

THE TRIAL OF SABAHATTİN ALİ – NİHAL ATSIZ:

AN EXAMINATION OF THE EFFECTS OF THE TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY
ON DOMESTIC POLICY DURING THE SECOND-WORLD-WAR

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
Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız Davası: İkinci Dünya Savaşı Esnasındaki Türk Dış Politikası'nın İç Politikaya Etkileri Üzerine Bir İnceleme

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Title: The Trial Of Sabahattin Ali – Nihal Atsız: An Examination Of The Effects Of The Turkish Foreign Policy On Domestic Policy During The Second-World-War

The ability of Turkey to continue her position of non-belligerence during the 2nd World War is a success in terms of the aims of Turkish foreign policy. Turkey developed relations with both belligerent sides via signing treaties in order to achieve her aims. These relations sometimes necessitated giving priority to the different sides on the basis of the progress of the war. It can be said that the Turkey's foreign policy during the 2nd World War is reflected in her domestic policy, in accordance with her desired benefits.

In this sense, the essentials of Turkish foreign policy are primarily examined to see the changes within it. Then the differences are discerned by the examination of the period that began after the Lausanne Treaty and ended with the outbreak of the 2nd World War. The phases of Turkism are detailed in order to understand the efficiency of the Turanists during the war. Lastly, the confrontation which emerged as a result of the ultimate shift in the foreign policy during the 2nd World War is examined. In this regard, the trial of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız can be considered the first confrontation with the Turanists. The reason for, emergence of, key figures in, result of and echoes of the trial are primarily examined.

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Türkiye Cumhuriyeti'nin İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nın dışında kalması Türk Dış Politikası'nın amaçları bakımından bir başarıdır. Bu amaçlarına ulaşabilmek maksadıyla Türkiye yaptığı anlaşmalarla her iki kampla da ilişkiler geliştirmiştir. Geliştirilen bu ilişkiler savaşın seyri açısından, Türkiye'nin, zaman zaman, farklı kamplara öncelik vermesini gerektirmişti. Bu noktada Türkiye'nin takip ettiği dış politikanın savaş yılları boyunca, menfaatleri gereği, iç politikaya da yansıtılmış olduğunu söyleyebiliriz.

Bu anlamda Türk Dış Politikası'ndaki değişimleri gözlemleyebilmek amacıyla, öncelikle, Türk Dış Politikası'nın temel kavramları incelenmiştir. Daha sonra, savaş dönemindeki değişiklikleri takip edebilmek maksadıyla Lozan Antlaşması'ndan savaş başlangıcına kadar olan dönem incelenmiştir. Ayrıca, savaş döneminde ortaya çıkan Turancı grupların yayılmacı talepleriyle ilgili olarak, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'ndan Cumhuriyete değişen Türkçülük politikasının üzerinde durulmuştur. Son olarak ise, savaş döneminde izlenen dış politikanın savaşın sonuna doğru nihai olarak değişmesiyle ortaya çıkan iç hesaplaşmalardan biri olan Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız Davası'nın ortaya çıkışı, sebepleri, aktörleri, sonuçları ve devamı niteliğindeki davalar esas olarak incelenmiştir.

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TABLE OF CONTENTS

INTRODUCTION	1
CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND	4
PAN TURKISM IN TURKEY	4
Emergence of Ottomanism	4
Exploration of Turkism	6
Nationalism in Republic of Turkey	9
TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR	12
Ottoman Legacy	12
The Essentials of the Turkish Foreign Policy	13
Foreign Relations Until the Outbreak of the War	16
Relations with Britain and France	16
Relations with Germany and Italy	19
The Balkan Entente and Sadabad Pact	22
Relations with the Soviet Union and the Case of the Straits	24
GERMAN INVASIONS (1939 – 1943)	26
The Tripartite Treaty	26
Germany in the Balkans	32
German-Turkish Rapprochement	37
Rise of the Pan-Turkism	40
CHAPTER 2: THE TRIAL OF SABAHATTIN ALİ – NİHAL ATSIZ	51
THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL	51
Towards the End Of The War (1943 – 1945)	51
Attempts for Rapprochement with the Allies	55
About Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız	56
Sabahattin Ali	56
Nihal Atsız	58
The Relation of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız	59
TRIAL	63
The Reason for the Trial	63
The Sessions	69
First Session (April 26, 1944)	69
Second Session (May 03, 1944)	75
Third Session (May 09, 1944)	81
Result of the Trial	82
ECHOES OF THE TRIAL	83
CONCLUSION	92
APPENDICES	98
Appendix 1	98
Appendix 2	99
Appendix 3	108
Appendix 4	109
BIBLIOGRAPHY	110

INTRODUCTION

The 2nd World War can be interpreted as the first threatening international crisis faced by the newly founded Republic of Turkey. After the Lausanne Treaty in 1923 Turkey dealt with her domestic problems, ending longstanding wars. While Turkey solved her foreign affairs problems with neighbors and great powers such as Britain and France, in the 1930s she made every endeavor to pursue economic development. In this regard, Turkey, as an underdeveloped country, lacked the technology needed to handle her own capacity for economic and industrial growth. Consequently, Turkey determined to follow a peaceful policy in her foreign affairs and attempted to stabilize relations with her neighbors. In time she was able to solve her problems with Britain and France, which were the consequence of circumstances in Europe.

One of the characteristics of Turkish foreign policy, which followed Atatürk's presidency (1923-1938), was her independence. Additionally, in contrast with the Ottoman Empire, Turkey did not feel herself constrained to observe the balance of European powers. Different from the other Axis states of the 1st World War, she had her order by the treaty of Lausanne, which was signed as a consequence of the War of Liberation (1919-1922) and the negotiations with the winners of the war; Britain, France and Italy. Turkey also had close relations with the Soviet Union, which was understood to be the main figure of foreign affairs, under Atatürk's presidency. Even though two major changes (the Montreux Conference regarding the Straits and the annexation of Hatay) found a place in the Lausanne Treaty, Turkey made these both changes with respect to the international law and in peaceful negotiations with the foreign affairs actors.

This stability and composure in foreign affairs gradually disappeared toward the outbreak of the 2nd World War. After the death of Atatürk and the presidency of his successor, İsmet İnönü, in 1938, a transformation in Turkish politics became apparent. For instance, the “chieftaincy” regime, which had similarities to contemporary Fascist (*Duce*) and National Socialist (*Führer*) regimes, was officially accepted and consequently Atatürk was designated the “Eternal Chief” (Ebedi Şef) after his death; his successor İnönü¹ became the “National Chief” (Milli Şef). One of the significant changes in Turkey under this national chieftaincy regime was the reappearance of the Turanists on the stage.² Turanists became influential with the assistance of the right wing of the Republican People’s Party (CHP) under the gradual administration of the National Chief. The signing of the non-aggression and neutrality pact with Germany, on June 18, 1941, can be interpreted as a turning point in Turkish foreign policy which continued until April 1944. During that time Germany was had great influence on the foreign policy of Turkey. In this sense, it can be said that this Germany-oriented foreign policy of Turkey significantly affected domestic policy. However, as a direct consequence of the defeat of Germany Turanists, who had indirect connections with the Nazi regime, were judged. The trial of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız was the first of the trial series that dealt with Turanists, and it continued later with the trial of Turanism-racism (1944-1947), the trial of Hasan Ali Yücel-Kenan Öner (1947-1949) and the incident of the Faculty of Language, History and Geography (Dil, Tarih ve Coğrafya Fakültesi, DTCF)³ (1946-1950). However, the progress of the trial series was changed entirely during these

¹ Nadir Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, 3rd Edition. (İstanbul: Çağdaş Yayınları, 1979), 14 – 15.

² Niyazi Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, ed. Ruşen Sezer, 4th Edition. (Cağaloğlu İstanbul: İletişim, 2011), 155, 161 – 164.

³ By this, I shortly meant the process of accusation and judge of three professors from the Ankara University, Pertev Naili Boratav, Niyazi Berkes, Behice Boran, regarding their communism activities at the University.

series of trials, which also resulted with Turkey becoming one of the Cold War countries, in which anti-communism and Soviet opposition determined the political atmosphere.

The oppressive anti-communist atmosphere in Turkey, which started in 1945, damaged the country's intellectual progress and freedom of expression. Thus, anti-communism became an addition to the obsession of nationalism, which was the main characteristic of the 1920s and '30s⁴ in Turkey, from 1945 onwards. Bringing accusations against people regarding communism, in particular, was the most popular charge against one's opponents. It is apparent that this atmosphere resulted in the reduction of the quality of intellectual life in Turkey. In this regard, the aim of this thesis is, firstly, to take a close look at the circumstances in pre-war foreign policy in Turkey and to compare them with the foreign policy was followed during the 2nd World. Then it is also important to focus on the policy at the end of the war and the foreign and domestic⁵ circumstances that resulted in the trial of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız. Additionally, one of the significant effects of this trial was in its assistance in clarifying the changes in Turkey's before-and-after war politics and in some conceptual definitions of the terms with purge of the intellectual area.

Lastly, the archive source regarding the German foreign policy on Turkey from 1941 to 1943 and the reports by the media about the trial of Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız are the main sources of this thesis. In particular the German foreign policy documents captured by the Allies during their occupation of Germany give a lot of information regarding the intensity of the German activities. Moreover, press

⁴ Mete Çetnik, ed., *Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav'ın Müdaafası* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1998), 192.

⁵ It is necessary to point out what the president İnönü had said about it. According to Barutçu, İnönü said that the foreign problems affect the domestic problems and he even claimed that he always solved the problems by blending the foreign and domestic problems together. See; Faik Ahmet Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954* (İstanbul: Milliyet Yayınları, 1977), 316.

reports play an important role in estimating the significance of the trial. Indeed, it is apparent that the media showed an increasing interest to the trial. When this situation is considered in light of the fact that the media was under the strict control of the government⁶, the significance of the reason for this increasing interest can be better understood. Additionally, the personal memoirs regarding the 1940s, the 2nd World War years, the incident of the “The Devil in Us” and so on contributed much to the enrichment of the standpoint of the thesis.

CHAPTER 1: HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

PAN TURKISM IN TURKEY

Emergence of Ottomanism

The emergence of nationalism during the Ottoman Empire started in the 19th century. In the same period Turkism also emerged; however, Ottomanism, as an essential movement, found a way to develop and gain acceptance. The social structure of the Ottoman Empire was built in accordance with people’s religious affiliation. Thus the identification of the people in the Ottoman Empire was based on the Law of Citizenship until the 1860s, which was created according to the religious communities.⁷

⁶ The memoirs of the journalists who experienced the 2nd World War as journalists explain the control of the government on press. See; Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, 24, 50; Cihad Baban, *Politika Galerisi (Büstler Ve Portreler)* (İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 1970), 286; M. Zekeriyâ Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)* (İstanbul: Yaylacık Matbaası, 1968), 215. Additionally, for the contemporary examination about the press; see; Cemil Koçak, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türk Basını,” *Tarih Ve Toplum*, November 1986, 31.

⁷ Karpat adds that even though the ethnic and linguistic affiliation was prior to the religious; the Muslims tended to identify themselves in accordance with the religion mostly. See; Kemal H. Karpat, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Ortadoğu’da Millet, Milliyet, Milliyetçilik*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2011), 184.

In fact, the multi-ethnic and multi-religious character of the Empire in a way prompted the development of nationalism.⁸ Ülken underlines the underdeveloped character of the Empire politically and economically, which was a factor in the generation of nationalism movements in the Empire, in contrast with the West. He comments on this fact, saying the Turks considered themselves the main element of the Empire. For the sake of maintaining their dominance, the Turks began to imitate the West and thus tried to assure the union of the Empire.⁹ In fact, Young Ottomans can be interpreted as the first group who aimed to unify the subjects of the Empire under an Ottoman nation. The purpose of gathering and unifying the multi-ethnic and multi-religious subjects of the Ottoman Empire under an Ottoman nation was called Ottomanism.¹⁰ Thus, the Ottomanism policy was a step towards modernism. The union of Ottoman subjects, with a modern Ottoman identity, aimed to grant a wider social base for the Empire and initiate modernization.¹¹ The progress, in this respect, took place through transformation of the members of religious communities.¹² This transformation process had a legal characteristic and implicitly marked the end of the priorities of Muslims. It was therefore the first time the equality of subjects was implemented.¹³

⁸ Fatma Müge Göçek, "Osmanlı Devleti'nde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Oluşumu: Sosyolojik Bir Yaklaşım," in *Milliyetçilik*, ed. Tanıl Bora, vol. 4, 1st edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 76.

⁹ Hilmi Ziya Ülken, *Millet ve Tarih Şuuru*, 1st edition (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2008), 139.

¹⁰ Regarding the description of the Ottomanism, see; Yusuf Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset* (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Basımevi, 1976), 19; Selçuk Akşin Somel, "Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839 - 1913)," in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, vol. 1, 5th edition., Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 88; Yusuf Akçura, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: Kaynak Yayınları, 1998), 27; Masami Arai, "Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği," in *Cumhuriyet'e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet'in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, vol. 1, 5th edition., Modern Türkiye'de Siyasi Düşünce (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 180; Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 3rd edition. (İstanbul: İnkılap Kitabevi, 1987), 16.

¹¹ M. Vedat Gürbüz, "The Genesis of Turkish Nationalism," *Bellekten* LXVII, no. 249 (August 2003): 495; Somel, "Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839 - 1913)," 88 – 89, 91.

¹² Karpat, *Osmanlı'dan Günümüze Ortadoğu'da Millet, Milliyet, Milliyetçilik*, 185.

¹³ *Ibid.*, 186.

According to Ülken, legal equality in the Empire provided Western capital support. The economic inefficiency of Turks in the Empire was, in this sense, an obstacle for Ottomanism.¹⁴ In addition to this obstacle, in terms of the so-called, failure of Ottomanism, Mardin underlines the ambiguity of the “fatherland” (vatan).¹⁵

In contrast with Ülken, Karpaz finds Ottomanism to be a successful policy. According to him, although it could not prevent the separation of Christian elements, it has been successful in bringing forward the Islamic character of the Empire.¹⁶ Additionally, Somel considers Ottomanism the prime policy of the Empire and divides the phases of Ottomanism into four:

1. Authoritarian and centralist period (from 1830s to 1875)
2. Young Ottoman opposition and constitutionalist pragmatism period (1868 - 1878)
3. Young Turk opposition against Abdulhamit II.
4. The idea of Ottomanism in 2nd Constitutional Period.¹⁷

Towards the collapse of the Empire, Ottomanism finally gave way to Turkism, which emerged rapidly during the Balkan Wars.

Exploration of Turkism

Although the Ottomanism policy had difficulties in the practical elements of building an Ottoman nation, it continued until the end of the Balkan Wars.¹⁸ In fact

¹⁴ Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 140.

¹⁵ Şerif Mardin, “Yeni Osmanlı Düşüncesi,” in *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, 8th edition., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce 1 (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 49; Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 140.

¹⁶ Karpaz, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Ortadoğu’da Millet, Milliyet, Milliyetçilik*, 186. Also see; Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839 - 1913),” 116.

¹⁷ Şükrü Hanioglu, “Osmanlılık” *Tanzimat’tan Cumhuriyet’e Türkiye Ansiklopedisi* (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1985), vol. 5, 1389 – 1393 quoted by Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839 - 1913),” 88.

¹⁸ The Balkan Wars in 1912 was accepted as the end of the Ottomanism policy unanimously. See; Kerem Ünüvar, “İttihatçılıktan Kemalizme: İhya’dan İnşa’ya,” in *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, vol. 1, 5th edition., Modern

Turkism, as an alternative to Ottomanism, emerged at around the same time, but Ottomanism was initially more popular. One of the reasons the Ottomans neglected Turkism as a movement was down to the usage of “Turk”: by the Ottomans. “Turk” was only used in reference to peasants, ploughmen and rough people. Only the elites called themselves as Ottomans, in order to differentiate themselves from the rural masses.¹⁹

It can easily be said that the first signs of Turkism can be seen among the literary men in the Tanzimat Era. Akçura and Ülken both point to the middle of the 19th century as the emergence of Turkism in literature and language.²⁰ Şinasi, Ziya and Ahmet Vefik Pashas, and Ali Suavi can all be counted among the prominent figures in literature whose attempts were quite valuable because they tried to use Turkish, the spoken language, in their works.²¹ As an addition to the interest in literature, Western scholars also contributed much with their works on Turkish history and language. These were all result of the scrutinizing of translations by Leon Cahun, Arminius Vambery, Silvestre de Sacy and Deguigny.²²

Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 132; Gürbüz, “The Genesis of Turkish Nationalism,” 495; Somel, “Osmanlı Reform Çağında Osmanlılık Düşüncesi (1839 - 1913),” 86; M. Şükrü Hanioglu, “Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889 - 1908,” in *Turkey Beyond Nationalism: Towards Post-Nationalist Identities*, ed. Hans-Lukas Kieser (London: I.B. Tauris, 2006), 19.

¹⁹ Mehmet Kalpaklı, “Osmanlı Edebi Metinlerine Göre Türklük Ve Osmanlılık,” in *Tarih Ve Milliyetçilik* (presented at the I. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi, Mersin: Mersin Üniversitesi Fen - Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1999), 75; François Georgeon, “Türk Milliyetçiliği Üzerine Düşünceler: Suyu Arayan Adam’ı Yeniden Okurken,” in *Milliyetçilik*, ed. Tanıl Bora, vol. 4, 1. Baskı., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 23; Herkül Millas, “Edebiyat Metinlerinde Milliyetçi Tarih Söylemi,” in *Tarih Ve Milliyetçilik* (presented at the I. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi, Mersin: Mersin Üniversitesi Fen - Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1999), 95.

²⁰ Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 143; Akçura, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi*, 28; Karpat, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Ortadoğu’da Millet, Milliyet, Milliyetçilik*, 37.

²¹ Akçura, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi*, 28 – 32; Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 143 – 145. The debates and efforts on simplification of the language had continued during and after the 2nd Constitutional Era. See; Arai, “Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği,” 187; Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 5.

²² Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 146; Akçura, *Türkçülüğün Tarihi*, 38 – 39; Sina Akşin, *Turkey: From Empire to Revolutionary Republic : The Emergence of the Turkish Nation from 1789 to the Present* (London: Hurst, 2007), 84; Göçek, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Oluşumu: Sosyolojik Bir Yaklaşım,” 72; Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 7.

It is especially important to note the contribution of the émigrés, because their influence was quite important for the development of Turkism. These émigrés came from Russia, where the Turks were the minorities and therefore -- in contrast with the Turks in the Ottoman Empire -- already fully aware of their national consciousness.²³ Hüseyinzade Ali, Akçuraoğlu Yusuf and Ağaoğlu Ahmet can be counted among those who played vital roles in the rising of Turkish nationalism in the Ottoman Empire.²⁴ Mustafa Celaleddin Pasha was a Polish convert, whose contribution focusing on philology and history did much to evolve Turkish nationalism. The efforts of Suleyman Pasha to introduce Turkism in military schools were also considerable in the context of education.²⁵

It was not so easy to leave Ottomanism aside and follow Turkish nationalism instead. As Turkism was increasing as an alternative ideology the Ottoman Empire was ruled by the Islamism of Abdulhamit II, along with Ottomanism. The existence of various ideologies, such as Islamism, which was a fairly popular trend during “Hamidian Era”, simply made these ideologies the colors of Ottomanism. This indicates that expectations of preventing the collapse of the Ottoman Empire had not yet disappeared.²⁶

In his significant article, “Three Ways of Politics” (Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset), Yusuf Akçura argued to follow the best policy for the Ottoman Empire from among

²³ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 7; Hanioglu, “Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889 - 1908,” 9; Alaattin Oğuz, “Rusya Türklerinin Türk Milliyetçiliğiyle İlişkileri,” *Doğu Batı*, no. 38, Milliyetçilik I (October 2006): 115.

²⁴ Oğuz, “Rusya Türklerinin Türk Milliyetçiliğiyle İlişkileri,” 117; Mehmet Karakaş, “Türkçülük Ve Türk Milliyetçiliği,” *Doğu Batı*, no. 38, Milliyetçilik I (October 2006): 64. For a brief survey regarding with the activities of those in “Türk Yurdu”, see: Arai, “Jön Türk Dönemi Türk Milliyetçiliği,” 186 – 192; Akşin, *Turkey*, 85 – 86.

²⁵ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 5; Günay Göksoy Özdoğan, “*Turan*’dan “*Bozkurt*”a : *Tek Parti Döneminde Türkçülük, 1931-1946*, 3rd edition. (İstanbul: İletişim, 2006), 60 – 61.

²⁶ Suavi Aydın, “İki İttihat - Terakki: İki Ayrı Zihniyet, İki Ayrı Siyaset,” in *Cumhuriyet’e Devreden Düşünce Mirası: Tanzimat Ve Meşrutiyet’in Birikimi*, ed. Mehmet Ö. Alkan, vol. 1, 5th edition., Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2003), 118.

Ottomanism, Islamism and Turkism. Akçura concludes his article suggesting the pursuit of ethnic-based Turkism from among these three alternatives.²⁷ This article was first published by a journal called “Türk” in 1904, in Cairo. It was not considered particularly important at the time. In fact, following Turkism as official ideology of the Empire was a risk.²⁸ Even the Young Turks were following a policy of Ottomanism at the beginning of the 2nd Constitutional Era, until the outbreak of the Balkan Wars in 1912.²⁹ It is apparent that the émigrés, who migrated from the newly lost territories, prompted the Turkish nationalism.³⁰ Hanioglu implicitly approved and added that Turkism was the last link in the chain – in contrast with others in the Ottoman Empire.³¹ Moreover, one last thing should be added on the subject of the aforementioned Turkism, which emerged as a project to unify the Turks in order to build a Turan state at the very end of the 1st World War; Enver Pasha was the prominent figure of this expansionist clique of Turkism³² which was launched as a consequence of the Arabian revolts.

Nationalism in Republic of Turkey

The adventure of Turkism in the Republic of Turkey began with a distinctive change in its form. The expansionist facets of Turkism had to be diminished for the

²⁷ For the whole text, see; Akçura, *Üç Tarz-ı Siyaset*.

²⁸ Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 140; Göçek, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Oluşumu: Sosyolojik Bir Yaklaşım,” 63.

²⁹ Ülken, *Millet Ve Tarih Şuuru*, 140; Göçek, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Oluşumu: Sosyolojik Bir Yaklaşım,” 63; Hanioglu, “Turkism and the Young Turks, 1889 - 1908,” 8; Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 9.

³⁰ Georgeon, “Türk Milliyetçiliği Üzerine Düşünceler: Suyu Arayan Adam’ı Yeniden Okurken,” 27; Göçek, “Osmanlı Devleti’nde Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Oluşumu: Sosyolojik Bir Yaklaşım,” 66.

³¹ M. Şükrü Hanioglu, *A Brief History of The Late Ottoman Empire* (Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2008), 142.

³² According to Abidin Nesimi, Parvus organized a Turanist group for the sake of attack the Ottoman Empire against Russia. See; Abidin Nesimi, *Türkiye Komünist Partisi’nde: Anılar Ve Değerlendirmeler (1909 - 1949)*, 2nd. edition. (İstanbul: Nöbetçi Yayınları, 2009), 48. For an expanded examination about the Young Turk activism on Turanism issue; see; Gotthard Jäschke, “Der Turanismus der Jungtürken: Zur osmanischen Außenpolitik im Weltkrieg,” *Die Welt Des Islams* 23, no. 1/2 (1941): 1 – 54. Karakaş takes attention to the role which the Ottoman Empire would have played in a Turan state, see; Karakaş, “Türkçülük Ve Türk Milliyetçiliği,” 63.

sake of the re-establishment of the Republic of Turkey. As a consequence of pursuing an expansionist policy of Turanism actively at the end of the war, irredentism became influential on Turkey during and after the War of Liberation.³³ Ertekin examines Turkism, dividing the Turkists in the Republican Era into two groups; the first group includes, roughly, the military officers, bureaucrats and intellectuals born in 1870-1890. The second group comprises, again roughly, those born in 1900-1920, who rendered Turkism as a political ideology instead of a state-owned or state-based movement.³⁴ In this regard, the first generation comprised people who participated in the Revolution in 1908 and in the 1st World War, subsequently winning the War of Liberation. There were prominent figures among them who can be considered the ideologists of Turkism, such as Ziya Gökalp, Yusuf Akçura and Moiz Kohen (also known as Tekinalp). Those are the intellectuals who had a great impact on forming the principles of nationalism in the Republic of Turkey.³⁵ As is widely accepted, Ziya Gökalp was the one whose ideas formed a standard representation of the state.

The definition of the idea of the nation is, according to Gökalp, “congruity in education, culture and senses.”³⁶ As can be clearly seen, there is no stress in this definition on ethnicity, religion or geography. The nationalism concept of Atatürk is similar to that of Gökalp, without any ambiguity.³⁷ According to the viewpoint of

³³ İbrahim İslam, “Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Düşüncesinin Toplumsal Gelişme Bakımından Değeri,” in *Tarih Ve Milliyetçilik* (presented at the I. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi, Mersin: Mersin Üniversitesi Fen - Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1999), 384; Karakaş, “Türkçülük Ve Türk Milliyetçiliği,” 68.

³⁴ Orhangazi Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları,” in *Milliyetçilik*, vol. 4, 1st edition, Modern Türkiye’de Siyasi Düşünce (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2002), 351.

³⁵ *Ibid.*, 354.

³⁶ Ziya Gökalp, *Türkçülüğün Esasları*, 17.

³⁷ For an alternative view on this issue; See; Cemil Koçak, “1940’lı Yıllarda Devletin Hizmetinde Ve Gözetiminde Türk Milliyetçiliği,” in *Tarih Ve Milliyetçilik* (presented at the I. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi, Mersin: Mersin Üniversitesi Fen - Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1999), 210.

Atatürk, the nation aims, first and foremost, for the protection of morality and a common will, struggling for progress.³⁸

The Republic of Turkey, in contrast with the last phase of the Ottoman Empire, showed no irredentist intentions that might give birth to such problems with her neighbors.³⁹ The main endeavor of Atatürk was, in this regard, establishing an ideologically stable state so as not to have the imperial problem. Therefore, the assignment of enlightening people in Turkey was undertaken by the state. This process largely took place in the intellectual area. For instance, the Turkish thesis of history, an increase of anthropological surveys regarding the Turkish race and – moreover – discussions at the Turkish Congress of History, were all strongly related to these intellectual endeavors.⁴⁰ Meanwhile, however, an alternative definition of Turkism was developing, with the aim of defining a non-equivocal and concrete Turkishness. This idea was improved by a group of people such as Fuat Köprülü and Zeki Velidi, who were opposed to the Kemalist interpretation of nationalism during the 1st Turkish Congress of History.⁴¹

There was also an independently developed group whose ideas on nationalism tended more towards racism and blood kinship. The prominent figures of this group who played an important role during the 2nd World War were chiefly Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkan and Necdet Sançar. They played a vital role in the

³⁸ İslam, “Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Düşüncesinin Toplumsal Gelişme Bakımından Değeri,” 386; Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları,” 356.

³⁹ Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları,” 353; Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 23.

⁴⁰ Kemal H Karpat, *Osmanlı’dan Günümüze Edebiyat ve Toplum* (İstanbul: Timaş Yayınları, 2009), 81; Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 35; Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları,” 357 – 358.

⁴¹ Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları,” 360; İslam, “Türkiye’de Milliyetçilik Düşüncesinin Toplumsal Gelişme Bakımından Değeri,” 385.

Turanist and racist journals they published during the late 1930s and the 2nd World War years in Turkey.⁴²

TURKISH FOREIGN POLICY BEFORE THE WAR

Ottoman Legacy

Turkish foreign policy cannot be thought of separately from the 19th and 20th century experiences of the Ottomans, which deeply influenced governing and military circles. In fact, the governing elites of the Republic of Turkey mostly comprised Ottoman military staff. They had gained experience in the wars and state of power affairs of the Empire.⁴³ In this sense, Turkish foreign policy was largely performed by people leaning on their personal experience. Thus the memoirs of the 1st World War was considered in and had an influence on the decision-making process of the administrators.

The most important issue of the Republic of Turkey was the “National Pact,” which determined the national borders of Turkey after the collapse of the Empire. At the end of the 1st World War, the Ottoman Empire had signed the Armistice of Mudros in 1918. As a result of this armistice, some regions of the Empire were occupied. As a reflection of these occupations, the National Pact was determined by the Ottoman Parliament in İstanbul. Additionally, it was approved by the national

⁴² Boratav underlines the fact that the Nazi enthusiasm was spreaded before the war and it went further even during the war. See; Çetik, *Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav'ın Müdaafası*, 195; Ertekin, “Cumhuriyet Döneminde Türkçülüğün Çatallanan Yolları,” 360 – 361; Ayşe Azman and Nalan Yetim, “1940’lı Yıllarda Türk Milliyetçiliğinin Farklı Görünümü,” in *Tarih Ve Milliyetçilik* (presented at the I. Ulusal Tarih Kongresi, Mersin: Mersin Üniversitesi Fen - Edebiyat Fakültesi, 1999), 394. Nesimi takes attention to the predominance of the Pan Turkists and their interpretation of Ziya Gökalp. See; Nesimi, *Türkiye Komünist Partisi'nde: Anılar Ve Değerlendirmeler (1909 - 1949)*, 152; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 26 – 27.

⁴³ Selim Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1994), 57 – 58.

movement in Anatolia.⁴⁴ Under these circumstances the security of national borders emerged. The idea of sovereignty was, as a consequence of this process, passed on to the people. The characteristics of Turkish foreign policy were built up in this way.

All of the experiences came from before and during the 2nd World War. The difficulties in forming the newly established Turkish came in a tendency to prevent preventing Turkey from seeking adventure.

The Essentials of the Turkish Foreign Policy

The main motivation and inspiration for the War of Liberation for Turkey was to regain her own sovereignty in the predetermined borders under the National Pact.⁴⁵ According to the principals of Kemalism, sovereignty was a prerequisite in foreign affairs. In addition to the quest for sovereignty, its security also occupied a prominent place.⁴⁶ This related directly to the evolution of the Empire. Accordingly, Turkey was directed to transform herself into a modern nation state in the Western sense. Therefore, the concept of national interest became a priority in foreign affairs relating to that process.⁴⁷

The goal of improving good relations with neighbors played an important role in normalizing relations. This also helped to ensure the security of sovereignty after the War of Liberation. In fact, one of the crucial points for Turkey was to not to have

⁴⁴ Baskın Oran, "Kurtuluş Yılları: Dönemin Bilançosu," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 104 – 107; Zehra Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 1st edition. (München: R. Oldenbourg Verlag, 1977), 10 – 11.

⁴⁵ Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 10; Necmeddin Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," *Foreign Affairs* 27, no. 3 (April 1949): 449.

⁴⁶ Oral Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 1st Edition. (Ankara: İmge Kitabevi, 1998), 69; Edward Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945* (Princeton University Press, 1973), 7.

⁴⁷ Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, «Elli Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası, 1923 - 1953», *Belleten* XXXIX, no: 153–156 (1975): 269; Additionally, see; Baskın Oran, «The box of Ulusal Çıkar», in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol 1, 11th edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 34.

irredentist tendencies toward her neighbors. An adventure might have caused her to lose her sovereignty, after all.⁴⁸ In this sense, Weisband brings forward the peaceful character of the Kemalist Revolution in Turkey in contrast to the other revolutions.⁴⁹ So, in addition to the peaceful and neighborly character of Turkish foreign policy, her cooperative character can also be added. Consequently, Turkey was open to solve and prevent problems via an active participation in discussions with her counterparts.⁵⁰ In fact, agreements such as the Balkans and Sadabad can be given as examples of the patterns of the policy of Turkey.⁵¹

Accordingly, Koçak generalizes the aims of Turkish foreign policy under two titles:

- Firstly, constituting a security circle against any attack might take place around her,
- Then, solving the problems in terms of international law with non-violent approach.⁵²

The principals of Turkish foreign policy, according to Oran, can roughly be gathered under two titles, which can be considered the basis of the state.⁵³

- The main principal is Status Quoism. The status quo, namely the established order for Turkey is the Treaty of Lausanne. In the Treaty of Lausanne Turkey determined her national borders. Even though there were some changes in favor of Turkey, she however did not follow an aggressive policy in order to broaden her territories. The territories were formally annexed as a consequence of attentive policies to the international laws by Turkey. Therefore, Turkey did not follow an irredentist policy.⁵⁴
- The Westernism also forms an important basis for constituting Turkish foreign policy. Since 19th century onwards, as a direct result of the Ottoman modernism policies, Turkey had turned her face completely toward West. Although Westernism was, first of all, seen in army,

⁴⁸ Kurat, "Elli Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası, 1923 - 1953," 269.

⁴⁹ Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 7 – 10.

⁵⁰ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 2 – 4; Kurat, "Elli Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası, 1923 - 1953," 269.

⁵¹ Fore more, see; "The Balkan Entente and Sadabad Pact", p. 23.

⁵² Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi : 1938-1945 : Dönemin İç ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, vol. 1, 5th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 229; Also see; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 11.

⁵³ Oran, «TDP'nin Temel İlkeleri», in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, 1:46 – 53.

⁵⁴ Sadak, «Turkey Faces the Soviets», 450; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:229.

it the spread across the whole society. There were even ideological reasons to explain Turkey's choice. Accordingly, there were no such alternatives better than West.⁵⁵

The active role of the leader in determining the foreign policy is a fact for Turkey. Atatürk was the final decision maker. Then İnönü, as the successor of Atatürk, undertook the determination of foreign policy. Additionally, the general secretary of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Numan Menemencioğlu, should also be taken into account as a prominent figure who also played an important role as assistant to İnönü.⁵⁶

The famous motto of Atatürk, "Peace at home, peace in the world," clearly explains the approach of Turkey. Accordingly, it can be said that Turkey would follow a peaceful policy in order to improve her economic facilities.⁵⁷ Oran also interprets the meaning of the slogan to include the establishment of a state that endeavors to solve her own problems. Thus, étatism was used in efforts to solve economic problems; political problems with the one-nation motto; and the suppression of the Kurdish upheavals with the one-party regime ideology. There was even no desire for expansion.⁵⁸

⁵⁵ Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 70, 130; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 10 – 11; Baskın Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi: TDP'nin Temel İlkeleri," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 49 – 53; Şevket Süreyya Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, vol. 2, 11th edition (Cağaloğlu İstanbul: Remzi Kitabevi, 2011), 52.

⁵⁶ Weisband makes a broad explanation about the roles of İnönü and Menemencioğlu in the 2nd World War. See; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 33 – 54; Also see; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 42 – 56; İlhan Uzgel, "TDP'nin Uygulanması: TDP'nin Oluşturulması," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 74 – 75; Brock Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42," *Middle Eastern Studies* 31, no. 3 (July 1995): 484.

⁵⁷ Tevfik Rüştü Aras, *Görüşlerim* (İstanbul: Semih Lütü Basımevi, 1945), 18; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 2; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 7 – 8.

⁵⁸ Oran, "TDP'nin Kuramsal Çerçevesi: TDP'nin Temel İlkeleri," 47; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 10; Mehmet Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, vol. I, 5th edition. (Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, 1982), 62; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 7 – 8; Aras, *Görüşlerim*, 18 – 19.

It should also be pointed out that Turkey continued her foreign policy during the 2nd World War in accordance with the Balance of Power in Europe, which was also used a lot in the Ottoman Empire.⁵⁹

Foreign Relations until the Outbreak of War

Relations with Britain and France

Anglo-Turkish relations were, despite the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne, not improved. The Mosul crisis can be considered an important point that prevented the improvement of relations. The prolongation of the crisis, in this sense, prevented the determination of the southeastern border of Turkey.⁶⁰

Furthermore, memories of Britain's role in crumbling and dividing the Ottoman Empire were still alive, which exacerbated the anti-British atmosphere. Even the press supported the anti-British camp for the sake of getting Mosul from Britain. They wrote about a feasible war with Britain.⁶¹ Although the problem was solved in favor of Britain, there were still no changes in Anglo-Turkish relations. In the end, a visit from the British Navy to the Mediterranean can be described as a turning point; it can be accepted as the beginning of normalization of the relations with Britain.⁶² But the emergence of Italy as a threat in the Mediterranean strengthened relations fundamentally. In addition, the disquiet of Britain regarding

⁵⁹ For more, see; Sander, *Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 36; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 3.

⁶⁰ More see; Fahir Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995* (İstanbul: Alkım Yayınevi, n.d.), 321 – 323; İlhan Uzgel and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler: İngiltere’yle İlişkiler,” in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 260 – 265; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:72 – 78; Akşin, *Turkey*, 221.

⁶¹ Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler: İngiltere’yle İlişkiler,” 265; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 322; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:232.

⁶² Uzgel and Kürkçüoğlu, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler: İngiltere’yle İlişkiler,” 271; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:79 – 80; Lothar Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg* (Frankfurt am Main: Vittorio Klostermann, 1964), 12 – 13.

the participation of Turkey in the revisionist camp and Hitler's accession to the power in Germany can also be counted among facts that quickened the normalization of relations. Britain, Yugoslavia, Greece and Turkey concluded a Treaty as a consequence of Italy's menacing discourses. The treaty they concluded was called the Mediterranean Treaty and supported mutual collaboration against Italy in Mediterranean region. This was also interpreted as the first step toward the Tripartite Treaty.⁶³ The rapprochement of Britain and Turkey did not just comprise defensive alliances; British economic aids and cooperative correspondence in international conferences were also part of it.⁶⁴

The progress of relations with France was, in fact, similar to those with Britain. The distinctive feature of relations with France lay in her recognition of Turkey as a sovereign entity in 1921. Despite that, the relations did not develop as they did with Britain.⁶⁵ Additionally, the attitude of France during the Lausanne Conference was found unconstructive and Turkey clashed with the French opposition on almost every point of her thesis.⁶⁶ But there were two essential problems that prevented the establishment of stable relations. The issue of the Ottoman debts was one on which negotiations continued until 1928 for the sake of concluding an agreement.⁶⁷

⁶³ Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:123 – 125; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 241; Önder, *Die Türkische Außenpolitik Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 13, 18 – 19.

⁶⁴ Uzel and Kürkçüoğlu, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: İngiltere'yle İlişkiler," 272 – 273; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 13; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:234.

⁶⁵ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:232.

⁶⁶ İlhan Uzel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Fransa'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 277; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:88.

⁶⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 324 – 325; Uzel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Fransa'yla İlişkiler," 279; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:132.

The stress point of relations, in fact, comprised the issue of Sancak (today's province of Hatay). The treaty of 1921 can be pinpointed as the root of the problem of Sancak. According to the terms of the treaty, Turkey left the city to Syria, which was under French mandate at that time. The French mandate was not generally problematic, but when France declared the end of her mandate in Syria, Turkey put forward her claim. Thus, a problem emerged in Turkish-French relations that led to their deterioration.⁶⁸ Any *fait accompli* regarding the joining of Sancak to Syria was unacceptable for Turkey. Meanwhile, France gave no consent to Turkey for the annexation of Sancak. Under these circumstances, Turkey decided to take the issue to the League of Nations.⁶⁹ According to the plan accepted by the League of Nations, Sancak (Hatay) would be an independent state. As a consequence of the independence of Hatay, the influence of France on Sancak would be broken because France saw Sancak as a part of Syria. In addition to developments in the League of Nations, the dangers of the coming war in Europe contributed a lot to the implicit confirmation of the independence of Sancak (Hatay).⁷⁰ Thus, the process began with the independence of Sancak in 1938 and concluded with the annexation of Hatay to Turkey in 1939.⁷¹ One of the significant results of this annexation can be seen as the conclusion of Turkish-French Agreement. The agreement can be seen as the predecessor of the Tripartite Treaty.

⁶⁸ Melek Fırat and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Fransa'yla İlişkiler: Sancak (Hatay) Sorunu," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 282 – 283; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:133 – 134; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 348.

⁶⁹ Fırat and Kürkçüoğlu, "Fransa'yla İlişkiler: Sancak (Hatay) Sorunu," 283 – 285; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 349 – 350.

⁷⁰ Akşin, *Turkey*, 222; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 350; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:138.

⁷¹ Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 21 – 22; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 17; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:139.

Relations with Germany and Italy

Relations between Germany and Turkey had, as a result of the Versailles Treaty, been interrupted in the wake of the 1st World War. As a consequence of this interruption in relations, their development was held back in comparison with the others. One of the remarkable points of the limited relations between Germany and Turkey can be seen in German support. Thus, many German citizens worked as qualified and skilled employees and experts in Turkey. In addition, the German military staff can also be counted among those who worked as the military experts in modernizing the Turkish Army thanks to the disarmament of the German Army in line with the terms of the restrictions in the Versailles Treaty. Moreover, they took part in establishing a defense industry, and even armament of the Turkish army.⁷² It is certain that Hitler's accession to power in Germany influenced German-Turkish relations. The reason for this improvement in relations was essentially economic in nature. But it can also be said that a consistent progression in economic relations during the Weimar regime (1919-1933) had already begun. In this sense, it was maintained according to the priorities of new foreign policy of Germany. Accordingly, the new German foreign policy strictly related to the economy. Essentially, this formed a crucial part of the newly establishing Nazi regime in Germany.⁷³

Germany was intensifying her relations with Turkey through a trade policy developed by Minister of Foreign Trade Hjalmar Schacht. Accordingly, Germany was demanding raw materials largely from Southeast and East Europe countries and

⁷² İlhan Uzgel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Almanya'yla İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 299; Yuluğ Tekin Kurat, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk - Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset," *Bellekten* XXV, no. 97-100 (1961): 96.

⁷³ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 352; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:120; Uzgel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Almanya'yla İlişkiler," 304.

supplying them the end products. Germany had really taken an important role in Turkish foreign trade as a consequence of long-term credit agreements. This was even to the advantage of Turkey; accordingly, Turkey was supplying agricultural products and raw materials in exchange for manufactured products. At first glimpse, it seemed to Turkey's advantage, because she had some problems in terms of currency. But problems began to emerge. Thus, Turkey was becoming a raw-material supplier and market place for Germany.⁷⁴ Britain was thought of as a balance to the German influence in the Turkish economy and a clearing agreement was concluded in 1936.

Political relations with Germany, contrary to the intensity of economic relations, were not developed to the same extent.⁷⁵ It can be assumed that Italy was the factor shaping political relations between Germany and Turkey. In particular, the aggressive discourses of Italy urged Turkey to undertake certain measures. These approaches Germany where she approved the Italian point of view in Mediterranean resulted with an implicit deterioration in relations.⁷⁶

One of the problems that prevented the development of political relations with Germany was German expansionism. Initially Turkey considered these the wiping away of the traces of the Versailles regime and therefore found this policy to a certain point comprehensible.⁷⁷ The turning point in relations can be accepted as

⁷⁴ Uzgel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Almanya'yla İlişkiler," 304 – 305; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 14 – 15; Kurat, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk - Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset," 97; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:120 121.

⁷⁵ Hughe Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War* (London: John Murray, Albemarle Street, W., 1949), 145.

⁷⁶ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 353; Uzgel, "Batı Avrupa'yla İlişkiler: Almanya'yla İlişkiler," 303; Kurat, "İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk - Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset," 96; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 20; Franz von Papen, *Memoirs* (London: Andre Deutsch, 1952), 444.

⁷⁷ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:239; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 19; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 353.

being the annexation of Czechoslovakia. From that moment on, the ambiguous “*Lebensraum*” policy became a source of anxiety.⁷⁸ The perspective of Germany was interesting, however; Germany assumed Turkey to be a revisionist state and asked to improve close relations.⁷⁹

The progress of relations with Italy was fairly strange, because even though Italy was perceived as a threat and therefore shaped Turkish foreign policy, Italy was at the same time the first occupier to establish good relations with Ankara at the War of Liberation. But after for a while, when the occupation ended, internal unrest developed in Italy. As a consequence the Fascist Party ascended to power. Thereafter, the Fascists who were dissatisfied with the state of Italy at that time started to change their foreign policy attitudes. According to them, Italy’s hope for expansion at the end of the war had not been met. Thus, they started to follow a threatening policy in the Mediterranean.⁸⁰ This change regarding the claims on the Mediterranean was considered a threat and caused Turkey to take precautions against Italy. Moreover, Mussolini aimed to recreate the Roman Empire with his famous “*Mare Nostrum*” speeches. In addition to these speeches, the Italian invasion of Abyssinia in 1935 was observed with disquiet in Turkey. This also led to the displeasure of Turkey, Britain, France and Greece.⁸¹ Briefly, Italy’s activities, threatening discourse on Mediterranean, invasion of Abyssinia, occupation of

⁷⁸ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:240; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 20; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:107.

⁷⁹ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:122; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 353; Hasan Köni, “II nci Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Türk Dış Politikası,” *Ankara Üniversitesi Türk İnkılap Tarihi Enstitüsü Atatürk Yolu Dergisi*, no. 1 (1988): 45.

⁸⁰ Rıfki Salim Burçak, “İtalyan Politikasının Beş Yılı, (1935 - 1939),” *SBF Dergisi* I, no. 3 (1943): 473; İlhan Uzgel, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler: İtalya’yla İlişkiler,” in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 293; Fahir H. Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” *Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Dergisi* XIII, no. 2 (June 1958): 327 – 328.

⁸¹ Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 12 – 13; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 20; Uzgel, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler: İtalya’yla İlişkiler,” 295; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:116 – 117. In this regard, Papen advised Germany to put pressure on Italy, see; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 447.

Albania in 1939 and armament of the Dodecanese in 1936, quickened the conclusion of agreement with France and Britain.⁸²

The Balkan Entente and the Sadabad Pact

The cornerstone of Turkish foreign policy after Lausanne was a peaceful policy and the normalization of relations with neighbor states. The necessity of “Peace at home, Peace in the World” had, in this regard, begun with neighbors after longstanding wars. Thus, it can be said that Turkey gave importance and even focused on establishing good relations with the Balkan states. Turkey had a respectable progress in relations with her neighbor states until the European political depression of the 1930s.⁸³ Turkey’s membership of the League of Nations can also be counted among the stimulating points in the establishment of a collaborative atmosphere in the Balkans. In addition, the establishment of Turkish-Greek relations contributed a lot to rapprochement in the Balkans.⁸⁴

The Balkan Entente was signed by Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania in 1934. It can be said that those were non-revisionists. Additionally, they even had no territorial problems with each other. The main reason prompting them to conclude an agreement was the discourse and even the activities of revisionist states such as Bulgaria and Italy. On the other hand, it was obvious that a war was getting closer and in this regard, it was necessary to take precautions to secure the region.⁸⁵ In

⁸² Köni, “II nci Dünya Savaşı Öncesinde Türk Dış Politikası,” 46 – 47; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:233, 239 – 140; Uzgel, “Batı Avrupa’yla İlişkiler: İtalya’yla İlişkiler,” 296 – 297; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 17; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:111; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 340.

⁸³ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:103 – 104; Melek Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler: Balkan Antantı,” in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı’ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 350.

⁸⁴ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 337 – 338.

⁸⁵ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:105 – 107; Fırat, “Yunanistan’la İlişkiler: Balkan Antantı,” 350 – 351.

addition, Albania and Bulgaria had declared their dissatisfaction with the Versailles regime, and furthermore Italy was also still seen as the prime threat because of her imperial dreams for the Balkans and Mediterranean.⁸⁶ Accordingly, Albania, Italy and Bulgaria were altogether affecting the direction of the policies of Turkey, Greece, Yugoslavia and Romania.

Although Bulgaria did not take place in the Balkan Entente, she then signed a treaty with Turkey. The reason for the disquiets with Bulgaria related to forming a common security circle in the Balkans. During the war the validity of the Entente became a question that remained far from measuring a system of security in the Balkans.⁸⁷

As a consequence of the Westernism principal of Turkish foreign policy, the priority, in this sense, was given to the West. But when Turkey solved her problems in the West, then she turned to the East in order to establish good relations with her eastern neighbors. It was important for Turkey to conclude a pact with Iran and her Arabian neighbors for the sake of security measures against Italy. It was understood that Italy's expansion would be toward the Balkans and East Mediterranean. It can obviously be pointed out that the occupation of Abyssinia by Italy in 1935 urged Turkey to conclude the pact. Thus, Turkey hoped to establish a security circle against a probable Italian attack.⁸⁸ Accordingly, the pact prohibited attack on a signatory country and even stressed not encouraging expansionism over a signatory country.

⁸⁶ The former Minister of Foreign Affairs Tevfik Rüştü Aras thinks Italy was the first state whose activities damaged the peace in the Balkans. See; Aras, *Görüşlerim*, 52 – 53. Additionally, see; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 338 – 339.

⁸⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 339 – 340; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:237 – 238; Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42," 489 – 490.

⁸⁸ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, 1:111 – 112; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 346; Atay Akdevelioğlu and Ömer Kürkçüoğlu, "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler: Sadabad Paketi," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 365 – 367.

The crucial part and sensitive point of the pact was showing respect to national borders.⁸⁹

Relations with the Soviet Union and the Case of the Straits

The Soviet Union was the first country with which Turkey established good relations during the War of Liberation. The Soviet contribution to the War of Liberation occupies a really notable place; first and foremost, Turkey was recognized as a sovereign entity. Additionally, the Soviet aids and support was not only financial but also military. It can be said that circumstances have prompted rapprochement of Turkey and the Soviet Union.⁹⁰ The treaty signed in 1921 can be considered a start in establishing good relations. Moreover, the Soviet Union became a vital foreign policy partner of Turkey during a time at which her relations with West had still not normalized. The circumstances and their mutual complications with the West brought them together to conclude the Non-Aggression and Neutrality Treaty in 1925. Accordingly, stable peaceful relations were finally established, which were maintained until the end of the Moscow negotiations in 1939.⁹¹

When Turkey solved her relations with the West she started to develop peaceful relations. Depending upon the Mediterranean issues and Italian threat, circumstances brought Turkey to collaborate with Britain. Thus, the Soviet Union gradually lost her unique position in Turkish foreign policy, even though Turkish

⁸⁹ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 347; Akdevelioğlu and Kürkçüoğlu, "Ortadoğu'yla İlişkiler: Sadabad Paktı," 367 – 369; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:113.

⁹⁰ Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:20 – 21; Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," 450 – 451.

⁹¹ Aras, *Görüşlerim*, 21; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:82; Erel Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 315.

foreign policy was based on Soviet friendship.⁹² Additionally, Italy was a threat to Mediterranean security.⁹³

The status of the Straits was, in fact, determined in the Lausanne Treaty. Accordingly, the disarmament of the Straits and the independence of navigation of the Straits were accepted. In addition, an international commission undertook control of the Straits.⁹⁴ Thus, as can obviously be seen, Turkey gave consent to the restrictions regarding her sovereignty in the Straits.⁹⁵

Aras points out that the issue of the Straits had first come into question in 1933 through an international conference regarding disarmament. According to Turkey, the international atmosphere was not conducive to the continuation of the current conditions in the Straits. Moreover, this might have caused a problem in defense of Thrace. This was, however, considered after Italy's invasion of Abyssinia. Turkey guaranteed the support of her close partners, Britain and the Soviet Union.⁹⁶ It can be said that the armament and activities of Germany and Italy had created alarm in France.⁹⁷ This can also be considered as a development in favor of Turkey.

⁹² Ludmila Zhivkova, *Anglo Turkish Relations: 1933 – 1939*, (London: Secker and Warburg, 1976), 5 – 7, 119 – 120 quoted by Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 69. Additionally, see; Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42," 488; Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," 451 – 452. According to Sertel, Atatürk requested to maintain the good relations with the Soviet Union before his death. See; Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 216 – 217; Also see; İsmet İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, vol. 1, 1st edition. (İstanbul: YKY, 2001), 212 – 213.

⁹³ Even though Weisband counted the Soviet Union as the prime threat which formed the Turkish politics, essentially, it is hard to say that there was a conflict in Turkish-Soviet relations until the German -Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in 1939. See; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 3. Moreover, see; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 70 – 71; Millman, "Turkish Foreign and Strategic Policy 1934-42," 485.

⁹⁴ Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:125 – 126; Kudret Özersay, "Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi," in *Türk Dış Politikası, Kurtuluş Savaşı'ndan Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar: 1919 - 1980*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 370 – 371.

⁹⁵ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 343; Özersay, "Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi," 370.

⁹⁶ Aras, *Görüşlerim*, 123 – 125. Additionally, see; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:127.

⁹⁷ Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 344; Özersay, "Montreux Boğazlar Sözleşmesi," 372.

The conference took place in Montreux in 1936 without Italy's participation. As a result of this conference, Turkey regained her sovereign position over the Straits.⁹⁸ Interestingly, the Soviet Union requested Turkey conclude an additional pact to Montreux but this was essentially refused by Britain. Thus, this can be understood as the roots of Soviet interest in the Straits.⁹⁹ As is known, this issue was discussed at every opportunity the Soviets had, and thus continued until the end of the war. An implicit result of the conference was its contribution to Anglo-Turkish relations in the Mediterranean. It also assisted improvement of the geopolitical importance of Turkey during the war.

In conclusion, it is possible to say that Turkey focused on establishing cooperative good relations with her neighbors. As a consequence of her foreign policy, Turkey primarily turned to her region when a threat appeared in Europe. Additionally, she sought to conclude mutual assistance and non-aggression agreements with neighbor states.

GERMAN INVASIONS (1939 – 1943)

The Tripartite Treaty

Relations between Britain and Turkey increased as a direct consequence of both Turkey and Britain's perceptions of Italy, which was accepted as a prime threat in the Mediterranean after invading Albania in 1939. In fact, the activities of Italy prompted Turkey to conclude new agreements to keep herself secure. This was the situation that brought Turkey to establish close relations with Britain in addition to

⁹⁸ Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:129 – 132; Armaoğlu, *20. Yüzyıl Siyasi Tarihi, 1914 - 1995*, 345.

⁹⁹ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 72; Tellal, "SSCB'yle İlişkiler," 321; Sadak, "Turkey Faces the Soviets," 452.

her historical partner, the Soviet Union. From that time on, it can be said that this duality in foreign affairs became a starting point for Turkey's following irreconcilable foreign policies during the 2nd World War.¹⁰⁰

As a direct consequence of the security measures directed toward an Italian threat in the Mediterranean, Turkey and Britain agreed upon a declaration on May 12 1939 that later provided a basis for an expanded agreement.¹⁰¹ Essentially, a front against Italian activities in the Mediterranean was being established, and in this regard, Turkey signed a declaration with France similar to the Anglo-Turkish declaration on June 23, 1939.¹⁰² The reaction of the revisionist states, such as Germany and Italy, to this declaration was negative. They were also aware these declarations were concluded against them. On the other hand, even though the Soviet Union considered these declarations between Turkey, France and Britain not to be as negative as Germany and Italy did, in fact due to her distrust of the West she did not want Turkey to establish good relations with the West.¹⁰³

After Turkey signed the declarations between France and Britain, she tried to add the Soviet Union, her traditional foreign affairs partner, to them. In this regard, Turkey hoped to reconcile her traditional policy that she followed in accordance with the Soviet Union and her new policy that began as a consequence of signing declarations with France and Britain. This would also have helped build a front

¹⁰⁰ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:259; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 146 – 147.

¹⁰¹ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:244 – 254; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 30 – 33; Sabiha Sertel, *Roman Gibi* (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 1987), 195 – 198.

¹⁰² Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:255 – 257; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:139; Mustafa Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," in *Türk Dış Politikası: Kurtuluş Savaşından Bugüne Olgular, Belgeler, Yorumlar*, ed. Baskın Oran, vol. 1, 11th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2005), 417.

¹⁰³ Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 40; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:145 – 146; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 417. According to Hugessen the reaction of Germany was milder than the expectations. See; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 149.

against the revisionist states. Even though the Soviet Union was also in negotiations with the West, it was not concluded with an agreement and ceased.¹⁰⁴ Thus, as a result of this break in negotiations, the Soviet Union changed her policy and concluded a surprising Non-Aggression Pact with Germany on August 23, 1939. This surprised Turkey, because it was not thought that the Soviet Union might conclude a pact with Germany.¹⁰⁵ Although the German-Soviet pact caused a shock in Turkey, this development did not generate problems in Turkish-Soviet relations. In this sense, Turkey decided to try to conclude a separate agreement with the Soviet Union, and therefore Minister of Foreign Affairs Şükrü Saraçoğlu paid a visit to Moscow as a consequence of an official invitation on September 25, 1939.¹⁰⁶

One of the interesting points of that visit was its timing; the minister left Turkey with an agreement negotiated with Britain and France and ready to sign in the event of any failure in negotiations with the Soviet Union. During these negotiations with the Soviet Union, the displeasure of the Soviets with the Montreux Convention was revealed. Moreover, they also tried to learn the content and matter of the British-French-Turkish Agreement that was ready to sign and provided the neutrality of Turkey.¹⁰⁷ In addition to these, the Soviet demand regarding mutual

¹⁰⁴ Turkey tried to add the Soviet Union from the very beginning of the conversation between Britain and France. The problem which obstacles the participation of the Soviet Union to the alliance was the distrust of the Soviets against Britain and France. See; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 34 – 35; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:257.

¹⁰⁵ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 78 – 80; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 199 – 201; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 53; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 25; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:118 – 122. Papen claimed that he had learnt it at last time, see; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 451.

¹⁰⁶ Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 417 – 419; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 81 – 90; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 10 – 11; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 52 – 58.

¹⁰⁷ Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 419; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 59. The most important task of the German Ambassador was to assure Turkey's neutrality. See; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 446; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 149; Johannes Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, trans. Arif Gelen, 1st Edition. (Ankara: Onur Yayınları, 1970), 121 – 122.

defense of the Straits was for the first time mentioned by the Soviet Union.¹⁰⁸ As a result of the negotiations, even though the parties agreed upon some points, the negotiations were interrupted. The main reason for this interruption was, in fact, the unacceptable Soviet demands regarding the Straits. According to the standpoint of Turkey, the mutual defense of the Straits was an explicit intervention to the sovereignty of Turkey.¹⁰⁹ As a direct consequence of this intervention by the Soviets, Turkey immediately signed the agreement that was already ready for signing. This development in Soviet-Turkish relations can be accepted as the starting point of the deterioration in relations, because from that time on, Turkey was suspicious regarding Soviet intentions for her.¹¹⁰

The Tripartite Treaty¹¹¹ signed on October 17, 1939, between Turkey, France and Britain brought Turkey to the point of mutual assistance in some certain issues. According to the treaty, Turkey undertook responsibilities to assist France and Britain in Mediterranean issues, while Britain and France would help Turkey if she was attacked by a European state. In addition, Turkey agreed to help Britain, as a consequence of her single-sided guarantees to Greece and Romania; therefore the circumstances in Romania and Greece became important for Turkey.¹¹² Additionally, Turkey would not be in any situation that might bring her to a state of aggression

¹⁰⁸ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 12 – 14; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:124; Kreeker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 60. Regarding the Soviet demands, see; Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” 147 – 148; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 421.

¹⁰⁹ Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 419 – 422; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 92 – 93. Sadak mentions that Molotov denied the Soviet demands regarding the Straits but he pointed out the article 4 as reason for interruption that Turkey had not approved. The article was prohibiting any Soviet activities against Germany. See; Sadak, “Turkey Faces the Soviets,” 454.

¹¹⁰ Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 422.

¹¹¹ For Turkish translations of the whole text, see; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:271 – 280.

¹¹² Kreeker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 62 – 63; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:281.

against the Soviet Union.¹¹³ Even though Turkey showed sensitivity in as much as the treaty was not against the Soviet Union, the Soviets declared that they saw it as a step which taken in relation to the war.¹¹⁴ This reaction of the Soviets triggered Turkish suspicions.

The Soviet Union, after the signing of the Non-Aggression Pact with Germany, showed an explicit expansionist tendency by occupying Poland and the Baltic States. It even started to expand toward Finland. France and Britain made a plan against the Soviet Union with the aim of preventing the expansionist tendencies of the Soviets. According to that plan, France and Britain targeted the oil reserves of the Soviets. The participation of Turkey in that plan was quite important, thanks to the need to use her airspace. According to reports of French Ambassador René Massigli, Minister of Foreign Affairs Saraçoğlu had implicitly approved Turkish support for that plan.¹¹⁵ Due to some reasons, the plan had not taken place and moreover the documents regarding the plan were all captured and published by Germany when Germany occupied France in June 1940. The reason for the publication of these documents was to damage Turkish-Soviet relations. However,

¹¹³ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 422 – 424; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:149 –150; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 63.

¹¹⁴ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:281 – 282; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:150; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 424; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 63 – 64.

¹¹⁵ Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 168 – 169; Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 149 – 150; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası, 1939 - 1954*, 130 – 135. In addition to the plan that the oil reserves would have attacked, the Turanism issue was also mentioned. Accordingly, a rebellion would have taken place among the Turkish people and Muslims in Caucasus. See; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:292 – 294; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 42 – 45.

there was no remarkable change in relations, or even in Soviet policy toward Turkey.¹¹⁶

After a remarkable period, known as the Phony (or Strange) War, Germany started to attack West Europe. Accordingly, after the collapse of the Netherlands, Germany invaded Belgium, and during her invasion of Belgium, France became involved in the war. When France was resisting Germany, Italy declared war against Britain and France. The declaration of Italy came a few days before the collapse of France. According to the Tripartite Treaty, Turkey had to enter the war as soon as possible but this option was rejected after much discussion at the National Assembly.¹¹⁷ Turkey justified this on the basis of her inadequacy of military equipment, which could lead to her early destruction. Additionally, the Soviet reserve was also used in order to refrain from war.¹¹⁸ On June 22, 1940, France was defeated by Germany¹¹⁹ and the defeat of France triggered Turkey to ask herself whether or not she was once again on the wrong side. Apparently, as a direct result of German military victories in Europe and the sudden defeat of France, the political atmosphere was gradually changing to the advantage of Germany.¹²⁰

Italy's attack on Greece on October 28, 1940, opened another page in the progress of the war for Turkey. Hence the war finally reached the doors of Turkey;

¹¹⁶ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 429; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 463 – 464; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:160 – 161; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:154. About the after-decision debates, see; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 94 – 101.

¹¹⁷ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:302 – 307; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 460; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:152 – 154; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 106 – 112; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 57 – 59; Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, 108 – 111. Regarding with the talks and debates upon entering to the war, see; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 85 – 91.

¹¹⁸ Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 150 –151; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 460 – 461; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 125. Hugessen, the British Ambassador, agreed about the military inadequacy of Turkey. See; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 166 – 167.

¹¹⁹ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 112 – 122.

¹²⁰ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 109; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 206 – 207.

therefore she declared she would enter the war if Italy reached Thessaloniki. Additionally, Bulgaria was warned over her aggressive attempts against Greece. At this point, Britain indicated she would not put any pressure on Turkey to enter the war. However, what Britain wanted from Turkey simply permission to use her air and naval bases, but this was also rejected by Turkey. In fact Turkey refrained from anything that can be considered a movement against Germany.¹²¹ Interestingly, Greece managed to repel Italians from her land and even started to pursue them in Albania. When Italy and Greece were fighting, Minister of Foreign Affairs Soviet Union Vyacheslav Molotov was visiting Berlin in November 1940 for the sake of concluding the pact and participating in the Axis. Moreover, they were not just discussing the participation of the Soviet Union; they also started to divide the world into regions of interest. At these negotiations it was understood that there remained no certain facts that connected Germany and the Soviet Union.¹²² Hence, from the German standpoint, the Balkans and Straits had to belong to them.

Germany in the Balkans

At the end of 1940, almost all Western Europe was occupied by Germany. From that moment on, an implicit conflict between Germany and the Soviet Union over regions of interest began-as a consequence of the Berlin meeting. At his visit to Berlin, Molotov understood that there were differences in the interests of Germany and the Soviet Union and, therefore, it was not possible to conclude an agreement

¹²¹ Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” 151; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:157; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:313 – 317; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:154 – 155; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 67 – 68; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*, 123– 132.

¹²² Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:317 – 319; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:156 – 157; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 431 – 433; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 108 – 118; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 70 – 76; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 143; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 465 – 468.

with Germany. In this regard, the Balkans, as one of the most problematic areas, became the stage of German-Soviet rivalry.¹²³

The disagreement of the Soviet Union and Germany brought the Soviets closer to Turkey.¹²⁴ Endeavors for the restoration of relations concluded with a Non-Aggression Pact in 1941. The reason for this pact was, firstly, a direct result of rumors regarding a probable Soviet attack with Turkey in the war. The pact was the concluded when all endeavors by the Soviets had come to naught in the Balkans.¹²⁵

As a consequence of unsuccessful German-Soviet negotiations in Berlin, Germany understood that there was no way to compromise with the Soviet Union regarding regions of interests. Therefore, Germany decided to occupy the Balkans, one of the main problems with the Soviet Union. In fact, this occupation was the first part of preparations for the invasion of the Soviets for the sake of keeping herself secure. In this sense, German Ambassador in Ankara Franz von Papen¹²⁶ was struggling for the reinterpretation of the German-Turkish relations.¹²⁷ The first steps

¹²³ Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 128 – 129; Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” 151 – 152; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 434 – 435; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:158.

¹²⁴ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:147; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 144 – 146.

¹²⁵ Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 142 – 146; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 437 – 438; Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” 157; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:161 – 162; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 168 – 170. Regarding the plans of Germany's that she aimed to prevent a Turkish-Soviet rapprochement, see: Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 128 – 129. After Molotov's visit to Berlin in 1940, von Papen asserted that Germany was the key for the development of the Soviet-Turkish relations. See; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:517.

¹²⁶ Franz von Papen (1879-1969) was a military officer in Turkey during the 1st World War. Then, he became the Chancellor of Germany in 1932. Thereafter, he was the ambassador in Austria during the “Anschluss” and lastly became the ambassador in Turkey from 1939 to 1944. He was also judged and sentenced to jail in Nuremberg trials in 1946. He was released in 1949.

¹²⁷ Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 168; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:514 – 515; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 471; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 134 . Germany started to create the anti-communist atmosphere in Turkey and therefore, the Soviet demands regarding the Straits was revealed as a material of propaganda, see; Ibid., 144; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 434; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:542 – 543.

toward an agreement between Germany and Turkey were taken as a result of von Papen's initiatives in December 1940.¹²⁸

On one hand, Britain was desperately trying to reanimate the Balkan Entente and on the other hand drawing Turkey's attention to Germany. Accordingly, Turkey was asked to show her assistance in order to prevent the expansion of the war to the Balkans.¹²⁹ According to Britain, Bulgaria, which is important for the security of the Balkans and Turkey, was in a critical position and threatened by Germany. Interestingly, Bulgaria requested Turkey conclude a non-aggression pact before her participation in the Axis. A struggle to win Bulgaria over to their side between Germany, Britain and the Soviet Union finally ended even with a non-aggression guarantee from Turkey.¹³⁰ As a consequence of the occupation of Bulgaria by Germany, the fears of Turkey soared. The main fear was the "syndrome of Poland," which referred to be occupation by the Soviet Union and Germany at the same time. In this regard, von Papen suggested Hitler send personal letters to İnönü in order to appease Turkey. In these letters Hitler underlined that Germany had no intention of invading Turkey; on the contrary, he requested signature of a non-aggression pact for the sake of reestablishing good relations.¹³¹ Even though Turkey had signed a treaty

¹²⁸ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:517 – 520; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 127 – 129; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 77; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 134 – 136.

¹²⁹ Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 153 – 154; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:160 – 161; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 120 – 121; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 159 – 162; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 133.

¹³⁰ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 436 – 437; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:159; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 130 – 134; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 163 – 165. It was even notified that if only Turkey would have declared war to Bulgaria, she had been in war with Germany. See; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 78 – 79; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:521. Glasneck asserted that Germany requested from Bulgaria to conclude an agreement with Turkey. See; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 139.

¹³¹ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 166 – 167; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 137; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 471 – 473; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 438 – 439.

with Britain, her approach to this request was positive. This can be considered a disappointment for England. However, Turkey remained important for Britain in keeping the war away from the Middle East.¹³²

When Germany took control over the whole Balkans, a coup d'état that justified British fears of the expansion of the war towards the Middle East took place in Iraq on April 3. Accordingly, Rashid Ali al-Gaylani, a nationalist and considered pro-German, installed the coup d'état successfully and seized the power. Thereafter, Britain took measures against the Gaylani regime in Iraq and as a consequence Gaylani demanded support from Germany in order to strengthen his position against Britain. It was a great opportunity for Germany to invade the Middle East and also quite necessary to gain access to the Iraqi petroleum.¹³³ In the meantime, when Gaylani demanded help, Germany and Turkey were in negotiations over the non-aggression pact. In this regard, Germany insisted upon a guarantee with a secret clause in the pact for a consignment of soldiers and military equipment to Iraq. This was contradictory to the responsibilities of Turkey under the tripartite treaty.¹³⁴ One thing was quite interesting during the negotiations; the German policy aimed to separate Turkey from her current ties with the Allies and lead her to the Axis. According to Germany, Turkey was encircled and therefore, had to give permission for the movement of military equipment and soldiers to Iraq.¹³⁵ During negotiations

¹³² Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 133.

¹³³ Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 110; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:162 – 163; Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 157; Kurat, "Elli Yıllık Cumhuriyetin Dış Politikası, 1923 - 1953," 272; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:161. For the German activities in Iraq, see; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 476 – 477.

¹³⁴ According to von Papen, Turkey could give permission to the consignment. In fact, he made a mistake when he was interpreting the President. The President said to him that "When there is a will, a formulation can be found". Consequently, Papen thought that it might have been possible. See; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, ed., "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)" (Foreign Languages Publishing House, 1948), 7 – 8; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 199.

¹³⁵ Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 169 – 170; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 -

with Germany, Turkey shared information on the development of negotiations with Britain; therefore, it can be said that Britain was tolerant of Turkey. At least Britain hoped to assure the benevolent neutrality of Turkey to prevent German passage to Iraq and the Middle East.¹³⁶ Germany used the typical method to persuade Turkey that of a Russian/Soviet threat¹³⁷ – rather than an alleged German threat regarding the territorial integrity of Turkey. Additionally, Germany made territorial offers to Turkey in order to satisfy her interests for the sake of gaining permission to send consignments to Iraq. Moreover, German Minister of Foreign Affairs Joachim von Ribbentrop insisted upon nullifying the former engagements, by which he meant the tripartite treaty of Turkey. Although the military equipment and soldiers were important for Germany, there was no time to lose.¹³⁸ As a result, Germany could not gain what she wanted from Turkey, although the non-aggression and neutrality pact between Germany and Turkey was signed on June 18, 1941.¹³⁹ The coup d'état was overturned by Britain in May and therefore the only thing left for Germany to do was to sign the pact and secure the neutrality of Turkey before attacking the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁰ As a result of signing a pact with Germany, Turkey left her neutral position, and it can be said that from that moment on the political atmosphere in Turkey had turned to the advantage of Germany.

1943),” 9; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 142; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 155 – 157.

¹³⁶ Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 170; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 111 – 112; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 199 – 102; Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” 159.

¹³⁷ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 197.

¹³⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, “German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943),” 10 – 24; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:161 – 164.

¹³⁹ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:581 – 585. For the details, see; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, “German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943),” 25 – 34.

¹⁴⁰ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:164; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 442 – 443; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 143 – 144; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:577; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 150 – 154.

German – Turkish Rapprochement

On June 22, 1941 – four days after the signing of the non-aggression and neutrality pact – Germany attacked the Soviet Union and Turkey declared her neutrality in this Soviet-German war. The attack of Germany on the Soviet Union was welcomed by Turkey and gave a considerable boost to her morale. Hitler's declaration of the basic casus belli, one of which related to the Straits, proved interesting for Turkey. As a consequence Germany hoped to gain public support Turkey by representing themselves as the protector of the Straits on one hand, meanwhile knowing this would cause problems in Turkish-Soviet relations.¹⁴¹

There was an important development in British-Soviet relations that led to Turkish apprehension. Against the expectations of Turkey, Britain decided to support the Soviet Union. This troubled Turkey and stirred up memories of the 1st World War, where her territories were divided by Russia and Britain through secret agreements. Meanwhile, these hesitations by Turkey over Britain and the Soviet Union gave a great opportunity to Germany to intensify her propaganda measures over Turkey. Additionally, Britain urged Turkey to protect her neutral position and not to take action that could be considered in favor of Germany.¹⁴² Soviet Union Minister of the Foreign Affairs Molotov disapproved of Soviet demands on the Straits, because of their need for Turkey during the campaign against Germany. Even

¹⁴¹ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 204 – 206; Önder, *Die Türkische Außenpolitik Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 127; Krecker, *Deutschland Und Die Türkei Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 190; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 445 – 446; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:165; Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 160; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:185 – 186; Cemil Koçak, *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir*, 1. Baskı. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2009), 292. Von Papen wrote in his memoirs that he had found Saraçoğlu with a great excitement. In their speech, Saraçoğlu described the Soviet-German war as a Crusade ("ce n'est pas une guerre, c'est une croisade") and took attention to the Soviet threat which directed to the Straits and even added that the fears of Turkey regarding the dual occupation, Syndrome of Poland, disappeared. See; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 479.

¹⁴² Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 206 – 207; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 147 – 148; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 224 – 225; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:165.

though the Soviet Union hoped for a détente in relations with Turkey, this did not happen as a direct consequence of Turkish suspicions.¹⁴³

The war, which was supposed to end in a relatively short time according to the plans of Germany was not over and continued to lengthen.¹⁴⁴ Interestingly, the German policy on Turkey was planned in accordance with the collapse of the Soviet Union. Therefore, the lengthening of the war and the difficulties Germany had on the eastern front caused pressure by Germany on Turkey to join the war. The politics of Turkey were based on Anti-Sovietism, but she was definitely against joining the war. However, Germany saw this as Turkey's waiting for the right time to participate – the collapse of the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁵ In this sense, Germany used propaganda as a tool to assure the support of Turkey, and the visits of General Ali Fuat Erden and retired General Emir Erkilet to the east front in October 1941 gave it this opportunity. The most significant point of their visit was the report of Erden, in which he explained his impressions on the progress of the war. Accordingly, Erden learnt a lot from this visit and consequently wrote in his report that he trusted Germany to win the war against the Soviet Union.¹⁴⁶ However, this report did not change the standpoint of Turkey. Ultimately US entry to the war became quite decisive for Turkey in not participating in the war.

¹⁴³ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 208; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:166; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 446; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:603.

¹⁴⁴ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 210 – 211; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 223.

¹⁴⁵ Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 158 – 163; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 49 – 58; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:603 – 604; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 192.

¹⁴⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 40 – 42; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 164; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:604 – 609. According to Glasneck, an attaché in Moscow requested to occupy Caucasus before Germany. See; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 165.

Until the defeat of Germany at Stalingrad in 1943, Germany can be thought of as the main figure in Turkish politics. As an addition to Turkey's distrust of the Soviets regarding the Straits, Turkey was suspicious of the British-Soviet rapprochement suspiciously.¹⁴⁷ In this circumstance, Germany became the equalizer against the Soviet Union. However, Turkey was not engaged with Germany imprudently, on the contrary, the after-war image of Turkey was totally different. According to Turkey; the Russians should be in the grave and the Germans in the hospital.¹⁴⁸ Although the press published some articles that can be considered pro-Soviet, it published mainly pro-German articles.¹⁴⁹

Lastly, an assassination attempt against the German ambassador, Franz von Papen, took place in Ankara on February 24, 1942. This attempt was important for displaying Turkey's point of view in the German-Soviet war.¹⁵⁰ Two Soviet citizens were captured and subsequently sentenced to 16 years jail. However, they were released a week after Turkey severed her relations with Germany in August 1944. Their imprisonment had, of course caused deterioration in relations with the Soviet Union.¹⁵¹

There were also economic issues between Turkey and Germany that provided not only a lot of opportunities to cover her military inadequacies, but also supply

¹⁴⁷ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:169 – 170; Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 163 – 164; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:246 – 247; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 207 – 208, 222– 223; Gotthard Jaeschke, *Türkiye Kronolojisi (1938 - 1945)*, trans. Gülayşe Koçak (Ankara: Türk Tarih Kurumu Yayınları, 1990), 68 – 69.

¹⁴⁸ Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 163.

¹⁴⁹ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 225; Krecker, *Deutschland Und Die Türkei Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 192; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 161; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 43 – 44; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:193.

¹⁵⁰ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:617 – 625; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 201 – 204; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 486 – 487; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 247 – 248; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:248.

¹⁵¹ Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:171; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 256; Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 160 – 164.

pressures such as that of chromium. Chromium was considered the raw material of the war industry and towards the end of the way was regarded by Germany as the most important material for sustaining the war.¹⁵² The chromium consignment was a problem in its own right, but it also became a race in terms of sales and in the prevention of sales to both parties.

Turkey could grow only agrarian products that were of poor quality, and as a consequence it was hard to find consumers for her products. However, Germany offered to buy these cheap agrarian products and chrome, in exchange for the “war materials” of iron and steel.¹⁵³ Thus, it was obvious not only did German trade hold a lot of opportunities for Turkey; there was also some sympathy to Germany in its war with the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁴

The Rise of Turanism

The focal point of the German activities surrounding Turanism was to make Turkey enter the war. Germany’s Turanism propaganda, aimed to attract support from Turkey, was successful. In this regard, the emphasis on the historical depth of German-Turkish relations was the most frequently used popular propaganda tool alongside the historical aims of Russian policy on Turkey. In addition to Turanism, anti-communism which continued for many years and shaped Turkish domestic and foreign policy intensely even after the war can also be counted among the main directions of the German propaganda.¹⁵⁵ The propaganda activities were mainly

¹⁵² Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 177 – 178.

¹⁵³ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*, 171 – 172; Önder, *Die Türkische Außenpolitik Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 104 – 107; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 178 – 180. Additionally, see; Kurat, “İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türk - Alman Ticaretindeki İktisadi Siyaset,” 95 – 103.

¹⁵⁴ Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 177; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 178; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 488.

¹⁵⁵ Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 10 – 17.

performed by newspapers and journals, wherein this pro-German tendency was related to German bribes.¹⁵⁶ Interestingly, all the press had given complete support to Germany when the German-Soviet war had begun, and also started to provoke the government to follow an expansionist Turanism policy against the Soviet Union.¹⁵⁷

There were also some points, such as the dismissals of the Jews from the Anatolian Agency (Anadolu Ajansı) in 1942, where Germany affected Turkish domestic policy.¹⁵⁸ In addition the Wealth Tax can also be considered an imitation of Nazi methods being used particularly against the Jews, but essentially against non-Muslims. The implicit aim of this extraordinary tax was to assure capital transfer from non-Muslims to Muslims.¹⁵⁹ However, the reasons for the enactment of the Wealth Tax were the extreme enrichment of people and the enhancement of revenue during the war.¹⁶⁰ It is interesting to see that there was disagreement over the tax even at the time.¹⁶¹

¹⁵⁶ Ali Sait Çetinoğlu, *Varlık Vergisi 1942 - 1944: Ekonomik Ve Kültürel Jenosid*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: Belge Yayınları, 2009), 51; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 210; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 204; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 117. Also see; Appendix 1

¹⁵⁷ Haldun Derin, *Çankaya Özel Kalemmini Anımsarken, 1933-1951* (İstanbul: Tarih Vakfı Yurt Yayınları, 1995), 160; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 194 – 195; Glasneck gave the classification of the Turkish daily newspapers according to the evaluation of the Germans. In this regard, Cumhuriyet and Tasvir-i Efkar were considered as pro-Germans; Tan leftwing; Akşam, Vakit and İkdâm centre and Yeni Sabah pro-Allies. See; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 22 – 26.

¹⁵⁸ Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 26.

¹⁵⁹ Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 240; Mahmut Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, Türkiye Cumhuriyeti Tarihi 3 (Ankara: Turhan Kitapevi, 1974), 177 – 178; Ahmed Emin Yalman, *Yakın Tarihte Gördüklerim Ve Geçirdiklerim 2 (1922 - 1971)*, 2nd. edition. (İstanbul: Pera Turizm ve Ticaret A.Ş., 1997), 1250 – 1251; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 233, 236 – 237; Çetinoğlu, *Varlık Vergisi 1942 - 1944: Ekonomik Ve Kültürel Jenosid*, 15, 53; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 170; Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, 234 – 237.

¹⁶⁰ Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 263 – 265; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:233; Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, 234; Cemil Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi : 1938-1945 : Dönemin İç Ve Dış Politikası Üzerine Bir Araştırma*, vol. 2, 5th edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2010), 481 – 487; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 231.

¹⁶¹ Uran counted the Minister of Internal Affairs in opposition. See; Hilmi Uran, *Meşrutiyet, Tek Parti, Çok Parti Hatıralarım (1908 - 1950)* (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Yayınları, 2008), 314 – 316; also see; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 264 – 265. The most interesting detail regarding the discrimination of tax assessment comes from Aydemir. In his speech with Avram Galanti, he tried to

It is quite ambiguous as to whether Germany had launched Turanism as a political movement when the 1st World War took place or whether it had already existed in Turkey. Even though it remains hard to say, it is a fact that Germany supported this movement for the sake of using it on her own account against the Soviet Union, where there were a lot of Turkic people.¹⁶² In fact, Pan-Turkism and Turanism as movements emerged relative late in Turkey. Although there were some distinctions in the definition of Pan-Turkism and Turanism, they came to the point of meaning the same over time.¹⁶³ Hermann Vambery, a Hungarian Turcologist, became a promoter of Turanism; but Ziya Gökalp was accepted as the outstanding figure of Turanism in Turkey. His romantic Turanism poem influenced a lot of people who later considered themselves Turanists or Pan-Turkists.¹⁶⁴

Turanism which was supported by Germany as an expansionist ideology in the 1st World War¹⁶⁵ found an opportunity in the form of the ideologies movements

justify and even made him to accept the rightfulness of the tax. See; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 1938 - 1950, 2:235 – 236.

¹⁶² Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 192; Armaoğlu, “İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye,” 163 – 164; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:165; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:660; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 157 – 159; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 210; Charles W. Hostler, “The Turks and Soviet Central Asia,” *Middle East Journal* 12, no. 3 (Summer 1958): 265; Abidin Nesimi, *Yılların İçinden* (İstanbul: Gözlem Yayınları, 1977), 173.

¹⁶³ In this sense, Turanism refers the integration of Ural-Altai descended folks that live in broader areas. On the contrary, Pan Turkism is referring an emphasis on Turkish-descended folks. Additionally, it is known that “Turan” as a word was firstly used in a Persian legend in which it represented a geographical region whose boundaries were roughly in between Volga River, northern part of Iran, Afghanistan and Chinese Turkistan. See; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 27 – 29; Jäschke, “Der Turanismus der Jungtürken: Zur osmanischen Außenpolitik im Weltkriege,” 2; Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 196; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:660.

¹⁶⁴ Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 28 – 29; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 206 – 207; Hostler, “The Turks and Soviet Central Asia,” 264; Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 194 – 195.

¹⁶⁵ In a letter which was sent by German ambassador Wangenheim to the Prime Minister Said Halim, the German support in east was clearly indicated. “5. Deutschland verpflichtet sich, der Türkei eine Berichtigung an ihrer Ostgrenze zu erwirken, die es ihr gestatten wird, mit den muslimischen Elementen in Rußland unmittelbar Fühlung aufzunehmen.” In addition to that, Ludendorff said to General von Seeckt in one of the telegrams that: “Der Schwerpunkt der türkischen territorialen Erwerbungen muß im Osten gesucht werden. Dort besteht für eine geschickte türkische Diplomatie neben der Möglichkeit der Landerwerbung auch die Aussicht auf Schaffung von Einflußzonen bis tief in das zentrale Asien hinein”. See; Carl Mühlmann, *das Deutsch-Türkische Waffenbündnis im Weltkrieg*, (Leipzig, 1940), 193 quoted by Jäschke, “Der Turanismus der Jungtürken: Zur

that failed in 1918. It can roughly be said that it started as a policy after the Arab revolts at the very end of the war and, therefore, even extended to Baku.¹⁶⁶ Thus, the Turanist legacy of the Ottoman Empire was assigned to Turkey. However, Atatürk was principally against following adventurist foreign policies such as Turanism, which was even found unrealistic during the War of Liberation. Essentially, according to the agreement Turkey and the Soviet Union concluded in 1921, Turkey was prohibited from supporting the Turanist and separatist movements in the Soviet Union. Therefore, a nationalism concept gained recognition that was not racist and did not even lean on blood kinship. Moreover, extremism or Turanism found no place in Turkish foreign policy.¹⁶⁷ Even though Turanism was not active during Atatürk's presidency (1923-1938), it became visible again in the first years of İnönü's presidency. There were differences in sanctions against Turanism between Atatürk and İnönü's presidencies.¹⁶⁸

The active Pan-Turkists in 1940s in Turkey can roughly be divided into two groups. The first were the retired military generals, mostly educated in Germany and who experienced the 1st World War alongside German military staff in the Ottoman Empire. Nuri Pasha, who was the half-brother of Enver Pasha and pioneer of the Ottoman Army in the Caucasus, can firstly be counted,¹⁶⁹ then Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir

osmanischen Außenpolitik im Weltkriege," 11, 28; also see; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 207.

¹⁶⁶ Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 22, 30; Jäschke, "Der Turanismus der Jungtürken: Zur osmanischen Außenpolitik im Weltkriege," 22, 25; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 208.

¹⁶⁷ Baskın Oran, "İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar," *SBF Dergisi* XXIV, no. 3 (1969): 265; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 35; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 162; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 208 – 209; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 190.

¹⁶⁸ Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 209; Hostler, "The Turks and Soviet Central Asia," 265; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 197.

¹⁶⁹ Regarding the activities of the Ottoman Army in Caucasus, see; Jäschke, "Der Turanismus der Jungtürken: Zur osmanischen Außenpolitik im Weltkriege," 39 – 41; Uğur Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 22nd edition. (Ankara: Umag Vakfi Yayınları, 2007), 14, 18 – 23; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 202 – 203.

Erkilet, briefly Erkilet Pasha, who was a military columnist in a daily newspaper (Cumhuriyet), and Ali İhsan Sabis, who was the director in charge of "*Türkische Post*".¹⁷⁰ The second ones were mostly émigrés and teachers. Nihal Atsız, who was a teacher in a high school and publisher of various extreme nationalist, racist journals, can be counted as one of the prominent figures, additionally Zeki Velidi Togan¹⁷¹, who was a professor of Turkish history at Istanbul University, and Reha Oğuz Türkkan, a university student.¹⁷² The second group had a significant place in development of Turanism in Turkey. They published Turanist journals that made their activities publicly visible. However, the first group mostly remained invisible and conducted their relations secretly.¹⁷³

German activities regarding the Turanists in Turkey started as a consequence of the Non-Aggression Pact on June 18, 1941. For instance, German Ambassador von Papen numbered the prominent members of Turanist groups in Turkey¹⁷⁴ and underlined their intentions of the annexation of Baku, as happened in 1918. Additionally, von Papen wrote about the rising irredentist interests of the governing

¹⁷⁰ Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 174 – 176; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam*, 1938 - 1950, 2:250.

¹⁷¹ For the brief stories of Zeki Velidi and other émigrés which was written from a different perspective, see; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 166 – 171.

¹⁷² Oran, "İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye'de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar," 265.

¹⁷³ In this regard, a Russian committee was established under directorate of Deputy Secretary Ernst Woerman and Werner Otto von Hentig. Von Hentig's department was related with Turkish people. Both of them were active and they had even good contact with these Pashas. See; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 161. Additionally the correspondence of Erkilet Pasha and von Hentig, See; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 43 – 44 and 47 – 48. In his letter, Hentig complained upon the rumours that he was considered as "fifth column" and also indicated that he expected to see the articles which were promised to be written on German successes. Additionally, Erkilet Pasha gave the names of two men who were coming to Germany for the sake of making propaganda "on behalf of common Turkish-German interests." (Emphasis added) See; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:663; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 194.

¹⁷⁴ He counts the names of Şükrü Yenibahça-as the leader of that group, Nuri Pasha-as the leader of the Islam Army that had occupied Baku, Professor Zeki Velidi, Ahmet Cafer-was a Turkologist and even one of the members of General Sikorski's Prometheus organization. He was found non-reliable because of spying in favour of the Government. Memduh Shevket was also pointed out that he could be with them as a representative of government in Ankara.

circles in Ankara.¹⁷⁵ According to Papen's report, the plans related to the Turkic folks of the Soviet Union in Ankara.

The present plan of Turkish government circles in Ankara in respect to these Eastern Turks-with an exception of Azerbaijan-in other words, the Volga Turks, the Tatars, the Turcoman etc.-is to weld them together into their own, outwardly independent, East Turkish state, in which, however, the Western Turks would play a dominant political and cultural role as "advisers".¹⁷⁶

Then he added a notification that these were only the thoughts of Ankara and it was still unknown if the Turks would accept it. One of the interesting points of his report was the part relating to the "Turkishness of the people of Turkey". According to the viewpoint of the Turks of the Soviet Union, the Turks of Turkey were the "Turkish speaking Levantines".¹⁷⁷ Additionally, von Papen did not forget to add the views of another agent, who supposed to be a Turk from Azerbaijan, "Eastern-Turkish." As a result he suggested not to work with these old retired staff because they lacked financial support and was not competent to undertake important roles in Azerbaijan. At the end of his report, von Papen underlined the importance of the encirclement of Russia with trustworthy elements. These trustworthy elements were the "Turks".¹⁷⁸

As an addition to Papen's report, the Turkish ambassador in Berlin, Hüsrev Gerede paid a visit to Ernst von Weizsäcker, who was the state secretary at the

¹⁷⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 34 - 35; Additionally, Berkes examined the same document as well, see; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 195. Berkes pointed out that the Occupied Eastern Territories Minister Alfred Rosenberg had submitted a report regarding these regions in which he was strictly opposite of establishing any states. See; *Ibid.*, 197. Also, see; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 159 - 160; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 37 - 40; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:661 - 662.

¹⁷⁶ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 35 - 36; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 312.

¹⁷⁷ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 36.

¹⁷⁸ *Ibid.*, 37 - 38.

Foreign Office of Germany, in order to introduce the new Embassy Counselor of Turkey. On this visit Gerede talked about anti-Soviet propaganda opportunities among the Turks and implicitly stressed the Turan state and grouped all Turks together in a “buffer” state. Weizsäcker’s impression of Gerede was, however interesting; he thought they had coincidentally talked on these issues and found him outspoken.¹⁷⁹ In addition, Ernst Woerman, undersecretary for the Foreign Office, prepared a very detailed report about the Turanism issue in Turkey.¹⁸⁰ First, he explained the aim of Turanism movement:

The aim of Turanism is to assure a state to the Turkish people who are currently living out of today’s Turkey. It is namely these regions will not be annexed but will be politically related with Turkey.¹⁸¹

Then he carefully described the areas where they live;

... The wanted areas from the Soviet Union are primarily Azerbaijan and the area of Dagestan which is at the north of Azerbaijan, moreover, the area which is between Crimea, Volga River and Ural Mountains and the region which reaches from upper side of these areas to the Soviet Tataristan...¹⁸²

¹⁷⁹ Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 210 – 211; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, “German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943),” 39; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 145 – 146; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 159; Berkes, *Unutulmuş Yıllar*, 202; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:662.

¹⁸⁰ This secret report which coded U St. S. Pol No:88 and dated on September 17 1941 but the meeting took place in September 11, see especially part 1; Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı*, 2 – 5.

¹⁸¹ “Turancılık hareketinin amacı, bugünkü Türkiye sınırları dışında kalan Türk halklarına özgür bir devlet yapısı kazandırmaktır. Yani, bu bölgeler Türkiye tarafından alınmayacak fakat siyasal olarak Türkiye’ye bağlanacaktır.” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Ibid., 2 – 3; For the whole text of Woerman’s report, see; Özdoğan, «Turan»dan «Bozkurt»a, 315 – 319.

¹⁸² “... Sovyetler Birliği’nden öncelikli olarak Azerbaycan ve Azerbaycan’ın kuzeyinde yer alan Dağıstan talep edilmekte, ayrıca Kırım ve Volga ırmağı ile Urallar arasında kalan, yukarıda kuzeye çıkarak Tatar Sovyet Cumhuriyeti’ne kadar uzanan bütün bölgenin tamamı istenmektedir...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı*, 3; Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 206; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:660; Kreckler, *Deutschland Und Die Türkei Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 212.

According to the report on the meeting on September, 17 1941, Nuri Pasha claimed that the government was fully aware of his activities and that he even had a meeting with the prime minister before he went to Berlin. He underlined the points respectively that first and foremost, it was obligatory for the Turkish Army¹⁸³ to conclude an alliance with Germany for the sake of the collapse of the Soviet Union. Then, a private group had to be formed from the captives from the Turkish regions in order to spread the German propaganda in their regions.¹⁸⁴ Özdoğan noted that this was the only offer applied and used by Germany during their occupation of Crimea.¹⁸⁵

During his stay in Germany, Nuri Pasha had various meetings with German officers. In one of his last meetings, he requested the establishment of a center for Turanist propaganda where he and his friends could undertake important roles. In addition, he thought that he could provide contributions from government circles in Turkey. However, Woerman did not agree with Nuri Pasha, thinking a propagandas center unnecessary at that moment.¹⁸⁶ Nuri Pasha also claimed the government was aware of his negotiations on Turanism with Germany.¹⁸⁷

¹⁸³ In one of Hentig's report, it was written that Marshal Fevzi Çakmak sent a message with a mysterious man called Dr. Harun. Accordingly, the Ambassador Gerede and Marshal both wanted to learn the standpoint of Germany in Turanism issue. Moreover, Marshal thought the Turanism issue might create better relations in between Germany and Turkey. He also praised the treats of Germany to the Turkish people in occupied territories. See; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 45 – 46. An interesting example regarding with the good treatment of Germans to the Turkish people, see; Mustafa Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınevi, 1977), 88.

¹⁸⁴ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 3– 4; Kreckler, *Deutschland Und Die Türkei Im Zweiten Weltkrieg*, 212.

¹⁸⁵ Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 163; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 7.

¹⁸⁶ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 9.

¹⁸⁷ Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 212 – 214; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 3; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:679 – 680. Additionally, see; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 9. On the contrary, Berkes does not think the government circles were aware that Nuri Pasha was in Germany and performing negotiations regarding the Turanism. According to

The official visit of Ali Fuad Erden and Emir Erkilet to the headquarters of the east front gave a chance to broadcast the propaganda of the German successes in order to persuade Turkey to enter the war. It was interesting that both Ali Fuat Erden and Emir Erkilet were known as pro-German and even Erkilet was an apparent Turanist.¹⁸⁸ According to the von Papen's report, Erden explained his pleasure at his visit to Papen. Erden was delighted to be hosted by Hitler personally and to be informed elaborately about the ongoing Operation Barbarossa. So far as von Papen wrote in his report, Erden shared his information with the Marshal Fevzi Çakmak and President İsmet İnönü in a six-hour meeting in Ankara. This was evaluated optimistically by von Papen, because he was sure that Erden was under the influence of the German successes. However, Erden could not convince the marshal or the president of a certain German victory over the Soviet Union.¹⁸⁹

In his reports, von Papen clarified that the US entrance to the war in December 1941 had a staggering affect on government circles in Ankara. He described the situation as a great disappointment and even warned that it might lead to consequences in the longer term to the disadvantage of Germany, because according to the government circles in Ankara the Anglo-American alliance was undefeatable. Additionally, he wrote about the expectations of the Turks who were hopeful to find a way of compromise between the Allies and Germany against the Soviet Union. In this sense, von Papen thought fear of the Soviet Union was shaping

him, Nuri Pasha was not a trustworthy man in sight of the President İnönü and therefore, he could not perform negotiations on behalf of Turkey. See; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 204.

¹⁸⁸ Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 213 – 214; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 150; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 102, 126, 207 – 208; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 25 – 26; Jaeschke, *Türkiye Kronolojisi (1938 - 1945)*, 60.

¹⁸⁹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 40 – 42; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 212 – 213. Özdoğan claims that they met with a group of Turkish captives. See; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 163; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 27.

the policies of Turkey.¹⁹⁰ As a result of the US entrance to the war in December 1941, Turkey decided to stay away from the war and secure her neutral position.

Even though Turkey had no intention to enter the war, she was still interested in the collapse of the Soviet Union. In this regard, von Papen informed President İnönü about the German attack against the Caucasus and asked for the concentration of the Turkish Army along the border of the Soviet Union for the sake of helping Germany in that attack. Ali Fuad Cebesoy, minister of public works at that time, mentioned implicitly that the request of Germany was evaluated in favor of Germany by the General Staff and would be decided later.¹⁹¹ However, there were no such explicit intentions by Turkey to side with Germany.

Despite every effort by Turkey spent to remain outside the war, however, she could not refrain from interest in the Turkic people of the Soviet Union.¹⁹² In this sense, one of the retired generals von Papen on behalf of Marshall Fevzi Çakmak and

¹⁹⁰ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 49 – 51, 68; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 223.

¹⁹¹ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 52 – 55. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of Britain, Anthony Eden warned Turkey about the occupation of the Caucasus. If Turkey had occupied the Caucasus, she would have isolated from the rest of the world. See; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 27 – 28. Additionally, there were also claims that the troops moved from Thrace to the East as a result of the persistence of Germany. See; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:662; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 28.

¹⁹² Menemencioglu told von Papen that Turkey could not be indifferent to the destinies of 40 million Turkish people of the Soviet Union in a talk but, on the other hand, a union with those people could only take place when the Soviet Union collapsed. Moreover, he gave assurance to von Papen that Turkey would rather to see Germany as a neighbor instead of the Soviet Union. Moreover, the President İnönü refrained to make any comments before seeing the victory of Germany, but Saraçoğlu indicated that the cultural aid to Turkish people can be possible. See; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 165. The most interesting interpretation about the so-called "Russian Problem" came from Saraçoğlu. In this regard, he interpreted the problem from two different viewpoints; first of all, as a "Turk" and then, as the "Prime Minister of Turkey". Von Papen wrote that "as a Turk, he yearned for the destruction of Russia which would be epoch-making deed on the part of Führer, and which was the dream of the Turkish people for centuries..." and "as Prime Minister, it was his business to observe the circumstances and not to let a chance to the Russians for slaughtering the Turkish minorities. The fear of people against the Russians was well known fact..." see; Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 87 – 91. It was even subjected in a memorandum of Woerman where he evaluated Turkish foreign policy, see; Ibid., 62. Also see; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:663; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 232 – 233.

asked von Papen if Germany needed any civilians from the Turkish Army for the common benefit of Germany and Turkey in the Caucasus campaign.¹⁹³ As can be seen, even though Turkey did not enter the war, it seems she could not stay completely indifferent to the developments regarding the Turkic peoples of the Caucasus.

As an addition to the Turanism activities in foreign policy, it was interesting to see the abundance and diversity of Turanist publications that increased after the signing of the Non-Aggression and Neutrality Pact with Germany in June 1941.¹⁹⁴ Even though there were a lot of journals on Turanism, the writers of these journals were almost the same. One of the most significant among these journals was “Grey Wolf” (Bozkurt). It was published by Reha Oğuz Türkkkan from 1939 to 1942. The editorial staff comprised Nihal Atsız, Hüseyin Namık Orkun, Necdet Sançar, Zeki Velidi Togan, Peyami Safa and Abdülkadir İnan.¹⁹⁵ Türkkkan formed an association called “the Fraternity of Booklovers” (Kitapseverler Derneği), which was later considered a secret organization.¹⁹⁶ Bozkurt declared a program in 1942 called “The faith of the Grey Wolfer” (Bozkurtçunun Amentüsü)¹⁹⁷ which is an important illustration of the progress of Turanism activities in Turkey. In addition there were also journals that can be considered Turanist. For instance, “Çınaraltı” can be counted among those whose owner was Orhan Seyfî Orhon and whose prominent

¹⁹³ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, “German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943),” 74 – 75; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 228 – 229.

¹⁹⁴ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:664; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 194 – 195.

¹⁹⁵ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:665 – 668.

¹⁹⁶ Charles Warren Hostler, *Turkism and the Soviets: The Turks of the World and Their Political Objectives* (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., n.d.), 219; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:666.

¹⁹⁷ “İdeolojimiz... Bozkurt Türkcülüğüdür... Bozkurtçular Türk ırkının ve Türk milletinin her ırktan ve her millettten üstün olduğunua inanır... Bu üstünlük kaynağı... Türk kanıdır... Bozkurtçular ırkçıdır... Onlar temiz ve öz Türk şartı arıyorlar... Bozkurtçular Pan Türkisttir... Türk devletini 65 milyonluk bir millet olarak görmek... mukaddes ülküdür... Bozkurtçular, savaşın, askerliğin ve kahramanlığın en yüksek hürmet mevkiine çıkartılması gerektiğine inanmışlardır.”, see; Reha Oğuz Türkkkan, “Bozkurtçunun Amentüsü”, Bozkurt, Year:3, Vol:2, No:1, (5 March 1942) quoted by Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 1:668.

writers were Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, Nihal Atsız, Ahmed Caferoğlu, Zeki Velidi and Hüseyin Namık Orkun. “Orhun” was also among the important Turanist journals published by Nihal Atsız.

In conclusion, it can be said that the Turanism issue between Turkey and Germany continued until 1942. According to Glasneck, the reason for the termination of the Turanism talks was the Turkey’s rejection of changing her foreign policy to the advantage of Germany.¹⁹⁸

CHAPTER 2: THE TRIAL OF SABAHATTİN ALİ – NİHAL ATSIZ

THE CIRCUMSTANCES AT THE BEGINNING OF THE TRIAL

Towards the End of the War

As a result of the general attack of the Soviet Union that began at the end of December 1942, the Soviet Union stopped successfully the progress of the German troops. Even their ongoing attacks on Germany forced them to withdraw from Stalingrad. In addition, the attack of the Allies on North Africa was also successful, and therefore the myth of German invincibility came to the end. From that moment on Germany started to defend areas which she occupied, and the end of the war was more or less determined in first quarter of 1943.¹⁹⁹ In this regard, British Prime Winston Churchill and US President Franklin Roosevelt met in Casablanca in January 1943. Soviet Union President Joseph Stalin was not present at this meeting because of the Soviet attacks on Germany. At this meeting, agreements concerning

¹⁹⁸ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, “German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943),” 102 – 106; Glasneck, *Türkiye’de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 213; Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı*, 45; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 221 – 222; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 150 – 151.

¹⁹⁹ Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 119; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:141; Aydın, “İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945,” 450; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nda Türkiye’nin Dış Politikası*, 182; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:251 – 252.

the end of the war²⁰⁰ were mentioned and the Allies decided to maintain the war until Germany's unconditional surrender.²⁰¹ The importance of this conference for Turkey related to her entrance to the war, at least in 1943, because Churchill was quite decisive in persuading Roosevelt to open a Balkan front and, therefore, assuring Turkey's participation in the Casablanca Conference.²⁰² Additionally, Britain and the US divided some regions into spheres of interests, and therefore the US²⁰³ agreed Turkey was lying in British sphere of interest.²⁰⁴ In the end, it was decided to organize a conference in Adana to inform Turkey about the result of the Casablanca Conference.

One of the themes discussed at that Adana conference was the decision for the unconditional surrender of Germany. According to Turkey's viewpoint, Germany had an important place in the center of Europe and she was even necessary as an antagonist to the Soviet Union²⁰⁵ because of Turkey's suspicions regarding the expansionist intentions of the Soviet Union.²⁰⁶ Britain was also aware of the

²⁰⁰ Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 120; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 183.

²⁰¹ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 451; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 130; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:147.

²⁰² Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 187 – 188; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:145; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 121 – 123; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 184; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 180.

²⁰³ It should be denoted that it was quite problematic for both American and Turkish officers to concede this –almost– fait accompli. It seemed to remember the Ottoman Empire, namely the "sick man of Europe". See; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 188 – 189; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 129. For the dissatisfaction of the Americans regarding with the Agreement and especially in such cases that related with the Turkey. See; *Ibid.*, 125 – 127; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 451.

²⁰⁴ On the other hand, China was also left for the American area of interest. See; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 451; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 184; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 180; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 239 – 240.

²⁰⁵ Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:260 – 261; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 452; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 130 – 131, 134; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 231 – 232; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 184 – 185; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:144 – 145.

²⁰⁶ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 190; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 452; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 272; Gönübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:174; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 188.

suspensions of Turkey regarding the Soviet Union and therefore attempted to convince Turkey to enter the war. However, Turkey also had suspicions upon the Allies as well and even found them unreliable.²⁰⁷ In fact, Germany was still the occupier of Greece and Bulgaria and, therefore entering the war was dangerous because of Turkey's then being an easy target for Germany. As a result Turkey retained her non-belligerent position²⁰⁸ and resolved to remain secure until the end of the war.²⁰⁹

At the Moscow Conference, which took place in October 1943, Turkey's entrance to the war was once more demanded by the Allies to help the Soviet Union and shorten the duration of the war. Therefore it was underlined that Turkey would only have the right to join in forming the new world order after the war if she had declared war on Germany.²¹⁰ Meanwhile, the Soviet Union brought the consignment of arms to Turkey into question.²¹¹ The Soviets thought Turkey had no intention to enter the war and therefore should not continue to receive arms. It can be said that there were changes in the policies of the Allies on Turkey as a result of this

²⁰⁷ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 453; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:177; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:150 - 151.

²⁰⁸ In order to keep herself away from the war, Turkey brought the "Adana Lists" which was related with the present needs of Turkish Army exaggeratedly forward. See; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 192; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 180 - 181; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:259; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 139; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 185; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 230 - 231; Barutçu, *Siyasi Anılar, 1939 - 1954*, 269 - 272.

²⁰⁹ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 454; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 134; Kreckler, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 232; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:180; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:164 - 165.

²¹⁰ Turkey's entrance to the war was a controversial issue even among the Allies. See; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 205 - 206; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:180 - 181; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 456 - 457; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:263; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 208; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 246 - 247; İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, 1:376 - 378.

²¹¹ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 456; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:181; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:176; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 200.

conference.²¹² Accordingly, relations between the Allies and Turkey started to deteriorate, and this continued until the end of the war.

Even though Turkey basically agreed to enter the war in December 1943 at the 2nd Cairo Conference, she succeeded once more in staying away from the war. It can be said that both Britain and the Soviet Union persistently sought Turkey's entrance to the war because Britain wanted to expand her sphere of interest toward the Balkans, and the Soviets were also in need of help and support in their war against Germany. As a consequence, it was determined that Turkey had to enter the war by February 15, 1944.²¹³ However, Turkey did not enter the war, and this led to deterioration in her relations with Britain. Even though Britain put pressure on Turkey for use of her airbases, this offer was rejected and Turkey maintained her neutrality.²¹⁴ In 1944 relations with Britain reached a critical level and Britain ceased consignments of arms.²¹⁵ Even meetings between US and British diplomats and their Turkish counterparts were almost forbidden. In addition, chrome consignments to Germany became a crisis and ended in April 1944 as a consequence of a personal letter from US President Franklin Roosevelt.²¹⁶ The last and final attempt for

²¹² Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:183; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 210 – 211.

²¹³ Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 221 – 225; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 462; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:186; Armaoğlu, "İkinci Dünya Harbinde Türkiye," 171; Glasneck, *Türkiye'de Faşist Alman Propagandası*, 251 – 254; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 198 – 199; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 241 – 242.

²¹⁴ Koçak pointed out the importance of von Papen factor who played a prominent role in making Turkey's decision. Accordingly, von Papen was well-aware about to conversations and negotiations between Turkey and Britain through the Cicero Incident. See; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:232; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 464; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 226 – 239. For the Cicero Incident, see; von Papen, *Memoirs*, 506 – 528.

²¹⁵ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:234; Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:188 – 190; Krecker, *Deutschland und die Türkei im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 246 – 247; Knatchbull-Hugessen, *Diplomat in Peace and War*, 200.

²¹⁶ Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 236 – 237; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 228 – 241; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 465 – 466; Deringil, *Denge Oyunu: İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Türkiye'nin Dış Politikası*, 234 – 235; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:239 – 241; Levent Konyar, trans., "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Stalin, Roosevelt Ve

rapprochement with the Allies was the severance of relations with Germany in August 1944. Turkey's entrance to the war in February 1945 had a symbolical meaning.

Attempts for Rapprochement with the Allies

At the end of the war Turkey's relations with the Allies were bad. It can be said that the main concern and disquiet of Turkey was the after-war arrangements of the Allies. For the sake of rapprochement with the Allies, Turkey took the first step with the judging the racists and the Turanist groups in Turkey. Even though Turkey was not linked with Turanism officially, the Soviet Union was aware from the non-official activities of Turkey.²¹⁷ Additionally, Turkey made significant changes to her administrative and military circles that can also be called the purging of pro-Germans. Marshal Fevzi Çakmak and Minister of Foreign Affairs Numan Menemencioğlu were the most prominent among those mostly referred to as "pro-German" by the Allies. According to the Allies, the marshal was the most important pro-German figure in the army and Minister Menemencioğlu was the person who prevented Turkey from entering the war.²¹⁸ This clearance aimed to erase the German influence in Turkey.²¹⁹

Besides Britain, the position of the Soviets was also important for Turkey. As a result of Turkey's distrust of the Soviet Union, Britain became the mediator in

Churchill'in Türkiye Üzerine Yazışmaları" (Cumhuriyet, 2000), 123 – 124; İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, 1:389 – 395.

²¹⁷ Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 468; Özdoğan, "*Turan*"dan "*Bozkurt*"a, 175; Aydemir, *İkinci Adam, 1938 - 1950*, 2:248 – 250; Levent Konyar, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Stalin, Roosevelt Ve Churchill'in Türkiye Üzerine Yazışmaları," 100; İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, 1:379.

²¹⁸ Gönlübol et al., *Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası (1919 - 1973)*, I:190; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 229 – 232; Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:245 – 255; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 265 – 268; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 258; İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, 1:406.

²¹⁹ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:237 – 238; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 229; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 233.

healing Soviet-Turkish relations.²²⁰ In this regard, Churchill tried to persuade Stalin of the significance of Turkey and conclude an agreement with her.²²¹ Stalin's answer was positive and he explained that the Soviets were ready to meet with Turkey.²²² Additionally the release of two Soviet citizens sentenced to 16 years for attempting the assassination of German Ambassador Franz von Papen in 1942 should also be considered with regards to attempts at rapprochement with the Soviet Union in 1944.²²³ Additionally, publication of the "Türkische Post" newspaper was terminated in February 1944 and the Turanism trials started in April 1944. Moreover, Turkey did not permit the entrance of refugees who were mostly Turkic people and had fought against the Soviet Union.²²⁴ As a result, there were no changes in relations with the Soviet Union and Turkey formed her foreign policy in accordance with the necessities of the new order.

The summaries of the biographies of Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız will be examined in the next part, which is necessary to see and remember what circumstances brought them to be hostiles and what consequences this had.

About Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız

Sabahattin Ali

Sabahattin Ali was born in Gümülcine²²⁵ in 1907 as the first child of Selahattin Bey and Hüsniye Hanım. Even though he is considered one of the most

²²⁰ Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 182.

²²¹ Levent Konyar, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Stalin, Roosevelt Ve Churchill'in Türkiye Üzerine Yazışmaları," 97; Aydın, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı Ve Türkiye, 1939 - 1945," 453; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 190 – 191; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 182.

²²² Levent Konyar, "İkinci Dünya Savaşı'nda Stalin, Roosevelt Ve Churchill'in Türkiye Üzerine Yazışmaları," 100; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 183.

²²³ Vatan, (09.08.1944); Tan, (09.08.1944) in Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:270.

Additionally, see; Önder, *Die türkische Außenpolitik im zweiten Weltkrieg*, 237.

²²⁴ Koçak, *Türkiye'de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:270.

²²⁵ Today: Komotini in Greece

significant storytellers in Turkey, he started to write poems at his early age. His early poems were published in a (local) journal called “Çağlayan”²²⁶ in Balıkesir. He finished the Teachers College in 1927 and got a scholarship to take language courses in Germany. He was in Germany from 1928 to 1930 training as a language teacher. He came back from Germany in 1930 and was appointed as a German language teacher in Aydın. His first stories were published in “Resimli Ay” journal. He was arrested for the first time in Aydın on charged of making communist propaganda. He was then taken to Konya, where he was charged in connection with insulting the president Atatürk in one of his poems. Consequently, he was sentenced to 14 months jail in 1932. He was released in 1933 and appointed as a teacher after he wrote a poem called “My Beloved One” (Benim Aşkım) as proof he had changed his ideas about Atatürk. He was then appointed the interpreter of Carl Ebert, who was a dramaturge and teacher at the state conservatory in Ankara.

He got the opportunity to meet Nazım Hikmet, whose influence was so apparent in his works published in “Resimli Ay”.²²⁷ His first volume of poetry, “Mountains and Wind” (Dağlar ve Rüzgar) was published in 1934. His novel “The Devil in Us” (İçimizdeki Şeytan), published in 1940, generated a strong reaction among Turanist circles.²²⁸ It can be said that this made him the target of Turanists. He attempted to publish a newspaper called “New World” (Yeni Dünya) in 1945; it could not be published as a consequence of the “Tan Incident”. He then published

²²⁶ Sevgül Sönmez, *A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2009), 150.

²²⁷ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 120 –121; Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 287; Asım Bezirci, *Sabahattin Ali*, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: Evrensel Basım Yayın, 2007), 28 – 29.

²²⁸ For the most striking one which published by Nihal Atsız. See; Nihal Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 2nd edition., Bütün Eserleri 11 (İstanbul: İrfan Yayınevi, 1997).

“Markopaşa” in cooperation with Aziz Nesin in 1946,²²⁹ before being murdered in Kırklareli in 1948.²³⁰

Nihal Atsız

Hüseyin Nihal Atsız was born in İstanbul in 1905 as the child of military officer Hüseyin Efendi. He initially attended a French school, but after a while moved to a German school. Due to the military duties of his father, he had to move to Suez, where he continued his education in a French school. Öner pointed out that Atsız ascribed great importance to these schools, because – according to him – these French and German schools increased his awareness and contributed to his perceptions as a Turk. He went to the Medicine School and later changed to the Military Medicine School. He was dismissed a few years later as a consequence of his fractiousness. He worked in various jobs until he started the Faculty of Literature in 1926. Then, he became assistant to Prof. Fuad Köprülü at the Institute of Turcology in 1931.

It can be said that Atsız had an active interest in Turks; he published his journal “Atsız Mecmua,” which was known for its emphasis on the village and Turkism,²³¹ from 1931 to 1932.

²²⁹ Filiz Ali and Atilla Özkırmı, eds., *Sabahattin Ali* (İstanbul: De Yayınevi, 1986), 15 – 19. Additionally, See; Bezirci, *Sabahattin Ali*, 9 – 75; Sönmez, *A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali*; Filiz Ali, “*Filiz Hiç Üzülmesin*”: *Sabahattin Ali'nin Objektifinden, Kızı Filiz'in Gözünden Bir Yaşamöyküsü* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2011).

²³⁰ Sabahattin Ali was murdered mysteriously in near of the Bulgarian border, in Kırklareli when he was attempting to pass the border and fleeing to Bulgaria in May or June in 1948. Therefore, a lot of books and articles were written regarding the mysterious death of Sabahattin Ali. Kemal Sülker's “Sabahattin Ali Dosyası”, Kemal Bayram Tanyeri's “Sabahattin Ali Olayı & Derin Devletin Faili Malum Cinayeti”, Aziz Nesin's “Birlikte Yaşadıklarım, Birlikte Öldüklerim”, Yalçın Küçük's “Aydın Üzerine Tezler-3”, Sevengül Sönmez's “A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali”, Rasih Nuri İleri's claims in various journals can be counted which related with Ali's death.

²³¹ According to Nesimi, Turkism and villiage case was not clarified intentionally. The remarkable point was in its opposition against the single-party regime. On the other hand, he indicated that there were left and right wings of the journal. The left wingers were essentially comprised of him,

As a consequence of an insult by Minister of Education Reşit Galip to Prof. Zeki Velidi in a discussion regarding the Turkism theories at the 1st Turkish History Congress in 1932, he headed a group of friends in sending a protest telegram to the minister in which they had written they were proud of being the students of Zeki Velidi. As a result of this action, he and his friends were banished from the university.²³² He started to publish “Orhun” when he was working as a teacher in various schools in Anatolia.

The new epoch in his life began with the open letters he wrote to the prime minister in 1944. In these letters he complained about the communist activities and even listed names he believed to be under the protection of the Ministry of Education. Thus, he became the focal point of the Turanism trials that started in 1944 and continued until 1947. Thereafter, he worked as a specialist in Süleymaniye Library. He never gave up the Turanist ideas, eventually dying in 1975.²³³

The Relation of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız

It is quite interesting to that they met long ago and kept in touch until the time the novel “The Devil in Us” was published. Were they really friends or just acquainted? Sabahattin Ali spoke at the trial and denied that they were friends. He and Atsız both agreed upon one thing, that they met in 1926, when they were still students.²³⁴ They met at Turkish Hearths (Türk Ocakları) in the Red Apple room.²³⁵

Sabahattin Ali, Pertev Boratav, Abdülbaki Gölpınarlı. On the contrary, right wingers were Nihal Atsız, Orhan Şaik, Safaeddin Karanakçı. In conclusion, the main distinction of these two wings was in their way of interpretation the ideals of the journal. See; Nesimi, *Yılların İçinden*, 86 – 87.

²³² Çetik, *Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav'ın Müdaafası*, 192 – 193; Altan Deliorman, *Tandığım Atsız* (İstanbul: Boğaziçi Yayınları, 1978), 36 – 37.

²³³ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 124 – 125; Sakin Öner, *Nihal Atsız*, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: Toker Yayınları, 1988), 9 – 15.

²³⁴ “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, April 27, 1944; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 10. Additionally, see; Çetik,

Despite this they managed to maintain their relationship. In this sense, a turning point in the deterioration of their bond happened when Ali had returned from Germany. From that time on a consistent estrangement began and even increased after he met Nazım Hikmet.²³⁶ However, Sabahattin Ali was still writing poems and stories in *Atsız Mecmua*.²³⁷ Their correspondence, particularly Atsız's letter, when Sabahattin Ali was jailed, was quite interesting; there, Atsız clearly pointed out his displeasure about Nazım Hikmet. It is obvious that he was worried Sabahattin Ali might lose his nationalistic tendencies:

...At least a genius like you, I do not reconcile your participation to these activities that might hurt your own country by giving credit to a few sold men such as Nazım Hikmet with your intelligence... I never ask you to be a Chauvinist nationalist, fascist militarist, like me. But, from now on, I can suggest you give up your childish attitudes...²³⁸

It may be concluded that Atsız described Ali as a weak person and even easily influenced by people whom he talked with. He then goes further and underlines the fact that Nazım Hikmet had a bad influence on him. According to Atsız, Sabahattin Ali had already become a communist, and thus their friendship was

Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav'ın Müdaafası, 192 – 193; Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 109, 309 – 310.

²³⁵ Atsız explained the first scene in which he met with Sabahattin Ali elaborately; “Hiç sıkılmayan gayet serbest bir huyu vardı. Kendisini ilk gördüğüm zaman pek yüksekte konuştuğu için, talebe olduğunu öğrendiğim bu gence: “Siz yüksek muallim mektebinden misiniz?” diye sormuştum. O hemen sırtımış ve “Hayır, Alçak Muallimdenim” diye cevap vermişti”. See; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 11.

²³⁶ Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 310; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 14.

²³⁷ Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 310 – 311; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 16. Additionally, see; Deliorman, *Tanıdığım Atsız*, 36 – 37; Nesimi, *Yılların İçinden*, 86 – 87.

²³⁸ “Hele senin gibi bir dahi namzedinin Nazım Hikmet gibi, falan gibi bir iki satılık herife inanıp da kendi memleketinin aleyhine neticler verebilecek fikirlere iştirakini senin zekanla kabil-i telif bulmam...Sana hiçbir zaman benim gibi şoven nasyonalist, faşist militarist ol demem. Fakat artık çocukça hareketlerden vazgeçmeni tavsiye edebilirim...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Sabahattin Ali, *Hep Genç Kalacağım: Mektup*, ed. Sevengül Sönmez, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2008), 224; Also see; Sönmez, *A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali*, 83.

damaged.²³⁹ He, on the other hand, gave some details about Sabahattin Ali's political tendencies; he depicted him as a contra-figure in to today's terms:

Once you were thoroughly nationalist. I cannot understand how a few fools dissuaded you and you became to this damned poison (or rather seemed to be becoming). I know you can never be a communist...²⁴⁰

Although they did not lose touch, their relations were seemingly deteriorating with time.²⁴¹ In that sense, Atsız finally sent a postcard from Germany²⁴² that was actually the last contact between them. When, after a while, Sabahattin Ali began to publish "The Devil in us" in "Ulus" 1939, their friendship suddenly changed into hostility. The novel had given birth to harsh reactions from Pan-Turkist groups because he overtly criticized Turanists in the novel. Moreover, he was even accusing them of working for the benefit of foreigners.²⁴³ In fact Atsız gave a quick response, writing a pamphlet called "The Devils in Us."²⁴⁴ He explained why he needed to write an answer:

The point I will touch in this novel is that it is written with a particular intention. Sabahattin Ali wants to accuse all the nationalists, racist, Turanist and Anatolians of working for the benefit of the foreigners. He even wants to humiliate some people, certainly including some who are today living among us, and humiliate them by using them in the novel. Thus he wishes to take revenge on people who did not appreciate him. I deemed it necessary to give an answer to the insults of Sabahattin Ali, because I am also Turkist, Turanist and racist. Yes, I say it proudly and repeat it: Turkist, Turanist and racist.²⁴⁵

²³⁹ Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 16, 18.

²⁴⁰ "Sen bir zamanlar adamakıllı milliyetperverdin. Birkaç salak senin fikrini nasıl çeldi de şu zıkkıma meylettin (daha doğrusu meyleder göründün) anlayamıyorum. Senin hiç bir zaman komünist olamayacağını biliyorum..." (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Ali, *Hep Genç Kalacağım*, 224; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 11, 27.

²⁴¹ Atsız wrote that "Bu sefer çok meşgul olduğum için, sana yine manili şarkılı, hoşça gidecek bir mektup yazamadım..." which can be interpreted as their correspondance continued . See; Ali, *Hep Genç Kalacağım*, 225.

²⁴² The card was sent on March 07 1939 and it supposed to be the last card, because Sabahattin Ali began to publish his novel a month later in Ulus. See; *Ibid.*, 356.

²⁴³ Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 308; Bezirci, *Sabahattin Ali*, 191.

²⁴⁴ For details, see; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*.

²⁴⁵ "Benim bu romanda işeyeceğim nokta hususi bir kasıtle yazılmış olmasıdır. Sabahattin Ali bu memlekette ırkçı, turancı, anadolucu olan milliyetperveleri hep satılmış insanlar olmakla itham etmek istiyor ve romanını yazarken de bugün aramızda yaşayan bazı kimseleri, tabii biraz değiştirerek,

In addition to that, one of the crucial points of the novel was the characters. They were not simply imaginary characters; on the contrary, they were taken from Sabahattin Ali's circle of friends.²⁴⁶ Atsız took the issue further and tried to prove those characters were actual. According to him, first and foremost, the main character, Ömer, had similarities to Sabahattin Ali.²⁴⁷

...The character named Professor Hikmet is, in fact, the historian Mükrimin Halil. Both of them are from Maraş. They are both Anatolian and similar to the people from Anatolia. Both like to support their friends...²⁴⁸

...One of the characters named the author İsmet Şerif is, in fact, vacant, purposeless and immoral, even though he seems clever and nationalist... It is understood that he is Peyami Safa. The reason for Sabahattin's animosity to him can be explained with Peyami's nationalist personality and his fame as a novelist...²⁴⁹

... The man who had no name and was depicted with a Tatar appearance must be Professor Zeki Velidi or Abdülkadir İnan. Because this man was a president or minister in one of the small and temporary states that emerged and failed within a few months or a few years in various parts of the World after the 1st World War. Among the acquaintances of Sabahattin, there are only Zeki Velidi and Abdülkadir İnan who were president or minister...²⁵⁰

romanına sokup onları küçültmek istiyor. Böylelikle de kendisini küçük gören insanlardan bir öğ almak diliyor. Ben de ırkçı, türkçü ve turancı olduğum için – Evet, övünerek söylüyorum ve tekrar ediyorum; ırkçı, türkçü ve turancı olduğum için-Sabahattin Ali'nin iftiralarına cevap vermek lüzmunu duyuyorum.” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Ibid., 10.

²⁴⁶ Bezirci, *Sabahattin Ali*, 196; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 24 – 25; Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 308.

²⁴⁷ He examined the similarities of Ömer and Sabahattin Ali elaborately, see; Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 21 – 23.

²⁴⁸ “...Bunların arasında Profesör Hikmet diye gösterilen insan hakikatta tarihçi Mükrimin Halil'dir. Çünkü ikisi de Maraşlıdır. İkisi de Anadoluludur ve Anadoluluları sever. İkisi de arkadaşlarına yardım etmekte hoşlanır...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) Ibid., 25.

²⁴⁹ “...Romandaki tiplerden muharrir İsmet Şerif de milliyetperver ve kafalı gözüktüğü halde boş, manasız ve ahlaksız bir insan... Bunun da Peyami Safa olduğu anlaşılıyor. Sabahattinin ona düşmanlığı da Peyaminin milliyetçi ve tanınmış romancı olmasıyla izah olunabilir...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Ibid., 26.

²⁵⁰ “...Romanda adı söylenmeyen tatar suratlı herif ise ya Zeki Velidi ya profesör Zeki Velidi, yahut Abdülkadir İnan olacaktır. Çünkü bu adam umumi harpten sonra dünyanın muhtelif yerlerinde teşekkül eden birkaç ay veya birkaç sene sonra batan küçük ve uydurma devletlerden birinde reislik yahut nazırlık yapan birisidir. Sabahattinin tanıdıkları arasında reislik veya nazırlık yapan, Zeki Velidi ile Abdülkadir İnan vardır...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Ibid.

Even though Atsız wrote this pamphlet to give a response to Sabahattin Ali, he went far beyond this aim and it can be accepted that he even started a counter attack against his personality.²⁵¹ Moreover, he challenged Sabahattin Ali to a duel at the end of the pamphlet.²⁵² Sabahattin Ali gave no response to these attacks and therefore the tension declined after a while, until the time at which Atsız wrote open letters to Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu.

TRIAL

The Reason for the Trial

Even though Turanism had showed a sharp rise until the end of the battle of Stalingrad, the effect of Turanism gradually faded in line with the progress of the war. The shift, including domestic and foreign policies, became visible in 1943.²⁵³ In this regard, this process (which continued until the Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız Trial in 1944) began with the release of a pamphlet called “The Biggest Danger” (En Büyük Tehlike) in 1943. This pamphlet, in which Faris Erkman introduced the Turanism issue,²⁵⁴ had a significant public impact. Accordingly, it was the first time the dangers of Turanism took the public attention.²⁵⁵ It was even discussed at the National Assembly.

In this pamphlet, Erkman revealed Turanist groups that were publicly agitating the sensitivity and emotions of a fake nationalism by using newspapers,

²⁵¹ He used these phrases mostly in order to insult him; “Kiry Sabahattinaki”, “Ofllu Rum dönmesi”, “Sabahattin Aliyef”.

²⁵² Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 31.

²⁵³ Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:210.

²⁵⁴ Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 252; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:211; Çetlik, *Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCTF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav’ın Müdaafası*, 10.

²⁵⁵ Faris Erkman, “En Büyük Tehlike,” in *Kırklı Yıllar - 1*, 1st edition. (Beyoğlu İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2002), 13.

magazines and journals as tools. In fact, they intended to mobilize people in favor of the foreigners.²⁵⁶ Erkman then pointed out the excessive interpretation of nationalism of these groups. For them it was impossible to accept the “official” interpretation of nationalism because of their ideals, which belonged to irredentism and racism.²⁵⁷ These extreme interpretations of nationalism or ideals directly related with Pan-Turkism and Turanism owed much to Germany, which woke Turkism and even instigated its dissemination. Accordingly, during the rise of the Turkism movement, émigrés such as Zeki Velidi, Ayas İshaki, Muharrem Fevzi Togay and Resulzade Ahmet Caferoğlu played an important role in having positions for their own benefits.²⁵⁸ Additionally, General Hüseyin Hüsnü Emir Erkilet, Yusuf Ziya Ortaç, Nihal Atsız, Orhan Seyfi Orhon, Ali İhsan Sabis and Peyami Safa can also be considered people who supported and were involved in the movement.²⁵⁹ Even though this pamphlet was confiscated, it reached many people and finally succeeded in becoming a topic at the National Assembly. This happened as a consequence of Cevdet Kerim İncedayı’s question to the minister of foreign affairs on July 05, 1943.²⁶⁰ He pointed out in the speech that there were claims on the Turanist movement that directed people to follow irredentism in order to unify Turks inside with Turks outside. However, he continued to explain that he personally did not think it would happen.²⁶¹

²⁵⁶ Ibid., 14.

²⁵⁷ Ibid., 17.

²⁵⁸ Ibid., 22– 24.

²⁵⁹ Ali and Özkırmılı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 315; Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 252; Özdoğan, “*Turan*’dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 98; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 247 – 248.

²⁶⁰ Ali and Özkırmılı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 316. Sabiha Sertel asserted that İncedayı was the General Secretary of the party. See; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 242; Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 252.

²⁶¹ “...O halde (En büyük Tehlike) namı altında çıkan risale sahibinin maksadı, siyasi ve içtimai hüviyeti nedir ve bizim prensiplerimizi bu yolda istismara yeltenmek bu veya o taraf için doğru bir hareket midir?” see; Cevdet Kerim İncedayı, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: 7, Cilt: 4, 44. İnikat,

Minister of Foreign Affairs Numan Menemencioğlu gave a reply in which he underlined the principal of freedom of the press; however, he did not hesitate to note that if any of these publications were accepted as having an adverse influence on Turkish politics, then they would have had the right to close them down. He even explained that he did not believe Turanism movements could take place in Turkey. Moreover, he quoted the identification of the nation accepted at the 6th General Assembly of the CHP. Accordingly, he clarified one thing about Turanism; that Turkey officially had no interest in Turks outside the country.²⁶²

At this point Oran asked why this simple pamphlet matter enough to be brought to the National Assembly for discussion. According to him, the defeat of Germany at Stalingrad in 1943 obliged the bureaucracy to make a shift in internal and external policies depending on current circumstances.²⁶³ In addition to all these, Atsız published a counter-pamphlet called “The Most Insidious Danger” (En Sinsi Tehlike). In his response to Erkman, Atsız, first and foremost tried to prove that Turanism was not an ideology launched by Germany.²⁶⁴ Then he emphasized that a racist could not support another race to get something on its own behalf. Furthermore, he gave examples to prove the racism of the government.²⁶⁵ The remarkable point of this pamphlet Atsız wrote was in its publication. The pamphlet

05.07.1943, 13 – 14. Additionally; Kazım Alöç, “İfşa Ediyorum: Türkiye’de Komünizm,” in *Kırklı Yıllar - 5*, ed. Rasih Nuri İleri (İstanbul: Türkiye Sosyal Tarih Araştırma Vakfı, 2006), 207 – 209.

²⁶² “...Bizim Türkiye hudutları haricinde kalan Türklere yalnız refah ve saadet temennimiz vardır.

Bunun yanında bütün siyasetimiz, bütün Türkçülüğümüz bu vatanın sınırları içine girmiş olan Türklere ait ve onlara münhasırdır.” Additionally, he referred the speech of Saraçoğlu; “Biz Türküz ve Türkçüyüz diyoruz.” See; Numan Menemencioğlu, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: 7, Cilt: 4, 44.

İnikat, 05.07.1943, 14; Ibid., 209 – 210. Sertel criticized the speech of Menemencioğlu harshly and indicated that there was a movement and even propaganda regarding with Turanism during the 2nd World War. She accused him for being blind and even working in favour of von Papan and Germany. See; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 242 – 243.

²⁶³ Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 253. At this point, Sertel agrees not with Oran. According to her, the reason of the debates of Turanism issue in the National Assembly was just to show their loyalty to Germany.

Compare; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 244.

²⁶⁴ Atsız, *İçimizdeki Şeytan, En Sinsi Tehlike, Hesap Böyle Verilir*, 60 – 63.

²⁶⁵ Ibid., 64 – 66.

was published as “The Devils in Us.” It was quite interesting that Atsız (and even Türkkan) were in need of quoting “The Devil in us” when were writing a response. They tended to see it as a conspiracy directed at nationalists as Sabahattin Ali had done. Thus, the incident was once more remembered.²⁶⁶ However, Sabahattin Ali gave no response.

The reason for the Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız Trial was open letters to Prime Minister Şükrü Saraçoğlu. These letters were published in a monthly journal called “Orhun,” owned by Atsız. The first letter was published in March 1944 and the second in April of the same year. In his first letter, Atsız aimed to draw attention to the danger of communism in Turkey; according to him, the communists dominated and possessed very influential positions in the state administration. Thus, they started to prevent the growth of nationalist ideas and stopped people known as nationalists from taking active roles. Moreover, their deeds were of course disadvantageous for Turkey.²⁶⁷

In his second open letter²⁶⁸, he claimed that there was currently improving communism in the Ministry of Education. According to him, the communists had already managed to get important positions. Moreover, they were supporting each other in order to secure their positions. He wrote that these communists were all protected by Minister of Education Hasan Ali Yücel. He then started to count the

²⁶⁶ Türkkan wrote that; “...Gariptir ki bundan üç yıl evvel solcu hikayeci Sabahattin Ali de (İçimizdeki Şeytan) adlı romanında, tamamen aynı şekilde iftiralarla ve aynı tabiiyle, Türk milliyetçilerini satılmışlıkla damgalamış ve onları batırmak için kaleminin bütün zehirini akıtmıştı. O zamanlar, yalnız milliyetçi birkaç kalem bu sinsî tecavüze ateş açmış ve tuzağı teşhir etmişti...”, “...Burada Türkçülük ve Türkçüler, tıpkı risalede, Ses mecmualarında, Yurt ve Dünya’da, Yeni Yol’da ve Sabahattin Ali’nin romanında olduğu gibi, yabancı tahrikçiliği olarak takdim edilmekte ve yıkılmasına çalışılmaktadır.” See; Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 316 – 317.

²⁶⁷ Mustafa Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 2. Baskı. (İstanbul: Yağmur Yayınevi, 1977), 23 – 30; Erer mentioned almost about the same things. See; Tekin Erer, *Basında Kavgalar* (İstanbul: Rek-Tur Kitap Servisi, 1965), 93 – 94.

²⁶⁸ For the whole text, see; Appendix 2

significant communists at the Ministry. Sabahattin Ali was included as the first and foremost communist in the list.

There is a man called Sabahattin Ali who is one of the members of the Linguistic Foundation which is affiliated to the Ministry of Education, and he is also one of the teachers at the State Conservatory in Ankara. Almost everyone who is acquainted with him knows he is a communist. He was sentenced to fourteen months' imprisonment in Konya in 1931. The reason was that even though Atatürk was the president at that time, he mocked him, along with the ministers, high officials and regime in one of his poems. It is possible to find and bring the whole poem from the archives of courthouse in Konya, whose verses are also known by some of the members of the parliament. Dear Prime Minister! In these two verses (I request you to excuse me) which I urge by necessity and feel the agony, says this 'traitor' that:

Is İsmet still not locked down?

Has Kel Ali already been beheaded?

It is not difficult to infer that İsmet, who was longed to be put in prison by a communist that was the beloved officer of Ministry of Education, is the current president and above all the chief commander of the victories of İnönü is İsmet İnönü. Besides, the one who asked to be beheaded is the commander of the regiment that fired the first gun against Greeks in Ayvalık. Sabahattin Ali, who wrote these delusions today, had a comfortable life thanks to the money he earned from the Turkish nation that he wants to ruin and occupies a significant position in Cultural Affairs through the personal sympathy of Hasan Ali Yücel, the minister of education.²⁶⁹

²⁶⁹ "Bugün Maarif Vekâletine bağlı Dil Kurumu azasından ve Ankara'daki Devlet Konservatuarının öğretmenlerinden bir 'Sabahattin Ali' vardır. Hemen hemen bütün kendisini tanıyanların komünistliğini bildiği Sabahattin Ali, 1931 yıllarında Konya'da 14 ay hapse mahkûm edilmişti. Sebebi de başta o zamanki Reisicumhur Atatürk olduğu hâlde bütün devlet erkanını ve rejimi tehzil eden manzum bir beyanname yazmasıydı. Bazı mısralarını bugünkü bazı mebuslarında bildiği bu beyannamenin tamamını Konya'daki adliye arşivinden bulup çıkarmak kabildir. Sayın Başvekil! Buraya bilmeceburiye yazarken büyük iztirap duyduğum iki mısraında (beni mazur görmenizi rica ederim) bu "vatan haini" şöyle diyordu:

İsmet girmede mi hâlâ hapse

Kel Ali'nin boynu vurulmuş mudur?

Maarif Vekâletinin sevgili memuru olan bir komünistin hapse girmesini temenni ettiği İsmet, pek kolaylıkla anlayacağımız gibi o zaman ki başvekil, şimdiki reisicumhur ve hepsinin üstünde İnönü zaferlerinin başkumandanı İsmet İnönü olduğu gibi, boynunun vurulmasını istediği Kel Ali de, Ayvalık'ta Yunana ilk kurşunu atan alayın kumandanı Ali Çetinkaya'dır. Bu hezeyanları yazan Sabahattin Ali, bugün kültür işlerinin mühim bir mevkiinde, Maarif Vekili Hasan Ali'nin şahsî sempatisi sayesinde, batırmak istediği Türk milletinin parasıyla rahatça yaşamaktadır." (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 34; Ali and Özkırımlı, *Sabahattin Ali*, 317 – 318; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 48 – 49; Erer, *Basında Kavgalar*, 99 – 100.

According to Mumcu, Atsız had primarily wanted to assure the deposition of people he counted in his letter. In addition to them, he even pointed out at the last paragraph would have been better if the minister himself had resigned.²⁷⁰

It can be said that the letter became influential.²⁷¹ A few days later, Minister of Education Hasan Ali Yücel emitted a circular about ideological tendencies in which he warned against foreign ideologies. He briefly took the attention of the teachers on the point of educating children under the ideological principals of the CHP. Moreover, he underlined the significance of nationalism as described in the party program.²⁷² Alongside the emphasis on nationalism, the direction of discussions led to a conflict between communism and nationalism. Thus, the agenda of Turkey was interestingly changing from the danger of Turanism into the danger of communism. In fact, the tendencies of government in Turkey also played a decisive role on public opinion. The prime minister emphasized the importance of being a Turkist almost from the very first days of his presidency.²⁷³ Essentially, this situation encouraged Atsız to write an open letter. By the way, it should be noted that Sabahattin Ali was, at that time, principally known as a leftist but was slowly getting

²⁷⁰ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 50 – 51. Atsız wrote those at the last paragraph; “Maarif Vekaleti şimdiye kadar İnönü Ansiklopedisiyle ve birçok kitapların ithafıyla Devlet Başkanı’na karşı olan bağlılığını göstermeğe çalıştı. Bu bağlılığın samimi olduğunu isbat zamanı gelmiştir. Milli Şef’e karşı o hezeyanları yazmış olan vatan haini başta olmak üzere, bütün bu saydığım komunistleri hala mühim vazifelerde tutmak bu bağlılıkla tezat teşkil eder. Bağlılığın ispatı için, bunların vazifelerine derhal son verilmesi zaruridir. Hatta, şimdiye kadar her nasılsa bir gaflet eseri olarak bunları vazifede tutmaktan doğan utancı silebilmek için, bizzat Maarif Vekilinin de o makamdan çekilmesi çok vatanperverane bir jest olurdu.”

²⁷¹ Erer mentions about the influence of the letter exaggeratedly. See; Erer, *Basında Kavgalar*, 94 – 95.

²⁷² “Yabancı Fikir Ve Inan Akımları Karşısında Gençliğimiz,” *Cumhuriyet*, 04 1944; “Maarif Vekilliğinin Çok Yerinde Ve Mühim Bir Tamimi,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, April 5, 1944; “Maarif Vekilliğinin Her Derecedeki Öğretim Müesseselerine Mühim Bir Tamimi,” *Ulus*, April 5, 1944. Müftüoğlu claimed that Hasan Ali Yücel intended to erase the influence of the letter by a circulation letter. See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 45.

²⁷³ “Arkadaşlar, Biz Türküz, Türkçüyüz ve daima Türkçü kalacağız. Bizim için Türkçülük bir kan meselesi olduğu kadar ve laakal o kadar bir o kadar vicdan ve kültür meselesidir. Biz azalan ve azaltan Türkçü değil, çoğalan ve çoğaltan Türkçüyüz ve her vakit bu istikamette çalışacağız. See; Şükrü Saraçoğlu, TBMM Zabıt Ceridesi, Devre: 6, Cilt: 27, 77. İnikat, 05.08.1942, 21 – 22.

radicalized by the media by being called communist.²⁷⁴ Thus, it can be interpreted that this might have been a preparation for a struggle of ideologies. Under these circumstances, Sabahattin Ali made up his mind to sue Nihal Atsız.²⁷⁵ In his petition²⁷⁶ he underlined the point of damage to his honor and dignity:

This insult does not only make me exposed to the outrage and hostility of my countrymen, but also it puts me into a disrespected place in the eyes of my students, which influences my honor and pride. At the same time, it has even had an insulting influence on my personal and professional position and honor. I ask you to prevent his audaciousness by punishing him and charging ten liras for the moral damage he has caused.²⁷⁷

With this trial, the conflict of Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız changed dimensions, as became apparent in the incident of “The Devil in Us.” As Mumcu pointed out, “this trial can also be considered the first round of the trials or an introduction to the Turanism trials.”²⁷⁸

The Sessions

First Session (April 26, 1944)

When Nihal Atsız arrived just a few days before the trial, he was welcomed by a mass of young people with acclamation and applause in Ankara.²⁷⁹ The trial took place at third civil court of first instance; Saffet İnan was the judge and Hadi

²⁷⁴ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 13 – 18; Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 97.

²⁷⁵ Müftüoğlu claimed that so far as Sabahattin Ali said to Orhan Şaik Gökyay, Falih Rıfkı Atay and Hasan Ali Yücel persisted a lot from him to sue. Actually, Sabahattin Ali did not want any sue. See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 45 – 46; Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 100 – 102. However, Sertel did not confirm this claim. See; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 217. Also see; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 51; Weisband, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1943 - 1945*, 243.

²⁷⁶ For the whole text, see; Appendix 3.

²⁷⁷“Bu hakaret beni yalnız vatandaşlarımın kin ve husumetine maruz bırakmakla kalmıyor, aynı zamanda benim şahıs ve mesleki mevki ve haysiyetimi sarsacak, talebem üzerinde ki şeref ve itibarımı kıracak bir mahiyet de taşıyor. Hakkında takibat yapılmak ve cezalandırılmak suretiyle cüretkarlığının önlenmesini ve manevi zarar olarak onbin liranın tahsiline karar verilmesini dilerim.” See; Sabahattin Ali, *Mahkemelerde* (İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Yayınları, 2010), 76.

²⁷⁸ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 48.

²⁷⁹ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 46; Sönmez, *A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali*, 87; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 247; Cengiz Mete, *Atsız Ve Türk Ülküsü* (İstanbul: Baysan Yayınları, 1990), 19.

Tan was the public prosecutor.²⁸⁰ Despite the atmosphere, almost all papers of the time introduced the trial as an insult trial.²⁸¹ The circumstances gradually grew tense as the trials continued. In these circumstances the trial, which was supposed to start at 10 o'clock, was postponed before the reading of the indictment. This was essentially because of the curious crowd²⁸² who filled the courtroom and the corridors – their noise continued during the trial.²⁸³ Hamid Şevket İnce, Ferruh Agan and Rasih Yeğencil were the lawyers who defended Nihal Atsız.²⁸⁴

The session finally began in the afternoon with the reading of the indictment. In this indictment, it was claimed that Nihal Atsız insulted Sabahattin Ali by calling him a “traitor.” Furthermore, it was even demanded by the prosecutor that Atsız had to be sentenced in accordance with Article 480 of the Penal Code²⁸⁵ as Sabahattin Ali drew attention to the same point in his petition.²⁸⁶ Then, the judge asked Sabahattin Ali whether he had something to say: Ali stated that this was not the first time Atsız

²⁸⁰ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 51; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 46; Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 100.

²⁸¹ See; “Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 27, 1944; “Sabahattin Ali'nin Açtığı Davaya Dün Ankara'da Başlandı,” *Ulus*, April 27, 1944.

²⁸² “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı”; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı,” *Tan*, April 27, 1944. Müftüoğlu mentioned that the crowd who filled the court hall and corridors were consisted of nationalist young people. See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 46; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 218. According to the *Cumhuriyet*, the majority of that crowd was comprised from the university students. See; “Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava.”

²⁸³ Sabahattin Ali explained Sertel how the incident at court hall took place; “...mahkeme salonuna sızan bir sürü sağcı, faşist birdenbire salonda gösteri yapmaya başladı. Yargıç celseyi tatil etmek istiyordu. İrkçılar hemen istiklal marşı söylemeye başladılar. Tabii, yargıç da sesini çıkarmadı. İçeride dışarıda müthiş bir gürültü vardı. Bereket versin mahkeme binanın birinci katında idi. Pencereden atlardım. Zor bela kendimi kurtarabildim” See; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 218. Müftüoğlu wrote that: “Muhakeme başlayıp henüz hüviyetlerin tesbiti sırasında koridorlardaki kalabalığın kaynaştığı ve bir anda müthiş bir gürültü ile cam ve kapıların kırıldığı, Sabahattin Ali'nin ise sapsarı bir benizle kendisini birinci kattaki duruşma salonundan dışarıya attığı görülmüştür!...” See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 46 – 47.

²⁸⁴ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 51; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 46; “Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava.” Tan and Tasvir-i Efkar wrote ‘Rasim’ instead of ‘Rasih’ Yeğencil. See; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.”

²⁸⁵ “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı”; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı.”

²⁸⁶ “Suçlu, on beş sene evvel geçmiş ve hesabı tarafımdan verilmiş olan bir hadiseyi ele alarak bana hakaret etmiştir. Kendisinin cezalandırılmasını ve ayrıca 1000 Lira tazminat vermesinin kara altına alınmasını istiyorum.” See; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı.” Tasvir-i Efkar notified that the recompense was 10.000 Lira. See; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.” For the whole text of petition, see; Appendix 3

had insulted him; his aggressive attempts began with the publication of his novel “The Devil in Us.” Atsız published “The Devils in Us” as a counter-reply and with this opportunity, insulted him many times while calling him a “Greek renegade” and “enemy of the nation.” Moreover, he carried out his attacks on Sabahattin Ali in order to force him to give a response.²⁸⁷ However, the only response he got from Sabahattin Ali was the trial. Sabahattin Ali continued:

...The criminal is someone who is used to insulting everyone. To me by his last article... he has made the heaviest and the most unbearable insult ever to a citizen that it might have been...I cannot respond that one by being quiet like the others because the issue is not only my personality.²⁸⁸

Sabahattin Ali then underlined the fact that he was a popular author and his books were read by a lot of people. In this very point, he said he had to take action in order to prove that his reader did not read and like the works of a “traitor.” Besides, he even added, he was a teacher at a high-ranked university and had to sue for the sake of showing his students that they were not taking classes from a “traitor.”²⁸⁹ At the end of his words, he points out that this trial was in fact an insult:

With the decision that your fair court will give, the criminal has to realize that the honor and the pride of people whose aim is only thought and serving to their country’s culture and young generation is not something that could be played with like a toy by some adventurous men.²⁹⁰

²⁸⁷ “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.”

²⁸⁸ “...Suçlu herkese hakareti itiyat edinmiş biridir. Bu son yazısı ile bana ... bir vatandaşa edilebilecek hakaretlerin en ağırını, en tahammül edilmezini yapmıştır.... Bu son hakarete bundan evvelkiler gibi susmakla mukabele edemeyeceğim. Çünkü mevzuubahsolan sadece şahsiyetim değildir.” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.”

²⁸⁹ “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.”

²⁹⁰ “Adil mahkemenizin vereceği karar neticesinde suçlu anlasın ki, Türkiye Cumhuriyetinde yurdumuzun kültürüne ve genç nesline hizmetten başka bir şey yapmayan ve düşünmeyen vatandaşların namus ve haysiyeti bu kabil maceraperest adamların oyuncağı değildir.” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı*, 52; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı”; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı.”

Nihal Atsız then answered the question as to why he called Ali a “traitor.” According to him Sabahattin Ali’s personality, in this case, was not important; he wanted to address a concrete community.²⁹¹ He then elaborated:

I, as a patriot, see that Turkey is getting dragged to the cliff. These kinds of people were getting high positions in Turkey by leaning on each other. They were attempting to attack the ones who love Turkey. I wrote that well-known letter to the prime minister just to prevent that situation...²⁹²

The judge then asked whether he was guilty. Sabahattin Ali emphasized that he would never accept being the perpetrator of an incident that implicitly insulted the president. According to him, though he had committed a past offence, he was sentenced to one year and then released.²⁹³ Moreover, he then drew attention to the point that he had not been politically active for the past ten years. In addition, due to his publishing, he was not suspected or guilty of being a traitor or communist.²⁹⁴ Sabahattin Ali finally said that it was clear that Atsız had explicitly addressed him, otherwise, he would not have written his name. At the end of his speech, expecting an answer from Atsız, he asked who these men were that had risen to high positions.²⁹⁵ After Sabahattin Ali’s speech, Nihal Atsız started to talk and asserted

²⁹¹ “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.”

²⁹² “Ben bir vatansever sıfatıyla Türkiyenin uçuruma sürüklendiğini görmekteyim. Bu kabil kimseler birbirlerine dayanarak memleketin yüksek makamlarına tırmanıyorlar. Halbuki bunlar Türkiyeyi sevenlere darbe vurmaya çalışıyorlar. Ben bu vaziyetin önlenmesi için Başvekile malum olan açık mektubu yazdım...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.” Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 47. At this point Cumhuriyet notified that it had some differences than Tan and Tasvir-i Efkar. According to Cumhuriyet, Atsız also said that; “Yabancı bir rejime taraftarlıkla bu memleketi batırmak isteyen insanların birbirlerine tırmanarak yüksek makamlara çıkmağa savaştıklarını görünce ...” See; “Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava.”

²⁹³ “Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı”; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı.”

²⁹⁴ “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı”; “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı.”

²⁹⁵ “Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı”; “Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı.”

that Sabahattin Ali was telling lies regarding his appointment as a teacher. Atsız's lawyer then spoke, and indicated that the trial was not as simple as a libel trial:

This is the trial of two clashing ideologies. This is the trial of clashing nationalism and communism. The roots of this trial are in consciences and heads. We will supply that point in our defenses. There is the fire of communism in the head of claimant. My client is making an attack in order to extinguish this fire. I request to ask the court for permission to ask Sabahattin Ali if we should prove his treason by regarding the certainty of the penal code. This is the trial of scientific and political opinion. In addition, I request to bring the file of conviction from Konya.²⁹⁶

As can be seen, the both sides had different intentions regarding the conclusion of the trial. In the end, the court did not give permission to Atsız's lawyer to ask the question. Moreover, it was decided to investigate whether Nihal Atsız had any previously convictions. In this regard, the next session was postponed to May 03, 1944.²⁹⁷

After the first session it was clearly visible that the trial was slowly getting stressful. In this regard, an incident that took place the next day illustrated the tension of the trial. The daily newspaper "Tan" wrote that while a few men were discussing the trial they started to quarrel with Sabahattin Ali, who happened to be there. The quarrel between Sabahattin Ali and Osman Yüksel did not end and was therefore

²⁹⁶ "Bu dava iki imanın çarpışması davasıdır. Bu dava milliyetçilikle komünizmanın çarpışması davasıdır. Bu davanın kökleri vicdanlarda ve kafalardadır. Bunu müdaafalarımızda arzedeceğiz. Davacının kafasında komünizmanın ateşi vardır. Müvekkilim bu ateşi söndürmek için hamle yapmaktadır. Ceza kanunundaki sarahate nazaran rica ediyorum Sabahattin Aliden sorulsun hıyanetini ispat edelim mi? Dava ilmi ve siyasi bir kanaat davasıdır. Ayrıca Konyadaki mahkumiyet dosyasının getirilmesini rica ediyorum." (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 47 – 48; "Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava"; "Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı"; "Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı." Additionally, see; Sönmez, *A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali*, 76 – 81; Kemal Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası* (İstanbul: Ant Yayınları, 1968), 21.

²⁹⁷ "Sabahattin Ali'nin Açtığı Davaya Dün Ankara'da Başlandı"; "Atsız Aleyhindeki Davaya Başlandı"; "Açık Mektub,, dan Çıkan Dava." However, so far as to Tasvir-i Efkar, it was notified that the court did not refuse to ask whether Sabahattin Ali want them to prove his treason. See; "Nihal Adsız ile Sabahattin Ali Davasına Ankarada Başlandı"; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 49.

carried to the court.²⁹⁸ In addition, “Tasvir-i Efkar” was obviously more aggressive in what it published. According to it, Sabahattin Ali interrupted the talk of the students and even insulted them; therefore he was beaten by the students. It briefly gave a statement that the students were the subjects of an unfair act of Sabahattin Ali.²⁹⁹

Sertel told the story as she had heard it from Hayr nnisa Boratav, who was one of the eyewitnesses to the incident. According to her, the incident took place late, not in the afternoon but in the evening. Essentially, a few men threw stones at them when they were going to watch a play at the state conservatory. Then Sabahattin Ali suddenly started to run after them and caught one of them. While he was beating this man, it was then understood that this man was Osman Y ksel. Hence, the police arrested both of them. Sertel underlined that she accepted this incident as the first attempt to kill Sabahattin Ali.³⁰⁰

The same day Hamid Őevket İnce, the lawyer of Atsız, made a statement to “Tasvir-i Efkar.” The reason for his statement was the phases of the trial, which had been wrongly conveyed by the newspaper. In his statement, he insisted on underlining the point of assuming the trial as a clash of nationalism and communism. In this regard, he said:

I am Turk, an old Hearthest Turk, therefore Turkist. In this respect, I consider Nihal Atsız’s article as mine and therefore decided to defend his trial as mine. I cannot undertake defending a communist...Sabahattin Ali has said that this trial should be considered as simply an insult and even should not be considered political. Notwithstanding, I have pointed out that it is not possible to contemplate this process from narrow point of view; on the contrary, I have said that we must get to the root of the matter. In the background of this trial the two faiths and ideals were clashing and we are responsible for showing the impression created and which

²⁹⁸ “Sabahattin Ali Davasıyla Alakalı Yeni Bir Hadise,” *Tan*, April 28, 1944.

²⁹⁹ “Hakarete Uđrayan Bazı Talebeler,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, April 28, 1944. Additionally, see; M ft ođlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 49 – 50.

³⁰⁰ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 218 – 220; Çetik, * niversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav’ın M daafası*, 213 – 214.

would be created by this clash in our social milieu... namely we are ready to prove that Sabahattin Ali is a communist... We can interpret the objection on the newspapers to this claim is to cheat the public and tell every lie for the sake of serving communism and making it successful.³⁰¹

The political atmosphere was changing in Turkey. In addition to all these, Falih Rıfkı Atay finally published an article in “Ulus” in which he emphasized the fact that the social, political and historical conditions had not yet arisen to build a state leaning to racism and communism. Extreme movements can find no place in Turkey. However, he wrote that it was not the time to fall out with each other.³⁰²

The trial gradually gained more significance and gained in prominence. The most important incident took place at the second day of second session.

Second Session (May 03, 1944)

On May 3 people had gathered in front of the court where the session took place to support Atsız. At the beginning, the investigation of previous convictions of Atsız was read and it was understood that he had no previous convictions. Interestingly, Hamid Şevket İnce, who gave statement to “Tasvir-i Efkar” on the previous day, was not present at this session.

³⁰¹ “Ben Türküm. Eski Ocakçı bir Türküm. Binaenaleyh Türkçüyüm. Bu itibarladır ki, Nihal Atsız’ın yazısını kendi yazım addettim ve davasını kendi davam gibi müdafaa etmek kararını aldım. Ben komünist bir adamın müdafiliğini yapamam.... Sabahattin Ali, açtığı davanın alelade bir hakaret meselesi telakki edilmesini, bunda siyasi bir mahiyet görülmemesini...(söylemiştir.) Buna karşı, ben hadiseyi dedikleri gibi dar bir kadro içinde temaşa etmeğe imkan bulunmadığını, bilakis meselenin mazarine, köklerine kadar inmeğe mecbur olduğumuzu, iki imanın, iki idealin çarpıştığını, bu muasaranın içtimai muhitte yarattığı ve yaratacağı intibaları belirtmek mevkiinde bulunduğumuzu (söyledim)...yani Sabahattin Ali’nin komünistlik yaptığını isbata amadeyiz...Bu beyanatın hilafının gazetelere aksettirilmesinin manası şudur: Muvaffak olmak için herçibadabad her yalanı irtikap etmek ve o suretle komünistliğe hadim olmak ve efkarı umumiyeyi aldatmaktır.” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; “Hakarete Uğrayan Bazı Talebeler”; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 51.

³⁰² “Sağ - Sol,,,” *Cumhuriyet*, April 29, 1944.

When the session began, Sabahattin Ali spoke and clarified that even though he had done nothing to provoke Atsız, he had been insulted by Atsız many times.³⁰³ He even added that he had done nothing to provoke Atsız. Then Ferruh Ağan, one of Atsız's three lawyers, read some parts from Sabahattin Ali's novel "The Devil in Us." Thus, the novel once more reappeared. He claimed "Nihat," one of the characters in the novel, symbolized Nihal Atsız. Therefore, he claimed, they had reciprocally insulted each other. Another of Atsız's lawyers, Rasih Yeğengil, pointed out that they could prove this by pamphlets written by Atsız. Sabahattin Ali rejected this. Atsız then demanded the extension of the investigation. This was, however, rejected by the judge.³⁰⁴

The public prosecutor then read the indictment³⁰⁵ and accepted that Atsız addressed Sabahattin Ali explicitly by calling his name. He asked in this indictment to convict Atsız in accordance with Article 482 of the Turkish Penal Code. The punishment Atsız would face was six months imprisonment and a heavy fine of a hundred liras.³⁰⁶ In the light of all these developments, Atsız's lawyers asked for extra time to prepare their defense. It was then determined that the last session of the trial would place on May 9.³⁰⁷

³⁰³ "Nihal Adsız Sabahattin Ali Davası," *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 4, 1944; "Ankarada Görülen Hakaret Davası," *Tan*, May 4, 1944; "Sabahaddin Ali - Nihal Atsız Davası," *Cumhuriyet*, May 4, 1944; "Müddeiumumi Dün İddiasını Serdetti," *Ulus*, May 4, 1944.

³⁰⁴ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 52; "Nihal Adsız Sabahattin Ali Davası"; "Ankarada Görülen Hakaret Davası"; "Sabahaddin Ali - Nihal Atsız Davası"; "Müddeiumumi Dün İddiasını Serdetti."

³⁰⁵ For the whole text of indictment, see; Appendix 4

³⁰⁶ "Ceza Kanununun 482 nci maddesinin 3 üncü fıkrası mucibince Müddeiumumi tarafından nihâl Adsız'a verilmek istenen ceza, altı ay hapis ve yüz lira ağır para cezasıdır." See; "Müddeiumumi Dün İddiasını Serdetti."

³⁰⁷ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 52; "Nihal Adsız Sabahattin Ali Davası"; "Ankarada Görülen Hakaret Davası"; "Sabahaddin Ali - Nihal Atsız Davası"; "Müddeiumumi Dün İddiasını Serdetti."

One of the remarkable points of the progress of the trial was the growing media interest. A demonstration on May 3³⁰⁸ can be considered a turning point that directed public interest toward the trial. At the same time, it should be noted that the non-belligerent position of Turkey was reaching a critical level. The Allies had finally interrupted military aid, while Turkey had declared she had stopped chrome consignments to Germany. In this regard, the government in Ankara had to show its displeasure at any kind of development incompatible with her policy. Thus the trial touched on a critical condition and exacerbated the existing tensions, meaning the demonstration and trial occupied an important place in the media.³⁰⁹ Müftüoğlu thinks demonstrations had already begun in favor of Atsız. First the crowd started to walk with slogans against the communists towards Ulus Square. Then, he claimed, people had gathered spontaneously and there was nothing to direct them to gather to support Atsız or demonstrate. The next goal of the crowd was to cheer for the prime minister in front of his office and, lastly, they burned the books of Sabahattin Ali.³¹⁰

It could be said that the demonstration influenced the viewpoint of the semi-official newspaper “Ulus.” From that moment on, “Ulus” started to deal deeply with the progress of the trial. Moreover, it was obvious that Falih Rıfkı Atay’s article mainly regarded nationalism and Pan-Turkism. In this significant article, he drew attention to the demonstrations of May 3. He used “We Do Not Allow Disorder” as title of his article, in which he admonished both left and right wingers:

Everybody knows the incident: a teacher from Istanbul insulted a teacher from Ankara by calling him as a “traitor.” The citizen, who was insulted then sued in order to seek justice. So far as it come into view with the investigation by the police, a few provocateurs attempted to

³⁰⁸ This was accepted as the beginning day of the celebrations of the World Turkist’s Day. This is accepted as one of the important days of the Turkists. In this regard, it seems that it can be thought how much importance they have given to this day and how persistent they are to keep alive this tradition. See; Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası*, 20, 24.

³⁰⁹ Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 104 – 105.

³¹⁰ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 52 – 53.

terrorize the claimant with the young cheated men and thus hoped to get the judge and the government under their influence by planning organized demonstrations in and outside the court. It generated them as if the government would want these demonstrations. As a matter of fact, many of these young men cried and said that they were cheated in interrogations. By the way, it should be denoted that the provocative partisanship of some newspapers from whom we expected to defend the authority of the state and law in describing the judgment seems to justify the suggestions of the provocateurs... It should be known that the laws of the Republic allow a troublesome cause, including neither the Guardist terrorism nor the Trotskyist anarchism. The founder of the state and party, Atatürk, said in his speech which is considered as the real history of Kemalism that “my intention by saying national politics is, first and foremost, to protect our national presence in national borders by leaning on our own power and work for the state’s and people’s real welfare and prosperity, not to damage and occupy the people while following great dreams, expect humanitarian treatment and so reciprocal fellowship from the civil world...”³¹¹

He continued and emphasized that the regime of Turkey was obvious and it needed no change to any other regimes called foreign and even alien to Turkey. His style seemed to imply Pan-Turkists:

... By whom would it be tolerated in this land to bring nationalist doctrines from abroad on purpose or unwittingly? The Republic, in Turkey, constructed on a regime of free minds and consciences. This regime can survive by being protected against the anarchical movements and violence ...³¹²

³¹¹ “Vakayı herkes biliyor: İstanbul’da bulunan bir öğretmen, Ankara’da bulunan bir öğretmene ‘vatan haini’ diye hakaret etmiştir. Hakarete uğrıyan vatandaş mahkemeye giderek adalet istemiştir. Zabıta tahkikatıyla meydana çıktığına göre, birkaç tahrikçi, bir avuç genci aldatarak, mahkemenin içinde ve dışında, tertipli nümayişlerde bulunmuşlar, akıllarınca davacıyı tethiş etmek, hakimi ve Hükümeti tesir altına almak yeltenişinde bulunmuşlardır... Gençlere, Hükümet böyle bir nümayiş arzu ediyormuş gibi telkinlerde bulunulmuştur. Nitekim sorguya çekilmiş oldukları resmi makamlarda gençlerin bir çoğu, aldatılmış olduklarını, ağlıyarak söylemişlerdir. Yalnız Devlet ve Kanun otoritesini müdaafa etmelerini beklediğimiz gazetelerden bazılarının, muhakemeyi anlatışlarındaki kışkırtıcı taraftarlık, tahrikçilerin telkinlerini haklı gibi göstermiş olduğunu da sırası iken söyleyelim... Şurası bilinmek doğru olur ki Cumhuriyet kanunları ne Gardistlik tethişçiliğine, ne de Troçkistlik anarşisine, bu memleketin başına bela getirmek fırsatını vermiyecektir... Devletin ve Partinin kurucusu Atatürk, Kemalizmin hakiki tarihi olarak elde tuttuğumuz nutkunda der ki: ‘Milli siyaset dediğim zaman, kasdettiğim mana şudur: hudud-u milliyemiz dahilinde her şeyden evvel kendi kuvvetimize müsteniden muhafaza-i mevcudiyet ederek millet ve memleketin hakiki saadet ve umranına çalışmak alehtlak tul-u emeller peşinde milleti işgal ve ızar etmemek, medeni cihandan, medeni ve insani muameleye ve müteakabil dostluğa intizar etmek...’ (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Falih Rıfkı Atay, “Nizam Düşmanlığı Yaptırmayız,” *Ulus*, May 7, 1944. The same article was published even in the same day by other newspapers. See; “Ulus’un Makalesi: Nizama Düşmanlık Yaptırmayız,” *Tan*, May 7, 1944; “Nizam Düşmanları,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 1944.

³¹² “...Bu memlekete kimin, bilerek veya bilmeyerek dışardan milliyet dersi getirmesine tahammül edilecek? Cumhuriyet, Türkiye’de, hür kafalar ve hür vicdanlar rejimi kurmuştur: bu rejim, ithal malı cebir ve anarşi cereyanlarına karşı korunmakla devam edebilir...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Atay, “Nizam Düşmanlığı Yaptırmayız.”

This article was published in various newspapers simultaneously. This can also be interpreted as the sign that the government had finally taken a role. From that moment on, we can see that Falih Rıfki Atay undertook a prominent role with his articles against Turanism.³¹³ On May 8, before the last session of the trial, Falih Rıfki Atay published a new article called “Why is It Important?” about the Turanism issue. He pointed out once more that there were provocateurs who intended to hide themselves naming the nationalists. According to him, Turkey had her independence after a longstanding war; therefore, she needed some time in order to let new generations grow up and reconstruct the land without any fears of instability. He emphasized that there might be people who aimed to deceive youth people for the sake of their ideologies, which were not in favor of Turkey.³¹⁴

Meanwhile, a telegram written on behalf of the university students was sent to the media. Essentially, a student from Istanbul had sent it to thank the lawyers in Ankara.³¹⁵ In this telegram the student wrote:

The university students offer their respectful greetings to the lawyers in Ankara who did not accept the representation of Sabahattin Ali.

Signature: University Students.³¹⁶

It was understood as a result of the investigation that a student intentionally signed the telegram on behalf of the “university students.” Accordingly, with this

³¹³ It is worth to remember the assertions which were about Hasan Ali Yücel and Falih Rıfki Atay that they encouraged Sabahattin Ali to sue against Nihal Atsız. Regarding with this point of view, Oran thinks that it can be. See; Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 254.

³¹⁴ Falih Rıfki Atay, “Niçin Üstünde Duruyoruz,” *Ulus*, May 8, 1944.

³¹⁵ “Ankara Barosuna Çekilen Telgraf,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 7, 1944; “Avukat Hamid Şevket, Nihal Adsız’ı Müdafaadan Vazgeçti, Ankara Barosuna Sahte Bir Telgraf Çekildiği Anlaşıldı,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 7, 1944.

³¹⁶ “Sabahattin Ali’nin vekaletini kabul etmiyen Ankara avukatlarını Üniversiteliler hürmetle selamlar. İmza: ‘‘Üniversiteliler.’’ (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; “Üniversiteliler,, İmzasiyle Çekilen Telgraf,” *Tan*, May 8, 1944.

telegram, he intended to present the university students as if they were interested in politics.³¹⁷ In addition to that, Hamid Şevket İnce, who had declared that he saw this trial as a clash of nationalism and communism, gave up defending Atsız. He gave a brief explanation about his decision:

Some of my invaluable friends whom I highly trusted said to me; we know you as an old hearthest Turkish man. How could you undertake the representation of a Turanist who follows an expansionist policy in contradiction with the principals of Kemalism? At least, in Republic of Turkey, how can you represent a man who derides and scorns Atatürk, and sees him equal to drunks and brownnosers in opposition to all youths and Turkish public opinion?... (After reading the “Brownnosers’ Night”) Considering this framework, I see that my national love which burns in my heart unwittingly intended to make an instrument for Turanist and racist aims and I startled. I..., as a Turk who wants Turkish youth and Turkishness to find themselves within the national borders, decided not to defend Nihal Atsız... I am neither communist, nor Nazi, Pan-Turanist or racist. I am a just Turkist for Turkey...³¹⁸

In addition to all these, Zekeriya Sertel waded into the debate with an article about the 5th column. The remarkable point in these conditions was the common ground that targeted Turanism. It should be indicated that these all began to be mentioned after the demonstration of May 3. In his article, Sertel described Turanists as antagonists that had contradictory aims to national unity and the government. Furthermore, he called the demonstrations in Ankara the activities of the “5th Column.” According to him, a foreign and hostile country supported and prompted

³¹⁷ Ibid.

³¹⁸ “Sözlerindeki ciddiyete tam bir itminanla bazı kıymetli arkadaşlarım bana: ‘Biz seni, eski ocakçı bir Türk çocuğu olarak tanırız, sen nasıl oluyor da Turancı bir adamın vekaletini aldın, sen, Kemalizm prensiplerine aykırı milliyet, hudut ve havası haricindeki bir siyaseti nasıl müdafaa edebilirsin? Hele bütün gençliğe ve Türk efkarı umumiyesine karşı, Atatürk’ü tehzil ve tahkir eden, onu sarhoş ve dalkavuklarla muhal gören bir şahsı Cumhuriyet makamlarında sen nasıl temsil edebilirsin? Dediler... (Dalkavuklar Gecesi’ni okuduktan sonra) Bu manzara muvahecesinde ben, bağrımda yanan milli aşkımin, bilmiyerek Turancı veya ırkçı bir emele alet edilmek istendiğini gördüm ve irkildim. Ben...bir Türk olarak, ancak milli sınırlar içinde Türklüğün ve Türk gençliğinin kendini bulmasını isteyen bir milliyetçi farikasıyla bu davada Nihal Adsız’ı müdafaa etmemek kararını verdim... Ben ne Komünistim, ne Nazi, ne de Turancı veya ırkçı. Ben Türkiye Türkçüsüyüm...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; “Hamit Şevket İnce Nihal Adsız’ın Avukatlığından İstifa Etti,” *Ulus*, May 8, 1944; “Avukat Hamit Şevketin Verdiği Karar,” *Tan*, May 8, 1944; “Avukat Hamid Şevket, Nihal Adsız’ı Müdafaadan Vazgeçti, Ankara Barosuna Sahte Bir Telgraf Çekildiği Anlaşıldı.”

them in order to weaken the resistance of Turkey. He even argued that their interpretation of nationalism was racist and imperialist. In conclusion, he supported Falih Rıfkı Atay and came to the point that there was no need to divide the society into left and right.³¹⁹ On the contrary, the matter in “Tasvir-i Efkar” was different from the others. “Tasvir-i Efkar” was dealing with the Turkish youth. It was once more pointed out that these were the draw backs of the incitement.³²⁰ The day of the last session came along with all these discussions.

Third Session (May 09, 1944)

In the last session, different from the others, the media gave more importance to the trial. Even “Ulus” indicated that people had to get an entrance card in order to follow the last session.³²¹ Meanwhile, Falih Rıfkı Atay kept writing on racism and Turanism, which he cursed as the most harmful ideologies preventing Turkey from forming a nation-state. He then underlined the same points with Minister of Foreign Affairs Numan Menemencioğlu. Accordingly, Turkey could not have expansionist intentions, in this regard, if the Turks were not satisfied with circumstances in the foreign countries in which they were currently living; they could move to Turkey in order to live within the national borders. Thus, attention was taken to the War of Liberation principals.³²² The same article was also published in “Cumhuriyet,” “Tan” and “Tasvir-i Efkar.”

The final session of the trial began in the afternoon with the defense of Atsız. Accordingly, his lawyers, Ferruh Ağan and Rasih Yeğengil, read their common

³¹⁹ Zekeriya Sertel, “Birliğe En Çok Muhtaç Olduğumuz Günlerde: Beşinci Kol,” *Tan*, May 8, 1944.

³²⁰ “Türk Gençliği Bilmelidir Ki...,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 8, 1944.

³²¹ “Sabahattin Ali - Nihal Adsız Muhakemesine Bugün Devam Edilecek,” *Ulus*, May 9, 1944.

³²² Falih Rıfkı Atay, “İrkçılık Ve Turancılık,” *Ulus*, May 9, 1944. Nadir Nadi wrote an article in this direction. See; Nadir Nadi, “Bizim Realitemiz, Bizim Idealimiz!,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 9, 1944.

defense. One of the interesting points of their defense was their retreat. In contrast to the beginning, they clarified their standpoint and claimed that Hamit Şevket İnce tended to see it as a clash of nationalism and communism; on the contrary, this was an insult trial according to them. Additionally, Atsız had not intentionally called Sabahattin Ali a “traitor.” They referred to the penal code and cited mitigating factors in order to decrease the punishment, even asking for its postponement. Atsız then took the floor and immediately deprecated Sabahattin Ali. He refused the statement that he had attacked high-ranked people. Atsız underlined the fact that he had not even written one word opposing the homeland. On the contrary, he accused Sabahattin Ali of writing a book that opposed the homeland. He finally said that his purpose was not charging Ali. However, he could not avoid calling Sabahattin Ali a provocateur.³²³

Result of the Trial

In the second part of the session the judge read the verdict. The court determined that Nihal Atsız was guilty of attacking the fame and honor of Sabahattin Ali. They consequently found the defense, which was based on the claim that Atsız did not directly mention him as a “traitor” unacceptable. However, interestingly, even though the court did not find mitigating reasons regarding the punishment, they decided to bring up the issue of the hostility of Sabahattin Ali at the incident of the “the Devil in Us”. Accordingly, this was considered to be a ruling in favor of Atsız;

... yet he has been against Sabahattin Ali’s opinions and found them inappropriate to his ideology, and moreover, even though Atsız has harshly criticized his works, Sabahattin Ali

³²³ “Nihal Adsız 4 Ay Hapis Ve 66.60 Lira Ağır Para Cezasına Mahkum Oldu,” *Ulus*, May 10, 1944; “Nihal Adsız Dün Mahkum Oldu,” *Tan*, May 10, 1944; “Sabahattin Aliye Söven Nihal Adsızın Cezası Tecil Edildi,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 10, 1944; “Nihal Adsız - Sabahaddin Ali Davası Bitti,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 10, 1944.

kept his silence and he wrote the open letter undertaking it as a mission; all these were regarded as reducing factors for the punishment...³²⁴

In addition, the punishment was postponed for his good conduct, moral inclination and common belief that he would not commit crime. Thus, the trial came to the end but, despite that, a new process was about to begin. This was called the Turanism-Racism trial. In this regard, Atsız was arrested in relation to his role in the demonstrations that took place on May 3.³²⁵

ECHOES OF THE TRIAL

The extension of this proceeding was not just restricted to Atsız; at the same time it spread across the whole country. According to Müftüoğlu, a chase had already begun with the atmosphere of terrorism; it was the hunt of the nationalists.³²⁶ “Tasvir-i Efkar” declared its discontentment with the progress. In a leading article, the process was called “gossipy” and it was also pointed out that their point of view was opposite to any movements assured from abroad. Moreover, it was indicated that nationalism in Turkey would only be valid within its borders.³²⁷

In the meantime, the press was celebrating the commemoration of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement, signed on 12 May 1939. This agreement can be considered as providing a basis for the Tripartite Agreement. The chief writer of “Ulus,” Falih Rıfki Atay, underlined the friendship of Turkey and Britain. According to him, the

³²⁴ “...ancak Sabahattin Ali'nin fikirlerine maznunun ötedenberi muarız bulunuşu ve ülküsüne uygun bulmadığı müdahilin eserlerini acı ve hatta hakaret edici mahiyette tenkit etmiş olmasına rağmen müdahilin sükut etmiş olması ve bu kere yazdığı açık mektubu da, bir vazife yaptığına kail olarak neşretmiş olması gibi haller maznun lehine cezayı azaltıcı takdiri sebeplerden kabul edilerek...” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 59 – 604; “Nihal Adsız 4 Ay Hapis Ve 66.60 Lira Ağır Para Cezasına Mahkum Oldu”; “Nihal Adsız Dün Mahkum Oldu”; “Nihal Adsız - Sabahaddin Ali Davası Bitti”; “Sabahattin Aliye Söven Nihal Adsızın Cezası Tecil Edildi.”

³²⁵ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 62; Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası*, 24.

³²⁶ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 62.

³²⁷ “Sağ, Sol Tanımıyoruz, Dosdoğru Milliyetçiyiz,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 11, 1944.

relations of enhanced development after the agreement could not only explained by the outbreak of the war. He noted that the close relations between Turkey and Britain would continue even after the war.³²⁸ “Tasvir-i Efkar” also joined this commemoration of the agreement.³²⁹ Additionally, Zekeriya Sertel was putting emphasis on changing and broadening the principals of the Anglo-Turkish Agreement into an agreement with the Allies in his leading article.³³⁰ All these developments can be considered as endeavors to ameliorate relations with Britain and with the Allies towards the end of the war.

Falih Rıfıkı Atay played an important role during the revelation of the secret Turanist organization through his leading articles, which were even published by other newspapers. It can be said that the progress of the process that began even after the end of the Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız trial and continued until May 19 was something of the puzzle for the press in Turkey.³³¹ On May 19, a Turanist secret organization became apparent and was even declared to the public. The official notification to the newspapers was on May 18. Accordingly, the demonstration comprised a basis for this investigation and Nihal Atsız, Reha Oğuz Türkkkan, Zeki Velidi and Hasan Cansever were accepted as the prominent figures of this secret organization. According to the press, their aim was to cheat by misusing the nationalist senses of the young generation:

...those people have contradictory principals against our constitution-based current regime and the true nationalist senses of our citizens. They even have a secret organization; program of activities, propaganda materials, ciphers and passwords for the sake of keeping

³²⁸ Atay, “Nizam Düşmanlığı Yaptırmayız.”

³²⁹ “Türk - İngiliz Dostluk Beyannamesi,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 12, 1944.

³³⁰ Sertel, “Birliğe En Çok Muhtaç Olduğumuz Günlerde: Beşinci Kol.”

³³¹ See; “Bizim İçin Mukaddes Olan Yurt Ve Vatan Mefhumları,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 17, 1944.

communication secret... their aim is to have supporters from the innocent young generations by misusing their nationalism and patriotism senses...³³²

The main argument against the Turanists related to their activities in order to establish a dictatorship similar to the examples of Germany and Italy. Falih Rıfka Atay underlined the fact that the struggle of the Turanists began at the outbreak of the war aimed to demolish the party and constitution in Turkey.³³³

The atmosphere in Turkey seemed to signal a long process regarding Turanism would begin. In this sense, the speech of President İnönü, which took place on May 19, suddenly brought the Turanists to the position of guilty.³³⁴ In this speech, the president described Turanism as a diseased and harmful ideology and Turanists as “thoughtless and unscrupulous plotters.” He then emphasized that, in line with the points of the national policy of Turkey and the general circumstances, it was impossible to follow adventurous ideologies such as Turanism. He described Turanists as if they would do anything in order to gain power. One of the important parts of his speech was the question he asked regarding to the advantage of whom or

³³² “...bu kimselerin Teşkilatı Esasiye Kanunu ile müesses bugünkü rejimimize ve vatandaşlarımızın hakiki milliyetçilik hislerine aykırı umdeleri ve bu umdelere varmak için gizli cemiyetleri, faaliyet programları, teşkilat ve propoganda organları, hatta muharebelerini gizli tutmağa mahsus şifreleri ve parolaları vardır... mas’um gençlerin milliyetçilik ve vatanseverlik duygularını istismar ederek genç nesil arasında kendilerine taraftar toplamak...yolunda çalışmaktadır.” (It is paraphrased and translated by the writer) See; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 70 – 71; “Son Tahriklerin Gizli Bir Cemiyetin Eseri Olduğu Anlaşıldı,” *Ulus*, May 19, 1944; “İrkçılık Ve Turancılık Umdelerini Yayıma Çalışanlar Tespit Edildi,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 19, 1944; “Tahrikçiler Meydana Çıkarıldı,” *Tan*, May 19, 1944; Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 105 – 106; “Şehrimizde Meydana Çıkarılan Gizli Cemiyet,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 19, 1944; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:224 – 226; Nadi, *Perde Aralığından*, 244 – 245.

³³³ Falih Rıfka Atay, “Hak Görünüründe Bir Kaygı,” *Ulus*, May 18, 1944; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 54.

³³⁴ Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 78 – 79.

for which state they were working. According to him, these were ideas that could only bring trouble and disaster to Turkey.³³⁵

After this speech, Falih Rıfki Atay wrote an article in which he summarized the speech. Meanwhile Zekeriya Sertel underlined the concept of Atatürkist nationalism. According to him, Atatürk had drowned the borders of Turkish nationalism in order to prevent the loss of independence by following adventurous ideologies. Moreover, Sertel found Turanists to follow principles that were strongly racist and incompatible with those of Turkey.³³⁶ Interestingly, the arrests in Turkey took the attention of a British daily newspaper, the “Manchester Guardian.” According to that newspaper, the activities of the Turanist group were supported by Germany.³³⁷

On May 21, “Tan” started to publish a serial under the title “Their real faces with their own words,” regarding significant people in the Turanism trial.³³⁸ Additionally, an interesting incident happened in the form of the arrest of Ali İhsan Sabis. Sabis was a retired general who was known for a controversy over Atatürk; he was captured in a post office when sending threats and insulting letters to the government regarding criticism of its foreign policy.³³⁹

³³⁵ “Cumhurreisinin Gençliğe Hitabı,” *Tasvir - i Efkar*, May 20, 1944; “Milli Şefin Hitabeleri,” *Tan*, May 20, 1944; “Cumhurreisimizin Nutku,” *Ulus*, May 20, 1944; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya’da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 71 – 76; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 107 – 108; “Milli Şefin Tarihi Nutku,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 20, 1944.

³³⁶ Falih Rıfki Atay, “Cumhurreisimizin Nutku,” *Ulus*, May 20, 1944; Zekeriya Sertel, “Atatürk Milliyetçiliği Nasıl Anlıyordu,” *Tan*, May 20, 1944.

³³⁷ See; “Manchester Guardian Gazetesinin Bir Yazısı,” *Ulus*, May 25, 1944. In addition to that, Mumcu gives a report of the ambassador of the US. He underlines the fact that it was thought of a Nazi support in order to enter Turkey to the war. See; Mumcu, *40’ların Cadı Kazanı*, 59 – 60.

³³⁸ “Kendi Ağzlarından İç Yüzleri,” *Tan*, 21 - 29.05 1944.

³³⁹ He was later included to Pan Turanism trials. See; “Emekli General Ali İhsan Sabis Tevkif Edildi,” *Cumhuriyet*, May 25, 1944; “Ali İhsan Sabis Nezaret Altında,” *Tan*, May 25, 1944; İnönü, *Defterler, 1919-1973*, 1:400.

According to Mumcu 49 people were interrogated and 33 of them arrested at the beginning of the trial. Then in while the trial was in progress, ten were released on July 2, finally leaving 23 to judge. The public prosecutor of the trial was Kazım Alöç and the defending lawyers were Kenan Öner and Hamit Şevket İnce.³⁴⁰ The rumors of torture in interrogations came into question before the sessions had begin. Accordingly, there was a claim torture was systematically applied and that they had spent weeks in special rooms called “Tabutluk.”³⁴¹ Sertel touched on this subject in her memoires, using the summaries of the indictment by “Akşam.” She wrote that the most important parts of the interrogations belonged to Cihat Savaşfer, because he explained the aim of the organization. The aim of this organization was, briefly, to rescue Turkestan and realize the unity of the Turks. Additionally, he confessed that they intended to take possession of the power by a putsch, when Germany defeated the Soviet Union...³⁴² In addition, Atsız clarified that the demonstration was not organized by him but, on the other hand, it was implicitly prompted by significant people who occupied important places in the CHP such as Reşat Şemsettin Sirer, Suut Kemal Yetkin, Behçet Kemal Çağlar and Tahsin Banguoğlu.³⁴³ The trials came to an end on March 30 in 1945 and most of the accused were sentenced to various terms of imprisonment. They then appealed the verdict at the Supreme Court of Appeals, which reversed the judgment. The process was restarted and from that time on they were set free from prison. The Turanism process ended on March 31, 1947,

³⁴⁰ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 58; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 110 – 111; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 249 – 253.

³⁴¹ For the details, see; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 81 – 86; Alparslan Türkeş, *1944 Milliyetçilik Olayı*, 12th edition. (İstanbul: Kutluğ Yayınları, 1975), 42 – 48; Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 255.

³⁴² Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 254; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 111; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 151 – 157; Goloğlu, *Milli Şef Dönemi (1939 - 1945)*, 254; Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 254.

³⁴³ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 64.

with the acquittal of everyone.³⁴⁴ Therefore, it was loudly declared that there was no crime called Turanism-Racism in Turkey. The remarkable point of the trial related to Soviet demands declared by a diplomatic note on March 19, 1945. This was officially repeated by Foreign Affairs Commissar Molotov on June 7, 1945.³⁴⁵ This development had a shocking effect on Turkey, which changed the political standpoint of Turkey in relation to that issue.³⁴⁶ As a consequence of Soviet demands on Turkey, communism was loudly declared and even started to be described as an evil ideology. One of the important developments illustrating activities against so-called communism in Turkey was the “Tan Incidents” on December 4, 1945.³⁴⁷ This was a well-planned and successfully achieved “youth movement.” It should be noted that the youth movement character of the incident was quite similar with the demonstration on May 3. However, there was a difference; the press supported the December demonstration.³⁴⁸

One of the most important developments in politics in Turkey was also taking place, meanwhile, with the establishment of an opposition party, the Democratic

³⁴⁴ Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 255; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 259; Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 112 – 113; Koçak, *Türkiye’de Milli Şef Dönemi*, 2:228.

³⁴⁵ Feliks Çuyev, *Molotov Anlatıyor: Stalin’in Sağkolu ile Yapılan 140 Görüşme*, trans. Ayşe Hacıhasanoğlu and Suna Kabasakal, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: Yordam Kitap, 2010), 116 – 118. In addition to that, Truman explains the Soviet claims regarding with the Straits, see; Harry S. Truman, *Hatıralarım*, trans. Cihad Baban and Semih Tuğrul (Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi, 1968), 167 – 169, 180 – 181 ; Tellal, “SSCB’yle İlişkiler,” 496. Sertel touches on that issue in his memoires, see; Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 256 – 258.

³⁴⁶ Berkes takes attention to the fact by referring Hostler that Turkey firstly tried to get a good side of the Soviet Union by judging the Turanists. After a while, when the Soviets demanded the mutual defence of the Straits and annex the eastern provinces, the policy changed. See; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 311. So far as Sertel writes, Turkey remained alone at the end of the war. See; Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 258.

³⁴⁷ Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 304 – 318; Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 267 – 274; Burhan Oğuz, *Yaşadıklarım, Dinlediklerim: Tarihi Ve Toplumsal Anılar*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: Simurg, 2000), 173; Oran, “İç Ve Dış Politika İlişkisi Açısından İkinci Dünya Savaşında Türkiye’de Siyasal Hayat Ve Sağ - Sol Akımlar,” 258 – 259.

³⁴⁸ Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 124.

Party (DP), in 1946.³⁴⁹ The DP became a center of interest for people in Turkey and therefore started to struggle with the ruling party. From that moment on, “communism” or “communist” became one of the most useful words in terms of insults or blame. Thus the members of the parties were accusing each other of being communists.

In contrast with the Turanism trials, it can be said that the wind changed with the Soviet demands on June 1945. This also caused anger with communism and this anger was directed against people known as communists and leftists. In this regard, the accusations of Atsız were once again remembered as an aid to uncover the communists out there, and at this time, former Minister of Education Hasan Ali Yücel was the goal. It can be simply said that these circumstances brought Yücel to defend himself.

The trial of Hasan Ali Yücel-Kenan Öner, which turned all the processes upside down, began 1947. As it is known, Hasan Ali Yücel was the former minister of education who resigned in 1946, while Kenan Öner was the lawyer who took parts in Turanism-related trials. Moreover, he was the provincial head of the opposition DP in İstanbul.³⁵⁰ This trial between them had a symbolic meaning because of their relations with the Sabahattin Ali and Nihal Atsız trial. Accordingly, the beginning of the trial was based on a speech by the minister of internal affairs regarding the phases of communism in Turkey in the National Assembly. Then, Marshall Fevzi Çakmak gave a statement that dealt with his struggle against communism. In this statement, he implicitly accused Hasan Ali Yücel, former minister of education of support for

³⁴⁹ Sertel, *Hatırladıklarım (1905 - 1950)*, 260 – 274; For detailed examination regarding the establishment of the DP, see; Samet Ağaoğlu, *Siyasi Günlük: Demokrat Parti'nin Kuruluşu*, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 1993).

³⁵⁰ Özdoğan, “Turan”dan “Bozkurt”a, 120; Sönmez, *A'dan Z'ye Sabahattin Ali*, 259.

the communists through his ministry. Then Hasan Ali Yücel wrote open letters, all of which were unanswered by the marshal. Thereupon, Kenan Öner answered Yücel's letters in which he explicitly confirmed his support for the communists at the Ministry of Education.³⁵¹ Müftüoğlu thinks that the Minister of Internal Affairs intended to attack the marshal, who was a popular figure in those years and also an elected member of the parliament from the list of the DP. Fevzi Çakmak was also among the founders of the Human Rights Association, which was presented to the media as a communist fraternity. The reason for these attacks did not only relate to the popularity of Fevzi Çakmak, but was also an attempt to bring discredit upon the DP.³⁵²

The focal point of the debate was communism, but Öner was eager to play the Racism-Turanism card, which was directly related to the previous trials.³⁵³ As an example, Öner said the Ministry of Education and the party itself had encouraged and directed students to nationalism with the assistance of books published by the Ministry of Education and with the speeches of significant politicians.³⁵⁴ Öner accused Yücel on the basis of the widely made claims of Nihal Atsız from 1944. He repeated that Hasan Ali Yücel had encouraged Sabahattin Ali to make a claim against Nihal Atsız.³⁵⁵ He even accused Hasan Ali Yücel of giving the order for the torture applied against nationalist young people.³⁵⁶ The reason for these tortures, so far as Öner noted, was the protection of the well-known communist Sabahattin

³⁵¹ Hasan Ali Yücel, *Davam*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: Türkiye İş Bankası Kültür Yayınları, 2011), 3 – 4; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 106; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 208 – 211.

³⁵² Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 208.

³⁵³ Yücel, *Davam*, 6; Kenan Öner, *Öner Ve Yücel Davası*, 2nd edition. (İstanbul: Kenan Matbaası, 1947), 27, 31, 44.

³⁵⁴ Öner, *Öner Ve Yücel Davası*, 11 – 13.

³⁵⁵ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 106 – 107; Öner, *Öner Ve Yücel Davası*, 12; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 214 – 215; Sülker, *Sabahattin Ali Dosyası*, 19; Muhiddin Nalbantoğlu, ed., *Alparslan Türkeş'le Sohbetler* (İstanbul: Hamle Yayıncılık, 1994), 148 – 149.

³⁵⁶ Yücel, *Davam*, 6; Öner, *Öner Ve Yücel Davası*, 53 – 60; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 107.

Ali.³⁵⁷ According to Mumcu, Öner had successfully managed to launch the previous trials and also bring the issues that got a reaction from people, such as the trials of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız, Turanism-Racism, the Village Institutes and the incident of DTCF.³⁵⁸

The witnesses in the trial were the people judged and then acquitted at the end of the trial. Nihal Atsız, Orhan Şaik Gökyay and İsmet Tümtürk were among those first judged later made the witnesses of Öner. Additionally, they also had personal problems with Hasan Ali Yücel.³⁵⁹ Although the trial had ended with the victory of Kenan Öner in 1947, the verdict was not approved by the Supreme Court of Appeals. The process was restarted and only ended in 1949 with Yücel's victory. Thus, as a result of the first judgment, it was accepted that the former minister, Hasan Ali Yücel, supported the communism and communists during his time in the Ministry of Education.

The result of the trial also implicitly affected the political discourse in Turkey. For example Turanists who were judged for being opponents to the Turkish political system started to be called nationalists. Moreover, they were even the sources of accusation of communist activities and the targets of the communists.³⁶⁰ In this respect, three professors from Ankara, Pertev Naili Boratav, Behice Boran and Niyazi Berkes, became prominent figures on the left wing. The Turanism issue had finally come to an end and therefore a counter strike against the leftists began with the endeavors of to identify and suspend them. In this sense, the role of these three

³⁵⁷ Yücel, *Davam*, 6; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 388; Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 107.

³⁵⁸ Mumcu, *40'ların Cadı Kazanı*, 112; Koçak, *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir*, 436; Asım Karaömerlioğlu, *Orada Bir Köy Var Uzakta: Erken Cumhuriyet Döneminde Köycü Söylem*, 1st edition. (İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, 2006), 114 – 115; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 369 – 370.

³⁵⁹ Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 122; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 388; Müftüoğlu, *Çankaya'da Kabus: 3 Mayıs 1944*, 242 – 243; Koçak, *Geçmişiniz İtinayla Temizlenir*, 439 – 441.

³⁶⁰ Özdoğan, “*Turan*”dan “*Bozkurt*”a, 123 – 124.

professors can be thought of within the framework of their role in publishing a periodical called “Motherland and World” (Yurt ve Dünya).³⁶¹ Besides “The Home and the World”, which was counted among the left-wing periodicals, these professors wrote articles to “Tan”, which was raided by university students in 1945. The interesting point in this case was the role of the students. Accordingly, as with previous examples, a demonstration at Ankara University was held for the sake of protesting Professor Boratav. The aim of these students was to explain their demands to the president of the university, but the demonstration could not be controlled and as a result they forced the president of the university to resign.³⁶² Even though investigations were related to their communist activities, these three professors were acquitted. However, they insisted upon the resignation of these three professors and gave passionate speeches, even organizing demonstrations against leftists, communism and communists.³⁶³ In the end their chairs were abolished and thus the process was concluded. When the last phase of the process was complete, few remained to oppose anti-communists in Turkey.

CONCLUSION

There are two perspectives that underline the importance of the trial of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız:

The main characteristics of the first perspective, which cover the short-term developments, relate to the defeat of Germany, and therefore the changes in Turkey that depended upon it. As pointed out above, Turkish-German relations during the

³⁶¹ Sertel claimed that the journal was not interested in daily politics; on the contrary, it was ideological and artistic. However, she adds that the articles were mostly written with anti-fascist emphasis. See; Sertel, *Roman Gibi*, 230.

³⁶² Sertel claims that these were all programmed by the politicians above and the incidents were all systematic. See; Ibid., 363; Çetik, *Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav'ın Müdaafası*, 21 – 22.

³⁶³ Çetik, *Üniversitede Cadı Kazanı: 1948 DTCF Tasfiyesi Ve Pertev Naili Boratav'ın Müdaafası*, 24 – 25; Berkes, *Unutulan Yıllar*, 410 – 411.

2nd World War were at their highest before Germany invaded the Soviet Union. Turkey's belligerency was for Germany's gaining strategic support from Turkey. Turkey was to play a role in the war against the Soviet Union by struggling to build a Turan state with the Turkic peoples of the Soviet Union. This was supported by groups in Turkey known as Turanists. Although Turkey declared her non-belligerency, it was impossible to follow an independent policy different to that of the state or group that currently had the advantage. Therefore it can be said that foreign affairs during the war also determined domestic policy. In this regard Turkey renewed her domestic policy on the basis of developments in the war and her relations with the belligerents. The media, which was completely controlled by government, can be considered a tool to show the trends in Turkish policy. In this regard, the Turanist activities, which increased after the Turkish-German Non-Aggression Pact, could be related to the explicit or implicit permission of the government. In fact, although Germany contributed a lot to Turanist activities in Turkey, it cannot be completely said that Germany had prompted it; on the contrary, there were also factors at play that related to the internal development of nationalism. Turkism and scientific research in the 1930s in Turkey can be considered an instrument that implicitly helped in the development Turanism and racism. This is despite the fact that Atatürk had never seen nationalism as a tool for expansion; it would have led to an adventure in the war. The change of the nationalism concept is therefore remarkable.

As an addition to the internal situation, the German activities and methods became apparent after the war through their foreign office documents, which were captured by the Allies and Soviet Union.

The Soviet friendship in foreign affairs, which continued until the German-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact on August 1939, was the key for Turkey. The reason for the close relations with the Soviet Union was based on an agreement signed in 1921 for the provision of aid from the Soviet Union. However, Turkey had undertaken not to provoke the Turkic peoples in the Soviet Union. Relations between the Soviet Union and Turkey did not suddenly deteriorate; on the contrary, they continued until the end of the war. It can also be said that the German-Soviet War and Turkey's standpoint in this war were among the factors directing Turkish policy.

The defeat of Germany at Stalingrad and her retreat caused some changes to the politics of Turkey. It was well understood that Germany would be defeated and therefore it was necessary to change the Germany-oriented policies. One of these vital changes, which can also be accepted as a message to the Allies, was the incident of the "The Greatest Danger." Accordingly, it was announced in the National Assembly that Turkey had no irredentist aims regarding her neighbors. Then, the open letters of Atsız gave a chance to judge the Turanists relatively early on and hence assist in the clearance of pro-Germans from senior positions in the administration. In this sense, the trial of Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız contributed much to bringing forward the judgment of the Turanists. Even though it was a libel trial, the circumstances surrounding the trial showed clearly that it was more than that. It was entirely a political trial; even a mass meeting of Turanists to show their strength. As a result of their demonstrations, the government confirmed they were out of control.

As can be seen, media interest gradually increased after the first session of the trial and, in the end, this process gave birth to the trial of racism-Turanism, which began in 1944 and ended in 1947. From the short-term perspective, the trial was an

instrument to illustrate changes in Turkish foreign policy at the end of the war. It can also be thought of as the first attempt to move closer to the Allies.

The second perspective can be termed the longer-term point of view, which was closely related to Soviet demands regarding the Straits and a few eastern provinces. In this respect, we can consider the trial in association with the incidents that took place in the second half of the 1940s. Thus, we can contextualize the trial within the period of Turkey's internal politics' transformation into the multi-party system. In this case, the Soviet demands over the Straits and provinces had a huge effect on Turkish policy at that time, because Turkey's relations with the Allies were then not going well. Additionally, Turkey was feeling herself alone and helpless. In these circumstances, a very strong anti-communist movement with an Anti-Sovietism character began in Turkey. The loneliness in foreign affairs and anti-communism also led to a shift in internal politics in Turkey. The first step of the shifting policy was the appeals of Turanists to the court and their release as a consequence of their appeal, which was upheld by the Supreme Court of Appeals. IN addition, the Tan incident gave an idea of Turkey's shifting policy. Accordingly, the press, in contrast to the demonstrations on May 3, stood alongside the university students who gathered and marched in protest of Tan and defended the plundering of the Tan printing house.

There are also some similarities between the incident of May 3 and Tan. First and foremost the participants of these incidents mainly comprised university students; the involvement of provocateurs was suspected. The viewpoint of the press was quite interesting; it started to publish articles against communism explicitly supporting the protestors. According to Yalçın Küçük, these attacks by the media can be seen as the starting point of creating Marxists and communists from the liberals

and democrats in Turkey.³⁶⁴ As a result of communist chase in Turkey, it can be said that the anti-communist atmosphere of the 1950s in the US had already begun in Turkey. Moreover, the new libel trial between Hasan Ali Yücel and Kenan Öner, plus the acquittals in the Turanism-racism trial, contributed much to the creation of the anti-communism atmosphere, thereby bringing the Turanism process to an end

The Kenan Öner-Hasan Ali Yücel trial related to the claims of Öner regarding Yücel's so-called protection of communists during his term at the Ministry of Education. An interesting point in this trial was that the suspects of the former Turanism-racism trial became witnesses in the Yücel-Öner trial. In fact, the subject of the trial was Atsız's claims in his famous "Second Open Letter to the Prime Minister" in 1944. This can really be accepted as a proof of the change in Turkey.

Finally, the last phase of these developments concluded with the dismissal of three professors from Ankara University. They were accused of being communists and this was also strongly related to both the Yücel-Öner and Sabahattin Ali-Nihal Atsız trials. In any sense, the source of these trials was the open letters of Nihal Atsız. This is really an interesting point; even though Atsız was also judged for a few years as a result of these open letters, he also became the source of the other trials. This remarkable change in Atsız had a specific meaning in that Turkey needed to change her policy in the direction of the West and in opposition to the Soviet Union. Thus, as a result of the Soviet demands regarding the Straits and three provinces, Turkey sought her place near the West and NATO. This can also be accepted as the final breakpoint in Turkish domestic and foreign policy directing Turkey to the West.

It was also interesting point observe the progress of Sabahattin Ali's and Nihal Atsız's lives. They were friends, or at least, acquainted until Sabahattin Ali

³⁶⁴ Yalçın Küçük, *Türkiye Üzerine Tezler: Gözden Geçirilmiş Özel Edisyon*, 1st ed. (İstanbul: Salyangoz Yayınları, 2006), 292 – 296.

published his novel “The Devil in Us.” Then a struggle, or rather a never-ending challenge from Atsız, began. Atsız never gave up goading Ali at every opportunity. However, the affect of the open letters changed their lives completely. Thus, even though it cannot be clearly said that Sabahattin Ali was a communist, he was known and accepted as a communist. In the atmosphere of suppression, he had to leave his job as an instructor and also as translator of Carl Ebert at the State Conservatory. Then he published “Markopaşa” with Aziz Nesin, and even continued writing stories. Due to the prosecution of his work, he decided to emigrate but was subsequently murdered mysteriously. His death created an atmosphere of dismay among leftist circles and was aimed to stop the activities of leftists. On the other hand, even though Atsız spent a few years in jail and even sometimes had problems with the government, his reputation remained high – in contrast with Sabahattin Ali – he later worked as an officer in a library.

APPENDICES

Appendix 1³⁶⁵

No. 34

RIBBENTROP TO PAPEN

TELEGRAM

Secret

Special train, December 5, 1942, 2 h. 30 m.

Received: December 5, 1942, 3 h. 30 m.

No. 1526

German Embassy,

Ankara

For the Ambassador personally

In response to your communication of November 20 – A 6154 – I have given instructions to remit to you immediately five million Reichsmarks in gold, so that you may be in a position to help out our friends in Turkey in their straitened circumstances. I request you to use this money most generously and to report.

Ribbentrop

Transmitted to the German Embassy, Ankara, No. 1700

³⁶⁵ Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the U.S.S.R. Archives Division, "German Foreign Office Documents: German Policy in Turkey (1941 - 1943)," 117.

Appendix 2³⁶⁶

Sayın Başvekil,

Orhun'un mart sayısında size hitaben yazdığım açık mektup Türkçü çevrelerde çok iyi karşılandı. Yurdun türlü bölgelerinden aldığım mektuplarla telgraflar büyük bir efkârı umumiyeye tercüman olduğumu bana anlattı. Size gelince, bunu sizin de iyi karşıladığınızı biliyorum.

Orhun'u okuduğunuz zaman hiçbir şey söylememiş, yalnız acı acı gülümsemiş olsanız bile yine iyi karşılamış olduğunuza inanırım. Çünkü ben o acı gülümseyişin manasını anlarım. Çünkü gönlünüzün bizimle birlikte çarptığına, yurt meselelerini tıpkı bizim gibi düşündüğünüze inancımız vardır.

Orhun'un resmî makamlar tarafından tamamen normal karşılanması da Türkiye'de yazı hürriyeti olduğunu göstermek, hükûmetin samimî Türkçülüğünü belirtmek bakımından çok iyi oldu. Çünkü her bakımdan su katılmamış Türk olan Orhun, bir Türk ülkesinde, bir Türk hükûmeti tarafından kapatılamazdı. Türklüğün davasını haykıran, Türklük düşmanları üzerine resmî bakışları çekmek isteyen Orhun gibi bir dergi ancak Türk düşmanlarının hâkim olduğu bir ülkede, meselâ çarların veya haleflerinin ülkesinde kapatılabilirdi.

Sayın Başvekil!

Bizim Anayasamıza göre komünizm Türkiye'de yasaktır ve devletimiz milliyetçi bir devlettir. Türk ırkının hususî yapısına, ahlakî ve millî temayüllerine aykırı olan komünizmi Türkiye'ye sokmak isteyenler millet bakımından soysuz ve namert oldukları gibi kanun nazarında da haindirler. Hiçbir millet kendi millî yapısına düşman saydığı fikirleri kendi ülkesinde yaşatmaz. Hürriyetin ve demokrasinin ana yurdu olan İngiltere'de bile, savaş başlar başlamaz faşist fırkası lağvedilip azaları hapse atıldı. Bütün dünyada, yurt düşmanlarına müsamaha gösteren hatta onlara mevki ve salâhiyet veren tek devlet Türkiye'dir. Bu müsamaha devletin kuvvetinden, kendine güvencinden de doğabilir. Fakat Türkiye'nin en

³⁶⁶ Nihal Atsız, "Başvekil Saracoğlu Şükrü'ye İkinci Mektup," *Orhun*, no. 16 (April 1, 1944): 1 – 6.

kuvvetli olduđu çağda, büyük ve şanlı Fatih'in yaptıđı müsamahanın sonradan başımıza ne belâlar getirdiđi düşünülürse yurt ve millet düşmanlarına müsamaha göstermekteki büyük tehlike derhâl anlaşılır. En sağlam gövdeleri yere vuran şey de küçücük birkaç mikrobun o gövdede köprübaşı kurmasıdır. Derhâl temizlenmezlerse zamanla çođalıp uzviyetin can alacak bir noktasını tahrip ederler. Sonrası yıkım ve ölümdür.

Türkiye'de komünistler var mıdır, sorusu bir takımları tarafından sorulabilir. Şunu unutmamalı ki komünistler hiçbir zaman biz komünistiz diye açıkça kendilerini ortaya vermezler. Onlar Halk Partisi'nin çok elâstiki olan altı okundan halkçılıđı alıp kendilerini halkçı, yurtseverler gibi ortaya atarlar. Fakat onların hakikî benliğini anlamak için dahi olmađa lüzum yoktur. Irk ve aile düşmanlıđı, din ve savaş aleyhtarlıđı, faşistliđe hücum perdesi altında milliyeti baltalama, yurdumuzdaki azlıklara aşın sevgi, her şeyi iktisadî gözle görüş onları açığa vuran damgalardır. En büyük düşmanları olan milliyetçilere ırkçılık noktasından saldırımları, milliyetçilikte ırkçılıđın temel olduđunu bilmelerinden dolayıdır. Temeli yıkılan yapının bir anda çökeceđini de çok iyi kestirmişlerdir.

İşte bu usta komünistler, komünizm aleyhtarı ve Türkçü Türkiye'de sinsi sinsi her yere el atmışlar, mühim mevkilere geçmişler, tuttukları köprü başlarından Türkiye'yi tahrip etmek için şiddetli bir taarruza girişmişlerdir. Fakat bunlar sınırlardan gelen mert bir düşman olmadıkları için kolayca sezilmezler. Bunlar paraşütle inen bozguncu casuslar gibi ülkemizin üniformasını giymiş olduklarından her Türk bunları seçemez. Onun için bunlar sinsi silâhlarıyla birçok Türk'ü vurup milliyetçilikten ayırabilirler.

Sayın Başvekil!

Sözü çok uzatmamak için bu ikinci mektubumda Maarif sahasına girmiş olan komünistlerden bahsetmekle iktifa edeceđim. Bunlar, vatan düşmanlarına karşı pek kayıtsız davranan Maarif Vekaletinin gafletlerinden faydalanarak mühim yerlere geçmişler ve oradan zehirlerini saçmaya başlamışlardır. Maarif Vekâleti Türklük düşmanlarına karşı o kadar gaflet içinde bulunuyor ki, size yazdıđım ilk mektupta talebesine: "Türk deđil misiniz? Allah belânızı versin! Alman veya İngiliz olmadıđıma pişmanım!" diyen bir tarih öğretmeninden bahsettiđim halde şimdiye kadar bu öğretmenin kim olduđunu araştırmak zahmetine bile katlanmadı. Bununla

beraber Maarif Vekâletine hak vermemek de elden gelmiyor. Çünkü onun kullandığı memurlar arasında öyleleri var ki, bu zavallı tarih öğretmeni onların yanında vatan kahramanı kadar asil kalıyor. Örnek mi istiyorsunuz? İşte sırasıyla veriyorum:

1) Bugün Maarif Vekâletine bağlı Dil Kurumu azasından ve Ankara'daki Devlet Konservatuarının öğretmenlerinden bir "Sabahattin Ali" vardır. Hemen hemen bütün kendisini tanıyanların komünistliğini bildiği Sabahattin Ali, 1931 yıllarında Konya'da 14 ay hapse mahkûm edilmişti. Sebebi de başta o zamanki Reisicumhur Atatürk olduğu hâlde bütün devlet erkanını ve rejimi tehzil eden manzum bir beyanname yazmasıydı. Bazı mısralarını bugünkü bazı mebuslarında bildiği bu beyannamenin tamamını Konya'daki adliye arşivinden bulup çıkarmak kabildir. Sayın Başvekil! Buraya bilmeceburiye yazarken büyük ızdırap duyduğum iki mısraında (beni mazur görmenizi rica ederim) bu vatan haini şöyle diyordu:

İsmet girmedi mi hâlâ hapse

Kel Ali'nin boynu vurulmuş mudur?

Maarif Vekâletinin sevgili memuru olan bir komünistin hapse girmesini temenni ettiği İsmet, pek kolaylıkla anlayacağınız gibi o zaman ki başvekil, şimdiki reisicumhur ve hepsinin üstünde İnönü zaferlerinin başkumandanı İsmet İnönü olduğu gibi, boynunun vurulmasını istediği Kel Ali de, Ayvalık'ta Yunana ilk kurşunu atan alayın kumandanı Ali Çetinkaya'dır. Bu hezeyanları yazan Sabahattin Ali, bugün kültür işlerinin mühim bir mevkiinde, Maarif Vekili Hasan Ali'nin şahsî sempatisi sayesinde, batırmak istediği Türk milletinin parasıyla rahatça yaşamaktadır.

2) Bugün Ankara'daki Dil Fakültesinde folklor doçenti olan Pertev Naili Boratav vardır. Nasıl bir komünist olduğunu bilhassa ben çok iyi bilirim. 1936'da Maarif Vekâleti tarafından Asur ve Sümer dillerini öğrenmek için Almanya'ya gönderilmişti. Fakat daha Türkiye'de iken başladığı komünistliği orada azıttığı için arkadaşları Ziya Karamuk (şimdi Samsun Lisesi Müdürü), Fazıl Yinal (şimdi

Ankara’da Arşiv Mütahassısı) ve Şükrü Güllüoğlu (şimdi İstanbul’da ticaretle meşgul) tarafından kendisine ihtar yapılmış, aldırılmayınca resmen şikâyet edilmiş ve Maarif Vekâleti tarafından gönderilen Müfettiş Reşat Şemsettin (şimdi meb’us) tarafından suçu sabit görülerek derhâl Türkiye’ye döndürülmüştür. Pertev Naili, altı yıl tahsil ettikten sonra doçent olacaktı. Fakat komünizmin faziletine bakınız ki yarıda kalan iki yıllık bir tahsilden sonra Türkiye’ye dönünce ilk önce Maarif Vekâletinde bir ambar memuru tayin edilmişken ba’zı meb’usların araya girmesiyle folklor doçentliğine getirildi ve dört yıl daha kazanmış oldu. İlk mektubumda size anlatmış olduğum Eminönü Halkevi’ndeki nümayişte, salonun sol tarafına oturup gürültü çıkaranlar arasında işte bu Pertev Naili Boratav’ın iki tıbbiyeli kardeşi de vardır.

3) Bugün İstanbul Üniversitesi’nin Pedagoji Enstitüsü başında bir Profesör Sadrettin Celâl vardır. Türkiye’de bu kürsüye lâyık bir çok kimseler varken onun buraya getirilmesinin sebebi, sırf Maarif Vekili ile arasındaki şahsi dostluktur. Bu Sadrettin Celâl 1920’de Moskova’daki enternasyonal komünist kongresine Türkiye mümessiliyim diye giden, 1921-1924 yıllarında İstanbul’da “Aydınlık” diye azgın bir komünist dergisi çıkararak Türk milliyetini baltalamaya çalışan, Lenin’i dahi bir peygamber diye yutturmaya çalışan, Türkiye’de bir sınıf ihtilâli yaparak Türk milletini birbirine kırdırmaya uğraşan, birçok askerî tıbbiyelilerin komünist olarak okuldan kovulmasına sebebiyet veren (şimdi rusçadan yaptığı tercümelemlerle edebi komünizm yapan Hasan Ali Ediz ve Anadolu’da bir kasabada mahpus olan Hikmet Kıvılcım bu askerî tıbbiyelilerdir), sonunda bu yüzden kendisi de hapse giren bir vatan hainidir. Bu vatan hainini ve hapisten çıkmış bir sabıkalıyı Türk Üniversitesinde Pedagoji Enstitüsünün başına getirmek şaheser bir gaflettir.

4) Bugün Ankara’daki Dil Kurumu’nun azasından ve geçen devrenin meb’uslarından (evet sayın başvekil: partinizin meb’uslarından) bir Ahmet Cevat vardır. Türkçeyi tıpkı İstanbul Rumları şivesiyle konuşan bu dilci de, 1920 yıllarında Rusya’ya kaçmış ve orada “Türk Komünist Fırkası Merkezi Komitesinin Harici Bürosu” azası olmuştur. Trabzon’da 1921’de halk tarafından linç edilen 16 komünist hakkında Rus komünistlerden Pavloviç’e yazdığı mektubu, Orhun’un 20 Şubat 1934 tarihli dördüncü sayısında neşretmişim... Pavloviç’in “İnkılâpçı Türkiye” adı ile 1921 de Moskova’da neşrettiği kitabın 119 – 121’nci sayfalarından alınan bu mektubu tekrar neşrediyorum:

Aziz yoldaşım Pavloviç,

28 Kanunusaniide Trabzon civarında vahşicesine öldürülerek denize atılmış olan Yoldaş Suphi ile Türkiye Komünist Fırkasının merkezi komitesi azalarından dört kişi ve on iki diğer komünist yoldaşlar hakkında sizinle ciddî görüşmek istiyorum.

Kaybolan yoldaşlarımız hakkında epey zaman malumat alamadık. Fakat sonra onların Trabzon burjuvazisi tarafından elde edilmiş cellâtlar tarafından öldürüldükleri anlaşıldı.

Ta Erzurumdan başlayarak bizim yoldaşlarımız aleyhinde nümayişler başlamıştı. Halka diyorlar ki: “Rusya’dan gelmiş olan komünistler bolşeviklerdir. Onlar mağazaları kapamak için geldiler. Kimsenin almak ve satmak salâhiyeti olmayacaktır. Sonra taharriyata başlanacak, herkesin eşyası ve parası müsadere olunacaktır. Komünistler dinsizdir. Allah’a inananların hepsini hapse atacaktlardır. Din, ticaret ve hususi mülkiyet Bolşevikler tarafından men edilmiştir.”

Nümayişçiler arasında burjuvazi tarafından para ile elde edilmiş ve polis teşkilâtı tarafından komünistler aleyhine tevcih edilmiş cahil şahsiyetler çoktu. Bunlar bizim yoldaşlara hücum ederek taşlamışlar ve parça parça etmeğe kalkmışlardır. Yolda bizim yoldaşlara kimse ekmek ve atları için yem satmıyordu. Hükümet ise bolşevikleri himaye rolünü takınmağa çalıştığını göstermek istiyordu. Komünistleri müdafaa için hükûmetin tedbir aldığı yalandır. Bizim mevsuk menbaalardan aldığımız haberlere göre polisler ahâliyi dükkânları kapamaya teşvik ettikleri gibi, müdafaasız kalmış olan yoldaşlarımızı taşlamak içinde halkı tahrik etmişlerdir. Bu gibi hücumlara yoldaşlarımız dört yahut beş şehir ve kasabada maruz kalmışlardır. Fakat bu yoldaşlar en vahşî hücumu Trabzon’da uğramışlardır. Bunlar Trabzon’a gelir gelmez, ahâlinin bağırıp çağırmaları ve tahkirleri altında limana sevk edilmişlerdir. Burada onların üzerinde bulunan birkaç tabancayı aldılar ve sonra cebren bir motora koyarak denize açıldılar. Bu motorun arkasından ikinci bir motor da sahilten ayrıldı. Bu motorda silahlı adamlar vardı. Bizim arkadaşları bağladılar ve süngüleyip denize attılar. Ertesi gün her iki motor sahildeydi. Ve bunların tayfası

herkese Türk komünistlerinin denizin dibine gittiklerini anlatıyorlardı. Rusya Şuralar Cumhuriyeti mümessili, yoldaşlarımızı istikbal etmek istemiş, fakat vali buna mani olarak mümessilin evinden çıkmamasını emretmiş, aksi hâlde halk tarafından parçalanacağını bildirmiştir. Rus mümessilin bu vak'ayı Moskova ve Ankara'ya haber vermesi ve bizim yoldaşların cellâtlar elinden alınmasına çalışması lâzımdı. Fakat yazık ki, o sırada Trabzon'daki Rus mümessili cesur bir adam değildi. Trabzon'da bunu bilmeyen yoktur. Motorlar ve sahipleri malumdur. Bu hadisenin Belediye Reisiyle Millî Müdafaa Cemiyeti riyaset divanı tarafından yapıldığı söyleniyor. Burada (Rusyada) ise bu meseleye dair henüz bir karar alınmamıştır. Fakat artık susmak da imkân haricindedir. En iyi ve cesur arkadaşlarımızdan on altı yahut on yedisini kaybettik. Bizimle hemfikir olup cellâtların tecziyelerini istemelisiniz. Trabzon'a gelecek her komünistin öldürülmesine karar verilmiştir. Anadolu burjuvası barbarca yaptığı cinayetlerden mes'ul olmadığını gördüğünden komünistleri şiddetle takipte devam ediyor. Cellatlar tarafından öldürülmüş olan bizim en değerli yoldaşlarımızı müdafaa etmeyi üzerinize alacağınızı ümit ederim. Komünist selâmları ve hürmetler.

Ahmet Cevat

Türk Komünist Fırkası

Merkezi Komitesinin Harici Büro Azası

Görülüyor ki Giritli Ahmet Cevat, millî ve dinî geleneklerine çok bağlı olan Trabzon halkının, din ve mukaddesat aleyhine tahrikat yapan on altı komünisti yok etmesini “Anadolu burjuvalarının barbarlığı!” diye vasıflandırıyorlar. Bu hareketi Türk polisi ve Millî Müdafaa Cemiyeti (yani, Müdafaa-i Hukuk Cemiyeti) yaptırmış diyerek kurtuluş savaşında önderlik eden ve Halk Partisi'nin başlangıcı olan teşkilâtı tahkir ediyor. On altı serseri gebertildi diye yabancı bir devleti Türkiye işlerine karışmağa kışkırtıyor. Bütün bunları yaptıktan sonra da yılan gibi Türkiye'ye süzülerek sizin partinize girebiliyor ve geçen devrede mebusluğa kadar yükseliyor. Şimdi de Türk dilini yaratacak olan Dil Kurumu'nda bütün dillerin Türkçeden çıktığını ispata yeltenecek kadar milliyetçilik yapıyor. Biz buna razı değiliz sayın

Başvekil. Akıl ve mantık da buna razı değildir. Müstakil Türkiye'yi yaratan ve bu gaza topraklarının altında sıra dağlar gibi yatan şehitlerimizin ruları da buna razı değildir. Siz, demokrat Türkiye'nin cidden demokrat olduğuna inandığımız başvekil herhâlde milletin arzusunu yerine getireceksiniz... Buna inanıyoruz.

Sayın Başvekil!

Bu saydıklarım komünist oldukları müsbet vak'alar ve vesikalarla bilinen kimselerdir. Yoksa bunların yanında daha birçoklarını saymak her zaman kabildir. Boğaziçi Lisesi'nin son sınıfında iken arkadaşlarına karşı komünizmin müdafaa ve propagandasını yapan, onların millî mukaddesat diye bildikleri şeyleri tahkir eden, "günün birinde hepiniz komünist zindanlarında çürüyeceksiniz" diye bağırarak ve hükumete haber verilmekle tehdit olduğu zaman "ben karakola gidersem on beş dakikada çıkarım ama, siz girerseniz kolay kolay çıkamazsınız" diye mukabil bir tehdit savuran "Doğan Aksoy" nihayet Rusya'ya kaçarken yakalandığı, evrakı arasında Moskova damgalı mektup zarfları bulunduğu, dolabında Lenin vesairenin fotoğrafları yakalandığı ve millî mukaddesata karşı olan hareketleri arkadaşlarının şahitliği ile sabit olduğu hâlde maalesef mahkûm edilmedi. Davada şahit olarak benim de bulunduğum bu komünistin bilakis lise imtihanlarını vermesine müsaade edildi. Şimdi felsefe talebesi olarak üniversitede bulunuyor. Esefle söylemek icap eder ki, bugün Kars valisi olan babasının nüfuz ve hatırı kullanılarak, mahkum edilmesi gereken bu mikrop, serbest bırakıldı. Sayın başvekil: Bunları gören vatanperver Türk çocuklarının kafasından neler geçtiğini bir lâhza düşündünüz mü ? Bu çocuklar bazen bana: "Testiyi kıranla suyu getiren bir olduktan sonra niçin çalışalım? Niçin yurdumuza bağlı olalım?" diye sordukları zaman ben makul bir cevap veremedim. Bu cevabı sizden rica ediyorum.

Evet! Komünistler gizli propagandalarla ordumuzun arasına kadar sokulmaya çalışıyorlar. Yine eseifle söylüyorum ki hükûmet bir ordu mensubunu komünistliğe başlamış gördüğü zaman, ciddileşiyor da, binlerce maarif mensubunu kıpkızıl komünist gördüğü zaman aldırış etmiyor. Maarif Şurası'nda "aile bir zehirdir" diyerek cemiyetimizin temelini yıkmak isteyen bir Sadrettin Celâl'i pedagoji profesörlüğünde tutmakla bütün alay kumandanlarını komünistten seçmek arasında ne fark var? Talim Hey'eti arasında komünistlerle kaynaşan Dil Fakültesinde solcu doçentlerin yapacağı zarar iki yedek subay talebesinin komünistliğinden bin kere

korkunç değil midir? Daha birkaç gün önce İstanbul Tıbbiyesi'nde kimya doçenti Halil, asker talebelere hitaben: “askerden nefret ederim” diye bağırdı. Bu sözün altında solcu temayülün açığa vuruşunu sezmiyor musunuz?

Bu solcuların, artık eski fikirlerinden caymış oldukları da müdafaa makamında söylenebilir. Fakat “sözü namus saymak” hususundaki geleneğimizi “burjuva budalalığı” diye gören komünistlerin verdiği söze inanmak, vatan ve millet karşısında en büyük gaflet değil midir? Dün dönenlerin, yarın yine dönmeyeceklerine hangi teminatla bakabiliriz? Onlar samimî olarak dönmüş olsalar bile vaktiyle işlemiş oldukları suçtan dolayı, hiç olmazsa bugün millet işlerine karışmak hakkından mahrum edilmeli değil mi idiler? Tövbekâr olmuş bir fahişe artık namuslu sayıldığı hâlde, nasıl namuslu ailelerin harimine alınmazsa, eski düşüncelerinden dönmüş olan komünistlerin de devlet harimine alınmamaları gerekirdi. Yüz ellilikler de affedildi. Fakat onlara makinesinde en küçük bir vazife veriliyor mu? Yüz ellikler acaba komünistlere göre daha mı suçludurlar? Unutmamak lâzımdır ki, bu komünistler yurdumuzun içinde kalıp devlette yer işgal ettikçe yarın sınırlarda yurdu korumaya koşacak olan Türk çocukları kendileri ve cephe gerilerini emniyette sanmayacaklardır. Acaba hangi düşünce ve hangi taktik, vatan çocuklarının bu emniyetsizlik duygusunu gidermekten daha üstün tutulabilir? Fransa'da olup bitenler, hükûmette yer almış komünistlerin bir vatani nasıl batırdıklarını parlak bir örnek hâlinde göstermiyor mu? Bu komünistleri ileride Türkiye için seve seve can verecek Türkçü gençlerin tutabileceği yerlerden uzaklaştırmak, farzımuhâl bir mesele doğursa bile, Türk oğullarını ıztırap içinde bırakmaktan doğacak millî zaaf kadar tehlikeli olabilir mi?

Sayın Başvekil!

Bütün milliyetçi Türkler sizinle beraberdir. Sizden, tarihimizin bu çetin anında vatan düşmanı komünizmin ezilmesini, bir daha başkaldıramayacak şekilde ezilmesini istiyorlar. Mevcut kanunlar kafi değilse bu bozguncular ocağının kökünü kurutmak için yeni kanunlar yapınız. Kanun, millet vicdanın makesi olursa manası olur. Millî vicdan vatan düşmanlarının tepelenmesini istiyor. Yurtsever Türk çocuklarının gözü önünde kötü bir örnek olan “komünistlere mevki vermek” usulünü derhâl kaldırınız. Yukarıda verdiğim örnekler yarının neslini yetiştirecek olan maarif sahasının bu mikropların nasıl bulaşmış olduğunu gösteriyor.

Haydarpaşa Lisesi'ndeki son hadise, bu bulaşıklığın görülüp bilinen son delilidir. Bu olaylar karşısında Maarif Vekâletine de bir vazife düşüyor. Bu vazife klâsiklerin tercümesinden, sanki yabancı dil ve hatta Türkçe öğretimi pek yolunda gidiyormuş da sıra kendisine gelmiş gibi bazı liselere konulan Lâtince ve Yunanca derslerinden daha ileri ve üstün bir vazifedir. Bu vazife Türk maarifini öğretmen olsun, öğrenci olsun, bütün komünistlerden temizlemek vazifesidir. Maarif Vekaleti bir yandan dersine bir tek gün gelmiyen öğretmenden doktor raporu isteyecek güvensizlik gösterirken, bir yandan kanunlarımızla yasak edilen fikirleri Türkiye'ye sokmağa çalışmış olanlara karşı şaşılacak bir güvenle hareket ediyor. Bunun Maarif Vekaletinin kötü niyetine veya kasdi hareketine yoramayız. Çünkü o takdirde Maarif Vekaletinin de vatan ihanetinde ortaklığını kabul etmek icap eder. Bunu, olsa olsa, gaflete verebiliriz. Her ne kadar bir vekilin gafleti mazur görülmezse de, kendisine yapılan ihtarla da bunu tamir ederek iyi niyetini göstermesi her zaman kaabildir. Aksi takdirde vekillik sandalyasının, dilediğine dilediği mevkii vermek için kurulmuş bir lüks sandalyası olarak telakkisi manası çıkar ki, bunu da demokrat ve halkçı Türkiye hükümetine yakıştıramayız. Maarif Vekaleti şimdiye kadar İnönü Ansiklopedisiyle ve birçok kitapların ithafıyla Devlet Başkanı'na karşı olan bağlılığını göstermeğe çalıştı. Bu bağlılığın samimi olduğunu isbat zamanı gelmiştir. Milli Şef'e karşı o hezeyanları yazmış olan vatan haini başta olmak üzere, bütün bu saydığım komünistleri hala mühim vazifelerde tutmak bu bağlılıkla tezat teşkil eder. Bağlılığın ispatı için, bunların vazifelerine derhal son verilmesi zaruridir. Hatta, şimdiye kadar her nasılsa bir gaflet eseri olarak bunları vazifede tutmaktan doğan utancı silebilmek için, bizzat Maarif Vekilinin de o makamdan çekilmesi çok vatanperverane bir jest olurdu.

ATSIZ

Maltepe, 21 Mart 1944

Appendix 3³⁶⁷

C.M.U liđi Yüksek Makamına

Ankara

Şikayetçi: Sabahattin Ali

Devlet Konservatuarı öğretmenlerinden, romancı

Ankara Yenışehir Karanfil Sokak Adalar Apartmanı No: 11

Suçlu: Nihal Atsız

Orhun dergisi sahip ve müdürü

İstanbul Maltepe (Kartal) Feyzullah Caddesi No: 13

Suç: Neşir vasıtasıyla hakaret ve sövme

Subut delili: Orhun dergisinin 1/Nisan/944 tarih ve 16 sayılı nushasında “Başvekil Saraçođlu Şükrü’ye İkinci Açık Mektup” başlıklı yazı

Hadise: Suçlu Nihal Atsız İstanbul’da basılıp Ankara’da Akba kitabevinde ve umumiyet itibariyle Ankara’daki gazete bayilerinde neşir olunan Orhun dergisinin bađlı olarak takdim ettiđimiz 1/Nisan/944 tarih ve 16 sayılı nüshasında “Başvekil Saraçođlu Şükrü’ye İkinci Açık Mektup” başlığı altında bir makale neşretmiştir. Bu yazıyı ihtiva eden derginin ikinci sahifesinin 2nci sütununda 13üncü satırda 15 sene önce geçmiş ve hesabı verilmiş bir hadiseyi ele alarak beni “bu vatan haini” demek suretiyle halkın hakaret ve husumetine maruz bırakacak ve namus, haysiyet ve vakarıma taarruz teşkil edecek mahiyette tahkir etmiştir. Aynı yazının 6ncı sahifesinin ikinci sütununda 17nci satırda tekrar kullanılan “vatan haini” tabiri açıkça hakaret ve sövme suçunu teşkil edecek mahiyettedir.

Bu hakaret beni yalnız vatandaşlarımın kin ve husumetine maruz bırakmakla kalmıyor, aynı zamanda benim şahıs ve mesleki mevki ve haysiyetimi sarsacak, talebem üzerinde ki şeref ve itibarımı kıracak bir mahiyet de taşıyor. Hakkında takibat yapılmak ve cezalandırılmak suretiyle cüretkarlığının önlenmesini ve manevi zarar olarak onbin liranın tahsiline karar verilmesini dilerim.

³⁶⁷ Ali, *Mahkemelerde*, 74 – 76.

Appendix 4³⁶⁸

Neşren ve mevsufan müdahil Sabahattin Ali'ye hakareten suçlu tanınan 1905 doğumlu Nihal Adsız , sahibi ve neşriyat müdürü bulunduğu İstanbul'da tab ve Ankara'da tevzi edilmiş olan Orhun adlı mecmuanın 1.4.1944 tarihli ve 16 sayılı nüshasında "Başvekil Saraçoğlu Şükrü'ye ikinci açık mektup" başlığı altında bizzat kaleme alıp neşrelediği yazının ikinci sayfasının ikinci sütununun 12 nci satırında, müdahil Sabahattin Ali'yi sarahaten kast ve zikredip "vatan haini" olarak tavsif etmek suretiyle mumaileyhin şöhret, vekar ve haysiyetine, umuma neşrolunmuş yazı ile taarruzda bulunduğu iddia edilmekte ve bu iddiada bizatihi hakareti tazammun eyliyen "vatan haini" ibaresi açık manası itibariyle ve bu ibareyi havi yazının adı geçen dergide intişariyle ve bu derginin de Ankara'da tevzi edilmiş olmasıyla ve nihayet Nihal Adsız'ın mahkeme huzurundaki sarih ve samimi itirafıyla sabittir. Nihal Adsız'ın duruşma zabıtnamesinde tesbit edilmiş olan müdafaası "vatan haini" ibaresinin isim tasrih edilerek müdahile atf ve isnadedilmesiyle ve keza kül halinde tetkik ve mütalea edilen yazı muhteviyatı muvacehesinde ve gene bizatihi hakareti tazammun eyliyen aynı ibarenin derginin altıncı sayfasının ikinci sütununda ve 17 nci satırında ve tekrar kullanılmış olmasıyla muallel bulunup hakaret kastı da maruz delillerle tebarüz etmektedir. 12.04.1944 tarihli iddianame her ne kadar Nihal Adsız'ın hakareti Türk Ceza Kanununun 480 inci maddesine uygun ef'alden olduğu kabul edilerek mezkur maddeye tecziyesi talep edilmişse de müdahil Sabahattin Ali'ye matufen ancak mücerret olarak yazılan "vatan haini" ibaresi mahsus madde anasını ihtiva etmeyip adi sövme mahiyetindedir. Binnetice sübut derecesine yukarıda arz olmuş delillerle vasıl olmuş olan ve suç unsurlarını ihtiva eyleyen işbu fiilden dolayı Nihal Adsız'ın hareketine uyan Türk Ceza Kanununun 480 inci maddesinin 3 üncü fıkrası ve Matbuat Kanununun 47 nci maddesi delaletiyle Türk Ceza Kanununun 482 nci maddesinin son fıkrasına tevfikan cezalandırılmasına karar verilmesini istiyorum.

³⁶⁸ "Müddeiumumi Dün İddiasını Serdett«Müddeiumumi dün iddiasını serdetti». Ulus, May 4, 1944.."

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