


AESTHETIC FRAGMENTS



GUSTAV SHPET

BERSERKER
BOOKS



Annotation

In the early 1920s, the eminent Russian philosopher G.G. Shpet became interested in issues of aesthetics and devoted his remarkable "Aesthetic Fragments" to them, revealing his many years of reflection on the essence of human existence and cognition. Of particular interest to linguists is the second part of Aesthetic Fragments, which reflects the author's views on various problems of the philosophy of language, semiotics, linguogenesis, logical analysis of language, semasiology, and psycholinguistics (in particular, the problem of speech reception and comprehension). G.G. Shpet examines in detail the issues of the structuring of linguistic signs, the relationship between meaning and sense, the interconnection between words and culture, and the place of sensory impressions in the semantic structure of words. draws on extensive theoretical and linguistic material, and offers his own interpretation of the views of W. von Humboldt, G.W. Leibniz, and A. Marty, whose influence is particularly evident in the terminology used by G.G. Shpet.

The book is intended for linguists, philosophers, psychologists, cultural studies scholars, as well as teachers, students and postgraduates of humanities universities and all interested readers.

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Aesthetic Fragments
Gustav Gustavovich Shpet

I. TIMELY REPETITIONS

MISCELLANEOUS

Swing

There is hardly any subject of scientific and philosophical attention — except for the most precise ones: arithmetic and geometry — where the contradiction between the name and the essence is so senseless and ugly as in Aesthetics. It is worth saying to oneself that aesthetics deals with beauty, i.e. with the idea, in order to feel that aesthetics has nothing to do with music. Music — the cradle name of all artistic art — in aesthetics makes aesthetics thoroughly sensual, almost animalistic, devoid of ideas, forcibly sensual. One could perhaps come to terms with this if one could risk calling everything sensual, without exception or limitation, ugly. It would then be understandable how it could be the subject of aesthetics alongside beauty. But who would dare to do so now, in our age of prudent definitions and hygienic names? There are no longer any insensitive people

— neither among Jews, nor among Christians, nor among Muslims.

To say that aesthetics does not bear its name by chance is to banish poetry from aesthetics. This requires neither courage nor determination. Perhaps it requires sensitivity? We have an abundance of that. Is boyishness needed? Capital city boys loudly proclaim their existence. Are they really as stupid as they are portrayed?

The more one thinks about the "idea" of poetic creation, the less of it remains. The result is always some dry lump that does not deserve to be called an idea. What remains is a single plot framework, which, if it evokes any aesthetic experiences at all, then only an unbearable feeling of banality. But it is not aesthetics that corrodes the ideological content of the plot, but reasoning, calculation and calculation itself.

This is how aesthetics oscillates between sensualism and logic. This is exactly how someone who wanted to learn what a *verst* is would run from milestone to milestone

find out what a verst is by counting the posts. The most serious thing he could learn is that ten minus nine equals one. The oscillating aesthetics cannot and does not want to do more than that: its subject is some kind of unit.

But if only it knew that! A unit is something formless, a unit is something meaningless. If aesthetics realised this, it would not cease to swing between beauty and lust, but it would cease to argue about form and content. It would be difficult, tedious, and nauseating, but it would not provoke ironic remarks from those around it. Isn't it ridiculous: to swing with your mouth agape and maliciously, abusively repeating your own and your own — form! — content! — content! — form!

Common sense does not swing, does not rush about, gives advice, does not get angry, does not swear. Common sense knows that the subject of aesthetics is art. Common sense knows everything. But, as was established in times before us, common sense does not understand everything — it understands only what is sane. And sane art is like a blunt sword: you can chop wood and kill someone from behind, but you cannot fight chivalrously with a friend of equal birth.

Art is the domain of art history. And there is nothing offensive about the existence of such a science. There was art; and there is a science about it. And if this science comes to the conclusion that art is studied not only by aesthetics and not only aesthetically, then this must be accepted. This means that when aesthetics studies art, it does so from its own point of view. There is something aesthetic in the subject of "art." But a positive and serious science cannot teach aesthetics what is aesthetic. There is nothing offensive about this state of affairs, it is only sad that the question remains unanswered: where is the mother's womb of this science? It is sad because it is shameful and scrupulous to say: in the basement, behind a window covered with street dirt, there — in rotten rags, in shameful neglect, is the mother — the Philosophy of Art.

For science, its subject is a mask at a ball, anonymous, a biography without the hero's own name, patronymic, or ancestry. Science can tell little, much, or everything about its subject, but there is one thing it never knows and cannot possibly know — what its subject is, its name, patronymic, and family. These are in a sealed envelope, which

is kept under the rags of Philosophy. Art history is one thing, but the philosophy of art is quite another.

How much will we learn by obtaining and opening the envelope? — The first name, middle name and surname, all the relatives by name, the genealogy — and everyone in their place. Is this aesthetics? Art history and the philosophy of art will lead us through the markets, salons, taverns, palaces and ruins of temples, showing us art that is precisely named and glorified

— we will learn about it, but will we understand it? Will we see the meaning? Will we comprehend the mind of the arts? Isn't it more likely that only now will we think about them, their fate, and retreat into solitude to ponder their meaning?

Solitude gives birth to dreams, fantasies, and reveries — the silent shadows of thought, the play of insubstantial desert mirages, a consolation only for the anchorite dying in the throes of hunger. Solitude is the death of creativity: the metaphysics of art! Blessed is he who has brought with him into the desert of solitude from the noise and confusion of life a sufficient supply of living words and can saturate himself with them, creating himself, killing that life: trampling death with death. But this is no longer solitude. It is a conversation with a friend and a quarrel with an enemy, a prayer and a song, a hymn and satire, philosophy and the ringing babble of children. From the Word is born myth, shadows — the shadows of creatures, mirage — the reflected Olympus, dreams — love and sacrifice. The game and life of consciousness — word for word, dialogue. The dialectic of consciousness, conscious and understanding the meaning in the game and life of art, in its run through squares and markets, in its refuge in palaces and taverns, in the sensual realisation of ideas — aesthetics that is not swaying, but rapid, itself art and creativity, realising meanings.

Between knowledge and consciousness, between knowledge and conscience, evaluation is rubbed in — between art and aesthetics — criticism. It does not create, does not know, does not realise, it only evaluates. The ideal critic is an automatic device, scales, a sensitive, insensitive apparatus. Only a false critic is a living being. A critic, like a judge, should study the law and be able to apply it, suppressing a passionate and impatient heart, defending the law and justice, but not human interests, instilling a sense of justice, but not nobility. There is no established law for a lynching judge, a judge of conscience. A critic is not an automaton when he judges according to Lynch's law and

carries out the sentence himself: an unscrupulous sentence of conscience. In other words, criticism is the judgment of the crowd, unaccountable, irresponsible, unmotivated. The critic is the executioner in an unlawful court. Criticism is public execution, just as solitude was suicide. But solitude offers salvation within oneself, while public execution is the dishonour of the executioner, falling on the good name of the executed.

Art is forgotten in the aesthetics of "nature." But, strictly speaking, that is how it should be. Common sense sets a healthy precedent and creates a healthy tradition. It would be not only an empirical contradiction to speak of the aesthetic consciousness of the Archaean, Palaeozoic, and Mesozoic eras. Culture emerged somewhere in the Cenozoic era, when the annihilation of nature began. That is why "nature" must first be cultivated and artisticised before it can be perceived aesthetically. "Nature" must cease to be a natural thing, just as it appears to the sensory consciousness as an imperfect possibility. In short, "nature" acquires any meaning, including aesthetic meaning, like everything else in the world, only in context — in the context of culture. Nature is fiction for aesthetics, just as culture is not reality for aesthetics. Aesthetics does not cognise, but contemplates and fantasises. Beautiful culture is fictitious; fictitious culture is aesthetic.

The same conclusion can be reached by means of the most banal syllogism, provided that its major premise proclaims that art is creativity. Only artificial nature can be beautiful nature. On the other hand, like music, nature can irritate and soothe the nerves while retaining all its natural ugliness.

On the synthesis of the arts

Dilettantism alongside art is the same as science and philosophy — is like flirting next to love. A sacrilegious joke about eros! The flaccid stylelessness of the era — in its tolerant attitude towards dilettantism, when dilettantism becomes shameless and, contrary to the rules of social decency, leads a publicly open life. According to , dilettantism — is always indecency. Cynicism

reaches the level of mockery when it asks with a feigned innocent look: "But what is a dilettante?" The question assumes that dilettantism and art are degrees of the same thing. Then flirting would be a degree of love. What nonsense! In art, there are degrees: from student to learner to master. Dilettantism is outside these degrees; mastery and dilettantism are contradictory. Dilettante does not mean "one who loves," but one who amuses himself (with love), a "pleasure-seeker." Therefore, dilettantism is also a lie. In it, that which is unskilled — *ατέχνως* — is falsely presented as that which should be unskilled — *ατεχνως*. Finally, only a philosopher — *φιλόσοφος* = friend of skill — possessed by eros, has the privilege of understanding everything, even though he does not know how to do everything. The privilege of a dilettante is not even to know everything, but only to be familiar with everything.

Only someone who is familiar with everything and knows nothing — *άσοφος*-dilettantism — could give rise to the most absurd idea in world culture, the synthesis of the arts. Only theosophy, the synthesis of religions, is vulgar nonsense equal to this. Art — like religion — is characteristic, art is typical, art is stylish, art is unique, art is individual, art is aristocratic — and suddenly, "synthesis"! So art must be schematic, schematic, crystallographic? Those who entertain themselves with a love of the arts do not rack their brains over this. And indeed, what entertainment: Dante, Aeschylus, Beethoven, Leonardo and Praxiteles on one stage! Better still: a Turkish drum, a donkey, Goethe and the dreamy dilettante himself — but, unfortunately, it won't help, it definitely won't help...

But if amateurs are to blame for the emergence of such a rational and intellectual monstrosity as the "synthesis of the arts," then it is not amateurs alone who are to blame for this ignoble and unappetising entity gaining access to aesthetic society. What is interesting is not the faux pas of aesthetics, but some kind of note fausse of art itself. I am not speaking for the sake of edification, but solely for the sake of reflection. One fact is striking. After all, a painting on an easel, a score on a music stand, a manuscript on a desk — these are not yet reality. Who knows what "accidents" might happen: fire, revolution, bad temper, progressive paralysis, evil will — Gogol himself burned his manuscripts. A painting goes to an exhibition, a manuscript goes to print. Why? To be realised, to come to fruition.

For art, this means finding a "use" or "application." There is no other benefit to be gained from the creation of beauty. When music, painting and poetry were transferred from temples and palaces to public houses, when theatres were turned from national celebrations into daily cash registers, art lost its "application". Today's art galleries, louvers, national museums, and even

"Tretyakov Galleries" — have gone into the service of pedagogy. As if this could hide the tastelessness and state encouragement of accumulating in one barn — like wine in wine cellars — products of artistic creativity that have not found "application" or, even worse, have been removed from "application" and "nationalised".

The same applies to volumes of poetry in public libraries and music in conservatory concert halls. Everywhere and everywhere, conservatories are warehouses of scrap metal. It is no coincidence that they are maintained at the expense of the state and public account, generally "maintained". A "free" conservatory would not last five minutes — it would be plundered for "use." What would the old masters say if they were asked to paint a picture not for a temple, not for a palace, not for a home — but for a public museum or for "private" collection? Now they write... It turns out that art is not for a specific place, but "for itself." They found a way to "apply" it again: Reskina, Morris, artisans, "artistic industry." But the distance from art to craftsmanship is about the same as from nobility to good manners. In the end, the artist, who himself fed many artisans, is right on both counts: "The slave of 'artistic industry' is as ridiculous and pitiful as the uncultured artist who has closed all doors to creative expression except canvas or clay" (Roerich). But there is no reason to be angry here: industrial style is as much a historical necessity as the "bourgeois" style once was, with flowers and poems on blue garters.

As a result, like the vital syllogism of art itself, the conclusion of dilettantism about the synthesis of the arts: a large public house, on the walls "just like that" paintings, with "just like that" stages, the sounds of oratorios, symphonies, and military marches rush by, poets read poems, actors reproduce the audience themselves, synthetic fantasists... One could limit oneself to the latter to achieve "synthesis":

filling the opera hall with "light effects" corresponding to the sounds; perhaps also with non-aesthetic stimuli, such as smells, tactile, thermal, gastric and other excitants! But the intoxicating idea of such a synthesis — as opposed to the "platform" proposed above — if it had been expressed, would hardly have had methodological significance, but only symptomatic — for psychopathology.

I cannot recall who recently, horrified by the absurdity "general synthesis" of the arts, claimed that without any synthesis, poetry fulfils the role of synthesis. However, the words "without any synthesis" seem to be my own addition; the rest, I suppose, was said by the poet. If a painter thinks about it, he will be forced to say the same about painting, and a musician about music. And everywhere, the philosophising aesthetician must add: "without any synthesis," for the structure of each art, each work of art, i.e., the organic nature of its structure, is a sign of the concreteness of aesthetic objects, but by no means of their synthetic nature. Structure is only structure because each of its parts is also an individual part, not a "side" or "quality," not at all a subject of abstract categoricity. The "synthesis" of poetry has only the "advantage" that it is a synthesis of words, the most intense and condensed. Only in the structure of words are all the constructive "parts" of an aesthetic object present. In music, meaning is split off; in painting and sculpture, the understood object is obscured (the "named" things stand out too much).

Art is thoroughly concrete — every embodiment of it, every moment of it, every creative instant. This is unbearable for the amateur: how can one "get to know" everything?

The master, the artist, the painter, the poet — they fragment. Their path is from singularity to uniqueness. Down with synthesis, unification, unity! Long live division, differentiation, dispersion!

Art and life

That art arises from decoration is not only a genetic fact, it is also an essential function of art, since art, in one way or another, wholly or in part, incidentally or

wholly, represents beauty. That is why art "in itself" is meaningless, inanimate, insubstantial. But the formula cannot be reversed, for such a reversal is a distortion — one cannot say that all decoration is art.

Decoration is only the expressiveness of beauty, i.e. gestures, facial expressions, tears and smiles, but not yet thought or idea. Expressiveness generally comes from excess. Meaning and ideas must live, i.e., first, they must experience a lack and, second, they must be embodied and expressed. Beauty comes from the need to express meaning. *Réalisez — tout est la* (Cézanne). Need — until it is satisfied — is anxiety, restlessness. Creativity is restless torment until expression is found. The torment of the student is worse than that of the master: until the expression is "satisfactory," until the exciting is expressed. Truly, until it is expressed, it humiliates the consciousness, mocks the mind. The expanse of the sky, a woman's breast, the grandeur of the spirit excite — the artist writes, paints, carves until he has "removed" the expression of restless passion. The "master" does not suffer as much as the "student" — that is why there are venerable masters, "academicians". There are, however, masters who are disciples. But, of course, the point is not that passion and excitement are "dulled" — does a venerable man feel less need for life than a boy? — but that a venerable man does not grasp at expressions that are "beyond his strength." The instinct for honours is against the instinct for life!

And so the formula: art is life — is true for the few. A perverted cry: life is art! Such perverted appeals are repeated: life is philosophy, life is poetry. This is a socio-psychological symptom. This is a sign of an era when lies are cheap. This is the cry of the degenerate. They want to cosmetically enhance their pitiful, fading lives with philosophy, art, poetry. This is called "introducing" philosophy, art, poetry into life... Or, more brazenly, not separating them from life. But youth does not cry out about this; it is adorned by itself and fears no losses or ruptures.

Life is art, the "creation" of art from life, life is even the greatest of the arts — all this is typical decadence. The falling ancient world knew this, romanticism knew it — falling Christianity — we have heard it recently from falling democracy and naturalism

— everyone has reminders of this in their own archives. Outside of decadence, the "art of living" is vanity and vulgarity.

If life is art, then there is no art. For decoration must be the decoration of something, and if it does not decorate life, then it does not exist, and life is torture. And to decorate decoration

— is a kind of aesthetic insanity.

Artistic creation — whether the decadents like it or not — enters life as a fact. There is nothing that can be done about it. Once a work of art has entered life as a fact, it cannot help but be life itself. But they want something else. They want what cannot be to become what is, what cannot not be. But this is a return to an unadorned life, natural, animalistic — beautiful only in some rare cases of play and the ugliness of nature. Here, instead of gold, there is almost always a handful of clay shards. Only art that is far removed from life, distant, distant from it, can be its adornment, ugly as it is. And art in life, close to it, is a new ugliness in it. Isn't what we have enough? Art should not be in life, but for life, alongside it, easily detachable — detach it and move on — attach it to something else.

edge... Beauty is a celebration, not a Wednesday.

Poetry and philosophy

Art is not life, and philosophy is not life. No logical conclusion can be drawn from these negations. But if we look closely at the meaning of these negations, their positive significance soon becomes clear. Life is only the material of art and philosophy; therefore, life is only abstraction. Philosophy is the last, final concreteness in its task and infinite in its real implementation; art, precisely because it is art and not already-being, creativity and not creation, is the penultimate, but still transparent concreteness. Philosophy can be the penultimate concreteness, and then it is art, and art, penetrating the ultimate concreteness, is already philosophy. Thus, art as philosophy is philosophy as

art — and therefore, a breach in the wall between art and philosophy.

Philosophy is art, and art is philosophy — two truths that cannot be derived from each other through mutual formal conversion. Both statements are truly independent and original. Philosophy is art as the highest mastery of thought, the creation of beauty in thought — the greatest creation; the image of the ugly, the adornment of the ugly, the creation of beauty from the non-existence of beauty. Philosophy is art, i.e. it begins to exist "without use", without a task, "purely" — in the extreme case, perhaps, only in a decorative "application".

Now the arts are organs of philosophy. Here the senselessness of the synthesis of the arts is particularly clear: what is the "synthesis" of hands, feet and head? — a bloody mess of muscles, nerves and bones. But what is painting in poetry, poetry in music, and so on? The same thing as walking on your hands, hugging with your feet, kissing with the top of your head... A circus trick, if we are serious. In reality, it is only a metaphor. There is as much in common between the musicality of poetry, the imagery and meaning of music, and the poetic nature of a painting as there is between randomly selected homonyms, between the hour of thunder and the hour of noon, between talent buried in the ground and the talent of a gravedigger, between a gravedigger and a clown.

Modern poetry is engaged in a ridiculous endeavour, transferring musical analogies into poetry. Only at the court of the Hottentots could a musical piece written according to the rules of Boileau, Batte and Bryusov be performed. Poetry as a "synthesis" of music and meaning is a synthesis of cobwebs and honey. How can meaning make music? Meaning does not make music — music kills meaning — tone cripples poetry.

— Poetry excludes music, music excludes poetry.

— Why?

— Because they want to combine them!

The arts are organs of philosophy; philosophy needs not only the head, but also the hands, eyes and ears to touch, see and hear. It is time to stop walking on our heads and applauding (futurism) with our ears!

When musical appearance — all music directly only appearance — kills meaning in poetry, cling to

picturesqueness, for "image." The image is not on canvas — only "image," metaphor; poetic images — figures, tropes, internal forms. Psychologists have done poetry a disservice by interpreting internal form as image — predominantly visual. The assertion that internal form is a pictorial image is a lie. The visual image interferes with poetic perception. To take the visual image for the poetic is the same as considering all contemplation, all intuition, to be visual.

To strain towards the visual image of a "monument not made by human hands" or a "fiery word," any "image," any symbol — where forms are not visual but fictitious — means straining towards a non-understanding and non-perception of the poetic word.

Of course, there is also an inner musical form; without it, there would be no music. But this does not justify reducing poetry to musicality. The proof is in history. Every poem has its own "musicians," and each one will name its own when examples are needed. But poetry knows poets, and not only "its own," but simply all of them for all.

Poets are needed in poetry, and just as musicians are not needed in poetry, so are painters. Pictorial poetry was born on a fence, and that is where it belongs.

Inner form, "image," contemplation, and intuition can also be intelligent. This is where art as philosophy begins, the transition to ultimate concreteness, this is where pseudo-philosophy and pseudo-art end, where, for those who have eyes and ears, the pre-Promethean twilight ends, *οἱ πρώτα μὲν βλέποντες ἐβλεπον μάτην, // χλόοντες οὐκ ἤχονον* — they had eyes, and looked in vain, strained their ears, but did not hear.

Signs and styles

The eighteenth century is magnificent in its monolithicity. The streams of the Renaissance, which had been exhausted in the intellectual dryness of the seventeenth century, merged into one great wave, and around the middle of the century this wave of historical current rose up. It subsided again towards the end of the century, only to rise again at the beginning of the next century in

a multitude of national Revivals. The failure of the mid-nineteenth century only accentuates the new rise of the cultural and historical wave towards the end of this remarkable century. Our time wanted to be a tool in the hands of the evil genius of history and erected a monstrous military dam across its flow. Like a toy, it swept away the pressure of spirit and thought — for, despite the millions of corpses and mutilated bodies, it was a war of spiritual, not physical, forces — and there were no defeated peoples and victors, only the fallen and the exalted. We, the first to be cast down, are rising above the others, perhaps as the ninth and final wave of European and world history. Now we are transforming ourselves in order to finally begin — we must believe! — our European Renaissance. What we need now is style. Until now, we have only been imitating.

The 1940s were, perhaps, the last period of natural style. According to the philosophical task of the time, this should have been a style that reflected the spirit of reality — a style that was durable, well-founded, strict, serious, and reasonable. In reality, everyday life was often mistaken for reality and supplanted the cult: democracy and philistinism overshadowed spirituality. Spiritual realism remained an unresolved task because the means of symbolising such reality had not been found. The philosophy of history was overwhelmed by empirical history. Strict rationality was replaced by loose prudence and calculating comfort. Bourgeois revolutions brought chaos into life, art became democratised, irrationalised and degenerated — *a equis cano* took the place of *equitibus cano*. With the "naturalist" Feuerbach, illogical debauchery began in philosophy itself. Aesthetics fell apart. Naturalism ran rampant. One can speak of differences in talent, but not of differences in the forms realised. Zola and Tolstoy, Turgenev and Flaubert, Chekhov and Maupassant, Spillhagen, Sudermann, Sienkiewicz, and Tolstoy again — the difference is only in talent and, consequently, a sense of proportion. The Kreutzer Sonata, Sentimental Education, *Une Vie* are saved from vulgarity only by talent, but not by direction. Accordingly, aesthetics becomes naturalised, sociologised, generally preoccupied with trifles, "facts," gossip about the origins and adventures of the arts. The high style of aesthetics itself has become incomprehensible because it is not sufficiently

understandable, foreign, and has become reason itself. How timely was the classic Nietzsche's hammering of philosophy! We need to become classics in our sleep, Cézanne insisted.

Only in Russia did the intelligent incomprehensibility of Tyutchev's poetry continue to resonate, despite everything, and the incomprehensible rationality of Dostoevsky's tragedy continued to annoy meaningless minds. Their role and paths are supra-historical. Historically, the realism of the 1840s collapsed along with Gogol. Tyutchev and Dostoevsky remain the promises of a new style. Andrei Bely takes on the responsible feat of prematurely fulfilling the promise — because style can only appear after school.

This style must be ours. Every style is guided, every style is directed by a people chosen for that purpose at the right time. But style only comes after schooling. And we have not been to school. This is our cultural antinomy. The West went to school, and we only learned poorly from the West, whereas we need to go through the same school that the West went through. We are always too busy to learn; instead of *σχολή*, we have *ασχολία*. After the alphabet, we immediately read the latest news in the newspapers, love the latest words, and decide the latest issues. We are like children, but at school, we are underdeveloped. We were born this way — our antinomy — from birth, or rather, from baptism: we were baptised and are baptised in the Byzantine manner, we learned the Bulgarian alphabet, we read German books, we write books without style.

Naturalism, which we accepted as the last word, was pure aesthetic nihilism. In its essence, in its idea, naturalism is a fundamental rejection not only of style, but also of direction. "Direction" in naturalism is replaced by teaching, morality, because the nihilist, denying useless creativity, is unable to come up with any justification for himself except the utilitarian one. Direction in art is seriousness, nihilism is carelessness, utilitarianism is a hypocritical cover for spiritual idleness, the feigned seriousness of a loafer, the practicality of a barbarian, the civility of a seminarian.

Symbolism appeared for the formal defence and restoration of the rights of art. Due to its foundations, which are directly opposed to naturalism, symbolism as such cannot have a style and cannot be a "direction." Just as naturalism is a denial of art,

so symbolism is an essential property of art. Symbolism is an exceptionally concentrated art, and therefore the symbolic style is always an artificial style, not a natural one, always a stylisation.

A symbol is a comparison of the sensory realm with the realm of the conceivable, ideas, idealism, actual experience (emotions) with the realm of the ideal, the experience of understanding. Art, in terms of aesthetics, is essentially between the two. It is wrong to say that symbol is established necessarily on the basis of "similarity".

The "similarity" of the physical and spiritual, the sensual and the ideal, is a very tricky problem in general, if by "similarity" we mean

"likeness" rather than simply "convergence" — from two unquestionably dissimilar ends to some conventional single point. A symbol is not an allegory. An allegory is rational, "fictional," and flat. A symbol is creative, prophetic, and inexhaustible. An allegory is theosophical, a symbol is mystical.

At least in a completely conventional sense, a symbol is a sign in the sense of a "word" as a sign other words, directly (or metaphorically) naming

"thing" (process, sign, action). Consequently, a symbol is *sui generis* suppositio. Therefore, a word, from the other end, is the prototype of all art. Therefore, its structure is exhaustively complete and constitutes the type of every aesthetic object. Art is a modus of reality, and the word is the archetype of this reality, an unreal reality.

As a result, symbolism is fundamentally an affirmation of the rights of the arts. Historically, symbolism is a time of all kinds of restorations and stylisations. In our case, for example, classicism, archaism (Slavicism), romanticism, populism. But now, at this moment, we do not need restoration, but a Renaissance.

Through symbolism, Europe saved itself from frivolity, idleness, utilitarianism, barbarism, and Eastern wisdom: the East itself was stylised, the Japanese and other barbarians were stylised, even savages and low-born people in general, for the sole purpose of ennobling them in the European manner. They only played at primitivism because they needed to replace the ridiculous with the cheerful, the absurd

— intelligent, unforgettable Cézanne — in place of the forgotten Gokusai. And if in our time various Altenbergs, Tovotes,

Schnitzlers and the like have faded from memory, is it not to emphasise the provincial tastelessness and still existing ability to "read" some Rabindranath Tagore?

In the struggle for the right to art, for the "joyful science," Europe lost its style. Style became a matter not of implementation, but only of study. Stylisation replaced schools of craftsmanship. The discipline of good upbringing disappeared; hairdressers and tailors replaced governesses; salesmen inserted the price list of their trading houses into the cover of the Gothic Almanac. It so happened that in the age of technology, the secret of technology was lost, although it was no secret to the cheerful masters of the serious guild.

Realism is also an essential property of art. The requirement for form comes from content. Content without form is pure suffering. Content suffers from form and suffers without it, just as everything repulsive suffers from itself, just as the soul "in itself," deprived of the body, repulsive, suffers. Forms without content are not the subject of creativity, but of gathering, collecting — musicians in poetry, for example, collectors, homeless, their home is the cosiness of the museum, they sleep, eat, love and do other things in old clothes shops. One content, without form, is the element of nature and the soul — repugnance and spiritual, logical, aesthetic falsehood in culture, for culture — the birth, transformation and rebirth of the spirit — is a moral falsehood for nature.

Realism, if it is not the realism of the spirit, but only of nature and the soul, is abstract realism, a slide into the "nothingness" of naturalism. Only the spirit in the true sense is realised — even if it materialises, incarnates and is inspired, i.e. it is realised in the same nature and soulfulness, but always arises to real existence in the forms of culture. Nature simply exists, the soul lives and biographs, one spirit is present to arise in culture, waits, endures, hopes, endures everything, does not misbehave, does not exalt itself, does not seek its own. The Christian metaphor for the spirit is love. It is ridiculous and pitiful to listen to Christians talk about love: the blind man's reasoning about flowers, the fool's about the mind, the liar's about truth, the theosophist's about mysticism, the castrato's about the joys of marriage. The assertion that love is the source — and a particularly deep and fruitful one at that — of knowledge, creativity, beauty, as well as is true, as it would be true the assurance, that

weeping willows are the source of the lake's fullness, to which they lean and into which they shed their tears. The spirit is the source of everything, including love.

The spirit is not a metaphysical Sesame, not an elixir of life; it is real not "in itself" but in recognition. "In itself" it is only known, in itself it is only an idea. Culture and art are realisation, creativity. Spirit is created. Without style and form, it is pure and abstract non-existence. Realism is realisation, not existence. To know the real, to recognise the idea and realise it — this is the path from the Renaissance to style. Will it ever come? Our task now is only the Renaissance. That is why it is now more necessary to take into account the signs than to worry about style. Style will come on its own, unexpectedly, when, perhaps, we get tired of waiting; the spirit will not tire of waiting, it has waited out Christianity, it will wait out the current post-Christian disarray. But we ourselves, of course, are already tired. It is no wonder that the minds of our contemporaries are dried up by Eastern wisdom, that we are deafened by the rumbling of the theosophical chariot carrying the cruel Kali, that her followers, the suffocators of reason, are raving. This is their last frenzy. Their doomed sacrifice is the redemption of a new spirit that is about to be born. This sacrifice is dear to the mind, but not its legitimate offspring — European metaphysics. A tomb will be built for it in a new style, constructed by a revived mind — in forms that are now legitimate for the realisation of the spirit. New realism, expressed realism, not the realism of everyday life, will be an expression of what is, not what happens and occurs, of what really is, not what seems to be.

Decay and rebirth

Differentiation — new birth and growth, centripetal force to the point of saturation, to the point of tension that cannot withstand the compression of internal forces and resolves into a system of new centres repelling each other, independently capable of new condensations and new differentiations. First — the concentration of life, then the scattering of circles: each flies away with its own centre, preserving only the memory of what was once a common, unified proto-centre. Creativity —

imitation (μίμησις) based on memory (ανάμνησις). Therefore, imitation is never copying. There would be no memory if there were no forgetting. Forgetting is the whip of creativity, it rears up the imagination. Soaring in the spaces of imagination

tenses itself to the capacity of new birth, stratification of concentration, differentiation.

Nothing grows out of decay. Decay is starvation, when life is sustained by feeding on the organism, the organism's self-cannibalism. Decay is rot. Its product and its purpose is fertiliser.

Decay excludes death, because it is a mechanism, a cycle of matter, the preservation of matter. There is no death, therefore there is no new birth — preservation instead of creation. Death is the mask of creativity, the domino of love. Mortal marriage is a secret, a mystery of birth and creativity. Love and, immediately after it — after so many hours or months — birth is illusory creativity. True creativity comes from nothing, therefore death enters the interval between love and birth. Those hours and months "in between" are hours and months of waiting. New birth awaits old death. Death is an explosion, a revolution, destruction. Birth is silence, peace, a single and unstable moment of equilibrium, after which growth, tension, and condensation begin. The pains of childbirth are an image of how

"Ascension of the sun," also — propter hoc ergo post hoc. A in reality — the agony of death, the movement of the earth around the sun, post mortem ergo propter mortem. In the womb — death, nothingness — where there was life; in the solar world — new birth, something from nothing. Why is there no new realism after symbolism? That is, there is none yet, not yet.

The first thought is that decay, fertilisation, manuring is taking place. The evidence for this is clear: art is cannibalising itself, reflecting on itself. Is this not true decadence, feeding on its own tissues? Never, it seems, has there been such a

lack of meaning in spiritual life: philosophy instead of reflection seeks knowledge through

"experience," has confused all the meanings and senses of the word concipio and runs away from the mind, hating it, while art, in place of spontaneous creativity, reflects, fulfils all the meanings of the word experior and subordinates experience to "poetics" — of the present, past and future, for there is no such thing as absolute, timeless poetics. The poetics

of the future is taken for the poetics of the absolute. Futurism is a theory of art without art itself. A futurist is not only and not always someone who calls himself a futurist — in the collapse of art, the art of naming also disappears — but someone for whom the theory of art is the beginning, the reason and the foundation of art. When those who called themselves futurists called for "arsonists with blackened fingers," it was not frightening — glorious guys, one thought. When they commanded:

"destroy the foundations of glorious cities," it was incomprehensible and curious — incomprehensible because everyone knew that such "foundations" had long since been destroyed, and curious because the "manifesto" was addressed to us: which one of us, it seemed, — glancing sideways at our "neighbours" — business people — would abandon their father and mother to go and tear down what had long been torn down and could not be torn down? But it immediately became distasteful and repulsive to the sense of smell when the Manifesto revealed the age of Their Majesties: the oldest of us, it said, were thirty years old! What? You are thirty years old and you already have a theory of art? — then you are not artists, not artists in creation, not artists in theory. You can only be artists in theory! The practice that followed the theory was to different tastes. Those who affirmed the primacy of poetics over poetry were the Futurists.

Futurism "creates" according to theory — it has no past — the pregnancy of the futurists is false. The classics went through school, overcame it, became romantics, the romantics became realists through school, the realists became symbolists; the symbolists can become new classics through school. Futurists who have not mastered school will not master art either; they will not be masters of it, but clerks, even if state clerks. The point is not "Artificiality," as it is sometimes interpreted. Artificiality is only artificiality when it is noticeable, and therefore only then can artificiality be a reproach. The technique of all decadents is to attract attention with a trick. People talk about insincerity, but who cares? It is the work that must be sincere, not the creator. Insincerity and artificiality mean simply that the trick has failed. The criterion is not talent or artistry, but authenticity, not falsification, genuineness: the artist's first opus. If it is "by the teacher," "by the school," by "accepted" forms, one against the other, what will come of the artist is a reformer;

if it follows his own "new" forms, ten thousand to one that he will become a bureaucrat.

Futurism, therefore, is decay, rot and fertiliser. The ground is ready. The first thought did not answer the question of why there is no new realism. The second: because we do not know what reality is. We have lost it. We dream about it, which means we don't know what it is. Our life has become unreal, reality — nonsense. This means that aesthetic perception and acceptance of reality have faded away, leaving only the pragmatic. The unreal "works," nonsense is the highest reality. Nonsense was handed out to artists in the form of theosophical workbooks; theosophical wisdom drove creative reality underground. Theosophical theories have always suggested that reality is hidden under a veil; lifting its folds reveals the horror of madness. And indeed, who would not lose their mind when faced with black nothingness? Here is a criterion for recognising an artist: place the test subject in front of the veil, suggest that they lift it, and an artist, unlike a theosophist, will sternly dismiss the experimenter. How can one destroy this mystery — the beauty of the folds of the veil — with a cynical movement of the hand? Can an artist destroy with his own hands the reality given to his eyes and therefore genuine? Is there and can there be any other? It can only be "imitated"; it must be created; it

— is evident, behind it — nothing. Depict it, but do not disfigure it. All that is internal to it is external. The external without the internal is possible — such is illusion; the internal without the external is not. There is not a single atom of the internal without the external. Reality, actuality is determined only by the external. Only the external

— is directly aesthetic. The inner must be mediated by the outer for aesthetic perception; fat, muscles, the belly are aesthetic only when covered by skin. The mediation itself

— the object of aesthetic contemplation through its contact with the external.

Ευρύμαχ', η τοι εμην αρετην ειδός τε δέμας and ωλεσαν αθάνατοι, —

My valour, Eurymachus, was destroyed by the immortal gods, — My appearance and looks...

It was a glorious time when "virtue" could be understood as "appearance and looks"! If in our time people agreed to recognise appearance as a virtue, it would be worth not only being virtuous, but even preaching virtue...

All this is true aesthetically, and it must be true in life. Aesthetics must turn life inside out so that life is true. What do we gain from the strong love of our "neighbours" if this love is "deep in our hearts"? And how much would we gain if we were not deceived by the illusory reality of the depths of our hearts, but always manifested, expressed, and behaved outwardly as loving people do. What is vitally real: disposition on the inside and bad manners on the outside, "the good of humanity" on the inside and a knife clenched in the fist on the outside, or constant affection and attentiveness on the outside, and on the inside — does it matter what is "inside" then? One may prefer one or the other way of behaving, but what really exists in the first case is rudeness, and in the latter, love. In general, is it not because philosophers and psychologists failed to find the "seat of the soul" that they were looking for it inside, when in fact the whole soul is outside, enveloping "us" in a soft, airy veil? But the blows that are dealt to it are wrinkles and scars on our outer face. The whole soul is appearance. A person lives as long as he has appearance. And personality is appearance. The problem of immortality would be solved if the problem of immortal appearance were solved.

And for philosophy: "inside" is only ideal, not real, not actual, not effective. "Internal" is "only" an idea. The Germans taught us to add the word "only" to "idea" so that the expression "only an idea" means nothing. And it is true that if an "idea" cannot be resolved externally, outside, it is nothing. But if it is a living, real idea, it is not "only an idea," but *tōéa*, i.e., first and foremost, an external, visible appearance. The ideal, like nothingness, can only be comprehended, conceived; it is not really existent. Bergsonism is a shrill "be silent" before the non-existent. Appearance requires not conception, but understanding and interpretation. The word is an irreplaceable and unchanging image of reality as of appearance: everything, without

remaining, actual being — outside, everything internal — only ideal.

The artist must affirm the rights of the external so that the philosopher can exist. Only the actual external can be meaningful, because only it is alive. Only the artist has the right and the means to affirm the reality of everything — both meaningless and meaningful — as long as the external is before him. The philosopher usurps the rights and privileges of others when he stammers and mumbles something about irrational existence and the reality of the irrational. All reality is external, and therefore such mumbling is also real only as mumbling — illogical nonsense.

Continuation on the same subject

We do not know now what reality is, although philosophy always has one task — to know reality. For some time now, philosophy has lost not only the solution to this task, but the task itself. A state of ignorance has appeared in the world that did not exist before. This ignorance arose when philosophers imagined that they were not seeking knowledge, but rather "creating" and "overcoming." Philosophers-commanders appeared under the title of idealists. Contemporary sufferers are their degenerate, cynical descendants; their morbid condition — moral sanity — makes them philosophically insane: they are free only because they are sane. No disciplined philosopher would dare to call out: "Let's survive," just as no one in a civilised society would exclaim in public: concipite — such commands can only be uttered publicly in a brothel.

And the artist does not create reality, does not produce — what he produces is art, not reality — he imitates and reproduces. But he affirms reality before the philosopher, because contemplation precedes all knowledge. In this regard, they speak of the artist's special powers of observation. What does this mean? Does the artist see "more"? No, he sees less, because he sees selectively: he does not see everything he

he sees is artistic. Does he see more sharply? This also means less: the sharper one thing is, the duller another is. The difference between an artist's vision and ordinary vision is not quantitative, but qualitative. It is the best kind of vision. For him, the beauty of reality is evident. Is that all? Not at all! The beauty that is clear to him may remain his secret. What do we care about other people's secrets? The artist does not simply contemplate for himself, but reveals secrets. To capture — this is where the artist's artistically perfect vision begins — the manifestation of the external. Beauty is twice born, twice revealed. That is why it has meaning and significance. That is why it is not only aesthetic, but also philosophical. But before conveying reality to the philosopher, the artist must affirm its right to exist in contemplation: not yet real and no longer ideal.

We do not know reality now, but in order to know it, we must find it affirmed. Reality can only be affirmed in beauty; the ugly cannot be affirmed — unless beauty is revealed in it itself, as immanent in the transcendent. The ugly is essentially transcendent. It is necessary to "translate" — traducere ad suam intuitionem — the transcendent into the language of appearance in order to see and understand. In this translation — the transition from the limited human to the divine: the mother herself fled in horror when she saw Pan,

The lovely son of Hermes, with a face like a hideous monster,
the goat-footed, two-horned, noisy son with a cheerful smile, but the
god of understanding, Hermes,
. . . without delay embraced the child
And rejoiced endlessly in his son with all his heart.

The artist does not create reality, but only reproduces it. This is the guarantee of the reality he affirms and the reality of what he affirms. The creator can make a mistake and create one reality instead of another — through delusion, recklessness, cunning, ineptitude, or some other reason. The artist reproduces a reality that has already been created.

His affirmation refers to what exists. However reality may have been conceived and created, created and existing, it is what it is, and nothing else. Perhaps false in conception and execution, it is true in existence. Its truth is its appearance.

We have no reality because we have rejected it. And again, let the idealists and the overly sensitive stammer that rejection is destruction, just as affirmation is creation. Rejection is a sign of dissatisfaction and a call for deeper understanding. Theosophists and Bergsonists distort the picture and replace deepening into the external with deepening "into oneself": not this, that, -

This one here: he's as dumb as... a navel...

(Andrey Bely).

Omphalopsychia is the title of this deepening, this self-deepening. Another deepening is another substitution: peeking under the covers — "inside" (as if!). This is simply a distraction from the present and a thought captive to irritation. We need to delve into the external itself, according to Leonardo's rule: to peer into dusty or mouldy walls, into clouds, into the night-time contours of tree branches, into shadows, into the curves and irregularities of the surface of any object, everywhere — worlds and worlds. Look deeper and deeper into the fabric of the bedspread, and it moves, it floats, it rustles, it reveals image after image. Vision requires understanding. Philosophy begins, logic begins, because its outcome takes shape, takes on a living form, the eyes of its first foundation light up with brilliance: *ante hoc ergo propter hoc*. Vision comes first, therefore understanding comes first. We begin to see with our minds: we begin to see with our ears (cf. the German *vernehmen* — *Vernunft*) and hear with our eyes.

In the darkness and horror of night-time vigil
Hearing vainly tried to embrace the sounds...
..... Count,
count the last moments,
Soul, tired of waiting in vain...
.....

But...

...you can weave joy into the shackles of fate,
..... Dare to
listen to the calls of the night with your eyes!
How long ago it was figured out:
To hear with eyes belongs to love's fine wit.

(Shakespeare).

Here is a question that we should stop evading: what can be seen? Or, at least, what can already be seen? Or, at the very least, can the star of the new Bethlehem be seen? Does our art reproduce the new reality? For in this lies the guarantee, the condition and the beginning of a new birth! The artist's purpose is to see. Have our artists already seen the new reality in our old essence? The general opinion is that Blok saw it. I think Andrei Bely saw it. Blok was not satisfied with seeing, he wanted a vision and lifted the veil; but it is not for nothing that there are so many interpretations and explanations of his message.

...So they march with a stately gait —
Behind them — a hungry dog, Ahead
— with a bloody flag, And invisible
behind the blizzard,
And unharmed by bullets,
With a gentle step above the blizzard,
A snowy scattering of pearls, In a
white wreath of roses — Ahead —
Jesus Christ.

So, what is "inside"? — Ahead — Jesus Christ, behind — a hungry dog, and in the middle — Petka fell in love with Katya — our ancient article, legend, existence... Further on — Chichikovs, Khlestakovs, Smerdyakovs, Molchalin — the old world, the old way of life... And that's all?.. Is it worth renouncing "appearances" because of this?..

After that, Blok was doomed. Blok is the sacrificial victim of our criminal curiosity, because everyone pushed him and everything around us urged him to lift the veil, to remove the elastic silks imbued with ancient beliefs, to look behind what was previously an external but sufficient reality for him.

Andrei Bely's vision is a different vision: external, real, actual. Bely is no longer a "symbolist" here, because to understand this unrealistically means to give up hope here, in reality, means to remain with the same scorched actual past, not the present.

In the
deafening
depths of
fate, In the
earthly
depths, In
the
centuries,
In peoples, In
the
continuous
Blue Skies of
Heaven
— May the
News remain:
— "Christ is risen!"
— There is. There
was.
Will be.
.....
.....
And the Word,
Standing now In
the middle of
the Heart,
Storms heralded Spring,
Spread the resounding
depths From the fiery
throat:

— "Beloved Sons,

—

'Christ is risen!'"

If the Great Pan has risen, what does this promise? What does this promise for us? A complete philosophical answer can be provided by the philosophy of culture. There you will find analysis and interpretation. In aesthetics, you will find results. Among other results is the fact that the Resurrection is a promise of New Birth. Art has always been the beginning of the Renaissance. It is. It was. It will be. Art is the reproduction of what has been produced. The new Hellenism would be an "imitation" of the Creator — ancient Hellenism. Renaissance is the recollection of birth. That is empirically. Hence — Hellenism. But also essentially, because the Renaissance as a manifestation, externalisation, realisation, is first and foremost an aesthetic modus. Not political, not pedagogical — how pitiful and pathetic all these practices and practitioners are. The aesthetic declaration of reality about itself is essentially primary. The rest will follow.

New Hellenism will lead to a new Bethlehem. "Imitation" is not copying; copying is false imitation, false Hellenism, "pseudo-classicism." A philosophical answer about reality is needed so that there is no "pseudo," no illusionism, no idealism, no "experiences," so that there is life and realism. Revival is the embodiment of mystery, its externalisation. Renaissance is "rebirth," and its demand for knowledge, for philosophy: re-cognition — the knowledge of the known. The mystery of philologists must be exposed; everyone must become lovers of words, everyone is called to the knowledge of the known. What was outwardly only for philologists must be open to all. On the greatest holiday, anyone can become a priest, if only they are ready to take on the burden of priesthood.

The fabric of the divine veil flutters before everyone's eyes at the open gates of the temple. In this is Pan, the word, and he is wholly in this word. This word is Everything; all reality. Nothing else exists, nothing real "inside." Everything real is outside; inside is only the ideal.

Words are deception, said the naturalists — idola.

The word is a symbol, said the symbolists.

Words are not deception, not just symbols; words are reality, all of reality without exception is words addressed to us, already heard by us, awaiting your understanding, philosophers, says the new realist artist.

Words are plastic, musical, pictorial — this makes sense when all these predicates refer to the subject of reality. This is philosophical language. Plastic arts, music, painting are verbal. Such is their appearance; through their inherent verbal nature, they are real. This is the language of real art.

All this is expressed by the trembling of the veil. Appearance is a sign. The naturalist considered the "sign" to be nature; this was false realism; new realism must look at nature as a sign. Romantic Christian realism was illusionism; it hypostasised "only the idea" and thereby deceived itself; it declared appearance to be an illusion and thereby deceived others. Romanticism — like all Christianity — did not have the courage of sincere falsehood, as, for example, the Cynics and Pyrrho had, and hid behind irony. What a transparent anagram, and yet the Christian world did not solve it. *Ειπονεία* = illusio, romanticism = illusionism. Christianity could not understand this because it is itself romanticism. Romanticism, proclaiming itself, proclaimed Christianity, and proclaiming Christianity, proclaimed itself. In both Christianity and romanticism, conscious illusionism covered up the insincerity of lies. The crisis of contemporary culture is a crisis of Christianity, because there has been no other culture for two hundred years. The extent to which art is non-Christian is the extent to which it is in crisis. A new renaissance is the sincere birth of a new Pan. New realism is verbal, the realism of languages and peoples, while Christianity and internationalism are a single fabric, Mephistopheles' cloak: black with a red lining. New realism is the realism of peoples and languages — pagan. The new reality is the triumphant entry of Pan, the lover of round dances, into the city, the rebirth of Pan in the city. The city is not a natural reality: in nature, in forests, fields and skies, there are no real cities, only fairy-tale ones. The city, however, is reality. The city is real only as a sign, a word, a culture; reality is history. The time has come to historicise nature and Pan; time spring the city. New

reality — historical — completion of an unfinished thought romanticism: "to present the history of the world as the history of humanity, to find only human events and relationships everywhere" (Novalis).

— Hey! Answer me, who goes there?
Our history now is an illusion. Our reality is ashes: Disappear into
space, disappear,
Russia, my Russia!

The revolution devoured yesterday's reality. But the revolution — hours and years "in between," death for a new birth, ontological fiction. Only that which does not melt in the flames of revolution, the purifying flames, will remain historically real and truly historical. The tongues of flame are words of new meaning and significance, signs that the Reborn will live in the life-giving light. Philosophy, science, art — not different children of the same mother, all of them

— one, in different qualities and at different times. But there will be no Renaissance of thought and reflection if there is no Renaissance of art, of spontaneous creativity. Artists are in the front line.

When reality becomes an illusion, only empty form exists. This is the source of our current refinement in poetic technique, our ability to forge new forms — for no content whatsoever. No content, insignificant content in a promising form is aesthetic falsehood (Akhmatova, for example) — a sign of the loss of perception and feeling of the world. The existence of the cosmos has disintegrated into everyday life, the reality of words is not understood, what remains is a mosaic of fragments of everyday life, passed off as monolithic reality. There are broken dogmas, hackneyed teachings, there is theosophical vulgarity, there is no echo of true religion. And there is also division, fragmentation, dispersion. There is the genius of the artist Andrei Bely, and there is the swagger of the crystallographer Andrei Bely, a brilliant epic ("historical reality") and a Gnostic herbarium. No wonder Boris Bugaev complained about Andrei Bely: he was terrified at the sight of two Andrei Bely's.

One of them gave an interesting interpretation of The Twelve: "And so, in Katya and Petya's The Twelve, in that sound of the old world crashing down, which Alexander Alexandrovich heard with all his maximalist realism, there had to be the beginning of a rebellion, the beginning of a bright resurrection, of Christ and Sophia, of the Russia of the future: — ahead — 'in a bright [!] wreath of roses, ahead — Jesus Christ'. But it should not be understood that the Twelve are marching, with a pitiful dog behind them and Jesus Christ marching ahead — that would be a truly idiotic interpretation.

"Jesus Christ ahead" — what does that mean? — Through everything, through the deepening of the revolution to the revolution of life, consciousness, flesh and bone, to the change of our feelings, our thoughts, to the change of us in love and brotherhood, this "everything" is going towards what is "ahead" — this is what "ahead" it is going.

The "dog" is clear, of course,
A mangy dog with its tail between its legs,
stuck to his companions, lagging behind his benefactor,
... Baring its teeth — a hungry wolf — Tail
tucked — not falling behind —
A cold dog — a stray dog...

Christ, however, is not so clear. One thing is certain: "maximalist realism". So, is appearance a sign? But what kind: a goal or a vision? Apparently, a vision!

— Who else is there? Come out!
.....
— Whoever is in the snowdrift, come out!
.....
— Hey, answer me, who's coming?
— Who's waving that red flag?
.....
— Who is walking there at a brisk
pace, Hiding behind all the houses

What is the vision, the sign, and the symbol? Not transcendent "nothingness," but first and foremost one's own consciousness, conscience. And this is twofold: (1) as

— "in the name of Christ" and (2) as a reproach — "what are we doing"? There is nothing anti-Christian in the first. Christianity equally carried out murder and socialism in the name of Christ — the latter not as an economic plan — although there were such cases — but simply as a game playing on the worst strings of the human soul, vulgo, as the affirmation of the downtrodden, the poor, the wretched, the sick, and at the same time the energetic, talented, strong, cheerful, and healthy. Thus, there would be nothing anti-Christian or unchristian in this, but it would be a real untruth, and therefore a symbolic one. Even before the revolution, Christ was identified with the "priest" in our country. This is a peculiar form of democracy in the Russian Orthodox Church. Both Roman Catholics and Greek Orthodox Christians worship Christ, but the former have the Pope, while we have the priest (or, equally, the hieromonk, the bishop, in cases and the deacon, although, of course, and warmly: "father"). There it is concentrated, here it is distributed.

Do you remember how
Brikho used to walk
ahead, and Brikho's
cross would shine upon
the people?

As a result, "down with the pope" did not mean anything serious: Protestant margarine, and "down with the priests" came to mean "down with Christ." But since the prick of conscience — in a wreath of roses — was still there, and from childhood, how could one drive away the obsessive vision?

— Look, you bastard, you've started a
barrel organ. What are you, Petka, a
woman?
— Surely, you've decided to
turn your soul inside out? Go
ahead!
— Keep your posture straight!
— Keep control of yourself!

And again, and again, and again — the disturbing vision, and the increasingly urgent anxiety that the vision is reality, that very

destructible and destructive reality.

— It doesn't matter, I'll get
you, Better surrender to me
alive!

— Hey, comrade, it's going to
be bad, come out, we'll start
shooting!

He is not afraid of real shots. A sign, a word, a name — always valid, always real. Just one name — and the vision becomes solid. "Reasoning correctly", once rejected Himself, the Name must also be "removed" — perhaps with a secret, "deceptive" plea to Him to lift the burden from the soul...

— Oh, what a blizzard, Saviour!
— Petka! Hey, don't get lost!
What saved you
the golden iconostasis? You are
unconscious, truly. Think, think
sensibly —

So, everything is "down" — into "unconsciousness": Him, the Name, and simply the voice of human conscience! Here, the hand reaches out to lift the veil... What did Blok see behind it? A cold nothingness, which the poet does not mention, and indeed there is nothing to say about nothingness. Only a formless horror penetrates the soul, giving rise to despair at the impossibility of rebirth, despair that everything is in vain, despair that the revolution itself is the old way of life, "the old world, like a mangy dog"... And suddenly, in fact, is it not the vision that is reality, but the transcendent, hypostasised by us, our old nihilistic nothingness? So it is not a nightmare and will remain so? Blok has two encouraging lines:

Thump-thump-thump! — And
only the echo Echoes in the
houses... Only the blizzard laughs
long and loud

It is covered in snow.

Flooded with malicious, triumphant, mocking laughter? No, hardly! But then this laughter is not over failure and the abyss, but only over a slight misfortune, over a ridiculous mistake: the very "thump-thump-thump" of real vision is not real, not true, illusory. In this lies hope. Therefore, those who said "in a low voice": "Traitors! Russia is lost!" They were wrong; Russia is not lost.

The new reality cannot be a romantic restoration of Moscow, for why and for what was the revolution? And every Renaissance is patriotic. The only question is whether it will be European. Christianity has brought its culture to a crisis. Those who call themselves Christians admit this. The opposition between culture and civilisation is conditional, but since it has been made, let us examine it. Christian culture has reached Christian civilisation. Not only human foreheads were blessed with the cross and sprinkled with holy water, but also steel machines. Culture has been spoiled by civilisation — this is confessed, but not repented. They do not repent

— is evident from the fact that in complaints about "crises" they call for salvation from the East. But where is culture in the East? The East, like all world barbarism, is capable only of perception, assimilation, and perhaps even creativity, of civilisation. An engineer with slanted eyes — there is nothing unnatural about that, but Plato, Aeschylus, Dante, Shakespeare, Hegel — with slanted eyes — a motif from Goya.

Spengler's scandalous book is causing quite a stir, and his opposition of culture and civilisation is becoming canonical for the masses before our very eyes. Wisdom and lessons are drawn from it. Meanwhile, it is precisely in Spengler that this opposition is only formal, and how to fill it is a question. Civilisation is

the "completion and outcome" of culture. And therefore, "every" culture has its own civilisation. As if there were not a single culture in the world, varying from nation to nation, not unified genetically and essentially! If civilisation is "the outcome and completion," then what is the point of this opposition? — Ebb and flow, lower and higher. But isn't a new tide a Renaissance, i.e., a continuation of the same

single culture? The difference must be fundamental. And with all this, Spengler speaks of "historical philosophy," of "the world as history"... But then, further on, no longer formally, but in terms of content: it turns out that our philosophy suffers from an organic flaw — non-interference in practical life. What does this mean? It means:

1) It does not speak of the "spirit of the times." Of course, this is a flaw. But the question arises: where is this philosophy, and when did a philosophy that did not express the spirit of the times ever exist? Where has the notorious historicism gone? But 2) — and here the essence of the matter is clearer — for example, the pre-Socratics were merchants and politicians, Plato almost paid with his life for wanting to improve the affairs of Syracuse, Descartes was the "first technician of his time" (!), and modern philosophers are not technicians, politicians, or merchants. If von Gertling were still alive, he could pull Spengler's ears, and he would not be the only one. But this would hardly teach Spengler anything — he considers himself the sole master of facts. Something else is essential: if the fact that philosophers do not trade, do not electrify, do not sanction death sentences is a sign of civilisation, then long live civilisation! If, on the contrary, the fact that a philosopher-engineer is a sign of civilisation, and not of culture, a sign of Eastern wisdom and philosophy that has not yet established itself, has not yet realised that its participation in the great reality, as Spengler puts it, is thought, and not buying and selling or building water turbines, and even less the persecution of free speech, then perhaps we will have to make a different diagnosis of the "decline of the West" than the one made by Spengler. For Spengler, everything is measured "until now" and "from now on," counting from the year his book was published. He has so many "discoveries" and inventions that they would be enough for thirteen engineers. But it would have been better for him not to "discover" anything, but simply to refer to the opposition between civilisation and culture, which really should have been made canonical and which was pointed out in his own homeland more than a hundred years ago. In any case, he would have had to apologise, at least for his terminological abuse, which did not take into account historical precedence. One hundred and fifteen years ago, the famous Friedrich August Wolff wrote: one cannot put the Egyptians, Jews, Persians and other Eastern peoples on the same level as the Greeks and Romans. "One of the main differences between these peoples is that the former

either did not rise above the level of education that should be called civic culture or civilisation, as opposed to the higher, proper culture of the spirit, or rose only to a small extent. The first type of culture is concerned with the conditions of life that require security, order, and comfort; for this purpose, it even makes use of some higher inventions and knowledge, which, however, having been discovered not by scientific means, should never have been credited with the glory of sublime wisdom; Finally, this type of culture not only has no need for literature, but also does not create it — whereby literature is understood as a collection of works that contribute to the enlightenment of contemporaries, not by a separate caste, in accordance with its official goals and needs, but by each member of the people who is conscious of higher ideas within themselves. That is precisely the point!

Wolf is one of the revivers of the German people. He started with Homer. That is where every Renaissance begins. Are we starting? Will we start? We have always had a civilising and enlightening imitation of ancient forms. We need more and more. We need to achieve our own mastery, our own sophianity. We need to achieve the art of expressing our reality in cultivated forms. We need to become Europeans not by copying, but by reproducing beauty. We used to shout that we were "between" Europe and the East. This is not true. Until now, this "between" was occupied by the Germans. Only after the defeat of the Germans can we become between them and the East. To do this, we need to become Europe, and Europe, again and again and again, began on the shores of the Aegean Sea.

Following Spengler, Christian civilisers in our country are also frightening us. "The decline of Europe." Not scary at all! The collapse of Germany is not the collapse of Europe, and even more so, is Germany's collapse really a collapse? Spengler depicts Western Europe as Faust. But why, and more importantly, for what reason? At least Goethe's Faust, but no, just Faust, "in general"! For what?.. Faust is a libertine, a magician and a charlatan, with boundless lust and shallow rationality, a theosophist. Why and how is this an image of Western Europe? Faust is a German invention, although Spengler made the "discovery" of the "hitherto" unknown fact that the Faustian soul found a body in Western culture, as it "flourished with the birth of the Romanesque style in the 10th century in the northern

[!] plains between the Elbe and the Tagus" (p. 254). However, the Slavs did not accept this soul, nor did the Romance peoples, unless, as Spengler does (), we consider the "plains" () between the Elbe () and the Tagus () () to be "northern" () and, say, the Loire () to be "northern" (). "northern" ... The English — but here is Marl's confession of Faust:

And I would have long since ended my
life, Had not the sweetness of sensual
pleasures Overcome the despair in my
soul.

(Translated by Balmont).

Only in the eyes of a German, and even then only after 1914, could such a self-description be considered the ideal of an Englishman. Finally, we did not accept it either — we who seem so insatiable, restless and impetuous! Or could it be that our Pushkin and Dostoevsky are Fausts? As is well known, the plot of Faust was approached from different angles, but it was none other than Pushkin who, in two words, captured the source of Faust's "insatiability": "I am bored, devil." And Pushkin's Mephistopheles gives an exhaustive explanation of Faust's taedium

...did you think at a time when no
one else thinks...

But this is the connubium of reason and lust. ^[1]It was said that Ivan Karamazov was the Russian Faust, although he did not sell his soul to the devil, but rather "reveled" and "killed himself" in a completely national way. If any of the Karamazovs was Faust, it was most likely Fyodor Pavlovich, who was adept at managing his property affairs and at the same time was the most voluptuous man of his entire life. The Faust of legend was not without success in his dealings, but as for the rest, here is what the simple and naive narrative says, which did not predict, but collected "facts" and recounted them:

After this, the spirit Mephistopheles came to him and said: If you persist in your promise, behold, I will satisfy your lust in such a way that you will desire nothing else in your days. So

you cannot live chastely, I will bring you a woman to your bed every day and night, whom you will see in this city or elsewhere and desire for unchastity according to your will. In such a form and shape shall she attend you.

Then Doctor Faustus was so pleased that his heart trembled with joy; and he regretted what he had initially intended to do. And he fell into such lust and debauchery that he sought beautiful women day and night, so that if he committed debauchery with this devil today, tomorrow he had another in mind.

In the end, does Spengler not place himself in the position of the Turkish emperor, in whose palace Faust, in the guise of Mohammed, spent six days and nights, and does he not imagine whether he, that his "Faustian souls" — that great people whom Faust, as his legacy, promised to the Turk through his wives:

They (his wives) told him that it was the god Mohammed, and how he had demanded this and that at night, slept with them and said that a great people and warlike heroes would spring from his seed.

But if Western Europe is not this "great people" and not these "warlike heroes," the descendants of Faust, then it is unclear why Spengler is breathing the "Faustian soul" into Europe. Is it because Faust is tormented by the "epistemological tragedy"? But if Faust did not like scholasticism, what is quite understandable, then why does the "gnoseological tragedy" require recourse to magic and necromancy rather than to Homer or Plato? No — Faustian Western Europe turned precisely to them, and hardly has any reason to regret it. Goethe wanted to make people believe in some kind of infinite spiritual insatiability of Faust. True: not only philosophy, but also art — from insatiability, from spiritual restlessness. But did Dante, out of insatiability for knowledge and love, begin to womanise and seek adventure hand in hand with the devil? Goethe was a great patriot and, moreover, His Excellency; he naturally wanted to embellish a national invention. But why such excitement about the fate of all Europe when the defeated Faust raised a cry? He got what he deserved, strictly speaking.

All this is theirs alone, local to them; it would be inappropriate for us to interfere. We need our own European Renaissance, beginning with the revival of antiquity, and someday

reach the "twilight"? Moreover, the "twilight" of antiquity did not deprive the new Western man of his mind, and the latter absorbed everything he learned about it. We should not rejoice over Spengler's predictions, but hurry to absorb as much of Europe's experience and knowledge as possible. , ahead, visible still will be, truly or it "sets".

Be that as it may, we believe in the power of art, and above all in the art of words. As it says, so it will be in reality, in thought, in our entire culture. Russia is now like a bride:

Russia, you
are now a
bride...
Accept the
news of
spring...
The earth
will burst
into bloom
And turn green with
birch trees:
There is
Resurrection...
With us is
Salvation...
Who is destined to be the groom? One
— from the east:
His eyes are like slits, his mouth stretched
wide, His face is not like a face,
And his cheekbones protrude at an angle...
Another — "one of you":
...he will sit in his tower, Like an idol in
the middle of a temple,
And he will beat your backs with a whip,
And you will bow down to him again and
again... The third —
He will go to the Hyperboreans

To a distant land, to the wild north,
Ascending his chariot, he rules.
White swans fly swiftly.

Moscow, 26 January 1922.

II. TIMELY REMINDERS

STRUCTURE OF THE WORD IN USUM AESTHETICAE

I

I

A

The term "word" in the following is taken as a complex of sensory data, not only perceived, but also claiming to be understandable, i.e. associated with meaning or significance. A word is a sensory complex that performs specific functions in human communication: primarily semantic and synsemantic, and secondarily expressive and deictic (indication, appeal, command, complaint, plea, etc.). A word is *prima facie* a message. A word is, therefore, a means of communication; a message is a condition of communication. A word is not only a phenomenon of nature, but also a principle of culture. A word is an archetype of culture; culture is the cult of understanding, words are the embodiment of reason.

It does not matter in what qualitative sensory complex a word is perceived. Empirically, the most common is the quality of the sound complex. One quality can be translated into another. The laws and types of forms of one quality can be revealed in any other quality. Artistic and, in general, creative transformation of forms of one quality can be considered typical for any quality.

A word is a sign *sui generis*. Not every sign is a word. There are signs — indications, signals, marks, symptoms, omens, omina, etc., etc. Theories about the connection between a word as a sign and what it means, based on psychological explanations — associations, connections between cause and effect, means and ends, deliberate agreement, etc. — are only hypotheses, the practical value of which in the modern

crisis is virtually zero. The connection between a word and its meaning is a specific connection. It is a "genus" and cannot be subsumed under a genus. Even if it were possible to subsume it under a genus, or if some fundamental premises allowed and required such subsumption, it would still be methodologically more correct, more impeccable, and more expedient to consider this connection as specific before constructing any theories. The specificity of the connection is determined not by the sensually given complex as such, but by the meaning — the second term of the relation — which is also *sui generis* object and being. Only a rigorous phenomenological analysis could establish how the perception of a sound complex as a meaningful sign differs from the perception of a natural thing. The words-concepts:

"thing" and "sign" are fundamentally and originally heterogeneous, and only a precise interpretative method could establish the limits and meaning of each. This is a problem no less difficult than the problem of distinguishing reality from illusion, and is part of the general problem of reality.

What constitutes a "single" word or a "separate" word is determined by context. Depending on the purpose, one or another sound complex can be singled out as a separate word from a given context. In modern times, the graphic representation and isolation of a sound complex as a separate word is established arbitrarily — mostly for reasons of convenience and the needs of grammatical morphology. "Hod" is a separate word, also "steamboat", also "white steamboat", also "big white steamboat", also "I will see a big white steamboat", etc. Syntactically, "word connection" is also a word, therefore, speech, books, literature, the language of the whole world, the whole culture — is a word. In a metaphysical sense, there is nothing to prevent us from viewing the cosmic universe as a word. Everywhere, the essential relationships and typical forms in the structure of a word are the same.

Graphically, a word can be represented by a complex or simple system of symbols. Pictography and grammography have their own history. A graphic symbol can always be replaced by a sound symbol. Even a graphic symbol such as a free space between two written, drawn or printed "words" — "space", — can be replaced by a sound complex or a sound

pause, which can take on any function of a sign, including that of a word, i.e. a meaningful sign with a meaning. The theory of the word as a sign is a task of formal ontology, or the study of objects, in the field of semiotics.

A word can perform the functions of any other sign, and any sign can perform the functions of a word. Any sensory perception of any spatial and temporal form, any volume and any duration can be considered a sign and, therefore, a meaningful sign, a word. No matter how diverse the suppositions of a "word" may be, its specific definition includes a relation to meaning.

In

The structure of a word is understood not as a morphological, syntactic or stylistic construction, in general not its "flat" arrangement, but, on the contrary, an organic, deep structure: from the sensually perceived to the formally ideal (eidetic) object, through all the stages of relations between these two terms. Structure is a concrete construction, the individual parts of which can change in "size" and even quality, but no part of the whole in potentia can be removed without destroying the whole. In actu, some "members" may be underdeveloped, in an embryonic state, or degenerated, atrophied. The structure diagram does not suffer from this. Structure must be distinguished from "complex," both as something that can be concretely divided and as something that can be broken down into abstract elements. Structure also differs from an aggregate, the complex mass of which allows for the destruction and disappearance of any of its constituent parts without changing the qualitative essence of the whole. Structure can only be broken down into new self-contained structures, the reverse combination of which restores the original structure.

Spiritual and cultural formations are essentially structural in nature, so it can be said that the "spirit" or culture itself is structural. In the social world, structure is an externally incidental form. The very substance is fundamentally

devoid of structure, even if it consisted of structurally formed components. Oil, bread, wax, sand, lead, gold, water, air. The spirit is fundamentally immaterial and therefore does not allow for corresponding analogies. Air acquires forms only in "motion" ("spirit"), water — in flow, in vessels, etc. Only formed structures are structural in the material world — cosmic, plastic, organic, the solar system, mineral crystals, organisms. An organism is a system of structures: the skeleton, muscular system, nervous system, circulatory system, lymphatic system, etc. Each structure in the system retains its specificity within itself. Each part of the structure is specific and remains a structure until it disintegrates and melts into matter, which, although also specific, is no longer structural.

In structural givenness, all moments, all members of the structure are always given, at least in potentia. Consideration not only of the structure as a whole, but also of its individual members requires that neither the actual givenness nor the potential moments of the structure be overlooked. Every structural form is considered to be actually and potentially complete. Actual completeness is not always given explicite. All implicit forms are fundamentally open to explication. This is particularly important to remember when it comes to words. Thus, an enthymeme potentially and implicite contains a syllogism with all its structural members; a theory is condensed into a formula; a mathematical form contains not only potential relationships that are revealed in actual quantitative measurements, but also implies the algorithm that leads to it; a proposition in potentia is a system of conclusions and implicite — the conclusion of a syllogism; a concept (a defined word) is in potentia, and also implicite — a proposition; a metaphor or symbol is implicite a system of tropes and in potentia — a poem, etc.

EXEMPLA SUNT ODIOSA

II

I

A

The word as a given fact is not in itself an aesthetic object. It is necessary to analyse the forms of its givenness in order to find moments in its given structure that lend themselves to aestheticisation. These moments constitute the aesthetic objectivity of the word. Psychologists have repeatedly attempted to draw up a diagram of the word in which its structural elements would be highlighted (cf. the attempts by Messer, Martinak, and others; the most interesting is Erdman's *Erkennen und Verstehen*). But they pursued the goal of revealing the psychophysical processes involved in understanding and conception, ignoring the objective basis of the latter. As a result, they overlooked those moments on which, among other things, aesthetic experiences are based. If psychologists did encounter aesthetic "complications" in the processes that occupied them, this aesthetic "sensual tone" was attached to intellectual acts as a mysterious appendage, the consideration of which was referred to "below." "Below" aesthetic

"feeling" was usually "explained" again without any objective basis or objective justification.

Let us take the word as we perceive it, as we hear it from our interlocutor N, who is communicating something to us, "transmitting" it. It does not matter whether he wishes to evoke an aesthetic effect in us or whether this effect is evoked beyond his conscious desire. If, instead of this we took us ourselves the word pronounced or "internally" given as an argument with oneself, we would find it less "coherent", its purpose and role as a message would be not so clear, but in its subject properties this word

would not differ significantly from the word heard from the mouth of N. The analysis of such an example would be particularly difficult because the conditions, causes and reasons for the emergence of this internal speech, i.e. the entire genetic environment of speech, which is interesting for a psychologist but irrelevant for objective analysis, would constantly intrude into the field of attention.

When we hear the word spoken by N, regardless of whether we see N or not, whether we touch him or not, we are able to distinguish the perceived sound, (1) as a human voice from other natural sounds, perceive it as a general characteristic of a human being, (2) as the voice of N from the voices of other people, as an individual characteristic of N, (3) as a sign of a special psychophysical (natural) state of N, as opposed to signs of other possible states of N or any other person. All these are natural, innate functions of words, as opposed to social and cultural ones. So far, the word does not convey any meaning; N itself is for us an "animal" rather than a member, in potentia or in actu, of a conscious, communal unity.

Further (it goes without saying that this sequence does not reproduce the temporal empirical series in the development and deepening of perception), we perceive the word not only as a phenomenon of nature, but also as a fact and a "thing" of the cultural and social world. We therefore perceive the word (4) as a sign of the existence of culture and of N's belonging to a more or less narrowly perceived circle of human culture and human society, connected by the unity of language. If it turns out that the language is familiar to us, and this familiarity is also directly recognised, then we (5) recognise it as a more or less or completely specific language, recognise the phonetic, lexical and semasiological features of the language, and (6) at the same time understand the spoken word, i.e. we grasp its meaning, while at the same time distinguishing the quality of the message, command, question, etc., i.e. we insert the word into a semantic and logical nominative (naming things, persons, properties, actions, relationships) context that is known and understood by us. If, in addition, we are sufficiently educated, i.e. we are at the appropriate stage of cultural development, we (7) perceive and, in perceiving, distinguish the forms of words conventionally established at this stage of culture

in the narrow sense: morphological ("morphemes"), syntactic ("syntagms") and etymological (more precisely, word formation). It is clear that in specialised scientific work, as in all well-known examples of deciphering ancient inscriptions or cryptograms, point (7) may be fulfilled "before" (6) or independently of it. (Cases of deviation from the proposed typical scheme for each point are so numerous and obvious that there is no need to discuss them in this brief overview.)

In

Another aspect of word perception stands apart, although it presupposes the perception of words in a cultural and social context, i.e., it presupposes the understanding of words as a natural fact that lies at the basis of human (and animal) communication. This is (8) the distinction between the emotional tone that accompanies the transmission of the meaningful content of the "message" as we understand it. We are dealing with a sensory impression (Eindruck) as opposed to a meaningful expression (Ausdruck), with empathy on our part as opposed to empathy. Here, a very special kind of "understanding" takes place — understanding that is essentially without understanding — sympathetic understanding. Here, perception is directed at N's personality itself, at his temperament and character, as opposed to the character and temperament of other people, and at his current emotional state, as opposed to his other past or generally possible states. This is the perception of N's personality, or personal perception and understanding. It stands apart, is natural in nature, and brings us back to (3). Only now do we associate the perception of N's emotional state not simply with N's psychophysical state, but with a psychophysical state that we somehow associate with his personal understanding of what he is communicating and his personal attitude towards what is being communicated, thought, named, towards the expression he has "put" into the expression of his thought. There is no need to narrow the concept of empathy, sympathy, and assume that

Any sympathetic response to feelings N is a response of the same unquestionable quality, an "imitative" or "herd" response. This is simply a matter of well-known parallelism, correspondence — "with" and "in" here indicate only factual and existing commonality and formal correspondence, where "yes" can be followed by either "yes" or "no," or an indefinite degree of oscillation between them, duellum.

A complicated case, when N hides his mental state ("excitement"), suppresses, masks, imitates something else, when N "plays" (like an actor) or deceives, such a case causes a perception, distinguishing or not distinguishing, in the most sympathetic and intellectual understanding, play and deception from what N experiences "in reality". This results in an interesting kind of supposition, but not in the intellectual sphere, when we are dealing with a word about a word, with a statement, a message, the meaning of which refers to the word, but, in parallel with the intellectual sphere, in the emotional sphere. Here, it is not "meaning" that overlaps "meaning," but "co-meaning" that overlaps "co-meaning," synecdoche (not in the sense of a rhetorical trope, but in the literal sense of the word) that overlaps synecdoche. This phenomenon can also be compared to the superimposition of symbolic, allegorical meaning or meanings on the literal — a kind of emotional, resp. expressive symbolism, which can be illustrated, for example, by the conventionality of stage expression. This case is very interesting, especially because it is one of the cases of interference between the natural and the artificial, between "nature" and "art". It is therefore very important in the analysis of aesthetic consciousness, but does not constitute a fundamentally new moment in the structure of the word.

Another type of "complication" is also possible: N communicates his own emotional state — especially the emotional state accompanying the utterance, then his state is perceived (a) as the meaning or significance of his words, according to understanding, and (b) as co-meaning, according to sympathetic understanding. (a) and (b) in this case are factual data of different orders: (a) refers to (6), (b) to (8).

Even more confusing and interesting complications and intertwining are possible. It is necessary that not nevertheless always carefully distinguish

the objective nature of the underlying soil from the underlying layers, the nature of the word as an expression of objective meaning, thought, as a message that in it performs its direct "purpose", its πάρεργον, from the expressive role of the word, from its πάπεργον, from subjective reactions to objective meaning. [2] Like plagues or nonsense, one must therefore fear and beware, especially of theories that boast of "explaining" one thing from another, the "origin" of the meaning of a rational word from a meaningless cry, the "origin" of understanding and reason from the frightened trembling and convulsive spasms of proto-anthropus. Such an "explanation" is only a curtain covering the shameful picture of naked ignorance.

2

The above breakdown of word perception only roughly outlines the most general contours of its structure. Each member of this structure is a complex intertwining of acts of consciousness. Untangling these knots remains an open problem of fundamental analysis. Let us turn to establishing an equally approximate, summarising scheme of the corresponding perceived pure objective framework of verbal structure, to the extent necessary for what follows.

Leaving aside the "natural" objectivity of the word, let us focus on the moment when we recognise in it a certain "thing" of a cultural, social, and historical nature. The word still remains a certain sensual-empirical, sensually perceptible given, but now, along with the pure forms of combination of sensual qualities (Gestaltqualität, the form of combination) in it, we distinguish new forms of combination, as it were, of functional meaning. Repeated combinations are linked already with "meanings" in some unknown way that needs to be investigated. (The claim that this connection is a connection of so-called

"association" is, at the very least, superficial — it is purely theoretical, and, as always, the hypothesis masks ignorance and laziness to learn.) By studying these forms of combination, we are convinced that they are predominantly determined by natural (psychophysical) laws and relationships, despite the fact that they are "linked" with

"meanings", or, conversely, they are determined by changes in the meanings themselves and the internal relationships of meaningful content. These general directions of changing forms of trends are not contradicted by the fact that the first forms are sometimes influenced by the second ones, associated with meaning [especially when forming an unarticulated sigh (*ορυγή*) into an articulated one (*έναρθρος*) and therefore also *εγγράμματος*], and the latter can be modified under the pressure of psychophysical phenomena. Nor should it be thought that the second type of forms are "linked" to meaning in such a way that they themselves are "words", i.e. directly convey meaning. This is only true of the group of forms known as root forms. Another group — affix forms — can be carriers of meaning (for example, in Chinese — *ci*, *cé*, *sò*, *tí* etc., partly in agglutinative languages), but these forms can also be simply "characters" or "characteristics", synsemantics that have lost their independent meaning but are "meaningful" in another sense: in the sense of signs indicating relationships, so to speak, within meaning, within content and its own logical, syntactic and ontological forms.

For the sake of clarity and to avoid the aforementioned ambiguity of the word "meaning," one should carefully observe whether we are talking about the self-sufficient sound form of the meaning itself or about the functional-grammatical meaning (role) of this form. These forms, root and prefix forms, are predominantly morphological in the narrow sense of the word; the former forms, which are not conditioned or motivated by meaning in their formality, are phonetic combination forms. It is easy to see that phonetic forms are generally so free from the laws of meaning that the influence of the latter on them can generally be ignored. It is important to recognise this in principle, because even if, in particular, a more direct connection between meaning and phoneme is sometimes observed, it does not follow that there is a relationship between them that allows us to construct general hypotheses about the natural connection between phoneme and meaning, referring, for example, to the onomatopoeic formation of words, the expressive and emotional role of sounds, etc. On the contrary, a morpheme, as a sound formation, being entirely subject to the laws of phonetics, is not easily freed from the pressure of meaning. It can, to a certain extent

, like lava, solidify and freeze meaning, but beneath its surface, meaning bubbles and retains its flame. Historical and archaeological excavations reveal its dynamics and movement, but sometimes even the simple successful use of a word — especially in poetic speech — reminds us of the living spirit beating beneath the petrified wrinkles of the morpheme. Prefix morphemes fossilise "more quickly" and more hopelessly, their semantic animation dissipates and seems to atrophy, as a result of which their role is reduced mainly to that of features and characteristics.

Thus, due to its direct connection to nature and independence from meaning, the phoneme does not yet construct words as such. As for the morpheme, if it can be attributed with such an ability, then, as is clear from the above, it is only because of its more intimate connection with meaning (thought) as such. The morpheme is the first step from the sensory to the mental, the outer garment of meaning, the first point of support for the lever of understanding. But for it to be so, for it to be the first step, it must not be the only one, it must be fused into a single whole with the subsequent steps, it must be included in the context of the authentic and immediate forms of meaning itself as such. Not only as a sign, a prefix morpheme, but also as a root morpheme, a morpheme in general, in order to overcome its static nature, it must be a member of a context whose dynamic laws are constructed according to syntactic and logical forms. This is self-evident, but it needs to be reiterated in order to draw the conclusion that this self-evidence compels.

The fact is that applying the term "meaning" to what "denoted" by an isolated word taken out of context, as follows from the above, is inaccurate. Strictly speaking, an isolated word is meaningless; it is not *λόγος*. It is not a word of communication, although it is already a means of communication. It is useful to recall and draw a parallel with this distinction between the Stoics' distinction between *λόγος* and *λέξις*, where *logos* is a sound with a meaningful meaning, and *lexicon* is only an articulated sound (unlike Aristotle, for whom *lexicon* is any utterance, affirmative, imperative, prayerful, etc.). Accordingly, what is "denoted" or "indicated" is not "meaning" (not *ένοια*), but *λεκτόν* (dicibile). In the strict sense, dicibile does not

, it can only "refer to," "indicate ,"
"name" a thing (res).

If here can speak about "meaning", then not about "meaningful meaning", but about indicative and nominative meaning. Meaning should be compared here not with sense, but with intention, purpose, a certain goal. The word here is only a means, a tool, an instrument that can be used in a variety of ways and in numerous ways to convey the meaning of a message. "Meaning" here is in the possibility of using it, applying it, a pragmatic meaning, not a poetic or cognitive one. It can be used for communication, but also for commands, pleas, questions, etc. (however, we will leave these distinctions aside in this preliminary brief overview, because the communicative function of words is not only the most important, but also the one that underpins the others).

Thus, this "meaning" of a word should be distinguished from its sense, just as meaning-sense differs from meaning-importance. In this form, i.e. as a nominative possibility, the word is placed in lexicons. A dictionary is not, in the strict sense, a collection or list of words with their meanings, but rather a list of the names of a language that designate things, properties, actions, relationships, and states, and moreover in the form of all grammatical categories: substantive, verbal, prepositional, any — everything, therefore, that is denoted by the philosophical term *res* or *ens*. In this respect, a lexicon can therefore be called alphabetically arranged "realities" (*realia*). We ask, "What does *pisum* mean?" and answer, "*pisum* means pea," but at the same time we ask: "how is pea in Latin or in botany?" and answer: "*pisum*," i.e., in this turn of phrase, it is implied: "what is it called, etc." "Pea," therefore, is not the meaning of the word *pisum*.

But further, if a "sentence" ("judgement") is defined only by its syntactic form, then not all sentences are *λόγοι*, i.e. have meaning. Conversely, if a sentence necessarily includes meaning, such dictionary phrases as "*pisum* — pea", "die Stadt — city", are not sentences. And phrases such as "a pea is a leguminous plant" or "a pea is a genus of plants from the legume family" should be considered either

phrases without meaning (meaningful only teleologically or pragmatically) or as sentences (with meaning), depending on whether we use them (which is why "on their own", in isolation, they have only a functional, instrumental "meaning") — we use them as nominal (naming "a thing") and classificatory definitions, or as explanatory, for example, sentences that animate the phrase with meaning through the "inclusion" of the species in the genus. The particular use of the phrase is again determined by the context. The simplest way to create a context would be, for example, to say:

"Peas are a pod-bearing plant" is a nominal definition, which is a turn of phrase in practice of speech throughout and alongside simply "implied". Then it is immediately clear (if the new phrase is not again a nominal definition that can be repeated ad infinitum) why the phrase "peas are pod-like plants" is meaningless — it is simply lexicon.

Some hermeneutics have suggested talking about the "meaning" of a word when it is placed in a lexicon or taken in isolation, and about "meaning" in connected speech. This is both impractical and theoretically unfounded, because "meaning" as a term with its various senses is not only a homonym, but also a mode of supposition. We will distinguish between the nominative function of a word, resp. the nominal objectivity of a word, and the semasiological function, resp. the semantic objectivity. Nomen, a name as such, is an empirical, sensually perceptible thing. It is a sign, signum, connected with the named thing not in the act of thought, but in the act of perception and representation. If you like, you can call this connection associative, not for the sake of "explanation," but so that the named fact, the "thing," has its own "name," "indicating" that this connection is not a connection of thought, resp. judgement, but an automatic-sensory connection. It can be "established," "experienced," and felt by a non-thinking subject, for example, an animal (if it is a non-thinking creature). A thing, for example, given visually and tangibly (an axe, this person), is associatively connected with a thing given to hearing (with the sounds: "axe", "Alexei"). The association is based on contiguity, in rare cases on similarity (cuckoo — cuckoo bird). Thus, a word as a means, a tool, in its nominative function is simply a sensually perceived thing, entering into a sensually

perceptible connection with another sensually perceptible thing. Needless to say, in a nominative (not nominal) sentence or judgement, in which nomination enters as the true meaning, as a semasiological animation, we are already dealing with another function of the word — with another level and another subject moment in the structure of the word itself.

I will leave aside other formations and suppositions of the word in its nominative capacity, although they are very interesting and necessary and instructive for a complete account of the aesthetic properties of the word. For example,

"peas, etc." served as an "example" in my exposition, i.e., again, a new pragmatic, but not semantic, "meaning" of the word, a new pragmatic supposition; or why did I take "peas" as an example? — because, for example, I was tired of the hackneyed "apple" in logic and psychology, and perhaps for more complex and "profound" reasons, perhaps by chance association, etc. All this is psychological, "personal," subjective growth, *ek parergou*, but not around the semantic, but around the same nominative function of the word, directed at the thing (*res*), the object moment of the verbal structure. All these "subtleties" require special and specific work. My task is only the most general, minimal outline.

3

A

Further on, it seems to get easier; there are no fewer equivocations and homonyms, but they are easier to understand, and their relationships are clearer and more obvious, because we are moving from the sensory to the intellectual.

When we hear a word from N that we perceive as a nominal sign of a thing, we do not only refer to that thing — whether present or remembered. Sometimes the thing is not present, and nothing specific is remembered (if the thing itself is specific), or we do not even know what specific thing is being named. In fact, even if there is no direct indication (e.g., with an index finger, a cane, etc.) that could give us a rough idea of the thing as N perceives it,

we never know what thing N is naming, what his idea of it is, and what he thinks about it. N himself, when naming things, if he uses not only proper names but also common names, names them indefinitely, i.e., he does this and forces us to relate the names to a whole series, group, or set of things, so that for him and for us, from the point of view of cognition and understanding, it does not matter which thing will be represented. The only thing that matters is that N, when naming, and I, when hearing the word-name, will understand the same thing by the word. This is the object in question, about which the "word" is spoken. Despite the diversity of potentially named things, they belong to one formal unity — ontic, or the unity of the object. In terms of its formal qualities and in relation to other objects, the object is characterised as a genus, species, class, etc. The object can also be concrete, abstract, collective, material (oil, oxygen, etc.), and so on.

In the structure of the word, there is a new objective moment, not of sensory perception, but of mental, intellectual perception. The word now refers not to sensory but to intellectual reality. The word now points to something presentable, achieved not by a pointing finger, not by sensory but by intellectual intuition. What the word now points to is implied by it; the word implies an object. N implies it, and we imply it; he "means" it, and we "mean" it.

Implication and implied meaning should not be confused with understanding and understood meaning, which already relate to meaning, semantic functions and semantic objectivity (not ontological and formal, not rational, but "material", reasonable). Implication is not understanding, but only a concept, as a grasping, comprehending, embracing, conceiving, having in mind. Nothing about content and meaning-sense, only about volume and form — if about meaning, then only in the sense of "place" in some formal system.

We say: "it is implied" — not by the subject-person, not by N, not by "us," but by the word itself and in the word itself. "It is implied" what the word refers to "itself," absolutely independently of the speaker, the experiencer, of N cheerful or sad, N

boring or mischievous, N sceptical or cynical, N a liar or an ignoramus.

The implied "subject" is only a certain point of attention, "something," a given topic. The execution, implementation (in terms of content), and development of the topic is a further matter, involving new givens, new functions, new depths, and "steps." The subject is only a question, even a riddle, x, the conditions for revealing which still need to be given and understood by some other means.

They say that that under the word or for the word implies "concept". Of course, it is possible — as long as the concept implies "subject" as it characterised, and not "represented" "experience". To avoid this exaggeration, it is better to refer to the word itself in its terminological form, as opposed to its "everyday" and "poetic" usage, and in its function as a concept, as a notion, a conception, an implication. A concept, then, is a word, since something (an object) is implied by it.

The terms "object" and "thing" are often confused. Indeed, a thing is a real object, and an object is an ideal thing. But it is precisely these terminological epithets: real and ideal — that show the direction in which they should be distinguished. Anything that really, empirically, actually exists — a real person, a real property, an action, etc. — is a thing. Objects are possibilities; their existence is ideal. To say, for example, that the number π is a "mathematical thing" is not meaningless, unless one means that the number π , - 1, i, or an ellipsoid, a pseudo-spherical surface, etc. are "ideal things," only possible (by the principle of contradiction), conceivable. Obviously, there is an abuse of terms in metaphysics when an "ideal thing," possible, conceivable, is declared to be a "real." The realisation of the ideal, as stated, is a complex process of revealing meaning and content — a translation into empirical, uniquely real existence — rather than empty hypostatisation, i.e., from the objective side — growing cabbage in the clouds, from the functional side — smacking lips.

But precisely because an object can be realised, filled with content, materialised, and through the word it will also be given meaning, it and is formal forming the beginning of this meaning.

The subject groups and shapes the word as a message and as a statement in general. It holds the content within itself, forming it from the semasiological side, it is the "carrier" of meaning, and it reshapes nominal forms, binds them together, affirms them, and fixes them. If the word did not imply an object that binds and cements things into a unity of conceivable form, they would scatter under their name, like sand spilling from the palm of your hand when you squeeze it.

An object is the implied form of named things, a specific theme, since it is extracted from its verbal-nominal shell, but does not detach itself from it. And the subject is the actual (in ideal possibility) bearer of properties, qualities, essential, attributive, modal, since it is taken abstractly from its verbal appearance, from the verbal sign of its ideal dignity. The object is both subject and object; it is formally *materia circa quam* and *materia in qua*. And only *materia ex qua* is given not through implication, but through a new function in the perception of the word.

The sphere of the subject is the sphere of pure ontological forms, the sphere of the formally conceivable.

In

It has been said that N, when naming "things," implies by the name "object," "grasps" it, "comprehends" "takes" or "embraces", "conceives". And we do the same with N, perceiving "name". It may seem that "understanding" and "conception" — acts that are not mutual in this case, but only reciprocal: for example, N "implies" and we "conceive". In order not to create unnecessary confusion from this, it is sufficient to refer to the fact that N, by naming something to us, thereby names it for himself, and only from that moment does he begin to "imply" and "conceive." Consequently, these acts are indeed mutual, but not reciprocal.

But there is another, more interesting side to this doubt. If understanding () goes () through () a name (), then () is not () pure comprehension () of the object? Or, conversely, perhaps comprehension is possible only through a name, and understanding can be pure?

Is conception pure comprehension of the object? Or, conversely, is conception only possible through the name, while implication can be pure?

This is a question about a pure object as a pure concept. It has been confused on both sides, and is confused even more when both sides want a uniform solution. The purity of an object is (a) purity from sensory content, (b) purity from verbal form (or formula).

(a) As conceivable, it must of course be free from the sensual, otherwise we would have to admit that we think sensually, i.e., roughly speaking, that we sleep while awake. Logically clear distinctions are confused, however, by genealogical curiosity.

And how would modern sages differ from bony logicians

— because it is not enough for them to distinguish themselves from ordinary mortals — if they did not question the "origin"? A breed of people is formed who base their profundity on not understanding what N is saying until they know who N's parents are, what law he was raised by, what his beliefs are, and so on. The trouble is that even when they know all this, they still do not understand anything, because they are always torn to pieces by doubt: is truthful M lying in this case, and is liar N telling the truth in this case? As a result, it turns out, for example, that it is impossible to understand Hamlet, because it is not known whether Shakespeare believed in God when he wrote his play, or whether he drank Lisbon or simple stout at the time, whether he indulged in greed or humbled his soul, repented and lit candles for the repose of the souls of the greedily deceased. Or, to take another example, you think that clouds are rushing by, demons are whirling around, and that means that demons are rushing and whirling, but this is only your naivety; there are no demons in nature, and genetic profundity opens your eyes to the truth — that — the mother-in-law (born in such-and-such a year) of the weary (for neurasthenic reasons) poet (blood — compass direction SSE) rustles in his ear (he loved Mozart, did not understand Bach) with unpaid (in the amount of 40,000 roubles in banknotes) bills (companies and their addresses).

The logic of understanding "from origin" is the same as in the argument that the writer had to hear from a young creature close to him

young person who wrote "щепку" with a "ят" in a dictation and justified this by saying that "щепка comes from поліна".

Leaving aside, due to their absurdity, all theories of origin, including the theory of the origin of thought from feeling, we recognise that the reason for thought is still precisely what is given by the senses. It is a springboard from which we leap to

"pure object." So we walk as if on mountain peaks — we mustn't look down, otherwise we'll get dizzy. Some believe that it is impossible to completely detach oneself from the sensual spices of perception, and refer to "experiences" (for example, the American psychologist Tichner). Let us give them this vital preference for a "rich imagination"; after all, seasoning is not a living thing, and a thought remains a thought, regardless of whether it is served with soy sauce or not.

(b) Another thing is an object pure of verbal substrate. This question cannot be decided by analogy with the first. Pushing off from the springboard, a thought must not only overcome material resistance, but also use it as a supporting environment. If it dragged all its material baggage behind it, it would not fly high. But neither in absolute emptiness nor in absolute formlessness, i.e., without the expedient adaptation of its form to the environment, could it remain in the ideal sphere. Its image, form, appearance, ideal flesh is the word.

A senseless thought is normal; it is a thought that has risen above bestial experience. A wordless thought

— is a pathology; it is a thought that cannot be born, stuck in an inflamed womb and decomposing there in pus.

A poet who understood what thought was better than many "thinkers" and knew the power of words, asserted: "I do not believe that any thought, rightly so called, is beyond the limits of speech" (Edgar Poe). He was mistaken only in thinking that thoughts "fit" into speech like a newborn is swaddled, and that they are born naked. Words

— are not swaddling clothes for thought, but its flesh. Thought is born in words and together with them. Even that is not enough — thought is conceived in words. That is why there are no stillborn thoughts, only dead words; there are no empty thoughts, only empty words; there are no shameful thoughts, only

only shameful words; there are no world-shaking thoughts, only words. Insignificance, greatness, vulgarity, beauty, stupidity, cunning, poverty, truth, lies, shamelessness, sincerity, betrayal, love, intelligence — all these are predicates of words, not thoughts, i.e., I mean, predicates that are concrete and real, not metaphorical. All the qualities of words are attributed to thoughts only metaphorically.

Strictly and seriously, without romantic whims, wordless thinking is meaningless speech. On earth, on water, and in the sky, speech rules everything. Logic, i.e. the science of words, is the greatest power on earth and in heaven. Illogicality as a system is intellectual atheism; an illogical person is an empty soul, devoid of the sense of verbal grace. Illogicality as an experience is a punishment imposed by a denied god for a crime against him; an illogical person is in progressive paralysis of thought as a consequence of his frivolous verbal immorality. The straitjacket of logic is the tormented delirium of the illogical person!

The conclusion from all that has been said is brief: a pure object, as a conceivable object, when considered outside the verbal form of its givenness, is an abstraction. Specifically, it is given to us only in verbal logical form. Of course, this does not prevent us from establishing concrete relationships, so to speak, within formal ontic formations as members of a whole, just as nothing prevents us from considering the geological structure of the earth as a concrete form after we distract ourselves from its flora and fauna. The earth without its flora and fauna is an abstract earth in its existence, but for consideration it is a concrete connection of concrete members. A pure object is a member in the structure of a word. Taken out of the word, it is part of the whole and thus retains its concreteness, but it has no life outside the word, and thus it is abstract.

Taking the "object" in the structure of the word, we recognise in it the form and formative principle of the material content that N names and designates. This same content is formalised on the other side, the phonetic, signifying side. It is placed within the framework of a specific morpheme. From this follows what is obvious and self-evident. Between ontic forms (together with their formalised content) and morphological forms (with their content, which is the same as that of ontic forms) there is a wedge

as a system of relationships between them, a web of new forms, specifically logical forms. In understanding what N is saying, our mental energy is now focused on them. All the content of what N communicates is now completely transformed into these new forms, and we follow — "notice", somewhere in the background of our consciousness — the fluctuations of morphemes and ontic forms only insofar as changes in them modify the logical forms of the meaning itself. When we shift our attention back to them, or when they themselves compel us to do so with their "unexpected incorrectness," grotesqueness, ugliness, or, conversely, unexpectedly enchanting charm, we lose our balance of "understanding," and meaning as such eludes us.

It must be emphasised, however, that when we conceive purely logical forms, we do not merely conceive them. For when we speak here of understanding in the proper sense, we mean that we understand together with conception, but not entirely through it. If we only conceived, we would only obtain "concepts," i.e., schemata of meaning, a channel, but not the actual flow of meaning through this channel. Those who accept concepts, the "volumes" of thought, as thought itself, as "content," do not understand, and in order to hide their own confusion in the face of their own ignorance, they shout to the whole world that they are being deceived, that logic, having promised them power and authority, has in fact grabbed them by the throat, is suffocating them, and is not letting them breathe. They called him to the throne to rule the world, but they put him in a dark cinema and showed him

"cinematic images" of the world. But he is not Sancho Panza, Don Quixote's squire, and he cannot be persuaded to do anything; he studied under Fabre and does not want to be Fabre himself; he is the creator of creative evolution, and he wants to truly experience the evolution of the world's creativity. It is not a matter of what he calls himself — the name modifies our concept of him, but does not change its meaning, and in terms of meaning, he is still the feeble-minded Xailun, and his desire is in fact Xailun's desire to change so much that he can escape the beatings of his Oatbhi. The story of his change is well known: he will have to visit both angels and devils, but since Harun al-Rashid is a good caliph, everything will end well... So, logical forms as conceptual forms are only abstractions. As "pure" forms, they are abstracted from their own content. In this "pure" form, strictly speaking, they are

not logical, but only logistical — and science now correctly distinguishes Logic from Logistics. Therefore, true logical forms must be thought of as lying between morphemes and ontic forms, conceivable together with their content. They are the relations between morphemes as forms of the actual named content and ontic forms as forms of the objectively implied content. They themselves are concrete as forms of meaningful content. They are, therefore, "relationships" whose terms are: the linguistic empirical form of a word and its fundamental ideal meaning. As such, they precisely define exposition, resp. cognition, i.e. they construct it logically. Logical forms are constructive or creative forms that give (id.: "transmitting," communicating, "reproducing") as opposed to ontological forms — "given," "created," and only reflexive, albeit constitutive, things. Adhering to Humboldt's formal definition, I call logical forms internal forms of speech.

Indeed, if we recognise the morphological forms of words as external forms, and agree to call the ontic forms of named things pure forms, then the forms lying between them are logical and will be internal forms, both in relation to the former and in relation to the latter, because in the latter case, too, the "content" of the object is "internal," covered by its pure forms, which, being internally logically structured, is meaning. Logical forms are internal forms as forms of ideal meaning, expressed and communicated; ontic forms are pure forms of existing and possible material content.

This is where such a subtle correspondence between logical and ontological forms arises that, on the one hand, it becomes a criterion of logical truthfulness of statements and, on the other hand, leads to a confusing distribution of tasks between logic and ontology, as a result of which, for example, the laws of identity, contradiction, etc. are interpreted either as logical laws or as ontological laws, the concept itself is identified either with the object or its "essence" or with some special "logical" construct, etc. In reality, there is a strict

correspondence between them, and it is always possible to translate from the language of logic into the language of ontology and vice versa. One could compile the following lexicon: object — term, property — feature, genus — general term, individual — singular term, state of affairs (*Sachverhalt*) — proposition (*Satz*), inclusion — predictability, circumstance — truthfulness, causality — wine-making, objective order — method, etc., etc. The aforementioned confusion in the distribution of tasks has made many terms identical, while others are simply mixed up, interfere with the flow, or linger where they are at least illegally but hospitably caressed. A similar parallelism of terms can also be partially noted in the direction from logic to grammar. It is no coincidence that grammar teachers, after seriously warning that there is a difference between logical and grammatical analysis, then, together with their young flock, embark on the most cheerful logical adventures. However, it is no laughing matter when, from under the masks of logical and grammatical subjects, the horned faces of psychological subjects begin to emerge, which healthy and sober people have never seen, either in dreams or in reality. A psychological "subject" without a residence permit and without a physiological organism is simply a visitor from a world unknown to us, where subjects do not live and do not perform physiological functions. The only psychological thing about such a subject is a delusion, and if you take it for real, it will inevitably drag along an even greater wonder — a psychological predicate!

The correspondence between logical and ontological forms that I emphasise should not be understood as their complete coincidence. Ontological forms are the forms of all that exists and all content, while logical forms are the forms of essential meaning, and therefore, in methodological application, forms that are categorically selected and selected. Moreover, ontological forms are already revealed in the nominative function of a word, in simple implication, and this is reflected in their calm indifference to their content, in their, so to speak, non-discrimination towards any content. On the contrary, logical forms are discerning, well-mannered and act only in the presence of a special sanction — semantic. They are not yet contained in the nominal function as such; a special act is required for their self-affirmation. This act is an act of affirmation or negation, an act of establishment or positing (*Setzung*). As a result

This proposition (Satz) is the fundamental form that underlies all logic. Modifications of the word itself as a statement are logically modifications of the proposition as such. The function of the word here, in contrast to its nominative function, should be called establishing (cf. above on "construction"), positing or, at least, predicating. Accordingly, it can be said that the internal logical form of the word differs from the pure ontic form in the same way that the predicative function of the word as a whole differs from its nominative function, also as a whole.

A special development of what is outlined here only in the most general terms is already an exposition of logic itself, as I understand and define it, i.e., as the science of the word (logos), specifically of the internal forms of verbal expression (exposition).

Note. Actually, naming, as well as setting (Setzung), where the predicate is a name, is formally already a logical function. Only because of this is it possible that naming is not simply a sensory act (for example, an associative connection between two sensory complexes, perceptions or representations), but a mental act — implication. The peculiarity of naming as predication is that the objectivity of the predicate here is not material, but nominative. (Compare this with the following remarks on the ontic nature of syntactic forms.)

S

α

The definition of "word" that I am starting from encompasses every linguistic phenomenon, both autosemantic and synsemantic. This definition is so broad that it must encompass both any isolated word, "lexical material," and any connected material, i.e., a period, a sentence, as well as any organic member or arbitrarily established part thereof. I have resorted to this definition in order to save space, otherwise necessary to prove that, indeed, whatever specific part of the whole human speech we nor have singled out, in it although would

virtually enclosed properties, functions and relations of the whole. Logic, incidentally, has long benefited from the idea that "judgment" (the proposition itself) is a "concept" (term) explicite, and a concept is a judgment implicite. This general premise allowed me to place logical forms in a simple relationship between morphological and ontic forms of subject matter. Since, in a broad sense, the term morphology is used, including in it and the doctrine of forms "sentences", i.e. the study of syntactic forms, then the specific question of the role of the latter in the structure of a word seemed to be resolved by simply including these forms in morphological ones. But, first, a morpheme in the narrow sense still needs to be distinguished from, say, a syntagma, even if the latter has no other physical carrier than a morpheme, and even if the morpheme itself is defined only from observation of the syntactic dynamics of a word, and secondly, syntagms as forms have their own characteristics, which cannot be ignored without at least some clarification.

It would be simplest, in developing the scheme I propose, to place syntactic forms between morphological forms in the narrow sense and logical forms. Based on the nature of the syntactic form itself, it would be possible to convincingly justify the place assigned to it in this way. On the other hand, it is immediately apparent that the position of logical forms will only become clear when we compare them directly with syntactic and, consequently, dynamic forms, rather than with indefinite morphological forms or with certain pure morphemes, which are always static — even in their (empirical) history. The role and position of logical forms are not realised in living language and are incomprehensible without the mediation of syntactic forms.

Indeed, this view of the position of syntactic forms is not incorrect. But it will not help us if we understand it too simplistically, without going into the details of some of its exceptional features. If we imagine the deepening from the phonetic surface to the semasiological core of a word as the sequential removal of layers or garments surrounding this core, then the syntactic layer surrounds the subsequent bizarre

rising folds, the features of which, however, do not depend on the subsequent structure of the whole and are not reflected in it. Only the mutual relationship between this syntactic and the nearest logical layer gives a complex, peculiar pattern that reflects the features of the structure of the aforementioned folds. Or if the whole process is depicted as climbing steps, it turns out that one cannot simply step from the syntactic step to the logical one, but has to move from one to the other via special, sometimes bizarrely thrown connecting bridges. Between syntactic and logical forms, there is, as it were, a delay in the movement of thought, sometimes pleasant, sometimes hindering progress (a delay in understanding), but one that cannot be ignored.

Reflecting on the essence of syntactic forms and noting that their characteristics (both morphological and accentological) are exhausted by sensually perceptible empirical properties, we see that their relationship as forms to the ideal members of the verbal structure is not an essential and organic one, but only a conditional and conventional one. This is, of course, a sign, but not only a semasiological or nominative sign, but also a symptomatic one, so to speak. The same phoneme, resp. morpheme, acts both as a sign of meaning and of a thing, and as a sign that it is this sign. It is, as it were, the nomen of a thing and at the same time the nomen nominis. For example, the accusative ending indicates (names and signifies) not only the thing to which the action of another passes, but also that the name of this thing occupies the place "additions" in this sentence. The phoneme and morpheme of the "case ending" are thus a sign, a symptom of its special, "secondary" nominative meaning, as if it were a second derivative in the nominative function of the word. If we imagine a language devoid of any morphological and syntactic features, we could introduce two systems of special names, accents or simply indices, the addition of which to the words-names of the language would indicate their role in the arrangement of speech. Something similar is partially implemented in the Chinese language, but to a greater extent in Raimundus Lullus' *Ars magna* or in Leibniz's *ars characteristica combinatoria*, as well as in symbolic

logic (logistics) and even simply in mathematical conditional-symbolic speech, which uses not only signs of "things" and the relationships between them, but also signs of their actions with their signs. Let us agree, for example, to use numbers and lowercase letters to denote affix morphemes, and uppercase letters to denote syntactic forms, resp. the syntactic position of a name, and imagine that the lexicon of proper names in our language consists of letters and combinations of letters of Greek transcription. Then we could obtain the following graphic representations:

let π be father, $\sigma\tau$ be to love, ν be son, then $Sns\pi Pps3\sigma\tau Oas\nu$ would mean: father loves son, and, for example, the formulas $Oas\pi Pps3\sigma\tau Sns\nu$, $Xvs\pi Yis2\sigma\tau Oas\nu$, $Sns\pi Pfs3\sigma\tau Oap\nu$, should mean: father is loved by son, father, love your son! the father will love his sons. Moreover, the meaning here remains independent of the order of the symbols π , $\sigma\tau$, ν , which order, under other conditions, can itself serve as a syntactic sign, which is actually the case in real languages.

This example shows that syntactic meanings (SPOXY) simultaneously denote 1) things and relations (π , $\sigma\tau$, ν), 2) morphemes, root (π , $\sigma\tau$, ν) and prefix (ns, ps2, etc.). But it also shows something else: we can do without syntactic signs and still read and understand our formulas without error. Similarly, in real language, we can do without syntactic signs of syntactic (quasi-logical in our grammars) stress, intonation, word order, pauses, etc.

This shows that syntactic forms are not essential for conveying the semantic and ontological relationships of things in the structure of a word. They can even be a hindrance, delaying understanding. Morphological forms alone would be sufficient for meaningful speech, the transition from them to logical forms is just as simple, i.e. logical forms can control morphological matter just as well as syntactic forms do — which tempts grammarians into the sin of betraying syntax and committing adultery with logic...

The ideal "unnecessary" (non-essential) nature of syntactic forms or the real lack of need for special signs for them, apart from morphological ones, predicts in advance what we will now arrive at by a different route. Syntactic forms are forms that are not

not given directly in the external sign, but are implied forms, "pure" and, as such, ontological *sui generis* forms. Their implied nature reveals their dynamic nature. On the contrary, morphological forms are, as it were, a static summary of observations of the living in the syntax of language. Syntax is the exposition, morphology is the index and table of contents to it.

A language devoid of syntax and based on a single logic might be admired as an ideal by scholarly pedants or legalistic bureaucrats, but it would decisively stifle any poetic sensibility. Logic would bring living and free morphemes into order, one might say, into drudgery. But what would grammar do, understanding that the purpose of a word is not only to "communicate logically" and that a word communicates not only logically? Grammar based solely on heteronomous force condemns language to drudgery. The syntactic forms of living language are broader than logical ones and do not fit entirely into the latter. The question is, what ideal norms will the free dynamics of language, which floods and inundates the channel of logic with its waves, submit to?

Language itself must have its own free legislation. The forms of linguistic construction, design, order, and structure must be autonomous. They must be found within the language itself. To do this, we must not forget that a word is not only a sign and is not determined solely by its meaning. A word is also a thing and, therefore, is also determined by its ontological laws. Its ideal reference is twofold: significative and ontic, direct. A word is also a "word." A "word" is also the name of things-words, and it implies an object — a word. Syntax studies not the word as a word about something else, but simply the word, i.e. syntax itself is a word about the word, about the word as a word, about the word as a word-thing. Syntax studies the difference between this "thing" and any other thing, other things (for example, the difference between a phoneme and any other acousma —

coughing, smacking, expressive tone, etc. [3]), and must strictly observe its dignity as a word about a word-thing as opposed to words about other things, from other sciences. In this capacity, syntax is nothing more than the ontology of words — part of semiotics, ontological the study of signs in general. If any

representative of syntactic science expresses surprise at finding himself in the embrace of ontology, then it must be pointed out to him that he himself wanted this, freeing himself from the captivity of logic. Syntax as formal ontology of words is syntax

"ideal", if you will "universal", syntax of a given specific language is ontology material, as applied to the form of language as a social and historical fact, ontology historical. The history of language must answer the question about the forms of its empirical existence, development, changes, emergence, etc.

As historical forms, syntagms are given to us externally, i.e. they have their own sensory, external appearance, — in the morpheme itself or in a special feature: accentuation, pause, temporal sequence of morphemes, etc., although, as mentioned, special signs for them are not ideally necessary, so that they can be substituted by other external data. As ontological forms, they are given ideally, in intellectual intuition, i.e. as pure and implied forms. Syntagms are not constructive for their science, syntax. The latter, the word about the word as a word, must have its own construction, its own logic, turning towards which we will again find ourselves in our usual general logic. Here, syntagms are only constitutive for language as a thing, but not constructive for the word as a meaningful, meaningful sign.

Another horizon will open up if we now turn to the constructive meaning of the syntagma as a form of expression. The relationship of the latter as such to external forms, i.e., consequently, among other things, but also mainly to morphemes, should give a kind of analogue to logical forms, but not yet to the latter themselves. These are very special syntagmatic internal forms. According to the definition, they must also be constructive forms. Their difference is that logical forms must already be assumed by them, for, as has been said, through this entrance we return to general ordinary logic and expound syntax itself according to the rules of this logic. The whole question is whether the aforementioned detour and return to logic remain fruitless, or whether we return, like

from the valley of Escal, with a branch of grapes, pomegranates and figs?

Undoubtedly, we will encounter the same logical forms, but the new relationship, in which syntagms will now become not as simple morpheme similarities, but as pure (auto-ontological) forms of the name itself, to the pure ontological forms of the things named and the meanings denoted, must be modified accordingly, i.e., the logical forms themselves must be modified accordingly. The difference between the original internal logical form and this modified form may remain unnoticed, may seem insignificant, until the question is asked directly and openly. For, having usually to do with the modified form and not suspecting its modification, we do not ask ourselves about this modification. Defining this difference, the differential between the two logical forms, and establishing its relationship to the original simple form will indicate the extent of the new constructive enrichment of speech.

This differential and its relations constitute the sphere of new forms, just as internal as logical forms. Let us call them, in contrast to purely logical forms, internal differential forms of language. They are composed, as it were, in the interplay of syntagms and logical forms. Logical forms serve as the foundation of this interplay, and to that extent, one can observe ideal constancy and regularity in it. Empirical syntagms are delivered by the whim of language, constituting its smile and grimaces, and to that extent, these forms are playful, free, mobile, and dynamic.

These are the poetic forms of language. They are relations to the logical form of the differential established by the poet through the increment of the ontic meaning of the syntagma to the logical form. They are derivatives of logical forms. The result is a *sui generis* poetic logic, analogous to "logical" logic — the study of the internal forms of poetic expression. These forms have their own relationship to the subject, differentiated from the relationship of logical forms, and to that extent we can speak of a third kind of truth. Alongside transcendental (material) and logical truth, there is also poetic truth as the correspondence of the syntagma to the subject, even if it is not real, "fantastic,"

fictitious, but nevertheless logically structured. In the play of poetic forms, complete emancipation from existing things can be achieved. But these things retain their *sui generis* logic. And together they retain their meaning, since emancipation from things is not emancipation from meaning, which is evident, since the logical forms that underpin the play of fantasy are evident.

Through the construction of these forms, words perform a special, unique function—a poetic one. Alongside *syntagma*, *noema*, etc., we must also discuss poems, and accordingly, poets, and poetic consciousness in general. The science that encompasses these issues is poetics. Its concept is broader than poetic logic, because it also deals with poetic phonetics, poetic morphology, poetic syntax (*inventio*), poetic stylistics (*dispositio*), poetic semasiology, poetic rhetoric (*elocutio*), etc. Poetics in the broad sense is the grammar of poetic language and poetic thought. On the other hand, the grammar of thought is logic. Poetic logic, i.e. the logic of poetic language as a doctrine of the forms of poetic expression of thought (exposition), is analogous to the logic of scientific or terminological thought, i.e. the doctrine of the forms of scientific exposition.

Note: In contrast to the external forms of sound combinations, poetic forms can also be called internal forms. In Humboldt's not always clear exposition, which can be interpreted in various ways, it is worth considering the following statement, for example: in contrast to and in opposition to external form, the character of languages consists "in a special way of connecting thought with sounds" (in der Art der Verbindung des Gedanken mit den Lauten ^[4]). Internal poetic form is necessarily attached to syntax. How else could it be recognised? Otherwise, it would be

poetry without words! Consequently, it is given in the expression of the *syntagma* externally and sensually — just as, of course, in business, everyday, pragmatic speech, and just as in scientific terminology. Their specific nature and the "laws" of each become clear from their mutual comparison, contrast and relationship.

The nature of the relationship between internal form and thought is most tangibly reflected in "words" and "phrases" (in the sense of English grammar and logic), uncorrected syntactically, t. e. in

potential state of internal form. "Air ocean",

"Shock" has a potential internal form, as well as a potential meaning. Every word in the lexicon is in this position. Attention to a "single word" or "image," focusing on them (especially on the part of a poet, linguist, or logician) reveals a tendency to actualise the potential power of the word. This can lead to some potential predication and proposition. Thus, a linguist who knows the etymological origin of the words "table," "truth," etc., can predict their potential etymological meaning and "have in mind" a corresponding proposition. Similarly, a non-linguist may associate certain words with their original root or base, since one or another word formation seems obvious to them, for example, when dealing with a newly formed translation term. At one time, some people were confused by the word "influence" (introduced by Karamzin) — from "to pour, to pour in", and meanwhile — "influence on someone". For profane it is clear: "concept" from "to understand". And t. p. In such "reflections", in the absence of specific syntactically structured sentences, it is as if an internal form is formed from the relationship between the "original meaning" (etymon) and the commonly used lexical-logical. The apparent profanity

"absurdity" or "beauty" of the existence of such a relationship may hinder or facilitate understanding, may evoke a certain aesthetic or other mood.

Based on these observations, Marti constructed his definition of "inner form." For him, it was the etymon itself that formed the basis of this concept, and he speaks of the latter as a figurative inner form (as opposed to a constructive one — the distribution of what is currently captured in a temporal series). And in the aforementioned stratification, caused by the absurdity or beauty of the relationship, he is ready to see even the "purpose" of the inner form in the word: to arouse aesthetic pleasure and facilitate understanding. I think that different "moments" in a word serve both purposes in different ways. This is partly evident from the present exposition, and will be shown in more detail below in a special passage on internal form. In general, the doctrine of internal form proposed here differs radically from Marty's doctrine.

β

Poetics is not aesthetics, nor is it a part or chapter of aesthetics. Not everyone realises this. Poetics solves aesthetic problems as little as syntax or logic. Poetics is a technical discipline. It is as technical as the doctrine of the technique of painting or sculpture, as technical as "music theory," etc. For the poet himself, it is replaced by practice and exercise and is therefore practically unnecessary for the poet, just as logic is practically unnecessary for the scientist, because the scientist also has his own exercises and his own scientific technique. Only special interest corrects both logic and poetics into theoretical and even philosophical teachings. Poetics should be the study of the sensory and internal forms of the (poetic) word (language), regardless of whether they are aesthetic or not. Rather, poetics can become part of the philosophy of art as an ontological discipline. Aesthetics in the proper sense is the doctrine of aesthetic consciousness, correlative to the ontological doctrine of the aesthetic object (the beautiful, the sublime, the tragic, etc.), which is completely immersed in the object of artistic creation and fantasy (the "fictional" object) in general.

Continuing the analogy between the logics of scientific and poetic thinking, it can be noted that just as the logic of science ascends from elements to scientific methods, so too can we speak of the methods and techniques of poetic thinking. Both are creative (constitutive) thinking and establish different types of methodology. The methodologies of creative poetic forms are classified based on their classification of subjects, since poetic subjects, as we have seen, are special, "fictional"

— emancipated from real existence, and poetic meaning is also special, "fictional" — *id, cui existentiam non repugnare sumimus, utut revera eidem repugnet, ens fictum appellatur*. The subjects of poetics — motifs, plots — must have their own material justification and substance, their own meaning and content, just like the subjects of science.

Without going into the details of the case, it suffices to note that the aforementioned correspondence
methodologies
is not a random parallelism, but also not

correspondence
between the real and the poetic

determined by a third common "cause," but rather an internal relationship, where the real thing is the foundation of the poetic. Every poetic subject is also a real subject. That is why realism is the specificum of all poetry. On the other hand, since, by virtue of the above, correspondence or comparison, "coincidence" is fundamental and essential, symbolism is also an essential feature of all poetry. The doctrine of poetic methodology is the logic of the symbol, or symbolism. This is not the abstract, purely rational symbolism that we encountered above, such as semiotics or Ars Lulliana, but poetic symbolism, the foundation of the entire aesthetics of the word as a doctrine of aesthetic consciousness as a whole. This is the highest stage of aesthetic poetic ascent. Aesthetic consciousness here blazes at the highest stage of poetic penetration into the meaning of the plot (into the content of the subject), melting into the highest poetic understanding.

Here, the symbol is not an abstraction or an abstract characteristic, characteristicum, but a concrete relationship. Just as logical meaning is given, understood in a given context, so symbolic meaning is created, reasonable in a created context. Logical meaning, the meaning of a word in logical form, is the relationship between things and objects, inserted into the general context of such a relationship, which is ultimately the world, all reality. It is methodically carried out, implemented in the presentation of the subject, in the development of the theme; its material is the corresponding things, ultimately the world, reality and their cognition. Symbolic poetic meaning, the meaning of a word in poetic form, is the relationship between logical meaning and syntagms, as *sui generis* objects (verbal-ontological forms).

That is why a symbol is born only in the intertwining of syntagms, syntactic forms and logical forms, always bearing the mark of both terms. The sphere of poetic symbolic forms is the sphere of the greatest, most intense, fiery life of the word. It is a thicket, bubbling with the inexhaustible life-creating power of the word. A flicker, a flitting of light, shadows and sparkle. Symbolic semasiology is a cascade of lights of all colours and brightness. Any simplistic genetic theory of symbols — grimace of a monkey before

fireworks. What does the unfolding creativity of symbols demand from the viewer?

Admire them and be silent!

Experiments in deriving symbols from "similarity" are particularly dangerous. Similarity must be based on some kind of identity — ideal in reality or in the ideal. The empirical can be similar to the empirical, the real to the real, the ideal to the ideal, but not the real to the ideal. And such is always the symbol: in every symbol, the external symbolises the internal. Through the symbol, the internal is external, the ideal is real, thought

is a thing. Through the symbol, the ideal dead emptiness is transformed into living things — these things — fragrant, colourful, resonant, joyful things.

Feed on them and be silent!

A symbol is not a comparison, because comparison is not creativity, but only cognition. It is creativity in science, and in poetry, a symbol is creativity. Terms linked by a symbol are rather antithetical, mutually exclusive, sowing discord. A comparison can double the meaning allegorically, in a fable, a parable, but not in a "poem," where it is not comparison, but creativity, the creation of an "image" out of nothing. And the path of this creativity is precisely from nothing, from the ideal, from the internal, from 0 to 1, to the external, the real, to everything. Fundamentum relationis in the symbol itself can only be ideal, i.e., again, nothing, zero. The symbols themselves, as relationships, are all *éν καὶ παν*, the cosmic harmony of things.

Listen to their song and be silent!

Truly, truly SILENTIUM — the object of the last vision, supra-intellectual and supra-intelligible, quite real, ens realissimum. Silentium is the upper limit of knowledge and being. Their fusion is not a metaphysical toy (with a German spring inside), the duality of being and knowledge, not the mystery (secret) of Christian Polichinelle, but a bright joy, a celebration of light, an all-benevolent death, all-benevolent, i.e. one that will not spare what must die, without any hope of its resurrection, an all-benevolent incineration of universal vulgarity, a mystery as open as the azure and gold of the sky, all-redeeming poetry.

Amidst thunder, amidst fire, amidst
seething waves,
In elemental, fiery strife, She descends
from heaven to us — Heavenly — to
earthly sons,
With azure clarity in her gaze...

Poetic forms are creative forms, symbolic forms, because, as mentioned, poetic forms are analogous to logical forms, and the poetic meaning of a symbol is analogous to logical meaning. In logical meaning, there is a relationship between objects and things (ideal and nominative-real), while in a symbol there is a relationship between ideal (internal) logical forms and real linguistic forms of a particular language (syntagms). The symbol itself is *sui generis* meaning — that is why it is the identity of "being" and "thought" — co-thought and syn-bolon. The analogue of the logical predicate function in the symbol is quasi-predicativity, because — since the object of poetic form is ontologically neutral, detached, fictitious — the symbol does not include cognitive and, even more so, pragmatic realisation. Formally, one could kick up a fuss: this is "pure" predication, unrelated to being. But since the logic of cognition, which presupposes this relation, has already taken over the predicative functions, what can be done? Poetic predication is only quasi-predication, not an establishment (*Setzung*), but a juxtaposition (*symbolon*).

If we take the symbol as the very meaning — the "second" meaning — then the difference between the symbol and the (rational-logical) meaning will completely dissolve in creative poetic acts, will be distributed and divided between them, without destroying the logical meaning itself, but only neutralising and detaching it. So, conditionally:

, or

σύμβολον ≡ ἐννοια (mod. ποιησις)

This is the parodic-mathematical formula, quasi-formula, fictitious formula of artistic creativity, of art. If we subtract everything logically necessary from the poetically depicted fact, then the entire individual context of the fact falls to the share of creativity,

distributed among its individual acts. The positive difference (+) is the share of fantasy; the negative (-) is the share of hypotheses (scientific, metaphysical); equality, i.e. difference = 0, is mere copying.

D

The givenness of pure and internal forms is an intellectual givenness. Conception is usually regarded not only as the most characteristic act of the intellect, but even as its only possible activity. Hence the widespread complaints about the formalism of rational cognition and the more or less hysterical efforts to "overcome" it. However, since ancient times, more observant philosophers have distinguished two functions in the activity of the intellect: a "higher" one and a "lower" one. The latter was understood to be primarily conceptual, rational-formal activity. The former was distinguished under the name of reason. Reason was almost always understood as an "ability" that was formally similar to the "senses" not only in its opposition to reason, but also in its positive characteristics. Even Kant was unable to take this away from reason.

Of the essential characteristics of reason, we will mention only those that are necessary for the following. They show why the activity of reason was classified as "higher." Not precisely, but persistently, reason was contrasted with intellect, as the ability of intuition as opposed to discourse. This is incorrect, if only because reason is also based mainly on intuition: conceptualisation is as unthinkable without intellectual intuition as sensory perception is without sensory intuition, and rational understanding is without rational or intelligible intuition. On the other hand, in general superficially profound opposition between intuition and discourse only appears to be justified as long as we sharply contrast, in abstracto, the process of comprehension, "cognition," and the process of logical exposition, proof, and communication of what has been cognised to others. But the more we think about the fact that "comprehension" itself is conceivable

only in "expressions," the more it becomes clear that discourse is nothing other than intuition itself, only considered not in the isolated separateness of each act, but in their connection, flow, and course. The only thing that is true in this contrast is that the formalism of reason deals with abstract givenness, while the speculation of the mind is essentially directed towards concrete objectivity. Hegel has already shown this with unmistakable clarity. And it is in this that the mind enters into an understandable comparison with feeling.

Closely related to this is the tendency, arising naturally from the observation of these characteristics of reason, to interpret the object of reason as reality par excellence. Since reason is furthermore attributed with the ability to penetrate deeply into things, into their "true nature" — and in this it already differs from the superficial contact of the senses only with the appearance of things — the so-called "reality" was defined by the risky term "true", "authentic", "inner", "profound," etc., and was then hypostasised and affirmed as a kind of second "most real" reality alongside or beyond the sensory one. But if one was able to reveal the positive features of this reality, one became convinced that it was the very one that our experience constantly testifies to, that it was the only one in general, just as experience itself is unique, including reason, and not adding it to itself as a gift received from above for fulfilling the ten commandments of Moses and the one of Christ. We were also convinced that if rational reality does have privileges, then these consist only in the fact that rational reality is the "criterion" of reality in general. Stupidity itself, real stupidity, must be recognised as rational, so as not to deceive us in any way and force us to recognise it as illusory. If, however, no positive qualities were found in rational reality, and it was characterised only by negations, "apophatically," then by hammering home the word "no, no," they put themselves in the position of that woman who, standing next to a man sowing wheat, kept repeating "poppy, poppy," and the observer was put in a position where the only reasonable thing to do was to repeat the man's answer: "let it be so, let it be so." They did not notice that by attributing only apophasis abilities to reason, they were equipping it with only formalistic qualities and,

consequently, they were wrong to be angry at its weakness when they should have been lamenting their own powerlessness.

What the mind gives is primarily content. The main falsehood of Kantian idealism lies in sensualism, in the belief that the content of knowledge is provided only by sensory material. The great advantage of the approach to the study of concrete cognition, which does not distract from the word as an effective tool of cognition, is that with this approach, one cannot miss the rational and meaningful moment in the structure of the word-concept. The mind, that which understands, is a function aimed at discerning meaning. Its acts are acts of understanding, intelligible intuition, directed at the very content of the word *N* being expressed. This is a function in the perception of words that is predominantly semasiological.

In the structure of a word, its content, meaning, occupies a very special place in comparison with other members of the structure. Meaning cannot be separated, if we use the analogy of this structure to the structure and composition of the body, from other members, such as the skeleton, muscular system, etc. It is more like the filling of the circulatory system; it is the nourishment carried throughout the body, enabling the normal activity of its brain-logic and the joyful activity of its poetic senses. On the other hand, semantic content can be likened to the matter that fills space, whose rotational movement around its own centre of gravity and condensation form a system of chaotic nebulae. The living dictionary of language is chaos, and the meaning of isolated words is always only fragments of thought, indefinite nebulae. Only by distributing itself among the numerous forms that have been discussed so far does meaning acquire a purposeful organic existence.

Therefore, strictly speaking, it is impossible to discuss meaning separately, in the abstract. It is constantly referred to when discussing forms, because even if these forms are discussed in abstracto, as

"empty," their filling is always implied, and it is only possible to talk about them meaningfully and not in vain in relation to their possible content. "Pure" content is even more abstract and conventional than "pure" form even more

indication of the tendency of analysis, rather than "things", has even more only a regulatory, rather than a subject-defining meaning.

Pure meaning, pure content of thought, literal and absolute, is as impossible as pure sensory content. It is only a certain limiting concept, *ens imaginarium*. Pure content as an object of analysis is content with a diminishing significance of form. It is consideration with minimal attention to forms. It is consideration when only one indefinite "natural" form remains, which is impossible to think away. It is worth trying to imagine some "colour", regardless of the objective forms and relationships of coloured surfaces, to make sure that the imagined colour spreads out before the imaginer on some surface and in spatial forms, even if they are indefinite, vague and

"before the eyes." The same applies to thought. No matter how vague and elusive it may be, it is "given" in its pure form in the forms, albeit indefinite, of consciousness. It is always a thought directed at something, even if it is represented as the most vague "something", "something", and it already — *minimun* that

"natural" form, without which thought is inconceivable. This minimum form of ontological being already presupposes at least a minimum form of logical being. And, consequently, the minimum of thought postulates already although would also minimum, some embryo,

"verbalism." That is why attempts to depict a wordless thought are so childishly helpless. They depict the thinker as some kind of deaf-mute, immersed in "pure" thinking, as if in clouds of tobacco smoke, and moreover, a deaf-mute who is not empirical and alive, because the latter necessarily possesses his own means of embodying and transmitting thought, but a disembodied deaf-mute — something like an angel or a demon.

When we try to imagine simply "colour" as pure sensory content and "consider" it on some surface, we do not imagine this surface to be flat, nor do we imagine the colour content with which we cover it to be absolutely stable and static. The surface has curvature and suggests a certain density, inevitably transferring the "gaze" into the third dimension. The colour content itself

also trembles, fluctuates, folds and unfolds, moves, and extends dynamically in time. And the conceivable content of the most elementary "something" is conceived dynamically. It does not fit into our space, it does not condense, and its analogue in time is not time itself, but it is still dynamic and requires deepening into its objectivity. It is, we say, dialectical.

Hence the peculiarities of the "natural" form of the conceivable. It not only diffuses and clusters around some centre of gravity of the emerging meaning until it is finally fixed and established by the context, but always carries with it, so to speak, the history of its formation. Like any thing, even in nature, it is not only a thing similar to or different from others, but also has and carries its own history. Meaning is also historical, or more precisely, a dialectical accumulator of thoughts, always ready to transfer its intellectual charge to the appropriate receiver. Every meaning conceals within itself a long "history" of changes in meaning (Bedeutungswandel).

There is no need to understand this story empirically, too empirically, in a fundamental sense. It should not be forgotten that in the most empirical presentation, the story cannot be revealed if it has no fundamental basis. Precisely because empirical linguistics did not know such a basis, it became entangled in such a simple thing as the difference and relationship between meaning, representation and things in their history. What is still presented as the "history of meanings" is, for the most part, the history of things themselves, changes in the ways they are used, in everyday life in general, but not the "history" of meanings as ideal constellations of thought. That is why, in reality, we still do not have not only a "history of meanings" (actually, word formation or word production — from etymons) — but we do not even have principles for classifying possible changes in meanings. The experiments of Paul, Breal, and Wundt have been decidedly unsuccessful. Not to mention the confusion of the name with the "word," things and representations with meaning, they mix logical and poetic forms as fundamental. Meanwhile, meaning spreads across both, i.e. from genus to species and back, from part to whole, from attribute to thing, from state to action, etc., but also from the logically insignificant but poetically characteristic

to a thing, etc. "One-armed," as the name for "elephant," does not change the logical form, but places a new form on it. "Earth in the snow," "under the snow cover," "under the snow blanket," "in the snow robe," etc. — all these words can be considered as one logical form, but here there is more than one internal poetic form. However, the situation is even more hopeless when the "history of meaning" is taken to be the history of the thing and, consequently, the history of the name. Only secondarily and derivatively can one speak of the history of meaning following a change in name, the attribution of a sound word to a given class and scope of things (properties, actions). But this is only one method. Obviously, word formation can take other paths: according to the prescriptions and indications of the needs of realising the meaning itself.

The dialectical laws of internal metamorphoses within thought itself have not yet been revealed. The laws of development, growth, impoverishment, encrustation, sprinkling, etc., etc. of plots, themes, systems, etc. must be found as specific laws. The history of the meaning of words, historical semasiology, the history of literature, philosophy, scientific thought — all these are still scientific and methodological aspirations, not realised facts. Thank God that at least they have been done away with as empirical histories of everyday life, "environmental influences," biographies — if, indeed, they have been done away with. Real history will only be possible here when we manage to lay the fundamental foundations of an ideal "natural" dialectic of possible plot developments. Only then will empirical history, as the history of one or several possibilities that have been empirically realised, acquire its meaning and justification.

Just as "motifs" must twist, swirl and whirl in some kind of vortex to produce a plot, so plots themselves collide with each other, pile up and scatter, rising again in a spinning and rushing whirlwind. The dynamic mobility is astonishing; the power of attentive concentration and the ability to rebuild and reinterpret any synthetic and antithetical combinations on the part of the one who follows the development of the plot and understands it at every moment of its change and in every character of its change. Just as the word itself, from its smallest atomic or molecular fraction to its global

connection in the languages of peoples and languages of languages, so the meaning, plot, and all the content of the conceivable in all logical and poetic forms is one content. It is embodied in the entire history of the word and includes, through the accompanying interpretation of the names of things, all things on earth and under the earth.

This reference to "things" should remind us of another circumstance that complements the overall picture of the existence of the "plot" as meaning. Understanding, by drawing things themselves into the sphere of reason, thereby draws in their inherent sensory content. Ontic and logical — formally rational — schemes come to life under the breath of reason and blossom, becoming once again tangibly accessible to our experience and perception, after reason has temporarily removed this sensory diversity from us under the pretext of the need to bring order to its chaos. Reasonably meaningful sensory images of reality are now transformed from the simple material of everyday, "vulgar" experience into the material of aesthetically transformed experience. Reasonable aesthetics restores the gap that reason has introduced into living experience, and it reminds us of the ultimate justification for which we allowed this gap to occur. The "theory of knowledge" often forgets why we board its carriage and imagines that our stay in its more or less comfortable compartments is the very purpose of our cognitive journey. The greatest depth of the mind's intuitions lies not in the fact that they supposedly take us to a "new" transcendent world, but in the fact that, having penetrated through all the accumulation of ontic, logical, sensory and non-sensory forms, they place us directly before the most real reality. The earth on which we were born and the sky under which we were nurtured are not the whole earth and not the whole sky. The frame into which they must be inserted changes their very essence, their meaning, their reality. The purpose and justification of our journey is to return from it and accept our reality not in a childishly illusory way, but in a courageously realistic way, i.e., with an awareness of responsibility for life and behaviour in it. Boratynsky wrote:

We diligently observe the light, We
diligently observe people

And we manage to comprehend miracles,
— What, then, is the fruit of long years of
science? What, finally, will our keen eyes
see? What, finally, will our haughty minds
understand At the height of all experiences
and thoughts?

What? The exact meaning of the folk saying.

How strange that this thought is clothed in a pessimistic expression! As if it does not point to the comprehension of the greatest of the hoped-for miracles! And is it not the arrogance of the mind to consider such a result unworthy of the efforts of keen observation, experience and thought? What a sad example of the corrupting influence of Judeo-Christian claims on the comprehension of the incomprehensible — although the example is just one of many such examples. And how different must be the worldview of a person drawn to his temple in search of the comprehension of the short saying EI, the unravelling of whose "precise meaning" promised not only illusory joy and strength, but was enticed not by the disappointing lure of otherworldly bliss, but by the real earthly beauty of earthly existence and a reasonable belief in the comprehension of its meaning.

When we speak of the material filling of the forms of the ideal dialectic of meaning and plot, we are already speaking of the final moment of cognition and understanding. We are talking here about the empirical-historical existence of meaning. We are talking about the final objective moment of the arrival of the word N from his mouth and consciousness into our hearts and consciousness. This last objective moment is not the last, as we shall see, but first we need to say a few more important words about it.

Filling meaning with things, making a story real, isn't, of course, making the thing itself. Otherwise, we'd have to admit that the thing itself flew to us from N's mouth, like a letter or a parcel sent by pneumatic mail. Things exist, they are not communicated. Meaning is not a thing — that is, it is not a thing that can be touched, chewed, weighed on scales, exchanged for another thing, sold or pawned. It is a "thing" that is meaningful, and therefore conceivable, thought out, and precisely because of this

it has acquired the ability to enter into the conceivable forms of the communicated, into ontological and logical forms. An existing thing must be "meaningful" in order to become part of the semantic content. Meaning is not a thing, but a relationship between a thing (named) and an object (implied). Through its name, a conceivable — and not just sensually perceived — thing enters into this relationship, which is itself conceivable and can only connect conceivables. To dream of a connection between the "thing" itself and an ideal connection, and especially to dream of this connection in the same way as a "material" one, would be to dream that a chicken would lay a mathematical ellipsoid for Easter and that a philosophising gentleman would put a mathematical top hat on his head for this holiday.

A thing is included in the plot only because, becoming conceivable as a thought, it enters into the totality of co-thoughts of meaning. If it goes in its "natural", unthinkable form, then it enters, in other words, into the ideological content of the word as an idea. Meaning is an ideological member in the structure of the word. Meaning is the ideological saturation of a word. The sensory-empirical and formal-logical givenness of a word is supplemented by its material-ideological givenness. The nominative and conceptual functions of a word are supplemented by its ideational, rational function. A word is ideological.

The idea, meaning, and plot are objective. Their existence does not depend on our existence. An idea may or may not fit into the head of a philosophising character; it may or may not be hammered into his head, but it exists, and its existence is in no way determined by the capacity of his skull. Even the fact that the idea does not fit into his head can be taken as particularly convincing proof of its existence independent of philosophising individuals. Heads in which the opening for the penetration of ideas is blocked by a solid plug imagine that they "form" representations "within themselves" that supposedly constitute the content of what is understood. If this were the case, it would, of course, explain the possibility of mutual misunderstanding between conversing subjects. In order to explain understanding itself on this assumption, one has to come up with more or less cunning theories, but the question always remains: why, since these theories themselves are ideas and do not exist objectively? Firstly, since they do not exist, it is impossible to find them and , and it is only possible to

"invented", and secondly, as subjective inventions, they will remain in the corresponding head, inaccessible to another, even if it swallows the first. And it is for the best that they are inaccessible, because the second mind is not obliged to even be interested in what the first mind invents "for itself" and "within itself", and also because this encourages independent work... of the imagination.

Non-specialists, philosophers who, in fact, have no interest in philosophical archives and in what place and under what number subjective idealism occupies in the amusing memory, should also refrain from looking into popular introductions to philosophy, then — if their brains are not hopelessly corrupted by pseudo-psychological and pseudo-philosophical theories that have smuggled their way into their own speciality — they will find nowhere else any indication that their understanding is aided or constituted by so-called representations. They will find no such indication anywhere, because their own consciousness, which remains the only source after the recommended abstinence, will not give them these indications. Incidentally, perhaps philosophers will then sooner end their dispute about where to place "representations" in thinking and cognition. Let us limit ourselves here to the statement that if a representation is an idea, a thought, then it is a thought, i.e., that very thing that constitutes thinking, and its second name is only a pseudonym, from which the existence of a particular thing follows as little as from the Christian name Veronica, that there was such a Christian martyr and saint. If, however, a representation is not a thought, but something else, then it should not be confused with what is meant when we talk about thought. On this basis, when listening to message N, as long as we have not ceased and do not want to cease to be interested in the meaning of what he is saying, whatever "representations" he may have that are related or unrelated to the meaning, for us they all remain unrelated to the meaning — unless, of course, he does not directly communicate his ideas, but speaks about things in the real world and the ideal relationships between them. So, if he talks about the moon, the stars, music, fire, Einstein's hypothesis, hunger, revolution, etc., etc., then we will understand that he is talking about these "things" and not about his ideas about these or other things. If he changes the subject and starts talking about his ideas about these and other things, then 1) we

will understand that he has changed the subject, and 2) we will now look at the "ideas" themselves as *sui generis* "things" that can be objectified by the word *sui generis*, and his ideas about them will not attract our attention for the time being.

If we now return to the understanding, meaning, and conceptual content of the word, we will notice some interesting details. People who like to arrive at profound conclusions using the method of least mental effort have long decided that, of course, content without form is useless, but form without content is of little educational value. And if they have looked up philosophical terms in dictionaries, they also know that form and content are relative concepts and that one cannot exist without the other. It is annoying to agree with things that are clichéd to the point of tedium, but nevertheless, it is true. And yet it is upsetting to agree, because banality is nothing more than boring nonsense, devoid of the aroma and fresh charm of healthy, exciting stupidity. A statement that is banal in form and devoid of content — is that not why it is true, and is that not why it has such repulsive, narrow-minded accuracy?

The correlation between the terms form and content means not only that one term is inconceivable without the other, and not only that form at a lower level is content for a higher level, but also that the more we take in form, the less content there is, and vice versa. In theory, one could even say that form and content are one and the same. This means that the deeper we delve into the analysis of a given problem, the more we will be convinced that it is an *ad infinitum* accumulation, intertwining, and fabric of forms. And this is, in fact, the very law of the method: every problem is solved by resolving the given content into a system of forms. What is given and what seems to be content to an untested researcher is resolved into a system of forms and layers of forms that is all the more complex the deeper he delves into this content. Such is the progress of science, resolving every content into a system of forms and every "subject" into a system of relationships; such is the progress of poetry. The measure of the content that fills a given form is the definition of the level to which our analysis has penetrated. Content is an indefinite and boundless $\mu\eta\ \acute{o}v$, awaiting its formulation and definition. The definite is

content — a multitude of "lower" forms in relation to the highest unified form. Thus, a drop of water is pure content for a very limited level of knowledge; for a higher level, it is a system of the world of its climatic, mineral, and organic forms. A water molecule is a system of forms and relationships between atoms of two elements; atoms are electronic systems of forms. Pure content is pushed aside, and we stop at the level of our knowledge. How far we can go is something we ourselves do not know. We only know the imperative of the method: to comprehend content means to break down vaguely defined matter into ideal formality.

The plot, meaning, and content of words are the essence of a system of ideal-rational forms, just as the sensory reality of the empirical world in each of its qualities is a system of sensory forms and can be fundamentally resolved into this system. There are no empty forms only in the sense that every form is full, as a unity, of the diversity of other forms, i.e., new unities, new diversities. To understand a word, to discern its meaning, means to discern unity in diversity, to see their mutual relationship, to grasp the text in context, which means, as has been said, to grasp the relationship between the diversity of named things and the unity of the object that shapes them, which means, in short, to live concretely in the world of ideas.

Objective unity, as we have also seen, is a given unity, not a constructive one, although it is constitutive. The logical act of positing (Setzung) constructs forms of meaning. It is empty for those who do not see that what is established and formed by it is the unity of diversity, not a bare unit. Like a cinematographic shot frozen in motion, it is the unity of many things, but it is a unit isolated by an artificial freeze, and in reality it is a component of the fluid moment of other unities, coordinated in subordination to a higher unity. Empty conception is an illusion of abstraction; conception is always understanding, i.e., it is not only the fixation of a logical point, but also the awareness of its fluid, dynamic fullness. Each point of conceiving and at the same time intelligent attention is a moment on the trajectory of the movement of thought, a word and at the same time a key from which thought and meaning spring. Only in this dynamic can a word be comprehended to its objective end.

The act of understanding or comprehension, the act of perceiving and affirming meaning in a concept, appears to be enclosed in the shell of a concept, a formal-logical establishment (Setzung). Those who see only the shell conceive without understanding, for thought and the function of reason are a rational constraint; those who, in fact, reason but do not understand. Naturally, everything is painted for them in their own hopeless position of rational asphyxia. One can only advise them to take urgent measures to dispel the asphyxiating gases of theory that envelop them. A little bit of intelligent oxygen, and they will come alive in a natural and immediate understanding, if they do not forcibly turn away from the meaning spreading out before them and do not want to forcibly kill themselves — just out of caprice. The act of Setzung, empty and meaningless in itself, could be compared to firing a gun loaded with a blank cartridge. In reality, one must take a cartridge case, fill it with explosive, insert a piece of lead, and only then fire. The illogicalists assure us that logic fires only blanks, that words are at most only wads. Is it not from this that their argument stems, that they, cherishing their experiences, tremble for their lives? Cowardice, including intellectual cowardice, often fails to see the real danger. Logophobia invents illogical shells to fire at the truth, unaware of the danger that their invention poses to illogicalists. The fact is that as soon as they invent it and as soon as they cover it with a shell of words to send it to destroy the mind, they cannot hide the secret of the invention from themselves and will blow themselves up first. The mind has been present at such explosions before; for it, these are merely illustrations of its recognition of the power of words. And the illogicalist is needed for something!

E

Having finished with the interpretation of the objective, we should turn to the "representations" with which N accompanies his message. These are his personal experiences, his personal reaction to what is being communicated. When he tells us something, he willingly or unwillingly "conveys" to us his attitude towards what is being communicated, his emotions

about it, his desires, sympathies and antipathies. All these experiences are conveyed to us more through his gestures, facial expressions and emotional excitement than through his words. But they are also reflected in the words themselves, in the way they are conveyed, in intonation and stress, in the structure of speech, whether calm or agitated, interrupted, stuttering, introducing unnecessary sounds or omitting necessary ones, etc. And there is no doubt that in many cases this

"member" in the structure of the word prevails for us, so that the meaning itself, in terms of its significance for us, recedes into the background.

The meaning of an empty word
Her lips are full of greetings.
.....
Everything in her breathes truth,
Everything in her is false and
deceitful; It is impossible to
understand her,
But it is impossible not to love her.

Understanding as an intellectual factor in the perception of such a word, or in the perception of a word from this side, recedes into the background, and one has to say that if it is understanding after all, then it is a special kind of understanding, not intellectual, but loving or hateful. To emphasise the immediacy of the perceiver's experience as a response to the experience N, it is appropriate here to speak of sympathetic understanding. The word 'sympathy' highlights both the predominantly emotional way of perceiving experiences N and its immediacy, based on direct 'imitation', 'empathy', "empathy" and so on. There is no need to think that an experience of a certain quality N arouses in us an experience of the same quality. Not only are the degrees of sympathetic experience indefinite and vary from perceiver to perceiver, but even the quality of the experience in the perceiver is not predetermined by the quality of N's experience. His joyful message may cause us anxiety, his fear —

irritation, etc. However, our co-experiences should be distinguished from our independent, non-sympathetic reactions to both the content of what is being communicated and N's own feelings. Thus, his fear about what is being communicated causes immediate, sympathetic irritation, while the communication itself may cause confusion about the reasons for his fear, and the awareness that N is afraid of such a thing may cause a feeling of comedy, etc.

In any case, by playing the role of such a stimulant, the word performs a new function, different from its communicative function — nominative, predicative, semasiological — and in its structure it singles out a special member to perform this function. However, bearing in mind that the internal fragmentation of the word is also reflected in its external, purely phonetic appearance, we would search in vain for a constant phonetic feature, a "symptom" of N's subjective reactions. If, within the known limits, it can be said that such role is played

"interjections" and "particles" (especially, for example, in Greek), on the other hand, it is obvious that their use is too insignificant, and the reactions mentioned are conveyed quite fully even without their help. At the same time, we should not forget that the "meaning" of interjections and particles is conditional and that a well-known part of interjections is formed in language as a result of a word losing its own meaning. Such interjections and particles as "thank you," "corbleu," "parbleu," "dame,"

"jemine", etc., testify against the notorious theory of the origin of language from "natural" cries, but in favour of the fact that as expressions of the subjective state N, they resulted from the atrophy of their own meaning.

Thus, if there is in the word or among words a special "expresser" of subjective "representations" N, then we must admit that for the word as such, this function is secondary, additional. And, of course, this is the case. The word, as we have considered it so far, was a social "thing", whereas as an

"expresser" of subjective emotional disturbances, it is entirely a fact "natural." Animals, which have no language and therefore cannot think, nevertheless make sounds that express their emotions, physical condition, etc. In a precise and strict sense, such "sounds," which are devoid of "meaning" in the same precise sense, are not "expressions." These are signs — of a different category. Psychologically or

psychophysically, these are components of the experience itself, of the emotion itself. We speak of a cry that "expresses" fear in the same sense that we speak of paleness, trembling limbs, etc. as expressions of fear. All these are not expressions of "meaning," but parts, moments of the experience or state itself, and if they are more noticeable than other moments or if they are easier to identify, this allows them to be symptoms, but not "expressions" in the strict sense. A natural cry, scream, or groan does not become speech *eo ipso* simply because it comes from a human being. Speech is accompanied by natural manifestations of the speaker's mental and physical state. Conversely, these manifestations are reflected in all of his behaviour, including his speech. To understand a word, you need to take it in context, you need to insert it into a familiar sphere of conversation. The latter is surrounded by an atmosphere familiar to the speaker, reflecting his state of mind and worldview. The listener understands speech when they enter the corresponding sphere, and they sympathise with the speaker when they enter their atmosphere, penetrate their state of mind and worldview.

From this it is clear why the word as such does not particularly convey the speaker's subjective ideas and experiences. Understanding the word as such is not enriched by them. Here we are talking not about understanding the meaning of the word, but about understanding the person uttering the word. For the word, this is a secondary function, *πάρεργον*.

This conclusion must be firmly adhered to, because it is not only dilettantism that still fusses over the word as a transmitter of "another's soul." If you like, you can, of course, focus all your attention on this role of the word, and this is certainly not without interest, but this interest, these pursuits, this attention belong to psychologists. The word is one of the most powerful tools of psychological knowledge, but we must be aware of why we approach it. For a linguist, logician, semasiologist, or sociologist, the word is not at all the same thing as it is for a psychologist or biographer. The psychological atmosphere of a word is made up of various air currents, not only individual ones, inherent, for example, to the author of the message, but also historical, social-group, professional, class, etc., etc. All this is the subject of a special kind of knowledge,

special methods. I will not dwell on this, as I can refer the reader to my article The Subject and Tasks of Ethnic Psychology, where this aspect of the issue is covered in more detail.

Thus, the reality of the word here is no longer objective, but subjective, individual and socio-psychological, or even psychological-historical. The function we are dealing with is performed not on the meaning, the basis of the word, but *ek parergou* on the known growth around the word. Having delved into the analysis of the structure of the word from its acoustic surface to its most intimate semantic core, we are now brought back to the surface of the word, to its subjective shell. And it is true that the mental state of N, its excitement, is most accurately conveyed by the fluctuations and changes in the sound itself, by its tremor, intonation, softness, insinuation, or other qualities, sometimes unrelated to meaning.

The combination of all these qualities gives the word a special kind of expressiveness. In order to distinguish this expressiveness of the word from its expressive ability in relation to meaning, it is better to distinguish it with a special conventional name. This name is: the expressiveness of the word. Accordingly, we can speak of the expressive function of the word. One could also speak here of the impressiveness of a word, because often the task of the person using the word is to evoke a certain kind of impression in us, and not just to communicate something. Cases where it is necessary to dissect the very atmosphere of expressiveness in order to separate the "natural" from the "artificial," intention from execution, falsehood from sincerity, "self-centredness" from frankness, etc.

Sometimes it is precisely the expressive side of a word that is given exceptional aesthetic significance. Since expression has a purpose and, even independently of a consciously set goal, evokes aesthetic emotions along with other emotions, this cannot be denied. But as a principle, this statement is fundamentally incorrect. Aesthetic perception is not exclusively linked to any member of the word structure. In general it affects as complex conglomerate

experiences based on all aspects of verbal structure. The role of each member, both positive and negative, must be taken into account separately in order to form an idea of the cumulative effect of the whole.

Only one circumstance should be noted in advance and in general, because it really plays a special role when it becomes the goal of conscious effort. Where the special emotional significance of the expressive properties of a word is noticed and where there is a purposeful effort to use the word in order to evoke the appropriate impression, there is a place for a kind of creativity in the sphere of the word itself and the creativity of the word itself. Created for the purpose of expression and impression, the word then enriches the word that simply communicates. This is the creativity of poetic language. This is not necessarily aesthetic creativity — and in general, as we have seen, poetics is not an aesthetic discipline — since expressiveness can also relate to emotions of an orderly nature, e.g., moral, exciting moral feelings, patriotic feelings, feelings of justice, indignation, etc. The means used for these purposes have long been called figurative means or simply figurativeness of words.

Just as some sayings are transformed from meaningful to expressive, so figures of speech can become auxiliary means for conveying the very meaning, emphasising its nuances and subtle relationships, and thus contribute to the enrichment of the communicating word itself. The figure of poetic form becomes an internal logical form. Language grows. Subjective experience is embodied in objective meaning. The author dies, but his work is preserved as a common treasure in the common wealth of language. Therefore, if we read a literary work, and not a personal message, appeal or letter addressed to us, and if we read it not for the purpose of biographical or personal analysis, but precisely as a literary work, then for us its figurativeness remains only a "literary device".

"decoration" of speech and, in this sense, should be attributed more to the realm of internal poetic forms of speech itself. Forms of personal expression are thus objectified into poetic forms of words. And again, regardless of the author's calculation and desire. The question

of the writer's sincerity is either a literary, poetic and aesthetic question, or simply an indecent question, unacceptable in a well-mannered society. Only with such an attitude towards the author is the author an author, and not the frivolous Ivan Georgievich, the empty-headed Georgy Ivanovich, the foolish Ivan Ivanovich, the thief and cardsharp Alexander Ivanovich, or the trustworthy hypocrite Ivan Alexandrovich. Here, apparently, lies the boundary and the first rule of good taste and decorum in literary criticism — as opposed to biographical sensationalism and psychological sleuthing.

Old rhetoric contrasted figurativeness as the language of passions — striking and strong, characteristic of the heat of feelings, the aspirations of the soul and the ardent movement of the heart — with tropes, the language of imagination — captivating and picturesque, based on similarities and different relationships. This conventional division has little meaning other than genetic. This is what I want to emphasise when I say that figurativeness enriches speech itself. In poetic analysis, poetics has every right to regard expressive forms as its own and to see the poet in the poet not only to the detriment of his person, but also to the direct disregard of it. On the contrary, in the eyes of his shopkeeper, footman, biographer, and his purely poetic qualities appear as expressive personal traits.

Moscow, 1922. 13 February.

III. CONTEMPORARY REMINDERS

AESTHETIC MOMENTS IN THE STRUCTURE OF THE WORD

I

Actually, in the article Word Structure, in usum aestheticae, everything related to this new topic is shown and said. All the "i"s are dotted. All that remains is to put the dots above them.

Aesthetic aspects are understood to be those aspects of the given subject and creative structure that are connected with aesthetic experience. It does not matter whether this experience is classified as "positive" or "negative," as pleasure or disgust. Only moments that are aesthetically indifferent, evoking neither positive nor negative aesthetic reactions, remain non-aesthetic in the strict sense. To avoid ambiguity, such moments can be called extra-aesthetic. There are moments in object structures whose presence is not connected with aesthetic experience, moments that are aesthetically indifferent, but whose elimination or transformation is not aesthetically indifferent and is qualified as negative or positive.

Aesthetic experience is an objective experience, but aesthetic experience is not directed directly at objects, if by

"objects" are understood to mean only existing and ideal objects, i.e. objects of actual or ideally possible existence, according to the principle of contradiction. An existing or conceivable object must be transposed in a certain way in the mind in order to become an aesthetic object . The aesthetic, "beautiful", resp.

"ugly", requires a special attitude, not sensual and not ideal, but *sui generis* There are no essentially aesthetic objects in the sense of being actually perceived or conceivable; therefore, any non-aesthetic object can be an object of aesthetic consciousness. Such are the objects of sensual experience. Ideal objects as such are non-aesthetic; they are no more beautiful,

neither uglier than eight, a heptagon is neither more beautiful nor uglier than a pentagon, a "monkey in general" is neither more beautiful nor uglier "women in general." A sensual object, becoming a beautiful object, is "idealised," "aestheticised," "stylised." The forms of an aesthetic object are not the forms of either actual or ideal being, but they may coincide with them or resemble them; which is why it is not meaningless to speak of "the beauty of nature." Such coincidences are forms and within forms. (On aesthetic objects, see Aesthetic Fragments, Issue IV, Problems of Contemporary Aesthetics.)

Aesthetic forms and categories are not forms and categories of being as such, but they idealise empirical being and, conversely, make ideal being sensually visible. The aesthetic in form mediates between the sensual and the ideal, just as the semantic mediates between the empirical and the ideal object in terms of content. Accordingly, aesthetic consciousness corresponds to "intellectual" consciousness. Not only aesthetic forms are mediating in the sense indicated; all internal forms are mediating; aesthetic forms — among "intermediate" — not logical and not "forms of combination".

Applied to *sui generis* aesthetic subject, to its "neutral" and "detached existence," we must speak of *sui generis* aesthetic consciousness, resp. aesthetic perception, representation, image, idea, etc. Individual moments in the structure of the word are in *potentia* aesthetic objects of this kind. Accordingly, one can speak of aesthetic judgement, perception, etc. of these moments or of their aestheticity, in a positive or negative sense. It is necessary to highlight moments in the structure of the word that are essentially non-aesthetic.

Just as categories, forms, and objects of actual existence are neutralised, becoming indifferent in the sense of actual existence, as they "detach" themselves from it, transforming themselves under aesthetic influence, so, conversely, aesthetic categories themselves can be reified and logised. Thus, one can speak of the tragic, the sublime, the comic, etc. not only as aesthetic categories; there are sublime ideals, comic situations, tragic events, etc. in actual

existence, regardless of their aesthetic classification. Hence, the conversion is understandable and sometimes necessary, due to which it is necessary to specifically mention the aesthetically comic, tragic, etc. All this indirectly confirms the immediately obvious formal nature of aesthetic objectivity.

In objective aesthetic consciousness, a well-founded aesthetic experience can be specifically identified and distinguished in reflection and analysis. At all its stages — unaccountable emotion (enjoyment — disgust), "experiencing beauty" and the like,

"mood," "consciousness as a whole" (of a cultural era, subjective, style, objective, etc., etc.) — aesthetic pleasure, etc., must be distinguished from the non-aesthetic.

The non-aesthetic is not only non-aesthetic (aesthetically indifferent) and "non-aesthetic" or anti-aesthetic ("ugly"), but also devoid of aesthetics, where "devoid" means the positive removal, destruction and annihilation of aesthetics and, consequently, entails the positive impossibility of aesthetic qualification — as if damage to beauty, its murder, violence against it (and not simple neutrality, as in the non-aesthetic). Similarly, absurdity and nonsense are still logical qualifications (having their own special logical value, such as the concept of a square circle, abracadabra, etc.), but deprivation, the removal of meaning, its essential absence, is not only illogical, as, for example, the sensually and empirically accidental, but also positive violence, the murder of logical meaning, for example, in idiocy, in an idiotic set of words. Pragmatism, a pragmatic attitude, pragmatic consciousness, in particular, moral consciousness, is so deadly to aesthetic meaning, resp. to aesthetic understanding (= taste).

Everything that needs to be said has been said by Edgar Poe: "The only supreme judge of beauty is Taste; it has only an incidental connection with Reason and Conscience; it has no connection with Duty and Truth, except an accidental one."

The following does not provide an analysis of aesthetic consciousness itself; its task is to identify and qualify the positive, negative and non-aesthetic elements in the structure of the word. Consequently, here

only the subject matter and issues are discussed, while the analysis of consciousness itself is still ahead.

II

I

The first thing we encounter when perceiving a word is its acoustic complex. We do not need to know its meaning or significance in order to be able to appreciate it aesthetically. And in the interests of accuracy of analysis, it is even necessary to distract ourselves from all its other qualities, focusing only on its acoustic and phonetic qualities. There is no need to further separate the latter, i.e. phonetic, from the actual acoustic ("natural", not "verbal") qualities, as this would be in the interests of purely acoustic aesthetics, not the aesthetics of words. It is enough to imagine that we are hearing a completely unfamiliar language or an artificial selection of sounds deliberately deprived of meaning. Perhaps more effort is needed to distract ourselves from the emotional tone and expressiveness of such a sound sequence. But this, of course, is achievable, especially if we do not succumb to the false suggestion of some theorists that a particular "mood" is essentially connected with (musical) sounds. There can be no essential connection here, just as there is none between sound and meaning. Purely acoustic impressions (which have only very limited application in phonemes), such as very high-pitched squeaky tones, so-called beats, scraping iron on glass, etc., if accompanied by a stable sensory tone, are based on nothing other than the "aesthetic".

On the other hand, it is necessary to make it a rule to consider the verbal sound scale as a non-musical series. Anyone can mix musical and verbal aesthetics, but one must be able to distinguish between them. For music, it does not matter in which language, even Dutch, an aria is sung — for the Dutch language, the score is not rewritten from Italian, its forms remain strictly unchanged. Similarly, factors such as

the timbre of the voice, its softness or purity, coloratura transitions, etc. All of this can be a pleasant addition, but it is incidental and insignificant for sound-word as such. Usually, music does not judge other elements of verbal sound except for vowels, i.e. tones.

it cannot cope with "noises" on its own. Meanwhile, it is not only vowels that determine the aesthetic value of a word, and, for example, the Finnish language, due to its abundance of vowels, can hardly be placed aesthetically above the Czech language, for example. A wide variety of noises, ringing, whistling, hissing, howling, creaking, rumbling, whistling, squeaking, rustling, even nasal sounds and many others, can be measured when they become aesthetically acceptable, justified and pleasant in a sound word. Noises have their own laws in words, which cannot be copied from music and cannot be reduced to its elementary (relatively speaking) laws of tonal relationships. Music itself, when it speaks of "ideas," "content," and even "moods," only more or less successfully imitates and analogises. And no musical imitation can convey the aesthetic impression we experience, regardless of the "meaning" of even a single line:

Ring, ring, crystal alto of glasses...

References to the idea that poetry may have originated from singing with music are not at all convincing, as are all references to genesis. Such references do not establish a meaningful connection. The (possible) origin of poetry from singing is as insignificant for poetry as the fact that Pushkin was born near Gorokhovoye Field and not Vorontsovo Field is insignificant for Pushkin's poetry, even if Pushkin had sung the praises of Gorokhovoye Field. If the connection between poetry and singing and music were a significant one, they would never have diverged, and moreover, in such a carefree separation. If poetics retains terms such as melody, singability, musicality, etc., then for it these are actually metaphors.

What remains is a certain sound complex, arranged in a temporal sequence and bearing its own distinctive characteristics: the length and brevity of vowels, their number (syllables), metrical combination

— authentic or analogically conventional, the tonic combination of verbal stresses for the purposes of construction, rhythm, periodic repetition of sounds, rhyme, alliteration, assonance, and finally, accentuation, pauses, and caesuras. Some of these techniques, such as pauses and stresses, can also be used to highlight semantic relationships or emotional expressiveness, along with voice modulations, special emphases in pronunciation, and intensity of sound tension, but it is still legitimate and understandable to highlight a series of pure sound impressions. They are entirely distributed in pure sound forms of combination and "outline" (Gestaltqualitäten) and should be considered as such in their aesthetic value. In particular, the emotional tone of sounds, such as signs of danger, romantic tension, etc., should be carefully separated from them, both as an object of special aesthetic perception and as a sensual tone in itself, distinct from aesthetic emotion. The tone of pronunciation, the so-called "accent," gives something more than an emotional indication, being a sign of the individual himself, or his belonging to a social class or nationality. Such personal and ethnic diagnostics can be added to the diagnostics — as opposed to the interpretation — of emotions and can reveal the basis of the aesthetic tone of speech, but strictly speaking, it goes beyond what is aesthetically conveyed by a single "pure" sound. Only in relation to the latter should we speak of combinations in the strict sense.

Using an old aesthetic term, we can say that in this last act we are dealing with pure phenomenal appearance (Schein). And, consequently, we enjoy only it as such. This is pure sensory intuition, i.e., it contains nothing intellectual or emotional (emotional

— "superstructure" rather than intuition itself). And this is pure aesthetic intuition, i.e. containing nothing but aesthetic pleasure, detached from both reality and thought. We are dealing with "beauty," but not yet with "beauty." In this intuition, we do not attribute any physical reality to the sound sequence itself, but we do not yet perceive it as a sign,

substitute or representative of any physical or spiritual reality.

Such pure aesthetic pleasure could be called formal not only because of its objective foundation in pure forms, but also because of the requirements that it apparently satisfies; the essence of these requirements is formal, such as fragmentation, diversity, gracefulness of grouping, proportionality, unity, etc. Of course, these are not motives for aesthetic pleasure, and perhaps even a distinctive feature of this kind of aesthetic perception is that it is not motivated. In this respect, and quite formally — i.e., without transferring any "laws," "criteria," or rules of discussion from one area to another — one can compare such formal enjoyment of sound words with the enjoyment of musical tones, regardless of the tone of "expression," "mood," etc. In both cases, its power is determined by formal power, subtlety, or the development of taste. It is imposed, as it were, with the compulsion of physical reality and is characterised in terms of irrational physiology. It is almost impossible to account for the source and motives of enjoyment of "beauty," and their denial is of a contrived critical nature. Nevertheless, taste here is able to make its own "choice," "selection" or assessment, poorly motivated and, apparently, guided by nothing but the attractiveness of the experience itself. The compulsion of aesthetic recognition generally stands here alongside the boundless freedom of choice in every detail.

If we agree to denote the dismembered formal elements of this aesthetic impression as a series $u_0, u_1, u_2 \dots u_n \dots$, then the overall impression can be denoted by the sum symbol: Σu_n

The awareness of the phonetic-morphological structure that accompanies the pure perception of sound hardly has the qualities of positively enhancing the aesthetic impression. Familiarity with the language and knowledge of its empirical certainty may

cause a certain feeling of "calmness," absence of "anxious tension," absence of "expectation of the unexpected," but these and similar feelings are not directly related to the aesthetic qualities of the morphemes themselves. The limits of choice that would make it possible to aesthetically prefer one combination over another are extremely narrow, on the one hand, by the awareness of the connection between the morpheme and its meanings, and on the other hand, by its connection to internal logical forms. The question of aesthetic preference, for example, between the expressions "Greek language" and "Hellenic speech," "sazhen" and "sazhen," "days" and "days," the passive form of the verb and the active form, etc., is often determined not by aesthetic considerations, but by the need to convey "style",

"characteristics," etc. And if, all other things being equal, an aesthetic question can be raised, then the aesthetic significance of a given form will be determined not by its grammatical role, but exclusively by its sound impression (u_0 , u_1 , u_2 ...).

Without having positive aesthetic qualities, morphemes can, however, play a negative role in the overall aesthetic impression. Thus, a sharp violation of familiar forms can serve as an obstacle to immediate positive aesthetic perception. "Stklo" and truncated participles in verse are not only inharmonious, but also violate the form that is familiar to our time, just as, for example, "untuned piano" does for those who are accustomed to saying "untuned", etc. This aesthetically unpleasant violation disrupts not only the style or syntax, but also the immediate auditory impression of familiar "forms of combination." Precisely because there is a violation of habit here and familiarity, insignificant, not sharp deviations from the "norm" can indirectly play the role of a pleasant stimulant, similar to the way certain deviations from the usual pronunciation play it.

Incorrect, careless babbling,
Inaccurate pronunciation of words,
heartfelt trembling
Will produce in my chest.

Some morphological archaisms or provincialisms, regardless of the freshness of their internal poetic forms inherent in their "disuse," can disrupt or excite aesthetic impressions.

Let us agree to denote the role of morphemes in aesthetic perception with the symbol::

III

I

In an indefinitely broad sense, all the relationships that are constructed between the external forms of combination and the meaning of a word in its "natural" ontological constitution are arranged as a realm of internal forms. Their composition, however, is diverse, and includes, on the one hand, logical forms and, on the other, internal poetic forms; depending on their definition by basis or action, syntactic and subject-stylistic (not subjective-expressive) forms may be added to both. Since external syntactic features coincide with morphological differences, there is no need to discuss them separately — their aesthetic significance is exhausted by the meaning of the latter. The presence of their open consciousness, as the fulfilment of the syntactic canon or a departure from it, makes them internal forms, and in this case it is methodologically quite legitimate to consider them as poetic forms (forms of poetics).

The simplest manifestation of internal form is logical form or scheme, as a reflection of objective (ontic) relations or even as their transformation, but essentially finding its ontic correlate. The presence of these forms is clearly evident when comparing strict, scrupulous, and even pedantic scientific speech with everyday "despised prose." It is not so much the predetermination of logical forms by ontic ones — which, after all, remains a task for the definition itself — as the conditional agreement of simple nomination or nomenclature

distinguishes logical speech as terminological speech. On the contrary, the forms of presentation, "reasoning," "proof," etc., which are commonly referred to as methodological, are a kind of logical algorithm that reflects semantic and ideological relationships rather than strictly ontological ones. Hence their opposition, in terms of their materiality or transcendentality, to pure ontological forms. All of them are essentially ideal and

"overcome" material and sensory-phenomenal givenness. Their "formation" is recognised and formulated as a "law".

In themselves, given the regularity and orderliness of their formation, these internal ideal relationships, which give the impression of clarity and separateness, evoke a peculiar feeling of intellectual pleasure, rather than purely aesthetic, "sensual" pleasure. Here, a certain "tightness" of the mind is felt, required and evoked, rather than excitement and tension of the senses. It is, as it were, logical satisfaction, the calmness of logical conscience. Therefore, when speech complies with logical laws, just as when morphological and syntactic habits are not violated, a simple calmness and balance are observed in their perception, but not a positive addition to the aesthetic feeling.

Cases of supposition, wordplay with homonyms and synonyms, certain syllogistic techniques (e.g., horned syllogisms), etc., when introduced into reasoning, attract attention and therefore may seem to evoke positive feelings. But it is curious that in logic, it is precisely these cases that are associated with the doctrine of "logical errors," and their main source is in "wordplay" and "pun," forms that are more correctly attributed to poetic internal forms. Indeed, in scientific discourse, these are monstrosities, "sophisms," while in poetry, they are a necessary attribute of certain literary forms — comedy, wit, etc. — and a favourite technique of some authors (for example, F. Sologub, cf. "knives and presses," etc.). Here there is always an "intertwining," a "play" between the forms of sensory perception of sound-words and ideal logical forms. Logic does not like this. The whole doctrine of supposition, which positively resolves the "plans" of objectivity, "relativity," intentions (primaе, secundae), has a warning and prohibitive meaning: do not mix concepts

(words) about an object (about a "thing") with the concept of a concept (a word about a word) as an object ("idea").

But if logical calmness is not a positive active factor (*causa efficiens*) of aesthetic excitement, but only a passive condition, then — as in morphological regularity — a violation of balance can cause an aesthetically negative reaction. Logical-syntactic ambiguity, for example, of the expression "the darkness of low truths is dearer to me..." — as if we were expecting "what?" or "by what?" — "the deception that elevates us," causes a loss of balance and a reversal in the attitude of consciousness — an expense that is not aesthetically rewarding, but rather somehow depresses the general flow of aesthetic experience. Once logical balance is restored and the phrase is understood, it flows more smoothly aesthetically. But, as mentioned, one should distinguish between intellectual feeling and its satisfaction or dissatisfaction from the aesthetic itself. For example, "the subject determines the object."

— logically ambiguous, aesthetically — perhaps beyond evaluation. One could introduce some kind of syntactic sign, for example, word order, which would eliminate the ambiguity, or simply say: "the object is defined by the subject," resp. "the subject is defined by the object." But even in this form, this aphorism [5] can lead a logically disciplined mind to a state of deep melancholy: "subject" — empirical or pure? —

"defined" — logically, causally, functionally? — "object"

— material, realised, as a goal, as a cause? etc. So many combinations, so many misunderstandings — but precisely misunderstandings, i.e. intellectual stumbling blocks, not aesthetic ones.

Since a logically imperfect formal expression is, however, also an aesthetic stumbling block and, consequently, a factor that diminishes aesthetic enjoyment, let us conditionally designate its participation in aesthetic perception as.

In the vulgar understanding, discursive, logical, terminological, "only communicating" speech is opposed to poetic, rhetorical, figurative and figurative speech, which evokes all kinds of emotions, including aesthetic ones. In reality, both forms of speech are opposed by "formless," everyday, utilitarian speech, which generally constitutes a reserve stock, material for the minting of both logical and poetic elements of speech. With logical and poetic criteria at our disposal, we can easily extract terms and

"images" from "vulgar" (i.e., purely utilitarian) speech. As for the mutual relationship between logical and poetic speech, it is determined by the internal position of these forms themselves between the pure ideal forms of the object and the pure sensual forms of the sound-word, with logical forms remaining the fundamental internal forms and poetic forms being the fundamental internal forms. Strict and pure adherence to this canon is denoted by the term historical, but one that has already acquired theoretical significance: classicism. From the point of view of the relationship between logical and poetic forms, perhaps the most transparent example is *The Divine Comedy*, a work that is entirely classically realistic (regardless of its "fantasticity" — realistic poetically, not metaphysically, not from the point of view of "perception of the real world") — alien "carelessness" of romantic idealism. Although, of course, creatively and genetically, the poetic form leads the way and guides the unfolding of the plot, while the logical foundation is, as it were, pushed underneath it. If the genesis were reversed, we would be talking about a philosophical work presented in poetic form, rather than a poetic creation with a philosophical plot. A reverse example is the poetic and philosophical failure of the second part of Goethe's *Faust* — a scattered heap of poetic plaster and philosophical stones, where there is no poetically animated logic and no logically tightly woven poetry.

Whatever contrast we use to characterise poetic speech as figurative and metaphorical, the term "image" requires its own absolute interpretation as a *sui generis* form. As a verbal form in general, distinguishing one series of words from another, "image" (just like "term") must

have the same fundamental structure as a word in general. Only individual members of the structure, subject to special definition, will differ in some specific features, for example, intensifying certain relationships between forms, weakening, stretching, shortening, etc. Externally, the image is imprinted in special stylistic forms, which can ultimately be reduced to syntactic forms and correlative logical forms. Such are the forms of composition of the whole and its parts, the distribution and construction of parts: chapters, scenes, stanzas, etc., individual phrases: periods, fragmentary judgements (amazing, for example, Journey to Arzrum) and, finally, individual elements of a sentence. There must be something that distinguishes them from a simple and bare logical construction, which gives us the right to characterise them as figurative or images. This finds its purely external expression: repetitions, direct and inverted parallelisms, anaphora, refrains, etc.

Imagery is not unique to "poetry" as a form of artistic literature. It is a common feature of language, inherent also in scientific exposition. This does not mean that science can be presented

"elegantly" or "artistically," but rather that scientific exposition as such cannot do without the help of creative imagination in constructing "visual" (?) hypotheses, models, and modes of representation. For example: "Copper atoms are so close to each other that the metal seems incompressible to us; on the other hand, it is clear that the closer the atoms are to each other, the easier it is for each of them to transfer a separable electron to a neighbouring atom. Electrons accumulate on zinc, and we build a bridge over which the excess could pass to copper," etc. There is no poetry here, but there is a lot of fantasy and "imagery." Theories such as organic theory in sociology, physiological explanations in psychology, a mechanistic understanding of the world, an organic understanding, the development of productive forces that determine history, as well as any metaphysical theory — all of these are constructions of fantasy, images, but not "poetic" images in the narrow sense of artistic and aesthetic factors. As we have already seen, "poetic" forms

— are not the direct subject of aesthetics. The question of their aestheticity is a separate issue.

Nevertheless, it is necessary to distinguish, at least in terms of tendency, between a word-image and a word-term. A word-image denotes a feature of a thing that "accidentally" catches the eye, according to creative imagination. It is always a trope, a "figurative expression," as if temporary, when there is no direct meaning yet; "direct," i.e., directly pointing to the meaning; or when there is a direct meaning, but it needs to be expressed precisely as an imaginary, poetic experience. This is a free word; mainly, it is a tool of the creativity of language itself.

The word-term strives to move towards "direct expression", to bypass the image and trope itself, to avoid figurativeness. Since every word is, in essence, a trope (a designation based on imagination), this is achieved by including the word in the corresponding system. Living speech puts it into context and brings it closer to the "direct," but terminisation itself is the inclusion of the word in a system of concepts that constitute the context with their own special laws, ideal relationships between concepts. When a term is invented, an attempt is made to stamp it with an essential feature. This is a fixed word; mainly a tool of communication.

It is very important to expand the concept of "image" so much that it is understood to mean not only a "single word" (semasiologically often an independent part of a sentence), but also any syntactically complete combination of words. The Monument, The Prophet, The Bronze Horseman, Eugene Onegin are images; stanzas, chapters, sentences, "individual words" — are also images. The composition as a whole is, as it were, an image developed explicite. Conversely, an image, for example, the metaphorical nature of an "individual word," is a composition implicite. The development of a simple name or title into a legend, myth, or fairy tale is, as we know, a common occurrence. Therefore, looking ahead, it should be noted immediately that the belief that, for example, a metaphor arises from a comparison is an extremely narrow and simplistic view of the actual state of affairs — unless, of course, the very concept of comparison is expanded to mean any kind of juxtaposition. Formally, there should be as many types of metaphorical construction as there are types of objective relationships that form the basis of judgements.

From an internal point of view, the opposition between terminological and figurative speech is just as relative. It does not mean the replacement of one series of forms by another — from the previous section, we already

that internal poetic forms are superimposed on internal logical ones — but only the relative development of one and the relative impoverishment of the other series. Their mutual relationship as necessary members of the verbal structure does not fundamentally change. Consequently, the opinion that in poetic speech the concept is replaced by the image and conception by fantasy is incorrect. This is refuted by the relationship of the image to other members of the word structure: the image is predicated, which is not a function of fantasy, and the image is understood, which is also not a function of fantasy.

The distinctive features of the "image" as a *sui generis* internal poetic form can be roughly and tentatively outlined in the following characteristics. In the structure of the word, it lies between the sound word and the logical form, but also in abstract analysis as an independent subject of study, it is placed between the "thing" and the

"idea." It simultaneously bears the features of both, without being either one or the other. An image is not a "thing" because it does not claim to have actual existence in the real world, and an image

— is not an "idea" because it does not claim to have an eidetic existence in the ideal world. But an image bears the characteristics of an individual, random thing and bears the characteristics of an idea, since it claims to be realised, albeit not "naturally" but creatively, in art (culture in general). It is a materialised idea and an idealised thing, *ens fictum*. Its relationship to existence is neither affirmative nor negative; it is neutral. An image is concrete, but its concreteness is not the concreteness of a perceived thing and is not the concreteness of a speculative idea; its concreteness is typical. An image is neither strictly individual nor strictly general in the logical sense. The laws of logical concept formation do not apply to it. Being general, an image does not lose the characteristics that are not common to all persons, on which it indicates. It is possible sometimes to fix an image ,

"stop" it and bring it to the point of visual representation and reproduction, but if we individualise it in this way, it will be destroyed as an image. If this means anything to anyone, then the general tendency of the poetic image, as opposed to the logical form, can be expressed as a tendency to individualise the general by emphasising the typical and characteristic as opposed to the specific and essential. ^[6]

Unlike a static concept, which is brought to life only by the mind, an image is dynamic in itself, independent of rational understanding (even if it is "unreasonable" and "incomprehensible"). It is always in motion and easily transforms into a new image-likeness. The logical concept when accumulating characteristics is limited, is refined, "defined" — the steamboat is white, large, screw-driven, etc. The image seems to sway, come to life, jump from place to place — the steamboat is cheerful, gloomy, bouncing, tearful, grumpy, etc.

The concept conveys a thing through the representation of its constitutive ontic essential properties; an image can take a feature that is logically insignificant for the thing as a characteristic of the thing. Through the image, the thing is transformed in our consciousness and, in the process of transformation, loses its logical stability, being indifferent in itself and to itself to its own essential basis and needing it not so much for itself as for the plot (content) being formed by the image. The meaning in the image does not prevail over itself, as in the concept. Understanding, the shifts in meaning that make a concept dynamic, are replaced in an image by fluttering, soaring, and, accordingly, require intuition, taste, etc. in place of understanding or, rather, in addition to understanding its underlying basis. Some aesthetics speak of "internal imitation" — as applied to an image, this is, as it were, its understanding, because understanding seems to chase the flow of meaning, while "internal imitation" runs through the figure, outlines, scheme, composition, etc., which externalise the image. An image, like a concept, is not a reproduction, and, accordingly, "imagination"

— is not "perception" or "representation." It lies between representation and concept. It should be compared to "assumption" (according to Meinong's terminology). It is particularly important that an image is not a representation (we will return to this later), and therefore psychologism from poetics as a doctrine of internal poetic form, of image, must be eradicated with the same firmness with which it is eradicated from logic. Psychological poetics, poetics, as "psychology of artistic creativity" is a scientific relic. Our anti-Potebnyanism is a healthy movement. Potebnya, following

the Herbartians in general and, in particular, following Steintal and Lazarus, compromised the concept of the "internal form of language."

The purpose of a logical concept is clarity and distinctness. Science, provisionally accepting some name for a thing as a sign of a concept, attaches other names to it as new terminating signs and introduces logical requirements of adequacy as a condition of the connection itself. Logic ensures that all this is done in accordance with the task-subject; this is what is called the truth of a concept. The image is not satisfied with a once-chosen name. Attached to a thing, it fades and dies for it. It needs to be stirred up, coloured. The image throws garlands of words-names, plucked from other things, onto the thing. But here, too, there is its own "consistency" and its own guardian — poetics. Metaphor, comparison, personification, juxtaposition of the familiar with the unfamiliar and vice versa, etc. — all of this has its own foundations, including ontological ones, only the subject of this ontology is the word itself. Just as formal ontology alone is not enough for the sciences in their special methodologies, and each science has its own material ontology — a stock and apparatus of scientific (logical) models, fictions, working hypotheses, etc., applicable to the material of that science, so too can poetry not be satisfied with syntax alone. A poetic work has at its disposal not only syntax, but also the entire material wealth of the stylistics of a given language. Drawing on these poetic models and fictions, poetics constructs and tailors verbal attire for its thoughts, replacing the faded and worn-out names of things from everyday use. Poetics is the science of the styles of verbal garments of thought. Like logic, it does not prescribe rules and fashions, but takes them into account. Logic is the history of the logical, poetics is the history of the poetic costume of thought. The relationship between the external sensory forms of combination and the logical-ontological forms of being, the life of thought

— the form of poetics or image.

From what has been said, it is clear that images as forms created by the poet — through the reproduction of models of the relationship between names and meaningful forms

— are "artificial" forms. Poetics as a doctrine about them is one of the problems of the philosophy of art. Every formal-objective discipline has necessary correlate in concrete and

material teaching of philosophy about the very meaning that develops in these forms, or in general about life and play reflected on the edges of forms and refracted through them by consciousness. The history of scientific consciousness is the history of the actual realisation in science of one of the possibilities of logical consciousness in general. Similarly, of the possible forms of creativity and art, those that have actually been realised have their own history, as the history of aesthetic consciousness. The history of aesthetic consciousness, along with the history of scientific consciousness, is part of the comprehensive history of cultural creative consciousness in general.

The very position of the image as an internal poetic form thus gives rise to the requirement that the image be "coherent." This is, first and foremost, coherence according to the general ontological principle of identity with itself. And then, also according to the general ontological principle of sufficient reason — why this one and not another? — the image as a relation must be consistent with its terms. But for this, both terms of the relationship — logical meaning and phonetic-morphological sign — must each be canonical in themselves. Their correlative fluctuations are the dynamics of the image itself, which now also acquires its own canonicity — "harmony" — both in its construction and in its movement. It must be ready for the question: how should this meaning be expressed so that its perception is aesthetic? And by its very existence, it answers this question: this is how you should see a thing if you want to see it aesthetically!

As we have already said, the aesthetic requirement for both terms of the image as a relationship — to the morpheme and the logical form — was only negative: not to interfere. For a violation of its canon by any of these terms entailed the destruction of the entire relationship. Only a certain limited freedom was allowed for them, and even then on condition that any deviation from the canon had to be compensated for aesthetically. A violation of logic had to be compensated for by satisfying a purpose, for example, a special "emphasis", attracting attention, creating "impression." Similarly, "ambiguity," "novelty," "inaccuracy" of morphological-syntactic "signs" must be compensated for by the ability of the "speech defects" themselves to attract

aesthetic attention. Provided that all these deviations do not violate the canon of the internal image, which is generally quite broad and free due to its inherent dynamism.

In relation to the image, on the contrary, our aesthetic demands are positive. The image must solve a positive task: to fit the plot (theme, material), logically structured (for example, if A is B, then C is D), into syntactic patterns (e.g., when a is b, then c is d, when e is f and g, when h and f are k, then mn is pq), denoted by freely chosen phonological and morphological signs connected by external forms of combinations (e.g., freely chosen rhythmic divisions). The choice here is so wide that the question of whether this task is solved or not can only be answered directly by feeling or analysing each individual case. If we perceive the image, the internal poetic form, as the accomplished realisation of the task, we establish the presence of an aesthetic impression. And perhaps there is only one general rule: perception must be, as it were, the reverse of creativity; the composition as a whole must be felt as corresponding to and subordinate to the flow of the plot material, its own internal movement, and not the other way around. Otherwise, art becomes artificial to our consciousness. Although creativity itself must therefore follow the opposite path — from "forcing" the material into form — because the material is first given to the poet as a thought that is only general in its "natural" form of an idea. The formation of an idea into a poem or play is its sensual blossoming.

We are dealing here, on the whole, with a special type of consciousness: with intellectual-aesthetic experience that accompanies the perception of an image as a certain idealisation of a thing and the realisation of an idea. As an intellectual (in the "imagination") experience, it is generally opposed to a sensual, anoetic, unaccountable, irrational experience, from the external music (rhythm, etc.) of sound words. In familiar terms of aesthetics, this is the aesthetic consciousness of beauty — the union of magical sounds and thoughts.

Love has passed, the muse has
appeared, And the dark mind has
cleared.

Free, I seek once again the union Of
magical sounds, feelings and thoughts.

Let us agree to denote the positive aesthetic significance of the layering of images as internal forms of poetic speech, added to a certain logical unit, by the symbol of a work of a series of multipliers of the form $1 + un$, i.e. as $P(1 + un)$.

3

An image is not a representation. It would be more correct to speak of an image as an object of representation, and to equate them would be to play with homonyms (image — both "image" and "representation"). One can have a representation of an image, but it differs from the image itself in the same way that representations of the Kremlin differ from the Kremlin itself, as representations of the far side of the moon differ from the moon itself, as representations of a hyperboloid differ from the hyperboloid itself. Eugene Onegin, Don Juan, Prometheus, Faust — these are images, but not representations. As images, they also differ from the plots of Faust, Don Juan, etc., which have been given different poetic forms by different poets. For some, this is not so obvious when it comes to images embraced by a simple syntagma or even by its autosemantic or synsemantic members. They imagine that there is a special ability of imagination that paints some kind of "pictures" that reproduce what is perceived or combine "elements" of what is reproduced — they imagine, therefore, that in this act of imagination about the activity of imagination, some kind of picture should be painted? No, "imagine" here means to construct some kind of fictional image, detached from reality and having its own laws of form, which are neither sensory nor logical.

It is worth making an effort and actually "imagining" "reproduce," draw a "picture" when perceiving poetic images: "The mountain peaks are asleep...", "choirs of stars shining...", "the soul of the calmed sea", "the insatiable night mist spreads across the sky like a leaden cloak", "the witch has gone mad evil And, snow seizing, She let go,

running away, into a beautiful child," and so on, ad infinitum. It is worth trying to convince yourself once and for all that if any "images" arise before us, they play the same role in the aesthetic perception of poetic language as they do in understanding scientific or everyday speech. Just as the "representation" of a concept delays understanding and hinders it, so it delays aesthetic perception of words and hinders it. If "representations" appear here at all and accompany poetic perception, then as something incidental, ek parergou, insignificant.

The image as the internal form of poetic speech and as an object "imagination", i.e. the supersensory activity of consciousness, must in no case be confused with the "images" of sensory perception and representation, the "images" of sight, hearing, touch, movement, etc. Another, even more significant difference between image-form and image-picture is that once a form is created, it exists as one for everyone who perceives it, the same for the poet himself as for the listener or reader, whether he be Potebnya, or another professor, or a teacher of literature, or simply an uneducated person. The representations of the "picture" evoked in them by this form are different for everyone, and even for each of them they are different in different cases of their appeal to this form, just as their aesthetic enjoyment of this form is different. A word signifies, denotes meaning, sense, in given internal forms, logical and poetic, — that is, this meaning objectively exists. The "representation" of a word does not mean that the word only evokes or awakens a representation. The meaning thus formed is one, but there are many representations, even if they are about the same subject. Of course, the same content, the same thought, can be expressed in different forms, but each expression is objective and, as such, is not comprehended through representation, just as a single object of representation itself is not comprehended through representation, but only in relation to it.

The imagery of speech is not, say, visual colourfulness, or contour, or anything like that; it is not a visual or other sensory form at all, but rather a certain scheme, objectively correlative to the imagination, as an act that is not sensory but mental. From the point of view of the common understanding of "mind" and

"Intellectual" once again highlights the source of errors in identifying

"image" and "picture". They cannot free themselves from sensualism, which forces everything that is not "reason" to be lumped together with "feeling." At the same time, they narrow the scope of thinking itself, limiting its functions to cognition. This narrowing is arbitrary. Imagination, meditation, and "reflection" are not cognitive mental acts, just as "emotional," aesthetic, and religious thinking are not cognition, but neither are they feeling. Poetic imagery is based on acts that may have cognitive significance, but also have poetic and aesthetic significance. Such acts include, for example, comparison, juxtaposition, grouping, contrasting, parallelisation, etc.

In a whole series of mental acts, we arrive at constructions that are in some respects analogous to cognition, but do not constitute it in the strict and proper sense. If the latter, in their natural course, evoke and substantiate a kind of intellectual emotion, intellectual pleasure, then aesthetic pleasure, substantiated by the play of poetic images, can be regarded as analogous to intellectual pleasure. Beauty is not truth, and truth is not beauty, but one is analogous to the other. There is a certain aesthetic charm and appeal in novelty, brightness and boldness of comparisons, in an unexpected departure from the usual "sphere of conversation", in bringing two different circles of the theme into coincidence, etc. I do not set myself the task here of analysing the aesthetic consciousness of beauty in poetry, limiting myself to formal dissections of the subject matter of aesthetic poetic perception. And from this point of view, I attach considerable importance to the aforementioned analogue.

Similar to a logically formulated term, the transfer of an image from one context to another causes a change in its aesthetic interpretation and understanding. An image requires precision. Context modifies it, and it influences the formation of context. There are many cases of a poet "quoting" another poet, and this is not a simple insertion of a line or image from another poet's poem into one's own poem, but often a new quasi-logical — "poetic" development of the image itself.

The fools believed it, and passed it on to
others; The old women immediately
sounded the alarm —

And here is public opinion, And
here is the motherland!

(Griboedov)

Of course, there should be contempt
For the price of his amusing words;
But whispers, the laughter of
fools... And now public opinion!

(Pushkin)

Perhaps more interesting are other cases where the image compels the choice of precise expression. For example, Pushkin writes:

In the barren and deaf desert, On
soil scorched by the heat, Anchar,
like a formidable sentry,
Grows, alone in the entire universe,

and corrects: "withered and sparse" and "stands". The first correction gives the image strength: it is unlikely that the correction here is motivated purely by the acoustic superiority of some epithets over others. "Skinny and deaf" "desert" is so common that it seems to be one word, the internal structure seems to have disappeared, erased, fundamentum comparationis not is felt. "Sparse" — already brighter and fresher, and "stingy" — already strikingly bright, unexpected, fundamentum comparationis is quite palpable. And by the way, regarding the previous point: how, for example, does the visual image-representation of a desert in general differ from that of a barren desert, and how do both of them differ from that of a stingy desert?

But "stands" instead of "grows" is directly caused by the logic of the meaning of the image itself. "Anchar" grows, but "guard" stands. The comparison forces a change in the expression of the object itself; it seems to bring with it the requirement for a new context and a new "position" of things, and the context of the image corrects the context of the logic in which it was "presented".

came the thought. What here matter not in "visibility", clear from

the resulting "visual contradiction": the watchman is "alone in the entire universe," but the scheme, the internal poetic form, does not suffer from this. Nor does it suffer from the fact that the further description in the play also "contradicts" the introductory image of the "watchman" ("Poison drips through his bark... No bird flies to him, And no tiger comes...') — i.e. to that which 'grows', and not to that which 'stands'). The point is not in visuality, but in *sui generis* commonality, i.e. in thought and mental contemplation, rather than sensual. I have already had occasion to describe this commonality as "typicality," the selection of a characteristic feature in place of a (logically) essential one. A typical position, achieved through comparison, for example, acts as a characteristic not only of the given, depicted position, but also of similar ones. Similarity is not an object of sensory perception or representation. Something like "the sun is an eye" is a typical position, not a visual "image" (for whose eye is it — a pike's or a crab's? And the eye of a pike, a crab or an owl is a concept and an image, not a "picture": nature morte, portrait, landscape, illustration for Brehm). In this respect, it is also clear how the word itself, from a "sign" that is generally used arbitrarily, becomes a symbol, i.e. a canonised image. The very process of becoming is also clear in the light of intellectual poetic creativity.

Despite the clarity, in general, relations, determining "image" as an internal poetic form, there are frequent references to the fact that visual images do indeed accompany the perception of the poetic word. But since there is no essential connection between them, this addition should be attributed not to the nature of the form itself, but exclusively to the perceiving individual. In some individuals, visual representation can contribute to the vividness of perception and the aesthetic nature of its experience, but in others it can certainly be a hindrance. The same role is played by the "associations" that flash up in an individual for individual reasons, accompanying direct perception, although it is precisely to them that psychological aesthetics (Fechner) sometimes tried to attribute a decisive role and transferred to them the aesthetic responsibility for what is perceived. Similarly, the emotional tone accompanying these ideas and associations, which are incidental to the matter at hand but familiar and intimate to the individual, is not necessarily aesthetic in nature. There may also be "emotions" of a different kind,

non-aesthetic and unaesthetic, which may either hinder or facilitate aesthetic experience. Each individual could or should compose their own personal aesthetic equation on this subject and use it to correct their subjective experience, restoring its objective, objective meaning.

Let us agree to denote this personal correction, this addition to and subtraction from objective aesthetic perception, with the symbol: $\pm S$.

IV

I

Can semantic content as such, i.e. independently of its logical and poetic forms, be the subject of aesthetic perception and, consequently, a source of aesthetic pleasure? If the opposition of form to content is understood in absolute terms, then the answer in favour of forms alone is unequivocal and categorical. In reality, such an answer is illusory. Absolute matter is

pure non-existence, unconsciousness, meon. And only as a methodological construct can the concept of absolute matter be useful in scientific analysis. Applied to the word "pure," its content, its pure meaning, would mean, contrary to the task at hand, precisely nonsense, internal contradiction. A "pure" thought, without logical (verbal) forms, is nonsense, unthinkable. As has been pointed out, it is not through the absolute opposition of form and content, through the selection of forms, that we arrive at the idea of a certain

"residue." This is, as it were, the limit of perception and thinking. As such, it is essentially empirical, i.e., it testifies to the limitations of knowledge at a given moment. The fundamentally material "residue" is subject to further resolution into forms. The problem of "meaning" and

"understanding" has been studied too little, and little can be said about their immanent forms, their nature and type, but it is clear a priori in which direction to look for these forms, since meaning is not only etymologically co-meaning.

Those forms that may be inherent in meaning itself, i.e., in the raw material that is subject to conscious and systematic logical and poetic elaboration, were conditionally called "natural" above. The point of the previous question is precisely to find out whether there is an objective basis in meaning as such for its aesthetic awareness. The question takes on fundamental philosophical significance if we consider that the comprehension of meaning, understanding as a function of the mind, is presented by us as analogous to sensory perception as *sui generis* perception or intellectual and intelligible intuition. Can understanding as a pure activity of the mind be the basis for a kind of aesthetic enjoyment? Can philosophy itself, for example, be a source of aesthetic joy and, therefore, a kind of art? Are Plato's eros and beauty of thought not an illusion?

The assertion of the "meaning" of immanent, "natural" forms *eo ipso* puts an end to speculation about the opposition between form and content and suggests a positive answer to the question posed. The problem of aesthetic enjoyment, as in other cases, is only a particular one here and can be shown as a specification more of the general problem about "enthusiasm", "mania",

"passion" and "passionate" thought in general. Aesthetic pleasure

— is only a special case. Without prejudging the question of how

— a general property, I will note an interesting feature of the immanent form of content associated with aesthetic perception. Undoubtedly, it is not only ontological in nature, but is directly predetermined by the ideal properties of the object. But since the proper forms of content are certain relations between a possible ideal object and its actual material realisations, such a relation, at least by limiting ideal possibilities, introduces modifications into pure ontological forms, depriving them, first of all, of their purity. Proper semantic forms are constructed in the form of analogues of poetic forms (forms of sound-word combinations): (internal logical forms) = (forms of material content combinations): (ideal ontic forms). This confirms the fact that has long

underlying the comparison between the work of the "creator" of the world, the Demiurge, and the work of the artist.

, although guiding in constructing content, The "plot" remains an ideal ontological form, but when viewed abstractly, the new modified forms attract more attention than the content itself. One feature of these forms is particularly important from an aesthetic point of view. Although each plot can be formulated as a general proposition, maxim, aphorism or proverb, this generality is not a generality of concept, but a typical generality that is not defined but characterised. As a result, any successful embodiment of a plot is easily individualised and strongly associated with a specific name. This makes it possible to easily and concisely designate a plot with a single name: "Don Juan," "Childe Harold," "Daphnis and Chloe," "Manon Lescaut," etc.

An essential feature of the individual is that we consider it primarily in terms of the intensity of its characteristics and even completely exclude extensive characteristics from the idea, or rather, ignore them. This necessarily entails that the plot unfolds in our consciousness as a series of temporal events. Since we are talking about the ideal unfolding of the plot, the use of the term "temporal" inaccurately, as well as speech does not refer to empirical "astronomical" time, namely that ideal necessary sequence in which the intensity of the individual is conceived, and which could only be called absolute temporal, and whose prototype we see in the law of unfolding, for example, of a mathematical numerical series.

No matter how indifferent to the tasks of poetics we may take the form of conveying the plot itself, in the most elementary conveyance the plot already reveals in itself a "play" of forms, indeed analogous to poetic forms. Here we already encounter parallelism, contrast, transformation, a chain of links, etc. Indeed, "content" takes the form of a form, the role of matter in relation to which takes on itself that what is commonly called "motif" in the poetics of the plot and what could be called, in relation to any content, an element. The method of constructing content from elements — so to speak, the scheme

of combining atoms of matter into molecules — in its dynamics, and it is on the objective consciousness of this that emotional experiences, moods, excitement, etc. are based. Further analysis, of course, will also reveal form in the "atom," and therefore Veselovsky is right, for example, when he speaks of "formulas" and "schemes" not only of plots, but also of motifs.

Let us compare, for example, the stories of Oedipus, Don Juan, Prometheus, and Elizabeth of Hungary from this point of view. Regardless of the poetic forms of representation of these stories that we know, we can talk about the different emotional tones with which these stories are coloured in our minds. King Oedipus can evoke horror, disgust, depression, and other feelings, but it seems to me that hardly anyone would agree that this story is aesthetic in itself. [7] Similarly, plots such as Don Juan, Prometheus, and Faust do not, at least at first glance, arouse aesthetic interest. On the contrary, no matter how much

's legend nor moralised — but, as is known, there is and directly immoral developments of this plot, — Elizabeth's miracle with flowers primarily evokes an aesthetic effect.

The plot of Elizabeth of Hungary is beautiful — means that that in The "natural" given nature of the motifs predetermines the form of presentation and externalisation, which inevitably produce an aesthetic effect. It has, so to speak, an innate internal poetic form; without it, there is no plot. In fact, in order to introduce it into the content, it is necessary to spend time depicting certain moments: the character of her husband; her relationship to her lover (according to more

"Christian" version — to the poor); the sudden appearance of her formidable husband, who catches her in the act of committing a crime. Then suddenly — inevitably suddenly — flowers! It is this "suddenly", this unexpected denouement, that creates the effect. But at the same time, it is precisely this need to end the "speech" that shows that without reference to "sign", without "appearance", there would be no aesthetic experience. Nevertheless — if only because there is a reason for such an "appeal" — we can speak here of a special aesthetic moment, which, if it does not constitute a fundamentally special addition as an independent factor, since it is absorbed by the poetic form itself, to the overall impression, is nevertheless a kind of additional coefficient, exaggerating the effective power of this form itself. In general, it seems to increase the aesthetic

potential of the subject, making it "easier" to express in canonical forms.

Thus, even a purely intellectual, rational, intelligible act of understanding can have its own aesthetic atmosphere. If we turn from the objectivity of meaning to the correlative fluctuations of the act itself, we can discern yet another source of aesthetic relation to what is understood. Thus, understanding can be clear or unclear, easily or difficultly incorporating a given content into the context necessary for understanding. Moreover, since this context can be either the context of understanding the plot in general or the context of a given "sphere of conversation," apperception in general and understanding in the proper sense, there may be a peculiar interruption between the two. The latter either enlivens aesthetic perception or hinders it. Similarly, the same effect can be produced by the uncertainty and "interference" of semantic emphasis, its possible timing, on the one hand, and the accumulation and layering of meaning and its applications, on the other.

People still talk about the "several" meanings of a word. This is inaccurate. There is only one meaning, but its transmission can be more or less complex. Medieval biblical exegesis elevated the distinction between four meanings to almost canonical status, especially since the time of Bonaventure and Thomas Aquinas. This fourfold distinction is already found in Bede the Venerable; others distinguished seven or more "meanings," others fewer. All of this basically goes back to Jewish exegesis and Hellenistic philology. ^[8]

We find the poetic application of the distinction between four meanings (literal, allegorical, moral, anagogical) in Dante (*Il Convito* and the dubious letter to Congrande). The only meaning is actually "allegorical," which Dante himself characterises as "true." We arrive at it from the images and tropes of the "literal." This results in two "languages" — the given and the implied — but the meaning is one. The "moral" meaning — is not the meaning, but the "application" and the "lesson."

The "anagogical" meaning, or super-meaning (*sovra senso*), is the understanding of what is stated in terms of eternal or divine truth — in reality, again, is only the possibility of translating

of what has been stated into a new "language". Explicite, this occurs, for example, in any metaphysical exposition that hypostasises phenomena and thoughts and gives the hypostasised fictions — non-existent "realities" — a quasi-objective meaning

of a "second," "true," "real," etc. "world." Strictly speaking, the introduction of anagogical interpretation into poetry would destroy it, since it would require the recognition of the significance of existing reality behind poetic fictional reality. Poetry is not metaphysics. But since the consciousness of the fiction of the poetic sphere of being is not lost, anagogical "translation" of the narrative can pleasantly complicate the overall impression aesthetically. The Divine Comedy is the best example of this.

Finally, the "mental matter" of words also includes various fluctuations in the ease or difficulty of understanding caused by familiarity, banality, novelty, paradoxicality, etc. of the content, which also complicate the aesthetic effect of poetic expression.

Above all this, like a foundation, rises an emotional and aesthetic superstructure. The formality that it feels beneath itself is the formality of the plot itself, and its connection with the intellectual factor of the perception of the plot is a connection with the pure act of understanding, albeit one that is contained and implied in the necessary act of predication, which is tethetic or synthetic in nature, when establishing the "word". Until the tethetic act is complete, until the content is "affirmed," the fluctuations of aesthetic

"mood" do not cease. Its completion, however, is not a complete cessation of the fluctuations of the mind that grasp meaning or intelligible intuitions. This is what speaks in favour of the perception of meaning as a new independent factor of the aesthetic organisation of consciousness in the intellectual-material division of the structure of the word. The final moment that concludes the fluctuations and establishes the very nature of aesthetic enjoyment is the reduction of the plot to a purely aesthetic category: majestic, heroic, graceful, comic, ugly, etc.

We will denote the positive value of "content" as an aesthetic factor with the symbol: M; in order to emphasise the availability

the "natural" immanent forms, the "ideality" of content, highlighted as the semantic core of all conceivable content, we will write: Mf.

A pure object as a form without content, i.e. as a form into which any content specified by definition can be inserted, is easy to conceive and analyse. It goes without saying that from the point of view of that completely general definition

"word" from which the present argument proceeds, "object" is conceived everywhere not only as correlation "representation" or "concept", but also as "state of affairs", "circumstance", as "object" (Meynong's term), correlative to "position" (Satz) or "proposition". The givenness of an object in this sense is analytically prior to the givenness of meaning, just as "understanding" or "having in mind" an object is prior to understanding its content. The object is given first and foremost as a certain task, and therefore what constitutes the constitutive forms of content has yet to be found. These forms are revealed, however, in the process of our familiarisation with the object. The first moment of encounter with it is the attraction of our attention and interest to it. Only at this moment is it, strictly speaking, pure. It is not yet bound — for our consciousness — by logical chains and appears to us "in itself." Conversely, in order to obtain its pure givenness, it is necessary to remove its verbal forms and clothing in abstraction.

If we could think "without words," perhaps we would be able to obtain a pure object without the aforementioned purification, and the conditions for its establishment would probably be different than they are now. Meanwhile, the vagueness of naming — not as words with meaning, not as the investment of words, but simply as indications, where the utterance of sounds replaces, say, the pointing of a finger — already introduces vacillation and uncertainty into the establishment of the object. But even with complete certainty of indication, we easily accept an essential feature of the given object as insignificant, and vice versa, we hypostasise

the ideal, we substantiate properties and attributes, we materialise forms, etc.

All this may be of little significance for poetics as such, unless one sees in these very "errors" the product of creative imagination and, consequently, a source of aesthetic pleasure. For poetics, in any case, all modalities of subject implication already appear in logical guise. On the other hand, overly crude logical errors — inaccuracies in the perception of objects, which are often not only sources of logical errors but are directly called logical errors — can destroy the aesthetic impression. But, as with purely logical errors, creative imagination can use inaccurate perception of an object within certain limits for specifically aesthetic purposes, constructing the object in a comical, satirical, caricatured way, etc. There can be no doubt that here too — in the development of the object as detached — there is its own ontological regularity, which determines the fantastic construction in the same way that cutting a square diagonally predetermines the formation of two equal triangles, right-angled and isosceles.

When considering an object without words, perhaps it would be impossible to speak of meaninglessness, because in the absence of an object as a "term," there could be no meaning as a relationship between a thing and an object. This means that it would not be "nonsense" that would take place, but simply nothingness, 0, in place of meaning, i.e. we would not think about anything, we would not suspect the need to think, thought would not be awakened, it would be absent, just as thoughts about a wife and marriage, a servant and service do not arise when we say: "Chinese," and until we say: "married," "sir." True, when constructing the fiction of a wordless object, we still speak about its sensual content , "represented", "perceived". But here too, we must distinguish between irrelevance as absence of subject and as confusion, its "sensual" absurdity. The first, for example, occurs in a state of absolute anesthetic consciousness — fainting, "loss of consciousness"; the second — a disorder of noetic and imaginative acts — hallucinations, for example.

But is it possible for verbiage to be meaningless? It could be, first and foremost, a purely acoustic phenomenon that has no meaning,

having a "meaning" (role, function) that is only emotional-expressive or indicative, generally the meaning of a "sign without meaning." Aesthetically, it would be assessed, for example, by its musicality: tra-la-la... — forte (crescendo) or na-na-na... — piano (diminuendo). This applies to the form Σ . Then, meaninglessness can also indicate nonsense, absurdity, internal contradiction. Such a phrase is not detached from meaning and is not only a deictic sign, but a real word. But, strictly speaking, it has meaning, and this meaning is nonsense — for example, abracadabra, a white crow, a round square — and "meaninglessness" is a kind of object, a *sui generis* object. Whatever its logical meaning may be, a "meaningless word" can have a positive aesthetic value, since it still reveals its own internal poetic forms. The latter also apply to meaningless words, subjecting them to their own laws or construction techniques. We construct nonsense along the paths of parallelism, contrast, etc., as well as according to the rules of syntax ("the street walks on a chicken"). The aesthetic meaning of the corresponding "poems" refers to Π . Naturally, these cases should be distinguished from metaphorical play, where nonsense is only "appearance" and is felt only in cases of extreme sharpness, novelty of metaphor, or special attention to it — "he stunned him with a pseudo-sphere," "Pavlusha could no longer fit Pythagoras' trousers into his head."

An object as a pure given, as a point of focus of attention, despite its constitutive indivisibility, does not always remain entirely non-aesthetic. But its aesthetic effect, precisely because it is an object of attention, is determined by its general position in the sphere of consciousness and specifically in the clear field of attention. Fluctuations in attention and apperception of an object can either be influenced by "external" factors or originate from the object itself, such as "uninteresting," "deceptive interest," "expectation," etc. The object undergoes a special aesthetic modification — not without the influence, however, of the plot — as an object that is " " "insignificant," " " "serious," " " "banal," " " "vulgar,"

"erased," etc., which in turn arouses *sui generis* interest.

Let us designate the aesthetic role of the pure object through:

Psychologism, interfering with the uneducated analytical perception of the object, often substitutes "thing" and "representation" for pure authentic objects and relationships and, accordingly, modifies aesthetic perception. But this is a subjective factor, whose disruptive role cannot be predicted in the characteristics of the object itself. It is a kind of subjective constant, defined through a personal equation and added as + or - to the overall aesthetic impression. Let us denote it by $\pm r$.

V

I

The objective structure of a word, like the atmosphere of the earth, is enveloped in a subjective, personal, biographical, authorial breath. This division of the verbal structure is in an exceptional position, and, strictly speaking, it should be placed in a special section of scientific knowledge. It should have no place in the discussion of poetics, just as it has no place in the resolution of questions of logic. But even more than in the consideration of the movement of scientific thought, it is still impossible to interpret poetic works without looking into the author's biography. To this day, historians and theorists of "literature" rummage under the sofas and beds of poets, as if with the help of the utensils sometimes found there they could fill in the missing understanding of what the poet said and wrote in black and white. In simpler language, this non-literary activity is touchingly and loftily called the explanation of poetry from the poet, from his "soul," which is broad, deep, and generally possesses all the hyperbolic-spatial qualities. On more "terminated" language, this is called, in a meaningless but sonorous Greek word, the "historical" or "psychological method" — which, without knowledge of the true psychological method, passes for good.

If not an excuse, then an explanation for such philistinism in science may be that not only — lofty or servile —

human interest in the human soul draws us into the realm of the poet's biography, but also the methodological requirements of studying poetry itself. Firstly, the poet not only "expresses" and

"communicates," but also, as already mentioned, makes an impression. If only to separate poetic interpretation from expressive interpretation, one needs to know both. Secondly, again, in order to identify the objective meaning of a poem, one needs to know what we empathise with in the author, so as not to confuse this with what needs to be understood. After all, when a ragman pulls rags out of a pile of rubbish, he lifts and turns over piles of gnawed bones, tin cans, decayed coals and other rubbish that can bring back all sorts of memories and emotions.

As for the first point, instinctive attempts to single it out as a special subject of study have existed, perhaps, since [9] distinguished poetics and rhetoric. basis its

"impression" of a word does not depend on the specific characteristics of the word as such, and should be compared with "impression" from other ways and means of expressive "expression of sensations and feelings." Genetic theories, which derived meaningful words from expression, have caused a lot of confusion here. The simplest observation is enough to notice that the development of meaningful word usage and its emotional coloring proceed independently of each other and reach agreement relatively late. The special, often charming peculiarity of children's speech is well known, stemming from the child's use of strong emotional statements and assessments without a trace of corresponding experiences and without coordination with meaning. A child's emotional expressiveness precedes any use of words, but post hoc does not mean propter hoc, and squeals, squeaks, screams, and cries do not turn into thoughts, just as the sun does not turn into the moon at night. A child writhes in impulsive movements and gestures, but regardless of the artistry he achieves in them, he begins to recognise and name things, and then to understand and communicate. Much later, this is associated with

"meaningful" gestures and emotional expression are associated with this. There are individuals who fully master impulsive movements and yet, until the end of their days, are unable to coordinate what they communicate with their expression.

Another source of confusion is explanatory aesthetic theories that take simple facts of empathy, introjection, etc. as explanations. Not to mention the fact that it is precisely this that requires explanation, namely how these facts can serve as sources of aesthetic pleasure, it is fundamentally wrong to assume that this is the entire source of the aesthetic nature of words and that in its other functions, the word evokes an aesthetic impression according to the same principle of empathy.

Undoubtedly, sympathetic understanding is generally the way in which we penetrate the "soul" that emanates in expression. But through sympathetic understanding, we empathise not only with the aesthetic experience of the other who communicates the word. Moreover, if we limit ourselves only to, so to speak, aesthetic sympathetic experience, we will not explain anything, since then we would have to admit that we aesthetically perceive only what is aesthetically experienced by the communicator himself. In reality, we can pass by the communicator's aesthetic emotions without aesthetic excitement, and vice versa, we experience aesthetic impressions where he does not. This fact is the basis for corresponding "deceptions," pretences, theatrical performances, etc. In general, these facts only confirm the presence "unconscious" (actually anesthetic) sympathetic understanding, since they are directly aimed at it. In an actor's stage performance, we know in advance about the "pretence" and acting, and yet our sympathetic reaction is not destroyed by this. But it is clear that their varying strength and quality depend not on the very fact of sympathetic perception of expression, but on the characteristics of that expression. Acting can be "good" or "bad."

Despite the fact that we perceive expression through "sympathy" and subjectively, we look at expression in our aesthetic assessment as a *sui generis* object. The intentionality or unintentionality of the object-like nature of expression does not change for us; it must still take the form of something capable of having an aesthetic impact on the perceiver. The impression of (the expression of) affection, anger, protest, contempt, hatred, etc. must take on an objective form, based on the semantic forms of words. Similar to direct sensory impressions

from the forms of sound-word combinations, here we are dealing, therefore, with sensory forms of combination. Emotions have their own forms, just like combinations. But just as in the simplest sensation, the sensory (emotional) tone presses on it, colours it, differing from it itself, so in the perception of a word as a whole, expression is its colouring, hovering over it.

Cases of complex layering of aesthetic experiences are particularly interesting. We perceive intonation, tone, timbre, rhythm, etc. as sensations, the combination of which excites us aesthetically. But these same intonations, rhythms, etc., since they serve the purpose of expression and reveal the speaker's emotional state, evoke their own aesthetic experiences. One builds on the other. But further, these emotional states can be feelings of joy, sadness, anger, love, envy, but also aesthetic pleasure. The latter objectifies itself and forms the basis for the next level of aesthetic experience. On top of all this, when listening, for example, to Hamlet on stage, we distinguish the words of Hamlet himself, perhaps also Shakespeare's, and certainly those of the actor portraying Hamlet. All this causes one personal expressiveness to be layered on top of another, all of them on top of a meaningful word, not to mention the visual sources of aesthetic pleasure. However, it is enough for any two layers to "diverge" and interruptions begin, "aesthetic contradictions" that destroy the entire structure. No less a threat to such destruction is the fact that sympathetic understanding often elicits a reaction in us that the expression does not anticipate. Thus, the threats of the depicted hero may cause us to feel boredom, his fear and trepidation — a feeling of contempt, etc., to such an extent that they drown out the aesthetic feeling required by the depicted expression. An unsuccessful author can ruin a talented actor, and an "unlikable" actor (towards whom the viewer feels personal dislike or who has an "unpleasant" voice, etc.) can "ruin" a good role.

For aesthetic perception, emotion must have its own emotional forms, determined by the laws of its emotional "harmony," "balance" of emotion, or, in other words, the laws of balance of expression. The latter could be omitted, since expressions are emotions themselves (as

a word is a thought) — for the perceiver, at least. And just as emotions and expression are inseparable for experiencing them, so it must be for perception. Their identity is the basic principle of sympathetic understanding. The fact of "feigned" expression — for the perceiver — feigned emotion — contradicts this as little as the utterance of words by those who do not understand them, for example, reading a poem in an unfamiliar language (as singers sometimes sing foreign romances, learning them by heart from a transcription familiar to them). True, one can automatically repeat someone else's words without understanding them, but one cannot invent them, "create" them, and an actor precisely "creates" in his expression. However, even an actor would not "invent" expressions, if (and to the audience) were absolutely alien to him. "unknown" emotions, and if the actor's creativity did not consist in the fact that the ability to sympathise and imitate can be developed in him to the point of becoming a gift, a talent.

Let us agree to denote the aesthetic impression of expressiveness that surrounds words, sounds and word semantics with the symbol e, which is their common exponent.

The second of the above points is entirely a matter of psychological interest in the person of the author of the word. Interpretation of the word from this point of view is an interpretation of the author's behaviour in terms of his truthfulness or falsehood, his benevolent or malicious attitude towards what is being communicated, his belief in it or his doubts about it, his reverent or cynical attitude towards it, his conviction in it, his fear of it, his enthusiasm, etc., etc. No matter how many qualities of his attitude towards what is being communicated we list, all these qualities are, first, psychological, and second, his, the author's, the subject for whom what is being communicated is the same subject as for us, although it may evoke completely different emotional experiences in us than in him. If, just now, we were talking about the expressive properties of words, which could be the subject of our attention regardless of their author, now our interest is focused solely on the author. When we listen to an actor, we are not listening to the actor, but to

the hero or the author of the play; when we read Hamlet, we shift our attention to Shakespeare; and so on.

Addressing the author also occurs on the basis of sympathetic understanding and with regard to expression. But expression here is only a pretext, and sympathetic understanding is only a starting point. External expression requires a transition to its depths, to its constant source, to its guiding principle. Sympathetic understanding must be followed by a systematic acquaintance with the author and his personality. What is important here is not the "impression" made by the content of the words, but the opportunity that their expressiveness provides to penetrate the author's "soul". At first, we only point it out in his expressions, understand what he is saying, but we also want to guess what he wants to say, how he relates to what he is saying, to what he is saying, to what is being communicated, and to the communicator's own behaviour. What is important to us now is not objective meaning his speeches, but his own

"experience" them as his own personal actions and as some kind of objectifiable socio-individual fact. We guess on the basis of sympathetic understanding, picking up on the corresponding intonations of his voice, taking into account, for example, the calmness or interruptions — natural and feigned — of his speech, intentional or "accidental", from the depths of his soul and character traits, as well as from his cultural awareness or ignorance, creative tensions or passive repetition, resulting "figurativeness" of his speech, lowered or raised voice, indicating his irritation, envy, jealousy, suspicion, etc., etc.

On the basis of these initial guesses and "intuition," we begin to "consciously" reproduce, construct, and paint a general picture of his personality and character. Here we need to familiarise ourselves with other facts about his behaviour in similar and opposite situations, drawn from other sources, as well as facts drawn from his biography. Sympathetic imitation plays an increasingly smaller role, replaced by congenial reproduction. Expressive details are interesting not in themselves, but as fragments of a whole, from which the whole must be reconstructed. What is sympathetically given is rationalised and elevated to an effect, a symptom of a certain

constancy, which is patiently, systematically and methodically selected, compiled and reconstructed as a whole face.

Behind every word of the author, we now begin to hear his voice, guess his thoughts, and suspect his behaviour. The words retain all their meaning, but we are interested in a kind of special intimate meaning that has its own intimate forms. The meaning of the word is accompanied by a kind of co-meaning. In reality, this is a quasi-meaning, a parergon in relation to the ergon of the word, but it is on this parergon that attention is focused. What is said loses its relevance and actively conscious impact; it is perceived automatically. What is important is how it is said, in what form of emotional experience. Only some kind of surprise, a paradox in what is being communicated, can temporarily interrupt and distract attention, but then we turn even more intently to the author, striving to see behind the paradox and decide whether the impression he creates of his personality is consistent with another or not.

Just as forms of pure expressiveness were compared as analogous to sensory forms of combination, so forms of co-meaning can be considered analogous to logical forms of meaning. The latter are assumed to have their own psycho-ontological forms. And we can speak of a special ontology of the soul, where "things" are "characters," "individualities," "persons" — subjects of study in individual, differential, and characterological psychology, or where a collective person, collective subject, and bearer of experiences is assumed — in ethnic, social, collective psychology (material: folklore, "folk" creativity as opposed to individual verbal creativity).

In general, the author's personality acts as an analogue of the word. Personality is a word and requires understanding. It has its own sensual, ontological, logical, and poetic forms. The latter are constructed as a relationship between the expressive forms of random facts of its behaviour and the internal forms of the regularity of its character. Aesthetic perception has its own categories here. Aesthetic pleasure is evoked by the "structure" of character as "whole" ("unity in diversity"), "harmonious," "consistent in behaviour," "sublime in

feelings," "heroic," "graceful in manner," "grand in design," etc.

For the possibility of aesthetic perception of personality even more than in the aesthetic perception of the expressiveness of the signs themselves, one needs to free oneself from one's personal reactions to personality as an object of contemplation. In our consciousness, it can become entangled in the completely impenetrable fog of our "likes" and "dislikes," experiences that are not aesthetic, and sometimes even hostile to it. A loving attitude can be no less of a hindrance here than a hostile one, and reverence no less than condescension. One must step back, as it were, in order to identify and evaluate one's aesthetic attitude towards the personality and its type. Its individual forms are typical, and we can easily attribute to the personality an emotional reaction that is familiar to us in relation to the corresponding type. One could say that an aesthetic attitude towards a personality ultimately grows out of overcoming a sympathetic understanding of it. It, is "overcoming", only and capable of creating the necessary "balance".

Let us designate the aesthetic significance of the perception of the personality of the author of the word as a certain constant coefficient S to the word itself in all its objective phonetic and semasiological functions.

VI

General parodic-mathematical formula of aesthetic perception of words is composed as follows:

Moscow, 19 February 1922.

notes

Notes

1

Klinger noted the same trait in Faust, though not with Pushkin's expressiveness. According to Klinger, Faust had a burning imagination, "which was never satisfied with the present, noticing the emptiness and incompleteness of what had been achieved at the very moment of enjoyment."

2

For clarification of the terms I use in the above, cf. my
article Subject and tasks in ethnic psychology
in
Psychological Review" 1916 , I-IV, and in Introduction
to Ethnic Psychology. — Issue I. — Pb.: Kolos, 1923.

3

Phonetics itself (as the physiology of speech sounds) does not study this, i.e. it cannot justify it; for phonetics, a phoneme is a given. Only semiotics can justify the differences between a sign and a "simple" sound.

4

In general, I am borrowing only the term from Humboldt, but I am giving it my own meaning. A knowledgeable reader will recall the contrast between external and internal form in Scherer's Poetics, but will also note that it has no connection with my use of the term (Scherer W. Poetik. - B., 1888. - S. 226 ff.).

5

[The author accepts no responsibility for the spelling of this word.]

6

Compare, of course, planting mutatis mutandis
examples and their explanation in Carriere. — Carriere
M. Die Poesie. - 2nd ed. - Leipzig, 1884.
- p. 100 ff.

It seems debatable to me whether ancient tragedy pursued aesthetic or exclusively aesthetic goals in its depiction of this subject. Indirectly, among other things, this is further evidence that poetics is not a "part" of aesthetics. The progenitor of all poetics, Aristotle's Poetics is not an aesthetic or exclusively aesthetic treatise in our sense; and his "catharsis" is far from having only aesthetic significance. In some respects, it is the third part of his Ethics: ethics, dianoetics, and poetics, respectively. However, Aristotle's ethics is not "ethics" in the modern sense. This does not contradict Bucher's vigorously defended assertion that Aristotle consciously eliminates didactics from poetics (p. 221s): cf. Butcher himself pp. 233, 238 (The aesthetic representation of character he views under ethical lights, and the different types of character he reduces to moral categories); cf. also p. 337ff Butcher Aristotle's Theory of Poetry etc. 4 ed. Ldn. 1911.

8

See my book: Hermeneutics and Its Problems.

9

The most comprehensive study (known to me) on the difference between Dichtkunst and Sprachkunst is a book rich in historical references and examples: Gerber G. *Die Sprache als Kunst*. B. I-II. - 2 Aufl. - B 1885; in particular, see: B. I. - p. 50ff. and B.

II. - p. 501ff. The author's main idea on the subject that interests us is the deepening of the ancient division: die Sprachkunst first overcomes the difficulties of embodying the soul in sound, then the hardened, abstract language, which has become only a sign, tries to animate it to the point of individual expression; poetry, on the other hand, requires that language satisfy the consciousness of the species, and the sensual liveliness with which poetry is often discussed emphasises that, as far as language is concerned, only particulars are involved, and the liveliness of the whole, and therefore of the work of art itself, rests in poetry on the depth and grandeur of thought (p. 53). I will quote one interesting passage: In poetry, therefore, the whole weight falls on the writing, the invention, the transformation, the reshaping of the phenomenal world, the entanglement of thoughts, the struggle of ideas; in the art of language, on the perfection of the representation of a moment of the soul through language; the poet invents complications, solutions, circumstances, situations, gives a worldview; the language artist invents words, sentence formations, figurations, sayings, gives the image of a moment of life of the soul (p. 52). Not everything in Gerber's work is unambiguous, acceptable and modern, but, alas, much that has been buried alive needs to be brought back from the graveyard.

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