Serbs immense hopes for an imminent liberation from the yoke of the Islamic pseudo-empire. Serbs, from all parts of the homeland, both free and occupied, took up arms and joined the campaign of Emperor Leopold's army, which had called them to battle in December 1688, promising them freedoms and privileges. It seemed that the Asian enemy of Europe would be repelled beyond the Bosphorus, but this opportunity too—like all those before and after—was lost thanks to a lack of European, or at least Christian, solidarity, which was all too often burdened by betrayal.

In the tragedy in question, the betrayal was committed by the king known as *the Sun*: instead of joining and assisting Emperor Leopold's liberating campaign, Louis XIV formed an alliance with the Islamic pseudo-empire in order to exploit the concentration of the empire's military forces in the European southeast and invade the Palatinate with his army in the autumn of 1688. Leopold's strategists were forced to immediately divert the bulk of the army and the allied units of Serbian warriors from the south-eastern to the western front of the empire's defence. This betrayal by Louis XIV was a key factor in the reversal of the balance of power on the Balkan front, and the wretched remnants of the imperial army, after their defeat at the Battle of Kačanik, turned to a swift and even panicked retreat northwards, leaving the Serbian people unprotected to the bloodthirsty vengeance of the occupiers of Europe.

When the forces of the Islamic pseudo-empire once again captured Niš – the birthplace of the Roman Emperor Constantine – the defeated European army was granted freedom of withdrawal on the condition of surrendering all Serbs, of all ages, who were then summarily slaughtered. An anonymous chronicler from the Dečani Monastery testified to this great trial of the Serbian people: "*Oh, oh, oh, bitterly for me! There was fierce fear and misery then; they tore mothers from their children, and fathers from their sons; they enslaved the young, and hacked and drowned the old. Then people yearned for death rather than life at the hands of the accursed Turks and Tatars. Alas for me, bitter sorrows!*" (Panić-Surep, 1963)

Thus, the greatest migration of the Serbian people from the occupied territories to the empire was set in motion; the empire needed the Serbs to defend it from Asian threats and invasions along the Military Frontier. Emperor Leopold then addressed the leader of the Serbian migration, Patriarch Arsenije Carnojević, with a written acknowledgement and an appeal to persevere in his work to "*destroy the barbaric-Ottoman tyranny and its like.*"

The depiction of the Serbian migration was commissioned in the late 19th century from Paja Jovanović by Patriarch Georgije Branković and the Church Assembly, as the Serbian response to Mihály Munkácsy's painting, *The Founding of the Hungarian State*¹.

commissioned for the celebration of the millennium of Hungarian culture and state. Unfortunately, Jovanović's work – the product not only of national sentiment but also of extensive historiographical research – was not shown at the aforementioned exhibition because the artist did not have enough time to make the necessary changes, which the commissioner, intent on using the painting to testify that the migration of the Serbs was not a mere retreat of a people before a foreign invasion but the arrival of a militarily and politically organised force, had demanded.

As the third, final version of the work from 1945 attests, the artist crystallised his perception of the Serbian migration around a tripartite community structure, embodied by representatives of the functions of spiritual sovereignty, defence, and fertility. On the right wing of the frontally deployed order, in front of the densely packed ranks of the cavalry, a knight-crusader in a gallop stands out, with a protectively raised lance in his right hand. On the left wing is the embodiment of the function of fertility, a mother with a child and the warrior people, while in the centre are the high dignitaries of the church, led by Patriarch Arsenije Čarojević, with the symbols of the faith. The gaze of the artist, or of the observer of the scene, is decentrally placed and falls upon the space between the representatives of the nobility and the clergy, where, before all others, strides a man in clogs, rifle on his shoulder, with masculine determination—a paragon of the Serbian peasant-soldier, or *Krajisnik*, for centuries on the front line of Europe's defence against Asiatic invaders.

When we observe him with an eye that is also capable of reliving what it sees, it seems to us that he bears a burden far greater than that '*immense tragedy of a dream on the peasant's shoulders*' of which Ezra Pound movingly testifies in the very first line of the first canto from his Pisan prison. (Pound, 1953) On his shoulders, this Serbian warrior-warrior bears not only the tragedy of Europe's great defeat but also the burden of duty and responsibility for all three functions of the community, assumed by virtue of extraordinary circumstances that have persisted for the Serbian people for centuries. This Serbian warrior-warrior comes from great distances and seems, with his pensive gaze under the deep shadow of gathered brows, to strive even further. It seems that for such an arduous march through history, the skill of multi-hued reflection in each of the three basic functions-disciplines of the Euro-Aryan community is necessary.

's ideology of tripartition

Any glance towards the horizons of the Euro-Aryan origins of European man must perceive that they are—in the realm of political realities or ideals—marked by a unique quality which Georges Dumézil designated as *the ideology of tripartite division*. This refers to the ideal model of a tripartite community order, composed of distinct yet interconnected and complementary functions: sovereignty, defence, and fertility. In the ideal, Euro-Aryan community, the first function encompasses sovereign and judicial, magical and religious functions; the second function is performed, in the first instance, by the fighting element of the aristocracy and of anarchy-prone youth, while the third encompasses a range of fields of activity, from motherhood to agriculture, crafts and commerce. The most ancient legal definition of the duties of the three functions is contained in the law code of the life of the Indian Aryans, *the Manava-Dharma-Castra*, according to which their prescriber, Puruṣa, is the unifier of the natural and cosmic dimensions of man and the embodiment of the principle of the efficacy of the universe:

For the protection of all that was created, Purusha produced certain activities, divided among those who were born from his mouth, from his arms, from his thighs and from his feet. He commanded the Brahmins to teach, study, offer sacrifices for themselves, offer sacrifices for others, to give and to accept gifts. He commanded the Kshatriyas to protect the people, to give, to offer sacrifices and study the sacred books, and to be above objects of sensual pleasure. Livestock husbandry, almsgiving, sacrifice, reading (of the sacred scriptures), commerce, money-lending at interest and agriculture are the occupations prescribed for the Vaishyas. To the Shudras, Purusha assigned only one duty: to serve the other classes without envy." (I, 87-91)

Summarising her decades-long research into the multifaceted phenomena of the triadic ideology – from the Euro-Aryan pantheons to the structures of communities and the forms of the Euro-Aryan man – Dimezil concluded:

First: apart from the Indo-Iranians, the Indo-European peoples in antiquity either applied such a (three-fold) classification there, or, in the legends by which they explained their own origin, they divided theirs, the so-called 'original' ingredients among the categories of that same classification; secondly: in the ancient world, from the land of the Sinics to the Pillars of Hercules, from Libya and Arabia to the Hyperboreans, no non-Indo-European people has ever expressed, practically or ideally, such a structure, or, if it did so, it was after a certain contact—at a discernible place and time—with some Indo-European people." (Dumezil, 1958)

The ideology of tripartition is the Euro-Aryan man's coordinate system of worldview with which he observes and experiences, perceives and feels, and determines the meanings and significance of things and phenomena in the arena of his life-struggle. In a cognitive perspective, one of the consequences of possessing such a coordinate system is that it enables him to perceive phenomena in terms of their being, essence, and becoming.

system is the value primacy of the role over its performers: as if the roles belong to the Platonic world of ideas and the performers to the world of becoming and perishing. As historical experience attests, this primacy of roles makes them inviolable and unconditional with respect to the forces of becoming and perishing, and enables the perpetual mobilisation of the executors. Thus, the roles are eternal, while the people are replaceable and mortal. The effort to transcend the replaceable and mortal, in order to elevate the centre of being to the level of a type or heroic role, is an act of metaphysical transformation which Homer highlights by calling his heroes 'godlike'. And it is precisely here that the ideology of tripartite division is shown to be fully embodied in the sovereign and commander-in-chief, Agamemnon, who resembles three gods, representatives of the three functions: "In eyes and head he seemed a likeness of the Thunderer, / in waist and loins like Arethusa, god of streams, to Poseidon. Iliad, 11,7, 378-379)

Not even the gods of the Euro-Aryan pantheon are spared the strict tests of the Iranian principles of the ideology of tripartition, compelled to yield their places to others through failure. The movements of replacement occur not only within the pantheon but also between gods and humans, which points to me and even to the decline of religious consciousness. Thus, at times, in the scenes of myths and legends, a historical figure manages, by virtue of their individuality, to so obscure the paradigmatic role that it remains known only by their corresponding first name and surname. Thus, in many minds and hearts, Jesus Christ has taken the place of the Euro-Aryan Saviour, for example the Iranian Saoshyant (Autran, 1935). - born literally of a virgin conception, for his mother is a virgin - who returns victoriously at the end of each cycle, lasting three thousand years, to perform the great correction and transformation of the world. The coming of the Saoshyant is promised, for at least a thousand years of the new era, by the Aryan hymns of the Yashtr: "When the dead shall be resurrected, /ZrV/(Sao- shyant) will come without

hesitation, /By will life will be transformed. " (XIX, 11 and 89) In the popular hopes of medieval Europe, these primordial expectations of meta-historical salvation were awakened and crystallised around figures such as Frederick II of Hohenstaufen and Marko Kraljević, of whom the corresponding traditions say that they did not die but that in the centre of a sacred mountain, with their warlike followers, awaiting the end of the worst of ages, when they will emerge in a victorious charge against the forces of evil. Just as *the Iranian Saoshyant* does, at the end of the fourth, dark age.

Judging by the crystallisations of the historical experience of the Indo-European peoples in the form of myths and legends, the structures of *a tripartite ideology* enabled not only the harmonious life of the community—marked by the cooperation of all its functional parts—but also the integration of other ethnic groups. Mythical and epic traditions concerning the wars between the Aesirs and the Vanir, the Latins and the Sabines, or the Achaeans and the Trojans, undoubtedly reflect the combat experiences of the Indo-European peoples on their paths of Euro-Asian dispersal. Where the ethnic or racial differences between the conquerors and the indigenous peoples were too great—making integration through the third function (as with the Vani or Sabines) impossible—a special, fourth class was formed, similar to *the Shudra*, for the indigenous peoples of India. A good example of successful integration is provided by the legends of the founding of Rome through the unification of different ethnic groups, or functions. The demigod, Romulus, *rex-augur*, together with his Latin companions, is the bearer of the first function. He is assisted by the Etruscan Lucumon, with his group of professional warriors, while the Sabines, the wealthy indigenous people, embody the third function.

The ideology of tripartite division is the first characteristic of the political being of the Euro-Aryan and European man, not only in a chronological but also a qualitative sense. The diverse forms or reflections of *the ideology of tripartitism* mark and measure the entire political history of Europeans, from Plato's *Republic*—the most complete doctrinal description of its contents—to the estates-general of Europe before the bourgeois-askian revolutions, which overturned the corresponding hierarchy and enabled the usurpation of power by the unproductive and parasitic parts of the third estate. It is precisely the historical persistence of this pattern of community organisation, whether of gods or men—which sufficiently refutes the evolutionary theories that regard it as merely one stage in the development of any society—that points to its metaphysical, and therefore ahistorical, nature and origin.

The Metaphysical Root of the 's Tripartite Structure

Before any investigation of the historical expressions or reflections of *the ideology of tripartiteness*, it is essential to bear in mind its metaphysical root, fruitful in a range of domains, from Euro-Aryan conceptions of the cosmos and pantheon to the mythological beings of the underworld, from ideal models of the qualitative, from the ideal models of qualitative, political organisation to the understanding of the basic, constitutive elements of man. In light of the density, frequency, and significance of the domains of phenomena of tripartition, trinities, or triads, we can conclude that it is a feature of the Indo-European world whose models have been adopted—by force of contact, conflict, or commingling—by other, nearer or more distant cultural circles.

The ideology of tripartiteness is so widespread throughout the Indo-European world that we perceive it not only in the political or social domain but also in many other fields of the complex whole.

They are usually represented as being analytically broken down into three basic, qualitatively distinct but complementary and irreplaceable components. The most striking example of the tripartite structure of Euro-Aryan pan-theons is provided by the Slavic Triglav, a union of three functions, personified by Svarog, Perun and Svetovid. According to *the Veles Book*, the first-mentioned god of that triad performs the function of fertility on a cosmocreative scale: "We praise Svarog, the god-father who is the originator of the whole divine lineage / he is the creator of all that is living, the eternal source that flows in summer/and everywhere, and in winter never freezes." The second function is performed by Perun: "You revive us with the ceaseless turning of the wheel and lead us along the path /of Right through battles to the Great Struggle." The first function belongs to Svantovit and encompasses a range of sovereign and magical tasks, from maintaining the stability of the universe's pivot and Svarog's wheel of necessity to the enlightenment of mankind: "To the god Svantovit we raise glory / for he is the god of Prav and Yav, and to him we sing a song for he is the light / through which we see the world."

The principle of tripartition is inherent not only in the pantheons but also in many manifestations of the Euro-Aryan gods. Thus, for example, Purusha, the solar deity of the Aryan Vedas, the prescriber of the duties of all three castes of the Aryan community, embodies the principle of the universe's activity and measures and thus determines it by means of his 'three broad steps', which create the three dimensions of space and the three-world heaven, the intermediate space, and the earth. (*Rig-Veda*, VIII,29,7.) The Indo-European peoples are aware of the existence of three heavens: the daytime, the nighttime, and the morning one, which is the fruit of their union. In *the Chandogya Upanishad* (VI,2,3-4), the human domain consists of three elements: the first, spiritual fire (*tejas*), was created by the cosmic creator being, moved by the desire to multiply the self; *tejas* created the waters, and the waters, food. And this trinity is connected with *the idea-Logya* of triplicity; it is the power of 'opening (the spring) waters', one of the basic characteristics of Indra, the most beloved god of the company of young warriors.

Also connected with *the ideology* of tripartition is the teaching of the Indo-Aryans—most simply set out in *the Bhagavad-Gita*—on the three basic dimensions or disciplines to which people should submit, in accordance with their natures, or capacities: *Jnanayoga*, *Karmayoga* and *Bhaktiyoga*. The first is devoted to knowledge, the second belongs to the world of action and struggle, and the third, the most widespread, consists of passive surrender to the divine and the corresponding prayers and rituals. The divine incarnation warns of the necessity of action here: "A man cannot attain freedom of action by refraining from action, nor can he attain perfection by mere withdrawal from the world." (111,4)

According to the doctrine of the ancient *Upanishads*, *prakriti*, the primordial substance of the world, as well as the eternal powers of the divine self, possess three fundamental properties or virtues (*gunas*): *sattva*, *rajas* and *tama*. Literally, *sattva* denotes *essence*, *completeness*, or *that which exists*, and in the language of the *Upanishads* it was used to describe the first *guna*: *stable luminosity*. *Rajas* denotes the world of *sensation* (but also of *dust*), while *tamas* (*tama* or *darkness*) indicates *the obscurity of the mind*, as the opposite of the quality called *sattva*. At the other end of the Indo-European world, Plato, in *the Republic*, sets out a similar teaching on the basic properties of being, namely **phronesis**, **epithymia** and **thumos** (*thumos*) - "which takes the side of the mind if it does not agree with the appetites...if (courage) has not been entirely corrupted by a bad upbringing" (IV, 440e - 441a) - observed in the series from the individual to the state. When comparing the two doctrines, it is noticeable that the differences between the meanings of the virtue designations actually complement and clarify one another. With **rva**, that is, *steadfast luminosity*, is a characteristic of **phronesis**, enabled, according to Plato's teaching, by the openness of the mind to divine illuminations. The heart is the centre of **thymos**, and therefore this quality

here we translate as *'heartiness'*, although this word encompasses a range of feelings (*rajas*) inherent to the second function: from *anger* and *passion* to *liveliness* and *combattiveness*. *Lust*, however, requires *tamas*, that is, a state of *obscured mind*. The general framework of the *gunas* is *Dharma (the Law)*, whereas in Plato the relationships between the qualities are harmonised by the *'inner working of justice'*: *It is necessary to place each (quality) properly where its place is, just as does one who is master of his house and of himself. Thus order and friendship with oneself is achieved, as is harmony of the three qualities, just as one achieves it in the musical harmony of the three: the highest, the lowest, and the middle, not counting the other which can be inserted between them. Thus all of this, being thus connected, to enable one to arise from the multitude of things, moderate, harmonious.*" (IV, 443de)

Between the human element and the state is the family and its extended form, *the commune* - also imbued with *the ideology of tripartite division* - longest preserved in a codified state among the borderland Serbs (Semjan, 1960). The classical Indo-European family dwelling, called *the house* (with its emphasis on the physical domain) or *home* (with its emphasis on the family domain), constructed from wood in the wooded, northern primeval habitat, testifies to the idea and principle of tripartition. The base section, usually grounded, corresponds to the third function, as it is where the means of subsistence are stored, from tools to provisions. The central part is above ground, with a hearth and often a world-axis beam, which is *the tree of life, the cosmic pillar or axis mundi*, and the loft, under a gabled roof, corresponds to the spiritual nature of the first function. The loft is where items are stored that deserve to be kept and remembered, or items that need to be kept for magical reasons

- temporarily removed from the central space. In the attic, according to a number of beliefs, the spirits of ancestors reside, and it is also the space through which gods and the Sun enter the house, later disguised as the Christian Christmas at the time of the Solstice. (Čajkanović, 1994)

Perhaps the idea of a harmonious combination of different functions – inherent in *the ideology of tripartiteness* – is also contained in the Euro-Aryan root (**dem-* or **dem(a)*) a series of names for dwelling places, from Old Church Slavonic *domu*, Sanskrit *damah* and Avestan *damana*, and Serbian *dom*, to Ancient Greek *domos* and Latin *domus*. Some verbal and nominal derivations from the root serve not only in the vocabulary of constructing architectural forms but also in shaping interpersonal relationships. Thus, from the root **dem=* or **dem(a)*, perspectives of the power of signification and determination lead to a broad horizon, from the Latin *dominus* to the Old Slavic *domoviti/and domovina*, to the *'Serbian host, who in his hands mediates the management of the community, who in the very determination of his own name reveals the notion of a community of souls and of a particular organisation of the family'* (Buti, 1962)

Benvenist, however, considers that the said roots are merely homophones and are entirely different in meaning, and therefore classifies the derivatives into three separate families (*government; construction and house-family*), while attributing the rest to *"contaminations: "It is undeniable that contaminations have arisen between these forms, born from these two roots, for example in Homeric Greek between do(m) (house-family) /domos (house-building)."* (Benveniste, 1969). If Benveniste's distinctions are well-founded, a far more significant fact remains that what he calls *'contaminations'* betrays the corresponding potentialities of this tendency not only of the lexical roots and their composition but also of people. When Virgil's Aeneas exclaims, *"Ifi's home—this is his fatherland!"*- he, despite the different roots of **domus** and **patria**, expresses from a deeper or more archaic layer of the language's treasury, and out of necessity, a sense of the organic connection between these two concepts, preserved in other branches of the Indo-European tree, for example, in Slavic: **ć/om* - homeland*.

According to the findings of the Euro-Aryan research of Gamkrelidze and Ivanov, the 'general Indo-European lexeme *t'om- with the meaning 'home and organisation' denotes the basic social unit of Indo-European tribes, which presupposes the unification and union of certain people connected by specific kinship ties." (Gamkrelidze, Ivanov, 1984).

Having presented a series of examples of symbolism of the Trinity that are in direct or indirect relation to the ideology of tripartite division, we must ask ourselves why the Euro-Aryan man tends to see wholes of certain things and phenomena of the visible and invisible world broken down into three and not— for example—into two, four, five, ten, thirty or countless elements. The Euro-Aryan man's aversion to reducing a multitude of differences into a formless *One*—as does the opposite, chthonic *form mentis*, from Dravidian India, via the Semitic Middle East to Pelasgian Hellas, from the cults of the Mother Earth and Dionysus to eros- the psychology of the often desperate search for a resolution of the irresolvable internal dualisms, or contradictions, inherent to man - can be explained by a lack of a corresponding psychological impulse. This is the psychology of an often desperate search for a resolution of the irresolvable internal dualisms, or contradictions, inherent in a human being created from the mixtures of heterogeneities at the narrowest part of the World Landmass, at the points of collision and connection of Europe, Asia and Africa. Of the same origin is the basic raonothestic sublimation of the impulse of the lowest layer of the human mixture, which creates the human pole of opposition to the pole of the supposedly indeterminate and conceivable abstraction called the *One*.

First, the most ancient illumination of the posed question was provided to us by - but not a significant one help - the famous Upanishadic sage Yajñavalki, in reply to King Vidagdha Shakali:

"At that moment Vidagdha Shakali asked him: 'How many Gods are there, O Yajñavalkya?'. He answered by means of the numbers given for invocation: 'Three and three hundred, three and three thousand'. 'So it is,' said the other, 'but how many Gods are there in truth, O Yajñavalkya?' 'Thirty-three.' 'Alright,' said the other, 'but, in fact, how many Gods are there, O Yajñavalkya?' 'Six.' 'Correct,' he said, 'but, in reality, O Yajñavalkya, how many Gods are there?' 'Three.' 'Yes,' he said to him, 'but, truly, o Yajñavalkya, how many Gods are there?' 'Two.' 'Alright,' he said to him, 'but, truly, o Yajñavalkya, how many Gods are there?' 'One and a half.' 'Yes,' he said to him, 'but, in truth, O Yajñavalkya, tell me, how many Gods are there?' 'One.' 'Yes,' he said to him, 'but what then are those three hundred and three, and the three thousand and three?' Yajñavalkya answered, 'These are, in fact, their great powers (mahimānah), but in reality there are no more than thirty-three Gods.'" (*Bṛhad-aranyaka-upanishad I, 9, 1-20*)

We are free to conclude that for the Indo-European man, the triad or tripartite division was the most desirable form of ultimate generalisation and reduction of the complex wholes of things and phenomena of Heaven and Earth. This inclination is generically preceded by the need or will to perceive the object of knowledge, that is, to define and present it as a whole, without remainder. For the Euro-Aryan man, the trinity or tripartite nature is the ultimate achievement of cognitive generalisations, where a sustainable vital wholeness is maintained, which requires dialectical relationships, that is, internal oppositions or complementarities. Beneath the number *three lie two and one*: dualism and the abolition of all differentiation, towards which the authentic Euro-Aryan and European man harbours an innate aversion, sometimes tinged with horror or disgust, as before some monstrous hybris.

It is also worth bearing in mind the historical background: on its millennia-long marches through the Eurasian spaces, having been set in motion from its circum-Arctic proto-homeland, chains of abrupt glaciation, towards the south of the Eurasian continent, the Euro-Aryan man faced numerous challenges of alienation, among which, from an intellectual point of view, the most significant are those reducible to the symbolism of values

called *countless* (multitude), *two* (dualism) and *one* (non-distinction). To the countless abysses of this meaninglessness led the Aryan gods the multiplying whirlwinds of the tropically vivid imagination of India's Dravidian aborigines. In these multiplications of *avatars*, the deities only seemingly grew stronger quantitatively, when in fact they were failing, alienating themselves from their Vedic essence to a monstrous unrecognisability, just like the Olympian gods in the gossip of the pre-Aryan stratum, the Pelasgian plebs.

Already on Indian soil, the Euro-Aryan man faced the pitfalls and limitations of dualisms, seeking to overcome them precisely with the doctrine of the three *gunas*, like that which the sun god imparts to the young warrior Arjuna on the eve of the battle, in a scene from the *Mahabharata*:

Equalising pleasure and pain, gain and loss, victory and defeat, rise up to the struggle; thus you will not transgress the rule. .The Vedas relate to the domain of the three gunas, but you, O Arjuna, be free, making yourself free from the pairs of opposites, with a firm resolve striving for the supreme reality, caring neither for buying nor for hoarding, the master of your own being.

The European man, centuries later, showed an equal aversion to Levantine dualism, building—upon the foundations of a rhetorical baptismal formula from the *Gospel of Matthew* (28:19), twisted into something of an excuse—the magnificent cathedral of the *Holy Trinity*. It is highly instructive for our consideration that in the period before the Council of Nicaea, the bishops from the empire's Asian and African provinces—from Tertullian and Origen to Clement of Alexandria and Dionysius of Alexandria—showed the least understanding towards this theological creation. It was necessary for the decisive command of the Roman prefect Dionysius to impose the dogma of the *Holy Trinity*. It is not our task to consider whether the very artificiality of that Trinitarian construction is the true cause of its mystery or the cognitive opacity confessed by Blessed Augustine, pointing to the **intrahistoria** as a prerequisite for contemplating such a vision:

"Who can comprehend the Holy Trinity? Yet who speaks of him, if he is truly spoken of? Rare is the soul that knows what it says when it speaks of him. Men dispute and strive, and no one without inner peace can see that vision." (*Confessions*, XIII, 11,12)

To make the *Holy Trinity* more accessible to the faithful, Blessed Augustine suggests that they begin "by practice", that is, "the observation of three things in oneself", which are a special contribution to the Euro-Aryan doctrine of the *gunas*: "I think of these three: to be, to know and to will. I truly am, I know, I will; I am the one who knows and wills; I know that

I am, I know, I will; I am the one who knows and wills; I know that I am, I know that I will." (*Ispõ vesti*, XIII, 11,12).

Not even the dualism of *heaven* and *hell* is acceptable to the Euro-Aryan and to the European man of today, who has limited or at least mitigated it by introducing a third element between them, *purgatory*. Drawing on a series of attestations of the belief that prayers for the dead could alleviate their sins, and on corresponding customs, such as that known as 'baptism for the dead' (1 *Corinthians*, 15:29), Catholic thought succeeded in constructing the doctrine of *purgatory* and adopting it as dogma at the Councils of Florence and Trent in 1563. And this doctrine is threefold, indirectly maintaining the ideology of *tripartition*. In accordance with the magical dimension of the first function of this ideology, the first element of the doctrine of *purgatory* establishes the existence of an *interregnum* between *heaven* and *hell*, where the righteous will spend a certain time in order to be fully *purified*, until they have redeemed the debts incurred by their sins. The second element – characterised by its combative efficacy – constitutes

the nature of the punishments meted out: they are intended to *purify* the righteous, not to torment them eternally, as in *hell*. The third element is quite analogous to the market, or rather, the buying and selling dimension of the third function of *ideology*. Believers are permitted to redeem and *purify* their neighbour in *purgatory* through virtuous deeds—not only prayers and penances but also by making donations to the church, in money and in kind.

According to common opinion, many models of seeing tripartite structures of history were derived from the doctrine of the *Holy Trinity*, from millenarian ones (Giacomo da Fiore) to philosophical ones (Hegel), from the expectation of a *third Rome* (after Rome and Constantinople – in Moscow) to the expectation of the *Third Reich*. In all these models, despite the diversity of their sources, foundations and content, the fundamental need of the European man is evidenced: to oppose the current of becoming and passing away, the forces of temporality and transience, and to not only determine, *geometrize*, but thereby also make sense of time, or rather, history.

Plato's state

The antiquity of the ideology of tripartition is evident in Aristotle's work in a mediated way: he attributes the idea of a tripartite community to Hippodamus of Miletus, allegedly the first political thinker of the Hellenic world to confront the question of the best constitution: "*He conceived of a state of nine thousand people, divided into three parts: one part would be workers, the second husbandmen, the third warriors and armed men. He divided the land into three parts: the sacred, the public, and the private, the sacred for those who would perform the prescribed rites in worship, the public for the maintenance of the warriors, and the private for the farmers.*" (*Politics*, XXII, 1267b)

It is not difficult to suppose that this is an example of the historicisation of a prehistoric tradition, with distortions or gaps evident in the lack of a function of sovereignty in the first part, which is subsequently corrected in the second, where the division of the land perfectly expresses *the ideology of tripartition*. In the history of European political thought, Plato's *Republic* provides the first and most complete example of an exposition of *the ideology of tripartite division*. Its order is "*composed of three classes of beings: the one that earns its living, the one that is auxiliary, and the one that decides.*" (IV, 440e-441a) The backbone of Plato's ideal state is its three-part structure (IV, 435c), and a significant portion of the dialogue is devoted to elucidating the nature of such an arrangement, which is based on corresponding qualities, that is, the types of human material, where the measure of justice is conditioned upon their exclusive devotion to the tasks for which they are (genetically) predestined: "*We said that a state is just if in those three, naturally given types of people, each individual performs what is his due.*" (IV, 435b). Plato illuminates the ontological basis of such a state in the nature, that is, the character traits of man, through a question that is also the answer:

"Must we necessarily agree that in each of us there really exists such a structure and such character traits as the state possesses? For the state did not acquire them from someone else." (IV, 435e)

This concerns three basic *character traits* which correspond to the fundamental domains of human manifestation: the intellectual, the emotional, and the physical. Each of these three properties *'rules over its corresponding kind of action; for example, by means of one we learn, by means of another we become angry, and by means of the third we relate to food, to sexual pleasures, and to everything of that sort.'* (IV, 436a)

It may be superfluous to point out that the exposed trinity is reducible, without remainder, to the narrowest framework

ideology of tripartition. Following the Hesiodic tradition of determining the types or genera of humans through sim-

of metal alloys, Plato entrusts the first function to the men of the *golden race*, the second to the men of the *silver race*, while the third estate is in the sign of *iron or bronze*. The particular value of Plato's model lies in its inner vitality, expressed by the principle that every member of the *raora* must earn the position in the order and the rank, which makes it certainly much closer to the sources than were the remnants of the *ideology of tripartite division* in his time and in later ages, where nobility was inherited by mere birth, as some inalienable right. Therefore, the care of posterity is the most important task of the holders of the first function, that is, the *guardians of the ideal state*: "*If their offspring has in him bronze and iron, they must have no pity for him, but will assign him to the place that suits his nature and place him among the artisans or the farmers; if there were one among them who had gold and silver in him, they would show him honour and promote him, some to be a guardian, some to be an assistant; for the oracle declares that the state will utterly perish in the time when the iron and bronze guardian are its guardians.*" (III, 415b-415c)

In the *Laws*, Plato's *alter ego*, the Athenian, in describing the ideal state order, provides an insight into a hierarchy of values which are also structured according to the principles of tripartite division:

"Rectitude consists in this, that the goods of the soul are to be regarded as the most precious and supreme, and those of temperance; then, in the second place, beauty and the bodily virtues; and only in the third place, the so-called goods which consist in gold" (III, 697b)

At this point in the exposition, it is worth opening a parenthesis to point out the very widespread ideological (and psychological) intolerance of the prevailing thought of modern Western civilisation towards Plato's tripartite and hierarchically structured community. All too often, instead of cognitive breakthroughs, modern criticism merely scrawls graffiti of insults and demonisation on the walls of Plato's state. Rather than observing it in its historical context or in comparison with the supreme, eternal idea of the state, modern criticism stages Plato's work in the theatre of contemporary ideological wars. No intellectual creation of the distant past provokes such fierce disputes, as if the realisation of Plato's ideal were imminent and must be thwarted at all costs. This fact of the intellectual chronicle of our time attests not only to the strength of Plato's thought but also to the vitality of the ideal of the state in the hidden chambers of memory and in the depths of the European man's heart.

After all, we can fully agree with Karl Popper's observation that Plato's state - as the first theoretically fully derived system of the '*closed society*' - the extreme opposite of the ideal of the '*open society*' (Popper, 1950), but this is certainly not enough to turn our backs on the great teacher of Europeans. "*The Open Society*" is the final and most charming, theoretical translation of the perpetual demand of thalassocratic and commercial powers that their commercial, plundering, and conquering expeditions should open all doors and remove all internal and external defences. Since the said dualism does not pose a sobor (nor can it pose) an ethical, but at best only a moralistic, and therefore changeable and fickle, question - any value-judgement of the concepts of *openness* and *closedness* in politics depends exclusively on the subject of the judgement and the corresponding, strategic point of view. There is no higher court of appeal for its judgements.

In principle, from the standpoint of defenders of the community and its state, closure is a good name for a valid defence against threats from internal weaknesses and foreign interests or hostilities. For example,

The basic conditions for the great growth of the Prussian and German economy were created by List's strategy, which was characterised by the unification and establishment not only of a common market but also of its common tariff protections against imports, in order to encourage domestic production and to strengthen and equip the national economy to enter the world arena. After all, even Poper's '*best all-rounder*' knew how to protect its interests with unprecedented measures of economic and even political *closure*, from the mass internment of citizens of Japanese descent in the US and supposedly pro-German citizens of Great Britain during the Second World War, to the wall the Israelis built to separate themselves from the Palestinians and the corresponding threats.

Popper's *openness*, however, signifies a complete deprivation not only of self-defensive means but also of any higher, supra-economic sense of community.

power, but also of any higher, supra-economic sense of community. For instance, if a community voluntarily makes its state completely and unconditionally *open* to all, even the most diverse immigrant influxes—which will sooner or later reduce it to the status of a minority—then this simply means that it has lost all meaning and reason for being. There is, however, no doubt that the internal or external enemies of the community and its state desire it to become not only a *society*—that is, a mechanical collection of solitary individuals rather than an organically structured assembly of personalities—but also an *open one*, so that thereby all obstacles to every kind of attack would be removed, from the external to the internal, from the conquering to the subversive, usurping and parasitic.

Incidentally, it is worth remembering that the other great political teacher of Europeans, Niccolò Machiavelli, also recommended a *closed society*. High above all unfounded accusations that he preached amorality and the principle that *the end justifies the means*, he taught of the need to subordinate morality to politics, just as a part must conform to the interests of the whole. From the standpoint of the ethos immanent in the ideology of *tripartism*, Machiavelli praised the economic self-containment of the German nation. This is a praise of the extraordinary virtues of the German nation, preserved precisely thanks to a certain *self-containment*, long before the economic reforms of Friedrich List:

Neither did they (the neighbours) go to them (the Germans), nor did these go into other people's houses, for they had enough of their own goods, for they lived on that food, for they clothed themselves with the silk cloth that their land provided- their land is fertile and thus the cause of all intercourse and the origin of all corruption was removed, since they could not adopt the customs of the French, nor the Spaniards, nor the Italians, nations which together constitute the corruption of the whole world." (Discorsi, I, 55)

A thought from the risis

The prejudices and intolerances of the modern detractors of Plato's state are also betrayed by the overlooking or silence of the true magnitudes of its origin, meaning, and significance, along with the not uncommon attempts to reduce it to the domain of mere, unachievable fictions, called *utopias*. The observation of Plato's interlocutor that the state they have built '*exists only in mish'ma*' does not point to a *utopia*—as is often claimed by modern interpreters—but to two poles of reality: the absolute and the ontological. From that absolute pole, that is, from the *heavenly*, intelligible world of eternal ideas, from the idea of the state, the mind derives its earthly expression: "*But—I said—perhaps for him who is willing to see it and who, having seen it, is willing to order his soul according to it,*

its model exists in heaven. It does not matter at all whether such a state exists somewhere at present or will exist in the future. For such a man lives according to it and no other." (IX, 592b)

The opposite pole of reality was constituted by the experience of that realisation of the deep crisis of identity and political institutions of the Hellenic community, which in Plato persistently spurred manifold efficacities, from unsuccessful attempts at participating in the political life of Athens, through the vain attempts at enlightening tyrants, to the intellectual construction of the best state by opening the mind to the emanations of its heavenly pattern. In this domain, the most immediate source of the teaching in question is Plato's youthful disappointment in the human material on the stage of Athenian politics. Time and experience only broadened his horizons and deepened the reasons for his effective pessimism. Plato's *Seventh Letter* poignantly sets out his devastating assessments of the state into which the Hellenic man had fallen:

"So, as I observed the people who were conducting the state's affairs, its laws and customs, the more I reflected and the older I grew, the more difficult it seemed to me to engage properly in state business. Written laws and customs, however, were being established, and this was happening remarkably quickly. This turned my head, for although I was at first filled with a desire to engage in public affairs, upon observing this state of affairs and seeing the general turmoil, I was eventually left dizzy. I did not, however, cease to consider how both those circumstances and the entire state administration might be improved, but I awaited a suitable moment to act. I was finally convinced that all existing states are badly governed, for the state of the law in them is almost irredeemable unless some extraordinary intervention, aided by fortune, comes about. And so, to the praise of true philosophy, I was compelled to maintain that by its means one can know all that is just in the life of the state and of the individual; that therefore mankind will not be freed from its troubles until either the true or proper representatives of philosophy come to the state's government, or the rulers of states, by some divine providence, embrace the right philosophy." (325c - 326b)

Through a series of remarks, Plato indirectly informs us that such a state is an expression of a general alienation from tradition, thereby explaining both his own loneliness and his inability to engage in politics: *"I saw that this could not be achieved without friends and reliable supporters, whom it was not easy to find, since our state was no longer governed by the customs and decrees of our forefathers, and it was impossible to acquire others quickly, new ones."* (325d) This mention of *'the customs and ordinances of the ancestors'* is neither isolated nor incidental in Plato's work, but is an expression of his consistent viewpoint, confirmed by the very nature of the ideology of tripartite society, which is *archaic* in the most original sense of that adjective.

The scale of the crisis of the Hellenic man allows for no illusions regarding the possibility of restoring the aforementioned *"customs and ordinances of the ancestors"* and therefore Plato does not give himself over to fruitless nostalgias and laments but, in the style of a revolutionary traditionalism, seeks to create a model of a state that is even closer to its heavenly pattern than all those previously realised on the stage of history.

One question stands above all others: what caused the crisis of the Hellenic man? Following Plato's teaching on the disastrous consequences of mixing the classes (*The Republic*, VIII, 547a) - which he calls *ethnoi*, as if the stelean differences were in principle conditioned by the ethnic ones - we can also seek the cause of the crisis in question precisely in the adverse consequences of the coexistence of the Achaean, conquering, and Pelasgian, indigenous ethnos, and their corresponding cultures. These two ethnic groups and their corresponding cultures never managed to create an organic community and synthesis, but rather the history of Hellas

from Homeric times was marked by a constant, undeclared war between opposites, embodied in the dualism of Apollo and Dionysus, beginning with their struggle for supremacy over the Delphic oracle.

Plato was a contemporary and a keen observer of the twilight of the Achaean man, of the loss of identity and the dissolution of the minority descendants of the northern conquerors into the grey of the Mediterranean *melting pot*, where the previous campaigns of the pale-faced had been mixed and diluted. And this awareness of decadence also drives him to undertake the political enlightenment of tyrants and to create a model of state, statesman, and lawgiver. In a number of places, he directs his students towards the Apollonian principle and inspiration, and invites them to choose between the Achaean and the Dorian tradition: "*Therefore, him among you who is not able to live the Dorian way, according to the customs of the ancestors, but who aligns himself with the way of life of Dion's murderers and with the luxurious Sicilian life, do not invite to your company, and do not think that such a one could accomplish anything reliable and sound.*" (*The Epistle to the Seven*, 336cd)

All remaining or resurrected forms of the civilisational life of the ancient inhabitants inspire Plato with aversion and ridicule, much like that directed towards the fashionable forms of *other religiosity* (Spengler *dixit*), such as the initiations into the so-called *great mysteries*, which mark a reversal of the traditional, archaic and Achaean value system: "*And when the sacred has been thus cleansed and erased from the soul of the young man thus won over, then they introduce him into the great mysteries in a more solemn manner, and now in the great procession, splendidly dressed and with a wreath on their heads, come: insolence, lawlessness, luxury and shamelessness; they sing paeans and speak fine and flattering words. They call impudence good breeding, lawlessness freedom, prodigality generosity, and shamelessness courage.*" (*The Republic*, VIII, 560d - 561a)

Under the shadow of the ideology of equality

The absence of a form, or even a mere reflection, of the *ideology of tripartitism* on the political scenes of the modern era – characterised by the totalitarian impositions of various forms of the *ideology of equality* – should not be taken as a sign of its historical obsolescence, all the more so because politics itself has been driven from its own sphere by the forces of omnipotent economism, imposed under the pretext of egalitarianism. It is precisely the predominance of the *ideology of equality* that prevents its conscious adherents, or its unwitting mediums and prisoners, from fathoming the meaning of the *ideology of tripartitism*. By all accounts, the ideal conditions for a value comparison between a system founded on the *ideology of tripartitism* and one imposed by bourgeois revolutions under the pretext of the ideal of *equality* is the direct experience of both orders. Contemporaries of the French Revolution had such an opportunity, and therefore Joseph de Maistre did not have to make a special effort to present to his fellow countrymen not only the need for a *counter-revolution and reconstruction*, but also for the restoration of the hierarchical order of estates:

When in a State all can lay claim to everything, then there is too much unrest and not enough subordination. Order requires that offices be generally ranked like the orders of citizens and that talents, with the occasional small protection, remove the barriers that separate the different classes. In this way, there is competition without humiliation and change without destruction; the difference attributed to a particular job is merely an expression of the greater or lesser difficulty of attaining it. (De Maistre, 2001)

As Louis Dumont observes, *'living in an egalitarian society, we are inclined to see hierarchy as a scale of power and command, as in the army, and not as a gradation of rank and status.'* (Dumont, 1966). Even more often, in the narrow and distorted perspective of the modern man, the hierarchy of the traditional community appears as some kind of means of justifying and maintaining a slave-like or unjust system of class discrimination and exploitation. From the standpoint of the classical community, organised into estates or classes, such as the Indo-Aryan **vama**, the situation is precisely the reverse. As one of the most eminent voices of traditional India in the twentieth century, Ananda Coomaraswamy, testifies:

The institution of class (vama) differs from the 'division of labour' characteristic of modern industry—which is characterised by the fragmentation of human abilities—in that it gives rise to different modalities of work but not to different degrees of responsibility. And precisely because the traditional organisation of community functions rested on mutual loyalty and duties, it is irreconcilable with the competitive character of our industrialism - any system of government based on monarchy, feudalism or classes was always condemned by various sociologists whose opinions are clearly the product of the prejudices of an environment that, as a rule, rejects any relationship to true principles. Thus, a total mixture of classes signifies death (traditional communities which are thus degraded into a shapeless mass where man can change professions at will, as if this were something independent of his nature. And this is precisely the way in which traditional communities are being killed and their cultures destroyed by the influx of industrial and proletarian civilisations. " (Coomaraswamy, 1943) For materialist worldviews, *liberal* in their deference to the modern demons of economism, any class distinction based on non-economic principles is unacceptable or scandalous. Historians of a materialist worldview, however, are inclined to interpret the numerous and pan-European medieval attestations of the resurrection or vitality of the *tripartite ideology* as deceptive products of the ruling elites, who sought to conceal the essence of a system that was not tripartite but supposedly only dualistic, that is, reducible to *the rich and the poor, the exploiters and the exploited*. Such suspicion is most favoured by the description of the threefold hierarchy provided by Bishop Adalberon of Laon, in an address to the king

To Robert the Pious, in the year 1020:

The community of believers forms only one body, but the State comprises three bodies. For the second law, the human law, distinguishes two other classes: indeed, the feudal lords and the serfs are not governed by the same law. The first are warriors, the protectors of the churches; they are the defenders of the people, of the great as well as the small, of all, in short, and at the same time they secure their own safety. The second class is that of serfs: that wretched stock possesses nothing but the price of its labour... We see how the secular lords and high church dignitaries make servants of their servants; the serf feeds the lord, who, however, claims that he feeds him. And the serf sees no end to his tears and his sighs. The house of God, which we think is one, is therefore divided, nam (á<á&): some pray, others fast, and the third, finally, work. These parts which coexist do not suffer from being separated; the services which one part performs are conditioned by the work of the other two parts; each in turn takes it upon itself to ease the whole. / Thus this threefold composition is always united, and thus the law could triumph so that it might enjoy peace.

In the aforementioned period, the historian Le Goff sees a *crucial* demonstration of the reality of the feudal the reality of feudal social relations:

"In a single flash, the reality of feudal society is revealed in the sentence: the serf feeds the lord, who in turn claims that he feeds the serf. And the existence of classes—and consequently their antagonism—although immediately revealed

a just claim to social harmony, it is stated as a fact: 'The House of God, which we think is one, is therefore divided into three.' (Le Goff, 1974)

The admission of a single bishop—provided it is not an expression of the then very widespread intolerance of the clergy towards the nobility—does not seem to us to be sufficient reason for reducing the ideology of the tripartite division to a class dualism, particularly dear to the Marxist worldview, which is one of the last, secularist metastases of the Old Testament spirit. After all, historical experience testifies that 'instruments of propaganda' are not, nor can they be, long-lived. The ideology of tripartitism, however, has endured for millennia across the Eurasian continent as the fundamental structure of worldview and political existence for communities, which testifies to its meeting a real and equally deep-rooted need. This need is certainly not a new one, but rather an ancient, primordial and enduring phenomenon. It is Le Goff himself, with his survey of medieval examples of the ideology of tripartitism, who provides the one that at least indirectly refutes the Marxist suspicions. This refers to a German folk song from the 13th century which points to the existence of a fourth class, the class of usurers (Wucherers), for which it is further prophetically foretold, with black irony, that it will rule over the preceding three classes. A similar testimony is provided by an English proverb from the 14th century:

"God created priests, knights and warriors, but the devil created burghers and usurers."

Incidentally, in its origin the English word 'lord' means 'keeper of the bread', while his subjects, or wards, are traditionally called 'the breaded'. In light of the aforementioned and numerous other examples, we are free to conclude that the ideology and reality of a tripartite social structure are precisely the opposite of this, and a defence against the threats of parasitic exploitation, embodied by the bourgeoisie and usurers. As the history of peasant uprisings in Europe before the revolutions clearly shows, they were not so much aimed at the feudal system and the feudal lords—except when they were seeking to restore *old rights*, that is, from the time of original feudalism—but rather at the ever-stronger, the more audacious and intrusive parasitism of the bourgeoisie, from usurers and merchants to tax collectors. Most of these peasant uprisings were in fact led by nobles, fulfilling one of the fundamental duties of their role, namely, to protect the peasant from the exploiters and parasites produced by the pathological growth of urban society and the state administration of the absolutist monarchies. As Kamen observes, 'the leadership of (peasant) rebellions, undertaken by aristocrats or members of the lower nobility, was such a universal phenomenon that only a narrow-minded dogmatist could deny it.' (Kamen, 1982)

Plebeians of European stock were in the front ranks of the defence of the American, agrarian South, one of the last oases of 'the sweetness of life unknown to those who have not lived before the Revolution' (to quote Talleyrand), which was assailed by the force of the Northerners' civic greed, under the pretext of fighting the slave-owning system. Even in times far removed from the autumn of the Middle Ages, wherever an opportunity for a truly free choice arose between the old feudal system and the new, liberal one, the peasants opted for their former status. Investigating a series of such examples from the time of the Spanish administration of Lombardy in the 17th century, Domenico Sella points out how the peasants even took up arms to restore the feudal system and against the so-called liberation preached by the bourgeois landowners and rentier class, concluding: "All the cases we have presented here show that on the issue of the re-feudalisation of the rural community, two camps were divided: on the one hand, the landowners, who opposed the feudal regime, and on the other, the peasants who desired it." (Sella, 1982)

Comparing the lives of Europeans by the method of the New *History* school /i/ bourgeois revolutions of that epoch of *rationalism* and today - in the study p r e - 3 j e naslov the concise conclusion of the research: *Reason was in the knvu čiji* ♦ i^simo Fini observes the "*astonishing fact that in the ancienne regime... - the power of the nobility and the warriors was never established in that kind of society permeated by constant hatred and insecurity, which, with the advent of*

...the historical and post-industrial civilisations, established between industry and the citizenry, between the poor and the rich, between the proletariat and the petty bourgeoisie, between every one of his neighbours. 'citizen; 1985)

(F i l i — A l s o , the history of the modern age convincingly testifies that - the violent overthrow of the remnants of ideology and institutions three-part nakoi~^6 j)e community and its state, the corresponding forms of exploitation-structure n jhave been destroyed, yet it has already undergone extraordinary expansion, liberation-tion^,yth pre-existing bonds and limitations of moral, religious and legal nature, the socio-economic history of humanity – after the stormy, natural and evolutionary, and marked by a constant increase in social complexity and a general and lasting deepening of the gap between an ever-narrower and duali2r^^^a tije manjine i sve veće, siromašnije i gladnije te očajnije sve bo^ većin^ -

CP^I- Ravanice to three tables of Mark Kraljević

^ska epic poetry of the post-Kosovo cycle – that is, after the state – which attests that its impulses are beyond \loma sr f^Za^vno § naz ^og^ - provides a series of compelling examples of how the idea of *independence* was ingrained in a people who did not feel ideological but only a strong and deep attachment to their upbringing - whatever cr - j_ rarhij i i državi. U pesmi *Zidanje Ravanice* (Karadžić, I arajućoj t^^ bard, dakle glas iz sveta treće funkcije, posredstvom 35) n^31 ^4 ^ .pjkgog ili idealnog otelotvorenja u kraljevskom dvoru, ^enog ^v^h rena da se spram materijalnog blaga odnosi sao- ^foozorava j|0 jno svoje uloge, dakle da ga ne gomile već ulaže u ^ Vazno i do j^eća. Ovako govori kneginja Milica svom supurgu,

^Mhovna p<2 .

jezuLaza^^no,glorious Prince Lazarus! /At dawn I will go to you, /I cannot say what I want: / Laty, / And kE»'
Must

As for the Nemanjići, they lived, / They reigned, and then they passed away, / They did not heap up treasure, / But built their foundations with it, / They built many monasteries: / They built Dečani above Đakovica; / Pačaršiju above Peć the level; / In Drenica, the white Devič Monastery; / The Church of St. Peter below Pazar; / A little above, the Towers of St. George, / Sopoćani on the banks of the cold Moručica, / The Holy Trinity in Herzegovina, / The Church of Janj in Old Vlach; / And Pavlica below Jadovnik, / Studenica below Bivenik; / The Church of Žiča above Karanovac; / In Prizren, the Church of Saint Petka; / Gračanica in the Kosovo plain; / All these are her foundations; / You remained in her table / I streved treasure on the heaps, / And built no foundations anywhere; / Behold, the treasure will not suit us, / Neither for our health nor for our soul, / Neither for us, nor for any of ours."

The special significance of this poem for an overview of the Serbian tradition of *the ideology of tripartiteness* lies in its vindication of a perspective from another function, characterised by the psychology of effective pessimism and the economy of heroic realism. Thus speaks the Serbian knight Miloš Obilić:

By God, my lord, to your folly! / If you wish to build family churches, / The time is not right, nor ever can be; / Take, my lord, the imperial books, / And see what the books tell us: / The last time has come, / The Turks will take the empire, / The Turks will rule swiftly; / They will pull down our endowments, / They will pull down our monasteries, / They will pull down the church of Ravonica, / They will dig up its leaden foundation, / They will cast cannonballs from it, / And they will tear our cities to pieces; / They will strip the church of its bells, / They will cast them into the sea; / They will tear the church's covering apart, / And fashion beads from the pillars; / They will pluck the pearls from the church, / And string them into rosaries; / They will pull out the precious stones, / And strike them with their sabres / And fashion them into golden rings; / Oh, hear me, glorious Prince Lazarus! / That we may dig marble stone, / That we may build a church of stone, / The Turks will take the empire / I to serve our cezar's endowments / From the beginning of time to God's judgement: / From stone, not a stone to anyone."

Good examples of the deep-rootedness of *the ideology of tripartitism* in the mind and heart of the Serbs over many centuries

Resistance to the Islamic conqueror of Europe is provided by the songs about Marko Kraljević, the most popular hero of Serbian epic poetry, a prime example of the strategy of revolutionary traditionalism (Kalajić, 1997), a historical figure from the Middle Ages and the ill-fated sovereign of Serbia.

A key place of the realisation of *the ideology of tripartiteness* in the cycle of songs about Marko Kraljević is the song *'The Turks in Marko's House'* (Karadžić, II, 72):

"And when Saint George comes to Marko / He summons all the lords to the holy place, / In his court three tables were laid; / The first table for twelve bishops, / The second table for the Christian lords, / The third table for the poor and needy; / Marko serves wine to the priests / The fair Christian lords, / His mother serves the poor and needy."

The arrangement of the feast on the day of Marko Kraljević's *celebration* indicates the sacred basis of *the ideology of tripartition*. Marko's sorting of the guests perfectly fulfils the principle of *the ideology of tripartition* in the domain of the community's order. The first table belongs to the bearers of spiritual duties, whose number evokes the wholeness of the apostolic calling. In *the 'lords of Riškanji'* one can easily recognise representatives of the nobility, while Marko's mother's dedication to serving *'the poor and wretched'* at the third table indicates the place of the function of fertility. To understand this image, we must know that the reduction of the third estate to *'the poor and wretched'* is a faithful expression of the people's awareness of their own condition under the centuries-long violence and impositions of the parasitic economy of the Islamic conqueror, that is, the Ottoman pseudo-empire.

Serbia's entrapment under centuries of occupation and the lack of nobility – which was almost completely wiped out on the Kosovo Field in 1389, in 1389, sacrificing himself for the defence of his homeland and Europe – explain the extraordinary significance of Marko's mother, the embodiment of the third function in the cycle of songs about the Serbian prince. Marko Kraljević seeks and finds answers to many of his questions and wise advice—he, the ill-fated bearer of the first function and the solitary performer of the second—under the aegis of the third function.

Through the song in question, Serbian folk experience and memory testify that *the ideology of tripartiteness* and its customs were precisely what protected the nation from the hardships imposed by the extraordinary state of servitude under a hostile force. This meaning is also evidenced in the poem *Marko Kraljević and Beg Kostadin* (Karadžić, 11,60), where the Serbian hero refuses his friend's invitation to a feast because he had previously observed his *inhumanities*, that is, his transgressions against the ethos inherent to *the ideology of the tripartite structure*.

First of all, brother, it's inhumanity:/ two poor orphans came to you/ to feed them white bread/ and give them red wine to drink;/ and you say to the two poor souls:/ 'Off with you, you human scum!/' Don't you dare disgrace me before the master of wine!/. Second, sir, is inhumanity:/ that they were in a lord's house,/ and so they lost their wits/ and on them was an old scarlet coat - /you put them on the lower table;/ but those who are the true lords/ and have long since lost their coat/ and on them was a new scarlet coat - / you put them on the upper table,/ you bring them wine and brandy/ and the lord's delicacies in turn/ Thirdly, fleeing, is inhumanity:/ you have both a father and a mother, / not one at the table, / to drink the first glass of wine for you.

We are free to conclude that the folk tradition about Prince Marko attests to the perception of the ideology of tripartition as an exemplary structure of tradition, to which a noble *ethos* is inherent. People were valued on the basis of their virtues and the performance of their roles, not their material possessions. Hence, in Mark's worldview, the old lords, despite their impoverishment, deserve precedence in honour, ahead of the new lords, who have nothing to show but their new scarlet. Mark's hierarchical order is essentially similar to that in Plato's *Republic*, where the moneylenders, that is, the most materially wealthy class, are at the bottom of the community's value system, while freedom from material wealth is the hallmark of the best, the noblemen of the golden race.

The roots of such a hierarchical order and of the European man's lasting aversion to the predominance or expansion of carpentry principles, beyond the framework of the most immediate necessity, reach deep into the unfathomable sources of the Euro-Aryan ethnos and ethos. The authentic European man, everywhere and always, perceives these principles as something alien, even contrary to his ethos. Therefore, from the same perspective, the merchant's trade was considered humiliating. Benveniste noted how "the comparison of Indo-European languages does not provide any common definition for trade as a specific activity, distinct from buying and selling... The specification of a term - which originally meant 'employment' - in the sense of 'commercial transactions' is not isolated and is even found in many modern languages (Fr. affaires, Eng. business, Ltd.); it betrays the difficulty of defining with a single specific term an activity which has no tradition in the Indo-European world." (Benveniste, 1969)

Here is one of the most important questions of our history: what (all) caused the reversal of such a value system and enabled the usurpation of power by alienated elements of the third estate?

's enthusiasm for gold

And it is in this domain of inquiry that Plato provides the most profound guidance. *The State* contains a very clear guide to distinguishing between metaphysical and physical gold as the dividing line between the exemplary order and the steep descent into the other, lower forms of government: timocracy, oligarchy, democracy, and tyranny. Here, it is worth highlighting Plato's teaching that states originate in 'the character of the people... who pull the state about like a weight on a balance' (VIII, 544 e), and that all the basic forms of state and their organic succession on the stage of Hellenic experience are caused by 'the mixing up' (Vm, 547 a) and the weakening of the classes and the decline of the formative and informative state-creating principle along the tripartite hierarchical vertical, from the first to the second and finally to the third class.

The second estate produces a "patrician state" (VIII, 545 b), called *timarchy* or *timocracy*, epitomised by Sparta, whose opposite, *oligarchy*, is conceived where the desire for glory and honour is replaced by 'the love of money' (VIII, 548 a), opening the abyss of decay. Democratic and tyrannical rule are the beginning and the end of the spectacle presented by the nature of the third estate

when it usurps the right to determine the political system, conditioned by the lowest impulses and self-deceptions. To secure the state from the magnetism of the demons of material enrichment for the sake of enrichment, Plato decrees that the first two orders of the ideal state of the tripartite ideology—namely, *the guardians* and *the auxiliaries*—must be kept at a reliably insurmountable distance from any contact with physical gold and its corresponding influences:

As for gold and silver, they (the guardians of the state and their assistants) need it to say that they carry in their souls the divine and gift-bestowed by the gods, that human gold is in no way necessary to them, and that they err if they bring the divine gold into contact with the gold of mortal men and thus profane it, for many godless things have already happened to coined gold, while theirs remains unsullied. "(111,416e-417a) In determining the hierarchy of human materials and ages through the symbolism of metals, Plato, using the same vocabulary, warns of the great harm to the state from the mixing of the sexes:

"And when the wife of Segvoth mixes silver with bronze, a discordant inequality and an uneven heterogeneity will arise from this mixture which, wherever it appears, always creates war and enmity. It should also be said that the origin of discord is always the same, wherever it may appear." (VI, 547a)

It should be emphasised that Plato's adherence to the Euro-Aryan tradition and its ideology of tripartite division is evidenced by his teaching on metaphysical gold and his recommendation to preserve the purity of the races from any mixing that opens the way for usurpations of the first function. This refers to the fatal consequences of the collapse of the tripartite hierarchy, which allows the seizure of power by human material marked by iron or bronze. *"For the oracle declares that the state will utterly perish in the time when the iron and bronze guardian are its shepherds."* (III, 415 c)

Plato's doctrine is widely confirmed by Hellenic experience. The foundational work of the worldview of the third, warrior class of Hellas stems from the experience of greed acquired by its creator, Hesiod, in a lawsuit with his brother. Already the legislative mind of Solon, in the first Hellenic polis to give itself over to the mania for economy and the enrichment of wealth for its own sake—that is, Athens—perceived the nihilistic threats of greed, freed from the constraints of the principle of cosmic harmony and the corresponding justice:

"Our city will not perish by the decree of Zeus and the decision of the gods, for Pallas Athena, its proud guardian, has spread her arms over it, but the citizens themselves, through their own greed, will ruin the city in their folly!" (fragment 3)

Addressing the Athenians, Solon pointed to the resulting weakness that allows tyrannical forms of government to be established:

"If you have had a bad experience because of your own weakness, do not shift the blame onto a god, for you yourselves allowed these men (Pisistratus and his followers) to rise to power, and so you have fallen into their shameful bondage." (fragment 8)

The gold in Plato's andragogy is not merely an expression of rhetorical ingenuity but refers us to a long and numerous series of Euro-Aryan traditions. Through the mythological crystallisations of age-old and cherished experiences, they bear witness that the first great crisis of the community's tripartite hierarchical structure is everywhere caused by the mixing of the sexes and the degradation of the meaning of gold. At that point, *the golden age* comes to an end.

age and the process that leads to *the collapse of the divine powers of creation* begins, as the translation of the phrase reads *Ragnarök*, from the poem *Völuspá*, an essential

monument of old-Germanic religiosity. In the tradition in question, the crisis of the Aesir community is caused by the appearance of an alien element, a sorceress from the ranks of the hostile Vanir, the embodiment of a third estate. Her name, *Gulveig*, means 'Ecstasy of Gold'. The ecstasy of the material element of gold, or rather the loss of the metaphysical values it symbolises, indirectly betrays the breakdown, or at least the weakening, of the ideology and institutions of the tripartite hierarchy to the extent of a reversal of the evaluative axis. The extraordinary significance and meaning of this phenomenon is also attested to by the fact that *Ragnarök* begins, marked by Aza's attempt to destroy the intruder **in** their community through the fire of purification, or to overcome the established impulses of greed, which also marks the beginning of *the 'first world war'*:

I know of the First War of the peoples in the world./how they pierced with their javelins/Gulvaja/I how they burned her in Hagalaz (Odin's) hall./ Twice they burned her./twice she was reborn./ Always and everywhere she revives... Then all the gods ascended./to their judgment-seats, /the Supreme Deities,/I consulted together: /whether to exact tribute from the Aesir /or to receive sacrifices equally with the Vanir. Then Odin hurled his spear /and cast it among the peoples /It was the first /war in the world: /The rampart of the fortress Aza was breached, /The field remained with the victorious Vanir." (Völuspá, 21-23)

's divine origin of the classes

The aforementioned tradition persistently raises epistemological questions about the reality it expresses or maintains. The prevailing view is that it is a mythological expression of historical events, beginning with the conflict between the South-Germanic (Vanir) and North-Germanic (Aesir) gods. It is also a widespread belief that this is the mythological memory of the struggle between the indigenous, agricultural population (the Vanir) and a spiritually superior, warrior tribe (the Aesir), who arrived from the southeast, from the region between the Black and Caspian Seas, that is, from the direction of Asia, as the first medieval commentators believed. According to them, the ethnonym *Azi* denoted the Asiatic origin of that people. Boj's reference to psychology is also worthy of attention:

*"We are dealing with two complementary aspects of a single ideological and religious entity: the deities, let us say superim, the wise and efficacious ones, enter into conflict with the deities considered inferim, the vegetative, meditative ones. This confrontation is futile because it pits the inseparable constituents of the human psyche against each other and **must therefore** end in reconciliation in the *Kvasir*." (Boyer, 1981)*

The assumptions presented are not mutually contradictory and can coexist—like the polysemy of traditional symbols—because the tradition in question does not present only and exclusively a specific event in history, but also the contents of a diachronic perspective of shared experience and memory, which penetrates all time, even the future. Whoever can perceive the lines of movement of forces in the past and present—can also foresee their directions and magnitudes in the future. Thus the seeress from the poem **Völuspá** speaks of the future, commanding silence upon the people so that they may hear of that which is essential, which has been and which will be. We should also bear in mind the backdrop to this call: the ice and rock of Iceland, illuminated by volcanic fires, battered by the roaring waves and winds of the Atlantic. It was there that those who had proudly refused a violent and coercive conversion sought the last space of freedom for their faithfulness to their gods. It was precisely this rebellion

we owe a lasting debt of gratitude, for it preserved and transmitted the Edda cycle, the most immediate—albeit rather late—testimony to the Northern religiosity of the Euro-Aryan man.

And it is precisely the Eddic cycle that reveals the depth of the crisis which had engulfed the Norse pantheon, certainly long before the arrival of Christian missionaries. It also speaks of a crisis that profoundly weakened the first ranks of the community's tripartite hierarchy, the first and second functions, paving the way for the perversions of the third function. The one whom the Azi call *Zanos, the Golden*, would surely not have found a place at their court if the god Tyr had been in his full strength and power. As the Edda cycle testifies, the once-supreme Tir has been reduced to the role of a god of justice whose right hand—that is, the power of his manifestation—is pledged and imprisoned, helpless in the jaws of the wolf Fenrir, the embodiment of the worldly forces of evil and chaos.

The challenges of those *final times* have, indirectly, brought Odin, from some province of the divine world, to the top of the pantheon, through abdications, of the abdication, capitulation or weakness of the other gods of all functions, seeks to compensate by assuming and performing all their roles in their stead, almost everywhere simultaneously: from the self-sacrificial acquisition of wisdom and universal memory, to the commanding position at the head of the army and as the exemplar of the bards, to that of a counsellor to warriors. Odin's son Heimdall is the guardian of the Bifrost bridge, which connects the human and divine worlds in the form of a rainbow, and the creator of the community's three-tiered hierarchy; that is, the biological father of the archetypes of all three estates, born from his relationships with mortal women, which particularly testifies to the sanctity of such an order in the eyes of its adherents.

In the Danish tradition concerning the creation of man and the first castes – and the origin of the servant class, which is outside the tripartite community – like *the Shudra* in Aryan India – "*the skin was yellow and the hair black; they bathed him and called him Trel because he had the appearance of a slave: his hands were rough, his joints coarse, his arms knotty and his face ugly, his back stooped, his feet enormous.*" In the third-generation forefather, called Karl—"*as befits a freeborn little boy—his eyes were light; he had fair skin and blond hair. The child grew well and was always healthy, he tamed oxen, built ploughs, raised houses and barns, repaired wagons and tilled the land with a hoe.*" The exemplar of the second estate, called Jarl - "*as befits a freeborn boy - he was fair-haired, his cheeks glowed and his serpent-eyes flashed like lightning.*" In accordance with the function of defence, the Jarl "*soon learned to wield a shield and spear, to draw and string a bow, to sharpen an arrow and throw a javelin, to ride a horse and a mare, to swim against the current and to wield a sword.*" The archetype of the first order, of the functions of sovereignty and magic, is Jarl's youngest son, Kon: "*he was skilled in the runes that govern life, he could also protect warriors, blunt the enemies' swords and calm the waves. He could interpret the voices of birds, tame the sea and fire, soothe pain; he was strong for the eight...*" (Dimić, 1964)

Coriolanus loneliness

Some detractors of Dimezil's discovery use the lack of public institutions *of the ideology of tripartism* in certain spaces and times of the Euro-Aryan world to refute its general significance and meaning. It is precisely these absences and deformations *of the ideology of tripartism*—along with certain indirect emanations—that bear witness to the metaphysical, or rather metapolitical, rank of this constant Euro-Aryan **forma mentis** and its community, where it serves as an ideal model, an exemplary value system. It may be superfluous to point out

that the nature of this world of things and phenomena resists even relatively complete, let alone permanent, postulations of ideal orders. Otherwise, there would be no distinction between the intelligible and eternal, and the sensible and changing, and transient world. Therefore, in the Euro-Aryan world, *the ideology of tripartiteness* is much more frequently manifested precisely as the idea, or rather the ideal, of an upright and hierarchical structure of the community, as the supreme principle for evaluating the state of its institutions. Therefore, it is much more present in myths, legends or fables than in the scenes of politics, in laws and proclamations.

A good example of the nature and role of *the ideology of tripartite division* is provided by Livy, describing the first great conflict between *the plebs* and *the patricians* and the idealised uprising of the general Caius Marcius, nicknamed Coriolanus. It is not possible to speak of this dispute as an expression of some crisis of community or *ideology* of the tripartite system, for what is at issue is *a society* formed by the forced union and coexistence of different ethnic groups. Here, the words *patrician* or *plebeian* still, in a significant sense, denote corresponding ethnic origins and preserve the memory of the fundamental divisions between conquerors and the conquered natives. It concerns a group of two distinct communities of which *the plebeian one*—relegated to the status of a third estate, but with certain military obligations for the defence of the state—ill-endures the superiority or supremacy of *the patrician one*, which possesses the rights and duties of the first and second functions. Thus, there is a tripartite hierarchical structure created by the division of labour on an ethnic basis.

Coriolanus rises through the social rift as the loneliest man of the Roman state, alone against all: against the self-important demagoguery of *the plebeians* and the cowardice of *the patricians*, who withheld their support and delivered him to the ill-will of the mob, terrified by its threats: "*The consuls knew well what order they had received from the Senate, but they also saw that none of those who had spoken so proudly from between the walls was with them to take his share of the hatred* (before the plebs)". (11,28) Livy informs us of the first signs heralding the social collapse: the secret, nocturnal gatherings of *the plebs* on the Esquiline and Aventine hills to organise their partisan appearances on the Forum. Lamenting the lack of one decisive man to oppose this properly, Livy observes a great crack in the fabric of society through the withdrawal of the decision-making institution from the bright public eye into the darkness of secrecy: "*If the Republic had had a true magistrate, there would have been no assemblies in Rome other than public ones; now, therefore, public business is divided between the thousands of curiae and the thousands of gatherings.*" (11,28)

Livy also informs us of the demands of *the plebs* and the reasons for their lack of response to the military mobilisation: "to grant everyone freedom before handing them weapons, so that they would fight for the common fatherland and their fellow citizens, and not for their own masters." (11,28)

It is, in fact, a matter of relief from debts which had been increased and made burdensome by the warfare between the Romans and the Volsci, and by the parasitism of usurers. Here is confirmed the validity of the popular intuition that *the fourth*, usurious order, would prevail over all the others: "*The war had been concluded with a threefold success, but neither the patricians nor the plebs ceased to think of a resolution to their internal affairs: such was the subtlety and skill with which the usurers had prepared the means capable of deceiving not only the plebs but even the dictator himself.*" (11,31)

And in this crisis, the holistic principle of *the ideology of the tripartite system* is invoked as an exemplary guide for life, through the speech by which Menenius Agrippa—an envoy of the Senate and Coriolanus's friend—sought and succeeded in bringing *the rebellious plebs* towards wholeness and the defence of the state:

*In times when, as is the case now, perfect harmony did not prevail within man among all his parts, but rather each member had its own particular way of thinking and its own particular manner of expression, the other parts were offended because everything they acquire through their actions, their exertions, their functions, goes to benefit the belly, while it rests in peace and at the centre, thinking of nothing else but the pleasures and delights it is provided with; Therefore, they conspired and agreed that the hand would no longer give food to the mouth, that from then on they would refuse what was offered to them, and that the teeth would no longer chew what they received. The consequence of such a rebellion was that, in striving to master the stomach by hunger, not only it but the whole of it, the limbs and the entire body, were brought to the point of utter exhaustion. It became, therefore, evident that the stomach was not idle but had its own function and was not fed more than it fed the rest of the body, equally distributed-
Flowing through the veins is that blood to which we owe our life and strength, and which is created by the intake of food. Thus, by way of comparison, showing how similar the internal rebellion in the body was to the fury of the plebs against the patricians, it is said that he succeeded in restraining the designs of those men. (11,32)*

The deep-rootedness of the idea contained in the story in question is attested to by its extraordinary spatial and temporal spread, and we encounter it from Aesop's Fables (197) and Xenophon's *Memoirs* (II, 3,18), through the Roman forum to Shakespeare's attempt to dramatise Agrippa's speech, reducing the *plebeian* rebellion to a striving for universal equality: 'and that is just as fitting / as when you are angry with our senators / because they are different from you.' " (*Coriolanus*, 1.1) To sharpen the anti-egalitarian dimension of his hero's uprising, Shakespeare has him pronounce the condemnation of the fickleness of *the plebs*, which hates and cannot bear any virtue of difference:

It is your virtue to praise / Him whom obon guilt, / And to curse the justice that punishes him. / Whoever attains greatness, your hatred / Immediately reaches him; your ambitions / Are like the desire of a sick man, who wants / Most of all that very thing which worsens his / Ailment. " (Kono/an, 1,1)

The root of the positive foundation of the criticised anthropomorphism of *the ideology* of tripartiteness lies in the primordial cosmogonic myths of the Indo-European world, which depict the creation of the universe as the self-sacrificial act of the original, cosmic macro-human. On the horizontal plane of Euro-Aryan symbolism, man is permeated with the duality of left and right and encompasses all sides of the world, which was retained even under Christianity, as, for example, attested by an early Byzantine teaching which explains the name Adam as an acronym formed from the first letters of the Greek designations for east, west, north and south. (Averintsev, 1982) At the centre of the world-view presented to us by the best-preserved Slavic tradition of magic is the three-tiered man, composed of three hierarchically arranged parts: the head, the chest, and the limbs (Radenković, 1996), whose properties and effects perfectly correspond to *the ideology of the tripartite structure*. the function of sovereignty requires *the head*, or mind; the function of defence requires the heart, or courage, and the function of fertility requires the working power of the human limbs.

The doctrine of the four ages of

A series of traditions of the Euro-Aryan man, across the Eurasian space, attests to the analogical and even natural connections between the threefold hierarchy of the community and the historical sequence of the four ages. It is necessary to point out that *the fourth age* is an anomaly, that is to say, a deviation from the three-part order in the same way that in Aryan India the fourth class, *the Shudra*, is in fact outside the Aryan community. Taking from Hesiod

The metallic symbolism of the age and of the corresponding types of people (*Proverbs* 10:20-21) Plato determines the three-part structure of the ideal state in terms of gold, silver, iron and bronze. "You who make up the state, whistle, brothers! - we shall say to them as if we were mythologists. - But God, who fashioned you, has ordained that those who are to command should be mixed with gold, and therefore deserve to be most highly esteemed; there is most silver in those who are made as auxiliaries, and the husbandmen and other craftsmen are composed most of iron and bronze." (*The Republic*, 415a)

According to the doctrine of the Indian Aryans, as set out in *the Vishnu Purana* – a chronicle of the solar deity's activity through a series of ages – each age is characterised by the predominance of the principles or qualities of the corresponding *varna* (colour), or class of people. For example, the first, most sacred age, is characterised by the qualities of the first function of the three-part structure of the Aryan community, while in the last, the qualities of the *Shudra*, the outcast class outside the system, predominate. Even Vishnu himself adapts to these changes, and his avatars are in accordance with the spirit of the time of the respective age. "In the *Krita Yuga*, He, for the benefit of all creatures, was born as the great ascetic *Kapila* and taught him true wisdom. In the *Treta Yuga*, He was born as the supreme Lord and suppressed the wicked and protected the three worlds. In the *Dwapara Yuga*, He was born as *Vyasa* and divided the *Vedas* into four parts, which were again divided into various branches, which were in turn divided into various sections. And at the end of the fourth age, *Kali Yuga*, He will be born as *Kalki* and will lead the wicked again on the paths of piety. In this way, the endless *Vishnu* creates, maintains and destroys the worlds." (*Vishnu Purana*, I, 2)

In that open work, which was shaped over a millennia-long succession of generations, each contributing their experiences, insights and hunches, our attention is particularly drawn to the description of the end of the worst of the ages, the fourth age, called the *Kali Yuga*, marked by the complete collapse of the three-tiered hierarchical structure and the predominance of the *Shudra* class—that is, the *untouchables*, outside the caste system—and the demonism of the worst materialism:

In the Kali Yuga, people will not respect castes, order, and institutions, nor the festivals ordained by the Vedas. In the Kali Yuga, all scriptures will be regarded as holy; all celestial beings will be considered equal, and the way of life will be almost the same for everyone... Every paltry possession will make its owner proud of his wealth... Women will abandon their husbands when they lose their fortunes, and only the rich will women consider their master. He who distributes great wealth will be considered a Teacher, and noble birth will not be considered a virtue... People's consciousness will be occupied with earning money, which will be spent on satisfying selfish desires. No one will part with even the smallest fraction of their wealth or sacrifice their own interests, even if friends ask them to. In the Kali Yuga, people will consider cows equal to Brahmins, and they will be valued only for their milk... Princes will plunder their subjects instead of protecting them. In the Kali Yuga, everyone who possesses chariots and elephants or horses will consider themselves a chief; everyone who is weak will become a slave. The Vaishyas (members of the third caste, ed. D.K.) will abandon agriculture and trade and will support themselves by serving or performing mechanical tasks; the Shudras will strive to survive by begging and will adopt the appearance of religious mendicants and will become impure followers of false and perverted teachings. Tormented by famine and taxes, people will abandon their homelands and take refuge in lands suitable only for coarse crops. The path of the Vedas will be swept away and the people will turn to depravity." (*Vishnu Purana*, V, 1)

It may be superfluous to point out that many of the characteristics of *Kali Yuga* perfectly correspond with the general characteristic of modern Western civilisation, from the process of desacralisation and secularisation ("all scriptures will be considered profane") to the destruction of every bastion of legitimate authority ("people will consider themselves equal to Brahmins... and noble birth will not be considered a virtue") and the violent imposition of the ideology of equality ("the way of life will be almost the same for everyone"), to the idolatry of material wealth ("every trifle

property will make the owner proud of his possessions'), to of the movement of mass emigrations ("People are leaving their homelands"). This inevitably raises the question of the nature of the outlook that created the visions presented. If we set aside the assumption that they stem from some extraordinary clairvoyance, the only explanation for their correspondence with the scenes offered by modern Western civilisation can lie in a foreboding of the dreadful potentialities contained in the phenomena that the creators of the Vishnupurana observed, experienced and perceived as foreshadowings of the darkest horizons of the future. These phenomena may originate from the inner or outer world, from the crises and ruptures of the community's tripartite hierarchical structure, and from the confrontation with the decadences of other cultures and civilisations. It is also about the symptoms of the disease of those materialistic and slave-owning civilisations that the Aryans observed on their great march through the Eurasian spaces. As a veritable bog of historical memories of diverse origin, the Vishnu-Purana also contains traces of the encounters of the Aryans with failed Semitic and Dravidian cultures and civilisations. Thus, in a qualitative sense, the diseases of modern Western civilisation are no novelty in this arena of the universe: they are unique only in the extremism of their manifestations and in their vast, planetary scale of dissemination. The diseases in question here were unleashed by the force of bourgeois revolutions and the corresponding destruction of the last remnants of the institutions and customs of the triadic ideology.

Liberty - Equality - Fraternity

In the realm of the systems and institutions of political life, the first victim of the French Revolution was the Estates-General – which was composed of the separate representations of the clergy, the nobility and the third estate – that is, the possibilities contained within that final organon of *triadic ideology*. Although the Estates-General - established on a good tradition of 1347. in 1887 – existed only *de jure*, having long been dormant due to the processes of the monarchical absolutism's pathological development and the corresponding autocracy, its restoration, on the eve of the coup, could have opened up an alternative had the defenders of the monarchy been up to the challenge. It seems a cynical irony of historical fate that it was precisely a grotesque simulacrum of the Estates-General – convened in the summer of 1887. in 1887, from the past where it had lain buried for almost two centuries, by the Parisian Estates General, to legally resolve the conflict with the king over new tax impositions—necessary to settle the state's debts to shadowy usurers—opened the way for the forces that led to the French Revolution.

This summons was not an expression of an appreciation for the ideal values embodied in the Estates-General, but rather the cunning of the king's councillors and the cowardice of the Third Estate's representatives, who lacked the courage to refuse the king's demands, instead pleading their lack of authority.

Admittedly, it was the representatives of the Third Estate themselves, at the previous session of the Estates General, held as far back as 1614, who had demanded that it be convened more frequently, at least once a decade. Thus, the primary blame for the near two-century-long stagnation of this institution of *the ideology of the Estates General lies with* the first estate, embodied by the king, whose *absolutism* stifled and perverted many of the virtues of the second estate, causing an almost universal withdrawal of the nobility from all fronts of duty and responsibility towards the decadent idleness and luxury of Versailles. According to the sound observation of René Guénon, here we see how the king, in order to '*centralise*' and pris-

seeking to wield the power collectively belonging to the entire nobility, he enters into conflict with the nobility and devotes himself to the merciless destruction of the feudalism from which he sprang; and for these reasons we see how the kings of France, beginning with Philip the Fair, almost invariably surrounded themselves with bourgeois, especially those kings, such as Louis XI and Louis XIV, who carried 'centralisation' to its ultimate consequences, from which the bourgeoisie was bound to reap the benefits when it seized power through the Revolution." (Guenon, 1929) There is no doubt that the nobility loses its meaning where, by external force or its own cowardice, it deprives itself of the duties and responsibilities inherent in the second function. And it is not only a question of the functions of the community's physical but also spiritual defence, that is to say, of the loss of the nobility's sacred nature. Therefore, modern historians are only partially correct when they attribute the decadence of the nobility to circumstances which rendered their services superfluous: "*One fact was becoming ever more apparent: the fact of the absolute superfluity of the nobility, for long ago, the lords, the nobles, or whatever they were, at least as such, had protected no one, nor*

from whom." (Goubert, 1976).

Returning our gaze to the assembly from which the French Revolution emerged, we can conclude that the hypocritically and falsely renewed institution of *the ideology of tripartite division* displayed, in the benches of the representatives, the perversities of the electoral system or the profound extent of the decline and alienation of all the estates. There, the representatives of the first and second estates timidly withdrew or even sided with the third, whose psychopathological motives are convincingly attested to by the famous questions and

the tragicomic responses of the Abbé Sieyès: "*What is the Third Estate? - Everything! What has it been up to now? - Nothing! What does it want? - To become something!*"

How faithfully (or not) the actual third estate was represented in that assembly is sufficiently attested by the fact that only one farmer, a certain Gérard, was present, elected to Rennes as *'a reasonable and very honest, though uneducated man.*" Chronicles of the time testify that he used to attend sessions dressed in a peasant's suit. He was, therefore, the subject of general ridicule—which says more about the baseness of laughter than its object—while he, for his part, held the other deputies in very serious regard: "*It seems to me that there are many scoundrels among us.*"

By the force of anarchy, to which the spiritual, intellectual and moral weaknesses of the first and second estates had long since opened all roads, it was inevitable that the self-styled representatives of the third estate would finally destroy every semblance of the establishment of *the ideology of the three estates*, and would call this usurped assembly *'national'*, implicitly assuming a complete equality between themselves and the supposed, artificial *nation*. The years of terror and mass killings followed, not only of members of the first and second estates but also of the peasant section of the third estate: in the Vendée, revelling in spectacles of torture and the burning of living victims, women and children, the revolutionaries killed over seven hundred thousand souls.

The revolutionary assault on the remnants of the institutions of *the ideology of tripartite division* is also evidenced by the motto of the ideal state – *Liberty, Equality, Fraternity* – which was taken from the mechanical syncretism of the Masonic lodges, or rather from the corresponding pillaging of the treasuries of symbols and teachings of traditional cultures. This is the triad of the ideal state that most aptly suits *the ideology of tripartite division*. *Freedom* as a permanent state is the characteristic of the first function, which in the constitution of man corresponds to the mind. Only those people who have proven themselves to be sovereign and unconditional masters of the animal in man, and capable of *the human religious*

and divine, having passed all necessary exams, can be *free* from constraints, norms and even rituals, as such restraints and aids are no longer necessary for them.

As a hallmark of this state of life, equality perfectly resembles the bearers of the second function who are, or potentially, by duty, directly confronted with death, called upon to tame and overcome all the fears of the animal in man, which creates an aristocracy. The ethics of the second function dictate that all must be equal before mortal threats, with the exception of the leader, whose duty it is to lead. Finally, the state of *brotherhood* is inherent to the third function, encompassing its entire range, from the fertility and blood ties of the community it literally expresses, to the corresponding solidarity that is meant to restrain the selfishness and greed of the animal in man when he finds himself in the world of production and consumption.

The trinity of *liberty-equality-fraternity* takes on a quite different meaning when it marks a revolutionary order, where the summit of society has been usurped by the dregs of the third estate. Here, the state of *freedom* from all limitations and restraints—spiritual and religious, moral and political—is demanded by the awakened and prodded greed of the economic animal within man. *Equality*, applied to the first function, signifies the annulment and devaluation of all its virtues and distinctions. The yearning for a state of *brotherhood*, recommended to replace the function of defence, presupposes that it will become superfluous by the force of demolishing all boundaries and differences between faiths, classes, races, nations and states, which are here proclaimed as the fundamental causes of all conflicts and wars.

The destruction of the last remnants of the institutions of *the ideology of the three estates* under the pretext of the all-binding moral commandment of *equality*, the expulsion of the first and second estates, the clergy and the aristocracy from

the political scene, did not increase the freedoms of the average individual but most often diminished them. The French revolutionaries, with particular zeal, suppressed the guilds and trade associations under the pretext of freeing man from corresponding obligations and dependencies. Thus, the very last defences of human dignity and of labour, and of the organic ties that connected it with the other domains of community life, were in fact destroyed by the forces of *free-market* totalitarianism and the corresponding *laws* unleashed by the bourgeois revolutions. According to Karl Polanyi's astute observation, "*to separate labour from the other activities of life and subject it to the laws of the market means to destroy all organic forms of existence and to replace them with a different kind of organisation, an atomistic and individualistic one.*" (Polanyi, 1974).

It should be emphasised that the observed phenomenon is only part of a series of consequences of the breakdown of the community's tripartite structure under the influence of numerous forces, beginning with the adoption of the principles of organisation inherent in Old Testament society, characterised by the dualism of man and god, the rich and the poor, body and soul, woman and man... The greatest blow to the institutions and *the very ideology of tripartiteness* was dealt by the forces unleashed by the Protestant adoption of the Old Testament, commercial concept of *religion*, where a man's wealth is a measure of his religious zeal, which opened the way for the rampant greed, selfishness and individualism, and the political system most suited to it. This is a system of oligarchic and plutocratic rule, under the guise of a representative democracy. De Tocqueville had already keenly observed these consequences, comparing American democracy and European aristocracy, the American society of isolated individuals and the European community which connects man with all generations of the past and future:

Aristocracy made all citizens form a long chain that led from the warrior to the king; democracy breaks that chain and makes each link separate. Democracy, therefore, not only makes every man forget his ancestors, but it also conceals his descendants from him and separates him from his contemporaries; it constantly directs him towards himself and threatens to shut him up entirely in the solitude of his own heart." (De Tocqueville, 1970)

The destruction of the last institutions and customs of the ideology of tripartite division has suppressed the traditional, organic community, in which people were connected by a series of spiritual, blood and work ties, often stretched high above spatial and temporal distances. Thus, the way was paved for the creation of a simulacrum of community, that is, society, a mechanical aggregate of isolated individuals (Toennies, 1935). It should be noted that Tönnies's distinction between community and society also has its roots in the tradition of the German worldview. Observations of the nation's decline and the upheaval of the value order inherent in the ideology of tripartitism can already be found in Justus Möser's famous **Osnabrückische Geschichte** from 1768:

"A time when every Frank or Saxon cultivated paterna rura and defended it himself, in which he came to the assemblies of the land from his own estate, a time when even he who did not possess an estate—and might have been the wealthiest of merchants—belonged to the class of poor men, without honour or standing, that time could have shown the true nation, and not this one." (Chabod, 1967)

A similar observation characterises the returnee from the First World War, the tragic hero of Jünger's novel **The Glass Bees**:

I was thinking of the good old days when the lords of steel, textiles and coal were not accorded the importance they now demand for themselves. Back then, there was no talk of films or robots, except at fairs. A small landowner, burdened by long dreams, was much more respected by horsemen than those they saw driving the new cars that unsettled the horses. The horses sensed what was coming. In the meantime, the world has been turned upside down." (Jünger, 1957)

A Cultural Morphology

Ezra Pound teaches that painters too can—consciously or unconsciously—foresee "what is coming" and the great reversal of the traditional hierarchy: "I repeat: an expert, looking at a picture (by Memling, Goya or any painter) will know how to discern the degree of tolerance for usury which was present in the society where the picture was painted." (Pound, 1942) In the preceding essay, **Art or Usury**, Pound explained how to discern the pictorial signs of the restriction or release of usury. A strict discipline is manifested in the "purity of line", such as that which characterises the mosque at Cordova and expresses the prohibition of usury by Muhammad. In contrast, freedom for usurers and speculators "goes hand in hand with a thickening in all forms of art" (Pound, 1938).

The epistemological method set out can also validly serve for comparative assessments of the magnitude of transformations. Pound's aesthetic and ethical ideal arguably represents the art of Pisanello well, of whom, in *the Pisan Cantos* (LXXIV), he says that he, along with the sculptor Matteo de' Pasti, is "outside Babylon". (Pound, 1953). The opposite pole, in the age before the French Revolution, arguably constitutes the art of Rembrandt, which is characterised by the greatest and most manifold thickening. Although he created his work in an age of the liberation of usury, under the shadow of the Venetian mercantile and thalassocratic republic, Pisanello is the last great painter of European Gothic and of the ethos of medieval chivalry. Against Venice and on the side of the noble Gonzagas he was able to

rises and acts with arms α , to bear the burden of a political exile. Rembrandt created in Amsterdam, the capital of European usury, enjoying the support of the wealthiest stratum of the third estate, and enriched, he himself indulged in the trade of debts, stock-exchange speculation and earnings derived from time. A slave to greed, he lived in a wild marriage with a young maid in order to preserve the inheritance of his first, deceased wife, bequeathed on the condition that he remain a widower.

As if he were an adherent of the ideal of anonymity, in the sense of transcending vain individuality—to which medieval mystics, knights and builders aspired—Pisanello made no effort to leave traces of his life, nor of his appearance. We do not even know when he was born, or when he departed from this arena of the universe. A strong individual psychology, or the vanity inherent in the modern man, impelled Rembrandt to thrust his own likeness upon us, though he was physically very ugly, his body marred by shameless obesity, especially in his later years. He left behind some seventy self-portraits, but this was not enough for him, and he was happy to take on the role of a model for depictions of more famous figures, from Democritus to the Apostle Paul of Tarsus. This facile use of different masks, or the performance of quite different roles, also heralds the modern civilisation in which the superstitious egalitarianism will deny any significance to the differences of human natures with respect to tasks and duties.

Pisanello's delicate line—which with unprecedented elegance highlights the profiles of things and figures, patiently revealing the diverse textures of light in the material world—perfectly expresses an ultimate intolerance of usury. Yet, the age of such intolerance was then drawing to a close. Living and creating in *an interregnum*, at the twilight of Europe's age of cathedrals, chivalry and troubadours, Pisanello seems to have sensed the coming of a great upheaval in virtues and values: his finest or most significant scenes are suffused with a noble sadness, as if before a final farewell from loved ones. The line of Rembrandt's drawings is corpulent and rich, sometimes flabby and accompanied by blotches. His figures and self-portraits, particularly in his later period, are rendered in thick layers of paint, applied and smeared with a broad brush that leaves traces of bristles, over time highlighted by the incising of layers of dirt, or patina. As if their pictorial credibility were to be confirmed not only by the viewer's sight but also by touch. Such a pronounced, coarse *materiality* of the painting betrays a loss of spiritual content and a subjection to the gravitational forces of the material world.

In Pisanello's oeuvre, the time of upheaval is most poignantly heralded by the fresco **The Departure of Saint George**, from the wall of *Castelvecchio* in Verona. Beneath the Christian guise lies a universal, Euro-Arian myth that preserves a range of experiences, from the historical memory of *the clash of cultures*, under the banners of *celestial* principles against the devotees of chthonic and subterranean deities, to the struggle of the *divine* element, within *the* human *mixture*, to master and govern *animal* impulses and forces. Pisanello places the depiction of the myth in the social setting of his own time, thereby emphasising its contemporaneity. Yet, *the dragon* is still an external threat: the city, built with Gothic inspiration and skill, rests in peace and slumber. Order and law rule it decisively, as testified by the gallows from which hang the bodies of the hanged. Only those for whom it is a paid or moral duty are awake: a group of foreign mercenaries, common in the Italian cities of Pisanello's time, and Saint George and the Princess, who embody the latter and former functions respectively. Although the external threat is of supernatural proportions, the heroic couple conveys unwaveringness through their bearing, movements and gazes.

a bundle of virtues. The gaze of the caring Princess, resting on the face of the hero, and the gaze of Saint George, directed into the distance, towards the enemy – or towards Saint Anthony, in the scene of *the Madonna with Saint Anthony and Saint George*, just as the contemplation of Saint Eustace upon the crucifixion, shown to him from the forehead of the stag, in the painting **The Vision of Saint Eustace** – attest to the absolute sovereignty of the mind and the sovereign serenity of the spirit.

The bearing of Pisanello's figures, and above all their gazes, perfectly represent the attitude of authentic Roman, European and Euro-Aryan religiosity, which Lucretius described in *De rerum natura* as rejecting foreign customs: "*Religion does not consist in a constant turning towards the squalid stone, nor in approaching all altars, nor in prostrating oneself, flat on the ground, nor in raising hands before the dwellings of the gods, nor in flooding the temples with the blood of victims, nor in heaping up gifts—but in observing all things with a tranquil mind.*"

In the figures from Rembrandt's paintings, the eyes are usually lifeless, the gazes vacant. And this is a sure sign of the reign of money and usury, a sign of the extinguishing of the inner fire of the *divine* element. Rembrandt's *pendant* can only be *the Night Watch*, the group portrait of Amsterdam's civil guard, which the citizens pay to maintain order, peace and, above all, their property. The protected citizenry is represented by a sickly, overweight and elderly little girl who, with a smile of some foolishness, crosses the street, carrying a dead chicken tucked into her belt. Although the threat is formally reduced to the scale of ordinary crime, the scene betrays the extraordinary unease of those very people who are supposed to be reassuring others. The commander, the central figure, as he strides and explains something vehemently (he is addressing his nearest, but looks as if he is speaking loudly to himself), gazes, with wide-open eyes, into some void. In contrast to the extraordinary breadth of perspective in Pisanello's scene, commensurate with *the magnitude* of the an/m/hero and Princess - Rembrandt's scene exudes a sense of claustrophobic confinement, on the verge of panic. A heavy darkness has fallen upon all things and phenomena—heightened by the oxidation of carelessly prepared paints—accentuated by some ghostly, oblique illuminations. There, danger seems to lurk from all sides. This impression is heightened by the drummer, who is meant to encourage the citizenry and frighten away thieves. Here, every figure is utterly alone, as if the painter wished to depict his premonition of the life of *a lonely crowd* in the metropolises of the future. Some of the connections are entirely contrived and mechanical, such as the one mentioned between the commander and his assistant: each strides about, like a medium, shut away in his own world.

Unity of the people and that of the elite

The ideology of tripartite division requires—as a *condition sine qua non*—organic bonds of reciprocity between each estate and the others. In principle, in the normal state of the community or state, currents of influence spring from the summit and permeate all bodies and all estates. In extraordinary circumstances, as attested by Serbian folk poetry, where there are not enough, or suitable, people to perform the first and second functions, representatives of the third function assume the duties and responsibilities of those who are lacking. This is a linkage that unites the poles of the community and indeed leads—as Tocqueville observes—from the king to the warrior, but also from the saints and sages to the most amiable of men. For example, according to the tradition of the Aryas in India, even *the samnyasis*—men who, on the threshold of old age, after fulfilling all their obligations to family and community, retire into the solitude of the forest to devote themselves to the metaphysical realisation of the self—do not cease to act for the good of the community, even if

as teachers or counsellors. The advisory role encompasses everything, even the most profane tasks, as attested by the European experience of Don Juan Donoso Cortés, Marquis of Valdegamas:

*If the human race were not accustomed to seeing things upside down - it would choose as counsellors, among men, theologians; among theologians, mystics; and among mystics, those who lead the most withdrawn life with regard to the world and its affairs. Among the people I know, and I know many, the only ones in whom I have recognised an unshakeable and sound sense of reality, true wisdom, a marvellous ability to find a way out of the most difficult situations - these are the ones who live a spiritual and withdrawn life - they find practical and wise solutions to the most difficult problems and always find a way out of the most difficult affairs - these are those who live a spiritual **and** withdrawn life.*" (Donoso Cortes, 1946)

Where organic links between functions are absent, all the conditions are in place for the alienation of every estate, not only from the whole but also from its own essence. French sovereigns not only "*surrounded themselves with bourgeois almost on a regular basis*"- as Genon observed - but also to usurers, thus becoming hostages to their growing debts and mediums of a foreign will or ill-will, which too often drove them into fratricidal wars for the sake of new and deeper indebtedness. A great contribution was also made by the pliable juristic thought of the time: seeking to define the king's rule as completely independent of higher principles, it *de facto* deprived the monarchy of its sacred nature; seeking to make the king equally independent of the lower courts – it destroyed customary law, abolished the traditional liberties of the warrior class of the third estate, and disenfranchised its feudal protectors. Thus, the way was paved for absolutism and the bourgeois revolution which took over and greatly strengthened the centralist structures inherited from the *state of the Ancien Régime*.

The cycle of bourgeois revolutions began in the British Isles thanks to the weakening and perversion of the nobility. In the Hundred Years' War, which the English nobility waged against Flanders and Gascony on behalf of the wool merchants and, above all, the moneylenders - pot- necessary to finance the exorbitant maintenance of a standing army on the continent and the extraordinary development of siege engines and the means of besieging cities - it had almost completely exhausted its biological strength and material resources. Those who survived the war were so debased by senile barbarism that they had lost all power to fulfil their traditional roles in society. The nobles went to war inspired by the poetry of chivalry, only to return as slaves to usurious blackmail, turning their backs on the people, capable only of a predatory and parasitic life, sinking into ever-deeper indebtedness and dependency, which in turn necessitated new, ruinous wars, such as that between the *red and the white rose*.

England was the first country in which all significant restrictions on usury were abolished. And the first in which noble titles were offered for sale and purchased. For example, after the death of Henry VIII, the regency was taken over by a Council of sixteen members, among whom there was not a single trustworthy nobleman, as their titles had not been earned on the battlefield but purchased with money or services. The granting of a lordship to pirates like Drake or to usurers, like Rothschild—who acquired his greatest wealth through grand fraud and at the expense of others' misfortune—perfectly reflects the inversion of the value-order that is at the basis of any true postulation of the *ideology of the tripartite division of society*. The pathological phenomenon of unworthy or false 'nobility', supplied with titles bought with money or services in public or occult markets, spread rapidly and is already pointed to by de Maistre as one of the fatal causes of the French Revolution:

Pseudo-nobility was one of the greatest scourges of France: other, less brilliant kingdoms are weary and disgraced by it, awaiting other misfortunes... The role that a few nobles played in the French Revolution is a thousand times, I will not say more horrible, but more dreadful than anything we have seen during the Revolution." (DeMaistre, 2001)

In the long series of indignities committed by the pseudo-nobility of base Albion, the denial of asylum to the Russian Tsar Nicholas II and the imperial family stands out in particular, thus leaving them exposed to the bloodthirsty hatred of the enemies of the Russian people and the Christian empire. It should be noted that this crime was made possible by a long process of decay not only of the interconnections but also of the internal structures of the functions of the tripartite community. Contenting itself with only the rhetorical formula of the ideology of tripartite unity – "Orthodoxy, Autocracy, and Nationality" - and the corresponding applause of the court entourage, the tsar became ever more isolated and the empire ever more menaced. In the crucial hour, it transpired that the tsar and the empire had in fact been betrayed by almost everyone: from kinsmen at Buckingham Palace, to the Rurikovich nobility, the political and military elite, and the corresponding intelligentsia, almost entirely in the thrall of Western influences. In the salons of the empire, with an unheard-of complex of provincial inferiority or belatedness, the Russian elite zealously gave itself over to the diseases of the West, from Freemasonry, occultism and Theosophy to socialism, anarchism and nihilism. According to the testimony of Nikolai Berdyaev, *what is characteristic of the intelligentsia is the absence of a soil - a detachment from tradition - a severance with all traditions of the class-based way of life, and this is something characteristic of Russia. .. Given the conditions of the Russian political system, the intelligentsia found itself on the sidelines of any real social action, and this increasingly fostered in them a penchant for daydreaming about societal change. In tsarist and feudal Russia, the most radical socialist and anarchist ideas were born.*" (Ведляев, 1989)

The Tsar was most resolutely defended—and for that reason was murdered by the enemies of Tsarist Russia—by a certain fool-for-Christ from the common people, Rasputin. And herein is evidenced that organic bond which, in the faithful aristocratic Europe, linked king and warrior. By all accounts, the enemies of Tsarist Russia—which was on the best of its ways to become the most powerful world power—by demonising and criminalising Rasputin aimed not only to deprive the Tsar of even such a pathetically weak and solitary defence, but also to demonise and criminalise the Russian people and their tradition, to symbolically stifle his extraordinary vitality. As Platonov observes, after a detailed study of all available testimonies, *the negative myth of Rasputin must be considered as a specially created obstacle (though not the only one) on the path to perceiving our spiritual, political and national values. And it was created precisely to block the path of full-scale war towards these values, so that, having turned to the mythologised Rasputin, people would recoil in horror from their past, striving to forget it and never return to it.* (Platonov, 1996)

When we read the messages Rasputin sent to the Tsar, we get the impression that this uneducated son of the people was better able to see the state of humanity than the elites of the first and second functions. In his final telegram of 23 November 1916, Rasputin instructs the Tsar:

"We are all human, and we must all take human beings into account. Human plans are not a yardstick; the yardstick of human plans is when they reason with firmness and when the truth burns on their face, and we must submit with respect. But when discord and malice burn on their face, in their heart, that is a 'vilonska lica'!

Emphasising the principle of *'my own people first and foreigners aside'*, Rasputin concludes the message with the tsar's words of encouragement: *'We will not fear evil; good will be ours.'*

In the treasuries of European memory, alongside a series of historical attestations of the disastrous consequences of the rupture of reciprocity between the three functions, there also lies a mythical crystallisation, transposed into the Serbian epic poem *The Marriage of Dušan* (Karadžić, 11.29). In this poem, which is otherwise replete with symbolism of the number three, trinities and triplications, the bard sings of the path of heroic initiation, of the overcoming of extraordinary obstacles such as those which *the 'Latin king Michael'* "treacherously placed in the way of the wedding procession of the *'Serbian tsar Stephen'*," who, in accordance with the official promise and agreement, had set out among the Latins – *the 'old deceivers'* - to take and marry the daughter of their sovereign. Previously, that Mihailo had escorted an envoy of *'the Serbian Tsar Stephen'* with the message that the groom *'should not bring his two nephews, / Two nephews, two Voinovići; Vukashin and with them Petrashin; / I'll get the heavy drinkers drunk / And the Italian bravlers in the cage; / When they're drunk they'll start a fight, / Then it's hard to answer the cage / When we marry the white Ledana."*

Spotting the wedding procession pass by from their fortresses, the noble Voinovići notice a great danger: *"Why on earth has our uncle taken a dislike to us, / That he would not call us to the wedding? / Someone has spoken ill of us to him, / He was tearing the living flesh from his bones! / The Emperor has gone to Latin land, / And he has no hero with him / Not one of his own kin, / Who would be there in his need, / Should he ever be in trouble, / The Latins are old deceivers, / They will destroy our uncle / And we dare not laugh at the uninvited."*

As in the cycle of poems about the Serbian hero of revolutionary traditionalism from the time of the centuries-long Islamic occupation, that is, Marko Krstić - and here is reflected the leaden time on the shoulders of the people, deprived of its nobility; hence, the crucial advice to the Vojnovićs comes from the mother, that is, from the last remaining source of wisdom, which lies within the domain of the third function. The mother advises them to send their brother Miloš Vojnović, her third and youngest son, to secretly aid the Serbian tsar: *"You have a brother in the mountain / Among the sheep, Miloš the shepherd, / He is the youngest, the finest hero, / And the tsar does not even know of him."*

Joining the wedding procession under a shepherd's shubara which hid his features and a shepherd's greatcoat which covered his ceremonial silk and gold attire, Miloš Vojnović was the only one among the noble wedding guests to answer all the emperor's calls for a hero ready to answer the challenges on his behalf.

Latina, to the Latin stipulations for the hand of King Michael's daughter. A series of tests of the hero's versatility follows, from a duel with the king's captive, to leaping over horses with flaming swords and the power of wit to discover which is the king's daughter among three beauties, to the final victory, to the fight with *'Balač, the three-headed vojvode'*.

In the Serbian epic, the experience and knowledge are crystallised that the metaphysical strength of the nobility is maintained only where it has remained faithful to the people, where it lives with the people, carrying out its duties and responsibilities.

A Masonic surrogate of the threefold community

The estrangement of the nobility from its essence and role is one of the essential causes of the decadence and the stifling of the tradition and institutions of *the ideology of tripartite society*. Therefore, even the most powerful polemics against monarchical absolutism or clericalism did not rest on the positive principles of *the ideology of tripartite division*, but instead invoked the worlds of imagined exoticism, utopia or the "ancient liberties", as for example the Count Henri de Boulainvilliers did—an unjustly forgotten forerunner and teacher of Rousseau and Voltaire, and of French Freemasonry—who extolled the Arabo-Islamic social order over the European, monarchical-absolutist and clerical one. (*Vic de Mahomet*) and the Frankish aristocracy against the ruling French dynasty. Admittedly, De Bulanville also launched a rehabilitation of the Estates General (*Lettres sur le anciens Parlements de France que l'on nomme Etats Generaux*) as the target of his polemics. but overlooking its *triple* essence, overshadowed by its Frankish origin and its nature in the sign of ancient liberties and equality, where an elective and not hereditary king is merely *primus inter pares*.

Thus prevented by monarchical absolutism and the intellectual derangement of the nobility, *the ideology of tripartite division* was postp-led in a stunted and pathologically perverted form, by its nature similar to a malignant tumour, which was the main laboratory for those ideas and movements that carried out the bourgeois revolutions against the absolutist monarchies and the remnants of empires and spiritual authority. This concerns the organisation of *the Freemasons*, which had significant, and even crucial, roles in a number of decisive events on the stage of European modern history, from the French Revolution (Jacob, 1991) to the provocation of the First World War and the creation of Yugoslavia and the new partition of Europe (Mužić, 2001).

It is important to point out at the outset that this is not about some authentic legacy of the medieval guilds of cathedral builders, but about modern, speculative Freemasonry, which took its name from the old, *operative* one, into whose secularism and, without a doubt, long-abandoned London *lodges* it nested, like a cancer in another's shell. The first composition of Freemasonry was precisely marked by the discovered interplay of three functions, represented in the lodges by the Protestant clergy, the nobility, and the wealthier section of the third estate. Judging by the findings of Bernard Fay's uniquely far-reaching research, the primary impetus for the creation of *speculative Freemasonry* in the British Isles was the overwhelming need of certain Protestant clergymen to respond to the challenges of the growing moral anarchy and godlessness of English urban society by demonstrating the existence of *God* through positivist and empirical evidence, seen particularly in Newton's theory of gravitation. One of the main driving forces, whom Fay recognises in the pastor Desaguliers, explained this approach in these words, on the pages of the introduction to his lectures on *experimental philosophy* (*A Course of Experimental Philosophy*):

"All the knowledge we have of nature rests upon facts, for without observation and experience our natural philosophy would be nothing more than a science of mere words and unintelligible jargon." (Fay, 1945)

Given that such sermons were unsuitable for churches and were to be thrust deep into profane society, the preachers sought out and found the most suitable, that is, the most spacious and cheapest premises in the headquarters of the remaining associations of the rare cathedral builders, who were there mostly whiling away their time, vainly awaiting commissions from a society possessed by godlessness. It was a *formula suited to the educated, of a high intellectual calibre, drawn to heterodox mysticism, as well as to the clergy,*

...obsessed with preserving traditional morality, the Church's social cadres and the essential part of Christian dogmas for the plebeians, eager for novelty, somewhat sensitive to the idea of the divine, somewhat inclined towards mysticism, respectful of liturgy and prayer but vain, arrogant and thirsty for excitement... The upper bourgeoisie followed the nobility, but cautiously and with restraint; a small, intellectual, artistic, and commercial bourgeoisie, for whom life in luxury and the atmosphere of the big city had already made life feverish, threw themselves headlong and blindly into Freemasonry, filling the lodges. They were diligent, enthusiastic, and indiscreet. For them, it was delightful to take part in meetings in the lodges where everyone was equal, where everyone was a brother; where everyone wore a sabre, where everyone called each other 'knights'. That sublime fellowship with its deepest mysteries was at the same time a very pleasant fellowship with the upper classes." (Fay, 1945).

However, such a representation of the three functions or estates did not bear the fruits that the institutions of *trinitarian ideology* usually provide, although towards the outside world, benevolence was and remained officially the primary aim of Masonic association. In all likelihood, this is the fatal consequence of the contrived, mechanical nature of such participation and the self-deceptive nature of the content of the Masonic pseudo-doctrine, its myths and legends, and its '*deepest mysteries*'. A single, cursory glance through an iconological lens at the scenography of Masonic lodges is sufficient—lodges crammed with symbols pilfered without conscience or sense from the most diverse sources, by the force of fashionable exoticism and quasi-esotericism - to perceive the fact that Freemasonry does not originate from ancient Egypt, nor from the surviving, vindictive remnants of the Templar Order, but rather from the Levantine pseudospiritualism born in Florence of vain hucksters and barren Mannerists, that is, in the 16th century. This embellishment with the plunder of others is usually accompanied by the overlooking, and even the complete inversion, of the authentic meanings of the stolen symbols, devise and ritual, and it can be freely said that with Freemasonry begins the history of that kind of bad taste, called *kitsch*, which was unknown to any previous epoch or culture.

Also, the Masonic imitation of the chivalric orders is utterly tasteless and repulsive, devoid of any sense other than a deceptive one. This is a mockery of the initiatory and hierarchical paths of the human element's metaphysical transformation, which in reality require heroic ordeals and combative confrontations with mortal threats. One can only enter the true knightly path of existential rupture and metaphysical transformation with arms in hand and with the merits gained through the winds of war, the fires of battle, and in the coldest trials of the heart. The farcical nature of such a petty-bourgeois monkeying of the chivalric orders is also evidenced by the fact of the rapid multiplication of rungs on the ladder of the Masonic pseudo-hierarchy: from the initial two, proper to true, that is, *operative* Masonry, which distinguished between *apprentices and fellows* - to which the *speculative Freemasons* immediately added a third, for the lodge president, produced into a *Master* (Newton, 1916) - all the way up to as many as thirty-three degrees, invented and named with the arbitrariness of the penny-dreadful imagination of the modern man.

At this point in the exposition, it is necessary to open a parenthesis and point out that negative assessments of the content and effects of Freemasonry are not without their shortcomings, where exceptionally significant undertakings and deeds also rest, particularly in the domain of the discovery of fabled values and virtues in the treasures of the heritage of European nations. Many of the researchers to whom we owe the insights of Euro-Aryan solidarity during the 19th century belonged to the Masonic order and participated in the movements of national awakening and

and rebirth. Any more complete view of the history of Freemasonry must also take into account the vast differences between often good intentions and disastrous outcomes. In the Masonic lodges, there were certainly some who found themselves there, led astray or by the force of their own naivety, like Prince Pierre Bezukhov, the hero of Tolstoy's novel *War and Peace*. A good example of this is provided by the Count Joseph de Maistre in his reply of 18 June 1782 to the Duke of Brunswick's invitation to join the Masonic gathering at Wilhelmsbad (*Mémoire au duc de Brunswick*). De Maistre not only decisively rejects all mystifications about the origin of the Masonic word, but also emphasises his conviction (or desire) in the Christian nature of its initiation. De Maistre outlines his ideal organisation, which is in fact a form of *triadic ideology*. According to De Mestr, the Masonic organisation should be structured in three parts: *the brethren* at the first degree should devote themselves to charity and to the study of morals and politics; on the second degree to establishing Christian ecumenism and influencing governments, and on the third, to the supreme revelations and dogmas of the esoteric domain of Christian doctrine. It is perhaps unnecessary to point out that De Maistre had to abandon Freemasonry.

Closing the parenthesis, we can point out that the first losers of speculative Freemasonry were precisely the members of the first and second estates. Members of the clergy, in their search for empirical and positivistically valid proof of the existence of the Christian God—which was to be as irrefutably demonstrable by law as that demanded by the methods of modern, experimental science, thus devoted solely to the world of quantity, and of science—finally lost all faith in God, who was replaced by a Frankenstein's monster of a deistic and anthropomorphic abomination, half-man, half-goat, which in the vision of the renegade Eliphas Lévi embodies *the Great Architect of the (Masonic) Universe*.

The aristocracy quickly lost itself in the crowd of representatives of the third estate, where the principles of plutocracy reigned and still reign, and they all became aware, willingly or unwillingly, that they were the media's executioners of nihilistic strategies of occult or open forces of subversion, which aimed to undermine and destroy, through Freemasonry as a mere instrument, the remnants of the orders and institutions, virtues and values of monarchical and imperial, Christian and aristocratic Europe. Freemasonry has, above all, completely betrayed the essential meaning of the tripartite structure of the traditional European community, which it mimicked in its composition: instead of serving the whole of the community, it has always been and remains a foreign body, a self-appointed elite which has related and continues to relate to society in a parasitic manner. For members of the third estate, Freemasonry has largely served, and continues to serve, as a shortcut for the gratification of a range of selfish needs, from personal advancement and the exercise of influence, through business deals and bargains, to earnings obtained outside of morally or legally prescribed procedures. These benefits were and are paid for by conscious or unconscious service in an undeclared war against Europe, on the side of its enemies, beyond the English Channel and the Atlantic Ocean. The absence of any positive basis for this enmity betrays its mediumistic nature, in the service of the forces of nihilism. The statement of the experience of Freemasonry as gained by Frederick the Great, King of Prussia, is much deeper than was intended, as it illuminates the ideal of nihilism: "*Freemasonry is one great Nothing!*"

The Fourth Estate

With the overthrow of the last institutions and customs *of the ideology of tripartite division*, a great abyss was opened for the degradation of labour and the reduction of the complex relations of the world of production to the simple dualism of the owner of the means of production and the wage-labourer, the exploiter and the exploited, profit and survival. Observing predominantly the English economy and society, Marx could rightly observe in *the Communist Manifesto*: *"The whole of society is more and more splitting into two great hostile camps, into two great classes which stand directly opposite one to the other: the bourgeoisie and the proletariat."* (Marx/Engels, 1945).

The world onto which Marx projects his unbridled hatred of the European and Christian tradition is determined *by the ideology of tripartite division*. Marx sees this world in a historical perspective. He observes with undisguised satisfaction that the bourgeois revolutions have cast not only the first and second estates but also all their corresponding virtues and values onto *the 'dustbin of history'*. According to Marx, these virtues and values are merely *"religious and political illusions,"* produced for the purpose of *"concealing exploitation."* Therefore, he praises and glorifies the nihilistic undertaking of the bourgeoisie, which strips man of all *"illusions* and reveals him as he is, namely as a selfish, economic animal:"

The bourgeoisie has played a revolutionary role in history. Wherever it has come to power, the bourgeoisie has shattered all feudal, patriarchal, idyllic relations. She has mercilessly torn asunder the manifold feudal ties that bound man to his natural superior, and has left between man and man no other bond than naked interest, than the heartless 'payment in cash'. She has drowned the quiet stream of pious dreaming, chivalrous enthusiasm, and petty-bourgeois melancholy in the icy waters of selfish calculation. She has dissolved personal dignity in commodity value and, in place of the countless, chartered and won freedoms, has set one unscrupulous freedom of trade...

The bourgeoisie has stripped from all the hitherto dignified professions, which were looked up to with awe, their saintly aureole. It has turned the doctor, the lawyer, the priest, the poet and the scientist into its paid wage-labourers.

The bourgeoisie has stripped of its family relationship its touching sentimental veil and reduced it to a purely monetary relationship... Everything that is stately and established is evaporating, everything that is sacred is crumbling, and people are finally being forced to look with sober eyes upon their position, upon their mutual relations."

Although in Marx's eyes the bourgeoisie has extraordinary merits for destroying European and Christian values and for reducing human relationships, and even man himself, to the framework of material interests - it is doomed to hand over its power and its dominions to the fourth estate, the proletariat, because its nihilism is insufficiently effective. In the eyes of Marx's hatred for all things European and Christian—already evidenced by his youthful, Satanic poems—the proletariat has a twofold advantage over the bourgeoisie. The first: its nihilism is potentially more decisive and effective. The second advantage: unlike the bourgeoisie, in and through which some remnants or at least simulacra *of the old society, or rather of the old 'illusions'*, survive, the proletariat, by its very being and its moral desolation, provides a stark and encouraging example of how far the process of nihilism can go:

The conditions of the old society are already destroyed in the living conditions of the proletariat. The proletariat has no property; its relationship to woman and child has nothing in common with the bourgeois family relationship; modern industrial labour, modern slavery to capital... has stripped it of every national character. Law, morality, religion are for it only bourgeois prejudices behind which hide bourgeois interests."

How was it possible that for decades, countless numbers of educated and well-meaning people read these lines from the *Communist Manifesto* and did not realise that they were a blatant expression of hatred towards everything human that belongs to the upright in life? The question of why generations flocked to the siren call of Marxist nihilism—at the cost of intellectual, moral, and even physical self-destruction—deserves a separate and very thorough investigation. Here we must be content with the hypothesis that the deepest reason, or rather the driving force behind the masses' adherence to the communist movement, lay precisely in the contested yet immanent *ideology of the tripartite division*, in its value hierarchy which condemned the unconscionable possessors of material wealth - Marx would have said "*the owners of the means of production and the exploiters*".- places the owners of material wealth at the bottom of the third estate. The bourgeois revolutions, enabled by the centuries-long weakening of the first function and others, have performed a complete reversal of the value system inherent to the *ideology of the tripartite division* on the stage of social reality, but it has remained unconquered and upright in the hearts of men. This has caused a strong contradiction between the human exterior and interior. Therefore, the communist call to revolution was widely and mistakenly understood as an undertaking aimed at establishing the natural order of values, that is, *social justice*; in other words, aimed at the renewal, not the destruction, of humanity.

Such, completely different understandings of the goals of communism finally took on the proportions of a combative dualism within the revolutionary movement, manifested already in Stalin's conflict with almost the entire 'party leadership', starting with Lenin and Trotsky. Stalin, enjoying strong support from the Russian 'base', strove for the restoration of the devastated state and of Russian power. Lenin, Trotsky and the others from the 'top leadership' advocated for the complete subjugation of the Russian state and the genocidal extermination of the first and second estates, as well as the upper stratum of the third estate of the Russian people, above all the peasants. Gennady Zyuganov, observing the history of the communist movement in the USSR – from the October Revolution to *perestroika* and its collapse – notes that it is characterised by a dualism of '*heroism and betrayal, victim and executioner, greatness and baseness, patriotism and Russophobia...*' *The first strove to restore the destroyed and looted infrastructure, to establish food supplies, to modernise the economy, to build new factories, to revive the armed forces. The second signed savage decrees*

0 in a 'complete totalitarianisation', carried out liquidations of thousands of hostages, praised 'shooting as a method of upbringing', organised concentration camps, cold-bloodedly murdered millions of people and blew up the nation's sanctuaries. The internal struggle between these two factions within the party sometimes subsided, sometimes flared up with renewed force, but it never ceased, not for a single moment, lasting for many decades and representing, in a sense, the subtext of the Soviet period in Russian history, which has decisively and dramatically conditioned the events of recent years." (Zyuganov, 1999)

New World Chaos

The ideology of tripartition does not necessarily lead to a complete faithful representation of its own structure, nor does it create corresponding classes. It is expressed from the depth of the European man's self-being, as an ideal, ahistorical and eternal pattern of political organisation, most fully realised even where the corresponding hierarchy has been overturned, as Plato's doctrine testifies to us above all. In the history of European man, this ideology has been proven to be an immanent, ideal model that enables him to comparatively assess the actual state of the community or society, or the extent of alienation from the norm of a harmonious relationship between functions.

Instructive examples of the use of *the ideology of tripartition* to assess the state of Europe after the bourgeois revolutions—carried out under the banners of the ideology of equality—are provided by Russian thinkers, foremost among them the Slavophiles. For example, Fyodor Mikhailovich Dostoevsky, upon his return from Paris, published his impressions of the state of the French nation, reduced to the narrow circle of the third estate, in 1863. year, in the pages of the journal *Vremya*, his impression of the state of the French nation, reduced to the narrow-minded member of the third estate, a certain or imaginary Jacques Bonhomme, self-satisfied with his own nothingness and amorality. The disillusioned Russian, observing the disappearance of the chivalrous and religious type of man among the French, concludes that they have been stifled by scorn.

This insight is confirmed and deepened by Konstantin Leontiev in his essay on *the average European as an ideal and a tool of general destruction*. Here, *the ideology of tripartite social structure* is the implicit, positive basis for the critique of the process of class mixing and simplification, that is, the obliteration of all qualitative distinctions within humanity, from racial and national to class-based. This process negates these properties in favour of an unnatural uniformity, that is, reducing everyone to the mould of the third estate. Taking into account the technological development that accompanies this process, Leontiev outlined catastrophic outcomes, which threaten not only nature itself but also *human society, which ought to be a complex and rounded organism, like the bodies that nature has shaped... Machines, steam, electricity and so on, firstly, strengthen and accelerate this mixing... Their further spread will inevitably lead to violent and bloody upheavals; probably even to unforeseen physical catastrophes; secondly, all these inventions are useful only to that class of average people who are at the same time the main instruments of mixing and its representatives, and its product.* (Leontiev, 2002)

The world we live in, at the beginning of the 21st century, is characterised by global nihilistic processes unleashed by bourgeois revolutions and the usurpation of power by the unproductive and parasitic parts of the third estate. These processes have destroyed the last remnants and institutions of *the ideologies of the tripartite social order*, and the corresponding religious, political, ethical and moral constraints on the greed of the economic animal within man. It should be pointed out that this is not only about the great bourgeois revolutions – such as the English and French – but also about the preceding ones, the small or creeping, the quiet or secret ones, which created commercial republics like the Venetian or Genoese. In Venice, the first victims were precisely the nobility, to whom the plutocratic principle and standard of a man's worth granted or denied even the right to marry. This right was denied—at the cost of extinguishing the lineage—if the fortune was below the prescribed threshold.

As historical experience testifies, in bourgeois revolutions it is not the fundamental or holistic spirit of the third function that prevails, but rather the factors of its pathological degenerations. Hence, sooner or later, and

the world of the third function becomes the inevitable target of attack for such liberated, nihilistic and parasitic forces. The processes initiated by the ideology of liberalism and the Enlightenment, the Judeo-Protestant work ethic and apologies for individualism and selfishness, the bourgeois revolutions and the liberation of productive, commercial and financial forces from the shackles and limitations of a political, religious and moral nature – have, after two centuries, led to, to the triumph of the darkest economy in human history, which threatens the basic biological and ecological conditions for the survival of all life forms on the planet, beginning with the human species.

The processes that began in the British Isles with the legalisation of usury, by the expulsion of the blackmailed nobility into the plunderers of the people, the shameless buying and selling of noble titles, and the alienation from Europe - have led to a complete reversal of the classical order of the community, and today at the top of the world's pyramid are only specimens of the worst, villainous and criminogenic stratum of human material. In a study of *the new world economic chaos*, the economist Georges Corm surveys the gallery of champions of the darkest economy, at the top of the world's pyramid of financial power, from *the 'princes of finance, who have acquired extraordinary fortunes thanks to stock market movements and financial big bangs, made possible by the revolution in electronic communications... to the vast network of national and international traffickers in drugs, weapons, cheap labour and any commodity or person moving in violation of national laws. This is a legion of new rentiers of the 20th century whose wealth does not rest on any productive basis, but on the contrary, on the dismantling of modern economic mechanisms.* (Corm, 1993)

It may be superfluous to point out here that liberal capitalism is the fundamental ideological matrix and the driving force behind the centuries-long process that has led to *the new global economic chaos*. On the other hand, it is necessary to point out that the fundamental force opposing that process—in various, and even mutually contradictory, forms and movements—drew its strength from that feeling commonly called *social justice*, which is in fact an impulse inherent in *the ideology of tripartitism*. It is worth bearing in mind the historical experience that impulses, inclinations or dispositions of a particular **forma mentis** are not very discerning in states of scarcity or utter destitution: if they do not have their own, innate form of expression, they will settle for the nearest available. Thus, the paradox of the mass accessions to the communist movement, whose basic doctrine is in fact a radical, nihilistic expression of intolerance towards *the ideology of the tripartite division*, can be explained.

The sweep of *the new world economic chaos* certainly discourages hopes for the possibility of a new establishment and re-enactment of *the ideology of tripartitism*. Where *the 'laws of the market'* prevail"—in fact, the alienated centres of financial and political power, and the transnational companies and corporations—there is no place under the sun not only for any higher forms of human fellowship but not even for the upright man. But it is precisely under such conditions that *the ideology of tripartiteness* can reveal its fundamental nature, namely to serve as a value basis for resistance to plutocratic forces and as a guide for the preparations for the time after the collapse of the world of deception and self-deception of the monstrous, poisonous and usurious Western civilisation.

IDEAL OF TOTALITY

Carl Schmitt's famous doctrine on the essence of the political - which is constituted by the corresponding criterion for distinguishing friend and enemy (Schmitt, 1995) - rests on a much deeper foundation than that illuminated by the chair of that last guardian of the ideal of the *jus publicum Europaeum*. It is a matter of the common etymological root (*pt~) of the word *p(t)olis* (city) - from which, via an adjectival derivation, the noun *politiká* (*politics*) is derived - and the word *p(t)olemos* (war). If it is not an expression of some unconscious foreshadowing of a future horizon of civilisational collapse, this nexus of the city and war may seem surprising, as the words in question are of Proto-Indo-European origin, and were thus forged in a culture whose very hallmark was a highly developed urbanity. This connection is fitting for the Indo-European world, for the peoples in question appeared on the stage of history as great destroyers of cities, from Mycenae and Troy to Mohenjo-Daro and Harappa. Hence, 'city-slayer' is the most common trait by which Homer recognises the Achaean heroes.

Few European cities were created by the confluence of trade routes. The vast majority of European cities were founded on the foundations of military fortresses, and the most beautiful, the medieval ones, crystallised around castles, testifying to the human need for greater protection. Even Dubrovnik, a distinctly mercantile city-republic and the last *polis*, which never waged war, is surrounded by vast, centuries-old ramparts and fortresses.

In the age of the birth of the Hellenic concept of politics, the link between the polis and war was an almost constant phenomenon. Therefore, Plato's final work, through Kleinias's exposition of the law of Critias, contains a condemnation of the 'folly of those numerous people who do not realise that war is constantly ongoing, both between individuals and between states (polis)... For what the majority of people call peace is but a name, while in reality all states are constantly engaged in a hidden war, and that of all against all.' (Laws, I, 625e-626a)

It is not difficult to recognise in the aforementioned observation not only the initial *attaco* of Hobbes's vision of *Leviathan* but also the ideal basis for Smith's teaching on the distinctiveness, that is, the autonomy and independence of the concept and criteria of the political vis-à-vis the other domains of human thought and action: "The political, namely, has its own criteria which become operative in a specific way with respect to the various, relatively autonomous spheres of human thought and action, particularly with respect to what is moral, aesthetic, and economic. Political must therefore lie in its own ultimate differentiations, to which any action that is in a specific sense political can be reduced.

The following is a stance that appears to be an ideal of conceptual purity, set against the murkiness of historical reality: "The distinction between friend and enemy has the meaning of denoting the ultimate degree of intensity of bonding or separation, association or disassociation; it can exist theoretically and practically without all those moral, aesthetic, economic and other distinctions having to be applied at the same time."

Indeed, there is not always 'a need for the political enemy to be morally evil, there is no need for him to be aesthetically ugly; he does not have to appear as an economic competitor...', but history testifies to countless examples that hostilities on a war footing rest precisely on economic, moral and even

for aesthetic reasons. According to Smith, 'secondary differentiations' are used only 'to support' that which is primary and essential, namely the political. However, the great teacher does not illuminate the content of the criterion for the political, but only its final conclusion, with the passing observation that the politically recognised enemy is 'the otherness of the stranger (which means the negation of one's own way of existence, and is therefore rejected or subdued- gives way in order to preserve one's own, to existence-appropriate way of life.'

In searching for the content of the criterion in question, one ought to ask what constitutes the 'mode of existence' and 'otherness' if not everything that Smith subsumes under the heading of 'other differentiations'. The mode of existence, among other properties, is constituted precisely by the ethical and moral outlook, the aesthetic taste, and the economic disposition and intent. Blaming the liberal standpoint for having "attempted, in the dilemma between spirit and economy... to dissolve the enemy, starting from the business sphere, into a competitor, and starting from the spiritual sphere, into a disputant" - Schmitt committed a similar epistemological oversight. It is precisely the optic of the liberal worldview that is prone to overlooking or denying the reality of complex wholes, preferring instead to see masses of disintegrated, disconnected, and autonomous particles. In the cultures of Euro-Aryan man, the direct and indirect management of the affairs of the political community ideally encompasses all essential domains of thought and action, including morality, aesthetics and economics. This ubiquity of the tasks and responsibilities of the political mind certainly neither changes nor weakens the corresponding, essential criterion. The ideal political outlook in question here encompasses in its concern and effort for the preservation, the preservation, enhancement and development of the virtues and values of all essential domains of human thought and action, and of the corresponding community. From this totality, or wholeness—and not from particularity and partiality—it judges, with due criteria, who is friend and who is foe, with regard to the good and the interests of the whole community or state. A political worldview does not share the same level as the moral, aesthetic or economic, but rather transcends them all, as it encompasses them all with their respective criteria. The particularity of the political, in relation to 'other differentiations', lies in the fact that it, in principle, contains them all within itself. Where the political withdraws, an unguarded space of weakness opens up to the advantage of internal and external enemies.

The Ethical Axis of Politics

In its original sense, the concept of politics not only stems from that of the city-state but also corresponds to it: politics is, above all, decision-making and action that permeates all the institutions and organs of the state; In the ideal state, the basic formative and informative principles of the state, and thus of its politics, are of a *celestial* origin, carrying special tasks and responsibilities within the structure of the cosmic Order. Awareness of the state's and the sovereign's metaphysical roots was maintained, over the course of several millennia, until the time of the bourgeois revolutions, and the ideal of the state 'imitating the immutable decrees of God' was widespread throughout rationalist thought, as well as in the writings of Jean-Jacques Rousseau. This is the Christianised or deist stump of this very thought of the Euro-Aryan man, who saw and defined himself and his community in

order of the struggle for Order, through the repetition of exemplary divine acts and deeds. This is the reality that is most faithfully yet most succinctly presented by the light of the chair of Pius Filipani-Ronconi:

The whole world, from the tiniest blade of grass to the sublime vault of the heavens, from the humblest of humans to the supreme among the gods, is founded upon ethical forces which are reflected in the unchanging order of Nature. This order, which on the physical level is given by the existing, unchangeable harmony between natural laws and their corresponding phenomena, on the level of ethics in human consciousness also rests upon a desired and maintained connection between the word given and the deed of its fulfilment: a harmony and connection in which Truth resides. Thus, for the Indian and Persian Aryans, the fact of keeping one's word, of fidelity to oaths and friendship, had immense religious significance, because it made them—though acting on earth and in human affairs—spiritual participants in the maintenance of the cosmic Order. From Order to Sovereignty was a small step, and thus Mitra and Varuna were invoked in the complex rituals of coronation, the aforementioned raja-suya, which would later serve to crown the universal sovereign, the cakra-vartin, the 'Turner of the Wheel'. In this ceremonial act, which is in many respects connected with the 'conquest of the cardinal points of the world' (dig-vijaya; it should be noted that dig also means 'space') and the sacrifice of a horse, the king assumes two functions inherent to the pair of Sovereign Gods, priestly authority, the projection of a horn (Redaj and military and civil, ksatra (which in the legal domain seems to correspond to the concepts of fas and jus of the ancient Romans), while his throne, in that case covered with tiger skin, is identified with the 'centre of the world' (the various umbelicus or onphalos of the ancient world), that is, with the mountain of Sumeru, the dwelling place of the gods." (Filipani-Ronconi, 1981)

Containing the most ancient known laws, regulations and instructions for statecraft - precisely in the perspective of distinguishing friend from foe - The *Manarva-Dharma-Castra* illuminates the figure of the ideal sovereign, who is the most succinct embodiment of the ideal and universal function of political decision-making and action: "*When this world was without a king, then all people, driven by fear, ran in all directions and rushed about headlessly. The Lord sent the king to protect all this, taking permanent elements from Indra, Vayu, Surya, Agni, Varuna, Candra, and the lord of riches. And since the king is created from a fragment of these lordly gods - he surpasses all living beings with his brilliant energy and, like the Sun, scorches the eyes and hearts, and no one on earth is able to look upon him.*" (VII, 1-6)

The aforementioned period establishes the foundational role of the sovereign, which encompasses all others, just as the cosmic Order contains within itself all worlds. From the standpoint of the worldview of the Euro-Aryan man, it is inconceivable that any significant domain of individual and communal life exists which is not encompassed by the light of the formative and informative principles of the Order, mediated by the function of sovereignty. The celestial origin of the king's mission indirectly indicates that the state order is a fraction of and a corresponding reflection of the cosmic Order, which, at the other end of the Euro-Aryan world, the ancient Greek language preserves by designating *the cosmos*, the universe, and the legal constitution of the state with the same word. What follows is an analytical breakdown of the composition of the material from which the ideal sovereign is made. These are elements of divine origin whose diversity describes such a wide range of attributes that they editorially and protectively encompass all the needs of the state community. Through the Vedic hymns, Indra is established as the political god *par excellence*: he is not only the supreme god but also the helper of the Aryans in their battles against the Asuras. Indra's solar element in the composition of the sovereign corresponds to the martial and warlike dimensions

of state policy. Unlike Indra, who rules the daytime, Varuna is the god of the night and the vault, in whose stars the Vedic poet recognises his eyes, that is, the omnipresence and boundlessness of divine powers, beginning with those of a demiurge and a creator of the cosmos, when *the "noble god conceived the inconceivable"* (*Rg-Veda*, VII,86,7). The element derived from Varuna – which in the creation of the cosmos determines the ethical and substantial constitution of the universe – corresponds to the ethical, legal, legislative and economic domains of political decision-making and action.

In the light of the Euro-Aryan tradition, we are free to conclude that the deontological basis, the axial dimension, and the supreme goal of the ideal political worldview of the Aryan man are of an ethical nature. Therefore, the construction of the ideal Euro-Aryan state, through Plato's dialogues, begins with a fundamental questioning of the meaning of justice and righteousness. Before the entire Euro-Aryan tradition, Plato there stands against the perverted opinion, conveyed by the young Trasymachus, who, concealing his disappointment with the state of affairs under a mask of cynicism, asserts that *"justice is what benefits the stronger"*, or that *"power is stronger, freer, and more powerful than justice"*. (*The Republic* I, 344c).

The comprehensiveness of the political outlook

The most significant monuments of ancient political thought also bear witness to the deep-rootedness of the idea that the duties and responsibilities of political decision-making and action encompass all essential domains of human life and community. From Plato's **Republic** and **Laws** to Aristotle's **Politics**, the conviction is attested that everything public or common in the state falls within the remit of the indirect or direct concern of those in political power.

By embedding in the consciousness and hearts of the faithful the Levantine dualism—utterly alien to the Euro-Aryan worldview—primitive Christianity dealt a great, devastating blow to the traditional conception of politics and the relationship between the individual and his political community and the state. The political was thereby stripped of its essential content and the state of all its higher and formative roles, while objective ethics was replaced by subjective moralism, from which, as its prosthetics, all essential social ideas or sensibilities, measures and regulations inherent to Christian...- Christian teaching and the church, from love and fellowship, through mercy and equality, to prohibitions and punishments. The imposed schism between spirit and body also affected the relationship between the citizen and the state, which, along with its politics, was denounced—at least in the early days of Christianity's rule—as the fruit of original sin and a necessary evil. Yet, if we exclude the monastic communities, which are an ideal **fuga in avanti**, which experimentally live in the promised bliss of the non-contradiction of the eschatological horizon of the future, Christianity over time conformed to the world of necessity but also to the conditioning of the European *mindset*, and the dualism of faith and state in the East dissolved into the idea of a harmonious division of powers between the emperor and the patriarch, whereas in the West it transformed into the centuries-long conflict between the emperor and the pope over supremacy. This opened the way for the rehabilitation of the ancient remit of politics and the metaphysical roots of the state, right up to the time of the bourgeois revolutions. For example, it was a cardinal, Giovanni Battista de Luca, who, in the sixth chapter of his handbook

for the Christian sovereign (*Il Principe cristiano pratico*), from 1680. the concept of 'political authority' as 'all that pertains to the public affairs of the State for the preservation, increase, embellishment and happiness of the principality and consequently of the Prince himself and the people, of which that mystical, that is to say, political body is composed'.

Even in the teaching of Machiavelli, where political self-awareness achieved its greatest emancipation and independence, the organic links with 'other differentiations' were not severed but were persistently emphasised through a series of historical examples. For instance, Machiavelli most often identifies the causes of the decay and collapse of states or orders in the corruption of moral or religious forces and customs: "The rulers of a republic or a kingdom should guard the foundations of the religion they profess; if they do so, it will be easy for them to keep the republic religious and, consequently, good and united." (*Discorsi*, I,12)

Some of the fundamental powers of political action are of a distinctly ethical nature, such as *virtue* (*virtu*) and *goodness* (*bonta*). Admittedly, in Machiavelli's lexicon, which preserves its links to the Latin source, the word 'virtue' contains a broader yet deeper spectrum of meanings, denoting above all the highest degree of the manifestation of spiritual virility and energy, in both good and evil. It is precisely in this spiritual virility that the ethic of Roman *humanitas* is rooted. The word *goodness*, in turn, implies complete and supreme ethics. According to Machiavelli, the correction of political communities or states requires the rehabilitation of original principles which must contain goodness: "All the principles of communities, republics and kingdoms should have in them some goodness, by means of which they acquire their original reputation and original growth." (*Discorsi*, III,1).

Machiavelli's work, particularly the commentaries written in the margins of his edition of Livy—where the great Florentine's thought reached its most comprehensive vantage point—provides us with an open insight into the contents of the political criterion. These are precisely those 'other distinctions', from economic impulses to mental movements and forces, such as the will to rule. From the standpoint of totality and, in principle, giving precedence in disputes to the whole it represents over the interests of its parts, the political mind ultimately judges the judgements of the 'other differentiations'. For example, from a political, or rather holistic, standpoint, the vitality of religiosity is of vital importance to communities and states, a reliable protection against corruption and decay: "Those principalities or those republics that wish to maintain themselves uncorrupted must, above all, keep the religious ceremonies and their constant observance uncorrupted; for there is no greater sign of the ruin of a province than to see the divine cult despised." (*Discorsi*, I, 12) Although in the recommendation cited, Machiavelli points only to the external forms of religiosity, this does not mean that he considers its internal vitality to be politically insignificant. Without the vitality of religiosity, its external forms and customs are not, in the long run, sustainable either.

Machiavelli attaches equal importance to the vitality of ethical principles, embodied in living examples, which influence by the force of their exemplary nature no less than laws and corresponding sanctions: "Those who in Rome particularly performed such good deeds were Horatius Cocles, Mucius Scaevola, Fabricius, the two Decii, Regulus Atilius, and others; with their rare and virtuous examples they produced in Rome almost the same effects as the laws and institutions did." (*Discorsi*, III,1) However, there are circumstances in which fidelity to ethical principles can be fatal and must be sacrificed. By slightly modifying Livy's testimony, Machiavelli points out the

an instance when the Romans, after a defeat in battle against the Samnites, agreed to accept the humiliating terms of a pardon for *their* lives, *because the motherland, well defended, was safe in any event, whether defended with dishonour or with glory; for having saved that army, Rome had time to wipe away the dishonour; not having saved it, though with a glorious death, Rome would have been lost, as would its liberty*" (*Discorsi*, 111,41).

This supermoralism is particularly highlighted in the treatise **Il Principe**, where the great Florentine indicates to the expected liberator and unifier of Italy how a ruler *"cannot observe all those things for which men are considered good, because it is often necessary, for the sake of maintaining the state, to act against faith, against charity, against humanity, against religion."* (XVIII) And here Machiavelli has in mind above all the ideal and virtual political entity, whose name is Italy, to which he devotes all the strength of his mind and heart: *"To understand the Italian spirit, it was necessary for Italy to be reduced to what it is today: to be more enslaved than the Jews were, more servile than the Persians, more dispersed than the Athenians; without a leader, without an order, defeated, stripped bare, torn apart, lost, enduring every kind of decay"* (XXVI).

Ideal system

Which political system is most suitable or most natural for the political nature of Europeans? If we were to entrust such a question to a statistical survey of European history, we would receive an answer extremely unfavourable to the very widespread yet entirely unfounded beliefs of modern people that the democratic system is not only a hallmark of the European man but also inherent to his political being. We shall confront these beliefs more fully in the chapter on *the European Union*, while here it is worth pointing out how the ancient, democratic, and modern, pseudo-democratic systems together encompass a very small, not even a tenth, of the history of Europe. If one were to agree with Plato that all political systems can be reduced to two basic ones, monarchical and democratic (*Laws*, III, 693d), then it is certain that the former encompasses a significantly larger part of Europe's history and geography.

In the domain in question, the European man is not characterised by a supposed inclination towards democracy or monarchy, but by a constant dissatisfaction with the existing and an ideal or pragmatic search for the 'new' system, which creates and tests countless different and even diametrically opposed structures of the political community and the state, often at the cost of great upheavals and overturns, civil wars and even bloody revolutions. Judging by the ironic observation of a character in Aristophanes' satire, *The Gorgas*, by that time the Athenian state had experienced all possible and 'impossible' political systems. Nowhere in the history of other, non-European cultural and civilisational circles can one find anything similar to the profusion and dynamism of Europe's political history, except in the form of provincial reflections of the movements within the European circle. The profound source of this phenomenon is also confirmed by isomorphisms in the history of art: unlike European culture, which is characterised by an abundant production of styles—that are born quickly and often die out slowly on its stage—non-European cultures character-scribe a persistent conservatism, and the rare stylistic changes there are usually the result of strong Euro-Aryan and European influences. For example, the visual arts and architecture of the Indian subcontinent have already

for millennia have been marked by a tropically lush, fantastic and even monstrous proliferation of hybrids derived from Hellenistic models and matrices, which were brought by the Hellenic builders accompanying Alexander the Great. The great monotheistic revolution, in the sign of a heliocentric religiosity, carried out against the millennial tradition of Egypt by Amenhotep IV, cannot be explained otherwise than by the influence of Nefertiti, *the Aryan 'beauty who arrived'* from the north, bringing with her the corresponding cult, aesthetic taste and style. The "Cubist" stylisation of black masks is the ultimate consequence of a millennial process—begun with the imitation of Egyptian realism—in which each successive generation of sculptors strove to "faithfully" reproduce the models of the previous one. Thus, it is the ultimate sum of the errors of all generations of creators.

What drives the European man's perpetual quest for a 'new' political system or a 'new' style of artistic expression? The history of art provides us with far more clues, and it is instructive to seek an answer to our question within it, for we are dealing with but two different domains of manifestation of the same **forma mentis**. Almost as a rule of historical experience, by the virtue of a Euro-Aryan worldview characterised by a constant, nostalgic gaze towards the bygone 'golden age' and a corresponding psychology—all the great styles in the history of European art were born from a gaze towards the horizons of the virtues and values of past or long-past models, and from the longing to restore them. For example, what we call the 'Flemish Renaissance' is the product of the marriage of Gothic realism with Roman classicism at the altar of the ancient models that the great masters of this movement sought to understand and revive. The protagonists of Mannerism consciously sought to replicate and unite the finest qualities of their 'inaccessible' predecessors, from Leonardo and Raphael to Michelangelo. Palladio meticulously studied and measured the forms and proportions of Roman ruins, seeking to resurrect them, but in fact created a new, 'Palladian' style that shaped villas and palaces across Europe, from Padua to the banks of the River Moskva. The first and foremost current of Romanticism is the movement of nostalgia for the virtues and values of the heroic and epic Middle Ages. Finally, the last style created by the European man – called *the Modern Style* in the British Isles, *Art Nouveau* in France, *Liberty* in Italy, *Jugendstil* in Germany or *Sezession* in the Austro-Hungarian cultural sphere also stems from a nostalgia for medieval culture and the renewal of the Celtic visual language, forged on the Eurasian paths of Celtic adventure, probably based on the patterns of Scythic art.

In light of the examples presented and a multitude of others, we can conclude that the birth of styles is driven not so much by a yearning for the 'new' but rather for the 'old'—that is, for the attainment or renewal of supreme patterns. By analogy, we can assume that political systems are not born of a need for mere change or novelty, but of the establishment of the most suitable, better, and best form of government, as testified by the countless utopias, which are also a European invention.

Unlike Plato, who assumes that political systems, or forms of state, developed *'one from another... due to the migration of people to new settlements, and this over an incalculably long period of time*

*period of time" (Laws, III,683a), Polybius hints at some considerably higher, supernatural causality for this phenomenon. Polybius's doctrine that political systems alternate on the stage of history in a predetermined order and cyclically—perhaps it is closer to the truth and deeper than it is misguidedly conceived. Perhaps political systems are actually disintegrated and distorted parts of some ideal and complete supersystem from the past, or from the Heaven of Plato's world of ideas? The idea presented is indirectly confirmed by Plato's own teaching that the best political system is a mixture of the best qualities of different systems, reducible to the dualism of monarchy and democracy: *The Persians have the former, developed to the extreme, and we the latter. Almost all the other constitutions consist of these, in the most diverse degrees of mixture. The State, if love and freedom are to exist in it along with reasonableness, must participate in both these forms of government... If, then, one State adopts exclusively and in excess the monarchical principle, and another the principle of freedom exclusively, neither of them is in the right proportion to the fundamental requirements.*" (Laws, III, 693d)*

In the Hellenic world, the earliest manifestations of the doctrine that the best form of government is a synthesis of monarchical, aristocratic and democratic systems originate from the Pythagorean schools. Taking into account not only the international connections but also the Hyperborean roots of Pythagoreanism, we can conclude that this idea is considerably older. One thing is certain: it very quickly conquered all the main philosophical schools, from the Academy to the Stoa.

In the light of tradition, we can conclude that the closest to the ideal was the polity of Sparta, which its representative on the stage of Plato's dialogues describes in the following words:

It seems to me that it is similar to a tyrannical regime, for it has the authority of the ephors, which is incredibly tyrannical. At other times, however, it appears to me that of all states it most resembles a democratic one. It would, however, be quite unusual not to acknowledge that our state's government is aristocratic. It really does contain a lifetime kingship, the oldest of all governments, and we and all the Jews acknowledge it as such. And when this question is put to us so suddenly, I really cannot, as I said, declare with complete certainty to which of the aforementioned forms of government our own belongs." (IV, 712de)

More than two millennia later, in 1818, Nikolai Karamzin, a forerunner of the Slavophiles, expressed a similar dilemma when confessing his political stance in a letter to I. I. Dmitriev: *"I want neither a Constitution, nor representative institutions, but in my heart I am nevertheless a republican, and at the same time a loyal subject of the Russian Tsar; there is a contradiction in these words, but not in reality."* The reality of which Karamzin speaks, in which the contradictions apparent at the level of analysis disappear, appears to be deeper than was supposed. And here we are confronted with manifestations of the lost integrity of the political system, whose autonomous elements have subsequently been given meanings that render them antagonistic rather than congruent or complementary.

The ideal of an integral political system also shines through Polybius's early view of the history of the Roman state, set out in the first layer of *the History's* inscription. The reason for the extraordinary stability of the Roman state, which readily withstands all external and internal shocks and the decadence that threatens from peace and prosperity, Polybius saw in its unification of the principles and institutions of monarchical, aristocratic-

of the kratos and the democratic order. The tripartite power, that is, the division of authority between the monarch, the patricians and the plebs, by virtue of mutual checks prevented the monarchical element from degenerating into tyranny, the aristocratic into oligarchy, and the democratic into ochlocracy. The centuries of European history have not diminished the brilliance of Polybius's model, and Machiavelli incorporated it, almost verbatim, into the first book of the **Discorsi**.

It may be superfluous to point out here that such an ideally balanced tripartite power did not last long in Rome. By all accounts, it was untenable in the conditions of a constant state of emergency, that is, the sustained war efforts for the expansion of the state, which was subsequently called an empire, perfectly in keeping with its martial destiny. The title **imperator** originates in military parlance: it was a cry of the soldiers celebrating their supreme commanders after significant victories. Thus, the military commanders so spontaneously honoured bore with their title a number of acclamations. Nevertheless, in principle, the empire is entirely open to the establishment of the aforementioned tripartite power, for it, as the greatest form of political unity, does not prejudice the form of government for the whole, nor for its parts. It is necessary to emphasise that here we are speaking of an ideal system in a very limited domain and sense. If we were to adopt the traditional doctrine of history unfolding through four regressive ages and the general belief of its contemporary interpreters that we live in the last, worst, called *Kali-yuga* or the "dark age" - then the impossibility of the mere appearance, let alone the survival, of an ideal system under such conditions is perfectly understandable. Therefore, the Roman triumvirate is an ideal system only under the given conditions and not in an absolute sense.

The unstable, changing and even chaotic conditions of life in the late age are matched by an amorphous and dynamic political system, capable of constantly adapting to situations and needs. Therefore, the abundance of contradictions that researchers see in Machiavelli's work is not an expression of his intellectual confusion or inconsistency, but a faithful reflection of the reality of a world that is as fickle as a globe. Machiavelli's "contradictions" are in fact a catalogue of recommended responses to different and even contradictory challenges and conditions, from the normal, when politics should be based on ethics, to the extraordinary, which must be met with amoralism. The nature of the "dark age" The ancient Romans had perfectly grasped the nature of the 'dark age' and, to meet the state's extraordinary states of emergency and challenges that threatened its unity, they invented and legally established the figure of the dictator, in possession of *imperium maximum*, that is, full civil and military authority, for a limited period of no more than six months.

The saviour in the person of Emperor Frederick II

In a model study on the imperial idea of Frederick II Hohenstaufen, Antonino di Stefano rightly observed a qualitative characteristic of the empire, which makes it superior to all other forms of government because it potentially contains them all within itself without any contradiction: *"Whereas Aristotle conceives of forms of government as exclusive and absolute, and the classical conception of the Empire remained alien to the concept of a hierarchy of purposes and political bodies, in the Middle Ages, in which the concept of unity transcends but does not negate that of plurality,*

the monarchical principle, embodied by the Emperor, appears to be in keeping with all possible forms of government—whether democratic or aristocratic—as less perfect expressions of unity” (De Stefano, 1978).

According to the general and centuries-old belief, with the crowning of Charlemagne by Pope Leo III in Rome on Christmas Day in the year eight hundred, the western part of the Roman Empire was restored, which Frederick I, known as Barbarossa, several centuries later officially proclaimed 'holy': *Sacrum Romanum Imperium*. The very fact that the emperor, in principle, rules over subordinate monarchs and princes rather than a corresponding territory points to the immaterial, and therefore primarily spiritual, nature of his authority. It is necessary to point out that *the 'holiness'* of the new, emerging empire was already emphasised at the council of German bishops in Frankfurt in 794, in their solemn address to Charlemagne, who was then proclaimed not only king but also priest: "*The king to rule and the priest to magisterium-podiičavanje*". It may be superfluous to note here that with this proclamation, the duality of the monarch's role was renewed, inherent not only in the primary function of the Roman state but also in the Euro-Aryan ideology and the tradition of tripartite division. At the other end of the Euro-Aryan spiritual world, one of *the most ancient Upanishads, the Chandogya Upanishad*, preserves traces of the original, ideal state, in which kings of the Kshatriya lineage instructed the priests, i.e., *the Brahmins*, in the highest knowledge of the sacred scriptures (7,1,1). After all, if the well-founded philological assumption is correct that soldiers derived the title **imperator** from a formula of Jupiter's power – **Iuppiter imperator** – then its sacredness accompanied it from the very first moment of its eponymous exploit, from the moment it was celebrated with a shout on the Spanish battlefield, when it glorified the elder Scipio Africanus (Livy, XXVII, 19,4).

The possession of the sacred principle of crystallisation and of the gathering of different nations and states is the distinguishing mark that separates a legitimate empire from pseudo-empires. The unstoppable spread of Christianity was a sure sign of the death of the sacred heart of the Roman Empire and, consequently, of its end. The desperate attempts of Julian the Emperor to revive this heart were met only with the flabbiness of faith and with unbelief, revealing that the very foundation of *the Roman religion* had become extinct: the Roman ethnic substance. Therefore, the struggle of Frederick II Hohenstaufen against *the papal libido dominandi*—for the defence and recognition of the immediate connection of the emperor and the empire with a divine source of inspiration and authority—is much deeper than is commonly supposed. Had Frederick II's struggle ended in victory, it would certainly have been crowned by the great rehabilitation of the sacredness of the whole world in the eyes of at least the empire's subjects. This was the prospect of overcoming that splitting of the world imposed by the Christian dichotomy of moral duplicity between Caesar and God, the profane and the sacred. Only in the light of the conviction in the integral sacredness of the world can the essential positions of the Hohenstaufens be understood, beginning with the conviction that those who elect the emperor are inspired by divine Providence, as Friedrich Barbarossa proclaimed at the synod of Besançon in 1157:

"Through the choice of the princes, we owe the crown and the empire only to God; the rule over the world is entrusted to two sceptres; but since Saint Peter said 'Fear God and honour the king', lies he who dares to assert that Frederick received the imperial crown from the hands of the Pope as an act of beneficence".

The election of the emperor was carried out under the light of a higher all-powerful grace, "*constat nos divina dispensante gratia ceteris mortalibus supereminere*", developed from the formula "*Dei gratia*", coined for the purposes of the Christian consecration of the Roman emperors and also used in the times of Charlemagne's ventures.

In Frederick II's worldview, the state also stood securely at the centre of the sacred world, as a work of divine Providence. Thus, the state was elevated not only from Aristotle's world of mere necessities but also from Augustine's limbo of shame, in which it had been held for centuries as an evil fruit and a confirmation of original sin. For Frederick II, the empire was a supernatural, Providential means of combating the consequences of the said sin, and thus towards the great correction of mankind. As in all the great statecraft of the Euro-Aryan and European man, we see in Frederick II's enterprise the idea that the state should rest upon a deontological Right. The Empire is precisely the most significant form of the embodiment of this Right, and therefore it is only "*through the Empire that human society attains its perfection and realises itself*". (De Stefano, 1978) In Frederick II's worldview, the Church and the Empire are two different but complementary and equally sacred paths to the uprighting, improvement, and metaphysical transformation of man and community. According to Julius Evola, *the 'last Ghibelline'*, the movement of supporters of Frederick II's imperial idea *'held that through the concept of earthly life as discipline, militia and service, the individual could transcend himself and follow the supernatural goal of the Imperial Personality through the paths of action and in the sign of the Empire.'* (Evola, 1972).

In accordance with the rule of the great movements of European man, the Guelph also creates new things, striving to restore the charm of antiquity. Countless signs and statements from the great protagonists of the turbulent, arduous, yet often glorious and magnificent life of the Holy Roman Empire attest to this awareness and will for *the *renovatio** of the Roman Empire, from the idea that the act of placing the imperial crown on the head of Charlemagne effected a **translatio imperi**, to the solemnly proclaimed conviction of Frederick Barbarossa that he was *the 'heir of Augustus and Antoninus'*. Yet, upon closer inspection, this millennial endeavour must be seen as one in which the will to renew was not fundamentally aimed at the political substance of the Roman Empire, but rather at the vitality of the very idea, which ideally precedes and transcends any particular realisation. If we exclude the adoption of the tradition of Roman law—particularly Justinian's Code, which served as a model for Frederick II's jurists—the emperors of the Holy Roman Empire adopted only superficial elements from their supposed exemplar. For example, the official lists of Friedrich II's titles of address contained a series of Roman titles, from *Augustus* and *Caesar* to *Magnificus*, but these were detached from the formal, political meanings of their originals, serving to evoke the pathos of the emperor's superhuman role. It is certain that Friedrich II of Hohenstaufen—the most learned of the German emperors and the most versed in the history of his predecessor—by no decision showed any intention of restoring the principles and customs, institutions and structures of the Roman Empire.

In the same era, on the other side of the European continent, legends of the knights of the Round Table and their quest for the Grail, a trophy of heroic initiation but also a means of restoring the kingdom, barren and

impotent like his king, Arthur. Thus, in this cycle of legends, which point to the most ancient, Euro-Aryan sources, there is no mention of the Roman Empire, although its monuments were very conspicuous, inspiring awe in the minds and hearts of the young barbarians, as the touching song of an anonymous English bard before the ruins of the city of Bath testifies:

"A wall of stone is a marvellous thing. Events have broken it./buildings have fallen, the work of giants is crumbling."

By all accounts, the enterprise of Frederick II, as well as the tapestry of legends concerning the quest for the Grail and the renewal of the kingdom, were aimed beyond and far above the Roman Empire, guided by the deepest memory towards some ideal state, which precedes and surpasses all subsequent ones, by the virtue of its metaphysical position. Considering not only the extraordinary virtues of Frederick II but also the redemptive function of the empire, Dante called him *'the second Messiah'*. Nevertheless, he erred in pointing to the Old Testament model, which, as we have already shown, is but a distant and distorted, not to say wretched, imitation of the Euro-Aryan archetype, such as the Iranian Saviour, the Saoshyant, which is closest to it. In this domain, the common people proved to be much wiser, recognising in Frederick II the very embodiment of a veritable, Euro-Aryan Saviour:

"The Emperor is not dead - the saga sings - but sleeps surrounded by his knights in the inaccessible Kifhauser cave, awaiting the hour when the ravens cease to circle the mountain top and the dwarf pear tree blossoms in the valley, to awaken when the German fatherland is in danger. He will reappear at the head of his crusaders and will bestow upon his young and faithful Germany peace, strength and unity." (Momigliano, 1960) Similar legends

were also woven in the Italian space, around the volcano Etna, in whose centre Frederick II, with his knights, awaits the end of time to return and lead the final, victorious battle against the forces of evil. It is precisely the web of popular legends which see in Frederick II *the* future *avatar* of the Saviour that attests to his moral victory, in a trans-historical perspective. In the chronicles, however, the struggle between Frederick II and the Pope had exhausted the strength and power of both the Empire and the Church. After Frederick II's departure from this arena of the universe, the Holy Roman Empire was destined to be reduced to the scale of a single German nation. The Church, however, became easy prey for much weaker sovereigns, such as Philip the Fair, a hostage to usurers and the suppressor of the great European order of the Templars. Philip the Fair and his jurists inaugurate the process of establishing an absolute monarchy, a monstrous surrogate for imperial integrity. At this point in our exposition, it is instructive to return our gaze to this phenomenon and illuminate its alienness to the European sphere, as well as its disastrous political consequences.

Absolutism versus Community

The perversion of the monarchical element into a tyrannical one through the establishment of absolutist and centralist authority opened a process of suppressing and destroying many of the life-giving and fruitful elements of the community and state, reducing their riches of complexity and diversity to a simple dualism of the sovereign (and the corresponding bureaucracy) and the populace could no longer recognise their home. If we set aside the absolutist temptations of certain Roman emperors, beginning with Diocletian and Constantine, that is, in the late, senile,

could not recognise its home. If we exclude the absolutist temptations of some Roman emperors, beginning with Diocletian and Constantine, that is, in the late, senile period of an already Levantine-influenced empire, such a form of government was entirely unknown in Europe. Even the authority of the elected or hereditary Germanic kings - who in the eyes of their peoples had divine origins

- was limited by the decisions of the national assembly, the main organ of the state and guardian of sovereignty.

In hierarchical order, the first to fall victim to the absolutism of the French monarchy was the 'old' nobility, which had acquired its titles and estates on the battlefields, that is to say, in the most arduous trials of the power to govern people and to master fear in the face of mortal threats. The "old" nobility had to cede its place in the hierarchy to the "new", which acquired its titles or bought them in the offices, salons, backrooms and even marketplaces of the kingdom. This was not only a great ethical but also a social upheaval, marked by the process of the extinction of the feudal system, or the withdrawal of the "old" nobility from the front-line positions of peacetime roles, severing the organic ties between the aristocracy and the peasantry, who were deprived of the elite's aid and protection and left at the mercy of the insatiable new, bourgeois masters.

The inevitable consequence of this upheaval was the collapse of many reliable barriers against the demonism of the economy, whose release manifested itself in a series of pathological phenomena, from the process of devaluing-valuation of real estate and the production of tangible goods, the overvaluation of movable property and the strengthening of speculative capital's influence, to the great proliferation of the metastases of usurious parasitism. Thanks to absolutism and the enormous costs of maintaining a centralised state administration, usurers entered the inner circle of the sovereign's advisers, and the resulting growing public debt became a permanent yoke on the people's shoulders. Wars waged to settle debts necessitated new and greater borrowings, turning the sovereign into a hostage to the usurers.

The absolutism of Louis XIV dismantled many traditional forms of provincial, regional and municipal self-government. The violent character of the transformation of state structures, the destruction of organs of community cohesion developed over centuries, and the monarch's essentially hostile attitude towards his subjects are symptomatically and succinctly expressed in the figure of the military governor over the surviving provinces. Apart from repressing resistance, these governors had no other duties of any real significance and preferred to live far from their areas of responsibility, in Versailles, devoted to the sweet life of the court. Other systems of symbiotic community, from the guilds to the general, estates-general assembly, which the monarchs ceased to convene in accordance with their absolute power, also suffered the same destruction. Such disintegration, having deprived the state of all forms of symbiotic community, created the prototype of modern society: a mechanical aggregate of isolated and powerless individuals.

As we have already pointed out, such a form of government is utterly alien to the European political spirit and is, instead, characteristic of the traditional Near Eastern, mercantilist, materialist, and slave-owning states and civilisations. On European soil, the establishment and justification of the absolutist system of monarchical rule—deprived of any historical or customary legal basis—required great efforts of legalistic rhetoric. And just as the greatest flourish of papal absolutism was

supported by the extraordinary development of canon law, with the aim of legitimising all its demands—even at the cost of falsification and, above all, the sacrifice and neglect of theological studies—and so it is also The 'legitimisation' of absolutist monarchy was the fruit of the labours of several generations of court jurists, ever since the time of Philip the Fair, typically spineless in the face of the sovereign's desires. A good example of moral exceptionalism is provided by Jean Bodin with his theory of sovereignty, or rather the project of absolutist rule, devoid of any mediation between the subject and the monarch-lawgiver. It is a work born of the impulses and despair that form the foundations of *the jus publicum Europaeum*. Only in such a state, above all divisions and schismatic passions, did Bodin see salvation from the fratricidal, religious wars that were tearing Europe apart. Yet, his state, too, did not essentially distance itself from the fray.

Rejecting Roman and customary European law, breaking with political traditions and attributing to the king the right to self-government, all these jurists saw a model in the Old Testament tradition, namely in the Jewish state. A cynic might conclude that a mere convention of artistic embellishment or rhetorical exaggeration for the purpose of glorifying dynasties—the identification of medieval dynasties with Old Testament models—assumed, in the far west of Europe, in the domain of state-law, a revolutionary character, prepar- possessing all the necessary conditions for a third-estate revolution. The French revolutionaries did not abandon the centralist system but rather fully adopted, deepened and exploited it to its utmost possibilities.

It should be noted that the same Old Testament tradition was the model for Hobbes's vision of Leviathan, an equally absolutist and centralist, but also materialist, state, which is not based on a supposed "God's will" was already in *the ratio naturalis* of the masses of self-interested individuals, horrified by the prospect of their own, lowest impulses running rampant. Hobbes's state is created by the voluntary submission of the masses—who were moved solely by "natural cupidity" ("*cupiditas naturalis*") - in order to save their miserable lives from their own 'war of all against all' ("*bellum omnium contra omnes*"). The state in which England found itself was the natural substratum for Hobbes's desperate distrust of mankind: in the centuries-long war against France, immense material wealth and the almost entire body of the trustworthy nobility had been sacrificed, with the consequent collapse of the moral and economic customs, institutions, and organs of community. This vacuum paved the way for the most unscrupulous elements of the third estate to seize power and authority: the pioneers of merchant and financial capital, usurers, and buyers of noble titles and social positions.

Hobbes openly stated his departure from the European tradition: "*My doctrine differs from the practice of those countries which have received their moral education from Athens and Rome.*"

In this departure, Hobbes was by no means alone: the Anglo-Saxon legal system – on both sides of the Atlantic – is based on the Old Testament tradition. (Konvitz, 1978) In France, however, monarchical absolutism succeeded in stifling the fruits of the moral education of Roman and Hellenic culture and civilisation. Therefore, there is no essential difference between the status of the subjects of the 'social contract' in Hobbes's and Rousseau's systems. On both sides, we see abstract individuals, without any higher quality than their own bare individuality, that is, the ultimate degree of sociological reduction.

It is necessary to add that Rousseau's source of inspiration – by all accounts – was the work of Johannes Althusius, an exemplary interpreter of the European tradition of statecraft and the idea of the people's inalienable right to sovereignty. However, Rousseau completely overlooked or betrayed the essence of Althusius's teaching, siding with the state of desolation in the system of absolute monarchy, instead of the European tradition. Unlike Rousseau's, Althusius's '*contract is above all a source for the formation of the most immediate communities: the clan, the tribe, the village or the town. And through further applications of the same principle, many of these most intimate communities unite to form a sovereign community, the only one that can rightfully be called a state. In the formation of the sovereign community, individuals as such play no part. It is not a contract between individuals but rather a contract between corporations.*' (Derathe, 1993).

Class versus Estate

It was not difficult for Althusius to remain faithful to the European tradition, as it was very much alive in his time and in the German sphere. Hence Hegel's conception of "*civil society*" – set out in the *Outline of the Philosophy of Right*, almost two hundred and thirty years later – essentially rested on the same reality of the German community. Unlike the Anglo-Saxon defenders of individual liberties, Hegel sees the first manifestation of freedom precisely in the act of overcoming the conditioning limitations of the individual in order to create community. This is the immediate perspective of the realisation of human freedom, initiated by the overcoming of the limitations inherent to the individual through the establishment of property and contractual relations, that is, under the aegis of law. From this will for the right, morality and ethics develop, the essence of the nation, namely the living tradition of its customs and norms, in which the member of the respective community recognises the self and its duties. In Hegel's view, the picture of human community is similar to that illuminated by the chair of Althusius: symbiotic, hierarchical, and organically-dynamic. This community develops from the simplest, 'innermost' bearer of the nation's ethos, namely the family, through '*civil society*'—composed of corporate and professional associations, which this 'expressed' ethics also designs—to the most general container, the ethically founded state. The vertical dimension of this order is constituted by the organic development and self-awareness of ethics, the supreme end and the meaning of all authentic freedom. Such a structure itself indicates that any freedom which departs from the principle of community is unnatural or inauthentic; it is therefore the duty of the state to preserve and defend the integrity of the community from discord.

In the 20th century, this German tradition of ideas and ideals of community was taken up and developed by the thinkers of the *Deutsche Bewegung*, such as Oswald Spengler, who didactically presents the characteristics of '*Prussian socialism*' through a series of comparisons with those of Anglo-Saxon, liberal-capitalist society. Spengler observes many similarities between liberal capitalism and Marxist communism, from a single matrix to a shared intolerance towards the state: "*A true Marxist is an opponent of the state for the same reasons as a Whig: the state prevents the unscrupulous defence of private commercial interests. The model that inspires his (Marx's) thinking is a stateless society. As in the political-*

in the parliamentary reality of England, and in the Marxist economic universe only a system of two sovereign parties operates and nothing of that which stands above both... But the Prussian state stands above that Good and that Evil. She is the people in her wholeness and before her unconditional sovereignty both parties are just parties, minorities, both in the service of the wholeness." (Spengler, 1933) Like his famous predecessors, Spengler also values the concept of the estate and contrasts it with the liberal and Marxist concept of class:

With all the psychological inability of a mid-19th-century mind, educated in the natural sciences, Marx was unable to perceive the differences between a caste and a class. A caste is an ethical concept, the expression of an idea. The privileged order which, in 1789, opposed the bourgeoisie, embodied the order as an ideal form, as grandeur, courtoisie, inner and outer distinction... Class, however, is a purely economic concept: starting from it, the ethical-political concept of the bourgeoisie of 1789 was converted into the economic one of 1850. The ideal of the estate was transformed into class interest. Only in England had the classes long been distinguished by wealth. The middle class comprised those who lived on their own labour without being poor. The upper class was rich without labour. The lower class worked and was poor. In Prussia, however, it was position—that is, a greater or lesser degree of authority and obedience—that distinguished the classes. Here, at the end of the warrior class, was the class of (state) officials; thus, not an economic class, but a unity based on function. Thus, Marx was thinking exclusively in English terms. His class system is a reflection of the situation of a nation of merchants which sacrificed its agriculture to trade and which never had a state bureaucracy with a well-rooted—Prussian—sense of belonging to an estate."

The ideal of integrity and the corresponding harmony of the constituent parts of the community and its state rules out, as its very opposite, the emergence of political parties such as those spawned by the bourgeois revolutions. These are political organisations which, in the system of the so-called 'mediating and parliamentary democracy', offer to represent the interests of certain strata, determined primarily by economic measure. The economic basis of these parties—in keeping with the age of the governments of the displaced or alienated sections of the third estate—reduces political debate to the framework of mere economism, with the consequent, pathological deepening of the gulf of class antagonism. Not only are symbiotic communities thus transformed into mechanical societies, but this latter, degenerative state is exacerbated by the encouragement and even institutionalisation of constant and entirely sterile internal divisions, conflicts and hostilities which, as history testifies, can even assume the proportions of civil wars. It is certain that the history of humanity abounds with traces of the dualism of the rich and poor strata, of economically higher and lower classes, but it is only in Europe, by the force of the adverse consequences of absolutist monarchism and bourgeois revolutions, such an antithesis was established as the main axis and framework of political life, profoundly shaking, tearing apart and destroying communities and nations, societies and states.

Even the mere reduction of the political community or nation and its state to the framework of mere economics renders their existence meaningless. Internal conflicts, and even civil wars between parties over the economic means of existence, coupled with a complete disregard for the higher aims of the community and its state, only deepen the question of the purposefulness of their very survival. Plato himself, with a single rhetorical question, pointed to the alternative and the corresponding duty of the legislator:

"What would one prefer to accept: that one party be utterly destroyed and, after the complete victory of the other, the rebellion be crushed and peace brought about, or that friendship and peace be established through reconciliation between the parties, and only after this turn one's attention to external enemies?" (Laws, I, 628bc)

How much of Plato's *alter ego*, The Athenian on the scene of the law-making dialogues, considers the principle of community unity set out to be significant – the fact that he often returns to it is testament to this, and on another occasion he condemns the custom of the victors in inter-party debates of appropriating all power for themselves, denying it even to the descendants of the defeated: *"We do not consider such states to be true states, and we also consider those laws which were not created for the common good of the state as a whole to be worthless. On the contrary, we say that those laws which were created for only one part of the state are a matter for one party, and not for the whole state."* (Laws, IV,715ab)

Dante's Dream

The enduring Euro-Aryan ideal of community unity – where conflicts do not transcend the bounds of complementarity or the limits of the harmony of diversity – finds its supreme expression in Dante's consideration of the ideal, ethical empire. The primary impetus of the vision and the ultimate purpose of the imperial order is *'universal peace... the best of all that has been given for our happiness'* (*Monarchy*, 1.4) Although Dante invokes the evangelical tradition of Christ's peace—that is, the one between the human and the divine, which abolishes the Old Testament dualism - it is not difficult to conclude that it is primarily that earthly peace which is being invoked, with all the force of the suffering and terrible experiences gained through the fratricidal conflicts and the Guelph-Ghibelline wars. After all, peace as the basis of the principle of authority of Dante's Monarch, that is, the primacy of one instead of many, is not so much Christian as Euro-Aryan in nature. This is a peace dictated by the hierarchical harmony of the factors of the cosmic Order: *"/ as the part is to the whole, so the partial order is to the totality. The part stands to the whole as to an end and perfection: therefore, the partial order also stands to the universal order as to an end and perfection"* (1,6)

We are free to suppose that Dante's invocation of the evangelical peace is a kind of pre-emptive shield against possible attacks from the clerical enemies of the Ghibelline idea, which is openly demonstrated in several chapters of the third book, dedicated to *'bitikiza spas'* (111,3), that is to say, the refutation of theological opinions concerning the Church's precedence and supremacy over the Empire.

In the history of European political thought, with Dante's work *The Monarchia* begins the 'production line' of visions and projects for the unification of Europe, in the service of establishing and maintaining a lasting peace among its peoples and states. This tradition of a pacifist origin and function for ideal or real aspirations towards the unification of Europe continues to this day, and the first sacrifices of the sovereignty of European states, offered up to the construction of *the European Community*, were officially justified by the need to secure lasting peace. However, in the projects in question—in accordance with the forces of secularisation—the supreme, sacred principle of the crystallisation of the unifying order was entirely absent, immanent not only

to Dante's *Monarchy*, as well as to every faithful European empire, from the Roman and Byzantine to the Austro-Hungarian and Russian.

Dante observes that with the advent of the Monarch and a universal empire, the essence of the political dissolves and disappears: "... if he is truly the Monarch, he cannot have an enemy" (1,11). Dante builds a vision of a world empire on a cross, whose horizontal dimension is formed by the Euro-Aryan ethical commandment of sovereign mastery over all the desires and lusts of the animal element in man, and whose vertical dimension is likewise the universal, Euro-Aryan idea of metaphysically rooted justice, the foundation of peace. The world-encompassing scale of the empire renders meaningless, and therefore impossible, any desire to conquer new territories, thereby creating the precondition for the unimpeded and final triumph of justice: "*The Monarch has nothing to desire, for his dominion is terminated only by the ocean; this is not the case with other rulers, whose dominions border on one another, such as the King of Castile and the King of Aragon. Hence it follows that the Monarch can be the purest exemplar of justice among mortals.*" (0,11)

From the command to govern the movements of the inferior part of the human 'mixture', from the imperative of the unconditioned nature of that freedom of the human mind and judgement with respect to the desires and passions which it must sovereignly govern, Dante argues for the primacy of the empire over all forms, or rather systems, of political 'deviation', where the natural order of ends and means is inverted and where man loses his freedom: '*Only when the Monarch rules, The human race is an end in itself and not for another: for it is only then that the political deviations are corrected—that is, democracy, oligarchy and tyranny, which lead the human race into bondage, as is apparent to him who considers them—and that kings, nobles whom they call optimates, and advocates of the liberty of the people are in power; and since the Monarch loves the Jews most of all, as has already been touched upon, he wishes to make them all good: and this cannot be where there are political aberrations. For a citizen is not for the sake of the consul, nor the people for the sake of the king, but on the contrary, the consuls are for the sake of the citizens, and the king for the sake of the people...* (I, 12)

In the light of the historical circumstances and forces of Dante's time, his work can be read as a defence of the unfinished statecraft of Frederick II Hohenstaufen and of his position that the dignity of the emperor—and not only that of the high priest—derives directly from a divine source. While the pontiff has the task of leading humankind to 'eternal life' 'according to what has been revealed', the emperor, 'according to philosophical science', guides humankind to 'temporal happiness'. (111,15) Seeing in every division of the empire its destruction and an assault on human right, Dante blamed the partisans of papal supremacy for the failure of Frederick II's magnificent undertaking, emphasising the equally sacred dignity of the Monarch—"*the Monarch of the world proceeds directly from the ruler of the universe, who is God*" (111,15) - and indicating with a historical example the complete self-sufficiency of the empire's glory: "*That the prestige of the Church is not the cause of imperial prestige is proved thus: that which, without existing or acting elsewhere, has its power, is not the cause of that power; and when the Church did not exist or act, The Empire had its power: therefore, the Church is not the cause of the Empire's power, and consequently neither of its prestige, for its power and prestige are one and the same.*" (III, 12)

Dante's work is not only an apology for and an extension of Frederick II's state-building enterprise, but also a vision of the future, based on primordial tradition. In accordance with the Euro-Aryan view of history – which is conceived and experienced in the form of a cycle or sphere and not as a linear progression towards a final horizon, the Last Judgement, the '*Omega Point*' (Teyar de Chardin) or the '*One World*' – the archetype

of the ideal empire, that is, of a perfectly ordered world, when justice is at its most powerful, lies in the "golden age", whose restoration Virgil hints at: *"The Virgin comes again and Saturn's reign returns"* (*Bucolics*, IV,6). Dante's exegesis follows: *"By the Virgin, namely, was meant the justice which they also call 'Astraea'; 'the reign of Saturn' refers to the good times, which were also called 'golden'."* (0,11)

In Dante's vision, the Roman Empire is not only the first and universal historical model but also proof of the realisability of ideal justice and the corresponding peace, that is, the justification for hope in their restoration: *"it was only under the divine Augustus, for the existence of the perfect Monarchy, that the whole world lived in peace."* (I, 16). In the exemplarity and primacy of the Roman Empire, its properties and institutions, Dante sees manifestations of the divine will, that is, Providence. It goes without saying that such a gift would not have been possible without the virtue of the Roman man, acting in devotion to the ideal of justice: *"If, then, the Romans aimed at the good of the state, it will be true to say that they also aimed at the purpose of right. And that the Roman people aimed at the aforementioned welfare by subjecting the whole world to itself, their deeds show, in which, casting aside avarice, which is ever contrary to the state, and fostering universal peace with liberty, that godly and renowned people seemed to neglect their own pleasure, in order to secure the public good, for the salvation of the human race... I say, therefore, with regard to the question, that the Roman people rightly, and without usurping the task of Monarchy, which 'Empire' which is called, consciously acquired the supremacy over all mortals. And this is proved in the first place as follows: it is fitting for a most virtuous people to be supreme over all; the Roman people was most virtuous; therefore it was fitting for them to be supreme over all."* (11,5-13)

Closest to Hyperborea

If in the vaults of Europeans' deepest memories an ideal empire rests, which occasionally moves them to great undertakings of restoring and re-enacting that dream – then there must also exist its ideal people, that is, the human correlate of that form of political unity, or wholeness. The prehistoric or even ahistorical position of this invisible empire directs our enquiry towards the primordial homeland of the people who embarked on a millennia-long adventure of dispersion along the routes of the Eurasian continent and, ultimately, the world. Along these paths, many peoples have vanished or merged into others, as vanquished and subjugated, but often also as conquerors and invaders. Today, at some imaginary roll-call, hundreds of Euro-Aryan peoples would have no single man, descendant or representative to confirm their presence with self-awareness and a voice. Among the remaining nations, there is not one that has been directly and completely preserved from the first cycle of dispersal. The remaining nations, through their mutual differences, bear witness to the different historical and spatial paths of experience, which have only served to distance them from their original wholeness.

Anyone who has ever tried to place the fundamental differences of European nations within a single framework must have observed how they complement one another, like the parts of some ideal whole. It is as if, for millennia, the adventures of the Euro-Aryan peoples served to actualise the wealth of different possibilities contained within the primordial people and its wholeness. Judging by the famous command of Friedrich

Nietzsche's famous commandment—which has the power to enlighten, like a formula for Aryan initiation: *tat vam asi!* (*that is you!*)—that primordial people still lives, through true Europeans:

"Let us look each other in the face: we are Hyperboreans! We know well enough how much on the sidelines we live. Neither by land nor by sea will you find a path that leads to the Hyperboreans; Pindar already knew this about us. Beyond the north, the ice, death – there our life is, there our joy is."

By all accounts, among contemporary European nations, the Russian is the one most closely resembling the Hyperboreans. This is not just because the Russians predominantly inhabit the very regions that are presumed to be the homeland of the Indo-European peoples. If these regions are the first homeland of the peoples who, around the year 1000 AD, merged into the Russian nation – then we are confronted with a unique force of ancientness, which the greatest winds of history have failed to uproot and break. If, however, the claim in *the Nestor's Chronicle of the Past Years* that the Danubian lands are the ancestral homeland of the Slavic peoples is well-founded, then we must conclude that the ancestors of the Russians undertook a unique movement of return to the Hyperborean primordial homeland. Perhaps the nostalgia of the Serbian Krajisnik for Russia—which led them from the limes of the Austro-Hungarian Empire to the first defences of Russia from the Turkic invaders—is much deeper than Piščević confesses in his memoirs and than the Serbian writer Miloš Crnjanski supposes in his novel, *Seobe*.

Since the time of the unification of a number of Slavic peoples and their corresponding statelets into a Russian nation and state of imperial perspectives, the backbone of its history has been a quite unique restraint, a soulful reserve and spiritual distance or elevation from all the summonses of the European arena to participate in the great cults and civilisational movements. This phenomenon cannot be explained by some kind of spiritual sluggishness, and even less by 'backwardness', for the history of the Russian people amply demonstrates the possession of an extraordinarily vigilant, persistently inquisitive, and far-sighted worldview. This is a characterological trait without parallel among European nations, which Nestor's chronicle itself attests to, providing a magnificent map of the world's wealth of racial and ethnic, cultural and religious diversity. Given Nestor's very touching unpretentiousness, the scope of his vision across the horizons of the world is astonishing, a scope that can only be compared with that of the great Hellenic historians and geographers.

Even the very tradition concerning the establishment of the Russian state under the leadership of Rurik—according to which the Russians invited Norman lords to rule them, as if they had no great state-building experience, of which *the Veles Book* bears witness—points to the withdrawal we are discussing. Ivan Kirievsky, the first philosopher of the Slavophil movement, however, believes that the Russian crown was ceded to foreigners in order to avoid conflicts between domestic pretenders. Doubts about the historical basis of this tradition are raised by the fact that it appeared later than Ilarion's **Word on Law and Grace** and *the *Memoir and Praise of the Russian Prince Vladimir**, which trace the genealogy of the Muscovite dynasty back to Prince Igor. Nevertheless, the very willingness of the Muscovite people, and even of the majority of Slavophiles, to adopt this tradition betrays a *mindset* uniquely devoid of all vanity. According to the teaching of the Slavophile Konstantin Aksakov, the Slavs ceded to the Normans the task of creating and managing the state because they realised that it was a necessity, but they

at the same time, they wanted to preserve their community and its ethical and vital principle from any interference and identification with the political and state.

The deepest, indirect illumination of the metaphysical roots of that masculine restraint is given to us by Leo Tolstoy in his novel *War and Peace*. The narrative flow is often interrupted so that the author can set out, in the form of a philosophical essay, his doctrine of the cosmic dimensions of the causality of every event and every phenomenon. Hence, the courses, forms, and outcomes of conflict on the battlefield depart from military plans and strategies. Instead of acting in the world with only one's own will and the immediate circumstances of its object in mind, one must perceive the whole of the world and its movements, and adapt one's participation accordingly. Here, Tolstoy stands at the threshold of the Aryan doctrine of the 'action of non-action' of the Cakravarti, the 'lord of the world', embodied as an immovable centre in the wheel of world changes. According to Tolstoy, General Kutuzov achieved victory over Napoleon precisely because he refrained from futile strategic planning and decision-making. This embodiment of the essential nature of the Russian man is most succinctly revealed to us by Tolstoy through the observation of Prince Andrew Bolkonsky, who, after meeting General Kutuzov and returning to his regiment, felt much more at ease regarding the outcome of the war: *"The more he saw in that old man the absence of any distinctive trait... and instead of intelligence (which gathering events and drawing conclusions) the ability for serene contemplation of the course of events – the more so he felt convinced that everything would go as it should. 'He will do nothing on his own initiative. He will not intervene, he will take no action' - thought Prince Andrew - 'but he will listen to everything, remember everything, put everything in its place, will not prevent anything useful and will not allow anything harmful. He realises that there is something stronger and more significant than his will: the inevitable course of events; and he knows that he sees them, that he understands their meaning, and, having regard to that meaning, he knows how to refrain from taking part in those events, knows how to give up his will directed towards another."* (111,16)

"Beauty will save the world"

A particular aspect of this Russian restraint is indifference towards the prevailing social measures of 'earthly', material values. Many Russian writers also bear witness to the nobility's readiness to throw material wealth, without a smile, into the fires of passion. However, in these scenes, an affected arrogance and an active contempt, inherent to effective pessimism, predominate. These are alien to the psychology of the Russian people and form part of the character traits acquired on the paths of the nobility's alienation. True Russian indifference towards the social measures of 'earthly' values is expressed by a single, mute, serene and sovereign contempt. And this Tolstoy observed well and expressed in his novel *War and Peace*, through the feelings of Pierre Bezukhov:

"The second feeling was an unconditional, purely Russian contempt for everything that was conventional, artificial, and human, for everything that the majority of people consider the supreme good of the world. For the first time, Pierre felt this strange and fascinating feeling in the Slobodsky palace, when, in a flash, he felt how

wealth and power, and life, and everything that people make and keep with so much effort, even when something is of value, it is of value only for the pleasure with which it is cast aside."

In the diverse acts of this pleasure in rejecting worldly values, the Russian man "*puts his power and strength to the test, declaring the presence of a supreme court of life, a court that rests beyond human conditions*".(111.27) The authentic Russian worldview inverts the usual perspective on 'earthly' values, as if modelled on the so-called 'reverse perspective' of the Orthodox canon of painting holy icons. The material aspect is at the bottom and beauty at the top of the Russian hierarchy of 'earthly' values. The deep-rootedness of this measure in the Russian psyche is also confirmed by tradition

O to the Russian choice of the Christian faith. According to the legend as related in Nestor's Primary Chronicle, the Russian choice of Christianity was not made under the mortal threat and compulsion of political ambition, nor under the influence of the Gospel's messages of love or the terrible promises of *Revelation*, but exclusively through the virtue of an aesthetic choice:

We walked in Bugare, we watched them bowing in the temple, called a mosque, standing with their trousers down; having bowed, they sit and look this way and that, like mad, and there is no joy in them but sorrow.

I a great stench. Their law is not good. And we came to the Germans, and in their temples we saw many services but we saw no beauty at all. And we came to the Greeks, and they brought us to the place where they serve their God, and we did not know whether we were in heaven or on earth; there is no such sight or such beauty on earth, and we are at a loss for words to describe it; we only know this—that God dwells there with the people, and their service is more beautiful than that in other lands."

That the aesthetic choice of faith was not the result of chance but a decision made from the very essence of the masculine being is testified by the tendency of Russian thinkers to entrust beauty with the greatest tasks: from Prince Vladimir - mira Odoevsky, who pointed out that humanity could rise from a state conditioned by original sin and regain its lost human wholeness by undertaking an aesthetic path of education and self-reclamation

- to Fyodor Dostoevsky who, before the horizons of the 'last times', through the words of Karamazov, confides his conviction that beauty will save the world.

This reliance on beauty is certainly not of a Christian origin, but is rooted in the Euro-Aryan **forma mentis** and its corresponding worldview. As with every European, in every Russian the idea of beauty is mediated by the Hellenic-Roman culture, which the Russians adopted along with the Byzantine tradition as the heir to the Roman Empire. Relying on beauty is one of a series of attestations to the preservation of the pre-Christian heritage in the minds and hearts of the Russian people. By choosing the Christianity of the Eastern rather than the Western Church, the Russians preserved a significant part of the treasury of the culture of the 'old faith'. The fundamental principle distinguishing Orthodoxy from Catholicism is: '*Christianity is faith and God is law*', as opposed to the Roman '*Christianity is law and God is faith*'.

- thus the extraordinary openness of the Orthodox Church to different paths of faith, through which many peoples brought and incorporated their pre-Christian heritages, explains the preservation and vitality of many ancient, pre-Christian and even prehistoric ideas, beliefs and

customs. Moreover, the very foundation of the autonomous Orthodox Churches on real nations, to which at every moment in history correspond

- contributed to the development and strengthening of their custodial roles with regard to their respective cultural heritages. After all, unlike Western Europeans, whom Muslims persistently remind that they owe their fundamental education, acquaintance with the works of Hellenistic philosophers sold to them by Arab traders – within the circle of Byzantine civilisation, the link with Hellenistic tradition was never broken at any moment, but remained constantly alive and fruitful. In light of the above, it is understandable how the Russians managed to preserve their fundamental characteristics through the centuries.

It is also certain that no European nation has embraced the legacy of empire as deeply as the Russians. The most striking measure of this assimilation is an unconditional elevation above its own national consciousness. History bears witness that in times of crisis or defeat, other European empires have disintegrated into actual or potential ethnic or national components. For the Russians, the sense of belonging to the empire is above the sense of belonging to the nation, and so they remain, always and everywhere, loyal to Russia, even in moments of greatest defeat and suffering. Although Russians have a very strong national consciousness, it has always and everywhere been, and remains, subordinate to their imperial consciousness. Hence, the word '*Russian*', even today in everyday usage, denotes first and foremost a member of a multinational community whose state is called *Russia*. This is a phenomenon that points to the sacred, metaphysical nature of the state that the Russians carry in their thoughts and dreams. And here we see the Byzantine-mediated legacy of the Roman Empire shining through, to which the Russians owe—in the observation of Konstantin Leontiev—their unity and unheard-of strength:

Byzantine ideas and feelings firmly united the semi-wild Russia into one body. Byzantinism gave us the strength to endure the Tatar pogrom and the prolonged payment of tribute. The Byzantine image of the Saviour on the grand prince's standard protected Dmitry's devout army on the battlefield, where Muscovy first showed the Tatars that it was no longer the earlier, fragmented and tom-apart Russia. Byzantinism gave us the strength to fight the Poles, the Swedes, France and Turkey. Under its wing, if we remain faithful to it, we shall have the strength to withstand the pressure of the whole international Europe, should it ever attempt, having destroyed all that is sublime and beautiful in itself, to impose upon us the rot and stench of its new laws of petty earthly well-being, of earthly radical universalism." (Leontiev, 1994)

"The Last Europeans"

Acting contrary to the culture and tradition, the aspirations and will of the Russian people, forcibly introducing the achievements and inventions, as well as the ideas, institutions, customs and fashions of Western European civilisation, Tsar Peter I provoked a centuries-long upheaval and schism. The estrangement of the Muscovite nobility from the people was marked by a series of measures: from the relocation of the capital from Moscow to Saint Petersburg to the adoption of the French language not only for courtly and salon conversations but also for everyday and intimate discussions. From that historic moment

The Russian elite became—precisely thanks to the chaste integrity of the Russian soul—an ideal laboratory for the ultimate, *in vivo* testing of all, even the most extreme, Western European ideas and ideologies, beliefs and superstitions. Dostoevsky's novels provide spectacular insights into these laboratories and the uncommonly consistent and sincere confessions of the experimenters. The main character of the novel **Evil Spirits**, Prince Stavrogin, subjects the unwitting guinea pigs to a series of the extreme philosophical and political ideas of the time—which would determine the fate of the 20th century—in order to observe their outcomes in the trials of life. One of the Western European observers of these Russian experiments with Western ideas concluded his observations with the mocking remark that the Russians "*take everything too seriously*", not realising that in so doing he had in fact passed a damning judgement on the Western man or his ideas. Ezra Pound teaches us: "A man who has not the courage to stand by his ideas is a wretch, or his ideas are worthless."

And it is to Dostoevsky that we owe the discovery of a special dimension of Russian wholeness, which potentially contains all European nations within it. Count Versilov speaks to his son of the impressions gained before Claude Lorrain's painting of the Golden Age and in the fight against the Paris Commune, on the side of the Prussians:

Yes, it was then that the Commune set fire to the Tuileries... Oh, don't be upset; I know it was 'logical', and I can perfectly well understand the irresistibility of the contemporary idea; but, as a bearer of a higher Russian cultural thought, I could not allow it, for higher Russian thought is precisely in the all-reconciliation of ideas. And who in the whole world then could grasp such a thought: I wandered alone. I do not speak of myself personally—I speak of Russian thought. There was struggle and logic there; there the Frenchman was only a Frenchman, and the German only a German, and more so than ever in their history; consequently, never did a Frenchman do more harm to France, nor a German to his Germany, than at that very time! Then, in all of Europe, there was not a single European! Only I, among all those petroleum-heads, could have told them to their faces that their burning of the Tuileries was a mistake; and only I, among all the conservative-vengeful ones, could have said to those avengers: that the burning of the Tuileries was a crime, but a logical one. That is why, my little one, it was only I, as a Russian, who was then the only European in Europe... It is only the Russian, even in our own time—and this was long before the final reckoning—who has acquired the ability to be most Russian precisely when he is most European. In this lies the essential national difference between us and everyone else, and in this respect, we are something entirely separate. In France I am a Frenchman, with a German a German, with an ancient Greek I am a Greek and, in that I am, to the greatest extent, a Russian. In that very same I am a true Russian and I serve Russia best, because I carry its main idea." (Dostoevsky, 1979).

Thus, it is no coincidence that from that Russian vantage point of European self-awareness come the deepest insights into the weaknesses and ills spread by Western civilisation. In this domain, Russian Slavophil thought has far surpassed the reach of its models in the German Romantic movement. In accordance with the fundamental nature of the Russian being, the main epistemological perspective of Slavophilic thought—from Ivan Kireyevsky to Alexei Khomyakov—aims to analyse the disintegration of the wholeness of man and community under the influence of the ideas and forces of Western civilisation. For instance, in the gnoseological domain, from the standpoint of the Slavophile ideal of the '*wholeness of reason*'—where logical cognition is temporally and hierarchically preceded by will, as a formative and informative principle, and by faith, as an immediate, so to speak, pre-categorical power

of perception – Homjakov conducts a positive critique of Western rationalism, which ruptures this organic connection, leading to the consequent degradation of knowledge, which becomes a mere and superficial reflection of things and phenomena. In the light of the *'wholeness of reason'*, however, things and phenomena are also experienced wholeheartedly and transformed into facts of our inner life.

For Kirievsky, too, *"logical thought, detached from other cognitive faculties, is a characteristic feature of an intellect that has lost its wholeness"* (Kirevskij, 1911). Ivan Kireyevsky's perspective is on a much grander scale, but he too begins from a positive premise, the ideal of the wholeness of man whose individual faculties are organically harmonised from a common, metaphysical centre. The man of the West is characterised precisely by the breakdown of these connections: each faculty acts for itself, independently of the others, and it is in this way that Kiijevskij explains the success of Western civilisation in achieving at least temporary progress in certain domains, despite a general spiritual weakening. Kiijevskij observes a causal connection between Protestantism—which imagines that Christian truth is accessible to the logical reason, and therefore to every person—rationalism, and democratic egalitarianism. Rationalism undermines every idea and reality of communion by alienating the individual reason from the super-individual mind and the corresponding corporate life. In this process, man also alienates himself from his Creator. Its ideological correlate, liberal democracy, by destroying the traditional community, holds individuals together only by an external force, which allows the idolatry of private property and the corresponding greed to dehumanise and desolate human relationships, turning people into slaves to things—the very opposite of human wholeness.

The ideal of human wholeness and the community of the people was the positive basis of the Slavophiles' criticisms of Peter I's reforms. These reforms extraordinarily strengthened the power of the Russian state on the world stage, but they devastated Russian society by introducing Western germs of stratification and discord, disunity and conflict. According to Kiiievsky, that community *"knew nothing of the iron separation of self-contained social classes, nor of the one-sided privileges and the inevitable political and moral conflicts that arise from them, nor of the contempt, hatred and envy of one class for another. Princes, boyars, the clergy, the people, princely, noble, urban, and peasant associations, all classes and all strata of the community were imbued with a single spirit, single convictions and thoughts, a single aspiration for the common good."* (Kireevsky, 1911)

In that Russian, as in any ideal traditional community, the different forces do not wage war but rather cooperate. Drawing upon the extraordinarily profound yet perfectly concise intuition of Drieu La Rochelle – *'Russia is the Tsar, and communism, and even more'* (Drieu La Rochelle, 2002) - one could freely say that in such a community, one can be simultaneously a monarchist, a communist, and even more, without at any point falling into contradiction. It is precisely the contradictions *of the 'left'* and *the 'right'* - to the point of civil wars - bear witness to the diseased state of modern society and of corresponding thought, which falls into the whirlpools of reductionism and the pit of particularism, incapable of a holistic worldview.

At the crucial exam of history, before the challenges of a violently imported, foreign and anti-Russian revolution, the full ruinousness and depth of the process of the Russian elite's alienation from the Russian people and even the state was revealed. The Russian elite was not up to these challenges and, through its weaknesses, essentially betrayed not only

the people and even the Tsar and the empire, even though, on the eve of the First World War, in all domains of civilisational comparison – from science and technology to the economy – the rise of Russia indicated that it would very quickly become the world's leading power. It is essential to point out that the Russian Empire, like the Austro-Hungarian, did not suffer an ideological but a military defeat. Although it fought on the side of the Atlantic Allies in defence of the unjustly accused Serbia, it too was defeated because of the disintegration of the successor to the Roman Empire – was the main target of Europe's enemies, namely the instigators of the First World War, who entrapped the young Serbian devotees of the Masonic idea into assassinating Franz Ferdinand of Habsburg in order to have a valid pretext for opening hostilities. (Mužić, 2001) Therefore, the idea of a European empire, essentially undefeated, has every right to be revived and realised.

The anti-European nature of liberalism

In the fires of two world and fratricidal wars, not only were the European empires destroyed, but also the European orders of virtue and values. The inversion of these orders and hierarchies, along with the spread of subhuman principles and forms of life, is certainly not the result of some qualitative superiority of liberal capitalism, but rather a consequence of the violence with which this ideology was imposed upon Europe—namely, by the force of military victories of the Anglo-American, Atlantic power in both world wars. Therefore, our discussion requires at least a cursory examination of the essential nature of the ideology of Europe's occupier, for it is the prime mover of a series of processes of alienation, from the narrowing of the sphere and perversion of political action to the destruction of communities and their transformation into mechanical, class-divided, and internally conflict-ridden societies.

There is some truth to the belief of the proponents of liberal capitalism that the appropriate models of social and economic organisation are universally applicable, always and everywhere. These are ideas and models that do not stem from the European essence but from the basest, and therefore universally widespread, impulses of the human element. They concern the impulses towards the acquisition and increase of material goods, which, without proper checks, can assume the proportions of obsession and of plundering and criminal greed. The bourgeois revolutions, that is, the usurpation of power by the degenerate parts of the third estate, and the upheavals of the traditional, tripartite and hierarchical structure of the European community, have destroyed all its defences against the greed of the economic animal. These were defences built and maintained through the effort and care of objective ethics and Christian moralism, by means of the state and appropriate politics. Therefore, the first victims of the nihilism of the economic demon, called liberalism, were precisely politics and the state.

We have already pointed out the significance of the research of Max Weber and Werner Sombart, which illuminated in Protestantism and the Old Testament **forma mentis** a special incentive for the liberation, or rather *the liberalisation*, of the economic animal from all restraints and barriers. This is one of a series of far-reaching, sweeping and often tragic consequences of the shift in the centre of gravity of religiosity towards *the Old Testament*, and towards the commercial concept of the relationship between the believer and the supposed deity. The superstitious assumption that material wealth is a kind of reward and an indicator of one's religious zeal has created

is, by the force of centuries of indoctrination, a *form of mind* that the prevailing inclination to enrich oneself for its own sake condemns to a corresponding economy of one's own life, to a kind of asceticism and self-absorption, which is concealed under the mask of pious individualism. This is the ideal subject of the liberal-capitalist rule which everywhere suppresses symbiotic or organic communities and, in their place, produces artificial societies, mechanical masses of solitary individuals.

The hatred of the Old Testament man for historical empires or pseudo-empires, whose yoke he had experienced and resented—and which has broken through all the barriers of *the New Testament*, having conquered the final frontier, where he enviously curses the power, splendour and wealth of Rome through *the* supposed *Revelation* - prepared the psychological humus for the germination of a new, Protestant and consequently liberal hostility towards modern states and their remaining barriers and limitations. We know how the absolutist monarchies—by the force of centralising the life of the community, thereby weakening it—produced highly favourable conditions for the rise of such hostility and for the bourgeois revolutions of orders and hierarchies, values and virtues. Destroying the riches of the complexity of feudal systems, stifling many essential and constituent structures and forms, organs and institutions, clans and estates, traditions and customs of life, and thereby the very essence of the community's vitality – the processes of centralisation of absolutist states enabled the easy rise and triumph of the lowest, thus liberated, forces of the human element. Almost everywhere, revolutionaries adopted a centralist system but completely inverted, or rather perverted, the classical European sense of the state and the relationship between the state and its citizens. Instead of feeling the state as something of *his own* and *inherent*, as an extended home, like a community which is an extended family—the man of liberalism sees and experiences it, at best, as an external, alien and necessary evil, if not as an opponent or an enemy, to be deceived and exploited.

The spirit of liberalism is characterised by the problematisation and dramatisation of the freedoms of the individual vis-à-vis the state, and of human rights—which, according to the dogmas of natural law, chronologically precede and are of greater value than the state—along with the need for appropriate constitutional and legal provisions and safeguards. It is perhaps superfluous to point out that such problems were entirely unknown in Euro-Aryan and even in ancient European orders. This is why Socrates, free to escape and avoid punishment, chooses death instead, remaining loyal to the state, in good times and in bad, despite the ultimate nature of his conflict with the authorities.

Of the persistence of a feeling of aversion and hostility towards a *foreign* state, rooted in an Old Testament *form of thinking*, is attested to by the fact that liberalist pseudo-empires – first Great Britain and then the USA – have persistently sought and found their public *raison d'être* in the existence of supposed hostile orders that must be destroyed. Thus, the innate anti-state impulse of the alienated masses is externally channelled and focused upon officially denounced embodiments of evil, from the Southern Confederacy, through the Axis powers and Russia (under the pretext of anti-communism), to Serbia, Iraq and Iran.

In a world under the shadow of liberal rule, having lost all positive, and especially its educational, formative and informative role, the state, along with politics, has been reduced to a handmaiden

the demon of the economy to which its adherents, like the Marxists, are equally subject. The Marxist outlook neither sees nor acknowledges the authenticity of human virtues and values, free from the conditioning of the world of production and commercial relations. Marxism differs from liberalism in essence only in its yearning to liberate man from capitalist exploitation, through the universal abolition of private property and the just distribution of profit. Yet, the horizon still remains confined to the circle of the same demonism.

The processes of secularisation have transformed the idea of divine Providence into the theory of economic determinism, which operates through the market and *the laws of the market*. In the market and its presumed *laws*, the preachers of liberalism, such as Hayek, celebrate transcendent forces capable of regulating all human relations for the common good by themselves. It is on this superstitious premise that the doctrinaire liberalist challenge to, or prohibition of, any state intervention in economic processes, and above all in the operation of the market mechanisms of supply and demand, rests. In reality, under the shadow of liberalism, the market has never been, nor is it, a free or autonomous institution or force, but rather the expression of the effects of the ruling powers – from the international financial capital, supranational companies and corporations to trusts and *lobbies*.- which use the state and its corresponding policy as instruments of influence over economic and even market processes.

One of the main, albeit indirect, causes of the extraordinary submissiveness of the liberal state to the rule of alienated and even anti-national centres of power and *lobbies* lies precisely in the individualism and anti-state intolerance of *the silent majority*. These traits render it alienated from state affairs and a powerless victim of perverted politics. This schism is also evidenced by the ongoing process of widening the social divide between, on the one hand, an ever-narrower and wealthier minority, and on the other, an ever-growing and impoverished majority. The exposed fact is in itself sufficient to refute one of the basic liberalist justifications for unleashing the greed of the economic animal as the best or shortest path to general well-being, conceived or imagined in accordance with the arithmetic sum of individual well-beings. It is in this social divide that the foundations of parties in modern, mediating and parliamentary democracy also rest, for they *grosso modo* and in principle represent the economic interests of the corresponding classes, or strata, of the disintegrated society. And this reduction of politics to a dualism of economic *left* and economic *right* attests to a particular aspect of its degeneracy, namely the loss of higher and general formative and informative principles, along with a reduction to the service of inferior and particular interests.

Last but not least, the ongoing degradation of politics in the world under the shadow of liberalism is also evidenced by the language used. In everyday speech in the *English-speaking* world, the word '*politics*' has long since given way to '*policy*'. On the other hand, in European culture, as if in a kind of revenge for the loss of its classical duties and responsibilities, and for the impoverishment of the semantic richness of the word '*politics*', it is everywhere experiencing inflation. In almost every domain of social existence, there is or is invoked some *policy*, from monetary, fiscal or investment, to cultural, developmental, housing and health. And this

This fact indicates to us that *the political* is indestructible and alive, like the corresponding ideal of wholeness and the idea of an empire which most fully actualises it on a state scale.

AUTHORITY AND FREEDOM

On the battlefields of the age-old war *of the sea against the land*, the enemy can also, consciously or unconsciously, reveal to Europeans their political characteristics, striking them with subversive or corrosive blows. A textbook example of this experience was provided in 1968 by the nihilistic onslaught of deluded and incited masses of students upon the foundations of the European higher education system, especially upon the virtues and institutions of scientific and andragogical authority, polemically defined and reduced to the stigma of *authoritarianism*.

Although the targets of these attacks were, for the most part, merely the stunted or fossilised remnants of institutions of *authority*, the nihilistic force that descended upon them did not aim to clear the ground for the establishment of credible forms, content, and virtues, but rather to destroy every trace of them. Given that these attacks completely lacked any positive basis for *refutation* and any positive definition of *authority*, we are free to conclude that they did not target manifestations of the virtue's decay, but the virtue itself, falsely presented as some kind of threatening opposite to freedom, as part of a universal *system of oppression*, in the service of the ruling forces of capitalism.

Metaphysical denial

In the history of Europeans, beginning with the first known manifestations of Roman statecraft, the need for authority has been one of the essential and enduring characteristics of political thought and action. This history is marked, as its constant, by the perpetual movement of seeking and reifying this need, with varying forces and powers, on different grounds and under diverse political conditions or systems, in equally varied forms or proportions. The aforementioned characteristics of this need for authority point to its pre-political or metapolitical and timeless origin in the very essence of the European man. On the metaphysical origin of the idea of *authority* and of those varying needs is also attested to, indirectly, by the obscurity or insufficient clarity of the meanings contained in this Latin-derived vocabulary, which is in stark contrast to the persistence of the needs and quests, as well as the intensity of the hatred towards their embodiments or institutions, remnants or traces.

These hatreds and denials, which constitute a parallel constant in the recent era of European history, are not always and necessarily manifestations of mere baseness that cannot tolerate sublimity. Often, they are a conscious or unconscious expression of rebellion against false authorities, which summons the appearance of the true. In essence, a long line of intellectual rebels against *authority*—from Descartes to Fichte—have used that word entirely incorrectly to denote the prevailing opinions and the precepts of the church, state, or science, overlooking the truth that the supposed value-contradictions, thus reason and freedom, the very elements essential to true authority. True authority always and everywhere comes from on high, calling upon freedom to respond effectively to its counsels, just as in Plato's model of the human mixture it illuminates and therefore tames and directs the other powers.

The metaphysical nature of authority is sometimes dimly sensed by modern political thought, which, pathetically powerless, attempts to explain the phenomenon with the aid of its reductionist methods, such as

the shortcomings of psychoanalytic interpretations of the superior and the general, in their reduction to the constructs of the inferior, the subconscious, and the particular and pathological. Thus, for example, the legal theorist Kelsen explains *social authority* as an echo or projection of the first, infantile experience of authority: "*Social authority, like religious authority, like every other authority, is originally felt as the first authority to appear in the life of the individual: as the father, as the fatherland, as God the Father. And this psychological denial of social authority rejects the idea of the creation of authority by those subject to that very authority.*" (Kelsen, 1929)

If we set aside the fact that, assuming the proposed generic perspective, the first authority experienced is not paternal but maternal, and the historical fact that the phrase '*father of his country*' was coined several centuries after the first proclamations of political authority in Rome - remains the far more significant fact of the fundamental failure of Kelsen's epistemological endeavour, which does not at all explain the meaning and significance of authority, but merely shifts the epistemological problem from the social to the familial and infantile level. The polemical tone of the final part of the quotation reveals to us the polemical purpose of the exposition of psychoanalytic theory, which

it actually aims to ridicule any need for social authority, reducing it to a casebook of presumed regressive reactions. After all, Kelsen himself unconsciously refutes his hypothesis: if the denial of social authority is psychological, that is, infantile - then the mere thought of the possibility of '*the creation of authority by the subordinates*' is completely unfounded, that is, nonsensical. It may be superfluous to point out that authority would not exist at all if those who need it were capable or accustomed to creating it themselves. True authority is a quality which—like heroism or wisdom, beauty or nobility—is not given to or available to everyone, nor to every capacity.

In essence, in keeping with the reductionist and falsifying tendencies of the modern mind and the patterns of *rationalism*, Kelsen conceives of *authority* as a synonym for power and its commands, which is the easiest way to overlook the true content and meaning, the significance and importance of this virtue. In its first and highest source, authority is a metaphysical virtue which is not rightly to be identified with power, for authority can act just as effectively without any means or attributes of power, and even without any visible action. At the eastern end of the Euro-Aryan world, this quality was first revealed to us by its careful frontier observer, the imperial librarian Lao Tzu, summarising the insights into the recommendation for the narrow art of statecraft of non-action (XXXVII, 1-4), after the heavenly pattern: "*This is the way of Heaven: it does not contend, yet is victorious; it does not speak, yet has the answer; it gives no sign, yet all things come to it.*" (LXXIII, 8-11)

Power devoid of true authority must resort to the force of laws and rules, even violence or fear, and to despondency, in order to compel people to carry out its unwelcome commands. Wherever it operates of its own accord, as in the original form of the Roman Senate, authority addresses human freedom, seeking voluntary responses. William Shakespeare has provided us with a good example of this complete independence of the nature of authority from the nature of power, precisely in the epoch when *authority* was sinking into the semantic framework of the concept of *power* until it was dissolved and identified with it. The tragedy **King Lear** contains a fine example of this complete independence of the nature of authority from the nature of power, precisely in the epoch when authority was falling into the semantic framework of *the concept of power* to the point of dissolution and identification. "Lear: Who am I?"

Lear: *Well, who are you?*

Kent: *A man of very honourable heart, and as poor as a king.*

Kent: *Service. Lir: If you are as poor a subject as he is a king, then you are poor enough. What would you be?*

Kent: *Service.*

Lir: *Who would you serve?*

Kent: *To you.*

Kent: *Do you know me, friend?*

Kent: *No, my lord, but there is something in your bearing that I would like to call master.*

Kent: *Authority."*

Kent: *Authority."*

In a polemic against the ideologues of revolution, pointing to the difficulty of grasping the content of the phenomenon denoted by the noun 'authority', Franz von Baader correctly perceived its indestructibility and inseparability from freedom:

Although no one, as far as I know, has defined the essence of authority correctly and exhaustively, no one has so far denied its reality, and the same applies to the sans-culottes and their popular authority. It is known that not even the most ferocious revolutionaries have succeeded in destroying authority; they have only limited themselves to usurping it... Despite the weakening or removal of legitimate authority, the need to serve it remains, and it is no longer voluntary but becomes truly servile (Von Baader, 1925)

At this point in our survey, it is worth emphasising that a complete and self-conscious need for true authority characterises those individuals who are worthy of it, that is to say, free people who are capable of recognising it because they possess something of the object of their search. Otherwise, they would be incapable of feeling the need for authority, nor of responding to its summons. Hence, the *servile* need never addresses itself to true authority, but to its reflections, surrogates, or to mere, raw power and force. A instructive and general example of this complete disregard for the true nature of authority is provided by Friedrich Engels in his essay *On Authority*, polemically addressed to the socialists who, in the observation of Marx's associate, are waging a "systematic crusade against what they call the principle of authority". (Engels, 1949) Engels first defines the authority in question: "the imposition of a foreign will upon our will; on the other hand, authority presupposes subordination". This is followed by the dramatic question of all Marxists who have reached the threshold of doubting the ideal of the withering away of the state: "Can we do without that relationship, can we—under the conditions that exist in today's society—create another social order, in which that authority will no longer have any purpose, in which it will, therefore, have to disappear?"

Reducing *authority* to what it is not, namely to an element of governance and even to the mere physical conditioning of any task – with the example of the so-called 'authority of steam', that is, the steam engine, 'which cares not for personal autonomy' and to which workers must submit, regardless of the system in which they live

- Engels concludes that the disappearance of the "political state and with it political authority requires the application of the 'most authoritarian thing'", namely the social revolution:

"Revolution is, undoubtedly, the most authoritarian thing there can be. Revolution is an act in which one part of the population imposes its will on another by means of guns, bayonets and cannons, that is to say, by extraordinary means

authoritarian; and the party that has won does not want to lose the fruits of its efforts, it must maintain its dominion by means of fear, which is its weapon against reactionaries.

Thus, we see how the word *authority* is used to denote the worst means of coercion, terror and fear, with a shameless recommendation that unequivocally reveals to us the subhuman nature to which true authority is absolutely inaccessible and unknown. Following the recommendations laid out, and understanding *authority* in the same way as a synonym for the coercions of the power-mongers, Max Horkheimer – one of the most vocal neo-Marxist agitators against *authoritarianism, the authoritarian man, and authoritarian systems* – concluded that a value judgement about a particular *authority* depends on an assessment of the corresponding system of dependency:

Authority, as an established dependency, can therefore mean both advanced relationships, which correspond to the interests of the participants and foster the development of human potential, and a set of artificially maintained, long-since untrue social relationships and representations, contradictory to the true interests of the community. Authority, therefore, can mean both advanced relationships, which correspond to the interests of the participants and foster the development of human potential, and a set of artificially sustained, long-since untrue social relations and representations, contradictory to the true interests of the community. And yet, these two modes of existence differ like sleep and wakefulness, like captivity and freedom. And yet, these two modes of existence differ as sleep and wakefulness, as captivity and freedom. Only a total analysis of the existing social situation can answer the question... whether unconditional subordination to a political leader or to a party historically points forwards or backwards. (Horkheimer, 1976)

The paradoxical and unconscious invocation of authority by its opponents and destroyers was first and keenly observed by the inspired thinker of the counter-revolution, Antoine de Rivarol, as he watched the revolutionary mob in the squares of Paris hurl stones at the statues of the sovereigns:

"To the Royal Persons happens the same thing as to the statues of the gods: the first blows are indeed aimed at the god, but the last fall only upon the disfigured marble." (De Rivarol, 1941)

An etymological perspective

The very fact that, in its first historical appearance on the stage of Rome, the idea of *authority* reveals a highly complex and mature nature testifies to the long, prehistoric paths that preceded its determination and development.

Tradition directs us to seek the fundamental understanding of the original meaning of concepts in an etymological perspective. The Latin language has the most offshoots of the common but dormant Euro-Aryan root of the word *authority*. Unlike in the *Vedic* and *Avesta* languages, where the offshoots of the root **aug-* are limited to the domain of the second, that is, the defensive function – signifying fullness of physical *strength* (*ojas*, or *aogar-* or *aojah*), whereas in the *Vedic* and *Avesta* languages the derivatives of the root **aug-* are limited to the domain of the second, that is, defensive function – signifying the fullness of physical strength (*ojas*, or *aogar-* or *aojah*), with which the corresponding gods, primarily Indra, act – in Latin they permeate all three functions and denote manifold roles and properties, vital to the community and its state.

Considering the Indo-European root **aug-* with the suffix **-es* - which usually denotes *a consolidated, collected effect of an action or the total effect of repeated actions* - Georges Dumézil observes that **aug-es-* "can have the sense of the 'concrete and actual effect of an increase or augmentation!,' that is, 'plenitude' of this or that kind of forces or means... In Indo-Iranian, where the verb is lost and where the derived noun was attached to the ideology of another

function (physical strength, a warrior's feat) *auj-as has taken on, of course, the clear and limited sense we have defined: 'the fullness of that which conditions the act of a champion or a fighter, the fullness of muscular strength.'" (Dumezil, 1969)

In its Latin domain, *the auctoritas* and the series of designations of creative, religious and statesmanlike deity-creating power and corresponding roles - from *auctor*, through *augur* to *Augustus* - derive from the verb *augeo* which dictionaries translate much like the Indo-European root **aug-*: *an action that increases or causes growth* in some value or magnitude. Clearly, the contents of *auctoritas* and the aforementioned roles far exceed the semantic framework of their common, of the Latin and Indo-European root, although in the case of the authority wielded by the Roman senators, as an essential property, a certain correspondence can be observed in the domain of measures of the quantitative world: they become senators (from *senex* - old man) they are those who possess the virtues and knowledge that elevate them above the other members of the community, a transcendent *surplus*, acquired through noble birth and experience, tempered and confirmed in the trials of life and public affairs, and which is the source and foundation of their *authority*.

However, it is not possible to overlook the fact that the sum of such a *surplus* with the rest constitutes a certain *wholeness* or *fullness*. In light of all that has been set out, it is reasonable to suppose that the emphasis of the virtue signified by *auctoritas* and its roots lies not so much in the act of *augmentation* or in *surplus* itself, but rather in the postulation or postulatedness of a certain *wholeness*, crystallised around the upright axis of quality. Reflections of this primordial meaning can still be observed today in the Serbian language, in idiomatic expressions such as 'to fulfil one's life' or 'to fulfil one's role', where 'to fulfil' is synonymous with 'to give meaning to' or 'to realise'. A such assumption is also suggested by the **forma mentis** of the Indo-European mind, for which the very notion of an empty progression towards an infinite advance, or of an unbounded increase in wealth, was utterly alien and even foreign: here, any increase is limited by the world of measures and forms, and thus directed towards an ideal wholeness or fulfilment.

The Roman Senate

This ideal wholeness is also indicated by the number of one hundred members of the first senate which, according to Roman tradition, was established Romulus (Livy, 1,8). And to the assembly of Solon's Athens, each tribe sent a hundred representatives. In the symbolism of the traditional cultures of the Eurasian continent, the number *one hundred* is almost invariably a symbolic signifier of totality, condensed into an individual or a group. The Roman Senate is the most complete historical expression of the institution of *the council of elders*, which is one of the common elements of the Euro-Aryan tradition of political assembly and its decision-making. In European history, the Roman Senate is one of the first (and most complete) expressions of political authority. In its original form, the senate is an advisory and supervisory body of the first, sovereign function, entrusted with the task of confirming or denying, by the mere force of its *auctoritas*, the validity of decisions made by *the potestas* and *libertas*, that is, by the legislative and executive bodies and the popular assembly, obliged to seek such confirmations and advice but also free to reject them. In this freedom, a significant distinction between *auctoritas* and *potestas* is evident. Senators would assume *imperium*, the duties of executive power, only in exceptional cases of the absence or incapacity of the holders of power or magistrates, that is, during periods of interregnum.

During the period of the republican constitution, on the political stage of the Roman state, the Senate was the sole remnant of the archaic structure of the sovereign function, as Cicero indirectly indicates in *De re publica*, when he defines the basic properties of the elements of the tripartite structure of the Roman state: authority (*auctoritas*) is the characteristic of the Senate, power (*potestas*) belongs to the magistrates, and liberty (*libertas*) is the attribute of the people. In the Roman Republic, the source of sovereign decision-making, in a qualitative sense, shifted downwards, towards the domain of the classical second function, where *potestas*, the executive civil and military authority, was exercised by the magistrates, consuls and praetors, elected by the people. This shift attests to the assumption of a nature and destiny marked by the predominance of the god Mars, in keeping with the combative maintenance and subsequent extraordinary and conquering, extra-continental expansion of the Roman state.

In his study of the foundations and institutions of the Roman state, Theodor Mommsen rightly observed the irreducibility of the senate to the category of a mere advisory body, for the decisions of the senators were more significant and much stronger than a mere piece of advice, but without the force of a complete binding obligation, as in the relationship of a tutor to a ward:

"The word auctoritas, in that ancient formula, has preserved its original, literal meaning, as in the tutoris auctoritas of public law: an act of the community's will, subject to errors and wrong decisions, requires 'augmentation', confirmation by the council of elders." (Mommsen, 1887)

If the advice or decisions of the senators had binding force, the senate would not exist, nor would the complementary duality of the advisory body and the executive power. Had the executive power made decisions entirely independently, without the obligation to seek the senate's advice beforehand and to submit to its corresponding oversight, it would have suffered to a much greater, even fatal, extent from the forces of its own bias or the political arena, being conditioned rather than doing the conditioning. The complementary duality of the senate and the executive power actualises the ideal of an organic interplay and dialectic of the objective and subjective poles of reality, the world of ideas and principles, and the world of application and practice, of the general and the particular.

This institution of the Euro-Aryan tradition of political organisation is particularly distinguished by the status of the senator vis-à-vis the magistrate: unlike the magistrates, who are elected for a one-year term to specific areas of business, senators are elected for life and their remit encompasses the entirety of the state, all its dimensions and horizons. The lifetime nature of the senatorial office corresponds to the timeless nature of an authority whose core originates with the tribal ancestors, ideally present and effective in the senate through their descendants. Thus, the senate's actions for the good of the community are the fruits of many generations, and with a certain freedom of interpretation, it can be said that this timeless dimension is a particular aspect of that '*superabundance*' or '*superiority*' which distinguishes the senator from the magistrates and the people. Therefore, any voluntary or compulsory seeking of counsel from the senators was addressed not only to contemporaries but, ideally, also to ancestors, that is, to tradition.

The ideal insulation of the senate from any self-interest of its members—who, in the classical period of the institution, were forbidden even from engaging in a number of the most lucrative trades in the markets of *the urbs*, which directed them towards acquiring wealth through agriculture - also indicates the metaphysical rank and origin of senatorial authority, for the principles of those provisions of the Euro-Aryan ethos are the very opposite of the forces that govern the chthonic part of *the Human Mixture*. The restrictions in question are a reflection of those principles of the Euro-Aryan political tradition which Plato remembered and set out well in his draft of the state, the top of which,

unlike the bottom, the 'carpenter caste', which is characterised by the possession of metaphysical gold and a perfect renunciation of material goods:

"as for gold and silver, they should be told that they carry in their souls that which is divine and a gift from the gods, that human gold is in no way necessary for them, and that they err if they connect divine gold with the gold of mortal men and thus profane it, for many godless things have already happened to coined gold, while their gold remains unsullied" (The Republic, 416e-417a).

It is clear that these provisions protect the community and that one ideally requires or desires them, but this fact is not a sufficient basis for the assumption that the institution of *the council of elders* stems from the world of general, universal human or all-human needs and that it corresponds to *sive* experiences, for otherwise it would be universally widespread. It is a political body rooted in the deontological world, which embodies a need of a metaphysical rank, innate to the Euro-Aryan man.

The use of the root *augeo* in Roman writing also points to the metaphysical source of *authority*. Emile Benveniste, with the help of a series of citations from Roman tradition – from Lucretius (V,322) to Titus Livius (XXIX,27) - points out that *its ancient uses of augeo do not show the growth of something that already exists, but the act of its own production; a creative act that brings forth something from fertile ground, a privilege of the gods or great natural forces, and not of humans.*" (Benveniste, 1969) The rule that senate sessions were held in sacred places and sanctuaries, from *the Curia Calabra* on the Capitoline Hill to the Temple of Jupiter on the Forum, points to the same metaphysical origin. We are free to conclude that the ideal wholeness—which the idea of *auctoritas* contains—also stems from the heights of the divine element in *the human mixture*. It was therefore possible that in the thoughts and feelings of the Romans the adjective *augustus* came to acquire the meaning of an attribute of a divine nature in man, represented by the emperor.

Emperor Augustus: the self-construction of *auctoritas*

However, the union of *auctoritas* and *potestas* in the role and, above all, the person of the Caesar or Emperor paves the way for the end or suppression of the fruitful duality of the Senate and the executive civil and military power.

The Caesar's or Emperor's usurpation of the senators' authority overthrew one of the fundamental institutions of the political character of the Roman and Euro-Aryan man, opening the door wide to Levantine, or Middle Eastern models and impulses of despotism, which, together with the corresponding human material on the throne, marked the decline of the Roman state.

This phenomenon was accompanied, encouraged and fuelled by the excessive, conquering importation of foreign deities and cults – along with the constant influxes of foreign masses, in which *the Roman ethnos* was dissolving – with the consequent weakening of *the authentic Roman religio*, and thus a departure from the metaphysical sources of *auctoritas*. In the temporal coincidence of the importation of the cult of Mother Earth—embodied in black stone, which was placed in the Temple of Victory in 204 BC—and the agony of the republic, a higher-order causal connection is discernible. This also marks the beginning of the senate's decline, which fought desperately but too late and ever more feebly against the dissolute and anarchic consequences of the importation of foreign cults and customs. Not even the senate could be spared the process of compaction. Ultimately, the senators themselves bore witness to the institution's final weakness

by laying bare the wretched remnants of their own authority through the act of acknowledging the universality of the authority of the Emperor Augustus: *auctoritate omnibus praestans*. His predecessor's contempt for the senate, which had become a hotbed of oligarchic power, rested on an insight into the terrible state of corruption of that institution:

The Senate, by its vast numbers, had become a distorted and disorderly mob: there were over a thousand senators, and some were completely unworthy men, and such as had been enrolled in the Senate after the death of Caesar thanks to influence and bribery, and the people called them members of the Ork'. This senate Augustus reduced to its former number and restored its old splendour, holding two elections: the first was left to the senators, each of whom chose his own man, and the second he conducted according to his own and Agrippa's wishes.' (Suetonius, II, 35)

As if inspired by the Neapolitan idea of the positive role of nihilism, Julius Caesar did nothing to regenerate the senate but everything to worsen it, elevating human material from the social bottom to the rank of senator. At this point in our consideration, the question arises as to the motives of Emperor Augustus for restoring the senate, despite a great aversion to the baseness of its members, which led him to receive them only individually, after searching their clothing, and to preside over them armed, in his armour beneath his toga, surrounded by loyal friends of senatorial stock and a bodyguard.

In all likelihood, Emperor Augustus undertook the restoration of the senate not only to establish the basis of legitimacy for his rule but, above all, to acquire the mass of *auctoritas* necessary for the immense and magnificent renaissance of the Roman state, which he carried out in the sign of a *traditional revolution*, unprecedented in European history. We can reasonably assume that Emperor Augustus was deeply aware that his personal *auctoritas* was insufficient for such an undertaking, and so he did everything to increase it, from the restoration of the Senate to a personal, self-aggrandising transformation.

Imperator Augustus was deeply aware of the crisis and the lack of *auctoritas*, perfectly knowing the essential differences between *auctoritas* and *potestas*. In the unfinished history of his undertakings (*Monumentum ancyranum*), Imperator Augustus states that he transferred from his own possession the acquired power ("*ex mea potestate transtulit*") returned the *res publica* to the senate and the Roman people, thus surpassing all in the domain of *auctoritas* but not in that of *potestas*, where he remained first, that is, *princeps* among equals, formally basing his power on the consulship and the tribune's office respectively. History has largely adopted the view of his opponents that the principate thus established was in fact a disguised form of monarchy. However, with the power he possessed as the great victor of the civil wars, Augustus had no need to hide it behind the restoration of the senate; his reforms should therefore be interpreted in the light of a keen awareness of the importance of *auctoritas*. Otherwise, the Emperor Augustus would not have made great efforts to transform himself in the image of *auctoritas*.

The path of this spiritual self-exaltation is strikingly measured by the enormous physiognomic differences between the chronological beginning and the climax of the gallery of portraits of Emperor Augustus. The first portrait in that series, executed no later than the thirty-fifth year of the Old Era, shows us the victor over Antony and Cleopatra in a Hellenistic realist style that faithfully translates the likeness of martial youth into marble. His hair is tousled by the winds of war and military glory, and his asymmetrical face is imbued with an extraordinary tension of physical strength and will to power, which radiates from every muscle and bone, as if rising up against all the limitations of the physical world. There is not a trace in that portrait of the solar spirituality and sublimity,

the sovereign serenity and balance that radiate from the portrait of the *Porta Prima* type of emperor—created eight years later, with the virtues of classical style—which served as a model for a hundred or so well-known replicas and variations. The physiognomic and characterological features of the first and latter portraits are so different that it is difficult for the uninitiated to believe they depict the same person.

Some modern historians believe that the *Porta Prima*-type portrait does not so much reflect the figure in reality, but rather expresses the deliberate presentation of an iconic symbol of **pax auguste**, intended to reassure and encourage the masses, who were shaken and unsettled by years of party conflicts and civil wars. However, even if we accept this assumption—in fact, a projection of modern experiences of political propaganda—we must conclude, based on historical testimony, that the Emperor Augustus did everything to conform himself physically, as well as mentally, to his marble likeness. Suetonius testifies:

He was in his element, when he spoke and when he was silent, perfectly calm and cheerful; so much so that a certain Gaulish chieftain admitted among his men that his expression had softened him and turned him from his firm intention to ambush him at the Alpine passes, when he was let approach him under the pretence of a conference, and hurl him into a precipice. His eyes were clear and bright, and he wished that something of divine power could be seen in them, and he rejoiced if he looked at anyone and that person averted their gaze as if before the Sun's splendour. " (11,79)

Gaius Caesar Germanicus testifies that the Emperor Augustus was able, with a single glance, to frighten and restrain rebellious legions (Tacitus, 1.42). Perhaps it is precisely to this effort of subjugation to the marble embodiment of solar *auctoritas* that the Emperor Augustus's final movements and words refer. Suetonius informs us that on his deathbed he asked to be combed and for his loose dentures to be adjusted, and that he asked the friends gathered around him if he had played his part in the comedy of life well. With his last breath, he uttered the customary message with which actors at that time took their leave of the audience after a performance: *"If our acting has been excellent, then applaud us and all accompany us now with joy!"* (Suetonius, **De Grammaticis** II, 99).

To the thoughts and dreams of Europeans of all generations, Suetonius also handed down the scene of Augustus's play, beyond death, on the stage of the world: while the emperor's body was burning on the Field of Mars, where it had been carried on the shoulders of senators, a praetor saw the figure of the emperor ascending to heaven (11,100). Thus, not only the spirit freed from the constraints of the body, but the very figure of the sovereign was elevated to the heights from which the idea of *auctoritas* originates. The effort of a metaphysical transformation of the self reached its culmination, where the face was completely and irrevocably fused with the golden mask of the supreme interpreter of the idea of *auctoritas* on the world stage. It was the greatest reward for him who had dedicated his life to the most arduous role, the living embodiment of the idea and virtue of *auctoritas*. Any doubt as to the truth of that triumph is consumed by the splendour of the 'golden age' which Augustus, according to the almost universal testimony of his contemporaries, had restored. From the standpoint of general needs, it matters little whether a man of the house of Octavian, called *the Elevated One*, truly effected an internal and external transformation of his being in the image of *auctoritas*. Only the works he created through that effort are significant.

The Path of Negations

In the arena of the world, depending solely on the virtues or vices, strength or weakness, the nobility or baseness of a man at the height of power, *auctoritas* became the prey of human differences and fluctuations, losing its true meaning on the slopes of history, sinking into the domain of the mere *potestas*, almost as its second, albeit more distinguished, name. This decline allowed base powers to usurp even the divine element contained in the core of *auctoritas*, reducing it to a sort of ornamental attribute in the possession of a series of unworthy emperors, particularly of Levantine origin, who demanded to be regarded by the senate and others as embodied gods. Thus, for example, the Syrian homosexual Helagabal, having ascended to the throne through a force of intrigue, corruption and conspiracy, in the early third century, He established a cult of the penis in place of the Sun cult, erecting marble monuments to it along the roads leading to Rome, into which he entered triumphantly riding a donkey backwards, as a sign of scorn for Roman tradition.

Losing its *auctoritas* by ceding to the domain of *potestas*, the senate finally lost all authority, transforming into a mob of flatterers at the emperor's beck and call. In the twilight of Rome, only occasionally, and 'ever more rarely, could a voice of the ancient pride of the good stock be heard from the ranks of the senators. One such voice, tinged with irony, from the breast of the brave Gnaeus Piso, pointed to the wretched state of the human material in the senate, by asking Emperor Tiberius: "*Which way will you vote, Caesar? If you vote first, I shall know to whom I am to conform: if last, I fear that, from ignorance, I shall dissent from you.*" (Tacitus, 1,74)

Ultimately, the emptied shell of *auctoritas* became the subject of bidding by money and sheer force, which ruled through a fear that had become all-pervasive, permeating everyone, from the lowest subject to the emperor. Ammianus Marcellinus, in his exhaustive description of this climate of universal fear, suspicion and denunciation, testifies that at that time "*people feared even the walls, as the only witnesses* (XIV, 1,7) and that the emperor Constantius, "*of a narrow and timid spirit, construed every rustle into an act or intention directed against him, lamentably triumphing by the slaughter of the innocent*". (XIV,52)

Although from the ruins of imperial Rome, Pope Saint Gregory the Great cried out for the senate - "*Where is the senate now, where is the people now? There is no senate - the people are lost* - a series of historical documents attests that this institution, despite the general process of the erosion of the structures of the Roman state, managed to survive and withstand the blows of the winds of change, at least formally, and to endure, especially in Constantinople, where it wielded significant influence throughout the seventh and eighth centuries. Nevertheless, the centre of gravity of *auctoritas* shifted towards the realm of the duality or dualism of Christian prelates and emperors. Although the Christian division of the world and man, and of their obligations into the profane and the sacred spheres, in the sign of the dualism of *God* and *Caesar*, was entirely alien to the Euro-Aryan, holistic worldview—which sees the entire universe as a single organism, imbued with sacredness - this rift created a kind of dam against the erosion of the sanctity of *auctoritas* in the eyes of the despairing Christianised masses.

Confirming the polemical experience that negation, devoid of valid positive foundations, is usually conditioned by its object of dispute, the chief theological architects of the conformity of Christian doctrine and the church to the will for total dominion over the empire – from Tertullian and Cyprian to Blessed Augustine – have built- they incorporated into the foundations of the respective structures and institutions not only key terms but also the very concepts of that structure, taken directly from the Roman legal, political and military order. In this way and

the duality of *auctoritas* and *potestas* was given the conditions for a new life and new forms, marking the course of the following centuries.

The Two Swords

Tertullian and Cyprian took up the very much damaged notion of *auctoritas*, which for centuries of imperial whim had been stripped of any connection with the world of freedom, reducing it, for the most part, to the vague legitimisation of the autocratic wills or whims and commands of the ruler. According to the theological understanding of the time, most fully expressed by Cyprian, the church, through its bishops, the legitimate messengers of the Saviour - on the basis of the authority given to the apostle Peter (*Gospel according to Matthew*, 16:18-19) - possesses the capital of '*sacra auctoritas*', which ideally stems from '*God and divine right*' as laid out in *Holy Scripture*. Thus, the profane, political order was theologically subordinate to the formative and informative principles of the '*divine order* and its corresponding authority'. Thus, the sacral nature of *auctoritas* was renewed, albeit in a Christian translation and without freedom, save for that which the bishops appropriated to themselves, pitted against one another in the field of interpreting the content of *Holy Scripture*. Thus, the duality of *auctoritas* and *potestas* was absent, for '*sacra auctoritas* served only to legitimise the ecclesiastical power of the bishops and their doctrinal statements, decisions or commands. Saint Augustine, in whose writings the concept of *auctoritas* appears in one thousand one hundred and sixty-four places (Lutcke, 1964), endeavoured to strengthen or preserve its sacred nature from the onslaught of the forces of corruption of this world by distinguishing its invisible, higher, and visible, lower seat, or the '*invisible*' and the '*visible church*'. Unlike the '*visible* institution of salvation, where the good and the evil are mixed together to an external indistinguishability and at least until the *Last Day*', the '*invisible* or ideal church, which is constituted by the '*community of the saints*' (*congregatio sanctorum*), represents a part '*the City of God*' (*Civitas Dei*), as a partial and premature realisation of the horizon of the future, beyond history, towards which Christians strive.

By acquiring the status of the state and the only legal religion, the church created the conditions for the postulation of the doctrine of the universality of the '*divine order*' and '*divine authority*', according to the formula of the apostle Paul of Tarsus: '*omnis potestas a Deo*'. From being a barely tolerable enemy of *God*, the emperor became his servant, which raised the question of primacy in the representation of the '*divine order*' and '*divine power*', and set the stage for a centuries-long dualism between the church hierarchy and the princes, above all the emperor of this world.

On the Western stage of this struggle, the formula of division and cooperation proposed by Pope Gelasius to Emperor Anastasius in his famous letter of 494 had the most far-reaching influence: '*Two powers above all govern this world, O Most Excellent Emperor: the holy authority of the pope and the royal power.*' According to this formula, the Church is a supernatural community, to which belongs that supreme, '*holy authority*', while the state is a natural community, to which belongs the corresponding power. Ecclesiastical authority blesses, legitimises and morally supervises the power, which provides the Church with the necessary material support and defence. Based on the principle of separating the sovereign and priestly roles, this formula recommended the primacy of the Pope in the spiritual domain and of the emperor in the political sphere. A similar formula is contained in the *Epanagoga* of the Byzantine emperors Basil, Leo and Alexander, inspired by the teaching of Patriarch Photius and forged in the late ninth century: the church and the state are a single organism cared for and governed by the patriarch and

the emperor, the first in the spiritual and the second in the material domain. The doctrinal basis for this concordant duality is also provided by a metaphor from the Gospel according to Luke: ^U And the disciples said, 'Lord, behold, here are two swords.' And Jesus said to them, 'That is enough.'" (22:38)

The emperor Frederick Barbarossa invoked the metaphor of *the two swords* in response to the challenge of Pope Adrian IV, and subsequently evoked the *Saxenspiegel*: "The Lord has appointed two swords for the protection of Christendom. The spiritual sword is entrusted to the Pope and the temporal to the emperor." The appeal of this image is attested to by the fact that it was revived in the 19th century through the encyclical *Immortale Dei* by Pope Leo XIII: "Thus God has entrusted the care of the human race to two powers: the ecclesiastical and the civil. The former is concerned with divine things, the latter with earthly ones. Each is supreme in its own kind: each has certain limits within which it moves, limits which are the essence and ultimate end of each of these two powers."

This is the formula for an ideal relationship that was very rarely realised as a short-lived truce on the battlefield of an almost constant and largely undeclared war, limited by the mutual dependence of the two powers: *grosso modo*, religion provided legitimacy to the authority, and the authority in turn responded with support and defence. It should be noted that in the first period, due to the lack of a vertical hierarchy developed later, it was precisely theological conflicts and even schisms within the church that indirectly strengthened the influence of the emperor, who not only appointed bishops but, when so summoned, appeared at synods as unofficial yet supreme arbitrators in disputes, decreeing unity for the church for the sake of the state's stability. It is superfluous to point out here that their judgements were based not so much on doctrinal as on political reasons.

The earliest trace of the emergence of the ruler's spiritual primacy is provided, at the eastern end of the Euro-Aryan world, by the ancient Upanishadic testimony to the precedence of the royal and even the knightly class over the Brahmanical in the domain of interpreting Vedic doctrine (*Chandogya-Upanishad*, 7,1,1). In pre-Christian Europe, the institution of the royal priesthood and the widespread belief among the Germanic peoples in the divine origin of royal lineages indicate *the sanctity* of the sovereign function. The primacy of Charlemagne in the Church—which he led with the conviction that *God* had entrusted him with this mission—represents the most successful example of the vitality of this Euro-Aryan tradition in Europe under the shadow of Christianity. The opposing stance is most fully expressed by the doctrine of Pope Boniface VIII, according to which not only all *auctoritas* but also direct power in this world (*potestas directa in temporalis*) belongs exclusively to the head of the Church.

Summarising the history of these relations or conflicts, we can conclude that the impulses of **libido dominandi** and greed were led by the popes, armed with blackmailing threats and promises, the policy of **divide et impera**, and the powers of excommunication, not shying away from forgeries either, such as the so-called **Donation of Constantine**, of Constantine's donation of property, which Stephen II was the first to invoke in 751 to legitimise territorial claims. Nor did the emperors and sovereigns shy away from violence and even public humiliation of religious leaders, sometimes reducing them to mere puppets.

In this *low-intensity* war, as the conflict between the Guelphs and Ghibellines testifies, the popes were also adept at mobilising the basest impulses, selfishness and greed of the third estate, against the Emperor Frederick II Hohenstaufen and the proponents of his idea of an imperially united Europe, which was inspired by a legitimate sacred *auctoritas*.

According to the historian Antonino de Stefano, for Frederick II the supreme ruler is '*God's chosen one who serves as an intermediary between natural man and God and is therefore the emperor a second Saviour and—as Dante will call him—the new Messiah*'... *The ruler is, no less than the Church, in his very being, the means of man's eternal salvation, given that he was created as a countermeasure to sin, and what is true for individual sovereigns is even more true for their head, the Emperor. Such a hierarchy of authority does not exclude the spiritual authorities from the world, but only from their own domain and their own hierarchy, and the summit is the Emperor who, as such, has no one above him but God, from whom he receives his authority and his mission directly, and with whom he is united in governing the world.*" (De Stefano, 1978)

It should be emphasised here that *the* aforementioned '*rule of the world*', as well as the supposed universal nature or spread of the ideal empire, should not be understood in a material and conquering sense, but rather in a spiritual and regenerative one. As a means of realising *divine Providence*, that is, the redemption and re-establishment of the Human Race, the empire must be directed towards the universal, even if it occupies no more space than a single human heart, such as that which beat in the breast of the great bard of the imperial idea, Friedrich II, Dante Alighieri.

In the post-Christian domain, this doctrine was inspired by the ancient idea—transmitted to us by the Neoplatonist Celsus—of the harmony of all religious perspectives in the point of their common, metaphysical origin, or of the existence of '*a single intellectual principle which descends from on high, a principle of harmony of the wisest peoples, states and peoples.*'" (*Alethe logos, 1,14*) The Castle of Frederick II of Hohenstaufen, *Castel del Monte*, is a great monument to this idea, architecturally embodied in the symbolism of the octagonal floor plan and towers, a sign of the aspiration for renewal and eternity – and historically confirmed by the fact that within it, Frederick II's extraordinary and universal intellectual curiosity gathered together wise men, experts and scholars, summoned from all sides of the secular and spiritual worlds. Therefore, Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen considered himself entitled to judge theological matters as well, even standing up against the papal polemic against the Orthodox Hellenes. For example, in a letter to his friend and the husband of his daughter Constance, the Byzantine Emperor John Vatatzes—who was close to him in his worldview—Emperor Frederick II of Hohenstaufen defends the Helens "*whom that so-called supreme shepherd (the Pope) shamelessly slanders, calling them heretics, although from them the Christian faith originated and spread to the most remote borders of the world.*" (Obolensky, 1996)

Seeking to deprive the emperor of *his sacred authority* in the eyes of the people, the popes and the relevant offices also resorted to persuasion through images, such as the one Friedrich Barbarossa noticed during his visit to Rome, which depicted the emperor, like a stable-hand, obediently holding the reins of the papal horse, with the inscription: "*Homo fit Papae, sumit, quo dante, coronarri*" Friedrich Barbarossa conveyed his Roman impression to the German bishops in a famous letter, which explains his attitude towards the Church and the Pope and bears vivid witness that the emperor's noblest motives were devoted to the defence of *the very sacred authority*.

God magnified the Church in the capital of the world with the help of the Empire, and now, in that same city, the Church wants to lose the Empire. It began with a single image, then a caption was added to it, and now that caption is to be given the force of law. Here is what I will never endure: I would rather lose my crown than allow it to be so humiliated.

It should be noted that among the didactic scenes contained in the churches of medieval Europe, many have a meaning entirely different from that of the image which struck a blow to the pride of the Emperor Frederick Barbarossa. For example, even today, our eyes, if they venture into the gloom of the Romanesque church of *Della Martorana* in Palermo, can be beautifully dazzled by the golden sky of the mosaics, which highlights the figure of Jesus the Saviour who, from on high, floating above the ground, lowers a crown with his right hand onto the slightly inclined head of Ruggero II, the famous maternal grandfather of Frederick II Hohenstaufen.

However, the Holy See's aspiration to have a monopoly on *sacred authority* prevailed with mutually disastrous consequences. With all the forces and means at their disposal, the proponents of this monopoly prevented the virtue of *sacred authority* from growing and flourishing in other orders and institutions. The cycle of epics and legends about the exploits of the knights of the Round Table on the paths of the metaphysical transformations of the noble self, or the metaphysical quest for the sacred means of restoring the ailing kingdom, and *the Divine Comedy* and the ideal of the Holy Empire of Dante Alighieri—are but the most prominent manifestations among the testimonies to the magnificent possibilities inherent in the self-contained, pre-Christian tradition of *the sacred authority*. These possibilities were restricted and stifled by the ring of clerical hostility and exclusivity, from the blackmail politics of the popes to *the crusade against the Grail* (Rahn, 1933) and the Guelph counter-movement, that is, the urban part of the third estate against the Ghibellines, which paved the way for monarchical absolutism and centralism, the essential prerequisites for bourgeois revolutions and usurpations of power, in the sign of the complete inversion of the Euro-Aryan, tripartite hierarchical structure.

It was precisely at that zenith of medieval European civilisation that the papacy's hostility towards the autonomy of the imperial dignity undermined the Christian form of *sacred authority*, depriving it of its powerful defences and noble incentives.

This great crisis of the Church's *sacred authority* and the need for real authority was indirectly attested to by the uprising of the Roman plebs against papal authority and the nobility, which, after the death of Innocent II (1143), seized the Capitoline Hill by force and established a senate, in effect its own legislative and executive authority. This power of the plebeian counsellors and senators lasted for several decades, ending, in this form of autonomy, with the recognition of papal authority, but primarily due to internal weaknesses caused by factional conflicts.

Liberated from the oversight of the other, imperial half, *the sacred authority* of the popes and the clergy became the prey of the basest impulses, selling—towards the end of this moral decline, in a kind of constant and open, simoniacal auction—its powers of co-consecration, *potestas*, to the highest material bidder. that is to say, to the monetary and territorial offers of the claimants to the crown of that temporal authority.

Where, however, the calls of *the 'internal church'* prevailed, a kind of historical *black hole* opened up in which, for centuries, the immense genetic treasures of Europeans were irretrievably and irreparably lost, condemned to barrenness by the priesthood's celibacy and the mass expansion of monasticism, that is to say, to the genetic suicide of an immense succession of innocent generations. The history of the Eastern and subsequently

of the Serbian Empire testifies that this *'internal church'*, with its hesychastic yearning, for centuries sapped the strength and weakened the defences against the onslaught of Asian invaders. In critical periods, this *'internal church'* gathered far greater masses of monks to places of asceticism and prayer than men with arms were mustered under the banners of the empire's defence.

In Western Europe, the weakness of *sacred authority* was evidenced by the spread of simony from the top of the hierarchy, the defeatist submission of high dignitaries and the clergy to the centrifugal impulses of the "animalistic" element in man, in various forms of the demonism of material greed, from soulless levies and the shameless display of signs of wealth, to the sale of indulgences. These characteristics largely provoked the Protestant Reformation, which, in its domain, dealt the final blow to the tradition of *sacred authority*, reducing it to the skeleton of *Holy Scripture*, with the centre of faith being shifted to the Old Testament and the world, and the consequent adoption of a corresponding, Levantine **forma mentis** and a distinctly mercantile nature of religiosity. Thus, as if by the will of some ironic cynicism of the spirit of history, Protestantism tore down all the barriers against the forces of apostasy it had risen against. The research of Max Weber (Weber, 1989) and Werner Sombart's (Sombart, 1911) research have masterfully illuminated the Old Testament roots of liberal capitalism, which has pushed from the political or public stage to the margins not only the national community, its state and politics, but above all the church itself and its faith, reducing it to the prison of the strictest privacy, left at the mercy of the released forces of the demonism of economism and its priests and mediums.

In that age-old struggle between the Pope and the Emperor, both authorities mutually exhausted and weakened themselves, a fact well observed by Enea Silvio Piccolomini, the future Pope Pius II, as early as the mid-15th century, when addressing the vassals of the German Emperor: .

The authority of the Caesars is null. You ought to obey them only to the extent that you yourselves wish, and you will wish to do so as little as possible... Christianity is a body without a head, a republic without laws and state institutions. The Pope and the Emperor are left with the splendour that great dignities bring, but these are only deceptive shadows, for they are beyond the ability to command, since there is no one to obey them."

Under the Shadow of Leviathan

In the political arena of Europe, only the word *authority* remains, with adjectival derivations from which the concept of *authoritarianism* has finally been aborted, as a symptom of the agony of politics. The metaphysical nature of *auctoritas*, most succinctly defined by the adjective *sacra*, is attested by the fact of its indestructibility and its persistence in the thoughts and heart of the European, despite all the blows of revolutionary and nihilistic forces. Thus, the word endures in the political lexicon to this day, if only as a second, more distinguished name for a contested or defended authority, or as a designation of its ill-defined power to impose upon its subjects the unconditional execution of its decisions, orders, and laws.

Perhaps, towards the close of our survey, it is superfluous to point out that in modern usage, in a world after the bourgeois usurpations of power, this word has lost all its original and therefore only authentic meanings. A good example of this desolation is Hobbes's *Leviathan*, the product of a Levantine spirit's horror at the forces of Jewish greed unleashed by the zealous and secularised application of the very principles of the Old Testament, thus opening the way to '*a war of all against all*'. Thus, man, alienated from his European essence, has been and remained crucified between selfish individualism and tyrannical totalitarianism, whose contradictions fatally characterise Anglo-Saxon liberalism. In Hobbes's work, the word *authority* denotes exclusively the right

the exercise of the *Leviathan*, which the mass of voluntary subjects transfers to it in order to be saved from their own 'war of all against all'

The fundamental theoretical problem Hobbes had to confront was how to transform the formless multitude (*multitudo*) into a people (*populus*) that is politically *unum*, that is, unified. To put it more fully, the issue is the transformation of a multitude of supposedly *free* individuals—with individual opinions, needs and wills that are diverse to the point of contradiction, and which even take on the dimensions of a truly universal 'war of all against all'—into a single political body and a single political will. Incidentally, the novelty of the significance of such a problem in the history of political thought in Europe stems from the novelty of the phenomenon of a statehood permeated by the demony of economics as a major consequence of a series of historical forces and, above all, the process of the alienation of the Anglo-Saxon man from the European essence and the corresponding tradition of community and corporate solidarity.

It may be superfluous to point out that such a problem cannot be resolved mutually favourably, as it is an irreconcilable contradiction. A similar contradiction also characterises democracy, torn between the principle of the primacy of the majority and the principle of equality. The moment a *multitude* of selfish individuals consents to be collectively represented and acted upon by a *single* body—with its own opinion, needs and will, independent or free from them—that *multitude* essentially withdraws from the political stage, temporarily or permanently, all its individual needs and wills and corresponding rights. Hobbes clearly saw and highlighted this fact through the example of laws of the purely physical world, whose frameworks already chronically limit and condition the thinking of the Anglo-Saxon man:

"For since it is impossible for any man to transfer his own strength to another, or for that other to receive it, it must be understood that the transfer of a man's power and strength is nothing other than the relinquishment and abandonment of his own right to resist on the part of the one to whom it is so transferred." (*Elements of Law*, I, 19, 10).

On the opposite side of such a transfer, or substitution, "he to whom rightful opposition cannot be made - has power of compulsion over all others and can therefore limit and direct their actions to his satisfaction, which is absolute sovereignty." (*Elements of Law*, 11,1,19).

Here we can see a textbook example of political systems deviating into a kind of opposite of the original ideas on which they are founded, something already observed in the world of their experience by Plato and Aristotle. In his attempt to solve the problems of the emerging liberal society, Hobbes created a model that any tyrant in the system called *oriental despotism* would gladly adopt. It should be noted that this observation is not some rhetorical quip but corresponds precisely to the Old Testament roots of Hobbes's model of the state, which, not coincidentally, bears the name of the Old Testament theocratic monster, *Leviathan*. It is one of the vengeful, zoomorphic fantasies of the Old Testament Man, tormented by his own humiliations and by his fears and envy of all things sublime: "There is nothing on earth that can compare with him, that was created to be without fear of anything. He who despises everything that is high is king over all the beasts of the earth" (*The Book of Job*, 41, 24-25).

After all, Hobbes himself openly stated that for him the terms *tyrant* and *sovereign* are synonymous: the first used by those for whom the sovereign is not to their liking. Aware of the contradiction between liberalist desires and his model, Hobbes in *Leviathan* attempted to conceal or at least mitigate them by dissolving the notion of transfer or substitution, inherent in proprietary relations, into a system modelled on the transfer of a writer's copyright

some plays to its performers on the stage, where individual will is embodied by *the author* and the general will is represented by *the actor*.

"The words and deeds of some artificial persons are acknowledged by those whom they represent. The person is then the actor and he who acknowledges his words and deeds is the author; in that case the actor acts by authorisation." (*Leviathan or the Matter*, XVI).

In the history of political thought in Europe, Hobbes's model marks a complete break from its tradition, precisely to the extent of the Anglo-Saxon man's degeneration or alienation from the European essence. Here, *auctoritas* is the word that denotes the right of *the Leviathan*, acquired through 'authorisation', to act on behalf of *the populus*, which has become a *populus* from a *multitudo* thanks to the voluntary loss, or transfer, of its decision-making rights. Hobbes inverts the traditional source of *auctoritas*, so that it no longer comes from on high but from the bottom of human despair and hopelessness. Here the community is reduced to *society*, to a mechanical collection of individuals whose life and remaining (but conditioned by the laws of the Leviathan) consists of: *'buying and selling, making other contracts, choosing one's residence, raising children and so on'*. It is certain that such a life requires no *sacred authority*, for of the threefold structure of the Euro-Arian community, only some of the contents of the final, third function have remained.

Even in the camp of the opponents of the Third Estate's revolution and supporters of *the old regime's* restoration, the word '*authority*' did not fare much better, equally deprived of its essential properties, particularly its organic connection with freedom, and highly exalted as the motto of the essential opposition to *the Enlightenment's* and republican, negative liberalism. Admittedly, it still pointed to its *divine* origin here, but reduced to the hallmark of the supposed legitimacy of autocracy, not much different from that of *the oriental despotisms*. A good example of such a conception of *authority* is provided by Stahl's theory of monarchical power, according to which its legitimacy indicates that "*the authority by whose force the state is governed, originates from God, as His right to occupy the throne.*" (Eschenburg, 1965)

The very extraordinary vitality of the word '*authority*' and its diverse and polysemous, adjectival and noun forms in the political languages of the modern era testifies that it corresponds to the deepest needs of the European mind and heart. Despite millennia of the speech of the masses, and even of elites, inappropriately using the word '*authority*' to denote *power*—albeit in accordance with the processes by which authority sinks into the mire of power—this confusion has nevertheless not obliterated the core meaning it truly signifies in the consciousness or subconscious of the European man. A telling testament to this is the fact that, in the entire history of European languages, *the word 'power'* has never been used to denote any kind of *authority*. The very nature of language resists such a use, but it is merely an expression of the fundamental state of *the form mentis* and its needs.

This concerns a need of a metapolitical nature. That is why all attacks on *authority* and *authoritarianism* – from intellectual scepticism to violent coups – do not strike at virtue and its true power, but rather at its (rarely) genuine and worthy, or (most often) false and unworthy, figures and manifestations. The fact that the European man's need for authentic authority remains largely unfulfilled or overlooked, and is instead distorted and betrayed, only confirms its vitality. It may be superfluous to point out that the vitality of the idea of *authority* in the hearts and minds of people is in itself a great

condemnation of existing political orders, devoid of any authority and legitimacy. Herein lies the profound explanation for the phenomenon of using the concept of *legaimost* as a surrogate for *equality* and *authority*, which Carl Schmitt observed when considering the modern system of representative and multi-party democracy: "Legality' here has precisely that sense and task of making it illegitimate and of denying both legitimacy (of the monarch and the plebiscitary will of the people) and any self-grounded or higher authority/power. If in this system words such as 'legitimate' or 'authority' are still used at all, then only as an expression of legality and only derived from it." (Schmitt, 2001)

The European man's need for real authority seems to patiently yearn for an authentic appearance.

There is no freedom without authority

The absence of the virtue and force of true authority on the scenes of modern world officialdom indirectly betrays the wholly false or partial nature of the freedoms present or on offer. Every freedom—both that *of* and *from*—has meaning only in relation to *the authority* of the corresponding norm that enables or prevents it, directs or limits it. The highest freedom is that which is the property of true authority and the fruit of the greatest restraints. Therefore, where there is no authority, and consequently no corresponding norms, there is no tension or dualism between that virtue and its limitations, on the one hand, and the impulse towards freedom, on the other. Besides being rendered meaningless, freedom thus threatens to turn into its own opposite, into slavery to the forces and instincts of the animal in man, which only the authority of the enlightened mind and of that higher norm can master. This is why the greatest, revolutionary movements for freedom, in rising up against all the authorities and norms of the traditional order without their own valid replacements, have everywhere established the rule of violence and terror, of enslavement and mass exterminations.

Thus even a prince, Cyrus—as we are informed by Xenophon, a source—envied even the common Hellenic soldiers the freedom he himself had not, nor could have, in a multi-ethnic state whose peace and order rested not on the conscience of sovereign people but on the fear of a servile mass of the brutal punishments. Thus he spoke to the Hellenes, on the eve of the battle for the Persian throne:

"People of Hellas, I did not unite with you out of a lack of barbarian troops, but chose you precisely because you are better and more worthy than their multitude. Show yourselves once more worthy of the freedom you have won, and of which I am so greatly envious: know that I would rather possess that freedom than all that I have and all the wealth in the world." (Anabasis, I, 7)

It is also a matter of freedom *for* the most significant, that is, religious differences, which at that time was expressed most succinctly, instead of all the Helens, by Herodotus—on the occasion of Cambyses's mockery and the burning of the statues of the gods in the temple of the Cabiri—indirectly attesting to one of the essential

a characteristic of the Euro-Arian *mindset*; a lack of proselytising impulses: "*If one were to let people choose from among all customs and determine which are the best, they would examine them and, certainly, each would choose its own. Thus, all people think that their own customs are the best.*" (III, 38)

The concept and experience of freedom depend on *the form mentis* and its worldview. The longest boundary that separates freedom *for* and freedom *from* is that which on the world map of ancient cultures and civilisations

separates *the uranic*, Indo-European from *the chthonic*, namely Dravidian, Semitic and Pelasgian cultures. Striving with their celestial gods for the preservation and development of cosmic Order, the Indo-European man sought to attain the greatest powers of freedom *for*, while the devotees of chthonic deities and the cults of Mother Earth, from India to the Pillars of Hercules, longed for freedom *from*, especially under the burden of alien norms of life, such as those imposed by conquerors from the north. Unlike the chthonic, subterranean deities from the womb of Mother Earth, who mostly inspire fear, the Euro-Aryan gods were born of joy, as attested to by their '*joyous names, that is to say, names beginning with an exclamation of delight.*' (Juenger, 1957)

In the etymological basis of the Indo-European languages, there is no root for '*freedom*'; rather, all roots only give '*freedom for*'. In Rome, the most ancient legalised use of the adjective '*free*' rests in the marriage formula: the bride's father gives his daughter "*libei(of)um quaesundum eausa (o gratia) 'to bear legitimate sons'*". According to Benveniste's observation, in the Indo-European languages "*the original meaning (of freedom) is not, as is commonly thought, 'freed from something' but rather belonging to an ethnic race, denoted by a metaphor of vegetative growth. This belonging grants a privilege that the foreigner and the slave never experience.*" (Benveniste, 1969). In the Indo-European world, a man is *free* by virtue of belonging to a family, tribe or caste, that is, in association with others, because the essential meaning of its use is the welfare of the community.

Those vast differences can still *be felt* today, encapsulated in just a few steps, the distance it takes in great European museums to cross from the halls of Mesopotamian cultures to those of Hellenic and Roman culture. Behind us are left the darkness and anxiety, the anthropomorphic monsters and the fossilised corpulence and vanity *happy few*, slave-owners, eunuchs and accountants. Before us, abruptly, unfold the scenes of triumphant holy light and the magnificent unbridledness of the gaze, thought and movement of beauty, boldness and sublimity that uplift, enliven and illuminate even the marble.

When we pause, for instance, in the Louvre, in the hall of Sumerian culture and civilisation, and cast our gaze upon the figure of the priest *Abila*, or upon the figures from *the Urnashu votive plaque*, or upon the statue of *Gudea*, our basic characterological experience tells us that we are standing before the archetypes or paradigms of consumer sensuality, of the spiritual narrowness and soul-numbing deadness of the modern, half-man, which is confirmed by written monuments, such as the speech of the cupbearer of the gods in the Epic of Gilgamesh, who with effective pessimism stands alone in contradiction to it all: "*When the gods created man / They gave him death, they gave him breath, / But they kept life for themselves. / But you, Gilgamesh, fill your belly, / Be merry day and night, / Let every day be a feast for you, / Day and night dance and play!*" / *Let your garment be splendid, / Your hair clean, wash with water, / See how the child holds your hands, / Delight your wife with a kiss - / That is all a man has in life!*" (Tablet X)

Had he heard the aforementioned confession, Plato, from the standpoint of the last guardian of the Euro-Aryan ethos in Hellas, would have reiterated that it betrays those subject to passions, who are threatened by '*the same thing as those who have succumbed to fear: they will come to slavery in another and even worse way... and do not deserve to be called brave and free men*' (Laws, I, 635d) In the halls of Hellenic culture, from the figures of the *Panathenaic procession to the Venus de Milo*, stretch invisible webs of dignified yet serene gazes of nobility, directed beyond all material and human things, towards the boundless and the eternal. Above, touching the ground only to

from it to launch herself ever higher – as De Maistre so beautifully observed in **Les soirs de Saint-Pétersbourg** – the goddess of victory, Nike of Samothrace, her robe billowing in the spring breeze of freedom.

Cultural and religious differences in the conception of the relationship between the human and the divine consequently and analogously manifest themselves in the domain of understanding the relationship between man and freedom. The sense of qualitative and ethical equality between humans and gods, who stand in the same order of struggle for Order against Chaos, leads the Indo-European man to consider himself completely free to shape his own destiny to the best of his ability and to influence the course of the world of things and phenomena. From the awareness that a man's destiny is determined not only by his own but also by the ancestral thoughts and words, actions and deeds, post-Upanishadic thought developed the doctrine of *karma-cita* (the sum of actions), according to which "different forms of existence are the consequences of the sum of actions" (*Mundaka Upanishad*, II, 1, 12).

In the scenes of *the Iliad*, the gods take part in the battles and even enter human beings to speak through their voices to utter advice and instructions. However, people do not perceive this, but only the inspired poet. For the Hellenic worldview of the classical period, from the Pre-Socratics to Plato and Aristotle, a man who possesses free will and reason is entirely responsible for his thoughts and his deeds. Demons and gods may have a part in these thoughts or deeds, encouraging, inspiring or limiting the powers of the Human, but this does not diminish the glory or responsibility of man, in good or in evil.

It is only in the twilight of the Achaean element of Hellenic culture, in Hellenism, that the theme of the relationship between human will and Necessity, or divine Providence, emerges. This is a clash of cultures, a consequence of the influence and adoption of the Levantine worldview, for the Near Eastern, to desert religions is to absolutise Necessity and Providence, bending man into a servile position, which is more comfortable than standing upright, bringing with it a considerably lesser burden of personal responsibility even for the wrongs committed. In the last great religious movement in the Middle East, in the magnificent uprising of a solitary man against the appalling scale of his people's corruption, the believer was literally called a slave (*Muslim*), and for the forgiveness of all sins committed, repentance was sufficient. For instance, although *the Quran* forbids usury as the greatest vice, the usurer is required only to repent and desist, but not to return the wealth unlawfully acquired at the expense of another's misfortune.

The uprising of Jesus Christ against the Old Testament spirit and world aimed at a great reversal of the human condition. This historical embodiment of the Aryan idea of the Saviour, through its teachings and deeds, proclaimed that man is not a *slave* of the gods but is—as the primary object and purpose of God's love, and even of God's *descent* into human form—endowed with the most precious freedom. The extent to which such ideas were alien to the Near Eastern world is testified by the fact that Christ could not be understood, nor did even his closest disciples have the courage to follow him. Having brought with it and spread throughout Europe the principal objects of Jesus Christ's uprising, beginning with *the Old Testament* **forma mentis**, Christianity spurred on and persistently fed the questioning, contemplation, and debate concerning the duality or dualism of human *free will* and *divine Providence*.

This is a persistent theme of European thought, from Epicurus, Cicero and Plutarch to Fichte, Kant, Hegel and de Maistre. And in this domain, general differences are discernible, similar to those we observed during a swift survey of the fundamental cultural-ethnic boundary of the Old World, along the *north-south* axis. Generalising the more recent

From the history of this theme, we can conclude that *the European form mentis* manifests itself here with a striving to defend sovereignty, dignity and the freedom of human will. Against such a belief rises an opposing thought—one that seems to draw its ideas and inspiration from Levantine roots—preaching that man is servilely powerless and subject to external or even subconscious conditioning. Such is Marx's theory, which reduces the entire reality of man and society—from religious ideas and ethical models, through artistic achievements and scientific inventions, to historical changes and interpersonal relationships—to the mere consequences of economic forces and conditioning. Freud's theory likewise denies man freedom, reducing all human thoughts and actions to the consequences of external, alien, or internal, *libidinal* and unconscious conditioning.

The ideology of *liberalism* also apparently belongs to this non-European body of theories and beliefs. The ideology of liberalism completely departs from the European conception of freedom. It is a movement for freedom *from* all moral, political and state restrictions on entrepreneurship, which aims to satisfy individual greed, doctrinally elevated to the level of the main factor in general well-being. Thus, its subject and intended beneficiary is not the family, the community or the estate, but the solitary, selfish and greedy individual.

Faithful to the true and original European conception of freedom, and perceiving the impossibility of its realisation outside traditional forms of community, Hegel rose in defence of the corporate institutions and guilds as constitutive elements of civil society: "*To that man must be something, we understand that he belongs to a definite estate; for that means that he is then something substantial. A man without an estate is a mere private individual and does not stand in real universality... We have seen earlier that the individual, in looking after himself, works for others in civil society. But this unconscious necessity is not enough: he becomes a conscious, thinking habituality only in corporations* (Hegel, 1989)

After the breakdown of illusions

Where should one direct the gaze of expectation for the appearance of a true authority? The force of inertia directs such a gaze towards the remnants or ruins of that institution from which *auctoritas* was first proclaimed in the political history of Europe. This refers to the senate. For such an institution to be fully opened to the appearance of a true authority, it is also necessary that it be completely renewed, which requires an extraordinary recognition of that virtue and an equally exceptional strength to open a path for it to a fitting place. What survives today on the political scene of Europe under the name of a senate is, at best, merely a kind of higher chamber for vetting and correcting the decisions of the lower house of a multi-party, representative democracy, although even here the senators are *de facto* electors of the same parties, representing the corresponding interests, which are ever further removed from the electoral base.

As the apex of the tripartite structure of the Euro-Aryan community, its authority for its political manifestation and effectiveness demands its correction, or rather, its renewal. In the immediate horizon, however, there are no signs of preparations for such a great correction, except for those that announce it indirectly, that is to say, except for the symptoms of the decline and end of a civilisational cycle. Ortega y Gasset's observation that

'money rules only when there is no other principle which rules' should be supplemented by the realisation that where money rules, no opposing principle is permitted to exist publicly, let alone to prevail peacefully. It is to Ortega y Gasset that we owe a hopeful and inspiring lesson from historical experience on the return of authority thanks to the collapse of oligarchic and anti-tribal illusions:

"When collective sensibility reaches that degree, a new historical epoch usually begins. Pain and ruin create in the masses a new attitude of sincere modesty which turns the tide against all anti-aristocratic illusions and theories. Envy of the exceptional minority ceases. The necessity of its special intervention in social coexistence is acknowledged. In this way, the previous historical cycle closes and another opens. A period begins in which a new aristocracy is formed." (Ortega y Gasset, 1921)

Where today does this *new aristocracy*, the natural bearer of the renewal of legitimate authority, stand or emerge? If we place this question in the perspective of the agony of a world, that is, the Western cycle of civilisation, we must conclude that the answer must be sought precisely within the European circle, among the ruins. To date, the European spirit has always known how to respond to the challenges of crisis, decadence and collapse with new ideas that have been able to renew and revive European life. On the other hand, in other cultural and civilisational circles, for centuries there have been no signs, as there are not today, of the emergence or even the preparation of any self-sufficient value alternative to the processes of Westernisation. Although, according to Samuel Huntington's observation, the shadow cast by Western civilisation over the world is constantly shrinking, as is its share of global production (Huntington, 1996) - which, from the relevant perspective, is an essential indicator of power - the other cultural-civilisational circles are characterised, in the best-case scenario, only by defensive processes, the assimilation and adaptation of their own, weakened traditions and customs to Western models and norms.

One thing is certain: the renewal of authority can only be expected from that sort of person who is capable of standing upright amidst the ruins, unconditioned by the processes of decay. This is a literal realisation of a metaphor for the heroic man, bequeathed to our thoughts and dreams by Horace (*Odes* III.3): *"Si fractus illabatur orbis - impavidum ferient ruinae"* (*"If the world should fall in pieces, he will stand unshaken among the ruins"*).

Such men are certainly not to be found among the masses of adherents, functionaries and media of the hideous, usurious and poisonous civilisation of the West, which represents a complete inversion of all the essential principles of life and worldview, virtues and values of the Euro-Aryan and European man. This is human material marked by irreparable moral and/or intellectual weaknesses, from which it is not possible to mould a *new aristocracy* and bearers of authority. This is the half-formed man of the modern Western civilisation, who is in fact the complete opposite of *the wholeness* that characterised the select members of *the councils of elders* throughout the Euro-Aryan world, from Roman senators to Aryan samnyasins.

The bearers of the renewal of authority cannot be found even where the cathedras of the official science of the modern Western civilisation rise, for its fundamental and binding worldview, in the sign of *the supremacy of quantity* (Gu&on, 1945), also halves man, depriving science and any corresponding cognition and efficacy of *the qualitative*, and therefore essential, dimensions of things and phenomena.

The lack of an organic nature and of a connection between knowledge and scientific disciplines—which in the ancient world ideally centred on their philosophical origin, centre, and leadership—witnesses the end of a centuries-long process of disintegration.

It is certain that what remains of the discipline called *philosophy*, or that which so calls itself—often entirely without foundation—cannot assume and renew the role it held in its Hellenic youth: the only available alternative to the masturbatory and essentially suicidal, yet everywhere imposed and widespread, direction of *analytic philosophy* and the other metastases of neo-positivism (Paci, 1965) is Heidegger's reference to the need for the renewal of cognitive innocence and self-questioning before the world, with the help of etymology and poetry, and a forest-dwelling outlawry from Western civilisation, with the mere hope that, in the face of the onslaught of the unleashed forces of its nihilism, "*only a god can save us*". (Heidegger, 1980)

Following the logic of antithesis, the *second beginning* of European thought should be expected from those places where there exists the most vivid awareness of the nature of nihilism and a will to renewal. One of such most prominent places on the map of European thought is marked by thinkers—from Heidegger to Jaspers and Spengler—who were able to marry and creatively develop Nietzsche's first lessons on nihilism and Goethe's mediations on traditional doctrines concerning nature. They also provided many inspired and inspiring examples of the fruitfulness of a cognitive orientation towards the *qualitative* dimensions of objects of knowledge. These are signs or portents of the renewal of a holistic worldview, in keeping with the ideal of *ceiovitost* which characterises the authentic Euro-Aryan and European epistemic disposition. The fundamental stronghold of these endeavours, in opposition to currents of anarchy, lies not in poetry, nor in philosophy *in the strict sense*, nor in the social or natural sciences, but *in the space between them*, at the intersection of their perspectives, through mutual influence. Therefore, the best fruits of such a worldview are characterised by the interplay of the poetic inspiration of the mind, the philosophical wakefulness of reason, and scientific informedness. This interplay most penetratingly illuminates its subjects with flashes of intuition through optics similar to those forged for physiognomic, characterological, and iconological research. The exclusion of such optics from the world of official science recommends them well for the horizons of the future, beyond the collapse of Western civilisation, in which the weaknesses of the corresponding sciences also play a significant part.

In the political domain, following the logic of dualism, the renewal of *vitality* as the basis for the emergence of true authority should be expected where political thought and effectiveness strive for the ultimate overcoming of the process of disintegration, that is, towards the restoration of unity. It is precisely the ultimate outcomes of the processes of disintegration that significantly facilitate this renewal, where even the very definitions of social and ideological particularities and oppositions—beginning with the most fundamental, that of the opposition between *left* and *right*—lose all firm footing, principle, meaning, and significance. The growing weakening of these principles, the decay of meaning and the collapse of significance of the ideological determinants of *left* and *right* in the processes of *globalist* nihilism, remove the great obstacles to the counter-movement. In the face of the onslaught of the latest and greatest avatar of the demon of economics, called *globalisation*, previous class and ideological antagonisms lose all significance because all parts or strata of society are threatened, which allows for the emergence of the kind of solidarity inherent in a genuine community, that is, a nation. AJco is faithful to the ideal of *wholeness*, such

The counter-movement must be faithful to the ideal of wholeness, by suppressing any possibility of civil war between *the left* and *the right*, by raising its base far above the arena of divisions and hostilities, by setting in motion synergistic forces, *by gathering together what has been scattered*.

It is also necessary to highlight a further value of the conditions imposed upon man by Western civilisation. In the existential domain, the immediate experience of the forces of nihilism and perversity, gained in places of resistance, is a precious and even indispensable means of forging *a new aristocracy*, just as the old one was born on the battlefields, through the transformative overcoming of all weaknesses inherent to the human element. It may be superfluous to point out that the trials inherent to peacetime living under the shadow of Western civilisation today are immeasurably greater than those of the Middle Ages, and that the tests *the new aristocracy* must pass are considerably more difficult and the targets more distant.

NATION AND NATIONALISM

Judging by its planetary spread, often on the lines of the prevailing currents of history, *nationalism*, *the nation*, and *the nation-state* are the most successful political products of the European mind in the modern age. The historical backbone of this success stretches from the use *of the nation* to legitimise power (usurped by sections of the third estate, by the force of bourgeois revolutions), through the Romantic movement of awakening *a pan-German national consciousness* for the political and economic unification of a series of states and statelets into a single *Reich*, to *nationalist* responses to the challenges of the anti-national, socialist *internationalism* through the adoption of its advocacy of *social justice*, to a series *of national liberation* movements against colonial subjugation and *nationalist* resistances to *globalisation*, or rather the pseudo-imperialism of the strategists *of the new world order*.

It should be emphasised that *the avatars* of nationalism outside the European circle, particularly in the Third World, are for the most part only superficial imitations of European models, often without any real foundation. The difficulty of applying this concept of the European political mind is attested to by Sun Yat-sen, who pointed out in the mid-1920s that in the Chinese cultural and historical context, *nationalism* could only be understood as a *'state doctrine'*, adding that he was deeply aware this *'is valid only for China and not for the West'*.

The power of this idea is also evidenced by the fact that even the most dispassionate research perspectives are apt to be inflamed by the fire of partisanship in its presence. Hence, many of the most reputable contemporary studies of nationalism are distinguished not so much by a scientific method and its corresponding epistemic effects, but rather by a poetic passion: a will to deny not only any value or virtue, but the very reality of the subject under consideration, which is thereby reduced to the domain of collective (self-)delusions. Summarising an ideal overview of the understanding of the nation and attitudes towards nationalism over the past centuries, one could conclude that they primarily reflect and attest to the corresponding political premises and objectives.

Means and End

The most famous and consequential declaration of the political role of *the nation*—that is, in the *Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*—consists of just two sentences: "*The principle of all sovereignty essentially resides in the Nation. No authority, no individual can exercise any power which does not expressly derive from it.*"

What does it contain, what are its characteristics and properties, what memories and will, to what goals does that *Nation* aspire? Judging by the said *Declaration* and the surrounding statements, that *Nation* is as lifeless, imaginary and vague a concept as *the man* and his *rights*, in whose name alienated elements of the third estate carried out the coup d'état. After all, it was precisely this ambiguity of the concept that was necessary for the revolutionaries, as it enabled the broadest, most unlimited, and even criminal abuses. Given that the drafters of *the Declaration* use the word 'citizen' as a synonym for 'man', we are free to conclude that *the Nation* is composed solely of *citizens*, in fact, only of the supporters of the coup. All others – from the nobility and the clergy to the mass of peasants – were forcibly excluded from *the Nation*, and many from life itself. This is the essential, deepest, and indeed infernal meaning of the famous tragicomic answer of the Abbé Sieyès to his own question: "*What is the third estate? - Everything!*"

At best, this *Nation* would be an artificially educated society, formed by the mechanical aggregation of individuals—that is, *citizens*—whom de Maistre rightly distinguished from the figure of the same name in ancient civility: "*See how crime serves as the basis for all these republican scaffolds; that word citizen, which they have substituted for the ancient forms of courtesy, is borne by those who are the most vicious among men.*" (De Maistre, 2001)

After all, *the citizens* displayed intolerance not only towards the other estates but also towards other, actual nations or ethnic communities, seeking to muzzle the languages of those cultures, based on suspicions of which a report compiled for the state security service in 1794 provides compelling testimony:

"Federalism and superstition speak Breton, emigration and hatred of the Republic speak German; the counter-revolution speaks Italian and fanaticism Basque." (Oberlercher, 1989)

That the establishment of *the revolutionary Nation* required the sacrifice of real nations and ethnic communities on the bloody altar of *the invented goddess of Reason* is testified to by the numerous, forcibly extorted denials of origin. Thus, in those revolutionary years, tens of thousands of members of the National Guard, from Languedoc and Provence to Brittany and Alsace, signed collective oaths of allegiance to *the Nation*, declaring that they were no longer Languedocians, Provencals, Bretons or Alsations, but only and exclusively *French*.

Unlike the supranational yet also supra-political, sacral authority of the monarch, the counter-revolutionaries of the time appealed to no nation, although they could have done so with far greater right, for the spiritual core and genetic treasure of France was under mortal threat. It was as if the revolutionaries' mere invocation of some *Nation* discouraged the counter-revolutionaries from seeking the strength for the counter-movement in the real nations of France. An exception is made for the thoughts of the most intelligent of the counter-revolutionaries, the Savoyard Joseph de Maistre, who entrusts the nation with a much higher role than that prescribed by *the Declaration of the Rights of Man and of the Citizen*. De Maistre's *Three Fragments on France*.

it begins with the expression of the belief that nations, like individuals, have "*their own character, and even their own mission.*" Therefore "*in the society of nations, each of them presents itself to the observer with an indelible character which is the result of all its individual qualities and which moves unitedly towards a much more general, but no less unknown, goal. Some nations have mediocre activities; they barely mark the track of the centuries; little is said of them, and they almost enjoy happiness instead of boasting of glory. Others, quite the contrary, play more conspicuous roles, but always with a secret aim. This nation is destined by fate to conquer and to unite under its power several different nations; the other, on the contrary, is commanded by nature not to spread beyond its borders: it is great only within them...*" (De Maistre, 2001) By all accounts, the first in a series of De Maistre's examples corresponds to the French nation. For De Maistre, the unification of different ethnic communities into a single French nation had been accomplished many centuries before the corresponding efforts of the revolutionaries. De

Maistre discovers the greatest task of the French nation's mission in his search for the meaning of the extraordinary, catastrophic events of his time. In his **Reflections on France** of 1797, he comes to the conviction that the bloody spectacle of the French Revolution is part of the higher andragogy of divine Providence, mediated by the corresponding mission of the French

nations, punished with a penalty that "*enables rebirth*":

Every nation, as well as every individual, has received a mission which it must fulfil. France truly has a great influence on Europe, which it would be pointless to prove, but which she has, in the most sinful manner, misused... Every drop of Louis XVI's blood will cost France a storm; four million Frenchmen will, perhaps, pay with their heads for the great national crime of an anti-religious and anti-social rebellion, crowned by regicide... And finally, the punishment of the French arises from all the daily laws, and the protection of France also arises from this; but these two united miracles multiply one another and constitute one of the most extraordinary spectacles that the human eye has ever beheld." (De Maistre, 2001).

However, until the twilight of the decades-long period of European peace – won and maintained by the *Holy Alliance* of continental, Christian empires – conservative and counter-revolutionary thought had shunned nationalism, well remembering the upheavals, riots and immense suffering of peoples committed in the name of the *Nation*, or else suspecting in such a movement a threat of plebeian chaos to the traditional, monarchical and Christian order. Metternich, the chief executor of the *Holy Alliance*, consistently and effectively denied any right to political existence to the principle of nationality and to the nation.

By the end of that uniquely long epoch of peace, nationalism *sui generis* was one of the main means of mobilising the liberal-minded strata of the citizenry in the movement towards the seizure of economic and political power. And here, in the realm of the uses of nationalism, we can observe how and to what extent political purpose determines its nature.

It should be pointed out that this purpose does not necessarily require self-deception or forgeries—as the various enemies of the nation and nationalism persistently maintain—but that it can also invoke genuine forces. A good example is provided by the German Romantic movement of discovering the people's treasured resources with a view to restoring the people's empire, or rather establishing a unified national state, which was preceded by the establishment of common external borders for a single market through the *Customs Union* of 1834. Both undertakings, the economic and the unifying-state-building, were not only enabled but also

legitimised precisely by that movement of expanding and deepening national self-awareness and a sense of national unity among all German ethnic communities, across all borders.

A watershed for *the left* and *the right*

In the history of France, 1871 marks a series of severe social and military defeats – from the Paris Commune uprising to the siege of Paris and the capitulation to the combined German forces, along with the loss of significant territory – and the subsequent reversal in the nature of nationalism. The force of the impression made by these defeats is attested to by the spectacular reversal of opinion on the French Revolution by one of its most distinguished spiritual descendants and most influential ideologues of liberalism, Ernest Renan. He explained Prussia's military triumph by its adherence to aristocratic tradition and France's defeat, analogously, by the loss of the virility inherent in the nobility, stifled by the guillotines and terror of the Revolution. Or is it more correct to say that this reversal merely testifies to the inconstancy of liberalist or rationalist-Enlightenment thought under the stronger blows of the winds of history?

One thing is certain: all those defeats, by exposing the moral vices and political weaknesses of the autocratic rulers the (pseudo)elite of liberalism's adherents—have exposed the entire groundlessness and even artificiality of their nationalism, fashioned to fit the moulds of Enlightenment, secularist, and positivist opinions and notions. Even where the liberal and Enlightenment thought is so unbridled and carried away by its own revolutionary vision that its language approaches that of its opponent, the Romantic, yet in Mazzini's speeches—the *nation* and *Europe* are merely grand words devoid of any real substance. In the essay *On the Revolutionary Initiative in Europe*, Mazzini contemptuously calls contemporary Europe, the Europe under the aegis of the *Holy Alliance*, "*old and dying*", "*lying in Napoleon's tomb*", but provides no definition of the desired "*Young Europe*". As if conscious of this emptiness, Macini directs all the invested and in others encouraged passions and hopes even further, towards some vaguely and no better defined, also to a lifeless *Humanity*, conceived in the narrow mould of the Masonic utopia of *One World* and the liberal-capitalist division of labour, unconsciously devaluing every previous effort, reducing both *nations* and *Europe* to mere way-stations and service points. These vast voids are perhaps most succinctly attested to by the proclamation of the *Holy Alliance of Peoples*, from 1849:

"Without homelands there is no Humanity, just as without organisation and the division of labour there is no speed and productivity in work. Nations are the individuals of Humanity just as citizens are the individuals of the nation. Just as every man lives his own life and a life of relationships, so too does every nation; as the citizens of a nation should make it strong and progressive by performing their various functions, so too must each nation carry out a special mission, a part of the work based on its own endowments for the common development, for the progressive growth of Humanity." (Mazzini, 1972)

Everywhere that the forces of liberalism have taken power, it has proven that behind the scenes woven from such, ostensibly pro-national and pro-humanitarian rhetoric, there usually lies the naked force of an even more bare-naked greed. Whenever the people dared to express their discontent with liberalist rule—it, almost everywhere and always where it felt strong, would instantly forget all its vows to the sanctity of the national source of legitimacy and sovereignty and would respond with contempt and even massacres. It was correctly pointed out by one of the most astute minds of the counter-revolution,

Abel Bonar, having perceived the fatal consequence of the hatred from which the French Revolution was born, which had divided France into two permanently opposing parties, *the Jacobins and the French*.

"If the French rise up in revolt of their own accord, if they rebel without being ordered to do so, if they show the slightest movement of sincere discontent - they will be fired upon from machine guns, for this is no longer a manufactured people. The only war the Jacobins cannot abandon is the one they are waging against the French. For them, politics is, in essence, a war within the nation." (Bonnard, 1936)

Since then, the signs and banners of nationalism and national liberation from alienated and unworthy rulers. The symbols and banners of nationalism and national liberation from alienated and unworthy ruling elites are taken up and borne by the spiritual descendants of the counter-revolution, the champions of the spiritual *right*, though always fragmented into opposing schools, from legitimist monarchism and Catholicism to neo-paganism and populism. It may be superfluous to point out that the protagonists of the spiritual *right* have completely changed the content and nature of French nationalism and that of its essential product, namely the nation. According to the previous, very narrow definition, the centre of meaning of the nation lay in the corresponding state: all citizens of France are members of the French nation. Thus, for example, Joseph de Maistre, a citizen and high official of the Kingdom of Sardinia, born in the Duchy of Savoy, did not consider himself a Frenchman but *'the most French of foreigners'*.

It may be superfluous to point out how exposed this definition is, not only to being narrow but also superficial and unstable: such nations usually last as long as their founding states, and historical experience testifies that the other, organically formed nations are much more long-lived than states. Some, and even the greatest, nation-states, such as *the Soviet or Yugoslav*, died, so to speak, with the hour of their dissolution.

The turn of the spiritual *right* towards the nation has resulted in a shift in its defining focus towards the ethnos and tradition, language and culture. Thus, thanks to the interpretation of the descendants of the Counter-Revolution, the nation has far outgrown its ancestral frameworks, in all dimensions, including particularly the temporal one. For generations, Charles Maurras taught and continues to teach his followers about the universal, all-encompassing dimensions of *the Nation*, as well as the self-deceptions of its opponents:

"Of all the firm and compact circles of fellowship that exist in the temporality of Nations is the broadest. Break it and you will lay bare the Universe, which will thus lose every form of defence, support and participation. Liberated from the yoke of the Nation, he will be freed neither from shortages, nor from exploitation, nor from deadly violence. Therefore, let us conclude in accordance with the natural truth that everything that is, everything that has, and everything that loves lives conditioned by the existence of the Nation: everything that wishes to preserve itself, however small, must defend, at all costs, its nation. We do not make a deity or a metaphysical absolute of the nation, but ultimately we can say that we do what the Jews of ancient times called deism." (Maurras, 1966)

At that point of a strange confession by a devout Catholic, the metaphysical dimension of the nation is revealed to us, which Maurras's follower, Alphonse de Châteaubriant, translated into Christian terms, considering that the decadence of the French nation was a consequence of its descent into godlessness: *"Since France no longer believes in the resurrection*

Christ in the hearts, France is unhappy; God is no longer born in her." The renewal of faith in the resurrection of Christ is the condition for the salvation of the contemporary generation and the renewal of life within the nation, the nature of which Alphonse de Chateaubriand outlines with a series of examples of its characteristics: "the pious brow of Vercingetorix, the holiness of Louis IX, the practical unity of Louis XI, the inspiration of Joan of Arc, the chivalrous simplicity of Bayard, the kingly conscience of Henry IV, the purity of Vowenargo, the soulfulness of Catinat." (De Chateaubriand, 1937)

These differences in attitude towards the nation and nationalism have remained, until the present day, one of the essential distinctions between *the* pro-capitalist and *the* prosocialist *left*, on the one hand, and the true, that is to say spiritual, post-economic *right*, on the other. As a rule of historical experience, when *a* primarily economic *left*, of one persuasion or another, seeks the reasons for its political struggle in national interests and sentiments, its reach is very superficial and limited, and is usually not much deeper than the layer called *society*. Any deeper probing is resisted, above all, by the ontological limitation of all economism—that based on greed and selfishness as much as its opposite—which dictates the distribution of income according to social justice.

This is an ideology of the primacy of the economy over politics as an end over a means; in other words, an ideology of the primacy of the partial and inferior over the whole to which it belongs and its corresponding, superior properties. Given that politics is, by definition, *a public affair*, and that its very reason for being and acting lies in the diverse interests of the community or nation, every form of economicism inherently negates not only every nationalism but also any true politics. Therefore, the appearance of nationalism in the political programme and actions of *the left* arouses suspicion regarding the sincerity or steadfastness of its commitment. Otherwise, as the evolution of a current of Italian socialism into fascism—and the latter, similar movements across Europe—testifies, the element of sincere nationalism is so strong that it easily imposes itself as the centre of crystallisation for the union. And herein lies the unfoundedness of the criticism of nationalism as some kind of *false consciousness*, supposedly produced in order to replace and suppress *class consciousness*. The strength of nationalism stems precisely from the depths of its cultural rootedness and permanence.

The intellectual thought of *the Left*—both Enlightenment and Marxist in origin—agrees in observing the dangerous impulses of these ideas, which supposedly contain the depths of human irrationality, and which are awakened, summoned and provoked by the tribunes of nationalism. Therefore, when this thought forgets, or rather overlooks, its own foundational premise—that all the desires and actions of the social individual are, indirectly or directly, caused by economic motives—it accuses nationalism of being the chief cause of modern, and even world, wars.

"The Horizon of Graves"

Historical experience, however, testifies that nationalism, in the worst cases, is largely a warmongering tool of certain economic forces and interests. A more careful examination of the history of the wars that have bled Europe in the modern age must recognise that economic reasons are invariably their fundamental and primary driving force. Here too, we should highlight the wisdom of Plato, who first perceived this causal nexus between the demonism of the economy and war (*The Republic*, 373e).

Although a stridently zealous or emphatic rhetoric of bellicosity usually characterises the champions of *right-wing* nationalism, modern history testifies that the essential or decisive advocates and instigators of conquering wars and colonial ventures are precisely the champions and proponents of liberalism. The conquering policies of the most aggressive manifestations of nationalism – such as those of the Third Reich and Fascist Italy

- were in fact belated attempts to acquire colonies. The strategists of the Third Reich's colonial expansion towards the European East and Italy's across the Balkans and Africa took as their model the British colonial pseudo-empire of global proportions. Regarding the causes of the National Socialists' infamous policy, Ernst Nolte is only partially correct when he reduces its essence to an extreme and imitative reaction to the challenges of criminal Bolshevism. (Nolte, 1987). If we set aside the irrefutable evidence that it was Roosevelt and his associates who were the prime culprits of the Second World War, because by a series of challenges and blackmails, sanctions and provocations, they consciously pushed Hitler onto the path of a military adventure as the only alternative (Bavendamm, 1983)

- the fact remains that the main models for the National Socialist and Fascist dreams of expansion and their methods were the British colonialists, who also first invented *reservations* and *concentration camps* for the *final solution*, i.e., the extermination of undesirable opponents.

By the First World War, the globally expansive colonial policy of British liberalism had conquered and seized over thirty million square kilometres, leaving far behind its belated continental imitators, such as Germany, with a spoils of barely three million square kilometres. The German colonial push into Africa was not in Bismarck's favour, nor was it an expression of Prussian nationalism or militarism, nor of the interests of the great industrialists. It was the venture of liberal-minded and greedy, yet adventurous, members of the nouveau riche class, who were followed by the peasant poor.

French colonialism also stems from *the liberal left*. One of the most striking examples was provided, at the beginning of the twentieth century, by the French Assembly, in which various factions of *the Left* united to form a numerically superior parliamentary majority in support of colonialism, known as *the Groupe colonial*. In contrast to *the bellicose left*, *the right's* mood ranged from indifference or indecision, through to condemnations from the pulpits of Catholic thought leaders, such as Léon Bloy, to nationalist revulsion at the shedding of young French blood to satisfy the rapacity of *anonymous capital*, to Maurice Barrès's suspicion that the sirens of colonialism served to "*detach the elite of our army from the Rhine*", which would allow "*the extension of German hegemony across Europe*". (Girardet, 1972)

The rare condemnations of colonialism that came from some masters of liberal thought - such as Adam Smith or Jean- Baptist Say - did not stem from moral but from calculating motives: they assessed that the conquest and military-administrative maintenance of colonies cost the taxpayers and the state economy far more than the benefits they brought, and that only a negligible minority of colonisers profited.

After all, it was liberal, or rather wild, capitalism, destroying peasant culture through the force of industrialisation, that was the main driver of the mass emigration which in the 19th century took almost a sixth of Europe's population to other continents. These processes provided the flesh for the predatory colonial conquests managed by champions of liberal capitalism, such as Cecil Rhodes – one of the first ideologues of reforming the British pseudo-empire towards a *new world order* – which justified its world-scale greed with the assumption of the English race's superiority. It is a matter of *superiority*

derived from the then-widespread belief among the British ruling pseudo-elite that the English were not of Germanic origin but in fact a lost tribe of the 'chosen people', namely the Israelites:

I assert that we are the first race in the world and that it is better for humanity for us to settle in as large a part of the world as possible... Given that it is obvious how the English-speaking race has been made by God his chosen omd, by whom he will create a state of dmštvo based on justice, freedom and mim, that his desire must be fulfilled, and if it were all in my power I would hasten to give that race as much space and power as possible. If God exists I think He will be pleased to grant me something, to colour as much of the African map as possible in British red. (Rhodes, 1902)

In contrast to Rhodes, the exemplary teacher of the spiritual right, Count Arthur de Gobineau in the unjustly infamous *Essay on the Inequality* (read: *diversity*) of human races – who cannot or will not properly read the generations of their detractors or slanderers – devoted an entire chapter to the condemnation of colonialism, particularly the brutality of the Anglo-Saxon kind, which "tolerates not only the presence (of the indigenous people) but even their very existence."

According to De Gobineau's observation, the use of alcohol, poisons and disease for the extermination of opponents is a patent of modern civilisation, 'for neither the Vandals, nor the Goths, nor the Franks, nor even the Saxons ever thought of using such means.' Being more refined, the civilisations of the ancient world were also more depraved, but they never fell so low. Neither the Brahmins nor the Magi felt the need to wipe out with perfect precision everything around them that did not conform to their ideas. Our civilisation is the only one that has this urge and the corresponding murderous force. It alone, without anger, without agitation, considering itself even excessively kind and tolerant, proclaiming endless benevolence, works incessantly to surround itself with a horizon made of graves.

De Gobino did not stop at the ethical condemnation of modern civilisation and its nihilistic colonialism. Observing that at the root of everything is greed freed from all constraints, and respecting geopolitical considerations, De Gobino pointed out the overestimation of the importance attached to the conquest and colonisation of new territories:

"I mean to say that countries do not constitute the value of a nation, nor will they ever do so; on the contrary, it is the nation that gives, that has given, and that will give a territory its economic, moral and political value." (De Gobineau, 1967)

A cynic might conclude that the true reason for the hatred that De Gobineau's thought has endured for centuries lies precisely in his condemnation of the demonism of the economy and the nihilism of modern Western civilisation. If one is determined to attribute a racist value system to De Gobineau at all costs, then it is the pale-skinned who would fare the worst in his writings, viewed through such a lens. Among other things, a letter dated 22 March 1855, sent from Cairo to Prokesch, bears witness to this, in which de Gobineau openly condemns the amorality of the conquerors: "Europeans are hardly recommendable and at any moment they provide enough reasons for the natives to despise and hate them."

After the First World War, the left gradually, beginning with the communists—on the orders of the Comintern and its corresponding strategy of *permanent revolution* (Lavrov Trocki dixit)—took up the banners of anti-colonialism. After the Second World War, the remaining, pro-capitalist parts of the left in

In Europe, under the shadow of the West, the left gradually, beginning with the communists – on the orders of the Comintern and its corresponding strategy of permanent revolution (Lenin, 1917) – took up the banners of anti-colonialism. After the Second World War, the remaining, pro-capitalist parts of the left in Europe politically and financially supported the national liberation movements across Africa and Asia towards so-called independence, in order to impose a new, incomparable order. politically and financially, the nationalist liberation movements, across Africa and Asia, towards a so-called *independence*, in order to impose a new, incomparably more lucrative form of neo-colonial exploitation, called *the debt economy*, under the supervision of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank.

Considering the history of the relationship between wars and nationalism, we can roughly conclude that it is not nationalism that causes wars, but rather that wars create nationalism. It is precisely hostilities and wars that are the strongest catalysts for the awakening or birth of, and the forger of, national consciousness. If we limit our view to the modern era, we must observe that the first historical signs of the awakening or birth of national consciousness are provoked by the military campaigns of the Anglo-Saxon nation, beginning in the tenth century and especially during the Hundred Years' War. As the British historian Greenfield rightly observed, "*the birth of the English nation was not the birth of one nation but the birth of nations, the birth of nationalisms.*" (Greenfield, 1992) Indeed, Scottish, Irish and Welsh nationalism owe their existence and vitality, to a great extent, to the ruthless, conquering and even genocidal strategy of the sons of *base Albion*.

After all, enmities and wars are also the cradles of states: according to the astute observation of the German anthropogeographer Ratzel, almost as a rule of historical experience, states are born on the frontiers of ethnic circles. (Ratzel, 1902-1904) The greatest wave of the birth or awakening of nationalisms and nations was triggered by the conquering campaigns of Napoleon's army under the banner of national sovereignty. By inspiring admiration and imitation, they created ideological supporters who, precisely because of their loyalty to the idea of the nation, were able and duly opposed the conqueror, as attested by the success of the defenders of Spain, i.e., *Hispanidad*. The speed and strength of the movement towards a common state, German nationalism owes in large part to *the Rhenish Crisis* of 1840, and the conquering threats of France.

Treacherous Albion

A good example of the ambivalent attitude towards nationalism and its attendant abuses is provided by the history of British pseudo-imperial policy. There is no doubt that all these relations were and have remained determined by reasons of political expediency and by strategies aimed at inflicting some harm on an opponent or enemy, most often proclaimed precisely as a friend. For instance, Great Britain, with the support of France, did everything to weaken or nullify the self-defence measures of the states of *the Holy Alliance* against nationalist and separatist movements, which threatened the traditional order and European peace. It is certain that liberal and republican ideals were then also a mere and therefore very transparent, cynical pretext for advocating nationalism, as this was largely confined to the territory of *the Holy Alliance*.

British foreign policy made a particular contribution to the awakening of national consciousness and the corresponding liberation or separatist movements within the European empires, using a range of available means, from public and secret diplomacy to a continental network of Masonic lodges. It aimed to weaken and undermine the influence of the Catholic Church and, above all, the defence of the integrity of the European, supranational empires. On the opposite side, for the same geopolitical reasons – in the belief that Europe's weakness was a condition and even a source of *Albion's* power – British foreign policy supported and artificially sustained the Islamic pseudo-empire, *the Sick Man of the Bosphorus*, and its occupation of Christian

peoples of south-eastern Europe, furiously suppressing and demonising their national-liberation aspirations, movements and uprisings.

One example is sufficient: the British government rejected with unheard-of ill-will the memorandum of Count Andr assy, the Foreign Minister of Austria-Hungary, of 30. December 1875, which proposed to the Porte that it abolish the servile status of the Christians, ensure their full equality, and allow a European commission to supervise such social reforms. On that occasion, Disraeli publicly called the memorandum of Count Andr assy "*an idiotic act of treachery*", warning the European powers that they must take British interests into account in the Ottoman pseudo-empire. (Živojinovi , 1976).

Incidentally, Britain's attitude towards European nationalisms was almost identical to that charted by the loves and hates of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels. They too, above all else, passionately hated Russia and those nations and nationalisms that had close historical, cultural and spiritual ties with the Russian people. How much this attitude was dependent on geopolitical reasons is shown by the double standard towards the Romanians: great favour towards those from Bessarabia when they harboured anti-Russian sentiments, and great anger towards the Romanians from Transylvania for loyally defending the integrity of the Austro-Hungarian Empire.

Assuming from Great Britain the role of the main geopolitical spur of the Leviathan – after the First World War and the relocation of the centre of the international finance capital from London to New York – the USA continued the same policy of a double standard towards nationalisms. For example, all Congressional resolutions that obliged the state administration to assist anti-communist resistance movements during *the Cold War* listed all the nations and even the smallest ethnic communities of the USSR, with the exception of one, the largest of them all: the Russian. Just as the main New York banks once financed the Bolshevik revolution to destroy Tsarist and Christian Russia and to perpetrate genocide against the Russian people, so the real aim of the Atlantic powers' centuries-long struggle against communism was and remains the Russian nation and its state. On this, among other things, the numerous official statements of intent by the US Secretary of State, James Baker, after the collapse of the USSR bear compelling witness, such as the one of 24 May 1992: "*What we want to achieve are independent states, not only in Russia and of Russia, not only of Moscow and St Petersburg, but also of the Urals, Siberia and the Far East.*" The stated need to break up Russia into a series of powerless pseudo-states and statelets can be more fully understood in light of an earlier statement by Baker, made on 16 December 1991 - that is, just four days after the dissolution of the USSR was proclaimed - how the US should lead the exploitation of "*the rich human and material resources of those vast countries for the cause of freedom instead of totalitarianism, thereby immeasurably strengthening the security, prosperity and freedom of America and the world.*" (Baker, 1991)

Based on historical experience, we can expect that the Atlantic Leviathan will continue to foster those nationalisms and separatisms that serve the strategy of Russia's destruction. However, the architects of *the new world order* do not foresee any further future for the European nations, which are gradually disintegrating, paralysing and dissolving them by force through economic coercion, media *brainwashing*, and ever-increasing influxes of Third World immigrants who are changing Europe's demographic and religious makeup.

The First World War, brought about by the *divide-and-conquer* strategy, redrew the map of Europe largely according to the states-nations, created from the fallen empires. Then they too, sooner or later, became an obstacle to the march of the Atlantic Leviathan, intent on completely subordinating, or rather transforming, Europe into a province of the *One World* by the force of the process of universal political *mondialisation* and economic *globalisation*. It should be pointed out that European nationalisms today, despite all their weaknesses, are in fact, whether actual or potential, the most resilient and indeed the last natural defences of Europe, which indirectly explains the ferocious attacks from the proponents of *One world*.

Lexical weaknesses

In the domain of ideological attacks on nationalism and its aspirations, movements, institutions and fruits, the most shameless but also the stupidest spirit employs neo-positivist analytical methods to assess and deny the validity of existing definitions of the concept of *nation*. For example, one of the most active opponents of nationalism among twentieth-century historians, Eric Hobsbawm, who openly admits to personal motives of intolerance, in his review argues that "*no satisfactory criterion can be found by which to decide which of the many human collectives should be so called (nationhood) - cannot be discovered... Attempts to create objective criteria for determining the nation, or for explaining why certain groups have become 'nations' and other groups have not, often relies on a single criterion such as language, common territory, a shared history, cultural heritage, or something else,*" (Hobsbawm, 1996)

The mere assertion that there is no satisfactory definition of the concept of *a nation* is then, without any justification, elevated to proof that such a concept is devoid of any creative content and is a "*myth*", an artificial (mis)creation or a collective self-deception. The critique of *the nation's* authenticity presented relies on the definition provided by Comrade Joseph Vissarionovich Stalin in his discussion, *Marxism and the National and Colonial Question* (1912), in which he responds to the defeat of the first attempt at an anti-Russian revolution (1905) and the perceived attempt by the Tsarist regime to pre-empt revolutionary challenges by '*encouraging the development of nationality*'. (Stalin, 1947) Thus, seeing in this "*development of nationality*" a threat to the revolutionary aspirations of the communist movement, Stalin considers the substance of *the nation* and provides one of the most quantitatively demanding criteria for its existence:

"A nation is a historically constituted, stable community of language, territory, economic life, and psychic make-up, which manifests itself in culture... It is necessary to emphasise that none of the indicated characteristics, taken in isolation, is sufficient to define a nation. Moreover, it is sufficient for just one of these characteristics to be lacking for a nation to cease to exist as such."

In the light of the exposed difficulty, Stalin's associate denied nationhood not only to mechanical groups (such as *Americans*) but also to a number of generally accepted nations, from Germans, Russians, Norwegians, Lithuanians and Danes to Georgians and Jews: "*Bauer speaks of the Jews as a single nation, although 'they have no common language'; and what 'common destiny' and what national ties can be spoken of, for example, with regard to Georgian, Dagestani, Russian and American Jews, who are completely separate from one another and live in different territories and speak different languages?*"

Consistently applying the principles of (Marxist) materialism, Comrade Stalin overestimates the power of conditioning and the significance of elements of the material world, such as land, that is, territory, and underestimates the strength of the spiritual essence of the nation to overcome such limitations or shortcomings. It was Renan who most profoundly proclaimed this essence, in his famous answer to the question of *what a nation is*, delivered from the Sorbonne's lectern on 11 March 1882:

"A nation is a soul, a spiritual principle. Two things, which are in truth only one, constitute this soul, this spiritual principle. One of them belongs to the past, the other to the present. The one is the common possession of a rich heritage in memories, the other is the present agreement, the desire to live together. Thus, the nation is a great community of solidarity that bears the burden of the sacrifice that has been made and the sacrifice that is still being made."

That a nation has *a soul* and *a spiritual principle*, that it is imbued with a specific character – we have heard this previously from the chair of De Maistre. The weakness of Renan's definition lies not so much in a lack of originality, but in a simplicity that is also open to other, for instance, exclusively religious forms of communion and solidarity. Revisiting Stalin's definition from a higher vantage point, which allows for the observation of the centuries- and millennia-long currents and abysses of ideas and beliefs, we can observe that his overestimation of the importance of *territory* ideally stems, along with communist egalitarianism, from cultures crystallised around the cults of Mother Earth, which flourished along the southern belt of the Eurasian continent, before the last great wave of Euro-Aryan migrations or conquests.

Returning to the main field of consideration, we should point out that the main difficulties in defining the concept of *nation* can be reduced to an artificial semantic problem. This problem stems not so much from the phenomenon that the word '*nation*' should ideally define and denote, but rather from the process of impoverishment of European languages under the shadow of Western civilisation. This also concerns the subsequent process of reducing different phenomena to a single common denominator and the resulting semantic confusions. These often involve fundamental phenomena and properties of human life and community: from *love* to the *friend-enemy* dualism and *the nation*. For example, unlike Ancient Greek, which possessed some twenty expressions for different types and forms of interpersonal inclinations, modern European languages, with only the word '*love*', are compelled to encompass all relationships, even unnatural and pathological ones, within its semantic framework. Schmitt's discussion of the concept of the political rightly indicates the kind of monstrous interpretations to which the Gospel principle '*Love your enemies*' (Matthew, 5, 44; Luke, 6:27) can lead to monstrous interpretations of the evangelical principle '*Love your enemies*' (Matthew, 5, 44; Luke, 6:27), when one is unaware of the fact that both ancient Greek and Latin possessed different expressions for different kinds of friendship or enmity, and that here the term refers to a personal (*inimicos*) enemy, not a public or political one (*hostes*). (Schmitt, 1995)

Similar, and even worse, misunderstandings can be caused by the attempt to view and designate diverse and varied forms of human gathering or community with a single term (*nation*), especially where it is used as a criterion for distinguishing reality from illusions. *The nation* is but one in a long line of concepts that the discursive language of modern man is unable to define without remainder or exception. Admittedly, the history of the word *nation's* usage points to its extraordinary malleability to different needs, from Cicero, who used it to denote the order of the nobility, through to the medieval

universities, where students were sorted by national origin – although there, the term *natio anglica* encompassed all members of the Germanic family of peoples and not just arrivals from the British Isles – to our own day, where even the mechanical aggregate of the inhabitants of the USA is called (American) *nation*, despite all racial and national, ethnic and cultural and linguistic differences.

Etymological definition

By appealing to etymology, we learn that in Indo-European languages the core of the concept of *nation* (Latin *natio* from the root **gnatio*) lies in the genetic bond of a (tribal) community. (Gamkrelidze, Ivanov, 1984) Epic literature provides us with countless examples of the immense importance the Indo-European man attached to genetic descent in determining the position of people in the ideal hierarchy of valour. "Who are you? Where are you from? Where is your home? Where are your father and mother? / ... And by what lineage do you boast?" - asks Telemachus of Athena, disguised as a stranger (*Odyssey*, I, 3, 170-172), and Helen to Menelaus about Telemachus, having recognised the features of Odysseus in his appearance: "Do we know anything, Menelaus, pride of the Titans, of what / stock these foreigners who have come to our halls boast?" (*Odyssey*, IV, 3, 138-139).

The conquering campaign of the Indo-European peoples across the southern, peripheral belt of the Eurasian continent is widely attested by historical, mythological and legendary scenes of dualism and duality, of conflict and reconciliation between opposing cultures, and of the corresponding patterns of the human element. Everywhere and always, the conquerors emphasised the cult of ancestors and the importance of genetic lineage in determining the quality of the human stock. The indigenous peoples, uniquely devoted to the cults of Mother Earth and their derivatives, saw in every hierarchy of humankind and in every demarcation, with horror, an attack on the law of equality of all people, derived from the analogy with maternal love. In the worldview of the adherents of Mother Earth cults, from the Iberian and Apennine peninsulas, across the Middle East to the Indian subcontinent, every border imposed by human will was seen as a violation of the law of nature's indivisibility. Although Bachofen was mistaken in convincing us of a succession of matriarchy to patriarchy within unified ethnic communities—instead of recognising the predominance of the conqueror's *patriarchal* culture over the *matriarchal* culture of the defeated indigenous stratum—his observations of the characteristics of the conflicting cultures are essentially correct:

"That which is born belongs to the maternal matter, which has nurtured it, brought it into the world and now feeds it. But this mother is now the same, ultimately it is the earth, which represents the female element in the entire order of mothers and daughters... The assumption of maternity

of the earth and from that derived kinship and brotherhood of all people is not a speculative idea, but is the concept of the oldest world in general... The equality of all free citizens we have derived from their common origin from one mother's womb, the earth." (Bachofen, 1990)

Using his invention of epistemically useful *'falsehoods in words'* and adopting the myth of the native Pelasgians about Mother Earth as the mother of all people, Plato rejected the universalist and cosmopolitan dimensions of the supposed kinship and reduced it to the scale of the homeland, that is, the ideal state, according to the formula: "You who make up the state—O brothers!" (*The Republic* 414d–415a).

At the highest level of human self-awareness, the connection between certain nations and their corresponding lands forms part of a metaphysical network of correspondences between ideas, things and phenomena that the peoples of ancient cultures perceived, felt, experienced and contemplated. In the face of Plato's doctrine, one gains the impression that it is a kind of ideological palimpsest: beneath the Euro-Aryan ideology of genetics, the remnants of the Pelasgian myth, or rather the cult of the Mother, can be discerned.

the impression arises that it is a kind of ideological palimpsest: beneath the Euro-Aryan ideology of genetics, the remnants of the Pelasgian myth, or rather the cult of the Mother Earth, are discernible. The communist elements of Plato's state also belong to this cult, in contrast to its Euro-Aryan structure.

The Pelasgian myth and cultures crystallised around the cults of the Mother Earth not only fail to provide any favourable conditions but also prevent the emancipation of any qualitative differentiation and classification of the human race, the emergence of the genealogical tree of nobility, as well as of the nation, that is, national self-awareness. From the standpoint of a man prostrate before a statue of the Mother Earth, these are all blasphemous or heretical forms of denial of her fundamental law, according to which all human beings are of the same kind and equal, her children, *brothers and sisters*, and *bastards*.

Plato's teaching, however, provides a good starting point for defining natural nations. This is confirmed by the tendency of stable communities to acquire an ever-increasing ethnic homogeneity through centuries of residence in a particular territory, thereby expanding and deepening the genetic ties of their members and assimilating newcomers. Therefore, the European of pre-industrial revolutionary times was not so hesitant in his use of the word '*nation*'—as nationalists' historians often assume—using it to define ethnic communities but also the inhabitants of provinces, regions or cities. If we now leave aside

leaving aside the metaphysical level and the corresponding network of correspondences, the undeniable fact remains that the majority of the inhabitants of the regions or cities in question were connected by a series of ties, from genetic and historical to cultural and political. In some cases, these ties were so strong that—contrary to modern processes of *internationalisation* or *globalisation*, which tend to erase differences in the direction of a general and planetary *levelling*—they caused and fostered enormous differentiations, even within single cultural spaces and over minuscule distances.

A good example is provided by Renaissance Italy: one only has to compare the visual arts of Florence and - just a few hundred kilometres away - Venice at that time, to see the evidence of the vast differences between the **forma mentis** of the Florentine and Venetian *nations*, which, after all, also possessed corresponding states. In Florence, Byzantine Romanesque merges with German Gothic to form a synthesis characterised by hierarchical, axial and symmetrical structures, solid forms and the psychological realism of a self-assured worldview. In Venice, however, behind the dazzlingly sumptuous, commercial riot of colour, forms and structures dissolve, things and phenomena waver, and the most esteemed masters, such as Tiepolo and Tintoretto, depict the theatre of the world as a series of randomly cropped frames of accelerated transience, where a spirit of unease and anxiety prevails.

Ethnic diversity is also evident: Tuscany was for centuries a refuge for rebels and adventurers, heretics and freedom-lovers, who on an Etruscan foundation created a combative type of people, called *the damned Tuscans* (Maiaparte, 1956), who for centuries fought, divided between the ideals of the empire and the independence of the cities. Venice, once the land of the Veneti, by the force of its commercial and maritime power became a haven for an *international crowd*, while the aristocracy, disgusted, withdrew along the Po River, returning to feudal agriculture, managing their estates from the beautiful villas and palaces of the architect Palladio, which the impoverished aristocracy built, unfortunately, from flimsy bricks instead of granite or marble.

The prehistory of national consciousness

According to a very widespread belief among modern historians and political scientists, *nationalism* and *the nation* are patents of the modern age, old by no more than two centuries. This is one of a series of self-deceptions of modern thought, because expressions of national self-awareness in the domain of political aspirations, will, and action are one of the enduring constants of history. After all, the essential properties that moderns consider mandatory indicators of a nation's existence – from language and customs, through a distinctive culture and history, to *the 'psychic complex'* (Stalin) and *the 'spiritual principle'* (Renan) - they convincingly refute the assumption of youth, as their age is usually measured in centuries and even millennia.

The novelty in modern expressions of national self-awareness stems precisely from the corresponding processes inherent to modern civilisation. The essential novelty is expressed in the feeling of a nation's individuality, insofar as it is completely detached from the whole of nature. This is a phenomenon analogous to the processes of alienation of the modern individual from the world and society. For the people of ancient Indo-European and even European cultures, every nation was an organic part of the cosmic order, connected with the corresponding elements of the world of things and phenomena, from the land, flora and fauna to colours, numbers, sounds and constellations. In the long tradition of considering nations as the products of the actions and influences of geographical and climatic factors – from Hippocrates and Aristotle to Bodin and Dvorniković – we can recognise the unconscious remnants of former and higher insights into correspondences. After all, it is possible to reverse the epistemological perspective of this tradition and say, with full justification, that each nation has chosen the space that corresponds to its predestination.

According to the view of the archaic or ideal man of the Indo-European cultures, nations are rooted in Heaven. Therefore, the Euro-Aryan sovereigns too—according to the testimony of a number of traditions—bear the insignia of Heaven, from the heavenly origin of royal authority (Herodotus, IV, 5), to the divine origin of the Germanic kings (Heusler, 1908). At least in ideal or principled states, those nations served neither sovereigns nor gods, but were together with them, on a corresponding level

power, strove to preserve and develop the cosmic Order, imitating the cosmogenic acts in their own domain.

The consciousness of nations as political communities is as old as history as a science. The earliest of the known historians—from Herodotus and Thucydides to Tacitus and Marcelinus—when they think of the greatest, indeed multinational, states, such as Egypt, Persia or Carthage, speak of state or political nations, of *the Egyptians, Persians or Carthaginians*, because that is how they perceive them. Plato's **The Republic** contains not only a high awareness of the characterological differences of the world's nations (IV, 435e-436a) but also the principle of national altruism, against fratricidal conflicts and enslavement:

Do you think it is just for the Hellenes to enslave Hellenic states, or should they, if possible, learn to spare the Hellenic tribe and take care themselves not to become slaves of barbarians? I maintain, in fact, that the Hellenic tribes are related to one another and are indigenous, whereas they are foreign and alien to the barbarian peoples... If, however, the Hellenes fight against the Hellenes, we shall say that they are by nature friends, and that Hellas is in such a state sick and in revolt, and such enmity should be called discord." (V, 469b - 470d)

When modern historians emphasise the ideal of *liberty* as one of the fundamental characteristics of modern nations, what makes them, allegedly, an unprecedented phenomenon in history (Chabod, 1967) - one has to wonder whether they have properly read even a part of the work of the founder of that science, Herodotus, which contains the famous reply of the Athenians to Alexander the Great's proposal to make peace with the Persians:

"We ourselves know that Xerxes has an army several times greater than ours, and there is no need to waste words on that. But our love for freedom is such that we shall defend ourselves for as long as we are able. Do not even try to persuade us to make peace with the barbarian, for we will not listen to you. " (History, VIII, 143).

It may be pointed out that this love of freedom is not only a characteristic of the highly cultured Athenians, but a general feature of the ethos of the Euro-Aryan peoples, with which they present themselves from their very first known steps on the stage of history. For example, it was precisely in their freedom-loving spirit, one of the distinctly *national* characteristics of the Germans, that Tacitus perceived a force that surpassed the mightiest states of his time: *"Neither the Sammites, nor the Carthaginians, nor the Spaniards and Gauls, nor even the Persians, have given us so much trouble, for it is easier to conquer the kingdom of the Arsacids than the freedom of the Germans"* (Germania, XXXVII)

Tacitus's work testifies that *national pride* is not some unique trait of modern nations and nationalisms, but a phenomenon that was so strong in ancient times that the corresponding envy could even cause changes of identity:

"The Treveri and the Nervii claim for themselves a German origin, and even pride themselves on it, as if by this they wished to exclude all connection with the sluggish Gauls." (XXVIII).

National self-awareness and national pride in the political domain are also attested to by much older monuments, although mostly by indirect signs. For example, such an indirect attestation of a nation is contained in the first Gath of the *Vendidad*, from Zoroaster's *Avesta*. This is the most concise account of the descent of the Aryans, prompted by glaciation, from the far north to the south of Eurasia, from the Aryan homelands in the circum-polar regions to the Iranian plateau and the Indian sub-continent. We learn this story from the address of Ahura Mazda, who informs Zarathustra of the lands he created for the Aryans and into which they settled, only to be regularly attacked by the malevolent Angra Mainyu and his demons:

"I (who am) Ahura Mazda created first, of place and dwelling, the well-built Homeland of the Aryans (Airyana Vaejah). But Angra Mainyu, very deadly, produced from it a great calamity. the red serpent and winter, which the demons (daeva) created. There are therefore ten months of winter, a twelfth part. And they are cold for the waters, cold for the earth, cold for the plants. / (it is) the centre of winter, the heart of winter... " { *Vendidad*, I, 2-3)

This is followed by a description of the other fifteen dwellings which Ahura Mazda created and in which the Aryans faced corresponding challenges and threats, from external hostilities to internal weaknesses, from diseases that afflicted their cattle (I, 4) and unhealthy, excessively warm climatic conditions, encountered in the regions of *Hapta Hindu* (I, 18), through the reign of injustice (I, 5), the perversion of sexual relations and the mixing of classes (I,9) and pederasty (I, 11), to their own despondency (I, 7) and credulity (I,15), to the expulsion of Aryan sovereigns (I, 10) and the loss of land ownership to the non-Aryan (I, 17).

In the light of the intelligible messages of *the Vendidad*—a monument that has come down to us with terrible damage and distortions, betraying the effects of the forces of decadence and oblivion—we can conclude that it is a work created not only for religious but, above all, for the political needs of the Aryans. This purpose is also indicated by the work's very title: *Vendidad*, literally '*Given against the demons* (daevas).'

It is a manual for the fight against the demons in the service of the god of Evil. Based on a series of data contained in *the Vendidad*, we can also conclude that the Aryans are an ethnic community that possesses all, and even higher, properties of an ideal nation, beginning with the memory of a national history stretching back millennia. One might add, with a smile of irony, that the Aryan community in question more than fulfils the main requirement which comrade Stalin sets in the examination of nations: it remembers no fewer than sixteen territories of its historical dwellings. And precisely the fact that this community has preserved its fundamental faith, ethos and customs, whilst facing a series of alienations and hostilities, diversities and oppositions, is a powerful testament to the solidity of the body of a nation that possesses the corresponding qualities.

The entire seventh chapter of *the Manava-Dharma-Castra*, a fundamental code of ethical, legal and political life of the Indian Aryans, is devoted to instructions on the skills of politics and strategy, understood in the sense of the Schmittian friend-enemy dualism, that is, Aryan-non-Aryan. This unique monument is permeated throughout with countless instructions, orders and prohibitions against the mating and mixing of Aryans with non-Aryans, which betrays a desperate struggle to preserve the tiny Aryan nation of the conquerors of the Indian subcontinent from dissolution in the ocean of the indigenous, mainly Dravidian, grey and black races. This code testifies that this was a nation which possessed not only the qualities demanded by the most exacting modern criteria, but others considerably higher. According to that code, mere birth—that is, ethnic origin—was not enough for a person to be recognised as a member of the Aryan nation: he had to be *dvi-ja*, *twice-born*, that is to say, to undergo the path of initiation and experience a metaphysical transformation:

"If (the members of) the three kiasas have not undergone the ritual of transformation at the appointed moment - they lose the possibility of learning a verse dedicated to the sun god, they become lawless and despised by the Aryans." (II, 39)

One of the most ancient monuments of Aryan culture, the epic *Mahabharata*, contains perhaps the most moving example of heroic loyalty to the national community, which is stronger even than divine offers of immortality. The hero Dananjaya, in search of extraordinary weapons to save his people from defeat and restore his lost kingdom—on a circuitous path around *the centre of the world*, the metaphysical mountain *Meru*, through a series of ascending initiatory trials of heroism—finally reaches the divine abode, steps among the gods and seeks help from Indra, who replies:

"Now that you have come here, what use are weapons to you, O Dananjaya? Choose divine powers, eternal worlds, for you have reached the supreme life.' Thus questioned, Dananjaya answered the god of a thousand eyes: 'Nor eternal worlds, nor divine powers - for what use, otherwise, is (such) happiness? - for I desire not lordship over all the immortal I, O king of thirty gods. Leaving my clan in the jungle, having not overcome my foe, I would gain shame in all the worlds for all time.'" (III, 284)

Loyalty to kinship—which binds the members of a family, unites families into a tribe and tribes into a nation, when they acquire political self-awareness and will—is the primary driving force of the central part of *the Mahabharata*,

speaks the *Bhagavad-gita*, where on the eve of the fratricidal battle, the young warrior, Arjuna, confides in the god Krishna, an avatar of the solar god Vishnu, his reluctance to fight the impending battle. His refusal to fight is based on a deontological ethic and a cognitive perspective that connects the individual and the family with the whole of the community, across all time:

"I do not long for victory, O Krishna, nor for kingdom, nor for pleasures. What use is a kingdom, O Govinda (Krishna), what use are pleasures, or even life itself? Those for whose sake we desire kingdoms, pleasures and delights—they themselves are the ones who fight, renouncing life and wealth: teachers, fathers, sons and grandsires, uncles and brothers-in-law, grandsons and cousins, and other kinsmen. I do not wish to kill them, O Madusudana (Krsna), even if they kill me; nor for the three worlds (do I not wish that); I would never do it for the love of dominion over the earth... When a family perishes, the most ancient laws (virtue) die, and when the law has died, injustice

subjects the entire family. And when injustice prevails, O Krishna, the women of our (Aryan) race become corruptible, and when women become corruptible, a mixing of the racial classes (varnasamkarah) occurs. And this mixture is a hell for those who have destroyed the family and for the family itself; and there the spirits of their ancestors also fall, deprived of (cultic) rice-offerings and water... Thus speaking, on the battlefield, his soul tormented, Arjuna mounted his chariot and cast from him his bow with a handful of arrows,"(I, 32-47)

The treasures of the supreme crystallisations of the experiences of the Euro-Aryan peoples also contain a series of epic and mythical attestations of the phenomenon we today call *national consciousness*. Sometimes, this consciousness of national distinctiveness and of a particular nation's special mission reaches metaphysical horizons, as attested by the *Kosovo vow* in the Serbian tradition. According to the epic tradition, before the decisive battle against the Islamic horde of invaders at the Field of Kosovo in 1389, the leader of the Serbs, Prince Lazar, faced a choice between *earth* and *heaven*, between maintaining power at the cost of submitting to the will of the enemy and fighting, losing, and achieving eternal, heavenly glory. Prince Lazar chose defeat, death and eternal, *heavenly* glory, consciously or unconsciously fulfilling the heroic pattern of the metaphysical purposefulness of defeat, contained in the ancient myth of several Caucasian peoples about the disappearance of the Narts. If the Serbs do not originate from the Caucasus, this myth was probably transmitted to them by the Sarmatians, or rather the Alans, during their joint campaigns.

According to the final act of the myth of the Narts, they were the strongest people in the world, until someone suggested they test their strength against God and lure him into a duel by withholding a sacrifice. Deprived of all honour, the challenger called out to them and agreed to the fight on one condition: *"If I am stronger, what will be more desirable to you: for your race to be destroyed or to be succeeded by worthless descendants?"**One of the Narts loudly remarked that it was better to have worthless descendants than to be left without any, but the hero Urizmag ruled: *"No, it is better to be left without descendants. What need have we to live for ever? What is necessary for us is not a single life but eternal glory."*(Dumezil, 1965) The core of the retold myth contains not only a heroic dimension but also the relentless logic of the economy of roles of communities in the concert of humanity: if the meaning of the Nart life is that they are the strongest in the world, and if they are finally defeated, even by a god himself – then this ends any reason for their national existence. The fact that the myth of the Nart election was transmitted only to the Serbs, the only historical nation to have re-enacted it, in a new form, points to the demonstrated, metaphysical

the roots of nations. Despite their small numbers, having settled on "*the middle of the imperial road*"- which, through land and river routes, both real and virtual, directly connects Europe with the Middle East and Central Asia - the Serbs have for centuries fought to defend their country from the conquering campaigns of the world's greatest powers, from the Eastern Empire and the Ottoman pseudo-empire, to the Austro-Hungarian Empire, the Third Reich and the USA, and *the 'new world order'*. And perhaps it is not a mere coincidence, but rather a necessity stemming from the alignment of nations in Heaven, that the downfall of almost all these powers began precisely with a conflict against Serbian resolve. This is, above all, about the resolve of Heaven's choice, the fulfilment of *the Kosovo vow*.

We are free to conclude that the ideal man of Euro-Aryan cultures is able to see in the nation a much greater and even more significant role than the one it has held since the French Revolution, as a mere, largely formal bearer of sovereignty and, in fact, a false pretext for the rule of alienated pseudo-elites.

To the Hellenes, above all

In the eyes of both Hellenic and Roman philosophers and historians, a nation is a living body connected by a series of causal links to its environment and foundation. We have already pointed out that through such perspectives, older and higher teachings about the correspondences between the worlds of things and phenomena, Heaven and Earth, shine through. It should be noted that the first historical researcher of the formative influences of the environment on nations, Hippocrates, in his famous treatise *On Airs, Waters, and Places*, observes not only the power of geological and climatic but also of political and genetic conditions, holding the belief that artificially acquired properties are also inherited (XIV). All these forces together, according to Hippocrates, determine not only the nature and character of nations but also of continental groups, *Europeans and Asians*.

"Indifference and cowardice feed fearfulness, while manly qualities are fostered by hardship and exertion. Therefore, the Europeans are more combative, and also because of their different political structure, as they are not subject to a monarchy, as

Asians. Now, where monarchical rule is in force, people are necessarily cowardly, as I said before. Their souls are servile and they refuse to voluntarily face dangers beyond their own self-interest, for the defence of another's power. Free men, however, in their own interest and not for the sake of others, choose the path of danger, spur themselves on, and boldly face peril, for they themselves reap the victor's reward."(XXIII)

This observation by the famous encyclopaedist from Kos is a forerunner of the modern liberals' theory of the despotic nature of the monarchical system. When he speaks of the boldness of *free men*, however, he seems to have in mind the modern, liberal conception of the state-society, in the sense of a body of citizens united to realise individual interests. One thing is certain: the models of the interplay between ethno-characterological and geopolitical insights presented are found in the works of such a great number of historians, philosophers and thinkers – beginning with Herodotus, a contemporary of Hippocrates, through Plato and Aristotle, Thucydides and Posidonius, Proclus and Marcellinus, right through to Boden and Montesquieu, Dvorniković and Gumiliov – that this fact cannot be explained by the influence of the encyclopaedist from Kos, but rather by an optic inherent to the worldview and experience of the Euro-Aryan man. And so, as Herodotus himself testifies, when Xerxes asked Demaratus, the exiled king of Sparta in Persian exile, about the combat readiness of the Greeks, he replied with a concise lesson on the unique qualities of the Spartan nation:

"Poverty has always prevailed in Hellas, but they, thanks to their wisdom and strict laws, have acquired a virtue by which Hellas is defended from poverty and slavery. All honour to all the Hellenes who dwell around those of the Dorian provinces, but I will not speak to you of them all, but I will tell you of the Spartans that they will never agree to this, that at your request they should thrust Hellas into slavery; on the contrary, they will challenge you to single combat, even if the whole rest of Greece should side with you..." (History, VII, 102)

One of the most painful demonstrations of the weakness of the feeling of belonging to a natural, objective nation, and of the strength of the feeling of belonging to subjective, political sub-nations, is precisely the fratricidal, the Peloponnesian Wars, which shattered the finest human materials of the Hellenic community and destroyed its cultural, political, military and economic power. And this, as we have previously noted, was well observed by Plato, who pointed out that *"Hellas is in such a state, sick"* (*The Republic*, V, 470c) and implicitly calling on the Hellenes for national reconciliation.

However, the actual situation was ethnically much more complex than the presumed Heian homogeneity. The deepest, latent but persistent ethnic hostility of the descendants of the Pelasgian indigenous people towards the descendants of the Dorian conquerors—expressed also in the constant struggle for supremacy over Delphi between Dionysus and Apollo—was carried on through politics. It was the fundamental conflict between the shifting coalitions crystallised around *the open society* of multicultural and democratic, plutocratic and thalassocratic Athens, on the one hand, and *the closed society* of mono-ethnocratic and aristocratic, patriarchal and warrior Sparta, on the other. However, when the shadow of an Asian conqueror loomed over Hellas, the sense of belonging to an ideal political nation would prevail in the hearts of the Athenians, overcoming all other Hellenic animosities and enmities.

According to Herodotus, a good example of this sense of belonging to the Hellenic nation was provided by the Athenians in their response to the Spartans' fears that they would succumb to the entreaties of Alexander the Great and make peace with Persia:

It is quite understandable that the Spartans fear that we might form a friendship with the Persian king. But it is a shame that you have been frightened, even though you know the Athenians' point of view, for there is no gold in the world, nor any beautiful and rich land, with which we could be paid to voluntarily side with the Persians and help to bring Hellas into bondage. There are many things that prevent us from doing so, even if we were to wish it. The first and foremost of these is the burnt and ruined statues and temples of the gods, for which we consider it our sacred duty to take revenge on the one who did it, rather than to befriend him. And besides, we too are Greeks, and we speak the same language as you, and the same blood flows in our veins; we have the same gods and the same temples, the same sacrifices and the same customs, so it would be a shame if the Athenians were to be traitors to all of that. Know then, if you did not know before, that as long as a single Athenian remains alive, we will not make peace with Xerxes." (History, VIII, 144)

It may be superfluous to point out that the aforementioned response contains such a developed definition of the nation that it is in no way inferior to the most demanding of modern ones, such as Stalin's. All the elements are clearly laid out here: from a shared faith, a common language, through a presumed ethnic unity, to a unity in culture and customs. The aforementioned speech testifies not only to the national consciousness of the Athenians but also

of its political rank: in the domain of foreign policy, relations with others, the non-Hellenes, national solidarity is the supreme value, above all ideological differences and conflicts.

The Unfulfilled Decision of Julian the Emperor

At this point in our exposition, it is also essential to point out a great, as yet unrealised, possibility for a historical upheaval contained within a political worldview based on an insight into the vast diversity of races and nations encompassed by the Roman Empire. This is the possibility attested to in the open letter of Julian the Emperor against the degenerate citizens of Antioch, written on the eve of the battle against the Persians in which he lost his life. This work, *the Misopogon*, is characterised by a contempt for the Levantine world and a burning nostalgia for the Celtic and Germanic peoples of Europe, whom he had come to know well while defending the empire's already lost western provinces from their attacks. The Emperor first outlines the differences, rhetorically adopting the guise of the Antiochians who address him reproachfully: "*Have you not realised that we are far from being Celts or Thracians or Illyrians? Do you not see how many shops there are in this city? And you are hated by the merchants because you do not allow them to sell provisions to the people and to strangers at whatever price they wish.*" (349d-350a)

A nostalgic confession follows:

"I have had dealings with the Celts and the Germans and the Hercynian Forest from the time I came of age, and I have spent a great deal of time there, like some Ionian who consorts with wild beasts and has become one of them. There I encountered characters who could neither flatter nor ingratiate themselves, but who could only conduct themselves simply and freely towards everyone alike." (359b ϵ)

By all accounts, in the depths of his soul, Julian the Emperor had made a decision—one that others would realise centuries later—that after the expected victory over the Persians, he would establish the centre of his operations where his heart longed to go. In the light of the aforementioned recollections, this is the only meaning of the otherwise mysterious message, uttered towards the end of the treatise: "*Having entrusted myself to the Adrasteia, I shall depart for another nation and other cities.*" (370b)

All that remains is for us to discern the nature of the racial or national differences that Julian the Emperor observed. Did he perceive the essence of these differences to lie precisely in the realm of worldviews? Or does the mention of *the Hercynian forests* point not only to one predecessor, Julius Caesar, but also to his observation of how civilisation weakens the strength of a people? Highlighting how the Celts were once stronger than the Germans, having taken from them "*the most fertile lands around the Hercynian forests*", Caesar observes how the balance of power had shifted because, due to their proximity to Roman civilisation, they "*had the opportunity to become acquainted with the comforts of life.*" "Therefore, 'little they have become accustomed to consider themselves inferior, having suffered defeats in many battles, so that today they do not even think of comparing themselves with the Germans on the battlefield.'" (*De bello Gallico*, VI, 24)

One thing is certain: had Julian the Emperor not fallen in battle against the Persians and had he fulfilled the wish expressed in his last work, history would have been entirely different. The Empire would probably have lost its Asian and African provinces, but it would have been saved, healed and renewed precisely for that reason, by the shift of its ideal, formative and informative centre northwards, among the Germanic,

Celtic and Slavic peoples, where Julian's great ideological struggle would have been deeply understood and wholeheartedly embraced in the direction of a great up-rising.

The Nation, the Last Hope

Julian's letters and writings—from the period of his imperial duties and responsibilities—bear witness to a growing disappointment at the defeatful outcomes of his desperate appeals to his fellow citizens for the renewal of *paganism*. Yet, in these expressions, there is not a trace of any weakening of his faithfulness to the gods. His desire, therefore, to travel 'to another nation and other cities' was surely prompted by the hope or conviction that there his appeals would meet with the most complete, longed-for response.

It is not the first time that in great crises, hopes turn to the nation and not to any faith or ideology, political doctrine, and state system. What causes a particular crisis is precisely inherent to the corresponding faith or ideology, doctrine and system, or to their conflicts and wars. Beneath those superstructures, the foundation is not necessarily constituted by the nation. In the historical survey, we often encounter (mechanical) societies, *melting-pots* and even masses, mere crowds. No one appeals to them for salvation because neither society, a mechanical aggregate of individuals, let alone a *melting-pot*, a mass or a crowd, possesses any intrinsic, positive principle of guidance and shaping, of sustaining and preserving life. Therefore, the appeal to nations—where they exist—is a mandatory sign of a great crisis of superstructures, a symptom of a growing or general loss of faith in their power to continue successfully organise and beneficially foster the vitality of the individual and the community.

The conviction of modern historians and political scientists that *nationalism* and *the nation* are phenomena of the modern age, without precedent, in fact betrays a major error in their epistemological perspective, or rather a profound misunderstanding of the subject of their inquiry. Modern *nationalism* and *the nation* are not the fruits of some political liberations or progress, but of deep crises: after the collapse and disintegration of all superstructures, and even the state, the naked body of the nation is revealed, whose life force can withstand even the greatest blows in the arena of history. A good example is provided by the testimony given by a former captain of the Austro-Hungarian army, Borer, from Orebić, to the writer Ernst Jünger, in the summer of 1932:

"The different way in which the coup took place in Austria became particularly clear to us when Borer one evening told us about the events that took place in the ship's officers' mess in Split during the revolution. In our Reich, one could, among other things, observe the diversity of social classes; here, however, gaping chasms of difference between the nationalities had opened up. In the honest captain's account, one could hear the horror he felt when the old camaraderie of comrades, one day, as if under the touch of a magic wand, disintegrated into Poles, Czechs, Serbs, Slovenians, Croats and Italians, scattering in all directions." (Juenger, 1990).

Very often, from the crises and collapses of empires and pseudo-empires of nations, degenerate ones emerge, devoid of any connection to the higher, to Heaven. After all, the wave of modern nationalisms began from the greatest crisis of Christian religiosity, from the Protestant reaction. In the polemic against Rome, the leaders of Protestantism used *the Old Testament*, but their adherents gained converts mainly by appealing to ancient, trampled rights and

the freedom of the German nation. And here we see an effect marked by the magic of the coincidence of opposites: from Protestantism emerged the two main and opposing ideological forces of the modern age: liberal capitalism with socialism, on the one hand, and nationalism, on the other. The historic novelty of these movements does not lie in their content, but in their extraordinary scale of diffusion and strength, unprecedented in its kind.

The immense forces that can reside in national consciousness, nationalism and patriotism are convincingly demonstrated by the victorious outcome of Stalin's decision to declare the war the USSR was waging against the Axis powers a *Patriotic War*. Faced with terrible military, ideological and moral defeats, with the fact that the people were welcoming the invaders as liberators from communist terror, and realising that there was no strong will to defend the land of *communism* from *Nazi-fascism*, Overnight, Stalin discarded his ideological profile and called upon Russian patriotism and the clergy, with the banners and standards of *Holy Russia*, for assistance. And when one half of the system of this world's economic demonism, namely *the socialist system*, was collapsing, in its ruins the masses did not seek ideology or the order of historical victors, namely liberal capitalism – which had been imposed upon them by force through betrayals and deceptions, blackmail and threats – but instead turned to the embrace of the nation and the language of nationalism as the only path to salvation. It is no coincidence that in the discourse of defeat, in the ruins of the socialist system, words of hope bearing the names of *nation* and *Europe* are sometimes heard from the very same places.

As we have already observed, from the greatest crises a consciousness of an ideal European unity can emerge, an awareness of belonging to the European family of nations. Objective nationalism and true Europeanism – based on real nations as the ideology of their ideal fellowship – are two that are only quantitatively

different degrees of political self-awareness. In the ideal perspective, they are organically linked in a hierarchical order where the nation is the basis from which one starts and Europe is the common, metageographical unifying principle towards which one strives.

As we have already indicated, although a very rare phenomenon in history, the nexus of nationalism and Europe as the ideal gathering place of nations is a very ancient one. The idea of national unity – derived from a consciousness of a common origin, which the great Hellenic tragedians contrasted with fratricidal conflicts and enmities – appears for the first time coupled with the idea of Europe in the discourses of Isocrates, amidst the ruins of Athenian power, exhausted by the Peloponnesian Wars.

As if the enmity of the Peloponnesian Wars were some immortal force, Isocrates advocated that it be directed from the interior towards the external sphere. Although he lamented only the fate of his Athens, admonishing others, principally his opponents, the Spartans, that its naval supremacy had been of benefit to all the Hellenes, Isocrates perceived the necessity of an alliance with Sparta for the regeneration of all Hellenic states. In his speech to Philip, he calls on the Macedonian king to unite and lead the Hellenes in a war against the Persians, justifying this need with reasons that betray the economic mania characteristic of democratic, thalassocratic, and mercantile Athens:

"Consider how shameful it is to endure that Asia is in a better position than Europe and that the barbarians enjoy a greater prosperity than the Hellenes; besides this (consider) that those whose authority originates with Cyrus, whom his mother left in the street, are called 'Great King', while the descendants of Hercules, raised

by his father to the rank of the gods because of his virtues, are addressed with more modest titles. Such a state of affairs must not be allowed to continue; rather, it must be overthrown and everything changed." (To Philip, 132)

It should be stressed that Isocrates's political worldview is twofold and contradictory, which is also a testament to the depth of the crisis. For Isocrates, the Hellenic nationalism he professes is merely a means of achieving an imperial ecumenopolis and the corresponding, Enlightenment-like spread of the superior values of the Athenian system of civilising, or culture. In this respect, the nationalist becomes a cosmopolitan, the principle of blood gives way to the principle of brotherhood of spirit, and Isocrates proudly declares in the *Panegyric*: "He who participates in our civilisation is a Hellen in a higher sense than he who shares with us only the same origin." (51)

That conquering impulse on an imperial scale, adorned with the trinkets of a *civilisational mission* and *cosmopolitanism*—as a prototype of the **forma mentis** of British, likewise democratic, thalassocratic and mercantile pseudo-imperialism—is certainly alien to the Hellenic man, particularly to his sense of *measure*. He comes from an already thoroughly degenerate and essentially anational Athens. For a fuller picture, one must also consider the historical incentives for these conquering dreams: the centuries-long, persistent shadow of the threats that loomed from Asia. The idea of pan-Hellenic unity is primarily a product of these threats, and this fact is the basis of Aristotle's famous observation that 'the race of the Hellenes... could rule over all, if they were to unite into one state.' (*Politics*, VII, 1327b, 29-35)

It may be superfluous to note that history fulfilled the political dreams of both Isocrates and Aristotle. Under the inspired and inspiring leadership of Aristotle's pupil, the Hellenic nation was united into a single state, whose imperialist and colonialist momentum reached the shores of the Indus, but did not survive the death of its sovereign. Nevertheless, the cultural hegemony of Athens, which Isocrates advocated as a means of legitimising and maintaining imperial supremacy, endured for centuries without an empire, and in the minds and hearts of many Europeans, even until our own day. It is essential to point out that this refers to the cultural hegemony of that part of Athens which was an opponent of the ruling, democratic spirit and system, one that was capable of driving even the finest of its citizens into exile or death, such as Xenophon and Socrates.

Historically, the last great appearance of the nexus between nationalism or nationalisms and the idea of Europe was staged under the shadow of the Second World War. There is no doubt that the Third Reich's shift in political strategy towards the idea "New Europe" or "new European order" would be a cynical response to a series of political and military challenges, from the loss of illusions in the reversal of British policy and the entry of American power into the war arena to the most unexpected of all, the halt of the armies of the Third Reich on the Eastern Front.

The narrow confines of petty-bourgeois nationalism did not allow Adolf Hitler's political thought to rise to genuine insights into the phenomenon of races, and his allegedly *racist* policy was in fact consciously anti-racial, openly directed against large parts of the white race. In essence, he reduced the concept of the *white race*, *de facto*, exclusively to the Germanic framework of nations. Naively and unwittingly hoping for an alliance with a Germanic Great Britain, Hitler spared the capture of almost the entire army of *base Albion*, which had been landed at Dunkirk and defeated, allowing it to return unhindered to the islands, probably trusting that such magnanimity would deeply move and

convert the descendants of the Angles and Saxons. Thus, the strategists of the Third Reich missed a unique opportunity to secure tranquillity on the Western and African fronts for a long period of time.

On the other hand, a series of documents and testimonies, right up to Hitler's *table-talk* (Hitler, 1953), testify that the ultimate goal of the *Drang nach Osten* was the conquest of the Eurasian spaces of the Slavic peoples and their reduction to reserves of a new slavery. After all, even in the official statements of the Minister of Propaganda, Joseph Goebbels, for the purpose of mobilising pan-European forces for the combat construction of a 'new Europe', the actual conquering and colonising intentions of the Third Reich – modelled on British colonialism and pseudo-imperialism – were poorly concealed behind a pretence of merely hegemonic intentions:

"Our (European) internal conflicts deprive us of the political and economic vitality on a territorial basis, which would enable us to maintain our (superior) position for the next hundred years... The coordination of the efforts of individual nations in the political domain is only possible if one group of powers takes command. The experience since the end of the First World War, and historical experience in general, shows that an alliance of groups of nations - such that their common interests can be represented only by a single group - can exist only under the hegemony of a single power, stronger than the others, which has demonstrated this through its struggles and whose rule is recognised by all the others.... In return for relatively modest concessions to the new order, the interested peoples and states will enjoy an economic and social security, such as they could not hope for in the age of turmoil and upheaval that awaits us. (Goebbels, 1942)

Yet, it was precisely in the most notorious part of the Axis military orders that the sincere and unadulterated aspiration of national sentiments towards European unification was born and realised. This was a confederation that transcended national narrow-mindedness in the direction of European solidarity. This was the *Waffen-SS*, the largest pan-European army in European history, a good fifth of which was made up of volunteers from almost all European nations, from the Dutch, Danish and Walloons, through the French, to the Russians. Regardless of the judgements and verdicts on the convictions of the *Waffen-SS* volunteers that they were defending Europe, European culture and civilisation from the threats of the alliance of 'Judeo-Bolshevik barbarism' and the 'Judeo-Masonic plutocracy'—they unquestionably proved themselves to be the most self-sacrificing and best fighters of the Axis powers on the Eastern Front, which attests to the significance of the ideological factor on battlefields under the shadow of the god Mars. In light of prevailing notions, a particular paradox is the fact that it was precisely the volunteers of the French *Charlemagne* Division who were the last defenders of Hitler's bunker in Berlin (Saint-Paulien, 1958).

According to the astute observation of Ernst Nolte, the members of the *Waffen-SS* who hailed from western and northern Europe defiantly and youthfully opposed the provincial narrow-mindedness they had left behind in their homelands: "If it is true that tendencies towards development emerged among them, it is also true that their common struggle represented one of the most unexpected expressions of the fascist counter-faith." (Nolte, 1968) As Colonel Leon Degrelle of the *Waffen-SS* attests in his memoirs—in whom Hitler publicly recognised the ideal son he never had—the fighters on the Eastern Front, confronted with the astonishing heroism of the enemy, were able to burn away all the prejudices about the Russians spread by Nazi propaganda:

"Penetrating into Russia, The Germans, who had been subjected to a truly over-simplified Nazi indoctrination, had imagined that the only worthy beings in the universe were the Aryans, who necessarily had to be giants, fashioned like organ pipes, bluer than tea, with eyes as blue as the Tyrolean sky in August... One can imagine the Germans' surprise when, advancing through Russia, they encountered only blue-eyed blondes, precisely the type of perfect Aryans they had been instilled to adore. Blue gods. And blondes! And what blondes they were! Tall girls from the fields, radiant, strong, with clear blue eyes, more natural and healthier than anything the Hitler Youth had to offer. It was impossible to imagine a more Aryan race, if one were to adhere to the sacred canons of Hitlerism. Within six months, the entire German army had become Russophile. Everywhere, it fraternised with the Russian peasants..." (Degrelle, 1970)

WAS

EUROPEAN UNION EUROPEAN?

Having surveyed the fundamental contents of the essential characteristics of the political being of the European man in the millennial perspective of his existence and permanence, we can proceed to consider the nature of *the European Union* in the light of the derived principles of distinction. In other words, we can answer the fundamental question that initiated our quest: *Is the European Union truly European?* Before any cognitive delve into the organisation in question, its answer to the posed question should be considered, an answer it provides through its contractually declared and affirmed fidelities to the principles of democracy and human rights, which, along with a range of measures and scales of impact from the member states' economies, have been elevated to the level of fundamental criteria for admission.

However, even the most cursory survey of the *European Union's* building site must notice the chronic contradiction between solemn commitments to the principles of democracy and the actual state of affairs. For example, what should be the fundamental institution of the broadest-possible democracy, that is, *the European Assembly*, a body of representatives of the member states, elected in the relevant political elections, has *de facto* failed, through a painstaking development, to overcome its nature as a passive body, deprived of essential and full legislative powers and rights. It is a mediating body subordinate to the activism of *the European Commission*, which is determined, authorised or dismissed by procedures within the structure of *the eurocracy*, far from any influence and especially any oversight by the demos. Ida Malji even considers that the European Parliament, "a puppet, without the power of initiative, was created precisely to enable—so hidden from indiscreet inquiries—the organisation of true command, concentrated in the few hands that make up the European Commission, whose members, according to Article 157. of the Maastricht Treaty 'seek, nor accept instructions from any government or authority'. Article 145 stipulates that the decisions of the body of command are 'executive'. It seems simply incredible that twenty people, with such a formula, to which no one has recourse, govern 375 million people. (Magli, 1997)

The cumbersome and slow progress of the system of essential decision-making – from the general right of *veto* towards a right for some sort of majority – has, for decades, prevented *the European Union* from establishing itself as a single and decision-making political body. This impotence is sought to be compensated for by the unbridled activism of *the Eurocracy*, whose hyper-production of ordinances, regulations and recommendations is all too often an end in itself, devoid not only of higher formative and informative principles but also of purposefulness. In light of the foregoing, it is understandable that even many proponents of *the European Union* openly accuse a "democracy deficit". In this regard, the assessment of the shortcomings of *the Maastricht Treaty*, by Luigi Vittorio Majocchi, Professor of the History of European Integration at the University of Pavia—from a chair named after Jean Monnet, the first behind-the-scenes architect of the unification process among Europeans—is symptomatic:

A perverse consequence is observed in the removal of an increasing number of issues from national, democratic control, in order to entrust them to supranational institutions, which lack it (democratic control). Hence, there are many who have seen in the (Maastricht) Treaty an element that increases the 'democracy deficit' and deepens the crisis of democracy, which is already evident in

in the Community's countries in the most diverse forms: from aversion to political choices and the resurgence of far-right forces, to criminal uprisings inspired by xenophobia." (Majocchi, 1996)

Last but not least, the said 'deficit of democracy' has also been observed from the very top of the European Union's construction; from the perspective of arguably its most enterprising builder in its history, the President of the European Commission, Jacques Delors, in reflecting on the adverse consequences of the behind-the-scenes actions of the 'Founding Fathers'

"The controversy surrounding the ratification of the treaty has revealed the gulf between the actions of the architects and the degree of attachment of a section of public opinion. Unfortunately, European construction has long been carried out surrounded by the widespread indifference of the peoples, led by a kind of pleasant, enlightened despotism. When the time came to break with the method applied by the Founding Fathers, we paid the price for a scarcity of communication, pedagogy and debate." (Delors, 1993).

It is necessary to point out that the 'deficits of democracy' and the 'widespread indifference of the people' are inherent in the subsystems, i.e. the political structures of all member states. It is perhaps sufficient to point out that describing even the basic gaps, flaws and weaknesses of modern, representative, multi-party and parliamentary democracies would lead us far from our main line of reasoning and exposition. After all, at least in principle, taken in themselves and for their own sake, within a given space and time, all "deficits of democracy" are not sufficient to deny the general conviction that the commitment to democracy is a fundamental characteristic of the political being of the European, from which it originates, serving as his legitimisation on the world stage.

The Contradictions of Democracy

Therefore, the first step of our questioning should be: *is democracy the self-sufficient and most authentic expression of the will of the European political being?* If one were to seek an answer from some ideal, imaginary repository of European wisdom, it would certainly be negative. The vast majority of Europe's most original and bold, most inquisitive and far-sighted thinkers, who by these very qualities most represent the style of European thought – from Heraclitus, Socrates and Plato to De Maistre, Donoso Cortés, Nietzsche, Schmitt and Berdyaev – has provided countless expressions of aversion to the absurdity and baseness inherent in democracy. Originally formless, the democratic system, in Plato's observation, "*overthrows all forms of state-ordered government (Demonstratie, VIII, 557d)*, that is to say, it provides the means and legitimisation for the establishment of the most diverse and mutually contradictory forms of government. It is a system that rests on two fundamental and completely contradictory principles.

On the one hand, there is the principle of the primacy of any numerical majority over any minority, that is, the principle of the primacy of the value of quantity over the virtues of quality. On the opposite side is the principle of equality, with the division of equally abstract particles of sovereignty among all adult citizens or nationals. Such a division is based on the principle of equality, which in a number of the most significant domains of individual and societal life devalues or renders meaningless the intellectual and spiritual, experiential and educational, creative and productive differences, ideally reducing everything to a mechanical mass or a crowd of faceless individuals. Thucydides' Pericles, in the most famous definition of Athenian democracy, had already indirectly presented this contradiction between the principle of the primacy of the majority and the principle of equality and freedom:

"The word we use to describe our political system is democracy. Yet, in private disputes we give equal weight to each individual, and in every case in our public life there is freedom for all.

It may be superfluous to point out that where a majority rules, not all can be equal, and that where all are equal, all rule or no one does. This contradiction opens up wide perspectives on the possibilities for the exercise and experience of violence. In the essay *De la liberté des Anciens comparée à celle des Modernes*, written in the shadow of the terrible experiences of the French Revolution, Constant rightly observes that the model of the French revolutionaries, the freedom of the Athenian democracy, enabled a series of violence, from ostracism to the condemnation and death of the wisest Athenian, Socrates. Admittedly, what is called *democracy* in the modern world has little or nothing to do with the Hellenic model. For instance, although many historical accounts suggest that the Athenian democracy was in fact a disguised oligarchy, in that system, unlike in modern 'mediated democracies', the people ruled, or rather decided, directly, while the principle of unity dictated that holders of public office were to be chosen by lot.

The above-mentioned Thucydidean definition also contains a third characteristic of the democratic system: the tendency of individuals and interest groups, under favourable conditions, to assert their right to freedom against the broader requirements, the will, and even the freedom of the majority, and ultimately against the state. This is a striving for freedom based not only on the corresponding human right but also on the principle of equality—to secede to the greatest possible extent from authority, that is, to reduce to the utmost the domain of state administration and oversight. And this possibility is precisely being realised in modern, liberal democracies, under the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan, where the officially unleashed and incited greed of the economic animal in man drives not only ethics, religion and the church from the political scene, but also credible politics. Only a politics transformed into a mere mouthpiece for the needs of business security, speculation and the hoarding of capital survives. In this system, the nihilism of plutocracy encourages ethnic, moral and even sexually deviant minorities against the worldview of the majority, in order to undermine and destroy the remnants of traditional values and virtues, which always and everywhere constitute the backbone of the community, defending it from collapse and transformation into an amorphous mass, susceptible to every negative conditioning. *The European Union* provides a number of examples of how, by invoking the principle of equality, the relationship between the minority and the majority is inverted, and the majority is deprived of the right to express its needs, will, and freedoms, which *the Eurocracy* supposedly assumes could harm the needs, wills, and freedoms of minorities, or jeopardise their *human rights*. Thus, the European and Christian majority in *the European Union* becomes a hostage to diverse and even numerically insignificant minorities. It gives the impression that this shift in the focus of political concern towards individual human rights is, in fact, a means of depriving the political majority—first and foremost the European and Christian nations—of any rights whatsoever. The political powerlessness of European nations is accompanied by a psychological and moral paralysis, sustained by a chronic crisis of conscience fuelled by media producers of public opinion, who accuse them of collective crimes or of endangering minorities. This modern crisis of conscience in the soul of Europeans appears to be a secularised substitute for the feeling of guilt over *the original sin*.

After all, it was Thucydides himself who testified that even in that most glorious period of Athenian history, "*democracy existed only in name, while in reality a prince ruled*", namely Pericles.

The principle of equality in the political sphere inevitably requires the political reduction of the human to the framework of mere physiological needs, according to the formula by which the Athenian sophist Antiphon already denied any coherence to the discrimination between Greeks and barbarians: " *This can be reduced to the theme of what is naturally necessary for all human beings. Everyone can acquire it in the same way and in all of this,*

differences between us, neither barbarian nor Greek. For we all exhale air through our mouths and nostrils and we eat with our hands." Convincing anyone willing to listen of the supposed superiority of rhetoric over knowledge, the sophists enthusiastically supported democracy, recognising in this system the ideal opportunity for the masses to be guided or for power to be gained by mere skill in speech, outside of or contrary to the truth.

The verdict of historical experience is no more favourable. Almost without fail, in its very first historical appearance, the democratic system has proved itself—by weakening the state through the force of individuals' self-directed impulses towards freedom *from*—to be a prerequisite or cause of its adherents' most severe defeats. In principle, the loss of a war does not necessarily signify the defeat of the loser's ideology, but the defeats of democratic states, led by Athens, despite their material and military superiority, certainly point to political causes. The first great defeat of the Hellenic democracy was at the Battle of Mantinea in 418 BC, which marked a turning point in favour of the oligarchies. Plato's observation of the weakness of the corpulent soldiers of a system dedicated to material enrichment (*Diogenes Laërtius*, IV, 422b) has been widely confirmed by a series of failures of the hegemonic ventures of democratic Athens and its allies, despite enormous strategic advantages: from the shamefully unsuccessful expedition against the Sicilian cities, to the final outcome of the Peloponnesian War, which saw the triumph of Sparta. The ideals of democracy were championed by the fiercest opponents of Alexander the Great's Eurasian enterprise, as well as by the last, powerless defenders of Hellas against the Roman conquerors.

The Denial of Democracy

The fact that historical research has identified the first traces of a democratic system on the Hellenic horizon of the seventh century BC is by no means sufficient to confirm its European origin, in the ethno-cultural sense of that adjective. In the Euro-Aryan cultural circle, throughout the Eurasian diaspora, there are no other traces or even mentions of democratic principles, with the exception of the *Vishnu-Purana* tradition, where the social

equality is described as a consequence of the breakdown of traditional hierarchy, or as one of the many symptoms of the general inversion characteristic of *the kali-yuga*. By all accounts, the Aryan creators of this tradition observed institutions of equality among the subjugated masses of indigenous peoples and included them among the signs of the times of *the 'dark age'*. The ideology of equality with the primacy of quantity and the ideal of freedom - point us towards their proto-Euro-Aryan origin, towards the Melesian cultures, crystallised around the cults of the Mother Earth, widespread along the southern belt of the Eurasian continent, from the Pillars of Hercules to India. Bahofen, with unsurpassed inspiration, described the more beautiful or pleasant part of that world, permeated and conditioned by networks of commercial relations, marked by cultures and religions of fertility and sexuality, illuminated by the maternal principles of justice and social organisation, from

from which the idea of the equality of all people was also derived, modelled on that particular kind of maternal love for one's own family.

From the same, supposed principles of Mother Earth, from the corresponding cosmogonic myths which represented the world of things and phenomena as a process of the disintegration of the ideal, primordial *One*, from all differences and divisions—as attested to by the forces of nature, which tolerate no obstacles or limitations other than their own—was derived and deeply instilled in the corresponding human material the ideal of freedom *from*. It may be superfluous to point out here that this ideal, in the domain of politics, is always and everywhere the primary driving force of democratic aspirations. Nevertheless, it is necessary to point out how even the pre-temporal level of the presupposed, original state of the world, or *the One*, indicates the unachievability of the idea of the equality of all people before the end of the cycle of decay and the restoration of the ideal order. According to the teachings in question, there will then no longer be any people.

It is also necessary to consider the other, darker side of that world, which is particularly manifested in the second narrowest part of the world's landmass relative to the planet's bodies of water, namely the Indian Ocean and the Mediterranean Sea, which connects the Eurasian continent with the African one, predestined for the greatest clashes and mixtures of races and their corresponding cultures. It is precisely the extreme dimensions of these racial, ethnic and cultural oppositions and clashes, extended and forced through mixing even within individuals, that in *the Levantine melting pot* provoke the greatest pendulum swings of mass religious and political movements, often marked by an irreconcilable or absolute dualism. It is here that the pendulum of mass movements reaches its poles of extreme affirmations and negations, from idolatries of the feminine element or androgyny, which even dictated ritual self-castrations of the masses of believers—to cruel forms of male supremacy, to the disenfranchisement, oppression and contempt of the feminine element; from resistance to the monogamous laws or customs of the Euro-Aryan conquerors, even by force through rituals of compulsory atonement, called *sacred prostitution* - to the complete concealment of the woman from prying eyes, behind a series of partition walls and fabrics; from the complete dedication of life to the orgasmic pleasures of the senses - to unheard-of forms of repression of all sensual impulses in the face of the challenge of the material and carnal world, by forcibly withdrawing into desert or cave-hermitages; from the elevation of sexual intercourse to the level of the sole or ultimate, universally given means of experiencing the divine - to the brutal suppression, restriction, and punishment of sexual impulses; from movements marked by pre-communist aspirations of the masses, establishing collective ownership of goods and women and negations of the divine - to the abyssal dimensions of the dualism of god and man, rulers and subjects, or masters and slaves.

Negative selection and falling birth rates

We have already hinted that democratic principles allow for the expulsion from the political scene of any higher principle or form of civilisation and association, from ethics to its religious crystallisations and the church. Although the democratic system is, in principle, formless and open, it is precisely these qualities that make it the most suitable medium for the triumph of human weaknesses and even baseness, and for the consequent establishment of corresponding forms of government. The lack of meritocratic selection criteria and a credible elite at the head of the state—in accordance with egalitarian principles—leaves the democratic system open to usurpation by the worst, those endowed with ruthlessness. This is why democratic systems

it is often characterised by the 'negative selection' of elites. The democratic state, deprived of the notion of the exemplary man and the corresponding pedagogical and andragogical roles, favours the rise of all human weaknesses, and even baseness, against virtue, which there is no one left to demand, preserve and develop. Under the influence of its inherent forces, the democratic system reduces the vast richness of the gallery of traditional human types and duties to a single basic figure: the consumer. Its characteristic trait is called selfishness. De Tocqueville, comparing American democracy with European aristocracy, had already observed that the former breaks the chain of community and generations which, at every moment, connects not only the sovereign with the last warrior but also the living with those who are no more and those who are not yet:

" The destruction of communities makes a man forget his ancestors and not see his descendants; it alienates him from his contemporaries and constantly directs him towards himself, threatening, in the end, to imprison him in the loneliness of his heart. I see an innumerable multitude of similar and identical people who only turn in on themselves, in order to afford themselves small and vulgar pleasures with which they feed their souls. Above them towers a vast and tutorial power which undertakes only to provide them with the means of subsistence and to watch over their fate. It is absolute, meticulous, systematic, cautious, and gentle. It provides for their security, their needs, facilitates their pleasures, manages their affairs, directs their industry, regulates their inheritances, distributes their property: does it not, perhaps, deprive them of the strength to live and to think for themselves?" (De Tocqueville, 1970)

By breaking that chain of community and generations, the forces of democracy in politics and liberalism in the economy press every person towards not only alienation and loneliness but also self-abasement to the point of complete powerlessness. Since the time of de Tocqueville's observations, they have cancelled many of the aforementioned services, but without restoring the conditions for a complete and sovereign life for the individual. Relying solely on an existential basis, the horizontal dimension of the struggle, torn from the web of ties that bind ancestors, contemporaries and expected descendants, the individual in a liberal-democratic system is directed solely towards himself and his self-absorption, which consequently feels, nor conceives of, any such reproductive obligations towards those who are no longer here and those who have not yet been born. His self-devaluation and powerlessness stifle the very possibility of conceiving of himself as a transmitter of his lineage's virtues and values in the perspective of the future, which is one of the fundamental prerequisites for the desire for offspring. Hence, *the 'white plague'* reigns supreme wherever peoples and nations have adopted the principles of representative democracy and liberal capitalism.

Thus, from a moral standpoint, the liberal-democratic system encourages the predominance of impulses of self-indulgence and selfishness. In the political domain, it does not recognise any particularities in the individual, reducing them to an abstract, lifeless unit. In the intellectual and spiritual domain, devaluing every higher level of Humanity and above all any metaphysical perspective on education, Posturing and productivity – democracy and liberalism break in man the verticality that makes him upright and cause psychic, existential and, ultimately, social anarchy, which creates favourable conditions for a surge of alienation from nature and parasitism upon life. In this deprivation of the fundamental dimensions of humanity – the verticality of the spirit and of community – lies the primary cause of a series of pathological and even catastrophic phenomena of Western civilisation, beginning with the biological vulnerability of the European man. At the beginning of the 20th century

Europeans made up a quarter of humanity, but by the end of that century, they comprised barely a tenth. According to official UN demographic projections (published on 9 December 2003), by the end of the 21st century, the European share will amount to 6.5 per cent. Thus, the precipitous fall in the birth rate of Europeans threatens to reduce them within a few generations to a negligible minority, a pale blot that is rapidly dissolving in the dark ocean of humanity, called *One World*.

That the causes of the 'white plague' should be sought more in the surrender to democratic and liberalist principles than in poor economic conditions - with which many sterilities are justified before the pollsters of 'public opinion' - is proved by the fact that the vertical collapse of the birth rate is a universal phenomenon, inherent to both the developed North and the undeveloped South of the European world, from the mother country to the diaspora.

Constructed from simulacra and illusions, permeated by the idolatry of profit as the meaning of life, with no basis in natural life, which makes it its enemy, Filling this void in vain with the incessant production of meaningless theories and concepts, the liberal-democratic system responds to the challenges of falling birth rates in a manner entirely consistent with its unnaturalness. Reducing concrete communities to arithmetical sets of individuals and people to numbers, and denying or overlooking any value or virtue in the substance of the nation, its culture and tradition, the opinion devoted to the liberal-democratic ideology and the *white plague* itself are understood exclusively as a threat to the productive powers, that is, to the corresponding profit and to the funds of social and pension insurance. Consistent with the hubris from which this ideology and its system originate, its proponents do not even consider advocating for measures to increase the birth rate of Europe's indigenous population. They use the falling birth rate as a further reason to import foreign labour, recommending the adoption of Third World children as the best means of rejuvenating the nation. Clearly, we are here confronted with one of the most monstrous forms of modern, reductionist thought, whose proponents delude themselves that by forcefully imposing, and even legalising, the appropriate superstitions, it is possible to erase any significance of ethnic and cultural differences. This is the ultimate expression of nihilism, an anti-European racism which, under the mask of humanism, selectively targets only and exclusively the virtues and values of European nations and cultures.

By all accounts, supporters of democracy do not consider the system worthy of their own effort. Otherwise, they would have to witness great protests, and even uprisings, against the misuse of the democratic idea as a mask for oligarchic and plutocratic systems. It is difficult even to imagine that the proponents of democracy, today in Europe, would embark on the path of its emancipation from the servitude of liberal capitalism. After all, it is the history of Greece that indirectly shows us that the modern alliance between democracy and a form of economic demon—namely, liberal capitalism—is not a coincidental phenomenon, but rather a testament to their mutual attraction. Therefore, the greatest inclinations towards democracy were shown by the states and city-states washed by the waves of maritime trade: from Athens, through Miletus, Aegina, Megara and Corinth, to Chalcis. That is why Plato, in *the Laws*, recommended that cities be built on hills, far from the sea:

"Neighbourhood to the sea produces a desire for money, and opens wide the doors to wholesale and retail trade and in the souls it creates unstable and dishonest habits, making the city itself untrustworthy and hostile towards itself, and likewise towards other people. Since it is situated in the hills, it is clear that it cannot

to bring forth numerous fruits and in abundance. For if it were to have all this, then through the rich export of all these things it would be filled with gold and silver, and this is the greatest evil, so to speak, for a state, which ought to acquire noble and just habits..."(IV, 705.ab)

Democracy also betrays its origins in the mixed cultures that flourished before the last great conquering campaign of the Indo-European peoples—at the end of the second millennium BC—and in the already noted, an inherent tendency to expand its own electoral base by extending the franchise and to promote inter-racial or inter-ethnic and cross-cultural mixing by demolishing or dissolving all customary or legal distinctions, defences and barriers. And this property of democracy was well observed by Plato: "*The newcomer is equalised with the native, and the native with the newcomer, and even with the foreigner, in the true sense of the word.*" (Diogenes Laërtius, VIII, 562e-563a) This property indirectly explains to us at least the principled indifference of modern proponents of the liberal-democratic system towards the dying out of European peoples, and their advocacy that the decline in the human stock be resolved by importing masses of foreigners from the Third World. Such aspirations inevitably undermine the ethnic and cultural homogeneity of any community that has adopted democratic principles.

After all, one of the fundamental existential conditions of democracy, the reduction of people to impersonal and interchangeable units—to which the doctrines of a related positivism contribute indirectly, reducing man to a passive medium of conditioning by non-human, or sub-human, and above all economic forces—deprives the corresponding state of any higher defence. As in the world under the shadow of Hobbes's Leviathan, society is there assembled by the basest interests and the mere fear of *'the war of all against all'*. And therefore, according to the rule of historical experience, the winds of crisis and war first and most easily overthrow democratic states, whose weaknesses are innate and chronic.

"Human rights" against the Human

Human rights are the second essential element of the political conditions for accession to the *European Union*. The nature of these rights is indirectly testified to by a piece of black humour from the Serbian satirist Bora Đorđević, who doubted that his country would ever join the *European Union*: "*We don't have enough pederasts to be admitted to the European Union.*" Derived from jusnaturalism and the rhetoric of the French revolutionaries and the corresponding (but also non-binding) reflections throughout the celebratory charters of various institutions of internationalism – beginning with the United Nations – *human rights* have long since lost their ornamental quality, taking on the weight of one of the most lethal pretexts of Western nihilism. It is precisely the rhetorical nature of the declaration of *Human Rights*, and the absence of a valid legal definition of the corresponding obligations, that widely enables any arbitrary interpretation and cynical abuse. The end of the 20th and the beginning of the 21st century were marked by the aggressive campaigns of the Atlantic power against a number of sovereign states in order to conquer the most significant- of the most significant strategic spaces and the greatest energy and raw material reserves of the Eurasian continent, with shameless excuses that these are magnanimous sacrifices for the defence and expansion of the realm of human rights, freedom and democracy.

One of the many indicators of the *European Union's* lamentable subordination to the Atlantic Leviathan is precisely its obligation to respect and implement the nihilistic purposefulness of the *human rights* establishment. For example, it is highly symptomatic that the fundamental principles of the labour protection system – which constitutes one

of fundamental human rights, vital to the vast majority of any society - have no real defence in the treaties and charters of *the European Union*. Hence, during the last decade of the twentieth century, many *EU* member states were able, despite their left-wing programmes and contrary to the will of the relevant social strata, to demolish the entire system of protections for labour and workers, built up through the centuries-long struggle of *left-wing* trade unions and parties. Fundamental *human rights* to freedom of opinion and expression were equally destroyed by a host of laws that criminalise '*politically incorrect*' and 'revisionist' opinions – as if without the method of *revision*, inherent to every scientific discipline and even to the historical sciences, any development of thought and knowledge would be possible. It should be noted that both of the aforementioned labels were taken, without any alteration, from Lenin's legacy of patents for the criminalisation and liquidation of political opponents.

At the end of the 'Cold War' era and on the eve of the appearance of the greatest waves of peacetime conquest of the Old Continent by the hungry masses of the Third World, the legislatures of the member states of *the European Union* and other European states have made synchronous efforts to very quickly and quietly, without parliamentary debates, insert provisions that drastically punish all forms of "negative" nations. Experience shows that these provisions are never used to defend the dignity and feelings of the majority nations and religious, Christian communities from negative discrimination - tion and slander of the majority nations and religious, Christian communities, but rather that they essentially serve to intimidate and suppress any resistance to the internal actions of anti-national forces and the invasion of Third World masses, the mass victims of usurious colonialism, under the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan. The spectre of *human rights* actually serves as one of the means by which the globalist plutocracy suppresses cultures and traditions, customs and worldviews, ethical and religious norms. It is a vile instrument for discouraging every effort and institution that preserves and develops the values and virtues of the people, thereby encouraging the factors and processes of individual, psychological, and social anarchy. Under the pretext of the struggle for *human rights*, significant forces of *the eurocracy* and the governments subordinate to it show a fanatical commitment to spreading many forms of behaviour that the European and Christian man have for centuries and millennia considered amoral, from social parasitism to homosexuality. The aforementioned abuse of the *human rights* institution in favour of a peacetime invasion of Europe is evidently aimed at depriving European peoples of their homelands as well, through a complete reversal of the demographic and cultural-religious colour of our continent.

In the final year of the second millennium, with the vocal or tacit approval of the aforementioned governments, *the Eurocracy* brazenly demonstrated its regard for the human rights of European nations and the principle of democracy by placing Austria in a moral quarantine through a series of sanctions and demoralisations - entirely arbitrarily, without any legal basis - simply because, thanks to the outcome of a political election, i.e. the mediated will of the Austrian people, *the Freedom Party*, allegedly '*politically incorrect*', had won a place in government. In any case, having provided every requested military and logistical support for the US aggression on Yugoslavia in 1999, the political The (pseudo)elites in question and the respective governments have with equal contempt trampled on their own national sovereignties and constitutions, which explicitly prohibit offensive war and mandate that a defensive war be previously approved by the national assembly and that the head of state declare a state of war. One gets the impression that all these pretences at democracy serve

only to conceal not only a '*deficit of democracy*' but also a complex system that prevents any real influence from the people or from credible elites on crucial political decisions. Majorities, which are won in political elections mainly through media conditioning—proportionate to the money invested—serve there as a mere, formal cover for a power that has all the characteristics of an oligarchy and a plutocracy.

Acquits or aequalitas

The widespread adherence to the ideal principles of democracy—which characterises the most recent period of European history—is not sufficient proof that they are immanent or co-natural to the political being of the European man. Nevertheless, these said attachments require an understanding of the causes which it is certainly not possible to grasp fully without also—such an awareness is a casuistry of the extraordinary powers of modern manufacturers of public opinion, acquired through technological development and the ubiquity of mass communication media and the corresponding, one-way conditioning and indoctrinations. These inclinations may also be the fruits of a series of external conditioning, beginning with the very '*deficit of democracy*' which the European man, under various systems of coercion, feels or experiences as a blow to the foundations of personal dignity, as violent deprivations of basic political rights and freedoms.

For example, in the post-war conditions, of the two-tiered occupation of Europe, for the majority of Eastern Europe's freedom-loving spirits, under the shadow of Marxist socialism, the Western intermediary, multi-party democracy appeared as the embodiment of the '*empire of freedom*', all the more so because in reality there was not a trace of any remnants or possibility of establishing any different system. For the masses under the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan, whom the occupier constantly blackmailed and intimidated with the supposed conquering intentions of the '*Russian bear*' and the inability of their states to defend themselves independently (Kalajić, 1998) - a multi-party, parliamentary democracy seemed the only alternative to a supposedly rival, incomparably worse form of subjugation.

Any survey of the reasons for contemporary inclinations towards the principles of democracy—despite their regular and profound disappointments—must also consider the possibility that they are, to a significant extent, the result of a kind of forced self-deception. Given that in the political '*marketplace*' the system of representative democracy is the only permitted path for an individual's political participation or life, with no alternative, because the others are simply, tacitly or legally forbidden – the man in the street is almost compelled to entrust some of his basic needs to it at its mercy. It is necessary to point out that the rights and freedoms crystallised around the principle of democratic, and therefore horizontal and uniform, participation are not in question here. Given that in the political '*marketplace*' the system of representative democracy is the only permitted path for an individual's political participation or life, with no alternative, because the others are simply, tacitly or legally forbidden, the man of everyday life is almost compelled to entrust some of his basic needs to it at its mercy. Here, the rights and freedoms in question are crystallised around a principle that is fundamentally opposed: the vertical and qualified participation of individuals in the community's political decision-making.

In considering the political meanings and significance of the concept of *auctoritas*, we have already pointed to the supreme level of qualification under discussion here, attested throughout the breadth of the Euro-Arian and European world, from the Roman popular assembly and *senate* to the Old Russian *Zemsky Sobor* and the pan-Slavic *council of elders*. Institutions such as a *senate* or a *council of elders* potentially contain an incomparably higher and more extensive power of representation than that of modern multi-party assemblies because they embody

the most complete scale and the greatest reach of the community's memory, knowledge and experience. The community represented by the highest ancient Indo-European and European organs of politics is also incomparably greater, deeper, and more far-reaching than any modern society that elects its representatives: it stretches from the primordial past to an unfathomable future, ideally encompassing all generations of the past, present and future.

Although the ideal, complete forms of the political organism probably disintegrated before historical time, showing us in and through it only their distorted parts, the combative succession and transformations of fragments of the primordial unity and of foreign elements in the European arena of politics - from monarchy and aristocracy to republic and demo- kratia - the innate impulse of concern for the fate of the community to which he belongs and the corresponding will to participate have remained his enduring characteristic, manifesting itself in all favourable circumstances. After the decline of the ancient world, the first favourable opportunity was provided by the medieval movement of universal renewal. It is necessary to point out that despite the conditions provided by the egalitarian elements of Christian teaching, despite the conditions provided by the egalitarian elements of Christian teaching, the High Middle Ages, for its part, renewed the primordial forms of qualified participation in the political life of the community, inherent to the political being of the Euro-Aryan and European people. Despite the scholastic mediations of Aristotelian political science, the recognition of the people as the immediate source of legitimacy for city-states, and the invocation by some emperors of popular authority—contained in the inherited legacy of the Roman Empire—the principles of Athenian democracy were neither taken into consideration, let alone applied.

The High Middle Ages, however, renewed the primordial forms of qualified participation in the political life of the community, inherent to the political being of the Euro-Aryan and European man. The focus of political life in the urban communities of medieval Europe did not rest on the isolated individual and mere elections, but on the organic components of the community and the competence of the corresponding representations. Here, it was not so much the significant form or method of election, but rather the final outcome, the legitimacy and the quality of the representation. In contrast to modern democracies, which reduce the mass of individuals to a general statistical pattern or the abstraction known as '*one man - one vote*' - the political system of High European Middle Ages was based on a rich abundance of organic compounds which often interpenetrated and fertilised one another, from the family and clan, through orders, associations and corporations, to quarter, municipal, regional councils and estates' assemblies and diets. In such a system, decisions were not based on a majority, quantitative basis, but on a qualitative one. Here, the Heraclitean principle that one can be worth more than a thousand still prevailed.

There is no concession to the original principles of democracy in the supreme work of medieval theological-political thought, *the *Defensor pacis**, the theory of the ideal state of Marsilius of Padua, which anticipates Montesquieu's system of the threefold division of powers. Marsilius's state is determined by laws rooted in the people, recognised as the primary source of sovereignty, but the exercise of that sovereignty, that is, any participation in politics, is determined here by the principle of quality and not quantity, or a mere numerical majority. In this participation, not every participant is equal, but each individual value (*'valentia pars'*) is determined by the value of the mandator, that is, the position of the corresponding order, association or corporation (*'secundum gradum suum'*) in the hierarchical structure of the community.

"Deficit of democracy"

Looking back at the contemporary construction site of the *European Union*, we must acknowledge that the causes of the observed 'deficit of democracy' cannot be reduced solely and exclusively to the framework of the *Eurocrat's libido dominandi* and the corresponding, anti-popular policies, which consciously or unconsciously serve the enemies of Europeans. We should also bear in mind the findings of a number of researchers of political systems, from Machiavelli to Bryce, who were unanimous in observing that the establishment of a true democracy requires almost unattainable conditions, from general inspiration, education and commitment ^{in civic-minded times} to also general economic well-being, peace and the absence of any significant class differences.

Painful debates over the decision-making system reveal that the policies of some member states are guided by the principle of unscrupulous preservation of unfounded privileges, at the expense of the *European Union*. These debates revealed, at the end of 2003, that Great Britain is not the only "Trojan horse" which, in the service of the Atlantic Leviathan, openly sabotages the building of a common European home. Many of the Eastern European actual and potential members

- 2 starting with Poland, which the Slavophiles called "*the Judas of the Slavs*"
- 3 openly revealed their slavish subservience to the Atlantic Leviathan and their readiness for anti-European actions. If one considers that in these states the agencies of the Atlantic Leviathan (from *the World Bank* and *the International Monetary Fund* to a number of Atlantic 'non-governmental organisations') have destroyed the national economies, stolen and sold off national industries and wealth for the benefit of foreign capital and domestic criminal structures, and have deeply permeated state administrations and bribed the ruling pseudo-elites – then it is clear why they are, at least for the foreseeable future, potential conduits for the enemies of Europe's true unification. After all, their political (pseudo)elites approach the *European Union* openly with a beggar-and-parasitic mentality, seeing it as a *panacea* for all problems.

It is necessary to point out that contemporary political (pseudo)elites of Europe are the embodiment of a multi-decade negative system of selection that both occupiers – the Atlantic and the Soviet, liberal-capitalist and Marxist-Socialist – imposed by the force of their victory in the Second World War, in order to preserve its fruits. Plato himself observed that tyrannies remove all the virtuous men, '*until there is not one left who is worth anything, friend or foe*'. (*The Republic*, VIII, 576b) This fact explains a series of chronic weaknesses and vices of contemporary political (pseudo)elites, from moral spinelessness, self-absorbed alienation and a propensity for corruption, to the aforementioned beggar-and-parasitic mentality.

By all accounts, the '*democracy deficit*' is an inescapable consequence of a number of different causes, open to equally diverse uses or abuses by forces, whether secretly or openly opposed, on the construction site of the *European Union*. 'The democratic deficit' has been artificially maintained and deepened to suppress any resistance to a policy that tends to deprive states of their sovereignty under the pretext of European integration, in favour of the project of a global pseudo-empire of the Atlantic Leviathan, called the '*new*'

world order". The same 'deficit of democracy' can be used for entirely opposite endeavours and to overcome widespread illusions about democracy, towards establishing a system of political participation and representation that is commensurate with the authentic political essence of the European man.

It is certain that *the status quo* only serves the enemies of Europeans and the creation of *the European Union* as an independent, sovereign and powerful force on the world stage. For a very long time, there has been the experience of the abuse of the principles of democracy and *human rights* to suppress any idea or movement, opinion or action that contradicts the egalitarianism of '*political correctness*', as prescribed by the priests of the Atlantic Leviathan. The priests of the Atlantic Leviathan, by translating the principle of the primacy of the majority from the domain of political choice into the domain of the choice of truth, and by presenting the majority opinion, i.e. '*public opinion*' (which they themselves have created through the force of a media monopoly), as some kind of norm and under the pretext of defending democracy and human rights – they deny the right to exist to everything that does not conform to the prescribed frameworks. Their contempt for the people is also betrayed by their terminology, in which any emergence of political movements that express the genuine needs of the people, and which quickly gain support, is denounced and demonised with the coinage '*populism*'

Even the liberal Karl Mannheim—admitting that there are "*truths or correct intuitions which are accessible only to certain personal aptitudes or to certain aspirations of certain groups*"—had to warn against the evil fate of democratic cosmopolitanism: "*The democratic cosmopolitanism of the rising bourgeoisie denied the value and right to existence of such understandings. In so doing, the purely sociological component in the criterion of truth prevailed, namely the democratic demand that such truths must be the same for everyone.*" Arbitrary freedom (of the individual) and arbitrary despotism (of the Caesar or the state) are, in appearance, mutually exclusive. *In reality they are 3)* (Mannheim, 1952) A more concise yet broader definition of this fate was provided by Tönnies in his famous essay on the differences between organic community (*Gemeinschaft*) and mechanical society (*Gesellschaft*): "*Arbitrary freedom (of the individual) and arbitrary despotism (of the Czar or the state) are self-evidently mutually exclusive. In reality, they are merely two different faces of the same state.*

They can also fight one another, more or less fiercely, but are allies by nature." (Toennies, 1935) This was seen and known thousands of years ago by the Hellenic sages, such as Socrates, Plato or Xenophon, and also the brilliant Megabyzus at the Persian court, who pointed out to the sovereign that a democratic system was unbecoming of an Aryan state, as it is worse than tyranny, given that it is based on ignorance. (Herodotus, *Histories*, III, 80)

The very legally enforced, coercive nature of maintaining a mediating, multi-party democracy—which pre-emptively and forever rules out the emergence of any significantly different political system—demonstrates that political creation and decision-making in *the European Union* is devoid of *any real freedom*. Such a compulsory and violent condition for maintaining the mere semblance of democracy closes off all possible prospects for the development of European politics and, consequently, *of the European Union*. The unsustainability of these pretences has forced Europe's enemies to create a false alternative, called *civil society*. This is a forgery of the civil society of which Hegel spoke. Instead of the real bodies of the community, we see self-proclaimed '*non-governmental organisations*', part of the infrastructure of a new colonialism, outposts of the secret and public institutions of the Atlantic Leviathan on European soil, led mainly by intellectual mercenaries from the Anglophone world, also called *the 'English-speaking idea'*, refugees from unemployment in their home states. '*Non-governmental organisations*' serve as

avant-garde and loj- providing support for an aggressive and subsequently occupying policy across a range of domains, from the subversion of national defences and propaganda of the aggressor's ostensible best intentions, to the misrepresentation of the nation's vital activities and professions, to espionage, the manufacture of public opinion and elections, and the corruption and direction of 'cooperative' elites.

For the horizon of the future to open up, to open up perspectives for the emergence of genuine alternatives, namely political systems of qualitative participation and decision-making, which is *the sine qua non* for the renewal and establishment of the original integrity towards which the most far-sighted Europeans have consciously or unconsciously, but for centuries and millennia, striven.

Invalidity instead of wholeness

In considering the ideal of wholeness, we hypothesised that all basic forms of political systems, as shown once and for all by the Hellenic experience—from timocracy through oligarchy to democracy and tyranny—are distorted reflections of the content of a decayed, value-ideal and chronologically preceding order, which organically united all the corresponding values and virtues. If our assumption is well-founded, then the democratic system – to which *the Eurocrats*, with an unheard-of fanaticism, entirely uncharacteristic of the European man, make a disingenuous pledge – is merely a distorted fragment of the ideal system of political wholeness that awaits the labours of renewal.

That part of the ideal, holistic political system, which the *Eurocratic* democracy perverts or falsely represents, contains the principles of political effectiveness of the community's members that are peculiar to the European man, belonging to the realm of quality rather than quantity. Nevertheless, the mere rehabilitation of that tradition and the restoration of qualitative and qualified political representation and decision-making cannot, in themselves, substitute for ideal wholeness. It may be superfluous to point out that *the European Union*, even under the condition of the ideal realisation of the boldest of the existing aspirations on its building site, is very far from the ideal of the integrity of a political system. If we set aside the media of alien or hostile needs, interests and plans, and the rare, merely rhetorical contributions of Christian personalism, such as those of, for example, provided by Danièle de Roujmon – the foundations of the European Union were laid by the conscious or unconscious, legitimate or illegitimate children of Illuminism or Rationalism, Positivism and Liberal Capitalism, that is to say, of related or partner movements whose worldviews are, by definition, reductionist or invalid, with an innate tendency to absolutise the primacy of the partial over the general and the inferior over the superior.

Thus, the invalid state of the political system *of the European Union* is an inevitable consequence of the limitation and narrowness of its ideological horizon, within the framework of certain movements for the degradation and debasement of the human. Politics ideally originates in the realm of philosophical questioning and answers and expresses, indirectly or directly, all essential changes within it. Therefore, it is inevitable that any politics which is based, indirectly or directly, on modern philosophies of becoming—which collectively lead to a nihilistic abolition of the problem of the cognition of eternal truths and to self-silencing or intellectual suicide—suffers the same fate. The renunciation of the ideal of wholeness—which is *the sine qua non* of any true politics, and which entails the reconciliation of diversity—invariably rejects not only the idea of schism but also the aspiration to truth, which is the North Star of all authentic political thought and action. Thus, it is also a matter of the suicide of politics, of which only bare

illusions and techniques. After all, *the European Union's* particular disability is the lack of a single foreign policy. Therefore, the foreign policies of *the European Union's* member states are inevitably contradictory, rendering solitary resistance to the conquering nihilism and parasitism of the Atlantic Leviathan futile. What prevails is the vocal or tacit approval of every lash of the Leviathan's tail as some sort of Hegelian necessity.

Under the conditions described, it is not possible to restore the fundamental, tripartite, and hierarchical structure of wholeness inherent to the political tradition of the Euro-Aryan and European man. A certain American general became known for his judgement on Europe, which seems to have been expressed as if by the yardstick of the ideology of tripartite division: "*Europe is an economic giant, a political dwarf, and a military worm.*" Not only is the ideal structure completely absent from the projects, but from the very beginning, a completely opposite, liberalist ideology prevails in them, in the sign of the primacy and sovereignty of the demon of economism. The demon of profit and the idolatry of growth in economic performance threaten to completely distort and frustrate European unification. Proposed as the fundamental and central principle of the Christianisation of unification, the market, with its forces and *laws*, threatens to become an end in itself, demanding the dismantling of all external defences *of the European Union* and its dissolution into the global marketplace. Given the almost universal prevalence of the belief that we live in a world governed by *the laws of the market* and *free competition*, it is essential to persistently expose the mystifications of the priests of liberal capitalism, which serve to dismantle all defences of national economies against the conquering campaigns of supranational capital and to delay-ravaging corporations and companies. In essence, there are no *laws of the market*, nor *free competition*, because world markets are conditioned by the actions not only of global centres of power and *lobbies*, but also by extra-market and unproductive, i.e., parasitic forces, such as speculative capital, which is capable of destroying even the most advanced economies. This mystification is exposed by the fact that its priests raise great alarms against any economic policy that, in defence of the national economy, dares to contradict the forces *of the law of the market* and the principle *of free competition*, while on the other hand they remain silent about the catastrophic effects of speculative capital on the supposed *laws* and *freedoms*, as if it were an act of God.

The sacrifices and renunciations of the member states of significant parts of their sovereignty in favour of European unification have proved to be in vain, which is particularly and paradoxically evident in the very domain of the economy. Almost all essential instruments of economic policy – from the production of their own coinage and the management of exchange rates to fiscal strategy and the setting of public budget frameworks – were handed over by the member states *to the Eurocracy*. Yet, the expected common, active economic policy failed to materialise, and the transferred instruments remain largely unused. Deprived of economic policy instruments and with their defences for domestic production dismantled, the governments of the member states have become powerless in the face of internal and, above all, external challenges, leaving the national economy at the mercy of the shocks of the globalisation process, under the shadow of a liberal-capitalist idolatry of a global market without borders. Thus, a great reversal of values is legitimised and enabled: all the achievements of European civilisation in the economic domain – from *the so-called 'gilded age of prosperity'*, the protection of labour and workers, social concern for vulnerable groups and universal health insurance, to the legal obligation of industrial production to preserve the environment and ecological balance – have been roundly condemned by the court of world

world market. Consequently, on this quintessentially European market, third-world products are increasingly winning out, their irresistible cheapness achieved through slave wages and a complete disregard for living conditions. Instead of decisively confronting this type of competition with barriers and conditions, *the Eurocracy* is retreating, especially before the clamour of Atlantic proponents of globalisation, the pan-market posturing of the pseudo-imperial idea of *One World*.

Instead of the construction of the European Union following the order of precedence dictated by the tradition of the ideology of the three pillars – from a single culture and politics, through common defence, to a common market – it all began in the economic domain, with consequently very uncertain and arduous prospects for higher forms of integration. The oft-cited example of German unification – initiated by a common customs union – is not a valid one. First and foremost, the creation of the customs union was preceded by decades of work by intellectual elites to spread and deepen a pan-German cultural self-awareness. In other words, it was the unification of parts of a single nation, not a series of nations whose common roots still had to be revealed. Furthermore, almost thirty-six years passed between the customs union, the masterpiece of Friedrich List's economic policy, and the unification of the German states and principalities into a single *Reich*. Finally, it is quite certain that the decisive impetus for the unification was given by France's attack on Prussia and the triumph of the Prussian and Russian armies.

Admittedly, Europeans should not be blamed so much for the flaws and weaknesses built into the foundations of the European unifications, as these were perpetrated by the process's prime movers: the American occupiers of Europe. Washington's proponents of Western Europe's economic integration operated on a number of levels, from the clandestine actions of agencies that recruited elites and founded and financed organisations such as *the European Federalist Movement* (Evans-Pritchard, 2000), to the open conditionality of aid from *the so-called Marshall Plan* on the beneficiary states' joint projects. According to the designs of the Atlantic creators, promoters and financiers of the first post-war 'pro-European' movements and forms of unification, all of this was to culminate in the common market, with the corresponding loss of sovereignty of the participating states. In the optics of the transatlantic occupiers of Europe, *the Common Market* was conceived as the easiest way for the European states to deprive themselves of sovereignty. In this regard, it is instructive to read the works of Lionel Robbins, Director of the Economic Section of the British War Ministry and one of the architects of the idea that through European economic integration, not only would the sovereignties of European states and peoples be weakened and their powers divested, but a mondialist path would also be opened up to condition the movement towards a world economic federation. In a 1939 essay on the ultimate cause of war, observing that modern states constrain economic life which spontaneously tends to transcend all borders, Robbins points out that European states have become "*anti-economic units which, in administering the positive functions they perform and because of the burden of maintaining the defence apparatus necessary to ensure independence, increasingly tend to exhaust all the energies of their inhabitants. The existence of restrictions on commercial activities and migrations between different European states is as absurd as the existence of analogous restrictions between different provinces in previous periods.*" (Robbins, 1985)

How one-sided the stated desire for freedom from 'all state supervision of economic life' is, as evidenced by the complete disregard for the foundational fact - cence that said restrictions are often a necessary means of defence for weaker national economies against invasion by stronger ones, particularly in the shadow of the Great Depression, which was caused by the collapse of the New York Stock Exchange. After all, it was precisely the economic sanctions and embargoes against the Third Reich and Italy - imposed by the consciously warmongering policy of Roosevelt and his advisers - that were one of the main, if not the essential, catalysts for the Second World War. (Bevendamm, 1983)

It is certain that *the European Union* today cannot withstand even an examination in light of a comparison with the relative integrity of any state that is even remotely sovereign and independent. The most conspicuous attribute and **conditio sine qua non** of sovereignty is the possession of a foreign policy. It could be freely said, in the light of Carl Schmitt's doctrine, that *the European Union*, a series of decades without its own foreign policy, is a textbook example of being devoid of a fundamental political capacity, namely the power of a sovereign state to distinguish friend from foe:

"From the moment the capacity or will for such a distinction is lacking, a people ceases to exist politically. If a people accepts that a foreign power dictates the choice of its enemy and determines against whom it has the right to fight, it ceases to exist as a politically free nation and is appropriated or subordinated by another political system... If a people no longer has the strength to assert itself in the sphere of politics, this is not the end of politics in the world, but merely the end of one weak people. (Schmitt, 1992)

The European states - under a dual occupation since 1945 - provide a perfectly lamentable proof of the validity of the observation in question. The exception of France during the presidency of General Charles de Gaulle only serves to confirm the rule. Disabled from acting politically and economically in a sovereign manner, they accepted that the occupying powers, the USA and the USSR, dictated who they should consider an enemy and who a friend. It is essential to point out that General de Gaulle, in a public address from on 24 January 1963, in opposing the opening of the European Community to Great Britain, *the first Trojan horse* of Washington's policy, he rightly perceived the corresponding dangers of dissolution into the world's multitude, under the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan:

"In fact, Great Britain is an island, a maritime country, linked, through its exchanges and its markets, its supplies, to the most diverse and most distant countries... On the other hand, that (European) community, growing in this way, will face all the problems of its economic relations with the mass of other states, and above all with the USA. It should be foreseen that the cohesion of its members—there will be many of them, and quite diverse—will not last long, and that, ultimately, a colossal, Atlantic community will emerge, under the dependence and administration of the USA, which will quickly absorb the European community.

At all critical moments in modern history, *the EU member* states have confirmed the predicted subordination, even taking part - creating - at the cost of violating not only the UN Charter and international law but also their own constitutions - in the US's wars of world conquest and to deepen Europe's dependence and weakness, from Operation *Desert Storm*, against Iraq (1991), through the aggression against

from Yugoslavia (1999), to the final conquest of Iraq (2003). Only in the most recent conquering campaign against Iraq's geostrategic advantages and its oil reserves, some members of the European Union, foremost among them France and Germany, showed unprecedented boldness in publicly refusing to pay the Atlantic Leviathan its political and military tribute in European honour, intelligence, and blood. British politics was quick to stoke artificially cultivated fears of the creation of a Paris-Berlin axis, which prompted the eminent historian of European mediaevalism, Franco Cardini, to make the following melancholic observation:

"I wonder if those who today wave the bogeyman of French-German hegemony over Europe have ever read a book of history, or ever looked more closely at a geographical map? Had they done so, they would have realised that Europe is, in essence, France and Germany, with something else around them: something else which is in fact much, wonderful, marvellous, but remains, in any case, something else. The main axis is Franco-German. And I wonder why we should be so concerned about not becoming 'vassals of Paris and Berlin', whilst on the other hand we accept, as something natural, as if it were nothing, being vassals of Washington (Cardini, 2003).

The Russian Question

A lack of the ability to discern the enemy is consequently accompanied by a lack of the ability to recognise the friend. The greatest test, perhaps, of the sincerity—or at least the sovereignty—of the aspiration to unite the nations and states of Europe is called Russia. As a rule, all the architects and builders of the *European Union* have failed this test, with the exception of General Charles de Gaulle, who incurred the wrath of the Atlantic Leviathan for advocating a Europe "*from the Atlantic to the Urals*". Not even the most detailed analysis of all official and unofficial statements of refusal to ever open the *European Union's* building site to Russia can find any coherent, irrefutable reason. Opponents of Russia, whether they are aware of it or not, most often repeat a judgement by Napoleon from his exile on the island of Saint Helena, which is nothing more than a humanly understandable, pathetic attempt to justify a senseless and catastrophic campaign against Russia and a lament for the shattered dream of French hegemony:

"I calculated that Russia was too large to ever be able to enter the European system I had just established, and whose centre was France. It was therefore necessary to exclude Russia from Europe so that it would not spoil the unity of that system. It was necessary to give this new political demarcation fairly firm boundaries so that they would withstand the weight of all Russia. It was necessary to place that country by force in the position where it was a hundred years ago." (Napoleon, 1974)

There is at least more cunning in Delors's response to the Russian proposals for a '*common European home*', given towards the end of his presentation on the prospects for the *European Community* to the European Parliament on 17 June 1989. Jacques Delors characterised such proposals as an outburst of '*excessive irredentism*', without offering any explanation as to why Russia should forever remain merely the '*neighbour*' of the *European Community*:

"We are certainly mindful of the true geographical dimensions of Europe; we certainly want with all our might for peace, trade and cooperation to be the characteristics of tomorrow's Europe. Nevertheless, we must be careful not to fall into excessive lyricism or the danger of a policy of advertising slogans. I will say—in order to be better understood—that we all envisage a European village in which there is agreement, in which economic and

whose economic and cultural activities unfold in mutual trust. But if I were to sketch such a village today, I would arrive at the outline of the future called the European Community, of which we are the sole architects and whose keys we will jealously guard, using them to open our doors only to trade with our neighbours. (Delors, 1993)

We are left only to guess how it was possible to overlook the existence of Russia in *the 'accurate geographical dimensions of Europe'*. German Chancellor Helmut Kohl, for his part, denied Russia a place in *the European Union* on the grounds that it largely lies in Asia, but he did not apply this geographical criterion against the accession of Asia's Turkey, which he advocated, even though its European portion, the remnant of a centuries-long occupation, constitutes only three per cent of Turkish territory. From the standpoint of a longer European memory, we can be pleased that in the aforementioned Delors review, Russia is no longer designated, as was the decades-long custom, as an enemy, but merely as a neighbour. In some previous periods, the self-styled "*Founding Fathers*" of *the European Community* and *the Union* even had the custom of denouncing Russia as a threat on a par with Attila's Huns or the Arab invaders at Poitiers, even though it was Russia that for centuries defended Europe from Asian conquerors:

"We are living in an era... in which Western civilisation is facing another civilisation that is attacking it and wants to destroy it. The same thing happened when we stopped—so to speak—Attila on the fields of Châlons, or when the Arabs were stopped at the walls of Poitiers. And, mutatis mutandis, the same historical phenomenon is manifesting itself, but under different conditions, with the Russians, who wish for it and we accept the challenge; it is a challenge, on Western soil, to see what civilisation and what values will emerge from this struggle... For this task, we have, naturally, a need for the participation of the whole—entire West, and I repeat, the Whole, beyond the borders of little Europe and reaching to the USA." (Spaak, 1958)

We are free to conclude that in the ultimate vision of the self-proclaimed '*Founding Fathers of the European Community and the Union*, it was only meant to be a part of *the whole* of the West, which encompasses Europe and the USA.' An observer endowed with irony might recognise in the aforementioned statement a tragicomic expression of the horror that President of the USA Harry Truman and his associates instilled in Paul-Henri Spaak and the other foreign ministers of the European members of the Atlantic Alliance during the state dinner in honour of the signing of the founding act-ative act, held at the White House on 3 April 1947. It was then that the US President blackmailed the Europeans by frightening them with the cheap deception that a Red Army invasion of Western Europe was imminent: "*Despite the enormous war potential of the US, the Western nations were practically disarmed and had no way of preventing six hundred Soviet divisions from crushing Western Europe and a large part of Asia.*" An even greater horror was caused among the European guests by the US President's response to their suggestion that American atomic weapons be used for deterrence: "*We had better not talk about the necessity of using (atomic bombs) against our Western European allies if they were to be occupied.*" The Atlantic occupier of Europe promised defence only on the condition of '*accepting some traditional economic and security objectives as a sacrifice which in your (European) eyes will not look particularly desirable.*' All in all, this tragicomic spectacle of intimidating European naivety or pliability served to extort from the European members of the Atlantic Alliance a large haul, from essential parts of state sovereignty to colonies, intended

a new, incomparably cheaper but also more brutal and effective form of colonialism, called the 'debt economy'. (Kalajić, 1998)

With the collapse of real socialism and the disintegration of the USSR, the ideological pretext for Russophobia, which shamelessly equated communism and the Russian people, shamelessly equating them, and cynically ignoring the fact that this doctrine and its mercenary army were exported to Russia from the West, with abundant financial support from the New York international of usurious capital, for the purpose of destroying the Christian empire. Yet, at the heart of the conquering strategy of Atlantic globalism have remained the unchanged principled, racist, religious and materialist reasons for Russophobia, which sees in the fabulous riches of Russia the final and greatest prize, an essential necessity for the parasitic nature of the survival of the American pseudo-empire. That the supposed hostility towards communism is merely a pretext or a mask for Russophobia is demonstrated by one example, US National Security Council Directive 20/1, of 18 August 1948:

"We must have autonomous guarantees that ensure that even an anti-communist and nominally friendly regime (Russia): a) does not in future dispose of any military power, b) is in economic relations heavily dependent on the outside world, c) has no serious authority over its main national minorities, d) does not establish anything like an iron curtain. In the event that such a regime shows hostility towards communism and friendship towards us, we must ensure that these conditions are imposed nonetheless, though not in an insulting and humiliating manner. But we must, if not by persuasion then by force, bring them around, in order to protect our interests."

However, the anti-Russian stance of the main architects of *the European Union* cannot be attributed solely to the Atlantic overseer. This is the chronologically final period in a centuries-long constant of hostile policy by the European powers towards Russia.

As Danilevski long ago observed and irrefutably proved in his study **Russia and Europe**, Russia has never given any cause for the pen of enmity. The rare, sporadic and very limited interventions of Russian military force in inter-European conflicts and wars were, in fact, mere fulfilments of obligations undertaken under previous bilateral or multilateral treaties of mutual defence. In none of these cases did Russia seek or demand any territorial concession or conquest in return for its military participation. The main and enduring cornerstone of Russia's foreign policy towards the rest of Europe was the endeavour to free the Christian peoples of Eastern Europe from Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire to extort relief from the burden of slavery on the shoulders of the Christian peoples subjugated for centuries, towards their complete liberation, and to secure free and unfettered navigation for the Russian merchant fleet through the Bosphorus Strait. The ideal of generations of Russian patriots – to which Empress Catherine II also dedicated herself – was the final liberation of *the Second Rome*, Constantinople, and the expulsion of the Turkish-Islamic occupier from European soil.

Such selflessly pro-European and pro-Christian aspirations of Russian foreign policy, and the corresponding calls for a common struggle, did not provoke any support, except for sporadic responses from the Austro-Hungarian Empire, but for reasons of geopolitical expansion of its hegemony towards the Middle East. During a diplomatic tour of Western Europe in 1698, instead of enthusiastic responses to the idea of a joint struggle to liberate European territories from Turkish-Islamic occupation, Tsar Peter I received only the assurances of the sovereigns of Brandenburg, Saxony and Poland for a joint war against

Sweden and its hegemony over the Baltic Sea. The history of European powers' relations with Russia, from the time of the great "opening" of Tsar Peter I, is marked by a manifold endeavour—from diplomatic to military—to frustrate all its pro-European and pro-Christian aspirations and to keep alive the '*sick man of the Bosphorus*' and his parasitic occupation of the cradle of European culture and civilisation. As a rule of historical experience, this constant hostility towards Russia has always been dictated by the British pseudo-imperial policy to its European intermediaries—chiefly France—by means of secret or public diplomacy, by force of blackmail and promises and above all by the formula *divide et impera*, which was presented as a supposed endeavour to preserve peace through the maintenance of *the balance of power*.

At this point in our exposition, it is necessary to recall only the most significant successes of Albion's anti-European policy. Concerned with maintaining the prototype of the 'sanitary cordon', which served to encourage quarrels instead of alliances between the Russian Empire and the last form of the Roman-Germanic Empire, *Albion*, through French policy, incited the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire to attack Russia in 1712. years. In 1717, Tsar Peter I visited Paris with a proposal to replace the senseless hostilities, instigated against Russia by British foreign policy, with an alliance, but he was rebuffed by the force of the fatal London influence. The brilliant victories won in the war of the Russian and Austro-Hungarian empires against the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire (1736-1739) were nullified at the peace negotiations by strong pressure from French diplomacy, in favour of British interests. After the great concessions that the Russo-Austrian military alliance had forced from the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire by the Treaty of Kuchuk Kaynarja in 1774. year – from territories to the right of free navigation on the Black and Aegean Seas, and the right to supervise and protect Christians – British foreign policy, dissatisfied with the French mediation, decided to act directly. The first opportunity arose in 1787: incited, the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire provoked a new war with the Russo-Austrian alliance, and British foreign policy simultaneously mobilised the Swedish army against Russia from the north.

By pressuring Vienna, British diplomacy managed to force a separate peace with the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire in 1792, once again leaving Russia alone on the battlefield, where it nevertheless managed to withstand all challenges and confirm all previously gained concessions. The ideal conditions for the final liberation of Europe's cradle from the Turkish-Islamic occupation were provided by the secret alliance of Tsar Alexander I and Napoleon, concluded at Tilsit, with a treaty that entrusted Russian hegemony with the entire responsibility for south-eastern Europe under Turkish-Islamic occupation and, indeed, a free hand to liberate Constantinople. Unfortunately, it soon became apparent that the French sovereign was not sincere and that his greed meant he wanted to possess everything, and the rest.

The next opportunity for the liberation of the cradle of European culture and civilisation was provided by the Greek people's uprising: from 1821, Tsar Alexander I vainly sought to obtain the consent of the European allies and powers for military intervention. That consent, along with the right to supervise the internal policy of the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire, was successfully won by Tsar Nicholas I, in accordance with the public and secret provisions of the treaty concluded with Prussia and the Austro-Hungarian Empire at Munichgratz in 1833. This is

was the signal for a great counter-offensive by British public and secret diplomacy, crowned by the London Convention of 1841, which obliged the European powers to respect the sovereignty of the Turkish-Islamic pseudo-empire, thereby *de facto* causing Russia to lose almost everything it had previously gained at the cost of enormous sacrifices. The culmination of *Albion's vile* anti-Russian policy was reached with the Crimean War (1853-1856), into which Great Britain also drew its media against Russia, France and the Kingdom of Savoy, sacrificing the lives of hundreds of thousands of Europeans for the sake of preserving the '*sick man of the Bosphorus*' and his parasitic shadow over south-eastern Europe. At that time, *Albion* even deprived Russia of the right to concern itself with the fate of Christians under Turkish-Islamic occupation.

After the horrific massacres committed against Christians in 1876, Russia again set out against the Asian conqueror, and when Russian soldiers found themselves on the outskirts of Constantinople, they forced a peace agreement which liberated all the Slavic peoples - Great Britain brought it all to a halt with a demonstration of military force in the Sea of Marmara, accompanied by furious anti-Semitic harangues from Disraeli and the Anglophile media across Western Europe. It was then that Nikolai Danilevsky, in an essay entitled '*How Europe Behaved Towards the Russo-Turkish Polemic*', perceived the superficiality of certain declared oppositions, observing that against Russia and for Turkey had risen not only the expected '*Jewish, banking, stock-exchange, speculative Europe*' but also '*Europe democratic, revolutionary, socialist, from the people's revolutionary parties... to the cosmopolitan international.*' It was, in fact, a confirmation of a sadly ironic conclusion, put forward in the study '*Russia and Europe*', according to which hatred of Russia is the only bond capable of uniting an otherwise deeply divided Europe: "*in this respect clericals help liberals, Catholics Protestants, aristocrats democrats, monarchists anarchists, Reds Whites, legitimists and orientalist Bonapartists*" (Danilevski, 1994).

Then, the British policy of '*divide et impera*', having won over Germany and the Austro-Hungarian Empire, succeeded not only in thwarting the fruits of the military victories of the Russian army and insurgents but also in digging a deep chasm of mistrust and rivalry between Moscow on the one hand, and Berlin and Vienna on the other. For almost the entire century, on the Asian front, British policy consistently waged a proxy war against Russia, from arming and inciting Muslim peoples and peasants against the Russian Empire to its wholehearted and financial support for the Japanese military challenge in 1905. A particularly cruel act of '*perfidious Albion*' was the denial of the requested asylum to the Russian imperial family, leaving them at the mercy of the butchers of the Russian and Christian people. Incidentally, the British dynasty thereby also broke its blood ties with the Romanovs. A couple of decades later, it dispatched a warship to evacuate the Abyssinian Emperor Haile Selassie and his entourage, ahead of the belated colonial expedition of the Italian forces.

Thus, the contemporary insularity of the *European Union's* construction site for a major contribution to the unification of Europe from Reykjavik to Vladivostok reflects the all-too-long susceptibility of West European political (pseudo)elite to influences or directives that once emanated from across the English Channel and today from across the Atlantic, in line with the relocation of the centre of international financial capital from London to New York, or rather Washington. Otherwise, given the distinctly economic nature and orientation of the *European Union*, its hostility towards Russia would be completely inexplicable. It is not

it is impossible to overlook, from the perspective of economic benefits alone, the immense advantages that Russia would bring to *the European Union*. from invaluable reserves of natural wealth and energy sources, through a vast market to an exceptionally highly-skilled labour force, to weaponry technology that far surpasses that of the United States. Only with Russia can *the European Union* become politically powerful, militarily independent and economically self-sufficient, unconditional and untouchable, and thus sovereign and capable of offering the world a great, life-saving cultural and civilisational alternative.

Eurocracy versus Nations

In the history of the use of the word *European*, no one has used it for so base a purpose of definition as Jean-Jacques Rousseau, in an essay on the government of Poland, lamenting the disappearance of nations. Yet, two centuries later, his critical exaggeration proved, so to speak, prophetic:

National institutions are what create the genius, character, tastes and customs of a people; which make it a particular nation and not another; they inspire in it that burning patriotism which stems from roots that cannot be uprooted... Let people think what they will, but today there are no longer any French, Germans, Spaniards, or even English. There are only Europeans. They all have the same tastes, the same passions, the same customs, because no one has received the national stamp through a distinctive upbringing. All will, in the same circumstances, do the same things; all will speak of the public good whilst in reality thinking only of themselves; all will praise moderate prosperity whilst desiring to become rich; they have only one ambition: luxury; only one passion: gold. Convinced they can use it to achieve everything that tempts them, they will sell themselves, without exception, to the first person who wants to buy them. What does it matter who is the master they serve and whose laws they obey? Wherever there is money to steal and women to corrupt – they feel at home."(Rousseau, 1971)

By all accounts, in describing *the* supposed *Europeans*, Jean-Jacques Rousseau had in mind a very narrow stratum of the third estate, whose international uniformity or similarity was certainly the product of urban uprooting and subjection to the conditioning of mercantile civilisation. It is also certain that the said description corresponds far more to the *dmštvo* of our own time than to that of Rousseau's, which indicates that the once-narrow layer of the third estate has, over the last few centuries, assumed mass proportions. Equally contemporary is the implicit dualism between Rousseau's *nation* and *Europeans*. This refers to the *Eurocracy's* hostility towards European nations and nationalisms, which, like a constant, permanently marks the prevailing state of mind on the construction site of *the European Union*. According to Ida Maly's observation, from the Oriovecian heights of her anthropology chair, one of the main declared goals of *the Eurocracy* is the 'death-nation'.

However, politicians and journalists systematically do not allow citizens to debate that goal. They know full well that otherwise they would provoke a rebellion. According to one reconstruction of history by Heimut Koepp—perhaps unconsciously but entirely tailored to exonerating Germany's role—which politicians and historians repeat as if it were the most obvious truth, nationalism is the driving cause of all wars. Thus, only by the elimination of nations, or rather states (although an attempt is made here to establish a subtle distinction between nation and state), can war be avoided. It is such an ideologised premise that it is hardly worth discussing. The fact remains that the ignorance of politicians regarding long-term history is almost incredible. When they think of the history of nations, they reduce it to the dynamics of phenomena in

the nineteenth century – they are completely outside the knowledge of twentieth-century scholarship. Or, to put it better, they remain indebted to explain the mechanisms of the formation and rise of States. Even if we set aside this error in the interpretation of history, the inescapable fact remains that nations exist. And that is precisely what the European Union project believes it can erase with words on paper (the Maastricht Treaty). (iMagli, 1998)

Admittedly, in the preamble to the *Maastricht Treaty*, the member states of the *European Union* commit themselves "to strengthening solidarity between their peoples, respecting their histories, their cultures and their traditions". Accepting this conditional commitment as a sincere, albeit clumsy, expression of the best of intentions, we must observe that it has since been regularly betrayed at every significant test. The most striking example of such a betrayal is the denial of any support for Greece's demands that its history, culture and tradition be respected and defended in solidarity. These are the appeals for support with which Greek politics addressed the *European Union* against the shameless appropriation and usurpation of the toponym *Macedonia* and of the historical symbols of the Greek people by the neighbouring, newly-composed Balkan pseudo-state, which emerged from the 'anti-heroic war of the West against Yugoslavia'. In themselves, the said theft and adornment with another's plunder would deserve nothing more than a melancholic sneer, but the geopolitical context lends them the meaning and significance of a serious threat. The political pseudo-elite of said pseudo-state has openly requested and received the status of an unconditional vassal and attendant to all the needs of the Atlantic Leviathan. Thus, the self-proclaimed *Macedonia* has voluntarily become one of the geopolitical links in the '*Islamic Transverse*', a chain of countries with a Muslim majority or a strong minority, which stretches from Turkey to Bosnia and Herzegovina. In the perspective of Washington's anti-European strategy, the "*Islamic Transverse*" is intended to cut Greece off from Europe and to serve as a single land bridge for the pacific conquest of Europe by the force of Third World masses, a victim of neo-colonialism, i.e., a debtor economy. Furthermore, this so-called pseudo-state is also a potential vehicle for Turkish expansionism and territorial claims, which can easily exploit the fact that historical Macedonia also extends through Greece.

According to the rule of historical experience, all indirect or direct reactions of the *Eurocracy* towards the manifestations, rise to power, or electoral successes of nationalist movements and parties are decidedly negative; these are otherwise the only ones ideologically committed to the defence and development of the values of national histories, cultures, and traditions. Although the *Eurocracy* seeks to indirectly justify and explain its intolerances by applying pseudo-Enlightenment principles of discrimination between *progressive* and *reactionary* forces, or the presupposition-veloped intellectual and economic backwardness of the supporters of nationalist movements and parties - the geo-economic map of European elections bears witness to the very opposite. It is precisely the most economically developed regions of Europe that form the electoral base for the most radical nationalist movements of resistance to *Eurocracy*, globalisation and *multiculturalism*, from Italy's *Northern League* to the *Flemish Block*. Regarding the broad support for the programme of the *French National Front*, Dr Miroslav Jovanović, a United Nations economic observer, observes that the movement gains the most trust in the areas where experiences with the processes of European integration are most developed: "*Therefore, liberal theories that economic progress brings enjoyment and satisfaction do not hold water in that*

case. Progress is necessary, but the people have a need for a sense of a shared experience of the future. The people need to be consulted or to participate in the system in order to contribute to creating such a perspective. The elite has seriously underestimated the emergence of powerful nationalism." (Jovanovic, 2004)

Is it merely an underestimation? The fact that nationalist movements and parties are often characterised by the fiercest criticisms and the most resolute opposition to a range of *Eurocratic* political measures – from anti-democratic usurpations of national sovereignty to pro-immigration laws and the imposition of various levelling-down policies on the world of production, at the cost of losing their distinctiveness – cannot explain, let alone justify, the intolerance on display, the essence of which is certainly deeper and more principled, as Ida Malji observed. The intensity of this anti-nationalist intolerance is so great that it overrides any internal measure of political wisdom, known as restraint, at the cost of scandal and of provoking the opposite of the desired effects. It is precisely this psychological charge of intolerance towards nationalism – or rather towards the political manifestations of nations, or at least of the most nationally self-aware strata – that indicates the so-called European unification was essentially conceived and built against European nations, against their histories, cultures and traditions. And the immense and passionate advocacy of *the Eurocrats* for the establishment of a multicultural society has as its underlying basis a hatred of European nations, that is, of the virtues and values which nations bear and embody. Were that hatred not so blinding, proponents of multicultural society would have to notice that they are contradicting their own ideal by attacking the rights of European nations.

The powers that, in the period before the First World War, encouraged and magnified nationalisms within the European and Christian empires in order to destroy them, and which then, at Versailles, drew the map of Europe as nation-states so as to permanently sow discord and conflict among them – by the new, much more dynamic British formula of *divide et impera*, called *the balance of power* – laid the basic blueprint for *the future European Union* as a trap for stifling any true political life of the nations. If we set aside the fundamental purpose of European unification in the perspective of the anti-European strategy of the Atlantic Leviathan, the fact remains that its first movers and shakers in Europe were imbued with a spirit of hostility towards all nationalisms. It should be noted that many proponents of this hostility sincerely believed that nationalism was the sole, or at least the main, cause of both world wars, overlooking a number of facts which indicated and indicate that the accused was, in the worst cases, merely a medium for other, of distinctly anti-national, anti-European and, above all, anti-Christian forces, strategies, motives and objectives. The first and predominant ideological underpinning of the movement towards *the European Union* was of a negative nature: the belief that peace could be achieved by dismantling nation-states and weakening their borders, the supposed or alleged causes of inter-European conflicts and wars. The most famous and arguably most inspired spokesman for this delusion is Thomas Mann, as attested by the message to the Europeans, sent from New York via the BBC radio on 29 January 1943:

"This statehood, through arbitrary state borders and sovereignty, has led to the continent's downfall. For me and for those who share my views, the idea of European unity has always been dear and precious; it represented something natural to our thinking and our will. It was the opposite of provincial narrow-mindedness, miserable selfishness, brutality and the pride of nationalists; it represented freedom, a broad outlook, a spirit of goodness".

It is not difficult to recognise in the aforementioned opinion a distant, faint reflection of the very powerful thought of Nietzsche from *Beyond Good and Evil*:

"Thanks to the morbid alienation which the nationalist madness has established and continues to establish between the European peoples, thanks equally to the short-sighted politicians and the superficiality which, with its help, are today at their height and give no hint whatsoever of how the destructive policy they are applying will, necessarily be the politics of an interlude - thanks to all this, and to something else, which is utterly ineffable, the clearer signs of Europe's will to unite are today being ignored or arbitrarily and falsely overlooked.

With regard to the aforementioned views, it is also necessary to bear in mind the fact that nationalism is irreducible to definitions such as Mann's, which, drawing on the experiences of Romantic and Realist literature and their corresponding anti-bourgeois sentiments, constructs a general picture of the average member of the lower tiers of the third estate for the purpose of portraying nationalists. To such an identification, one could oppose many expressions of nationalist consciousness and self-awareness that condemn precisely *the provincial narrow-mindedness, the wretched egoism, the brutality and the idiotic self-satisfaction of the bourgeoisie, who are indifferent to the state and interests of the nation.* Mann's criticism applies only to one of a series of quite different, and even opposing, forms of nationalism. After all, Thomas Mann's early political essays belong to the ideological anthology of German nationalism, *the Deutsche Bewegung*, whose champions were also the first victims of Hitler's struggle for absolute power. This is a movement whose essential worldview was open to inter-national alliances, particularly with Russia, continuing the best tradition of Prussian nationalism. After all, it was the same kind of nationalism that Nietzsche espoused, particularly in the posthumously published draft of **The Great German Politics**:

"We have an absolute need for an agreement with Russia, for a new joint programme, which does not envisage any English supremacy in Russia. / any American future". (Mohler, 1972)

In the political essays of Denis de Rougemont, the spiritual father of European integration, there are too few words devoted to illuminating the post-realisation horizon of the aspiration. In contrast, his writings abound with rhetoric attacking the nation-state. One gets the impression that even here, the unification of Europe is merely a means to an end, the destruction of nation-states. Assuming monstrous proportions in de Rougemont's optics, the nation-state became guilty of, so to speak, all the evils of the modern world, guilty both for being allegedly too small and for being simultaneously too large:

"The centralised and united nation-state dreams of and sees itself as closed, complete, and self-sufficient, both in its culture and its economy, and as the sole arbiter not only of its own but also of others' interests. Thus, it is a part that wants to be everything. Modern, unified and absolute nation-states are just failed empires... Given that they are too small, nation-states should federalise on a continental scale; and given that they are too large, they must federalise from within." (De Rougemont, 1968)

Thus, nation-states are to disappear, along with all the purposes and duties in the service of the vital needs of defence, ops-tank and the development of the national communities that built them, as their greatest and most multiply protective form. It is symptomatic of all opponents of the nation-state - from

From Thomas Mann to De Rougemont, they completely overlook their positive content and spheres of influence, roles and contributions. In the afterword to the Serbian edition of De Rougemont's seminal work, **The Future Is Our Business** (De Rougemont, 1989), we have already pointed out the disastrous consequences of the suppression of the nation-state before the creation of a common state of European nations: by ceding sovereignty piece by piece and the protections and benefits that a nation-state provides on the path towards a final, genuine form of unification, national communities risk remaining completely devoid of any defence in all vital domains before that goal is reached. After all, in principle there is, or at least there should be, no significant qualitative difference between the nation-state and the common, federal state of all European nations towards which De Rougemont strove. Otherwise, if it were not sufficiently *self-contained, complete* and *self-sufficient*, it would become easy prey for mondialist stratagems of blackmail, exploitation and stifling.

The appearance of the construction site *of the European mind*, at the beginning of the twenty-first century, confirms the aforementioned fears.

We have already pointed out that the economies and cultures of *the European Union's* member states are becoming ever weaker in the face of the destructive waves of globalisation and mondialisation, in the face of transatlantic conditionalities and blackmail; On the other hand, due to the tragic lack of a common foreign policy and military force, common European responses to the challenges on the world stage are regularly absent. The processes of suppressing and extinguishing national self-awareness certainly contribute significantly to the weakening and collapse of any resistance to the peacetime invasion of the continent by third-world masses of immigrants, which threaten to completely reverse the ethnic and cultural landscape of Europe in the foreseeable future. And this is precisely the goal that the intellectual pseudo-elites *of the Eurocracy*, in the service of the Atlantic Leviathan, are already openly and (maliciously) advocating. One example is sufficient: the speech by Professor Luigi Bonanta of the University of Turin, a member *of the International Advisory Board* of the "European Journal of International Relations", who claims - by the force of his desires alone and not by evidence - how the fall of the Berlin Wall also brought down the Europe of nations and of corresponding identities:

The fall of the Berlin Wall did indeed sweep away one idea of Europe, although it did not replace it with another. However, one circumstance came to the fore as soon as the dust of the collapse had settled: that the state (defined as the set of its inhabitants) cannot allow itself not to be represented, or as necessity dictates. Clearly, this means a renunciation of the idea of a nation based on identity (what identity could possibly unite a Hainanese with a Moroccan?), an abandonment of the idea of a Europe based on the uniqueness and superiority of its historical and cultural heritage, finally, and in contrast, the adoption of the hypothesis of a democracy not based on a travel document but on a participation in destiny (above all a future one), no longer based on the past but on the originality of existing situations and the unknowns that await us - will not only give Europe democracy, but will be the first steps towards its expansion. A non-national, non-sovereign Europe, averse to identity, democratic: this is the project."(Canfora, 1997)

The aforementioned opinion deserves attention because it succinctly represents the common trope of nihilism of the ruling pseudo-elites in the service of the Atlantic Leviathan, which clumsily conceal their (sado-masochistic?) anti-European disposition by seeking to distort, or even erase, the consciousness of the masses

any historical, cultural and traditional meaning of Europe. The sample presented reveals an opinion formed from a combination of the implicit, pseudo-Hegelian stance that everything which is real is rational, and the conviction that everything which is rational is worthy and morally indisputable. Projecting, for example, such a bowing before every reality into the times of the victorious campaigns of the armies of Attila, Suleiman *the Magnificent*, Napoleon or Hitler, one would have to condemn any national, religious or European resistance as an attack on reality, and thus on the value of rationality. For example, with equal justification, one would also have to defend the reality, or the rationality, of the concentration camps, from Africa to Siberia, against *the supposed irrationality* of condemnation. Furthermore, the aforementioned opinion lacks any valid basis in reality for its first premise, namely the belief that the fall of the Berlin Wall caused, through some not better described mechanisms, a kind of '*abandonment of the idea of a nation based on identity*'. On the contrary, it was precisely the fall of the Berlin Wall that marked the beginning of great, and even tragic, revivals of national consciousness and state-building wills, across Eastern Europe.

A nation not based on some kind of identity is something completely unknown in the annals of history, that is to say, something that truly contradicts reality, unless the aforementioned thinker has in mind, in place of a nation, an amorphous mass or a crowd. The key moment of that speech. (Sado-masochistic?) desires, where the fundamental motivation is revealed, is the rhetorical question: "*what identity can unite a Dutchman with a Moroccan?*" Indeed, no common and unifying identity exists. It remains for us to illuminate that fact would then just explain what legal or political, moral or logical law dictates that because of the hospitality shown to immigrants from Morocco or any other country, the Dutch must forever renounce the cultural, civilisational, ethnic and historical identity and sovereignty of that respective state. It is clear that no such law exists and that this is merely a symptom of a widespread, nihilistic hatred towards European nations and the Europe of nations, which would like to present itself as some kind of undeniable reality and irrefutable rationality. Next, the monstrous desire is that modern Dutch people should renounce the land their ancestors spent centuries wresting from the ocean, and allow it to sink beneath the waves of Third World masses.

Admittedly, one must also bear in mind the historical experience that through the force of repetition, certain deceptions and lies come to appear as reality and truth. And it is precisely in the present day that we observe how the force of criminalisation and demonisation of national identities – which spreads through the media of mass conditioning from the pulpits of treacherous pseudo-elites – sets in motion multiple processes of alienation from the self and the collapse of all defences. Thus, through the force of media conditioning, European nations are indeed, gradually but inevitably, being transformed into amorphous masses. In the aforementioned example of a lack of a shared identity, the target group of Eurocratic nihilism is not, nor can it be, the Moroccans, but the Dutch. They are to be stripped of their identity, whereas the Moroccans will certainly preserve theirs through the strength of their Islamic faith. If the aforementioned Eurocrat betrayal of European nations and Europeans remains in power, considering demographic trends, we can easily conclude that by the second half of the twenty-first century, the identity of Third World immigrant masses will prevail in Europe. It is precisely towards such a goal that the realisation of the project of a '*non-national, non-sovereign Europe, averse to identity, democratic*' leads.

Last but not least, it should be pointed out that the belief that it is possible to base democracy on some 'unknown that awaits us' beyond the death of nations and national identities is entirely unfounded. Modern, representative democracies are the fruits of national movements towards the nation-state. This fact explains the diversity of forms or natures of democracy on the political map of 19th and 20th-century Europe as a consequence of national differences. Therefore, it is correct to expect that the weakening of national self-awareness and identity will cause and deepen the political apathy of the masses, an indifference towards the performance of the rituals of representative democracy. After all, these are two parallel and interdependent processes that are already unfolding before our very eyes. Along with the ebbing of national self-awareness and identity, political party membership is declining and voter turnout at elections is constantly falling. This decline is certainly deepened by the relocation of centres of political decision-making beyond national frameworks, which is perceived as the loss of the last remaining opportunities for influence. After all, in the world's largest political organisation, the UN, there is not a trace of democracy, because the crucial, executive decisions are made by the members of the Security Council, whose populations combined are far from constituting the majority of humanity.

Eurocracy versus Christ

We have already, at the outset of our considerations, highlighted the special place and mediated nature of the Christian heritage in the vaults of European self-identity. Viewed from a lofty chair of comparative religion, Christian doctrine is a special, dramatic and agonistic expression of the spiritual uprising of the remnants of the Euro-Aryan tradition within *the* Levantine *melting-pot*, betraying its origin through a series of essential elements, beginning with the rehabilitation of the Iranian idea of the Saviour, falsified in the Old Testament reflection tailored to ethnocentrism or ethno-egoism and a linear-historical instead of a cyclical conception of time and history. The authentic European man, with certain excisions and purifications of the evangelical tradition, can be recognised in some expressions of the mediated doctrine. The Christian heritage certainly constitutes a significant and, in some places, essential part of the history, culture and tradition of European peoples, as it contains and inalienable European elements, spiritual, intellectual and creative contributions, or rather works on set themes, which very often tend to manifest the excesses of the essence of Euro-Aryan being and worldview. Christianity played a particularly significant and mobilising role on the front lines defending Europe and its heritage from Islamic invaders. Therefore, the Maastricht obligation to respect the history, culture and traditions of the European peoples must surely also encompass the Christian heritage.

Nevertheless, we witness the overt or covert intolerance towards Christianity that *the Eurocracy* displays at every opportunity, starting with its persistent deafness to the pleas of the Pope, on behalf of Catholic Europe, that the constitutional definition of the nature and content of *the European Union* should also make room for a Christian component. *The Eurocrats'* hatred of Christ is so unbridled that even here it overcomes all internal restraints—such as those dictated by the basic rules of the political art of getting along—and does not permit even the possibility of a mere, rhetorical and entirely non-binding acknowledgement of the Christian component of history, of the culture and traditions of the peoples of Europe. In a reflection on the European heritage of the Preamble to the draft Constitution for the European Union, which Giscard d'Estaing – President of the Convention convened to draw up the document – submitted for public consultation in May 2003, there is not even a mention

Christianity, but there is an expression of debt to Masonic Illuminism, otherwise divided between militant atheism and deism:

In response to the remarks of Archbishop Jean-Louis Tauran that the omission of any mention of Christianity whilst paying homage to the Illuminists was an *"ideological operation"* and an expression of the *"temptation to rewrite history"* - published in the Milanese daily *Corriere della Sera* on 31 May 2003. Giscard d'Estaing, challenged, pleaded a lack of general consensus and the supposed sensitivity of non-Christian minorities:

(In the Preamble) *religion is mentioned and I point out that many did not even want that... We could not have specified (Christianity) more explicitly because in that case we would have had to mention other religious traditions present on our continent, from Judaism to Islam. And that solution would not have been acceptable to everyone either."*

Finally, through the same publication, from 4 September 2003. In September 2003, the British Minister for European Union Affairs, Denis McShane, informed the Christian public that he had to abandon any mention of the Christian heritage in the European Constitution because of the fact that *"fifteen million Muslims live in Europe."* Thus, the previously observed contradiction inherent in the democratic system is revealed here as well: an attack by individuals and minorities on the freedoms, needs and will of the majority. The formal-legal basis for the militant atheism of modern democracies, and the consequent expulsion of all ethical or religious influence from the sphere of politics, is provided precisely by the reign of the aforementioned principle of freedom and peace in the sphere of relations between citizens. Here, the majority is completely and inconsistently disregarded, and it is arbitrarily assumed that the proclamation of one ethical or religious will threatens others: therefore, ethical worldviews and religious faiths are ordered into strict seclusion within the confines of mere privacy, with the consequent deprivation of society and the state of a vital, vertical dimension of life. It goes without saying that the greatest victim here is the faith of the vast majority of Europeans. Even where all belief in a higher order of things has vanished, at least those rudiments of ethics remain, which almost every religion demands as a **conditio sine qua non**. It is not true that everything is permitted where there is no God—as one of Dostoevsky's characters suggests—because the greatest European teacher, Plato, in *the Euthyphro*, long ago taught that our devotion to the gods is founded on an insight into their supreme virtue and goodness, and not on a belief that they are virtuous and good simply because they are gods. Before the divine appears, man must discern in himself and around himself the radiance of virtue and goodness, the germs of the crystallisation of the gods.

Returning to the main course of the exposition, we must note that the anti-Christian disposition of the *Eurocracy* was particularly evidenced by a unique conspiracy of silence on the part of the institutions and spokesmen of the *European Union* and the corresponding network of media information regarding the act of beatification of Mark d'Aviana, prophet and miracle-worker, preacher and spiritual adviser to Emperor Leopold I. His courageous spiritual leadership of the small army of defenders of Christian Europe and his miraculous, towering apparition in the heavens – in the eyes of the masses of Asian invaders before the capital of the last incarnation of the Roman-Germanic Empire – a series of events- Austrian sources attribute the main credit for the defeat of the last Turkish-Islamic siege of Vienna, on 12 September 1683. Nor by explicitly pointing out the significance of the role of Saint Mark of Aviano in the defence of Europe, in the homily of 27 April 2003.

In the year 2003, Pope John Paul II failed to obtain from *the Eurocrats* even a symbolic expression of remembrance, respect and gratitude:

"An unarmed prophet of divine mercy, he was prompted by circumstances to take effective action in defence of and for the unity of Christian Europe. The European continent, which in these years is opening up to new prospects of cooperation, Blessed Mark of Aviano reminds us that its unity will be stronger if it is based on its common Christian roots."

In the same year, in Brussels, an *Inter-institutional Seminar*, dedicated to financial support for research into the diverse uses of human embryos, *de facto* rejected, by the force of the principle of (a)moral relativism, all Christian demands to respect human life and to end such criminal practices. The concluding document of that meeting confirmed the right of each member state *of the European Union* to prohibit or authorise, through its own legislation, research and the use of human embryos. Thus, Christian or simply

Humanitarian bioethics was not included in the *acquis communautaire*. In that case, too, the rule of the demon of economism was demonstrated: the only contradiction that arose was whether it was right for the research in question to be funded by the taxpayers of the member states that ban it.

Sometimes, this hatred does not even shy away from crimes against the Christian tradition, as is sadly evidenced by the participation of military forces of European Union member states in the Atlantic Alliance's aggression against Yugoslavia. One of the essential targets of the nearly three-month-long bombing campaign was also the dozens of Christian churches in Kosovo and Metohija, most of them medieval in origin. This destruction was continued by Islamic-Albanian terrorists under the protection of the international peacekeeping forces (KFOR), with the tacit consent of *the Eurocracy*, which on no occasion has spoken out to express even a platonic protest against the destruction of Christian churches and monuments in Kosovo and Metohija, the cradle of European culture and civilisation. As to what kind of heritage is being spoken of, let the words of Massimo Cacciari, philosopher and Mayor of Venice, from an interview published in the pages of the local Venetian press alone, bear witness:

"The Muslims could launch new attacks, they are destroying monuments... After the ethnic cleansings, the cleansing of memory came next. To erase memories. Let the symbols, above all the strong ones, disappear: churches, monasteries, monuments of Christianity. All of this must be wiped from the face of the earth to remove any pretext for the return of the Serbs. The war ended in 1999, but Kosovo and Metohija, an autonomous province of the federation of Serbia and Montenegro, in anticipation of becoming an autonomous state at some unknown time, remains a ghost town. One hundred and twenty-two Orthodox churches have been blown up, in the sight of KFOR, the multinational peacekeeping forces. A world-class artistic heritage is disappearing. The Church of Saint Mark (part of the Peć Patriarchate) has miraculous icons. The monastery and church in Pristina are Constantinople, Byzantium. Entirely painted on the inside, the Dečani Monastery possesses an incredible beauty. These are the most ancient monuments of Byzantine art, ten thousand times more significant than the Greek churches in Kastoria or the Byzantine remains in

Thessaloniki. I also remember the Romanesque churches on a par with the great Dalmatian cathedrals in Zadar, Šibenik, and Trogir. It is outrageous that the international community – which tore its hair out simply because Bin Laden's Afghans blew up two Buddha statues, which were of no artistic significance whatsoever – has not lifted a finger. Even though it has its own army there... If, as part of the operation that Italy (the Italian contingent within KFOR) is supposed to be carrying out, such a world-unique heritage is not protected, we will become complicit in its destruction. We should be shot. I have no other words: we should be shot. Are we the liberators, those who went there to bring peace, who chose civilisation over barbarism? These are incomprehensible things. As long as we are not absolutely certain that no one will be able to threaten these churches, we must not disband our military bases. That artistic heritage is unique, unprecedented." (Veca, 2003)

The Rule of the Pseudo-Elite

On the margin of the preceding quote, it is necessary to point out that the expression '*we should be shot*' is aimed solely and exclusively at the ruling pseudo-elite. The conspiracy of silence of the main producers of information and public opinion – under the sovereign control of the international financial capital – prevents its consumers from learning the undesirable truths. Therefore, the vast majority of citizens of the *European Union* are completely unaware of the perversions, embezzlement, betrayals and even crimes systematically committed by the ruling political class. Nevertheless, even without a more complete insight into the true scale of the evil, the majority has managed to form a general judgement about the ruling pseudo-elites, which is one of the main causes of the widespread and growing mistrust in political institutions. The judgement of General Pierre-Marie Gallois, adviser to General de Gaulle, creator of the French nuclear deterrence strategy and one of the leading geopoliticians, testifies for all:

"Europeans are led by politicians who are to a considerable extent worthy of contempt, who are obsessed with personal interests and who couldn't care less about the interests and future of their peoples. The majority can be bought in a straightforward manner, with a bank account in New York, and they will side with the American will. This has led, this magma of individuals who no longer have anything to fight for, to accepting what is. The national state that protected the citizen has been destroyed. The state has been brought to the point where it can no longer look after its citizens, as evidenced by the many redundancies and social tensions." ("Sunday Telegraph" of 29 January 2003)

The rule of even the worst human material confirms the aforementioned rule of historical experience that democracy is conducive to the establishment of a system of 'negative selection'. The phenomenon referred to by General Pierre-Marie Gallois has another, specific historical cause. This concerns the consequences of the outcome of the Second World War, when its victors, in both parts, were shattered, occupied and 'by the iron curtain' of a Europe divided by the victors, political institutions were being rebuilt, entrusting formal power to those proven most suitable, not only in an ideological but above all an amoral sense, that is to say, the most corruptible and compliant human material among the subjugated peoples. Sincere belief in the winning ideology could then be associated with moral firmness and was therefore subject to the inquisitors' principled suspicion. It was for this reason that the sincere and morally strongest communists became the most numerous victims of the pro-communist system throughout Eastern Europe. Therefore, even contemporary pseudo-intellectuals in power or in

opposition, in *the* Eastern European '*transition countries*' – from pro-communism back to liberal capitalism – are led, en masse, either directly or at least indirectly, by scions of the previous, pro-communist *nomenklatura*. The logic of amorality has made and continues to make this system of 'negative selection' not only self-perpetuate but also deepen: each generation chooses its successors to be even worse than itself.

Anyone who has had the opportunity to experience both systems of the occupation of Europe can testify that the Atlantic, liberal-capitalist one causes much deeper and more disastrous consequences in the minds and hearts of people. The revolutionary and therefore unnatural content of Marxist doctrine was not concealed by its preachers, but was even proudly emphasised, unconsciously signalling to the victims of indoctrination that they were being compelled to believe in the correctness of intellectual and moral perversities. Hence, the indoctrination was superficial, and it was enough merely to attend the collective rituals of ideological fervour to remain untouched. Its preachers, however, present the ideology of liberal capitalism—no less revolutionary but considerably more unnatural—as something that perfectly and rationally expresses human reality and even the best of human desires. Moreover, the preachers of liberal capitalism and the corresponding pseudo-imperial and mondialist projects have far more sophisticated media and techniques for '*brainwashing*', not hesitating even to secretly broadcast subliminal messages and images.

Therefore, the masses herded into the corrals of liberal capitalism are defenceless, convinced that they are pursuing their own goals. Moreover, the control of "*political correctness*" (Lenin *dixit*) in the world under the shadow of Western civilisation is incomparably stricter, more complete and even more cruel than that which was applied by *the* Marxist "*engineers of souls*". Any public resistance to the ruling "dogmas", however small, - from mere concern about the consequences of openness to immigration from Third World masses and expressions of doubt about the validity of *the* '*multicultural society*' model, to advocating for the preservation of national identity - is subjected to public pillory, criminalised and demonised.

The question of the deep, psychological causes and drivers of this hatred of the ruling pseudo-elites towards their own nations and national identities remains open. Given that the ruling pseudo-elites are merely samples of social dregs, while national identities are composed of virtues and values tempered in the fires of history, this contrast helps us to understand the hatred as a psychological expression of opposition. Putting aside a consideration of this phenomenon for another occasion, here we will merely point out the fact that a Russian, in a Russian laboratory for testing Western ideas, felt and sincerely confessed a sentiment that today permeates the ruling pseudo-elites of Europe under the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan. In the estate of the professor of Moscow University, V.S. Pecherin, a poem was found explaining his departure from Russia for the West: "*How easy it is to hate one's fatherland! /To yearn for its destruction! /I In its ruin to see /The dawn of universal resurrection!*" Yet, unlike the masses of his psychopathic successors, Pechorin possessed great intellectual power and a moral backbone. Like many preceding and subsequent Russian dissidents, Pechorin too experienced great disappointment upon getting to know the Western world better, where he joined the ultraconservative order of militant Catholicism.

"European Union" ksiO bait

Finally, one must ask whether, or to what extent, the type of person who embodies the prevailing processes on the construction site of *the European Union* can represent contemporary Europeans and their creative powers.

strivings? When, following these processes, we approach their ideological or conceptual origins, we must observe that they are largely characterised by secularisation and by a distortion and alienation from European traits and traditions. Detached by the force of secularism and liberalism from the religious, or rather Christian, community, as well as from the national one, *the average Eurocrat*, the executor of these processes, is loyal to no one but his own self-absorption and selfishness. The only thing that at first glance contradicts the programmatic individualism or egoism in this man is the inclination—often professed by proponents of laicism and liberalism—towards the dream of destroying all borders and the sovereignty of states and nations and dissolving them into a unitary, world republic and a faceless humanity, illuminated by the '*dawn of universal resurrection*'. This is a dream that stretches from the first London lodges of speculative Freemasonry, through the conceptual confusions of Mazzini's agitation, to the first laboratories of projects for the unification of Europe. That the unification of Europe, in the minds of its anti-fascist fathers, was merely a necessary means to the realisation of some kind of world state is testified to by many documents, from the proposals of the highly influential economist Lionel Robbins, director of the economic section of the British War Ministry, to the '*bible of the Eurofederalists*', *the II Manifesto of Ventotene*.

In Mazzini's rhetoric, a sign of equality could already be discerned between the concepts of *Europe* and *humanity*. By all accounts, in the rhetoric of Mazzini's visions, the word *Europe* denotes merely a waystation on the imagined path of progress, that is, the process of the political unification of nations and states towards a universal humanism.

confederation. Therefore, the homeland is defined as "*a base given to a lever must act for the benefit of humanity*." (Mazzini, 1972) At the very beginning of the Second World War, Robbins describes the state of the ideal of a world-scale federation in these words:

It now seems a thoroughly utopian hope that a world federation will be established in our time. There is not enough of a sense of a single citizenship. Under present conditions, even the problems of electing such a body would present insurmountable difficulties... Nevertheless, it is not utopian to hope for the creation of smaller federations, for the fusion of independent sovereignties into territories where there is an awareness of a civilisational community and a need for greater unity. It is not, in particular, utopian to think of creating such a structure in that part of the world which is most threatened by the contradictions of contemporary political organisation, namely the belligerent European sovereignties. Far from being utopian, for those who have eyes to see, such a federation is the most urgent practical necessity of our epoch. (Robbins, 1985)

A few years later, in the preface to the *Second Manifesto of Ventotene*, one of the founders and leaders of the *European Federalist Movement*, Eugenio Colorni, sees the realisation of the dream of a world federation much closer and openly sets out how the European federation is to be only its *prelude*:

"The ideal of a European federation, a prelude to a world federation, could have seemed like a distant utopia until just a few years ago, but today, at the end of this war, it is proving to be an achievable goal, almost within reach." (Colorni, 1991)

We are free to conclude that in the strategy of the founders of the federalist movement, the European Community was a bait intended to lead and bring European states and nations into a single organisation of a global scale. What essentially causes these persistent aspirations of pseudo-elites for European states and nations to dissolve into a completely indeterminate world republic, federation or pseudo-empire? Is it a secularised relic of a *form mentis* culture beneath the last layer of Euro-Aryan sediment, marked by cosmogonic beliefs that the existing world of difference, boundary and conflict is the consequence of the disintegration and degradation of *the* primordial *One* – later philosophically articulated through the lessons of Plotinus – with after- ch, religiously educated and ritually measured longings for the renewal of the primordial state?

Perhaps we are here in the presence of manifestations of depth psychology, of a drive towards self-abolition which Freud observed in his Viennese patients? In that case, the phenomenon we are considering would be an expression of a megalomaniacal striving for death that seeks to dissolve in it not only an individuality but also all the European nations and states. III is at issue, quite the contrary, an intellectually perverted, stunted expression of an unbridled, destructive curiosity, characteristic only of the Euro-Aryan and European man, which has for centuries and millennia persistently driven him and is driving him into magnificent movements along all the latitudes and altitudes of the material and immaterial worlds: from the dispersion of the Euro-Aryan peoples to the south, east and west of the Eurasian continent and beyond, through the imperial campaigns of curiosity of Alexander the Great or Constantius Chlorus, who, according to the panegyrics of court poets, set out to conquer Great Britain to see the climates where the day and night last for six months, to the conquest of a *new land* and a *new heaven*, beyond the Atlantic Ocean, under the aegis of *the Revelation* of the theologian John? Perhaps the phenomenon in question also partakes of a remnant of *the* secularised *universalism* of Christianity, to which the theologian and bishop Eusebius of Caesarea had already provided a political symmetry:

"One and only one God has been revealed to the Jews; and at the same time, a universal authority, the Roman Empire, has grown and developed. The long-standing and insurmountable envy of every nation towards others has already been overcome; and as the knowledge of the one God and of the one way of faith and salvation, as well as of the teaching of Christ itself, is presented to all peoples—so, at the same time, since the entire power of the Roman Empire is entrusted to a single sovereign, profound peace prevails throughout the whole world. And so, by the express will of the same God, two roots of good, the Roman Empire and the Christian teaching of charity, spring up together for the benefit of the human race." (De laudibus Constantini, XVI)

Eusebius's panegyric should today be borne in mind as a lesson not to be deceived by the splendour of appearances: it may be superfluous to point out here that the collapse of the already long-decaying structures of the Roman Empire began precisely from the time of the reign of the Emperor Constantine. One thing is certain: of the depicted image of the complementary duality, only a vague dream remains of some kind of universal, world state and power, which in the modern world is pursued by the Atlantic movements and organisations that have indirectly or directly sprung from the bitter fruits of Protestantism, from the British Freemasons to *The Round Table Groups*, a society founded at the end of the nineteenth century with the aim of restoring, strengthening and increasing *RuJe Britannia*, that is, the British pseudo-empire, across a world encompassed by the *'English-speaking idea'*. (Kalajić, 1998)

By all accounts, in the realm of the essential causes of the striving to dissolve states and nations into some kind of world state and *the* corresponding *Weltgeist*; the strongest demon is that of economism, not only by the force of its own impulses but also by the power of the consequences it brings about in the consciousness and soul of the subjects. Ripped from all subordination to higher principles of the organisation of man and community and their state, transformed from a means into the end of human and social life, elevated to the pedestal of the exclusive, or at least ruling, value and formative and informative principle, economism strives to expand its market to the furthest limits of the world. Its opponents are states and borders, measures to protect the national economy, customs duties and import quotas. His ideal is a world reduced to a borderless market, that is to say, *One World*. In other words, by producing the demon of economism and its triumphs, liberalism has, contrary to its promise, contained in its very name, has enslaved the individual, turning them into a captive of self-absorption, selfishness and even greed, which stifle in the consciousness and soul every vital form of belonging to a community and to a shared sense of memory and hope. It is a *void* that testifies to the ravages of the demon of economism and the processes of alienation, whose victims modern literature has widely described, beginning with Joyce's caricature of Odysseus, the Jew Bloom, an individual without a homeland or even a self, who wanders the streets of Dublin in vain while his wife, a grotesque parody of Penelope, indulges in erotic fantasies.

We can assume that in individuals in whom the sense of belonging to a spiritual and national community—or, more broadly, the European tradition—is suppressed or dulled, such a void provokes a series of pathological reactions, from the widely attested hatreds of the church, the nation, or the European tradition, to an enforced striving to create a compensating, internal obligation towards greater, all-encompassing surrogates, such as that known as *humanity* or *One World*. Perhaps this is also why *the eurocracy* is offensively passive and tolerant in the field of foreign policy, unable to recognise and designate even a mere rival or opponent, let alone an enemy. It does not dare to contradict American illegal trade challenges in a timely and open manner, even when punitive responses are officially permitted and recommended by the World Trade Organisation. In the domain of domestic politics, *the eurocracy* behaves aggressively intolerant towards any higher, that is, spiritual, national and traditional form of community and its corresponding characteristics. Therefore, in *Eurocratic* environments of spiritual desolation and barrenness, one feels '*the stench of death scented with fashionable perfume*', as one of Drieu La Rochelle's characters would say, when confronted with the sight of a homosexual act. After all, the prevailing spirit is similar to the homosexual because it overlooks or suppresses the vertical dimension of man and the relationship of the human to the non-human, that is, to the divine. And because of this enforced banality, to which the European man has been reduced, the building of the *European Union's* home has been proceeding, for decades, painfully and shambolically, with the utmost indifference and even widespread aversion from its unwilling inhabitants, which leads *the Eurocracy* to skilfully deprive *the demos* of any serious opportunity to pronounce on the essential choices facing the horizons of the future.

Therefore, we are free to conclude that the outlines and substance of *the European Union* are not European, or rather, they do not express the political nature of the European being. Not only can the Europe of nations not recognise its home in this edifice, but neither can the Europe of the masses of lonely individuals, such as *the Eurocrats* produce, by submitting to

the demon of economism and, above all, to the Atlantic Leviathan, thereby forbidding and suppressing the virtues and values of nations and traditions.

THE IMPERIALIST EMPIRE

Often, the final outcome and even the deepest meaning of some undertakings not only eludes the intentions of the entrepreneurs but is also contrary to them. That is why in the arena of history, many victories have later turned into defeats, and many conquests have inflicted irreparable losses on the conquerors. Thus, at the end of the second millennium BC, in a series of unstoppable military campaigns, on the war chariots they had invented, *the 'god-like'*, the golden-haired and blue-eyed Aryans conquered the Indian subcontinent, subjugated the masses of black natives and destroyed the cities of a highly developed, materialistic civilisation, based on cults of the Mother Earth, fertility and sexuality. They brought the core of *the Rig-Veda*, the official foundation of Hinduism, and the corresponding, tropical and often completely unfaithful superstructures, a testament to the indomitable vitality of the pre-Aryan cultures and the beliefs and superstitions of the natives. To preserve their minority gene pool and worldview in the threatening ocean of subjugated masses, the Aryans developed the structure of the tripartite community into an unheard-of, complex and strict system of prohibitions on caste and, above all, racial mixing. In vain. Today, more than three millennia later, in India, among hundreds of millions of indigenous people, it is not possible to meet a single being whose face still preserves the features, pallor, and celestial radiance of the pupils of the ancient Aryans. The Aryans conquered fabulous expanses and riches, but they squandered and lost themselves, dissolving into the black ocean of foreign lands which, as a result, has only here and there turned grey.

The same rule of historical experience is confirmed by the outcomes of the Crusades, from the destruction of the Eastern Empire and the corresponding defences of Christian Europe against Islamic, conquering threats, to the loss of several generations of young Europeans. This concerns not only those who died in vain but also the countless others who decided to remain in the Middle East for good, far from the European cares and renunciations, restraints and duties, drawn by the ease and sweetness of the Levantine way of life. Many boastful letters from the expatriates to their loved ones left behind in Europe bear sad witness to this. Today, centuries later, we can conclude that this great exodus of the European gene pool was also in vain. Nothing living remains of the crusading columns: not a single custom, not a word, not a single face that could emerge from the mass of the Middle Eastern melting pot and credibly declare an awareness of its centuries-distant European origins.

Sometimes, we can only infer losses from indirect knowledge and signs, from the discovery of 'white Indians' in the jungles of Ecuador, to the South American indigenous myth of 'white gods' who promised to return. Perhaps even the monumental, stone heads of Easter Island, depicted and turned towards the ocean's vastness, with the prominent features of the Be'e race, with long noses and ears, are a desperate expression of expectation and a call for the 'gods' to return.

One thing is certain: on the planetary paths of discovery and conquest, the Euro-Aryan and European man lost priceless treasures. The discovery of 'new' continents and the appalling living conditions imposed in Europe by liberal capitalism set in motion new waves of dispersal, in search of living space and more tolerable conditions of life. In the 20th century, revolutions, world wars and

above all, the violence of communist rulers triggered the last great waves of European emigration to other continents.

By all accounts, the loss of European colonies to the greed of the Atlantic Leviathan was something of a blessing in disguise. By stripping the European powers of their colonies—through blackmail and threats, by means of the outcome of the Second World War won by force or diplomacy, in order to impose its own form of colonialism, in the name of debt peonage. The Washington strategy was arguably also aimed at weakening Europe by depriving it of its raw material and energy sources. In the vast majority of such 'liberated' colonies, from Indochina to Algeria, the Congo and Rhodesia, white European colonists, whether born there or merely having settled there, became the targets of bloody reprisals, looting and persecution. The displaced members of *the 'white tribe'* sought and seek asylum where whites are still in the majority, from Australia to Canada. Many have returned and are returning to the European motherland.

This is the beginning of the end of the millennia-long process of the planetary dispersal of Europeans which began—judging by the primordial, direct or indirect testimonies and memories of Euro-Aryan cultures—with the impact of an extraordinary ice age on the original homeland, in the northern, circumpolar belt of the Eurasian continent. The time of diaspora is over. Today, we find ourselves at the beginning of a great reversal of that millennial process, on the threshold of an age of the great return of Europeans to Europe and to their European identity.

The collapse of the USSR left, outside the borders of Russia, in the newly independent republics of Central Asia, in a foreign environment, some twenty million Europeans, mainly Slavs, namely Russians, Ukrainians and Belarusians. Thus, having become unwanted foreigners or second-class citizens, subjected to intolerance and attacks, abductions and oppression, and without any protection, they were leaving their native homelands and all the gains of their ancestors' labours en masse to seek salvation in their motherlands. Thus, a column of refugees set off for Germany, descendants of German colonists who had been settled across the vast expanse of the Russian Empire by the enlightened agrarian policy of Empress Catherine II.

On the other side of the Atlantic, major economic crises in Latin American countries, such as Argentina, caused the subjugation of their economies to the parasitism of New York banks and North American supranational corporations and companies, triggering, at the beginning of the third millennium of the new era, the first waves of desperately impoverished returnees to their European homelands. By all accounts, in the foreseeable future, the same fate awaits the remaining materialist pseudo-empire, known as *the United States of America*, a collapse is imminent under the weight of a number of long-observed vices and ills, from an already irreparable and geometrically growing debt to the rest of the world, to the also growing contradiction between the financial needs for maintaining world domination and the capacity to pay. When this global parasite is denied the opportunity to feed and sustain itself at the expense of the rest of humanity, the entire domestic system of purchased social peace will collapse, triggering the disintegration of American society not only along class but, above all, along racial and ethnic lines. Therefore, in the foreseeable future, we can expect the collapse of the remnants of *the United States of America* into the abyss of the Third World and the subsequent return of European sons and daughters, and their descendants, to European, real or ideal homelands.

Perhaps it is not a chance but a law-governed synchronicity of two historically unique phenomena: the cessation of the migration processes of Europeans to other continents and the beginning of their return to their motherland – and the enterprise of uniting the European peoples and states. Despite the initial anti-European plans and corresponding endeavours, this enterprise makes arduous or too slow but certainly irreversible progress towards a common state. Perhaps the deepest meaning of the unification of Europeans – contrary to the intentions of its founders – also corresponds to the need to welcome the expected returnees. One of the great duties of the contemporary generation is precisely to prepare the conditions for the proper reception of all the sons and daughters and descendants of Europe.

European self-awareness

The first condition for the building of a common European home is the existence of a 'critical mass' of European self-awareness, necessary for a proper statecraft movement. It is quite illusory to expect the emergence of European self-awareness where the national self-awareness has been completely smothered or suppressed. It is equally unfounded to assume that European self-awareness and Europeanism are some kind of opposites and alternatives to national self-awareness and nationalism. They are two levels of human recognition in a commonality of memories and hopes, virtues and values, that differ only quantitatively, not qualitatively. European self-awareness is a superstructure, or rather the fruit of the self-knowledge of a personal national or multinational identity. Without possessing a consciousness of belonging to a nation or nations of the European circle, it is not possible to acquire a genuine European self-awareness, because its ideal object is composed of national ingredients and multinational factors. The ideal European object of self-awareness for the European person is the sum of the essential contents of the treasury of the prehistoric and historic, cultural and civilisational heritage of a number of European nations.

Therefore, unlike nationalism, which, being subject to its own limitations, blind spots or oversights, has all too often acted against European interests, a genuine Europeanism has never risen up against European nations and their corresponding interests, but only against the weaknesses and distortions of nationalism. That which has opposed and opposes European nationalisms under the guise of Europeanism is, in fact, a form of hostility towards Europe. The masterly path to European self-awareness necessarily leads through national self-awareness. The fact that the paths of self-knowledge of European nationalisms have very rarely led to European self-awareness only betrays their shallowness or superficiality. Therefore, for the failure of national self-awarenesses to grow into European magnitudes, one should blame precisely the inadequacy of nationalist impulses, forces, and capacities for self-knowledge. General historical experience attests that European nationalists have for the most part not deserved their political name, as they have not deepened national self-awareness to the cognition of the nation's source and of the essential principles, virtues, and values of the treasury of heritage. Otherwise, had such insights been achieved, nationalists would have had to recognise the multitude of genetic, ethnic and cultural ties and interconnections between European nations. After all, it is only in the light of European self-awareness that many otherwise obscure or irreparably damaged elements of national identities—which have lost their full meaning and significance on the paths of history—assume their full and original meaning. It is the product of the application of comparative methods inherent to Euro-Aryan, or Indo-European, research,

where the original but forgotten meaning of a word or phrase, a god or myth, a ritual or custom, is reconstructed through the elucidation of analogous or isomorphic matters and phenomena from other branches of the common tree of tradition.

We have already pointed out at the beginning of our essay that these connections and interconnections are also constituted by shared historical perspectives, which lead to a single ancestral homeland and a single, Euro-Aryan proto-people, from which almost all modern European nations indirectly originate. We are free to conclude that the vast lack of European self-awareness is to be blamed primarily on the weaknesses and shortcomings of national self-consciousnesses, which are *the *conditio sine qua non** of the birth and existence of self-aware Europeans. Admittedly, the weaknesses and shortcomings of national self-awareness are not only subjective but also objective in nature, caused by decades of persecution, demonisation and criminalisation by the major producers of Western public opinion. In such, overwhelmingly difficult conditions of survival, it is not possible to expect the natural deepening of national self-awareness perspectives to the horizon of their recognition within a common, European identity.

It may be superfluous to reiterate how European self-awareness is usually awakened in the thoughts and hearts of Europe's sons and daughters when they leave the common homeland and venture deep into the lands of a foreign land. Those who have lived or live far from Europe, for instance in the heart of black Africa or yellow Asia, know well the joy that a meeting with even a stranger who is European by *blood* brings. Within the circle forged by this joy and sense of solidarity, any inter-national distance usually vanishes, for the representatives of European nations present there ideally form a single, unified bundle of European being and European self-awareness. Within the circle in question, it is easy and swift to realise the truth that European self-awareness does not exclude the national: we can therefore expect the birth of a European nation in which existing nations will not disappear but will endure, with their respective hallmarks of identity serving as central stations on a scale of quantitative hierarchy, between the lowest, regional, and the highest, all-encompassing, European identity.

We know well that in the arena of history, only a great threat can rouse European self-satisfaction from its long slumber, such as that of the Arab invaders who were stopped at Poitiers. In the year 732, united Germanic, Gallic and Romance forces, inspiring one monk to credit the victory to '*Europeans*' in his chronicle, thus entering the coinage into our dictionaries and the annals of literacy. Given the gravity of these experiences, we can assume that European self-awareness will awaken, expand and develop under the blows of ever-greater, more frequent and more intense waves of immigration from the Third World masses, which are already taking on the proportions of a peacetime invasion. This is a growing catastrophe produced by the new, usurious colonialism of the Atlantic Leviathan, and a series of signs indicate that its strategists are consciously encouraging, financing and directing the flows of mass emigration towards

Europe in order to completely change its cultural and demographic picture, in accordance with the mondialist vision of the ideological world, called '*One World*'. And it is precisely this threat of a peacetime invasion of Europe – for which some one hundred million emigrants in sub-Saharan Africa alone are being prepared, as noted by research from the Department of Demography at the University of La Sapienza in Rome (from *the 'Messaggero'* of 17 June 2003) - one of the manifest necessities of a real unification

of the European states into a single, independent and powerful force, capable of defending itself by offering an alternative and counterposing to Atlantic parasitism and nihilism a European model of international cooperation and co-prosperity.

The education of the European man

Rather than waiting for a European self-awareness to emerge on a wider scale through the force of external threats, everything must be done to awaken it before the final exams, before the collapse of Western civilisation, so that it is able to respond to all challenges preparedly. The fact that a chronic void persists in the curricula of European states' education systems, where the will to impart European self-awareness should long ago have taken root, reveals the true attitude of the ruling pseudo-elites towards the ideal of European unification. Therefore, the task of awakening and imparting European self-awareness awaits all who are capable of it, in all walks of life, from primary school teachers, librarians and booksellers to university professors, academics and sages; from mere art lovers and students of cultural history, and walking encyclopaedias in the cafés of Central Europe, to expert researchers of ethnological and archaeological treasures; from the family home to networks of pro-European, secret and public associations and movements. And in this respect, the German unification in the 19th century can provide a good example: the political decisions of a number of states and statelets to form a single entity were preceded by decades of work and effort by the elites in uncovering the national heritage and in spreading national self-awareness.

On the world stage, the spark-igniter of European self-awareness stands as an avant-garde among the fighters for the real unification of European nations. Without the existence of a 'critical mass' of European self-awareness, it is neither possible to create nor to maintain a state of all Europeans. The building of a common state home for Europeans requires from all nations and individuals sacrifices that can only be sanctioned by a strong and universally rooted European self-awareness, deeply imbued with a sense of pan-European solidarity. Therefore, the call to awaken European self-awareness is the last historical figure to appear against the backdrop of the profound twilight of the Western cycle of civilisation. If it succeeds in its mission, it will also be the first figure of the new cycle, marked by the great re-emergence of the European man.

The figure in question ideally unites within itself a range of skills and callings, from the exploratory, in the Euro-Aryan world, through the pedagogical and missionary, to the political and combative. The success of the enterprise of awakening, educating and developing European self-awareness literally depends on the survival of Europeans, who in their history have never found themselves in a worse and more dangerous position, simultaneously hopelessly weak, will-less and unconscious. Otherwise, were it not for this anaesthetised state, akin to that brought on by anaesthesia, it would seem as though they had reconciled themselves with the certainty of losing their homelands and their very existence. Therefore, a final assault is necessary from all those who are awake and *'upright among the ruins'* against this morbid numbness of European consciousness and self-awareness. It should be borne in mind that Europe has plenty of valiant examples but few devoted people: therefore, in this field of decisive struggle, every awakened individual is precious, obliged to carry forward the European idea.

The Euro-Aryan and European heritage, the worthy object and content of the self-awareness in question, is composed of crystallisations of knowledge, experiences and inspirations realised in elite and popular workshops, throughout a series of millennia of the arduous march of the Euro-Aryan and subsequently European peoples through this arena of the universe, from the Hyperborean primeval home towards the common state of a new great gathering, from prehistory towards transhistory. Therefore, the first task is the enlightenment of the most ancient treasures, brought forth from the Hyperborean origin, which temporally and spatially precedes all subsequent stations of dispersion. Given the prevalence of a stupefying delusion, the truth must be repeatedly stated that Athens and Rome are not the starting points, but rather quite late, incidental stations on the historical adventure of the European man, which began some ten millennia ago, at the northernmost reaches of the world.

The transmission of the substance of European self-awareness, or of the subject of European identity, must be in keeping with its own tradition; therefore, it must be entirely different from that which takes place under the shadow of modern Western civilisation. In contrast to the science of the Western civicus, both marked by the reign of the principle of *quantity*, which not only overlooks the dimensions of *quality* but also 'deadens' the most living objects - studying them as if they were corpses on an anatomical dissection table and perceiving only the corresponding things and phenomena - the epistemological perspective of traditional cultures refines and imparts the *qualitative* properties and vitality of the heritage. This is an eternal and therefore most living heritage, which must be taken on as an inseparable and fundamental part of our spiritual body. The task of pupils in European schools of classical education and upbringing to memorise and be able to recite at any time long passages from the epics and the intricate webs of lyrical poems of the literary heritage was not so much aimed at exercising the powers of memorisation, but at introducing into the spiritual body a lasting source of the radiance of the virtues celebrated in verse. Thus, the aim of acquiring knowledge was not merely the mere increase of a quantity of dead data and information, but the radical, positive transformation of the individual. Each element of the Euro-Aryan and European treasury of heritage - from cosmogonic myths, the cosmograms woven on the looms of the Euro-Aryan tradition of the 'geometrisation' of the world and Fibonacci's 'sequence', which reveals to us the cosmic measure of beauty, namely the 'golden ratio' the proportion of the spiral movements of galaxies, the structure of the *Nautilus* shell and of Roman villas, to the Hellenic myths, the heroic epics of Central European chivalry, the lullabies of Serbian guardians of nature's secrets and the prophecies of the Eddic seers - exposed to the light of thought and the waves of feeling pos- conceals a powerful intellectual and spiritual weapon on the field of the great war of Order against Chaos, fit for opening the path to metaphysical transcendence and the overcoming of the self.

Ezra Pound's Lesson

One example of the use of the living knowledge of the heritage is sufficient, and let it be the one given to us, at the most difficult time of his life, by the greatest European poet of the 20th century, Ezra Pound. Thrown, like a ferocious and dangerous beast, into a cage of barbed wire, he remembered Odysseus's captivity in the Cyclops' cave and the cunning with which the Hellenic hero avoided revealing his name and thus being magically bound: "*My name is nobody*". This is why the first poet of Europe - "*a lone ant of a ruined anthill, from the ruins of Europe* ego scriptor" - at the very beginning of the first canto of the *Pisan Cantos* (Pound, 1967) introduces himself with a question in Ancient Greek: "*My name is no one, my name is no one?*" And he adds, in mathematical language: "*Odysseus / my name poroditej makes part of the process and the wind /*

little sister Luna / Fear God and the idiocy of the plebs..." (LXXIV) Between that questioning and the proverb for survival where the passions of the demos rule, an intuition of the European man's descent into servitude under the force of new cyclopes is discernible.

Pound's comparison hit the mark: among the figures of Homer's world, the Cyclops possess traits that make them the savage forerunners of the modern, senile barbarism of the bullies of the Atlantic Leviathan. Admittedly, Homer does not provide us with further details, assuming his audience was well acquainted with this type of hominid, but what little he does say is very reminiscent of the 'cyclops' of modern times. In the fact that the cyclops Polyphemus is the son of Poseidon, one can see a foreshadowing of the thalassocratic basis of the 'cyclopean' power of the Atlantic Leviathan. And the progenitors of the 'cyclopean' stock also inhabited the regions of the far west of Homer's world. They lived in a uniquely self-absorbed and selfish manner, as the archetypes of the 'lonely crowd' of modern Western civilisation. And indeed, the cyclopean worldview was devoid of any depth, thus superficial, or two-dimensional, as is inherent to 'single-eyedness'. Considering themselves stronger than all and believing only in the right of might, they acknowledged no god, nor law, over their parasitic and cannibalistic economy of survival. According to other sources, the Cyclopes were somewhere known as demonic, skilful producers of weapons—which they forged in the volcanic fires—and in other parts of the Hellenic world, they were remembered as legendary builders of "Cyclopean" walls, which in every respect departed from the Apollonian measure, like the skyscraper architecture of modern megalopolises.

The figure of the sorceress Circe is evoked by Pound in a scene provided by his keepers, typical examples of the power of modern Western civilisation to dehumanise people: "*thus lay the Jews in Circe's sty; / ivi in harum ego ac vidi cadaveres animae.*" (LXXIV). Yet, Circe cannot long maintain her dark reputation in the modern world. And she—like many figures and phenomena testing Odysseus's courage, steadfastness, and wisdom—seems like child's play when compared to the dreadful, black-magic powers of the sorcerers, that is, the shapers of public opinion in the modern world. Thus, only a few lines later, Pound, with a smile of irony, looks back on Odysseus's vision of Circe. Her modern successor, the personification of supranational usury, is incomparably more dangerous: "*not with leopards, nor with lions accompanied / but with poison, with poison / in all the veins of public health / if it is up, it will spread down among them...*" (LXXIV) The old, Homeric Circe, however, can well serve to familiarise European children in a timely manner with the pernicious powers of the modern media, which also transform the consumers of their charms and deceptions into subhuman beings. The symbolism of the bloodthirsty spectres, called sirens (from the Semitic *shir* =song) which herald the power of modern music and its subliminal messages to irresistibly draw the masses of the meek into rituals and hallucinogenic worlds of human self-destruction. The toponym *Ithaca* can be used not only in poetry but also in everyday speech as another name for our ideal homeland, Europe, which aptly measures its remoteness. Moreover, politically, Europe today is not substantially different from the *Ithaca* that Odysseus found upon his return, a figure shrouded in the shadow of a beggar's hood. Today, as in the past, due to the lack of a genuine *auctoritas* and

of corresponding power and authority – vaster than those who hold it unworthily, offering only examples of intellectual immaturity and moral spinelessness, or even perversion.

The tragic loneliness of the European poet, standing upright in the ruins of Europe, is revealed to us by the address of his poetry to himself and to his own memory. All too often, Pound's thoughts, observations or quotations are fragmentary, written with a telegraphic and even stenographic economy, all of which betrays the privacy of the manuscript but also a compulsion of urgent haste, under siege by threats to all that is human and upright. And the contents of that memory—from elements of the *imaginaire*, a general encyclopaedia of things and phenomena, to faces and corresponding actions and expressions known only to the poet—are presented to us as a particular reflection of circumstances, a scene of the *'ruined anthill'*. Yet, from the *"ravaged anthill, from the ruins of Europe,"* the poet's thought can rise higher than ever before, offering European lessons of a beauty that saves us: *"To raise the city of Dai, whose terraces have the colours of the stars / Gentle, clear eyes, not offended, / forms part of the prooses and the rains. / That from which you turn away is not the way / and the olive tree is bleached in the wind / bathed in the Kiang and Han / what whiteness would you add to that whiteness, to that chastity?"* (LXXIV).

From his Pisan captivity, Pound summons a series of jewels from the tradition of inalienable virtues and values: *"What you truly love remains, / the rest is waste / What you truly love will not be torn from you / What you truly love is your true inheritance"* (LXXXI). We can assume that this magnificent mobilisation of knowledge and experiences from all the paths and trails of memory was forced by the challenges of captivity. The human retreats into the cage of captivity before the onslaught of the inhuman, and from his cage Pound perceives a great and salutary reversal, the vindication of the metaphysical powers of tradition: *"Beyond the barbed wire chaos and nothing."* (LXXX)

There is no doubt that Pound was able to accurately assess the perniciousness of the evil brought about by usury, freed from all restraints and shackles by the force of bourgeois revolutions. It is precisely Pound's suffering and the shameful sentence of confinement in a New York psychiatric clinic that attests to the fact that his accusation hit its mark and enraged those he had exposed. The validity of Pound's insistence on usury as the principal threat to humanity today is attested to by a series of processes, from the relentless deepening of the abyss of indebtedness that is starving billions of people and the shift of the centre of gravity of the world economy towards the stock exchange hubs of speculative transactions, to the pathological growth of the dollar mass, whose total nominal value is tens of times greater than the value of all available goods in the world's markets.

The pound does not dwell on the condemnation of usurers and moneylenders but seeks and finds salvation in an ideal state to which it often returns on the tide of memory: *"yet the State can borrow money / and the jloa that went out to Salamis / was built with a state loan to the shipbuilders / hence the attack on classical studies"* (LXXIV). *"The State can lend money/ as was shown at Salamis/ and because of the notes on the monopoly/ of Thales; and on the credits, Siena;/ both for trust and distrust;/ 'the earth belongs to the living' / the interest on everything it creates from nothing / has the shameful bank; pure malice / and to change the value of money, the unit of money / METATHEMENON / we have not yet concluded that chapter/ Le Paradis n'estpas artificiel."* (LXXVII)

Roman heritage

Where is that ideal state, capable of containing the evil of usury by supporting all the productive forces that need it? That state exists only in our thoughts and dreams, bearing a multitude of other tasks of renewal and defence, of giving birth to and developing European virtues and values. Perhaps also because of the magnitude of the challenges and threats to the European man and his tradition and culture

- we see this ideal, internal state of Europeans as relatively powerful and great, that is, measured by imperial magnitudes. After all, true Europeans are spiritually prepared to gladly enter a common home that has the structure of an empire. In the thoughts and heart of every true European, at least a faint and hazy trace of nostalgia for the empire endures. All the sons and daughters of Europe can freely say "*civis romanus ego sum*", for their homelands were once part of the Roman Empire or one of its successors, such as the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation and the Habsburg Empire on the one hand, and the Eastern Empire and Tsarist Russia on the other. The Serbian Empire, which under the reign of Emperor Dušan assumed the Roman legacy, remained so deeply etched in the memory of the people that even centuries of Turkish-Islamic occupation could not erase it. Therefore, the idea of restoring *the Slav-Serbian Empire* inspired the leaders of the Serbian uprisings, from Karadorđe to Miloš Obrenović. (Kalajić, 1998b)

Although Hellenic thought owes us considerably more than Roman, in the languages of European nations most of the essential terms for phenomena, institutions and concepts of cultural and civilisational life derive directly from Latin. In all likelihood, this use of Latinisms—even where it is not necessary—is the result not only of the former widespread use of the Latin language throughout the European ecumene, but also a consequence of the great prestige of the Roman state's organisation and of Roman law. Using a fine saying of the Serbian people about the force of genetic conditioning—"blood is not water"—we could with equal right say of words that *they "are not water"*: when used, they influence the being of the individual and even of the nation by the force of their determinations, phonetic resonance and rhythm. The fact that it is a long-dead language only increases its power of influence, for it is precisely because of this state that Latin is eternal and unchanging. As an eternal and unchangeable language, the language of the Roman Empire, through the definition of key phenomena, institutions and concepts of cultural and civilisational life, provides us with the best defences against malicious deceptions: namely, immutable meanings. Therefore, the Atlantic occupiers of Europe, by virtue of their victory in the Second World War, attacked not only '*classical studies*', as Ezra Pound observed – ordering the closure of classical grammar schools and the abolition of Latin and Ancient Greek, philosophy and ethics – but also a significant portion of the Latin and Ancient Greek-derived vocabulary.

Thus, the opinion-makers in the service of the Atlantic occupiers continued the anti-European action of the Comintern of Lenin and Trotsky in the domain of language, attaching extremely negative meanings to a series of words that denote precisely the stances and actions of vital importance for the survival not only of man and community but also of mere Humanity, from *authority*, *discrimination*, *dogma* and *conservatism*, to *reaction* and *revision*. Everywhere that one naively or fearfully adopts the perversion of meanings of the signs of basic humanity, one becomes easy prey to the enemy's conditioning, shunning *authority* instead of seeking it; refraining from all *discrimination* and *dogma*, that is, the power to distinguish between truth and falsehood,

beauty and ugliness or good and evil; depriving itself of the ability to *conserve*, that is, to preserve, and to transmit (*tradition*) virtues and values. On top of all this – from the standpoint of the Atlantic enemies of Europe's strategy – the ideal subject is incapable of self-defensive *reactions* to challenges, as well as of *revising*, or questioning, not only the history written by victorious warlords but also the imposed ideology.

The famous saying that '*all roads lead to Rome*' is much deeper than is generally understood. It is an expression of a mental image of the world that has its centre, from which roads radiate outwards to the limes, like the sun's rays, symbolising the defence of Order against the forces of chaos. This same mental image also pertains to the Roman application of the prehistoric, Euro-Aryan cross for the layout of cities, which were centred on the axes of *the cardo* and *decumanus*. To this day, we travel on the main roads opened by Roman builders, and in many cities we walk along streets that follow the alignments of *the cardo* and *decumanus*, as determined by Roman urban planners. Monuments of Roman culture and civilisation – from the Pantheon, the Forum and imperial palaces such as Hadrian's, Diocletian's or Galerius's to statues, aqueducts and thermal baths, built across Europe – form the basis of the European heritage that guides and shapes our lives. Only when we leave Europe, that is, the space of this heritage, when we step out of the web woven from the emanations of meaning of the various marks of our European identity and the beacons for our thoughts and feelings, can we feel, can we sense their significance. In some overseas foreign land, on other continents, we ask ourselves, if we are at all sensitive, how it is possible to live in such narrowness, without the historical depth that Europe possesses. And this feeling of historical depth, or the greatness of time, we owe, in no small part, to the Roman Empire.

For decades, every first of January at noon, in accordance with an unwritten ritual, Europeans, consciously or unconsciously, pay homage to the last Western offshoot of the Roman Empire by listening to the broadcast of the New Year's Concert of compositions by the two Johann Strausses, father and son, both conductors of the orchestra of the Imperial Court of Vienna. It is this very ritual that is one of the indirect testimonies to the failure of all the attempts by Europe's transatlantic enemies to stifle in the hearts and ears of Europeans the love for true, tonal music and its harmonies.

According to the candid admission of Herbert Marcuse, ideologue of the anti-European student revolt and a CIA collaborator, *the "system of oppression"* is contrary to the collective memory because in it the masses can "*find dangerous intuitions*" : perhaps the enemy of Europe's fear of the intuition of the imperial idea obliges the official, or '*politically correct*', guides through the world of Central European culture have for decades diligently avoided its true greats, while mainly glorifying outbursts from subterranean laboratories of hatred against imperial, traditional and Christian Europe? Thus, it is anti-European or non-European products that come to represent the culture of the Central European man, from the atonal music of Schoenberg, Webern and Berg, a negation of the fundamental characteristic of European music, the stable centre of gravity for tones that leads to or produces harmonies; to Freud's psychoanalysis, a pseudo-scientific restoration of Levantine dream-interpreters and superstitions concerning sexuality (Bakan, 1977); to the extreme, neo-positivist form of Alexandrian sophistry, first cultivated in the 'Vienna Circle'. A notable observation by Karl Kraus presents Vienna as a '*laboratory for destruction*

of mankind" is much deeper than was intended. Thus, having learnt that the truth, goodness and beauty are sought in the opposite of the persuasion and indicators of the West's public opinion manufacturers - the European man should boldly turn the gaze of will and hope towards the imperial idea.

Imperial openness

One of the greatest obstacles to the unification of European nations and states is their differences. The Empire is the only form of political unity that is completely open to all internal differences. An empire does not prejudice the form or system of government at its apex, nor in its constituent parts. Imperial authority does not govern the states it encompasses; rather, it manages or directs all that is *above* and *between* the parts. In principle, an empire can contain states within its composition that have not only different statuses—as the example of modern China shows, with its provinces where capitalist methods of enterprise are permitted—but also diverse forms of government, from monarchical and aristocratic to democratic and communist. This is a possibility that is inherent to the idea of an empire, and there are no serious reasons why it should not be realised. On the other hand, countless reasons do not recommend the violent endeavour of the builders of *the European Union* to subject all states within its composition, despite all historical, national and religious differences, to a single model of political authority. Such violence not only contravenes fundamental rights and freedoms but also destroys one of Europe's essential riches, its internal diversity, acquired through millennia of often unique historical experiences of its national and ethnic communities.

The fact is that the external and formal, ideological and political uniformity of the *European Union's* member states, their reduction to the framework of multi-party and mediating (pseudo)democracy is not the product of some spontaneous development, nor of free choice, but is a direct, collective consequence of world wars and revolutions, the military defeats of other ideologies and the Atlantic occupation. The hindrance of development and the weakening of the socialist system were equally forced by the violence of the Cold War and the artificially stimulated arms race, which compelled the USSR to deprive broad areas of social necessity of vast resources, redirected towards defence needs. Nevertheless, all this was not enough to bring about the collapse of the socialist system, which was, above all, the result of the capitulation and betrayal of pseudo-elites. In this regard, it is symptomatic that the Chernobyl nuclear power plant explosion – which, according to a number of indicators, is a genocidal act by Russophobic forces – marks the end of the real '*perestrojka*', that is, the renewal of socialism, and the beginning of self-destruction. This process of violently steering nations was also evident after the suppression of the socialist system, when the Atlantic power, throughout Eastern Europe, through a number of its own media and outlets – from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank to '*non-governmental organisations*' - razoriia nacionalne ekonomije i otela društvene imovine te javna dobra posredstvom "privatizacije", kako bi narode lišila svake odbrane od "*tranzicije*" ka oktrosanoj, sužanjskoj sudbini.

Therefore, the empire is the most suitable form for the restoration of the freedom lost in world wars and revolutions, a true freedom *for* the political self-determination of European nations.

The European Union already possesses two principles of internal organisation that are inherent to a legitimate empire. These are the principle of openness to different degrees of union – the so-called '*Europe at different speeds*' post-war - and the principle of subsidiarity. The first principle essentially protects the building of the European home from obstructions, such as those from Britain, by allowing for the freedom to opt out of agreements, such as the application of the common currency or the single visa system. It goes without saying that this freedom *from* is worth just as much as the freedom *to*, that is, not preventing the former from expanding and consolidating forms and systems of solidarity. The principle of subsidiarity is precisely a hallmark of the European imperial experience, which was widely and fruitfully applied from the Eastern Empire and the Holy Roman Empire to the Habsburg Empire. A prime example of the application of this principle was provided by the Military Frontier, which stretched along the borders with the Ottoman pseudo-empire, *grosso modo* in the territory of present-day Croatia and northern Serbia. The Krajisnik, a proud nation of Serbian warriors and warriors, in defending the empire, enjoyed complete political and religious, military and economic autonomy, that is to say, self-government. The peculiar nature of the Military Frontier's status was also reflected in the fact that it was not, in any political sense, subordinate to Zagreb, but answered directly only to the imperial administration in Vienna. Thanks to this status, the Military Frontier became a treasury for the extraordinary preservation and development of Serbian culture, particularly the heroic epic, whose roots are prehistoric. For this reason, the ancient Euro-Aryan form of the growing family economy, known as *the *zadruga**, was retained and preserved in the Military Frontier for the longest time.

The principle of subsidiarity provides particularly favourable conditions for preserving and developing the European wealth of diversity, in all domains, from systems of governance and economic models to cultural traditions and customs, cuisine and oenology. When an empire exists, there is no danger that the principle of openness to different degrees of union, the principle of subsidiarity, and the processes of regionalisation will thwart the development of integration and its stability. On the contrary, it is precisely such a set of internal state and regional diversities, like the system of sealed chambers on a ship, that makes an empire stronger against all external shocks. Very open within itself to all manner of phenomena and movements, the empire nevertheless demands an unshakeable unity towards the outside world. And here we observe the essential qualitative difference between the empire and *the European Union*. As if built to be an inverted empire or an anti-empire, *the European Union* is characterised by internal processes of integration that tend to establish a general uniformity and levelling, that is, the destruction of the richness of diversity. Towards the outside world, however, *the European Union* is almost completely open, devoid of any protective shield and, consequently, any political will. Therefore, *the European Union* entered the 21st century without a foreign minister, or indeed a foreign policy, as well as without its own security forces, compelled to pay *protection money* to the Atlantic occupier and even *a tribute in the blood* of European youth for the purposes of its campaigns on *the Eurasian 'Heartland'*. These are the two elements of sovereignty without which not only an empire but even the smallest, ostensibly sovereign state is unthinkable.

An imperial openness to the richness of diversity, constitutionally determined and protected by positive laws, provides the conditions for defending the European man from the violence of the many exclusions of secularised metastases of monotheism, from liberal capitalism and the idolatry of economic growth,

a subspecies of the cult of linear-historical progress. The Empire provides sufficient room for manoeuvre to overcome the demonism of the economy, which transforms man and human life into a servile means. After all, the movement towards the unification of Europeans loses all meaning if it leads to the same, centuries-old goals of liberal capitalism from across the Channel, which are the primary drivers of the process of destroying European virtues and values. The building of *the European Union* will only gain its full meaning when it undertakes the task of man's emancipation from liberal capitalism, towards the rehabilitation of the European tradition of understanding the economy as a means for a range of human impulses towards self-realisation – and not just greed – and above all, in the service of all the community's needs.

The fundamental condition for the existence of a common European state is the restoration of a European order of values, which requires a great reversal of a centuries-old and forcibly imposed perversion that subordinates everything to the demon of the economy. Thus, it is a question of the rehabilitation of the threefold hierarchy of the community and its corresponding ideology. It is also a matter of the necessity of rehabilitating the supremacy of the political, that is, the universality of the primacy of the superior over the inferior and of the whole over the partial. It is essential to return the economy to its natural place in terms of meaning and importance, and to direct its forces to make positive contributions to politics within an appropriate system of representation. The long-standing and growing inability of existing political parties to respond to the increasing challenges of global processes necessitates the establishment of an alternative system for representing the real needs and will of the community, and the mobilisation of credible elites. This concerns the necessity of opening up a space for the political representation and mobilisation of all essential forces and activities of the community, from the church, science and technology, and the arts, through the military and security forces, to industry and agriculture. Managing only that which is *above* and *between* states, the imperial administration has an urgent need for such a representative chamber of roles and activities, and for the corresponding supranational, or pan-European, organisations, associations, alliances and corporations. In addition to an expertise that far surpasses the meagre and even non-existent powers of existing multi-party assemblies, such a house could also make an outstanding contribution to strengthening European unity. By connecting deputies and activists from all European states and nations along European axes and transversals, the driving forces of such a chamber would reliably defend Europe from centrifugal impulses and temptations.

The Unification of *Left* and *Right*

The struggle to post-modernise the European tradition of economic thought provides a special opportunity for the unification, or at least cooperation, of the forces of *the true right* and *the genuine left*, which the anti-European '*divide and conquer*' strategy has for centuries succeeded in pitting against each other to the extent of civil wars and revolutions. Occasionally, very rarely and only temporarily, these forces managed to overcome their mutual idiosyncrasies and unite. Somewhere, in Paris's Place de la Concorde, that magical alliance lasted for only one day: On 6 February 1934, young *left-wingers* and *right-wingers* rose up together against the corrupt, anti-social and anti-French government of *the Popular Front*. Several decades later, on 1 March 1968, a similar and equally spontaneous alliance of discontent among young *left-wingers* and *right-wingers* erupted in Rome, under the light of *the invincible Sun* and the common slogan: "*All united against all parties*". (Kalajić, 1968) Unfortunately, this alliance was quickly shattered by the ready

by agents in the service of Europe's enemies who directed the demonstrations towards the destruction of the European system of education, with incidental and entirely barren manifestations of idolatry towards historical figures of the communist movement.

The history of the alliance in question is inconceivable without the '*Ribbentrop-Molotov Pact*' or the '*Berlin-Moscow axis*', that is, without the peace treaty between the Third Reich and the USSR. There is no doubt that the principal architects of this agreement were, on both sides, those elements who were able to rise above the ideological constraints of National Socialism and Communism and to perceive the great interests of the Germanic and Slavic worlds, and of Europe. Based on both pro-Russian and pro-German ideas of the *Deutsche Bewegung* and the Slavophiles, this alliance cut across the forces in Berlin and Moscow. In Berlin, its supporters came from the intellectual circles of the SS and the revolutionary remnants of the party, while its fiercest opponents were the generals of the *Wehrmacht* and Adolf Hitler's own Anglophile soul. In Moscow, however, the top of the *Red Army* and the corresponding counter-intelligence service were pro-German, while anti-German feelings and suspicions were cultivated at the top of the party and the NKVD.

When the Russophobic regime in the Kremlin, with the help of officers from the Atlantic Alliance and snipers from the Israeli 'Jericho' division, launched military force against representatives of the will of the Russian people, gathered in the House of the Soviets, in November 1993. In the ideological domain, the alliance of Serbian *socialists* and *radicals* left no trace, nor did it bear fruit – perhaps due to the entirely pragmatic nature of its motives. That symbol of national sovereignty was defended, shoulder to shoulder, by young nationalists and communists. The alliance of the Serbian *left* and *right* in the form of the Government of *National Unity* was forced upon them by years of hostility, the *cold* and *hot* war waged by the Atlantic Alliance against the Serbian people and their state. Although in the ideological domain the alliance between the Serbian socialists and radicals left no trace, nor any fruit – perhaps due to the purely pragmatic nature of the motives on which it was founded – it proved to be a lifeline, defending the state and social justice, preserving national property and undertaking a great movement to rebuild the devastated country and its economy with its own resources.

Despite the rare, weak, and largely barren alliances *between the left and the right*, any encounter, however minor, and dialogue between the two sides without hostility prompts the Atlantic producers of public opinion to sound the alarm bells, as if it were the most dangerous threat imaginable. Given that the very axis of the conflicts and wars which have devastated and afflicted Europe over the last two centuries has been marked by ideological *left-right* dualisms, any goodwill would have to welcome such encounters, dialogues or alliances as a sign of the triumph of reason, pacifism, or some form of higher, cross-party solidarity. The fact that the shapers of public opinion are wary of a ceasefire between the *left* and the *right* testifies that the intentions of their Atlantic masters are not well-intentioned towards Europeans. Their true intentions were best revealed by the '*strategy of the two extremes*', particularly during the 1970s and 1980s, the bloody trail of which has always pointed to, and points to, the instigators and financiers from non-European secret services. It does not require great intelligence to understand that one of the essential interests of Europe and Europeans is not only the cessation of futile and dangerous conflicts but also a great alliance of the forces of the *true right* and the *genuine left*. We have already observed the easiest way

of finding the right answers to challenges: one should always do the opposite of the advice from *the 'masters'* of the institutions of the globalist project.

A cynic could rightly observe that the greatest parts of *the left* and *right* have long since been reconciled. This is about the ideological and moral erosion of the greater part of *the European left*, which has been caused by a series of subjective and objective factors, from inadequacy of Marxist perspectives for in-depth analyses, the decline of ideological education for elites and work with the masses, to the weakness of the human material at the top of political parties and trade union movements, to the collapse of the USSR and the corresponding network of solidarity. *The Left* has almost en masse fled from the position of '*class struggle*' to the *centre* and become a much more zealous, unconditional and unscrupulous executor of the orders of the Atlantic power and the international of financial capital than the false, or rather *economic, right* ever was or is. Were he alive, Donoso Cortés would conclude that socialism, like a prodigal son, has returned to its liberalist mother. In just a few years, during the last decade of the 20th century, *centre-left* governments across Europe have succeeded in dismantling almost all the defences and protections for labour and workers that were won through centuries of struggle. At the same time, they have cast aside any pretence of pacifism to approve, even at the cost of trampling on international law, the UN Charter and national constitutions, the participation of national forces in the Atlantic Alliance's aggression against Yugoslavia. All the wit of *the Left* – once in a chronic state of criticism and negation – for the transformation of the world demanded by Marx's famous eleventh thesis on Feuerbach – has been reduced to the indirect and direct approval or support of even the most disastrous ruling processes and phenomena, as if they were the consequences of some higher power. On the other hand, the same thought tends to be hurled with the greatest fury not only at voices of resistance but also at attempts to analytically understand the real causes of phenomena that threaten the world. For example, the intellectual effort to uncover the real aims and purposes of the military campaigns of *the United States of America* and its vassals is usually ridiculed as a '*conspiracy theory*' or as a 'symptom of intellectual megalomania: the abandonment of all analysis is recommended with the assertion that the causes of the said phenomena, as well as of other 'worldist' processes, are supposedly so numerous and their interactions so intricate that the human mind cannot possibly grasp them all. Therefore, without any shame, one witnesses the abdication of the mind and an all-encompassing capitulation before *the Wittgensteinian 'world – a totality of facts'*.

For decades, a crisis of identity has been eroding the forces of *the right*. The political lexicon is ample testimony to this, where the word '*the right*' has long become a designation for a broad front of forces advocating liberal capitalism. The assimilated or compliant remainder is criminalised and demonised, and exiled from the scenes of political and parliamentary legality with the stigma of '*the extreme right*'. In a world under the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan, the adjective "*extreme*" denotes the worst and even criminally punishable positions of human ideas and opinions, as if all of history did not testify to us that creative and driving forces are always at the most extreme fringes, while nothing new has ever been born from mediocrity and moderation. All the greats of European political thought, from Heraclitus and Plato to Dante and Machiavelli, Hegel and Nietzsche, Danilevsky and Spengler, are extremists *par excellence*.

The identity crisis of *right-wing* parties and movements is deepened by a chronic lack of a cultural dimension and of the corresponding intellectual and creative forces capable of defining and defending it.

It is the consequence of a series of causes, one of the strongest of which is psychological in nature. Unlike the average *left-wing* intellectual, prone to collectivism and the corresponding discipline, the intellectual of the European *right* is characterised by a strong independence of spirit, which usually makes him the object of multiple suspicions. There is also a certain 'laziness' to the *right-wing* intellectual: unlike the *left-wing* intellectual, whose ideology, deprived of an ontological basis, The intellectual of the *right* knows that his ideas are more real than material reality and are eternal, and therefore he has no pressing need to prove their truth to anyone.

It is certain that the ebb of intellectual power in Christian-inspired parties has deeper causes, which are also manifested after the latter and greatest historical crisis of the Catholic Church. This crisis and the weaknesses of the *Christian democratic* forces on the political scene are most clearly manifested in their complete political, moral and religious capitulation to liberal capitalism, despite being aware that it is an explicitly anti-Christian and even anti-human ideology and force. One testimony is enough, and let it be the letter from Giorgio La Pira, the Mayor of Florence, to Pope Pius XII, dated 1 May 1958. With a voice similar to that of the desert, La Pira admonished the ailing Pope on the duty of the Church to oppose with all available means the "*anti-Christian and inhuman principles of liberalism*":

"Most Blessed Father, the peoples and nations which are destined to have an essential part in the building of the new world of nations can no longer allow their economic (and therefore social and political) structures to be woven with the anti-Christian and anti-human principles of liberalism. The teachings of the Church speak clearly: from Leo XIII and Pius XI (the great encyclical Quadragesimo anno!) to Pius XII, the condemnation of economic (and not only economic) liberalism is extremely clear and decisive. The poison of civilisation, the cause of communism, is expressed and contained in that fabric of 'liberal norms' which are rooted in the principle of bellum omnium contra omnes (homo homini lupus!). Know, Most Blessed Father, that the power of money, truly demonic, is in the hands of a few... Sacred values must be returned to the people; They must not be broken by a single conception of the world—the liberal one—which does not recognise the mystery of grace, of the sacraments, of the Church, and which is as atheistic and materialistic as the communist conception which has sprung from it, like a fruit from a seed, as the effect of its cause. Most Blessed Father, we will fight tirelessly against this social cancer which has 'secularised' civilisation and brought it to the brink of the abyss." ("Corriere della Sera" of 3 January 2004.)

Despite great and powerful resistances, the march of the ideas and forces of liberal capitalism has not been stopped, and its proponents celebrate the '*end of history*', that is, the absence of any opposing alternative on the world stage. The proclamation of the '*end of history*' is much deeper than was intended, because the forces driven by liberal capitalism, by unleashing a series of catastrophes across the planet – from psychological and existential, social and cultural to economic, biological and ecological – truly threaten to end the story of the human race once and for all. And this is one of the vital reasons for the unification of the forces of the true *right* and the genuine *Left* on the building site of a common state for all Europeans, which, with such gathered knowledge and forces, powers and wills, could open up a salutary alternative to the '*new world order*'.

Horizons of Possibility

Even if an ideal alliance is not formed, the mere cessation of futile hostilities between *the true right* and *the genuine left*, and their mutual recognition of the real and common enemies and challenges that threaten Europe, would be a great contribution to the building of a common European state. *The Left* could make a particularly great contribution by re-evaluating, or rather profoundly deepening, the Marxist legacy, starting with the theory of '*surplus value*', whose account remained unfinished, or rather incomplete, in order that, by deliberately overlooking a crucial factor, the producer and lender of money '*out of nothing*', it might serve as the basis for an accusation against the owners of the means of production and as a lever for class struggle. The producer and lender of money, whose significance Marx endeavoured to downplay or silence and to protect—much like the leaders of the Paris Commune, who were careful not to let the incited masses set upon the banks and bankers - acquired and continues to acquire the fruits of the labour of all participants in the chain of production, both the owner of the means of production and the proletarianised worker, through the mere issuance of paper-based pseudo-values '*out of nothing*'. The shift of the world economy's centre of gravity into the realm of Byzantine speculation, gambling and trading in debts, with the consequent devaluation of the production of concrete goods, indicates the scale of the Marxist failure. This failure is particularly evident in the fact that the top echelons of capitalist power are not composed of the owners of the means of production, but rather of the protagonists of the most criminal economy, from stock market speculators and debt traders to drug, arms and human traffickers.

The defence of the European economy requires a new, impartial and comprehensive theory of surplus value, which should illuminate the great threats of '*globalisation*' and determine the best defences. This concerns profits obtained by conquering European markets with goods produced in the Third World through the exploitation of new slaves and the abuse of exemptions from a range of obligations to protect labour and the human environment, as mandated by the positive laws of Europe. In the long term, such a profit-making strategy has no future, as the process of moving production from Europe to Third World countries deepens the unemployment of Europeans and consequently narrows their purchasing power and the European market. In the absence of other defences, the European economy will be forced to adapt to global conditions, that is to say, to discard the last remnants of the defence and protection of labour, workers, and the environment. This is a process that leads to the lowering of the European standard of living to the level of the global proletariat. Leading to such an outcome are also the prospects of importing masses of Third World immigrants who drive down wages and working conditions, to the detriment of the European working class. If there remains any sense of proletarian international solidarity within *the Left*, then it is its duty to advocate for the renewal of European defences and protections for labour, workers, and the environment, so as to impose the virtue of adopting such norms in the non-European world of production as a condition for opening up the European market.

More than ever, the world today needs to combat the liberal-capitalist institutions of the inviolability and even the supposed '*sanctity*' of private property in domains of vital importance to the human species. These are the processes of privatisation and exploitation of land, air and water that deprive people of basic resources and essential biological conditions for survival, causing ecological disasters of a planetary scale. And it is from this battlefield that *the left* has deserted, because its ecological

parties are in fact fighting in the interest of the strategists of the 'new world order' and the peacetime invasion of Third World masses, against Europe and Europeans. The fact that the self-proclaimed anti-globalisation organisations advocate for the same goals, the overthrow of all state borders before the waves of a growing ocean of immigrants, indicates that they are in the service of those against whom they supposedly raise their voices and fists in protest. Thus, an artificial and cheap impression is created that the only alternative to globalisation is supposedly a handful of street thugs and hooligans whose ideologues suffer from a great muddle of concepts.

The essential task of the true *right* is to become truly *radical*, that is, truer to its roots. In this originality, it was not only the first to perceive and the most profound in its insight into the demonic, anti-Christian and anti-human nature of liberal capitalism, but it also provided exemplary alternatives, from Pope Leo XIII's encyclical *Rerum Novarum* to the works of the German real-historical school of economics and 'Prussian socialism'. Oswald Spengler, to de Gaulle's, Catholic teaching-inspired and rejected by referendum for being misunderstood project of worker '*participation*' in the management of enterprises and in the distribution of income. Incidentally, it was precisely from the laboratory of the *right*, from the programme of the Italian Social Republic, that the Yugoslav communists took over and successfully applied the idea of '*participation*', under the more suitable name of '*self-management*'.

History has confirmed the exposing clairvoyance of *right-wing*, counter-revolutionary thought towards the deceptions and utopias of the champions of liberalism (for the demonism of the economy) and the preachers of *progress*. It is necessary to take up the legacy of that thought and bring it to its conclusion, to the great rehabilitation of the wholeness of life, against the constraints of the demon of economics which forces life to serve the idolatry of profit and economic growth, bringing misery to generations. As the traditional bearer of nationalism in Europe, the *right*, or rather the radical *right*, has the task of initiating a great deepening of national consciousnesses to the horizon of recognising the essential unity of the European nations. The *right* is recognised under the motto "*Nationalists of all countries - unite!*" This task also requires the renewal of national, ethnic and regional cultures and traditions, rituals and customs, orders and brotherhoods, *communes* and *co-operatives*, and above all, the revival of the original creative spirit and voice. This necessitates the liberation of the mass media from serving agendas that obscure humanity. And for this task, our ancestors have bequeathed us a prime example, as attested by the South-Slavic myth of the rescue of Zora, who was captured by Cmobog, the greatest enemy of the '*light gods*', in his underworld, yearning to conquer the invincible Sun, Svanimir, and to rule over Svitogor.

A particularly significant task for the *right* is to free itself from the inertia of anti-communism, which was merely a pretext for Russophobia. We have already pointed out the great deception of the Atlantic occupiers who, after their victory in the Second World War, managed to convince the Western European governments and the European *right* that a Russian conquering campaign threatened Europe. This lie fell on fertile ground, on a latent and widespread Russophobia, the evil fruit of Albion's treachery and its anti-European '*divide and conquer*' policy. A great effort is necessary to revise the history of relations between Russia and Europe, which was written and is being written by historians in the shadow of the Atlantic Leviathan. For instance, anyone who consults encyclopaedias today for information

2 *the Holy Alliance* – the great fruit of Russian foreign policy and the only example of its major intervention in West European affairs – will learn how Tsar Alexander I proposed this alliance under the influence of the mystical teachings of a certain Baroness Krüdener, or how the Chancellor Metternich considered the text of the corresponding treaty 'empty

3 *sound*", or how "*illiberal measures*" resulted from it *all*... The encyclopaedias make no mention that thanks to *the Holy Alliance*, that is, the alliance of Russia, Austria and Prussia—offered to France as well—Europe, thus saved from mutual hostilities, religious contradictions and revolutions, enjoyed almost a whole century of peace and prosperity.

It is also essential to recognise the truth that without Russia, it is not possible to build a sovereign, independent, and powerful state for all Europeans. With Russia, the rest of Europe gains everything it lacks today and which is the subject of Atlantic blackmail, from superior defence capabilities and an exceptionally highly-skilled population, to immeasurably vast energy resources and a huge market. A common state for Europeans requires the magnitude of a credible empire, from Reykjavik to Vladivostok. Such an empire would be in every respect unconditional and self-sufficient, capable of truly saving the world, as the Russian Slavophiles foretold, with Russia's mission in mind. Only a legitimate empire provides the conditions for the fulfilment of the promise of the great renewal of European life, which the most inspired and visionary spirits have carried through the centuries, from the prophetesses of *the Edda* to Riikea: "*Everything will be great and strong again / The fields will dream simple dreams, / and the rippling waters will flow, / giant logs will wind their way to the heavens... / I in every home there will be hospitality, / and the awareness of sacrifice, like a beacon, / will give direction to our deeds.*"

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