HISTORY OF ROME

SELECTIONS

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BOOKS

Rome

BOOK ONE

From the beginnings of Rome to the abolition of the monarchy

INTRODUCTION

The Mediterranean Sea, with its many arms that cut deeply into the continent, forms the largest gulf in the ocean; sometimes narrowed by islands and promontories, sometimes spreading out over a wide area, it both separates and unites the three parts of the ancient world. It is on the shores of this sea that nations once lived which, from an ethnographic and philological point of view, belong to different races, but which, historically, form a complete unity. This is what has been rather inappropriately called the history of the ancient world. It would be more appropriate to call it the history of the civilisation of the Mediterranean peoples. In its successive phases, it first presents us with the Cophtic or Egyptian branch, on the southern shore of the Mediterranean; then the nation of

Then there were the twin peoples, the Hellenes and the Italians, who had their share of the European shores of the Mediterranean. At the outset, each of these histories was closely linked to that of other nations and other civilisations, but they soon all entered their own individual revolutions. The nations of similar or foreign origin that surrounded this

The Berbers and Negroes of Africa, the Arabs, the Persians, the East Indians, the Celts and the Germanic peoples of Europe have all had many links with the peoples who inhabited the shores of the Mediterranean, but they have neither given them nor borrowed from them any of the elements that make up their culture.

civilisation; and, as far as we can delimit exactly the field of a civilisation, we can consider as an isolated unit the one whose culminating points are called Thebes, Carthage and Rome. The four Nations we have named, after having gone through all the phases of a brilliant

civilisation, passed from one to the other and developed, each in their own way, the richest elements of human nature. Then, their race came to an end, and new peoples who had not yet been born were born.

had, so to speak, beaten the borders of civilisation, as the sea beats its shores without penetrating them, flooded its shores on two sides, and, cutting off, from the historical point of view, the southern continent from the northern, transferred the focus of civilisation from the Mediterranean to the Ocean. What we call modern history is in fact the evolution of a new sphere of development, which in many respects may well be linked to the decadence and fall of the Mediterranean States, just as these are linked to the primitive civilisation of the Indo-Germans, but which was called upon to follow its own path, and to experience fully all the vicissitudes of happiness and prosperity.

social misfortune. In this way, she has gone through her youth, her manhood and her old age in turn.

It has tasted the peaceful enjoyment of slowly amassed material and intellectual goods, and then undoubtedly also the decadence of the creative force exhausted by the satiety of possession. It is true that possession is fleeting, for while a particular civilisation may successively cover all the points of the periphery, the same cannot be said of humanity. Just when it thinks it has reached the end of its course, humanity sees a vaster and grander career opening up for it to follow.

Our aim is to bring to life the last act of this great drama of humanity, the ancient history of the nation that occupied the peninsula between the three that break away from the continent and extend into the Mediterranean.

It is the history of Italy, and not that of the city of Rome, that we set out to tell here.

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THE LATIN SETTLEMENTS THE

BEGINNINGS OF ROME

ROME'S HEGEMONY IN LATIUM

According to the most remote traditions, the middle of the peninsula was inhabited by two peoples, or rather two branches of the same people, whose position in the Indo-Germanic family is easier to determine than that of the Iapygian race. We can boldly call this people the Italiotes, because it is on them that the historical importance of the peninsula rests. They are divided into two branches, the Latins on one side, and on the other the Umbrians with their southern offshoots, the Marsi and Samnites, and the colonies founded by the Samnites from the earliest historical times.

The plain of Latium must have been, in primitive times, the theatre of the greatest events in history.
It was a time of natural upheaval, as the slow action of alluvial deposits and the eruptions of powerful volcanoes lifted layer by layer the soil on which the world's empire was to be decided. Latium is closed off to the east by the Sabine and Aecian mountains, which belong to the Roman Empire.
the Apennines, to the south by the Volsci mountains, which reach a height of four thousand feet and are separated from the Apennine chain by the ancient territory of the Hernics, the Sacco plateau (Trerus, tributary of the Liris) and which, extending towards the west, end at the Terracine promontory,

by the sea, which at this point forms only mediocre harbours on the coast; to the north this region penetrates a little into the mountainous territory of Etruria. Thus surrounded, Latium forms a magnificent plain watered by the Tiber, "the torrent of the mountains", which comes from Umbria, and by the Anio, which comes from the Sabine mountains.

The story of the founding of Rome by Albanian emigrants under the leadership of the Albanian princes Romulus and Remus is nothing more than a naive attempt by quasi-ancient history to explain the singularity of this settlement in a place less healthy and fertile than many others in Europe. peninsula, and link the origins of Rome to the metropolis of Latium.

According to reliable accounts, the original site on which Rome was built over the centuries consisted only of the Palatine or Square Rome (Roma quadrata), as it was later called after the irregular square shape of Mount Palatine. The towers and walls of this primitive enclosure could still be seen at the time of the Caesars. While the Latin race was uniting under the command of Rome and extending its territory to the east and south, Rome, meanwhile, through the favour of fortune and the energy of its citizens, was becoming an important city for trade and commerce.
agriculture, the powerful capital of a vast region. The reform of the Roman military system, and the political revolution it contained the seeds of and which is known to us as the constitution of Servius, are intimately connected with this inner change in the character of the Roman city. The fusion of the Quirinale community with that of the Palatine must already have been accomplished when the reform of Servius, as it is called, took place; and when this reform had united and consolidated the military strength of the community, the citizens no longer wanted to be satisfied with the entrenchments that surrounded the various hills, as they were covered with buildings, and to possess the island on the Tiber and perhaps the height that was on the opposite shore to control the course of the river. The Romans set about building the Servius Wall. The new surrounding wall began at the river, below
the Aventine, and included this hill, on which, very recently (1855), in two places, on the western slope towards the river and on the opposite slope, colossal ruins of these ancient fortifications were discovered. The surrounding wall then embraced the Cœlius and the entire area occupied by the Esquiline, the Viminal and the Quirinal, on which a wide earthen rampart, still imposing today, made up for the lack of a natural slope; it then headed towards the Capitol, whose steep slope, turned towards the Field of Mars, formed part of the city wall, which then joined the river over the island of the Tiber. This island, with the wooden bridge and the Janiculum, did not properly belong to the city, but the Janiculum was undoubtedly a fortified outpost. Until then, the Palatine had
It was on the other side, on the Tarpeian hill, which was free on all sides and easy to defend because of its small size, that the new citadel (arx, capitolium) was built, containing the source of the citadel, the carefully surrounded well (Tullianum), the treasury (aerarium), the prison and the oldest meeting place of the citizens. The Capitoline Hill was in fact, as in name, the acropolis of Rome, a
an independent fortress that could be defended even after the town had been taken. The enclosed space

In addition to the original cities of the Palatine and the Quirinal, the new city wall also encompassed the two fortresses of the Capitoline and the Aventine. The Palatine, like the ancient city itself, was surrounded by the two heights embraced by the surrounding wall, and the two castles occupied the the environment.

The names of the men under whose inspiration these great monuments of the city were built are almost as completely buried in oblivion as those of the leaders who fought and won Rome's earliest battles. In short, we have to content ourselves with learning from this tradition what is self-evident, namely that this second creation of Rome is closely connected with Rome's hegemony over Latium and the reconstitution of the army of citizens, and that, born of one and the same great conception, these two advances were not due, as far as their execution was concerned, to a single man or a single generation.

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LAW AND JUSTICE. RELIGION

All jurisdiction belonged to the community, i.e. to the king, who administered justice or the "commandment (jus), on the days fixed for the declaration (diesfasti), on the platform of justice (tribunal) situated in the square of the public assemblies"; he sat on a chariot seat (sella currulis), at his side were his "messengers" (lictores) and before him the accused person or the "parties" (rei). When it comes to slaves, it is the master who judges immediately, and when it comes to women, it is the father, husband or closest male relative, but slaves and women do not count as members of the community. Sons and grandsons, who were subject to the authority of the master, were not counted as members of the community.
the father's power was exercised concurrently with the royal jurisdiction. The procedure
Judicial proceedings took the form of a public or private trial, depending on whether the king intervened on his own initiative or was called upon by the injured party. The first form was used only when the public peace was disturbed; thus, above all, in the case of treason, or conspiracy with the public enemy (traditio), and of
violent revolt against authority (perduellio); but the public peace was also disturbed by the parricide (parricida), the sodomite, the violator of the chastity of a woman or a girl, the arsonist, the false witness and even the one who had caused the harvest to be lost by evil charms, or who cut, without having the right to do so, during the night, the wheat in a field placed under the protection of the gods and the people: all these culprits were treated as criminals of high treason. The king opened and conducted the trial, and passed sentence after consulting with the senators he had called.
Preventive imprisonment was the rule, but the accused could be released on bail. Torture to force a confession was only imposed on slaves. Anyone convicted of disturbing the peace

The public is condemned to death; there are different types of capital punishment. The false witness was thrown from the top of the fortress rock; the grain thief was hanged; the arsonist was burnt. The king did not have the right to grant clemency, which was reserved for the community: however, he could refuse or grant the condemned man a petition for clemency (provocatio).

In all other cases where the peace of individuals, and not that of the State, is disturbed, the State acts only on the denunciation of the offended party, who summons his adversary, or, if necessary, obliges him, by making him
violence, to appear with him before the King. When both parties have appeared and the plaintiff has orally explained his claim and the defendant has refused to comply, the King may hear the case himself or appoint a deputy to do so in his place.

All property is freely transferable from hand to hand. Roman law makes no essential distinction between movables and immovables, and knows of no unconditional right of children or other relatives over the property of the father or of the family. However, it is not possible for a father to deprive his children of his inheritance at will, because he can neither alienate paternal power nor make a will without the consent of the whole community, which can refuse it.

Contracts between private individuals, in ordinary circumstances, did not regularly give rise to any legal redress from the State. The creditor's only recourse was the debtor's word, which, according t o commercial custom, was sacred, and perhaps, if an oath had been added, which frequently happened, the fear of the gods who avenged perjury. The only contracts that gave rise to legal action were those of betrothal, under which the father, if he did not give the promised bride, had to pay compensation, and those of sale (mancipatio) and loan (nexum). The sale is considered final when the seller has handed over the thing sold to the buyer (mancipare) and the buyer has paid the seller the stipulated price in the presence of witnesses. The
repayment of the loan was made in the same form, at the agreed time. If the debtor did not
failed to meet his commitments to the State, he and everything he owned was sold without further ado. form of trial.

After a man's death, his property passed to the next of kin. All those of the same degree shared equally in the inheritance, including women; a widow was entitled to an equal share with her children. Dispensation from the ordinary order could only be granted by the people's assembly, and the consent of the priests had to be obtained beforehand, because of the sacred duties attached to property.

The world of the Roman gods had evolved from an idealisation of earthly Rome into a higher, more spiritual world, in which the great and the small were reproduced with scrupulous accuracy.
The State and the clan, the individual phenomena of nature, as well as the individual operations of the mind, every man, every good and every object, every act performed within the sphere of Roman law, were to be found in the higher world; and as earthly things undergo a to-and-fro motion
The same fluctuation can be seen in the circle of the gods. The tutelary spirit who presides over the particular act lives no longer than the act itself, the tutelary spirit of the individual lives and dies with him, and eternity belongs to the gods only in the sense that similar acts and men of the same constitution, and consequently spirits of the same nature, perpetually succeed one another. As Roman gods governed the Romans, so particular gods
governed the foreign communities; but however severe the distinction between citizen and
between the Roman god and the foreign god, man, like the foreign god, could be
When the 60 citizens of a conquered city were transported to Rome, the gods of that city were also invited to come and create a new home for themselves.

The national theogony of the Romans sought, above all, to form clear notions of the important phenomena and their properties, to give them a terminology and to classify them systematically, taking account first of all of the division of persons and things, which was also the foundation of private law, so that the citizen could invoke the gods individually and by classes, and to teach the multitude to invoke them in the same way (indigitare). The Roman theogony was essentially made up of similar notions, the product of positive abstraction, sometimes respectable, sometimes ridiculous. Concepts such as seed (sœturnus), work in the fields (ops), flowering (flora), war (bellona), the limit (terminus), youth (juventus), health (salus), good faith (fides) and harmony (concordia) belonged to the oldest and most revered deities of the Romans. Perhaps the most peculiar of the religious forms in Rome, and probably the only one for which a completely Italic image had been invented, was the two-headed Janus; and yet this god merely recalled an idea that was very characteristic of the intensity of the Romans' religious feeling, namely that at the beginning of any act one had to invoke the "spirit of openness". This
Above all, this conception bore witness to the deep conviction that it was essential to classify the Roman gods, and to relegate the more personal gods of the Hellenes to their own side. Of all the Roman cults, the most revered was that of the spirits who ruled the house and the room:
for public worship, they were Vesta and the Penates, and for family worship, the gods of the forests and fields, the Sylvans, and above all the gods of the house itself, the Lases or Lares, to whom a share of the family meal was regularly assigned, and before whom it was the duty of the father of the family, even in the time of Cato the Elder, to kneel on entering the house. In the order of the gods, however, these geniuses of the house and fields held last place rather than first;
it was, as is bound to happen in a religion so averse to the ideal, not the broadest and most general abstraction, but the simplest and most individual, that best nourished pious hearts.

Alongside this indifference to the ideal, Roman religion had a practical and utilitarian tendency. After the household and forest gods, the most revered divinity, not only among the Latins but among all the Sabellian races, was Herculus or Hercules, the god of the enclosed enclosure (from hercere) and hence, in general, the god of property and territorial acquisitions. Nothing was more customary in Roman life than to swear to dedicate to this god the tenth part of the produce at the altar.
placed on the cattle market, to obtain the diversion of a destructive plague or the security of a desired gain. It was customary to go to the same altar to conclude contracts, and to confirm them by oath, which meant that Hercules soon became confused with the god of good faith (deus fidius). This
It was not by chance that this tutelary god of speculation, to use the words of an ancient writer, was revered in every corner of Italy, and that altars were erected to him in the streets of the cities as well as on the main roads, nor was it by accident that the cult of the goddess of chance and fortune (Fors Fortuna) and the god of commerce (Mercurius) soon spread. Strict frugality and mercantile speculation were too deeply ingrained in Roman mores not to find their corresponding abstraction in the world of the gods.

The centre not only of Roman worship but also of Italian religion, at a time when the Italic race still inhabited the Peninsula alone, was the god Maurs or Mars, the killer god, regarded as the champion of the citizens, armed with the sword, who protected the flocks and overthrew the enemies. It was to his cult that the oldest priestly guilds were dedicated, first and foremost the priest of the community god, known for life as the "lighter of Mars" (flamen Martialis), as he was called because of the burnt offerings dedicated to him, and the twelve "dancers" (salii), a band of young men who, in March, performed the war dance, accompanied by songs, in honour of Mars.

Other public cults also existed, some of which probably predated Rome and were performed by special groups of priests or families on behalf of the people. Such was the college of the twelve "brothers of the fields" (fratres arvales), who invoked the creative goddess (dea dia) in May to ask for the growth of the wheat, and who, after the two guilds of dancers, were the first college of priests in the city. These were joined by the Titian brotherhood, which was set up to preserve and celebrate the particular cult of this Roman tribe; the same applied to the thirty "curial lighters" (flamines curiales) set up for the altars of the thirty curia.

At the same time, the cult of the city's new single altar - of Vesta - and the related cult of the community's Penates began. Six pure virgins, daughters, as it were, of the hearth of the Roman people, performed this pious office and were responsible for maintaining the beneficial fire of the common hearth,

to serve as an example and sign to the citizens. This cult, half domestic, half public, was the most revered of the Romans, and consequently remained the last of the pagan rites to disappear before Christianity.

The Latin cult is essentially based on man's attachment to earthly goods, and to a much lesser degree on fear of the blind forces of nature; it consisted above all of expressions of joy, songs and songs, games, dances and above all banquets. As was the case everywhere among agricultural populations whose ordinary food consisted of plants, the immolation of livestock was both a family celebration and an act of worship; a pig was the most pleasing offering to the gods,
precisely because it was the main roast at festivals. Among the Romans, there are only slight indications of belief in ghosts, fear of magic arts and mysterious practices. Oracles and prophecy never acquired the importance in Italy that they did in Europe.
Greece, and were never able to exert a truly serious influence on public or private life. Latin religion, on the other hand, fell into a singular state of dryness and inertia, and from early on it was encumbered by a painful and unspiritual mass of ceremonies [rites]. The god of the
As we have already said, the Italian faith was, above all, an instrument of help in obtaining very solid earthly goods. The tendency that their taste for the tangible and the real imbued in the beliefs of the Italians can still be clearly seen in the adoration of the saints in modern Italy. The gods stood before man like a creditor before his debtor; each had a duly established right to certain ceremonies [rites] and offerings; and as the number of gods was as great as that of the circumstances of human life, and negligence or incomplete performance in the worship of each god was avenged in a similar circumstance, it was a laborious task to know one's religious obligations thoroughly. The priests, who were experts in these divine laws and who taught their application, the pontifices could not fail to acquire a powerful influence.

Latin religion, reduced to the level of ordinary perception, was completely intelligible to all, and equally accessible to all; this is what enabled the community to preserve the equality of its citizens, whereas Greece, where religion rose to the level of the highest thought, had to put up with the good and bad luck of an intellectual aristocracy from the very beginning. Latin religion
Like all other faiths, it was rooted in an effort to penetrate the abyss of thought; there is only a superficial view that fails to recognise the depth of the river, because of the clarity of its waves, and to which the transparent world of spirits can appear hollow. This profound faith disappeared in the course of time, like the morning mist before the rising sun; but the Latins preserved the simplicity of their faith longer than many other peoples, and especially than the Greeks. In the same way that colours are due to the light that their effects disturb at the same time, art and science are not only the creators but also the destroyers of faith, and just as necessity commands this movement of creation and destruction, a similar necessity reserves certain results for eras of simplicity, results that subsequent eras try in vain to achieve. The powerful development

They sacrificed the simplicity, gentleness, devotion and spirit of association that are the first conditions of any similar union. It is therefore time to abandon this childish view of history, which believes that the Greeks can only be elevated at the expense of the Romans, and the Romans only at the expense of the Greeks. Why should we refrain from praising or criticising the two richest national organisms that antiquity has produced, and from understanding the truth that their imperfections are naturally linked to their perfections? The deepest, most essential reason for the diversity of the two nations is undoubtedly the fact that Latium did not come into contact with the East at the time of its growth, as Greece did. No people in this world was big enough to create by its own efforts the marvels of Greek civilisation, and later of the civilisation of the Roman Empire.
History has cast this splendid ray only where the ideas of the Aramaic religion germinated in Indo-Germanic soil. But if, because of this, Greece is the prototype of human progress, Latium is no less the prototype of national progress; and it is our duty, their successors, to admire both and learn from both.

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AGRICULTURE AND TRADE. ART

We have already noted that the transition from pastoral to agricultural life predates the immigration of Italians to the peninsula. Agriculture continues to be the principal means of existence for all the communities of Italy, for the Sabellians and Etruscans no less than for the Latins. There have never been purely pastoral tribes in Italy in historical times, although no doubt the various races combined pastoral economy with agricultural life to some degree, depending on the nature of the localities. The beautiful custom of beginning the foundation of a town by ploughing a furrow to determine the future boundary wall is proof of the extent to which the feeling of the necessity of agricultural life for the existence of towns was deeply imprinted in people's minds. In Rome in particular (and it is only in this case that we speak of agriculture with any certainty), Servius' reform clearly shows not only that the agricultural class was once the cornerstone of the state, but also that a constant attempt was made to maintain the body of landowners as the nucleus of the community. When, in the course of time, a large part of Roman land ownership had passed into the hands of non-citizens, and the rights and duties of the citizen were no longer attached to property, the reformed constitution obviated this poor organisation and the dangers it presaged, not only temporarily, but definitively, by dividing the members of the community once and for all, regardless of their political situation, into "owners" (assidui) and "producers of children" (proletarii) and by imposing public burdens on the former. This last measure could not fail to be followed by the granting of rights

public. The whole policy of Roman war and conquest rested, moreover, like the constitution itself, on the basis of property; since only the owner had a position in the State, the aim of the State's wars was to increase the number of owners. The defeated community was obliged to merge entirely with the agricultural population of Rome, or, if it did not wish to be reduced to this extreme, it was obliged not to pay a war contribution or a fixed tribute, but to cede a portion (usually a third) of its domain, which was then regularly occupied by Roman farms. Many peoples have lived and conquered like the Romans; but none has equalled the Romans in this way of appropriating conquered soil by pouring the sweat of their brow into it, and securing by the furrow of the plough what they had won by the spear. What is conquered by war can be recaptured by war; but this is not the case with conquests made by the plough. The Romans lost many battles, but they almost never gave up an inch of Roman land when they made peace; they owed this result to the tenacity with which farmers held on to their fields and their homes. The greatness of Rome was built on the most extensive and direct ownership of the land by its inhabitants, and on the compact unity of such a solidly established body.

We have already indicated that, in the earliest times, arable land was cultivated in common, probably by the various clans: each cultivated its own land, and then distributed the produce among the various households that belonged to it. There is in fact an intimate relationship between the system of communal cultivation and the form of clan society; even later in Rome, communal residence and communal cultivation, where there were joint owners, was very common. The very traditions of Roman law show us that wealth originally consisted of livestock and the right to use the land, and that the soil was only later divided into individual properties. The
The best proof of this is the old designation of ownership by the term "possession of livestock" or "de possession de bétail".
"of slaves and livestock (pecunia, familia pecuniaque) and the particular possessions of the children of
The term "peculium" was used to refer to the household and slaves. There is yet another
Last but not least, there is the ancient measure of ownership (heredium de herus, Herr) of two jugera (about one acre and a quarter), which cannot be applied to movable property.
apply only to gardens and not to fields. It is no longer clear when and how this division of arable land took place. What is historically certain is that the oldest form of the constitution was based not on personal ownership, but on collective ownership, which replaced it, whereas the constitution of Servius presupposes the distribution of land. The same constitution shows that the great bulk of land ownership consisted of medium-sized farms, which provided work and sustenance for a family and were sufficient for the maintenance of livestock and cultivation by plough. The ordinary extent of such a Roman inheritance cannot be fixed precisely, as we have already said, but can hardly be estimated at less than twenty jugera.

The distribution of land did not extend to pastures. The State, and not the canton, was considered to be the owner of common pastures; he made use of them, either for his herds and for animals destined for sacrifices or other purposes, and for the supply of which he was abundantly provided by fines, or by giving the owners of cattle the privilege of leading their livestock there in return for a moderate fee (scriptura). The right to graze on public land undoubtedly originally bore some resemblance to the actual possession of land; but no legal connection must have existed, in Rome, between private inheritances and a defined use of common grazing land; for property could be acquired even by the metoikos, but the right to use common grazing land always remained a privilege of the citizen and was only granted to the metoikos.
by royal favour.

Agriculture was undoubtedly the Romans' main and most popular occupation, but other branches of industry were also in vogue, as can be inferred from the rapid development of urban life in this warehouse of Latium. In fact, under the institutions of Numa, i.e. of
from time immemorial, eight guilds of workers. These were the flute players, the goldsmiths, the copper manufacturers, the carpenters, the fullers, the dyers, the potters and the shoemakers. This list would essentially exhaust the class of industrialists working for others and for sale in those ancient times, when bread baking and the particular art of medicine were unknown, and clothes were woven from wool spun by women in the home itself.

Trade between the Italiotes was limited at first, and this is self-evident, to mutual exchanges of goods. their products. Fairs (mercatus), which should be distinguished from weekly markets (nundinæ), had been established in Latium since ancient times. In Rome, they were perhaps not
The Latins who came to Rome for this purpose every year on 13 August no doubt took advantage of the occasion to do their business in Rome and buy their provisions there. In Etruria, a similar and perhaps even greater importance was attached to the annual general assembly held at the temple of Voltumna (perhaps near Montefiascone) in the territory of Volsinii. This assembly also served as a fair, and was frequented by Romans and local merchants alike. But the most important of all the Latin fairs was the one that was
held at the Soracte, on the Feronia prairie, in a situation that could not have been found in a better place. favourable for the exchange of useful objects between the three great nations. This high, isolated mountain, which seems to have been established by nature to serve as a landmark for the traveller in the middle of the Tiber plain, is located on the border that separated the Etruscan and Sabine lands (it seems more likely that it was built in the middle of the Tiber plain).
Roman merchants regularly visited the area, and the trickery of which they complained led to more than one quarrel with the Sabines.

Without doubt, people were trading and exchanging goods at these fairs long before the first Greek or American ship arrived.
appeared in the western sea. This is where, in the event of a bad harvest, the countries
It was here that livestock, slaves, metals and all items that might have seemed useful or desirable in those primitive times were still exchanged. The primitive means of exchange consisted of oxen and sheep, ten sheep being equivalent to one ox. The recognition of these objects as a legal representation of value, in a word as money, as well as the scale of proportion between large and small livestock, dates back (as the widespread use among the Germans proves) not only to the Greco-Italian period, but beyond, to a time of purely pastoral economy. In Italy, where metal was needed in considerable quantities everywhere, especially for agricultural objects and weapons, and where few countries produced it, copper (aes) appeared early on alongside livestock as a means of exchange: the Latins, who were poor in copper, called the valuation itself "cuivrure" (aestimatio). In this establishment of copper as a valid equivalent throughout the
We find traces of the international relations of the Italic peoples when they were still the sole owners of the peninsula in the invention of the elementary numerical signs we will discuss later, and in the duodecimal system of the Italiotes.

The elements of architecture were, as we have already indicated, the common heritage of the Latin races. The dwelling is always the element of all architecture: so it was with the Greeks and the Italiotes. Built of wood and covered with a thatched or pebble roof, the house formed a square dwelling chamber, which let smoke out and light in through an opening in the roof (cavum aedium), which corresponded to another opening in the ground for the run-off of rain. "
Under this "blackened roof" (atrium), food was prepared and eaten; it was here that the household gods were worshipped and the marriage bed was raised like the bier of the dead; it was here that the man received guests and the woman spun wool among her maids. The house has no porch, unless we count as such the open space between the door of the house and the street, which borrowed its name (vestibulum place for dressing) from the fact that the Romans walked in their houses wearing their tunic, and only rolled their toga around them when they went outside. There was no division of flats, except that sleeping quarters or storerooms could be arranged around the room; there were even fewer staircases or superimposed floors.

It is difficult to determine whether and to what extent national Italic architecture was able to emerge from these
The Greek influence in this field, even in the early days, made itself strongly felt and buried any national attempts that may have preceded it.

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BOOK SECOND

From the abolition of the monarchy in Rome to the union of Italy

CHANGES TO THE CONSTITUTION LIMITING THE

POWER OF THE MAGISTRATE

The political movement within the body of privileged citizens, the war between the excluded and the excluded, and the social conflicts between owners and non-owners, however intertwined they may seem to us in their variety, and however singular alliances they may have produced, were nonetheless essentially and fundamentally distinct from one another.

Servius' reform, by placing the inhabitant and the citizen on the same footing from a military point of view, seems to have been born more from motives of administrative convenience than from a party political tendency: it was therefore, we can affirm, the movement that sought to achieve the limitation of the magistrate's power that was the first of those that began the internal crises and constitutional changes. The first consequence of this ancient opposition to Rome consisted in
the abolition of power for life in the State, in other words, the abolition of kingship. One proof that this change was the result of the natural development of things is that the same change in constitution manifested itself in a similar way throughout the Italo-Greek world. Not only in Rome, but among the other Latins and among the Sabellians, Etruscans and Apulians, in fact in all the Italic states, as in the Greek states, we see the lifelong rulers of the primitive period replaced by annual magistrates. As far as the Lucanian canton is concerned, it can be proved that it had a democratic government in times of peace, and that in times of war only the
magistrates appointed a king, in other words a leader similar to the Roman dictator. The Sabellian states, including Capua and Pompeii, were likewise governed in later times by a "state guardian" (medix tuticus) who was renewed every year, and we can imagine that similar institutions existed in the other states and cities of Italy. There is therefore no need to look for other explanations for the substitution of consuls for kings in the Roman state. The organism of ancient Greek and Italic politics produced of itself, and by a sort of natural necessity, the limitation of power for life to a shorter duration, generally one year.

If the historical connection of this important event escapes us, we can fortunately see more clearly the nature of the constitutional change that followed. Royal power was in no way

abolished: this is proved by the fact that when there was a vacancy in the consulship, an "inter-king" was appointed as before. The single king appointed for life was replaced by two annual kings, who were called generals (praetores) or judges (judices) or simply colleagues (consules). The principle of collegiality, which gave rise to the name of annual kings, so widespread since then, took on a very special form on this occasion. The supreme power was not entrusted to the two officials together, but each of the two consuls acted and behaved individually with a freedom equal to that of the other consuls.
Although, from the outset, they undoubtedly divided their powers, with one of the consuls taking command of the army and the other the administration of justice, this division was in no way compulsory, and each of the two consuls remained perfectly free to enter into the powers of his colleague. Thus, when the supreme power came into conflict with the supreme power, when one of the consuls defended what the other ordered, the commands were divided.
neutralised each other. This specifically Roman, or rather Italic, institution of competing supreme authorities, which eventually became practicable in the Roman republic, but to which it would be difficult to find an analogy in any other great state, obviously arose from efforts to retain royal power in its fullness. But in a legal form, and not to share the kingship or transfer it from one individual to several, but simply to double it, and to annihilate it by itself, in case of necessity, by this means, the king's position in the Roman state was subject to the laws, and not superior to them; but as, according to Roman law, the sovereign judge could not be prosecuted at his own bar, if the king was guilty of a crime, there was for him neither tribunal nor punishment. The consul, too, if he committed murder or treason, was protected by his dignity for as long as he held it, but when it ceased, he was subject to the same criminal jurisdiction as any other citizen.

The right to appoint his successor, which the king had exercised without limit, was in no way taken away from the new head of state, but he was obliged to appoint the citizen nominated by the community. Finally, the appointment of priests, which had been a royal prerogative, was not transferred to the consuls.

Nevertheless, these limitations on the fullness and attributes of omnipotence did not apply in
In reality, it was only the ordinary government of the state. In extraordinary circumstances, as we have said, instead of the two leaders elected by the community, there was a single master of the people (magister populi) or "dictator" (dictator). The community took no part in appointing the
dictator, this appointment depended absolutely on one of the two consuls who were then in power.
functions. There was no appeal against him other than by provocation, as with the king, unless he consented. When he was appointed, the powers of all the other magistrates fell at once and passed into his hands. A master of cavalry was attached to him, as to the king, and as the appointment of a dictator only took place on occasions when internal unrest or danger to the country required the use of military force, the appointment of a master of cavalry was a circumstance of constitutional necessity like that of the dictator. The intention was,
in all probability, to distinguish the authority of the dictator from that of the king only by the term assigned to it

the duration of his term of office, which could not exceed six months, and by the fact that being a magistrate extraordinaire, he did not appoint a successor.

An extension of the community was inevitable, and it was achieved in a comprehensive way, by admitting to the curia the entire plebeian community, i.e. all the non-citizens who were not citizens. were neither slaves nor citizens of foreign communities living in Rome under the law of hospitality (which, on this point, put the head of state on a par with former citizens). At the same time, the assembly of curia, which until then had been legally and effectively the first authority of the State, saw its constitutional privileges almost completely stripped away.

All the political privileges of the public assembly, as well as the decision on appeals in the criminal causes, essentially political causes, the appointment of magistrates and the adoption or As a result of the rejection of the laws, everything was transferred or newly acquired by the assembly of men called up for military service; so that the centuries then received the rights of citizens, after having long borne their burdens. This measure caused the first progress made by the constitution of Servius, such as that which had given the army the right to consent to an aggressive declaration of war, to take such a decisive step that the curia were then completely and forever cast into the shadows by the assembly of the centuries, and people got used to considering the latter as the sovereign people.

The direct reform of the constitution did not, it seems, go any further. The position of the Senate in particular remained unchanged: it remained an assembly of notable citizens appointed for life, with no official powers of their own: the senators were the advisors of the annual kings, as they had been of the king for life. Appointments to the senate were made by the consuls, as they had been in the past by the kings.

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THE PEOPLE'S TRIBUNE AND THE DECEMVIRATE

Under the new organisation of the republic, the body of ancient citizens had achieved, by legal means, full possession of political power. Governing through the magistracy, which had been reduced to serving as its instrument, dominating in the senate, exclusively possessing all the offices and priesthoods, armed with exclusive knowledge of divine and human things, and familiar with the routine of political practice, voting at the head of the electoral assembly and influencing the masses through the multitude of devoted adherents attached to the various families, finally authorised to

If the patricians had been able to examine and reject every decree of the community, they could have retained their effective power for a long time, because they had in due course abandoned their claims to exclusive possession of legal authority. The plebeians, it is true, could not have been insensitive to their political capacity: nevertheless, the nobility did not have to worry at first about purely political opposition.
political struggle from the multitude, who wanted nothing more than fair administration and the protection of their material interests. In fact, in the early days following the expulsion of the kings, we come across various measures whose aim was, or seems to have been, to reconcile the favour of the multitude with the government of the nobility, especially from an economic point of view. Harbour dues were reduced; when wheat was at a premium, large quantities of grain were purchased on behalf of the State; the salt trade was made a State monopoly, in order to provide citizens with wheat and salt at reasonable prices; finally, the national festival was extended by one day.

The government of the kings had no doubt refrained on principle from containing the power of capital, and had encouraged, as far as it was in its power, the increase in the number of farms. The new aristocratic government, on the other hand, seems from the outset to have tended to distinguish between the middle classes, particularly the middle and small landowners, and to encourage the growth of farms.
development, on the one hand, of lord proprietors and capitalists and, on the other, of the agricultural proletariat.

The ruthless practice of the law of debtors, says the account, aroused the indignation of the whole class of farmers. When, in the year 250, the levy was called for a dangerous war, the men
The consul Publius Servius suspended the application of the debtors' law for a time, and ordered the release of those already imprisoned for their debts and the prevention of further imprisonment. The farmers took their
They returned from the battlefield to their prison and their chains. Returning from the battlefield, with the peace that their efforts had brought, they found themselves back in prison and in chains; with merciless rigour, the second consul, Appius Claudius, applied the law of debtors and his colleague, whom the former soldiers had not seen for a long time, took his place in the army.
implored, did not dare to oppose them. But when the war was renewed the following year, the consul's word was no longer heeded. It was not until Manius Valerius was appointed dictator that the farmers gave in, either out of fear of the authority or out of confidence in his sentiments favourable to the popular cause; for the Valerii were one of those ancient gentry, in whose eyes government was a privilege and an honour, not a source of gain. Victory returned under the Roman banners, but when the triumphers returned and the dictator proposed the reform projects to the senate, he failed in the face of the obstinate opposition he encountered. The army was still in arms, as was customary, at the gates of the city. When the news arrived, the long-suspended storm erupted; esprit de corps and the solidity of the military organisation drew the troops into the movement.
timid and indifferent. The army abandoned its leader and its tents, and led by the commanders of the legions, the military tribunes who were, at least for the most part, plebeians, it marched in order.

They occupied a mountain and threatened to found a new plebeian city in this, the most fertile part of Roman territory. The secession made it palpably clear, even to the most obstinate of the oppressors, that a civil war of this kind would end in their own ruin, and the Senate gave in. The dictator negotiated a compromise. The
farmers returned to the city walls and unity was restored within. The consequences would be felt for centuries to come: this was the origin of the people's tribune.

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The restriction of consular power and the extension of tribunitian power were the object of the war on one side, the annihilation of the tribunate was the goal of the other party.

The best-known incident of these conflicts is the story of Gaius Marcius, a valiant aristocrat who had earned the nickname Coriolan after the capture of Corioli. Indignant at seeing the centuries refuse him the consulship, in the year of Rome 263 (491) he proposed, if one version is to be believed, the suspension of the sale of wheat from the state granaries until the starving people had abandoned the tribune; according to another version, he directly proposed the abolition of the tribune. He was about to conquer the city of his fathers for the public enemy, when his mother's prayers touched his conscience: he thus atoned for his first betrayal with a second, and both with death. It is impossible to say exactly what is true in this account, but the story on which the naive glory of the Roman annalists has founded a title of glory for the fatherland, gives an insight into the immoral and pitiless character of these struggles between the orders. The same can be said of the surprise attack on the Capitol by a band of political refugees led by a Sabine chief, Appius Herdonius, in the year 294 (460);
They called their slaves to arms, and it was only after a fierce battle and with the help of the Tusculans, who had come to their aid, that the Roman army overcame this catilinarian band.

A new attempt was made to get rid of the power of the tribune by ensuring that the people had equal rights in a more regular and effective manner. The people's tribune Gaius Terentilius Arsa proposed appointing a commission of five members to prepare a code of public laws by which the consuls would henceforth be bound in the exercise of their judicial powers.

The decemvirs of 303 (451) submitted their law to the people and it was confirmed by them, engraved on ten copper tablets and placed in the Forum, on the tribune of harangues, opposite the senate. But, as a supplement seemed necessary, decemvirs were again appointed in the year 304 (450) and the law was confirmed.

added two more tables. The result was Rome's first and only code of laws, the Law of the Twelve Tables.

The moderate part of the aristocracy, led by the Valerii and the Horatii, tried, it is said, in the senate to provoke the abdication of the decemvirs, but the leader of the decemvirs, Appius Claudius, the passionate champion of the violent aristocratic party, won over most of the senators, and the people submitted.

In the end, when civil war was imminent and the street riots were about to begin, the decemvirs renounced their usurped and dishonoured power; Lucius Valerius and Marcus Horatius arranged a second compromise, by which the people's tribune was reinstated.

The new compromise was naturally very favourable to the plebeians, and imposed significant restrictions on the power of the nobility. The code of laws wrested from the aristocracy, and of which the last two tables were published as a supplement, was adopted and confirmed, and the consuls were obliged to comply with their judgments. Thus the conflict which had begun with the abolition of the power of the tribunes ended with the confirmation of their right to annul not only particular acts of administration, on the appeal of the injured party, but also any resolution of the constituent powers of the State.

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THE EQUALISATION OF ORDERS AND THE NEW ARISTOCRACY

The abolition of privileges, social reform, civil equality: these were three great ideas that were thus coming to light. It was in vain that the patricians exhausted their means of resistance against these legal proposals: the dictatorship itself and the old hero Camillus only delayed rather than prevented their adoption.

We must not, however, forget that this important republican equality was, in many respects, only a formality, and that it gave rise to a clearly pronounced aristocracy, which, to put it better, was contained within it from the outset. In one way or another, new blood penetrated the ruling class of Rome, but the government remained, after as it had been in the past, an aristocracy.
before, aristocratic. In this very respect, the Roman State was a true republic of farmers, in

where the owner of an entire inheritance has hardly anything to distinguish him outwardly from the poor, and deals with him on an equal footing, but where the aristocracy nonetheless exercises an all-powerful domination, to the extent that a man without property has more chance of becoming chief of citizens in the city than mayor in his own village. It was a very great and precious conquest that, under the new legislation, allowed the poorest citizen to hold the highest office in the State: it was no less a rare exception to see a man rise from the lower ranks of the population to such a position.

Finally, with regard to administration, war, peace and alliances, the founding of colonies, the allocation of land, the construction of buildings, in general, in short, all matters of permanent and general importance, and particularly the whole system of finance, depended absolutely on the Senate. It was the Senate which, every year, sent general instructions to the magistrates, to
determine their provinces of competence and fix the troops and money to be placed at the disposal of each of them; his advice was to be sought in all important circumstances. A
With the exception of the consul, the directors of the public treasury could not make any payment to a civil servant or a private individual without first being authorised to do so by a decree of the senate. Called to power, not by the vain chance of birth, but in substance by the free choice of the nation, confirmed every five years by the judgement full of moral gravity of the most worthy men, appointed for life, and thus independent of the expiry of an office, or the variable favour of judges, having his ranks close together and united since the equalisation of orders, embracing in him all that the nation possessed of political intelligence and practical skill, having absolute control of all financial matters and of foreign policy, having complete power over the executive by virtue of the short duration of its functions, and of the tribunitian intercession that was at the service of the Senate, since the quarrels between the orders were over, the Roman Senate was the noblest expression of the nation, and as consistency and political sagacity, as unanimity and patriotism, as plenitude of power and energetic courage, it was the first political corporation of all times, "an assembly of kings" that marvellously knew how to combine despotic energy with the power of the state.
republican selflessness. No state has ever been represented more firmly and nobly in its external relations than Rome was, in its heyday, by the senate. In matters of internal administration, it cannot be concealed that the financial and property-owning aristocracy, which was specially represented in the Senate, acted with partiality in matters that affected its own interests.
particular interests, and that the sagacity and energy of the assembly were often employed in such cases without benefit to the State. Nevertheless, the great principle established in the midst of violent struggles, that all citizens were equal before the law, with regard to rights and duties, and for entry into the political career (or, in other words, admission to the senate) contributed, along with the brilliance of military and political successes, to preserving the harmony of the state and the nation, spared the distinction between classes that bitterness and hostility which had marked the struggle between patricians and plebeians. And as the happy turn taken by foreign policy had the effect of giving the rich, for more than a century, a wide career on their own account, and spared them the need to oppress the middle class, the Roman people were in a position, by means of the senate, to lead, for a longer period of time, the political and economic life of their country.

than any other people, this undertaking, the greatest of all human endeavours, that of wise and happy self-government.

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THE FALL OF ETRUSCAN POWER

Assailed by these simultaneous and, as it were, concerted attacks by very different peoples, the Syracusans, the Latins, the Samnites and above all the Celts, the Etruscan nation, which had conquered such a vast and sudden ascendancy in Latium and Campania and on the two Italian seas, suffered a rapid decline. At the end of 346 (408) the Romans, for their part, resolved to undertake a war of conquest against Etruria, and this time the war was waged, not only to defeat Veies, but to annihilate it. The battle was fierce, and the outcome was not in doubt. The Romans were supported by the Latins and the Hernics, for whom the destruction of their feared neighbour was no less advantageous than for the Romans themselves: Véies, on the other hand, was abandoned by the nation itself. The Celtic attacks, which took place at the same time, are sufficient to explain the non-intervention of the northern cities. Véies succumbed in 358 (396), after a valiant resistance.

It was only when the Gauls had crossed the Tiber, and were at the stream of Allia, less than sixteen kilometres above Rome, that a Roman army sought to block their passage, on 18 July 364 (390). Even then, they marched into battle with arrogance and presumption, as if they were
were attacking not an army, but brigands under inexperienced leaders. Camille had withdrawn from business due to dissensions between the orders. Those against whom they had to fight were nothing but savages: what good was a camp and the safety of retreat? But these savages were men of courage who despised death, and their way of fighting was as new as it was terrible for the Italians. Drawing their swords, the Celts rushed at the Roman phalanx with furious fury, scattering it at the first blow. Not only was the defeat complete, but the disorganised flight of the Romans, who hurried to put the river between themselves and the Barbarians, drove most of the defeated army to the right bank of the Tiber and towards Véies. The capital was thus
left at the mercy of the Gauls. The few troops that remained behind or had taken refuge there,
were not sufficient to guard the walls, and three days after the battle, the victors found the gates of Rome open. A moment's respite gave them time to take away and bury the sacred objects and, more importantly, to occupy the citadel and bring in a few soldiers.
provisions. All those unable to bear arms were not admitted to the citadel; there was no place for them.
no bread for all. The mass of defenceless inhabitants took refuge in the neighbouring towns; but

Many, especially a number of distinguished old men, did not want to survive the fall of the city, and waited in their houses to die at the hands of the Barbarians. The Barbarians came, massacred and looted what men and property they could find, and set fire to every corner of the city before the eyes of the defenders of the Capitol. But they knew nothing of the art of sieges, and blockading the citadel was tiring and difficult, given that the army could only be sustained by parties beating the countryside, and that the citizens of the neighbouring Latin cities, the Ardeates in particular, frequently attacked the marauders bravely and successfully. Nevertheless, the Celts persisted with exemplary energy in such circumstances for seven months under the rock of the Capitol, and the garrison, which had only escaped a surprise in the middle of a dark night thanks to the cry of the sacred geese and the accidental awakening of the brave Marcus Manlius, was beginning to see its provisions run out when the Celts learned that the Venetes had invaded the territory of the Senones on the Po, which had recently been conquered, and this convinced them to accept the ransom that was offered. By contemptuously throwing his sword into the scales so that its weight could be balanced by Roman gold, the Gallic chieftain indicated the true state of affairs. The iron of the Barbarians had won, but they were selling their victory and thereby losing it.

No sooner had the Barbarians left than the arm of Latium was already weighing heavily on the Etruscans. After numerous defeats, they had to surrender the whole of southern Etruria to the Romans, as far as the Ciminian mountains. The Romans formed four new tribes from the territories of Véies, Capène and Falerii, 367 (387) and secured the northern border by founding the fortresses of Sutrium, 371 (383) and Napète, 381 (373). It was at a rapid pace that this fertile region, covered with Roman settlers, became completely Romanised. In northern Italy, the peoples who had been fighting each other finally calmed down and organised themselves in a more lasting way, within more clearly defined borders.

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THE ITALIANS AGAINST ROME

Since the fall of the Etruscans and the weakening of the Greek republics, the Samnite confederation had been, after Rome, the most powerful force in Italy and, at the same time, the one most immediately threatened by the invading spirit of Rome. As a result, in the struggle that the Italians had to wage against Rome for their freedom and nationality, it was the Samnites who bore the brunt of the burden.

It was in 428 (326) that the battle began on Samnite territory itself; some border towns in Campania, Rufræ (between Venafrum and Teanum) and Allifæ, were occupied by the Romans.

In the years that followed, Roman armies penetrated Samnium, fighting and pillaging their way into Vestini territory and even as far as Apulia, where they were welcomed with open arms.

After the Samnites had fought to rescue the town and were defeated, Luceria surrendered to the Romans. The war then moved on to Apulia, where the Romans stormed Saticula, a border town against Samnium, 438 (316). The Samnite army at Capua was defeated and forced to withdraw.
from Campania; the Romans, marching at the heels of the enemy, crossed the Mates, and
camped in the winter of 440 (314), in front of Bovianum, capital of Samnium. Fregelles, which was in the hands of the anti-Roman party, and which was the citadel in the region of Liris, finally fell after having been occupied for eight years by the Samnites, 441 (313). Two hundred citizens, the most eminent of the national party, were taken to Rome and beheaded there in the Forum, to serve as an example and a warning to the patriots, who were agitating everywhere.

Apulia and Campania were now in Roman hands. To secure and control the conquered territory in perpetuity, the Romans founded a number of new fortresses between 440 (314) and 442 (312).

The Romans' plans were developing more and more; they aimed at nothing less than
the subjugation of Italy, which they enveloped year after year in a network of fortresses and roads. The line from Rome to Luceria already separated northern and southern Italy, just as the fortresses of Cora and Norba had separated the Volsci from the Eci.

The final decision was reserved for the campaign of 449 (308). The two consular armies penetrated, one under the command of Tiberius Minicius, and after the death of Minicius under that of Marcus Fulvius, from Campania through the mountain passes, the other, under Lucius Posthumius, from
These two armies joined hands in front of Bovianum, the capital of the country: a decisive battle was fought; the Samnite general Statius Gellius was taken prisoner and Bovianum was stormed.

The fall of the military capital of the region put an end to this twenty-two year war. The Samnites withdrew their garrisons from Sora and Arpinum and sent ambassadors to Rome to ask for peace; their example was followed by the Sabellian tribes, the Marsi, the Marrucini, the Peligni, the Frentani, the Vestini and the Picentini.

Probably around the same time, and as a result of the peace with the Samnites, Rome also made peace with Taranto.

All of central Italy was still in ferment, and at certain points in open uprising: the fortresses were still only being built, and the road between Etruria and Samnium was not yet completely closed. Perhaps there was still time to conquer freedom, but there was no point in waiting.

So the war began again, 298 (456).

The battle of Sentinum was fought on a hot day. On the Roman right wing, where Rullianus himself was fighting with his two legions against the Samnite army, the battle remained undecided for a long time. On the left wing, commanded by Publius Decius, the Roman cavalry was disrupted by the war wagons of the Gauls, and the legions soon began to falter. Then the consul called
the priest Marcus Livius, and ordered him to vow both the Roman general's head and the enemy army to the infernal gods; then he threw himself into the midst of the Gallic hordes and died. This heroic despair of a superior man and a beloved general was not in vain. The fugitives turned around; the bravest rushed to follow in their general's footsteps, into the middle of the enemy army, to save him or die with him; at the opportune moment, the consular Lucius Scipio appeared, sent by Rullianus, with his Roman reserve, on the left wing, which was in peril. The invaluable Campanian cavalry, which caught the Gauls in flank and tail, routed them; the Gauls fled; in the end the Samnites also folded, and their general Egnatius fell at the gate of the camp. Nine thousand Romans covered the battlefield, but the triumph so dearly purchased was worthy of such a sacrifice. The army of the coalition disbanded, and consequently the coalition itself; Umbria remained in the hands of the Romans; the Gauls withdrew; what remained of the Samnite army moved away in good order, through Abruzzo, and returned to their homeland. Campania, which the Samnites had invaded during the Etruscan war, was occupied by the Romans with little effort when that war was over.

Etruria asked for peace the following year, 460 (294).

The Samnites acted differently; they prepared for a desperate resistance, with that energy of free men, which cannot command fortune, but which can defy it. Nevertheless, the Romans triumphed and stormed the fortresses in which the Samnites had taken refuge with their belongings. By the end of the Samnite war, Roman territory stretched as far north as the Cominian Forest, as far east as Abruzzo and as far south as Capua, while the outposts of Luceria and Venusia, built to the east and south on the enemy's connecting line, isolated them from each other on all sides. Rome was already no longer simply the leading power, but the preponderant power of the peninsula, when, towards the end of the fifth century of Rome, the nations that the favour of the gods and their own genius had placed at the head of their continent began to draw closer together in politics and on the battlefields; just as at the Olympic Games, the winners of previous battles prepare for a second and more decisive contest, Carthage, Macedonia and Rome prepared for a final and decisive battle.

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KING PYRRHUS AGAINST ROME

Pyrrhus, King of Epirus, was no more than an adventurous general: he was nonetheless a great man. knight errant, because his genealogy went back to Aeacus and Achilles, and because, if he had been of a peaceful nature, he would have reigned over a small group of mountain people, under Macedonian supremacy; at most, he could have lived and died in isolated freedom. He has often been compared to Alexander of Macedonia; and, in some respects, the foundation of a Western Greek kingdom, whose nucleus would have been Epirus, Magna Graecia and Sicily, which would have commanded the two Italian seas and placed Rome and Carthage among the barbarian frontier peoples of the Hellenic system, which would have dominated, in a word, from the land of the Celts to that of the Indians, was a great and skilful idea, like the one that brought the king of Macedonia across the Hellespont. But there was more than just a difference in the results of the two expeditions. Alexander could, with his Macedonian army, which he led with his wand, dispute the pre-eminence of the king of Persia; but the king of Epirus, who was more or less, compared to Macedonia, what Hesse is today compared to Prussia, had only a nominal army, composed of mercenaries and allies, whose participation depended on hazardous political combinations. Alexander entered Persia as a conqueror; Pyrrhus arrived in Italy as the general of a coalition of secondary states; Alexander left his states untroubled as a result of the absolute submission of Greece and thanks to the powerful army which remained there under the command of Antipater; Pyrrhus could count, for the integrity of his states, only on the word of his allies.

an insecure neighbour. For the two conquerors, their country was bound to be, if their plans
But it was more practical to transfer the seat of Macedonian power to Babylon than to found a military dynasty in Tarentum or Syracuse. The democracy of the Greek republics, although it was in perpetual agony, could not fit into the narrow framework of a military state; Philip knew well why he had not incorporated the Greek republics into his kingdom. In the East, there was no need to fear national resistance; there were dominant nations and nations that had long been enslaved, and the change of despots was, for the mass of the population, indifferent and often even desired. In the West, it was possible to defeat the Romans, the Samnites and the Carthaginians; but it was not in the power of any conqueror to turn Italians into Egyptian fellahs, or to turn Roman peasants into tributary Greek barons. When we consider the personal power, the allies, the strength of the
opponents, the Macedonian's plan seemed really practicable, the Epirote's an undertaking impossible; one seems to be the accomplishment of a great historical task, the other a brilliant error; one the foundation of a new system of states and a new phase of civilization, the other a remarkable historical episode. Alexander's work has survived him, even though its creator died. prematurely. Pyrrhus was able to see with his own eyes the ruin of all his plans, before death came. won.

They were both great and intelligent natures; but Pyrrhus was only the first general of his
At the time, Alexander was its greatest statesman, and if it is the discernment between the possible and the impossible that distinguishes the hero from the adventurer, Pyrrhus has as little right to be compared to his illustrious relative as the Constable of Bourbon to Louis XI.

Nevertheless, the name of the Epirote has acquired a certain prestige, a special interest that stems partly from his chivalrous and endearing personality, partly and above all from the fact that he was the first Greek to meet the Romans on a battlefield. With him began the relationship between Rome and Greece, on which the entire subsequent development of ancient civilisation and a considerable part of modern civilisation are based. The struggle between phalanxes and cohorts, between mercenaries and the national army, between military royalty and senatorial government, between individual talent and national energy; this struggle between Rome and Hellenism was first waged in the battles of Pyrrhus against the Roman generals; and although the defeated party has often since made a fresh call to arms, all subsequent battles have merely confirmed the first judgment. Although Greece succumbed on the battlefields as well as in the public square, her victory was no less decisive in any competition unrelated to politics, and these struggles already foreshadowed that the triumph of Rome over the Hellenes would be quite different from the
defeat of the Gauls and Phoenicians; the charms of Venus only began to take effect when
the spear was broken and the helmet and shield were put aside.

The truce from war that the peace with the Samnites in 464 (290) had given Italy was short-lived.

In fact, the Etruscan league rose up and called in numerous Gallic mercenaries; the Roman army, which Praetor Lucius Cæcilius led to the aid of the Aretines who had remained loyal, was annihilated under the walls of this city by the Senonese mercenaries, and the general himself succumbed with thirteen thousand soldiers, 470 (284). The whole of northern Italy, Etruscans, Umbrians and Gauls, were up in arms against Rome; serious consequences could ensue if the southern regions seized the opportunity and declared themselves against Rome. But while their adversaries were forming alliances, bargaining for subsidies and raising mercenaries, the Romans were taking action.

The consul Publius Cornelius Dolabella returned to the Senonese with a powerful army; all those who had not been put to the sword were expelled from the region, and this tribe was struck off the list of the Italic nations, 471 (283). A large Etruscan-Gaulan army headed for Rome to avenge on the capital the annihilation of the Senonese nation, and to wipe the name of Rome off the face of the earth more completely than even one of the Senonese kings had done in the past. But, as she passed
the Tiber, in the vicinity of Lake Vadimon, the united army was completely defeated by the Romans, 471 (283).

The coalition's affairs were not at their best when the king arrived. The result had already proved the peace party right, and negotiations had already begun with Rome, or were about to. Pyrrhus, prepared for such resistance, treated the city like a conquered city; soldiers were quartered in the houses, the assemblies of the people and many circles were suspended, the theatres closed, the promenades closed, the gates guarded by epirotic sentries. A number of distinguished people were sent as hostages across the seas; others escaped a similar fate by fleeing from Rome.

Pyrrhus, in order to protect the Tarentine colony of Heraclea, situated between that city and Pandosia, had set out on the march with his troops and those of Tarentum, 474 (280). The Romans, under the protection of their cavalry, forced the passage of the Liris and engaged in a vigorous and successful cavalry battle.
the failure of their general, abandoned the battlefield to the enemy squadrons. In the meantime, Pyrrhus took command of his infantry and once again began the battle. Seven times the legions and the phalanx clashed, and victory was not decided. It was then that Megacles, one of the king's best officers, fell, and how he had worn Pyrrhus' armour on that hot day,
the army believed, for the second time, that its leader had perished; the ranks were beginning to weaken, Lævinus could believe that victory was his and he threw his cavalry on the flank of the Greek army, but he was unable to stop it.

Pyrrhus, rushing headlong into the ranks of his infantry, roused the faltering courage of his men. The elephants, held in reserve until then, were brought into line. The cavalry troops, overwhelmed by the arrival of the elephants, threw themselves on the still intact ranks of the infantry, and the elephants, aided by the excellent Thessalian cavalry, made a terrible massacre of the fugitives. The Romans themselves estimated their losses, including the wounded they had carried from the battlefield, at more than fifteen thousand men. But Pyrrhus's army had suffered no less; nearly four thousand of his bravest soldiers covered the battlefield, and several of his best generals had succumbed. Taking into account that the loss was

As a true critic of strategy, the king was right to count this victory almost as a defeat, although he was not foolish enough, as the Roman poets later imagined, to record this criticism of himself in the inscription of the booty he sent to Tarentum. From a political point of view, success was more or less worth what it had cost; victory in the first battle against the Romans had invaluable consequences for Pyrrhus. His talent as a general

The victory at Heraclea was to do more than anything else to strengthen the energy and unity of the faltering league of Italiotes. But, in addition, the direct benefits of the victory were brilliant and immediate. Lucania was lost to the Romans: Lævinus recalled the troops there and went to Apulia. The Bruttians, Lucanians and Samnites joined Pyrrhus; with the exception of Rhegium, which was groaning under the yoke of the Campanian insurgents, the Greek cities joined the king en masse. Pyrrhus offered peace to the Romans. The king was told that proud word, which was then used for the first time and which has since become a maxim of state, was that Rome did not treat as long as foreign troops were in Rome.

The ambassadors were escorted out of the city.

The Romans held firm to such an extent that, apart from the Greeks of Lower Italy, no major state in the league dared to separate from the Romans. Pyrrhus remained immobile for some time in Campania, facing the armies of the two consuls together; but there was no opportunity to fight a major battle.

In the spring of 475 (276), Pyrrhus resumed the offensive and entered Apulia, where he met the Roman army. The two armies met near Asculum (Ascoli di Puglia). Under the standard of Pyrrhus fought, in addition to Epirotic and Macedonian troops, Italiote mercenaries, city militias, the white shields of Taranto, and the Lucanians, Bruttians and Samnites in coalition, seventy thousand infantrymen in all, including sixteen thousand Greeks and Epirotes, more than eight thousand horsemen and nineteen elephants. On that day, the Romans were joined by the Latins, Campanians, Volscians, Sabines, Umbrians, Marrucinians, Peligians, Frantani and Arpani; they numbered more than seventy thousand infantrymen, including twenty thousand Roman citizens and eight thousand horsemen. The Romans, for

to protect themselves against the elephants, set up a sort of war wagons, which ended in iron spikes, and to which had been adapted a sort of mobile masts, which were carried forward and ended in a spike. The Romans were wrong to claim that the battle remained indecisive. Both accounts agree that the Roman army crossed the river again and that Pyrrhus remained in control of the battlefield. But with the Roman and allied armies intact, and the Greek army, which was nothing without its leader, condemned by its wound to inaction for a long time to come, the campaign was lost for Pyrrhus, and he had to withdraw to his winter quarters, which he established at Taranto, while the Romans took them this time in Apulia.

The city of Syracuse, which in the past, with its armies and fleets, had disputed Carthage's possession of the world.
of the island, had fallen so low as a result of its internal dissensions and the weakness of its
It was so desperate for help that it was reduced to taking refuge behind its walls and begging for foreign aid: no one was in a better position to give it than King Pyrrhus.

The first consequence of this alliance between the Greeks of Italy and Sicily was to unite their adversaries. Carthage and Rome changed their ancient trade treaties into an offensive and defensive league against Pyrrhus, 475 (279).

Pyrrhus set sail with the main army corps from Tarentum in the spring of 476 (278) in order to
to Syracuse.

He immediately occupied Syracuse, brought all the free Greek cities under his control in a short space of time and, as head of the Sicilian confederation, took away all the Romans' possessions.
Sicily. Pyrrhus was never so close to his goal as in the summer of 478 (276), when he saw Carthage discouraged, commanding in Sicily, and retaining a foothold in Italy through the possession of Taranto, and when the new fleet which was to link, ensure and extend these results, was at anchor and ready to leave, in the port of Syracuse.

But the Greeks could only bear with the impatience of a nation unaccustomed to any compression in the long agony of its freedom, the introduction in Syracuse of the regime of Greek generals; soon the very yoke of Carthage seemed more bearable to this foolish people than this new military regime. A powerful Carthaginian army once again made its way towards Sicily and, aided everywhere by the Greeks, made rapid progress.

Pyrrhus made a second serious mistake: instead of going to Lilybaea with his fleet, he went to Taranto.

The consequential embarkation took place towards the end of the year 478 (276). En route, the new Syracusan fleet had to fight the Carthaginians at sea, and this battle cost them a large number of ships. The distance of the king and the news of this first misfortune were enough to overthrow the Sicilian royalty: all the towns held back the money and troops they were supposed to give to the king, and this brilliant state collapsed even faster than it had risen.

Despairing of his venture against Rome, Pyrrhus left a garrison at Tarentum and returned to Greece in the same year, 479 (278). He won more battles, but no lasting successes, and died in a miserable street fight at Argos, in the Peloponnese, 482 (272).

When, after the death of Pyrrhus, a Carthaginian fleet entered the port and Milon saw that the citizens were prepared to surrender the city to the Carthaginians, he preferred to hand over the citadel to the Roman consuls, 482
(272) and at the same time buy the freedom to withdraw with his people. This was a success for the Romans
unexpected.

In the same year that Taranto became Roman, the Samnites finally surrendered, along with the Lucanians and Bruttians. By 484 (270), all of Italy was subject to Rome.

Above all, the immediate circle of Roman domination was extended as far as was possible without completely decentralising the Roman Republic, which was ultimately a municipal republic and should remain so. When the system of incorporation had been extended to its natural borders and soon beyond, the communities that had since been added naturally had to undergo a relationship of subjection; for mere hegemony cannot constitute a lasting relationship. Thus, not through a voluntary monopoly of domination, but through the inevitable pressure of circumstances, the class of master citizens was joined by that of subjects. The means of domination naturally included dividing the subjects by abolishing the Italic confederations, as well as applying different degrees of sovereign pressure to different categories of subjects. Cato, in the internal regime of his house, ensured that his slaves could not band together, and deliberately stirred up quarrels and enmities among them; the Roman republic acted in the same way on a grand scale: the means were not moral, but they were effective.

However, the Roman senate was too wise not to see that the only way to ensure the duration of domination is to moderate the dominator. So, in place of their independence, the dependent communes were granted the full right of citizenship, and allowed a certain degree of autonomy, which contained within itself a shadow of independence, a personal share in Rome's military and political successes, and above all an independent municipal constitution: in all that was part of the Italiote confederation, there were no Ilotes. Rome renounced forever, with a clearness and magnanimity that are exemplary in history, the most dangerous of the rights of domination, the right of the "Ilotes". to impose his subjects.

The new Italy had thus become a political unit, and was on the way to becoming a national unit. The dominant Latin nationality had already assimilated the Sabines and the Volscians, and had sown several Latin cities throughout Italy; it was only the development of this seed that later led all men who wore Roman clothing to use Latin as their mother tongue. What proves that the Romans were already aware of this future is the customary extension of the name Latin to all the members of the Italic confederation. What we can recognise of this grandiose political edifice reveals the high political intelligence of its anonymous architect; and the uncommon solidity shown against terrible blows by this confederation, created from pieces and pieces, gave this great work the seal of durability. Since the meshes of this thin but solid net cast over the whole of Italy placed it entirely in the hands of the Roman Republic, it has been a great power, and has taken the place in the system of Mediterranean states of Taranto, Lucania and the other states of the second or third order, which the last war had made disappear from the number of political powers. The official recognition of its new position was attested to in Rome by the two solemn embassies sent from Alexandria to Rome in 481, and from Rome to Alexandria, which, even though they were dealing only with a commercial alliance, were a sign of the new power's importance,
were, however, preparing a political alliance for the future. Just as Carthage fought with Egypt for possession of Cyrene, and soon afterwards with the Romans for possession of Sicily, Macedonia was to fight with Rome for dominance in Greece and with Carthage for dominance of the Adriatic coast. The new struggles being prepared on all sides could not fail to collide, and Rome, as mistress of Italy, could not be enveloped in the vast circle that the triumph of Alexander the Great and his plans had assigned to his successors as a meeting place.

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LAW - RELIGION - MILITARY ORGANISATION - SOCIAL ECONOMY - NATIONALITY

At this time, in the development of Roman legislation, we can see a late but marked tendency towards humanity and progress. The main provisions of the Twelve Tables, which are in line with Solon's legislation, and which must therefore be regarded as material innovations, bear this stamp; for example, the right of association and the autonomy of the guilds thus constituted, the rules on the limitation of inheritance, intended to guarantee against the "unlawfulness" of the guilds.
The criminal law was softened in the same way, admittedly a century later, by the law of Pætelia.
Criminal law was softened in a similar way, admittedly a century later, by the law of Pætelia. The free
The law of the Twelve Tables, or the interpretation of this law, gave the same value to private wills as to those made in the curia: this was a great step towards the abolition of collective enjoyment, and towards the creation of a community.
the complete introduction of individual freedom into property rights.

In proceedings relating to property, the magistrate's hitherto absolute right to decide on the allocation of property was made subject to legal rules, and alongside possession the right of ownership was established, which removed a significant part of the magistrate's power. In the administration of justice
In criminal matters, it was the people's judgement that also guaranteed the right of appeal, which until then had been purely arbitrary. The accused, condemned by the magistrate, appealed to the people; the case was brought before three assemblies of the people, in which the magistrate who had pronounced the judgement defended it, and in which the accused was heard.
was in fact acting as public prosecutor. It was only in a fourth assembly
that the appeal (anquisitio) began, in which the people confirmed the judgement or overturned it.

In short, we stuck to the simple piety of the ancestors, and kept an equal distance from superstition and impiety. What proves how much was still alive at that time the idea of the spiritualisation of earthly things, which formed the basis of the Roman religion, is the institution, probably
the god dedicated to silver in 485 (269) (Argentinus), who was naturally the son of the old copper god (Æsculanus).

Military art underwent a complete revolution at this time. The old Greco-Italian order, which, as in Homer's time, was based on the selection of the most brilliant and valiant warriors who always fought on horseback and in the front rank, had been replaced in the latter days of the reign of the kings by the old Dorian phalanx of hoplites, probably eight ranks deep, who now had to bear the main brunt of the battle, while the cavalry was placed on the wings and fought mainly as a reserve, either on horseback or on foot, depending on the circumstances.

The usefulness of this military organisation, which was the most direct cause of the political greatness of the Roman Republic, rests essentially on the three great military principles of the reserve, the combination of mass combat with single combat, and the offensive with the defensive. The reserve system had already been applied to the cavalry; from then on, it developed through the division of the army into three corps, and the habit of reserving the veteran corps to strike the decisive blow.

It is clear that this new order of battle is nothing more than a development and an extension of the existing order.
Roman or at least Italic tactics of the old Greek phalanx.

In the social economy, agriculture remained, as before, the social and political foundation of the economy. the Roman Republic, as a new Italic state. Like the people's assembly, the army was made up of Roman peasants. What they had conquered as soldiers with the sword, they secured as colonists with the plough.

In Rome, there was no room for the development of a truly urban middle class, of a "middle class". body of independent traders and merchants. In addition to the centralisation
It was a custom from antiquity, and a necessary consequence of slavery, that the city's small businesses were run by slaves. It was an ancient custom, and in fact a necessary consequence of slavery, for small businesses in the city to be run by slaves whose masters set them up as traders or merchants, or by freedmen to whom the master not only provided the capital involved, but also regularly demanded a share, often even half, of the profits made.

But even though Rome did not have a prosperous middle class or a powerful class of capitalists, the importance of the great city was still growing steadily. One sure sign of this is the number of slaves confined to the capital, as attested by the first census of the Roman Empire.
serious conspiracy of slaves in 335 (419), and even more so in the ever-increasing number and frightening of the freedmen.

Appius Glaudius began the grandiose system of public utility buildings which, more than any military success, illustrated Rome from the point of view of public welfare, and which today, in the midst of its ruins, gives thousands of people who have not read a word of Roman history an idea of the greatness of Rome. It was to him that the State owed the first great military roadway, and the
city of its first aqueduct. Following in the footsteps of Claudius, the senate had this network built.

of roads and fortresses, the plan for which had already been drawn up beforehand and without which, as the history of all military states teaches us, from the Achaemenids to the man who laid out the Simplon road, no military hegemony can be founded. Following in the footsteps of Claudius, Manius Curius used the spoils of Pyrrhus' war to build a second aqueduct for the capital in 482 (272). The lives of the citizens themselves were changed. It was during the reign of Pyrrhus that silver tableware began to appear on Roman tables, and chroniclers date the abolition of thatched roofs in Rome to the year 470 (284). The new capital of Italy lost its village appearance and began to be decorated. When the Roman Republic became a great power, Rome also became a great city.

Traces of Greek ideas can be found in every branch of Roman civilisation at this time, in legislation and the monetary system, in religion and in the formation of national legends. In particular, from the beginning of the fifth century, i.e. from the time of the conquest of Campania, Greek influence seems to have made rapid and far-reaching progress on Roman custom.

The habit of sitting at table, not on benches as in the past, but on divans; the change in the time of the main meal, which was postponed from midday to two or three o'clock in the afternoon; the change in the time of the main meal, which was postponed from midday to two or three o'clock in the afternoon. Noon, according to our way of counting; the libation masters, who, at banquets, were usually chosen by lot from among the guests, and who alone told their table companions what to drink, and when and how to drink; the table songs, which were chosen according to the rank of the guests, and which, in Rome, were not refrains but songs of the ancestors: these are all innovations borrowed from the Greeks.

But as the two nations reached the peak of their development, they began to grow apart.
penetrate each other, either through their friendly relations or their hostility, their contrasts
On the one hand, the complete absence of individuality in the Roman spirit; on the other, the national, local and individual diversity of Hellenism.

The Rome of that time belonged to no one individual: the citizens all had to be alike if each of them was to be a king. On the other hand, individual Hellenic development was already beginning to emerge at this time, and the vigour and character of this opposition bears, like the opposing tendency, the stamp of this great age. Rome became great in a different way to all the other states of antiquity; but it paid dearly for its greatness by sacrificing the fruitful diversity, the easygoing nature and the inner freedom of Greek life.

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THIRD BOOK

From the unification of Italy to the conquest of Carthage and the Greek states.

Arduum res gestas scribere

Salluste

CARTHAGE

Of all the Phoenician settlements, none prospered more quickly or more rapidly than those founded by the Tyrians and Sidonians on the coasts of Spain and North Africa. Among the many flourishing cities on these shores, the "new city", Carthada, or, as Westerners call it, Karchédon or Carthago, shone out in the forefront. This colony was so marvellously suited to agriculture, trade and the exchange of their products that not only
In the time of Rome, Carthage, barely rebuilt, became the third largest city in the empire, and today, under less favourable circumstances and in a much less fortunate situation, there is still a flourishing city there, with a population of one hundred thousand.

But as the flow of Hellenic immigration continued westwards, the Phoenicians had to look for a foothold somewhere if they did not want to be completely crushed. The Carthaginians undertook this task; after a long and obstinate war, they halted the progress of the Cyrenians, and Hellenism was unable to advance west of the desert of Tripoli. With the help of the
Carthaginians, the Phoenician colonists held on to the western tip of Sicily against the Greeks, and voluntarily placed themselves in the clientele of the powerful city, their original kinsman. These important results, which were achieved in the second century of Rome, and which secured for the Phoenicians the south-western part of the Mediterranean, gave the city that had conquered them a natural hegemony over their nation, and a much-changed political situation. Carthage was no longer just a city of merchants; it was aiming to dominate Libya and part of the Mediterranean as soon as it could.

But dominance over Libya was only half of Carthaginian power; maritime and colonial domination had not developed any less powerfully at the same time. In
In Spain, the Phoenicians' capital was the old Tyrian colony of Gadès (Cadiz); they also had a network of trading posts to the west and east, and silver mines inland, so that they owned what is now Andalusia and the kingdom of Granada, or at least the coasts of these two provinces.

By the end of the second century AD, the Carthaginians had already established themselves firmly in Sardinia,
in the same way that Libya was completely exploited by them.

In Sicily, it is true, the Straits of Messina and most of the eastern part of the island had fallen into the hands of the Greeks, but the Phoenicians retained dominion over some of the smaller neighbouring islands.

Through their possession of southern Spain, the Balearic Islands, Sardinia, western Sicily and Melita, and through the obstacle they placed in the way of Greek colonisation on the eastern coasts of Spain, as well as in Corsica and in the vicinity of the Syrtes, the masters of the northern coast of Africa closed in on their own account and monopolised the western waters.

At the time of the Peloponnesian War, Carthage was, according to the earliest Greek historians, far superior to all the Greek states in terms of financial resources, and its revenues were compared to those of the great king. Polybius called it the richest city in the world. An account by
the intelligence with which agriculture was practised in Carthage, where generals and statesmen, as later in Rome, did not disdain to practise and learn it scientifically, is the book of agronomy by the Carthaginian Magon, which was later considered by Greek and Latin farmers as the fundamental code of rational agriculture, and which was translated not only into Greek but also into Latin by order of the Roman senate, which officially recommended it to landowners.

The military resources of the Romans and those of the Carthaginians were very different, but in many respects they could be balanced. At the time it was taken, the city still had a population of 700,000 souls, including women and children; if necessary, in the fifth century of Rome, it could field a national army of 40,000 hoplites. But far more than in

number of men able to bear arms, Rome had the upper hand over Carthage in terms of the actual number of men.
its national army.

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WAR FOR POSSESSION OF SICILY BETWEEN ROME AND CARTHAGE

Rome had disembarked its troops at Messina to extend its protection to the Mamertines, but a large Carthaginian fleet commanded by Hannon, son of Hannibal, appeared at Messina. While the fleet was blocking the strait, the Carthaginian army it had landed began the siege from the north. Hieron, who had only waited for the Carthaginian attack to begin his war against Rome, brought his recently withdrawn army back to Messina and began the siege from the south side of the city.

In the meantime, the consul Appius Claudius Caudex had appeared with the main army corps in Rhegium and during a dark night, he managed to force his way through, despite the Carthaginian fleet. Skill and luck were on the side of the Romans; the allies, unprepared for an attack by the entire Roman army, and for this reason not having joined forces, were defeated.
They were attacked separately by the Roman legions that had left the city and had to lift the siege. The following year, the two consuls, with an army twice their size, entered the island unopposed. One of them, Marcus Valerius Maximus, who ever since this campaign has been known as the man from Messana (Messala), won a great victory over the combined army of the Carthaginians and Syracusans; And as, after this victory, the Phoenician army was no longer in a position to hold out against the Romans, not only were Alæsa, Kentoripa, and in general the small Greek towns declared for the Romans, but Hieron himself left the Carthaginian side and made peace and an alliance with the Romans, 491 (263).

Akragas finally fell into the hands of the Romans, and as a result the whole island came under their power, at
With the exception of the sea fortresses, in which the Carthaginian general Hamilcar, Hannon's successor in the higher command, defended himself vigorously, and from which he could not be removed either by force or by famine.

The Carthaginian fleet had unrivalled dominance of the sea, and not only did it keep all the other Carthaginians in obedience.
cities on the coast by providing them with everything they needed, but still threatened Italy with a descent.

It was then realised that the first thing to do was to build a fleet and it was decided to form one of twenty triremes and one hundred quinquermes. As soon as the preparations were complete, this fleet sailed for Messina.

At the promontory of Mylæ, to the north-west of Messana, the Carthaginian fleet, which was arriving from Panormos under the command of Hannibal, encountered the Roman fleet, which then had to prove itself for the first time on a large scale. The Carthaginians, seeing the Romans' awkward and awkward sailing ships as easy prey, threw themselves at them in an irregular order, but the newly invented flying bridges were tried with success. The Roman ships chained and captured the enemy ships that were attacking them one by one; they could not approach from the front or from the sides without the terrible bridge being lowered onto the enemy's bow. When the battle was over, nearly fifty Carthaginian ships, almost half the fleet, had been sunk or captured by the Romans, including Hannibal's flagship, which had once belonged to King Pyrrhus. The success was great, and the moral impression even greater. Rome had suddenly become a naval power, and had in its hands the means to energetically bring to an end a war that seemed likely to drag on indefinitely and threaten Italian trade with ruin.

Two routes were open to the Romans. They could attack Carthage in the islands of Italy, and successively wrest from it all the fortresses on the coasts of Sicily and Sardinia. Or they could abandon the islands and throw all their forces into Africa.

The first plan of operation was chosen. In the year following the battle of Mylæ, 495 (252), the consul Lucius Scipio captured the port of Aleria in Corsica. The following year, 496 (258), the attack was repeated with greater success, and the open villages near the coast were pillaged; but these expeditions did not lead to permanent Roman settlement.

The senate resolved to change the system and attack Carthage in Africa. In the spring of 498 (256), a fleet of three hundred and thirty ships of the line set sail for the coast of Libya. The Romans found the Punic fleet in battle order at Eknomos to cover their homeland against the enemy.
the invasion.

Rarely have we seen larger masses fighting on the seas than those that met on this occasion.
battle. The Roman fleet, with three hundred and thirty sails, carried at least one hundred thousand crew,

The Carthaginian fleet, with three hundred and fifty sails, was manned by at least as many men, so that almost three hundred thousand men were lined up that day to decide the battle between two powerful peoples.

Twenty-four ships were sunk from the Roman fleet and sixty-four from the Carthaginian fleet. Instead of landing on the western side of the peninsula which forms the gulf, the Romans landed further east, where the bay of Clupea offered them a wide roadstead to protect their ships against almost all winds. In a short space of time, an entrenched naval camp was built, and the army was free to begin its operations.

The Carthaginians' energy was broken. They asked for peace. But the conditions proposed by the consul were unacceptable.

Hamilcar, who had so successfully waged guerrilla warfare in Sicily against the Romans, appeared in Libya with the elite of the Sicilian troops, who provided a valuable nucleus for the new levy. By the spring of 499 (255), things had changed so much that it was the Carthaginians who were the first to open the campaign and present the battle to the Romans. The main mass of Romans attacked in front by the elephants, on both sides and behind by the cavalry, although they formed a square and defended themselves heroically, in the end these compact masses had to be broken up and dispersed. Among the small number of prisoners was the consul himself, who later died in Carthage.

A Roman fleet of three hundred and fifty sails immediately set sail, and after winning a brilliant victory at the Hermean promontory, in which the Carthaginians lost one hundred and fourteen ships, this fleet arrived at Clupea just in time to draw the remnants of the defeated army, which had dug in, out of their critical position. But by this time the Romans had so completely lost the
After this successful battle at Clupea, they packed up all their troops and set sail for Italy. Three quarters of the fleet perished with their crews in a violent storm; only eighty ships reached port; July 499 (255).

After these unexpected successes, the Carthaginians were able to resume their long-delayed offensive.

Rome built two hundred and twenty new ships. Panormos, the most important town in Carthaginian Sicily, was captured by a successful naval attack, and the smaller towns of Soluntum, Cephaladium and Tyndaris also fell into Roman hands.

The following year, under the walls of Panormos, the consul Gaius Cælius Metellus won a dazzling victory over the elephant army; summer of 503 (251).

The siege of Lilybaea, the first major siege undertaken by the Romans and one of the most obstinate in history, was opened by the Romans with great success.

But after the besiegers had repulsed an initial sortie, the Carthaginians succeeded in burning the Romans' machines on a stormy night. The Romans abandoned their preparations for the assault and contented themselves with blockading the city by land and sea.

This led to six years of uneventful warfare, 506-511 (248-243), the fewest in history.
The Carthaginians, too, were not so glorious.

In the end, a number of far-sighted and magnanimous men resolved to save the State without government intervention, and to put an end to the ruinous Sicilian war. The wealthy Roman patriots built a fleet, the core of which was made up of ships built for privateering, and which provided the skilled crews who manned them.

The well-built and well-mounted Roman fleet, commanded by the skilful praetor Publius Valerius Falto, disrupted the enemy's heavily-laden and poorly-mounted ships at first impact; fifty were sunk to the bottom, and the victors returned to the port of Lilybaea with seventy captured ships. The last great effort of the Roman patriots had borne fruit; it brought victory and thus peace.

Hamilcar therefore renounced Sicily. On the other hand, the independence and integrity of the Carthaginian state and territory were expressly recognised in the ordinary form, meaning that Rome undertook not to enter into a separate alliance with Carthage's allies, as Garthage had with those of Rome.

The West was at peace, 513 (241).

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EXTENDING ITALY TO ITS NATURAL BORDERS

Later the Romans listened to the proposals of the Sardinian rebels, and received from them that part of Sardinia which had been in the hands of the Carthaginians, 516 (238).

So Rome effortlessly acquired Sardinia, to which it added Corsica, the ancient Etruscan possession where, since the last war perhaps, a few Roman garrisons had remained.

The Illyrians of Skodra became tributaries of the Romans; Demetrius of Pharo, who had switched from Teuta's service to that of the Romans, became known as a dynast dependent on Rome and its ally on the Dalmatian islands and the coasts. The Greek cities of Kerkyra, Epidamnos, Apollonia and the communities of Atintani and Parthini were attached to Rome by the easy ties of symmachy. So, like Sicily and Sardinia, the most important seaside resorts on the Adriatic were subject to Roman rule.

A well-understood policy commanded the Romans to take possession of the territories which extended as far as the Alps as quickly and completely as possible. However, the Romans made no haste, so the Celts themselves began the war. The Celtic generals marched on the Apennines with fifty thousand infantrymen and twenty thousand cavalrymen or soldiers fighting on chariots, 529 (225).

The Celts found the Apennines scarcely guarded and plundered without a fight the rich plains of the Tuscan territory, which had not seen an enemy for a long time. They were soon near Clusium, three days' march from Rome, when the Ariminum army, commanded by the consul Papus, appeared on their plain, while the Etruscan militia, which had gathered behind them after the Gauls had crossed the Apennines, followed the enemy's advance. A terrible cavalry battle ensued, in which more than one brave Roman perished, including Regulus himself, but he had not sacrificed his life in vain. Ten thousand Celts and their king Cocolitanus were taken prisoner, while forty thousand remained on the battlefield. According to Celtic custom, Ancerestus and his retinue killed themselves.

The Boians surrendered without resistance the following year, 530 (224), after the Lingons, and the following year, 531 (223), the Anari imitated their example; as a result, the entire plain as far as the Po was in Roman hands. The conquest of the northern bank required tougher fighting. But after a battle that was half won by the Celts, but ultimately decided in favour of the Romans, the consul Gnæus Spicio stormed the capital of the Insubres, Mediolanum, and this success, together with the capture of the town of Comum, put an end to the resistance.

The border of the Alps had been reached, in the sense that the entire Po plain was either subject to the Romans or, like the Cenoman and Venetian territory, possessed by the dependent allies.

The newly-acquired fertile territories were quickly covered with Roman cities. The solid fortress of Placentia (Piacenza) had already been built on the Po itself, to cover the river crossing; Cremona had already been established on the left bank, and construction of the walls of Mutina (Modena) was well advanced, when unexpected events prevented the Romans from continuing to reap the rewards of their successes.

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HAMILCAR AND HANNIBAL

The treaty signed with Rome in 513 (241) gave Carthage peace, but at a high price. One more regret
For the Carthaginians, it was a bitter blow to see their entire commercial policy system shattered.

In Carthage, therefore, there was a party of peace and a party of war, which were naturally aligned with the political distinctions that already existed between the conservatives and the reformers.

Also at the head of the army was the man who had proved in the wars of Sicily and Libya that fortune had destined him, of all men, to be the saviour of his homeland. When he left Carthage, he instructed his nine-year-old son Hannibal to swear eternal hatred of the Roman name on the altar of the supreme God, and took him and his youngest sons, Hasdrubal and Magon, "the race of lions" as he called them, to the camp to entrust them with the heritage of his subjects, his genius and his hatred.

We cannot follow in detail what he himself did in Spain; Cato the Elder, who, a generation after Hamilcar's death, found in Spain the still fresh trace of his work, could not help exclaiming, despite his hatred of the Carthaginians, that no king deserved to be named next to him.
of Hamilcar Barca. Hamilcar's command founded a Carthaginian kingdom in Spain, and Hasdrubal's political skill ensured its solidity. The most beautiful regions of Spain, the southern and eastern coasts, became Phoenician provinces; cities were founded, and above all Carthage of Spain (Carthagena), was established by Hasdrubal on the only good port on the southern coast, and it became the first Phoenician city in Spain.
the magnificent "royal palace" of its founder; agriculture flourished, and even more so
mining when the silver deposits of Cartagena were fortunately discovered and, a century later, produced an annual output of nine million (thirty-six million sesterces). Most of the cities as far as the Ebro became dependent on Carthage.

Fortune thus smiled on Hamilcar's bold plan. The means to wage war were assured, with a powerful army accustomed to victory and a treasury that was constantly being replenished, but this man was no more when it became possible to accomplish his plans. His successor Hasdrubal having been assassinated, the Carthaginian officers of the Spanish army called upon the eldest son of Hasdrubal to succeed him.
of Hamilcar, Hannibal. He was still a young man: he had been born in 505 (249), and therefore had
He was twenty-nine at the time, but he had already lived a long life. He had followed his father everywhere and shared his feelings about Catullus' peace. While still a child, he had followed his father into the camps, where he had distinguished himself from an early age. Lithe and vigorous, Hannibal was a fast runner, a skilful pugilist and a fearless horseman; he could do without sleep and, if necessary, as a soldier, he knew how to do without food. Although his youth had been spent in the camps, he had the education of the noble Phoenicians of the time. He accepted the inheritance and proved himself worthy of it. Although his story has been
written by anger, envy and baseness, it has not been possible to obscure this noble and great image. On the contrary, there is unanimous agreement that he knew how to combine discretion and enthusiasm, foresight and resolution to an unprecedented degree. He was remarkable above all for his cunning, which is one of the particular traits of the Carthaginian character; he loved to take extraordinary and unexpected routes; ambushes and stratagems of all kinds were familiar to him, and he studied the character of his antagonists with unprecedented care. He had permanent spies even in Rome, and was at all times informed of his enemy's plans; he was often seen wearing disguises and false hair, seeking information on one point or another. Every page of the history of those times bears witness to his
He displayed this talent as a general and his skill as a statesman after the peace with Rome, in his reform of the Carthaginian constitution and later still when, as a foreigner and exile, he exerted so much influence in the courts of the East.

Immediately after his appointment, in the spring of 534 (220), Hannibal resolved to start the war. The time was right: the Celts were still restless, and war seemed imminent.

between Rome and Macedonia; he could therefore lift the mask and take the war wherever he wished, before the Romans could begin it at their convenience by a descent into Africa. His army was soon ready to enter the campaign; his treasury was well-stocked as a result of a few raids; but the Carthaginian government showed itself to be far from desirous of a declaration of war against Rome. Hannibal made up his mind. He summarily informed Carthage that the Sagontines were disturbing the Torboletes, subjects of Carthage, and that he was obliged to attack them; then, without waiting for a reply, in the spring of 525 he began the siege of a city allied with Rome, in other words, war against Rome. Sagonte defended itself, as only Spanish cities know how to defend themselves, and the city was eventually stormed. When Hannibal sent Carthage the spoils that were to be distributed, patriotism and the ardour of war swept through the hearts that had hitherto been closed to Rome.
completely unaffected, and the division removed any chance of an accommodation with
Rome.

But how could Italy be attacked? Only the land of the Ligurians and Celts could be for Hannibal what Poland was for Napoleon in his exactly similar campaign in Russia. So everything pointed towards Hannibal's attack on northern Italy.

The reason why Hannibal preferred the land route is less obvious. Instead of exposing himself to the immense and unforeseen accidents of a sea voyage and a naval war, he may have thought it wiser to rely on the assurances, no doubt seriously made, of the Boëns and Insubres. In any case, the route he took was the primitive Celtic route, by which hordes larger than his army had crossed the Alps: the ally and liberator of the Celtic nation could venture to attempt this passage.

Hannibal assembled in Cartagena, at the beginning of the favourable season, the troops intended for his great army; it consisted of ninety thousand infantrymen and twelve thousand cavalrymen, of whom about two thirds were Africans and one third Spaniards. The thirty-seven elephants he brought with him were no doubt intended to make an impression on the Gauls rather than to fight seriously. Hannibal set off with this army, in the spring of 536 (218), from Cartagena towards the Ebro.

Hannibal found vigorous resistance on the Ebro, but only from the natives, whom, as a man for whom, in these circumstances, time was even more precious than the blood of his soldiers, he got rid of in a month, at the cost of losing a quarter of his army. He finally reached the Pyrenees.

Once in Gaul, Hannibal sent some of his troops home. With an army of fifty thousand infantrymen and nine thousand cavalrymen, most of them former soldiers, he crossed the mountains without difficulty, and when he took the road to the coast via Narbonne and Nîmes, through Celtic territory, this route was open to his army, either through treaties concluded earlier, Carthaginian gold or force of arms. It was only when the army reached Avignon, on the Rhône, at the end of July, that it seemed likely to encounter serious resistance.

Hannibal had to cross the river with an army equipped with a large cavalry and elephants, in full view of the enemy and before Scipio arrived, and he did not have a basket. On his orders, all the boats were bought from the many boatmen on the Rhone at the price they asked, and what was lacking in boats was replaced by rafts made from fallen trees, so that the whole army could cross the river in a day.

Scipio, who had been warned too late, then marched on to Avignon, but by the time he got there, the Carthaginian cavalry, which had been left behind to protect the passage of the elephants, had already been on the road for three days. Now that Hannibal, having crossed the Rhone, had entered the Celtic territory bordering on Italy, there was no longer any question of preventing him from reaching the Alps.

The Carthaginian army first marched up the Rhône to the valley of Haute-Isère, a low, rich and even then densely populated region, which is closed off to the north and west by the Rhône, to the south by the Isère and to the east by the Alps. The walk along the Rhône and across the "island" to the foot of the Alps took sixteen days.

The attacks made by the Celts against the advancing army in all the right places were extremely painful. When they reached the very foot of the Alps, where the road leaves the Alps
the Isère and entered a narrow and difficult defile along the Reclus torrent to reach the summit of the Saint-Bernard, the entire militia of the Centrones appeared, partly behind the army, partly on the crests of the rocks which dominate the passage on the right and left, with a view to cutting off the train and the baggage, and inflicting serious losses on it, by rolling rocks over it. At the "Pierre-Blanche", which still bears this name, a high and isolated limestone mountain at the foot of the Saint-Bernard, which dominates the route, Hannibal camped with his infantry, to protect the march of the horses and carriages.
He finally reached the summit of the pass on the following day, on a plain protected from all attack, which stretched for almost a league around a small lake where the Doria rises. There, on the plain protected from all attack, which stretches for almost a league around a small lake where the Doria rises, he rested his army.

The soldiers were beginning to feel discouraged. The paths were becoming more and more difficult, provisions were running short, the march through gorges exposed to incessant attacks from enemies that could not be reached, the ranks were decimated, the situation of the stragglers and the wounded was desperate, and the very purpose of the expedition seemed fanciful to all but the general.
This was beginning to put off even the veterans of Africa and Spain. But the general's confidence remained unshaken: after a short rest, they prepared with renewed courage for the last and most difficult undertaking, the march downhill. On this march, the army did not have to suffer materially from the enemy; but on the steep and slippery slope along the Doria, where the newly fallen snow hid the paths and damaged them, men and animals got lost and fell into precipices; Finally, towards the end of the third day's march, we came to a part of the route about two hundred feet long, where avalanches are constantly rushing down from the Cramont rocks that dominate it, and where, during the cold summers, eternal snow reigns.

The infantry crossed this passage, but the horses and elephants could not pass over the icy plateaux, barely covered by a light layer of newly fallen snow, and the general camped in this perilous spot with the baggage, infantry and elephants. The following day, the cavalrymen, by hard work in the trenches, made a path for the horses and beasts of burden; but it was only after three days' work with constant help that the elephants, half dead of hunger, were able to cross the ice,
were able to cross. In this way, after a delay of four days, the army was once again reassembled, and after another three days' march through the valley of the Doria, it arrived towards the middle of September on the plain of Ivrea, where the exhausted troops were housed in the villages, in order to recover, through good food and a fortnight's rest, from their extraordinary fatigue.

The goal was achieved, but at the price of harsh sacrifices. Of the fifty thousand veteran infantrymen and nine thousand cavalrymen in the army when it crossed the Pyrenees, more than half had perished in the fighting, the marches and the river crossings. Such a march is a military operation of questionable value, and it is doubtful that Hannibal himself considered it a success. In any case, the prudent and energetic execution of the plan deserves our admiration, and to whatever cause the results are attributed, whether to the favour of fortune or simply to the skill of the general, Hamilcar's great idea, that of continuing the conflict with Rome in Italy, had now been realised.

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THE WAR UNDER HANNIBAL UP TO THE BATTLE OF CANNES

The appearance of the Carthaginian army on the Italian side of the Alps suddenly upset the situation and disconcerted the Romans' plan. Of Rome's two main armies, one had landed in Spain and had soon come into conflict with the enemy; it could no longer be recalled. The second, which was destined for Africa under the command of consul Tiberius Sempronius, was fortunately still in Sicily. The army and fleet were still in Lilybaea when the Senate ordered them to return as soon as possible to defend their homeland.

Thus, at the decisive moment, there was not even a Roman outpost at the decisive spot; Hannibal had all the time in the world to rest his army, to take, after a siege of three days, the town of the Taurini, which had closed its doors to him, and to obtain or impose an alliance by force on all the Celtic and Ligurian communities, before Scipio, who had taken command in the Po valley, found himself in his path.

On the plain between the Ticino and Sesia rivers, not far from Vercelli, the Roman cavalry who, along with the troops
Scipio's light infantry, which had advanced to reconnoitre in force, encountered the Punic cavalry, sent for the same purpose. Despite the superiority of the enemy, Scipio accepted the battle offered to him; but his light infantry, which was placed in front of the cavalry, broke under the effort of the enemy's heavy cavalry. The Roman losses were considerable; the consul himself, who behaved like a valiant soldier, received a dangerous wound. Scipio, enlightened by this defeat about the strength of the enemy, understood the error of placing himself with a weaker army on the plain, with his back to the river, and decided to cross the river again in full view of the enemy.

The Roman army, now nearly forty thousand strong, had only to hold its position, to force the enemy either to try, in winter, to cross the river and attack the camp, or to suspend its march and test the fickleness of the Gauls in the midst of the rigours of winter. Hannibal left no stone unturned to lure him into battle. Soon, on a rainy day, an engagement
the Romans, surrendered at Trebia. The Roman infantry lived up to its name;
at the start of the battle, it fought with decisive superiority against the infantry
enemy. At that moment, an elite Carthaginian troop suddenly appeared, half infantry, half cavalry. cavalry, which, under the command of Hannon, the youngest of Hannibal's brothers, emerged from a ambush, on the rear of the Roman army, and fell on its mass already so pressed. The wings of the army and the last ranks of the Roman centre were broken and dispersed by this attack. The
The rest of the army was almost entirely massacred by the enemy's elephants and light troops,
trying to cross the river.

The Roman army took refuge in the fortresses of Placentia and Cremona; completely cut off from communication with Rome, it had to obtain supplies by water. Hannibal bivouacked where he was. His main concern was to organise the Gallic insurrection: it is said that more than sixty thousand infantrymen and four thousand cavalrymen from the Celts joined the army.

Hannibal left the Po valley to seek a route through the narrow defiles of the Apennines. The crossing of the Apennines was accomplished without much difficulty.

Hannibal camped at Fiesole, while Gaius Flaminius was still waiting in Arezzo for the roads to become passable before going to block him.

The consul hastily followed the enemy's march, which passed through Arezzo and moved slowly through the rich Chiana valley towards Perugia; he reached it in the vicinity of Cortona, where Hannibal, who had been accurately informed of his opponent's march, had had plenty of time to choose his battlefield, a narrow defile between two steep mountain walls, closed off at the exit by a high hill and at the entrance by Lake Trasimeno. He blocked the exit with the best of his infantry; the light troops and cavalry were hidden on either side. The Roman columns entered the unoccupied passage without hesitation: the thick morning fog hid the enemy's position from them. There was no battle; it was a simple rout. Those who remained outside the defile were hurled into the lake by the cavalry, the main body was annihilated in the defile without resistance, and the greatest number, the consul himself, were killed in the order of march. As if this were not enough, immediately after the battle of Lake Trasimene, the cavalry of the Ariminum army, commanded by Gaius Centenius and four thousand strong, which Gnæus Servilius had sent forward to rescue his
colleague, while he himself was advancing at a slow pace, was surrounded by the same army.
One part perished, the other was taken. All Etruria was lost, and Hannibal could march unhindered on Rome. The Romans prepared for the last extremities: they broke the bridges over the Tiber and appointed Quintus Fabius Maximus dictator.

But Hannibal saw further ahead than King Pyrrhus. He did not march on Rome; he did not even march against Gnæus Servilius, a skilful general. He made a completely unexpected move. He passed the fortress of Spoletium, which he tried in vain to surprise, crossed Umbria, devastated Picenum, which was covered with Roman farms, and stopped on the shores of the Adriatic.

Finally, when his army had been sufficiently rebuilt, and the infantry had been well trained in handling of the new weapons, he set up camp and marched slowly along the coast to the south of France.

Italy. But his hopes that the confederation would begin to dissolve were not fulfilled. This result was a decisive advantage for the Romans.

Their general followed a different tactic from that of his predecessors. He set off for the camp just as determined to avoid a pitched battle as his predecessor had been to fight one.

Hannibal crossed the Apennines in the heart of Italy to reach Benevento, took the open town of Telesia, on the border of Samnium and Campania, and headed for Capua. He had formed alliances there, which might have raised hopes that Capua would break away from the Roman league, but these hopes were not fulfilled. He then turned back and took the road to Apulia.

An entrenched camp was built at Gerunium, about nine leagues north of Luceria.

Far from being discouraged by its latest defeats, the Roman army was indignant at the inglorious task imposed on it by its general, "Hannibal's lackey", and cried out to be led to the enemy. In concert with the disgruntled soldiers and the owners of the ravaged lands, his political opponents pushed through an absurd and unconstitutional resolution, conferring the dictatorship, which was intended to ward off the inconveniences of divided command in times of danger, on Marcus Minucius, who had until then been Fabius' lieutenant, and consequently giving him powers equal to those of Fabius. Marcus Minucius, obliged to justify his title of dictator on the battlefield, made a hasty attack with unequal forces, and would have been
had his colleague not prevented a greater catastrophe by arriving in good time.
with new troops.

It was decided to make amends for these faults, and to equip an army such as Rome had never fielded before: eight legions, one-fifth the usual number, and one legion.
of allies, enough, in a word, to crush an enemy that did not have half as many allies.
these forces. As the appointment of a dictator could not be considered, the senate tried to ensure the election of capable consuls.

The senate had difficulty in passing one of its candidates, Lucius Emilius Paulus, who had prudently led the Illyrian war in 535 (219); the vast majority of citizens gave him Marcus Terentius Varron as his colleague, an incapable man who was known only for his violent opposition to the senate.

Hannibal set off from Gerunium in a southerly direction and, passing Luceria, crossed the Aufidus and took the citadel of Cannae (between Canossa and Barletta). Having received positive orders from the senate, the two new generals-in-chief, Paulus and Varron, arrived in Apulia at the beginning of the summer of 538 (216). With the four new legions and a corresponding contingent of Italians, the Roman army numbered eighty thousand infantrymen, half citizens and half allies, and six thousand cavalrymen, of whom one-third were citizens and two-thirds allies; Hannibal's army, on the other hand, had ten thousand cavalrymen but only forty thousand infantrymen.

At daybreak on 2 August, the bulk of the Roman army crossed the river, which at that time of year was dry and did not materially hinder the movement of the troops; it took up a position near the smallest of the Roman camps, on the vast plain stretching west of Cannae, on the left bank of the river. The Carthaginian army followed and also crossed the river, on which the Roman right wing and the Carthaginian left wing were supported. The Roman cavalry was placed on the wings: the smallest portion was made up of citizens commanded by Paulus, on the right near the river; the strongest was formed by the allies, commanded by Varro, and occupied the left towards the plain. In the centre, the infantry was ranged in exceptionally deep lines, under the command of the proconsul Gnæus Servilius. Opposite this centre, Hannibal arranged his infantry in the shape of a crescent, so that the Celtic and Iberian troops, with their national armour, formed the protruding part of the centre, and the Libyans, armed in the Roman style, the receding wings on either side. All the heavy cavalry was placed on the side, under the command of Hasdrubal, and the Numidian light cavalry on the side of the plain. After an outpost skirmish between the light troops, the whole line was soon engaged. Where the Carthaginian light cavalry fought against Varron's heavy cavalry, the conflict continued without any decisive result, amidst the continuous Numidian charges. In the centre, on the other hand, the legions completely overpowered the Spanish and Celtic troops they found in front of them; the victors pressed the enemy and continued to gain the upper hand. Meanwhile, in
On the left wing, fortune had turned against the Romans. Hannibal had simply tried to occupy
the left wing of the enemy cavalry, so as to be able to throw Hasdrubal with all the regular cavalry onto the weaker right wing and overthrow it first. After a courageous resistance, the Roman cavalry retreated, and those who were not overthrown were thrown back on the river and dispersed in the countryside. Paulus, wounded, ran to the centre, to conjure or at least to share the fortune of the legions.
These, in order to better pursue the victory over the enemy's advanced infantry, had changed their order from front to attacking column, and penetrated like a wedge into the enemy's centre. In this position they were vigorously charged on both sides by the Libyan infantry, and a portion was forced to halt to defend against the flank attack. This manoeuvre halted their progress, and the mass of infantry, already too close together, no longer had enough room to expand. In the meantime, Hasdrubal, having completed the defeat of Paulus' wing, had assembled and reorganised the cavalry and led it behind the enemy centre onto Paulus' wing.
Varro. The latter's Italic cavalry, already sufficiently occupied with the Numidians, was quickly dispersed by this double attack, and Hasdrubal, leaving the Numidians to pursue the fugitives, rallied the Numidians and the Numidians.

his squadrons for the third time, to throw them on the rear of the Roman infantry. This last charge was decisive. Escape was impossible and no quarter was given. Perhaps never before had such a large army been annihilated so completely on the battlefield, and with such
such a minimal loss for the opponent. Hannibal had lost six thousand men, mainly Celts;
of the seventy-six thousand Romans who had appeared in line, seventy thousand covered the field of battle.
battle, and, among them, the consul Lucius Paulus, the proconsul Gnæus Servilius, two thirds of the staff officers, eighty senatorial per- sons. The consul Marcus Varron, saved only by his daring and the speed of his horse, reached Venusia, and was not ashamed to survive this disaster. The garrison of the Roman camp, ten thousand strong, was for the most part taken prisoner of war: only a few thousand men, belonging partly to these troops and partly to those of the line, fled to Canusium. And as if the loss of Rome were sworn to, before the year was out, the legion sent to Gaul fell into an ambush and was completely wiped out by the Gauls, along with its general Lucius Postumus, the consul appointed for the following year.

After Hannibal had crossed the Rhone, Scipio had sailed for Emporia, first capturing the coasts between the Pyrenees and the Ebro and then, after defeating Hannon, taking the mainland, 536 (218). The following year, 537 (217), he had completely defeated the Carthaginian fleet at
At the mouth of the Ebro, and after his brother Publius, the brave defender of the Po valley, had joined him with a reinforcement of eight thousand men, he had even crossed the Ebro and advanced as far as Sagonte. Hannibal could therefore, less than ever, count on help from Spain.

Carthage, for its part, had done all that could be expected of its general. Phoenician squadrons threatened the coasts of Italy and the Roman islands, and defended Africa against a Roman invasion. But that was all. However, the news of the victory at Cannes reduced even the number of Phoenician squadrons.
the factious opposition to silence. The Carthaginian senate resolved to provide the general with considerable reinforcements in money and soldiers. Macedonia undertook to land an invading army on the east coast of Italy, in return for which it was assured that the Roman possessions in Epirus would be returned to it.

In Sicily, King Hieron formed an alliance with Carthage and ordered the Syracusan fleet to join forces with the Carthaginians.
Carthaginians, who had come to threaten Syracuse.

Even more decisive was the fact that the edifice of the Roman confederation finally began to fall apart, after having survived the shocks of two years of war without being shaken.

It was the Senate's duty to take the government of affairs into its own hands. If the deliverance and restoration of the State were still possible, the work had to begin with the establishment of unity and confidence in Rome. To have seen this through and, more importantly, to have done so without recrimination, however just, has been the undying glory and honour of the Roman Senate.

The most vigorous efforts were made to organise an army fit for combat. The Latins were called upon to help in the common danger. Rome itself set the example and called to arms the entire male population above childhood age; it armed debt slaves and criminals, and even incorporated into the army eight thousand slaves purchased by the State. As weapons were in short supply, the ancient spoils of the vanquished were taken from the temples and all the shops and workers were put to work. Not only were the allies not to believe that Rome was prepared to enter into negotiations, but even the humblest citizen had to understand that, for him as for the others, there was no peace possible, and that salvation lay only in victory.

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HANNIBAL'S WAR FROM CANNES TO ZAMA

Hannibal had immediately gone to Capua, before the Romans had been able to establish a garrison there. by this march he had decided the second city of Italy to join him, after a long hesitation. From Capua he could hope to gain control of one of the ports of Campania, where he could land the reinforcements that his great victories had wrested from the opposition in his homeland. The war of
Campania was at a standstill until winter arrived and Hannibal took up his winter quarters in Capua, and, amid the delights of that city, his troops, who had not camped under a roof for three years, made no progress. As for reinforcements, the party of fear in Carthage refused to give in to the pleas of the general who asked for more determined support, replying half out of simplicity, half out of cunning, that victorious as he was, he had no need of help; this party thus contributed no less to saving Rome than the Roman senate.

Publius Scipio. - For a long time, it is said, no one put himself forward as a candidate for this perilous and complicated office; but in the end, a young officer of twenty-seven, Publius Scipio, son of a general of the same name, killed in Spain, and who had fulfilled the functions of military tribune and of a magistrate, was elected.
as town councillor, presented himself as a candidate for military command in Spain. Soon his name was on the

the star that seemed destined to bring victory and peace to the world.
peace.

Publius Scipio went to Spain in 544-545 (210-209). Before the enemy armies had begun to move, Scipio headed for Cartagena, which he could reach from the mouth of the Ebro.
In a few days he reached the coast with his entire army of around thirty thousand men and his fleet, and surprised the Phoenician garrison, which numbered no more than a thousand men, with a combined land and sea attack. Along with the Carthaginian capital, eighteen dismantled ships and sixty-three war transports, all military equipment, fell into Roman hands,
large supplies of wheat, the military treasury containing 6,000 talents (more than 3,750,000 gold francs), hostages from all the Spanish allies of Carthage, and ten thousand prisoners.

In 546 (208), he marched towards Andalusia.

The Phoenicians seemed defeated, but the following year they were still able to put together a powerful army, with thirty-two elephants, four thousand horsemen and seventy thousand infantrymen. Victory was fiercely contested, but the Romans triumphed in the end.

After a thirty-year struggle, Spain was transformed from a Carthaginian province into a Roman one, where the struggle with the Romans continued for centuries, with insurrection always repressed but never subdued.

While the war was thus brought to an end by Marcellus in Sicily, Publius Sulpicius in Greece and Scipio in Spain, a powerful struggle continued uninterrupted in the Italian peninsula. At the beginning of 540 (214), the fifth year of the war, the Phoenicians and the Romans found themselves in the following situation: northern Italy had once again been occupied by the Romans after Hannibal's departure and was protected by three legions, two of which were stationed in Celtic territory, and the third as a reserve in Piedmont. Lower Italy, with the exception of fortresses and many ports, was in Hannibal's hands. He and his main army were at Arpi, while Tiberius Gracchus, with four legions, held out in Apulia, supported by the fortresses of Luceria and Beneventum. In the region of the Bruttians, there was a second Carthaginian army, under Hannon, and this army had no adversary at the moment. The Roman army
the main force of four legions, under the two consuls Quintus Fabius and Marcus Marcellus, was about to attempt to retake Capua; to this were added the reserve of two legions in the capital, the garrisons placed in all the seaports, and lastly the considerable fleet which occupied the sea, without being able to take possession of the city.

rival. Hannibal could still hope for victory, but he could no longer count on his rivals.
triumphs like those at Lake Trasimeno and Aufidus; the time of the citizen-general was over.

The year 542 was unfavourable for the Romans. Taranto was occupied by the Carthaginians. Hannibal marched away from Taranto towards Campania, seized the Roman garrison at Calatia and camped on Mount Tifata, very close to Capua, in the firm belief that the Roman generals would lift the siege, as they had done the previous year. But the Romans, who had had time to entrench the camp and their lines like a fortress, did not move. Hannibal then resorted to the last expedient that his inventive genius could devise to save this important city. He left with the relief army, after informing the Campanians of his intentions, and marched on Rome. The two Roman legions that left the city prevented the walls from being invaded. In
Moreover, Hannibal had never hoped to surprise Rome with a coup de main. So, after staying there for a while, he moved away. In fact, Hannibal retreated, because it suited his plans, and headed for Capua. But the legions remained immobile in their lines. The fall was now inevitable. Twenty-eight senators voluntarily gave their lives; the rest surrendered the city to the discretion of an implacable and exasperated enemy. Naturally, bloody vengeance was to follow. Fifty-three of Capua's officers and magistrates were whipped and beheaded in the market square; the rest of the senators were imprisoned, a large number of citizens were sold as "criminals", and the rest were killed.
slaves, and the richest properties were confiscated. The impression produced by the fall of Capua was profound, and the attempts made by the cities that were not too compromised to be admitted to the Roman symmachy on suitable terms affected Hannibal much more than the direct damage.

The danger that had threatened the existence of the State a few years earlier seemed to have dissipated, but the increasingly heavy burden of this interminable war was all the more apparent. The finances of were incredibly exhausted.

In the midst of these difficult and perilous circumstances, news suddenly arrived that Hasdrubal, in the autumn of 546 (208), had crossed the Pyrenees, and that the Romans should prepare to
The following year, he went to war in Italy with Hamilcar's two sons. As at the time of the greatest danger, Rome again raised twenty-three legions. At a time unforeseen by both friends and enemies, Hasdrubal appeared on the Italian side of the Alps 546 (207); the Gauls, already accustomed to these marches through their territory, opened their defiles at great cost. At the same time, news came through that Hasdrubal was camped near the Po, that he was calling the Gauls to arms as successfully as his brother, and that Placentia had been captured. The consul Marcus Livius rushed to the northern army, and it was high time he arrived there. Hasdrubal's dispatch, which was anxiously awaited in Hannibal's camp, was intercepted by Nero's outposts. Convinced that Hannibal was unaware of his brother's intentions and would continue to wait for him in Apulia, Nero ventured to head north on foot.

forced. Nero found his colleague, Marcus Livius, near Sena Gallica, waiting for the enemy; the two consuls marched towards Hasdrubal; the Carthaginian army, which had no way of retreating, was annihilated and the camp taken. Hasdrubal, seeing that the battle he had so admirably fought was thus lost
like his father, sought and found a heroic death. Nero set off again, and after an absence of barely fourteen days, he found himself back in Apulia, facing Hannibal, who
had received no message and had not stirred. The consul brought the message with him: it was the head of Hasdrubal, which the Romans threw into the enemy outposts.

Hannibal saw that his hopes were dashed and that all was lost. He abandoned Apulia and Lucania, and even Metapontum, and withdrew with his army to Bruttium. There was immense joy in Rome; business was resumed as in times of peace, and everyone felt that the danger of war had passed. As if his plans were finally to receive a brilliant justification from the very Carthaginian authorities who had rendered them useless, the latter, in their apprehension of a Roman raid, took up his plans on their own account, 548-549 (206-205), and sent Hannibal in Italy and Magon in Spain reinforcements and subsidies.

Probably no one in the Senate of Rome doubted that Carthage's war against Rome was coming to an end, or that Rome's war against Carthage would soon begin. The senate could not fail to see that the expedition to Africa was necessary, and that it would be unwise to postpone it indefinitely; that Scipio was a very skilful officer, and that in this capacity he was the right man to lead this war. So Scipio set sail for Africa in the spring of 550 (204), with two strong legions of veterans (about thirty thousand men), forty warships and four hundred transports, and landed happily, without encountering any resistance, at Cape Beau, near Utica. It was decided to try once again the fate of a battle on the plains, in the "great fields", five days' march from Utica. Scipio hastened to accept; his veterans and volunteers had little trouble dispersing the hastily assembled army of Carthaginians, Numidians and Celtiberians, who could expect no quarter from Scipio and were defeated after stubborn resistance. After this double defeat, the Carthaginians could no longer hold out.

After such defeats, the peace party in Carthage, which had been obliged to remain silent for sixteen years, was finally able to raise its head and openly revolt against the government of the Barca and the patriots. But the latter had the upper hand with the citizens; it was decided to let the opposition negotiate for peace, and to prepare, in the meantime, for a final effort. Orders were sent to Hannibal and Magon to return to Africa in all haste. Hannibal, unprotected by an armistice, no doubt, but only by the speed of his movements and the luck of fortune, arrived unhindered at Leptis. The armistice was broken by the looting of a Roman transport fleet. In his legitimate indignation, Scipio left his camp near Tunis, 552 (202), and crossed the rich valley of the Bagrada
(Medscherda), no longer granting surrenders, but seizing and selling populations en masse. The

Carthaginian general, in a personal meeting with the Roman general, sought to obtain from him However, the conference failed to produce any results and the decisive battle was fought near Zama. Scipio's cavalry had little difficulty in dispersing Hannibal's and was soon busy pursuing him. The battle between the two infantries was more serious. Hannibal's old soldiers
They did not flinch, despite the superior strength of the enemy, until the Roman cavalry and Massinissa's cavalry, returning from pursuing the enemy cavalry, enveloped them on all sides. Not only did this move decide the battle, but it annihilated the Punic army; the same soldiers who had fled to Cannes fourteen years earlier had just taken revenge on their victors at Zama. Hannibal fled to Hadrumetum with a handful of men.

After that day, only madness could advise Carthage to continue the war. An annual contribution of two hundred talents (1,220,000 gold francs) was imposed on the Carthaginians for fifty years, and they had to undertake never to wage war against Rome and its allies. Carthage became a tributary and lost its political independence.

Thus ended the Second Punic War, or as the Romans call it, Hannibal's War, after seventeen years of ravaging the lands and islands from the Hellespont to the Columns of Hercules. The Romans won the sovereignty of Italy because they fought for it; when hegemony, and consequently sovereignty over the Mediterranean states, came to them, it was, so to speak, thrown into the arms of the Romans by circumstances, and without any preconceived ideas on their part.

The fact that the population of Rome fell by a quarter during the war proves just how many voids the war and famine had left throughout Italy. A large number of flourishing cities (four hundred were counted) were destroyed and ruined; the capital that had been painstakingly accumulated was consumed.
the population became demoralised by life in the camps. Nevertheless, the Romans, who had been allowed by the gods to survive the conclusion of this gigantic struggle, could look back with pride and forward to the future with confidence.

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THE EASTERN STATES AND THE SECOND MACEDONIAN WAR

Philip, King of Macedonia, was a true king in the best and purest sense of the word. A violent passion for ruling alone and unaided was a fundamental trait of his character: he was proud of his

purple, but he was no less proud of other gifts, and rightly so. Not only did he showed the bravery of a soldier and the eye of a general, but he had greatness in the conduct of his men. affairs, whenever his sense of Macedonian honour was offended. Full of intelligence and witty, he won the hearts of all those he wished to attract, especially the most skilful and distinguished, such as Flamininus and Scipio; he was a pleasant companion, and, not only because of his rank, dangerous to women. But at the same time he was the most arrogant and immoral person that this unashamed age has produced. He used to say that he feared no one but the gods, but it almost seemed as if his gods were those to whom his admiral Dicearch regularly offered sacrifices - Impiety (Asebeia) and Illegality (Paranomia). The lives of his advisers and the authors of his plans were by no means sacred to him, and he did not disdain to appease his resentment against the Athenians and Attalus by destroying venerable monuments and famous works of art; from him is quoted this maxim of state: "Whoever kills the father must also kill the sons." It may be that cruelty was not precisely a pleasure for him, but the lives and sufferings of others were indifferent to him, and clemency, which alone makes men bearable, found no place in his hard and obstinate soul. His principle was that, for the absolute king, there is neither promise nor obligatory moral law, and by this he often created the most serious obstacle to the success of his plans. No one can dispute his penetration and resolution, but he combined them to a degree that was unprecedented.

This can perhaps be explained by the fact that he was called to the absolute monarchy in his eighteenth year, and that his implacable fury against all those who could oppose his will by an argument or an opposing opinion, kept any independent adviser away from him. We cannot say what various causes contributed to the soft and contemptible attitude he displayed in the first Macedonian war; perhaps it must be attributed to that arrogant indolence which only awakens in the face of imminent danger, or perhaps to his indifference to a plan he had not devised and his jealousy of Hannibal's greatness, which shamed him. It is certain that his subsequent conduct revealed nothing more of Philip, whose negligence caused Hannibal's plan to fail. He had turned his gaze in a completely different direction.

With Macedonia and Asia having attacked Egypt, the Romans, who in 553-554 (201-200) had finally concluded peace with Carthage on terms that suited them, began to worry greatly about these complications in the East. The Macedonian war was very unpopular in Rome, but it became inevitable. Could Rome remain a quiet bystander, while the trade with Carthage continued?

Italy and the East were becoming dependent on the two great continental powers? In fact, all the political, commercial and moral reasons combined to decide Rome to undertake a second war against Philip, one of the most just that the Republic had ever supported. As early as 553 (201), the procurator Marcus Valerius Lævinus appeared with the Sicilian fleet in eastern waters.

In the autumn of 554 (200) the consul Publius Sulpicius Galba landed at Apollonia with his two legions and a thousand Numidian cavalrymen, even accompanied by elephants from the remains of Carthage.

Greater importance was attached to the undertakings of the Roman fleet, which numbered one hundred deck ships and eighty light vessels. While the rest of the ships wintered in Corcyra, a division under the command of Caius Claudius Cento marched towards Piraeus to help the strong Athenians.
Cento then set sail and suddenly appeared in front of Chalcis d'Eubée, Philip's main fortress in Greece. The defenceless walls were scaled, the garrison put to death, the prisoners freed and the provisions burnt.

In the spring of 555 (198), the proconsul Publius Sulpicius left his winter camp, determined to lead his legions from Apollonia, by the shortest route, into Macedonia proper. Philip's army numbered around twenty thousand infantry and two thousand cavalry; the Roman army was about as strong. The consul offered battle several times, but the king persisted in declining. He led the retreat so skilfully that Galba, who boldly resolved to follow him, lost track of him, and Philip, by a flanking march, managed to reach and occupy the narrow passage that was to lead him into the valley.
separates the provinces of Lyncestis and Eordæa, with the intention of waiting for the Romans and receiving them warmly. A battle was fought on the ground he had chosen, but the long Macedonian spears could not be wielded on this wooded and uneven terrain. The Macedonians were partly turned, partly broken, and lost many men. But the Romans themselves were afraid of encountering new and unknown dangers in an impassable and hostile region, and returned to Apollonia.

All in all, Philip could congratulate himself on the results of the campaign. The Roman troops, after an extremely arduous expedition, were in the autumn precisely at the point from which they had started in the spring. The following spring, 556 (198), he took the offensive and advanced on the territory of the Atintani, with the intention of forming a well-entrenched camp in this narrow pass. Opposite him camped
the Roman army, reinforced by new arrivals of troops, and commanded initially by the consul of the previous year, Titus Quinctius Flamininus.

Flamininus, the new general-in-chief, immediately held a conference with the king. Philip made peace proposals; he offered to return all his own conquests, and to submit to fair arbitration for the damage inflicted on the Greek cities; but the negotiations failed. The Romans led a corps of four thousand Roman infantrymen and three hundred cavalrymen along mountain paths towards the heights overlooking the Macedonian camp. Philip lost his camp, his entrenchments and nearly two thousand men, and hastily withdrew towards the Tempe defile, the gateway to

Macedonia itself. At the first sound of the Roman victory, the Athamanians and Etolians immediately invaded Thessaly, and the Romans soon followed. The open country was easily overrun, with the exception of a few Thessalian fortresses and the territory of the loyal Acarnanians, and all of northern Greece fell into the hands of the coalition. The fleet sailed from there to Cenchreæ, the eastern point of Corinth, to threaten this solid fortress. On the other hand, Flamininus advanced into Phocis and occupied the country. The Achaean troops immediately joined forces with the Roman fleet and rushed to take Corinth by land. However, the Macedonian garrison, which was thirteen hundred strong and mainly made up of Italian deserters, resolutely defended a virtually impregnable city.

Winter arrived in the meantime, and Philip took advantage of it once again to try to obtain an equitable peace. When Philip's ambassadors appeared in Rome, they were simply asked if they had full authority to renounce all of Greece, and in particular Corinth, Chalcis and
Demetrias, and when they said they did not have them, the negotiators were dismissed, and it was resolved that the war would be vigorously pursued. Thus began the fourth campaign, that of 557 (197).
Flamininus sent part of the fleet against the Acarnanians, who were besieged at Leucas
In Greece proper, he used stratagem to gain control of Thebes, the capital of Boeotia, and then marched north, where a decisive blow could only be struck.

Battle of Cynocephalus. - The Roman and Macedonian armies had roughly equal numbers of combatants, around twenty-six thousand men. However, the Romans had the upper hand in terms of cavalry. In front of Scotussa, on the Karadagh plateau, on a rainy day,
the Roman vanguard unexpectedly encountered that of the enemy, who were occupying a high and steep mountain called Cynocephales. The Romans, who had ventured out imprudently, were defeated. pursued with great losses until near their camp. Philip ordered the phalanx on the right to lay down its spears and charge the legions at the bottom of the mountain, and the light infantry, back in order, to turn and flank them. The attack of the phalanx, irresistible on terrain so
Nicanor, on the other wing, when he saw the king attacking, hurried the rest of the phalanx forward.
Nicanor, on the other wing, when he saw the king attacking, hurried the rest of the phalanx forward; by this movement, it fell into confusion, and while the front ranks quickly followed the victorious right wing down the mountain and were thrown into even greater disorder by
The unevenness of the terrain meant that the last ranks reached the top of the mountain. In these circumstances, the Roman right wing quickly overcame the Macedonian left; the elephants alone, positioned at this point, made considerable inroads into the disorganised Macedonian ranks.
Philip fled to Larissa, and after burning his papers so that no one would be compromised, he evacuated Thessaly and returned to his country. At the same time as this great defeat, the Macedonians suffered other losses on all the points they still occupied.

It was completely within the power of the Romans to dictate peace; they used it, but did not abuse it. Philip obtained conditions similar to those granted to Carthage. He lost all his external possessions in Asia Minor, Thrace, Greece and the Aegean islands, but he kept Macedonia proper. The Romans kept none of their spoils, thus forcing their allies to show restraint. They resolved to declare free all the Greek states which had previously been under Philip's rule, and Flamininus was ordered to read the decree
of emancipation to the Greeks assembled at the isthmic games, 558 (196).

THE WAR WITH ANTIOCHUS OF ASIA

Faced with Antiochus' attitude, Rome resolved to go to war. In that same summer of 562 (192), a Roman fleet of thirty sail, with three thousand soldiers on board, under Aulus Atilius Serranus, appeared at Gythium. Antiochus gathered together the ships and troops he had on hand; he had only forty ships and ten thousand infantrymen with five hundred horsemen and six elephants; he
left the Chersonese of Thrace for Greece, where he landed in the autumn of 562 (192) at Pteleum, on the Gulf of Pegasus, and immediately occupied the nearby town of Demetrias. At about the same time, a Roman army of nearly twenty-five thousand men, under the command of praetor Marcus Bæbius, landed at Apollonia. War had thus begun on both sides. The Rhodians and Byzantines joined their former allies. Egypt also sided with Rome. Philip placed all his forces, with cordial zeal, at the disposal of the Romans. The second Greek power, the Achaean league, adhered no less completely than the first to the alliance with Rome.

In the early spring of 563 (191), the Roman general staff arrived at Apollonia. The commander-in-chief was Manius Acilius Glabrio, a man of humble origins but a skilful general, feared by his soldiers and the enemy; the admiral was Gaius Livius. They brought with them reinforcements in men and ships, Libyan cavalry and elephants, so that the total contingent of the Roman army amounted to around forty thousand men. The Roman troops had already begun operations in Thessaly.

Battle at Thermopylae. - Antiochus resolved to entrench himself at Thermopylae, which he had occupied, and to await the arrival of the great Asian army. He himself took up a position in the main pass, and ordered the Aetolians to occupy the heights through which Xerxes had once succeeded in turning the Spartans. But only half of the Aetolian contingent saw fit to comply with the general's order: their post at Callidromus allowed itself to be surprised by Cato, and the Asiatic phalanx, which the c o n s u l had meanwhile attacked head-on, dispersed when the Romans, hastening to
came down from the mountain and fell on its slopes. Since Antiochus had in no way foreseen the

Europe was lost to him, with the exception of his possessions in Thrace.

Antiochus was determined, if possible, to prevent the Romans from landing in Asia, and to this end he made preparations for a naval war.

While the Romans, having landed on the shores of Asia, stopped for a few days, ambassadors from the great king arrived in their camp to negotiate peace. But Antiochus, irritated by the probably intentional arrogance of his antagonist, and too indolent to persevere and make peace with the Romans, was forced to leave.
a continuous war, hastened to expose to the shock of the Roman legions the poorly mobile, unequal and undisciplined army.

In the valley of the Hermus, near Magnesia, at the foot of Mount Sipylus, not far from Smyrna, Roman troops encountered the enemy in late autumn 564 (190); the victory, which gave them a third continent, cost the Romans only eighty-four cavalry and three hundred infantry.
Asia Minor submitted, including Ephesus, from which the admiral quickly withdrew his fleet, and Sardis the
court residence.

Thus the protectorate of the Roman republic now embraced all the states from the eastern to the western ends of the Mediterranean. There was no state from which the Romans thought they had anything to fear. But one man was still alive to whom Rome did this honour: the
A Carthaginian without asylum, who had stirred up the whole of the West against Rome. Hannibal had taken refuge first in Crete, then in Bithynia, and was living at the court of Prusias, king of that country, helping Prusias in his wars with Eumenes. Flamininus undertook on his own authority to free Rome from Hannibal, as he had freed the Greeks from their chains, and, if not to put the dagger to the throat of the greatest man of his time, at least to sharpen and hone it. Prusias, the most pitiful of the pitiful princes of Asia, was delighted to grant the small favour that the Roman envoy asked in ambiguous terms, and Hannibal, seeing his house surrounded by assassins, took poison. He had lived long enough to see the West completely subdued, and to fight his last battle with the Romans against the ships of his own city, which had itself become Roman, and he was forced in the end to remain a mere spectator.

Around the same time, and probably in the same year, the man the Romans called their conqueror, Publius Scipio, also died. Fortune had lavished on Scipio all the happiness it had denied to his antagonist, some of which belonged to him and others to the Romans.

fortuitous. He had added Spain, Africa and Asia to Rome's empire; and Rome, which he had found simply the first republic of Italy, had by the time of his death become the mistress of the civilised world.

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THE THIRD MACEDONIAN WAR

Philip died in 575 (179), at Demetrias, in his fifty-ninth year, leaving behind him a shaken kingdom and a divided family.

Perseus came to the throne at the age of thirty-one, and as he had taken part in the ill-fated war with Rome as a child, he inherited his father's troubles, resentments and hopes along with his father's kingdom. In fact, he devoted himself, with a determination
He was determined to continue his father's work and prepared for war against Rome with more fervour than ever. But he was not what he seemed. He did not have Philip's genius or his
The real reason for the war was that Macedonia was seeking to convert its nominal sovereignty into real domination, and to supplant Rome as protector of the Hellenes. The real reason for the war was that Macedonia was seeking to convert its nominal sovereignty into real domination, and to supplant Rome as protectorate of the Hellenes.

The consul left a strong division in Illyria, to invade Macedonia from the west, while with the main force he went, according to custom, from Apollonia to Thessaly; not far from Larissa the first conflict took place between the cavalry and light troops of both sides. The Romans were completely defeated.

But Perseus, although a good soldier, was not a general like his father; he had made his preparations for a defensive war, and when things took a different turn, he found himself, as it were, paralysed. He took advantage of an important success that the Romans obtained in a second battle of
cavalry, near Phalanna, to return, according to the habit of narrow and obstinate men, to his first plan, and evacuate Thessaly.

The main Roman army made two attempts to penetrate Macedonia, first by the Cambunian mountains, then by the passes of Thessaly; but these attempts were badly combined, and both were repulsed by Perseus.

Finally, the Romans decided to send the right man to Greece. He was Lucius Æmilius Paulus, son of the consul of the same name, who had fallen at Cannae. He was in every respect the right man: an excellent general of the old school, rigid for himself and his troops, and despite his sixty years, still alert and vigorous; an incorruptible magistrate. As soon as the new general arrived at the Heracleum camp, he gave orders for Publius Nasica to surprise the poorly guarded Pythium pass; the enemy was thus turned and forced to retreat to Pydna. The
The disaster was enormous: twenty thousand Macedonians remained on the battlefield and eleven thousand were taken prisoner. The war was over fifteen days after Paul-Emile took command. The whole of Macedonia was subdued in two days. Perseus then saw his destiny clearly, and surrendered to the Romans at will with his children and his treasures, pusillanimous and weeping to the point of inspiring disgust even in his victors.

Thus ended the empire of Alexander the Great, who had subjugated and Hellenised the East, one hundred and forty-four years after the hero's death.

At a conference held at Amphipolis on Strymon, the Roman Commission ordered that this compact, deeply monarchical and united state should be divided into four federative republics modelled on those of the Greeks. The entire region was permanently disarmed and the fortress of Demetrias razed to the ground.

The Romans had achieved their goal.

Illyria was treated in the same way. The kingdom of Genthius was divided into three small states. Thus the affairs of the north were concluded, and Macedonia was finally relieved of the monarchical yoke; Greece was, in fact, freer than ever; it no longer contained a single king.

Egypt voluntarily submitted to the Roman protectorate and at the same time, the kings of Babylon put an end to their last effort to maintain their independence from Rome.

All the Hellenic states had thus voluntarily submitted to the protectorate of Rome, and all Alexander the Great's Empire had fallen to the Roman Republic, as if the city had received it from his heirs. Kings and ambassadors from all over the world arrived in Rome to congratulate it, demonstrating that sycophancy is never more despicable than when it is the kings who are in the antechamber.

Polybius dates the complete establishment of Rome's universal supremacy to the battle of Pydna. All subsequent struggles were rebellions or wars with peoples outside the sphere of Roman-Greek civilisation: the Barbarians, as they were called.

If, in conclusion, we look back over the history of Rome, from the union of Italy to the dismemberment of Macedonia, the universal empire of Rome, far from appearing as a gigantic plan, achieved by an insatiable thirst for territorial enlargement, appears to have been a "one-size-fits-all" project. This was a result that imposed itself on the Roman government without and even against its will. The Romans always asserted that they were not pursuing a policy of conquest, and that they were always provoked rather than aggressors. They were, in fact, provoked into all their great wars, with the exception of the one over Sicily, those with Hannibal and Antiochus, no less than those with Philip and Perseus, either by direct aggression or by the disruption caused to existing political relations. Rome's policy was from one end to the other the policy of a deliberative assembly which had far too much instinctive desire to preserve the Republic to imagine designs of the kind of those of a Caesar or a Napoleon.

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GOVERNMENT AND GOVERNED

At the beginning of this period, there was virtually nothing left of the Roman senate, considered as the body of councillors placed by free election alongside the highest offices of the republic. The citizens were still too independent, and the nobility too intelligent, to exclude absolutely from the Senate those who were not nobles, or even to wish to do so; but the essentially aristocratic constitution of the senate, the profound distinction which separated on the one hand the former curule magistrates in their three ranks of consulars, praetorians and edilians, from on the other the senators who had not entered through the curule offices and who were thereby excluded from the debates, meant that the non-nobles, although they sat in respectable numbers in the senate, were reduced to an insignificant position, and relatively without influence, and that the senate was, in fact, the support of the nobility.

The institution of knighthood also soon became a less important but not indifferent instrument for the nobility. Finally, censorship was surrounded by external honours that in no way belonged to it, and by a very particular aristocratic-republican apparatus, and became the culmination and crowning glory of a well-filled career.

Thanks to this political situation, which rested mainly on the senate, the knights and the censorship, the nobility not only attracted all the authority to itself, but also modelled the constitution in a direction favourable to its claims. A provision of this kind was the one whereby, in order to leave public offices as valuable as possible, the number of them was increased as little as possible and in no way in proportion to the number of members of the nobility.
the expansion of borders and the increase in business.

In general, access to the senate was open to people who belonged to the ruling families without distinction of ability, while not only were the humble and poor orders of the population completely excluded from the magistracies, but all Roman citizens who did not belong to the ruling families were also excluded.
the hereditary aristocracy were in practice excluded, not precisely from the senate, but from the two higher magistracies, the consulship and the censorship. After the case of Manius Curius, it would be impossible to cite any circumstance in which the consul did not belong to the social aristocracy.

The government bore the mark of this gradual change in the spirit of the governing class. It is true that the nobility justified itself by the certainly lacklustre, but sure and energetic direction it gave to the ship of state during Hannibal's storm and the complications that followed.

The financial system of the Roman republic also regressed rather than advanced at this time. It is true that the sum of revenues increased significantly. Indirect taxes, because there were no taxes at all, were reduced.
to Rome, increased as a result of the expansion of Roman territory.

However, this increase in revenue was largely offset by the rise in
expenses.

The real security for good administration lay in strict and uniform supervision by the sovereign administrative authority; and the Senate did nothing to provide this. It was in this respect that the sluggishness and inefficiency of the collective government manifested itself most completely. Legally,

the governors should have been subject to a much stricter and more special supervision than that which had sufficed for the municipal administration of the Italiotes; and now that the Empire embraced vast regions beyond the seas, the arrangements by which the government kept for itself the supervision of the whole should have received a corresponding extension. Precisely the opposite happened.

On the other hand, in all matters that went beyond mere municipal matters, the popular assemblies of Rome played a puerile and even ridiculous role. In general, the people adopted whatever was proposed to them, and when, in exceptional circumstances, they refused to give their assent of their own accord, as on one occasion in the Macedonian War, the politics of the Forum were certainly in miserable opposition, and with miserable results, to the politics of the State. Moreover, when the aristocracy became a special ruling class, concentrating in its hands not only power but also wealth, the clients became parasites and beggars, and these new supporters of the rich undermined the class of citizens both internally and externally.

Popular amusements increased at an alarming rate. The costs of these new popular entertainments were borne by the magistrates, who were responsible for staging the various festivities. The splendour of the games soon became the yardstick by which the electorate judged the ability of candidates for the consulship. In reality, the nobility paid dearly for these honours. A well-organised gladiatorial combat cost around 720,000 sesterces (180,000 gold francs), but they were gladly paid for, because in this way, men who were not wealthy were effectively barred from a public career.

Corruption, however, was not confined to the Forum; it was widespread even in the camps. The new generals, led by Scipio the African, spread Roman money like booty among the soldiers.

Discipline and the military spirit suffered greatly from this transformation of warfare into a trade in booty: we see this in the Persian War, and the progress of cowardice became scandalously apparent.

The party of reform was, so to speak, incarnated in the person of Marcus Porcius Cato, 520-605 (234-149). Cato, the last eminent representative of the old, strictly Italic politics opposed to universal domination, was for this reason later regarded as the type of honest Roman of the old stock: it would be better to regard him as the representative of the opposition of the class.
He joined the civic army at the age of seventeen. He joined the civic army at the age of seventeen and

had been involved in Hannibal's entire campaign, from the battle of Lake Trasimeno to that of Zama, served
under Marcellus and Fabius, under Nero and Scipio, at Taranto and Sena, in Africa, in Sardinia, in Spain and Macedonia. He had distinguished himself as a soldier, an officer and a general. He was the same in the Forum as he was on the battlefield. His bold and rapid speech, his rustic but piquant verve, his knowledge of Roman laws and Roman affairs, his incredible activity and his iron body first brought him to the attention of the neighbouring towns, and when he finally appeared in the larger arena of the Forum, he was soon the most influential lawyer and the leading orator of his time. He adopted the tone of Manius Gurius, who was his ideal among Roman statesmen; his long life was devoted to attacking the imminent decadence with honesty and the conviction of his conscience, and he was still, at the age of eighty-five, fighting battles against new ideas. He never tried
His passionate attacks made him many enemies, and he lived in open and irreconcilable hostility with the most powerful aristocratic coteries of the time, particularly the Flamininus. His passionate attacks made him many enemies, and he lived in open and irreconcilable hostility with the most powerful aristocratic coteries of the time, particularly with the Flamininus and the Scipios: forty-four times he was accused in public, but the farmers, which proves what power still had in the middle class of Rome the spirit that had enabled him to
to survive the disaster of Cannes, never denied the tireless champion of reform the support of their votes. And the nobles were forced to submit when the great reform took place.

The reform party at that time succeeded to some extent in halting the progress of the
This was due to the decline of the farming class and the abandonment of the old habits of austerity and frugality, and to the predominant influence of the new nobility. But there was too little follow-up to these otherwise respectable efforts, and the purely defensive attitude of the opponents rendered almost all the results futile. But just as this period saw the emergence of a multitude alongside the bourgeoisie, so it also saw the emergence of a demagogy that appealed to the masses alongside the useful and respectable opposition party. Hence the birth of these citizen-generals, accustomed to drawing up battle plans on the tables of cabarets, and who, by virtue of their innate military genius, took pity on the regular service. From there came the staff officers who owed their command to electoral intrigues and who, when matters became serious, received mass discharges.
Trasimene and Cannes, and the shameful conduct of the war against Perseus. But as the evil could not be stopped at its source, it did little good for those in the best position to listen anxiously to the roar of the rising tide and work on dikes and canals. As they contented themselves with palliatives and adopted, even too late and ill-timed, the most important ones, such as improving justice and dividing up state lands, they only succeeded in hastening the bad days for their descendants. Everywhere we look, we see cracks and fissures in the old edifice; we see workmen busy sometimes plugging them up, sometimes widening them; but nowhere do we see any preparations for seriously repairing it or rebuilding it anew, and there is no longer any need to wonder about this.
ask whether the building will collapse, but simply: when?

BOOK FOUR

The revolution

THE SUBJUGATED REGIONS UNTIL THE TIME OF THE GREEKS

A senatorial commission was sent to Spain to organise, in agreement with Scipio, the newly conquered province according to the Roman model, and Scipio did everything he could to eliminate the consequences of the short-sighted and foolish policy of his predecessors. Spain finally saw better times. The suppression of piracy, which had found dangerous havens in the Balearic Islands, through the occupation of these islands by Quintus Cæcilius Metellus in 691 (123), served greatly to increase the prosperity of Spanish trade. Despite serious disorders on its borders, Spain was the most flourishing and best organised of the Roman possessions; the system of tithes was unknown there; its population was large, and the country was rich in wheat and cattle.

The old Marcus Cato, with surprise and jealousy, saw with his own eyes the flourishing state of Rome's distant enemy, the prosperous land and crowded streets, immense supplies of weapons in the arsenals and the rich materials of the fleets: he could already see in his mind's eye a second Hannibal directing all these resources against Rome. Following his honest and virile, but profoundly narrow, approach, he came to the conclusion that Rome could not rest until Carthage had disappeared from the face of the earth, and immediately after his return he expounded this view in the senate.
It seems that his policy found adherents above all among the great Roman capitalists to whom would naturally inherit the rich city after its destruction.

The desired opportunity was soon found: Massinissa's provocative violations of the law. Massinissa put his troops on the move, and the patriotic party in Carthage also prepared for battle. The
The Carthaginians and Numidians fought a great battle, in which the Carthaginians, despite the help of 6,000 Numidian cavalrymen brought to them by officers displeased with Massinissa, and their numerical superiority, were completely defeated.

The Romans, who had carefully refrained from preventing the war by timely intervention, finally had what they wanted, a specious pretext for war, for the Carthaginians had certainly violated the stipulations of the treaty, by which they were forbidden to wage war against Rome's allies, or outside their own borders. The Carthaginians made every effort to avert this catastrophe by complete submission. But the consul Lucius Marcius Censorinus

declared that, following the instructions given by the senate, the city would be destroyed, but that the inhabitants were free to settle wherever they wished in their territory, on condition that it was at least ten miles from the sea.

This terrible command aroused in the Phoenicians that enthusiasm, magnanimous or foolish, which the Tyrians had once shown against Alexander, and which the Jews later showed against Vespasian. A message was sent to the consuls asking for a truce of thirty days. The precious interval was used to make catapults and armour; night and day were devoted by the inhabitants, without distinction of age or sex, to building machines and forging weapons; public buildings were demolished to obtain timber and iron, women cut off their hair to replace the ropes indispensable for catapults; in an incredibly short space of time, walls and men were armed. When at last the consuls, tired
To their surprise and horror, they found the walls equipped with new catapults, and saw the populous city, which they intended to occupy like an open village, capable of defending itself and ready to do so to the death.

The Romans attempted an assault, but they found the breach, part of the wall and the neighbouring houses so heavily occupied, and they marched so recklessly that they were repulsed with serious losses. Illness, the departure of Censorinus and the inaction of Massinissa brought the Romans' offensive operations to a complete halt.

To change the face of African affairs, Rome resorted to the extraordinary measure of entrusting the conduct of the war to the only man who had brought back any honour from the plains of Libya, and whom his very name designated for this war; instead of calling Scipio to the edict for which he was a candidate, he was given the consulship before the legal time.

So the siege began again, and with greater success. In a night attack on the suburb, the Romans managed to penetrate the buildings from a tower in front of the walls, which was equal in height to the Romans, and opened a small gate through which the entire army passed. The Carthaginians abandoned the suburb and the camp in front of the gates, and gave Hasdrubal the
command in chief of the army of the city, which amounted to thirty thousand men. Scipio, meanwhile, having squeezed the besieged into the city itself, sought to cut off all communications with the interior. He himself placed his headquarters on the spit of land that joined the peninsula to the mainland, and despite numerous attempts by the Carthaginians to disrupt his operations, he built a large camp across the isthmus, thus intercepting the city's communications on the landward side. Nevertheless, ships loaded with provisions managed to penetrate the isthmus and reach the mainland.

port. Scipio then built a stone breakwater ninety-six feet wide, extending from the tongue of land between the gulf and the lake to the latter, so as to close off the entrance to the port. But this surprise was offset by another. Suddenly, just as the Romans had finished blocking the entrance to the harbour, fifty Carthaginian triremes and a proportionate number of boats and skiffs left the harbour into the gulf: while the enemy was closing the old opening to the harbour, the Carthaginian triremes and a proportionate number of boats and skiffs left the harbour into the gulf.
port towards the south, the Carthaginians had, by means of a canal directed towards the east, created a new exit, which, because of the depth of the sea at this point, could not be closed. Scipio again set up the machinery and set fire to the enemy's wooden towers, thus taking possession of the quay and outer harbour. A rampart as high as the city wall was built there, and the city was finally secured.
completely blocked by land and sea. Winter had come, and Scipio suspended his operations, leaving famine and pestilence to complete what he had started.

In the spring of 608 (146), Lælius managed to scale the wall, which was barely defended by a starving garrison,
and entered the inner harbour. The town was taken, but the battle was by no means over. The attackers occupied the market square adjacent to the small port, and advanced through the three narrow streets leading to the citadel; their march was slow, as the six-storey houses had to be taken one by one. Six days passed in this way, terrible for the inhabitants of the town, and terrible also for the attackers; they finally arrived in front of the steep rock of the citadel, where Hasdrubal and what remained of his soldiers had taken refuge. Finally, the rest of the population, who had taken refuge in the citadel, asked to surrender. They were given their lives with great difficulty, and the victor was seen to appear before 30
000 men and 25 000 women, less than a tenth of the former population. The Roman deserters, 900 in number, as well as General Hasdrubal with his wife and two children, had thrown themselves into the temple of the god of health; there could be no surrender for those who had left their posts. But when the most resolute of them had given in to starvation and set fire to the temple, Hasdrubal dared not look death in the face; he rushed alone to the victor and begged on his knees for his life. He was granted his life, but when his wife, who had taken refuge with her children on the roof of the temple, saw him at Scipio's feet, her proud heart could not bear this ignominy inflicted on her beloved family, and after having insulted his love of life with bitter words, she threw herself and her children into the flames. The battle was over. The joy in the camp and in Rome was immense; only the most virtuous of the Romans were ashamed of Rome's latest success.

But by far the largest part of the city was intact. Scipio would have liked to keep it; at least, he sent the senate a special report on the subject. Scipio Nasica tried once again to make the voice of honour and reason heard, but in vain. The senate ordered the general to raze to the ground the city of Carthage and the suburb of Magalia, and to do the same for all the cities that had remained loyal to Carthage to the end; the plough was also to be driven over the place where Carthage had existed, so as to legally put an end to the city's existence, and to curse the soil and the place forever, so that neither house nor field could ever be built there again. The command was duly carried out. The ruins burned for seventeen days; and where the industrious Phoenicians had traded and traded

For five centuries, Roman slaves were seen grazing the flocks of their former masters. Scipio, whom nature had destined for a more noble role than that of executioner, was ashamed of his work, and instead of the joy of triumph, the victor himself was obsessed with the idea that such a crime would one day be atoned for.

The supreme administration of the new province was entrusted to a governor resident in Utica. Those who really benefited from the destruction of the first trading city in the West were the Roman merchants who, as soon as Carthage was reduced to ashes, rushed in droves to Utica, and from there began to exploit not only the Roman province, but also the regions of Numidia and Betulia, which had hitherto been closed to them.

At the same time as Carthage, Macedonia disappeared from the ranks of nations.

The kingdom of Alexander was, by order of the senate, reduced by Metellus to a Roman province. It was clear that the Roman government had modified its system, and had resolved to change the relations of clientele into those of subjection.

From then on, it was the Romans who defended the northern and eastern borders of Macedonia, or in other words, the borders of Hellenic civilisation against the Barbarians.

At the beginning of 608 (146), the Achaeans entered Greece, in Thessaly, to restore the obedience of Heracleia on the Æta, which, in accordance with the decree of the senate, had separated from the Achaean confederation. The consul Lucius Mummius, whom the senate had ordered to be sent to Greece, had not yet arrived: Metellus took it upon himself to protect Heracleia with Macedonian legions.

The Romans were quick to accept the battle. From the outset, the Achaean cavalry broke en masse before the Roman cavalry, which outnumbered them six to one. The hoplites held their ground until a flanking attack by an elite Roman corps confused their ranks.
That was the end of the resistance. Diæsos fled, put his wife to death and also poisoned himself: the cities submitted en masse, and as for the impregnable Corinth, in which Mummius hesitated three days to
It was occupied by the Romans without a fight because he feared an ambush.

The needless destruction of the flourishing city of Corinth, the first trading city in Greece, remains a blot on Rome's copybook. By express order of the Senate, the citizens of Corinth were seized, and those who were not killed were sold into slavery: the city itself was not only stripped of its walls and citadel, but razed to the ground. Most of the territory was declared public land of Rome. This was the end of the "Eye of Greece", the last precious jewel of the Greek region, once so rich in cities.

While Rome transformed the kingdom of Pergamum into a Roman province in the peninsula of Asia Minor, the regions beyond the Taurus and the upper Euphrates as far as the Nile valley continued to be virtually left to their own devices.

This is not the place to describe the rejuvenated empire of Cyrus: it is enough to mention in a general way the fact that, however powerful the influence of Hellenism, the Parthian empire, compared with that of the Seleucids, was based on a religious and national reaction, and the old language of the Parthians was still spoken.
Iran, the order of the magi and the cult of Mithra, the feudal constitution of the East, the cavalry of the desert, armed with the bow and arrow, found themselves in triumphant opposition in these lands against Hellenism.

The result was inevitable. The eastern provinces of Syria, under their unprotected or insurgent satraps, fell under Parthian domination; Persia, Babylonia and Media were forever separated from the kingdom of Syria; the new Parthian empire reached across the great desert on both sides, from the Oxus and the Indo Coosh to the Tigris and the Arabian desert.

This revolution in the relations of the peoples of the interior of Asia is the pivot of the history of antiquity. Instead of the national tide, which had hitherto flowed from the West to the East, and which had found its last and highest expression in Alexander the Great, the tide flowed back. Since
Under Alexander, the world had obeyed Westerners alone, and the East had the same effect on him that America and Australia would later have on Europeans. With Mithridates I, the East returned to the sphere of political movement. The world once again had two masters.

Governing this Roman-Hellenic world was a great and difficult problem for Rome: it understood it, but it did not solve it. Government itself was degenerating more and more into a weak and short-sighted egoism; it was content to govern from day to day, and to carry out current affairs according to circumstances.

The fleet was neglected; the continental military system fell into the most incredible decline. The task of defending the frontiers of Asia and Africa was left to the subjects. Everywhere we look, we see Rome's internal energy and external power in rapid decline. The ground conquered in gigantic struggles is not being extended or even maintained in this period of peace. The government of the world, difficult to acquire, was even more difficult to maintain. The Roman Senate had accomplished the first task, but succumbed to the second.

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THE REFORM MOVEMENT AND TIBERIUS GRACCHUS

For a whole generation after the battle of Pydna, the Roman state enjoyed a profound calm, barely disturbed here and there on its surface. All eyes were fixed on Italy, all talents and all riches flowed there; it seemed as if the golden age of peaceful prosperity and intellectual enjoyment had begun.

That's how things looked from a distance, but up close they looked very different. The aristocratic government was destroying its own work. When a limited number of ancient families of established wealth and hereditary political importance lead the government, these families show in times of danger incomparable tenacity of purpose and heroic self-sacrifice; just as in times of tranquillity they become short-sighted, selfish and careless.

Such was the internal and external situation of Rome when the State entered the seventh century of its existence. Everywhere the eye turned there were abuses and decadence: every wise and well-intentioned man had to ask himself whether such a state of affairs could not be corrected or changed. There was no shortage of such men in Rome, but none seemed more suited to the great work of political and social reform than Publius Cornelius Scipio Emilianus Africanus, 570 (625), the favourite son of Paul Emilianus and adopted grandson of the great Scipio, whose glorious name he bore, Africanus.

But he took an intermediate position between the aristocrats, who never forgave him for his defence of the Cassia law, and the democrats, whom he neither satisfied nor tried to satisfy: solitary during his life, abandoned after his death by both parties, sometimes as the champion of the aristocracy, sometimes as the promoter of reform.

It was then that a young man with no titles had the audacity to present himself as the saviour of Italy. His name was Tiberius Sempronius Gracchus 591-621 (163-133).

His views were known in a wide circle, and there was no shortage of voices approving him, and more than one public placard called upon the grandson of the African to think of the poor people and the deliverance of
Italy.

On 10 December 620 (134) Gracchus was invested with the people's tribune. As soon as he took office, he proposed the introduction of an agrarian law which, in certain respects, was nothing other than the renewal of the Licinio-Sextian law of 387. Under this law, state lands that were occupied without payment by the owners who enjoyed them were to be taken over on behalf of the State, but with the restriction that each occupier would reserve 500 jugera for himself, and 250 jugera for each son (up to a total of 1,000 jugera).

A colleague of Gracchus, Marcus Octavius, a resolute man and seriously convinced of the pernicious nature of the proposed law on domination, interposed his veto just as it was being put to the vote: thus, constitutionally, the proposal was rejected. Gracchus seemed to have reached the point where he had to either abandon his plan completely or start a revolution: he chose the latter.
Gracchus broke off all relations with his colleague and appeared before the assembled multitude, asking whether a tribune who opposed the will of the people should not be removed from office. The assembly of the people, accustomed to acceding to all the proposals presented to them, and composed for the most part of the agricultural proletariat who had emigrated from the countryside, and who had a personal interest in the vote on the law, gave an almost unanimously favourable response.

The aristocracy made no secret of the fact that, while it might not have opposed the law because it had no other choice, it would one day make the intruding legislator pay for its illegality. What is certain is that Gracchus saw his only means of salvation in his re-election to the tribune which protected him and that to obtain this unconstitutional re-election, he was still planning new reforms.

The Senate assembled in the Temple of Fidelity, next to the Temple of Jupiter, and Gracchus' most violent opponents took the floor; when Tiberius raised his hand to his forehead to indicate to the people that his head was threatened, it was said that he was asking the people to crown him with the diadem. Consul Scævola was begged to allow the traitor to be put to death.

The consular Publius Scipio Nasica, a violent and hot-headed aristocrat, ordered those who shared his views to arm themselves as best they could and follow him. Gracchus tried to escape with some of his followers. But as he fled, he fell on the Capitoline gate and was killed by a blow to the temple from one of those pursuing him. Around three hundred people were killed with him.

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THE REVOLUTION AND CAIUS GRACCHUS

RESTORATION OF SENATORIAL POWER

The partition commission, composed of the most ardent supporters of the Gracchi, and an absolute judge in its own cause, carried out its work hastily and without procedure. However violent, and most of the time well-founded, the claims were, the Senate allowed the distribution of land to take its course.

But the complaints of the allied or subject communities could not be disregarded in the same way as those of private Romans, who were injured by the acts of the commissioners. It was above all through the influence of Scipio Emiliano that in 625 (129) a decree of the people removed jurisdiction from the commission and handed over to the consuls the decision on the question of what was state possession and what was private possession. This
was nothing other than the suspension of land distribution in a milder form.

Scipio had announced, for one of the following days, an address relating to the complaints of the Latins: on the morning of that day, he was found dead in his bed. There is no doubt that he was the victim of a political assassination. It is obvious that the instigator of this murder must have belonged to the party of the Gracchi; the assassination of Scipio was the response of democracy to the aristocratic massacres at the Temple of Fidelity.

The history of Rome contains many men of greater genius than Scipio Emiliano, but none who equalled him in moral purity, in complete absence of political selfishness, in generous love of his country, and none perhaps who received from destiny a more tragic role. With the best of intentions and outstanding talents, he was condemned to see the ruin of his country consummated before his very eyes. He could say, however, that he had not lived in vain. It was to him, at least as much as to the author of the Sempronia law, that the body of Roman citizens owed an increase of nearly eighty thousand new territorial attributions: it was also he who put an end to the distribution of estates, when this measure would have produced all the good that could have been expected.

Caius Gracchus, 601-633 (159-121), was very different from his brother, who was nine years older. Like him, he had no taste for pleasures or vulgar things. But in talent, character and, above all, passion, he was far superior to Tiberius.

What Caius brought, in the midst of a series of diverse projects, was nothing less than an entirely new constitution, the cornerstone of which was the innovation introduced earlier, whereby a tribune could seek re-election.

Gracchus had it decreed that every citizen who presented himself in the capital would receive a fixed quantity every month, probably five modii, from the public shop, the modius being given at 6 as 1/3 (30 centimes, gold), i.e. less than half the average price.

Caius Gracchus also saw an improvement in the lot of the proletariat in the Republic's transmarine colonies. He sent six thousand colonists to Carthage, chosen not only from among Roman citizens but also from among the Italiote allies, and gave the new town of Junonia the right to be a colony of Roman citizens.

While Gracchus relied on the multitude, who were meanwhile receiving an improvement from him He worked with equal energy to ruin the aristocracy.

Despite their agreement to fight against a common enemy, such as Tiberius Gracchus, there was a Caius, more skilful than his brother, widened it still further until their alliance was broken and the class of moneyed men declared for him.

With his weapons thus prepared, the proletariat and the order of merchants, Gracchus set about his main task: the overthrow of the governing aristocracy. The new master of the State, without consulting the Senate, disposed of the State coffers, placing a lasting and heavy burden on public finances.
of the provinces, by having the financial organisation given by the senate to the province of Asia modified by decree of the people, and by substituting something completely different. Finally, he accustomed the people to seeing one man dominate all things, and cast into the shadows the weak and impotent administration of the senate, by the vigour and dexterity of his own government. Gracchus attacked the jurisdiction of the Senate with even more energy than its administration.

As we have already said, he removed the senators from their ordinary judicial functions; the same applied to the jurisdiction which the senate conferred on itself in exceptional cases, as a supreme court. Such was the constitution that Caius Gracchus wanted to give Rome, and it was, for the most part, put into effect during the two years of his tribunate 631-632 (123-122), without, it seems, encountering any real resistance.

Towards the end of his second tribune, in 632 (122), Gracchus, probably spurred on by the obligations he had entered into with regard to the allies, proposed giving the Latins the direct right of citizenship, and the other Italians the rights hitherto reserved for the Latins. But the proposal failed in the face of the combined opposition of the Senate and the dominant populace.

It was probably this success that emboldened the Senate to attempt to overthrow the victorious demagogue.
The aristocracy devised a plan to wage battle on its own soil against the author of the grain largesse and land assignments.

Naturally, the Senate offered the proletariat not only the same advantages that Gracchus had already assured them in grain or otherwise, but even greater advantages. The people, consequently, ratified the Livia law as readily as the Sempronia law. He paid back his last benefactor, according to custom, by striking first, by refusing to reappoint him when he stood for the third time for the tribune in 633 (121). The foundation of his despotism thus crumbled on him.

The first attack, as was to be expected, was directed against the most useful but unpopular measure of Gracchus: the restoration of Carthage. The senate found itself obliged in good conscience to propose a law forbidding the founding of the colony of Junonia. Gracchus appeared on the day of the vote in the Capitol.

Quintus Antullius haughtily ordered the bad citizens to leave the porch, and seemed to want to lay hands on Caius himself: a supporter of Gracchus drew his sword and killed him. A terrible uproar ensued.

Gracchus therefore had to try to escape to the other bank of the Tiber, accompanied by a slave. There, in the sacred wood of Furrina, the two corpses were found; it seems that the slave first struck his master, then himself. The memory of the Gracchi remained officially banned. But despite all the persecution by the police, the multitude continued to have a passionate attachment to their memory and to the places where they were buried.

Gracchus having died without heirs, the government of the senate spontaneously resumed its domination.

The reaction was directed exclusively against individuals; Publius Popillius was recalled from exile, after the decree had been annulled, 633 (121), and a war of prosecution was directed against the supporters of Gracchus. But the reaction did not immediately attack the distributions of grain, the taxation in the provinces of Asia, or the provisions made by Gracchus for juries and courts: on the contrary, not only did it spare the mercantile class and the proletariat of the capital, but it continued to pay homage, as it had done for the introduction of the Livia law, to these powers,
and particularly to the proletariat, in a more positive way than the Gracques had done.

On the other hand, nothing was attacked more quickly and more successfully than the greatest of his designs, that of introducing legal equality between Roman citizens and Italy, and later between Italy and the provinces. The plan to raise Carthage was put aside without difficulty by the government party, although the assignments of land already distributed were left to those who had received them.

The nation as a whole was in a state of complete intellectual and moral decadence, but particularly the upper classes.

If the state of religion did not present a faithful picture of the frightful dissolution of this period, and if the external history of the period did not show the baseness of the Roman nobles as one of its distinctive characters, the horrible crimes which came to light, in rapid succession, in the highest circles of Rome, would have been sufficient to indicate their character.

The social ruin of Italy was spreading with alarming rapidity; since the aristocracy had given itself legal permission to expropriate small landowners by paying them and, in its new arrogance, frequently allowed itself to expel them, farms were disappearing like drops of rain in the sea.

The provinces suffered even more in comparison. Official and semi-official brigands were joined by freebooters and pirates, who plundered every corner of the Mediterranean.

But nowhere was the impotence and perversity of the provincial administration of the Romans shown in such complete nullity as in the insurrections of the provincial proletariat, which seemed to have resumed their full vigour at the same time as the restoration of the aristocracy.

The war against Jugurtha and the subjugation of Numidia brought the vices of government to light; it was not only common knowledge, but, as it were, historically established, that for the masters of Rome everything was venal, peace treaties as well as the right of intercession, the rampart of the camp and the life of the soldier: the African had only spoken the exact truth when he declared, on leaving Rome, that, if he had had enough gold, he would have made a point of buying the city itself. The aristocracy governed as exclusively in 650 (104) as it did in 620 (134), but the signs of an imminent catastrophe had multiplied, and the sword had come to stand alongside the crown on the political horizon.

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THE PEOPLES OF THE NORTH

It is now necessary to point out the means employed by Rome to secure and extend its domination on this side, and to explain how the great masses of peoples who were constantly appearing on either side of this curtain of mountains began to remind the Roman and Greek world that it was wrong to count on exclusive domination of the land.

On 8 August 633 (121), on the southern border of the canton of Allobroges, at the confluence of the Rhône and Isère rivers, which the Arvernian army crossed on a boat bridge, the battle was fought that decided their domination of southern Gaul.

The result of these military operations was the creation of a new Roman province between the Maritime Alps and the Pyrenees. In the region between the Rhône and the Pyrenees, the Arverni kept their freedom and were not obliged to pay tribute to the Romans. However, they had to cede to Rome the southernmost part of their direct or indirect territory, the district south of the Cévennes as far as the Mediterranean and the upper reaches of the Garonne as far as Tolosa (Toulouse).

As usual, the foundation of new fortresses was accompanied by the construction of roads. The Romans settled in Narbo, an ancient Celtic city on the navigable Atax (Aude) river, not far from the sea.

In the regions around the source of the Rhine and the course of the Danube, the most powerful nation of the time was the great Celtic people.

Marcus Livius was the first Roman general, 642-643 (112- 111), to reach the Danube, and Marcus Minucius, 644 (110), defeated the Scordiscians so completely that since then they have been reduced to an insignificant position.

In order to protect the Rhine border and the directly threatened territory of the Allobroges, a Roman army commanded by Junius Silanus appeared in southern Gaul in 645 (109). The consul was completely defeated and the Roman camp was taken. But the Cimbres, instead of continuing their victory over the Romans, no doubt set about subduing the surrounding Celtic cantons.

They returned in 649 (105), under their king Boiorix, this time thinking seriously about an expedition to Italy.

The proconsul, Cæpion, was completely annihilated, so that even his camp fell into the power of
This disaster led to the equally complete defeat of the second Roman army. It is said that

that 80,000 Roman soldiers perished and half as many of the useless people who followed the camp, and that only ten men escaped. Gallic terror spread throughout Italy: the whole of the West seemed convinced that Roman domination was coming to an end.

Marius presented himself again in spite of the law forbidding him to hold the office of consul twice in succession, and not only was he appointed consul and given supreme command of the Gallic War while he was still in Africa at the head of the army, but he was invested with the consulship again for five successive years.

The Cimbres resolved to take the Italian expedition seriously. Their mass was divided into two hordes, one made up of Cimbres and Tigorini, who were to cross the Rhine again and invade Italy through the eastern passes already recognised in 641 (113), the other, made up of Teutons
were to invade Italy via Roman Gaul and the western passes.

Marius waited for the Teutons in a well-chosen and well-supplied camp at the confluence of the Isère and the Rhône. For three consecutive days, the Barbarians threw themselves on the Roman entrenchments, but their indomitable courage broke against this fortress and against the prudence of the general. After having
suffered considerable losses, the allied hordes resolved to abandon the attack, and to march
to Italy without bothering about the camp. For six consecutive days they continued to march, which proves the bulk of their baggage rather than the immensity of their numbers. The general let them advance without attacking them.

When the march was over, he raised his camp and set off in pursuit of the enemy. An initial collision, which was fortunate for the Romans, aroused the general and his soldiers: on the third day following it, Marius was in a position to fight a decisive battle on a mountain on whose summit the Roman camp was located (near Aquæ Sextiæ - Aix). The Teutons, who had long been impatient to measure themselves against their antagonists, immediately climbed the mountain and began the battle. It was hard-fought and contested; until mid-day, the Germans remained as solid as a wall; but the heat of the Provençal sun destroyed their energy, and a false alarm in the rear decided the battle.
the already shaken ranks. The whole horde was dispersed, and, as might be expected in such a situation a foreign country, they were all put to death or taken prisoner.

Gaul had been delivered from the Germans, and it was about time, for their brothers in arms were already on the slopes of the Alps. When the Cimbres emerged in thick masses from the mountains, panic swept through the Roman army, and legionnaires and knights fled. Catulus was forced to retreat to the banks of the Alps.

right of the Po, and to leave the entire plain between the Po and the Alps to the power of the Cimbres. But in
On this occasion, the Cimbres remained faithful to their custom of wintering. The Romans therefore gained time to meet them with their forces gathered in Italy. From the battlefield of Aix, the victorious army was led towards the Po. In the spring of 653 (101), it crossed the Po again, numbering 50,000 men, under the consul Marius and the proconsul Catulus, and marched against the Cimbres.

The two armies met below Vercellæ. A complete victory was achieved at a cost of
The Cimbres were exterminated. The human avalanche, which for thirteen years had alarmed the peoples from the Danube to the Ebro, from the Seine to the Po, was buried in these plains, or suffered the yoke of slavery.

The political parties of Rome continued their miserable quarrels over these corpses, without worrying about this great chapter in the history of the world whose first page had just been opened.

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ATTEMPTED REVOLUTION BY MARIUS AND REFORM BY DRUSUS

Caius Marius, the son of a poor day labourer, was born in 599. He was brought up as a ploughboy, with an existence so restricted that it even seemed to bar him from the magistracies of Arpinum. As soon as his age allowed, he entered the army, and in the harsh school of the Spanish wars, he quickly rose to the rank of captain.
officer. But in the current state of affairs, even a man of the highest merit could not attain the political offices which alone led to the great military posts, if he did not have wealth and alliances. The young officer acquired both through successful commercial speculation and his marriage to a young girl from the ancient patrician family of the Julii. Thus, with great effort, and after having been rejected several times, he reached the praetorship in 639 (115). We have already seen how, in spite of the aristocracy, he reached the consulship in 647 (107), and how, called upon after the disastrous day of Arausio to lead the war against the Germans, he obtained the renewal of his consulship for four consecutive years, from 650 to 653, and defeated and annihilated the Cimbres. He administered justice impartially, distributed booty with rare fairness and disinterestedness, and was considered to be immune to corruption.

In the eyes of his admirers, Marius' work was by no means finished. The bad government was oppressing the country more heavily than the Barbarians: on him, the first man of Rome, the people's favourite, the leader of the opposition, rested the task of delivering Rome once again.

With the reorganisation of the army, he had a formidable weapon in his hands.

As in the civil constitution, the military constitution contained all the pillars of a future monarchy; all that was missing was the monarch. When the twelve eagles flew around the Capitol, they heralded kings: the new eagle that Caius Marius gave to the legions proclaimed the advent of emperors.

The senate seemed so powerless and discredited, so hated and despised, that Marius did not believe to resist him, he needed no support other than that of his immense popularity.

He therefore dismissed the army after his triumph, in accordance with the established rules, and entered the career that had preceded Caius Gracchus, by being given constitutional magistracies. In this undertaking, he had to rely on the support of what was known as the popular party.

Saturninus and Glaucia were the two leaders of this party, which made common cause with the victorious general.

The Apuleian laws on wheat and the colonies met, as might be expected, with the strongest resistance from the government. But the brave soldiers of Marius, who had flocked to Rome on this occasion, rallied quickly and dispersed the bands of the city, and, on the voting ground thus regained, the vote on the Apuleian laws was obtained.

The ruin of the enterprise came above all from the dissension which the more than dual conduct of Marius produced among his supporters. Marius' hesitant attitude became evident in the question of the oath.
At first, it seemed that he was going to refuse the oath required by the Apulean laws because of the formal defects that had marked their adoption; but he took it with the proviso: "as long as the laws were really valid", a proviso that annulled the oath itself, and that all the senators had to accept. adopted by swearing, so that by this way of swearing, the validity of the laws was not guaranteed.

The result was a violent rupture that cost both parties their lives.

On the day the new tribunes of the people were to take office, 10 December 654 (100), a battle was fought in the main market square, the first ever to be fought within the walls of the capital. The outcome was not in doubt for a moment. The people were defeated and driven to the Capitol, where they ran out of water and were forced to surrender. Saturninus declared to the multitude that all that
that he had proposed had been made in agreement with the consul: a man other than Marius would have been ashamed of the conduct he displayed on that day. But he had long since ceased to be master of affairs. Without orders, the young nobles climbed to the roof of the Forum palace, where the prisoners were being held.
They tore off the roof tiles and stoned the prisoners to death. This is how Saturninus perished.

Never had the government party won a more complete victory, nor had the opposition suffered a more
It was a tough defeat on 10 December.

No one in the aristocratic or democratic party thought any more of the victorious general when it came to filling magistracies: the hero of six consulates did not even venture to stand as a candidate for censorship in 656 (98). He went to the East, ostensibly to fulfil a vow.

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THE REVOLT OF THE ITALIAN SUBJECTS AND THE SULPIC REVOLUTION

As soon as the revolution broke out, the Italians joined the movement and the agitation of the Roman parties with the aim of obtaining equal rights.

However, instead of making the expected changes, a consular law was passed in 659 (95), absolutely prohibiting non-citizens from claiming the franchise, and threatening judgment and punishment for offenders.

The Italiotes had no other resource left but to submit patiently or to renew once again, and if possible with combined forces, the attempt that had been crushed in its infancy thirty-five years earlier by the destruction of Fregelles.

Insurrection broke out in Asculum and the whole of central and southern Italy was soon up in arms against Rome.

The Etruscans and Umbrians remained attached to Rome.

In Rome, all business came to a halt, and all that remained was the raising of soldiers and the manufacture of goods.
weapons.

The army of the south, commanded by Caesar, tried to take the offensive and help the small divisions that had been sent forward into Samnium. But Caesar was repulsed by the Samnites and the Marsi commanded by Publius Vettius Scato, with considerable losses.

All of Campania up to Vesuvius was lost to the Romans: Salermo, Stabiae, Pompeii,
Herculaneum, declared their support for the insurgents.

However, Marius gradually penetrated into the interior of Marsian territory. He refused to fight for a long time; when he finally did, he defeated his impetuous opponent. In a second engagement, Marius' army and Sylla's corps, which belonged to the southern army, together contributed to inflicting an even greater defeat on the Martians, which cost them six thousand men.

In Picenum, the Italians found themselves confined to Asculum and the war was once again turned into a siege.

Finally, it became necessary to send Aulus Plotius against the Umbrians and Lucius against the Etruscans. Porcius Cato.

The public mood was singularly depressed.

As a result, the gates of the Roman city, which had been closed for so long to all traffic, were opened to the public.
suddenly opened. A law introduced by the consul Lucius Caesar conferred the right of citizenship on the citizens of all the communities of the Italiote allies who had not openly declared themselves against Rome.

Strengthened by these concessions granted to the hesitant cities, the Romans resumed the war against the insurgent districts with renewed vigour.

In Etruria and Umbria in particular, where it had just begun, it was suppressed with singular speed.

The gates of Asculum were opened, and Roman executions followed those of the Italiotes. The Romans again advanced as far as Venusia and Rubi, and took control of the whole of Apulia: the Marsi were defeated by Strabo's lieutenants.

The Roman army to the south, now commanded by Lucius Sylla, had at the same time taken the offensive and penetrated into southern Campania, subduing it as far as Nola.

The insurrection emerged deeply humiliated, beaten everywhere and without hope.

Rome was in terrible turmoil.

All it takes is one accident to start a revolution.

It was then that the people's tribune Publius Sulpicius Rufus in 666 (88), proposed to the citizens to declare that any senator who owed more than 2,000 denarii (2,050 gold francs) would lose his seat in the senate; to grant freedom to citizens convicted by courts other than that of jurors; to distribute the

new citizens in all the tribes, and to grant freedmen the right to vote in all local elections.
tribes.

These proposals met with the most determined resistance from the majority of the Senate. Sulpicius responded with a violent uproar. The Senate was forced to give in and Sulpicius' proposals passed unopposed.

Sulpicius, in order to ward off the blow he foresaw, planned to take the supreme command away from Sylla. On his proposal, Caius Marins was, by decree of the people, invested with extraordinary supreme power or, as it was called, proconsular power, and obtained the command of the army of Campania and the direction of the war against Mithridates.

Sylla was not a man to comply with this summons.

He assembled his soldiers, six legions making up about 35,000 men, and informed them of the summons that had arrived from Rome. From all sides came the cry for the general to lead the army to Rome. The consul left without delay. The army was quickly assembled by Marius and Sulpicius, was waiting for him and repulsed the march of the first columns with superior forces. But reinforcements came through the gates: another of Sylla's divisions prepared to turn the defenders through the Rue de Subura: they were therefore forced to withdraw. Marius tried again to resist, and urged the senate, the knights and all the citizens to come forward to support the legions, but to no avail. A few hours later, Sylla was absolute master of Rome.

Naturally, Sulpicius' laws were considered legally null and void.

Sulpicius was put to death and Marius fled.

Sylla dared to overturn an electoral organisation that had existed for more than a century and a half, and to restore the electoral franchise that had long been out of use. He dared to withdraw the right of legislation from its two usual instruments, the magistrates and the comices, and to transfer it to a council which had hitherto enjoyed no other privilege than to be consulted. No democrat had ever administered justice in such a tyrannical manner, or overturned and re-established the foundations of the constitution with such audacity as this conservative reformer.

However, in the consular comices, the choice did not fall on the candidates nominated by Sylla; instead, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, who belonged to the most resolute opposition, was paired with Gnæus Octavius, who belonged to the aristocratic party. Shortly afterwards, his own consulship expired, and his successor Cinna, on the one hand, urged him to leave for Asia, where his presence was certainly very necessary. Sylla entrusted the conduct of the siege of Nola to the praetor Appius Claudius, and embarked with his legions at the beginning of 667 (87) for the Hellenic East.

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THE EAST AND KING MITHRIDATES

The king of Pontus at that time was Mithridates VII, nicknamed Eupator, born around 624 (died in 691) (130-...).
63), who was descended on his father's side in the sixteenth generation from King Darius. The armour that covered the gigantic body of King Mithridates astonished the Asians, and especially the Italians. As a runner, he surpassed the most agile beast. As a rider, he could tame a horse
He rode wild, changing horses and covering up to fifty leagues a day. As a chariot driver, he drove sixteen horses and won many a prize in the arena. When hunting, he shot the beast at full gallop and never missed, but at the table he never found a rival. He was no less devoted to the pleasures of his harem. He satisfied his intellectual needs with the most absurd superstitions. He combined this with a crude imitation of Greek civilisation.

He had his mother, his brother, his sister whom he had married, three of his sons and as many of his daughters killed or locked up in perpetual prison for more or less real treasons. The experimental study of poisons and counter-poisons was for him one of the most important branches of the art of ruling. From an early age, he had expected betrayal and murder from everyone, especially his own relatives, and had learned to act in the same way against everyone, especially those closest to him. Not only was he a skilful orator, but he governed twenty-one nations, dispensing justice to them in their own countries.
language, without the need for an interpreter. The wars of Mithridatc are the last effort of the opposition of
Greece against Rome, and the beginning of an uprising against Roman supremacy, which was based on varied and deeper reasons for antagonism, the national reaction of the Asians
against the Westerners. After a long truce, it was a new pass in this duel between the West and the East, a duel passed on from the battle of Marathon to the present generation, and which will count its future, like its past, for thousands of years.

More powerful than any of the country's monarchs had ever been, Mithridates ruled over the northern shores.
and south of the Black Sea and in the interior of Asia Minor. The king's resources on land and sea seemed immeasurable. His recruitment stretched from the mouth of the Danube to the Caucasus and the Caspian Sea.

The Roman Senate remained a patient observer. It said nothing, while one of the states dependent on Rome became a great military power with an army of more than a hundred thousand men, while the head of this state entered into close alliance with the new great king of the East who was placed, partly by his help, at the head of the states of Inner Asia, while he annexed the neighbouring kingdoms of Asia and the principalities under pretexts which had the air of a bravado towards the distant and ill-informed protecting power, while finally he established himself in Europe and reigned over the Tauric peninsula. The measure was finally filled by the effective reunification of the kingdom of Cappadocia. The senate resolved that Mithridates should return to the Scythian provinces.

The Roman government, invoked by the kings Ariobarzane and Nicomedes in person, sent to Asia Minor, to help Lucius Cassius who was governor there, the consular Manius Aquillius, a tried and tested officer in the Cimberian and Sicilian wars, not however as a general at the head of an army, but as an ambassador.

Although neither the Roman senate, nor King Mithridates, nor King Nicomedes had wanted a rupture, Aquillius sought her out, and war broke out at the end of 665 (89).

Not since the Persian Wars had there been forces comparable to those of Mithridates. It is said that, not counting the Armenian auxiliary army, he entered the campaign with 250,000 infantry and 40,000 cavalry, and that 300 decked vessels and 100 open barques held the sea.

For the moment, the only troops available in Asia were a small Roman division commanded by Lucius Cassius and the West Asian militia.

At the beginning of the spring of 666, Mithridates took the offensive. The defeated Bithynian cavalry dispersed. A Roman division was defeated in Cappadocia. The Hellenics and Asians joined in welcoming the liberator with joy.

From Ephesus, the king sent orders to all the governors and cities under his rule to put to death on the same day all Italians within their walls, whether free or slaves, regardless of sex or age. This horrible crime even harmed the king's interests, as it forced the Roman senate to vigorously pursue the war.

Mithridates again led an attack against Europe. His son Ariarathus penetrated from Thrace into weakly defended Macedonia, subduing the region as he went along and dividing it into satrapies of the kingdom of Pontus. Euboea suffered a similar fate. In Greece proper, Mithridates continued his operations, not only with arms, but also with national propaganda. As soon as Mithridates' troops had gained a foothold on the Greek mainland, most of the small free states, the Achaeans, Laconians, Boeotians and even Thessaly joined them.

The position of the Roman government was becoming critical.

The government would have needed three armies to suppress the revolution in Rome, to completely crush the insurrection in Italy, and to continue the war in Asia: it had only one, that of Sylla. Sylla, in spite of the dangers to his constitution and his party caused by his distance, landed on the coast of Epirus in the spring of 667 (87). Immediately after landing, he left the ports of Epirus to go to Boeotia, where he defeated the enemy generals Archelaus and Aristion at Mount Tilphosian, and after this victory took the whole Greek continent almost without resistance. Sylla continued the siege of the city and port of Athens.

The town was stormed on 1 March 668 (86).

But Sylla's situation remained extremely difficult and even desperate. Asia was completely left to its own devices and the conquest of Macedonia by Mithridates' lieutenants had just been completed by the capture of Amphipolis. But there was something more serious than these military and financial embarrassments. The revolution had taken control of the government of the capital; Sylla had been deposed, his command of Asia had been entrusted to the democratic consul Marcus Valerius Flaccus, who was expected every day in Greece.

Mithridates' son had left Macedonia to attack Sylla in Greece proper.
The sudden death of this prince while on the march was the only reason for abandoning the expedition.

His successor Taxile then appeared (668), pushing the Roman corps stationed in Thessaly before him, with an army said to be 100,000 infantry and 10,000 cavalry.

On the plain of Cephise, not far from Chaeronea, the armies met in March 668 (86).

The retreating Asiatic infantry threw the cavalry masses into confusion. A general attack by the Roman infantry, which had time to breathe due to the sluggishness of the enemies, decided the victory.

Lucius Flaccus had just landed with two legions in Epirus. But Flaccus, having had the opportunity to convince himself that Sylla's soldiers were not prepared to betray their victorious general, avoided an unequal conflict and headed north through Macedonia to Thrace and Asia, in order to prepare for new results by subjugating Mithridates.

In the spring of 669 (85), Mithridates sent an army not much smaller than the one that had been wiped out at Chaeronea.

The Romans and the Asians met again on the plain of Cephise. The camp of the Asians was surrounded and swept away: most of them perished either by iron or in the marshes of Lake Copaïs. Nothing now stood in the way of entry into Macedonia and Thrace.

In the meantime, Flaccus had travelled with his army through Macedonia and Thrace to Byzantium and, crossing the Straits from there, reached Chalcedon at the end of 668 (86). But Flaccus was deposed by the army. Fimbria was appointed in his place by the soldiers.

Fimbria defeated the young Mithridates and, with this victory, opened the way to Pergamon; he dislodged the king and forced him to flee to the port of Pitane.

Mithridates tried to negotiate.

Sylla demanded the abandonment of all the conquests made by the king which had not been taken back, Cappadocia, Paphlagonia, Galatia, Bithynia, Asia Minor and the islands, the return of prisoners and deserters, and the return of Archelaus' eighty warships.

Mithridates demanded that the Romans at least not insist on the return of the warships and concede Paphlagonia to him. Sylla then directed his legions stationed in Thrace and his army to the area.
fleet towards the Hellespont. Archelaus finally managed, with great difficulty, to obtain his master's consent.
to this treaty. Sylla learned of Mithridates' ratification of the peace, but he continued his march towards Asia.

After meeting Mithridates on the Asiatic shore at Dardanes and concluding the treaty orally, he ordered his army to continue marching until it reached the camp at Fimbria.

When Fimbria ordered the attack, the soldiers refused to fight their fellow citizens. They went to Pergamon and killed himself in the temple of Aesculapius.

The goal had thus been achieved. After four years of war, the king of Pontus had once again become a Roman client, and a single government had been re-established in Greece, Macedonia and Asia Minor. Sylla's arrival in Italy was preceded by a report to the senate on the campaigns in Greece and Asia: the person who had written it did not seem to know that he had been deposed by the people: it was the silent signal of a forthcoming restoration.

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CINNA AND SYLLA

The name of the man whom the malcontents had called to the head of state, Lucius Cornelius Cinna, was until then almost unknown: all that was known was that he had distinguished himself as an officer in the social war.

When Sylla, yielding not to the solicitations of the consul Cinna, but to the urgency of the situation, had embarked, Cinna, supported by the majority of the college of tribunes, immediately proposed the projects of

laws that had been combined in a partial reaction against the restoration imagined by Sylla in 666 (88). These proposals included the political equalisation of the new citizens and the as proposed by Sulpicius, and the re-establishment of those who had been reduced, by Sulpicius following the Sulpician revolution, to their original state.

The tribunes of the senatorial party interposed their veto; when the swords were drawn against them in front of the tribune of harangues, Octavius opposed force to force. The Forum was flooded with blood, in this "Octavian Day" as it had never been before: ten thousand corpses were counted. In accordance not with the constitution, but with the oracle of the gods, Consul Cinna was deposed by decree of the Senate; Lucius Cornelius Merula was chosen in his place, and banishment was pronounced against the leaders who had fled.

However, the army of Campania recognised Cinna as consul and swore him an oath of allegiance. man. Marius soon had 6,000 men under his flag, and was able to equip forty ships, which stationed in front of the mouth of the Tiber, and which gave chase to the grain-laden ships sailing for Rome. He placed himself and his reinforcements at the disposal of the consul Cinna.

Cinna, with his corps and that of Carbon, took up position on the left bank of the Tiber opposite the Janiculum; Sertorius on the left bank, opposite Pompey, against the wall of Servius. Marius with his band, which now comprised three legions, successively took several leagues along the coast.

When Cinna's heralds proclaimed freedom for slaves who deserted, the slaves flocked from the capital to the enemy camp.

The senate submitted unconditionally to the proscribed consul, asking only that he not spread the disease. blood. Cinna promised, but refused to back up his promise with an oath.

The gates of the capital were opened, and the consul entered with his legions. It was decided that all the leading men of the aristocratic party would be killed en masse and their property confiscated. The gates were closed: for five days and nights, the massacre continued without interruption. The bloody persecution spread throughout Italy. The consul Gnaeus Octavius was the first victim. Among the others were Lucius Caesar, consul in 664 (90), Marcus Antonius, Lucius Crassus and Publias Crassus. The wealthiest were the first to fall to the assassins' daggers. A particularly regrettable death was that of Lucius Merula, who had succeeded Cinna.

The perpetrator of this violence was Caius Marius. This furious old man could not be stopped, and Cinna had no choice.
Instead, he chose Marius as his colleague for the consulship the following year.

The gods had granted Marius everything he wanted, but, as in the days of legend, they sealed his triumph with his death, as if by some implacable irony. He was carried off by inflammatory fever after languishing for seven days.

With terror came tyranny. Not only did Cinna remain consul for four years, but he regularly appointed himself and his colleagues without consulting the people. The law proposed by Sulpicius, and later by Cinna himself, which promised new citizens and freedmen equal suffrage with old citizens, was naturally reinstated. The restrictions on the distribution of grain established a few years earlier were undoubtedly removed: the project for a colony in Capua, conceived by Caius Gracchus, was carried out in the spring of 671 (83). Lucius Valerius Flaccus the Younger passed a law on debts, which reduced all private claims to a quarter of the nominal capital and returned three quarters to the debtors.

A letter from Sylla then reached the Senate; he declared that he would respect the rights conferred on the new citizens, and that, although severe measures were inevitable, they would not affect the masses, but the perpetrators of the crimes.

But Cinna, immediately after the close of the senate sessions, had gone to the army and had hastened his return to France.
boarding.

The need to embark in this unfavourable season provoked, among the troops already on board disgruntled from the Ancona headquarters, a revolt of which Cinna was a victim, early in 670 (84). But Sylla's offers were no better received for that; the senate rejected his proposals.

In the spring of 671 (83), Sylla landed with his legions at the port of Brundisium. On receiving the news, the senate declared the country to be in danger and gave the consuls unlimited powers; but these incapable leaders were not on their guard and were surprised by a landing.

The army of the consul Caius Norbanus was already in Capua, where the new colony had just been established with all the democratic pomp; the second consular army was also arriving by the Appian Way. But before it arrived, Sylla was in the presence of Norbanus.

Sylla's troops threw themselves on the enemy and their charge from Mount Tifata crushed him with the rest of his forces. Sylla then marched along the Appian Way against Teanum, where Scipio had taken up position.

But Scipio's soldiers swarmed into the enemy ranks. The scene ended in a universal embrace.

The results of the first campaign, favourable to Sylla, were the submission of Apulia, Picenum and Campania, the dissolution of one consular army and the defeat of the other, which was trapped in a town.

But despair seemed to give the revolution new energy. The consulship was entrusted to two of its most determined leaders, to Carbon for the third time and to Marius the younger. Marius' veterans lined up in large numbers under his son's banner. But nowhere were preparations against Sylla made with such ardour as in insurgent Samnium.

Marius sought to meet the enemy's main army in Latium: marching along the via Latia, Sylla reached the enemy not far from Signia. The troops soon gave up: the defection of a division during the battle accelerated the defeat. The capital, which had been left without supplies, was irrevocably lost.

Sylla himself marched, from various directions, on the capital, which he found, like the entire surrounding district, abandoned by the enemy and which he occupied without resistance. He immediately crossed into Etruria, in order, with Metellus, to dislodge his antagonists from northern Italy.

Etruria was occupied by Sylla's supporters.

The leaders of the revolution then decided to take revenge. Pontius Lamponius, Carrinas and Damasippus marched on Rome. Upon hearing the news, Sylla rushed to the aid of the capital.

Sylla appeared in person with the main army, and immediately placed himself in order of battle at the front.
temple of Venus Erycine, in front of the Colline gate. The battle continued throughout the night. The insurgent army
who were unable to retreat, were completely wiped out.

This battle ended the war. The victorious army was distributed throughout Italy, and all the insecure places were strongly occupied: under the iron hand of Sylla's officers, the last murmurs of revolutionary and national opposition were soon extinguished.

The State once again had unity of government and peace at home and abroad. This man
Would the remarkable leader, who had succeeded in the difficult task of defeating the public enemy and in the even more difficult task of defeating the revolution, be capable of accomplishing the most arduous of all, the restoration of the social and political order that had been shaken to its foundations?

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THE CONSTITUTION OF SYLLA

In a letter to the senate, Sylla announced that it seemed essential to him to place the government of the State in the hands of a single man with unlimited plenitude of power, and that he believed he was in a position to fulfil this difficult task. This proposal was adopted without opposition. Sylla then entered the walls of the capital. This new office, with its absolute power based on a decree of the people and unrestricted by any law or colleague, was no different from the old monarchy.

The constitution of the Gracchi, still spared in the first reform of Sylla in 666 (88), was then completely abolished. The regular distribution of wheat to citizens who were domiciled was abolished. Sylla abolished the equestrian corps and restored the senatorial courts.

In accordance with Sylla's orders, the senate was completed by the addition of around 300 senators, whom the assembly had to appoint from among the men who paid the equestrian tax.

The Senate, which until then had been based solely on indirect election, was henceforth elected by ballot. direct popular regime, and thus was assimilated to the representative regime, just as accurately as the direct popular regime.
oligarchy and the general ideas of antiquity. The extravagant prerogative attributed to the censors, to revise the list of the senate and to delete or add new names as they pleased, was in reality incompatible with an organised oligarchic constitution.

On the subject of legislation, Sylla contented himself with reviving the regulations adopted in 666 (88) and which assured the senate of the legislative initiative, which had hitherto belonged to it in practice, at least against the tribunes. The body of citizens remained sovereign in form; but with regard to the general assemblies, although it seemed useful to the dictator to preciously preserve their name, he took even greater care to withdraw their activity. The legislative functions of the comices were not, however, abolished.
directly restricted, there was no need to do so.

With regard to election to the magistracies, the method followed until then was retained on the whole, except with regard to the new regulation of military command. Censuses were re-established and partially increased. Finally, two years were to elapse between the exercise of two magistratures, and ten years between the renewed exercise of the same office.

The prerogatives of the tribune were reduced.

In future, the consul and praetor were to deal with the senate and the citizens, and the proconsul and praetor were to command the army; but all military power was legally taken away from the former and all political action from the latter.

Finally, we have already pointed out that the highest of all magistracies, censorship, although it did not have the power to censor, did have the power to censor.
not finally abolished, was set aside, in much the same way as the praetorship had been previously.

Finally, the development of an independent Roman municipal system was the work, if not of Sylla, then at least of the time of Sylla.

This was the constitution that Lucius Cornelius Sylla gave to the Roman Republic. The senate and the equestrian order, the citizens and the proletariat, the Italians and the provincials, accepted it as imposed by the dictator, if not without murmur, at least without revolt.

Sylla allowed the elections of 635 (79), declared re-election to the consulship incompatible with the new laws; and at the beginning of 635 (79), he resigned the dictatorship.

The most hardened hearts were struck when the man who had disposed of the lives and property of millions of men as he pleased, who had seen so many heads fall at a mere sign from him, voluntarily renounced his sovereign power, dismissed his retinue and his lictors, and invited every citizen to speak, if he had any account to ask of him. Everyone fell silent: Sylla descended from the tribune and returned home on foot, surrounded only by his friends.

Posterity has failed to appreciate either Sylla or his work of reorganisation, as is usually the case. for men who go against the grain. In fact, Sylla is one of the most marvellous
He is one of the most unique characters in history. Brought up with this education
the less wealthy senatorial families of Rome at the time, he was able to make the most of his
He soon gave in to the sensual and intellectual pleasures provided by the combination of Greek politeness and Roman wealth. He was very fond of a glass of wine and even more fond of women. He liked to choose his companions from among the actors, and enjoyed drinking not only with Quintus Roscius, the Roman Talma, but also with far inferior actors; he sang quite well himself and composed farces to play with his friends. In the midst of these joyous bacchanals, however, he lost neither his bodily nor his mental vigour; in the leisure of retirement, he devoted himself ardently to hunting, and he brought the writings of Aristotle from conquered Athens to Rome, which at least proves his interest in serious reading. He flattered himself with the idea that he was a chosen favourite of the gods, and in an even more special way of the goddess to whom he had always assigned pre-eminence, Venus.

Almost without wishing it, Sylla had become the most famous general of his time, and the shield of oligarchy. New and more formidable crises followed Mithridates' war and Cinna's revolution: Sylla's star continued to rise. As soon as he had finished with the enemy in Asia, he crushed the reign of anarchy and saved the capital from the despair of the Samnites and the revolutionaries. An absolute autocrat, as no king had ever been, and yet always seeking to remain within the law in terms of form, he crushed the ultra-reactionary party, annihilated the constitution of the Gracchi, which had dominated the oligarchy for forty years, and made the power of the "kingdoms" yield to the law, which had been re-established in all its strength.

capitalists, the proletariat of the city which had entered into rivalry with the oligarchy, and in linen the arrogance of the sabre which had taken hold of its own staff. Finally, when the work was finished, the creator let it run.

It is true that Sylla's constitution did not last any longer than Cromwell's, and it was not difficult to see that the edifice was not solid; but it is sheer stupidity not to understand that without Sylla the very site of this empire would have disappeared. Death surprised him a little more than a year after his retirement, in the sixtieth year of his life, while he was still in the full vigour of his body and mind.

Italy never witnessed a greater funeral solemnity. The dictator's ashes were placed in the Field of Mars, next to the tombs of the ancient kings, and Roman women wept for him for a year.

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THE REPUBLIC AND ITS ORGANISATION

While ancient civilisation was becoming increasingly concentrated in the Roman state and taking on a more precise form, the nations that had been excluded from it began simultaneously, beyond the Alps and the Euphrates, to move from defence to aggression. On the battlefields of Aquæ Sextiæ and
In Verceil, Cheronia and Orchomena, we could hear the first rumblings of the hurricane that was to bring the Germanic tribes and the Asiatic hordes to the Greek-Italian world, and whose last murmurs have lasted until our own time. In terms of internal development, this was a similar period. The old organisation collapsed without return. The Roman republic had been founded as a city which, through its own free citizens, gave itself masters and laws, which was governed by these well advised masters with royal freedom, within the limits of legality. The holder of Roman power was either a lone individual or an oligarchy made up of the nobles and the rich. Citizens had lost all real participation in government. Magistrates were no more than inert instruments in the hands of power. The urban republic of Rome had
broken by expanding unnaturally. The Italic confederation had been drowned in the city. The non-Italian confederates were in the process of becoming subjects. The entire organic classification of the Roman republic had perished, and all that remained was a crude mass of more or less disparate elements.

The situation threatened to end in complete anarchy, in the external and internal dissolution of the State. The only point still in doubt was whether it would be the narrow circle of noble families, the senate of capitalists or a monarch who would be the despot.

Rome's financial condition naturally took on a more alarming aspect when the revolution broke out. The new, and from a purely financial point of view, very heavy taxes imposed on the State by the obligation to which Gracchus had subjected it, to supply wheat to the citizens at a normal price, were offset by the new sources of revenue opened up in the province of Asia. Nevertheless, public buildings appear to have been halted at this time. The storm, as serious as it was, passed; Sylla, at the price of enormous sacrifices imposed on his subjects and on the Italian revolutionaries in particular, restored order to the finances and, by abolishing the distribution of wheat and re-establishing under a new name
the community a satisfactory economic situation.

In Agriculture, we have already seen that the growing power of Roman capital gradually absorbed intermediate and small properties in Italy and the provinces, like the Sun absorbs raindrops. The government not only saw, but did not prevent, but even aided this dangerous division of the soil through special measures, above all by forbidding the production of wine and oil beyond the Alps, in order to favour the great Roman landowners and merchants.

Of industry and manufacturing, there is nothing to say except that the Italic nation remained under this report in a state of inactivity that bordered on barbarism.

The brightest side, or rather the only bright side, of the Roman private economy was the exchange of money and trade.

Exports and imports from Italy were considerable. The former often consisted of wine and oil, of which Italy, after Greece, exclusively supplied the Mediterranean regions: wine production must have been rare in the Massalian and Mediterranean territories; Italian wine was exported in considerable quantities to the Balearic Islands, Celtiberia, Italy and the Mediterranean.
Africa, which was a land of wheat and pasture, to Narbo and the interior of Gaul. Imports into Italy were even more considerable: all the luxuries were concentrated there, and most of the luxury items - food, drink, fabrics, ornaments, books, furniture and works of art - were imported into Europe.

imported by sea. The slave trade grew considerably as a result of the ever-increasing demand from Roman merchants.

Putting all these phenomena together, we find that the distinctive feature of the private economy of this period was the financial oligarchy of the Roman capitalists giving a hand to the political oligarchy. It was in their hands that the territorial income of almost the whole of Italy and also of the best parts of the provincial territory came together: the usurious income of the capital monopolised by them, the products of trade throughout the empire and, finally, a very considerable part of the income of the State. It was not unusual for this order of capitalists to exert a preponderant influence on government policy.
He would have destroyed Corinth and Carthage through commercial rivalry.

As for popular festivals, the importation of beasts of prey from overseas, which was prohibited in the time of Cato, was, apparently towards the middle of this century, formally permitted by a decree of the citizens. Several lions appeared for the first time in the Roman arena around 651 (103); the first elephants around 655 (99). Luxury also increased in terms of houses and gardens: the splendid town house of the orator Crassus was valued with trees at 6,000,000 sesterces (1,455,000 gold francs). Villas and the luxurious seaside lifestyle made Baia, and in
the area around the Bay of Naples, the Eldorado of elegant leisure.

Muslin veils, which showed more of the body than they hid, and silk garments began to replace the old woollen dresses for women and even for men. It was in vain that sumptuary edicts forbade the abuse of foreign perfumes. Extravagant prices were paid, up to 100,000 sesterces (26,250 gold francs) for a superior cook. A dinner where the guests had to eat all the dishes instead of just tasting them was considered poor. At table in particular, the Romans displayed an army of luxury slaves, bands of musicians, dancers, elegant furnishings, carpets embellished with gold and paint, purple curtains, antique bronzes and rich silverware.

Divorce, which had previously been almost unknown in Rome, had now become very commonplace.

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LITERATURE AND ART

We find much more important results in comedy than in tragedy. Terence, 558-595 (196-159), is one of the most historically interesting phenomena in Latin literature. Plautus chose his plays from the wide circle of new Attic comedy. Terence stuck exclusively to Menander, the most delicate, refined and chastened of all the poets of the new comedy. Plautus' dialogue differs greatly from that of his models: Terence, on the contrary, boasts of the perfect resemblance of his imitations to the originals. Plautus knots and unknots his action lightly and carelessly, but his fable is comic and often strong.
apparent: Terence, much less striking, takes probability into account everywhere, even at the risk of length, and declares a resolute war on the rather flat and insipid expedients of his predecessors, for example, allegorical dreams. Plautus paints his characters in broad strokes, as if from a model, always with a view to a more distant and more general effect: Terence treats the psychological development with the care and delicacy of a miniature, as in the Adelphes or the Deux
Old men. The sources of Plautus' action and language are to be found in the tavern: those of Terence at the
maison du citoyen.

Plautus liked vigorous, often noisy dialogue, and his plays demanded lively acting from the actors: Terence confined himself to quiet conversation. Plautus' language abounds in burlesque terms and witty wordplay, alliterations, comical turns of phrase, Aristophanesque combinations of words and slang expressions jokingly borrowed from the Greeks: Terence knows no such vagaries, his dialogue moves along an even plane, and the points are delicately epigrammatic and sententious turns.

Plautus' style of composition had taken root in the Roman bourgeoisie; Terence's comedies met with the most violent opposition from the public, who found their flat language and "weakness of style" intolerable.

Terence succeeded: in literature itself, the oligarchy was all-powerful, and the artistic comedy of the comedy supplanted the comedy of the people; we see that around the year 620 (134) the plays of Plautus disappeared from the repertoire.

Art offers unsatisfactory results. In architecture, sculpture and painting, the extension of the dilettantism was visible, but the development of national art took a step backwards.

The work carried out in Rome was carried out by foreigners.

Finally, music and dance emigrated from Greece to Rome, to be applied solely to the advancement of decorative luxury. But what was new was to see the Greek dances and the musical performances become the obligatory accompaniment to the grown-ups' table.

On the whole, the more elevated genres of literature, such as epic, tragedy and history, ended or came to a halt in their development. Subordinate genres, the translation and imitation of the plot, farce, the poetic pamphlet and prose, flourished on their own. In the plastic arts and those of drawing, production, always low, was now completely nil. The Latins had to admit to themselves that the nation's youth had passed, and nurtured in the depths of their hearts the secret desire to return to the misguided and delightful paths of youth.

BOOK FIVE

Foundation of the military monarchy

MARCUS LEPIDUS AND QUINTUS SERTORIUS

Former liberal minority of the senate, democracy, freedmen, capitalists, proletarians of the capital, expropriated, proscribed, ruined, ambitious - such was the opposition with which the government left to its own devices by the death of the dictator, and sooner than expected.
Sylla had never thought of it.

Among the men who were neither resolute supporters nor declared opponents of Sylla's constitution, none attracted the eyes of the multitude more than Cneius Pompey, who, at the time of Sylla's death, had reached the age of twenty-eight, born on 29 September 648 (106). With a body and a soul full of health, Pompey was a skilful gymnast: having become a senior officer, he still competed with soldiers for the prize of wrestling in running, jumping and pugilism; a powerful and skilful horseman and wrestler, a bold leader of free bands, this young man, at an age that barred him from the magistracy and the senate, had obtained a number of victories, including that of the king of France.
the imperium and the triumph, held, at the death of Sylla, the first place in public opinion, and had earned the nickname "The Great One" from the dictator himself, half seriously, half ironically.
Unfortunately, his intellectual gifts were no match for these unprecedented successes. He was neither

but he was a vulgar creature whose destiny would have made him a very good man.
He was a soldier of foresight, bravery and experience. He was a far-sighted soldier, brave and experienced, in a word excellent, but he lacked all the superior gifts of a man of genius. He did not disdain making money, as all senators do, but he was too cold and too rich to risk much and to expose himself to scandal. He showed affection for his wife and children; he deserves credit for being the first to renounce the barbaric custom of executing kings and generals as prisoners after including them in his triumph. He was not cruel, as he is reproached, but what was worse, perhaps, he was indifferent to right and wrong. In the tumult of battle, he looked his enemy in the whites of the eyes: in civilian life, he was one of those timid men to whom the blood rushes to the head at the smallest things. He was nothing less than a statesman. Not knowing exactly what he wanted, unskilled in the choice of means, unpredictable in the whole as well as in the detail, he was obliged to hide his indecision and uncertainty under the cloak of a pompous silence.
when he wanted to deceive, he only deceived himself. He was an officer of Sylla and a supporter of the established constitution, and yet in opposition to Sylla personally and to the entire senatorial regime. The dominant position that Pompey acquired under Sylla's government separated him from the aristocracy in terms of substance as much as it brought him closer to it outwardly. Weak in mind as he was, he was soon overcome by vertigo in the heights he had so quickly and easily reached. Even in his time, he could have made a clear and superior position for himself if he had
had been content to be the general of the senate. That was his true lot. He was not content with that, and he preferred, in a position fraught with peril, to be something other than what he could be. He aimed seriously to an exceptional situation in the State, and when it arose, he didn't know what to do.
decide to take it.

Like Pompey, who was a little younger than him, Crassus belonged to the ranks of the upper classes. He had received the average education of the time and, like Pompey, had served with distinction under Sylla in the Italian war. Far inferior in intellectual gifts, literary culture and military talents to many men of his time, he surpassed them by his unlimited activity and by the perseverance with which he aimed at everything and occupied himself with everything. Above all, he threw himself into speculation. His wealth was built up through the purchase of property during the revolution. He was unscrupulous in the way he made a profit. He had been the richest of the Romans, and that made him
became a political power. Nature had not made him an orator: his speech was dry, his delivery monotonous; he could hear with difficulty; but his perseverance, which allowed himself to be put off by nothing and attracted by no pleasure, triumphed over all obstacles. He was always prepared and never improvised; he became a sought-after lawyer who was always ready, whose reputation did not suffer because no case was too bad for him, and because he knew how to use not only his word, but also his connections and his clientele, and if necessary his money to influence judges.

For a time he had been a supporter of Sylla and the senate, but he was too much of a financier to attach himself irrevocably to one party and to follow anything other than his own interests. Why should Crassus, the richest and most intriguing man in Rome, and who could not have been a vulgar ambitious, but a great speculator, not have speculated on the crown? It is indeed a sign of the times that a officer and a mediocre orator, a politician who mistook his activity for energy, his desires for ambition, and who had in short only a colossal fortune and the mercantile talent of making connections, that such a man, supported by the omnipotence of the coteries of intrigue, should believe himself the equal of the king.
general and statesman of his time, and dared to challenge him for the supreme prize of ambition politics.

In the democratic party, the eyes of friends and enemies were focused, in the younger generation, on Caius Julius Caesar, born on 12 July 652 (102). His alliances with Marius and Cinna (his father's sister had married Marius, and he himself had married Cinna's daughter); the courageous refusal that this young man, who had barely been born, had made to accept his father's death.
The way in which he kept the pontificate that Marius had given him and that Sylla had not recognised; his wandering during the exile that threatened him and that his parents found it difficult to turn away from him; his bravery in the battle of Mytilene and in Cilicia, which would not have been expected of a child brought up so delicately and his almost feminine manner as a young master; and lastly, his precociousness in the battle of Mytilene and in Cilicia, which would not have been expected of a child brought up so delicately and his almost feminine manner as a young master; his bravery in the battle of Mytilene and in Cilicia, which one would not have expected from a child brought up so delicately and from his almost feminine manner as a petty officer; finally the prediction that Sylla had made, when he said that in this child he saw more than a Marius : all these were recommendations in the eyes of the democratic party. However, one could only base one's hopes on Caesar. Thus the command of the democracy, in the absence of an eminent man called to this function, could belong to the first who would set himself up as the protector of oppressed freedom. That man was Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, a defector from the camp of Sylla's supporters, who
had changed party for more than dubious reasons. He was a remarkable man, an ardent orator in the Forum, who had switched to the opposition, but he was a worthless and unserious head. The opposition did not welcome him any less, and the new leader of the democrats had the good fortune to secure his election to the Consulate. But before the democrats had risen up in the capital, the democratic émigrés in Spain had begun their movement. The soul of this insurrection was Quintus Sertorius.

The experienced general Quintus Metellus reappeared. But Metellus was unable to control the movement. In the province of Ebre, not only was Calvinus' army wiped out by Sertorius' lieutenant, the quaestor Hirtuleius, but the general was killed and the governor of Gaul completely defeated.

A new revolution was underway. The overthrow of Sylla's constitution, the re-establishment of wheat distributions, the reinstatement of the tribunes of the people to their previous position, the return of those who had been exiled contrary to the laws, the restitution of confiscated property - these were

the aims of the revolution.

put forward as the avowed aim of the efforts to be made by Lepidus and his supporters. In the capital, people were recruiting on behalf of Lepidus in cabarets and bad places. The
senate proved its weakness against the insurrection and its concern by restoring the distributions of wheat. Lepidus armed Etruria, not for the senate, but for the insurrection. When, at last, in the
At the beginning of 677 (77), Lepidus received an order from the senate to return unconditionally, but the consul refused to obey. War was thus declared.

Lepidus appeared in the capital to conquer it for the revolution, as Marius had done in the past. The decisive battle was fought on the Field of Mars beneath the city walls. But Catulus prevailed; Lepidus had to withdraw to Etruria, while another division commanded by his son Scipio threw itself into the fortress of Alba. All in all, this put an end to the movement.

It was necessary to send a powerful army and a capable general to Spain, and Pompey made it clear that he wanted this mission, or rather that he demanded it. It was not from the people but from the senate that Pompey received the proconsular power and the supreme command in the Spanish mainland; he crossed the Alps forty days after receiving it, in the summer of 677 (77).

The war in Spain continued for a long time, with alternating successes and defeats, but Sertorius was assassinated at a banquet by his own staff. Part of his army, especially the Lusitanians, disbanded; those who remained convinced themselves that Sertorius had destroyed their souls and fortunes. At the first meeting with Pompey, the poorly commanded troops and
of the insurrection were dispersed. These defeats, although they were more the work of the
of perversity and misfortune than of the efforts of the adversary, were no less triumphs for the oligarchy. The curular chairs were once again consolidated.

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THE SYLLA RESTORATION GOVERNMENT

The rivalry that existed in Asia between Rome and the kings of Pontus and Armenia was not over, but was growing from day to day. Rome was as dissatisfied with Sylla's peace in Asia as it was with the conditions that Scipio the African had granted to Carthage. The Thracians of Macedonia reappeared on the borders of Macedonia and fleets of privateers covered the entire Mediterranean; emissaries once again came and went, as they had done in the past between Mithridates and the Italians,

today between the Roman emigrants from Spain and those from the court of Sinope. On the other hand, Mithridates
was following the development of Roman politics with growing concern.

The king of Pontus took the decisive step and declared war on the Romans in the winter of 679-80. Mithridates' offensive ended in a complete defeat for the army and the army of the sea, which was not very honourable, at least for the supreme leader who commanded them. Lucullus himself entered Pontus in the autumn of 681 (73). The Roman army, which now numbered only three legions, arrived, not without difficulty and loss, along paths that were difficult for Kabeira. Lucullus attacked, and the hordes of Pontus were crushed almost without resistance. Mithridates and a few companions struggled through the mountains to Komana. At Talaura, in Lesser Armenia, he crossed the borders of his empire to seek asylum in the kingdom of the great king, who refused him (end of 682-72). All of Pontus and Lesser Armenia were invaded by the Romans.

But Armenian affairs were not settled and a Roman declaration of war against Tigran was in itself legitimate and even necessary. Lucullus sent one of his officers, Appius Claudius, to demand extradition, which would lead to war.

In the spring of 685 (69) the formal attack began. The enemy army was completely dispersed. The victor's bulletin claimed that 100,000 Armenians and 5 Romans had perished; be that as it may, the victory won on 6 October 685 (69) before Tigranocerte remains a shining star in the military annals of Rome, and was no less fruitful than it was brilliant.

From a strategic point of view, all the regions taken from the Parthians and Scythians were lost to the Armenians and, for the most part, passed purely and simply into Roman hands.

Mithridates, who was almost like a father to the great king and still had great influence over him, used his energy to compel this weak man and persuade him not only to continue the war, but to entrust him with its political and military direction. Mithridates found no difficulty in
He could even have turned it into a war of religion. The Asians came in innumerable hordes, under the banners of the kings who claimed to be defending the East and its gods against the impious foreigner.

The year 686 (68) found Lucullus in a difficult and increasingly perilous situation. Despite his
He was not happy in Rome. The senate resented the independence of his conduct
The capitalist party, which he had scorned, was doing its utmost through intrigue and slander,
to call him back.

Just as Lucullus was suffering a defeat on the Euphrates, news arrived from Rome that the people had ordered all soldiers whose leave had expired, i.e. those from Fimbria, to obtain
their leave, and that supreme command in Bithynia and Pontus was given to one of the consuls
of the current year.

Mithridates not only regained possession of his entire kingdom, but his cavalrymen roamed throughout Cappadocia and as far as Bithynia. As a result of this unfortunate outcome, and above all because of the indiscipline of the soldiers, all the fruits of an eight-year campaign were once again lost; in the winter of 687-688 (67-66), the situation was just as bad as it had been in the winter of 679-680 (75-74). Let's take a look at this ten-year period filled by Sylla's restoration. No danger threatening the vital sources of the nation had arisen in the internal or external movements which had agitated this period, nor in the the insurrection of Lepidus, nor in the attempts of the emigrants from Spain, nor in the wars of Thrace and Asia Minor or in the uprisings of the slaves and pirates, and yet the State had fought for its existence in every battle. It was just under a century since Hannibal's war had ended: respectable Romans must have turned red when they saw the ground the nation had lost since that great epoch. Slaves used to stand like walls
Today, the Italian militia scattered like chaff in the wind before its revolting servants. In the past, the smallest officer could make a general if need be and fought with courage, if not happiness; today, it is difficult to find a general of ordinary skill among the most distinguished officers. In the past, the government took the peasant by the plough,
rather than give up on conquering Greece and Spain; today we would rather abandon these territories so painfully conquered, to defend themselves against the uprising of the slaves. Spartacus could just as easily have crossed Italy in victory, from the Po to the Straits of Sicily, defeated the two consuls and threatened Rome with a blockade. Finally, in the war of Asia Minor and that of the pirates, the government had gone completely bankrupt. The war in Pontus and Armenia and the pirate war were the causes that overthrew Sylla's constitution and brought about a military and revolutionary dictatorship.

FALL OF THE OLIGARCHY. PUMPED-UP DOMINATION

If Pompey could not find his feet with the governing aristocracy, all that remained for him, at a time when neither the times nor his whole personality were yet ready for a purely personal policy, was to make common cause with democracy. His personal interest did not
He could just as easily, if not better, pursue his goal in a democracy. There he would find all the support he needed. The skilful and articulate leaders of this party were prepared to give up active political leadership almost willingly to the mediocre hero, and there were too few of them to be able or even to want to compete with the triumphant general for the higher military command. From the moment that the latter was no longer fighting with declamations alone, but that the sword of a victorious general would support its efforts, the government was bound to fall, and perhaps without resistance.

But democracy and Pompey were not the only ones to form an alliance. Marcus Crassus was in a similar situation to Pompey. Although he was a supporter of Sylla, his policy, like Pompey's, was entirely personal and not that of the dominant oligarchy: he was in Italy at the head of a powerful and victorious army, with which he had just subdued the slave insurrection. The only thing left for him to do was to join the coalition; he chose this last option, which was certainly the safest. The democrats, moreover, who were not happy about an alliance with the powerful general, found in Crassus a counterweight and perhaps a future rival close to him.

Thus was formed in the summer of 683 (71) a first coalition between democracy on the one hand, and Sylla's two generals, Cnæsus Pompey and Marcus Crassus, on the other. Both made the programme of democracy their own. On the other hand, they were guaranteed the consulship for the following year: Pompey, in addition, the triumph and the distribution of land that he requested for his soldiers, and Crassus, the victor over Spartacus, at least the honour of a triumphal entry into the capital.

The repeal of Sylla's legislation was eagerly pursued. First of all, the tribunitian power regained its primitive importance. With regard to the places of jurors, the provision of Sylla, by which the senatorial roll, which served at the same time as the list of jurors, was abrogated.

Finally, not only was censorship re-established, but it had to last five years, as before, and the retirement of the censors was determined by law, but at their discretion.

In 684 (70), the essential points had been returned to the order of things that existed before the restoration of Sylla. The multitude in the capital was once again fed by the treasury, in other words by the provinces. The power of the tribune once again gave demagogues the facility to overthrow the state.

The silver nobility regained possession of the leases, revenues and judicial control over the rulers, and raised their heads higher than ever. The Senate once again trembled before the verdicts of the equestrian juries and the censors. Sylla's system, which had based the omnipotence of the nobility on the political annihilation of the financial aristocracy and demagogy, was completely out of kilter. If he wanted to, he could be what the instinct of the multitude already saw in him, the irresponsible head of the most powerful state in the civilised world. We have depicted this man struggling between his desire to remain a loyal republican and his desire to become king, with his indecision and his uncertainties, with his softness hidden under the appearances of resolution. It was the first test to which he had been subjected, and he had succumbed to it. The pretext under which he refused to disband his army was the distrust he had against Crassus, which prevented him from sending his soldiers back first: the democrats decided Crassus to
take the first step. Pompey now had no choice but to present himself as the tyrant of Rome or to withdraw. In the end, he gave in and agreed to the dismissal of his troops. By deposing the consulship after the dismissal of his soldiers in the last days of 684 (70), Pompey withdrew from public affairs.

The retreat of the man who had the leading role in the situation called this situation into question. Between the oligarchy and democracy, the party of the capitalists rose with renewed vigour.

But while passions were indulging in their traditional hatred, without any real solution being found, affairs in the East were continuing their painful course, as we said above, and it was these affairs which precipitated the political crisis in the capital. Naturally, the government was responsible for everything, for its own faults and those of others, and the murmurs of a multitude
were just waiting for an opportunity to call the senate to account.

It was a decisive crisis. When the man whose glorious successes were still remembered by all asked to be sent to the East, he was once again invested by the citizens with political and military omnipotence. He was given command for three years. He was surrounded by a staff the like of which Rome had never seen before: twenty-five lieutenants of senatorial rank, all clothed in the insignia and power of the praetorium, and two masters of camp with the functions of quaestors, all chosen at the pleasure of the general-in-chief. He was authorised to raise 120,000 infantrymen, 4,000 cavalrymen and 500 warships, and had unlimited access to the resources of the provinces and client states: in addition, he was given the warships available and a sizeable body of troops. The state coffers in Rome and the provinces, as well as in the dependent communities, were to be at his command, and despite the financial distress, he was credited with 144,000,000 sesterces (33,250,000 gold francs) from the public treasury. It was a complete overthrow of the established order that such a law was preparing. Never since Rome existed had so much power been concentrated in the hands of a single man. But if the old struggle had come to an end, a new one was in the offing: the struggle between the two forces that had hitherto been united in the overthrow of the aristocratic constitution, the opposition to the government and the opposition to the government of the people.

and the military force, which was becoming more preponderant by the day. Pompey's exceptional position was irreconcilable with the republican form. He had, as his opponents were already rightly saying, become not the admiral, but the regent of the empire. It was not without reason that a Greek familiar with Eastern customs called him "the king of kings". If, once again victorious and more glorious, he returned from the East with his coffers full, his troops tested and devoted, and if he laid hands on the crown, who could stop his arm? It would take
soon, said Catullus, to flee again to the rock of the Capitol to save freedom. It was not the prophet's fault that the storm did not come, as he believed, from the East, and that destiny, fulfilling his oracle to the letter beyond what he believed, brought the destructive storm from the land of the Celts.

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PUMPED AND THE EAST

When, forty days later, navigation was re-established in the eastern gulf of the Mediterranean, Pompey travelled with his sixty best transports to the eastern sea, then to the primitive and main stronghold of piracy, the waters of Lycia and Cilicia. Pompey's gentleness served more than fear to open the gates of these almost inaccessible fortresses. Soon the majority gave up fighting a useless war and decided to surrender. Forty-nine days after Pompey appeared in the eastern sea, Cilicia was subdued and the war was over. Nearly 400 ships and barques, including 90 special transport ships, were taken by Pompey or handed over to him; in all, more than a thousand pirate sails were destroyed, and the pirates' rich arsenals and buccaneers' docks were set on fire. More than 10,000 pirates were taken prisoner, and more than 20,000 fell alive into the hands of the victors.

In the spring of 688, Pompey went to Galatia to take command of the troops of Lucullus and to enter with them the territory of Pontus, where the legions of Cilicia had to follow him. At Danala, a village of the Trocmeri, the two generals met, but the reconciliation that had been hoped for on both sides failed to materialise.

As far as the season would allow, the troops crossed the borders of Pontus. There they found King Mithridates with 30,000 infantry and 3,000 cavalry. When the Roman general realised that Mithridates did not want to fight a decisive battle within his own territory, but to draw the enemy behind him into the unexplored regions of the East, he decided not to take part. The two armies were

close together. The Roman army arrived during the midday rest, unnoticed by the enemy, surrounded them and captured a remote hill overlooking a narrow pass through which the enemy was to pass, at the place where Nikopolis was later built. Suddenly, in the silence of the night, the fearsome battle cries of the legions were heard on all sides, and artillery began to rain down on the hordes under attack, where soldiers, baggage, wagons, horses and camels were piled up in a jumble, so that in this tightly packed mass, all the soldiers were unable to escape.
the blows landed. What didn't fall to the iron, in this appalling confusion, was crushed under the horses' feet or under the wheels. This was the last battle that the old king fought against the Romans. With his remaining troops, he hastened to join his ally, the great king of Armenia.

Even this hope was vain. During the battle we have just described between Mithridates and Pompey, the king of the Parthians, yielding to the advice of the Romans and above all to that of the fugitive princes, had fallen with his army on the kingdom of Tigranus, and had forced him to take refuge in inaccessible mountains. Tigran, however, defeated the Parthian corps that had remained behind and the emigrants.
of Armenia commanded by his son, and re-established his domination throughout his empire. It is understandable that in such circumstances the king was reluctant to renew the struggle with the victorious Roman armies and to sacrifice himself to Mithridates. From that moment on, Mithridates saw his kingdom in the hands of the enemy, his allies ready to hand him over; it was no longer possible to continue the war. He therefore headed north.

Pompey halted the pursuit, but instead of returning to the territory watered by the Euphrates, he headed south towards the Arax region, to finish off Tigran.

The great king was determined to buy peace at any price. Following barbarian fashion, he threw himself at the proconsul's feet and, as a sign of complete submission, placed his diadem and tiara in his hands. Pompey, delighted by this easy triumph, raised up the humiliated king of kings, gave him back the insignia of his dignity and dictated peace. In addition to a payment of 33,500,000 gold francs and a gift to the soldiers, each of whom was to receive 50 denarii (52.50 gold francs), the king renounced all his conquests. In a single campaign, Pompey had wiped out the two powerful kings of the East, the kings of Pontus and Armenia.

However, the brave populations of the central and eastern Caucasus were displeased to see the Westerners camped on their territory. Terrified by the news that the Roman general wanted to cross the mountains the following spring and pursue the king of Pontus beyond the Caucasus, the Albani threw themselves on the Roman army divided into three large corps under Quintus Metellus Celer, Lucius Flaccus and Pompey himself. But Celer, who received the main blow, held his own, and Pompey, after getting rid of the troops sent against him, drove back the Barbarians, who had been beaten on all sides, as far as the Kur. The

Albani, the Iberians and all the populations settled on the Caucasus and below accepted Rome's domination for the time being. Mithridates tried once again to deal with the Romans. He asked for his patrimonial kingdom and declared himself ready to recognise Roman hegemony and become a tributary prince. But Pompey refused to give the prince a situation in which he could resume his old game, and asked him to submit in person.

Since he had to die, Mithridates wanted to die at least as he had lived, and ordered all his harem to take poison: his wives, concubines and daughters, including the young fiancée of the king of Egypt and Cyprus, had to suffer death before the cup of poison reached him, and as the poison did not work quickly enough, he had a Celtic soldier, Betuitus, finish him off. Thus died Mithridates Eupator in 691 (63), at the age of sixty-eight, after reigning for sixty-seven years. Whatever one thinks of Mithridates' obstinacy, he was an important historical figure in every sense of the word. He had been the outpost of the reaction of the East against the West, and thus began the struggle of the East against the West, and victors and vanquished alike understood that his death was not the end but the beginning of this struggle.

Thus the edifice of the Roman State of Asia was completed, with its tributary kings and vassals, its priests, its princes and the circle of its wholly or half-free cities, which made it resemble the Holy Germanic Empire. Pompey allowed himself to be complimented and complimented himself in such a way as to give the impression that he was a great man.
had a weaker head than it did. His inscriptions mentioned 12 million subjugated souls and 1,538 cities or fortresses taken by storm. Quantity seemed to compensate for quality, and the circle of his triumphs extended from Palus Meotides to the Caspian Sea, and from the latter to the Red Sea. Democratic servility was not content with the triumph which, on 28 and 29 September 693 (61), the forty-sixth anniversary of Pompey's birth, swept through the streets of Rome, enhanced, not to mention a host of special features, by the royal insignia of Mithridates and the children of the three most powerful kings of Europe.
Asia, Mithridates, Tigranes and Phraates, it granted its general, who had defeated twenty-two kings, royal honours and allowed him to wear the golden crown and the insignia of magistracy for the rest of his life. The coins minted in his honour show the globe between the triple laurel of the three parts of the world, and, above it, the crown bestowed by the citizens on the triumphor of Africa, Spain and Asia. Rome's financial benefits were incalculable: the new taxes that all these princes, lords and cities had to pay to Rome, with the exception of a few cities that were freed from them, increased the State's revenues by more than half. Pompey's reorganisation of Roman Asia must, in the midst of many unavoidable errors, be considered intelligent and worthy of admiration: however difficult the circumstances of their lives, the much-tried Asians must have considered it a blessing to be able to enjoy, both internally and externally, a peace so long desired and so dearly purchased.

The conquest of Cyprus was decided in 696 (58) by the people, that is to say by the leaders of the democracy. Marcus Cato, entrusted by his opponents with the execution of this measure, arrived on the island without an army, but he did not need one. The king took poison; the inhabitants complied without resistance with their inevitable fate and were placed under the orders of the governor of Cilicia.

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PARTY STRUGGLE DURING THE ABSENCE OF POMPÉE

Since the general chosen by the democracy held the sword in his hand, his party, or what was called as such, was dominant in the capital. The consulate, although it had been possible to remove almost
The aristocracy understood this, without wanting to admit it, and considered itself lost. The aristocracy understood this without wanting to admit it to itself and considered itself lost. Above all, work was done to complete the democratic restoration and to put forward the main ideas of the time of the Gracchi, adapting them to the times. The election of priests by the comices, as established by Cnæus Domitius and abolished by Sylla, was re-established by order of the tribune of the people.

The triumphal statues that Marius had erected on the Capitol and that Sylla had toppled reappeared one morning, unexpectedly, in their former place, in all the splendour of gold and marble; the invalids of the Cimbres and African wars, with tears in their eyes, ran to see the cherished image of their general, and the Senate did not dare, in front of the enthusiastic masses, to remove the trophies that a skilful hand had re-established in spite of the laws.

In the struggle against the aristocracy, the democrats had remained victorious, but it was still necessary to get rid of the conqueror of the East and the king of the seas: how much longer he would remain in power, when he intended to regard the war as over, only he could say; for, like everything else, the moment of his return to Italy was in his hands. The parties in Rome waited and rested. The nobles viewed the return of the dreaded general with relative indifference; they had nothing to lose and everything to gain by the rupture between Pompey and democracy,
rupture which seemed imminent to them. On the contrary, the democrats, tormented by a painful expectation, sought, during the respite left to them by Pompey's absence, to establish a counter-mine against
the threatening explosion. In this they met with Crassus, whose only remaining means of opposing a necessary and hated rival was to link himself more closely than before with democracy. While the democrats publicly designated the absent general as the head and pride of their party, and

The attempts of the democrats to evade the threatening military dictatorship have historically been of far greater importance than the noisy agitation against the nobility, which served most of the time only as a mask. The intention of the democrats was, following the example of Marius and Cinna, to seize the reins of the State, and to entrust to one of their leaders either the conquest of Egypt, the government of Spain or a similar magistracy, ordinary or extraordinary, in order to find in him and in his army a counterweight against Pompey and his army. For this they needed a revolution, which appeared ostensibly directed against the government, but which in fact was to reach Pompey as the designated monarch, and to effect this revolution the conspiracy was permanently in Rome until Pompey's return in 688-92 (66-62). Wherever a band is formed, it soon finds a leader; there was no shortage of men who proposed themselves in this capacity. The former praetor Lucius Catilina and the quaestor Cnæus Pison stood out among their companions, not only because they were the only ones who had the courage to join them.
only by their birth and their high rank, but they had burnt their ships and imposed themselves on their associates by their audacity as well as their talents. Catilina was one of the boldest of the bold. His deportations belong to an indictment and not to history, but his exterior, his pale face, his frightened air, his sometimes indolent, sometimes hurried gait, betrayed the less than respectable annals of his past. He possessed to a high degree the qualities that should be sought in the leader of such gangs: the ability to enjoy and endure everything, courage, military talent, knowledge of men, the energy of crime, and that appalling pedagogy of vice, which leads the weak to fault and from fault to crime.

Catilina, Pison and their ilk resolutely went along with all the plans that included proscriptions and exemption from debts. It is understandable that an insurrection which had on its flag the promise of the abolition of debts should, at such a time, see many recruits drawn from the ranks of dissolute youth.

The party rallied all its forces for the electoral struggle. Crassus and Caesar pooled their own or borrowed money and their alliances to secure the consulship for Catilina and Antony. The nobility cast their votes for a candidate they did not like, but who was at least beyond reproach: Marcus Cicero, who was notorious for being a political weasel. He had enough alliances in the capital and the provinces to stand a chance against the democratic candidate, and as the nobility, albeit reluctantly, and the Pompeians voted for him, he was elected with a large majority. Antonius, whose family was better known than that of his rival, received slightly more votes. This circumstance ruined Catilina's election and saved Rome from a second Cinna. Cicero broke the link which bound him to the conspiracy, before they had both taken office, by renouncing the consular provinces which had fallen to him by lot, and by leaving the productive government of Macedonia to his debt-ridden colleague. Thus the essential preliminaries of the conspiracy were foiled.

Pompey's return and the likely catastrophe were approaching every day.

Catilina resolved to put a decisive spin on things and put an end to them once and for all. He wanted to begin preparations for civil war. Fæsula (Fiesole), a very strong town in Etruria, was designated as the headquarters of the uprising. The plan of the insurgents was, at the time of the consular elections of 692 (62) in which Catilina was standing, to assassinate the consul who would be supervising them, as well as those who would succeed him, and to ensure Catilina's election at all costs, to bring armed troops at a given moment from Fiesula and other rallying points against the capital and to break the resistance with them.

Cicero had built up a bodyguard of young men chosen mainly from the merchant class, and it was these men too who, on 28 October, the day on which the Senate had adjourned the elections, filled the Champ de Mars and dominated it. The conspirators were unable either to massacre the consul who was conducting the elections or to decide the elections in their favour.

Meanwhile, the civil war had begun. On 27 October, Caius Manlius had planted the Roman eagle near Fesula, and the army of the insurrection was to assemble there (it came from the soldiers of Marius and the Cimberian war), and the brigands called from the mountains as well as the people were to also joined in. However, this outcry failed again. This was fortunate for the government. For although civil war had long been openly announced, its own indecision and the worm-eaten machinery of government had not allowed it to make any military preparations. The reserves were finally called in, and in all parts of Italy senior officers were sent to crush each insurrection in its own district. Catilina, for all his audacity, judged it prudent to set his departure for a few days. But before that, at his express suggestion, it was decided, at a final meeting of the conspirators, which took place on the night of 6 to 7 November, to kill the consul Cicero, who was above all at the head of the counter-mine, before the departure of the
In order to prevent any betrayal, they were instructed to carry out this act immediately. Early in the morning of 7 November, the chosen murderers knocked on the consul's door, but they found the sentries doubled and withdrew: this time too the government's spies had emerged from the ranks of the conspirators. The Senate declared the two generals Catilina and Manlius and all their companions who had not laid down their arms on a specific day to be traitors to their country, and new trials were called. But at the head of the army sent against Catilina was the consul Caius Antonius, who was notoriously involved in the conspiracy, and whose character left it to chance whether he led his troops against Catilina or to join him. The insurrection in the capital was by no means abandoned by the conspirators, for the plan had been drawn up again by Catilina before his departure from Rome. A tribune was to give the signal, by calling an assembly of the people; the following night Céthégus was to rid them of Cicero, Gambinius and Statilius, set fire to the city and, in the end, to the city itself.

twelve places in the city, and the junction was to be made as quickly as possible with the army of Catilina who would arrive in the meantime.

Then the counter-mine was discovered. Lentulus, with his habit of covering up his slowness and his attempts in urgent and necessary matters with long-term projects, had opened up about this plan to the deputies of a Celtic canton, the Allobroges, who were responsible for the affairs of a ruined region and themselves covered in debts; he had given them a share in the conspiracy, and at the time of their departure, he had entrusted them with messages and letters for his affianced. The deputies left Rome, but on the night of 2 to 3 November, they were stopped at the gates by Roman officials and their papers were taken from them. It was discovered that the Allobroges were serving as spies for the Roman government, and
had only taken part in the conspiracy to provide him with evidence against the leaders of the conspiracy. In the morning, orders of arrest were issued quietly against the most dangerous leaders, and they were carried out against. Lentulus, Cetegus, Gabinius and Statilius were executed, while a few others escaped arrest by fleeing. The existence of the conspiracy was obvious and legally proven, and the most important episodes had been published by Cicero in loose sheets. Anger at this lawless conspiracy was universal. The multitude of the
The capital was particularly excited by the fire plan drawn up by the conspirators.

In his anxiety, Cicero summoned the senate and left it to decide on the life or death of four people. Although all the consulars and the great majority of the senate had already
pronounced in favour of execution, the principal ones, led by Cicero, inclined to keep within constitutional limits. But Cato knew how, by involving in the plot those who were in favour of clemency, to throw a new scare into hesitant souls, and regained the support of the people when the criminals were executed.
majority of the senate. The task of carrying out this resolution fell naturally to Cicero, who had provoked. Late in the evening of 5 December, the culprits were dragged from the houses where they had been staying.
locked up and led, in the midst of a large crowd gathered in the Forum, to the prison where the condemned to death. It was a dark dungeon, twelve feet below ground, which had once served as a water reservoir. At the prison gate they were handed over to the three men in charge of the execution, and strangled with torches.

The news of the failure of this movement dismayed the insurgent army: the mass of those who were less compromised dispersed. What remained of the determined or desperate people made an attempt to cross into Gaul via the Apennine passes; but as they reached the foot of the mountain near Pistoia, they found themselves caught between two armies. In front of them was the corps of Quintus Metellus, which had arrived from Ravenna and Ariminum to occupy the northern slopes of the Apennines, and behind them the army of Antonius. Catilina, who had sent away his horse and even those of all his officers at the start of the battle, proved on that day that nature had destined him for unusual actions and that he knew how to command as a general and fight as a soldier. Petreius crushed

In the end, he and his guard captured the enemy's centre and surrounded it on both sides, and this decided the victory. The corpses of Catilina's soldiers - three thousand of them were counted - covered the ground where they had fought in exact ranks; the officers and the general, at the moment when all was lost, had thrown themselves on the enemy, and had sought and found death, at the beginning of 692 (62).

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RETURN OF THE POMPEE AND COALITION OF CONTENDERS

When Pompey, having fulfilled the mission entrusted to him, turned his eyes back to his homeland, he found the diadem at his feet for the second time. The lawless conspiracy in the capital and the civil war that followed had convinced every man concerned with material or political interests that a government without authority or military power, such as that of the Senate, was delivering up a war to the enemy.
In the East, for example, he was convinced that a change in the constitution, which would link military power more closely to the government, was an inevitable necessity if solid public order was to be achieved. Thus, in the East
had raised up a master for himself, and in Italy he had prepared a throne for himself; to all appearances, the year 692 (62)
was to be the last of the Republic and the first of the monarchy.

In the autumn of 692 (62) Pompey set sail for Italy. While everything in Rome was being prepared to receive the new monarch, it was announced that Pompey, having just arrived at Brindisium, had disbanded his legions and set off for the capital with a weak escort.

The parties breathed a sigh of relief. Pompey had abdicated for the second time: the defeated competitors could
The most extraordinary thing was that Pompey again took part in the campaign. In January 693 (61) he arrived in Rome. His situation was indecisive and so fluid among the parties that he was given the nickname of Cnæus Cicero. He had lost with everyone. The anarchists still saw him as an adversary, the democrats as an inconvenient friend, Marcus Crassus as a rival, the wealthy classes as an insecure protector, the aristocracy as a declared enemy. Instead of the enthusiastic welcome
on which he was counting, the reception he received was more than cold, and his proposals were received with even more coldness. He wanted for himself, as he had had Nepos announce, the second consulship, and moreover, naturally, the confirmation of the decrees which he had enacted in the East and in the South.
the fulfilment of the promise he had made to his soldiers to distribute land to them. But the
senate systematically opposed him. The second consulate was refused.

Then a new combination appeared. The leader of the Democratic Party had used his interest in the political lull that had followed the return of the erstwhile ruler. When Pompey returned of Asia, Caesar was little more than a sort of Catilina, the leader of a political party which had become a leader of conspirators and a bank robber. His old friend and ally Crassus, in the hope of finding in Caesar the point of support against Pompey that he had lost in Pison, had decided before his departure for the provinces to pay part of his debts. It had become clear in the end, to the clever of all colours, that the battle of the parties would be decided, not by civil war, but by military power.
They foresaw the means of securing the consulship and the consular province for the most important of the democrat leaders, in the most constitutional manner, and of making themselves independent of Pompey's dangerous alliance by creating a democratic guard.

The second coalition was therefore formed in the summer of 694 (61). Caesar was assured the consulship for the following year, and then the government of the province; Pompey was promised the ratification of his allies in the East and the assignment of lands to his soldiers; the knights received from Caesar the promise to have the people give them what the senate had refused them. Finally Crassus, the inevitable, joined the coalition, without asking for any specific salary for his contribution. These were the same elements and the same people who had joined forces in the autumn of 689 and in the summer of 694.

The election of Caesar to the consulship for the year 695 (59) was assured without difficulty by the union of the parties.

As consul, Caesar fulfilled the wishes of his allies, especially the wish to assign land to veterans of the Asiatic army. The agrarian law proposed for this purpose by Caesar was based on the following principles The bases were similar to those of the bill that Pompey had presented the previous year and which had been rejected. Caesar submitted the bill, Pompey's actions in the East, and the petition from the farmers of the revenue asking for a third of their rent to be returned to them, all to the Senate for ratification, and declared himself ready to accept counter-proposals and to discuss them. The agrarian law was purely and simply rejected by them without discussion. The decree on the acts carried out by Pompey in Asia did not find favour in their eyes either. As for the proposal relating to the farmers of the revenue, it was also rejected. Naturally, all the proposals were submitted to the citizens together. Caesar added that the aristocrats had hatched a plot to have the project rejected, and that he begged the citizens and especially Pompey and his old soldiers to support him against cunning and force. Pompey's old soldiers had to be in costume and in arms at the place where the election was to take place shortly.

Despite all the chicanery and trickery of the nobility, the agrarian law, the ratification of the decrees and the abandonment of a third of the income to the farmers, were accepted by the people. The aristocracy
had only succeeded in strengthening the bond of the coalition through its blind and hateful opposition, and its energy, which it was going to need for more important things, had been spent in these circumstances.

In anticipation of Caesar's election, the senate had, in 696 (58), allocated him two provinces where he was to find nothing to do but repair roads. It was decided between the coalition forces that Caesar would be given a specific extraordinary command by decree of the people. The tribune of the people, Publius Vatinius, took it upon himself to present the proposal to the people, who naturally obeyed without hesitation. Caesar was thus given the government of Cisalpine Gaul and the command of three battle-hardened legions. This
His command was assured for five years, in other words, for a longer period than any general had yet obtained. Caesar's consulship had achieved its goal.

Pompey had Italy to look after, and as head of the Commission of Twenty, he saw to the execution of the agrarian law, and gave land to around 20,000 citizens, most of them soldiers in his army, in the territory of Capua. Caesar's legions in northern Italy served as his rearguard against the opposition. Daily and intimate contact with a man as irresistibly seductive as Caesar completed the transformation of the alliance of interests into a bond of friendship. The pledge and basis of this friendship, and at the same time the public and irrefutable testimony of this common power, was Pompey's marriage to Caesar's only daughter, aged twenty-three. Finally, having obtained the removal of Cato and the exile of Cicero, Caesar was able to leave Italy to devote himself to a more serious matter.

THE SUBMISSION OF THE WEST

Italian territory still had to be separated to the north and west and a new, virgin land had to be won for Hellenic civilisation and the still full power of the Italic race. This was the work to which Caesar devoted himself. It is more than an error, it is a crime against the holy spirit of history to consider Gaul as a mere field of manoeuvres where Caesar trained his legions for the civil war that was brewing. Although the subjugation of the West was for Caesar a means in
In the sense that he had based all his hopes for the future on the Transalpine War, it was nevertheless the It is the privilege of a statesman of genius that his very means produce great results. It is true that Caesar needed military power for his purposes, but he did not conquer Gaul as a partisan. It was a political necessity for Rome to seek out invaders.
on the other side of the Alps, and to build a dam there that would give security to the Roman world. But this important goal was neither the highest nor the main one for which Caesar conquered Gaul.

When the homeland had become too narrow for Roman citizens and was in danger, the senate's policy of conquest had saved it. Now the Italic homeland had again become too narrow; the State sought to apply the same remedy to a social crisis, but in even more important circumstances. It was a thought of genius, a magnanimous hope, that led Caesar to the other side of the Alps, the thought and foresight of opening up a new homeland for his fellow citizens there.
and to regenerate the State a second time, by broadening its base.

Caesar's campaign in 693 (61) in eastern Spain must to some extent be linked with attempts to subjugate the West. Although Spain had obeyed
the Romans, the western shore, even after the expedition of Decimus Brutus against the
Gallicia, was in fact independent of the Romans, and the northern coast was not defended by them. Caesar therefore directed his expedition towards the west coast. He crossed the mountain range north of the Tagus (Sierra de Estrella) and, after defeating its inhabitants and settling some of them on the plain, he subdued the region on both banks of the Ducro and reached the north-western tip of the peninsula, where he captured Brigantium (A Coruña) with the help of a flotilla brought to him from Gabès. As a result, the inhabitants of the Atlantic Ocean, Lusitanians and Gallic tribes, were forced to recognise Roman supremacy, while the victor, by abolishing the tribute paid to Rome and regulating the economic situation of the cities, was seen to have made the position of his subjects more bearable.

An important role in the development of Roman civilisation in the West was destined to the
a region stretching between the Pyrenees and the Rhine, the Mediterranean and the Ocean, which since the time of Augustus has been known as the land of the Celts and more commonly as Gaul.

The Mediterranean region, which stretched from Languedoc to the Rhône in the west and from Dauphiné to the east
Provence, had been a Roman province for sixty years.

The beauty of the climate, similar to that of Italy, the favourable conditions of the soil, which offered trade great and useful outlets with its trade routes reaching as far as Brittany, and continental and maritime traffic with its metropolis, gave southern Celtic great economic importance. The province of Gaul," says a description dating from ten years before Caesar's campaign, "is full of merchants and overflowing with Roman citizens. No Gaul did business without the intermediary of a Roman. The denarius that passed from one hand to the other in Gaul appeared in the Roman citizen's account book. It is likely that, in such circumstances, the civilisation or Romanisation of the natives advanced rapidly. So if the Celtic and Ligurian population of these regions were in the process of losing their nationality and groaning under oppression
political and economic, as evidenced by the desperate uprisings it has staged.

However, the subjugation of the population went hand in hand with the introduction of the more developed civilisation that prevailed in Italy. The situation was different when the Roman frontier was crossed. The great Celtic nation, which in the southern regions was beginning to be subjected to Italian immigration, was still living in its ancient freedom. Despite the many differences in language and customs in such a vast territory, trade was reciprocal and a sense of national community reigned from the Rhône and the Garonne to the Rhine and the Thames.
Agriculture was practised in Gaul, but among the Celts, the breeding of livestock was much more highly regarded.
cattle.

There was no shortage of walled cities, whose framework walls astonished the Romans as much for their skilful layout as for the obvious alternative of stones and beams. The significant development of urban life is directly linked to the activity of trade on land and sea. But the Celts were even more remarkable for their maritime navigation. The warships of the Phoenicians, Greeks and Romans had always been rowing galleys. But on the west coast of Gaul, the Santons, Pictons and especially the Venetians used large, crudely-built ships that were not rowed but sailed with leather sails and iron capstans, not only for trade but also for war. The art of extracting metals had to go hand in hand with the skill of working them, and in the iron mines of the Loire this art had developed to such an extent that the miners played an important role in the sieges.

The constitution of the Celtic nation is based on the clan, with the prince, the council of elders and the community of warriors, but what's special about it is that it never goes beyond this point.
cantonal organisation. As in the East, the town had only mercantile and strategic importance, not political. The great families held all economic power in their hands,
military and political. They monopolised the leasing of the State's major revenues. They forced
free men, crushed by taxation, to take refuge with them, and to give up their freedoms naturally at first as debtors, and soon by right as vassals.

Royalty, which should have put an end to the encroachments of the nobility, perished among the Celts as it did in Latium. In place of the king came the "defender of the law" or Vergobretus, who was appointed like the Roman consul for one year.

In the midst of the clan rivalries and all the feudal disorder, we could hear the voices of those who said they were ready to buy the independence of the nation, at the cost of the clans and even of the people. the aristocracy.

The unity and power of the Celtic nationality would be inexplicable if the political division of the nation had not long been accompanied by religious and even theological centralisation.

The guild of Druids certainly embraced the British Isles and the whole of Gaul, and perhaps other Celtic regions, in a vast religious and national union. It was governed by a leader chosen by the priests themselves. It is probable that such a priestly corporation sought to attract temporal government to itself, and partly succeeded. It was able to take control of the most important civil matters, including boundary and inheritance disputes, and claimed the right to decide matters of peace and war.

Cavalry was the dominant weapon, and among the Belgians and especially in the British Isles, national war chariots were used on a vast scale. The great shield was still the main defence; among weapons, the great spear still played the leading role. Instead of the fortified camp that the Romans set up every evening, the Celts needed a citadel of chariots. In general, the Celtic infantry of this period seems to have been a militia unsuited to warfare and unwieldy, whose bravery was rendered useless by their lack of skill. It would seem that when Caesar defeated the Celtic nation, it had already reached the height of its individual civilisation and was already in decline, and we must remember here that it was not only the superiority of Roman arms that triumphed over the Celts, but above all the superiority of Roman civilisation, which fertilised the first elements of Greek civilisation in the lands of the Celts. But it was trade and commerce as much as conquest that
paved the way. Soon the wine trade with the Celts became a goldmine for Italian merchants: it was not uncommon for a jug of wine to be exchanged for a slave. Just as American merchants used brandy to conquer America, Roman wine merchants and landlords paved the way for the future conquerors of Gaul.

The year before Caesar entered Gaul, the territory of the eastern clan of the Celts, that of the valiant and numerous Helvetii, was under threat from the Germans. It was in these circumstances that the new governor Caius Caesar entered Gaul in the spring of 696 (58). The army he received in the two provinces consisted of four line troops, the seventh, eighth, ninth and tenth legions, all trained and accustomed to combat, totalling 24,000 men. The Helvetii who had invaded Gaul tried at several points to reach the other bank of the Rhône in boats or rafts; but the Romans, entrenched in their lines, prevented them from doing so, and the Helvetii were obliged to give up crossing the river.

For a fortnight, the Roman army marched at a distance of one and a half leagues from the enemy.
back, waiting for a favourable moment to attack it under conditions that would allow it to

and annihilate him. But that moment did not come. The armies had reached the capital of the Aedui, Bibracte (Autun), a reasonable distance away: Caesar resolved to take this important town by force before continuing his pursuit of the Helvetii, but the Helvetii thought the Romans were moving backwards and attacked from their side. The main body of the Helvetian army was forced to abandon the southern route and take the northern one. The Romans had won. The Helvetii had to submit to Caesar.

On the Central Rhine, which the Romans had crossed many years before and where they were becoming more numerous by the day, the Romans had sufficient reason to want to crush the power of the Roman Empire.
of Arioviste, which rivalled theirs in Gaul, and a pretext was easily found.

Panic-stricken terror gripped Ariovistus' troops, especially his officers, when they had to measure themselves against the elite of these Germans who had not rested under a roof for fourteen years. But Caesar marched on and fortunately beat Ariovistus to capture the capital of the Sequanese. The two armies remained at a short distance from each other in the Lower Caucasus.
Alsace, in the vicinity of Belfort, until Ariovistus tried, by a flanking march, to fall, with his superior forces, on the rear of the Roman camp, and to cut off the Romans from their base of operations and their supplies. The Roman right wing, led by Caesar himself, threw itself violently at the enemy and drove him before it: the German right wing did the same on its side. The balance was even; but the tactics of the reserve decided the fate of the day in favour of the Romans, as it had done so many times against the Barbarians: the third line that Crassus brought forward in good time re-established the fight on the left wing and decided the victory. The pursuit was extended as far as the Rhine: few men, including the king, managed to reach the other bank, 696 (58).

The consequences of this single campaign were incalculable. Recent events had decided that Gaul would come under Roman rule not in part, but in its entirety, and that the northern frontier marked by the mighty river was destined to be the political frontier.

The foundations of the future edifice had been laid, but there was still much to be done to continue it and ensure that the Gauls recognised Roman domination and the Germans the Rhine frontier. The northern regions, as well as the Armorican districts of Brittany and Normandy and the powerful confederation of the Belgians, had been completely unaffected by the defeats suffered by those in the centre, and were not prepared to submit to Ariovist's conqueror. As a result of these
In the spring of 697, Caesar set off with his army, which had grown to eight legions, to attack the Belgian districts, which sent their first force of 300,000 armed men to the southern border,

under the leadership of Galba, King of the Suessions. Caesar did not attempt to fight an enemy six times his strength; north of the Aisne, not far from Pont-à-Vère, between Reims and Laon, he camped on a plateau made almost unassailable, both by the river and the marshes and by the bridges and redoubts that defended it, and contented himself with taking defensive measures to prevent the Belgians from crossing the Aisne and thereby cutting off his communications. King Galba was a universally respected man, but he
was not strong enough to lead an army of 300,000 men into enemy territory. Insubordination
and discord began to spread in the Confederate camp. The leaders of the levy had to
give in and allow men who would have returned to their country of their own accord to do so. The defeat was all the more overwhelming because it happened without a battle.

But in the eastern cantons, Caesar was met with energetic national feeling. The legions were surprised by the coalition army and driven back to the Sambre. Instead of a battle, there was a hand-to-hand struggle. Labienus, with the left wing, pushed the Atrebates back and pursued them to the other side of the river. The
The Viromanduans were also repulsed by the Roman centre. But on the left wing, the Romans were literally surrounded by the much more numerous Nervians, who seized the hills and the unfinished Roman camp. Everything was in doubt. The Roman general took up a sword and shield and fought in the front ranks: his example and his even warmer appeals kept the shaken ranks together. A little daylight had already been gained, and communication had at least been re-established.
between two legions of this wing, when they were finally rescued. The Nervians, separated from their and attacked from all sides at once, showed as much heroism as if they had been
had thought themselves victorious and fought behind heaps of corpses to the last man.

After this crushing defeat, the Nervians, Atrebates and Viromanduans recognised Roman supremacy.

It was the turn of the Armorican cantons. The entire coast from the mouth of the Loire to the Rhine rose up against Rome. The Celts, convinced of their superiority at sea, sent their fleet to meet the fleet commanded by Brutus. Neither the projectiles nor the harpoons of the Romans could reach the tops of the enemy barques, and iron spurs were no match for the oak planks of these ships. But the Roman sailors cut the cables that attached the yards to the masts, using scythes attached to long poles: the sails and yards fell to the deck and, as the damage could not be repaired quickly, the ships were left helpless, as they are today when the mast falls; it was then easy for the Roman longboats to seize the enemy ships that had been disabled by a simultaneous attack.

The triumph won by Brutus resulted in the submission of the Venetes and the whole of Brittany. Sabinus used the same tactics with which Caesar had triumphed over the Belgian reserve on the Aisne to raise the maritime states gathered on the English Channel, which led to the dismissal of the militias and the submission of the region as far as the Seine. The following year, Publius Crassus was sent to Aquitaine and the populations from the Garonne to the Pyrenees recognised Roman supremacy.

There were still the Celts of the Islands. Caesar had a transport fleet of 800 sails fitted out immediately (winter of 699-700) (55-54), and in the spring of 700 (54) with five legions and 2,000 cavalry, he set sail for the coast of England.

The Thames was crossed by the Romans, it seems, between Kingston and Brentford; they advanced, but in reality they gained little ground; the general won no victories, the soldier made no booty. The capture of a large Breton camp, in which the Romans found a lot of livestock, provided a reasonable conclusion to a futile undertaking and a plausible pretext for turning back.
After receiving the hostages, Caesar went to his camp of ships, and from there back to Gaul. If, as it seems, he had aspired to conquer Brittany, this plan had been completely thwarted, both by Cassivellaunus' skilful defence system and by the inadequacy of the Roman rowing fleet in the waters of the North Sea.

The work of repressing the Germanic invasions and subjugating the continent had been accomplished. But it is often easier to subjugate a nation than to keep it subjugated. Everything that had been tried, failed and achieved, encouraged the patriots to renew their attempt at deliverance with greater unity and success.

An initial insurrection failed, but nothing exalted the nation more than the outcry of the Arvernes. The leader of the Arverne patriots, Vercingetorix, one of those nobles we find among the Celts, had an almost royal status in his canton and abroad, and what's more, he was a cautious, brave and skilful man. He abandoned the capital and called on the people of the countryside, who were as hostile to the oligarchy as they were to the Romans, to re-establish the Arverne kingship and declare war on the Romans.
Rome. The multitude listened quickly; the restoration of the kingship of Lucterius and Betuitus was at the same time a declaration of war against Rome. The unity that had hitherto been lacking in all attempts to throw off the yoke of foreign domination was at last to be found in the new king of the Arverni, who took power in his own right. Vercingetorix was for the Celts of the continent what Cassivellaunus had been for the island Celts: the masses were imbued with the feeling that if ever a man could raise the nation, it was he. The insurrection had spread rapidly from the west to the mouths of the Garonne and the Seine, and Vercingetorix had been recognised as a general by all the cantons.

While the insurgents were working to decide the accession of the still hesitant cantons, and in particular that of the Aedui, and to take Narbo, the Roman general appeared in the southern province. Not only did he quickly make the necessary preparations to cover it, but he also sent an army corps into the territory of the Arvernes, taking it across the snow-covered Cévennes. He marched silently to Vienne and from there, accompanied only by a few horsemen, through the territory of the Aedui to his troops.

Vercingetorix therefore gave up attacking the Romans. He adopted a system of warfare similar to that by which Cassivellaunus had saved the island Celts. The Roman infantry could not be defeated, but Caesar's cavalry was made up almost exclusively of the contingents of the Celtic nobility, and was in fact dissolved by universal defection. Vercingetorix therefore directed all his efforts towards increasing his cavalry and the army corps that operated with it according to the military system of the time. Vercingetorix understood that it was not necessary, as had been done until then, to try to defend all the towns, which meant that none of them could be kept; it was necessary to agree to annihilate them, before they were attacked, the towns that could not be defended and to gather his forces for the defence of the fortified towns. On Vercingetorix's orders, more than twenty towns in the Bituriges were given over to the flames: the same fate was reserved by the general for the neighbouring cantons, as far as the Roman detachments could reach. The war was concentrated around Avaricum (Bourges). Vercingetorix established his infantry near the marshes around the town, in such an unassailable position that he could defend it against the Roman legions without being covered by cavalry. Avaricum held out for a long time but, one fine day, the Romans attacked and, irritated by this obstinate resistance, they
gender and age.

Labienus descended from Agedincum along the left bank of the Seine, in order to capture the town of Parisiensis Lutetia (Paris) situated on an island in the Seine, and from this secure position in the middle of the insurgent region, work to subdue it. But he found the road blocked in front of Melodunum (Melun) by the entire army of insurgents who, under the command of the old Camulogenes, had moved into inaccessible marshes. Labienus retreated a little further, crossed the Seine at Melun, and arrived unhindered at Lutetia. Camulogenes then had the town burnt down and the bridges leading to the left bank broken, and Labienus took up a position opposite Camulogenes that put him in no position to draw him into battle and cross the river in full view of the enemy army.

The main Roman army reached the Allier and the Arverne cantons. Vercingetorix tried to block the passage of the river on the left bank, but Caesar foiled his stratagem and camped a few days later in front of the capital of the Arvernes, Gergovia. However, Vercingetorix, while searching for Caesar on the Allier, had had Gergovia supplied and had set up an entrenched camp with a stone rampart on the top of a hill overlooking the town; and as he had a head start on Caesar, he waited for him in front of Gergovia, in the fortified camp and under its

walls. Caesar, with a relatively small army, was unable to lay regular siege to the town or to effectively; he camped behind the height occupied by Vercingetorix, and imitated his opponent's inactivity.

While the mass of the Gergovia garrison was busy entrenching this side, towards which the next assault was expected, the Roman general tried to rush into a less well guarded area. In fact, the assaulting columns broke through the wall and occupied the nearest parts of the camp, but the entire garrison had already received the alarm and Caesar did not consider it prudent to renew the assault. He gave the signal to retreat, but the most advanced legions, carried away by their success, did not hear or did not want to hear, and rushed over the walls, some soldiers even into the town. But thicker masses threw themselves in front of them; the first fell, the columns stopped: in addition, the centurions and legionaries fought with incredible heroism.
Caesar's troops massed on the plain received them and prevented a greater disaster. The expected capture of Gergovia had turned into a defeat and a considerable loss of dead and wounded. It was estimated that 700 soldiers had perished, plus 43 centurions: still, this was the least important part of the disaster. Caesar's predominant position in Gaul was due above all to his prestige.
victorious, and his prestige began to fade. This defeat, the first that Caesar had suffered at the hands of the Celts, crowned his success and gave the signal for a second resumption of the insurrection. The Aedui openly broke with Caesar and allied themselves with Vercingetorix.

But the most serious consequence of this news was that the Belgians, who had remained aloof from the movement until then, began to stir. The powerful canton of Bellovaques prepared to attack Labienus' corps from the rear at the very moment when it encountered the rising of the cantons of central Gaul at Lutetia. Caesar, for his part, moved in the opposite direction and arrived at Agedincum by forced march, ordering Labienus to withdraw as far back as possible. The deputies confirmed Vercingetorix in his command and adopted his war plan unchanged. In short, it was the same as the one he had implemented at Avaricum and Gergovia. The cornerstone of the new position was the fortress of the Mandubians, Alésia (Alise Sainte-Reine) near Semur, Côte- d'Or, and an entrenched camp was to be set up there. Immense supplies had been piled up there and Gergovia's troops had been ordered to move in. Not far from Alesia, Caesar encountered the insurgent army commanded by Vercingetorix and in a battle, which Caesar's Germanic squadrons, supported by Roman infantry on their rear, engaged in with the much more numerous Celtic cavalry, the latter got the better of them to everyone's astonishment. Vercingetorix hastened all the more to retreat into Alesia, where Caesar followed at his heels. The besiegers' surrounding lines were more than four leagues long and surrounded the town and the entrenched camp. Vercingetorix was determined to fight a battle under the walls, but not to be besieged in Alesia. When the Roman lines were completed, the town still had a month and a few days' worth of supplies; at the last moment, when the way was still clear for the cavalry, Vercingetorix sent his men back into the camp.

and at the same time transmitted to the chiefs of the nation the advice to call all the population to arms, and to lead them to the deliverance of Alesia. It was then that, at the last hour, the countless troops of the Celto-Belgian army, 250,000 infantrymen and 8,000 cavalrymen, appeared behind Caesar's lines. From the Canal to the Cévennes, the insurgent cantons had made supreme efforts to save the flower of the patriots and the general of their choice.

The first assault that the besieged of Alesia and the army of deliverance made on the double lines of the Romans was repulsed; but when, after a day's respite, it was renewed, they arrived at a place where the entrenchment passed over the buttress of a mountain and could be attacked from the height; they succeeded in filling in the ditches and pushing the besieged back from the wall. Labienus, sent there by Caesar, took the nearest cohorts and threw himself on the enemy, under the eyes of the general, who himself intervened at the most critical moment; the attackers were driven back in a desperate struggle, and the cavalry, falling on another side and catching them at their heels, completed the defeat. It was more than a great victory: it was the end of Alesia, and even of the Celtic nation. The Celtic army, completely discouraged, left the battlefield to return to their homes. Vercingetorix could perhaps have fled, or had recourse to the last resource of a free man: he did not do so, but declared in the council of war that since he had not succeeded in breaking the foreign domination, he was ready to sacrifice himself and to deflect on his head, as far as possible, the ruin of the Celtic nation. And so he did. The Celtic officers handed over the elected leader of the entire nation to the enemy of the fatherland who was to punish him.
individually. On horseback and in full armour, the king of the Arverni appeared before the Roman proconsul, and walked around the court; then he handed over his arms and his horse, and bowed silently at the feet of the victor. Five years later, he was led in triumph through the streets of the capital and, having been declared a traitor to the Roman nation, was beheaded at the foot of the Capitol at the very moment when his victor
lit the sacrifice of thanksgiving on the summit. Just as on rainy days the sun
appears at the end of the day, destiny wanted to give another great honour to this nation which disappeared. Just as Hannibal appeared at the end of the history of the Phoenicians, Vercingetorix appeared at the end of the history of the Celts. Neither of them was able to deliver their homeland from the yoke of foreign domination, but at least they spared it the last evil of all, that of perishing in shame. Vercingetorix, like the Carthaginian, had had to fight not only against the enemy of his homeland, but above all against anti-national opposition and the indolence that regularly accompanies a decrepit civilisation.
to give a nation divided and given over to particularism a point of support and a centre in his person. And yet no more striking contrast can be imagined than that which exists between the stubborn citizen of Carthage, who for fifteen years pursued grand designs with indomitable energy, and the skilful prince of the Celts, whose great deeds and generous sacrifice were accomplished in the space of an incomplete summer. The whole of antiquity does not present a man more chivalrous in sentiment or in appearance. It was the knight, not the hero, who refused to flee from Alesia when the nation
was more important to him than hundreds of thousands of ordinary citizens. It was the knight and not the hero who gave himself up voluntarily, when this offer could no longer serve any purpose other than to publicly dishonour the nation which, with as much cowardice as absurdity, allowed the name of rebellion to be bestowed upon him.

against her masters the fight to the death that she waged for her freedom. How different Hannibal had been in a similar situation! It is impossible to judge the noble king of the Arvernes without deep historical and human sympathy; but everything is said about the Celtic nation when it is said that its greatest man was only a knight.

The loss of Vercingetorix was irreparable. The unity of the nation was born with him. We do not see that the insurrection made a new attempt at common defence and appointed another general-in-chief: the league of patriots fell of its own accord, and each state remained free to continue the war with the Romans on its own account or to withdraw from it. Naturally, a thirst for rest prevailed. But it was in Caesar's interest to get it over with as quickly as possible. Of the ten years of his government, seven had already passed, and the last was being contested by his political adversaries in the capital; he could now count with certainty on only two summers, and if his interests and his honour demanded that he g i v e his successor the newly-acquired, conquered and pacified regions, time was of the essence for him to achieve this. Like the Aedui and the Arverni, most of the Gallic cantons resigned themselves to their destiny and, without further opposition, endured without grumbling.
the inevitable punishment. The Romans met with stiff resistance from the Bellovacs. But after Corréus was killed in a skirmish with Roman infantrymen, the resistance was broken and the victor offered acceptable terms, which the Bellovacs and their allies accepted. The Trevirians were brought back to obedience by Labienus, and at the same time, the territory of the Eburons was once again crossed and ravaged. Thus the last resistance of the Belgian conspiracy was overcome.
was shattered. The skilful Drappes and Vercingetorix's faithful comrade-in-arms, Lucterius, gathered together the most resolute members of the dispersed army of the Loire and threw themselves and the debris into the fortified town.
of Uxellodunum (perhaps Capdenac, not far from Figeac, on the Lot), which they managed to supply after a series of hard and bitter battles. It was only when Caesar appeared in person and, on his orders, the springs that supplied the town with water were diverted by underground works that the fortress, the last stronghold of the Celtic nation, fell. In recognition of the last freedom fighters, Caesar had all the men in the garrison cut off and sent back to their homeland.

Gaul was therefore subject to the Romans from the Rhine to the Pyrenees, and after a war that had lasted only eight years. Barely a year after the complete pacification of the country, at the beginning of 705 (49), the Roman troops had to cross the Alps again as a result of the civil war which had finally broken out in Italy, and all that remained in Celtic were a few divisions of recruits.
However, the Celts did not take up arms again against foreign domination, and while they fought against Caesar in all the old provinces of the republic, the newly conquered region remained in submission to its conqueror.

Although Caesar showed the conquered nation every consideration and respected its national, political and religious institutions insofar as this respect was compatible with Roman domination, he did not in any way abandon the fundamental idea behind his conquest, the Romanisation of Gaul, but above all he wanted to carry it out in the best possible circumstances. He was not content to give free rein in the north to the order of things that had brought about the Romanisation of Gaul in the south.
But as a true statesman, he followed the natural development, and in so doing he knew how to shorten the duration of a painful transition.

It took centuries for people to realise that Alexander had not only conquered a kingdom
It took centuries to realise that Caesar had not only conquered a new province for the Romans, but had founded Roman civilisation in the West. It also took centuries for it to be understood that Caesar had not only conquered a new province for the Romans, but had founded Roman civilisation in the West. Every day," says a Roman letter of 698 (56), "letters and messengers from Gaul announce the name of some people, some canton, some unknown country. This extension of the horizon opened up by Caesar's expedition beyond the Alps was an immense historical event, comparable to the discovery of the New World by Christopher Columbus. The peoples of central and northern Europe became part of the system of states.
Mediterranean. This is Caesar's work, and if the creation of his great predecessor in the East perished in the deluge of the Middle Ages, Caesar's edifice has defied the centuries, changed religion and the State for generations of men, laid the foundations of civilisation, and remains standing for what we call eternity.

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COLLECTIVE GOVERNMENT OF CÉSAR AND POMPÉE

Pompey was undoubtedly the greatest general of his time, Caesar was a skilful leader and an outstanding orator.
talent; but until then, he was considered to have an anti-military nature and even an anti-war tendency. feminine. Pompey ruled the entire Roman Empire, Caesar only two provinces. Pompey could dispose of the soldiers and the state coffers as he wished, Caesar could dispose of specific sums of money and an army of twenty-four thousand men; Pompey could decide for himself when to retire, Caesar's command had been given to him for a long time, it is true, but nevertheless for a specific period. Caesar had been sent north to oversee the defence of the capital in Upper Italy and to ensure that Pompey could command there in peace.

The problem of governing a city comparable in many respects to nineteenth-century Paris without an armed force was incredibly difficult, but for this stiff and pompous soldier, it was impossible to solve.

After Caesar's departure, the coalition governed world affairs, but not the streets of the capital. The senate itself, which had only nominal power, let things drift in the capital.
We were living in the interregnum between past aristocratic government and future military government. It is a singular coincidence that, at the very moment when Caesar was doing a work for all eternity beyond the Alps, the most grotesque political farce that had ever appeared on the stage of history was being performed in Rome. The part of the population that still cared about freedom and order was condemned to complete passivity. On the contrary, scoundrels had never seen better days, or better theatres. If, of the two potentates, one, Pompey, had failed completely in the field of politics, the other, Pompey, had failed completely in the field of politics.
of activity open to him, Caesar, within the limits of his competence, had accomplished things that put him above all pursuit as well as all fear. He who had been reviled as an effeminate man was now the idol of the army, the triumphant hero, all his young laurels eclipsed the withered laurels of Pompey, and the Senate accorded him all the more readily the honours that a successful campaign had always deserved, as Pompey had to share them.

The change in Caesar's position with regard to Pompey was a very serious danger; just as Caesar and his allies had previously sought military support against him, so he had to seek it against Caesar, and he was obliged to set aside his proud indifference to public office, and to run for an extraordinary magistracy which would put him in a position to face the governor of the two Gauls in an equal and, if possible, superior position.

In the autumn of 697 (57), Pompey arrived in the Senate with a proposal for extraordinary functions. Pompey's plan was to have the Senate entrust him with the superintendence of wheat supplies throughout the Empire, and jointly with the complete disposal of the State's revenues, to the army and the fleet, as well as a command which would extend not only over the entire Roman empire, but before which the governors in each province would have to bow. The Senate complacently accepted him in principle, on Cicero's proposal, but Pompey obtained neither the free disposal of public revenues, nor legions and ships, nor primacy over provincial governors; they were content to vote considerable sums for the organisation of the defence of the capital. He had missed his particular goal; the proconsular title, which he was authorised to use in the provinces, was a vain name if he could not count on an army of his own.

In April 698, the consularist Cicero proposed in the Senate to put the discussion on the division of the Campanian lands on the agenda for 15 May. It was a formal declaration of war on Caesar. Obviously, the aristocracy thought the time had come to start the war not with Pompey against Caesar, but against tyranny. It was easy to see what was going to happen. Domitius made no secret of the fact that, as soon as he became consul, he would ask the citizens to recall Caesar from Gaul... Caesar acted!
The aristocracy had not seen fit to wait for him to cross the Alps before breaking away. At the beginning of April 698, Crassus left the capital to confer with his more powerful colleague on what needed to be done: he found Caesar in Ravenna. From there they both went to Lucca, where Pompey met them. In order to give a new basis to the new collective domination, Caesar had taken care to share power more equally and to establish it solidly.
The most important military governments after the two Gauls were shared between his two colleagues: Pompey had the two Spains, Crassus Syria, commands which were assured to them for five years (700-704) by decree of the people. Caesar, on the other hand, needed to extend his command, which was due to end around the year 700 (54), until the end of the year 705 (49), and he needed to increase the number of his legions to ten and have the troops he had raised on his own behalf paid into the state coffers. The main issue was thus settled.

The most decisive reason for this conciliatory attitude was the thought of war. Caesar considered
Unlike his biographers, Pompey saw the submission of Gaul not as an occasional undertaking, useful in securing him the crown, but as necessary for the security and reorganisation of the empire, in a word as the future of the fatherland. To be able to accomplish this conquest without obstacle, and to be able to take in hand the direction of events in Italy, he needed supremacy over his rival, and at the same time Pompey had to have sufficient strength to overcome the senate and its adherents.

The mere news of the Lucca conferences is enough to destroy any thought of opposition
serious, to bring back to their duty of obedience, abandoned in a day of misfortune, the mass of hesitant people, that is to say the great majority of the senate. Above all, all military and political
The internal decisions were taken without the advice of the senate, sometimes by decree of the people, sometimes at the whim of the masters. The provisions laid down at Lucca concerning the military command of Gaul were submitted directly to the people for approval by Crassus and Pompey; those concerning Spain and Syria by the people's tribune Caius Trebonius, and the most important governments were henceforth usually given by decree of the people.

The discouraged Senate had to resign itself to its situation, willy-nilly. Marcus Cicero remained the leader of the obedient majority. His talent as a lawyer made him useful for finding reasons in all circumstances, and it was a real Caesarian irony to take as a speaker of servility the same man whom the aristocracy had used to demonstrate against the dictators. He was

For this reason, he forgave his short-lived attempt to resist the goad, but not without first ensuring, in every way possible, that he would submit. His brother had almost had to answer for him as a hostage by serving as an officer in the army of Gaul, and Pompey himself had obliged him to accept a command under him which made it possible at any moment to exile him honourably. Clodius had been ordered to leave him in peace, but Caesar did not so much abandon Clodius in favour of Cicero as Cicero did in favour of Clodius, and the great saviour of the fatherland and the no less great liberal were engaged in an antechamber competition at the headquarters of Samarobriva, which would have provided piquant scenes for a Roman Aristophanes. But not only were they hanging Cicero's head
the rod that had so sadly struck him, he was also given gold chains. In the midst of his seriously embarrassed finances, Caesar's interest-free loans and the collective administration of the incredible sums spent on buildings were very well received by him, and more than one speech was made in his honour.
The immortal of the senate spoke in his mind to Caesar's businessman, who, after the close of the session, could present him with a bill of exchange. He also boasted that he no longer consulted law and honour, but strove to earn the favour of the dictators and had become as flexible as the tip of his ear. He was employed wherever he could be of service as a lawyer - as such he often had to defend his deadliest enemies by superior order. Above all in the Senate, where he
As the recognised leader of the obedient majority, he still had a certain political importance. As with Cicero, fear, flattery and money were used to ensure the obedience of the other members of the Senate.

Cicero, however bashful he may have been before the dictators, published a pamphlet against Caesar's father-in-law, Piso, which was as nasty as it was inappropriate. But the opposition of the majority of the senate and the fruitless resistance of the minority proved all the more clearly that the government, having once passed from the citizens to the senate, had now passed from the senate to the dictators, and that the senate was no more than a council of state needed to absorb the monarchical elements. No one," said the supporters of the fallen regime, "can do anything apart from the three; the masters are all-powerful and are careful not to be mistaken: the entire state has been transformed, it obeys their orders; our generation will see a complete revolution. We were no longer in a republic, but in a monarchy.

However, when it came to elections and the courts, it was the dictators who had the upper hand.
Here, the potentates came up against the stubborn force of a tightly-knit oligarchy, grouped into coteries, which had not been rid of by wresting it of its power.
government, and which was all the more difficult to break because it was fighting under cover. What's more, in the case of the jury courts, they came up against the malice of the middle classes against the new monarchical regime, which they were equally unable to prevent, despite all the resulting embarrassments.

As far as he could, Caesar more than once sought to win over the most distinguished writers personally. Cicero already owed the kind treatment he received from Caesar to his literary reputation. Nor did the governor of Gaul disdain to make peace with Catullus through the latter's father, whom he had known personally in Verona, and the young poet, who had pursued the powerful general with the bitterest and most personal sarcasms, was treated by him with the most flattering distinction. Caesar had enough genius to follow his literary adversaries onto their own ground, and to publish, as an indirect diversion from attacks of various kinds, an overall account of the Gallic War which set out with happy and skilful naivety before the public the necessity and constitutionality of his military actions. But the serious elements of the literature were and remained anti-monarchical.

Then Achilles and Hector met by chance at the city gates on the Appian Way and the two bands came to blows: Clodius was struck in the shoulder by a sabre and was forced to flee to a nearby house. Milon ordered his men to pursue Clodius to his refuge and massacre him there, 13 January 702 (52). The riot went to Milon's house and kept him under siege until Milon's bands dispersed the besiegers with arrows.

Pompey mustered troops to put an end to the anarchy which reigned in the capital and which, in fact, had become unbearable for everyone: he ordered what he had hitherto asked for, and the senate gave in. It was a very visible loophole whereby, on the proposal of Cato and Bibulus, the proconsul Pompey, on leaving office, was appointed consul without a colleague instead of dictator.

When Pompey fell seriously ill shortly afterwards, his recovery was widely celebrated.
Italy with the obligatory demonstrations of joy, such as are customary in monarchies in such circumstances. The dictators were happy. On 1 August 702 (52) Pompey deposed the dictatorship and shared the consulship with his client Metellus Scipio.

DEATH OF CRASSUS - BREAK-UP OF THE TRIUMVIRATE

For many years, Crassus had been one of the heads of the "three-headed monster", but without actually being one of them. He served as a counterweight to the real dictatorship of Caesar and Pompey, or, to put it more accurately, he restored the balance in favour of Caesar against Pompey. But the Conference of Lucca changed the situation for him. To counterbalance Pompey's importance, Caesar gave his old friend Crassus the opportunity to go and do in Syria, through the war with the Parthians, what he had done in the past.

had done himself in Gaul through the Celtic war. Filled with an ardent passion, he seemed to want to buy every minute to regain lost time, get his hands on the treasures of the East, and pursue glory and military power with the speed of Caesar and the ease of Pompey.

The military operations of the first summer were limited to a kind of reconnaissance in Mesopotamia: the Euphrates was crossed, and the Parthian satrap was defeated at Ichnes; the neighbouring towns, including the brilliant Nicephorium, were occupied.

The Roman army, made up of seven legions, 4,000 cavalry and 4,000 slingers and archers, left the Euphrates and set off across the inhospitable plains of northern Mesopotamia. Finally, after several days of arduous marching, the first enemy horsemen appeared not far from the first river the Romans had to cross, the Balissos (Belik). The signal for departure was given on
Balissos was crossed, and the army, after half a day's insufficient rest, marched without delay to the battle. The drums of the Parthians could now be heard all along the line; on all sides could be seen their gold-embroidered silk standards, their iron helmets and their steel breastplates gleaming in the March sun, and next to the vizier was Abgaros with his Bedouins.

His army consisted exclusively of cavalry: the line was formed by the large cavalry, armed with long spears, and men and horses were barded with iron or leather, and other defences: the mass of troops consisted of horse archers. In this respect, the Romans were completely inferior, both in terms of numbers and skill. Their line infantry, so powerful in close combat, either at short range with the javelin or at closer range with the bladed weapon, could not force an army composed exclusively of cavalry to measure itself against them. While the Roman infantryman, heavily laden, had difficulty marching in the sand, and died of hunger and thirst on an unmarked road, where there were only a few springs far apart, the
Parthian rider galloped, accustomed from childhood to being and even living on his horse, to enduring and to
braving need in a desert he knew to be barren.

It was in the midst of these circumstances that the battle broke out six miles south of Carrhes, where there were
a Roman garrison, and to the north, a little closer to Ichnes, in the middle of the desert. Visit
The legions, marching towards the enemy in deep squares of ten cohorts abreast, were soon enveloped and blinded by the enemy's darts, which were sure to strike. To avoid being completely surrounded, Publius Crassus took the offensive with an elite corps of cavalry, archers and line infantry. In fact, the enemy stopped attacking him in a circle and withdrew. But the heavy cavalry came up against him head-on and he was enveloped on all sides by the enemy hordes, who rushed forward in droves. Only night could put an end to the massacre.

They headed for the mountains of Armenia; marching by night and resting by day, they arrived with a corps of 5,000 men at the fortress of Sinnaka. There, the vizier presented himself on horseback in front of the Roman camp to offer peace and friendship to the Romans on behalf of his master. A richly ornamented parchment was immediately brought: it was a gift from the king to the general-in-chief. pressed around Crassus, as if to invite him to mount his horse. It seemed to the Roman officers that they wanted to seize the person of the general-in-chief; Octavius, although unarmed, snatched his weapon from one of the Parthians and struck the man holding the horse. In the ensuing tumult, all the officers were killed; the old general wanted, like his great-uncle, not to serve the enemy alive as a trophy: he sought and found death. The leaderless multitude that had remained in the camp was partly taken, partly dispersed. What the day of Carrhes had begun, the day of Sinnaka completed on 9 June 701 (53); both took their place alongside the disastrous dates of Allia, Cannae and Arausia. The army of the Euphrates no longer existed.

It was the first serious triumph that the East had won over the West since the time of the Achaemenids, and there was a profound meaning to the occasion. The Roman city and the genius of Greece were beginning to tie themselves to the Sultan's chain.

The catastrophe, appalling in itself, seemed destined to be even more so in its consequences. Syria was invaded by the Parthians and the whole of Upper Asia trembled. But the Parthians did not know how to lay siege to cities. Not only did they fail to take Antioch, where Cassius had thrown himself with his troops, but on their return to the Orontes they were surprised by Cassius' cavalry and badly beaten. by Roman infantry. This was the end of the Parthian invasion of Asia Minor, and the Euphrates frontier was respected, at least for a while.

In Rome, the volcano of revolution continued to raise clouds of smoke. There was no longer any thought of sending a soldier or a shield against the enemy of the fatherland: there was no longer any thought of the destiny of peoples. It is one of the signs of the saddest of times that the unheard-of disaster of Carrhes and Sinnaka gave far less food for thought to the politicians of the time than the tumult of the Appian Way, in which, two months after Crassus, Clodius perished. Pompey's intention to break with Caesar was probably as old in its germ as the dictators' alliance itself; but Pompey's concealed nature had allowed it to mature until then. The death of the beautiful Julia, who perished in her prime
of her age, in the autumn of 700 (54), and whom her only son soon followed to the grave, was to put an end to the personal understanding between her father and her husband. It was Pompey who was the first to break it off. Caesar sought to renew the bond broken by destiny; he asked for the hand of Pompey's only daughter on his behalf, and offered him that of his closest relative, his sister's granddaughter, Octavia; but Pompey did not give in.

married her daughter to her former fiancé Faustus Sylla, son of the dictator, and in turn married the daughter of Quintus Metellus Scipio.

The catastrophe of June 701, in which the Syrian army and general were destroyed, was a terrible blow for Caesar. Once again, destiny had worked in Pompey's favour. Crassus was dead, all Gaul was on fire, Pompey was de facto dictator of Rome and master of the senate.

Thus the republican opposition, which for years had had to content itself with the role of spectator, and had hardly dared to breathe, found itself, through the break-up of the dictators, brought onto the stage. This was the circle that recognised Cato as its leader, those republicans who were prepared to fight, in any case, and now more than ever, for the republic. There was therefore only one way for Cato's party to restore the old regime, and that was to enter into an alliance with the less dangerous of the two dictators. Since Pompey declared himself in favour of the republican constitution and offered to defend it against Caesar, the republican opposition could and should recognise in him their own general.

It was not Caesar's intention to break with Pompey at this time. He therefore sought to maintain the situation, and consequently the peace with Pompey, and to attain the consulship which had been assured him at Lucca for 706 (48). In this way he gained the time to complete the affairs of Gaul, and left to his
This was very important for Caesar, in view of the majority of the senate and the party of material interests, and above all of his own soldiers. The consul Marcus Marcellus proposed to choose, for the year 705, from the first of March, the two consuls destined for the governments hitherto entrusted to Caesar. The long-dormant storm broke. The Catonians had no intention of abandoning their point of view. They believed that the right granted by an exceptional law to the proconsul Caesar to apply for the consulship, even though he was absent, (a right subsequently abrogated by a decree of the people) was being maintained illegally. The Senate was also to decide that, as the subjugation of Gaul was complete, soldiers who had completed their service would be dismissed. The granting of city rights and the founding of colonies by Caesar in Upper Italy were considered null and void and unconstitutional. Those who supported Caesar at the time argued in the senate that the situation in Gaul, as well as convenience, advised not recalling Caesar prematurely, but giving him command along with the consulship.

The Caesarians' proposal to give their master the combined consulship and proconsulship was rejected by Pompey clearly and harshly.

During the preliminaries of the diplomatic war waged by his adversaries, Caesar had succeeded in putting an end to the Gallic insurrection and restoring peace in all the territories that had risen up. However, he did not hesitate to make great sacrifices to avoid coming into open conflict with government officials.

He declared himself ready to lay down, by order of the senate, his government and command, on condition that Pompey did likewise; he could do so in complete safety, for, deprived of his command of Spain and Italy, Pompey was no longer dangerous. Pompey could not refuse. The vote that could not be postponed took place and signalled the defeat of Pompey and Cato all along the line. The Senate decided, by 370 votes to 20, that the proconsuls of Gaul and Spain would both be invited to lay down their commands. Pompey was therefore no less recalled by the Senate than Caesar, and while Caesar declared himself ready to obey, Pompey refused.

The defeated coalition in the Senate was in the most difficult situation.

It was said that Caesar, in October 704 (50), had brought four legions from later Gaul into the Gaul of the city, and had established them at Placentia. Curion demonstrated in the senate the complete unfoundedness of this rumour; but the consul appointed as well as the two elected for 705 (49), and belonging to Cato's party, went to Pompey, and these three men attempted, on their own sovereign authority, to decide him to put himself at the head of the two legions stationed in Capua, and to call the Roman militia to arms. A more unconstitutional act of omnipotence could not have been imagined.
to begin the civil war; but there was no time to think about these details: Pompey accepted. The preparations for war and the reviews began; to deal with them personally, Pompey left the capital in December 704 (50).

Caesar had, by remaining himself attached to the terrain of law, forced Pompey to declare war on him, and to declare it not as the repository of legitimate power, but as the general of an openly revolutionary minority of the senate which was terrorising the majority. This was a considerable result.
Now that war had been declared, it was in Caesar's interest to strike a decisive blow as soon as possible. Caesar sent Rome an ultimatum which, if it was good for nothing else, at least compromised his adversary in public opinion by its humility, and while he himself seemed to be hesitating, should have encouraged him not to rush his preparations. In this ultimatum, he disregarded all previous grievances, and declared himself ready to lay down the government of Gaul and to send back eight legions within the time limits fixed by the senate, and declared himself satisfied, if the senate left him the government of Cittadella and Illyria, with one legion, or that of Cittadella only with two legions.

legions, and not even until the consuls took office, but until the end of the elections.
consuls of 706 (48). Curion undertook to defend his master in the lion's den.

1st January 705 (49): Curion delivered the letter addressed by the general to the senate in open session. The grave and clear words, in which Caesar exposed, with the implacable power of truth, the imminence of civil war, the universal desire for peace, Pompey's arrogance and his own condescension, the proposals for accommodation whose moderation no doubt surprised his own supporters, the very clear statement that he was extending the hand of reconciliation for the last time, produced the deepest impression. Despite the fear caused by the soldiers who had invaded the city, the feelings of the majority were not in doubt: they did not dare to express them. The consuls responded by refusing to allow the vote, as they were authorised to do in their capacity as presidents.
Pompey had his usual spokesman, Quintus Scipio, declare that he was more determined than ever to defend the interests of the senate, and that there would be danger in waiting any longer. The consul Lentulus
announced in no uncertain terms that he would no longer abide by the Senate's decree, but that if the Senate remained unmoved by his servility, he would act on his own and make arrangements with his powerful friend. Thus terrified, the majority of the Senate voted as ordered: that Caesar was to hand over the government of later Gaul to Domitius Ahenobarbus and that of upper Gaul to Marcus Servilius on a fixed day in the near future, and to dismiss his army, failing which he would be charged with high treason.

It was all too much. Caesar gathered together his soldiers of the third legion, who had left their
The soldiers from the cantonments of Tergeste (Trieste), on their way to Ravenna, told them how things stood. This
He was not only the master of hearts and minds whose brilliant words, at this solemn moment in his destiny and in the destiny of the world, burst forth in fiery strokes; he was not only the popular and victorious general, who spoke to the soldiers called up by himself and who had followed him for eight years with ever-increasing enthusiasm; above all, he was the energetic and consistent statesman who, for nineteen years, had defended the cause of liberty in good times and bad, who had braved for it the daggers of murderers and the executioners of the aristocracy, the swords of the Germans and the waves of an unknown ocean, without hesitating or trembling, who had shattered the constitution of Sylla, overthrown the government of the senate, covered and defended beyond the Alps the democracy disarmed by his battles ; And he was not speaking to the public of Clodius, whose republican enthusiasm had long since been reduced to ashes and dust, but to the young populations of the towns and villages of Upper Italy, who still enthusiastically welcomed the thought of political liberty, who were still capable of fighting and dying for the ideal, who had revolutionarily received from Caesar the right of citizenship that had been denied them by the government, who
were willing to see Caesar overthrow the axe and the beams, knowing from certain works what ruthless use the oligarchy wanted to make of it against the Transpadans. In front of such listeners, such an orator explained the gratitude for the conquest of Gaul, which the nobility retained for the general and the army; he explained the suspension of the comices, the terrorism exercised over the senate, the sacred duty of the nobility and the army.
to wrest from the aristocracy, by force of arms, the people's tribune, conquered centuries earlier by their

fathers, with arms in their hands, and to keep the ancient oath that one took for oneself and for one's nephews, from generation to generation, to die for the maintenance of the tribune of the people. So when he, the leader and general of the popular party, who, after the failure of his attempts to do good, had pushed long-suffering to the limit, called the soldiers of the people to arms, to follow him in this supreme, inevitable and final struggle against an aristocracy that was hated and despised, as treacherous as it was implacable and ridiculously incorrigible, not one officer or soldier was willing to back down. The march forward was ordered; at the head of his staff Caesar crossed the narrow stream which separated his province from Italy and beyond which the constitution commanded the proconsuls of Gaul to remain. By once again treading the soil of his homeland after an absence of nine years, he was at the same time treading the path of revolution. The die was cast.

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BRUNDISIUM, ILERDA, PHARSALE AND THAPSUS

Although Caesar had what he needed: unlimited political power and an army of unshakeable strength, this power only extended over a relatively small area. Above all, he dominated the province of Upper Italy. This region was not only the most densely populated in Italy, but also the most devoted to the democratic cause. In Italy proper, on the contrary,
Caesar's influence more or less balanced that of his adversary. Although, by a skilful manoeuvre, he had been able to put Cato's party in the wrong, and had succeeded in persuading of his good right all those who were looking for a pretext to become neutral with tranquillity, like the majority of the senate, or to take his side, like his soldiers and the Transpadans, The mass of citizens had not allowed themselves to be deceived, and when the commander of Gaul led his legions to Rome, in spite of all the legal quibbles, they saw in Cato and Pompey the defenders of the legitimate republic and in Caesar the democratic usurper.

Transalpine Gaul as far as the Rhine and the Canal obeyed him, and the colonists of Narbonne as well as the Roman citizens who were established there, were devoted to him; but even in the province of Narbonne, the party of the constitution had many supporters, and the newly conquered provinces were rather, in the imminent civil war, a burden than an advantage; for he could not, for good reasons, have the support of the people of Narbonne.
reasons, make no use of Celtic infantry, and even less of cavalry.

If Caesar began the battle as a simple governor of Gaul, with no other essential resources than skilful lieutenants, a loyal army and a devoted province, Pompey began it as a leader.

effective head of the Roman republic, and in full possession of the available resources of the regular government of the great Roman empire.

The coalition dominated the sea exclusively: all the ports, all the warships and all the fleet equipment were at its disposal. The two Spains, which were to Pompey what the Gauls were to Caesar, were devoted to their master and in the hands of skilful and loyal governors. In the other provinces, naturally with the exception of the two Gauls, the positions of governors and commanders were, under the influence of Pompey and the minority of the senate, occupied by reliable men. The client states had taken Pompey's side against Caesar with great determination.

As far as Italy was concerned, the vast majority of citizens were, as we have said, against Caesar: first and foremost, of course, the entire aristocracy with its immense clientele, and, to more or less the same degree, high finance, which could hardly hope to preserve, in a serious reform of the republic, its courts of jurors and its monopoly on squeezing the provinces. The same anti-democratic sentiments were to be found among small capitalists, rural landowners and, in general, all those who had something to lose.

The army on which Pompey relied consisted mainly of Spanish troops, seven legions accustomed to war and on which he could rely entirely, and to which were added the divisions of troops, admittedly weak and scattered in Syria, Asia, Macedonia, Africa and Italy.
Sicily. In Italy, only the two legions surrendered by Caesar were under arms, and their strength did not exceed the strength of the other legions.
amounted to no more than 7,000 men, and whose loyalty was more than doubtful. But, in addition to the fact that the Spanish troops could arrive in Italy in the spring, either by Gaul or by the sea, one could find in Italy the contingent of the three legions raised in 699 (55), and the Italian raising of 702 (52), which was only on leave. By counting this reserve, the number of soldiers which Pompey could have had, without the seven legions of Spain and those which were dispersed in the other provinces,
in Italy alone, amounted to ten legions or almost 60,000 men, so it was no exaggeration to claim, as he did, that all he had to do was stamp his foot on the ground to bring out legions.

Under these circumstances, war broke out at the beginning of January 705 (49). It seemed madness for Caesar, with an army as strong as Catilina's and with no effective reserves, to take the offensive against a superior army that was growing every day; but it was madness in the
like Hannibal's. But perhaps Pompey, accustomed to operating slowly or surely with superior forces, would allow himself to be diverted by a completely improvised attack. So Caesar entered Italy.

At that time, there were two roads leading south from the Romagna: the Emilia Cassia road, which ran from Bononia over the Apennines to Arretium and Rome, and the Popilia Flaminia road, which ran from Ravenna to Fanum along the Adriatic coast. Marcus Antonius reached Arretium by the former, and Caesar himself took the latter. They found no resistance anywhere.

The consternation of his opponents was prodigious. Pompey heard in Rome the news of Caesar's march; at first he seemed to want to defend the city; but when the news of Caesar's entry into the Picenum and his first successes in that region reached him, he gave up and ordered the evacuation. Panic-stricken terror, heightened by the false news that Caesar's horsemen had already appeared at the city gates, seized high society. The senators, who had been told that any man who remained in the city would be treated as an accomplice of the rebel Caesar, rushed out. The consuls themselves had lost their heads to such an extent that they were unable to keep the public coffers safe. Soon new proposals for an accommodation were received from Caesar: he offered to sack his army, to hand over the provinces to the designated successors, and to present himself regularly to the king.
consulate, provided that Pompey went to Spain and that Italy was disarmed. The reply was that if Caesar himself returned to his province, they undertook to disarm in Italy and to obtain a proposal from the senate that would send Pompey back to Spain. If this was not a simple deception, this should have been an acceptance of the proposal, but it was in fact a rejection. The meeting that Caesar wanted with Pompey was refused by the latter. As for the direction of operations, it was decided at Teanum that Pompey would take command of the troops stationed at Luceria, on whom, despite suspicions about their loyalty, all hopes rested. But the region was already lost when the officer entrusted by Pompey with organising the defence, Lucius Vibullius Rufus, arrived there.
the six to seven thousand recruits who had been saved, and then to lead them on to the next stage.
to the next district in Corfinium.

But the commander of Corfinium was Caesar's designated successor, Lucius Domitius, one of the most stubborn of the Roman aristocracy: and he not only refused to follow Pompey's orders, but prevented Vibullius from marching towards Apulia with the contingent from Picenum. He was so convinced that Pompey was delaying only out of stubbornness and would necessarily come to his aid that he did not seriously prepare to support a siege. Instead of Pompey, it was Caesar who arrived (14 February). The following night, Domitius decamped with the senior officers. Then the entire garrison seized the staff and surrendered with him to Caesar (20 February).

Pompey had considered Italy lost as soon as Caesar had entered the Picenum: he wanted to only to postpone the embarkation as long as he could, to save what he could of the militias. He

had finally set off for Brundisium, the nearest port. There were the two legions of Luceria, and what Pompey had been able to gather hastily from recruits in depopulated Apulia, as well as the contingents that the consuls and the other delegates had been able to lead to Brundisium: there also went in large numbers the political refugees, and among them the first senators with their families. Embarkation began, but the ships that had been prepared were not enough to carry 25,000 men at once. All that remained was to
divide the army.

The stronger half set sail (4 March). With the rest of the army, around 10,000 men, Pompey waited at Brundisium for the fleet to return. In the meantime, Caesar, who had arrived in front of the city, tried first and foremost to close the harbour entrance with dikes and floating bridges, to prevent the fleet from re-entering on its return; but Pompey had the transports in the harbour armed, and was able to prevent the entrance to the harbour from being closed until the fleet appeared, and when the rest of the army, despite the close surveillance of the besiegers and the hostile attitude of the inhabitants of the city, managed to enter the harbour.
and arrived in Greece untouched by Caesar.

In a campaign lasting two months, without a single serious battle, Caesar had dispersed an army of ten legions, to the extent that barely half of them had been able to escape by fleeing across the sea, and that the whole of Italy with the capital and the state coffers, and all the supplies, were in Caesar's power. It was not without reason that the defeated party moaned about the marvellous celerity, foresight and energy of "the monster".

However, the main sources of revenue, i.e. taxes from the East, were still in the hands of the enemy, and the growing needs of the army, as well as the new need to look after the Roman population, required resources for which these enormous sums were so inadequate that Caesar was soon obliged to call on private credit.

The anxiety caused to the wealthy classes by the imminence of anarchy was universal. Friends and enemies alike saw a second Catilina: Pompey, it was believed, affected to believe that Caesar had only been driven to civil war by the impossibility of paying his debts.

However, once again, "the monster" deceived the expectations of both his enemies and his friends. In the midst of the greatest financial distress, the immense assets of his opponents, present or absent, were not touched. Caesar preferred to borrow from his friends than to antagonise the people by exercising their right to levy taxes on land - a legitimate right, it is true, but one that had fallen into disuse. He did not expect

the duration of his success, as he himself said, than by an unconditional pardon granted to the vanquished, and throughout the march from Ravenna to Brundisium, he incessantly renewed his proposals for a personal interview with Pompey, and reasonable accommodation.

The plans for revenge of the vanquished contrasted with the moderation of the victor.

The anger of powerlessness and the moderation of force produced their effects. The masses, who put material interests before those of politics, threw themselves into Caesar's arms. The towns of the provinces praised the fairness, moderation and skill of the victor, and the very enemies of Caesar's army were also praised.
were obliged to admit that this praise was well deserved. The great majority of the senate, at least in numerical terms (for the most illustrious and influential senators were no longer part of it), had, in spite of the orders of Pompey and the consuls, remained in Italy and even partly in the capital, and had come to terms with the new government.

But for the time being, this gentleness was more dangerous for Caesar than a renewal of the follies of Cinna and Catiline would have been: it made enemies of his friends and did not reconcile his enemies. The Catilinian clique surrounding Caesar murmured at seeing the murder and pillage postponed. A formidable opposition was to be expected from these disparaged, corrupt and sometimes talented friends.

When Caesar spoke to the senate about a dictatorship for the continuation of the war, one of the two consulars present, Servius Sulpicius Rufus, an honoured man who wanted nothing more than to die quietly in his bed, said that Caesar would be well deserving of the fatherland if he were to renounce taking the war to Greece and Spain. When Caesar asked the Senate to at least act as his intermediary in proposing peace to Pompey, they were not opposed in principle, but the threats made by the émigrés against the neutrals had so frightened them that no one wanted to take on the peaceful embassy. Caesar also came up against the reluctance of the aristocracy to help raise a throne, and against the softness of the senate, which had already paralysed Pompey's appointment as commander-in-chief of the civil war before Caesar. Caesar declared to the Senate, as he had done previously to the party of the constitution, that he would have liked to reorganise the State by legal means and with the help of the supreme body of the State; but that as long as this assistance was refused to him he could do without it.

Without bothering further with the senate and political formalities, he gave the government of Rome to the praetor Marcus Æmilius Lepidus, as prefect of the city, and he took care of the government of the regions under his control and the continuation of the war.

Caesar hastened to open the campaign. He had the choice of directing his arms either against the army that was being organised in Greece under Pompey's orders, or against the battle-hardened Spanish army,
commanded by his skilful lieutenants. He had decided in favour of the latter plan, and as soon as the Italian campaign was over, he took steps to assemble his nine best legions and 6,000 cavalry on the lower Rhone.

Caesar himself went to Gaul, and, held back by the conduct of the siege of Marseilles, he sent most of the troops assembled on the Rhone, six legions and cavalry, on the main road leading from Narbo (Narbonne) to Rhode (Rosas), to warn the enemy at the Pyrenees. He succeeded; when Afranius and Petreius arrived at the passes, they found them occupied by the Caesarians, and, having lost the line of the Pyrenees, they took up position between these mountains and the Ebro, at Ilerda (Lerida).

After many alternations, the battle turned to the disadvantage of the Pompeians, who capitulated.

Caesar guaranteed the officers and soldiers not only life, liberty and possession of what they needed, but also the right to a life of their own.
He simply had them lay down their arms and returned the prisoners to their homeland.

Cited Spain fell of its own accord into the hands of the victor through the dissolution of this army.

When Caesar, returning from the submission of Spain, arrived before Marseilles, he found the city at its wits' end because of the enemy attack, famine and contagion, and ready, this time seriously, to capitulate on any terms. Domitius alone, fearing the resentment of the victor, boarded a ship and passed through the Roman fleet to seek a third battlefield for his ruthless hatred. Caesar's soldiers had sworn to put the entire seafaring population of the city to the sword, and were impatiently awaiting their leader's signal to plunder. But Caesar, mindful of his great undertaking to establish Helleno-Italian civilisation in the West, did not let himself be forced to repeat the destruction of Corinth. Massilia had to surrender its fleet and arsenals to the conqueror, and lost part of its territory and privileges; but it retained its freedom and its nationality, and remained, albeit materially decimated, an intellectual power for Hellenic culture in this Celtic region, henceforth destined for new destinies.

The Pompeians intended to starve Italy. It was absolutely necessary for Caesar to frustrate the enemy's plan and take away the wheat-growing provinces. Quintus Valerius was sent with a legion to Sardinia and forced the Pompeian government to evacuate the island.

Sicily was occupied by Curion without a fight. Gurion left half his troops to protect the island.
island so precious to the capital, and set sail for Africa with the others, composed of two legions
and 500 riders.

Curion happily landed in Africa between Adrumète, where an entire legion was close to the warships, and Utica, in front of which the second legion was under the command of Varus. Enthused by the fiery harangue of their young general, Curion's cavalry set out to win the battle of Utica.
that of the fleeing enemy, and sabred the light infantry, which had marched with the cavalry, in front of the front of the two armies. Emboldened by their success and by Curion's personal example, the legions crossed the deep valley that separated the two armies to attack the Pompeians, who, not expecting it, fled to their camp, which they raised during the night. The victory was so complete that Curion went to lay siege to Utica. Curion, whose fiery nature hardly allowed him to rest, marched forward to give battle to Saburra, before the latter had joined forces with the garrison of Utica.

His cavalry, which had gone forward in the evening, managed to surprise Saburra's corps on the Bagradas during the night and mistreated it. But Saburra was not, as was thought, without a rearguard, and he was not much more than a mile from Juba's army. The elite Roman infantry and 2,000 Gallic and Spanish cavalry had already arrived on the battlefield to help Saburra, and the king himself was on the march with the main body of the army and sixteen elephants. After the night march and a fierce battle, the Roman cavalry numbered barely two hundred and, like the infantry, they were exhausted from marching and fighting.
were completely enclosed by the ever-growing masses of enemy troops. In vain
which Curion tried to charge en masse.

His soldiers were pushed back and scattered by enemy cavalry. All was lost. The infantry was wiped out to the last man. Of the cavalry, only a few men escaped. Curion could have been among them; but he could not bear the thought of appearing before his master again without the army that had been entrusted to him, and he perished with sword in hand. The corps in camp before Utica and the fleet guarding it, which could so easily have sailed for Sicily, surrendered to Varus under the command of the commander of the army.
the impression of this appalling catastrophe, the following day, August or September 705 (49).

Thus ended the Sicilian-African expedition organised by Caesar. It achieved its goal, in the sense that the occupation of Sicily, combined with that of Sardinia, provided for the capital's most pressing needs; the failure in Africa, an advantage from which the victorious party reaped no benefit, and the loss of two insecure legions, were soon forgotten. But an invaluable loss for Caesar and for Rome was the death of Curion.

The success achieved in Illyria by Pompey's fleet, although significant in itself, had little impact on the economy.
influence on the campaign as a whole.

Caesar's two-pronged offensive against Spain, on the one hand, and Sicily and Africa on the other, had succeeded in Spain completely, only partially elsewhere; on the contrary, Pompey's plan
to starve Italy by occupying Sicily had failed in part, and the plan that was based on
the complete annihilation of the Spanish army: in Italy, Caesar's defensive measures had barely been used. Despite the serious disasters in Africa and Illyricum, Caesar was clearly the complete winner of this first campaign.

The great battleground of Caesar's adversary was Macedonia. It was there that Pompey and the mass of emigrants from Brundisium went, and there that the other fugitives from the West went: Marcus Cato from Sicily, Lucius Domitius from Massilia, and in particular from Spain a multitude of the best officers and soldiers of the disbanded army, led by their generals Afranius and Varron.

The conduct of warfare in the Macedonian camp was in the hands of General-in-Chief Pompey. His difficult and painful position had been made even worse by the unfortunate events of 705. In the eyes of his supporters, the fault lay mainly with him. It was confidence in Pompey's military talents that had decided the party of the constitution to break with Caesar; the disastrous consequences of this break now fell on Pompey, and if, as a result of the notorious incapacity of all the other leaders, no attempt could be made to change the higher command, confidence in the general-in-chief was no less paralysed. To these consequences of defeat was added the unfortunate influence of emigration.

The aristocratic generals had brought into the camp the customs of the capital, and this was not for the greater good of the army; the tents of these great men were elegant cradles, the ground covered with fresh grass and the walls lined with ivy; the table was strewn with silverware and goblets shone brightly. These elegant warriors were in stark contrast to Caesar's companions, whose coarse bread frightened these dainties, and who, for want of the same bread, were unable to eat,

ate roots and swore they would rather chew leaves than give in to the enemy. Nevertheless, Pompey fulfilled his mission of organising large but scattered military forces with admirable zeal.

The core were the troops brought from Italy, of which it had been possible to form five legions by joining the prisoners of Illyria and the Romans domiciled in Greece. Three others arrived from the East: two formed from the remnants of Crassus' army, and another formed from the two weak corps stationed in Cilicia. In addition, a new legion had been formed from the discharged soldiers established in Crete and Macedonia, and two from the Romans in Asia Minor. In addition, there were 2,000 volunteers, remnants of the armies
and other bodies.

The cavalry, on the other hand, in addition to a bodyguard made up of the young nobility of Rome and more
and the mounted shepherds of Apulia whom Pompey had enrolled, was made up of the contingent of subjects and clients of Rome. They were joined by the excellent Parthian horsemen.

Pompey's fleet was also considerable. It consisted partly of transport ships brought from Brundisium or built since, partly of warships belonging to the king of Egypt, the princes of Colchis, the Cilician dynasts Tarkondimotos, the cities of Tyre, Rhodes, Athens, Corcyra, and above all the maritime cities of Asia and Greece, and numbered around 500 sails. Dyrrachium had considerable supplies of wheat and war material. The war chest was full, given that the Pompeians had in their possession the main sources of revenue for the state, and made use of the revenues of the client princes, those of the senators, and those of the farmers of Dyrrachium.
tax, and above all those of the entire Roman and non-Roman population that they could reach.

According to the general-in-chief, the fleet was to be assembled on the coast and in the waters of Epirus before the winter of 705-6 (49-8). Admiral Bibulus had already arrived at headquarters with 110 sails. On the other hand, the army, whose headquarters had been at Berrhoea on the Haliakmon during the summer, was behind schedule.

Thus Caesar still had the opportunity, despite the Spanish war which had broken out in the meantime, to take the offensive in Macedonia, and he did not hesitate to do so. He had long since ordered the assembly of the transport and warships at Brundisium, and after the surrender of the army, he was able to take the offensive in Macedonia.
of Spain and the fall of Massilia, he had directed to this place the core of the troops that had been there employees. But the lack of ships still threatened to derail the expedition. He did not

found at Brundisium only twelve warships and barely enough transport vessels to carry a third of his army of twelve legions and 10,000 cavalry at once.

On 4 January 706, Caesar, with ten legions weakened by forced marches and disease, and 600 cavalry, set sail from Brundisium for the coast of Epirus. It was a repeat of the bold expedition to Brittany. However, it got off to a good start, and the first transport landed without a hitch.
obstacle. While the ships were returning to take a second, Caesar passed the Acrocerunian mountains that same evening. The Epirote militia did not defend themselves anywhere.

But the rest of the campaign did not live up to this brilliant start. Bibulus made up for his negligence by redoubling his efforts. Not only did he capture more than thirty of the
He also established an active cruise along the entire district of the coast occupied by Caesar, from the island of Sason (Saseno) to the ports of Corcyra. It was not possible for Caesar's officers to get the second part of the army through. He himself was no more successful in taking Dyrrachium. Pompey learned from one of Caesar's messengers of peace that he was preparing to travel to the coast of Epirus and, accelerating his march accordingly, he threw himself into this important arsenal in time. Caesar's situation was critical. With an army of around 20,000 men, he could not offer battle to Pompey's army, which was at least twice as strong, and he should consider himself fortunate that Pompey proceeded methodically and, instead of giving battle to him immediately, wintered between Dyrrachium and the Epirus coast.
Apollonia, on the right bank of the Apsus. How desperate the situation appeared to Caesar himself can be seen from his resolution: realising that the fleet was not arriving, he wanted to board a fisherman's boat and cross the Adriatic to Brundisium to fetch it.
because he couldn't find a sailor to undertake the voyage.

But he no longer needed to appear to persuade his loyal lieutenant in command in Italy, Marcus Antonius, to make the last effort to save his general. Once again, the transport fleet with four legions and 800 horses left the port of Brundisium, and a good wind carried it beyond the Libo cruise. The second shipment could be disembarked.

Pompey, after having vainly tried to prevent the junction of the two armies of the enemy, and to force the corps of Antony to fight isolated, took a new position with Asparagium, on the river Genusos (Uschkomobin), which flows parallel to Apsus, between this last and the town of Dyrrachium, and it remained immobile there. Caesar was now strong enough to give battle, but Pompey refused.
On the other hand, he succeeded in deceiving Pompey and going unnoticed with his best marching troops,
as at Ilerda, between the enemy camp and the fortress of Dyrrachium, which served as its base.

Caesar's veterans, with infinite effort, invested Pompey's camp with a chain of posts sixteen miles long, and soon added to this first inner line a second outer one, to defend themselves against attacks from Dyrrachium and against attempts to turn their position, which could so easily have been carried out with the help of the fleet. Pompey attacked more than once a
part of these entrenchments with the intention, if possible, of breaking the enemy's line; but he did not try to prevent the investment by a battle; he preferred to build in his turn a certain number of entrenchments around his camp. There was a continuous struggle at various points.
No significant success was achieved on either side, but the effects of the investment were particularly felt by the Pompeians. Pompey could not delay any longer in freeing himself from his unpleasant situation by striking a blow at the enemy.

He learned from Celtic deserters that the enemy had neglected to defend the shore between the two chains of entrenchments 600 feet apart by a transverse line, and he based his operations on this fault. He had the legions on the camp side attack the inner line of Caesar's entrenchments, and the outer line by light troops placed on the ships and landed outside the enemy's entrenchments; a third division landed in the space left free between the two lines, and attacked behind their defenders, who were already sufficiently occupied. The entrenchment near the sea was taken and the garrison fled in complete confusion; it was with difficulty that the commander of the neighbouring trench, Marcus Antonius, succeeded in holding it and stopping Pompey's advance for a moment; but in addition to the considerable loss, the outermost entrenchment along the sea remained in Pompeian hands, and the line was broken.

When the Caesarians saw Pompey advancing, they panicked; and if the engagement ended with the loss of 1,000 of the best soldiers, and if Caesar's army did not suffer a complete defeat, it was simply because Pompey was unable to deploy his forces freely on this jagged terrain and, fearing a stratagem, held back his troops.

Caesar's bold attempt to take the offensive without ships against an enemy who dominated the sea and was supported by a fleet had failed completely. He found himself in the theatre of war, in the presence of an impregnable defensive position, and unable to strike a serious blow against either Dyrrachium or the Roman army.

After this unfortunate engagement, Caesar began his retreat towards Apollonia. Pompey followed. The march from Dyrrachium to Apollonia along a difficult road crossed by several rivers was not an easy task for a defeated army pursued by the enemy; but the general's skilful conduct and

the indestructible energy displayed by the soldiers on the march forced Pompey, after three days of pursuit, to stop. He now had to choose between an expedition to Italy and the march to the south. inside. However reasonable and engaging the first proposal may have seemed to him, and despite the fact that many voices were raised in its favour, he preferred not to abandon Scipio's body. Meanwhile, Caesar had arrived safely at Apollonia. The march on Apollonia had had no other purpose than to place the wounded in safety and to pay the soldiers where the depots were stationed: as soon as this operation was completed, he headed for Thessaly, leaving garrisons at Apollonia, Oricum and Lissus. Calvinus' corps had also moved towards Thessaly, and Caesar was able to make his junction.
with reinforcements from Italy, this time by the Illyrian land route, two legions commanded by Quintus Cornificius. Calvinus was also directed to this point, and the junction of the two armies was thus accomplished by the shortest route. Pompey had simply returned to the idea of fighting with Caesar at all costs, and therefore of reaching him as soon as possible and by the most convenient route. Cato took command of Dyrrachium, where a garrison of 18 cohorts had been left.
Scipio were busy, the first apparently following the Egnatia route as far as Pella, and then taking the main road south, the second from Haliacmon, through the passes of Olympus, to the lower Penea. They were due to meet up at Larissa.

Caesar camped to the south of Larissa, on the plain which stretches from the mountainous region of Cynocephalus to the Othrys range, and which is cut by a tributary of the Penaeus, the Enipaeus, on the right bank of the latter river, near the town of Pharsalus; Pompey camped opposite him on the right bank of the Enipaeus, along the hills of Cynocephalus. Pompey's entire army was assembled; Caesar was still waiting for the corps of nearly two legions detached to Etolia and Thessaly, then stationed under Quintus Fusius Calenus in Greece, and the two legions of Cornificius arriving by land from Italy, which were already in Illyria. Pompey's army, numbering eleven legions or 47,000 men and 7,000 horses, was more than double Caesar's in infantry, and three times as numerous in cavalry; fatigue and fighting had so decimated Caesar's troops that the eight legions contained no more than 22,000 men under arms, consequently barely half their normal contingent.

Thus it was that the battle of Pharsalus was fought on 9 August 706 (48), almost on the same battlefield where, fifty years earlier, the Romans had laid the foundations of their domination in the East. Caesar, foreseeing the defeat of his cavalry, had supported it on the threatened flank of his left wing with 2,000 of his best legionnaires. As the enemy cavalry, pushing Caesar's cavalry in front of them, galloped along the front and sides of the line, they suddenly encountered this body of cavalry.
who boldly advanced against them, and, thrown into disarray by this unforeseen and unexpected attack of infantry, left the battlefield at full speed. The victorious legionnaires
cut the now exposed enemy archers to pieces, and then rushed to the wing
left of the enemy and prepared on their side to turn it. At the same time, Caesar's third division, hitherto held in reserve, advanced along the whole line to attack. The unexpected defeat of the best part of Pompey's army, by increasing the courage of his opponents, broke that of his own.

army and above all that of the general. When Pompey, who, before the action, was not counting on his He left the battlefield and headed for the camp without even waiting for the outcome of the general attack ordered by Caesar. His legions began to fold and cross the river again, to return to the camp, but not without considerable losses. Pompey's situation
was much less perilous than that of Caesar after the defeat of Dyrrachium. But Pompey's weak soul, in such vicissitudes, fell into the infinite abyss of despair. Now that he saw his legions crossing the river again, he threw down the baton of command and fled as quickly as possible for the sea to embark.

Thus ended the day of Pharsalus. The enemy's army was not only defeated, but annihilated; 15,000 Pompeians were killed or wounded on the battlefield, while the Caesarians were only 200 men short: what could still be mustered, amounting to 20,000 men, laid down their arms the day after the battle. The soldiers were incorporated into the army; fines and confiscation of property were imposed on men of the first rank; senators and knights of distinction who were caught were put to death with few exceptions. The time for clemency had passed
The longer the civil war went on, the more implacable and remorseless it became. On the same day that the client cities submitted to the victor of Pharsalus, the tail of the constitutional party, all those who were there and all those who were not.
had reluctantly joined or who, like Marcus Cicero and his followers, danced around the aristocracy like witches on the Broken, came forward to make their peace with the new monarch, a peace which his disdainful indulgence graciously granted them. But the elite of the defeated party made no compromise. The aristocracy was done for; but aristocrats could not be converted to monarchy.

Pompey did not want peace either. If he had been a man worthy of the high position he occupied, we can assume that he would have understood that a man who aspires to the crown cannot
not return to the beaten track of ordinary life, and that there is no longer any place on earth for him. But Pompey's soul was just high enough not to ask for a favour that the victor might have been magnanimous enough to grant him: on the other hand, his mind was too small to do so. Either because he could not take it upon himself to confide in Caesar, or because in his vague and indecisive way, after the first impression of the disaster of Pharsalus, he had begun to hope again, Pompey resolved to continue the fight and to seek another battlefield than that of Pharsalus.

In Africa, the coalition, or rather Juba, king of Numidia, who held sway there, had been arming unhindered since the autumn of 705 (49). While the whole of the East had been lost to the coalition by the battle of Pharsalus, it could honourably continue the war, probably in Spain and certainly in Africa.

While the remnants of the defeated party allowed themselves to be dragged down by destiny, and while those who had resolved to continue the struggle did not know how or where to pursue it, Caesar, ever swift in his resolutions as in his actions, prepared to pursue Pompey, the only one of his he respected as a general, and the one whose capture would probably have discouraged the of his adversaries. With a few men he crossed the Hellespont: his boat encountered an enemy fleet destined for the Black Sea and took prisoners all the crews struck with terror by the news of the battle of Pharsalus, and as soon as the most necessary preparations were completed, he set off in pursuit of Pompey towards the East. Pompey had passed through Lesbos after the battle, had brought back his wife and his second son Sextus, and after sailing along Asia Minor, went to Cyprus. On hearing that Antioch had declared for Caesar and that the road to the Parthian country was no longer open, he changed his course and sailed for Egypt, where a number of his old soldiers were serving in the army, and where the situation and rich resources of the country gave him the time and opportunity to reorganise the war.

In Egypt, after the death of Ptolemy Auletes in May 703 (51), his children Cleopatra, aged about sixteen, and Ptolemy Denys, aged about ten, had jointly inherited the throne, in accordance with their father's wishes; but soon the brother, or rather his guardian Pothinus, had driven his sister from the kingdom and forced her to seek refuge in Syria, from where she made preparations to return to the kingdom. father. Ptolemy and Pothinus were at Pelusa with the whole Egyptian army, to protect the eastern frontier against it, at the very moment when Pompey dropped anchor at the promontory of Cassium and asked the king for permission to disembark. The Egyptian court, which had long been informed of the disaster of Pharsalus, was on the point of repelling Pompey; but the king's guardian Theodotus ordered the Egyptians to disembark.
point out that if this were done, Pompey would probably use his relations with the army of Egypt to stir up a revolt, and that it would be better, as far as Caesar was concerned, to seize this opportunity to get rid of Pompey. Political reasoning of this kind rarely failed to have an effect among the statesmen of the Hellenic world. Achillus, the general of the royal troops, and some of Pompey's former officers, went in a boat to Pompey's ship and invited him to come to the king, and as the water was low, to enter their boat.

As he touched the shore, the military tribune Lucius Septimius struck him from behind, before the eyes of his wife and son, who were obliged to witness Pompey's murder from the deck of their ship, unable to defend or avenge him, 28 Sept. 706 (48). On the same day that, thirteen years earlier, he had triumphantly entered the capital after the defeat of Mithridates, the man who, for a whole generation, had been called the Great and had governed Rome, perished on these inhospitable sands by the hand of one of his soldiers. A good officer, but mediocre in intelligence and heart, destiny had, with prodigious constancy, enabled him to perform the most brilliant and easy deeds for thirty years; it had allowed him to pick all the laurels planted and cultivated by others; it had offered him all the conditions required to show in his person a
an example of false greatness, to which history could offer nothing similar.

When Caesar, following in Pompey's footsteps, arrived in the roadstead of Alexandria, it was all over. He was returning home deeply agitated when the murderer brought him on board the head of the man who had been his son-in-law and colleague in power for so many years, and whom he had gone to Egypt to take alive. An assassin's dagger spared him from wondering what he would have done with Pompey in captivity; but, while human sympathy, which still held its place in Caesar's great soul alongside ambition, ordered him to spare his former friend, his own interests demanded that he get rid of Pompey by some means other than the hand of an assassin. Caesar, faithful to the custom of organising things definitively and immediately in person, and firmly convinced that he had no need to fear resistance from either the Roman garrison or the court, and also very short of money, disembarked at Alexandria with two legions merged together, whose strength amounted to 3,200 men, plus 800 Celtic and German cavalry. He stayed at the royal palace and set about collecting the necessary sums of money and settling the Egyptian succession. The brother and sister were ordered to suspend hostilities immediately, and were invited to have their dispute examined by arbitration.
They submitted; the royal child was already in the palace and Cleopatra also came. In accordance with the testament of Auletes, Caesar awarded the kingdom of Egypt to the married brother and sister Cleopatra and Ptolemy Dionysius.

But a storm was brewing. Alexandria was a cosmopolitan city like Rome, scarcely inferior to the capital of Italy, and far superior to it in commercial activity, industry, and taste for science and art: among the citizens there was a very powerful feeling of national pride. It was with growing indignation that the Egyptians, who were devout to the point of superstition, and who prided themselves on the renowned magnificence of their court as a personal possession, saw the walls of their temples stripped and the wooden tableware on their king's table stripped. The tumult of the landing, when the multitude saw the Roman bundles transported to the old palace, and the numerous murders of soldiers in the city, had shown Caesar the immense danger he was facing.
But it was difficult to return because of the north-easterly winds that prevailed at this time of year, and attempts to embark could easily become a signal for insurrection.
It was usual for Caesar to leave without having completed his work. At the same time, he sent for reinforcements from Asia, and until they arrived, he remained extremely calm. Never was there more gaiety in his camp than during this rest in Alexandria, and while the beautiful and skilful Cleopatra lavished her coquetries on everyone, and especially on her judge, Caesar seemed to include among his most beautiful women: his wife, his son and his daughter.
victories over women. It was a joyful prelude to a serious drama. Under the command of Achillus, and, as was later proved, by the secret orders of the king and his intimate, the Roman army of occupation unexpectedly appeared in Alexandria, and as soon as the citizens saw that it had come to attack Caesar, they made common cause with the soldiers.

Caesar hastily assembled his scattered soldiers, seized the king and his minister, entrenched himself in the royal residence and in the theatre adjoining it, and gave orders, given that there was not enough time to secure the war fleet stationed in the main port, in front of the theatre, so that it could be set on fire. At the same time, Caesar ordered the commanders of Asia Minor and of the nearest subject regions, the Syrians and Nabataeans, the Cretans and Rhodians, to send troops and ships to Egypt in all haste. The insurrection, led by the princess Arsinoë and her confidant the eunuch Ganymede, was spreading during this time.
At that time, the whole of Egypt and most of the capital were under attack.

Finally, the long-awaited help arrived. Mithridates of Pergamum, a skilful general of the school of Mithridates Eupator, whose natural son he claimed to be, brought a mixed army from Syria. After a series of successful battles, this army arrived on the other bank of the Nile at Memphis. Caesar, on the other hand, as soon as he heard the news of the arrival of the relief troops, transported some of his troops by water to the end of Lake Marea, west of Alexandria, and marched around the lake and along the Nile to
meet Mithridates going up the river. The junction took place without the enemy trying to prevent it.

Then Caesar marched to the Delta, where the king had retreated, overthrew the Egyptian vanguard at the first blow, despite the deep canal that covered it, and took the Egyptian camp itself.

The fate of the city, which had dared to thwart the plans of the master of the world, and which had come so close to doing so, was at stake.
But he was too much of a statesman to be resentful, and he treated the Alexandrians like the Massaliotes. Caesar, pointing to their city, which had been horribly devastated and deprived of its granaries, its famous library and other important buildings following the burning of the fleet, urged the inhabitants to cultivate the arts and peace in the future and to heal the wounds they had inflicted on themselves. Cleopatra and her younger brother Ptolemy won the sovereignty of Egypt under the supremacy of Rome.

This insurrection in Alexandria, although insignificant in itself, was nevertheless important enough to force the all-powerful man, without whom nothing could be achieved and nothing could be resolved, to neglect his subsequent plans from October 706 until March 707. The consequences of personal government were beginning to be felt. The monarchy was in place, but extreme confusion reigned everywhere, and the monarch was absent.

However, the vast majority of Republicans and Pompeians alike had gone to Africa, where it was possible to
only to pursue an honourable and constitutional war against the usurper.

As neither Caesar nor any of his lieutenants made the slightest attempt against Africa, the coalition had time to acquire complete political and military organisation there. First of all, it was necessary to fill the position of commander-in-chief left empty by Pompey's death. The army wanted the praetor Marcus Cato as its leader. But the choice finally fell on Scipio, and it was Cato himself who brought about this decision.

The senate of the "three hundred" again appeared before the new general-in-chief. It established its headquarters at Utica, and filled its enlightened ranks by admitting the most esteemed and wealthy men of the equestrian order.

Preparations for war were pushed forward with the greatest energy, mainly by Cato's zeal, and all men fit to bear arms, even freedmen and Libyans, were enrolled in the legions. To these must be added Juba's 120 elephants and the 55-sail fleet commanded by Publius Varus and Marcus Octavius. Caesar's absence, the restlessness of the legions and the movements in Spain and Italy had gradually raised spirits, and the memory of the defeat at Pharsalus was beginning to give way to new hopes of victory.

Worrying events had indeed occurred among the troops that Caesar had assembled in southern Italy in order to embark with him for Africa. For the most part, these were the old legions that had founded Caesar's rule in Gaul, Spain and Thessaly. The spirit of these troops had not benefited from victory, and had been completely disturbed by a long rest in southern Italy. The almost superhuman work that the general had demanded of them had left even these men of iron with a secret resentment. When the orders to embark for Sicily arrived, the legions refused to obey until the gifts they had been promised had been paid, scornfully rejected the officers sent by Caesar and even threw stones at them. Caesar suddenly appeared in the midst of the furious bands, asking them what they wanted. They cried out that they wanted their leave. In a moment they were granted what they had asked for.
With regard to the gifts he had promised his soldiers at his triumph, as well as the land he had not promised them but which he intended to give them, Caesar replied that they could ask for them on the day when he and his soldiers triumphed; they could not, of course, take part, since they had been dismissed beforehand. Ashamed, as men, of the fidelity with which the general had kept his promise to soldiers who had betrayed their duty and of his generosity, moved, as soldiers, by the fact that they had been dismissed.
the prospect of being civil spectators to the triumph of their comrades, and of
to hear themselves called not "comrades" but "citizens", an appellation that sounded so strange in his mouth and which destroyed all at once the pride of their military career, finally falling under the spell of a man whose presence had an irresistible power, the soldiers remained mute

for some time; then cries arose from all sides, asking the general to return his favour and allow them to call themselves Caesar's soldiers again. Caesar, after
But the leaders of the sedition were deprived of a third of their triumphal gifts. History knows of no greater masterpiece of psychology, and one that has succeeded more completely.

This sedition had an unfortunate influence on the African campaign, at least in the sense that it delayed its opening. When Caesar arrived at the port of Lilybaea, where he was due to embark, the ten legions destined for Africa were far from being fully assembled, and the most battle-hardened troops had been left behind. He was unable to land more than 3,000 men in Africa, most of whom were recruits, and 150 cavalry.

So Caesar waited for the legions of veterans to arrive. His situation was critical. His army was massed over a space of two and a half square leagues; although the fleet brought in grain, Caesar's cavalry suffered from the lack of forage as much as Pompey's had before Dyrrachium. Despite Caesar's efforts, the enemy's light troops remained so vastly superior to his own that it seemed impossible to continue military operations in the area.
the interior, even with veterans. If Scipio had withdrawn and abandoned the cities on the coast, he might have won a victory similar to that which the vizier of Orodes had won over Crassus, and Juba over Curion. But Scipio, the general-in-chief, decided that the war would be continued in the coastal regions. The methods of terror used against the communities who were merely suspected of indifference had exasperated them to the point of intense hatred. The towns of Africa declared their support for Caesar wherever they could; desertion spread among the Gétuliens and Libyans who served in large numbers in the light troops and even in the legions.
But Scipio, with the obstinacy that characterises madness, persevered with his plan, setting off with all his forces from Utica to appear in front of the towns of Ruspina and Petite-Leptis occupied by Caesar, and providing Hadrumetes to the north and Thapsus to the south (on the Ras el Demas promontory) with strong garrisons.

Finally Caesar, having been joined by the last reinforcements, made a lateral movement towards Thapsus. Suddenly, along the shore of the sea and opposite Caesar's camp, the legions of Scipio and Juba appeared. Caesar's right wing, in front of the other divisions, frightened the line of elephants opposing it - and this was the last battle in which elephants were used - by throwing bullets and shells at them.
arrows, so that they turned on their own ranks. The defensive force was broken, the wing
The enemy's left was knocked down and the whole line driven in. The mass of the defeated army threw down its weapons and asked for quarter; but Caesar's soldiers were no longer those who had agreed not to fight at Ilerda, and who had honourably spared the vanquished. The habit of civil war and the rancour created by the insurrection showed their power in a terrible way on the battlefield of Thapsus. The fifty thousand corpses that covered this battlefield, among which

several of Caesar's officers were known to be secret opponents of the new monarchy and were killed for this reason by their own soldiers, showed how the soldier took justice into his own hands.

Cato indignantly rejected the soldiers' request that he allow them to put the infidel inhabitants of Utica to death en masse, and preferred to let the last boulevard of the republicans fall without resistance than to sully the last moments of the republic with such a massacre. After
Having convinced himself that he could no longer render any service to anyone, he thought he could resign his command, retired to his flat and pierced himself with his sword. The commander-in-chief, Metellus Scipio, with the fleet of the defeated party, fell into the hands of Sittius' cruisers, and just as they were about to lay hands on him, he killed himself. King Juba, who was prepared for the circumstances, had resolved to die in the way he thought best for a king, and had erected a huge pyre in the market place of the town of Zama, intending to burn himself there with all the treasures and the corpses of all the inhabitants of Zama. However, the inhabitants showed little inclination to serve as decorations for the funeral service of the African Sardanapalus, and closed the gates in front of the king when, fleeing the battlefield, he appeared in front of the city accompanied by Marcus Petreius. This sovereign, who was one of those natures that become savage in the midst of a life of brilliance and insolent power, and who sought even in death an intoxicating feast, went with a
At the end of the feast he challenged Petreius to a single combat. It was Catilina's victor who died at the hands of the king, who then had one of his slaves kill him.

The struggle that Pompey and the republicans had undertaken against Caesar's monarchy thus ended, after lasting four years, with the complete victory of the new monarchy. The republican tradition that had lasted without interruption for five hundred years was broken, and the monarchy was established throughout the Roman Empire by the legitimacy of the fait accompli.

The constitutional conflict was over, and Cato proclaimed the fact when he took his own life at Utica. For many years, he had been the champion of republican legitimacy against its oppressors; he had continued in this role, even though he no longer had any hope of success. But today, the conflict itself had become impossible; the republic that Marcus Brutus had founded was dead and was not to live again; what was left for the republicans to do on this earth? The treasury had been removed; the sentries had been relieved of their guard; who could blame them for leaving? There was more nobility, and above all more judgement, in Cato's death than in his life. Cato was nothing less than a great man; but with all that narrowness of vision, that harshness, that dry prolixity, and those more or less authentic phrases, which made him, in his own time and for centuries to come, the ideal of unthinking republicanism and the favourite of all those whose rattle he was, he was nevertheless the only man who defended honourably and courageously in the final struggle the great system of the republic.

condemned to death. Precisely because the most clever lie is annihilated before the simple truth, and because all the dignity and glory of human nature depend, in the final analysis, not on cleverness but on honesty, Cato played a greater role in history than many men superior to him in intelligence. The profound and tragic significance of his death is enhanced rather than diminished by the fact that he was a fool: it is precisely because Don Quixote is a fool that he is a tragic figure. It is striking that, in this drama of the history of the
world, in which so many wise men and heroes had played their part, the epilogue had to be pronounced by a fool.

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THE OLD REPUBLIC AND THE NEW MONARCHY

The new monarch of Rome, the first leader of the entire Roman-Hellenic civilisation, Caius Julius Caesar, was fifty-six years old (having been born on 12 July 652 (102)), when the battle of Thapsus, the last ring in a long chain of important victories, placed the destiny of the world in his hands.
Few men have seen the flexibility of their genius put to greater test than Caesar, the only creative genius. Rome and the last of the old world, which naturally followed in its wake until the bright star disappeared. From one of the oldest
He spent his childhood and adolescence as the noble youth of the time was wont to do. He had tasted the sweetness and bitterness of the elegant life, recited and declaimed, practised literature and made verses in his spare moments, thrown himself into amorous intrigues of all kinds and had been initiated into
all the mysteries of the toilette of the time, as well as the even more mysterious art of always borrowing and never paying. But the flexible steel of his nature stood the test of these dissipated and corrupted practices; Caesar retained his bodily vigour and his elasticity of mind and heart. When it came to arms and riding, he was the equal of all his soldiers, and his skill at swimming saved his life at Alexandria;
The incredible speed of his journeys, which he usually made at night to save time, was in striking contrast to the solemn slowness with which Pompey moved from one place to another,
made his contemporaries astonished and was not the least of the reasons for his success.
The mind was like the body. His remarkable power of intuition was revealed in the precision and practicality of his combinations; he gave his orders even without having seen them with his own eyes. His memory was incomparable, and it was easy for him to carry out several occupations at the same time, while always remaining in control of himself. Although he was a well-bred man, a man of genius, and almost a monarch, he had a heart. As long as he lived, he surrounded his worthy mother Aurelia with the purest veneration (his father had died young); he had an affection for his wives and for his daughter Julia that did him credit, and which was not without influence on his political conduct. He maintained relations with the most capable and excellent men of his time, whether of high or low rank, and

remained inviolably loyal to them, treating each according to his own character. Unlike Pompey, who cowardly abandoned his supporters, Caesar, out of a feeling pure of any clique, remained loyal to his friends, many of whom, such as Aulus Hirtius and Caius Matius, even after his death, gave tangible proof of their attachment to him. If there was one dominant trait in such a harmoniously organised nature, it was that he abhorred all ideology and fantasy. By nature, César was a passionate man, for there is no genius without passion; but his passion was never too strong to be controlled. He had had his time in youth, and
love, songs and wine had taken their place in his mind; but these habits had not been able to penetrate his inner nature. Literature occupied him for a long time and seriously; but while
that Alexander could not sleep when he thought of Homer's Achilles, Caesar, in his insomnia,
thought about Latin declensions and conjugations. He wrote verses, like everyone else in
He was also interested in astronomy and natural history. While wine remained for Alexander the consolation of worries, the sober Roman, when the orgies of youth were over, gave it up completely. Even in old age, he had love affairs and successes with women, and he retained a certain nonchalance in his walk, or, to put it better, a flattering sense of his masculine beauty. He carefully hid his baldness with a laurel wreath he wore in public in his later years, and would have given more than one of his victories to regain the beautiful curls of his youth. But whatever pleasure he found, even as a monarch, in the company of women, he sought only distraction with them and allowed them to have no influence over him: his much-criticised intrigue with Cleopatra had had no other purpose than to conceal a weak point in his political situation. Caesar was above all a practical man and a man of sense: and whatever he he did so with a cool presence of mind, untroubled by memory or by his own personal feelings.
It is to this that he owed the ability to act with all his strength and to apply all his genius to the smallest and least important circumstances; it is to this that he owed that multiple power, which enabled him to master all that the intelligence can understand, and the will to drive; it is to this that he owed that ease and that self-possession, which enabled him to balance the periods of his life with the periods of his life; it is to this that he owed that multiple power, which enabled him to master all that the intelligence can understand, and the will to drive; it is to this that he owed that ease and that self-possession, which enabled him to balance the periods of his life with the periods of his life.
Finally, he owed him that marvellous serenity which he retained in good fortune as well as in bad, and that complete independence, which did not admit the control of either a favourite or a mistress, not even a friend. Moreover, this clarity of judgement prevented him from deluding himself about the power of destiny and the skill of man; he knew nothing of the veil that hides from man the futility of his efforts. However cautiously he combined his plans, he foresaw every eventuality, and he never forgot that in all things fortune, that is to say chance, must ensure success.
destiny, and that in particular he risked his person a thousand times with audacious indifference. Men of superior sagacity sometimes indulge in a pure game of chance; but there was a point in Caesar's rationalism where it bordered on mysticism.

Gifts like these were bound to produce a statesman. Caesar was a statesman from his youth, in the best sense of the word.
of the word, and its goal was the highest that any man could set himself: the regeneration of the human race.
The harsh school of thirty years' experience changed his views as to the means that could help him achieve this goal. The harsh school of thirty years' experience changed his views as to the means that could help him achieve this goal; but this goal itself never varied, in the
In times of hopeless humiliation and in times of unlimited power, in times when, as a conspirator and demagogue, he walked along dark paths and in times when, as the master of sovereign power and a true monarch, he worked on his project in the full light of day, before the eyes of the world. All the measures of a permanent nature that came from him at different times took their place in this vast edifice. We cannot therefore speak of isolated acts by Caesar: he did nothing in isolation. Caesar is justly praised as an orator whose masculine eloquence, disdaining all the tricks of the lawyer, illuminated and warmed like a flame. In Caesar the author is justly admired for the immutable simplicity of his composition, the perfect purity and beauty of his language. It is with justice that the greatest masters in the art of war have praised Caesar as a general who, disdainful to a supreme degree of routine and tradition, knew how to find the system of warfare which, in a given circumstance, ensured triumph over the enemy, and was therefore good, and who, with the certainty of divination, found the means appropriate to each goal, and, like William of Orange, rose after each defeat and invariably ended the campaign with victory. Caesar spared resources
He found the guarantee of victory, not in the mass of his forces, but in the speed of their movements, not in long preparations, but in rapid action, even when the means were insufficient. But these were secondary qualities in Caesar. He was undoubtedly a great orator, author and general, but he became one because he was a consummate statesman. Soldiers played only a secondary role in his life, and one of the main characteristics that distinguished him from the rest of the world was that he was a soldier.
of Alexander, Hannibal and Napoleon, was that he entered politics not as an officer but as a demagogue. According to his original plan, he intended to achieve his goal like Pericles and Caius Gracchus, without the force of arms, and for eighteen years, as leader of the people's party, he had lived exclusively in political plans and intrigues, until, convinced over time of the need for military support, he placed himself, at the age of forty, at the head of an army.

Napoleon's ventures against Egypt and England clearly show the artillery lieutenant who had risen from subordinate ranks to command, just as Caesar's similar ventures show the demagogue metamorphosed into a general. The task of the statesman is universal in nature, like Caesar's genius; although he undertook the most varied and unrelated things, they all had some connection with the great object which, with marvellous fidelity and constancy, he pursued relentlessly, and he never allowed the varied aspects of his great authority to be dominated by one another. Although a master in the art of war, he did his best, through political considerations, to keep civil strife at bay, and when it did begin, he tried to preserve his laurels from bloodshed. Although he founded a military monarchy, he persisted, with an energy that few have seen before, in his efforts to preserve his laurels from bloodshed.

of examples in history, to want neither a hierarchy of marshals nor a government of praetorians. If he had a preference for any form of service to the state, it was for the sciences and arts of peace rather than those of war. The most remarkable feature of his actions as a statesman was perfect harmony. In reality, all the conditions of this most important function were met.
difficult things of this world were united in Caesar. Deeply practical, he never allowed himself to be troubled by images of the past or by any venerable tradition.
In grammar, too, he scorned all historical and antiquarian research, and recognised only customary usage on the one hand, and the rule of symmetry on the other. Born a master, he ruled the minds of men like the wind rules the clouds, and forced the most heterogeneous natures to place themselves at his service, the polite citizen and the rough subaltern, the noble matrons of Rome and the beautiful princesses of Egypt and Mauritania, the brilliant cavalry officer and the calculating banker. His talent for organisation was marvellous; no statesman has ever forced alliances, no general formed an army from the most rebellious and resistant elements,
with a decisiveness and firmness comparable to that of Caesar, when he organised coalitions and legions; never has a ruler judged his instruments better or known how to put them to better use.
place with a sharper eye. He was a monarch, but he never played the king. Even when he became absolute master of Rome, he maintained the appearance of a party leader; perfectly supple and flexible, easy and gentle in conversation, indulgent to all, he seemed to want to be only the first among his peers. Caesar entirely avoided the pitfall of so many men who are, in other respects, his equals, and who have brought into politics the tone of military command; although his different relations with the senate often gave him the opportunity, he never had to carry out violence such as that of 18 Brumaire. Caesar was a monarch, but he never had the vertigo of tyranny. He is perhaps the only powerful man on earth who, in great as in small circumstances, never acted according to his inclination or his whim, but always, without exception, in accordance with his duty as a leader, and who, looking back on his life, while having to regret more than one miscalculation, never had to
regret a misplaced outburst of passion. There is nothing in the history of Caesar's life that can be compared, even on a small scale, to the poetic-sensual ebullitions, such as the murder of Clitus or the burning of Persepolis, found in the history of his great predecessor in the East. All in all, he was perhaps the only one of these powerful men who retained to the end of his career the political tact with which one navigates between the possible and the impossible, and who did not succumb to the most difficult task for richly gifted natures, that of recognising, at the height of success, the natural limits of things. He did what was possible, and never left a useful thing undone in order to pursue a new, impossible one; at least, he never disdained to mitigate incurable ills with palliatives. But where he recognised that destiny had spoken, he always obeyed. Alexandre
on the Hyphase, Napoleon in Moscow, resisted because they had no other choice, and
were indignant with destiny for giving his favourites only limited successes; Caesar
On the Danube and the Euphrates, he did not dream of unlimited plans for conquest, but simply a reasonable settlement of borders.

Such was this unique man that seems so easy and yet is so difficult to portray. His
The whole of his nature is transparent in its clarity, and tradition has preserved for us details of him that are even more detailed.
abundant and more vivid than on any of the heroes of the old world. The idea that we can
The face of such a man may vary, may be more or less hollow or deep, but it cannot undergo any perceptible difference: for any man whose mind is not absolutely perverted, his large face will be more or less hollow or deep, but it cannot undergo any perceptible difference.
has the same essential features, and yet no one has succeeded in bringing it to life. Visit
secret lies precisely in this perfection. Through his character as a man, as well as through his
In his place in history, Caesar occupies a position where the great contrasts of existence meet and balance each other. He had at the same time the most extraordinary creative power and the most penetrating judgement; he was no longer a young man, and he was not yet an old man; endowed with the greatest
energy of will and the highest capacity for execution, full of the republican ideal and at the same time born to be king, Roman in the deepest essence of his nature, and yet called to
By reconciling and combining in himself and in the outside world the Roman and Greek types of civilisation, Caesar is the complete and perfect man. But in this very circumstance lies the difficulty, I would even say the impossibility, of painting a life portrait of Caesar. Just as the artist can paint anything but consummate beauty, the historian, when he encounters perfection once in a thousand times, can only remain silent before it. Regularity can be painted; but it only gives a negative idea of
the absence of defect; the secret of nature, which in its most accomplished manifestations combines regularity and individuality, passes all expression. We have only to envy the fate of those who have contemplated this perfection, and to form an idea of it weakened by the reflected brilliance that remains in the works created by this great nature. It is true that these works also bear the stamp of time. The Roman hero is not only the equal of his Greek predecessor, but his superior.
aged, and had lost the charm of youth. Caesar's action was no longer, like Alexander's, a joyful march forward towards an indefinitely distant goal. He had to build on ruins and with ruins, and was content to establish himself as securely and as favourably as possible within the vast but impassable limits assigned to him. It is with good reason, therefore, that the delicate and poetic tact of nations has not fallen in love with the unpoetic Roman, and has only attached to the forehead of Philip's son that political halo which reflects all the nuances of legend. But it is with
This is all the more reason why the political life of nations has for centuries moved within the orbit traced by Caesar. The peoples to whom the empire of the world belongs still refer to the highest of their monarchs by his name, and this is a rather significant symptom, and unfortunately not very much to their credit.

In his work of pacification, Caesar started from the principle of reconciling the parties that had existed until then. While Caesar gave orders for the statues of Sylla, which had been knocked down by the populace of the capital on hearing the news of the battle of Pharsalus, to be raised, thus acknowledging the fact that history alone was the proper place to judge this great man, he also cancelled the last effects of his exceptional laws, recalling from exile the statues of Sylla, which had been knocked down by the populace of the capital on hearing the news of the battle of Pharsalus, at the same time he cancelled the last effects of his exceptional laws, recalling from exile those who had been banished in the troubled times of Cinna and Sertorius, and restoring to the sons of those who had been exiled by

Sylla the right to stand for election which they had lost. Similarly, he reinstated all those who, at the beginning of the recent

catastrophe, had lost their seat in the Senate and their civic rights by sentence of the censors or political trial.

One thing that was much more difficult than settling these questions, which already belonged, in terms of their subject, to the past, was dealing with the parties that still existed at that time: on the one hand, Caesar's own democratic adherents, and on the other, the destroyed aristocracy. When it became clear that Caesar was a long way from becoming the executor of Catilina's will, and that the most the debtors could expect from him was some relief in payment and changes in procedure, indignation manifested itself in the question: For whom did the popular party win, if not for the people? And the scum of this species, high and low, seeing their political and economic saturnalia fail, began to rattle with the Pompeians.

With regard to the old aristocratic party, which possessed a much greater vitality, he had to prepare and to begin its dissolution, which only time could accomplish, through a skilful combination of repression and conciliation. He avoided infuriating the defeated party with pointless sarcasm; he spoke of Pompey only with respect. The political persecution that followed the victory was confined by Caesar to the narrowest limits. He spared himself and the country the political trials of high treason. What's more, all the ordinary soldiers who had followed their Roman or provincial officers in the fight against Caesar enjoyed impunity. Only a small number of guilty parties were sentenced to death.

The republican opposition submitted, in order to obtain forgiveness; but it was not reconciled. Dissatisfied with the new order of things, they were exasperated with this intruding leader. There was no room for open political resistance. But republicanism was best expressed in opposing opinions, in secret agitation and in plots. When a comedian made a republican allusion, he was greeted with the loudest applause. The Roman Empire was full of nascent pretenders and republicans; the flames of civil war, ignited sometimes by the Pompeians, sometimes by the republicans, were violently rekindled in various places, and in the capital there was a perpetual conspiracy against the life of the monarch. But César could not, even in the presence of these plots, take it upon himself to be surrounded by a permanent bodyguard, and was content to have these conspiracies denounced by placards. César could not, for the lofty goal he was pursuing, do without the constitutional party itself, which in fact embraced, not only
the aristocracy, but all the literate and national spirits among the Italian citizens. As a result, the most distinguished leaders of the defeated parties were, it's true, removed from the scene.
did not spare the forgiveness of second- and third-rate men, particularly the younger generation. As with Henry IV and William of Orange, the greatest difficulties for Caesar arose after victory.

The degenerate democracy had been in open rebellion against Caesar from the moment it had taken power.
Caesar's personal adherents themselves murmured when they saw that the leader was establishing, instead of a state of condottieri, an equitable and just monarchy for all. This regulation of the republic was not well regarded by any party, and had to be
imposed on his associates no less than on his adversaries. In a certain sense, Caesar's position was more perilous than it had been before the victory; but what he lost, the State gained. By annihilating the parties and sparing the partisans, and even by allowing any man of talent or even of good family to come to power, regardless of his political background, he brought together all the living forces of the State for his great undertaking.

By accepting unreservedly, apart of course from the insane projects of Catilina and Clodius, the heritage of his party, by showing the most bitter hatred, the most personal hatred for the aristocracy and the true aristocrats, by keeping, without essentially modifying them, the ideas of Roman democracy, i.e. the alleviation of debts, colonisation beyond the seas, the gradual levelling of rights between the various classes of the state, the emancipation of political power from the senate, his monarchy differed so little from democracy that democracy, on the contrary, only achieved its goal by means of this monarchy. monarchy. This monarchy, in fact, was not the oriental despotism of divine right, but a monarchy such as Caius Gracchus wished to form, such as Pericles and Cromwell founded it, the representation of the nation by the man in whom it places its supreme and unlimited trust.

The position of the new head of state took an apparently singular form. Caesar had been invested with the dictatorship, first temporarily after his return from Spain, in 705 (49), then after the battle of Pharsalus, in the autumn of 706 (48), and finally for an indefinite period, after the battle of Thapsus, from 1 January 709, as an annual office to which he was first elevated for ten years, and finally in 710 for life: he also received the censorship under the new title of præfectus morum, in 708, for three years, and in 710 for life; then the consulship, first in 706, according to the ordinary forms (this was the immediate cause of the civil war), and successively for five years and for ten years, and once also without a colleague; in addition, not the people's tribune, it is true, but the tributary power in 706 (48) for life; he was also given the first place in the senate with the right to direct the vote; finally, in 708 (46), he received the title of imperator for life. A mixture of laws and senate decrees gave Caesar the right to decide on peace and war without consulting the senate or the people, the free disposal of armies and coffers, the appointment of provincial governors, a compulsory right of proposal concerning a portion of the elections in the comices by centuries, the right to appoint patricians, and other extraordinary prerogatives of the same kind, not to mention vain honours and decorations. This was an attempt to dissolve the absolute authority of the monarch into its various individual elements.

From every point of view, the new name of imperator appears to be the right expression for this new monarchy, precisely because it is new, and it cannot be seen to have been motivated by any external circumstances. From the point of view of public law, the new office of imperator was based on the position that the consuls and proconsuls occupied outside the pomœrium, so that not only military command, but supreme judicial and therefore administrative power was enclosed within it. The authority of the imperator was, from the point of view of quality, superior to that of the consuls and proconsuls, in that it was not limited in time or space, but was for life, hereditary, and was exercised even in the capital, so that the imperator could not, like the consul, be held in check by his colleagues of equal power.

In a word, this new office of imperator was nothing other than the re-establishment of the primitive royal power; for it was these very restrictions, i.e. the limitation of power as to place and time, collegiality, and the cooperation of the senate or the people, necessary in certain cases, that distinguished consuls from kings. There are few features of the new monarchy that are not to be found in the old, the union of supreme military, judicial and administrative power in the hands of the prince, a religious presidency of the republic, the right to issue ordinances having the force of law, the reduction of the senate to the role of a council of state, the re-establishment of the patriciate and the prefecture of the city, the particular and almost hereditary character ; for the constitution of Caesar, like that of Cromwell and Napoleon, allowed the monarch to appoint his successor by adoption. We should no longer be surprised that Caesar, who was nothing less than a political antiquarian, looked back five centuries to find the model for a new state. As a result, Caesar very sensibly linked himself to Servius Tullius, just as Charlemagne later linked himself to Caesar, and Napoleon at least tried to link himself to Charlemagne. More than one of his vehement followers advised him in different ways and at different times to take the crown, most notably Mark Antony, when he offered him the diadem as consul in front of all the people. But Caesar rejected all these proposals without exception.

But whatever the name, there was a sovereign there, and consequently the court was established with all its pomp, insipidity and emptiness. Caesar appeared in public, not in the purple-edged garment of the consuls, but in an all-purple robe, which in ancient times was the royal garment, and he received, seated on a golden throne and without rising, the solemn deputation of the senate. Festivals commemorating his birth, his victories and his wishes filled the calendar.

Under a monarch as absolute as Caesar, there was hardly any room for a constitution.
Caesar returned fully and deliberately to the tradition of the royal period; the assembly of citizens became once again what it had been at that time, with and for the king, the supreme and final expression of the king's will.

The senate returned to its original role of giving advice to the king when he asked for it.

As far as legislation was concerned, the democratic monarch remained faithful to the primitive custom of Roman public law, which was that the citizens as a whole, in agreement with the king who convened them, alone had the power to make organic laws for the republic, and he regularly had his ordinances sanctioned by decree of the people.

While the democratic king thus granted the community of the people at least a formal share in sovereignty, it was in no way his intention to divide his authority with the body which had hitherto been the sovereign, the college of senators. Caesar's senate must have been, unlike the future senate of Augustus, a supreme council of state which he used to prepare laws and to enact the most important administrative decrees made by him, or at least under his name; for there were occasions when senatus-consults were issued without any of the senators who were designated as present having had the slightest knowledge of them.

While the government of the nobility was thus discarded and its very existence undermined, and the Senate in its new form was no more than the instrument of the monarch, autocracy was at the same time introduced into the administration, and the government of the State; all executive power was concentrated in the hands of the monarch. First of all, the imperator naturally decided all matters in person. The Roman household was a machine in which the very intellectual power of slaves and freedmen was a product for the master: a master who knew how to govern them had a multitude of intelligences at his service. This was the ideal beauty of bureaucratic centralisation; our system of accounting tries to imitate it, but it remains as far from its prototype as the power of capital is inferior to the old system of slavery. What can be said with certainty is that Caesar had no second in command who exerted a personal influence on his work, or who was even initiated into the overall plan; not only was he the only master-builder, but he worked without skilled associates, with vulgar companions.

César took over the government of the entire financial and treasury system, running it as he did and the great men of Rome were accustomed to administering their own property. For the future provincial revenues, and, on the whole, the administration of the currency were entrusted to the imperator's slaves and freedmen, to the exclusion of men of the senatorial order: a considerable measure which over time gave rise to the important class of procuratores and the imperial household.

As for the governors, they became exclusively military leaders.

The magistrates of Rome were only the first among those of the empire, and the consulship in particular became a purely nominal post, which retained a certain practical importance only by virtue of the provincial government to which it gave the right. At the same time, the number of praetors and quaestors was doubled, as we have said, and the same was done for the plebeian aediles, to whom two new "aediles for wheat (ædiles cereales)" were added to oversee the capital's supplies. Appointment to these offices remained with the city, and was not subject to any restrictions as regards consuls, tribunes of the people and plebeian aediles: the imperator reserved the right to present to the electors, who had to accept them, half of the praetors, curule aediles and quaestors who were to be appointed annually.

The faint glimmer of Jupiter's cult still shone around the new throne.
The old national faith became the instrument of the Caesarian papacy,
which, however, was - from the outset - hollow and weak.

Caesar claimed the right to call capital cases as well as private trials in sole and final jurisdiction to his own bar, and to judge them personally if he was present, or by the city's lieutenant in his absence. In fact, we see him, in the manner of the ancient kings, sometimes sitting in justice
sometimes publicly in the Forum, to judge Roman citizens accused of high treason, sometimes conducting a judicial enquiry in his own house, for client princes accused of the same crime. For the usual judicial procedure in criminal and civil cases, Caesar kept the old judicial institutions or preserved the old way of dispensing justice.

Political crimes continued, even under the monarchy, to be reported to a commission of jurors: the new decree that Caesar issued on this subject specified the punishable acts with precision and in a liberal spirit that excluded any prosecution on the grounds of opinion, and set banishment rather than death as the penalty.

Caesar's reorganisation of the military system was limited to discipline, which he tightened and strengthened, since it had been lax under the negligent and incapable control that had preceded it. The Roman military system did not seem to him to require a radical reform, which it was not, moreover, susceptible to: he accepted the elements of the army as Hannibal had done.

The most essential change introduced into the military system was the institution of a permanent military leader in the person of the imperator, who dominated a governing corporation that was non-military and incapable in all respects, gathered in his hands complete control of the army, and made it, instead of a largely nominal leadership, a real and supreme command.

Above all, Caesar was planning an expedition against the Parthians, to avenge the day of Carrhes. He had counted three years for this war, and was determined to finish off these dangerous enemies once and for all, and with as much caution as vigour. He had also planned to attack Boerebistas, king of the Getes, who was considerably extending his power on both sides of the Danube, and to protect Italy to the north-east by border districts similar to those he had created for it in Gaul. On the other hand, there is no proof that Caesar, like Alexander, was planning an indefinite career of victories: It is said that he had thought of marching from Parthia to the Caspian Sea, and from the Caspian Sea to the Black Sea, and from there to the Danube, of annexing to the empire Scythia and Germania as far as the northern ocean, which, according to the ideas of the time, was not very far from Mauritania, and of returning to Rome via Gaul; but no credible authority guarantees the existence of these fabulous projects.

It is highly probable that Caesar, like Scipio Emiliano, was asking the gods not to increase the empire but to preserve it, and that his plans for conquest were limited to settling borders.

But, if it is only by probability that we cannot consider Caesar a conqueror of the world, in the same sense as Alexander and Napoleon, it is certain that his design was not to make his new monarchy rest mainly on the army, nor to place military authority above civil authority, but to incorporate it into the civil community, and, as far as possible, to subordinate it to it. The main pillars of the military state, the old and famous legions of Gaul, were honourably disbanded because their esprit de corps was incompatible with the civil state, and their glorious name was perpetuated only in the newly founded civil communities. The soldiers received plots of land from Caesar; but they were not, like those of Sylla, established together and militarily in particular colonies, but above all in Italy, isolated as far as possible.

Even though he was still surrounded by assassins and knew it well, Caesar rejected the proposal made in the senate to set up a private guard; as soon as peace had been restored, he dismissed the escort. He was satisfied with a retinue of lictors, as was the traditional practice for the supreme magistrates of Rome.

Destiny is more powerful than genius. Caesar wanted to become the restorer of the republic, and he became the founder of the military monarchy that he abhorred; he overthrew the regime of aristocrats and bankers, and replaced it with the military regime, and the republic continued as before to be tyrannised and exploited by a privileged minority. It is nevertheless the privilege of the highest natures to go astray in creating. The brilliant attempts made by great men to realise the ideal, even when they fall short of their goal, form the safest treasure of nations. It was thanks to Caesar's work that the Roman military state did not become a police government for centuries and that the Roman imperatores used the army, not against the citizens, but against the public enemy.

The settlement of financial affairs gave rise to relatively few difficulties as a result of the solid foundations provided by the vastness of the empire and the exclusion of the credit system.

As soon as the reins of financial administration were in the hands of Caesar rather than the senators, a new life, a stricter order and more unity in the direction, were felt in all the cogs of this vast machine. The two institutions that owed their origins to Caius Gracchus, and which were devouring the State's finances like gangrene, the farm of public revenues and the distribution of grain, were partly reformed.

While, according to the Sempronia law, renewed by Cato, all Roman citizens established in Rome had had a right to wheat distributions without paying, this list of destitute people, which had reached the figure of 320,000, was reduced, by the exclusion of those who had means of subsistence or for other reasons, to 150,000 and this number was definitively fixed as being that of men who were entitled to distributions. This change from a political privilege to a charitable institution ; we saw the birth of a principle that was as remarkable from a moral point of view as it was from a historical one.

The old Latin race had long since disappeared entirely from Rome. From every corner of the vast empire, crowds of people flocked to Rome for speculation, debauchery, and the pursuit of their dreams. intrigue, for crime, or to hide from the eyes of the law. These were evils inseparable from a capital city; but there were more accidental evils that were perhaps even more serious. There has perhaps never been a great city more incapable of being self-sufficient than Rome: imports on the one hand, and domestic manufacture by slaves on the other, made free industry impossible from the outset.

Popular festivals had grown so long that the seven ordinary festivals alone, the Roman, the Plebeian, the Mother of the Gods, Ceres, Apollo, Flora and Victory, together lasted sixty-two days, to which must be added gladiatorial combats and many other extraordinary amusements. The duty to supply grain at low prices, which was inevitably necessary with a proletariat living from day to day, was carried out with extreme lightness, and the fluctuations in the price of bread-making wheat were truly fabulous. Finally, the grain distributions officially invited all the proletariat who were dying of hunger and did not want to work, to remain in the capital. The seed was poor and the harvest suffered.

People always saw food shortages ahead of them, and often complete starvation. Nowhere was a man less sure of his life than in the capital: professional murder by bandits was the only trade peculiar to it: before the murder, the victim was lured to Rome; no one ventured near the capital without being armed and followed. The condition of the city's interior corresponded to this external disorganisation, and seemed a bitter satire of the government.
aristocracy. Nothing was done to rectify the course of the Tiber, except that the only bridge still in use was built of stone, at least as far as the island of the Tiber. Nor was anything done to level the city on the seven hills, except perhaps where the accumulation of rubbish had corrected the level. The streets went up and down narrow and angular, and were horribly unkempt: the pavements were narrow and badly paved. The ordinary houses were built in brick and without care, and reached extraordinary heights, thanks to the contractors who worked for the small owners: the first thus became prodigiously rich, and the others were reduced to the last misery. Like isolated islands in the middle of this sea of hovels, we could see the
splendid palaces of the rich, which ate up the space of the small houses, just as their owners devoured the rights of the small in the State: next to these marble palaces and these Greek statues, the ruined temples, with their images of the gods which were largely made of wood, made a
melancholy figure. The supervision of streets, quays and buildings was absolutely unknown. If the government was concerned with the daily floods, fires and falling houses, it was only to ask the state theologians for their report and opinion as to the meaning of these signs and wonders. If we picture London with the slave population of New Orleans, with the police of Constantinople, with the anti-industrial character of modern Rome, and agitated by politicians such as those of Paris in 1848, we shall get a rough idea of the republican glory, the loss of which Cicero and his followers lament in their unreasonable letters.

Caesar worked energetically to reform this lamentable and shameful state of affairs.
Unfortunately, the most essential evils were the most incurable. Caesar could not abolish
slavery with its trail of national calamities. Caesar was equally unable to create industry in the capital. However, the great constructions remedied to a certain extent the lack of support he encountered, and he opened up to the proletariat a limited but honourable source of earnings.

The ranks of the existing proletariat were thinned, on the one hand, by the courts which pursued the multitude with incessant vigour, and on the other, by extensive transmarine colonisation. From new measures to limit the incessant price fluctuations of the most essential commodities on the capital's market. The club system was reformed. The same applied to corruption and violence, which had prevailed in republican elections and in the courts, and generally to the saturnalia of scoundrels, which put an end to itself. To this was added a stricter administration of criminal justice and an energetic police force. The emperor did not disdain to oblige property owners to repair roads and pave the pavement to its full width, and also published ordinances on litter bearers and carters who, due to the narrowness of the streets, were only allowed to circulate freely in the capital at night.

Caesar was not only superior to his predecessors in terms of the extent of the buildings themselves and the amount of money spent on them, but a true sense of what was necessary for the public good distinguishes Caesar's work on Rome's public institutions. He did not, like his successors, build temples and other splendid constructions; the Forum was where the people's assemblies, the courts, the stock exchange, daily work and idleness were held; he at least got rid of the assemblies and the courts, by building new comices for the people, the Septa Julia on the Field of Mars, and a special meeting place for the courts, the Forum Julium, between the Capitol and the Palatine. Plans had already been drawn up for a new senate palace, a magnificent new bazaar, a theatre to rival Pompey's, a Latin and Greek library modelled on the one that had recently been destroyed in Alexandria, which would have been the first institution of its kind in Rome, and a temple to Mars, which was to have been built on the site of the Capitoline Palace.
surpass all that had hitherto existed in wealth and glory.

Despite the most serious attempts to annihilate smallholdings, tenant farming was no longer the norm. agriculture was predominant at this time, with the possible exception of the Apennine and Abruzzi valleys. In the domains of Tusculum and Tibur, on the shores of Terracine and Baia, where the ancient Latin farmers had sown and harvested, the villas of the Roman nobles now rose in empty splendour, some of which covered the space of a medium-sized town with their outbuildings of gardens, aqueducts, freshwater and saltwater fishponds for the conservation and multiplication of sea and freshwater fish, rabbit warrens, deer, roe deer and wild boar, and aviaries for pheasants and peacocks.

The rivalry between fruit gardeners was taken so far that, in elegant villas, the fruit garden was lined with marble and laid out like a dining room.

The valley of Rieti, the area around Lake Fucin, the districts of Liris and Volturne, and central Italy in general, were in a flourishing condition as far as farming was concerned: there were even certain branches of industry that were favourable adjuncts to agriculture and, when circumstances lent themselves to it, inns, cloth factories, and above all, the construction of "bakeries", were built on the property.
brickworks. Italy's wine-growers and olive growers, not only
supplied the markets of Italy, but exported large quantities of their products across the seas.

As a result of this economic system, which, from an agricultural and mercantile point of view, was based on mass capital and speculation, a terrible disproportion in the distribution of wealth was created. The oft-repeated phrase "a republic of millionaires and beggars" was perhaps never more aptly applied than to the Rome of the late republic. There could be no real middle class, in the true sense of the word, because no such class could exist in a slave state.

The aristocrat struggled with the plebeian to do nothing; if the one lay down on the pavement, the other stayed at home.
bed until the middle of the day. Extravagance, and tasteless extravagance, predominated. It spread into politics and the theatre, and naturally in such a way as to corrupt both. The office of consul was bought at an enormous price; in the summer of 700 (54), the vote for the first degree was paid for.
only 10,000,000 sesterces (2,500,000 gold francs), and all the pleasure that the educated man finds at the theatre was spoilt by the haphazard taste of the decoration.

But no luxury was more widespread than the crudest of all, the luxury of the table. Not only were there different dining rooms for summer and winter, but dinner was served in the painting gallery, in the fruit garden, in the aviary, or on a platform raised in the deer park, around which, when the local Orpheus appeared in theatrical costume and played his
In the midst of the accents, well-trained roe deer and wild boar would gather. Such was the care given to decoration, but the realities were not forgotten: not only was the cook a gastronomic expert, but the master himself often taught his cook. No naturalist has ever scoured the land and seas with greater zeal for new animals and plants than the epicureans of the time for culinary rarities. There is no
surprised to see a guest take an emetic after a banquet, to avoid the consequences of the meal.
too great a variety of dishes placed before him. Debauchery in all its forms became so systematic and learned that it found teachers who made a living from giving lessons to young men of quality on the theory and practice of vice.

The princely fortunes of the time had already been indebted to princely people: Caesar, around 692 (62) after deducting his assets, owed 25,000,000 sesterces (6,250,000 gold francs); Marc-Antony, at the age of twenty-four, received 6,000,000 sesterces (1,500,000 gold francs), and fourteen years later, 40,000,000 sesterces (10 million gold francs).

In such circumstances, morality and family life were treated as old prejudices in all classes of society. To be poor was not only the greatest misfortune and the worst crime, but the only misfortune and the only crime: for money, the statesman sold out his country and his family.
the citizen his freedom; the rank of officer and the vote of the juror were bought at a price of money; the women of
quality sold like courtesans.

As a result of this social situation, the Latin race in Italy had suffered an alarming decline, and its beautiful provinces were prey either to parasitic emigrants or to complete desolation. A considerable proportion of Italy's population took refuge in foreign lands.

Just as rivers take on different shades of colour, while a sewer always has the same colour, so the Italy of the Ciceronian era substantially resembles the Greece of Polybius, and even more so the Carthage of the time of Hannibal, where the omnipotence of capital ruined the middle class, raised commerce and large property to the highest prosperity, and finally led to moral and political corruption cloaked in a veneer of hypocrisy. All the crimes that capital has committed against nations and civilisations in the modern world are inferior to the abominations of the old slave states.

César applied all his energy to bringing the nation back to its home and to the rule of law by means of a special intervention.
family life, and to reform the national economy by law and decree.

In order to prevent the continual emigration of Italians, and to persuade men of quality and merchants to settle in their homeland, not only was the period of service shortened, but men of senatorial rank were no longer allowed to leave Italy. As emperor, he proposed extraordinary rewards for the fathers of large families, while as a judge
The supreme ruler of the nation, he treated divorce and adultery with a severity unprecedented in Roman history. He restricted the use of purple dresses and pearls to certain times, certain ages and certain types of women.

He set a maximum for the cost of the table, and directly forbade several luxury dishes.

Caesar refused to abolish debts, but two important concessions were made as early as 705 (49). The first was,
late interest was abolished, and what had been paid was deducted from the capital. Secondly, the creditor was obliged to accept the debtor's movable and immovable property in lieu of payment of the estimated value before the Civil War.

In the agrarian question, Caesar, who had already been in a position to settle it during his first consulate, was more judicious than Tiberius Gracchus and did not seek to re-establish the system of farmers at any cost. On the other hand, in his strictly economic way, which tolerated neither profusion nor negligence, even on a small scale, he instituted a commission of twenty members for the general revision of the title deeds of Italy, and destined all the state land of Italy (containing a considerable portion of the land which was in the hands of the spiritual corporations, but which legally belonged to the State) to be distributed in the manner of the Gracchi, insofar as it was suitable for agriculture. By deciding that the new owners would not have the right to alienate for twenty years the land that they had received, Caesar found a happy medium between the complete concession of the right of alienation, which would soon have put a large part of the alienated land into the hands of capitalists, and the permanent restrictions on the freedom of trade in land that Tiberius Gracchus and Sylla had established, both equally in vain.

The provinces that Caesar found existing were fourteen in number: seven European, later and upper Spain, transalpine Gaul, Italic Gaul with Illyria, Macedonia with Greece, Sicily, Sardinia with Corsica; five Asian: Asia, Bithynia and Pontus, Cilicia with Cyprus, Syria, Crete; and two African: Cyrenaica and Africa. To these provinces, Caesar added three new ones by erecting the new governments of Lyons Gaul and Belgium and by making Italy a separate province.

In the administration of these provinces, oligarchic disorder reached a point which, despite many notable examples of its kind, surpassed anything ever seen, at least in the West, and which it was impossible to ignore.
seems impossible, according to our ideas, to surpass. Ordinary taxes became much more oppressive because of the unequal way in which they were distributed and the absurd system by which they were levied, than because of their size. As for the burden of garrisons, the Roman statesmen themselves were of the opinion that a city suffered almost as much when a Roman army took up its winter quarters there as when an enemy stormed it.

In the client states, the burden was even worse. In this respect, the Roman oligarchy resembled a gang of thieves and plundered the provincials according to the business system.

Thanks to the low value of Roman property and the absence of a maritime police force, brigands and pirates were everywhere. In Sardinia and in the interior of Asia Minor, brigandage was the order of the day.
In Africa and later Spain, it became necessary to fortify all the buildings in the area.
built outside the city limits.

Caesar completely overhauled the system of administration. Governments were still
undoubtedly distributed among the consuls, who retired annually, and sixteen praetors.
the imperator appointed eight of them directly, and the distribution of the provinces depended entirely on him, they were, in reality, distributed by the imperator, and the levying of taxes was henceforth entrusted, even in the provinces, to imperial officers. Caesar's magistrates were there to protect the king.
Instead of the old and more than useless control of the equestrian or senatorial courts, they had to answer, on their own account, at the bar of a just and severe monarch. The law on atrocities, the provisions of which had already been made more severe by Caesar during his first consulship, was applied by him against the main governors of the provinces with an inexorable rigour that sometimes even exceeded the letter of the law.

Thus, although the old wounds were still bleeding, Caesar ushered in a more tolerable era, the first intelligent and humane government to appear in centuries and a policy of peace based not on cowardice but on strength. His subjects had at least as much reason as the best Romans to weep over the coffin of their great liberator.

On the other hand, the reciprocal fusion of the Latin and Hellenic characters was, it may be said, as old as Rome itself. On the occasion of the union of Italy, the conquering Latin nation assimilated all the other conquered nationalities, except for the Greek element, which was received in its integrity and as it was. Wherever the Roman legionary went, the Greek schoolmaster conquered,
He too, in his own way, was following in his footsteps: we early see distinguished Greek teachers established on the Guadalquivir, and Greek taught alongside Latin at the Osca institute. The highest Roman culture was, in fact, nothing more than the proclamation of the great Gospel of Greek morals and art in
the Latin idiom: the Greek could hardly protest against the modest claim of the victors who proclaimed their civilisation to the barbarians of the East, in the very language of the Greeks. Wherever Greek was dominant, wherever national feeling was purest, on frontiers threatened by barbarian denationalisation, in Marseilles for example, on the northern coast of the Black Sea, on the Euphrates and the Tigris, people appealed to Rome as the protector and avenger of Hellenism; and,

in fact, Pompey's founding of cities in the Far East resumed after a hiatus
the beneficent work of Alexander.

The idea of a Hellenic-Italian empire with two languages and a single nationality was not new: otherwise it would have been nothing but a mistake.
This was the work of Rome's third and greatest democratic statesman.

In Africa, the project that Caius Gracchus had been unable to carry out was put into effect, and in the place where the city of Rome's hereditary enemies had risen, 3,000 Italian colonists and a large number of farmers residing in Carthaginian territory were established: the new colony of Venus, Roman Carthage, rose with great speed, thanks to the favourable circumstances presented by its location. Utica, which until then had been the capital and first Latin city of the province, had to some extent received compensation for the restoration of its ancient rival in the form of Latin rights. In the Numidian territory newly annexed to the Empire, the important Cirta and the other cities assigned to the Roman condottiere Publius Sittius for himself and his troops were granted the rights of Roman military colonies.

In the desolate region of Greece, in addition to other plans such as the establishment of a Roman colony at Buthrotum (opposite Corfu), Caesar was particularly concerned with the restoration of Corinth. Not only did he bring a large colony of citizens to Corinth, but he also drew up a plan to cross the city.
the isthmus, so as to avoid the dangerous circumnavigation of the Peloponnese and allow the entire traffic between Italy and Asia via the Corinthian-Saronic Gulf. Finally, in the Greek Far East, the monarch founded Italian settlements: on the Black Sea, for example, at Heraclea and Sinope, which the Italian colonists shared with the ancient inhabitants, as they had at Emporia; on the Syrian coast, in the important city of Berytos, which, like Sinope, was given an Italian constitution; and even in Egypt, where a Roman station was established on the island of Pharos, which dominated the harbour of Alexandria.

As a result of these provisions, municipal freedom in Italy spread to the provinces much more widely than before. The complete cities, i.e. all the towns of the Cisalpine provinces and the cities of citizens, and the municipalities scattered throughout Transalpine Gaul and elsewhere, were on an equal footing. with those of Italy, in that they administered their own affairs and exercised limited jurisdiction. The formally autonomous Latin cities and the other emancipated cities, including those of Narbonese Gaul, all those of Sicily, insofar as they were not cities of citizens, and a considerable number of cities in the other provinces, not only had an autonomy of their own, but also of their own.

free administration, but probably also unlimited jurisdiction; so that the governor would not could only intervene by virtue of its administrative control, which was, admittedly, highly arbitrary.

Italy was converted from mistress of its subject peoples to mother of the renewed Italo-Hellenic nation. The Cisalpine province, completely assimilated into the mother country, was a promise and a guarantee that, in Caesar's monarchy, as in the best days of the republic, any Latinised district could become a part of Italy.
They hoped to be placed on an equal footing with their elders and with the mother country itself. The neighbouring lands, Greek Sicily and southern Gaul, which were rapidly becoming Latin, were on the threshold of political and national equalisation with Italy. At a less advanced stage of preparation were the other provinces of the empire, in which, as in southern Gaul, Narbo was a Roman colony, as well as the great maritime cities of Emporia, Gades, Carthage and Corinth,
Heraclea, Pontica, Sinope, Beryta and Alexandria had become Italic or Helleno-Italic cities, centres of Roman civilisation in the Greek East and fundamental pillars of future equality in all parts of the empire.

The new state needed a common religion in line with Italo-Hellenic thought and a general code of laws superior to municipal statutes. It needed these things and, in fact, they already existed. In the field of religion, men had spent centuries fusing together the Italic and Hellenic cults, either by outwardly adopting or inwardly arranging the
Thanks to the flexible nature of the Italian gods, there was little difficulty in transforming Jupiter into Zeus, Venus into Aphrodite, and all the essential ideas of the Latin faith into their Hellenic counterparts.

These were the foundations of Caesar's new monarchy. For the second time, in Rome, the question of crisis, where antagonism seemed to be and indeed was inevitable and
irreconcilable. On the first occasion, Rome had been saved by the fact that Italy had drowned in Rome and Rome in Italy, and on the new occasion, Rome remained enlarged and changed; the old antagonism, if not reconciled, had at least been greatly weakened. This time Rome was saved once again, because the countries of the Mediterranean either drowned in Rome or prepared to drown in it.
the war between rich and poor Italians, which, in old Italy, could only end in slaughter.
the destruction of the nation, no longer had a battlefield or meaning in the Italy of the three continents.
The Latin colonies bridged the abyss that threatened to engulf the Roman city in the fifth century: the even wider abyss of the seventh century was bridged by the transmarine colonisations of Caius Gracchus and Caesar. In the case of Rome alone, history not only performed miracles, but renewed them and twice cured the internal crisis that was incurable in the State itself, by regenerating the State. There was undoubtedly a great deal of corruption in this regeneration; just as the union of Italy was achieved on the ruins of the Samnite and Etruscan nations, the Mediterranean monarchy was built on the ruins of innumerable states and tribes that had once been vibrant and vigorous; but it was

a corruption that led to a renaissance, part of which has survived to the present day. What was overthrown in order to build were secondary nationalities that had long been designated for destruction by the levelling hand of civilisation. Wherever he destroyed, Caesar merely pronounced the verdict of history; but he defended the seeds of civilisation as he found them, in his own country as well as among the chosen nation of the Hellenes. He saved and renewed the Roman element; and not only did he spare the Greek element, but, with the same independent genius that he applied to the renovation of Rome, he undertook the regeneration of the Greeks, and resumed the interrupted work of the great Alexander, whose image, as we may think, was never absent from Caesar's soul. He resolved the two great tasks, not only side by side, but one by means of the other. The two great essential features of humanity, general and individual development, the State and civilisation, once united in embryo in those ancient Greek-Italians who grazed their flocks in the bosom of primitive simplicity, far from the coasts and islands of the Mediterranean, had become separated when the Italians and Hellenes were divided, and remained isolated for centuries.
Now the descendant of the Trojan prince and the daughter of the king of Latium created, with a state that had no distinct civilisation and a cosmopolitan culture, a new whole, in which state and culture came together to produce a rich and blessed harvest in a sphere appropriate to their union.

We have sketched out the work that Caesar conceived and that posterity, held back for centuries along the paths mapped out by this great man, has tried to pursue, if not with intelligence and energy, at least in accordance with the intentions of the illustrious master. There was nothing finished, and many features were barely sketched out. We would have to rival the genius of such a man to say whether the plan was complete; but we see no essential flaw in what we have before us, each stone of the edifice would be enough to make a man immortal, and yet all contribute to forming a harmonious whole. Caesar ruled as King of Rome for five and a half years, barely half the reign of Alexander : In the interval of seven great campaigns, which did not allow him to remain in Rome for a total of fifteen months, he regulated the destinies of the world for the present and the future, from the establishment of a frontier between civilisation and barbarism to the elimination of the pools of water in the capital, and he retained enough time and self-possession to follow the crowned plays in the theatre and to award the crown to the victor with improvised verses. The speed and precision with which the plan was executed prove that it had been carefully thought out and studied in all its parts, which does not prevent them from being as marvellous as the plan itself. The main features were sketched out, and the new State was defined for the time to come, which alone could complete it. Caesar could say that his work was complete; this is what he no doubt meant when he said that he had lived long enough. But precisely because the edifice was immense, the master added to it during his lifetime, stone by stone, with the same skill and the same painstaking elasticity, as if there were to be no tomorrow. He worked and created as no mortal ever did, and as a worker and creator, after twenty centuries, he has remained in the imagination of the peoples as the first, the only, Emperor Caesar.

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