# FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM

Elements of the Logic of the Will

Ernst Mally

BERSERKER

BOOKS

FUNDAMENTAL LAWS OF THE SOLAR SYSTEM

ELEMENTS OF THE LOGIC OF THE WILL

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Foreword.

In 1919, the word self-determination, which was on everyone's lips, prompted me to try to form a clear concept of the word. Of course, I soon encountered the difficulties and ambiguities of the concept of obligation: the problem changed. As the fundamental concept of all ethics, the concept of obligation can only provide a useful foundation for its construction if it is defined in a system of axioms. I present such a system of axioms here.

Will and judgement are based on facts, will in particular on the reality of something real, in which the will plays a decisive role: a reality that, at least in the sense of the will, should be. Judgement and will are materially correct if they correspond to the facts. The conditions for their material correctness prove to be strictly conforming; the logic of judgements is superseded by a logic of the will or deontics. The fact that we think in terms of determinations and the incompleteness of comprehension that this entails means that material correctness is always striven for, but only formal correctness — in which this striving takes place — is actually required. I believe I have demonstrated the essence of this correctness, which is at the same time the necessary and sufficient condition for value and oughtness, which can be grasped purely intellectually. The essence of values, however, and that of oughtness, remains accessible only to direct, intuitive grasping, which makes use of emotional presentation. Respecting this, one can arrive at an exact, pure ethic on the basis of our laws of ought without resorting to unauthorised rationalisation. In the presentation, I have reduced the purely formal part to the smallest possible extent and have also designed it in such a way that, in the end, no one is forced to follow formal derivations in order to understand the work. In addition to serious external reasons, the main internal reason for the limited consideration of the literature was that I wanted to offer only a positive foundation for the time being. I have therefore limited my citations to the writings from which I learned the essentials for this work — unsurprisingly, these are mainly works by my esteemed teacher —; I have only rarely pointed out mere coincidences and have completely avoided polemics.

avoided.

Oraz, Ara, **13 September 1925.**

Contents.

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Introduction.

There is a risk in judgement and desire: the facts may prove us right or wrong. Those who judge correctly and desire successfully have made the right choice; their behaviour is validated by the facts. It is in harmony with them in a way that goes far beyond the self-evident, that everything that happens is subject to the test of facts — because it is indeed factual. Nevertheless, we do not value such merely external testing highly in terms of judgement or volition: both may have been blindly trusted. On the other hand, even if a judgement, such as a diagnosis or prognosis made after careful consideration, fails to prove itself, this does not alter its value in terms of logical justification; and a volition may miss its target and yet find and deserve recognition as a correct and right volition. Thus, on both sides, justification is not bound to success, yet it is certainly not unrelated to it: logically important judgement and important volition have a very essential relationship to success; by virtue of their very nature, they possess an inherent tendency towards success, and their justification is based on this. If what is inwardly right is wrong and what is inwardly wrong is outwardly right, we attribute this to chance and do not change our assessment. The value of justification stands above risk; it carries with it that courage of conviction and will that fears no outcome.

Judging and willing are specific ways of taking a position on objects. There are conditions for the correctness of judgements, for correct judgement, which must be called objective because they have their origin in the nature of judgements as this specific type of position-taking on objects , therefore given nature of statement can only depend on the nature of beings and the relationships between beings. We have long been accustomed to attributing this to logic, and find it clearly expressed in more recent, exalted logic, which distinguishes these entirely rational, strict laws with certainty from the approximations to certain regularities in the actual occurrence and course of correct thinking, as psychological observation may empirically establish. We are not yet that far along in our understanding of the will. Wanting is also a specific stance towards objects and

It is clear that there are also **laws** of correctness here: **laws** that are correct in their **essence**, which have their origin in **the essence** of the law, and which are limited to the type of behaviour towards objects. And it is clear that these laws of nature are objectively correct and apply in the same way and for the same reasons in the universe and in the universe.

);e'die.2o§ieehefi, Bad 'that they must be sharply distinguished from all empirical laws of a psychological nature that are only approximately valid. It is difficult to imagine anyone seriously and clearly considering replacing the laws of logic with observations about how people actually think under certain conditions — however important and informative such investigations may be in themselves, and especially for logicians. But there is still far from similar clarity and unanimity about the meaning of ethics. It was not the worst thing that there was disagreement about whether ethics should determine rational laws of right volition or empirical findings about right volition, or perhaps both side by side. But the rational principles of volition have hardly ever been developed with sufficiently clear and concise intent, let alone carried out with any useful success. This task is undertaken here. The logic of thought is to be supplemented by something that can be called a logic of the will; but since it is not a branch of logic — such as the logic of concepts or the logic of judgements — but rather the essential laws of behaviour towards objects that is not thinking, this branch of logic might be better given an independent name, such as deontics. We can more easily assess the relationship between deontics and ethics.

In order to recognise the essential laws of judgements and those of volition, one must first consider the objects to which these behaviours are directed. Of course, one can judge any object, but the object that is initially and actually grasped by a judgement, that which is judged (about any object), has a fairly uniform nature: we judge that something is or is not, that something is or is not so, or something that can essentially be reduced to one of these main forms. What we grasp when we judge is therefore a being or non-being, a being or non-being, a   of something, in short: a fact. [1]   However, facts   are also those to which daa Wollen sich

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The facts of the matter are described here. My opinion is that the object is first recognised in its concrete nature and then subjected to explicit consideration. See in particular this author's book Ueber Annahmen, 1st edition, Leipzig 1902, 2nd edition 1910, then my works: Gegenatandatbeoretiache Grunde agen der Logik und Logistik, Leipzig 1912,

directed: we want that **something** be, not be, or not be so. At least, this is how it can be expressed when one disregards, as in the case of judgements, finer distinctions in the form of the facts, which are irrelevant to our investigation.

Facts are now contrasting concepts, **opposites,** as one might **say** with proper further application **of the term**, with clearly expressed characteristics that come to the fore in a multitude of common properties, general principles of facts. Since an object of any kind is naturally characterised by the facts that apply to it as its properties, the laws of the facts also generally specify the **properties** of the properties of any objects and apply to all kinds of objects: directly, if it is a fact, or indirectly, since it is always the bearer of facts. In this sense, the laws of facts are therefore laws of the most general kind. They apply in their own way to any arbitrarily defined object area and are binding on scientific activity, which must in any case reckon with them when selecting such an object area for its work, whether it explicitly observes and states them or not: generalised and primary preconditions.

It is now understood that logic must begin with a general theory of language or take it as its basis. After all, it aims to specify the general principles of correct thinking, and all thinking is an understanding of facts and, if it is to be correct, must be in accordance with the principles of those facts. Whether one now describes these principles, as is usually the case, as logical or as logic, as a doctrine of thinking, in a separate 'theory of facts' — which forms a major part of general object theory — without including them in logic, is a matter of delimiting logic and is of secondary importance. In any case, the laws of facts must be distinguished from the laws of thought, even if, insofar as one is to think in accordance with them, they are in a certain sense laws for thought. They are, since also there

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Studies on the 'Theory of Yö lichkeit und Aehnlichkeit, General Theory of Yerwandtßcbaft Objective Determinations, Proceedings of the Austrian Academy of Sciences in Vienna, Philosophy and History Section, Vol. 184. t. Abh. Vienna 1992.

[1] The aim is to recognise the existing duality and to bring it to light in the treatment of logic. My Gegenstandslogik und Logistik (supplementary booklet to volume 148 of the Zeitschrift für Philosophie und philosophische Kritik) Leipzig 19U, and N. Honecker, Oegenstandslogik und Denk-1oq•ik, Berlin 1921, represent steps in this direction. Critique) Leipzig 19U, and N. H o n ec k e r, Object Logic and Thought Logic, Berlin 1921. See also my article On the Nature and Task of Modern Object Theory. The Humanities I. Vol. 1913/14,
pp. 616–619.

If it is important, we want to give them a gambit, a set of laws for wanting, even though they are as unspecific as the laws of thinking. If we assign to logic the specific laws of thought and to deontics those of Cohen, then the general laws of facts fall under a separate theory that provides a common basis for both by treating the objective, towards which thought and will, each in its own way, are directed.

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I. Fundamentals.

§1. Preliminary observations.

The prerequisites of deontics, which do not belong to it itself, are therefore the concepts and propositions of the theory of facts. I will not present them in detail, but will only refer to what is indispensable, partly immediately, partly where it is needed.

i. g "e h v erfi a l t e ala O e ge n a t ä n d e d e s W o lle n s.

Neither judgement nor will can be applied to just anything. S«hverhalte richten. In order to arrive at a clear distinction between the possibilities, it is advantageous to differentiate between two types of situations. A few examples may help to clarify this. The Thirty Years' War ended in 1648, that gold is heavier than iron, that S -i- 8   5, are quite definite facts; but so are their negatives, which we think of when we deny them, or, for example, that the Earth is larger than the Sun, that the range of prime numbers is finite, etc.are the things we think of when we negate them, or for example: that the earth is larger than the sun, that the 6th power of prime numbers is finite, etc. Every specific fact is either an actual fact or an unreal fact, in short, 'fact' or 'non-fact', and accordingly, a judgement that asserts it is either true or false. — However, in addition to definite facts, there are also those that lack the character of definiteness. By judging, as I write this, that "tomorrow is Monday," I have grasped a definite fact, namely a fact. If I were to assert the same thing tomorrow, I would also be grasping a definite fact, but this time a non-fact, and accordingly, in every case where "tomorrow" refers to a definite, existing "today", such a judgement will grasp a fact or a non-fact, each time a definite fact. However, anyone who, without such a reference to a given case, merely thinks of the meaning of the sentence, **tomorrow** is Monday, as happens, for example, when we encounter the sentence as an example in a grammar book, is also thinking of a fact, but one that, in the present sentence, has a certain indeterminacy attached to it compared to those considered earlier; we call it an indefinite fact.   The facts that are the subject of the

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For more **details**, **see** my studies **on** the **theory** of **3föglichkeit** nnd Aehn-lichkeit, op. cit. chap. f.

Interpretation of the following 8 sentences — forms of expression, but not statements: x is (aei) red, x   1, x —[- y   5. It can be seen that the indeterminate facts are at the same time definitions for the indeterminate or variable elements that appear in them. Obviously, such an indeterminate fact is also indeterminate in terms of its factuality: it is neither fact nor non-fact. Let A (x), B (x) and the like be signs of a determination for the variable or indeterminate x.

If we now consider the behaviour of judgement and volition in relation to these two classes of facts, we must first note that indeterminate facts can neither be judged nor desired. It is impossible because it makes no sense to assert or even to assume, and it is equally impossible to desire that x be red or that x < y, as long as x and y are indeterminate objects, variables. But in x   x°, an indeterminate fact seems to be asserted in a demand, as if one were to make (x) a duty. However, what is judged there and demanded here is not an indeterminate fact, but an arbitrary one — left indeterminate, which one — and thus implicitly every F a 11 of the determination.[®)] x   x" for any arbitrary case, to demand "x does a duty" for any arbitrary case, is correct because the general judgement applies to every value of x, the determination x x° is correct, and likewise the general demand "for every B X for which the determination 'x does a duty' makes sense at all, it should be fulfilled". The idea
, for every x, x — x" clearly captures a very specific
Facts: the indeterminacy of x effectively rules it out for him, because it is
no longer a variable value of x that is considered, but rather the entire
range of values for which the determination makes sense in the first
place. And accordingly in the general requirement. The particular
judgement of the form   for some (at least one)
x, the determination B (x) applies, and likewise the corresponding
requirement refers to a specific fact, despite the x that occurs in it. For
such a judgement asserts as much as "there is at least one x for which B
(x) is fulfilled", and the requirement as much as "there should be at least
one such x". Thus, indeterminate facts are neither subject to judgement
nor to volition, nor even to
Accessible to wishes.

There is now no further restriction on judgement; it can cover certain and apparently every specific set of circumstances. With regard to volition, however, it is not quite so simple; indeed, there seems **to be a** difficulty here**.** That

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,* propositional functions" in contrast to "propositions" in the terminology of **logic.** Cf. inabeg. Whitehead and Russell, Prin eipia mathematica, vol. I, Cambridge, 1810.
Whitehead and Nass11, op. cit.

The problem is that 2 —ṭ- 3 — 5 are certain facts, but they cannot be desired because they are incompatible with the facts, and they are also unacceptable because they are wrong. However, every specific circumstance is a fact or a non-fact, and so it could be that we have wrongly rejected the indeterminate circumstances as possible objects of desire, because now there are none to be found at all. A more precise examination of the facts of the will brings clarity. Caesar decided not to cross the Rubicon. However, the fact that Caesar crossed the Rubicon in 49 BC is timeless, and it was not an indeterminate circumstance when Caesar considered the 'fat erat'. Just as the judgement that captures the facts is always true, or rather, true regardless of the time of judgement, the facts themselves are independent of any time, always facts. If two observers of the earthly event had bet each other before the event whether it would occur, one and only one of them would have spoken the truth, not something that only became true. So there is indeed a specific fact that is the object of the will. When Caesar had made his decision, indeed at the moment of making it, he could also judge: I will cross the river. Not with complete certainty, of course, but with all the more approximation to certainty and with all the more perfect objective certainty the more certain he was of his cause. Of course, he could not do this before making the decision. But not because the facts were still unclear at that point, but because he did not yet know them with sufficient certainty. The facts to which the will is directed, which are given to the will, are determined as facts or misdeeds, but are not grasped with certainty; no position is taken on them, since they are thought without any obligatory element of conviction, without judgement, i.e. they are merely assumed. However, a fact can be judged with conviction even before the will occurs, but then only with a reduced conviction, i.e. in the sense of a presumption: we can want to bring about something that we think might happen even without our intervention.

enters, we want to secure his entry,   . In any case, something is happening. We want a specific situation, only in a particular context, namely the verification of a specific situation — which is then also required — in a specific case, in some, in all cases of a specific kind. But these cases are not comprehensively defined in their entirety, not in such a way that the applicability or non-applicability of the required internal judgement could be deduced from the perceived given definitions. And here is another important point: we believe — implicitly, at least — that all those who wish to do so will accept the given determinations of the case (or cases).

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so that he now also fulfils the required determination. The person who wills, who never wills unsuccessfully, is constituting with his behaviour the case he has in mind and in which the desired determination is fulfilled. It is irrelevant whether the psychological act of volition itself or something else, of which it is the experiential expression, plays the role of the partial relationship in which this co-determination is realised.

S. A1I general and theoretical prerequisites.

Anyone who understands the laws of thought or volition will not be able to avoid the concept of consistency. But this presupposes — which is often overlooked — a certain relationship, purely counterfactual in nature, between facts: the relationship of implication. If A and B are facts — capital Latin letters always denote facts in our symbolism — and if the relationship exists when A (exists), then B°, then we say A implies B', and write

A o B.

Here, daa w'enn — ao" is understood in its broadest, most unassuming sense. If A, then B does not mean more than "ee is not A without B", "if A exists and B does not exist, it does not exist", it follows that A is not possible without B, or that A simply does not exist without B. An implication can be rational or a priori, such as the relationship "if 864 is divisible by 9, then 864 is divisible by ß", but it can also only be empirically verifiable, such as "if Peter comes today, he will be at my place at 5 o'clock" Or, if a conductor is traversed by an electric current, heat is generated in the conductor. From the first example, further **examples** of implications can be obtained — namely, those that can be recognised rationally — by replacing 8b4 in both cases with x or with a number. then instead of an implication between specific facts, one has an implication between unspecified facts. Another correct example is: if 17 is divisible by 9, then 17 is divisible by 8, which, as we said, means nothing other than: " , 17 is divisible by 9 and by 3 indivisible is4, that does not exist, is untrue, and that is
Our thinking even makes similar cases of implication

* What modern exact logic treats under this name is, however, according to the terms, a relationship between propositions or propositional functions, although between parts or between parts and wholes; but very often what is actually meant is the relationship between facts, which is given by each individual statement. This is
go bB€rA0At*D. EfiöB SMh6, w9 Oe$688t*BdEO k' And D6DM0$ü' FOküiOA
so but would be.

fruitful misuse. We assume, for example, that 865 **is** not divisible by ß**,** because the sum of the digits of **865 is** not **aei**, and thus tacitly or explicitly acknowledge the relationship:
"if 885 is divisible by 8, then the sum of the digits, i.e. l8, is also divisible by 3" — precisely because this is not the case, we recognise that the former is not the case either.

The relationship A o B, i.e. A is not without B being, obviously always occurs when B is a fact, because no fact A can exist without the facts existing; it is not possible for A to be a fact but not a fact. In fact, if anything is true, then the facts are always implied everywhere. — The relationship A o B also always occurs when A is untrue. Whatever B may mean, it is always true that: that the untrue fact A exists (i.e. is a fact) and B does not exist, does not exist°. In this sense, therefore, it is true that an untrue fact implies any arbitrary fact. This is also exploited in everyday thinking and speech when, in order to describe something as very much unreal, one says, for example: "   " If that is the case, then 2 S   ü° is also true.

We refer to the facts as 'Pataeich', the untruths as 'Adi', and write down the two sentences just formulated as follows:

Read   "If implies V, for every value M" or "for every a bi
— i.e. for every fact   — "M implies Vo" applies, or
"A implies II, for every value M• or ,for every äf applies "A implies M'".

8are A, B facts, then A and B', or that A exists and B exists° again a fact, which we call the conjunction of A and B and as

A . B or as A B

. For example, "A" means "it is raining",   B• means "it's cold", so it becomes   A . B° or   A B° means   it is raining and it is cold.

With the help of implication and the conjunctive link, we can now define the relationship of equivalence. The facts A and B are called equivalent if they imply each other; we write

A m B or B — A.

According to this explanation, "A   B" means "(A o B) and (B o A), 8lB0 means "(fi a B) . (B a A)".

Equivalent statements are, for example, the provisions "x is divisible by 15° and .x is divisible by 3 and by 5". Among the specific statements, all facts are equivalent to each other and all non-facts are equivalent to each other. For if A and B are both facts

In fact, neither A exists without B, nor does B exist without A, because on the one hand B exists and on the other hand A also exists in B. If both are impossible, the same applies again, but this time because one thing is not A and the other is not B.

These two statements justify retrospectively that we have used V, which denotes 'facts', 'the factual' or 'the fact', and A, which denotes 'non-facts', 'the non-factual' or ' ' to denote 'non-facts' per se.

Finally, we **introduce** the concept of the negation of a state of affairs
If A is a fact, then A° is obviously equivalent
with A beøtezt" — etæa, diea rat rot" equivalent with qdaß diea rot is, consists", because if daa erate, Bo iat also the second and vice versa. If A is a fact, then "A does not exist (is not, does not apply)" is also a fact, and this is called the negation of the fact A and is denoted by .

non-A or A'.

Now we can express the previously introduced definition of implication A implies B very simply and concisely using the concepts and symbols presented. We said: A implies B means that if A is true and B is not true, then it is not true; this can now be written as follows:

$$(A \circ B) \quad (A . B')'.$$

3. D a g S o l l en ii n d d aa F o rd e r n.

Since the unique essence of volition cannot be grasped by any analytical reflection on the results of other elements, nor can it be removed from the world, the moment that determines the uniqueness of this position on an object eludes any direct description. One can only refer anyone who wants to know to their own experience, with the warning that they should not take all kinds of accompanying phenomena for the essence, which lies solely in the unanalysed and unanalysable moment of striving. Beyond this reference to the given, there is only the possibility of indirect identification. One such indication is found in the statement that this atom gives meaning to the experience, the meaning that a behaviour B 0 tl ą exists, a determination a o I I e — in the given case or in certain cases — is realised. The volition directed at the fact A is expressed in the sentence: A i s a fact.

This ought to be, more precisely, the existence of a fact, corresponds to the will as an objective object: it is attributed to the object, namely the fact, to which the will is directed. Now one could say: that A is a fact means nothing other than that A is desired by someone —

Even if you only see it in a dispoøi@onøtţgp 8ig¡:   wollt* —, the implication contained therein, that someone wants A, provides the following rephrasing: A shall be. This is now countered by the circumstance gøgøn-liber, . dag air in many cases   **will** be **published** in a few days**,**   ubLkt or the. 9uhjekte dgs augebörigea &o1leoȩ aasugebea. However, it is clear that in most cases — and this includes the important ones that are ethically necessary — a subject does not exist at all, because it does not think about a will and a willing person. If the naive interpretation is correct here, then not every ought will correspond to a &o1leß.   But even if there is no actual ought, there is still a desire. This view, which is also remarkably prevalent among those who think differently, distinguishes between cases where something is supposed to be in the sense of a volition and cases where it actually is a volition, and then simply one thing, without regard to any will whatsoever. If I demand work from someone, he should perform it in accordance with my will; whether he actually performs it or not is not yet decided. If he has now concluded a contract with me and taken on the work and agreed to the terms of the contract, then he must perform it, and no will can override this obligation, no will   of the legislator, the state, the general public, a religious community , it only complies with the obligation, "corresponds to it and is justified in a certain sense, but is completely uninvolved in its fulfilment. Similar to how an act of recognising a fact is performed in **a** certain **way**, but is not accepted or constituted. Justified willing is opposed to a ought that is actually unjustified; unjustified willing also refers to an ought — for it is not meaningless, it also has the meaning that something ought to be — ; but it corresponds to a ought that is not realised anywhere — i.e. there is no case in which it actually applies — just like a false ought. The judgement concerns a matter that is not factual.

Our companies, which describe the uniqueness of the desired legal position in relation to the legal issues, have led us to the meaning of what is wanted and thus to what should be done. Freely, it is an irreversible change characterised by another, equally irreversible change. Nevertheless, this distinction will not be without benefit. For **now** we have, instead of the psychic, which remains so strangely intangible despite all its "obviousness"   , its counterpart...

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'Dieøøn Oedankøn **rertritt and** developed by F. Brentano in his work **ge**lf. W o1If in eeiner Omndlehre dee Sollens, Innøbrock, **1924.** Beer**'s ist** weekly **consideration of the diapositional** for **the Tatbøatand** anb- in a valuable w a y .

° Vg1. A. 3f e i n o n g. Zor Grnndløgnng der allgemøinen Wørttheoriø, adapted from E. 3fally, Oraz, **1993,** p. 145f.

We have before us a corresponding concept, an objective concept which, despite its inanalysability, is nevertheless accessible to systematic knowledge in a relatively easy manner: the ought can be described by specifying the actual relationships that exist between the facts of the isolated case. We therefore undertake to learn what ought to be done by seeking out the laws of oughtness. These will at the same time yield the essential laws of right or reasonable volition — precisely the de0Ctiachen OeBetze —; for volition is essentially characterised precisely by what its meaning is, and to satisfy the Oeaetsen dieaea i3innes is its own essential law. Since the knowledge we will gain in this way has a formal character in itself, it is in the nature of things — it is no different in the case of logical deontic necessity.

The concept of oughtness — the oughtness of a state of affairs —
*is a fundamental concept of deontics, and indeed the only one peculiar
to it,

i.e. not already belonging to the general theory of facts, which we are introducing. If A is a fact, then A ought to be. Bea aei A^ is again a state of affairs, but of a different kind; one could call it a demand, albeit in a purely objective sense, which does not take into account any desire or desirer.

One can always set "A aoll aein" to " it is true (exists) that A is aoll ^, because one obviously does not occur without the other, and so one has again set a normal, one might say, theoretical fiacWverhalt for the requirements, something that one can think of, judging or simply assuming, without wanting anything at all. On this basis, Btsllt*äioh responds to the critics with "the theory that considers them and also recognises their effects. The requirement 'A is A', 'A is A', is expressed by

The theory will deal with implications in which claims appear as objects; in particular, and initially, relations such as 'if A (exists, is true), then B should be' will be considered, i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies that B should be', i.e. 'xml-ph-0000@deepl.internal A implies

then B should be', i.e., ' A implies that B should be', according to our notation, "A implies B". For the sake of brevity, let us refer to this relationship as "A implies B".

ala, A requires B• — as one might say
, debt demands repayment — and written A f B^. Ea is, by virtue of this declaration

$$(A \text{ f } B) - (A \text{ o } 1 \text{ } B).$$

§ 2. The six propositions "of oughtness".

By starting from the recognition of the inevitability of the will, we will attempt to derive certain universal laws from the meaning of the will, which is present in the essence of oughtness, from which, by purely logical means, namely deduction, the totality of the remaining laws that characterise it should emerge as far as possible. The fact that the principles we establish will sound self-evident is, in turn, self-evident, especially if we want to develop a "natural" system that is to begin with propositions that are immediately obvious from the nature of the matter. If, then, propositions are derived from these basic principles, some of which are also quite self-evident, our endeavour is more than a mere logical exercise: the purpose is to recognise how the laws are interrelated and through which of them the totality of the essential laws of volition is implied in a rationally recognisable way, its inner necessity thus already being completely given. — The considerations that precede the formulation of a basic principle are only intended to point out the aspect of the fact that must be taken into account in order to become aware of the fact that the principle expresses; They are in no way intended to represent derivations of these propositions — which, as principles in the system, cannot be derived — ; these considerations stand outside the system. The system begins with the finished principles and comprises only those assertions that emerge from them through strict deduction.

An essential characteristic of correct thinking and correct willing is consistency. Those who judge not only take a position on the facts they are judging, but also on other facts, namely the implications of the judgement. Not equally, one might say: equally narrowly. Anyone who asserts the applicability of a determination A (x) in a given case, but believes that a determination B (x), which is rationally implied in the former, does not apply in the same case, will be accused of violating the necessary and self-evident principle of consistency, — as when someone claims that the given number is divisible by 15, but then says that it is not divisible by 3. The violation is perceived as less serious if it is merely empirical.

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* **Not entirely,** insofar as **a** system can also establish principles that **are** not immediately evident but prove themselves in all consequences. In a system of definitions, the principles are not judgements, but free assumptions; but this is not what is sought here, rather a system that does justice to the real facts of oughtness in correct judgements.

There is a clear implication between the two statements. If the judge is aware of this implication, the error will be judged differently than if he is unaware of it: in the first case, it reveals a logical defect, at least thoughtlessness or carelessness in thinking; in the second case, it reveals a lack of experience, knowledge or observation, which is all the more serious the more difficult the experience was to gain, but in any case remains a mistake. The principle that underlies all this can be stated as follows: whoever judges a fact has thereby, "implicitly," as one might say, acknowledged every implication of that fact. Therefore, he will only behave consistently if he behaves towards each of these implications as if he had judged them himself, indeed, as if he had judged them. Thus, the consistency of a sequence of thoughts lies in the fact that the later ones capture the current ones, or at least do not violate what was implicitly captured in the earlier ones, in terms of their meaning and essence, merely implied, even if not thought. And consistency requires judgement, i.e. that it belongs to its correctness, has its reason in the fact that judgement has a certain relationship to this state of affairs, such that it is   u f   1 I é s ø i n e I m P I I K a T e g ø h t .

It is the same with Cohen's polarity. If someone wants to see a provision A (x) applied in a specific **case** and is then made aware of a subsequent provision B (x) with the question of whether they also want it to apply in the same case, they will logically have to say yes or give up their original intention, just as in the case of judgement. However, a violation of this is considered acceptable if the intellectual l'erhalten is in order, since judgement is based on the implications at hand,   is actually attributed purely to the will, and it is not right to decide whether a distinction is made according to the same or different criteria as in the case of judgement — always assuming that there is a genuine implication, that is, that BİO believes with certainty that the volition is certain and not just more or less strongly presumed that A (K) entails B (x). The fact that such consistency is part of the correctness of volition has its reason in that volition encompasses all the implications of what is willed, so that with a particular state of affairs, all the circumstances that it implies are also willed. This lies in the meaning and essence of volition, both rational and irrational. But one remains in further acts in accordance with that first meaning, the other does not. It is noteworthy how the examination of correctness in the realm of judgment immediately leads to a multitude of acts and contexts in which it manifests itself.

The peculiar character of the crackdown on the ImplišĄate

— everything that is contained in the desired situation — is not found in all forms of desire. One may desire something very much, provided that it is pleasant or valuable, but not want the unpleasant consequences of the act. The fact that one wants the desired situation in all its parts, with all its consequences, is a distinctive feature of desire. Those who truly desire something are made aware of the undesirable aspects of what they desire, and they accept them, even the unknown consequences that may follow, with an attitude of "whatever will be, will be." They are prepared to accept this as well.

Anyone who wants a fact also wants everything that goes with it, without which this fact does not exist. This is in line with Wollena's thinking. This means that the opposite relationship exists: if a fact is 'aoll', then every implication of this fact must also be 'aoll'. Therefore, the following relationship also exists: if, under the assumption that A is a fact, B is a fact, then — if, as we said, A requires B — and if B is in 8 a o h v a r h a l t e a A, then B is in 8 a o h v a r h a l t e a B.

» he remains complicit, because 1 it   auo h,   that   under   the prerequisite A d a s C a e i n a o11 — that A d a a C requires. — This relationship, which is more general in nature than the one expressed above, is expressed in our first deontic principle   . It is given a more concise and clearer formulation in the following symbolic notation.

<div align="center">

Approach I

$(A f B) . (B o C) o (A f C)$

</div>

or in more detail:

<div align="center">

$(A o 1 B) . (B o C) o (A a ! C).$

</div>

The sentence can be called O r u n d a a t z d e a 6li t f o rd e r n a or O r u n d-s a t s d e r F o 1g e r i c h t i g k e i t because the desire that takes it into account is logically iat.

A second characteristic of volition is closely related to the matter of consistency. If a person or body has made a decision in the event of a particular circumstance M and later, with or without explicit reference to it, makes a second demand in the same case, the question immediately arises as to how the two demands are compatible with each other. The question is particularly relevant if both claims originate from the same person or persons, because the answer then sheds light on the internal rationality of their will, but it is equally meaningful and important even without this prerequisite. That it is so,

1 second

has its origin in a circumstance that is self-evident: if A is required in one case and B in another case, then A and B are required in case M, which is why it is so important how the two circumstances are compatible. It lies within **the nature of** the will that the demand of A or the demand of B for the same case results in a demand for the combination of A and B or the conjunctive combination of the circumstances A and B. And this is completely independent of whether one claim is based on the other: only the meaning of the will is decisive for this. It is based on the principle that the following **statement** applies: If, in a   the preliminary act is a factual relationship A and under the same preliminary assumption a factual relationship B, ß o a o ll u n I ø r d e r V o rau s ø ct s u n g M d ø r S a c h v e r h a l t AB s ein.

     As incomprehensible as the safe may be, it is nevertheless the expression of a characteristic of the pollen that distinguishes it from other types of behaviour towards situations. Only in the original, and only in the specific, can this composability still be found; if I claim that under condition M, circumstance A will occur, and if I claim on another occasion that under condition à1, B will occur, then I have implicitly claimed that under this condition, A and B will **occur**.

    — it is in line with my assertions, regardless of whether I think about it or not. If the two assertions are replaced by assumptions, their meaning is no longer that of an assumption of the addition of A and B. When a coin is tossed, it can show heads; when the coin is tossed again (the same coin in the same case), it can show tails, but that does not mean that when the coin is tossed, it can show heads and tails at the same time. "It can be A" and "it can be B" do not mean that it can be AB (i.e. A and B), but rather that it can be A or B: here, being able to be and ought to be are essentially different. Just as conjecture is the weaker form of judgement, desire, as the weaker form of desire, differs from the stronger form in that, among other things, it lacks the property of combinability considered here. One can desire A in the case of M and B in the case of B, without it being the case that, in the sense of these desires, both A and B are desired in the case of M. A may desire itself, and in the same case B may also desire itself, but their combination may not be desired. When desires are transformed into wants, this will then have the consequence that one desire — and one **value** — will be sacrificed for the other.

     This applies to the case under consideration here (abøolntøn) Søinøollen, which shows relative abør in accordance with g inkönnen or Hüglichøøin. Cf. nntøn,
§ 11, 3, and further.

——————

if one wants to be reasonable, because if one insists on both, then one also wants them to be together.

Claims that are linked to one prerequisite are combined into one claim with combined content and can be replaced by such a claim: they become one single claim.   applies to the acts of demanding, in their meaning, and therefore also to demands in the objective sense, i.e. requirements. We formulate this as the second of our fundamental laws of ought.

O and s a t I I

$$(If f A) . (M f B) o (Of f AB)$$

Ade

r $$(äl o ! A) . (M o ! B) o (M a l [AB]).$$

The category may be O r u n d a because of the combination or The Association

The two provisions concern conditional claims, as we find in decrees and orders of a general nature, in statutes and regulations. The "shall" here is linked to a prerequisite that is not always necessary, but always, in the strict sense, i.e. if the order is meant precisely, a sufficient condition for its occurrence. It should now be noted, and it is formally important for the derivation of certain corollaries, that every conditional requirement can be replaced by a simultaneous unconditional one. For example, a provision stipulating that anyone with an income of X pounds must pay X pounds in income tax imposes the requirement that in future the implication must apply – as if it were a law of nature – that if someone in the state has a certain income, they must pay a certain amount of tax on it. The conditional requirement when A (i a t), a o a o11 B a e i u" i a t ä q u i v a l e n t d e r u n b e d i n g t e n   , e a a olI z u t reff e u: if A (is), then (i a t) B'. This is our

Basic Act 1 II

$$(A/B)   !(A o B)$$

oder

$$(A o ! B)   ! (A o B).$$

This transformation is not only of theoretical importance. Someone may have received a series of instructions, perhaps at longer intervals, which complement and restrict each other, so that in order to clarify their duty, they will ask themselves: what am I actually supposed to do? The answer will take the form:

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in which and then I should behave in such and such a way. Thus he has
the various conditional   I   should be freed from their conditions and,
as an unconditional, precede a circumstance that has the form of a
conditional relationship **(an** implication). Since Principle III allows a
demand to be detached from its conditions, separating the ought on the
one hand and the ought-free situation on the other (which is demanded),
                                                                    he may

O and at the e n d of the selection.

The first three principles merely state what is required in terms of the
demand, a difference in <u>the interpretation</u>   . What these sentences say is
of the form: if that is to be the case, then that must also be the case; but none
of them claims that anything is actually the case. However, justification
depends on this. A demand — in the subjective sense of the term 01408
tfaa is justified, is obviously to demand something in accordance with a
"should"; thus, it can only be actually justified if this "should" actually exists.
Without an actual "should", **there can be no** actual justification. Every
                                          sense of entitlement, **every**
purely psychological feeling of justified desire that is not matched by
such a counterpart in the actual objective ought, is a claim to entitlement
without justification.   The theory must therefore make the following
statement: There is (at least) one fact that actually exists. We write for
this:

Article IV

(EU) ! U,

To read: 'There is (a fact) U, of which güt: U should be'. U is called the
unconditional requirement, l U the unconditional requirement, and the
principle of the fact of the subject can therefore also **be called** the
principle of the unconditional requirement**.**

Just as logic cannot exclude contradictory judgements, deontics cannot
exclude   contradictory   and   therefore   unreasonable   demands   from
consideration, for both exist. But the theory must establish that a
contradictory judgement does not correspond to any actual facts and that a
contradictory demand does not correspond to any actual obligations.   We
achieve this through a statement that says that what is unconditionally one
thing cannot be another thing.
not a negation — non-U — required. This negation
of U would be designated in accordance with the agreement in § 1, 2 as

U'; ea will play an important role in our investigation alongside U, the absolute requirement, the ideal, as the opposite of S o 11e n ß and may be emphasised by a particularly striking designation, namely n (.verkehrt - U°). The symbol for 'not required'   should be f', which stands for 'not implied• o'. Then our sentence takes on this form:

<div align="center">

Principle V

U r n

</div>

or

<div align="center">

U ɔ' ! ∩.

</div>

It is referred to as O r u n d a at z d e r W i d e r s p r u c h s 1 o a i gk e i t d e s (t at a ä c h 1i c h e n) S o11 e n s.

<div align="center">

Overview of the activities.

</div>

I. (A f B) . (B a C) o (A f C)

H. (M f A) . (M f B)' o (M / A B)

III. (A *l'* B) m ! (A o B)

IV. (ZU) 1 U

v vrn

A, B, C, 61, U, fl are facts.

I. (Orundaatz of co-requirement or consistency). If A requires B and B implies C, then A requires C.

II. (Principle of union). If M requires A and M requires B, then M requires A and B (their coexistence).

III. (Orundsatz der Auaaouderung).   The conditional demand ,A requires B' (if A is, then B should be) is equivalent to the unconditional requirement that A implies B (i.e., if A is, then B is).

IV. (Principle of the actuality of the ought or the unconditional demand.) There is (at least) **one** fact U of which the following is actually true: U ought to be. (U is the ought-to-be).

V. (Orundaatz of the impossibility of the actual ought). The ought-state (absolutely required, U) does not require a negation (the contrary of the ought, n).

II. No further conclusions

§ 3. Overview of the consequences.

Ouch. From the principles that have been gained in consideration of the essence of will and desire and put into precise form, one can now derive a system of deontic propositions through purely logical conclusions and then present the process of derivation purely and transparently in all writings using the few simple symbols we have introduced. But the logical nature of the deduction is foreign to many people who are nevertheless capable of thinking well; They are content to immediately recognise what is recognisable, to assume the rest without further deduction, and do not ask how all this can be derived from the smallest possible set of facts, which assumptions are necessary and sufficient to justify the whole system of assertions. This overview is written primarily for them; it aims to present the most important consequences of the five principles without going into more than a brief indication of the derivations. The following paragraphs of this section, which contain the derivations, can then be left out by those who are not fond of formulas.

(Aha $ A)

The O randata   I (O randata der   F o1ge ri c h Ii g-k e i t) — If, in the case of A being true, a fact B is required, then for the same case, **every** implication of B is also required — given that the facts are implied everywhere, there are always implications of B, the statement:

1. If, in the event that A applies, B is required, then the same applies to the same case. The law permits the following interpretation, although it is not entirely accurate:

The facts are required everywhere. —   We note him, who seems to lose sight of the point of demanding anything from the Pataachen, as strange, a consequence that needs to be examined.

Taking into account that an untrue fact can be interpreted in any way , it follows from I:

S. If, for Pall dea, an Untataaohe is required by A — in short: through A —•-, then any fact is required through A   .   —. Also   dieaer   Sats belongs   su' den   b 8 ' f r e m d l i c h e n conclusions.

'Aua O and that I I (0 and the union) If fact M requires fact A, and fact M requires fact B, then M requires the conjunction of A and B (which, incidentally, can also be proven by the reverse) — using I, this results in:

4. If fact M requires fact A and fact N requires fact B, then the coexistence of M and N requires the coexistence of A and B.   — The theorem allows for the combination or union of requirements in a more general sense than in Principle II. According to this, a system of dispositions that link different requirements to various preconditions will always take into account the case of the preconditions coinciding and must reckon with the coincidence of the requirements in this case.

(From § 5.)

The Orundaat III (Orundaat of Exclusion) stated: That fact A requires fact B is equivalent to saying that the implication, if A, then B is required. He states that the conditional requirement "if A is, then B shall be" is equivalent to the unconditional requirement, which is: if A is, then B is. However, he leaves aside the question of whether any such requirements actually exist.

5. The meaning of an unconditional demand "P aoll eein* — aie mag übrigens bestehen, du Recht bestehen, oder nicht   iat der-selbe wie der einer Forderung, die aich an jeden beliebigen .Sach-verhalt knüpft, die   unter allen Umständen° daa P fordert;,   dass P aein aoll" heißt soviel wie,   durch jeden beliebigen Sachverhalt M ist P gefordert'.

From this and from I, it follows that:

f›. If P (unconditionally) should be true, then every implication of P should be true; then, using III (through a somewhat longer deduction):

8. If A requires B and B requires C, then A requires C. The requirement therefore extends or transfers not only to the implications of the requirement, but also, as this sentence states, to a postulate; i.e. to what is required in the case of the applicability of the requested facts or, as we say, what is required by these facts.

Sats 9 expresses these facts, even for the postulate of an unconditionally required state of affairs*.

An obvious error in application can make sentence 8 — and then also 9 — appear incorrect. Under the conditions '(A) stipulated in a contract between x and y, x shall perform something for y (ei aoll B aein), and once the performance (B) has taken place, y shall provide a consideration. (C1 applies; according to our sentence, it seems to follow that as soon as the precondition 'A' applies, y must perform C, which is obviously incorrect. A precise formulation of this case immediately reveals where the error lies. If A applies, then x must perform B for y, i.e. there must be a time (to be determined later) when B is performed by x; if this is fulfilled, then there must again be a specific time when C is performed by y. And from this it follows that if A applies, then there must be a specific time when C is performed by y. This is in accordance with the meaning of the contract: ea is required by it to ensure that the performance is completed; and only this can be asserted according to our statement, which says nothing about how this is to be achieved and in no way imposes an unconditional obligation on y, but rather that it is to be achieved through the performance of the other party and a subsequent performance. It is noteworthy how the phrase "if A occurs, then y shall perform C" has led to the application of the proposition being immediately understood as a demand on y, as an expression of an obligation on the part of y, whereas it does not and cannot mean more than "if A applies, then it shall be ensured that y performs C". An indication that what is to be done by me is not yet my duty; what is to be done by me is my duty insofar as it depends on me, i.e. on my will, that it happens. — A contract according to which, if A applies and x performs B, y shall perform C, would of course not result in

, if A is true, y must satisfy C • , but it would also not be a case of application of the theorem, because in such a contract there are not two claims, as the theorem presupposes, but only one. Theorem 10 states the composition or union of unconditional claims into one claim — the coexistence of the individually demanded circumstances — in the form

$$! A \, ! B \qquad ! (A \, B).$$

By analogy with the concept of equivalence — § 1 , 2 — the Term dea O l e i c h f o r d e r n s ' or de,r f o r d e r u n g s m ä ß i g e n Ä q u i v a l e n z° introduced. Facts A and B are said to be equivalent if A requires B and B requires A — then everything required by B is obviously also required by A, and vice versa — we write this as A co B. It is easy to see that

11.   (A   B)   ! (A   B),

i.e. that equally demanding circumstances are also equivalent in the sense of "equivalent to the demand", since it is demanded that they should be equivalent.

The following sentences bring ä q u i va l e n t e U m f o r-m u n g e n d e r F o rde r un g a b e z i h u n g , among which the most important is the counter-proposal mentioned in 14:

14. (B' f A');

If A is true, then B is true is equivalent to if B is not true, then A is not true.

When applied to situations, which take the form of dea Zutre8ens When making a decision in a specific case, care must be taken to ensure that the counterposition does not change the time specifications and, accordingly, the time ratio of the songs: If I have borrowed a book, I must return it; the reverse is natural: if I do not return a book, I have not borrowed it, which is the same as saying that if I do not return a book, I have not borrowed it.

(From § 6.)

The Orundaat IV (Orundaat of the unconditional Pordern) states: There is a fact U that actually exists. — What is absolutely required, U, since it is necessary, is now — according to the meaning of the unconditional demand, according to 5. — that which should in fact be the case under all circumstances, under every assumption:

lb. $\quad$! U or M f U,
$$\mathfrak{Z}f$$

i.e. M requires U "for every M", or: any given fact M requires U. In this respect, U is consistent with the 'actual, V, since it holds under all circumstances, under all conditions. While sentences 6 and 8 established that if something (unconditionally) plays a role, then the implications or postulates of this should also exist, it is now unconditionally asserted that:

16. or 17. What is implied or required by daa is absolutely required, daa shall be.

In the next step, this results in the sentence

18. A requirement that exists (applies) exists; and the reversal of this, hence the equivalence:

19. $\quad$ I ! A — ! A.

Sentence 20 states that a 11 is unconditionally required to be equivalent in accordance with the requirements. In this sentence , a term the claim is used Oeltung, which does not recognise any O rade d e a So 11 e n a: allea war sein soll, soll gleichermaßen eein, namely under all circumstances, unconditionally. This sentence will also be examined, namely by contrasting it with an undoubtedly existing concept of obligation that allows for the distinction between stronger and weaker demands (ii, g).

In 1. it has been stated: if A demands any fact B, then A demands the 'facts'; in 7.: if something is absolutely demanded, then the 'facts' are demanded; if something is to be, then the facts must be. Since, according to IV, it is established that something is to be, it can be asserted that:

22. The facts must be: ! V.

The sentence naturally belongs to the category of " b e fremdli ch en" (b e fremdli ch en). It states that at least what Maa actually did was a mistake, but leaves open the question of whether the reverse is also true. It does not, of course, mean that a provision that applies at the present moment will also apply in the future, but only that it should apply at this very moment. After all, that was strange enough and seems to run counter to an actually existing concept of obligation.

The following sentence, however, corresponds perfectly to this concept. Its formulaic description is

23.   V co U or ! (U m V).

This means: The 'PatBachen and what is absolutely required are equivalent in terms of requirements; or: What actually happened and what should have happened should be equivalent. — This is in line with the requirement that what is should correspond to what is required.

A 'feilaachverhalt of this Tatbeatandea is found in

23'.   Y / U

: The facts demand what absolutely should be. — One could say that the 'facts' already demand what absolutely applies, and no special conditions are required.

which would be linked to his requirements. The idea of the   Self-comprehensibility of the fulfilment of duties is hinted at.

(Aua § 7.)

By contrasting statements about what ought to be, U, a series of statements about what ought not to be, 11, also emerges.

One of the strange sentences is again

27. The contrary of what ought to be requires any arbitrary state of affairs. — If what ought not to be is, then anything can be or anything cannot be, which amounts to the same thing. — The sentence represents the contrary of what ought to be, f1, in analogy to the unreal, A, which implies any state of affairs.

An obvious consequence of this sentence is

28. The contrary demands the contrary. — Why, despite "strangeness," certain emotions of the 3'er1tung and Raohe seem to speak.

In contrast to these two sentences, it is now important to note that the improper also demands the unconditional fulfilment of the proper.

The demands associated with the contrary to what ought to be are not contradictory; in addition to

28. 11 f fl   and   30. Ω t Λ gilt

29   ß AU,

d a 8 S o 11 e n § w i d r i g e f o r d e r t   d a g S o 11 e n s m ä ß i g e. .4.uch wenn iat, waa nicht aein aöll, aoll' daa unbedingt Odforderte aein. 8o Like a falacha prerequisite in theoretical areas, it does indeed lead to certain conclusions, but it does not negate the existence of the 'facts': these remain implied everywhere, even in the sub-facts.

In terms of requirements, flollenamäßigea and Sollenawidriges do not differ. The essential difference is highlighted by

O r u n d g a t z V (d e r   O r u n d a a t z   d e r   W i d e r a p r u c h a - 1 o s i g k e i t) hervor,   durch die Featatellung,   d a ß   d a a   S o He n a- m ä ß i ge, U, n i cht S oil e naw i d ri gea, n   fo rd ert. — Now it immediately follows that:

32. What is appropriate does not require untruthfulness; and

33. the appropriate does not imply the unreal.

Therefore, untrue statements are not appropriate. Based on this and on 22, the true statements are appropriate, resulting in the following: T a t s ä c h -l i c h e 8   u n d   S o l I e n s g e m ä ß e a,   in the   B e r e i o h e   der b e -s t i m m t e n S a c h Y B F h a l t e, which contains only facts and untatsachen, ä q u i v a l e n t a i n d ;   therefore   also   S o 11 e n s w i d r i g e a u n d U n t a t a ä c h l i c h e a äqu i v a l e n t:

34. U == V,   35. fl == A.

Dieae   last   sentences,   die Sainaollen   and   seem to be seem to identify, are among our most perplexing conclusions. probably the most disconcerting. An examination of the conclusions that lead to them and the premises from which these conclusions originated is necessary. One can anticipate that these premises, if they are correct, modify the usual concept of ought in essential points, or uncover a duality of coexisting concepts of ought, whose mutual relationship will be clarified — a task whose solution essentially involves establishing the relationships between ought, want, and act. concepts of "oughtness" that exist side by side, whose mutual relationship will need to be clarified — a task whose solution must essentially involve establishing the relationships between oughtness, volition and facts. — First, however, the formal derivation of the corollaries.

§ 4. Conclusions from Principles I and II.

If we set

I.   (A / B) (B a C) o (A f C)

f o r   C, we obtain

(A / B) (B o V) a (A / V),

and since the second condition, B o V, always applies according to § 1, 2,

'

1.   (A AB) o (A f \').

Sentence 1 states: If A demands anything — any B — then A demands the facts.　　　Or: if, under the assumption A, any circumstance is to exist, then, under this assumption, the facts must exist. The facts are required in every conditional demand.

If one substitutes the special **value** A for B in I, assuming that some fact A requires something impossible, i.e. unfulfillable, then — taking into account § 1, 2, A a M — one has

$$(A f A) . (A o M) o (A / II),$$

alao

$$(A / A) a (A f M).$$

In addition, the reverse is of course true

$$(A Z M) a (A / A),$$

5therefore the equivalence

2.　　　　　　　　(A / A)　　(A / M).

That requires, however, that I, and is not feasible, meaning that it requires every possible circumstance. Like a prerequisite that contains a false consequence, it leads to arbitrary conclusions.

— if falsehoods are valid, then anything goes —, such a demand for something that contradicted the facts, to arbitrary demands.

The second principle is:

II.　　　　　　　$(M f A) (M f B) o (M / AB)$.

It is easy to see that the reverse of this

theorem also **holds.** For it is obvious that

　　　　　AB o A,　　　　　　AB a B,

then, according to I,

　　　　$(M a ! AB) (AB a A) a (M a ! A)'$
　　　　$(V a ! AB) (AB o.B) a (M o ! B),$

therefore, by combining,

　　　　$(M a ! AB) o (M o ! A) (M o ! B)$

and daraua and from II:

IIt　　　　　　$(M / A) (M / B)$　　　$(M f AB)$.

The fact that M requires circumstance A and M requires circumstance B therefore means that M requires the coexistence of A and B. However, as the derivation shown above demonstrates, not the **entire** set of facts stated here is a deontic fact, but only the partial set of facts that

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' !AB naturally stands for ! (AB).

II recites, while the reversal of this — and t h u s also the equivalence relationship Hi — follows purely logically from II and I.

The proposition concerning the conjunctive connection of requirements is not followed by a similar proposition concerning the disjunctive connection,

i.e. the conjunction provided by "   " or "°".

$$A \vee B$$

the fact that at least one of the facts A, B, C, D, E, F, G, H, I, J, K, L, M, N, O, P, Q, R, S, T, U, V, W, X, Y, Z applies

one of them is admissible, i.e. the fact that   A or B   —without mutual exclusion of the elements — applies with regard to I —

(M f A) (A o A v B) a (M f A B),' alao (bt f A) a (M f A v B) (M / B)

(B o A v B) a (M f A v B), therefore (bl f B) a (M f A v B)

and therefore — purely logically deduced —

3.   (M f A) v (M / B) a (M f A v Bj,

A corollary to II; but the converse of this proposition does not hold. Demanding that A exist or promoting that B exist implies demanding that A or B exist, but not vice versa.

Orundaatz II provides a compilation of requirements which,   even if established independently of one another,   are linked to **the** same **prerequisite**. Indirectly, in the subsequent paragraph to be presented here, it also provides a compilation of the requirements which are subject to different conditions, when the conditions are combined. It is clear from pure logic — i.e. without

Consideration for the special nature of the b"ollens —

(M o ! A) (N a ! B) o (MN o ! A . ! B)

and likewise

(MN o 1 A . ! B) o (JOIN o ! A) (MN a ! B) ;

otherwise, according to II

(MN o 1 A) (MS o ! B) o (MN o ! AB),

therefore

4.   (MSA) (No ! B) o (MNo ! AB

also or

(M / A) (X / B) o (NX /' AB).

§ 5. Conclusions from Principle III (and I, II).

Principle III reads as follows:

III   (A f B) — 1 (A a B).

The observation that the implication relationship is transitive i.e. that

(1)   (A a B) (B a C) o (A o C),

_____

¹ M ƒ A ∨ B steht für M ƒ (A ∨ B), ·analog M o A˙ ∨ B.

and the further fact that the demand also extends to the implications of the demand, as stated, raises the question of whether the demand also extends to what what is required by the requirement, to the postulate of the requirement, i.e. whether the requirement is also transitive, pb

$$(A f B) '(B f C) a (A / C)$$

also applies.

According to III ·**ist**

$$(A f B,) (B f C) =- 1 (A o B) . ! (B o C)$$

Now, the assumption that (purely or unconditionally, i.e. under any circumstances) 1 P applies is logically equivalent — cf. § 1, 2 — to the assumption that P is required by any given fact M, i.e.

5.   ! P m (M f P)   (M a l P).

Therefore, with reference to I, it follows that

$$P.(P \text{ o } Q) = (M \text{ / } P).(P \text{ o } Q)$$

$$\text{o} (M f \quad)$$

alao

6.   ! P . (P o Q) a ! Q.

If we substitute Y for Q here, we get

$$1 P (P a V) a l V,$$

and, since P satisfies a V, we also have

7.   ! P a ! V,

i.e. if the WAB (unconditionally) requires it, the facts must be established — an addition to 1.

Applying this to our conditions, we have alao (A f B) (B / C) — !

(A o B) . l (B a C), as above,

—— *(M f (h o* B)] [M f (B a C)] according to 5.,

[M f (A a B) (B a C)] according to Ïli,

![(A a B) (B o C)] according to 5.,
a ! (A o C) according to (1) and 6.;

therefore

(A f B) (B f C) o l (A a C)

or according to
HI,

8.   (A f B). (B f C) o (A f C).

If A demands B through A, then not only are all implications demanded by A, as I have stated, but also all properties of B are demanded by A.   , d a fi e i n B s u t r e f f e, d a a a e i n e r B e l t B C f o r d e f t, a o i s t d u r c h A a u c h C g e f o r d e r t.

If, in particular, you require A to be the fact B that C requires, then it follows that every A, i.e. all, requires t':

$$(+ \ +).(B \ f \ c) * (+ <)$$

81ß0

$$! \ B . (B \ f \ C) \ o \ ! \ C$$

or, in other symbols,

9. $\qquad ! \ P. (P \ f \ Q) \ o \ 1 \ Q.$

This sentence is a gem from g. and says: If something is required by 8 e i n s o 11 e n d e s g e fo rd e r t i a t, then a o11 e s s e i n. Since the determination of the existence of unconditional claims by IV has not yet been taken into account, this does not assert that anything should actually be aein.

Aua the 8th sentence

Hi $\qquad (M \ f \ A)' \ (M \ f \ B) \ m \ (M \ / \ AB)$

it can be inferred

$$(II \ f \ A) \ (M \ f \ B) \qquad (M \ f \ AB)$$

or

10. $\qquad ! \ A . 1 \ B \qquad ! \ (AB);$

I will compile unconditional orders, one by one. Requirement, as specified.

If two facts, A and B, are mutually dependent, they may be considered equivalent or equivalent in terms of requirement, and this relationship is referred to as

$$A \ m \ B.$$

Then

$(A \ ne \ B) \qquad (A \ f \ B) \ (B \ f \ A) \qquad 1 \ (A \ o \ B) . ! \ (B \ o \ A)$

$\qquad ! \ [(A \ o \ B) \ (B \ o \ A)] \qquad I \ (A \qquad B),$

11. $\qquad (A \ co \ B) — 1 \ (A \qquad B).$

The Orundaats IH permits, based on a claim relationship. A f B or A o ! B the sauce sign and place an implication relation before it: ! (A o B). Now the implication A a B can be replaced by various equivalents. If A ao B° means, according to § 1, S, that A is and B is not, is not; ea also means, as can be easily recognised, that 'A is not or ea is not B' — i.e. at least one of the facts A' and B exists'. — Plan therefore has

$$(A \ a \ B) \qquad (A . B')' \qquad (A' \ v \ B),$$

therefore

1.S. $(A \ f \ B) \qquad (A \ o \ ! \ B) \qquad !(A \ o \ B) \qquad ! \ (A . B')' \qquad ! \ (A' \qquad B)$

and on the other hand

13. $\qquad (A \ o \ ! \ B) \qquad [A . (! \ B)']' \qquad A' \ w \ ! \ B.$

,   If A is true, then B must be true" means that   that A is
and B is not required, is not ^ and as much as 'A is not or B is'.

A more important transformation of the implication,   if 6f, then P'
did in,   if P not, then M not", which is known in logic under the
name of contradiction.

The logical contraposition

$$(M \text{ o } P) — (P' \text{ o } M')$$

we can add a deontic counterpoise:

(A / B)   ! (A o B) == ! (B' a A')   (B' » ! A')   (B' f A'),
alao

14.   (A f B)   (B' f A').

,   If A is true, then a o 11 B is true. Therefore, if B is not true, then a o
11 fi cannot be true.

§ 6. Conclusions from Principle IV (and I, II, III).

When we spoke of unconditional demands in our deductions, it was
only to determine what lay within the meaning of the demand, i.e., within
the realm of oughtness, without asserting that an ought actually exists.
This assertion is only made in Principle IV:

IV (ZU) l U.

That U is unconditionally required means that U is required under
all circumstances, by every fact; one has

J 5.   M / II   beside   M a Y

and ea appears to be the hand of being, in that ea is "required
everywhere," ala deontic oegenatück dea T a t s ä c h 1 i c h e n, which is
implied everywhere. — Further correspondences between what must
necessarily be true and what is necessarily true will be shown in the
following sentences.

Aua

$$(M \text{ f } U) (U \text{ a } A) \text{ a } (M \text{ f } A)$$

follows, since the first condition may be disregarded as fulfilled,

$$(U \text{ a } A) \text{ a } (M / A)$$

or

16.   (U a A) o l A   analogous to (V s A) o A ;

an implication unconditionally requires an unconditional requirement, just as
an implication is actually required.

After 8, the following also applies

$$(M /' 0) (U \quad A) \quad \text{a } (M / A)$$

and since the first condition, having been fulfilled, may be omitted again,

17. $(U f A) o 1 A$,

A poet unconditionally demanded and unconditionally demanded; which is required by   e i n S e i n a o11 e nd e a — and such things exist — g e f o r d e r t i a t, a o11 s e i u. One notices how this sentence goes beyond the content of the related sentence 8.

lat A demanded by U, and only in this case can one say, 'ea shall be something whereby A is demanded', 'it shall be such that A shall be', or '
' it is demanded that the demand
! A exists •.   Since under these conditions,   according to 17.,   A is a o11, the result is: A requirement that is b e a t e n s o 11, be-a t e h t, w h a t i s r e q u i r e d a e i n a o11, i a t r e q u i r e d;

18. $1 ! A a ! A.$

And since, as can be seen from 32, but also otherwise obvious, a requirement that exists should also remain in place, here is a preview of the equivalence

19. $I I A   ! A.$

$(U f A) (A f U)$ $(A m U)$

follows, since the second prerequisite is always fulfilled,

20. (USA)=-(A w U), corresponding to (V $\binom{* - V}{}$
ɔ A) =

What is required by his 11th is a requirement that is equivalent to him, i.e. according to 11, it should be equivalent to him — analogous to how daa, as implied by 'actual', is equivalent to him —.

If a fact A is to be true, and only in this case, then A is required by every fact, and in particular by U, and the prerequisite — the left-hand side — of 20 becomes 2u. Thus we have

21. $! A   (A   U).$

A l l e   u n b e d i n g t g e f o r d e r t e n S a c h v e r h a l t e s i n d
f o r d e r u n g a m ä ß i g ä q u i v a l e n t.

There are characteristic relationships of implication and requirement between what ought to be, U, and what actually is, V. In section 7, we already established that if any fact A is to be, then the facts ought to be.

Now we conclude from the sentence

$! U . (U a V) o 1 V,$

since naoh IV fulfils the first requirement and § 1, 2 fulfils the second requirement in any case,

22. $! v$

The Tatahons are   absolutely necessary;   a fact that actually exists, must exist.

T h e r e f o r e ,
according to 21.,   V   U,
23.

or, with reference to 11.,

It is required that actual and equivalent assets be available;   that what is one is one and what is two is two.

As a 'bearing fact', it is contained in S8 and can be highlighted from it

93'.   V f U,

the facts demand what is absolutely necessary.

Of formal importance is that, because of

$$(U \; r \; V) \; . \; (V \; » \; [A \; » \; A]) \; o \; (U\mathit{f} \quad » \; A])$$

also applies! (A o A), so, according to III, also

Accordingly, the requirement is A f B, is not only transitive — according to 8. — but also reflexive, thus possessing both essential properties of implication. This cannot be deduced directly from the definition, which explains pA f B• as a '(special) implication'; this explanation is only clear because aeita (A o 1 B) (! A o 1 B•, i.e. as a '(special) implication'; this explanation only makes sense if, on the one hand, (A o 1 B) (! B o ! C) o (A a ! C) and, on the other hand, ! A o ! A must also apply, statements which are not reflected in our theorems 8. and 24.

Ouch

$$(A \; r \; fi) \; (z \; "B) \; " \; (A \; r \; B),$$

which applies according to I, one concludes that, according to 24, the erate
                              Vozaus-

Betsuag iauaer is satisfied i8t,

25.   (A o B) o (A f B).

What is implied by a thing   iat, iat de n a o h d u rc h i h n g e f o r d e r t. — A consequence of this sentence is

26.   (A m B) o (A m B).

Equivalents are also equivalent in terms of requirements, which implies that the same circumstances also require the same circumstances.

§   7.   Continuation.   Contrapositive conclusions from principles IV and V.

The contraposition of the implication relation A o B, i.e. its transformation into the equivalent B' o A', yields the proposition M o V daa Oegenatück   *

A o M' or A o M,

as we have established in § 1, 2. If any fact M exists, then the facts always exist; this results from the contraposition: if the facts do not exist, then M does not exist, for any arbitrary M, and this then amounts to the same thing as saying that any arbitrary M exists. For in the totality of the facts of a logically possible system, the negation A' of every A occurs; if all are negated, one obtains A' and A from A', i.e. the same totality again. Whoever denies everything also affirms everything.

The contraposition of M f U, if any iat, then

always be the absolutely necessary, U, now yields

27. 11 f M' or ff f M.

What is not 11, that is really forbidden, demands the negation of a 11 em, prohibits a 11e g, and that means again, e a f demands all a — because prohibiting everything is demanding everything. If iat, waa should not be, then nothing should be, or, ao aoll allea arbitrary aein.

Daa fleinaollende is absolutely necessary, demanded by everyone and everything, even by the unavoidable — which demands everything. It is, alongside

S8. II / f1 (corresponding to A a

A), which applies according to S7.

39. f1 f U (corresponding to A a V).

D & B S 0 11 e n a w i d r i g e f o r d 9 r t S o 11 e n a w i d r i g e s. However, the following also applies: D a a fl o 11 e n a w i d r i g e f o r d e r t d a s S o11 e n a g e m ä ß e. This is and remains required under all circumstances. This is the deontic counterpart to the propositions: daB UOtataiiehliche implies Untataächlichea; the Untat8ächliche implies (but also) daa Tatsächliche. The facts remain under any precondition, unconditionally.

The counterposition of 23'. V f U, or 23. V cc U, results in

30. fi $f\,h$

81. fl cc A or ! (fi =- A).

Wine is what should not be, so it is unreal — even impossible. Since what is contrary to what ought to be is, by definition, equivalent to the unreal, it is required that what is contrary to what ought to be be unreal, that the unreal and what is contrary to what ought to be be the same.

The proposition V o' A, that facts imply non-actions — expressed logically, that nothing false follows from anything true — corresponds to our O r u n d a a t z.

V U / 'H,

who notes that what is absolutely required does not demand the opposite, that which is contrary to what ought to be.

From this it follows that U does not require A, the impossible. The assumption U f A would result, together with A o fl, in (U f A) (A o 11) " (U r n), so that, since the second prerequisite is fulfilled, (U f A) o (U f 11). Since U f fi is false according to V, it follows that

8S.   U f' A.

From this it follows again, with application of the contraposed 8atsea 25.,

$$U \; \mathrm{o}' \; \Lambda.$$

This does not necessarily imply anything — since it does not contradict the facts. What is important is the fact itself. This means that in the area of the specific circumstances — and that is what the will refers to — there is no third option besides 'facts' and 'non-facts': W a a a e i n a o11, i a t T a t a a o h e.

This strange consequence, together with the reverse 8atze SS., according to which what is 'fact' should be, the equivalence of 'fact' and 'factuality' is required:

34.   U   V,

Therefore, equivalents of S o1le n s wi d ri g em u n d U n t a t-

$$\Omega = \Lambda.$$

_____

III. Will and facts.

§ 8. The Willing of the Fact.

1. D al   W e de ntl i c h e   der   b efr ern dli c hen Fo1ger u ng en.

Through certain conclusions drawn from our fundamental principles, the concept of ought, at least its unity, has become doubtful. Now, this concept should be derived from the consideration of the will, as the concept of that intentionality which constitutes the meaning of the will. It can also be examined by investigating whether those strange conclusions actually arise from what an examination of the nature of volition reveals to be its meaning.

The train of thought that led to those conclusions can be summarised in a few essential steps, as a consideration of the will:

(1) The will is directed towards certain circumstances.

(2) It is in line with the intention that the implications of the intended circumstances are also intended.

(3) The facts are implications of every circumstance; the facts are therefore intended everywhere.

(4) The meaning of volition is that a situation should exist. Thus, the following follows from the last sentence: if something should exist, then the facts should exist.

(5) There is a justified will; there is some state of affairs that should actually be. From this and (4) it follows:

(6) The facts (at least) must be.

(7) Justified wanting is free of contradiction.

(8) A falsehood implies any fact, including its own negation.

(8) The desire for a non-fact is also not free of contradiction: non-facts should not exist.

Only facts and non-facts fall within the realm of desire
— according to (1) — :

(10) Therefore, only facts should exist.

As a summary of (6) and (10), the following finally emerged:

(11) What aoll, rat daB and only that, waa tataächlich ict. Waa   here
at   u u a b h ä n g i g e n   V o r a u a a e t z u n g e n vor-
are of various kinds. There are:

assertions about the nature of Wollena, etc. in (1), (2), (4), (5), (7), including in particular those about what ought to be

, Meaning ^ the Wollena in (4) and (5), — **overall** deontic assumptions;
general assertions of a theoretical nature about facts, in particular implications of facts and non-facts, in (3) and (8).

The rest is speculation and cannot be verified.

See D aa II i t w o l l e n   d e r   I m p l i k a t e i m a l l g e m e i n e n.

Beer does not particularly address the deontic conditions in Prague, and among them, not initially (1). For this assertion plays a role in the final conclusions of our research — where it deals with the equivalence of fleinaollen and Tatsächlichaein — but it is precisely in their critical examination that important conclusions about the nature of the Sollena will be drawn. Above all others, one immediately sees that the assertion (2) must be examined, which is consistent with the general theory of opposites in

3) The first and most important strange conclusion was that the facts are everywhere intentional.

Does ea really correspond to the Weaen dea Wollens when it is claimed that whoever wants something wants everything that is implied in the desired situation? There are certainly enough cases where one must **learn** that precisely through the realisation of what one wanted, one encounters, or others encounter, something completely unexpected, about which one states with complete conviction: that is not what I wanted. The right to make this statement is indisputable in a certain sense, namely insofar as it means that the undesirable consequences were not the immediate, explicit object of the desire. This is exactly the same as in the case of an assertion of a fact that is contradicted by the non-occurrence of certain implications of that fact and is subsequently refuted. In the case of an impliqué that is actually untrue, we will probably say that we did not mean to assert it, but rather that we did not think of it or did not know that it was untrue. In any case, we will not stick to the assertion — if we are still judging with our minds — and by dropping it, we acknowledge that it contradicts the facts, apparently precisely because of the implications whose irrelevance we have now recognised. This clearly shows a peculiarity of judgements: whoever judges a situation takes a certain position on every implication of the judged situation — as if he had judged it. The implication does not have to be explicitly stated in the judgement: in this sense, it is not judged. But it is implicitly judged, co-judged, and it is in the meaning of the judgement that the implications of the judged facts

behave in such a way as to judge. Even the undesirable consequences of what we want can, if we become aware of them early enough, move us to abandon those desires, and we will always do so if we definitely do not want those consequences, i.e. if we want them not to exist. If what we wanted has been realised, then it is of course too late to give up the desire, and a revocation, as in the case of assertions, seems irrelevant *here*. However, it does not stop there. It also expresses that we have changed our position on what we previously wanted, which can be very significant in practical terms and is also important for the theory: as an indication that there is also a difference in the volitional position even in the face of accomplished facts.

The evidence of language is not *entirely* clear in our case, because it does not distinguish between wanting explicitly and merely wanting implicitly or agreeing to want. Thus, the phrase just discussed, "I did not want that," is countered by the phrase, "You do not know what you want," which reminds one of what one wants, probably in opposition to one's other desires, merely implicitly, without knowing or considering it.

There are certainly "closer" and "more distant" implications of the intended meaning, depending on the degree to which the implication can be perceived; a subjective or human point of view that comes into play when attributing consequences of actions and in the degree of responsibility for them: as it were, in a shift of responsibility from the will to judgement (cf. above, p. 14). But purely logically, this is irrelevant, i.e. it is irrelevant to and cannot change the fact that it is in the sense of the will to fulfil every implication of the intended. And everyone has already had the opportunity to become aware of this fact. For everyone has experienced having to make a decision in an unclear situation and has done so with the thought, "I don't know how it will go and what will come of it, but come what may, I will do it this way." Here, the person who wills has also explicitly taken upon himself what is unknown to him in the sense of his will, declaring it to be part of his will.

3. "Own" and "non-own" I m p l i k at e. D a a M i t w o l l e n d e r T a a o h e n.

What appears to be intentional in the cases under consideration is brought about by the realisation of the intentional, as a consequence, or in the realisation of the intentional, as a means, and an occurrence appears as "close" or "distant", but always as a
"e i g e n t l i c h e g" Implikat der Vertataächlichung des Oewollten.

The relationship that connects it to this was of the kind that, when used, is entirely appropriate and natural. It is somehow inherent in the circumstances, the actualisation of which are the circumstances under consideration, that one leads to the other. whenever the determinations whose actualisation is desired in the given case become actualised, the implied determinations also become actualised, regardless of whether this is established a priori or only through experience. However, this type of implication does not extend to what is fact, independent of our will.

For the sake of easier understanding, a few names have been introduced. The implication between two determinations A (x) and B (x) is expressed in that if (any) x is the determination
If A (x) satisfies, then a also satisfies the condition B (x) is called a
B 0 ß t i m iii u D g s i m p l i k a t i o n — in logistics, it bears the less distinctive name F o r m a l i m p l i k ati o n —; if x < 1, then x < S^, if x Oold iat, then x is soluble in mercury. An implication such as "if 518 has a digit divisible by ß, then sis   is divisible by 3" — also the natural one we obtain when we substitute 517 for 518 — or "if this ring of mine is made of gold, then it is soluble in mercury" — can be regarded as an "applied determination". As can be seen, there is an implication between specific circumstances, facts or non-facts, as cases of implications A (x), B (x) — more generally A (a), B (y), as in "if today is Saturday, then tomorrow is Sunday" in application to a **given** today — and indeed of such cases between which there is a determination implication: one could say an application of a determination implication.

The implications between certain facts that we usually consider, especially those between individual cases, are of this kind. In contrast, the implication that exists between facts — and non-facts — as such, regardless of the determinations specified in them, is merely " Materiale Implikation". Thus, between the facts "my ring is made of gold" and "my ring is dissolved in mercury" there is the specified applied determination implication. At the same time, there is a material implication, but this is reversible — both facts are facts, and so one cannot be without the other — whereas the present applied determination implication is not reversible, i.e. the pure determination implication "   " if x is from Oold, then x is soluble in mercury" is not, and therefore its application cannot **result in** a reversible consequence.

Applying these distinctions, one can therefore say that whatever is implied in the intended circumstances in terms of any applied provision implication is also intended. The determination

implications, røinø and angøwandtø, corresponding to 0O YOlÎlfOmlZløn **dälït** usually borrowed qw e n n — so°, all ø i g ø n11i e h e' implication; so that the "intended" implications were intended, and, as it seems, only sic. However, how should one view the distinction between "genuine" and "non-genuine" implications in the case of Wollønø? What I mean is not simply the actualisation of a proposition B (x), but its actualisation in certain cases, such as in the given case and then under all the conditions of the case, which, as far as I am aware, are not included in the statement B (x) and are therefore not "actually" implied in the intended circumstances, but only materially implied. Between these conditions and those clearly covered in the case and included in B (x), many are only vaguely or "half" covered, those that are close to being explicitly covered, but not directly addressed by it.

"Because he handled the weapon carelessly, his friend died." — here, the conviction of the existence of an actual implication is expressed, although it is not necessary to distinguish between the explicit provisions "x is a man and handles a weapon inappropriately" and "y is a friend of x and dies". That is also not the opinion, but rather, in the case of the first provision in the given case,

i.e. in the proposed timing, there is certainly another determination that is actually an implication for the occurrence of the second condition. **But** how many of these conditions are, as eyewitnesses themselves clearly understand, 2 — Let us assume that the man knew how to clean the Oewøbr and shot his friend. The circumstances he knew did not imply the agreement that occurred in this case, and he will not be blamed for wanting that agreement to occur. But he wanted to meet them under the circumstances of the case, which he did not know completely, but for whose incomplete consideration he will be held responsible. I want to make a determination based on the conditions of the case; I want what would not be possible without these conditions, what indeed cannot be, because they are precisely 'patøaehø'. Anyone who wants A, which cannot exist without B, also wants B. And since this formula applies to every fact B, every fact is therefore desired in every respect.

4. D aa ex pl i s i t e Wo l l e n d ø r T a t ø a c h e n.

DÎ0 'f8tBachen are, of course, not quite in the same sense as the "actual" implications of the intended facts. These can, if attention is drawn to them, also

be emphatically desired. However, a 'fact' that confronts us as a fact is beyond our influence and thus, it seems, beyond any desire. And yet, in the face of facts, there is an experience that is sufficiently volitional to be included as an exception under an expanded concept of volition. It even occasionally expresses itself linguistically in the same terms as actual volition. Someone who has expressed their will and who has been given a circumstance to consider that contradicts their will might say, for example, "it may be, so be it," thereby indicating that they are sticking to their will, incorporating the fact into their will: "they accept it." The will has explicitly adjusted itself to the facts, it fits into the facts. The same "should be" occurs, however, and sometimes quite clearly, when we give up a goal in view of the facts and "change our will": in any case, we will make these facts clear to ourselves in an energetic review, incorporating them, as it were, into the foundations of our judgement, but also into our future plans. This is not only a passive abandonment of desires that are repugnant to us, but also, even if no new goal has yet been set, a preparatory but active adjustment of the will. It may be accompanied by the explicit intention "I will take that into account"; which then corresponds to a normal actual desire, only with the peculiarity that it is directed towards one's own future will; the essence of the process, of which this desire is only an expression, lies deeper and consists precisely in that setting of the will towards action. This adjustment differs from the adjustment to an actual goal of the will: the will is directed towards the goal-related situation, but ca directed arch towards the 'Tataachen, those "pursues" ea, "attacks him", serves "fullt" it, — all images that hint at the Oegenaatz and the kinship in the experiences.

5. The unique S o11 e n.

If, therefore, it is in accordance with Wollena's meaning that the desired state of affairs should be the case, then it is also in accordance with his meaning that the facts should be as they are, for without them the desired state of affairs cannot exist. Of course, this state of affairs no longer corresponds to the ordinary, natural concept of oughtness: just as the will of the facts is no longer actual will — but rather a willing behaviour — the being of the facts is now only an "unintended circumstance." Nevertheless, it is so closely related to the actual ought that it is an ought-like 'factual situation,'

since it justifies inclusion under a correspondingly expanded concept of oughtness.

The improper, one might say fulfilled, ought lies in the consequence of the ought: it is implied in every ought. It is now particularly noteworthy that the step leading from the natural to the expanded concept of ought is of exactly the same kind as the step leading from the natural to the expanded concept of implication, and that it is essentially connected with this step. The connection is clear: it is only from the implication of the facts in every situation that ought to be that the oughtness of the facts arises, but this implication is merely a factual implication.

The experience that first brings us into contact with the concrete relationship of implication is that peculiar transition from one judgement to a subsequent judgement, which expresses itself in 'also' or in a   w e i1 — a o"; frombecause A, is B", we arrive, when A remains unjudged, at if A, then B; that peculiar transition of thought from the antecedent to the consequent remains here as well. It corresponds in a unique way to the counterfactual relationship of implication and is the original means of grasping it. The implication   which corresponds to this thought motivation, is applied or pure determination-implication, alao,   actual° ; nnr opposite to it there is this peculiar setting of facts with regard   to another, as a **consequence** of a cause. But an exact logic cannot remain silent on this implication relationship. It is not irrelevant to it whether B follows from A , and the cases of implication in which this occurs deserve special theoretical treatment , but beyond this evidentiary relationship — evidence is a matter of thought — the general truth relationship of the   if — consisting in the fact that if the A judgement is true, then the B judgement is also true (regardless of whether this is obvious in view of that   plausible" or not): it corresponds to the relationship between the facts that A cannot exist without B, since the implication in its general concept encompasses both the actual and the merely material implication. Without this concept, logic would lack strict generality and precision. Without taking material implications into account, we would   not be able to recognise formal implications in the realm of reality through experience and would remain limited to a priori implications. For empirical formal implications arise only from the material implications of the cases from which we derive them through induction. The experience that originally corresponds to the actual implication of the required, the actual implication of the required, is a peculiar transition from wanting to wanting, the motivation of wanting the implication through the wanting of the implication. The requirement relationship

A demands B• presents itself as the "actual" one, insofar a s B can be willed (actually willed) in the Bible • on A.

The actual unconditional ought corresponds to the experience of wanting. He has also ensured that, in the sense of wanting, it extends to every implication of the desired and that, as an "inappropriate" fulfilled desire, it also affects the facts. Just as the original concept of implication, supported by the experience of consequential connection, leads to the necessity of extending beyond the realm of that experience and to a generalised, concrete formulation when attempting to treat it precisely, so too does the original concept of demand (the relationship of demand) and of ought. As in the case of inauthentic willing, the 'facts' nevertheless present an experience, since the remnant of willing still corresponds to the inauthentic ought,   the 'inauthentic' can also be

i.e. merely confronting a peculiar factual situation with a material implication of the facts. In the realm of actual implication, we find ourselves strangely bound by **the positing** of a fact in relation to an implication, we experience a tendency to posit it, and in the given case, a division takes place under this tendency, the motivation of the judgement. One result of this remains, however, the mere material implication: through every judgement, in a certain sense even through every assumption, we adjust ourselves to the facts. We set a fact, judging or assuming, aalva veritate, we add it to the context of the facts. To every assumption we make, we readily add the facts already recognised in the course of reasoning, with the awareness that the assumption is thereby

This does not change anything: we are simply explicitly linking the presupposed fact with a further fact that was implicitly linked to it, as a material implication of it. After all, the objectivity of the material implication is much clearer and easier to grasp than its psychological counterpart.

With the expanded deontic concepts, the opposite seems to be true. Since improper volition is a clearly discernible experience, improper obligation, which aims to be an equivalent of actuality but not actuality itself, seems to be only indirectly, indirectly, and masculinely influenced by consideration of the concomitant requirements of the facts. However, it should be noted that the oughtness of actuality is by no means far removed from extra-scientific and, as it seems, unbiased thinking.   One often hears the expression "   " (it just happens to be that way).

It is irrelevant whether B is desired because A is desired or because A is, in fact, because A is actually believed and judged to be true. If A is, then B should be, and if A is not, then B should not be. are equivalent relationships, and the fact that this equivalence is completely and immediately obvious is another sign that our extension of the natural concept of ought is not exactly natural, because here the concepts of A and 'being the case' can be substituted for one another.

ao should be° or ,ea comes anyway, as it should come°. The first occurs particularly in cases that we are justified in classifying as cases of improper volition: when one comes to terms with a fact, i.e. finds the volitional attitude towards it. The second does not necessarily imply a sense of fatalism. Whatever unclear secondary thoughts may be associated with such statements, **they** clearly **show** that the concept of improper volition   is not foreign to ordinary thinking   .

§ 9. The will and the determinacy of the event.

1. Conduct that is appropriate to the circumstances.

The next of the allegations in § 8, 1, which are to be examined, is the assertion (1): The intent relates to specific circumstances.
— Certain facts are 'acts or misdeeds, acts and misdeeds as such we cannot want in the true sense: so it seems that, since there is such a thing as true wanting, we want indeterminate facts. What needs to be said in refutation of this has already been said in § 1, 1. But, if I may judge from my own experience, it may be the case with this as with many other things: that, even when refuted, it is still not abolished and still disturbs our thinking. Thus, it is useful to contrast ordinary actual will with a case where there is in fact something like a desire for an indeterminate state of affairs; one will then see what kind of volitional behaviour towards such a case remains possible. I can judge $0 < 1$, but I cannot judge x   1, as long as x is not already assumed to be predetermined; however, I can assume this indeterminate circumstance as a determination for x. The normal expression of this assumption is "x is less than 1". This statement does not express a fact, but rather an assumption, and assumptions are arbitrary. In fact, along with the assumption, which is a purely intellectual act, something desirable may also be expressed here. Indeed, it seems that this is precisely where the freest will is found; we can dispose of nothing as unrestrictedly and unconditionally as we can of the meaning of signs — at least for us. The assertion that "the sign x should mean a number smaller than 1" is in fact a will. But this will does not refer to a determination, but to a specific fact that — within the scope of the statement — actually exists or does not exist: the will does not refer to an indeterminate x, but to the sign x, and that is a specific object, and it is fulfilled when

by those involved that the sign is actually understood in the intended sense. However, it should be noted that when setting x to be less than 1, we cannot even think about the meaning and understanding of the signs. The analysis of the concept of the "indefinite" or the variable and its determination is probably one of the most difficult tasks in psychology; but this much can be said: the assumption that x is less than 1 is a fantastical reproduction of a judgement that cannot occur here due to the absence of a specific subject, then the identical desire-based assumption — provided it does not concern the sign and its meaning, but rather the "changeable" itself — is merely a fantasy desire, an imaginary reproduction of a will. One can easily add other examples to this one that concern "real" and therefore more desirable determinations, such as x pays y one hundred shillings, etc. These can only show that one can at most desire a pure determination only in a phantasmal way, but not in a natural way — not even seriously desire it; just as one can only judge them in a phantasy-like manner, i.e. not judge them at all, but only assume them in a judgement-like intellectual behaviour.

2. Objective Boatimmtbeit b ø i a u b j e k t i v e r U n-b e s t i m t h e i t.

Of course, we do not want to actually want — and that is all we are talking about here — facts or even non-facts as such. 'frotzdøm is every circumstance that we want, one or the other. EB Ißt, timelessly and in a certain sense always, even before my decision, is a fact or it is a non-fact, that what I have in mind as desirable will come to pass. In view of this situation, the task arises of showing what meaning and significance actual wanting and oughtness have. Is it not just an illusion that we determine the course of events by wanting, when everything is already determined? And what is the point of another oughtness, when what ought to happen does happen anyway?

What we want is neither a determination of all possibilities, nor a fact or a non-fact of all possibilities, but rather the applicability of a determination in certain cases. The cases are not fully determined, but are only grasped by the thinker in an incomplete determination. For the sake of simplicity, let us consider a desire that refers to a single case. It is clearly understood by the desiring person, but the case itself — for example, the next eye...

The concept of fantasy perception (and that of the pantheist) was introduced by Meinong. See the author's book: Uber Annahmøn, op. cit., index.

view in which, in the sense of my knowledge, my hand should appear —
as the pall that it is, but by no means in every respect as I actually am.
Beine Yorgebe,

d. h. Before the occurrence of Wollena, the determination does not
normally contain (imply) the determination that is actually contained in it
and which we briefly refer to as the desired, assuming that it is not the
actual desired, but rather its applicability in this case. Before the act of
willing, it cannot be deduced from the given circumstances and thus
recognised that it will be fulfilled. However, it may be that even before
the will, I am already aware of it, with my hand outstretched and the facts
of this gesture not purely imaginary, merely assumed, but already real.
But then the original experience would not have the character of
certainty; if it did, there would be no actual willing anymore, but I would
only behave suspiciously and highly insincerely towards what was
happening to me or with me. Whenever genuine will occurs, the
preceding experience of the desired state of affairs is, if not merely an
assumption, then at most a conjecture: it appears to me as possible, not as
actual and not as impossible. Despite the certainty of the facts, there is, of
course, an objective uncertainty. But that only means that it is
incompletely grasped and that the appearance of uncertainty of the facts
to which the will refers is just an appearance. We can say: the facts that
are intended are a fact or a misdeed, but initially only comprehended in
incomplete modal certainty as possible.

ß. M ö g l i o h k e i I   b ø i   B e ø t i m m u n g e n   u n d   b ø
i   b e-st i m m te n g « c h v e r ha l t e n.

Here, it is essential to clearly understand the concept of possibility
in a few simple steps. The actual realm of possibility is the undefined
verbal expressions: x is a real number, x < 1 are possible determinations.
This means that there are cases in which these determinations are realised
or apply. It is possible for a dice to fall on one of its faces, in particular
on the face marked 1. The fact underlying this statement is diBB13F: in
the total range of (possible) cases in which a dice falls on one of its faces,
there is a 'range of cases' in which it falls on 1. Since this accounts for
half of the total range of cases, we assign the specified probability to 2/e.
It is the possibility of a determination, or more precisely, the possibility
of an indeterminate degree of the validity of a determination: the
possibility that an (indeterminate) case where the determination

Condition A (x), "x is a die and falls on one of its faces," applies, and at the same time, there is a ball where condition B (x), "x falls on face 1," applies. The probability of a determination, corresponding to the relationship between the two, i.e. the number of cases of this determination, is called the probability.

But pure possibilities tend to be of little interest, except in theoretical considerations. It is much more important to know what is possible in a given case and how it is possible. But the given case is completely determined, and whether a given determination, B (x), will occur in it is simply a fact, or it is not a fact if we do not know it. Precisely because we only have an incomplete understanding of the case, we are left wondering about possibilities, even though facts are available. Not only do we consider the dice, when it lands, especially on 1, to be possible, but also that the next throw I will make with this dice here the same result will occur, is called possible, and if I also state that this is a correct dice and I will throw it in the usual way, we will assume the same possibility that was found for the indeterminate case as a pure possibility. We therefore transfer the possibility of the determination or the indeterminate case of the determination to the determined case, to the occurrence of the determination in this case: we refer to the possibility of the determined circumstance, which we perceive, as applied.

The question of the meaning and justification of such an overburdening

is answered when one clarifies what has happened here. We have taken a given case in the   incomplete   —   given   — determination   A (x), blofi

, as a case of that determination". Since determination A (x) entails a definite pure possibility for the applicability of B (x) — in the indefinite case,   in general° — we have also claimed the same possibility for the applicability of B (x) in the given case. And it is clear: this possibility of a case of B (x) occurs in the given case if and only if it is a case of A (x) and only to that extent. The case is, of course, completely determined — either because the applicability of B (x) is actually the case, or because it is not actually the case, i.e. because it is completely determined — but regardless of this complete determination, it also has the aforementioned possibility relative to a partial determination A (x). Accordingly, the determined fact "applicability of B lx) in

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' Ygl. 31 e i n o n g. On Possibility and Probability, **Leipzig.** 191b (Registers ; also my studies on the theory of possibility and similarity, a. a. 0., § 3'7.

° Yg1. H e i n o n g, op. cit. (register); my 'Studies', op. cit., § 39.

In this case, in addition to its complete absolute modal determination, it also has the incomplete relative modal determination ₑof the possibility, relative to determination A (x), of the case BB.

This relative modal determination is just as real as, for example, the relative determination that the city of Baden is located south of Vienna, which applies to the city regardless of its complete local determination, and is just as little "subjective" as the latter. What is subjectively conditioned is only the incompleteness of the perception of what is objectively completely determined and the selection that occurs among the available determinations of the same. In this respect, a certain fact that is perceived as possible is "subjectively indeterminate".

4. Relationship between the W o l l e n s and the O e se h e n and the southern Tatra Mountains.

In volition, a peculiar and very remarkable change in the intellectual position towards a situation takes place. The applicability of the determination B(x) in the present case appears to me to be possible before the act of willing, but since I know this, I can now judge that "   , I will do ea", iso "ea will be", and this judgement has, from a psychological point of view, the character of certainty. This certainty is essential for the fact of decisive volition, and where this decisiveness is lacking, there is not actually volition, but something related to it. It seems, of course, that even the most resolute volition can remain without such certainty. The ambitious person wants to attain a high position, but perhaps does not judge that he will attain it. But he does not really want this goal, the realisation of which depends on so many things; he desires it, strives for it and wants to do what seems necessary to achieve it, and in each such case he is also certain that he will do it. The more distant the goal, the more external circumstances influence its realisation, the less certain it becomes that it will be achieved under the same conditions; but the desire to achieve it always brings the judgement of the completion of this certainty closer, even if only in relation to the next goals, one's own actions, until completion.

In the conviction of the actual occurrence of the desired — it may, incidentally, become current in an explicit judgement or exist only as an intellectual attitude
— it is remarkable that it appears to be directly linked to volition. I do not have to determine, as if I were an outside observer, that I want something in order to then conclude "so it will happen"; rather, by wanting it, I cause it to happen, and in this way

my judgement and will at the same time. The act of willing itself and
Not only does the judgement that established him bear the psychological
prerequisite for the act of judgement. — In the case of improper volition,
the opposite is true: here, the actual judgement carries the volition —.
Willing thus completes our judgemental statement about the future; it
leads us from an incomplete understanding of the situation to a complete
modal certainty • it allows us, in the best case, to discover facts. Those
who think clearly and will strongly know most about the future.

This conviction, **supplemented** by volition**, is** without moral
justification.   My volition is the experienced expression of a
real process within me, which is a real determination of the case to which it
refers. The case is constituted by this reality — rather, by me. Now that I
know the constituent parts of the case, I understand it more fully and, in the
best case, can recognise that a possible determination will actually apply to it.
In that the will — or rather, in that the will finds an experienced expression
— constitutively determines the actual occurrence, it enables the judgement
to grasp the 'fact' of this occurrence. The fact th   , at such and such a time,
this and that happens is, of course, inevitable and unchangeable, but just as
inevitable and unchangeable is the fact that it happens this way through my
will. The real function of volition is to play the role of a real factor in the
actual event, and for this, volition is decisive.   Of course, there is nothing to
determine in the facts; the will cannot make them, it can only help to discover
them.

The examination of our assumption (1) — that volition is directed
towards specific circumstances — has not only been confirmed, but has
also yielded an important addition that removes and clarifies the
appearance of indeterminacy in volitional circumstances. The line of
reasoning — § 8, 1 — that led to the paradoxical deontic propositions is
thus legitimised by the specific deontic assertions (4), (5), (7) about ought,
which probably no longer require further justification. The assertion (8)
that an untataache implies arbitrary facts results from the extended version
of the implication concept, which was justified in § 8, 5, by itself. — The
following investigations have the task of clarifying the concept of the
actual ought, in particular its relationship to the non-actual ought and to
the facts, by considering the right will and the knowledge of its rightness.
They will also bring the meaning of the three deontic assertions just
mentioned to full clarity.

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IV. The right intention.

§ 10. Laws of material correctness.

1. A ll g e za ei n e 0 e B e tz e des r i ¢b t i g en W'o ll en g.

The essential laws of will, which are expressed in our fundamental laws of ought, are these:

(I) Whoever wants something wants everything that is implied in the required circumstances; wanting extends to the implications of the intended action.

(II) If fact A is desired and fact B is desired, then it is also desired that A and B be true.

(III) Anyone who makes a conditional demand, "if A is, then B must be", implicitly wants "it must be the case that if A is, then B is also".

(IV) There is a situation U that one absolutely wants to be true.

(V) Those who want what is right do not want (even implicitly) the negation of what is desired; wanting what is right is consistent.

The propositions are consistent with the essential laws of judgement, namely those of certainty and assertion. These can be derived from them if one always substitutes "assert" for "want" or "demand" and "is in fact" for "8o1l" in (III). Here one can clearly see how the logic of judgement, as an essential part of the logic of thought, contrasts with the logic of the will (if one wishes to put it that way) and with the "logic of objects", namely the general theory of objects — in particular the theory of facts.

Here we must develop the "logic of volition." Its principles follow from the aforementioned principles of obligation, just as the deontic consequences (in Chapter II) follow from the principles of ought, or could be deduced from   and   . We will only present the most important conclusions, particularly from the perspective of the correctness of volition. I will continue to refrain from always highlighting the analogies in judgement; they are obvious. The first three propositions deal with volition in general: they concern all volition, both false and true. Only the fourth introduces true volition into the system, and the fifth establishes a

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• **Sentence** n **does not correspond exactly to the main clause** I — § 2 — **but to a subordinate clause** — 6., § 3, § 5 — which, **when applied to** volition, **allows for a simpler formulation than the former.**

criterion of correctness, in the case of contradiction. In the realm of specific facts — and these are judged and desired — only the facts are free of contradiction; accordingly, among judgements, only the true ones are free of contradiction, and among desires, only those that are fulfilled, let us say the materially correct ones. So when we talk about all correct volition here and consider these cases, it is the volition that proves itself externally by asserting itself. It will become apparent to what extent this external correctness goes hand in hand with internal correctness and how the latter distinguishes itself from the former. In any case, as in logical thinking, the main focus here is on correctness and its conditions.

The Orundsatz (II) — linking clause — establishes a fundamental connection between all claims that may be made at any time, either simultaneously or consecutively: they all constitute one claim and demand that what is to exist in the sense of each individual be maintained together.

This becomes particularly important in practice when demands are made on the same subject or are made by the same subjects, which then raises the question "What do I want?" and the equally important question "What do I actually want?" The second case in particular is of obvious importance when considering the correctness of one's desires. My desires can only be correct if not only what I want at the moment is consistent, but also the totality of all the circumstances that I have ever wanted or will ever want. Since one must want correctly, the requirement arises — naturally only in the sense of actual oughtness — that all our requirements must be able to be united in one.

It is important to keep the Orund dieaeB Oebotes ("imperatives") clear in mind so that one does not look for something where it cannot be found: it simply lies in the fact that all requirements together form a single, composite content, equivalent to   , and that they are subject to their

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' Of course, time specifications remain unaffected by this combination. If it is required that A (x) occurs today and B (a) occurs tomorrow, then it is required that A (x) occurs today and B (x) occurs tomorrow, and not both at the same time. The "simultaneous" existence of the (specific) facts does not mean that the conditions are met at the same time. This is sometimes overlooked, as is understandable, just as the conditional occurrence of a condition is occasionally taken to mean the conditional existence of the thing that it affects, and then a judgement is made of conditional truth or validity — which is absurd. (See O. K. Fll p e, Vor-leenngen fiber Logik. Leipzig, 1823. What is treated here as a "judgement" is not a judgement at all, but merely a linguistic form of judgement.)

Beer comes with a principle whose systematic significance only becomes clear later (§ 11, 4). It is only used here to avoid repetition.

In fact, it turns out that this is only correct if it is consistent, and that one should want it to be correct.

Sentence (I) — the consistency principle — states that with a given set of facts, every implication   every fact without which that set of facts does not exist — is desired, and derives the following principle for the correctness of desire: it is correct to desire an implication of what is desired — explicitly. But this does not imply the requirement to explicitly want every implication of a desired fact, which would obviously be impossible to fulfil; for the proposition does not claim that wanting is only correct if every such implication is explicitly wanted. One might want to make the following demand: to want in such a way that we could also explicitly want every implication of what we want — and to want it genuinely or at least in a non-genuine way, to consent to it. But such a demand would not be very specific, because it is not clear and it is difficult to explain what this "being able to want" actually means. What the sentence implies for the correctness of wanting is essentially only this: a wanting is only correct if the (explicit) wanting — the actual or non-actual — is also correct in every implication. And this corresponds to the requirement: to want in such a way that the (explicit) wanting is correct in every implication of what is wanted — in short, in every co-wanted thing. This
"Imperative" has practical value in that it points to a useful — and often used — means of testing the correctness of a woolen or a project.

Since, according to (II), all my demands amount to a single one, which, according to (V), is only correct if it is free of contradiction, and since, according to (I), all implications of a desired outcome are also desired, my desire will only be correct if every implication of one demand is compatible with every implication of every other demand without contradiction. This also provides a possibility for testing, which, however, can never prove correctness on its own, but can only reveal existing incorrectness. If I want A, which implies B, and on the other hand I want C, which is incompatible with B, then I want G to be B and my desire is incorrect. Of course, in this case, A is already incompatible with C, but the conflict may be hidden, whereas there is a clear contradiction between B and C.

Sentence (III) proves the correctness of Wollena's Oegetz: the conditional volition "if A is, then B shall be" is only correct if the unconditional volition "it shall be such that if A is, then B is" is correct. Instead of "only then", one can also say "then and only then", because the two requirements are equivalent. The
The "imperative" that could be formed from this is obvious enough, but another one with far greater significance can be deduced from our sentence.

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2. A principle of application.   àI o t i v a I i o n d u r c h
W o ll e n .

The implication, if A, then B, results in suøamoien with the fact that "
A iat Tatsache" (A is a fact)   the fact that "   B İBt Tatøache" (B is a
fact).
This fact, which is simply implied in the concept of implication, is
nevertheless of the utmost importance for thinking; not insofar as it grasps it,
but insofar as it applies it. The application takes place in the form: "   "
which has the form: if A, then B; A is (actually); therefore B is (actually). All
deduction is based on the application principle of implication: What is
implied by an act (is a fact and) can be correctly asserted.   lhm øteht   is
accompanied by the application principle of the requirement relationship:
What is required of a being-that-ought-to-be (ought to be and) can rightly be
willed — cf. § 6, 17.   — Eø is the principle of II o I i v at i o n, which is not
done justice to by thinking eø, but by willing in accordance with it, applying
it willingly.

The principle does not contain a necessary condition for richness, but
only a sufficient one. Therefore, it cannot be expressed as a requirement, but
only as a permission. It does not constitute an actual demand to assert the
implications of a fact that the postulates of a being want to happen — this
happens implicitly,   von gelbat", igt anyway actually and therefore only
improperly demanded.   A necessary condition of correctness —   but not
sufficient — and therefore only required if an implication of a fact is not
denied, a postulate of what ought to be is not opposed, and that is already
expressed in the request for consistency (§ 10, 1). Only when a position is
taken on a co-asserted or co-willed proposition should this be done in the
sense of asserting or willing (at least in the sense of consenting).

The opportunity to want a desired object arises in relation to an object
that plays the role of the centre. I want, for example,
I heat an iron wire to red hot using the Hittøla, as I send an electric current
through it. Then this means was the cause of the effect, which was the
desired event. The given case of conducting a current through the wire is
the cause of the given case of heating the wire; Cause and effect are real
events, completely determined cases. Between them, in their completeness
and specificity, there is of course a reversible (material) implication,
which is obviously not what we mean when we assert a causal
relationship. In doing so, we only refer to the two cases in an incomplete
manner: as cases of certain (incomplete) determinations $M(x)$, $N\{x\}$. M
(x) can be expressed as follows

,x is an egg wire and ea is a current sent through x", N (x) approximately, heat is generated in x. And now, applying this to the given xi,   the applied   Imp I i k ati on,   if M (xi), then N (zi)° asserts.   This, of course, only happens implicitly here, because, in addition, M (xt) is judged to be all t£ttBİiOhlich, and 6o the judgement w e i 1 M (xi), iøt N (xi)' results. In all cases of causality, øo1che applied implication is present. The existence of the 'cause', if this is a case of M (x), is the implicant of the existence of the 'effect', if this is a case of N (x).

If the existence of the cause is merely an implication (sufficient condition) for the existence of the desired effect and not at the same time a necessary condition, it is not required by this desire — and the same applies to 'l'eilurøachen'. In the 'l'at, I can also achieve the warming of the wire by other means, and the fact that I choose this particular means is not clearly determined by the purpose. But still, through this purpose together with the circumstances or through it under the circumstances in which I want it. Accordingly, there is a duality of concepts of motivation; it corresponds to the fact that one can say that this means was taken, although not motivated by the purpose alone, and yet one can also say that it was motivated by it. The one meaning of motivation in a narrower sense is that only the will of an actual implication of the willed is motivated — and not the existence of a specific cause or partial cause in general. The other meaning applies an expanded concept of motivation, according to which the will of a

, improperly" (blob material) implies that the existence of this particular cause (or partial cause) is also motivated by the desire for the effect. Only the will to use the means is actually required and actually motivated, insofar as they appear to be necessary, i.e. if their existence is a necessary condition of the desired situation, implication in the sense of applied determination implication. Here one notices how the actual ought

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'If a given event I is the cause of the immediately following event £'•, the third condition seems to be satisfied, since II is completely determined by I in an irreversible manner, i.e. for every value N (x) occurring in I**, there is** a value It (y) in I such that It (y) s N (x), but not vice versa. This may be the case if ll does not have the "entire" (instantaneous) effect of I; however, it is questionable whether a partial effect can be isolated without violating the assumption of the complete determinacy of II. Whether I and II can be understood as anything other than two successive "world situations" that naturally imply each other. These difficulties stem from the fact that, as stated in **the text**, the concept of the channel connection only encompasses what is relative to actual events: the fulfilment of certain independent determinations.

appears to be bound by incomplete provisions. But that is a matter for later consideration.

ö. Motivation through judgement.

Knowledge can be motivated not only by desire, but also by judgement: I want B because A is, where A is a subjective or even a purely 'objective' fact.

The reasons we usually give for our actions tend to be rather inadequate. I want to go out because "it's so beautiful"; I give someone a piece of clothing because they are poor,   another person a book because it's their birthday — all very inadequate explanations. The specific circumstances of each case, both internal and external, always play a role, and it is often very difficult to identify the most important ones that, together with the stated reason, constitute the full justification for our actions.

It may even be questionable whether such a justification — apart from the difficulties inherent in our limited knowledge — is ever possible, or even possible at all. There is probably a kind of dark will, simply based on the given reality and directed towards the next event, a will to exist that, in complete indeterminacy, is directed towards the existence of my individual self, which is not grasped in terms of being, perhaps simply directed towards reality. But although it is probably inherent in every desire and is the foundation on which every desire rests, it hardly appears as an independent fact of knowledge and may be disregarded here.

The actual will is directed towards the fulfilment of a determination. directed and for the fact that the application of provision B (x) is known in the present case, in the sense of the knowledgeable person, the reasons for the — actual or supposed — application of a provision A (x) are contained in the moment of volition. Willing is therefore, regardless of the influence of other motives, always motivated by judgement. The decisive determinations may be difficult to find in sufficient completeness and even more difficult to state clearly, but some reflection **often** leads us to clearly grasp the facts from which we want or have wanted. Then we say that in this case (xt the provision A(x) applies, B (x) must also apply, or   because A(x) is true, B(x) must be true • and this is now an expression of an applied determination implication: the application   of a requirement relationship between   provisions,   der

Relation A (x) f B (a). In the statement thus understood, ' w ø i1 A txt) is, B (xt) shall be', it is implied that if A (x) is true, B (x) shall be true — for every x. This general requirement is what is called the axiom of the action.

Whether we always act according to maxims is not a question of ethics; whether we should act according to maxims cannot be decided at this point without further investigation (cf. § lS, 4). But this is certain: if someone brings about the occurrence of event B (a) because condition A (x) is true — that is, in the strict sense of a sufficient justification — then he has acted according to a maxim, and in the sense of A. Pollen, it is clear that this maxim, "if A (x) is true, then B (x) should be true," applies generally. In other words: whoever wants B (x) to be true in a given case because A (x) is true, implicitly wants this to be true.

— that the relationship   if A (x) holds, then B (x) generally holds like a natural law   applies (this transformation of the previous sentence makes use of Proposition III). The Kantian demand that he should be able to know, since his maxim is generally valid, has its basis in the fact that he implicitly, i.e. according to the meaning of his knowledge, actually wants this. The desire for one determination to apply to Orund døø the application of another is only correct if the general requirement implied in it, that this determination entails that one (in every case), is also correct. This is a very strict condition of correctness, which follows from a mere   external • probation of knowledge, by achieving the desired result in the given case, without the correctness dBß   ÌtDplÌßÌt8EWãiøs with the general 8aohverhalteø, only a partial fulfilment — which does not achieve what was actually intended —, then the intention is materially incorrect. — But the game of the pàlaximøn" and their willingness to cooperate only acquires its essential meaning in   Oøbiøte dea, the actual 8ollenø, under the Oesichtø-points to a more than just material rightfulness.

4. The material is contrary to the law.

The **propositions** that are contrary to what ought to be, which occur in our theoretical system, naturally claim to be actual occurrences. Proposition V states that what is contrary to what ought to be is not implied by what ought to be; however, there are propositions of the form

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* *be* liënnen **occur** in the determinations, of course**,** several ¥erănder-liche **occur,** the representation chooses **only** the case of a change due to the finiteness.

Kant, (Ornndlegong znr Betapbysik der Sitten): Ifaxime is the

5.6

If something is contrary to what ought to be, then there is this and that, and these owe their truth in the realm of material correctness entirely to the fact that (here) what is contrary to what ought to be never is — such a statement says that what is contrary to what ought to be does not exist, or that there is this and that. In this realm, even incorrect volition is not contrary to what ought to be, insofar as it actually exists. A materially incorrect will is directed at something that is not an aoll — i.e., here, something that will not happen — and only in this sense is it contrary to what ought to be, but not in the sense that it does not actually occur, because it does occur. When one speaks of contrary-to-duty willing, one naturally always means something that demands something that is contrary to duty in the sense of actual duty, and then it is also the willing itself that is contrary to duty. Although not always, a willing that only lacks material correctness is also called incorrect. One would then rather say that someone did not start correctly, but also that they did not want correctly, even if it was well-intentioned and internally correct.

Our sentence (IV), which states that there is (mindeatena) an 8aeh-behaviour U, which su want to be correct iat, thus simply reflects the actual circumstances. The materially correct will goes back to Pataachen, be it ea, since it achieves its goal as actual will, be it that it recognises a fact as inauthentic.

Sats (V) requires consistency for true volition. This does not only mean freedom from an   internal or logical contradiction in what is desired, but also freedom from implied (applied) determinations, one of which implies the negation of the other, and freedom from material implications, one of which is the negation of the other. A fact such as that Socrates died of old age is not contradictory in itself, but it contradicts the fact that Socrates did not die of old age, which it implies (materially) as a fact.   Thus, it is not materially consistent.

— Anyone who wants to be materially incorrect implicitly wants the factual and the non-factual to coexist. If he tries to pursue his intention, he will reach a point where, precisely defined, it ceases to give him the direction of his actions, where everything seems equally good and equally bad for its realisation — because nothing can serve it: false will becomes meaningless, ultimately demanding everything and nothing. — If what ought to be is impossible, then anything is possible, and nothing is impossible. This paradoxical statement, a simple consequence of the fact that what ought to be is never possible in the material sense, nevertheless finds a kind of reflection in our consciousness: namely, when something happens that, in our view, should not be according to the order of nature, seems impossible and   impossible." Anyone who has witnessed a great catastrophe is familiar with the

A feeling of the incomprehensible and the thoughts that arise despite better knowledge: when something so monstrous happens, when that is supposed to be the case, then everything stops, or then everything can and should be over. It is difficult to muster the will to face such events, to feel the whole of nature and suddenly say: yes, it is right (Dostoevsky, The Demons).

§ II. The inner right will.

1. M a t e r i a l e   und   f o r m a l e   Correctness.

Dio external or material correctness simply consists in the meeting of facts in judgement and volition. Daa materially correct, i.e. the true judgement, grasps a 'fact'; materially correct volition recognises, as inauthentic, the fact of the existence of a reality independent of it, and as authentic the existence of a reality that is constituted by the will. However, there is a correctness that seems independent of this external verification by facts. First of all, there is what is referred to as the formal correctness of a conclusion and, analogously, the formal correctness of motivation. A (xt), B (xt) are applied determinations, i.e. of the form 'here — in the case of xi — A (x) applies', or 'B (x) occurs'. Then the conclusion is formally correct because A (xt) and B (xt) ^, regardless of whether A (xi) is a fact, if the relationship   if A (x) is true, then B (x) is true' actually exists: the formal correctness of the conclusion is based on the existence of the determination-implication applied in the conclusion and thus judged along with it. Under this condition, of course, the wanting of B (xt) would also be formally correctly motivated by the wanting of the fact A (xi). This formal correctness belongs to the consistency of thinking and willing or acting; it is probably what is meant when one pays tribute to someone for having "thought logically" or "acted logically," even if they did not do the right thing. This kind of inner correctness does not entail the material correctness of the motivated judgements or volitions, but it obviously favours it: those who think and act consistently have a chance of also "doing the right thing" in material terms; those who possess consistency as a general characteristic of their behaviour need only have the good fortune to also do the right thing. find the n e c e s s a r y   preconditions.

If it is not the desire of A (xt) or the judgement that A (xt) should be, but simply the judgement of the facts A (xt) that sufficiently motivates the desire of B (xt) — "because A (xi) is, B (xt) should be" — then this motivation is formally correct, provided that the

A p p l i c a t i o n   A (z) a! B **(z) exists**; **i.e. the relationship "if** A (s), then B (x) cmin". Then the following must apply: "it must be the case that if A (x) xntrift, then B (x) zntrist".   This is the Praga, which means "ea soß ao nein". If ea is understood in the sense of actual meaning, then ea means "en 'rat tatsächlich ao". And without doubt, it was indeed a fact or supposed fact A (xt) that the oneigeotliche   knew   ihrea ("actual") implication B (ai), i.e. consent to it, both formally and internally. But that was only consent to what actually is (or is supposed to be) or will be, and that is not the case that concerns us here.   The "it should be so" could be given by a piece of knowledge, such as a legal order: "it should be so that anyone who has an income of X pounds pays Y pounds in tax".   This is a case of "ownership" in the sense of knowledge that requires the existence of a specific implication. Accordingly, it is also knowledge that in the given case, "because I have n crowns of income", n crowns are paid, which is formally correct in the sense of "ownership".   However, whether or not there is actually formal correctness depends on whether the "legislative intent" is correct, i.e. it depends on whether the " should" exists not only in the sense of some knowledge, but whether it actually exists.*

2. The part motivated   Where11e n.

So we are faced with the question: What constitutes, or, less precisely, when, under what necessary and sufficient conditions, does the actual knowledge exist that justifies the formal correctness of the partially motivated actual knowledge? In order to find the answer, it is necessary to examine the facts of this judgement-motivated knowledge in more detail. We assumed that whoever wants the determination B (x) to be true in the given case (xi) because A (x) is true in this case, knows that whenever A (x) is true, B (x) is also true. This is certainly correct if the former is meant in the strict sense. However, it should not be overlooked — and this has also been noted — that the provisions that are given as justification for a piece of knowledge or even just become apparent to the mind are usually so flawed that this "because" in the strict sense cannot be understood at all.

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* Plan could object that the correctness of the law is not relevant, but that this is already binding, in that the law is not determined by the fact that I have a certain income, but rather by the fact that the law applies in the state and is binding on me as a citizen of the state. This is not achieved by the Yorans8etznng, but only by the fact that the law applies in the state and is binding on me as a citizen of the state. In this case, there is no question of any discretion, since the requirement to comply with the law would first have to be fulfilled before this precautionary measure could be taken.

would obviously be an Itiflveratehen. If one attempts to supplement the determination, one may succeed in arriving at an A (x) that contains sufficient conditions so that one can now say: if A (x) occurs, then B (x) will indeed apply, i.e. insofar as it is not already fulfilled without our intervention, it will be brought about by us. But if we take a closer look, we will find that we can never take this "if — then" too strictly if the determinations it connects are not themselves of a formal nature, determinations about facts and demands as they appear in the propositions of the material richness of the will. If we call a demand that enters into demands and therefore presupposes other demands a demand of a higher level, then it must be assumed that the actual — demands of a general nature, of the form A (x) o1 B (x) or A (x) f B (x), which have strict validity, are always of a higher level. It is not possible to prove that a primary requirement — a requirement of the first level — which occurs in this form of "if — then" or, as an unconditional requirement, is intended to apply under any circumstances, is a maxim that must be followed without exception.

It has often been pointed out — and it is precisely because of this that people have believed in the existence of a general moral law — that each of these commandments, such as: one should repay all borrowed items, tell the truth, or, when making a statement, not tell untruths, not kill, etc., there are cases in which it is not right or at least not necessary to obey them.

The prohibition against lying, stealing, slandering, and the commandment to do one's duty, to stand up for oneself, etc. But lying does not simply mean consciously telling untruths, as is usually defined, but the word also expresses a condemnation of such behaviour, which obviously cannot apply in cases where it is permitted, even commanded — x. B. when it appears necessary to secure a high goal against unlawful access — and so lying actually means: telling untruths where one thinks it is necessary. The same applies to the meanings of stealing, slandering, etc., and it is clear that doing one's duty means doing what one should do. The prohibitions and commands cited owe their influence and general validity to the fact that they contain provisions that presuppose an obligation: understood in this way, they are demands of a higher order, i.e. quite empty ones. If the demand "thou shalt not lie" does not express a simple self-evident truth, then the concept of contradiction must not be inherent in the concept to which the word "lie" belongs; then it must be understood as a primary requirement, for example: not to consciously utter untruths so that another person

belief. This can now easily be expressed in the form of a "if-then" statement: if x believes that the judgement u is false and that y will believe it if x states it, then x should not state u to y. But this requirement is untenable: it does not apply without exception, i.e. it does not apply at all. And yet there must be something in the fact that saying something untrue is wrong, which means that it is usually called **a lie** and judged negatively, as the word itself expresses. However, the prohibition of such behaviour is obviously only a rule that will normally be followed, and a c c o r d i n g l y the commandment "speak the truth" or more precisely: to speak according to one's convictions. Such rules apply, as far as can be ascertained by examining individual cases, wherever a primary requirement is established that appears in the form of a general command or prohibition; it may come very close to **strict** validity, so close that the exceptions are practically insignificant — in many cases this is obviously not the case — but there are exceptions everywhere. But then such a commandment, in the form in which it appears, is actually false and can only be tolerated as not meant precisely. The task for theory is to work out the 'fatbeatand dea Sollena' that lies behind such a demand and to define it precisely.

3. Relative S11en determinations.

Here, an observation can point the way, which is often done when trying to determine the correct course of action in a case that is not entirely easy to assess. Since we cannot judge the case as a whole at first, we analyse it and then say: in view of the circumstances, we should act in this way, but not in view of these other circumstances . This shows that — in the case of primary, actual demands — the way in which one condition is a prerequisite for the fulfilment of another is not expressed in a w e n, but in an i n g o f e r n. Insofar as the information the doctor gave the patient was based on his conviction, he acted as he should have; in that he took away the last comfort of hope that the sailor had clung to, there is perhaps something wrong, but insofar as this prompted the patient to put his affairs in order, which he would otherwise have neglected to his misfortune

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See the comment on the meaning of the conditional oil tone of a judgement, § 10, 1.

If the family had been destroyed, the action would be correct again; the example could easily be continued in this way. — It can be seen that a condition A (x) requires the fulfilment of another, B (x) — in such primary requirements — in the sense that in a case where A (x) applies, B (x) should also apply relative to this very circumstance. The fact that in the given case xi, where A (x) is true, B (x) should also be true is only an incomplete determination of the deontic modality of the facts B (xi), a determination of what ought to be that applies to it only relatively, in relation to or with regard to the given A (xi).

The incomplete nature of fact B (xi) in the given case corresponds to the circumstances, since this fact has value with regard to provision A (x), insofar as it applies. Informing the patient about his condition had the value of truth or at least sincerity, but also the disadvantage of robbing him of hope and comfort, and again the value of prompting him to take useful measures. The overall value of the action is also composed of such partial values and, accordingly, the final, decisive ought, as the deontic modality of the facts, is also composed of the individual relative and incomplete ought determinations.

One can establish a principle of independence here: the incomplete provisions of a matter exist side by side and independently of one another — as is generally the case with relative provisions of the same matter —, each relative to an actual or supposed partial provision of the case. Let us call the totality of the determinations that, according to the conviction of the person willing, apply to the case the total aspect or, in short, the aspect (as opposed to a partial aspect) of the case, so we can say, the resulting ent-a c h e i d e n d e S o l l b e g t i m m u n g come to the intended facts relative to the overall aspect of the case. However, the subject to whom this determination is given in the sense of the overall aspect should now and must obviously want it absolutely in the sense of the resulting determination of what ought to be. The still relative datum of the resulting ought-to-be   — dafi, insofar as the determinations of the overall aspect
to apply,   the facts of the case may be — the basis is an absolute
: someone who is given these provisions as a matter of course and wants all the facts. He will act formally correctly if he follows this obligation.

4. Formal correctness. Unconditional proper solutions.

We now have a more complete description of the formal correctness of the judgment-motivated actual will.

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, but we still do not have the necessary and sufficient condition we are looking for, namely that the actual ought, on which this correctness rests, exists. However, the discovery of this condition has already been prepared from two sides.

The facts just considered, namely the relative target provisions and the actual flow resulting from them, show an unmistakable analogy with the relationships between the applied possibilities and probability. The specific fact of the applicability of a given determination B (x) in the given case xi has its complete and absolute modal actuality or non-actuality and, at the same time, the deontic fact of its non-applicability or non-non-applicability. The same fact B (xt) has, in relation to any partial determination of the case xt, a certain possibility and at the same time a certain relative oughtness, and in relation to the entire given determination A (x), which may be given to someone as the aspect of the fact, it has a certain resulting possibility and at the same time a resulting oughtness, both still being relative data, incomplete modal determinations. Someone to whom the determination A (x) is given as a factual aspect of xt behaves formally correctly if he wills in the sense of the resulting relative ought-to-be, and the demand made of him, which results from this, is in turn absolute. There is also an analogue for this: the same subject behaves intellectually correctly only if he bases his decisive judgement as to whether B (x) applies here or not on all the partial determinations and partial possibilities that result for B (x), based solely on the resulting possibility that arises from the most complete available aspects: when eB believes or does not believe in this sense.

This strict analogy is accompanied by a second one, which shows that there is not merely an external correspondence here, but an essential connection. The will is directed towards the realisation of a determination: it is, in its innermost being, a striving for realisation. The will is materially correct when, in the realisation of what is desired, it encounters a fact, just as a judgement is materially correct, i.e. true, when it encounters a fact. Now, the fact is that, given the situation as presented to me by aspect A(x) in the given case, I will realise B(x) by wanting it, i.e. that I will behave in such a way that the occurrence of B(x) in the case xi is a fact, despite objective certainty, it is always only given as a possibility: in the possibility that comes to it relative to A(x). This is decisive for me.

— and for everyone in the same situation — ; I am acting correctly if, after considering the facts, I make my decision B (x) will apply" if the possibility of this is greater

' *V gd.* above § 9, *8.*

ala those for daa Nichtsutreffen. But this judgement is based on the existence of a reality in which I am involved as an active factor, and this real share of OescJiehen expresses Brett in the experience of my Wollena : rolling along, I come to that judgement, the decision in the judgement carried by the Entaohlufi. Thus, with the decision, the Entachluli is also correct: material, if both are proven in the 'fataachen , format, if they have been grasped in the sense of the predominant possibility, therefore we have a possible verification. This is the necessary and sufficient condition for the actual ought, which justifies the formal correctness of the judgment-motivated will. The requirement to will formally correctly implies the obligation to strive for the material correctness of the will. Act so that your will contributes to the probability of realisation. It lies in the nature of the will that it is also proven, insofar as it is correct, that it is provable. The will, one might say, reveals itself by fulfilling itself, even though the only commandment is to satisfy the conditions of fulfilment. There is no commandment that is not contained in this.

The commandment of formal correctness requires what can reasonably be demanded of human beings as beings endowed with free will: to fulfil the demands of material correctness to the best of one's ability. These commandments (the most important of which are developed in § 10) provide an ideal: to fulfil them is the goal, but it cannot actually be commanded; striving for them is strictly and unconditionally commanded. Formal correctness does not guarantee material correctness, the fulfilment of the will, and is in this respect independent of it; but it encourages fulfilment and, in a large number of cases, will lead to it in a corresponding number of cases. If we have once failed to fulfil a will and we can testify that we acted correctly to the best of our knowledge, i.e. that we fulfilled the conditions of material correctness as far as our knowledge of the situation allowed us to do so, then we have acted formally completely correctly.

It may seem doubtful whether this correctness is sufficient in all cases; in the case of the many everyday actions that are called morally indifferent, this is certainly the case, but what characterises an action as morally good must surely be something other than the moral soundness of the will that underlies it. The question still needs to be investigated. For now, just one remark to show that it is not quite so insignificant as the requirement of formal correctness.

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* The specific requirements of formal correctness that arise from the individual laws of material correctness are **not discussed** here**,** although this would not be without interest.

° See § 12 below.

Since all our demands, indeed all demands whatsoever, constitute a composite demand, it is necessary for their material correctness that they are all compatible with one another (§ 10, 1). Thus, in striving for material correctness, the individual will should seek to fit into a system of harmonious desires and help to constitute such a system. In view of this requirement, many external manifestations of a desire will prove to be mere illusions, and desires that have no more than the probability of realisation of a single thing, taken out of the larger context, will not be formally correct.

5. Primary a 11 common Requirements a 1s Rules.

Attempts to establish a primary requirement of a general nature that would serve as a strict maxim for our actions have repeatedly failed; however, this empirical fact does not yet prove the impossibility of such a maxim. Now, however, this failure can be recognised and explained on the basis of the nature of volition.

The actual desire — and that is what we are concerned with here — is directed towards a future event, albeit one in the near future, the reality of which I anticipate with a certain degree of certainty, but without the strict evidence of this certainty. My knowledge of the situation — given in its entirety — yields, even in the best case, only a probability that what I want will happen because I want it. And even the justification for this probability, the claim it can make for itself, is still essentially determined by my will itself, above all by its force. Therefore, one can never claim that if the condition A (x) — let it be a condition that does not presuppose any requirements — applies, then the desire that B (x) apply will be successful. And therefore one cannot say: if A (x) applies, then the will that B (x) applies will have a predominant possibility of realisation. For this "if" means, strictly understood, as much as "   " in every case where A (x) applies. Since it cannot be claimed that in every such case B (x) is realised through volition, there are therefore possible cases where this does not happen, and in such a case there will always be some determinations which, in addition to A (x), result in a determination that already excludes the realisation of B (x). This means, however, that there are cases of A (x) where a corresponding addition to the aspect
— and this is possible   —   a   arbitrary   slight possibility

* Cf. above § 11, 2.

for B (x), and since the possibility from the respective overall aspects is always decisive, the formal correctness for the will of this determination will then be lacking. Therefore, it is never generally and strictly required that if A (x) is true, B (x) must be brought about.

One could attempt to derive a primary general requirement by including the condition in the prerequisite alongside the determination A (x) of the situation. A (x) is given as the overall aspect or at least as the entire decisive aspect. A sole requirement would be, for example: when making a statement, to be sincere if there are no known circumstances that would prohibit sincerity. However, this would already constitute a higher-level requirement and would lose the essential content of the original maxim, which is to be sincere. Strictly speaking, the new maxim, with its clause, no longer means anything more than, for example, making an insincere statement when no reason is known. The difference — which is lost in this version — is only that in the first maxim, a decisive reason is known only in exceptional cases, while in the second, it is known as a rule. And so is the meaning of the maxims that appear in Oestalt as general primary requirements, which, although literally and strictly interpreted, are nevertheless, when taken imprecisely, useful approximation formulas or rules. In this respect, the best laws are wrong in that they treat as law what can only be a rule.

Such a rule, if followed by all perfect beings — and in this sense applicable like a law of nature — would indeed produce more right than wrong, but it would also produce wrong and occasionally formally wrong volition. Therefore, there is no single primary requirement that can serve as a maxim meeting the requirements of Kantian ethics.

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* The statement "if A (x) is true, then B (x) is possible" is, as I have already pointed out, an irrefutable saying. A (x) does not imply this possibility for the occurrence of B (x), because otherwise it would have to exist in every case where A (x) occurs, which is only the case if A (x) actually implies B (x), and therefore only in a non-committal sense does the possibility of B (x) occurring remain. One can only say: if A (x) occurs, then this state of affairs implies the possibility of B (x) occurring; but this relative possibility can be negated at any time by the emergence of other decisive factors that have a decisive — resulting — significance for our expectation of the occurrence of B (x).

The claim relationships of form A/B, which are dealt with in our deontic laws (in Chapters I and II), are either those between certain facts — A implies material! B — or they are demand relationships between concepts — A (x) implies (formally) that B (x) should exist — ; then, if they actually exist, they are higher-level demands, otherwise they are merely factual, subjective demands that arise, for example, in the sense of a desire. These include the primary type of laws and principles given in **the form of** if-then statements; they **correspond** only — in the best case — **to** a relative factual ought.

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Categorical imperative: "Act according to that maxim through which you can at the same time will that it should become a universal **law**." At least, **if** this can be desired, it must not depend on personal inclinations, but rather mean something like being able to desire without contradiction in one's demands. A maxim of universal validity is only the demand for formal correctness **itself** and everything that follows from it. However, this is not merely a maxim, but at the same time the highest commandment: the imperative.

6. O r a d e d e s S o l l e n a.   D a a 8 o l l en s w i d r i g e.

A provision that is a necessary condition for formal correctness must apply; a provision that is a sufficient condition for this correctness is one that may apply. Such a sufficient condition is an implicant C (x) of the actually required provision B (x). This B (x) can only be fulfilled if it applies in one case, therefore as an implication of the complete determination of the case, and thus there will always be such implicants C (x) — determinations that go beyond B (x) — among the determinations of the case. The partial determinations of C (x) that are not contained in B (x) are neither required nor prohibited: they may exist and no more. No obligatory action is so precisely prescribed that it may not always be carried out in any of an infinite number of ways.

The reason for this is that such deontic norms are different in their application.
Given that there are different opinions, it is easy to understand our definition of the concept of formal correctness. If this correctness lies in the fact that the will has maximum validity with regard to the aspect of the situation, then any determination of the will or its execution that has no discernible influence on this validity must also be indifferent to what ought to be. It can be seen that the broad area of what is indifferent in terms of oughtness owes its existence to the incompleteness of our experience. If an indifferent determination covers the entire aspect of an action, then this action itself is indifferent. A large number of our ordinary activities belong here.

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If G(x) s B(x), then we obtain the determination that contains all determination elements of C(x) that are not implied in B(x) in the form B ' (x) * C (x), which is equivalent to the determination that "if B (x) applies, then C (x) applies". I take a mandatory step with my left foot and thus establish a condition (i (x) which, although not required, includes the required B (x) — walking down the corridor. Then the determination of C (x) not contained in B (x) is that "when I start walking, I start with my left foot". For more on determination and the difference between implication and implication considered here, see my studies on the theory of possibility and similarity, op. cit. §§ 20, 23.

If we knew more, it would be considerably reduced, but at the same time expanded in some respects, as knowledge reveals new dependencies and sometimes also new independencies.

Our ethical judgement distinguishes between strict obligation and the absence of obligation, which is present in indifference, a kind of transition. A small deviation from the required performance is often tolerated, a larger one is more difficult to bear, as if the closer approximation to the required performance were less desirable than the smaller one. This is obviously impossible if the requirement itself is strictly desired. It can only occur if the required specification is more precisely defined than intended. For example, a mechanic undertakes to deliver a part with a specific expansion of 0 mm " and what is meant is that the deviation from this measurement, both upwards and downwards, should be less than 0.3 mm, and other specifications allow for much greater leeway, the limits of which are again not precisely specified. In all these cases, only the content of the intervals is strictly required, with perhaps the achievement of a specific point within them being most desirable. But, if rightly desired, this is then the most reliable option in this case, and the fact that it is not strictly required is only due to the imperfection of our abilities. What is strictly required is the best possible approximation to the beat, and that is again the greatest achievable reliability of the action; anything beyond that is not required to a lesser degree.
but not commanded.

However, deliberate and intentional deviations from the proven norm are considered more forgivable if they are minor, and more serious if they are major; these are referred to as minor and major transgressions. If someone has preferred a less proven course of action to the proven one, they have not violated a lesser obligation, but a more stringent one; however, they have nevertheless realised or strived for a lesser value instead of the highest one, and have followed a relative obligation (cf. § 11, 3) instead of the decisive resulting obligation. Only the relative ought has different degrees: what has a greater chance of success in view of the given circumstances is more strongly desired, but only the most proven is desired completely and decisively. Only this may we call obligatory, and everything that is obligatory is equally obligatory. If we call one breach of duty lighter and another heavier, this only has the justified meaning that in the former a stronger relative ought is fulfilled, in the latter only a weaker one. But this relative obligation is of a different kind than the unconditional one; what is only an obligation in a relative sense is actually something that, insofar as the partial determination applies, is an obligation, but with regard to other circumstances that are present, is not an obligation.

The significance of the theorems on the
Contrary to what ought to be, assuming the concept of the improper ought (§ 10, 4). In reality, however, there is something contrary to what ought to be, and it is remarkable that, in view of such cases, emotions and desires arise that correspond to our paradoxical statements, according to which what ought to be demands what is contrary to what ought to be, and if something is contrary to what ought to be, nothing or anything should be. The urge for retribution and revenge, as well as the "if you are so, why should I be any better" illustrates the first, the sometimes bewildering indignation ("that's where it all ends") and the "demand" for nonsense ("but surely ...") illustrates the second proposition. In poetry, there are many beautiful examples of Oemütsregutigen in the sense of this sentence (e.g. in Shakespeare, Macbeth III, 4, I—20, King Lear III,1, 18, III, 2, 18 and so on). — In fact, even that which is contrary to what ought to be does not negate the unconditional demand for what ought to be (sentence 29,
§ 8, § 7), and this is crucial for the correctness of our behaviour. But the contrary to what ought to be, in addition to its opposite, also demands the contrary to what ought to be as a consequence, and thus establishes a relative necessity for what is contrary to what ought to be. Thus, not only does the saying about the curse of evil deeds, which so easily have their consequences, apply, but also the abandonment of the consequence of the unimportant, the correction of evil, although dutifully as a whole, always and essentially — already as the abandonment of a consequence.
— Unworthy components and thus relative improprieties in Aich: it hurt the Böaegte at Böaen that ea did not grant us rights without guilt.

The improper nature of this attitude is evident in the fact that even what is contrary to what ought to be done, once it has happened, should be accepted as a fact, against which it would be unreasonable to protest, however much one may wish to prevent its repetition or continuation. Psychologically curious, incidentally, is the tendency to judge what is contrary to what ought to be done more leniently, if not to regard it as right, once it has lasted long enough: a kind of exaggeration of consent to the facts, to what, according to a habitual judgement — unless we do something about it — will remain so. Perhaps there is a trace of justification for such behaviour in the experience that "it just works that way", which, of course, can only result in a relative ideal for the future.

§ 12. The toll and the value.

1.   's dependence on value.

We do not want anything that does not have value for us in itself or for the sake of something else (valuable), and we should want something if

ea actually has value and we must decide what **is** most valuable under the **given** circumstances**.** In fact, it is primarily feelings of value and considerations of value that determine our will; Thoughts about the possibility and probability of realisation play only a secondary role and seem to come into play only when we are dealing with the possibility of realising a value. Something worthless or valueless may be easy to realise, but that does not make it desirable. Our reduction of formal correctness to maximum provability therefore owes its apparent justification to the fact that we somehow think of values when we think of provability. Only if **value** is based on provability and not vice versa is our statement of the necessary and sufficient condition of formal correctness correct.

As every relative target determination corresponds to a **value**, iat in § 11, 3 — already discussed; it remains to define more precisely the relationship between value and decisive ought. The formula that one should realise the greatest possible **value** in a given case needs to be clarified. It is clear that neither the purely external probability of achieving the individual goals nor the **value** of the goals alone is decisive for the decisive ought. If the values are the same, the more probable goal should be chosen; if the probabilities are the same, the more valuable goal should be chosen. What is decisive for the choice is what is called the hope value or expected value in probability theory, i.e., when value and probability are expressed numerically, measured by the product of their measures; If w is the measure of the probability of achieving the goal and a is the value of the goal, then w is the expected value. One should choose the goal whose expected value is the greatest. For a high goal, one will risk a lot and should risk a lot; for a **low goal**, one will risk little and should risk little. The justification for this assumption can also be seen in a

Consider the following example: Given a large number

n cases •   where one attempts to realise the value a with probability w

—   approximately n w will yield the profit a, the rest nothing: thus, the average profit is

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'The sentence, which, incidentally, will be clarified further, corresponds to the general concept of moral goodness, in particular to the view of F. Brentano (Vom Ursprung sittlicher Erkenntnis [On the Origin of Moral Knowledge], 2nd edition, edited by O. Kranz, Leipzig, 1921), but this does not correspond to the conviction expressed here regarding the nature of value.
° On value and its relationship to worth, see Meinong, Zur Begründung der allgemeinen Werttheorie (On the Foundation of General Value Theory), published by E. Falli, Graz, 1923.

a a rv : a   c **w." •The greater the size of the** balls, **the** closer **the observed return on the realised value of these** amounts **will be** to a rv; it would therefore be "iza groGea gaozea" that the greatest value would be realised if the greatest expected value were chosen in each case — at least, the probability of this can be approximated to any degree of certainty, provided that a sufficiently large number of cases are taken into account.

Of course, in the vast majority of human actions, neither value nor probability are given in numerical terms, but rather we somehow perceive value through our sense of worth or value retention, and probability through the strength of our prior assumptions that the goal can be achieved. Together, these two factors give us an estimate or "impression" of *the probability,* which could be characterised by the mathematical expected value,   but not directly,   so that it   would give the äI a ß z a h1 of this *OzöBe*.   The expected value itself cannot determine this probability, because reliability is a possibility and has its upper limit 1, but it can become arbitrarily large for any given w as the value a increases.

To find the measure of probability, let us consider a simple example whose straightforward circumstances are easy to grasp. In a shooting competition, different prizes ai, ac, y, ai — in ascending order — are offered for different levels of performance, the highest of which is a+ A. Each shooter may only shoot for one prize.   Someone who has the probabilities wi, ws, wt, wi of winning the individual prizes in order will decide to compete for the prize that offers him the greatest expected value according to his ability, which is approximately ai with the corresponding probability w. However, the greatest certainty would obviously be offered by a shooter who was sure to win the highest prize A eu; the certainty of our less perfect contestant's undertaking must be measured against this, and the probability value we assign to it must indicate the degree to which it approximates that high certainty. The reliability to be measured corresponds to an expected value wi ai, the highest possible expected value A — since here w   1 — and so we have for the

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F. H a o k , Probability Calculus, Berlin and Leipzig, 1914, g. i8 (the pointers at a and w have been omitted from the quotation as they are irrelevant).

However, the assumption that, after deducting the favourable cases, the remaining cases will not yield any profit is not entirely accurate in our consideration, as they can and will bring about the various positive and negative values on which our assumption is based, namely that each time the is not strictly applicable in our consideration, because they can and will bring about the various positive and negative values, which means that our assumption that the expected value a w existed each time does not yield anything, and therefore the total result of the expected successes cannot be taken into account.

The aforementioned feasibility of us8 ãfa¢——. This gives us an idea of

Annëbeuag ües bestesenüea BnœHapmweztes vo as sn üea bokWm bier æögücbea, A, aß uad sugleicb die Anaäberuag der beHabendeß

Provenability   g— to the highest, i.e.   or 1.

The result of this consideration is easy to generalise. If, in the given case, n possible relationships are possible with the values to be realised at, at, ...   a , among which the largest is A, and with the corresponding achievement possibilities I › ß› • • • n› >Ö Ï8t the maintainability of a certain one of these ratios is determined by the ratio of its expected value wt a¡ to the highest one considered here at all,

1. A or A, which would be the case if the highest **value** could be realised with certainty. The requirement of formal correctness demands that one choose the behaviour with the greatest expected value; then the will also has the greatest probability of success for what it can achieve according to the circumstances and the possibilities of success resulting from them. The reliability also depends on the ability that a will has to employ, because this is a determining factor for the probability of achievement. A will that **has** the **highest** ability **at its disposal** must always choose the highest **value** and, since it would certainly realise this, would have the highest probability 1, which ensures material correctness.

If the highest **value** offers the greatest reliability, then

wA
$$\frac{\quad}{A} = \frac{\quad}{A} = \mathbf{w},$$ the reliability period will be

equal

the probability of achieving the present individual goal. However, the value of the goal is always a determining factor for feasibility. The question arises as to how this fact can be reconciled with our earlier findings, according to which formal correctness is simply given by the maximum probability of the realisation of the will.

•*2. Word and vote.*

Where the solution to the question just raised is to be found has been noted in § 1 i, S. The material correctness of the will requires not only that the individual will achieve its individual, explicitly stated goal, but also that it be part of a system of purely correct acts of will, because only then will the intended goal be achieved. In order to be formally correct, a volition must take this requirement of material correctness into account. The individual acts of volition must be such that they can be combined in a maximally appropriate manner into a consistent system of volitions, into a unified, harmonious overall volition: for this inner

Alongside this is the formally required tail condition of material consistency. Now I can say with certainty that something has value for me to the extent that it corresponds to my overall will, my lasting and essential interest. If the object of desire presents itself to me as a possible object of desire, the greatest strength with which I would use my will, i.e. my conscious will, if it were sufficient, to achieve its realisation, would determine the value that this object of desire has for me. A fundamentally possible value judgement would arise if two values, ai and ai, were available with the possibilities of realisation wt and wa, between which no decision could be made on the basis of well-considered will without recourse to external factors — because one must decide anyway. Then the expected values are to be regarded as equal, si "i — wi ai, and this results in the ratio of values ai : ai   wa : wi.[®] Of course, the respective desirability is only a fluctuating measure of value, but in this respect the sense of value is not better, but rather worse; moreover, it proves even less amenable to any measurable comparison than the former.

In this sense, the (potential) participation of my total will in a desired goal, as a value factor a, is represented in the expected value w a, and the feasibility of the desire, which is proportional to w a, is therefore also directly proportional to the participation of my total will. The greater the participation, the more my overall will is fulfilled in the event of achievement, and we are thus justified

entitled, in the value c a (a $\frac{w\,a}{A}$, in the case where w   1, A   1)

the reliability of our Wollena, which, given its stake in the matter, would have the will to act if the possibility of achieving (individual) many 1, i.e. if it were certain to be achieved, and if the greatest value that could be achieved in that case (and therefore the greatest possible participation of the collective will) is assumed as a unit (of the will's satisfaction). It is therefore possible to understand the value — the value "for me" or the personal value [®]— of an act, in the manner indicated, as a chance or possibility of proving oneself, i.e., in this case, simply of asserting one's common will.

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'And not action, but strength of **content**. **On the concept of content as** it **is considered** here**, see rg1. 3f** e i u o n g, Über **emotionele** Präeenta- tioa, op. cit., g§ 6, 7

° In principle, this is consistent with F. Brentano, ¥om Ursprung eittliobet Srkenninis, 2nd ed., op. cit., p. 22 f, insofar as he also equates higher **value** not with **a** stronger act of preference, but with **a justified** preference.

* *4 gd.* N e in o n g, Znr Omndlegnng der allgemeinen Werttheorie, op. cit., IV, § 6.

The simple Oedanbe, which we have twisted here into an exact formulation, finds its natural expression in the self-evident i3atse that what has value for me has value for me precisely to the extent that it is in accordance with my overall will and, precisely because of this, when I realise it knowingly, represents a chance for the fulfilment of this overall will. For A 1, the verifiability is to be understood as a composite probability: the probability that I will achieve my individual goal and thereby satisfy my overall will. Of course, A would then have to represent the highest value that is possible for me to achieve, not only in this case, but in general; this would be the case in a decision where, in the strictest sense, everything is at stake. Here, too, it is not necessarily the highest value that is desired, but the value a, which, with the corresponding w, provides the greatest expected value, and one sees that, for example, those whose powers are not sufficient for the highest goal, to give them a sufficient chance of success, are faced with the harsh necessity of striving with all their might for a lesser value. His only consolation is that he has fulfilled his duty and thus achieved the decisive moral value. Herein lies the terrible and tragic nature of tragedy.

Instead of considering the value for me, the share My overall will must now, for the person who lives with others, in many early stages — actually in all of them, except that it does not become modifying in all of them — give way to consideration for the value for all, the share of the overall will of society. Of course, my will is also a constituent **of** this common will, and like mine, it is subject to the regulative principle that it must strive for a harmonious whole, and is ultimately compelled by the facts to strive towards it: a duty and a compulsion that has a concrete effect on the individual will and ultimately on the individual acts of will.

3. The objective value.

The value for the general public is still a personal value, except that it refers to a collective of subjects rather than to a single subject. This raises the question of whether the value that someone has in the sense of a desirability or an attitude towards value does not also correspond, in the best case, to an objective determination, which would then deserve to be called actual value or value per se. Without doubt, the justification for considering something valuable (   ) would have to be based on

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* This constraint of facts in the coexistence of humans provides the basis for a possible and entirely probable naturalistic conception of the origin of ethical volition and thinking. Such naturalism can explain the development **of ethics**, **but** it cannot do justice to the essence of ethical values, which are not created or invented through development, but only discovered in the course of it.

Such a reality must be based on fact — just as our will is based on the reality of what ought to be. The circumstances of what ought to be, which we already know, provide a useful guide when examining this question.

What ought to be, insofar as it ought to be, has value. No justification is required for this; it follows directly from the nature of being and value, like an axiom. Just as something that is desired has value in terms of desirability, so too must something that actually exists have actual value. What is to be in the true sense and unconditionally is the formal correctness of the will and everything it demands: it therefore also has unconditional value, because it has these, it must be so. The necessary and sufficient condition for formal correctness is now maximum verifiability, i.e. the predominant possibility that the will, or more precisely the official will expressed in the will, will achieve its goal. This is the common ground of ought and, apparently, also of value: t h e purely intellectually grasped equivalent of unconditional ought and unconditional value. Of course, this does not capture the true essence of either of them — otherwise they would have to be identical and not merely equivalent in terms of their purely similar effects. The essence of value can only be grasped through the mediation of the feeling that we call the sense of value, whereas the essence of the ought can only be grasped through the mediation of the feeling, but not by thinking about them and imagining something that stands in a certain relation to them.but rather simply by allowing the feeling or the will — without having to grasp it consciously — to correspond to our experience.

— alø øeinen "meaning — visualises, presents or displays, similar to how a preconception presents its Oøgønatand. Just as the Oeatalt dev circle can only be grasped through its appearance and in its own essence, so too can Werł and Sollen only be grasped through this emotional presentation. Without feeling and willing, we would never know what value is and what ought to be, just as without colour perception we would never know the nature of red and blue, and without vivid design perception we would never know the nature of the circle. However, this does not prevent us from assigning an abstract equivalent to a vivid circular shape, for example in a mathematical, purely analytical formulation of the concept of a circle, which

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Even the inherent meaning of facts actually has a value: the inherent value of simple reality. In this sense, everything real, every bearer of factual circumstances**, everything** to which determinations are actually attached**,** has a **word** that, alongside **others**, s its own value and worthlessness.

This relationship could only be that of the opposite counterpart, and what corresponds to a psychological entity in this sense is given to us directly. *The* idea of the relationship thus presupposes this openness,
i.e. the direct apprehension of the object.

the necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence of such a state of affairs has content. Nor has our analysis provided the purely intellectually comprehensible, "objective" equivalent, the necessary and sufficient technical basis for the existence of this "only emotionally comprehensible", i.e. directly comprehensible, state of affairs. It is at the same time the unconditional value. Such theoretical endeavours therefore do not deserve the name of intellectualism, if this is to be associated with a reproach. For it respects the uniqueness of objects, even those that cannot be grasped purely intellectually. It does not seek to dissolve them through thought. But in the end, recognition is still thinking, even if it uses non-mental and even non-intellectual means of comprehension (as representatives), and for every phenomenon that occurs, there must be conditions that can be grasped by thought, which are sufficient and necessary for its occurrence. Seeking them out is the task of science: in this respect, this science**, like any other,** is necessarily intellectual and rational.

The unconditional value of formal correctness is therefore based on verifiability. Something that is formally incorrect, i.e. incorrect in itself, can prove itself to be correct, at least externally, insofar as the necessary co-intentions are disregarded. But a bad overall will cannot prove itself at all, for in the overall will everything that is required is represented; it is the embodiment of everything I want and desire. If it is formally incorrect, it contradicts some of the conditions of this correctness, but it also wants the conditions of this correctness, because these are necessarily intended in every desire, according to my understanding. It therefore wants contradictory things and can never be fulfilled as a total will.

The relative values corresponding to the relative and incomplete target provisions — § 11, 3 — will be accurate insofar as these target provisions actually exist, i.e. insofar as they are based on proven facts. Now, the values of the objects to which primary knowledge refers — cf. § 11, 2 — have been described as the share of unaerea Oeaamtwollena in these objects. Of course, this description initially has personal value. However, Stan will derive a characteristic from this, i.e. actual objective values, if, instead of the share of a given personal — individual or collective — will, the share of a formally correct, i.e. verifiable, Oeaamt will is decisive. Since the individual still has considerable leeway within the bounds of correctness in choosing concrete goals, this seems to result in a relativity of values — with the exception of ethical values — in the sense that not only, as is self-evident, has real value insofar as it carries a valuable determination in itself — whereby it can also have the unvalue of unworthy determinations   — but also that a

A d e t e r m i n a t i o n is only valuable if its fulfilment is conducive to the realisation of a correct overall intention. But the correct intention would be the only absolutely valid one. Now there are certainly determinations of this kind, since a will can be applied in situations of varying intensity without thereby becoming incorrect: these are the determinations of things whose personal evaluation cannot be measured by the yardstick of objective correctness; among them, one may prefer this, another may prefer that, as it suits him, because they are indifferent to the correctness of the will. But there are also determinations in which every will must take part in certain circumstances in order to will correctly. We do justice to this fact when we explain: the determinations that are desired in a certain proportion to the strength of a will (Oeaamtwollen) and **give** it the greatest probability of fulfilment are objectively true in precisely this proportion (strength of participation in the sense of $ 12, 2).

With this value formula, iat does not define the value of the individual provisions in a circular manner by the validity of a will and, in turn, by the value of a goal,   , but rather it names those that are valuable in the sense that they must be desired by a will so that it, as a total will, is most valid. Under all circumstances, formal correctness itself is to be desired: its value is the highest, absolutely decisive. But this does not mean that all other values derive from this value, but rather that this value encompasses all others. Not because a right will uses the objects in this relationship, making them valuable, but because the will is right and valuable because it wills the objects in the relationship of their value, because it does justice to their value. As a technical — intellectually comprehensible — basis for their values, the determinations have a **certain** validity in a coherent system, the realisation of which is the goal of the right will. From this point on, it becomes understandable that truthfulness, reliability, honesty and goodwill are valuable qualities, and a developed ethic must have gained clarity about the relationships between its values on the basis of the value formula. At the same time, it becomes clear why — apart from errors in values — different things are considered good at different times by different people: by different individuals, under different conditions...

* The beginning of Kant's Groundwork of the Metaphysics of Morals addresses this idea. "There is nothing in the world, indeed, nothing even conceivable outside of it, that could be considered without restriction as

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good, except a good will." The talents of the mind, the qualities of temperament, the gifts of fortune, happiness, even
qualities that are conducive to good will, have no inherent value, but always presuppose good will" (nm gnt zu seio).
no intrinsic value, but always presuppose good will" (in the sense of being).

In the conditions of the existence and development of a society, very different primary demands have the best chance of success.

Do not object to the plan; the consistent system would be easiest and safest to have if one did not want anything at all and let things take their course: our will is a fact, and our will belongs as a real factor in reality and gril; therein lies its essence, to shape it. Obviously, not all formations are equally manageable in the sense indicated, and events necessarily strive towards ever more proven formations: comprehensive real entities, such as the development of organisms, supra-individual connections shaped by real interrelationships, such as the development of society. We want to consciously experience our participation in this process. However, the conditions that are binding for this desire are inherent in the meaning and essence of desire itself: every desire seeks validation and imposes on itself the requirement to strive for the greatest possible verifiability.

4. The good W i 11e.

The consideration of what lies in the sun of a judgement or a volition has already led us to the judged, the willed: this, in its entirety, to which the expression is only an exception, results in what is meant in the act, its meaning. Depending on how precisely we mean it, the judgement or the will sets in for the meaning of the current experience in varying degrees of completeness and, so to speak, with varying degrees of importance. However, this intervention means that one is not only bound to the implicit in a logical and deontic sense, i.e. by requirements of correctness, but that this ideal bond also corresponds to a psychological reality. Judging or wanting a state of affairs has as a consequence an increased disposition or readiness to judge or want its implications — including the deontic ones — and requires more of a reason, but no new cause, to trigger them. This experience is only understandable if there is a reality that represents the basis of these increased possibilities — disposition is possibility — and it must be assumed that the basis of disposition, which is expressed in a judgement or in a volition, is at the same time the basis for judging or volition of the implications and, through the positing of that act, enters into a state of readiness for the explicit positing of what is implicitly implied. Its entry into an act gives it its essential (real and psychological) content, for an object corresponds to what is meant: it thus determines the opposite direction or the "   " meaning of the

Experience.' In the case of volition, we call this real basis the will; it is the permanent peyohiache representation **of** what sioh around in with reasonable certainty as the overall will of a human being. The overall will of a community is not of the same nature as the individual will; it is represented by a multitude of individuals with wills, which, however, are not a mere collective, but are connected by real relationships of manifold mediated mutual influence and, through these, find an admittedly imperfect reflection and manifestation in the individual wills. Thus, by pursuing the common good, the individual will ultimately reflect on a single — socially determined — will. A consideration that aims at right will is always a reflection on one's own will and often presents itself in this form. Stan asks: what do I actually want? Is that what I want, or is it actually what I want? Since the 7ataacbeo are judged everywhere and, as a rule, are wanted everywhere, all convictions and all wills have a core in which they agree and are correct. The criminal out of weakness and even the villain ultimately wants what is good; only in this is there a lack.

he that he also wants, when his wanting is its own. Thus, **das** not his own and that of the Oeaetze, contradicts itself, by simply being a desire. Every evil desire is also a kind of stupidity, no matter how clever and astute it may seem. Convictions which, because they are correct, are included in every thought and lie ready somewhere in every mind. They have all been expressed before, but it is only through their inclusion in the laws of the whole that they acquire their clear scientific meaning and justification.

When deliberation precedes a decision, judgements take into account the facts of the case and the expected outcome, resulting in a desire that is actually motivated by judgement. But very often, in unimportant matters and also in important ones where there is no time for deliberation, we act without thinking, without necessarily acting "rashly". Here, too, the whole situation is grasped in a quick, comprehensive judgement, only without analysis; what remains is only what would be explicitly thought in further analysis, both on the part of the given act...

See my article, "Über Begrißebildxtng" in Beitritte zur Päda-gogik und Dispoaitionetheorie, edited by A. 3t e in o n g, Prague, Vienna, Leipzig, 1919, p. 94 8. On the concept of disposition, cf. Meinong, Allgemeine gemeinen zur Lehre von den Diap‹›8itionen, ibid., p. *8Z* ß.

° Ygl. aoch H. Picher, "The Logic of Community," Tübingen, 1924—A work that agrees with the present one in that it discovers essential and not merely accidental analogies between judgement and volition, truth and goodness; moreover, it also takes into consideration the aesthetic feeling for beauty, which corresponds to it.

begtandea, as on that of the intended facts. With such a vague grasp, most things remain unconscious and only represented diapoaitionally, but nevertheless truly represented by the dispositional foundations that come into play in all actions. Thus, we can also specify and explain more precisely afterwards what was meant.

However, the decisive factor in assessing the correctness and evaluating a desire is precisely what was meant. In most cases, it is here and not in a predetermined guiding principle that one can find the maxim of this desire. But the requirement to will to the best of one's knowledge also demands that one should not simply decide on the basis of the available information, but should seek out the most complete information available. Here, we are guided by a principle that is little known in its essence, namely to consider the circumstances of the case that are decisive for the possibility of a certain success, in this case the feasibility of the will. The judgements that determine our will have little to do with the chances of success. For example, the probability of achieving individual goals is taken into account — they too usually only occurs in the context of expectations regarding oil production

But the viability that the will brings to the collective will is not grasped intellectually, but rather in the emotionally vivid   Oeatalt ala Wert.

To survey this possibility, given the infinite complexity of the relationships that determine it, is a task that — perhaps with a few rare exceptions — exceeds the powers of our intellect, and where it fails, we are given a means of grasping value that is certainly not unfathomable, but, given the magnitude of the task, nevertheless astonishingly effective means of comprehension. If, in order to determine whether a line drawn on a plane has a circular shape, one always had to examine whether there is a point from which all its points are equidistant, one would indeed be striving for a very precise understanding, but one would not achieve it, since one would have to carry out an infinite number of measurements (since tracing with a compass already made use of the curves); but perception gives us the shape in one fell swoop.(tracing with a compass already made use of the curves); but the visualisation gives us the shape at a glance, albeit inaccurately and with the shortcomings of visual perception. The sense of touch does something similar is, incidentally, not only a centre of experience, but a l s o has a significance for our psychological life. Where we experience evidence for the correctness of our desires,   it has its basis in a special awareness   of the sense of value.   Through this evidence-based

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This is a "correctly characterised love," according to F. Brentano, op. cit. But the criterion of correctness is itself a property of judgement.

Only then does formally correct volition become   innerly right and justified. Correct volition can also be truly good if it does justice to felt values, not just their intellectually grasped equivalents. The **feeling** is suggestive of **the value**, and through emotional presentation, one also grasps what constitutes an essential characteristic of good overall will as a harmonious unity of individual goals; What can be grasped purely intellectually is nothing more than the freedom from contradiction of the coherent system.

We attribute this to individual knowledge and value it accordingly. A slide base is, of course, only partially and usually very incompletely characterised by an individual achievement. If I only see the immediate effect, I can say: it was so that she was able to achieve this, and also: there are cases where she achieves this — knowing this can also be important, in particular, one can also infer the disposition on smaller cases from the greater achievement. I know much more when I recognise the additional circumstances under which the disposition has manifested itself; for now I can assume that under such or similar circumstances it will also perform such or similar actions in the future. I know not only that there are cases of such behaviour, but also something about the conditions under which it occurs. The more special external conditions are required for the achievement to occur, the less characteristic it is of the disposition; the less, the more the nature of the disposition comes into play in the achievement. According to these general points of view, we judge a will on the basis of its actions. And according to this, the positive or negative contribution to the evaluation of the will is determined by one of its actions.

That a will behaves in a given manner 6f under given conditions A B C aioh no longer depends in any way on the conditions, but is solely a matter of the will: a characteristic that defines it. If this applies to all people, we attribute this behaviour to human nature and do not hold it against individuals; we are inclined to believe that, as a human being, he must behave in this way. But if such a law of behaviour — characteristics are always laws of behaviour or disposition — applies only to some people, then ea is more characteristic of each of them the fewer people share it, and finally ea will be an individual behaviour6 of the individual will. These make up the peculiarity of the individual will: it is up to him and him alone that he behaves in this way and not differently under these circumstances. One then says: a person can, under these circumstances, behave in this way and not differently.

behave differently under the same circumstances; this amounts to saying that there are people who actually do so. The mere possibility that a person might behave in a certain way under circumstances A, B, and C is applied to the person in question and results in a certain relative possibility for his behaviour (cf. § 9, 3). But the given person is fully determined beyond this incomplete determination, and the fact that his will behaves in a certain way and not differently under given circumstances is precisely due to this individual will and is attributable to him. The phrase that the given will is completely determined as a reality is easily misunderstood to mean that all its determinations are given by the rest of reality. But if every element of reality were to be completely determined by the totality of the rest, without itself determining anything, i.e. without contributing to its own determination, then in the end everything would remain indeterminate. Determinacy must not be understood purely passively, as being determined by something else. An element of reality must be determined in something, simply in itself and by itself. One can see what this irreducible core of determination consists of: **in** the fact that this reality behaves in this way and not in any other way under the completely given conditions of the environment.

Of course, a composite reality owes its self-determination to its elements. It came into being through their coming together, and it constantly takes in new elements and loses old ones. This is true of Man as a living being. That is why, mindful of its origin and history, we do not hold it equally responsible for every behaviour. But we do hold him responsible for every action that reflects his true will. Such actions belong to the completely given conditions of the environment. I am not simply responsible for having acted in this way, nor am I responsible without restriction for having acted in this way under the present circumstances. Rather, what belongs to my innermost will and my very being is the unchangeable: I am what I am, i.e. I am such that (as a result) under the conditions of my external history I have become such that I now act in such **present** circumstances. All changeable characteristics are an external, pre-determined form of activity that is conditioned by what remains constant. To the extent that this core of will is expressed in my behaviour, I am responsible for it. Attribution and responsibility presuppose the will — at least an innermost core of will — as an absolutely self-responsible entity. It can only be so if it is a genuine element, for only then is it not a composite.

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* Zn, who shares a similar view of the will — An¥länpe naturally also finds this — has recently come to the conclusion, based on natural philosophical considerations, that

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Zlezaent ter Wlrkliobkett ant 4ie Zeit **anthroposentrischen   Naturphilosophie.**

Register.

• I owe the creation of the Regietera to Henri Dr. Haus Mokre. The ¥e*f-