

EXODUS TO THE EAST

FOREBODINGS AND EVENTS

AN AFFIRMATION
OF THE EURASIANS

ARTICLES:

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This book contains the first complete English-language translation of *Exodus to the East* [Исход к Востоку], a seminal work of the Russian emigration published in Sofia, Bulgaria in 1921, which marked the emergence and became the foundation of Eurasianism. For this edition we have tried to provide a translation as faithful as possible to the original texts. We also tried to match the format and design of the original book. Russian names and places have been spelled according to the Library of Congress transliteration system. Spellings of linguistic terms, however, remain unchanged from the transliteration used by language scholars.

* * * * *

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Charles Schlacks, Jr.

November 7, 1996

The essays of this collective volume claim neither exhaustive completeness in regard to the questions they touch upon nor unity, in the sense of complete agreement of the opinions of the various authors: they are written by people who on certain issues think differently from one another. But there is something common to all of them, and the lines that follow have as their aim to establish exactly what that commonality is.*

The essays that make up the present volume were put together in an atmosphere of a consciousness of catastrophe. That segment of time, within which our lives pass, beginning with the coming of the war, is felt by us as a pivotal, and not merely a transitional, time. In what happened and in what is happening we see not just shock, but crisis, and in the future we anticipate a profound change in the customary countenance of the world.

In the catastrophic nature of that which is happening we see a sign of the ripening, quickening resettlement and regeneration of culture. Culture appears to us to be in constant motion and incessant renewal. It does not hesitate, past its term, in this or that concretely-historical settledness. It is not fully exhausted by some concrete achievement or other, and it does not fit neatly into the pre-sketched framework of invented formulas. We do not believe that there are peoples that are intended forever to be the chosen carriers of culture: we reject the possibility of "last words" and final syntheses. History for us is not an assured ascent to some prehistorically preordained, absolute aim, but a free and creative improvisation, each moment of which is not prearranged according to some general plan, but has its own meaning . . .

The culture of Romano-Germanic Europe is marked by adherence to a "wisdom of systems," a rush to elevate the given specific situation into an immutable norm. . . We honor the past and the present of West European culture, but it is not Western Europe we see in the future. . . With

* Originally as an untitled introduction to *Iskhod k Vostoku* (Sofia: Tipografiia "Balkan," 1921), pp. iii-vii. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

trembling joy, with shivering apprehension lest we give ourselves over to devastating arrogance, we sense, along with Herzen, that nowadays "history is pushing precisely into our gate." It is pushing not in order to generate some zoological "self-identification" for us, but so that through the great exploit of labor and accomplishment Russia would reveal to the world some universal truth, as the great peoples of the past and present had revealed it.

Contemplating what is happening, we sense that we are in the midst of a cataclysm, comparable to the greatest shocks known to history, with the foundation-laying turns in the fates of culture, as in the cases of Alexander of Macedonia's conquest of the Ancient East or in the Great Migration of Peoples. These turns could not and cannot occur instantaneously. The processes that led to the absorption of the Ancient East into the Hellenic world began as early as the period of the Great Persian Wars. And the Eastern campaign of Cyrus the Younger with ten thousand Greeks already directly foreshadowed the intentions of the Macedonian conqueror. But Cyrus the Younger fell, and Alexander established the dominance of Hellenic culture in the East several decades after his death. We do not know which of Russia's uprisings against the West will turn out to be the attempt of Cyrus the Younger, and which the accomplishment of Alexander. . . . But we do know that the world cataclysm, separating one epoch of world history from the next, has already begun. We do not doubt that the replacement of the West European world will come from the East . . .

On this point it is impossible to demand proof. And those who think otherwise are in the right to call us lunatics, just as we call them blind from birth. For us it is more disturbing to perceive the outlines of that cultural upheaval, which is presented to us in the storms and shudders of modernity.

Any modern consideration of the coming destinies of Russia must orient itself decisively in relation to the methods of resolution already formed in the past or, more precisely, to the very postulation of the Russian problem: "Slavophile" or "Populist" on one side, "Westernizer," on the other. At issue here are not these or some other particular theoretical conclusions or concretely-historical evaluations, but rather the subjectively-psychological approach to the problem. To perceive Russia, following the lead of some Westernizers, as a cultural "province" of Europe, tardily repeating its past moves, is in our days possible only to those for whom trite thinking comes ahead of historical truth: for the destinies of Russia have cut too deeply and originally into the life of the world, and much of what is nationally-Russian has won the respect of the Romano-Germanic world. But in affirming, following the lead of the Slavophiles,

the independent value of the Russian national element, accepting the tonality of the *Slavophile* approach to Russia, we reject the *Populist* identification of this element with certain concrete achievements, so to say, with the forms of an established way of life. In accordance with our historiosophical principle, we believe that it is altogether impossible to determine once and for all the content of future Russian life. Thus, for example, we do not share the Populists' view of the commune, as that form of economic life, to which belongs, and, according to the Populist view, *must* belong, the economic future of Russia. Precisely in the economic field the existence of Russia will, possibly, turn out to be more "Western." We do not see in this any contradiction to the possibility and fact of the true and coming cultural originality of Russia. For to those who do not belong to the ranks of the adherents of historical materialism, culture is not a "superstructure" on top of an economic base.

We do not connect historical *individualism* with economic *collectivism*, as was done in the past in other currents of Russian thought (Herzen), but we do assert the creative significance of autocratic individuality also in the economic sphere: in so doing, it seems to us — we adopt the point of view of *consistent individualism*.

Not all of us assign the same significance to the problems of a mighty economic development of Russia. But none of us is *against* this development — whereas in Populism, in its concrete expression, there was, undoubtedly, an organic hostility to a creative blooming and spreading of Russian economic might. We combine the Slavophile appreciation of the universal importance of the Russian national element with the Westernizer appreciation of the comparative cultural primitiveness of Russia in the economic sphere and with a desire to eliminate this primitiveness.

We do not refuse to determine — at least for ourselves — the content of that truth which Russia, in our opinion, reveals by its revolution. This truth is: *the renunciation of socialism and the affirmation of the Church*.

We have no other words, aside from words of horror and revulsion, to characterize the inhumanity and the abomination of Bolshevism. But we recognize that only thanks to the question, fearlessly raised by the Bolsheviks, concerning the very essence of existence, thanks to their audacity on a scale unheard of in history, that which under different circumstances would have remained unclear for a long time and led into temptation has revealed and established itself: the material and spiritual wretchedness, and the repugnance of socialism, and the salvatory power of Religion. Through its historical manifestation Bolshevism is coming to a rejection of itself. The vital overcoming of socialism is approaching within socialism itself.

We know that ages of volcanic shifts, ages of revelation of mysterious, black depths of chaos are at the same time ages of grace and illumination. Humbling ourselves before revolution, as before an elemental catastrophe, forgiving all the calamities of the debauchery of its unrestrainable forces – we condemn only its consciously evil will, which audaciously and blasphemously rose up against God and the Church. Only through repentance by the entire people can the sinful insanity of the uprising be washed away in prayer. We sense that the mystery of our spiritual age is revealed not only in boundless mystical sensations, but also in the severe formulas of Church life. Together with the great majority of the Russian people, we see how the Church is returning to life in a new strength of Grace, again attaining the prophesying language of wisdom and revelation. "The age of science" is again being replaced by "the age of faith" – not in the sense of the destruction of science, but in the sense of the acknowledgment of impotence and blasphemy of the attempts to solve the basic, ultimate problems of existence by scientific means.

In worldly matters our mood is the mood of nationalism. But we do not want to confine it within the narrow bounds of national chauvinism. Moreover, we think that the elemental and creative nationalism of Russia, by its very nature, is rending and tearing apart the bounds of "nationalisms" of the West European scale, which are too narrow to contain it; that even in the ethnic sense, it splashes as widely as the forests and steppes of Russia have splashed over the face of the globe. In this regard we again join with "Slavophilism," which spoke not only of the Russian people, but of "Slavdom." True, it appears to us that the idea of "Slavdom" has not justified before the court of reality the expectations placed upon it by Slavophilism. And we direct our nationalism not merely toward "Slavs," but toward a whole circle of peoples of the "Eurasian" world, among whom the Russian people has the central position. This inclusion of a whole circle of East European and Asian peoples into the mental sphere of the culture of the Russian world emanates out of, it seems to us, in even measure, from a secret "affinity of souls" – which makes Russian culture comprehensible and close to these peoples and, conversely, establishes the fecundity of their participation in the Russian enterprise – and from the commonality of their economic interest, the economic interrelationship of these peoples . . .

Russians and those who belong to the peoples of "the Russian world" are neither Europeans nor Asians. Merging with the native element of culture and life which surrounds us, we are not ashamed to declare ourselves *Eurasians*.

PETR N. SAVITSKII

A TURN TO THE EAST*

There is a certain, constantly noted, analogy in the position, in relation to the world, of France of the time of the Great Revolution and Russia of the current years. But aside from the detailed and the particular, there is a basic difference, which is, perhaps, fraught with the future. . . Then, as now, there existed a Europe, and for Europe one of the European countries brought "the new word"; this country, coming out in a revolutionary rush beyond its old political boundaries, conquered almost all of Europe; but when it misfired in its conquests — the rest of Europe, uniting in a coalition, was able to restrain it and occupy it with its troops. And Russia before the war and the revolution had been "a modern civilized state of the Western type, although, the most undisciplined and disorderly of all such existing states" (H. G. Wells). But in the process of the war and the revolution the "Europeanness" of Russia fell off, as a mask falls from a face. And when we saw the image of Russia, not covered by the cloth of historical decorations — we saw a two-faced Russia. . . With one face she is turned to Europe; as a European country, as France of 1793, it is bringing to Europe "the new word" — this time the new word of "the proletarian revolution," of communism fulfilled. . . But with the other face, she has turned away from Europe . . . — Wells relates that "Gor'kii is weighed down, as by a horror, by the fear of a turn to the East . . ." "of Russia to the East." But is not Russia herself already "the East?" . . .

Are there many people in Rus' through whose blood vessels there does not flow Khazar or Cuman, Tatar or Bashkir, Mordovian or Chuvash blood? Are there many Russians who are completely alien to the imprint of Eastern spirit: its mysticism, its love of introspection, indeed, its introspective laziness? Among the Russian common people there is evident a certain sympathetic attraction to the common people of the East. In the organic fraternization of the Orthodox believer with the nomad or the pariah of Asia, Russia is truly an Orthodox-Moslem, Orthodox-Buddhist country.

* Originally as "Povorot k Vostoku," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 1-3. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

The Bolsheviks have instituted the persecution of Orthodoxy and the profanation of all faiths. This is so. But with an even greater clarity, underscored by the power of contrast — there revealed itself the religious mood and direction of those Russian and non-Russian masses, by whose movement and by whose breath Bolshevism lives . . .

Bolshevik insult or Bolshevik indifference to faith offer as little to the understanding of Russia as Bolshevik attempts to realize Marx's bombastic proclamations in practice.

Precisely because Russia is not merely "the West" but also "the East," not only "Europe" but also "Asia," and even not Europe at all, but "Eurasia" — precisely because of that, there is added in the case of the Russian Revolution, in addition to the historical essence of the Great French Revolution, a certain different essence which has not as yet revealed itself on a full scale. . . The French Revolution was a revolution that took place in a European country with a population of 25 million and 540 thousand square kilometers of space. The Russian Revolution is taking place in a country that is not fully, or at all, "European," and, besides, has a population of 150 million and 20 million square kilometers of space. France is a part of Europe. Russia, on the other hand, comprises "a continent in itself," in a certain respect "equal" to Europe. . . For the allies of 1814-15 it turned out to be feasible to tame and occupy France. What kind of a new coalition must there be, for it to be able to subdue and occupy Russia? The Great French Revolution is one of the episodes of European history. The Russian Revolution is not an episode of European history only.

Two problems intertwine in modernity. One concerns the profound questions of being and creativity of culture; the other converts the words of ideological symbols into a concrete language of culturo-geographical, culturo-historical reality.

In immeasurable sufferings and deprivations, in the midst of hunger, in blood and sweat, Russia took upon herself the burden of searching for truth, on behalf of all and for the benefit of all. Russia in sin and godlessness, Russia in loathsomeness and filth. But Russia in search and struggle, in a bid for a city not of this world. . . The ardor of history comes not to those who are calm in the knowledge of truth, who are self-satisfied and satiated. The flaming tongues of inspiration descend not on the *beati possidentes*, but on those troubled in spirit: the wings of the Angel of God have moved the waters of the pool.

It is as if there are no changes in the world . . . except that in the well-off, cultural world Russia is no more. And in this absence there is a change. For in her peculiar sort of "nonexistence," Russia, in a certain sense, becomes an ideological center-point of the world.

In translation into the language of reality this means that a new culturo-geographical world, one that up to this point has not played a guiding role, has entered the arena of world history. A strained gaze looks into the future: is the Goddess of Culture, whose tent for so many centuries has been set among the valleys and hills of the European West, not heading for the East? . . . heading to the hungry, the cold, and the suffering? . .

We are under the spell of premonition. . . And in this premonition there may be attained a wellspring of smugness, a smugness of a certain kind, a smugness of the suffering. . . To succumb to smugness means to perish. It is not permissible to hide that which one feels to be the truth. But it is also not permissible to calm oneself down with the premonition. An act of history is brought about not by quietism, but by a feat of perfecting. Those who grow proud are abandoned by the grace of the search. And the curse of infertility falls on the self-confident. . . There is nothing inevitable. There is only the possible. Only by the means of concerted creativity, without fear in repenting for one's mistakes and acknowledging weaknesses — only by the price of incessant efforts, accomplished within the bounds of the "pliant" world open to the will, shall the possible become the real.

PETR P. SUVCHINSKII

THE STRENGTH OF THE WEAK*

So what, that one has not yet begun to worry, and another has already managed to reach the locked door, and hit his forehead hard against it. The same fate, in time, awaits all who do not embark upon the saving road of humble communication with the people.

Dostoevskii ("The Speech about Pushkin")

At the present time there is unfolding an event of world significance, the real essence and consequences of which cannot be guessed even by the most perspicacious.

This event is the Russian Revolution, not in its socio-political sense and meaning, but in its national-metaphysical essence. As a phenomenon of the socio-political order, it is, probably, obediently flowing along the river bed of revolutionary logic. The mystery lies in its national-universal outcome.

The West, when it endeavors to surround Russia with frontier posts, is worried about more than the communist infection. Europe has come to understand, although so far not clearly and assuredly (it is more as if it sensed the impending outcome of the Russian Revolution and already shuddered before it) and has taken security measures. Europe has come to understand that this outcome will be determined not by the revolutionary energy of Russian communism, but by the historical predestination of the entire Russian people. It has come to understand that before everyone's eyes there is growing in strength a former European province, with which it will be inevitable to do battle, and which, even without waiting for a lofty call to arms, will pounce upon its recent, and, so it seemed, eternal metropolis in a war of exposure, reproach, and anger.

Russia used to be a Great Power without ever embodying the state principle. The state habit of any people is determined by a composite of

* Originally as "Sila slabykh," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 4-8. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

national consciousness of all the individuals who comprise it. Great Power status is a predetermined potential for the power, the sweep, and the overflow of the entire popular essence. This is an unconscious feeling of might, a specific gravity of the entire mass of people, which displaces, pushing aside by its presence, the surrounding environment. This is an involuntary self-assertion, the *droit sacré* of the state's own existence. Sometimes the might of a Great Power expands haughtily, and sometimes it weakens and disintegrates – turning what seemed to be hardy state flesh into a crumbling, powerless, scattered human matter. It sometimes happens that the gift of Great Power status coincides with an advanced technical state aptitude – on the other hand, sometimes the two mutually exclude each other . . .

The glory of Russia is not consciously predicated on the state aptitude of the Russian people. Russia, although blind, is blessed by the glory of her Great Power essence. This essence determined the entire history of the whole collective of the Russian people, it subordinates completely the Russian individual, it conditions the traits of the Russian soul and the Russian will – or more precisely, the trait characteristic of the mass emanates from that of each individual. Like the ebbs and flows of the Great Power status of the Russian state collective, the Russian individual, as he strives for spiritual uplifting, as he moves through the great ordeal of life, also trembles, swaying between a great deed and a fall, between soaring flight and breakdown. The flight amazes by the strength of its ascent, as if an invisible hand from the sky reaches down to help it up. The breakdown is always terrifying by the chasm of its fall, by the loss of God's Image.

Sometimes meekness and submission border on servility and cowardice, on a feeling of being completely lost – sometimes bravery turns into an insane, provocative arrogance. In these shifts resides the law of the history of the Russian people, as well as the law of the life of each of its individuals. In this alteration between elevation and abasement lived the folk, elemental Russia, one instant a boundless Great Power, the next powerless and enslaved, when suddenly the mysterious powers of folk tension and elasticity were dried up, put away, folded up like gigantic wings of a frightened bird.

The Russian intelligentsia has long ago gotten accustomed to receiving European culture not with a consciousness of equality, but in conviction of its superiority, necessity, exclusivity, and righteousness. This timidity and subservience are undoubtedly rooted in the very essence of Russian nature: if one is to acknowledge oneself to be unequal, to allow someone else's superiority, then it is necessary to submit, to give in, to back away pusillanimously from what is one's own. This is a kind of obedi-

ence, even self-betrayal. In relation to foreign peoples, elemental Russia had been either a Great Power, that is, dominating; or, while decaying, unwillfully subjugated, subjected to servitude, she nevertheless convulsively held onto, jealously hid away, her testaments in the depths of the people's soul . . .

In different peoples universal ideas are reflected back in the forms of various cultures. By developing within itself the genius of universal conceptual capacity, the Russian intelligentsia thus incorporated, taken into its consciousness, to a point of complete identification, all the varieties of alien European cultures, at the expense of the self-discovery and assertion of its own. Consequently, the Russian intelligentsia turned out to be internationally enlightened, but without its own identity. A particular "intelligentsia," of course, does not exhaust Russia as a great whole. In the manifestations of her sovereign Great Power essence, in the creative enterprise of her culture, Russia maintains, as a precious inheritance, examples of unique, exclusive, and true national will.

At the present time, in an age of the greatest tragedy of decline, of a paralysis of state powers and of the will of the Russian people, in an age when the entire unified structure of Russian statehood has become weakened and diffused, and therefore when all its inner ties have to be reborn and built anew, the people's element unconsciously, but forcefully, has turned to the pursuit of the exposure of and revenge against its conscious sphere, when that sphere could not respond in a great moment of ordeal with a familiar, understandable, popular, national culture. It cannot be said that the entire intelligentsia has been exiled, but it can be asserted firmly that, with few exceptions, only the intelligentsia has been exiled.

This exile pronounces a stern sentence on that form of reception of Western culture which has been accepted by the Russian consciousness since the time of Peter as indisputable and true. To the extent that the creative, prophesying genius of Russia has manifested itself to be free and independent, to that same extent its inclusive, adaptive genius has revealed itself in all its timidity and subservient dependency.

The intelligentsia has found itself dispersed the whole world over. At the same time that the people's element, through tormenting battles and passions, is again attaining its mysterious, Great Power strengths, which sooner or later will expand Russia, spread it out to former glory and power, the Russian intelligentsia, for the first time put face to face, one against the other, with the cultured peoples of the whole world, and thus finally confronted with the necessity to reevaluate its possibilities in a responsible way, and especially its national, popular sources, has begun to experience the expiatory process of late self-discovery and self-assertion.

Only through actual, factual opposition, and not from "the charming abroad," or in the process of blind adaptation, has the Russian intelligentsia truly felt that line that has passed between it and its idol of yesterday. It has come to understand and tremble in repentance, because what is its own has turned out to be too unexpectedly precious, and what is *alien* has turned out to be too obsolete and destitute. Powerless and exiled, the intelligentsia has begun its rebirth and if it does not back away from it, then in the near future it will again attain its authentic powers and rights.

The people is gathering its strength in collective struggle; the intelligentsia – in individual experience. At present they are enemies, because in its thirst for self-revelation and freedom from alien forms of consciousness and life, the people has put the intelligentsia on the side of its European enemies. But it would be a great mistake to think that with the sword of communism the Russian people is battling Europe and the intelligentsia. On the contrary, communism is the latest guise adopted by the intelligentsia in its fanatical insistence on the principle of leveling and universality.

Having expelled, in a burst of hatred, its false ideological guides, the Russian people, in its search for a conscious truth, gave up its fate in customary obedience, placed itself into slavery once again, to a new dictatorship of that same intelligentsia – in fact, its most frightening and oppressive part, not the consciously ideological one that reigned before the revolution took place, but the fanatically volitional one. Irresponsibly, the seditious forces of the intelligentsia, self-selected in the blind rush towards universal socialist ideas, had gathered frightening volitional energy in the unhealthy, overheated atmosphere of the emigration and the underground. That will – scorching, cruel, vengeful, unstoppable – has now taken into its grip the people's masses, which have lost their guiding star. But its guiding truth is strange and antithetical to true Russia, just as the past one had been, because the Bolshevik International is merely the volitional consequence of the cosmopolitical wanderings and temptations of the godless, sinful spirit of the Russian intelligentsia; sinful, because outside the Church a dream of universality and truth cannot be righteous. This will be understood sooner or later by everyone, and after that the volitional (final?) dictatorship of the intelligentsia will also be elementally swept away. Then, the great injunction to Russia, its prophetic mystery will be realized: a wise and calm people and an intelligentsia that has recovered its sight will peacefully unite under the one great and all-resolving dome of the Orthodox Church, and before both, long hostile, sides will be revealed the true great enemy, the immemorial tempter, against whom then, in one burst of joy and common will, the Russian intelligentsia and people will rise up and revolt.

GEORGII V. FLOROVSKII

BREAKS AND CONNECTIONS*

"Why? says the Lord of hosts. Because of my house that lies in ruins,
while you busy yourselves each with his own house."

Haggai 1: 9

"But now, if thou wilt forgive their sin — and if not, blot me, I pray
thee, out of thy book which thou hast written."

Exodus 32: 32

For a long time "revolution" had been a Russian ideal. The figure of the "revolutionary" seemed to the social consciousness the highest type of patriot, uniting nobility of aspirations, love for the people, for the deprived and the suffering, and readiness for self-sacrifice upon the altar of universal happiness. No matter how different — from monarchist to anarchist — was the content that different people put into these conceptions, all of them agreed on one thing, on the belief that either the organized sociality, the common sense of the people, or the unrestrained daring of "those dying for the great cause of love," have the strength and shall be able, by the concentration of their will, to tear apart the knots of the social and political evil tying up Russia and establish the highest and most perfect form of culturo-social existence. Everyone from arrant Zimmerwaldists to mindless reactionaries came together in this belief in themselves, in the victorious essence of their inner being, the primordial goodness of their inner content. Some believed that it is necessary and sufficient to conceal themselves and re-dress "in European style"; others — to tear off the hastily thrown-on Western clothes; the third — to accomplish class regrouping. Arguments went on about who constitutes the true people, but, beneath it all, almost all were "populists"; all believed in the messianic calling of the entire people or of some part of it. All more or

* Originally as "Razryvy i svyazi," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 9-13. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky

less held dear Gor'kii's "prayer": "I saw an all-powerful and immortal people . . . and I prayed: Thou art God; there are no gods but Thee; Thou art the only God performing miracles" . . .

And in this frame of mind we met and "received" the war, placing it in the good-natured framework of utopian "progressive" optimism. Human hatred and fratricide were received under the sign of "the greatest happiness for the greatest number of people," and the mysterious contradiction of the assignment – with the price of thousands of murders and thousands of deaths to buy and secure other thousands of lives – was covered up by the hypnotizing words about this being the final war, a war for peace, for "common disarmament," an inner overcoming – exhaustion of militarism. The sharpness of the moral strain – through which must pass anyone who lifts the sword – was softened by the transfer of the issue onto the plane of formal obligation, to the motherland and one's tribesmen, to the good of humanity and civilization. And it was believable that "the cross and the sword are one," that following the baring of animal elements of human life their enlightenment will magically occur, and that after the war there will come a blissful time of "eternal peace" . . . People *themselves* will make themselves so perfect that it will be possible to reforge swords into ploughs. And for this enticing dream people joyfully went to kill and die . . .

In the name of that dream sounded the triumphant hymns of the "magnanimous and merciful revolution" four years ago. And when from behind the revolution's familiar in legend and dear in tradition "bloodless" image insolently began to appear there among the fume-black and wandering balls of fiery catastrophe the devilish outlines of the emerging collapse, when under the pinkish crape "chaos began to move," then perplexed thought began to speak of someone or other's errors and miscalculations, of prematurity, of tardiness, of the obfuscation of the idea, of the vulgarity of the masses, without losing faith in the fact that correction is easy and possible. And, as if in self-defense, that perplexed thought focused on the everyday prattle, on the various crises – from alimentary to paper – just to avoid seeing the all-encompassing horrifying collapse into an abyss, the collapse of the soul and the body.

There, where of deaths and diseases,
The dashing rut has passed –
Vanish into space, vanish,
Russia, My Russia . . .

And Russia did vanish . . . Not only Russian "statehood," not only the inherited way of life – national unity fell apart, all social patterns fell

apart, and in the consciousness there occurred, as in ancient times at the Tower of Babel, a mixing of tongues. Into the rapids of the historical water current is sucked all that Russia was becoming over centuries, all that which Russia was, when we first began to love it, although with a "strange love."

And looking into the wisely smiling mouth of the now silent "Russian sphinx," we suddenly, unexpectedly to ourselves, begin to see the disgusting likeness of a terrifying mythical monster and, what is most terrifying of all, we recognize in it the condensation of our own ancient ancestral hopes. And the further we look into this frightening puzzle, the clearer we see that even in our soul these old reveries have not lost power yet, that we still believe in — we want to believe in — "a natural flow of things," in the creative might of lofty ideals.

In the great cataclysm all the cracks have opened up, the protoplasmic layers are thrust to the surface, the depths have been bared. . . We have perceived the splitting into two of the Russian national culture. And perceived Russia standing

at the cross where roads join,
not daring to carry either the scepter of the Apocalyptic Beast,
nor the light yoke of Christ.

And we saw that we love Russia precisely for this, her double image, for her boundlessness, in which two abysses meet — one above and the other below. And, atavistically enchanted by the concentration of the furious forces and elemental sweep, we again dream of power and glory, . . . human power and glory.

And the truth is that the "vanished" Russia is stronger and more prophetic than the standing and surviving West. But this truth of the denial does not redeem the possible falsity of the assertion. Precisely the exact opposite of the pinkish optimism of the author of "Theodecy": all are correct in what they assert, and are wrong only in their denials — this could be said only by one who believes in his own allmightiness, in his own inborn goodness, and who considers evil an error but not a sin. Of course, no one "made" the revolution, and no one is guilty of the revolution, for its horrors, for its sorrow. The revolution made itself, it was born irresistibly as a sum of the entire preceding Russian historical process. In revolution everything is inevitable, everything is stamped by the sign of Fate. But out of what did it grow? Out of the good, sacred, eternal, holy elements of our people, out of its "idea," out of "what God has thought of it for eternity," or out of a spiritual lie, crookedness, which human will made the basis for our historical existence? . . .

We shall come to understand the past and become worthy of the future only when it will become not a sweet aspiration, but a duty, when expectations will be reborn as a thirst for exploit, when the condensed, nearly apocalyptic atmosphere of our days will spill into our soul the streams of true religious pathos, "fear of God," when beyond the collisions of the finite human will and the blind fata of "the great Faceless Nothing" we shall comprehend the Christian tragedy of the inner split into two: I do not do that which is good and which I wish to do, but that which is evil and which I do not wish. . . . When we shall understand that only

with the Lord Creator
comes eternal oblivion
of all earthly sufferings . . .

The issue is not "repentance." There has been much, very much, even too much — and too abundant—repenting in Russia. And repentance has come to be so common, that it has become a pose, a caricature, it has turned into haughty self-abasement, that most exquisite and refined form of spiritual charm. The recounting and public confession of our own sins — along with those of others — has turned for us into a stylized frame of mind rather than a trying exploit of blessed rebirth. Good deeds and worthy repentances have been replaced by the overexertion of a self-flagellating and self-accusatory voice. What is required is not to recount sins, but to take fright at the likeness of what is happening, to sense the entire splitting mysteriousness of being, to comprehend the reality of evil and temptations . . .

"Imagine that it is you yourself erecting the edifice of human fate with the aim in the end to make people happy, to give them, finally, peace and quiet, but to accomplish this, it is necessary and unavoidable to torture only a single tiny creature, a little baby, who is beating himself in the chest with a fist, and upon his unavenged tears to base this edifice — would you agree to be an architect on these conditions?" This is what Dostoevskii asked himself and quivered in torment, not understanding, refusing to accept the cruelty of the world . . .

But now "the building of human fate," the edifice of Russian fate, is based and constructed not upon the tears of a single tormented child but upon rivers of tears and blood. By bloodied hands these edifices are being forged now there, in deserted spaces. . . . For years and years we have been living on hate, on malice, on the thirst for vengeance, on the thirst for victory and retribution. Some kill. Others die. All hate. And they even dare to call their hatred "holy," dare to speak, as in the past, of "the

sweetness of hating the fatherland". . . All kill: some by a word, others by a gaze, still others by a sword. There is no love in anyone. And there is no exodus, as there is no thirst for redemption. — We are suffering. We are even crying, bitterly and without consolation. But our tears are still the tears of an affronted child, not those of a husband who has witnessed a "second death" face to face. Self-confidently we are prepared to justify our basest means by a "lofty" purpose — we still hope too steadfastly for pride to melt away completely. The demise of the "geographical fatherland" conceals from us the horror of the death of human souls. . . What is frightening is not that people die but that they stop being human. And there is only one way out of this horror and fear. Our heart ought to burn not for "Great Russia" alone, but, first and foremost, for the cleansing of the darkened Russian soul. Not in haughty predictions, not in prophesies, not in joy at the overflow of national powers, not in contemplation of the superhuman might and power of the popular element, but in repentance dissolved with tears, and in ardent prayer, in blessed pardon from Above, shall we attain the right to believe, to hope, to prophesize, and to call.

Sofia, 1921, March 31

PETR P. SUVCHINSKII

THE AGE OF FAITH*

To V. V. Gippius

But we have forgotten, o God, forgotten —
To compose to Thee our fiery psalter . . .

Grass on the steppe is tempestuous and confused
.....
Grass on the steppe — like rye — will ear! . . .

VI. Neledinskii

There are frightening times, terrifying epochs, like apocalyptic visions, times of great realizations of the Mystery, times frightening and blessed, when in some general, mysterious burst entire generations reach out for, and are uplifted to, the great mysteries of the sky, or when the skies by their mysterious essence hover over, lowered, like huge wings, above the earth. The human and the divine suddenly approach each other, opening up to each other in a new revelation, a new conception. God is in us, we are in God, but only in instants of the greatest strains of the spirit do we actually grasp this. The issue is not terminology, but if any name is to be applied to such ages of inspiration, then a name cannot be found other than Romanticism, presuming by that word not all the possible types of creative manifestation of the Romantic Age, but rather the very essence of travails and inspirations that predominated during "the Age of Faith." Romanticism is the pining for God. Or rather not the pining, for we always pine for God — even when in mad scoffing we deny and banish Him — but revelation of God and comprehension of God simultaneously. Chaos and illumination. In the Old Testament God appeared and ex-

* Originally as "Epokha very," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 14-27. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

pressed Himself through the words of the prophets, and only after his expression through the Son, after the disclosure of the great Mystery of the fusion of God and man through the ceaseless activity of the absolute individual, when for the first time and once and for all the Will of God-revelation and the Will of God-comprehension united in Christ — Will — Grace — Love, in equal powers of their counterposition — was given the gift of the comprehension of God through the Holy Spirit to man as a Blessing, in a descent of fiery tongues. The Old Testament prophesied or, through burning anguishes, foretold the coming joy of seeing the light in Christ. One symbol of Old Testament prophecy is Sinai, a sign of the will of the Father. The Old Testament is the law of self-disclosure of the Father: "I am your Lord God." Another Old Testament symbol is the frantic psalmody of David, at times blind, almost un verbal, rather ringing in frantic, eulogistic cymbals; and at other times, burningly crying over its own impotence and sinful pitifulness. The Old Testament trembled for God, cried over itself, but it did not comprehend. Christ, through the act of incarnation and Passions, established an infinite opportunity for exploit of the human will, for ordeal. And only in the descent of the Holy Spirit, through a fire He guided down to earth, was this exploit established as religion, upon the invincible rock of Christ's Church. Only after the incarnation, in the descent of the Holy Spirit, was the mystery revealed, in the establishment of the Church, of comprehending God, not as Will, but as God's Grace, in the inexhaustible gifts of the Holy Spirit, self-emanating, spilling over outside the Word-Will, resting upon the heads of the great chosen ones of the Church's bosom.

All deaf, blind, and mad, despising everything, disoriented by the great horror of the Powers of God's revelation, we lie in fear in the midst of blood, death, and smoke — we have lost our memory and forgotten the amazing gift of comprehending God given to us by grace. We are looking — and not seeing; listening — and not hearing. Or we have simply closed our eyes and shut our ears while the great miracle of God's revelation is occurring and we are being made capable of comprehending it through sparks of great illumination.

However, overcoming general blindness and deafness, the entire exclusivity and selectivity of our age is forcefully coming to light. After lengthy wanderings and denials, humanity, in modern generations, has entered a new phase of Romanticism, and, consequently, of religiosity. This cannot be denied, because events themselves demonstrate it. Not culture — as a combination of habits and human aptitude for abstraction, subordinated always to yet another logical discipline — determines the flow of events and facts into elegant systems of world view; the events

themselves, incessantly coming true, force us, by the very will of their occurrence, to perceive them and get a sense of them under the sign of various psychological and logical aspects, thus marking a mysterious change of the times. Our age is an age of great religious revelations, and, like any age of inspiration and unveiling, it flows through an accelerating alteration of events. This is its distinctive feature. Any event, as a particular knot of accomplishment, becomes self-sufficient. The natural succession of events, their unfolding, their revelation in time and space, their logical emanation out of each other — long taught by historical materialism — are completely breached. In vain do traditions of logic still attempt to contain the entire current of events within a coherent channel — natural sensation is no longer constrained by this sense of legitimacy. Life is perceived in the moment of time, in the collision of forces, as incessant volitional fragments, as beginnings and endings of a countless row of tragic constructions. Every phenomenon is perceived in its essence, as such, without consciousness of causality in the past and without logical inference of consequences in the future. The past becomes the domain of memory; the future — only of vision and prophecy. An abyss is on both sides of every event. Every event is a volitional act within the moment. Such a conception of perceiving life, in the scheme of Will-revelation and Will-subordination constitutes a conception of a tragic, religious world view, because the inner essence of tragic construction is contained in foreboding realization of all the preordained human paths, dictated from above. And these paths are either interrupted here on earth, in tragic, incomprehensible catastrophes, or they are mysteriously and imperceptibly elevated to the sky, continuing in the unearthly world. These events — the crossings of the paths — cannot be deduced from one another. They can be exorcised through prayer or anticipated through illumination. Tragic perception is equated with religious receptivity, because tragedy is an effectively-volitional projection of the religious principle. Any tragic conception is realized as a self-sufficient fact, the true commencement of which is always a mystery — we are only given an opportunity to separate the forces that constitute a particular collision, which are subsequently subordinated not to the law of logical causation and inference, but to laws of universal psychomechanics. A similar sense of life is established by the ability to enter into and penetrate the essence — which it uncovers infinitely — of all that is visible, audible, tactile, accomplished, and experienced. The essence of the world is revealed to the very last extremes of fusion, to the most clandestine penetration, to relishing, to perspicacity, because perspicacity is present only where there is an abyss between one event and the next.

Countless threads of causality and succession — strewn about everywhere by arrogant human rationalism with the intention of conquering the Mystery and establishing all the laws of realization — have been suddenly weakened and torn. Humanity, weakened and enfeebled by lengthy self-hypnosis of illusory omnipotence of reason, has lost in mad haughtiness its "gift for divine visions," the great gift of prophecy and perspicacity, the gift of comprehending God, and the gift of freedom, because it is in comprehending God that the issue of free will is resolved for all eternity. Is this not impoverishment? . . .

If we are to judge from the point of view of purity of the type of perception, then religious perception of life is the purest, because it is based upon Will-revelation and Will-subordination — and life is an incessant Self-revelation of Hypostasis of the First Day. As it defines the event, the tragedy, as life's pathos, religious perception of life must accordingly define the object of its fulfillment. If the will is determined in a self-contained moment, then there must be, naturally, a self-contained spiritual-material entity that has brought it about as an active agent, and that role, according to the conception of religious perception of the world, is assigned to the human *individual*. The individuality of each person plays out its tragedy of any given moment in time within itself; moreover, the intensity of volitional revelation and the quality of the spiritual-material entity are, of course, different in each given instance, and they can be arranged in a countless array of combinations. With this in mind, and in counterweight to the causal constructions of scientific materialism and the collectivist ideology of socialism, which postulate, in the first case, complete acceptance of any life type and phenomenon, and, in the second, regulation of the coexistence of the human masses on the basis of the all-leveling laws of struggle and exchange, religious culture postulates a spiritual basis of the individual. Each individual, in relation to any other, elicits unique illuminations, and, consequently, is unique in quality. As a result, every individual must be, without fail, in incessant contrast to other individuals. At the same time, in the general effort towards one and the same goal, the resultant line of this effort of all human individuals is analogous with the resultant line of all the material units of a constructed cupola, where each unit, in the process of overcoming those lying near it, and depending on the potential of the strength it contains, raise a soaring whole, on the basis of unwavering self-assertion. Such a mechanical overcoming of entities is, of course, of an entirely different order from the emotional overcoming within the law of the struggle for survival. If occurring events are the only criterion of life-perception, then it is natural that there can be no other method of taking stock and grasping phenomena and events, besides the method of their qualitative selection and determination, for that method

is shorter in time and contains within itself the maximal possibility of exhausting to the end everything that is subject to its application. After all, the notions of virtue and sin, good and evil – are actions different in quality and will, assuming, of course, that good and evil will are living, real entities. When events are set up outside the system of causality and consequence, the nature and quality of each phenomenon are established easily and practically. Good and evil become real beings which inspire every action and will and which are reflected in every event. As for the intensity of perception of an event, it, upon fixing the phenomenon only in given short segments of time or moments, is determined by the intensity of the volitional beginning, initiated at the moment of fulfillment. The more intense the will of an event, the greater the degree to which time is overcome, to a point of complete vanishing, to a complete penetration by volitional essence, as in music. Religious cognition of life is a musical notion, because only music, just as our psychic current, is capable of completely replacing time. Oral cognition is the most intent of all human possibilities of cognition, the most religious, because it is simultaneously the most intuitively-abstract and the most effectively-real, because it overcomes time in sound, combining the great mystery of inspiration with the mystery of mathematical logic. Only music, just like the most stressful psychic worries, is capable drawing apart any moment of time, of stopping time, and of subordinating its flow to some single psychic condition.

Thus, the conception of the religious world view recognizes tragedy and music as the purest and most perfect ways of world cognition. It was not for nothing that they were closely connected in antiquity; it was not for nothing that the poems of the Bible are, from beginning to end, prophetic songs; it was not for nothing that Greek philosophemes expressed themselves through verse. Music, in this context, is to be accepted in the broadest sense – as sound, as song, and as musical thought, that being intuitively-real thought. Only in the rhythm, in the beat, in the tremble, is caught and affirmed the endless changing of Will-revelation, only through them are we infected, and we tremble with that shudder, in which the Universe incessantly remains. Is not rhythm – which, of course, also exists in the spatial and plastic arts – in essence, the fixed-in-time, never-falling-silent in creative vision “waves of matter,” a mother’s quivering invisible to our eyes? Thus, in literature our time is a time of a singing, musical principle, and the tragic principle, when music bewitches words, halts time, or when tragic collisions fix in time the predestined encounters of inscrutable paths of life and reveal the struggles of superhuman will. The modern tone of life and psychic mood cannot tolerate any other forms of literature. At the present, in an age of Romantic inspiration, *belles-lettres*, empty-worded fiction, and novels

offering "psychological analysis" seem improper, unnecessary, and endlessly lengthy. Insisting that a purer type of world comprehension can be found in the tragic perception of life, Romantic culture, in its projection on art, consequently insists that the purity of the type of creativity is the basic criterion of quality. Everything that acts outside the bounds of the essence of present volitional content, in the projection of art, is a product of an impure kind of creativity. Any product of creativity of a mixed kind endlessly diminishes in its innate significance and power. Therefore, by demanding from manifestations of art the highest exertion and the highest inspiration for comprehending the world, modern ideology of art demands self-determination for every one of its branches, for every kind of art to complete exclusivity, in using the means of incarnation accessible to it. The idea of synthesis in art is of course the total opposite of this assertion.

Not unified in one joint synthetic action and at odds in view of the strict compartmentalization of means, all branches of art of the modern aesthetic ideology can find equivalencies in the basic laws of psychomechanics, in laws of equilibrium, gravitation, symmetry, and gold fustigation, to which they are subject in equal measure. Within this scheme of reasoning are currently revolving all the theoretical attempts of futurism (the term "futurism" is taken to include all the searching currents of modern art, enriched by new technical resources, strong in their inquisitiveness, but lacking in inspired illumination).

According to that ideology, music overcomes only time, marking it by its own flow, just as a psychic current, unraveling either through a process of simple revelation (in the form of a prelude), or through a process of opposition (in the form of a sonata), or, finally, through a process of exhaustion (in the form of a fugue). Of the three processes, the process of exhaustion — the process of the fugue — is the most, so to say, musical, because it flows in the steady forward movement. From this it follows that any polyphonic (horizontal) musical composition, from the point of view of purity of the process of overcoming time, is purer and thus more intense than a vertical, harmonized composition, which characterizes in the main static music, which is usually reflexively-illustrative; therefore, the psychic intensity of a fugue is incomparable to the intensity of any program music. All the church singing of the Renaissance was based precisely on the polyphonic principle. The *znamennyi* chant represents one of the most amazing examples of horizontal composition, perfect in its ascetic resources of monody, wherein the movement of the voice is elevated to the highest stage of psychological suppleness. Modern music is on the threshold of a new flowering of the intonational principle, a diatonal, in-key, composition, on the eve of a new affirmation of a song

element, of a musical breath, as a fundamental principle of musical creativity.

Creativity of the word in pure form (poetry), by overcoming time, reveals itself in dual meaning: in momentary semantic tricks, which establish logical accents, and in the current of phonetic succession, which forms the sounding, phonetic base of a poem. The various stages of perfection of their counterpoint determine this or that quality of poetry. As music brings about the predicate principle (the subject is assumed to be incessantly in the author, and thus removed beyond the bounds of the composition), only poetry, revealing itself partially through the logical order of words-meanings, brings about the subject principle. Thus, the phonosemantic power of a poetic composition is always dependent on the degree of the subjectness of poetic texture, because the logical side of a poem is revealed in intermittent, momentary, logical tricks, and the meaning of a subject is always more momentary than the meaning of a predicate, which inevitably conceals within itself some temporary prolongation. (The word-subject longest in number of syllables is always perceived in a shorter span of time than the shortest word-predicate.)

Seeming at first glance difficult and incomprehensible, the heap up of words in modern futurist poetry (especially Maiakovskii's), striving to greater intensity in every moment of sound, is explained by the prevalence of the subject principle over that of the predicate, which had been so overused during the symbolist age. And in this is the pledge of the entire truth of futurist poetry, because only through the reduction of the logical principle in poems to positive momentariness is it possible to attain its truest counterpoint to the principle of the musical current. In storytelling, in prose, the word ceases to be a sound-meaning and becomes a simple concept, and therefore prose, fiction, descriptive literature, and rhetoric in general comprise a decadent form of literature. Romanticism has always sang, and will continue to sing, through poems; inspired ages were always incarnated and will continue to be incarnated through the amazing form of tragedy — the art of recording mysterious, endlessly different combinations of the soul and the will of people, incomprehensible crossings of human paths, set by an otherworldly will.

Along with the singing and tragic principle, modern art mightily moves to the fore two other directions of creative development: painting and architecture, once again in the purest types of their realization. Modern painting is on the way to boundless possibilities in grandiose fresco and mosaic conceptions. Architecture is striving toward monumentalism. The gifts of combining the greatest intensity of inspiration and religious fanaticism with the wisdom and logical order of mastery, characterizing Byzantium and, partially, the Western Middle Ages, seem to be emerging once

again. So far, it is true, too theoretically, at times with absurd artificiality and without true inspiration. . . Emerging from a demand for maximal expression and striving toward the realization of the inner essence of all the visible, the painting of the modern age could not help but latch on to the ways and foundations of fresco painting, powerful precisely because of its amazing inner potential for filling up a plane, which completely transforms the material by its spiritual essence. In Byzantine and Byzantine-Roman art as well as in Russian icon painting, the flowering of painting proceeded under the sign of church subjects. And this is understandable: precisely in the icon, more so than in any other representation, the material principle must be thoroughly soaked through, from within, by the sanctity of the spirit. Modern futurism is attempting, so far in secular art, the art of the medley and coarseness of daily life, to reestablish this former immediacy of perception. Lacking in spirit, it nonetheless has reached significant heights of mastery by establishing the exclusivity of basic colors, by presenting in a new way the problems of the plane, of the perspective, of the temporary principle in painting, of rhythm, and finally, by working out the technique of filling in planes and spaces of any size. So far modernity is only in the foreboding, but as soon as the true spiritual inspiration shall emerge, painting will be prepared, in a new flowering, to initiate an age of religious creativity. Modern technical notions and theoretical strivings will make it quite ready for this new phase of existence.

The same applies to architecture. The flowering of the architectural principle is predetermined by the spiritual need for assertion and affirmation through monumental conceptions of the beliefs and cultural ideals of an age. More than any other kind of art, architecture defends humanity from time, place, and material, visibly uplifting it. The first and final – and, so to say, the defining – form of architecture is that of the temple. Besides being a symbol of divine glory, the temple is a monument to the religious form of a given age. There are ages when applied architecture completely displaces Romantic architecture. In such ages the skill of building temples and erecting monuments is lost. Temples turn into large gathering places and monuments become combinations of larger than life figures. The monolithic nature, unity of conception, and the completeness, which comprise the essence of architecture's assertive principle, are missing, ceding their places to bustling styles, or open-ended constructions, which do not balance space and material within themselves.

Modern architecture, along with the applied technology of iron and concrete, has revived the idea of Romantic architecture. The thirst to assert and uplift has emerged anew, so far in slavish forms of imitation of inspired models from the past. This initial thrust is important because the

age, sooner or later, will express itself through new forms of temples and monuments, because now there is something to pray for, something for which to erect monuments, something to assert. These preparations for the coming opportunities are quite indicative.

The leveling of currents and directions of art of various countries and peoples into a common general artistic ideology of a given age (while preserving, of course, the supremacy of the founding center) is a general historical phenomenon. Nevertheless, the simultaneous submission of all of Europe to the ideology of "futurism" is momentous. It shows that futurism is a current prompted by organic queries, which are concealed in the very essence of art, that it is a movement that directs technology and theory of all strivings of creative expression — frozen for a long time in the same old achievements, methods, and standards — toward new possibilities.

Nevertheless, this is not sufficient for bringing about an age of true artistic flowering; perhaps Russian art has been called upon to replace this insufficiency, and through its spiritual essence immeasurably enriched by the experience of its passions and great ordeal, to sanctify the entire prepared wealth of technical possibilities and theoretical conquests.

A wild, primordial feeling of life is always more intense, sharper, and most importantly, more real than a sensation of life sifted through the enfeebling sphere of rationalizing culture. Now, when there is an insatiable thirst for sharp sensations, the striving to comprehend life, to merge with it in its most powerful and furious manifestations is completely natural. Lermontov expressed this brilliantly in "Mtsyri," in which man merges with nature, absorbs it completely into himself, savors it — not in the manner of idyll and pastorage, but through religious illumination ("around me bloomed God's garden"), encompassing its violent, elemental manifestations, when man can catch lightning with his hand, and crawl and hide like a snake, to entwine in a ferocious one-on-one wrestling bout with a panther. . . For Mtsyri, nature was life in its entirety. He saw nothing else. The exact same striving for primary fusion with the whole world can be sensed today in all manifestations of art. This striving explains the modern barbaric "Scythian" aestheticism, the return to the primitive and to primary-clear comprehension. For him to whom it is given to merge with the world at the peak of its wild powers, it is easier to behold the revelation of its innermost primordial mystery — to see the world as a blooming "God's garden" and to "comprehend God's mystery in things."

It is not strange that all extreme currents of art sided without delay with extreme revolution. Bolshevism is in its element a deeply popular phenomenon, and modern art — close in its aesthetic beliefs of extreme intensity to unconscious popular aestheticism — naturally could not help

but have felt itself sucked into the common head-spinning whirlwind along with the human masses.

There is another branch of human spiritual life that ignites even more powerfully than all the rest in times of illumination and inspiration: theology. And here the flowering is defined by the purity of type of thought, because theologically dogmatic thought, in order to assure greater intensity of its creativity, must rigidly separate itself, on the one hand, from philosophic license, all-permissiveness, and abstraction, and on the other, from fallacious canonical categorization, which is sometimes rooted in narrow formalism and prejudice, and sometimes in an unconsciously aesthetic sense of the Church.

Creative theological thought must manifest itself in equal parts as inexhaustible inspiration and rigid invincible facts of dogma, because religion is an effective, all-resolving form of human illumination and thought. Orthodox theology — having long languished immovably in the inflexibility and incomprehensibility of its canonical teaching (as all paths of mystical comprehension and thought of the intelligentsia went outside the Church), and perhaps avoiding, thanks to this, Catholicism's false if effective inspiration of power and strength — has collected in its essence priceless gifts of revelation and wisdom, before which all the achievements of "cultural consciousness" in the sense of intuitive philosophy — "European cultural manufactured goods from Asian raw materials" — are mere rational schemes and lifeless constructions deprived of grace. Now, through tortuous overcoming of the discredited sensations and touches of religion in the forms of sensual aestheticism, a true, chaste feeling of Mysticism and Churchness is established. In addition, the entire inner dogmatic and canonical temperament and teaching of the Church, along with its ritual, came to life anew in full truthfulness and organicism of life, in all the trivialities of the exclusivity and wholeness of form.

All these various forms of God-comprehension are unfurled in the whirlwind and confusion of great, elemental events of God-revelation. Entire generations, entire ages are hurled into the menacing abyss, and tremble in the storm, the wind, and the confusion caused by the menacing flapping of the wings of chaos. But when the power of chaos is intensified, so too is the power of the Holy Spirit — and that is what all of us, frightened and intimidated as we are along the former paths of godless wandering, must understand. Humanity has lived drowsily, witheredly, godlessly, corrupting itself through refinement of mystical sensations and presumptuousness of rationalism, but from the instant when the age of effectively tragic events and, above the earth and in its depths, chaos, began to stir, all the people suddenly divided into two, two camps: those who are enraged, furled up by the horrifying whirlwind, temporarily

blinded and deafened, who are acting not on their own volition; and, those who have become numbed, frightened, and hidden, to the point of losing the ability to reason. They hate and curse that which must be understood and accepted . . .

From the first day of the war on, humanity is playing out a grandiose tragedy, a tragedy of death. Humanity must comprehend this tragedy, and come to see its true image through instantaneous flashes of illumination. As black dust are flung all the werewolves of the wild human element, rooted in pre-eternal chaos. Begun under the sign of the bloody banner of the great war in which almost all the peoples of the world were grabbed by the same will, this tragedy now continues in the Russian revolution under the sign of the red flag of the International. The pathos of the beginning and the continuation is in the same elements: in hatred, in fear, and in death. Revolution, ideologically proclaimed under the stale slogans of the past century, is in reality flowing through the events of a new Romantic order. Hoping to assert the ideals of leveling communism, the Russian revolution inevitably ends up asserting the individual. Having dared to proclaim socialism a religion, the revolution has affirmed the Christian Church with unprecedented force. Having initiated the struggle in the name of the glory of a unified worldwide call for "Bread" — material goods, which cast man into an animalistic abyss — revolution has raised and hurled to the surface the most frightening problems of the spirit. And this is understandable: for the consecration of bread and holy oil is conducted on the same altar. When they become satiated with bread, they will crave anointment, and then they shall understand. . . The entire world, shaken by the frightening convulsion of the war and currently knocked out of its former condition of self-confidence and lymphatic well-being, has pricked up its collective ears in alarm, and is waiting. It wants to understand, but so far is not understanding. It senses the deathly alarm, which could either end in a catastrophe of death or be replaced by a new tremble of life. And this tremble has already begun to beat in Russia; a fiery fever, raising the temperature of the entire human order, has clearly arrived — when all the seemingly steadfast arrangements of the past are fearlessly put up for reconsideration and reevaluation, when everything feverishly begins to listen to the tremblings of the earth and the sky. Russia has come to understand that which all of Europe, the whole world, must come to understand — under the sign of Russian Romanticism and Russian religious culture. Russia has come to understand that the finish of the terrible war, (considering all the "humanitarian" achievements of the international order), cannot be as inconsequential as Europe would have liked to see it, and as Europe has shaped it. Had there been no Russian revolution, then there would have been another

ending corresponding in its grandiose scope to the scope of that unprecedented war. A tragedy on the scale of the tragedy of a five-year war could not have avoided engendering a spiritual outcome as frightening and catastrophic as the war itself. And this outcome of the entanglement of the peoples of the entire world has turned out to be the Russian revolution. Europe will never be able to get away with a material outcome, an outcome of "peace settlements" – the true, spiritual outcome of the war is in Russia, and now this is clear to everyone.

The process of revolution is as bloody, mad, and absurd as the process of war, but as for the outcome – its result is closer and its spiritual aim more immediate. Perhaps the Russian revolution, by its outcome, is even destined to redeem all the blind, cruel, and presumptuous actions and acts, all the unprecedented sins of the European war. Europe after the war feels itself to be in a state of bewilderment, perhaps of unconscious shame, feeling itself without a resolution, without a consummation to crown the years of sufferings and death. Therefore, the winners have no feeling and confidence of victory; the vanquished – no consciousness of defeat. Europe wanted to inflate its principled slogan of war – but the war ended up playing itself out without a slogan, proceeding only through the ferocity of the struggle, stale, merciless, technical, lacking a spiritual principle. Still, the war had to raise its spiritual sign – and it did raise it in its immediate continuation, the Russian revolution.

No one was frightened by the war. They even got used to it and adapted. As for the revolution, they were immediately terrified of it. And it was impossible not to become terrified, because, beyond the bloody horror of killings and rapes, there is emerging a mysterious apparition of a new intensity, a new spiritual trembling, which is always frightening, more frightening than the material privations and constraints of wartime.

Fear has huge eyes. Not merely imaginary phantoms, but prophetic visions, are being revealed to the seekers, through fear and trembling. But this fear instantly turns into serenity and bliss of revelation and wisdom. All of Russia is presently in fear. Some, responding to an outside inhuman will, commit horrendous acts, and are themselves terrified of their own deeds – (after all, how can they not be terrified!) – others are in fear of the acts of their neighbors. Everything is seized upon and whirled round in the same smoky, suffocating panic; but then again, everything is engulfed by the same flame – like in a fire.

Let the terrifying fire of the Russian torture burn in Moscow, covering Russian skies with black smoke. – One must believe that the new, human, Russian inspiration has already ignited in this fire. This flame is scattered all over the world by the wind of the revolution, because every Russian, without exception, is ignited by the same fire, every one carries at least a

spark of this frightening burning. The burning Russian flame is rising up above the whole world. And all are true to their fatherland in equal measure — those burning in the fire and those scattered all over the world, the banishers and the banished — because every Russian, without exception, is infecting peoples and lands by his ignition and new trembling of life, and preparing unprecedented glory for Russia in the coming age. And relations for the newly enlightened people in the coming age shall be determined not by impoverished collectivist theories, but by the Russian experience. They shall be developed not on the vapid basis of leveling communism, but on the mighty formulation of the human vault, in which every individual is self-asserted, and by that the whole is asserted and spiritually elevated to the heights, like a cupola spread out above us.

GEORGII V. FLOROVSKII

THE CUNNING OF REASON*

"Do not rejoice in this, that the spirits
are subject to you; but rejoice that your
names are written in heaven."
(Luke, X, 20)

For a long time much has been said about the "crisis of European culture," thought and life, both in the West and here at home. And even the early Slavophiles, along with the West European Romantics, penetrated into its mystery and called "Europe's" original sin by its true name in beginning to speak of "rationalism." The deadly-cold "lifelessness" of science, of knowledge — that theme of the tragedy of Faust — has long been a hackneyed topos. "And he who knows more than all others must cry most bitterly of all, having become convinced that the tree of knowledge is not the tree of life," — thus did the lips of Manfred pronounce some time ago a fatal condemnation of "European" civilization, with its complete reliance on the cult of "reason," on the cult of "abstract principles." And we may trace back through the entire nineteenth century, somewhere in the depths, the fiery outbursts of this tragically unhealthy process that was being realized, this "self-destruction of Reason" — *die Selbstzersetzung und Verzweiflung der Vernunft*, as Schelling put it.

The Romantics — Goethe, Carlyle, Schopenhauer, Nietzsche, Hartmann, Renan, Ibsen, Maeterlinck. At first cautious, then more and more furious, waves of "irrationalism" grew up. Everywhere and in everything, even extending to religious attitudes and to the aesthetic perception of life. Starting from "literary" remarks about the "bankruptcy" of science, all the way to the attraction of the Satanic depths of black magic and to the rebirth of the orgiastic cult of Dionysius and Ceres, from the superficially

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atheistic denial of the Christian dogma all the way to the inspired justification of the "diversity of religious experience," from the call for a return to nature all the way to Futurism — everywhere there is clear evidence of profound disbelief in rational knowledge, in the "wisdom of systems." "Intuition" triumphantly supplants "logic," and the very ideal of the scientific cognition of "truth" fades away, either in the dim light of biological adaption to the conditions of existence or in the bright flame of mystical feeling and pantheistic ecstasy. The dynamic nature of the cosmos begins to be felt. The haughty dream of Feuerbach comes to life — that of the "creation" of God, the archaic idea of the "developing Absolute," of the incompleteness of the world, is revised.

A contemporary Russian philosopher and theoretician of law recently drew a graphic picture of the "crisis of the contemporary sense of justice," strictly speaking, of the entire social world view as a whole, a picture of the wreck of "the utopia of earthly paradise." In the process of the test of time, the incapacity of human thought to outline a plan for the organization of life in which the source of discontent would be decisively eliminated, in which there would no longer be social evil, has been revealed. The strength of the fascination wielded by all those words of socio-political wisdom, each claiming to be the ultimate, has been depleted. Doubt has arisen in earlier, hitherto self-evident dogmas of socio-historical faith. Considerable disappointments have extinguished hopes of the coming of "eternal peace," of general prosperity, and faith in the cultural ascension of a united humanity. The conviction is gradually ripening that there is not and cannot be one all-saving plan for definitively "structuring" life, and faith is broken in the omnipotence of the "code" of natural rights and of social justice.

Furthermore, this is not only in theory, but also in life. Does the current history of English democratic statehood not serve as an example of the silent establishing of the "primacy of life" over abstract legislation?! Over there, "reality" has long since parted with "the written law," so that official formulas express most "futuristically" that which is happening "in actuality." But here is what is most important of all — there is not even any attempt being made to correct the archaic "norms" and to secure the transformed contents of social life in a new framework. Trust and interest in "formulas" has psychologically "dried up," and has been succeeded by hope in the creating power of individual creation, which does not assume the form of anything "immutable."

And thus, for all to hear, incompatible and audacious words are pronounced — about the "perishing of the West." A thought which not long ago seemed altogether monstrous moves into the very focus of the spiritual field of vision, a thought concerning the beginning perhaps not of a

"new Eon of world history," but in any event of a fracture of the world's historical trajectory that is in no way less significant than the one once experienced by St. Augustine. And no one else after Hegel will repeat that our time is "the last" and "the concluding" stage of the evolutionary process. The historical horizon melted, disappeared: before the eyes everywhere was infinity.

But however impressive these symptoms of the dying of "immortal and absolute" wisdom may be, the roots of which go back far into the soil of history — all the way to Republican Rome and Aristotelian logic — the question still remains to be answered: will the rosy-colored dawn flare up into a bright new day? Will "the West" find in itself enough untouching and fresh strength to realize its dream and to renew itself not only in thought, but in actuality as well? — asked Herzen half a century ago. And it seems that, just like him, we too must now answer with at least sceptical doubt, if not yet with complete denial. Here "the facts" again speak.

"It is little to refute a beautiful idea, it must be replaced by something that is equally beautiful," said Dostoevskii through the lips of one of his heroes; "or else I, not wishing to part with my feeling, will refute the refutation in my heart, although by force." This is exactly what has happened in the West. Herzen accurately noticed the "pocket idolatry" of the European, which forces him to weave out of any true thought, instead of a "broadening of the circle of action" rather a rope "in order to then bind his legs together and, if possible, to bind others' legs as well, so that the free work of his creation becomes punitive authority over himself."

Having lost confidence in the empty and frozen formulas of Protestant Scholasticism, in the cold legal dogmatics of Roman Catholicism, Europeans are withdrawing in large numbers. But where are they going? To the religion of monism, to theosophy, to Buddhism! No further. But this is all the same "rationalism," the same former striving towards formulas, toward pseudo-scientific "doctrines," — in a word, to belief in logical irrefutability: the God of the Christian faith is being replaced, in a vague way — by Nature, in whose honor new, already "unbelieving" pastors pronounce new *Sonntagspredigten*; or in His place is put a vague concept of an elusive Higher Force, which rules the world in accordance with unshakeable laws and yields to invocations and oaths. Thus, in the uprising against "Scholasticism" European thought does not go further than Gnosis — that is, than the ideal of religious knowledge — not attaining the true freedom of religious life. Religious "conversions" in the West do not lead their neophytes out of the circle of naturalism. Such is the case, clearly seen in Huisman's example, of the martyr of "refined Thivaide," in the well-turned phrase of N. Berdiaev. Consumed by the de-

sire for vital completeness, he seeks a remedy to the torturesome banality of Positivism and "Realism" in the decadent overthrowing of conventionalities, in orgiastic individualism, and he passes through the silty depths of Satanism and black magic; reduced to ashes there, he runs to the protection of the cathedral. But not to no purpose have the dark forces, banished from within him, taken shelter as "numbered" monsters on his rooftop, have they gotten stuck in his windows: and even at the heights *de la vie devote* Huisman remains a typical "decadent"; he accepts religious values only aesthetically, not "religiously." He seeks balsam for his spiritual wounds — balsam, which inevitably heals. In his versions of folk tales the old waves of unhealthy eroticism, of attraction towards the deformities and distortions of life, can be felt. And this is not accidental. In his well-known book on religious experience, which is founded almost exclusively on "Western" material, James strikingly emphasizes that the religious love of "saints" is mostly converted to that which is instinctively repulsive, which seeks an unpleasant situation for its manifestation. He recalls how St. Francis of Assisi cured leprosy sores, how other saints licked them clean; the life of Elizabeth of Hungary, the biography of Madame de Chantal, are filled with such details concerning their selfless devotion in hospitals that it is repulsive to read them. And it is enough to compare this with even a religious sermon of Tolstoi, saturated with ethic purism, to bring back to mind unbelieving intellectuals' conversions to Tolstoiism and then to Orthodoxy, to recall even the *dukhobors* ("spirit-wrestlers") — and the religious limitations of the Western spirit stands out in full force. In this difference, undoubtedly, the contrast between the religious elements nourishing "the East" and "the West" is revealed. And between them now lies the same abyss which in ancient times separated the mysticism of the East from the thought of Montanus, the Athonite Hesychasts from the German Flagellants, St. Simeon the New Theologian from St. Teresa of Spain. *The naturalism of Western mysticism is organically connected with the rationalism of Western thought*, which was perspicaciously felt by Vladimir Solov'ev, who combines in the image of the Antichrist the great image of Apollo, the completeness of scientific knowledge and magical omnipotence over the elements of nature.

We encounter such combinations of "Positivism" and intuition in all manifestations of the West European reaction against rationality. The "rattling of dry bones" is distinctly heard even in the poetic philosophy of life of perhaps the most vivid expresser of contemporary Intuitivism. The authentic creative pathos of Bergson's "philosophical intuition" is assimilated with "science" in an original way. The French metaphysician substantiates the creative nature of spirit not so much on the unquestionable "self-testimony" of inner experience as on "objective"

proof from psycho-physiology, psychiatry and biology. Matter becomes spiritualized, it is only "hardened" spirit; but as a result the opposite end is achieved: the soul becomes materialized, being drawn into the incessantly fluctuating variability of the indivisible vital fervor, at once both material and spiritual — potentially. Within the limits of this kind of naturalistic Monism there is no place for true creation and freedom; what Bergson is calling creation is a visible novelty of phenomena, dependent on the fluctuating character of reality. Bergson does not break through the iron loops of necessity: the causal inevitability remains; only in the place of a mosaic-like composition of influences he has set the latter's organic confluence. But all the purely logical antitheses which come to light in the interspersed evolutionary flow were originally established in the nature of the "elan vital." And it is noteworthy that the supra-rational element is realized on an entirely "rational" level — that of the successive kingdoms of nature. Nothing else could possibly happen in Bergson: indeed, in exposing the cinematographic character of "scientific" cognition, he does not deny "science," and is only trying to replace the former false, "rationalistic" science with a new "intuitive" one. And genetically, this outstanding opponent of *ratio* is indeed the direct successor of the French philosophical tradition which ultimately goes back to the great rationalists — Descartes and Malebranche; in the latter we unexpectedly encounter, it would seem, direct anticipations of Bergson's most "modern" ideas.

The "European" limitedness of Bergson's world view is most noticeable when he is compared with genuine American Pragmatism, which is thickly steeped in the spirit of true religious creative searching. And it is instructive to realize that on "European" soil Pragmatism becomes colorless and impersonal. It may be directly said that Europe does not accept true "Pragmatism," and that what it does accept is only a substitute for the real thing. James' fundamental thought, the idea that the value of cognition consists not in its correspondence to some kind of unchanging canon of reason, but rather in its moral-creative force, has here been transformed into the identification of truthfulness with usefulness, when by "usefulness" we understand — "timely utility." Within the framework of the style of life in which "man is for the Sabbath," in which the highest justice is *fiat justitia, eret mundus* — the idea of the humanity of truth has not entered into this narrow framework at all, especially when by "man" we understand not the average "Enlightened" European, but rather the "image and semblance of God."

If we closely examine the philosophical development of Europe over the last decades, it is easily noticed that behind the visible shroud of Irrationalism a general mobilization of all rationalist forces, in the literal sense

of the word, is taking place. *The most mighty phenomena of German philosophical thought of recent times are nothing other than the revival of rational metaphysics.* This comes across most clearly of all in the so-called "anti-psychoanalysis." The destructive criticism to which Husserl subjected all of modern philosophical thought, exposing its inner "worm-eatenness," is well-remembered by all; he demonstrated nothing more and nothing less than the fact that the contemporary theory of knowledge makes knowledge, like an understanding of Truth, impossible. The shock produced by his arguments was tremendous: after them, many previously formed systems were rebuilt. Husserl insistently restores the rights of Truth — after a series of decades in which this word was written only with a small T. But to what purpose does he do this? For the sake of an absolute system of ideas, of "empirical" essences which rise above life and existence and are unconditionally inaccessible to any kind of real contact from without. This is the archaic rationalist conception of the supra-worldly and pre-eternal prototype of cosmic order, the deistic conception of God as a watchmaker. But in it there is not even a trace of the mystical trepidation which penetrated the entire system of the first "ideologue," the Hellenic prophet, of the religious enthusiasm which made him the pagan precursor of Christ. There is no enthusiasm in it, no rising over the surface of experience. The ideal of cognition remains, as before, something along the lines of "intellectual contemplation" — true, it is now under the new name of "eidetic intuition."

The same intellectual stamp has impressed even more sharply upon the character of another influential current in the philosophy of modern-day Germany, the so-called "Marburg School" of Neo-Kantianism. In this case, it is true, there is seemingly a definite break with the ideal of completed, absolute knowledge, which is transformed into the eternally unresolved "problem" of cognition: in place of completed cognition is an infinitely continuing process, the process of "cognition," the process of the "creation" and development of living thought. The place of *factum* is occupied by the creative *fieri*. But this is only how things seem to be. It is enough to recall with what application the representatives of this philosophical movement reduce all thinkers of earlier times to a common denominator, factoring the "common" Kantian coefficient out of their world views. In their hands, the "divine" Plato himself is transformed into a methodologist of science, and his religious terminology and mystical pathos are declared to be nothing more than superfluous "husks," an accident, which caught hold because of the conditions of his milieu. An open and conscious turning "back to Hegel" — explicitly to Hegel, the panlogist, not to any other of the last century's Idealist pleiade, like the moral enthusiast and "adogmatist" Fichte, for example — decisively re-

veals the ambiguity of the terminology. The "logic of pure cognition" is, indeed, a new system of panlogism, a new attempt to create an absolute science which, although eternally under construction and continually being repaired, is entirely incontestable and immutable in its "fundamentals," which develop linearly in a direction that is determined once and for all. Let the "system of knowledge" be replaced by the "history of cognition." History itself is transformed into a system, the principles of which are not subject to any kind of review. In contemporary philosophy in general the tendency to find the ultimate basis of knowledge, the axioms which are higher than all doubt, comes across very clearly. This is only a new form of the "inherent ideas" of the old rationalism. And it must be added that this kind of striving extends into the realm of special science. It is precisely this which is the motivating force behind the present-day research of mathematical science. True, here rationalism is obviously exposing its limits: the attempt to construct arithmetic on "absolute" principles led to the exposure of antinomies and paradoxes in the concept of quantity.

The same intellectual inclination characterizes contemporary moral philosophy. The Marburgian "ethics of pure will" "validates" morality on the basis of law — that is, on the judicial form, on the abstract type of social existence. The Hegelian apotheosis of the state involuntarily comes to mind. The recently begun "renaissance of natural law" represents, again, only the logical reaction of the rationalist spirit against the extremely modest intuitivism that lay at the basis of the "historical school" of the lawyers. "Natural law," the "just law" (*das richtige Recht*) that Rudolf Stammler preached not long ago, represents a systematic body of "rational" norms which definitively set all reciprocal human contact in its general vital traits. And when it is brought together with moral "law," then morality itself acquires the long-familiar dogmatically-killing touch of judiciousness which is so characteristic of all creations of the ethics of the "categorical imperative." Indeed, insofar as the latter is concerned, even reason is fighting against itself. The rationalism of socialistic teachings is too well known for more than a passing mention of it to be necessary.

In this whole new rationalist renaissance there is one extremely significant characteristic which the "philosopher of culture" is wrong to ignore. The rise of philosophical creation and the revival of philosophical literature over the last decades are inseparably linked in Europe — and particularly in Germany — with the influx of representatives of the Jewish nationality into the ranks of the European intelligentsia. This phenomenon is not unconditionally new. In earlier years one could already name Spinoza, Reimarus, Moses Mendelssohn (all rationalists), Maimonides and, finally, Marx. But at no other time would it have been possible to encounter whole groups of Jewish names. Hermann Cohen, Husserl, Bergson,

George Kantor, Minkowski, Freud, Weininger, Zimmel, Bernstein — and to these we must add more than a few lesser-known names — rare are those who catch the certain identicalness and unity of these uncoordinated names, of the spirit equally inspiring them all.

S. N. Bulgakov once drew a witty parallel between the game of sociological abstractions in *Das Capital* and the apocalyptic animals of post-bondage Judaic apocryphal literature (true, he did not make any rapprochements between the two nations): in both cases, abstract generalities totally hide the "living" variability of actual existence, the individuality of the historical process is totally supplanted by the plan of history which has crystallized. This comparison must be carried even further. It hardly requires many arguments to justify placing a sign of logical equality between "Judaism" and rationalism. Too well known is the "nomism," the conformity to laws, which penetrates all creations of the Jewish national genius, starting with Moses' tablets and going all the way to the "scribes and the Pharisees," and then again from the Talmud through Maimonides to the new Judaism, which no one other than Cohen himself openly placed higher than the obsolete religion of Christ. In the concept of "law" as a general formula, infallible and irremovable, all the threads of the European spirit intersect. Religion becomes a legal code. In the idea of a Deity all traits are effaced except juridical ones; the Judaic God is an administrator and an impartial judge, a strict observer of the order that has been established once and for all, the merciless punisher of all untruth.

At this point there is an unexpected convergence: the religious element of Judaism reveals its affinity with the spirit of Roman Catholicism, regulated by laws to such a great extent, which converted the Evangelical message into a theological system based on the model of Aristotelian Logic and the Justinian Code. Not to no purpose was it namely the Western Church that inherited the messianic theocratism of ancient Israel, and from a union of believers became a state. In both cases there is the same juridical understanding of good and evil, of sin and retribution, the same understanding of the world as a system of divine law-order, which realizes the pre-eternal thoughts and pre-determinations of the Almighty and Supremely-Wise Creator. And even in Western mysticism — not only in that of the church but also in the sectarian variety, which is far from Roman Orthodoxy — the All-forgiving and Kind-hearted Father, the God of the New Testament, is totally hidden in a frightening way by the terrible Judge protecting his eternal will amidst blood and punishments, effacing entire peoples from the "book of life," punishing men for the sins of their ancestors — descendants all the way to seven times the seventh generation — revealing his Truth amidst flashing lightning on fire-breathing

Sinai. Catholic thought absorbed all the "cultural" currents of the rationalistic mentality, and last century the official restoration, decreed *ex cathedra*, of the summarizing philosophy of schools is one more clear symptom of the all-permeating rationalism of the Western world. Here, truly, "the West is in the arms of the East," only it is "the East of Xerxes and not of Christ," the ancient pre-Neoasiatic East, which did not recognize any freedom other than that of the arbitrariness of one-man power; it is this very East which was revived in the Roman papacy, just as the traditions of the ancient synagogue were transferred to the Methodists and the Quakers, to their religion of — one could say — "common sense."

It would be completely erroneous to think that "rationalism" excludes all inspiration, all pathos; no, it has its own particular mysticism of "panlogism," the same one of which Hegel speaks in his well-known preface to *The Phenomenology of the Spirit*, opposing it to the aesthetic idealism of Schelling. The pivot of this rationalistic enthusiasm is the idea of the general accessibility of cognition, an original gnosiological "democratism." Individual entities become equal before the supra-individual and individuality-less, abstract, self-contained system of Reason. Truth must be nothing other than a system of reason — not a revelation of artistic genius, for only by standing higher than all individuals, by not being organically connected with individual life, can such a system be accessible to all and not be dependent on the spiritual anointment of the individual. Thus, in the name of general accessibility cognition is deprived of its vitality, moral-creative strength is removed from it, and at the same time it is drawn into the necessary game of the elements of the natural world. From a feat of spiritual birth, cognition is transformed into either a psycho-psychological reflex or a mirror-like reflection of "things in themselves." Psychology becomes "the mechanics of emotional life," and logic, a part of this inductive science. The mysticism of rationalism inevitably degenerates into naturalistic "magic," from an actor-creator, free and autocratic, man becomes the toy of elementally-caused pre-determination, a link in the all-encompassing system of nature. And if spiritual forces are felt in the world, then they are materializing at this very minute — they also obey inevitable laws, in this sense they are entirely analogous to the forces of dead nature, and like the latter they are subject to outer influences. Rationalism logically leads to "spiritism."

The inevitable association of rationalism and naturalism, the necessity for reason to dissolve freedom and the creation of personality in a system of nature, is penetratingly illuminated by the unjustly little-known Russian thinker V. Nesselrode in his brilliant interpretation of the Biblical story of the Fall. Well aware of the irreparability of the contradictions, the irreversibility of the antinomies to which the rationality of the current expla-

nation of the religious meaning of this event leads, he carefully avoids the use of traditional concepts — disobedience, outrage, punishment, retribution and so on. The meaning of evil should not be ascertained in criminological terminology. The content of the "original sin" can be neither in formally heeding the commandment, nor — as Vladimir Solov'ev maintained, continuing the gnostic tradition in the line of Schelling and Baader — in departing from total unity and the affirmation of the self. In striving towards the goal of the "cognition of good and evil" there was not and could not be anything bad. The "fall" consisted in the fact that people desired to attain this goal not through a creative act, through free searching, vital God-serving, but rather by a magical route, mechanically: "in essence, they wanted their life and fate to be determined not by themselves, but by outer material causes," and with this "they lowered their spiritual life to the position of simple things of the world," they "subjected therefore introduced their spirit into the general chain of worldly things." The essence of the "fall" is not in the violation of a law but in superstition, in the conviction that cognition is passive reception and not a creative act. And redemption consisted of nothing other than breaking through the fatalistic net of causal relations, of newly affirming the personal element over that of "things," in opening the eternal life which lies beyond and above the surface of the elemental forces.

For the very reason that "rationalism" secures the cosmic process in the steadfast formulas of world laws, individuality becomes a thing or an event — it does not merely seem to be this way, it is actually transformed into a thing, for consciousness of the self dies away, so to speak, dissolving into the formless element of reason. The most the rationalist can feel is the existence of borders, the existence of the inevitable limitations of Fate. But the magical circle cannot be opened by the abolishment of barriers alone. To accomplish this it would be necessary "to be born in water and spirit." This kind of rebirth does not happen in the West — and for this reason all of thought's efforts remain captive in the old prisons. It is already a great achievement that the prisoner has felt and become conscious of himself as such: indeed, earlier he considered himself free.

The "blowing" of the liberated spirit, which "breathes where it pleases" and not to where a causal sequence orders it, is heard in our time only outside the limits of "European" thought. It illuminates the creations of the national geniuses of the Russian people, which is "anarchical" by its very nature; it makes a mark upon the insights of American genius. It is not by chance that the American "rationalist" Royce lifted from among the dropped threads of the "European" philosophical tradition not the thread of the "uniformity of nature," not that of the self-disclosure of reason, but

rather than of the ethical pathos which inspired Fichte with the first succinct formulation in the history of West European thought of the idea of a "philosophy of freedom," a "philosophy of the individual," as opposed to the dogmatism of a "philosophy of things." It is not by chance that outside of Europe prophetic words were spoken concerning the "plasticity" of the world. It is not by chance, finally, that a Russian writer revealed the deep source of the rationalistic "sense of life" in the suggestions of the "terrible and wise spirit" who spoke with Christ in the desert. There, as earlier in primordial Adam, he spoke of one thing — of the unshakeable strength of the world elements, of world-order, of power over humanity, of social harmony, — and his words, which have an entirely different ring to them, bring genuine renewal: "Now the prince of this world will be banished hence. . . . Take heart, I have conquered the world."

Sofia 1921-III-20

PETR N. SAVITSKII

THE MIGRATION OF CULTURE*

The evolution of culture can be viewed, incidentally, from the point of view of the geographical shift of its centers, that is, concentrations of the cultural life of those peoples that in one age or another exercised the greatest influence on the surrounding historical environment. . . And if we are to turn to the cultural life of "the Old World" and, in particular, to that milieu, the historico-cultural tradition of which is currently impressed on the culture of Western Europe, we shall see, that the process of the geographical shift of the leading cultural centers is marked in this milieu by a certain tendency. . . We will direct our attention to the culture of that part of "the Old World," which we will call "western," to distinguish it from the southern and eastern parts, Hindustan and the Far East, which had and continue to have their specific civilizations. . . That culture — by which, in a form that, to be sure, has been reshaped over many thousands of years, Europe currently lives — received its tangible beginning in the civilizations of Mesopotamia and Egypt. If this fact is to be translated into climatico-geographical language, and the invariability of climate is assumed — which is basically a correct assumption, as our historical periods seem ridiculously tiny in the context of cosmic changes — then it will turn out that during that period cultural concentrations remained within the regions that have a mean annual temperature near +20 degrees Celsius and above: Nineveh (Mossul) with a mean annual temperature of +20.4 degrees C, Babylon (Baghdad) +23.3 degrees C, and Thebes +24.6 degrees.¹ As for the regions that were significant during that age that lay outside Near Asia, first and foremost in the Aegean world, these were regions on its extreme southern periphery; the culture of Crete existed on a territory with a mean annual temperature approaching +20 degrees C (Kanea, in northern Crete, +18.2 degrees). This is how things stood approximately until 1,000 B.C. It is possible to conclude that around that

* Originally as "Migratsiia kul'tury," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 40-51. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

1. Here, as throughout, the data on the average annual temperatures is taken from the following book: Dr. Julius Hann, *Handbuch der Klimatologie* (Stuttgart: J. Engelhorn, 1883).

time the middle and northern regions of the Aegean-Hellenic world began to play a prominent role.

The age around 1,000 B.C. was an age of the so-called Mycenaean-Trojan culture. Afterwards, through a lengthy historical process, the predominance of cultural influences went over definitively from the lands of Ancient East to the lands of Greco-Italian Northwest, first to ancient Hellas, and subsequently to Rome. That evolution signified the transition of cultural centers from regions with a warmer climate to regions with a more moderate one. It can be said that, beginning from 1,000 B.C., the most important cultural concentrations of the western part of the Old World lay in climates with a mean annual temperature near +15 degrees C and above: ancient Troy, +15 degrees; Athens, +17.3; Rome, +15.3 . . . Soon after the birth of Christ a further change took place within the aforementioned culturo-climatic correlations. On the arena of cultural creativity there began to emerge Gaul, gradually becoming the bearer of Latin culture and, as such, partially replacing Italy-Rome. At the turn of the eighth and ninth centuries A.D., this process received a certain political form by the fact of the restoration of the Western Roman Empire in the form of the Frankish Monarchy of Charlemagne. The role of Italy in the development of West European culture by no means lost its significance because of this, just as cultural significance of Egypt (Alexandria!) was not lost amidst the ascent of more northern centers in the culture of the ancient world. But the very emergence of Gaul-France undoubtedly signaled a transfer of cultural concentrations to a realm of harsher climate – after all, the climate of Gaul-France is characterized by mean annual temperatures of lower than +15 degrees C (Avignon, +14; Paris, +10.3; Brussels, +9.9) – although that emergence was not linked to a decline of the cultural role of its southern neighbor. Simultaneously with the rise in the West of the cultural significance of Gaul-France, the hegemony of cultural influence in the East passed from middle and northern regions of the Aegean world to a yet more northern capital, Constantinople, with a mean annual temperature also below +15 degrees Celsius (+14.1, to be precise) . . .

Taking into account that the most important in the history of culture *fait nouveau* of the first millennium A.D. was the birth of the cultural significance of Gaul and the emergence of "Frankish" culture, the centers of which were located in regions with mean annual temperatures near +10 degrees C, we believe that there are grounds to assert that between the age of the birth of Christ and 1,000 A.D., the leading centers of the culture we are interested in were located in regions with mean annual temperatures near +10 degrees C and above (the Arabic civilization of that age flourished in climates with mean annual temperatures near +20 degrees C).

In what direction, then, did concentrations of culture shift during the second millennium A.D.? — We perceive as indubitable that during this period the culture of the western part of "the Old World" continued its movement, first noted several millennia earlier, to the north, or, to be more precise, to lands with increasingly harsh climate. Already in the first millennium A.D. it is impossible to ignore the cultural relevance of the peoples that populated, and continue to populate, the British Isles (the culture of Ireland! the culture of the Anglo-Saxons!) with their mean annual temperatures of +10 degrees C and somewhat lower (London, +10 degrees; Hull, +8.8 degrees; Edinburgh, +8.2 degrees). In the second millennium A.D., especially in its second half, this significance grew immensely. Around 1,000 A.D., Norman culture came into its own as one of the active factors of the cultural life of Europe. It was located in lands with mean annual temperatures barely exceeding +5 degrees C (Bergen, +6.9; Christiania, +5.2). At approximately the same time, the Frankish civilization of the Carolingian Age splintered into several separate national branches; in the cultural existence of one of the created nationalities, which was to attain great relevance — the German one — the prominent role fell on the lot of the eastern regions of its territory, "the eastern marks," of Brandenburg and others. The German "eastern marks," like Scandinavia, lie within a thermal region with temperatures below +10 degrees C, with mean annual temperatures of +8 degrees, +7 degrees, and even +6 degrees Celsius (Königsberg, the former capital of Prussia and Kant's homeland, +6.6 degrees C). We will refrain from further examination of the geographico-climatic distribution of the centers of latest culture. Let us state our deduction directly: in the second millennium A.D. the culture of the western part of "the Old World," in its leading concentrations, was reaching northward all the way to the regions of mean annual temperatures near +5 degrees C.

A brief examination of the question leads us to establish the following chart of culturo-geographic shifts. Cultural concentrations of the western part of "the Old World" were arranged:

- before 1,000 B.C.,
in regions with mean annual temperatures
near +20 degrees Celsius and above,
- from 1,000 B.C. until the birth of Christ,
in regions with mean annual temperatures
near +15 degrees Celsius and above,
- from the Birth Christ until 1,000 A.D.,
in regions with mean annual temperatures
near +10 degrees Celsius and above,

from 1,000 A.D. to the present,
 in regions with mean annual temperatures
 near +5 degrees Celsius and above.

By no means do we attribute perfect precision to this chart. In particular, under the designation "near" we presume the possibility of deviation of mean annual temperatures to 2.5 degrees C from the stated numbers, that is, to half of that thermal quantity that separates from each other the proximate historico-climatic groups of this chart. . . It is also completely evident, that this chart marks only the *lower* thermal boundary of those regions in which the leading centers of culture were located in corresponding epochs. This boundary moved with the passage of time in the direction of progressively harsher climates, which in itself meant the growth in *relative* significance in cultural affairs of colder lands. The advancement of this boundary by no means excludes the possibility and fact of the existence during each of the aforementioned epochs of powerful cultural life in lands that lie perhaps even significantly to the south of that boundary, and also of particular instances of the shifting of cultural concentrations from colder to warmer lands. . . Our chart seeks to determine the *culturo-climatic fait nouveau* of each of the epochs under consideration; and the spread of culture, in its leading manifestations, to lands of progressively colder climates, invariably turns out to be that *fait nouveau*.

Concerning the latest epoch, we wish to emphasize the following: in the second half of the second millennium A.D. the culture of the western part of "the Old World" (represented in this period by "West European" culture), which is, as such, no more than one of the cultures existing on the planet, and which, throughout all the previous epochs, actually coexisted with a multitude of other cultures, in complete or almost complete isolation from them, has turned out to be in a position, whether for a long or a short period, to establish for the first time in known human history a communications system linking all the peoples of the planet. Through this process, it attained predominance, of its military as well as of its cultural influences, over the cultures of all the other peoples and thus brought about the possibility of colonization by European emigrants of immense non-European regions (all of America and Australia, part of Africa). This fact has broadened, in the most essential manner, the geographical realm within which there can now occur the shifts of the centers of the present-day "European" culture. But that is a question for the present and the future. As for the past, we have seen that concentrations of culture passed in the process of historical evolution to regions of increasingly harsh climate. . . Having begun its migration from lands that, in their mean annual

temperatures, are close to the maximum known on the planet (mean annual temperature of Upper Egypt is near +25 degrees C; maximum known annual temperature is near +28 degrees), culture moved to progressively colder regions, and reached the lands of central and northern Europe. We present this process exclusively as applied to that specific culturo-historical world which we shall call the cultural world of "the western part of the Old World," leaving open the question of the character of the geographical tendencies in the development of the other culturo-historical realms that existed and continue to exist on our planet. — However, we do ascribe to the aforementioned process of geographico-cultural shifts a certain universal-historical significance, because, according to what has been said above, precisely that specific-historical culture, which has turned out to be the bearer of these shifts, at a certain moment, in the second half of the second millennium A.D., has attained the potential to eliminate intraplanetary divisiveness, and subjected, to various degrees, the whole world to its influence. The elevation of this culture to universal-historical significance made clear, in reference to the past, also the significance of that culturo-historical evolution in which it grew, the aforementioned evolution of culturo-geographical shifts. . . We determine the tendency of this evolution wholly empirically. We cannot and do not concern ourselves with the problem of providing its causal interpretation. And only in a comparison — to which we wholly attribute the saying *comparaison n'est pas raison* — we shall note, that in the aforementioned process of geographical shifts, occurring within a pitifully short, on the scale of cosmic development, interval of time, there can be seen a certain parallelism to the processes of the organic evolution of the world, which unfold over infinitely broader time frames.

The middle of the secondary period was, it seems, a period warm and humid in equal measure, for the duration of which over almost the entire space of the planet there prevailed climatic conditions analogous to the conditions of the present-day equatorial zone. . . Beginning with the cretaceous period, there was a marked separation of the Polar world. . . The hot zone, with its reefs of zoological origin, narrowed more and more. . . On the continents, the increase in cooling and drying was accompanied by the formation of biological zones, the dying out of some biological groups, and the birth of new ones. In the secondary period, cold-blooded creatures had gigantic sizes; species existed that were adapted to the most varied forms of existence: amphibians, reptiles, run-

ners, swimmers, flyers. The cooling led to their extinction, and predominance passed to hot-blooded creatures: birds and mammals. . .²

To this evolution it is interesting to contrast the process of the migration of culture to increasingly harsher climates, which was mentioned above in connection to the cultural fates of "the Old World." As the "later" species of living creatures are produced by the cooling of the planet, so the "later" cultures are engendered in increasingly colder lands. Cold — if cooling that is so insignificant in the general order of the universe can indeed be termed "cold" — is a determining factor of evolution. It determines the modifications of the organic world. Does it not also attract into its range human nature in its most intense manifestations? — And sooner or later will it not, by its icy touch, terminate the existence both of the organic world and of human culture? . . . This is a theme that gives food for fantasy. . .

No tendency, regardless of how definitive it may have been in the past, gives grounds for predictions of the future, and no comparison can give it that quality of forecasting. But the existence of a tendency makes possible the raising of expectations . . .

The second millennium A.D. is nearing its end. If the forces that have been active in the cultural development of the western part of the Old World in the last millennium will continue to act in it and with the same intensity, then the expectation will become warranted that in the third millennium A.D., the cultural concentrations of the world, continuing their movement in the direction of the cold at the same tempo as in the past, will move toward climatic zones with mean annual temperatures near zero degrees C . . .

Of the regions on the planet distinguished by mean annual temperatures of between +5 degrees C and zero degrees C, and, at the same time, suitable for the habitation of the modern human being, only two are significant. These are the regions of Canada (Winnipeg, +0.6 degrees C; localities in middle Saskatchewan, 0; Fort Chipewyan on Lake Athabasca, which is still in the region of wheat culture, -2.5) with the adjacent districts of the United States (northern Minnesota, +3.0 degrees C), and then parts of northern and central, and the entire eastern, Russia, European as well as Siberian (Moscow, +3.9 degrees C; Kazan', +2.9; Ekaterinburg, +0.5; Krasnoïarsk, +0.3; Irkutsk, -0.1), that is, regions that are part of that geographical sphere which we call "Eurasia." Thus, the extension into the future of the tendency of geographico-cultural shifts, described above, leads, apparently, to the supposition that cultural concen-

2. [Emmanuel] de Martonne, *Traité de Géographie Physique*, 3-me édition (Paris: [A. Colin], 1920), pp. 741-43.

trations of that world, the bearer of whose tradition throughout the last centuries has been Western Europe, will move to Russia-Eurasia and to North America.

Within these geographical worlds, culture encounters on its way not only regions with those low mean annual temperatures, of which we speak here, but also lands that are far warmer; after all, New York, not to mention the southern States, has a mean annual temperature of +11.0 degrees C. — Culture also takes hold and becomes firmly established in these warmer regions. Within the system of thought of the culturo-geographical or, to be more exact, culturo-climatic, conception presented here, this fact can be viewed as one of the phenomena accompanying the process of the migration of culture in the direction of "the poles of cold," located in the depths of North America and "Eurasia". . . It would be laughable to lay claim to scientific authenticity for such a conception. And from the perspective of the principle of freedom of philosophic conviction, which, in the nature of things, must prevail wherever an attempt is being made to foresee the future on the basis of estimation-by-eye and empirical orientation, it is completely permissible to hold the opinion that, having reached their current limits, the leading centers of culture will again retreat southward. However, for one who is inclined to think that the processes of geographico-cultural shifts of the future will continue to flow in the same direction in which they had flowed in the past, there opens up a search for finding indications that the cultural centers of modernity are indeed moving, and have moved, toward Russia-Eurasia and North America, toward an attempt to achieve the expectation, which arises as a result of the observations of the tendency of the culturo-geographic shifts as well as living impressions of modernity. In this connection, one can allude to that predominance which North America has achieved in the last years within the economic life of almost the entire planet, in large part thanks to the intensive economic activity of those regions, severe in climate, the development of which is most noteworthy from the perspective of the geographico-cultural tendency outlined above. In this regard, one can also point out the incessantly growing political significance of the United States. On the other hand, let us not forget that central, in a certain regard, position, which in the very last years Russia has seized in the ideological life of the world by the explosion and the struggle of its revolution, and in so doing, to a certain degree, by the whole aggregate of its culture. Meanwhile, in one of the processes of her cultural evolution, Russia, by agricultural colonization as well as the shifting of manufacturing centers, is leaving the former cultural territory of her Center and Northwest, increasingly for the East — for the boundless

spaces and steppes of borderline-European and Asian territories, for regions where the mean annual temperature dips to 0 degrees:

O my Rus'. My wife. To the point of pain
 The long way is clear to us.
 Our way by an arrow of the ancient Tatar will
 Has pierced our chest.
 Our way of the steppe . . .

(A. Blok)

It is possible to think that the leading centers of culture, its most influential concentrations, are already located not only in Western Europe, as had been the case not long ago, but also in Russia-Eurasia and in North America, and that these two regions, or, to be more precise, two continents, are lining up next to Europe and "replacing" it in the sense of taking upon themselves part of the activity of cultural creativity (which, of course, in itself does not indicate the cultural-historical "removal" of the previously-active world) . . .

We come to foresee this "succession" by determining a certain tendency of culturo-geographical shifts, a tendency essential, in our opinion, for understanding the fates of culture, but determining still only the outer frame of the culturo-historical process. Our point of view is, in a certain sense, a formally-geographical one. Our immediate task is to point out the prospects that open up precisely from this point of view. . . We observe the geographical shifts of culture and see how the cultures of Near Asia, the Mediterranean, and Western Europe replace one another. And we pose the question: will not the culture of North America, on the one hand, and the culture of Eurasia, on the other, be their successors and, in particular, the successors to West European culture (or its current "partners")? . . . The name "Eurasia" expresses for us, for one thing, the link of the Russian element with some ethnically non-Russian elements of its surrounding milieu. If we were asked, how we translate the geographical chart of cultural shifts to the language of ethnography, then, following the determination of Chaldeo-Egyptian, Greco-Italian, Romano-Germanic periods, we would note the cultural existence of North America, as a continuation of the Romano-Germanic period, and as for Russia-Eurasia, we would speak of a Slavo-Mongolian period, a Slavo-Turanian one, or, now, a Russo-Mongolian, Russo-Turanian one . . .

What can be said within the context of the process of culturo-geographical and culturo-ethnographic evolution concerning the changes in the content of culture? Our conception presupposes, of course, historical changes in that content: such changes are attached to the stages of geo-

graphical and ethnographic shifts. According to this conception, images of geography and ethnography of culture are, at the same time, essential bearers of specific content of culture: of religion and philosophy, poetry and art, statehood and the economy, technology and the way of life. It would be important to determine the gradation of the intensity of those changes, in the content of cultures, by which the distinct stages of the culturo-geographical and ethnographic shifts are accompanied. Unfortunately, without a criterion to measure the differences of intensity, we are forced to limit ourselves to empirical presentation of the existence of the latter – the existence of a difference between, for example, the shift of cultural concentrations from Agamemnon's Argolis to Pericles' Attica and the one from the lands of the Ancient East to Hellas, as a total process. A question arises: is the conceivable transfer of culture from Western Europe to Russia-Eurasia and North America similar to the shift of cultural concentrations from Argolis to Attica or, in its character, does it approach the shift of culture from the lands of the Ancient East to Hellas? . . .

If this question is formulated in regard to Russia in particular, then it can be put in the following way: is the advancement of Russia the advancement of one of the "European" countries within the realm of "European" culture, similar, for example, to the growth of the significance of Gaul-France to the level of that of Italy, the replacement of what can conceivably be called the "Italian" period by a French one, or is it the birth of a new culture, although genetically linked to the West European one, but still representing an equally radical change of its tradition, as the one, for example, that was brought about by Hellas in relation to "the inheritance" of the Ancient East, or by the New World in relation to Antiquity? . . .

The process of the shifting of cultural concentrations from Argolis to Attica and the process of their transfer from the lands of the Ancient East to Hellas – these are the extreme cases. History offers examples of culturo-geographical shifts that occupy middle ground in the degree of radicalization: for example, the replacement of the Hellenic world by a Hellenistic one. A question can be posed: do not the cultures of Russia-Eurasia and North America, in their relationship to the culture of Romano-Germanic Europe, exhibit a certain similarity to precisely such relationships of the transitional type? . . .

A different problem becomes attached to the one here stated. The emergence of the leading cultural role of "young" lands does not in itself mean that the centers of "old" culture lose their significance. The same applies to the organic world: the newborn, the young, the adults, and the elderly coexist. But generally the young do outlive the old. Similarly, in the world of culture the "younger" centers, even if not immediately but grad-

ually, do eliminate the significance of the "old" . . . There are exceptions. And, for example, the culture of Ancient Egypt outlived many other "younger" cultures. But according to the general rule the young do outlive the old. How shall it be in regard to the relationships of Russia-Eurasia and North America to "Europe"; shall there occur a "*declin d'Europe*," an "*Untergang des Abendlandes*," or shall Europe, with that cultural ferment, which is contained within it, turn out to be firmer in its position of cultural significance than the other worlds that are currently emerging on the historical arena — either both of them or one of them in particular? . . .

We shall leave aside the ideological chasms of possible divergences. We shall limit ourselves to a concise comment on the particular condition of North America, on the one hand, and of Russia-Eurasia, on the other, in their relation to Western Europe, both on the size of the geographical "leap," to which is linked the conceivable culturo-geographical evolution and on the nature of the cultural tradition possessed by each country.

The birth of a mighty cultural life in North America is in some ways a "revolutionary" fact of culturo-geographical evolution. The transfer across the ocean of centers of a culture, which is in its roots a culture of "the western part of the Old World," removes from it the characteristic of being exclusively a culture of "the Old World," and gives it a fundamentally new geographical configuration. Just as new a culturo-geographical fact is the emergence on the broad culturo-historical arena of the regions of northeastern Europe and northern Asia integrated into Russian culture. Yet these regions are still within the bounds of "the Old World." It can be said that in the externally-geographical sense North America is located farther from Western Europe than is Russia-Eurasia; and, therefore, if the future belongs not to Western Europe, then, from the logical perspective it is precisely Russia-Eurasia that is the direct heir to the succession of "the western part of the Old World." The issue is different in regard to the content of the cultural tradition. North America is a land populated completely through immigration from Western Europe; in a certain regard, it is the flesh of the flesh and the blood of the blood of Western Europe. With the passage of time North America is of course developing, and will successfully develop, an independent tradition. But at its source, it carries only that tradition which is present in the culture of Western Europe. Russian culture, on the other hand, contains within itself not only those traditions that are borrowed from Western Europe, but some others as well — for example, the cultural tradition received directly from Byzantium. If Russia is to be interpreted broadly, if the participation in the matter of Russian culture by the Tatars and the Sarts, the Georgians and the Armenians, the Persians and the Turks, is understood and given proper weight, then it can be asserted that the Russian element, in its spiritual essence, is

at the crossroads of the West European tradition and the traditions of the old "pre-European" East. . . At the same time that the culture of the Romano-Germanic Europe receives a heretofore unheard of expansion in the rise of North America, in the Old World there is coming to cultural influence a certain New World, the cultural tradition of which has a different, and in some sense more complicated, content than the cultural tradition of North America.

GEORGII V. FLOROVSKII

ABOUT NON-HISTORICAL PEOPLES (The Land of the Fathers and the Land of the Children)*

To N. N. S.

Der Prozesz der Geschichte ist ein Verbrennen – Novalis

The idea of culturo-historical inequality and, consequently, unequal rights of peoples originates in deep antiquity, as long ago as when "God's Chosen People"-Israel distinguished itself from the motley mass of "tongues," and "free" Hellenes contrasted themselves to slaves-"barbarians." In the consciousness of the generations nearest our own, this idea has taken the form of the antithesis between "historical" and "non-historical" peoples, peoples that are old, which have lived through and endured long series of historical transmutations, and therefore carry within themselves a multitude of sequential historical layers, and new peoples, peoples that have hitherto been powerless, culturally virginal, "deprived of inheritance" and ancestors. The problem of nationality was refracted through the prism of the universal-historical life plan, and resolved from the perspective of the singularity of the historical process and the linearity of its course. The fates of humanity, as a unified whole, are directed, not in a bunch of rays or a bundle of parallels, but precisely in a single line, toward the resolution of a common, universal problem. Humanity is approaching its foreordained aim in slow, but uninterrupted steps. But not all of humanity steps into the world arena at the same time: peoples are replaced by other peoples, hoisting yet newer and higher tables of injunctions one above the other. They do not cancel one another, but rather steadfastly collect and deepen hereditary wisdom. All the past centuries, as Hegel used to say, are contained in the present. The riches of "universal civilization" increase and grow in strength. And now it seems that the limited ranks of "historical" peoples, who had inherited

* Originally as "O narodakh ne-istoricheskikh. (Strana ottsov i strana detei)," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 52-70. Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

from each other the leading role in universal life, have been already exhausted, and that the people to which had fallen the final turn is called upon to retain for itself forever the rights of cultural hegemony and the status of the world center. Such is the envious lot of "Europe," of that "Romano-Germanic" world which had formed itself on top of the ruins of the ancient Roman Empire and inherited from its predecessors their state wisdom, religious revelations, and cultural predispositions. And within the bounds of that world there occurred a "succession of peoples" of its own, leading in the end to the result that the German people became the "heart" and "capital" of world culture. In the days of patriotic sorrow, state humiliation, and popular despair, Fichte convinced "the German nation" in a rush of religious enthusiasm that only it was a "people" in the true and severe — messianic — sense of the word, and that a true "love of fatherland," enlightened by ideals, is accessible only to it. And almost in those same years, while attempting to reconstruct in an integral form the successive fates of humanity, Hegel was coming to the conclusion that precisely the "popular spirit" of the Germanic tribe, its *Gemuth*, represents the highest point in the development of world Reason. After several attempts, he finally found an adequate form for his self-revelation.

A series of culturo-historical migrations came to its end. And, like the foolish maidens of the gospel parable, those peoples that had not had the opportunity to play leading roles in "the past" are doomed to remain historical supernumeraries forever — that is, if they are even ever to come out from behind the curtains of historical life, whence many an obsolete people has already retreated into the darkness of oblivion. The right to participate in historical drama is granted, thus, by descent, by nobility, so to say, by purity of blood — those of humble origin, and those who do not remember their origin, are, by that alone, excluded from participation. What is available to them is not creative powers, but only the ability to imitate. The closer they come in the process of imitation to the original and the more exact copy of it they become, the higher will be their relative significance in world affairs.

The "new" vocabulary has already been exhausted. Everything that is accessible to human accomplishment has already been deposited into the treasure-houses of "eternal and absolute" wisdom. The solution to the world mystery has already been found. The all-appeasing and all-solving word has been pronounced. Henceforth the problem of production must yield its place in the economy of cultural life to the problem of distribution and exchange. From now on, the discourse must concern not the creation of new values, but the utilization of that which is available and accessible, "joining" the wisdom of the centuries. The type of the selfless seeker of truth and justice must be replaced by the type of *Kulturträger*,

enlightener, preacher of ancestral testaments. Whether this is "the beneficial hand of Providence," the dialectical self-realization of universal Reason, the iron laws of biological and economic "struggle for survival," or "the most immutable laws of physiology" makes no difference; the fatal necessity of historical development has forced human life to pour itself out into final, immutable forms, normal for the entire anthropological genus of *bipedes*.

"Uniformity of nature" is a basic law of the life of the world as well as of historical life. The number of active cosmic factors is constant, and the laws governing them are immutable. *That is how it was, that is how it shall be* — this is the basic idea of the "evolutionary" world view. Forces active in nature have always been active — they remain the same — and they always act in accordance with those same iron, necessary laws, that are discovered by the modern explorer of nature and the observer of the life of people and human societies. "The future," as Herzen said with his customary relentlessness, "is sold into debt-slavery before birth." But on the other hand, those fears with which the timid human heart had been filled by the ancient "catastrophic" world view of the times of Vico, the times of the arguments of "the Neptunists" and "the Plutonists," even the times of Cuvier, have been dispersed. The "laws of nature," which changed many times, may, after all, change again, the cosmic process may turn onto new paths, new forces may suddenly cut into world harmony, and all that had existed before may collapse into non-existence . . . "The theory of progress" insures against this with certainty. And along with the risk, there is abolished the sense of "personal accountability," completely superfluous for a tiny cog in a well-wound-up mechanism of "the system of nature." Thus behind the culturo-historical opposition of historical peoples to the non-historical is concealed another, deeper opposition — the culturo-philosophical one: the culturo-philosophical opposition, which Zarathustra's singer condensed with such insight into his catchy words about "the land of the fathers" and "the land of the children" — *Vaterland* and *Kinder Land* — is an opposition of two tones, two conceptions of life, the retrospective and the prospective.

"Who can recognize you?," he asked his "contemporaries." "Your face is completely marked up by signs of the past and on top of them are yet newer signs — you have concealed yourselves craftily, well enough to fool any fortuneteller. All times and peoples show through gaudily from beneath your coverings; all faiths and customs are audible in your songs." . . . But they have neither their own living face nor their own convincing word. They have only *the wisdom of the fathers*, primogenitory behests. Their gazes are fixed upon the past: there, and not even in the present, they seek security for the future, trying to determine "the tendencies of

development." A peculiar pride in years, in the number of elapsed generations, results. That which is the most ancient is considered the most sound. Genealogy takes the place of principled justification, of judgment according to merit. Trial by time is a trial by ideals. A "Western Old Believer" type is created. "It was laid down before our time, let it stand for centuries!" Anything that is not rooted in the deep layers of subsoil is apparently a chimera. "Immemorial principles" and "successive traditions of humanity" are juxtaposed against "groundless reveries." Accomplishments are higher than possibilities. Herzen grasped the very essence of this ideology when he wrote to Chicherin: "You know a lot, you know it well, everything in your head is fresh and new, and, what is most important, you are convinced by what you know, and therefore you are calm; with certitude you await a rational development of events in confirmation of the program discovered by science. It is not possible for you to be at odds with the present; you know that if the past was such and such, the present must be such and such, and lead to such and such a future . . . You . . . definitely know, where to go, where to lead others."

The philosophy of progress is oriented entirely toward the past. From the past a program of action is calculated, historical predictions are made based on the past. The future itself is projected onto the past either as a pre-eternal design of world-ruling Reason; or in the form of concealed potentialities, unfolding with imminent certainty over time, of that which exists; or again in the form of a conscious choice of a will to life. And moreover, "history repeats itself." All "peoples" pass through the same cycle of transformations; the difference is only in the tempo and the rhythm, the difference is only in the number of generations. And based on the history of one people, we can predict the still-developing history of another. *Historia est magistra vitae* — into that aphorism Cicero fused all the culturo-philosophical hopes of "the fathers." "We Russians," Turgenev wrote to Herzen with the irritation of a man forced to state the obvious, we "belong according to language and according to species to the European family, 'genus Europaeum,' and, consequently, in accordance with the most immutable laws of physiology, we must travel the same road. I have not yet heard of a duck, that, while belonging to the duck species, would breathe through gills like a fish." And he maliciously ridiculed the Russian "riddle," the "Russian sphinx" with its years of silence. He recognized in that "sphinx" the familiar features of a laroslavl' bumpkin, beaten down by indigence and arduous labor, with his smell and heartburn. He measured it, apparently, by the scales of "a grand building of a majestic civilization, put together for centuries" — in the West . . .

The first attempt at "a philosophy of Russian history" arose precisely in this ideological atmosphere. Russian historiosophy started off from the beginning with the prayer for the dying. The somber, cheerless, depressing pessimism of Chaadaev's first "Philosophical Letter" was instilled precisely by the realization that "we do not belong to any of the great families of humanity" and do not share a common life with them. "Our history is attached to nothing, it elucidates nothing, it proves nothing." We *did nothing* "at the time when the temple of modern civilization was being put together in the struggle between the energetic barbarism of the northern peoples and the lofty idea of Christianity," — "and nothing of what took place in Europe has reached us." "The whole world was being reconstructed anew, yet nothing was created among us; we kept vegetating as in prior times, stuffed into our hovels of logs and straw." "Having entered the world, like illegitimate children, without inheritance, without a tie to people who lived on earth before us, we keep nothing in our hearts of those lessons that preceded our own existence." "Our recollections do not go back beyond yesterday" and therefore, having taken nothing "from successive ideas of humanity," devoid of "inner development," "we all have the appearance of travelers," "we grow, but we do not ripen." "We move through time in such a strange way, that with every one of our steps forward, the fleeting instant disappears for us irrevocably," "every new idea forces the old ones to disappear without a trace," "in our brain no indelible furrows are formed, which successive development forms in other minds, and which constitute their strength." And it is completely natural "that not a single useful idea was born upon the soil of our native land, not a single great truth has come out of our milieu": for we are utterly deprived of humanity's "successive inheritance of ideas." "We belong to the ranks of those nations that seemingly form no part of the composition of humanity," "we are . . . in a certain sense, an exceptional people." And if we were to wish to reject this dubious and onerous advantage, if we were to wish to *enter into* history and in it "to attain a position similar to that of other civilized peoples — we would have (had) somehow to repeat here the entire education of humanity," anew and succinctly. Thus upon the soil of a universal plan of human history Russian "Westernism" was being born. This no longer was the common sense of the "Tsar-workman," and not the elemental *Drang nach Westen*, not a social Europeanization, but a genuine historiosophy of national fate. If there are no blood ancestors, they must be obtained; access into "one of the great families of the human species" must be attained through adoption. These families are not unlike Noah's ark: those who did not get inside are doomed to death, to anonymity, to infertility . . .

And Chaadaev's patriotic anxiety immediately softened, turned into abundant hope, into an intense expectation of the future, as soon as he came to realize that to be historically newborn does not at all mean to be doomed to a fate of eternal infanthood, that to have only blank pages in one's past does not necessarily mean a future as an eternal non-entity. On the contrary. "We never lived under the fateful pressure of the logic of the times," he wrote in his "Apology of a Madman," "never were we reduced by allmighty will into those precipices that tear out centuries from the histories of other peoples. Let us make use of that great advantage, which allows us to obey only the voice of enlightened reason, conscious will." Thus the absence of historical inheritance is transformed from shameful poverty into a priceless treasure. The old soil is too saturated by "memories," too polluted by the refuse of life's lengthy centuries, and new sprouts are forced to come up out of "emaciated soil," to struggle through the crowded, already aged shoots. The burden of old acquisitions, inherited prejudices, realized and broken aspirations, always weighs down and burdens thought, always paralyzes the dauntlessness of creative searching. By the might of the perceived mass it interferes with the objectivity of view, complicates the straightforwardness of originality by intricate twists. "The past of the West binds it," wrote Herzen. "Its life forces are shackled by a collective guarantee to the shadows of the past . . . Bright human sides of modern European life grew in the cramped narrow passages and establishments of the Middle Ages: they grew attached to the old armor, cassocks, and dwellings, intended for a completely different way of life; it is dangerous to separate them, for the same arteries pass through them. In the inconveniences of inherited forms, the West respects its memories, the will of its fathers. Its way forward is impeded by stones — but these stones are memorials to civic victories or gravestones." The West is a land of the past only, set in its ways and therefore no longer advancing. All its strengths sink into protecting the forefathers' riches and cleaning museum treasures. But no cultural riches can take the place of the irrepressible impulsiveness of youthful growth. "*Sero venientibus ossa*" — this West European proverb contains false wisdom: the latecomers receive reserves of crystallized life experience as a gift, thus escaping the burden of suffering through the experience themselves, and setting themselves free from the majority of historical temptations and falls.

This train of thought was repeated in the Russian consciousness over and over from the time of Chaadaev up to Solov'ev and Dostoevskii, dispelling the merciless specter of "non-historicity." The "Slavophiles" sensed as well as the "Westernizers" "how fine that majestic West was," where "in bright rainbows inspirations flowed together, and the living fire

of Faith spilled streams of light" . . . After all, it was the Slavophiles who came up with the pithy saying — "the land of holy miracles." They ardently professed "Europe" to be their "second fatherland." But they also recognized that "all this has long been a cemetery and nothing more"; true, this was "the most precious cemetery," "precious are the deceased who lie there, every stone above them testifies to such an ardent past life, to such an impassioned faith in their deed," that knees bend involuntarily and tears well up in the eyes. And did not Herzen say almost the same exact words, almost literally, to Russian "Westernizers," as represented by Turgenev. "You love European ideas — and I love them, too — these are the ideas of history as a whole, they constitute a graveside memorial, on which is inscribed the testament not only of yesterday, but of Egypt, India, Greece, and Rome, of Catholicism and Protestantism, of Roman peoples and Germanic peoples." All of that is "a rarity, a sarcophagus, a splendid footprint of a past life" . . . All "European culture," all that sparkle and din of "civilization," stunning and staggering the senses, all of that is the past, not the future. "Westerly wind brings tears," Vladimir Solov'ev will say several decades later. Yes, but only tears, tears of tender gratitude for an obsolete and dying world, tears of reconciliation. So be it that "from the place of the dead the heart did not return": it will await a new "commanding idea and word" from a different land that is also new. . . Only by contrast does the old land stimulate action.

It has long become a truism that poets are not created by schooling; they are born. But no one has yet succeeded in convincing the popular masses that culture cannot be learned, that it cannot be "appropriated," "taken over," "inherited," that it can be only created by an individual freely exerting his own strength. "Cultural tradition" — in that expression is contained a fateful double entendre. *Natura non facit saltus* — historically this is a lie. On the contrary, all of history is comprised of "leaps." Only he continues the cultural succession who renews it, who transmutes tradition into his own property, into an inseparable element of his personal existence and, as it were, creates it anew. "Creators, you are the highest people," spoke Zarathustra, "it is possible to be pregnant only with one's own child" . . . When historical "mutations," the unforeseen emergence of new forms of existence, cease, then *culture dies and only the stagnant way of life remains*. And as for the way of life, it is indeed passed along by inheritance. The way of life is frozen culture, incarnate ideas — incarnate and therefore lacking their own life, their own independent rhythm. The way of life is not established at once, sometimes it is forged over centuries; but when at last it is formed, that means that life, for the time being, along this particular line of development, has exhausted itself,

has reached some inner limit. Culture is precisely nothing but a still incomplete way of life, a way of life *in statu nascendi*. "Where a specie has been established," Herzen wrote, "history ends, or at least becomes humbler, develops little by little . . . in the same fashion as our planet as a whole. Having ripened to a certain cooling period, it changes its bark slowly; floods do occur, but not world deluges; earthquakes do occur here and there, but there is no general cataclysm. . . . Species come to a halt, consolidate in different, more or less uni-directional possibilities, pointing this or that way; species reach these possibilities, but they almost cannot overstep them, and even if they do so, then only in the sense of the same old single-directionality. A shell-fish does not strive to become a crawfish, nor does a crawfish seek to become a trout; if one were to conjecture animal ideals, then the ideal of a crawfish would be also a crawfish, but with a perfect organism" . . . "The evolving specie, striving beyond the limits of its strength, or lagging behind, gradually balanced itself out, restrained itself, lost its anatomical eccentricities and physiological irregularities, attaining on the other hand fertility and beginning to repeat, in the image and likeness of its first established ancestor, its own designated specie and its own individuality." — "Another generation, and there are no more upsurges, everything takes on the usual order, uniqueness is erased, the alternation of individual specimens is barely noticeable in the continuing ongoing flow of life." And "while some are settled in what has been achieved, evolution proceeds among the not-yet-formed neighboring species, next to the *completed ones*, which have come to the end of the cycle of their specie."

And this is the only "law" of life: the *young* incessantly displace the *old*. And indeed only because of this life is what it is. And if the number of "historical peoples" was truly exhausted, if the "succession of peoples" were to actually come to a halt, that would mean only that life itself has ended, and death is beginning. If the dream of a golden age, of blissful islands, were ever to come true, that would mean the coming of an endless epoch of eternal slumber, eternal stagnation. After the attainment of all aims, the idea of movement itself would lose meaning. For us, who are the forerunners of this imaginary epoch, which was at one time so ardently desired and anticipated, it is impossible even in reverie to invent such a type of a "future human being," for whom the opposition of the given and the norm, the sought after and the available, must appear nonsensical. But nonetheless, if nature is just a system, then that kingdom will come even in spite of our will. The second law of thermodynamics, upon which all our calculations about the physical world are based and to which is subordinated the human struggle against nature, that is, "the con-

quest of nature" for human aims, states that entropy of the world is increasing, i.e., that all the inequalities in the world are progressively smoothed over, that the number of cosmic transformations incessantly decreases, less and less space is left for them, in a word, that the world is surging toward rest. This rest of death is indeed really just another expression for the elimination of all disharmonies, the removal of all inequalities. If only "laws" hold sway in the world, that means that we are digging a grave for ourselves with our own hands and are getting ready to bury ourselves in it.

But what are the laws of the world, and in what sense can we speak of their holding sway over that which exists? No one will now attempt to assert the "reality" of these laws in the sense that they represent, so to speak, an exact copy of the relations between the forces of nature, as they exist by themselves, *an und für sich*. The view of them as a method for understanding reality has been sufficiently well rooted: laws of nature, known to us, are really laws of the existing methods of our contemplation about the world, passed through the prism of our perception of the world. And, let us ask, are these methods immutable and invariable? The only support for an answer in the affirmative is the notorious "uniformity of nature," which expresses nothing other than the dogmatic, will-assertive belief in the notion that the future is a simple function of the past. We attempt to create with our intellectual fantasy such an ideal image of the world, so that the forces acting within it would give birth to just such phenomena as those that are now observed by us, and as we know, were observed before our time. We attempt, in this way, to explain certain factual material, certain concrete-historical facts. In constructing the "plan" of the historical process, we intend to establish a causal inevitability of the present, and base this inference on the unspoken assumption that the past comes up against the present as if against a *cul-de-sac*. And if, in the end, it begins to seem to us that historical life is governed by ironclad laws of fateful predestination, that is so only because we started with this assumption. After all, human reason always finds in things that which it itself had placed in them. Actually, historical perspectives moved apart and changed many a time. It was customary to divide history into ancient, middle, and new periods, but it became necessary to part with that convention when within antiquity there opened up its own "medievalism" and it became clear that what we had considered one of the periods of a single universal-historical process is, in essence, a completed whole, an independent culturo-historical entity, possessing its own beginning, its own *anun*, and its own conclusion. And beyond the bounds of the Mediterranean cultural world there were discovered yet other such self-contained historical cycles. . . . Regardless of how long the scheme of

the four kingdoms of the Book of Daniel had held sway, finally the complete inappropriateness of this scheme became apparent.

Our historico-genetic schemes always come up with one end against *such and such* a present, with the other against *such and such* a past. We can confidently make forecasts and predictions only under the condition that the possibility of surprises, breaks, and twists – in a word, of creativity – is precluded in advance. Calculations must be conducted as if only the way of life exists, and there is no culture. And then we can deduce the new way of life out of the old, disregarding the link that connects them – the human individual. The main line of universal history that was divided into ancient, middle, and new – asserted Vladimir Solov'ev, with his mind gripped by ominous premonitions – had ended. What remains is to play out the epilogue of the great drama – and it may drag out for many acts. But was the specter of "pale death" that appeared before the thinker, who was in fact already near his own grave, the specter of *universal* death, or merely a judgment on the past? Is the death of Europe the death of humanity? In order to assert this, Europe and humanity must be considered one and the same. Can this be done without contradicting the facts? Is the European culture the first in the history of the world, and are we not aware of the deaths of "cultures" no less glorious?!

"We need not wait long," predicted Zarathustra, and "*new peoples will emerge*," and new springs will crash down into new chasms. "Earthquakes – they cover up many springs and overturn much; but they also uncover an outlet for new forces . . . New springs are shooting through amidst the downfall of old peoples."

"The general plan of development," Herzen wrote to Turgenev, "allows for an endless number of unforeseen variations. . . . Consider the variations on the same theme: dogs, wolves, foxes, hounds, Borzois, Newfoundlands, pug-dogs . . . *Common descent does not at all guarantee identical biographies*. Cain and Abel were blood brothers, yet what different careers they had." And, recalling Turgenev's comparison, he continues: "That a duck does not breathe through gills is certain; it is even more certain that a quartz does not fly like a humming-bird. Yet you are certainly aware . . . that in the duck's life there was a moment of hesitation, when the aorta did not bend with its pivot to the bottom, but strove to lay claim to gills; but, having physiological *tradition, habit*, and possibility for development, the duck did not end with the poorest structure of the breathing organ, but progressed towards lungs. This simply means that whereas a fish has *accommodated itself* to the conditions of marine life, and does not evolve beyond gills, the duck does" . . . "Before us now stand the completed, settled species, so

distant from each other, that any crossing between them is impossible. From behind every animal a long history shines through — of yearnings, of progress, of avortement and balance, in which its forms became settled at last, not having attained their vague ideal, but staying within the possible, within the Russian 'good enough to get by' . . . Some parts of the human species reached an appropriate form and won over, so to say, history; others are making it in the heat of action and struggle; yet still others, like a recently dried up seabed, are ready for various seeds, for great plantings, and offer rich fertile soil to all." As if anticipating our contemporary theoretician of "Creative Evolution," Herzen lays down the bases for a new sociology — alas, as yet not assembled — a sociology based not on the idea of monophyletic development of life, but on the idea of a fan-shaped divergence of its paths.

"The land of the fathers," the land of tradition and succession, will be replaced by "the land of the children, undiscovered, in the faraway sea" . . . , whither the prophet of "superhumanity" ecstatically called "the highest people." But where is it, that new "land of the blessed?" What compass will indicate whither to direct the sails? And the answer is clear — to the land of "non-historical peoples."

The young Kireevskii, still in his "Westernizer" *Lehrjahren*, wrote in 1830: among the European peoples "each has already fulfilled its purpose, each has expressed its character," and, as if having expressed itself, having passed its turn as a universal "heart," a "capital" of "enlightened peoples," has fallen into senile slumber. "That is why Europe now represents some kind of numbness," — "belated opinions, decaying forms, like a dammed up river, turned a fruitful land into a swamp, where only the forget-me-nots bloom, and a chilly, wandering small fire seldom glitters. Of all of enlightened humanity, two peoples are not participating in the common somnolence: two peoples, young, fresh, flower with hope: these two are the United States of America and our own fatherland." Hegel himself called America the land of the future, in which in the coming times . . . "is fated to reveal itself a universal historical value," different and distinct from the soil in which universal history had developed up to the present. And he recalls Napoleon's proud words: "*Cette vieille Europe m'ennuie.*" Already in the 1860s, having passed through the sickly ordeal of revolutionary contemplations, Herzen saw "outside of Europe . . . only two active regions — America and Russia, and perhaps the just emerging Australia." It is true that America is the same old Europe, but it is young and growing. "Wave upon wave carries to its shores influx upon influx — and they do not remain in place, but move farther and farther . . . The movement continues within America itself, newcomers seep through

the established population, sometimes carrying it along — and everything is surging, pushing and hurrying" . . . "The United States, like an avalanche, detached from its mountain, sweeps everything in its path," Herzen wrote to Turgenev; "Russia encircles, like water, it encircles tribes from all sides . . . And that same youthful plasticity! What did Joseph II laugh about at the laying of Ekaterinoslav, when he remarked that the Empress had laid down the first stone of the city, and he the last? Not a city was built there, but a state . . . And all of Siberia? And the current settlements along the banks of the Amur, where in a matter of days will be unfurled the starry flag of the American republics? And the easternmost provinces of European Russia? While reading the chronicle of the Bagrov family, I was struck by the resemblance of the old man who moved to the Ufa province to 'the settlers' moving from New York to somewhere in Wisconsin or Illinois. . . . When Bagrov hails people from all sides to fill up the dam for the mill, when his singing neighbors carry the soil, and he is the first to cross over the vanquished river in triumph, it seems as though you are reading Cooper or Irving Washington" . . . Thus Russia's "geographical physiology" itself attests to her might and power, to the "indefatigability" of her people, and prophecies about her future, which will reward her hundredfold for the absence of her past.

Of course, these optimistic prognoses relied on more than mere "youthful plasticity"; they were founded on a certain sociological base, although not an entirely identical base, by Kireevskii and Herzen. The difference between them was conditioned, to be sure, not by the opposition between "Slavophilism" and "Westernism," between conservative nationalism and liberal cosmopolitanism, but by the fact that only Herzen took his devastating critique of historical prejudices to its end; as for the ideas of the early Slavophiles, they remained within the previous circle, inwardly splintered. In essence, they merely added one more people to the number of "historical" peoples, and based this on the restoration of a forgotten "tradition" which was often obviously fictitious. In line with the "Western" rut of the universal historical path emerging from Rome, was established here an "Eastern" one, tracing its beginning, perhaps from the very Hellas and Jerusalem. The Slavic tribe fit into the plans of historical predetermination in the same position of "crowning the edifice," that in the West was given to "the German nation." And just as was the case there, culture was confused with the way of life, and accomplishments were confused with ideals. The future was derived from the past, and all hopes were based on it, on the assertion that we too had a history — and one that was not worse, and perhaps even better, than that of the West: and our inheritance is rich and old. Again we cast a look at the ancestors, instead of calculating our presently available strengths. Only Herzen alone

overcame the concept of the "historical" people fully, and only his historical predictions were based on the idea of the non-predetermination of the historical process, on the idea of "the disheveled improvisation of history," knowing neither of monopolies nor of prerogatives. He was the only one who did not erect any props, and looked *only forward*.

Nor is it possible for creative premonitions to be grounded in sociology, no matter what kind of sociology it is. Sociology merely reveals a *possibility* of birth for "new cultures," a possibility of an eternally renewed culture beyond the way of life. And all Russian prophets, as they asserted a Russian or a Slavic future, had before their spiritual eyes a wholly clear-cut image of a coming cultural type.

"Orthodoxy" and "socialism" — these are the two main benchmarks by which Russian forecasters had usually oriented themselves. "Holy Rus'," "the God-bearing people," and "the land commune," "choral principle" — these are the unfailingly repeating slogans of the supporters of Russian "originality." One should not assign frozen contents to these words, nor should one see in them concrete historical terms: they have always represented, first and foremost, "ideas," and if one is to look intently into the context in which they are usually comprehended, then it will become completely clear that these seemingly incompatible ideas met each other in the sense of "a purposeful life," or "a free all-unity," as Vladimir Solov'ev put it. It is not for naught that Dostoevskii referred to the Orthodox universal churchness as "our Russian socialism." No matter how often the "sought after" and the "available" coalesced in the consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia into an ugly ingot of nationalist utopia, no matter how often attempts were made for an apology of the entire concrete-historical Russian — and Byzantine-Slavic in general — path, the moving idea remained always the idea of *overcoming "organization,"* the idea of *the creative personality*. The Russian soul pined not for order, but for spirit. And, as it pined, it believed that it is possible to build life outside "the narrow bounds of juridical principles," that it is possible to replace all written legislation by unwritten law, impressed onto the human heart, that power and compulsion can be replaced by truthful profession of truth. And the Russian soul believed this because it knew that *only this kind of life* would have been a faithful realization of the great testament of God-humanity, the enactment of the prophetic prayer of the Eternal High Priest: "May all be as one." Vladimir Solov'ev, more strikingly than others, had expressed this hope during the early, still purely "Slavophile" period of his creativity. "Such a people," he said of the people-Messiah, "must not have *any special limited task*. It is not called upon to work on the forms and elements of human existence, but merely to communicate a living soul, to provide focus and unity to a torn and stiffened humanity,

by connecting it to the holistic, divine principle. Such a people has no need for any exclusive privileges, because it acts not on its own initiative, and realizes that which is not its own." It is a true instrument of God, a creative carrier of Divine and universal life, "the panhuman or universal culture." — Is there here a bitter aftertaste of national "self-extolment," was "love for the fatherland" distorted here into "a people's pride?" And were there elements of extolment in that true messianism, to which the foundation was laid by the promise given from above to Abraham, together with the call to leave the land of the ancestors "not merely for a year, not for many years, but for eternity? . . ."

But more than that, in the very attempt to resurrect "the past" there lay the true and essential kernel for the culture of the future. These unsuccessful "apologies" wanted to demonstrate the possibility of realizing *precisely that ideal — precisely by the Russian people* or by the entire Slavic tribe. "He who must create," prophesied Zarathustra in "the land of learning," "always has his prophetic dreams and celestial signs — and has faith in faith." Thus is created an urgent necessity for historical retrospection, immersion into the depths of popular elements, in order to check the accordance between various schemes and the powers available for their implementation. Historical aspirations require supporting points in the past and the present. There is no contradiction here with the revolt against fatherland traditions and with the call to look only forward. The concept of "tradition" in the realm of "culture" and the realm of "the way of life" is far from being one and the same concept.

When we say that the legal norms of modern Europe are based upon Roman law, we can trace step by step all the stages of ceaseless succession, show the junction points of intersecting threads. We can point out the material monuments into which this tradition has been cast, and all the adjoining links in the chain stretching from the laws of Licinius to the *Digest* and from there to the *Code Napoléon* and the latest German law code. We can demonstrate that here a conscious "mastering," a "reception" in the strict meaning of that word was taking place. And the same can be said about the Hellenization of the way of life of the Roman world, about the Europeanization of modern Japan and so forth. — But was it in that same sense that Dostoevskii understood "tradition," when he asserted with full justification, that the utopian socialism of Fourier and the Icarians breathes with the spirit of Roman Catholicism? Are we using the term "succession" in the same sense when we say that the philosophy of Europe is saturated by Platonic reminiscences?

The streams of the cultural and way-of-life "tradition" can diverge abruptly and sharply. It is precisely because of this that the image of the Far West, of America, is so mysterious. In the way of life it is a repetition

and an exaggeration of "Europe," a hypertrophy of general European democratism and bourgeoisie. And it is therefore all the more surprising to encounter under this crust a decidedly heterogeneous tradition of culture, proceeding from the first immigrants through Benjamin Franklin and Emerson to Jack London's *self-made men*, a tradition of radical rejection of philistinism, and a way of life and an assertion of individual freedom. Where does the rut of this tradition pass through? It is nearly imperceptible: "plasticity" merely symbolizes it. Yet precisely in it, and not in "capitalism" does American self-consciousness, which professes James to be its prophet, perceive its "spirit."

Such also is the "Russian sphinx." Regardless of its "non-historicity" within "the universal-historical scheme," Russia is an historical formation complicated to the highest degree. It is not difficult to decipher in the Russian way of life heterogeneous layers — Varangian, Byzantine, Slavic, Tatar, Finnic, Polish, Muscovite, "St. Petersburg," and others — and it is not difficult to trace these sedimentary formations to certain causal actions. As if of their own accord, bridges lead to Norman "armed merchants," to Byzantine Caesaropapism and *Nomokanon*, to the Golden Horde and nomadic foreigners, to Jesuits and the Polish nobility, and so forth. But Russian existence is clearly not exhausted by this way of life. "In slavish appearance the Lord of Heaven walked about, blessing" Russian steppes and forests. And gossamer threads stretch from Dostoevskii and Tolstoi, from Gogol' and Samarin, from Father Amvrosii and Saint Seraphim somewhere backwards, into the thickets beyond the Volga, to Nil Sorskii and Saint Sergei and from there to Mount Athos and beyond, to the scorching spaces of Thebes. Over centuries and spaces the unity of the creative element is unmistakably felt. And the points of its condensation almost never coincide with the centers of the way of life. Not in St. Petersburg, not in the ancient capital of Kiev, not in Novgorod, not even in "mother" Moscow, but in remote Russian dwelling-places, at Saint Sergei's, at Varlaam Khutynskii's, at Kirill Belozerskii's, in Sarov, in Diveev, is felt the intensity of Russian popular and Orthodox spirit. Here from ancient times lay the foci of cultural creativity. And up to the present is it not the "invisible town of Kitezh," in the remote forest thicket, on the shores of a bewitched lake, known only to a believer's gaze, that attracts to itself by its magical charm the decomposed currents of the national element? Tradition of culture is intangible and immaterial. Powers of culture are mystical inter-individual interactions. Its threads intersect in the unknown hiding-places of the human creative spirit. The seat of culture is in the intimate depths of the creative spirit. When we divide the living currents of Russian cultural life into their constituent elements, and subdivide the contents into finished forms, something always slips

through the fingers, and the intuitively unquestionable Russian "culture," "Russian element" turns out in the face of rational analysis to be a blank spot. Its flashes appear to be some ruptures of "tradition," riddles, deformities. Is not Dostoevskii's image: "Russia's Marquis de Sade," according to Turgenev's perception, a man who "had received into his heart a long time ago with exultation" Tikhon Zadonskii, according to his own words. . . . By way of life a product of Peter's frightening city, by culture — an offshoot of the Optina hermitage.

Genuine creativity, genuine novelty is always "inexplicable." Mutational bursts, distortions of inherited paths always remain beyond the bounds of rational comprehension. But does that mean that they are "causeless," that "the past" does not lead, had never led, to them? Not only to reason is the world "cosmic" (not chaotic). "Improvisations" have their immanent necessity. Creativity, like the succession of the way of life, has its own traditions. But these cultural links are comprehended not by reason, not by discursive analysis, but by feeling, which condenses centuries into a single instant. Through mystical intuition is grasped all at once "what is, what was, what is coming in the future centuries," in their subterranean mysterious bond. Through mystical intuition are felt and acknowledged "the God-bearing people," "Holy Rus'," "Orthodox East," and "Godless West." And the religiously enlightened gaze sees beneath the constructive succession of the way-of-life pictures the tragic mystery of historical life, sees life as an incessant struggle between the village of God and the city of the Antichrist — a struggle, tending towards apocalyptic cataclysms, as a single drama played out for centuries; this gaze captures the culturo-psychological successions of itself and its enemies; it senses itself moving along a certain channel. But this "past" is invisible and it does not oppress the present and the future with the blind inevitability of Fate. Through this mystery the free servants of ideals perform their sacred functions, although, in a blessed communication among themselves.

The ideals and premonitions of the future, revealed through intimate contemplations, become a genuine stimulus for cultural creativity and life — not in the form of an exhaustive program of action or an infallible *regula vitae*, but in the form of inspiring faith, urged along by love. The center of gravity is shifting completely into the depth of the individual. The future becomes the cause of the present, in accordance with Zarathustra's prophetic words. Whether many or few generations came before me, whether I stand in a "pure" or a "hybrid" line — makes no difference: an inner, "extra-historical" voice, rather than genealogical schemes, tells "where to go" . . . "He who discovered the land called 'man,' said Zarathustra," also discovered the land called "human future" . . .

Here is a deep, it can be said, intuitively mystical, focus of the "non-historical" perception of the world. Not the *vis a tergo* of "life's rush," not the countless swarm of prior generations, not unshakable skills move "culture" and creativity forward, but a freely chosen ideal calls and carries it into the distance . . .

"And still that same voice, without reproach, is heard in the silence:
The end is already near; the wished for will soon come true."

Vladimir Solov'ev

Sofia 1921 - III - 27

ON TRUE AND FALSE NATIONALISM*

An individual can maintain any of a variety of possible attitudes toward his national culture. The attitude of the Romano-Germans is shaped by a specific psychology which can be called egocentric. "A person with a clearly defined egocentric psychology subconsciously considers himself to be the center of the universe, the crown of creation, the best, the most perfect of all beings. Confronted by two other human beings, the one closer to him, more like him, is the better, while the one less like him is worse. Consequently, this person considers every natural group of human beings to which he belongs the most perfect: his family, estate, nation, tribe, and race are better than all other analogous groups."¹

This psychology is characteristic of the Romano-Germans, and it shapes their evaluations of all other cultures. Consequently only two general attitudes toward culture are possible for them: either the culture to which the evaluator (a German, a Frenchman, and so on) belongs is the highest and most advanced in the world, or this distinction is attributed not to one national cultural variant but to the sum total of the closely related cultures created by the collective efforts of all the Romano-Germanic peoples. The first type is known in Europe as narrow chauvinism (German chauvinism, French chauvinism, and so on), while the latter is best described as "Pan-Romano-Germanic chauvinism." However, the Romano-Germans have always been so naively convinced that they alone are human beings that they have called themselves "humanity," their culture "universal human culture," and their chauvinism "cosmopolitanism."²

Non-Romano-Germanic nations that have assimilated European culture usually assimilate with it the Romano-Germanic assessment of that

* Originally as "Ob istinnom i lozhnom natsionalizme," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 71-85. Translated by Kenneth Brostrom in N. S. Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991), pp. 65-79. Reprinted with permission.

1. See my *Europe and Mankind* [see bibliography entry].

2. *Ibid.*

culture; they are taken in by fraudulent terms such as "universal human civilization" and "cosmopolitanism," which conceal the narrow ethnographic content of these ideas. As a result, these nations do not base their assessment of cultures on egocentricity but on a kind of "excentricity," or more precisely, on "Eurocentricity." We have spoken elsewhere about the inevitable, disastrous consequences of Eurocentricity for Europeanized, non-Romano-Germanic nations.³ The intelligentsias of such nations can escape these consequences only by accomplishing a fundamental reversal in their thinking and in their methods of appraising cultures, this after they have realized clearly that European civilization is not a "universal human culture" but merely the culture of a particular ethnographic group, the Romano-Germans; for them alone is this culture mandatory. Such a reversal should fundamentally alter the attitudes of Europeanized, non-Romano-Germanic peoples toward all the problems of culture, and their anachronistic, Eurocentric judgments will be replaced by others based upon a completely different set of premises.

The first duty of every non-Romano-Germanic nation is to overcome every trace of egocentricity in itself; the second is to protect itself against the deception of "universal human civilization" and against all efforts to become "genuinely European" at any cost. These duties can be expressed by two aphorisms: "Know thyself" and "Be thyself."

The struggle against one's own egocentricity is possible only when there is true self-awareness. True self-awareness will show a person (or a nation) his place in the world; it will teach him that he is not the center of the universe or of the earth. But this same self-awareness will also lead him to an understanding of the nature of people (and of nations) in general—that not only a subject who seeks self-awareness but all those who resemble him are neither the center nor the apotheosis of anything at all. From an understanding of their own natures, individuals (and nations) come, through growing self-awareness, to a full awareness of the equal value of all persons and nations. A logical consequence of these new understandings is an affirmation of one's own uniqueness, the determination to be oneself: and not merely the determination, but the ability, for the man who does not know himself cannot be himself.

An individual can remain unique, never falling into internal contradictions and never deceiving himself and others only after he has come to understand his own nature clearly and completely. And it is in the achievement of this harmonious personal wholeness, based upon a clear and full understanding of one's own nature, that the greatest earthly hap-

3. See chap. 5 of *Europe and Mankind*.

piness is attained. Here, too, is to be found the essence of moral behavior, for when true self-awareness is achieved, the voice of conscience is heard most clearly; a person who lives so as to remain honest with himself and avoid internal contradictions will certainly be moral, and he will discover the greatest spiritual beauty accessible to any human being. For self-deception and inner contradictions, which are inevitable without genuine self-awareness, always make a man spiritually ugly. Moreover, the highest wisdom, both practical and theoretical, is to be found in self-awareness, for all other knowledge is vain and illusory. Finally, it is only after people (and nations) have attained a uniqueness based on self-awareness that they can be certain they are realizing their purpose on earth, that they are becoming what they were created to be. Self-awareness is the single, highest goal in this life for any human being. It is a goal — but it is also a means.

This idea is not new; on the contrary, it is very old. Socrates expressed it twenty-three centuries ago, but did not invent his $\eta\text{-}\acute{\omicron}\text{f}\acute{\alpha}\ \eta\text{'},\text{:}\Delta\text{-}$: he read it in an inscription on the temple at Delphi. However, he was the first to formulate this idea clearly, the first to understand that self-awareness is both an ethical and a logical problem, that it is just as much a matter of right living as it is of right thinking. This vitally important dictum, "Know thyself," identifies a problem that is superficially the same but essentially different for every person, owing to its merger of the relative and subjective with the absolute and universal; it is a principle that is equally applicable to everyone, without regard to nationality or historical period, because it is unlimited by time and circumstance. This principle remains valid today for nations as well as individuals. It would be easy to demonstrate that not one of the world's religions rejects or ignores Socrates' dictum; several have affirmed it and elaborated upon it. One could also show that the majority of a-religious ideas are quite compatible with this principle.⁴ However, further discussion of these matters would lead us too far afield.

4. The dictum "Know thyself" is based upon a certain philosophical optimism, upon the belief that human nature (and all creation) is essentially good, reasonable, and beautiful, and that everything bad in life (evil, ugliness, senselessness, suffering) is a result of a deviation from nature, the fruit of man's inadequate understanding of his true essence. Consequently, Socrates' dictum is completely unacceptable only to proponents of extreme philosophical pessimism. For example, a consistent Buddhist who views everything that exists as evil, senseless, ugly, and inseparable from suffering must reject Socrates' principle. The only way out for such a Buddhist is suicide, not physical suicide (pointless, owing to the doctrine of the transmigration of souls) but spiritual—the destruction of his spiritual individuality, that is, in Buddhist terminology, "nirvana" or "the total conquest of birth and death." However, most Buddhists are not so consistent and limit themselves to a theoretical acceptance of certain

The results of self-awareness can be diverse because they depend not only on the self-knowing individual but on the extent and the form of the knowledge itself. The labors of a Christian ascetic, which are directed toward overcoming temptation and becoming what God created man to be, are essentially a kind of self-awareness achieved through Heavenly guidance and constant prayer. It brings the ascetic not only to a high degree of moral perfection but to mystical insights into the meaning of creation and existence. The self-awareness of Socrates, which was devoid of specific metaphysical content, led to psychological harmony, wise conduct, and even to certain insights into worldly affairs — all of this coupled with complete metaphysical ignorance. In some individuals self-awareness happens under the predominant influence of logical reflection, while in others, irrational intuition plays a decisive role. The forms of self-awareness are variable in the extreme. The important thing is that a clear, more or less complete vision of oneself is achieved, an unambiguous understanding of one's own nature and of the proportional weights of all its elements and manifestations in their mutual interrelations.

All of this applies not only to individual but to collective self-awareness. If one views a people simply as a psychological entity, a collective individuality, one must admit that some form of self-awareness is both possible and necessary to it. Self-awareness has a logical connection with the concept of individuality: Where there is individuality, there can and should be self-awareness. And if, in the life of the individual, self-awareness is the all-encompassing goal that incorporates all the happiness accessible to him, all the goodness, spiritual beauty, and wisdom attainable by him, then it is the same universal principle for the collective individuality of a nation as well. The special feature of this collective individuality is that a nation lives for centuries and changes constantly during that time, so the fruits of national self-awareness in one epoch will not be valid in the next. However, they will always establish a point of departure for every new effort to achieve self-awareness.

"Know thyself" and "Be thyself" are two aspects of the same affirmation. True self-awareness is expressed externally in the unique, harmonious life and activity of the individual. The analogue for a nation is its unique national culture. A nation has come to know itself if its spiritual nature and individual character find their fullest, most brilliant expression in its national culture, and if this culture is thoroughly harmonious (that is, its components do not contradict one another). The creation of such a cul-

fundamental principles enunciated by Buddha. In practice they are adherents of a morally indifferent polytheism, and as such, they can accept Socrates' dictum up to a certain point.

ture is the true goal of every nation, just as the goal of each of its members is to achieve a life style that embodies his or her unique spiritual essence fully, brilliantly, and harmoniously. These two tasks – the national and the individual – are intimately related; they complement and condition one another.

In pursuing self-awareness, every individual comes to know himself as a member of a nation. The emotional life of the individual always contains elements of the national psyche, just as his spiritual makeup necessarily contains traits of the national character that combine in various ways, both with one another and with other traits whose origins are located in himself as an individual and in his family and social class. Self-awareness allows these national traits, in their merger with an individual nature, to be affirmed and enhanced. When an individual begins to "be himself" through self-awareness, he inevitably moves toward becoming an outstanding representative of his people. His life, being a full and harmonious expression of his consciously understood, unique individuality, inevitably embodies national traits. If this individual is engaged in work that is culturally creative, his efforts will bear the stamp of his personality and will thus reflect the national character; in any case, they will not contradict this character. But even if an individual does not participate actively in culturally creative undertakings and merely assimilates their products passively or participates as a menial in some area of his nation's cultural life, even in this case the fact that his life and activities embody certain traits of the national character (primarily tastes and predispositions) will serve to heighten and intensify the national qualities of his people's everyday life. It is everyday life that inspires the creator of cultural assets, that supplies him with both tasks and material for his creations. Thus it is that individual self-awareness facilitates the uniqueness of a national culture, a uniqueness which is the correlate of national self-awareness.

Conversely, a unique national culture is helpful in the acquisition of individual self-awareness. It facilitates complete understanding of those traits in an individual's psychology which are manifestations of the common national character. All such traits are prominent, vivid elements in a genuine national culture, and this enables each individual to find them easily in himself, to come to know them (through culture) in their true lineaments, and to evaluate them properly in the perspective of common daily life. A harmonious and unique national culture enables every member of the national whole to be himself, and to remain so, while being at the same time in constant contact with his compatriots. In such circumstances an individual can participate in the cultural life of his nation with complete sincerity and without pretending to others or to himself that he is something he has never been and never will be.

It is now apparent that a strong inner connection and constant interaction exist between individual and national self-awareness. The greater the number of people in a nation who "know themselves" and are "being themselves," the more successful efforts will be to achieve national self-awareness and to create a unique national culture, which will guarantee in turn that profound individual self-awareness can be achieved. The felicitous evolution of national culture is possible only when this interaction between individual and national self-awareness exists. Otherwise the national culture may cease to develop at a certain point, while the national character, which is composed of the characters of individuals, will still change. If this happens, the concept of a unique national culture will lose its meaning. The culture will no longer evoke a lively response in its bearers; it will cease to be the embodiment of the national spirit, and will become a kind of traditional hypocrisy that encumbers rather than expediting individual self-awareness and uniqueness.

If the highest earthly ideal for a human being is perfect self-awareness, then it follows that the only authentic culture is one that facilitates such self-awareness. In order to do this, a culture must embody those elements common to the psychology of all or most of the individual members of the culture (that is, it is an aggregate of the elements of the national psychology). Moreover, the culture must manifest these elements vividly and prominently, because the more vivid they are, the easier it is for each person to attain *through the culture* a full knowledge of them in himself. In other words, the only authentic culture is a completely unique national culture, because it alone can fulfill the ethical, aesthetic, and even utilitarian requirements incumbent upon every culture. If a person can be acknowledged as truly wise, virtuous, beautiful and happy only after he has "come to know himself" and "be himself," then the same applies to an entire nation. But here it means "to possess a unique national culture." If one requires that a culture provide "maximum happiness for the greatest number of people," this changes nothing. True happiness is to be found not in comfort and not in the satisfaction of personal needs, but in an equilibrium, a harmony among all the elements of spiritual life (including those "needs"). No culture can give individual human beings this happiness: happiness lies within, and self-awareness is the only path to it. A culture can help an individual become happy because it facilitates self-awareness. But it can do this only if it is completely, manifestly unique.

Thus the cultures of all nations should be different. Each nation should manifest all its originality in its culture, and in such a way that its elements, which are imbued with the same national coloration, are in harmonious relation. The greater the differences between the national psychologies of particular nations, the greater will be the differences between their na-

tional cultures. Nations similar to one another in their characters will have similar cultures. But a universal human culture, identical for all nations, is impossible. Given the great diversity among national characters and psychological types, such a "universal culture" would lead either to satisfaction of purely material needs at the expense of the needs of the spirit or to the imposition on all nations of forms of life reflecting the national character of a single ethnographic type. In either case, this "universal" culture would not meet the requirements incumbent upon every genuine culture: it would bring true happiness to no one.

Therefore, efforts to achieve a universal human culture must be repudiated, and conversely, the efforts of any nation to create its own distinctive culture are fully justified, while cultural cosmopolitanism and internationalism merit unequivocal condemnation. However, not every type of nationalism is logically or morally justified. There are various kinds of nationalism, some false and some true, and the only indispensable, objective guide for a nation's conduct is a true nationalism. The only kind of nationalism which can be acknowledged as true, as morally and logically justified, is a nationalism that has its origins in a unique national culture or is directed toward such a culture. The actions of a true nationalist must be guided by the idea of this culture. He will defend it and struggle for it. He must support everything that facilitates a unique national culture and reject everything that interferes with it.

However, if we apply this measure to the existing forms of nationalism, we will soon be convinced that the majority of them are false. Most frequently encountered are nationalists who do not consider the uniqueness of their nation's culture to be important. All their efforts are directed toward achieving national independence regardless of the cost; they want their nation to be recognized by the "great" powers as a full and equal member in the "family of nation-states," and to be like these "great" nations in all things. This type of nationalist is found especially often in "small," non-Romano-Germanic nations, where he appears in particularly outlandish, almost grotesque forms. Self-awareness plays no role whatever in such nationalism, because its proponents have absolutely no desire to "be themselves"; to the contrary, they want to be like others, like the "big" people, like the "masters" — even when they are often neither big nor masterful themselves.

When historical conditions cause a nation to become subject to the power or economic supremacy of another nation altogether alien to it in spirit and it cannot create a unique national culture without liberating itself from this domination, efforts to achieve national independence are fully justified on moral and logical grounds. However, these efforts are appropriate only when they are undertaken in the name of a unique national

culture; national independence as an end in itself is senseless. And nationalists of the type under discussion regard national independence and great-power status as ends in themselves. What is more, they are willing to sacrifice their own national culture to these ends. To make their people exactly like "real Europeans," they strive to impose not only alien Romano-Germanic forms of government, law, and economic life on their people but their ideas, art, and the bric-a-brac of European daily life as well. Europeanization — that is, the effort to reproduce general Romano-Germanic patterns in every area of life — results ultimately in complete loss of every trace of national uniqueness; soon the infamous "native language" is the only unique thing remaining in a nation led by such nationalists. And after this language has become "official" and begins to adapt to foreign concepts and patterns in everyday life, it will become distorted by the incorporation of an enormous number of clumsy neologisms and Romano-Germanic words and phrases. Frequently, the official language becomes incomprehensible to ordinary people in "small" states that have opted for this brand of nationalism, especially those who have not yet succeeded in becoming denationalized and depersonalized to the level of "democracy in general."

It is obvious that a nationalism which strives not for national uniqueness and national self-realization but for a close resemblance to the "great powers" can never be considered true. It is based not on self-awareness but on petty conceit, which is the opposite of self-awareness. The term "national self-determination," which proponents of this type of nationalism like to use, especially when they belong to one of the "small nations," can lead only to confusion. Actually there is nothing "national" and no "self-determination" whatever in this set of attitudes, and this is why national liberation movements often incorporate socialism, which always contains elements of cosmopolitanism and internationalism.

Another form of false nationalism is present in militant chauvinism, which is essentially an effort to disseminate the language and culture of one's nation among the greatest possible number of foreigners after first destroying in them the last traces of their own national uniqueness. The falsity of such nationalism is obvious without detailed argument. The uniqueness of a particular national culture acquires value only from the degree to which it harmonizes with the psychology of its creators and bearers. When this culture is transplanted to a nation with a different psychology, all the meaning of its uniqueness disappears and the value of the culture itself changes. The fundamental error of militant chauvinism lies in its lack of attention to the relationship between every culture and its individual ethnic representatives. Such chauvinism is rooted in arrogance and denial of the equal worth of all peoples and cultures — in a word, in ego-

centric self-exaltation — and it is inconceivable in conjunction with genuine national self-awareness. Thus it also stands in opposition to true nationalism.

A special form of false nationalism is to be found in the cultural conservatism that artificially identifies national uniqueness with certain cultural assets or patterns of living created in the past and rejects the possibility of change in them, even when they no longer embody the national psyche in a satisfactory way. Here, as with militant chauvinism, the living bond between culture and the psyche of its bearers is ignored, and absolute value is attached to culture independent of its relation to the people: "The culture is not for the people, but the people for the culture." Once again this destroys the moral and logical meaning of uniqueness as the correlate of the continuous process of attaining national self-awareness.

It is apparent that the aforementioned types of false nationalism have practical consequences that are catastrophic for the national culture. The first leads to a loss of national identity, to the denationalization of the culture; the second to a loss of racial purity by the bearers of the culture; the third to stagnation, the precursor of death.

Obviously, the different forms of false nationalism can combine to produce mixed types. But they all share one common feature: their foundations cannot rest upon national self-awareness in our sense of the word. However, even those variants of nationalism which seem to derive from national self-awareness and strive for a national culture are not always true. The problem is that self-awareness is often understood too narrowly and achieved incorrectly. True self-awareness is frequently obstructed by some label which, for whatever reason, a nation has attached to itself and will not relinquish. For example, the cultural orientation of the Romanians is strongly conditioned by the fact that they consider themselves a nation with a Romance language and culture, this because a small detachment of Roman soldiers constituted long ago one of the elements from which Romanian nationality developed. Similarly, contemporary Greek nationalism (a mixed type of false nationalism) redoubles its own falsity through the one-sided view Greeks have of their own origins: although they are in fact a mixture of several ethnic groups that share a lengthy cultural evolution with other "Balkan" peoples, they consider themselves descendants of the ancient Greeks alone. Such aberrations result from the fact that self-awareness has not been achieved organically, it is not the source of this particular nationalism but merely an attempt to provide it with a historical justification for its jingoistic, chauvinistic tendencies.

The process of examining the various types of false nationalism underscores by contrast what true nationalism should be. As a product of na-

tional self-awareness, it affirms the necessity of a unique national culture; it establishes this culture as its supreme task, and it appraises every aspect of domestic and foreign policy and every stage of the nation's history from the perspective of this task. Self-awareness gives true nationalism the kind of self-sufficiency that prevents it from imposing its culture on other peoples by force and from imitating slavishly others which are alien in spirit and enjoy, for whatever reason, special prestige within a particular anthropo-geographical area. The true nationalist displays no nationalistic arrogance or ambition in his attitudes toward other peoples. Because his world view rests upon self-awareness, he will be by nature peace-loving and tolerant of all foreign expressions of uniqueness. He will also be opposed to the artificiality of national isolation. Because he fully understands the unique psyche of his own people, he will be especially sensitive to characteristics in other peoples that are similar to those in himself. And if another people has succeeded in giving one of these characteristics felicitous expression in some cultural asset, the true nationalist will not hesitate to imitate this work after adapting it to harmonize with his own unique culture's inventory of cultural assets. Two peoples of similar national character who are in contact with one another and under the leadership of true nationalists will always have very similar cultures, owing to the free exchange of cultural assets that are acceptable to both sides. This cultural unity is fundamentally different from the artificial unity resulting from the efforts of one of the nations to subjugate a neighbor.

If we examine in light of these considerations the kinds of Russian nationalism existing in the past, we will be forced to admit that true nationalism is nowhere to be found in post-Petrine Russia. The majority of educated Russians have not wanted to "be themselves"; they have dreamed of becoming "real Europeans." And because Russia could not become a genuine European state, despite all her longing, many of us came to despise our "backward motherland." Consequently, until very recently most Russian intellectuals have shunned any kind of nationalism. Others have called themselves nationalists, but they have understood nationalism as the drive to become a great power, to acquire military and economic might, to achieve a brilliant international position for Russia. To achieve these goals, they considered it necessary for Russian' culture to approximate as closely as possible the West European model. The demands of certain Russian "nationalists" for "Russification" have reflected the same slavish attitude toward the West. This has meant the encouragement of a shift to Orthodoxy, the compulsory introduction of the Russian language, and the replacement of foreign with more or less awkward Russian place names. And these things were done only because "this is the way the Germans act — and the Germans are a cultured people."

At times this urge to be a nationalist because the Germans are nationalists found more elaborate expressions. Since the Germans base their nationalistic lordliness upon their contributions to the creation of culture, our nationalists have also tried to identify some sort of unique, twentieth-century Russian culture, exaggerating to near cosmic proportions the significance of any work by a Russian or even by some non-Russian subject if it deviated ever so slightly from the West European pattern, declaring it to be "a valuable contribution by Russian genius to the treasure house of world civilization." An even better parallel: As a counterpart of Pan-Germanism, Pan-Slavism was created, and the mission of unifying all the Slavic nations that were "treading the path of world progress" (that is, were exchanging their uniqueness for the Romano-Germanic model) was accepted by Russia as her own, so that Slavdom might assume its "proper" or even the leading place in the "family of civilized nations." During the period immediately preceding the Russian Revolution, this tendency in Westernizing Slavophilism became fashionable even in circles that had formerly considered the word "nationalism" indecent.

However, Slavophilism in the more distant past can hardly be considered a pure form of true nationalism. It is quite easy to spot in it the three forms of false nationalism discussed above, with the third type dominant initially, and later the first and second. There has always been a tendency to construct Russian nationalism according to the Romano-Germanic model. Thanks to these qualities, Slavophilism was bound to degenerate, despite the fact that a feeling for uniqueness together with the principle of national self-awareness were its points of departure. These matters were not understood clearly or formulated adequately.

Only isolated individuals have been concerned with true nationalism, which is based entirely upon self-awareness and demands in its name a restructuring of Russian culture guided by the spirit of uniqueness. True nationalism has never existed as a socio-historical tendency. It must be created in the future. And this will require that reversal in the consciousness of the Russian intelligentsia which we discussed at the outset of this article.

Sofia, 2 April 1921

NIKOLAI S. TRUBETSKOI

THE UPPER AND LOWER STORIES OF RUSSIAN CULTURE (The Ethnic Basis of Russian Culture)*

Every differentiated culture inevitably contains two components that can be figuratively termed the "upper" and "lower stories" of the edifice of that culture. By "lower story" we mean the stock of cultural assets that meets the needs of the so-called folk masses. When such assets originate in the midst of the common people themselves, they are rather elementary and lack the imprint of individual creativity. And when cultural assets migrate from the upper to the lower story, they necessarily become somewhat depersonalized and simplified as they are adapted to a context created by assets exclusively of "lower" origin.

The upper story of the cultural edifice is different in nature. The cultural assets of a nation's broad masses cannot meet the needs of all its members; many who are dissatisfied with the form of some generally accepted asset will attempt to improve it by adapting to their personal tastes. Altered in this way, an asset may become inaccessible to the masses but appeal to the tastes of those who in one way or another occupy positions of authority in the society. In this case the asset will enter the stock of assets belonging to the upper story of the culture. It follows that the assets found in this "upper stock" are created either by or for the society's ruling elite; they are responses to more refined needs and more demanding tastes. Consequently, such assets are always more complex than those of the lower stock. Since any asset from the lower stock may inspire the creation of an asset in the upper stock, and since the masses constantly introduce into their everyday life assets borrowed in simplified form from the upper stock, there is normally a process of exchange and

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interaction between the upper and lower stories of any culture. This interchange is increased by the fact that a nation's ruling elite is not a constant, unchanging quantity. It "rules" only as long as it maintains its prestige — that is, the ability to inspire imitation both literally and in the sense of "sympathetic imitation" (respect and obedience). However, over time this prestige may be lost and acquired by some other social group that previously belonged on the lower stories of the culture; this new aristocracy will bring many assets from the lower stock into the upper story of the cultural edifice.

In addition to this endogenous interaction between a culture's upper and lower stories, both levels are also nourished exogenously by borrowings from foreign cultures. The foreign source from which the upper story is drawing cultural assets may differ from the foreign source that is nourishing the lower story. If the borrowed assets are not incompatible with the general psychological makeup of the nation and are organically reworked during the process of assimilation, then a certain equilibrium will be established between the upper and lower stories owing to the natural process of internal exchange between them. However, this equilibrium may not be established, and a cultural rift will form between the upper and lower stories and national unity will be destroyed. This always indicates that the source of the foreign influence was incompatible with the national psychology.

In considering Russian culture specifically, we must first develop a precise description of the ethnographic character of its upper and lower stories and understand clearly the links between its constituent parts and foreign cultures. The Slavic element was unquestionably of fundamental importance in the formation of Russian nationality. We can arrive at some notion of the characteristics of our earliest Slavic ancestors only through linguistic data. As we know, "Proto-Slavic," the ancestor of all the Slavic languages, descended from the Proto-Indo-European language, which has been reconstructed by comparative study of all its descendants. The hypothesis of a completely homogeneous Indo-European was abandoned long ago; linguists agree that dialects were already present in the protolanguage and that over time the differences between them became more pronounced, leading eventually to the disintegration of the protolanguage and the transformation of its dialects into separate languages.

To say that Proto-Slavic is a descendant of Indo-European is tantamount to saying that in the latter there existed a Proto-Slavic dialect which was eventually transformed into a separate *language*. The reconstructible features that differentiate this Proto-Slavic dialect from or connect it with other Indo-European dialects constitute the earliest information we have about the ancestors of the Slavs. It appears that the Proto-

Slavic dialect and those closest to it, the Baltic dialects, were more or less centrally located.¹ Adjoining it on the south were the Proto-Illyrian and Proto-Thracian dialects, about which we know very little. To the east of the Proto-Slavic dialect was a uniform group of Proto-Indo-Iranian dialects that were alike in many details of pronunciation, grammar, and lexicon. Lastly, to the west was the group of West Indo-European dialects (Proto-Germanic, Proto-Italic,² and Proto-Celtic) which were much less homogeneous than the Indo-Iranian dialects, but which were still united by many common features in pronunciation, grammar, and lexicon.

Owing to its central position, Proto-Slavic resembled the Proto-Indo-Iranian dialects in certain features and the West Indo-European dialects in others, and sometimes functioned as an intermediary between them. With respect to pronunciation, the Proto-Slavic dialect shared several common consonant changes with the Proto-Indo-Iranian dialects and perhaps only a few similarities in the pronunciation of certain vowels with the West Indo-European dialects. And because consonants are more striking to the ear than vowels, one must suppose that Indo-European as pronounced by speakers of the Proto-Slavic dialect must have sounded more like the eastern (Proto-Indo-Iranian) dialects than the western. With regard to grammar, no particular affinities between Proto-Slavic and Proto-Indo-Iranian have been observed. But even the links between the Proto-Slavic dialect and the West European group had more to do with the common loss of some old grammatical categories and the merger of once distinct forms than with the creation of new forms. Generally speaking, the Proto-Slavic dialect and the closely related Proto-Baltic dialects represent a completely distinct, unique grammatical type.

The study of lexicons is of enormous importance in determining the relationships between contiguous dialects and languages. Unfortunately, when we are dealing with the earliest periods we have no objective method for distinguishing borrowed words from cognates. Nevertheless, in some instances borrowing seems less likely than relationship. In examining a series of words and roots common to the Slavs and the Indo-Iranians but unknown in other Indo-European languages (except, in part, the Baltic), we find prepositions such as the Slavic *кѣ* 'to,' *радѣ* 'for the sake of,' *безѣ* 'without,' *сѣ* 'with' (both as a preposition and verbal prefix), the pronouns *онѣ* 'that,' *онѣ* 'he,' *всѣ* 'all, whole,' the conjunction *а* 'and, but,' the special negative particle *ни* (cf. especially *ничѣто* 'nothing' and

1. Included in the Baltic group are the closely related Lithuanian, Latvian and Old Prussian languages, the last of which died out in the seventeenth century.

2. The Italic languages include Latin and several other related languages of the Apennine Peninsula, the principal ones being Umbrian and Oscan.

Avestan *naēčit*), the adverb *jave* 'clearly,' the particle *bo* 'for,' all of which almost certainly belong to the stock of cognate, and not borrowed, words. With no other Indo-European dialect do the Proto-Slavic and Baltic dialects exhibit detailed similarities in the area of such dependent "little words" (so characteristic of and important to every language). This allows us to assume an especially close bond between the Proto-Slavic and Proto-Indo-Iranian dialects. Among the other lexical elements common to these two dialectal groups are many words that could have been borrowed very easily from dialect to dialect on the basis of their semantics. Such words are very typical.

A whole group of these words pertain to religion. Slavic *bogъ* 'god,' *svetъ* 'holy' (where the *a* in Russian *svjat* comes from Old Slavic nasalized *e*), and *slovo* 'word' are usually cited (after the work of the French scholar Antoine Meillet) as words comparable to Old Iranian *baga-*, *spōnta*, and *sravah-*. It is noteworthy that these correspondences exist only between Slavic and Iranian (Indian is not involved, and only the second of these three words is known in the Baltic languages). It is appropriate to recall here that the Indo-European word *deiwos*, which means 'god' in other languages (Latin *deus*, Old Indian *deva-*, Old Icelandic *Týr* 'name of god,' pl. **tīwar*, and so on), in the Slavic and Iranian languages denotes an evil mythological being: Avestan *daeva-*, Modern Persian (*dēv* (cf. *Asmodev*), (Old Russian *divъ* (in *The Lay of the Host of Igor*), South Slavic *diva* 'witch,' *samodiva*; in addition *divъjъ*, *divъ* 'savage, barbaric.' With regard to the Iranians, this semantic change is usually explained by the reform of Zarathustra (Zoroaster), who recognized Ahura Mazdah (Ormazd) as the one true god and then declared all other gods to be demons; consequently, the term *daeva-* came to mean 'demon,' while 'god' was denoted by other words (among them *baga*). One must assume that the ancestors of the Slavs participated in some way in the evolution of religious ideas which ultimately led to Zarathustra's reform among their eastern neighbors, the ancient Iranians.

Under these circumstances, Meillet's hypothesis regarding the identity between the Slavic verb *věriti* and Avestan *varayaiti*, which also means 'to believe' but originally meant 'to choose,' is most plausible; according to the teaching of Zarathustra, the one who believes rightly is the one who has made the correct "choice" between the god of goodness (Ormazd) and the god of evil (Ariman). These similarities in the religious terminologies of the Proto-Slavic and the Proto-Indo-Iranian dialects illuminate several other lexical correspondences between them. For example, Slavic *zovetъ*, *zъvati* 'call' has a parallel (in addition to the Baltic languages) only in Indo-Iranian, where the corresponding verb has a

special technical usage meaning 'to summon god.' Slavic *zъdravъ* 'healthy' has a more or less precise parallel only in Old Persian; and we remember that health is the most frequent concern in prayers. Slavic *bojati se* 'to be afraid' occurs (in addition to Lithuanian) only in Old Indian; it can easily be placed in the general context of religious terminology. The fact that Slavic *šujъ*, adj. (a synonym for *lěvъ* 'left') has parallels only in the Indo-Iranian languages gives rise to some interesting considerations: a superstitious attitude toward the left side is well known, as is the custom of using special words to denote frightening ideas (so-called verbal taboos). In general, one can say that terms in one way or another associated with religious experience account for a very significant portion of the lexical correspondences between Proto-Slavic and Proto-Indo-Iranian.

Specific correspondences between Proto-Slavic and the West Indo-European languages are different in nature. Such correspondences may be more numerous than those with Proto-Indo-Iranian, but they do not include any of those intimate little words (conjunctions, prepositions, and so on) that play such a vital role in everyday language. The most prominent words here are those with technical meanings related to economic activity. Among nouns, *sěme* 'seed,' *zrъno* 'grain,' *brašъno* 'food,' *lexa* 'furrow,' *jablъko* 'apple,' *prase* 'piglet,' *bobъ* 'bean,' *sěkyra* 'ax,' *šilo* 'awl,' and *trudъ* 'toil' — all have exact parallels (beyond the Baltic languages) only in the Celtic, Italic, and Germanic languages. The same is true of the verbs *sějati* 'sow,' *kovati* 'forge,' *plesti* 'weave,' and *sěšti* 'cut, carve, cut off.' The adjective *dobrъ* 'good' (German *tapfer*, Latin *faber*, from Indo-European **dhabros* originally had no ethical meaning and denoted a purely technical "virtue," that is, dexterity, or fitness for particular work. A sense of the old social *mores* is conveyed by the words *gostъ* 'guest' (German *gast*, Latin *hostis*), *měna* 'exchange,' *dlъgъ* 'duty' (known only in Slavic, Italic, and Germanic), and perhaps by the word *dělъ* 'portion,' which has an exact parallel only in German *Teil*.

Other words encountered only among the Slavs and Western Indo-Europeans are less characteristic since they denote features of the natural environment, and their widespread usage is explained by common geographic conditions (*more* 'sea,' *mъxъ* 'moss,' *drozdъ* 'thrush,' *osa* 'wasp,' *srъšenъ* 'hornet,' *elъxa* 'alder,' *iva* 'willow,' *sěverъ* 'north'); or they denote parts of the body (*ledvъe* 'loins,' *brada* 'beard'). Both of these categories are represented in the stock of Slavic and Indo-Iranian correspondences (Slavic *gora* 'mountain'/Avestan *gairi-*/ Old Indian *girīs*; Slavic *grīvā* 'mane,' *usta* 'mouth,' *vlasъ* 'hair'/ Old Indian *griva* 'back of the neck,' *osthas* 'mouth,' Avestan *varesa* 'hair').

It is very likely that, in addition to these ties with the East and West, the Proto-Slavic dialect had certain connection with the South, at least with the Proto-Thracian and Proto-Illyrian dialects, and with the dialect from which the Albanian language later developed. Unfortunately, Albanian is a highly mixed language as we know it; foreign elements from the Greek, Turkish, modern Slavic, and Romance languages are much more numerous in its lexicon than the indigenous, of which very few remain. The languages of the ancient Thracians and Illyrians are almost completely unknown. Consequently, we can say nothing definite about the nature of the connections between the Proto-Slavic dialect and its southern neighbors.

Toward the end of the Indo-European era (that is, as the Proto-Slavic dialect was becoming an independent language), the Slavs were confronted with the need to make choices among these ties to the East, the South, and the West. We have seen that the Slavs were drawn to the Indo-Iranians "spiritually," and "physically" to the Western Indo-Europeans owing to geographical and economic circumstances. After the final separation of Proto-Slavic from the other branches of the Indo-European family, the ancestors of the Slavs continued for quite some time to be strongly influenced by the Western Indo-Europeans, who had already separated into three linguistic groups: Germanic, Celtic, and Italic (from which the Romance languages developed). The oldest Romance and Germanic elements entering the Common Slavic proto-language were related to the same semantic categories as the lexical items common to the Proto-Slavic and West Indo-European dialects earlier. They referred primarily to tools and the like, to trade and government, and to weaponry. Later, Christian terminology entered this language, at first by a rather circuitous route, from the Greeks and Romans via the Germans (*сѣрка* 'church,' *постъ* 'fast') or via peoples speaking Romance languages (*крижь* 'crosier,' *крѣстъ* 'cross,' *кумъ* 'kinsman') and later, directly from the Greeks.

Finally, in the period since the era of common Slavic unity, the Slavs have separated into three groups — the West, South, and East Slavs — each of which embodies, as it were, its own "orientation." Thus the cultural physiognomy of Slavdom was predetermined when the ancestors of the Slavs were still part of the common mass of Indo-Europeans and spoke a dialect of the Proto-Indo-European language, for the central location of the Slavic tribes inclined them at various times to the east, to the west, and to the south. Later these tendencies became differentiated in connection with the division of Slavdom itself, so that each of its three branches preserved *one of these tendencies*.

The West Slavic lands adjoined the Romano-Germanic world. True, this world did not consider the West Slavs equal members of the family and subjected them to Germanization and wholesale slaughter. At one time these Slavs occupied the entire eastern half of present-day Germany, all the way to the Elbe and to the Fulda (in Hessen); but now, of this large area, only Poland, the Czech lands and a small Lusatian island surrounded by Germans remain. Nevertheless, the West Slavs assimilated Romano-Germanic culture more or less completely, and they participated as far as possible in its development, despite their unenviable position in a world where they were not considered "family." The intellectual revolution that marks the beginning of the "new history" of the Romano-Germanic world was advanced to a significant degree by the work of two West Slavs — the Czech Jan Hus and the Pole Nicolas Copernicus.

The South Slavs found themselves in the Byzantine sphere of influence, and together with the other peoples of the Balkan Peninsula they created a special "Balkan culture," which was Hellenistic in its upper stories. Because the roles of the various ethnic sources that created this culture have not been sufficiently studied, a detailed ethnological description of its lower stories is not yet possible. The spirit of Byzantine culture was being thoroughly assimilated by the South Slavs, at least until the Greek Phanariots began their chauvinistic intrigues (during the era of the Turkish occupation) and tried to impose mechanically what was being spontaneously assimilated.

The cultural orientation of the East Slavs was much less clearly defined. Since they were not located near any of the centers of Indo-European culture,³ they could choose freely between the Romano-Germanic West and Byzantium, both of which they had come to know primarily through Slavic intermediaries. The choice was made in favor of Byzantium, and the results initially were very good. Byzantine culture was developed and enriched on Russian soil. Everything that came from Byzantium was thoroughly assimilated and could thus serve as a model for the creative efforts that shaped these elements to satisfy the requirements of the national psychology. This was particularly true of the religious culture, of art, and religious life.

Conversely, everything received from the West was not assimilated, and failed to inspire national creativity. Western products were imported and purchased, but not reproduced. Skilled artisans were not hired to

3. The Northern Iranian (Scytho-Sarmatian) tribes, which inhabited Southern Russia at one time, disappeared rather quickly; some of them were assimilated by the East Slavs, and some were driven out or swallowed up by Turkic nomads. The modern Ossetians are the last remnant of the Scytho-Sarmatian tribes.

teach Russians but to fulfill commissions. Occasionally books were translated, but they did not initiate a corresponding growth in the national literature. We are concerned here with general trends, not details. There are of course many exceptions to this general rule; on the whole, however, things Byzantine were unquestionably assimilated more easily and thoroughly in Russia than things Western. It cannot be argued that this is the result of superstitious misoneism. In this very "superstitiousness" there was an instinctive revulsion against the Romano-Germanic spirit and a recognition by Russians of their inability to create in this spirit. In this regard, the East Slavs were true descendants of their prehistoric ancestors — those speakers of the Proto-Slavic dialect of the Proto-Indo-European language who, as comparative lexical studies show, had no feeling of spiritual kinship with the West Indo-Europeans and who were linked religiously with the East. This psychological trait was suppressed among the West Slavs by continuous, direct contacts with the Germans; among the East Slavs it was perhaps intensified by intermarriage with the Ugro-Finns and the Turks.

This situation changed radically owing to the reforms of Peter the Great. Russians were supposed to be imbued with the Romano-Germanic spirit immediately and to be creative in this spirit. But they were incapable of fulfilling this task quickly. If Russia before Peter the Great could be considered the most gifted and productive successor to Byzantium culturally, after he initiated the Romano-Germanic orientation she found herself at the tail end of European culture, in civilization's backyard. Certain basic motive principles of European spiritual culture (e.g., European legalism) were poorly assimilated by the Russian elite, and not at all by the masses. The absence of several fundamentally important Romano-Germanic psychological traits was apparent at every turn. And so the number of genuine contributions by Russian genius to "the treasure house of European civilization" remained negligible compared to the mass of foreign cultural assets mechanically transplanted to Russian soil. Efforts to rework Romano-Germanic cultural assets and to display originality and individual creativity within the boundaries of particular European forms were common in Russia, especially in the realm of spiritual culture. However, only a few exceptional geniuses were successful in creating works that were acceptable not only in Russia but in the West. The overwhelming preponderance of activity was always on the side of simple, almost mechanical adaptation and imitation.

Whenever a talented or brilliant Russian artist tried to create within the framework of European culture something national and original, he usually introduced a Byzantine, a "Russian," or an "eastern" element (especially in music) that was quite alien to the Romano-Germanic world. A native

Romano-German will respond to such works as exotica that can be admired from a distance but not absorbed and experienced. At the same time, such hybrid works cannot be viewed as truly original, and a sensitive Russian will always detect something false in them. This falsity is the product of a flawed understanding of what is essentially Russian, as well as of a disharmony between form and content.

In the final analysis, and despite all the protestations of the Russian intelligentsia (in the broadest sense of the term), two abysses dug by Peter the Great — the first between pre-Petrine Rus' and post-Petrine Russia, and the second between the masses and the educated elite — remain open and gaping. Not even the spiritual perspicacity of great artists could throw bridges across these abysses, and the music of Rimskii-Korsakov differs fundamentally from a genuine Russian folk song, just as the paintings of Vasnetsov and Nesterov differ from a genuine icon.

Such then is the state of the upper story of the edifice of Russian culture. The life of the Russian cultural elite was always associated with traditions that were received first from Byzantium, and then from the Romano-Germanic West, and more or less thoroughly assimilated. It is true that these foreign traditions worked their way downward from the elite into the masses. The traditions of Byzantine Eastern Orthodoxy had a great impact on the masses and colored all aspects of the spiritual life of the people. But contact with the life of the Russian masses so altered Orthodoxy that its Byzantine traits were greatly suppressed. Western culture affected the Russian masses much more superficially and never touched the depths of the native soul. The result was a profound disharmony between the upper and lower stories of the edifice of Russian culture, unlike the situation after the assimilation of Byzantine culture by the elite.

However, the cultural and ethnographic composition of Russian national life consists not only of the Byzantine and Romano-Germanic traditions. It is widely believed in educated Russian society that the unique characteristics of this life can be described as Slavic. This is incorrect. From an ethnographic point of view, the culture (meaning the stock of cultural assets that meets the physical and spiritual requirements of a particular milieu) of the Russian people is an absolutely singular entity that cannot be accurately identified with any broader cultural zone or grouping of cultures. Generally speaking, this culture comprises its own special zone and includes, besides the Russians, the Ugro-Finnic peoples and the Turkic peoples of the Volga Basin. Moving to the east and southeast, this culture merges almost imperceptibly with the Turko-Mongolian culture of the steppes, which links it in turn with the cultures of Asia. In the west there is also a gradual transition (via the Belorussians and Ukrainians) to the culture of the West Slavs, which borders on the Romano-Germanic

and "Balkan" cultures. But these links with other Slavic cultures are not very strong, and they are counterbalanced by strong connections with the East. Russian national culture is closely associated with the East in a whole set of issues, so that at times the boundary between East and West passes exactly between the Russians and other Slavs. On certain issues the South Slavs and Russians are closely related, not because both groups are Slavs but because both have experienced strong Turkic influences.

This trait of Russian national life is clearly evident in folk art. Many Great Russian songs (including the most ancient, ritual and wedding songs) are composed in the so-called five-tone or Indo-Chinese scale (that is, like a major scale minus the fourth and seventh tones).⁴ This scale is used (in fact, it is the only one) by the Finnish and Turkic tribes of the Volga and Kama Basin, and also by the Bashkirs, the Siberian Tatars, the Turks of Russian and Chinese Turkestan, and by all Mongols. Apparently this scale once existed in China as well; in any case, Chinese music theory assumes its existence, and Chinese musical notation is based upon it.⁵ At present this is the predominant scale in Thailand, Burma, Cambodia, and Indochina. So we have here an unbroken line from the East that stops with the Great Russians. Among the Ukrainians the five-tone scale is found only in a very few ancient songs, and among other Slavs there are only isolated instances of its use. It is unknown among the Romano-Germans and is encountered again only in the far northwestern part of Europe, among the British Celts (the Scots, Irish, and Brythons).

Rhythmically the Russian song is fundamentally different not only from the Romano-Germanic but from the songs of other Slavs (if only because three-four rhythm is unknown – the rhythm of the waltz and mazurka). The Russian song differs from the Asian in that most Asians sing in unison. In this respect the Russian song is transitional: the vocalization of the Russian chorus is polyphonic; unison singing is not rare, but a "lead voice" is mandatory in certain kinds of choral songs.

Another type of rhythmic art – the dance – is distinctive in the same way. Romano-Germanic dances are characterized by the obligatory presence of "cavaliers" and "ladies" dancing together and holding each other, which permits them to make identical rhythmic movements with

4. For readers unfamiliar with music theory, this scale obtains if one plays only the black keys on a piano. Rachmaninov's romance *The Lilac* is one of the "cultured" works familiar to the Russian public which were composed using this scale.

5. In performance, a transposition occurs, so that a scale with four tones is produced. For example, a melody represented by the scale do, re, mi, sol, la, will replace both sol and la with la-flat, for sol an octave higher than for la.

their feet only. Russian dances are in no way comparable: couples are not obligatory, and even if two people are dancing, they may be of the same sex and may dance in turn rather than simultaneously; and they do not hold one another. Consequently, rhythmic movements can be executed not only with the feet but with the arms and shoulders. The foot movements of the men differ from those of the women; they are characterized by the way they alternate heel and toe. Distinctive, too, is the effort to keep the head motionless, especially among the women. The men's movements are not defined in advance, and there is much room for improvisation within the boundaries of a particular rhythm; the gait of the women is highly stylized. The dance motif is a short musical phrase, whose rhythm is quite distinct but open to variation. All these features can be seen in the dances of the eastern Finns, the Turkic peoples, the Mongols, the peoples of the Caucasus Mountains (however, dances with couples who hold one another are found in the northern Caucasus), and in the dances of many other "Asian" peoples.⁶

Unlike Romano-Germanic dances, in which (with their minimal technical requirements) constant contact between the man and woman introduces a distinct sexual element, Russian-Asian dances are more like competitions in agility and in the rhythmic discipline of the body. The force of the rhythm is intensified by the participation of spectators, who instinctively stamp their feet, whistle, and shout. Similar dancing is found among the Spanish, but in all probability it is traceable to eastern (Moorish and Gypsy) influences. As far as the other Slavs are concerned, they do not resemble the Russians in the art of dancing; only the Bulgarian *ruchenitsa* is reminiscent of the Russian-Asian type, doubtlessly because of some eastern influence.

Great Russian national culture has its own unique style in the area of ornamentation (wood fretwork, embroidery); this art has connections with the Balkans through the Ukrainians and with the East through the Ugro-Finns. There is apparently a complex pattern of intersecting influences here that requires scholarly attention. Unfortunately, our understanding of ornamentation is still rudimentary, and we have not worked out a classificatory system that would allow us to establish the degree of

6. In addition to the "solo" dances of the type described here, the Russians also practice a choral dance. It is very different from such dances among other Slavs, the Romano-Germans, and several eastern peoples. Strictly speaking, the Russian circle dance is not a dance at all, because none of the participants executes "steps," and no one is obliged to move his or her feet to the rhythm of the music. It is really a kind of "game," or a ritualistic act in which the choral singing is most important.

relatedness among various ornaments. Thus we cannot specify the differences between Russian ornamentation and those of the West Slavs and Romano-Germans, even though these differences are palpable.

The folk literature of the Great Russians is original. The style of the Russian fairy tale has no parallels in the folk literatures of the Romano-Germans or the other Slavs, although there are analogues among the Turkic peoples and those of the Caucasus. The fairy tales of the eastern Finns are completely under Russian influence as far as style is concerned. Russian folk epics are related in subject matter to the "Turanian" East and to Byzantium, as well as to the Romano-Germans. But their form is completely original, they display no Western features; one can only note that they have peripheral connections with the epos of the Balkan Slavs and significant connections with the steppe epos of the Tatar Horde.

The material culture of the Russian people is predictably very different from the culture of the steppe nomads and related much more closely to the cultures of the South and West Slavs. One thing is certain: with regard to material culture, the Great Russians and most of the Finnic peoples (excluding nomads) constitute a coherent whole. Unfortunately, there have been very few detailed ethnographic studies of the material culture of the Russian people; dilettantism characterizes most of those that exist. It is embarrassing to admit that the material culture of the Finnic peoples is far better understood, thanks to the efforts of Finnish ethnographers. But the relative roles of the Ugro-Finnic and East Slavic elements in the formation of what can be called a Russo-Finnish culture have not yet been established. It is generally believed that the Ugro-Finns had the greater influence in the world of fishing, and the East Slavs in housing construction. Russian and Finnish clothing display certain common features (bast sandals, the so-called Russian blouse, and types of feminine headwear) that are unknown among the Romano-Germans and the other Slavs (bast sandals are encountered among the Lithuanians). But here, too, the historical connections among these elements have not been fully explored.

Thus from an ethnographic point of view, the Russian people are not purely Slavic. The Russians, the Ugro-Finns, and the Volga Turks comprise a cultural zone that has connections with both the Slavs and the "Turanian East," and it is difficult to say which of these is more important. The connection between the Russians and the Turanians has not only an ethnographic but an anthropological basis: Turkic blood mingles in Russian veins with that of the Ugro-Finns and Slavs. And the Russian national character is unquestionably linked in certain ways with the "Turanian East." The brotherhood and mutual understanding that develop so quickly between us and "Asians" are rooted in these invisible racial

consonances. However, the Russian national character is still quite distinct from that of the Ugro-Finns and the Turks; it resembles not in the least the national characters of the other Slavs. Numerous traits that the Russian people value highly in themselves have no equivalents in the moral makeup of the other Slavs. The contemplative tradition and devotion to ritual in Russian piety are linked historically to Byzantine traditions; they are alien to the other Orthodox Slavs, and they connect Russia with the non-Orthodox East. The exuberant daring prized by the Russian people in their heroes is a virtue that comes from the steppes; it is understood by the Turkic peoples but is quite incomprehensible to the Romano-Germans and the other Slavs.

Any attempt to erect a new Russian culture must take into account the unique psychological and ethnographic composition of what is natively Russian, because it is this that must serve as the first story of the edifice of Russian culture. To ensure the stability of the edifice and prevent any discontinuities or gaps between the upper and lower stories, these stories must correspond with one another. Such stability existed as long as the edifice of Russian culture was capped with a Byzantine cupola. But when the upper story of the Romano-Germanic structure began to replace this cupola, the harmony between the parts of the edifice and its stability were lost; the upper stories began to lean and sway, and finally collapsed. And we — the Russian intelligentsia — after wasting so much energy in our attempts to shore up a Romano-Germanic roof that broke away from Russian walls for which it was never suited — we stand in amazement before these massive ruins and wonder how we can build a new roof according to the same old Romano-Germanic model. Any such thoughts must be rejected outright. In order for Russian culture to become firmly established on Russian soil, its upper story must be, at the very least, something other than Romano-Germanic.

A return to Byzantine traditions is obviously impossible. It is true that these traditions have not been swept away by Europeanization in one part of the edifice of Russian culture, the Russian Orthodox Church, which has shown itself to be amazingly resilient. When everything else was being destroyed, it not only failed to collapse, but it regained its original form by rebuilding itself according to the ancient model inherited from Byzantium. In the future, the Byzantine element in Russian culture, which has its roots in the Church tradition, may even be strengthened. But it is of course impossible to imagine the complete reconstruction of Russian life according to ancient Byzantine principles in their pure form. And this is so not only because two and one-half centuries of compulsory Europeanization did not leave Russia unscathed, but because of past experience: when in the seventeenth century Patriarch Nikon decided to

strengthen the Byzantine element in Russian life and to bring Russian worship closer to its Byzantine model, that model was perceived by many Russians as something alien, and it led to the Schism. Later the schismatics turned the blade of their protest against Europeanization. The yearning of the Russian national spirit for an original culture has been embodied since that time in the Russian Schism — a yearning that is perhaps misdirected and futile, since it can claim only a lower but no upper story. Nevertheless, one senses in the twists and turns of the Schism the presence of the Russian spirit's healthy national instinct protesting against the foreign upper story, artificially imposed on Russian culture. It is therefore extremely important that Emelian Pugachev stood under the banner of the Old Belief and rejected the "pagan Latins and Lutherans"; but he did not consider it reprehensible to unite with the Bashkirs and other adherents of not only non-Orthodox Eastern Christianity but of the non-Christian faiths of the East.

Guidelines for constructing the edifice of Russian culture must be discovered in these subconscious sympathies and antipathies of the Russian national spirit. We profess Eastern Orthodoxy, and this faith, while conforming to the traits of our national psychology, should be at the very center of our culture, from there influencing many aspects of Russian life. In addition to this faith, we have received many cultural traditions from Byzantium, which people once knew how to develop and adapt to Russian traditions. Work in this direction should continue.

But this does not exhaust the matter. Not everything should be put into a Byzantine framework. We are Russians, not Greeks; in order for Russian culture to be completely "ours," it must be closely linked to the unique psychological and ethnographic characteristics of Russian national life. Here one must bear in mind the special properties of Russianness. We have often heard that it is Russia's historical mission to unite our Slavic "brothers." But it is usually forgotten that our "brothers" (if not in language or faith, then in blood, character, and culture) are not only the Slavs but the Turanians, and that Russia has already consolidated a large part of the Turanian East under the aegis of its state system. Attempts to Christianize these "foreigners" have met with very little success. Therefore, if the upper story of Russian culture is to be in harmony with the singular nature of the ethnographic zone comprised by Russian national life, this culture must not be based exclusively on Eastern Orthodoxy but must also manifest those traits of the underlying national life that can unite into a single cultural whole the diverse tribes that are linked historically with the destiny of the Russian people. This does not mean of course that bast sandals and the five-tone scale must become integral parts of the upper story of Russian culture. It is impossible to predict or prescribe in ad-

vance the specific forms a new Russian culture might display. But any difference between its upper and lower stories must reflect not their conflicting orientations toward two different ethnographic zones, but a contrast in the degree to which elements of a single culture have been reworked and elaborated. Russian culture, understood as a cultural edifice under construction, must rise up harmoniously from its foundations in Russian national life.

PETR N. SAVITSKII

CONTINENT-OCEAN (Russia and the World Market)*

Economic knowledge, in the study of economic reality, deals with "internal-economic" relationships, that is, those having to do with the internal socio-economic structure of society as well as "external-economic" relationships, those, first and foremost, of commodity exchange on interregional and international scales. From the perspective of these relationships, each country, and within each country, each region, district, or a smaller geographical subdivision, are viewed, regardless of the social economic structure prevailing within them, as "units"-carriers of economic exchange, as indivisible wholes, in their points of contact, in the course of exchange with similar "units" of their immediate surroundings and the world at large. If we are to engage in establishing factors that condition the flow of such exchange, then our attention will focus, among other things, on the significance of the following circumstance: is the movement of the commodities of exchange taking place *on the ocean or on the continent* . . . Transport costs are vitally important in the formation of interregional and international exchange. It can even be said that if the problem of production (as the starting-point of any exchange) is, in its dynamic essence, ascribed to the problems of the "internal-economic" structure of society, then transport costs will turn out to be almost the most important factor determining the processes of exchange — the one least malleable to regulation by state power, and, in that sense, invariably active, or "natural," as an economist of the classical school would say. . . The state — through its customs policies and through its influence in setting the rates of railroad tariffs and shipping freights — forcefully interferes with and directs the relationships of interregional and international exchange . . . But even with the most extensive regulation of tariffs and freights, it is only partially capable of removing the impact of transport costs as an independent element of the economy. Moreover,

* Originally as "Kontinent-okean. Rossiia i mirovoi rynek," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 104-25.
Translated by Ilya Vinkovetsky.

state policy – whether in regard to customs, tariffs, or freights – changes, whereas transport costs remain the same as long as there are no changes in technology . . . And, because, in its development, technology has not reached a condition in which transport costs are approaching zero, these costs remain a defining principle for the sphere of “external-economic” relationships. Meanwhile, transport costs differ considerably, when it is a matter of marine conveyances on the one hand, and land conveyances on the other . . . Given the same distance, the German railroad rate before the war was “approximately fifty times higher than the ocean freight. But even the rates of the Russian and the American railroads (which, let us add, were quite often below cost rate) surpassed the cost of marine transport seven to ten times” . . .¹ Because of the discrepancy between the costs of marine and land conveyances, the following conclusion results: those countries and regions whose locations allow them to use primarily marine transport are far less dependent, in the processes of international and interregional exchange, on distance, than those countries which are oriented in their economic life primarily toward continental transport. The former, in choosing trade routes, can, to a certain degree, disregard distance. The latter must treat transport economically and strive in any way possible to reduce distance. Because this is so, it can be said that among the predominant principles in the sphere of international and interregional exchange, the “oceanic” principle of linking, with no regard as to distance, of the economically-mutually-supplementary countries, is opposed by the principle of utilizing continental proximities . . . Of course, this opposition should not be understood literally: after all, the costs of oceanic transport are not reduced to nothing. Nevertheless, in the realm of marine transport distance is significant only in cases of extreme difference in length or, the other way around, in cases of transportation over short distances. Distance is relevant when the issue is of a choice between “long” and “coastal” shipping: because sailing along coasts, sailing between the ports of the same country, where one and same language, the same customs and laws prevail throughout, confronts the seafarer and the vessel with substantially different – and lesser – demands, than “long” sailing. But, because the “long” nature of shipping is here taken as a given, distance, within certain bounds, becomes irrelevant . . .

The ocean is one. The continent is fragmented. And therefore the world’s united economy is inevitably perceived as an “oceanic” one, and it is inevitable that every country and every region of the world economy

1. Carl Ballod, *Grundriss der Statistik, enthaltend Bevölkerungs-, – Wirtschafts-, – Finanz – und Handels – Statistik* (Berlin, 1913), p. 115. The emphasis is the author’s [Savitskii’s].

operates within the framework of oceanic exchange. And yet, the positions of particular countries and regions of the world in respect to the ocean are far from identical. Some are at every point of their territories near the shore of the world-ocean. In order to participate in the oceanic exchange, it is sufficient for them, simply put, to load their products onto vessels, and to unload those vessels that have come into their ports. Meanwhile, other countries are situated entirely, or in a greater or a lesser part, at some distance from the sea . . . In order to participate in the general system of world trade, these countries must make a certain additional effort — in delivering their products to the shore, as well as in transporting into the interior of the continent those commodities that they receive from the world market. An idea of the positions of various countries from the point of view that concerns us here can be gained by looking at the maps of the so-called "equidistant zones" (*Zones d'équidistance*), maps, on which points located at a certain equivalent distance from the shore of the ocean-sea are connected by a line.² These lines are drawn through points separated from the coastline by, for example, respectively, 400, 800, 1,200, 1,600, 2,000, and 2,400 kilometers. Viewing such a map gives one an idea of how differently various regions of the world are situated in relation to the ocean. There are extensive territories that have within them no points farther from the shore than, let us say, 600 kilometers. Such is the case, for example, with Western Europe, within its bounds west of the Pulkovo meridian. There are no locations in Australia that are situated farther than 800-1,000 from the sea shore. The most "continental" points of three other continents, Africa, North America, and South America, are situated no farther than 1,600-1,700 kilometers from the sea shore. And only within the bounds of Asia are there places from which it is more than 2,400 kilometers to the shore of the ocean-sea. This is the case of Kul'dzha and a significant part of the Russian Semirech'ë.

On maps of "equidistance" the never frozen shores of the south seas and, for example, the shores of North Arctic Ocean near the Cheliuskin Peninsula, which are almost never ice-free, are treated exactly the same. In looking at the *economic* problem that concerns us, it would be prudent to make the following correction: the nonfreezing or the freezing of the sea and the extent of the latter determine the significance of a given water basin to world trade. With this correction, some regions of North America and Eastern Europe and a significant part of central and northern Asia will appear even more remote from the ocean . . .

2. Sea-lakes, such as the Caspian, are not taken into account.

In England, in the circulation of foreign and domestic commodities, sums spent on continental transportation appear negligible in calculating the per unit cost of the commodity . . . But if the Semirech'e were to enter intensively the system of world trade, the transport costs of commodities from the sea and to the sea would turn out to be quite significant . . .

Let us assume the existence of a single price for each commodity on the world market. Given this assumption, what will the costs of moving commodities to and from the ocean shores mean for the Semirech'e? — If on the world market all sellers receive the same exact price, then that same price will also be received by the producers of the Semirech'e. And no one else but they themselves will have to absorb the expenses of delivering the product to the world market. These expenses will constitute for them a deduction from earnings. As for those commodities that they obtain on the world market, their cost price will be increased by the amount spent on transporting these commodities from the world market to the Semirech'e. In other words, the cost of moving commodities from the sea and to the sea will constitute for the producers and consumers of the Semirech'e a *loss*, one not borne by the producers and consumers whose economic activity occurs near the shores of the ocean-sea . . . For the purposes of our present discourse we shall leave aside the existence within continents of internal waterways, which, according to the specific nature of each one of them, exert varying influences on the costs of intra-continental conveyances. We shall also leave aside other particular geographical and economic factors that affect the cost of transport. We shall calculate transport costs accordingly: by continent and by sea, in direct proportion to distance. And we shall picture "the world market" as a certain likeness of London, that is, as a point on a sea shore, on an island. We resort to this concretization of the term "the world market" in order to link *all* cases of participation in "the world trade" to the issue of overcoming a certain oceanic, marine distance. It seems to us that this assumption has an empirical basis. Given this assumption, we can say with certainty that the scale of removal of the Semirech'e from the coasts — unheard of in the rest of the world — will determine, upon its entry into the system of world trade, its peculiar "deprivation." It will receive less profit from its commodities than all the other regions of the world; it will pay more dearly than all the others for the imported products that it requires. In the field of industrial development, the competitiveness of the Semirech'e on the world market will turn out to be negligible. It may be surmised that even under favorable natural conditions for industrial development, the Semirech'e will be doomed to industrial "non-being." As for agricultural development, in the Semirech'e there will come into use

those cultural forms that are lagging behind, tentative in their existence, and entirely extensive in their nature.³

Double deprivation, of the producer and the consumer, cannot — *ceteris paribus* — fail to make the Semirech'e into "the backwoods of world economy . . ."

We used the Semirech'e as an example; the discussion which was applied to it can be applied to any region that is distinguished among the regions of our planet by its distance from the ocean-sea. For which of the world's regions and countries does the described scenario of becoming "the backwoods of world economy" have real meaning? If one is to take an agreed-upon limit of removal from the shores, for example, 800 kilometers, and to observe what regions of the world lie at that and even greater distance from the sea, then it will turn out that these regions are: 1) an insignificant part of the inner Australian desert, 2) regions of inner Africa: part of the southern Sahara and the Sudan, and land along the upper reaches of the Nile, the Congo, and the Zambezi, 3) regions along the middle Amazon, the plateau of *Mato grosso* in Brazil, the eastern (lowland) part of Bolivia, and Paraguay. These regions, given the current state of economic technology, are in part completely incapable of economic flourishing (these are deserts!), and in part, although capable of it, do not demonstrate indications of intensive economic development, because they are "pushed aside" in economic respects by regions that are economically similar to them, but closer to the shoreline. In addition, all these regions lie within the tropical zone, which in modern times has yet to provide examples of high intensity of economic life . . . It can be foreseen, that if an economic flowering of some of the abovementioned regions is ever to occur, then it will surely occur on the basis of the intensive use of those, at times superb, interior waterways, that connect these regions to the ocean (especially the rivers of South America: the Amazon, partly navigable by seagoing vessels, its tributaries, also the Parana and the Paraguay rivers), that is, on the basis of a wholesale joining of these regions to the single world "oceanic" economy . . .

A greater relevance in modern times is possessed by the continental regions of North America: central Canada (the area of Manitoba, Saskatchewan, and Alberta), the northern part of the United States, from the sources of the Missouri to the Great Lakes, and some of the middle

3. In this case, there will come into use those forms of agricultural development that in the discussions about land "differential" rent are depicted as the fate of that land plot which is situated in the most disadvantageous conditions, and that, on the Tiunenov diagram of the completely continental "isolated state" laid out in concentric circles around its industrial center, fall into the most extreme zone, furthest removed from the center . . .

states forming a triangle between the southwestern extremity of Lake Erie, the city of Santa Fe in New Mexico, and Salt Lake City. These areas are even already in part areas of vigorous economic life, and, as far as can be judged, they are capable of further development. Despite the existence of interior waterways, leading, for the most part, to the "non-freezing" ocean (Canada's rivers being the exception), the "continentality" of these regions is currently a substantial factor for the structure of trade and economic life in general within North America, and it must remain so in the future. But this can be asserted with even greater definitiveness in regard to the continental regions of Eastern Europe and Asia . . . Here, removed for 800 kilometers or more from the shore, we find: 1) the middle and western parts of the Chinese Empire, 2) Kashmir, Punjab, and the adjoining districts of India, and 3) northeastern Persia, all of Turkestan, all the parts of Siberia and the Far East that are capable of economic development, with the exception of the Primor'e region and the Amur region east of Blagoveshchensk, of the Ural and the middle Volga regions, with the better part of the middle black-earth area (the provinces of Tambov and Penza!). It should be noted that among the number of the named regions of Europe and Asia a substantial part of the "continental" provinces of China is represented by the Gobi Desert and the barren plateau of Tibet; it can be thought that the westernmost parts of China ("outer" Mongolia, eastern Turkestan, Kul'dzha), separated from the metropolis by the Gobi and Tibet, are predestined to join Russia economically; as for northern India, it is "pressed" to the ocean by the as yet insurmountable ranges of Hindukush and the Himalayas, which separate it from the remaining circle of continental lands . . .

The continental regions of China proper gravitate in part towards the water artery of the Yangtse, which brings with it the ocean into the depths of the Celestial Empire to Hankow, which seagoing vessels can reach . . . Despite this circumstance, the continentality of vast spaces of China cannot help but find a reflection in the forms of its economic life. But as a naturally-economic given, as a certain irrevocable fact of nature, that continentality is, to a substantial degree, weakened in its economic significance by the fact that the eastern territories of China, over a broad extension, are facing 1) open, and 2) always ice-free expanses of the Great Ocean. And, conversely, the continentality of those territories that we will call regions of "the Russian world" — that is, Russia itself, the extreme western and northwestern China, and also Persia — is greatly strengthened by the fact that even the seas toward which, after overcoming hundreds and thousands of kilometers of continental expanses, these regions could gravitate are: 1) in all cases, insular, "continental," "internal" seas and 2) in most cases, these seas are frozen, sometimes for six or

more months a year. The "insularity" of a sea, as long as it does not turn into a "lake" (which eliminates a given water basin from the ranks of the units comprising the ocean-sea), is, it would seem, a geographical sign that has no significance for the economy, because, even if a sea is connected to the world's other water basins only by a strait or a "channel," it remains open to world economic exchange. But this geographical sign is condensed into economic reality when it is linked to the fact of *political vulnerability* of free commercial circulation, determined by what extent the access to a given water basin can be *halted by military means*. These political and military circumstances are indeed relevant factors of Russian economic reality, as they concern such seas as the White, the Black, the Baltic, and the Japanese Sea in the East . . . It is even somewhat amusing to note that, even assuming a broad Great Power expansion, nowhere does Russia, except along the shores of the remote Kamchatka, open up to, or has a chance to open up to, the shores of an "open" sea, in the strict geographical meaning of that word, that is, a water basin that takes part in the hydrographic circulation of the world-ocean. Even the North Arctic Ocean, thanks to a shallow zone (less than 600 meters in depth) extending between Greenland, Iceland, Scotland (the so-called *Wyville Thomson shallows*), is excluded from the general oceanic circulation and maintains a regimen not even of a shoreline sea (like the "Chinese" seas, or that of the Antilles), but that of a locked "continental" one. And to the south, in view of the outer limit of conceivable Russian expansion, lie the Mediterranean Sea and the Persian Gulf, both of them typically "continental" water basins . . .⁴ The "continentality" of a water basin such as the one that faces Murmansk is merely an "abstraction" in the economic sense. But even in terms of such an abstraction introduced from geography, there is a certain piquancy in realizing that no matter how much Russia would strive, within its possible limits of exercising politico-economic influence in the geographical world, to come out to the "open" sea, it will never see in front of itself that free world ocean which rolls near the piers of New York or San Francisco, on the shores of Ireland or Brittany, almost all of South America, Australia, Africa . . .

But even more economically pertinent is the *freezing* of the vast majority of the seas which Russia-Eurasia "faces" . . . Some fanatics of oceanic exchange, mindful of the economic possibilities of Siberia, are already dreaming that "modern technology in the shortest time span will make . . .

4, The Persian Gulf is connected to other bodies of water of the world by a strait that is less than 100 kilometers wide, and, at that, obstructed by islands and, shallow, as is the entire Persian Gulf: less than 200 meters in depth, which is quite tiny on the scale of oceanic depths.

from the Kara Sea a Mediterranean Sea, where trading vessels of all countries will meet."⁵ In regard to the Kara Sea, it is only possible to allude to the miracles of future technology: presently this sea is unreachable to any ship traffic for three-quarters of the year . . . Arkhangel'sk is open to navigation for half of the year. The port of St. Petersburg freezes over for four to five months, and even ports on the lower Dniepr, the Azov Sea, Astrakhan', are closed to navigation for one-two-three months a year . . . It follows that the freezing over of a sea is, in the general system of world economico-geographical relations, a phenomenon that is "in some sense, exceptional." Aside from Russia-Eurasia, it is familiar only to the northeastern part of Sweden and to Canada. But no matter how blessed northeastern Sweden may be by natural resources of iron ore, white coal, and timber — it is still a tiny corner that has no chance to play a decisive role in the economic life of the world. And among the great economic entities of the planet, the freezing of the sea is defined as a particular — it cannot be said a happy one! — lot of "Eurasia" and Canada . . . But no matter how attentive the world may be to the speeches about an "outlet to the ice-free sea" made by Russia's enthusiasts of oceanic and "pontic" policy — these speeches — given the framework of world economic relations — must sound as a curiosity . . . The "frozen" sea is completely unfamiliar to nine-tenths of humanity . . . Even in Canada, which, as we have seen, approaches Russia in this particular respect, there can hardly be any talk about an "outlet to an ice-free sea." Canada has such outlets on both the Atlantic (Halifax) and the Pacific coasts.

A review of the positions of individual regions of the world in relation to the ocean-sea inevitably leads us to the conclusion that the most "deprived" among the countries of the world in the sense of qualities needed for participation in oceanic trade is that economico-geographical realm which we designate by the name Russia-Eurasia. We could even say that because of the combination of the fact of exceptionally distant removal of its regions from the sea shore with the fact of the freezing of its seas and their "insularity" (increasing the risks of politico-military interruption of exchange), Russia-Eurasia is situated in an environment that has no parallels in the rest of the world and that engenders a number of problems unheard of beyond its borders. China and North America follow Russia. Yet if we are to leave aside the Gobi Desert, the expanses of Tibet and the regions lying to their west, then in respect to China itself, the economico-geographical significance of "continentality" is decreased (as has been noted above) not only by the relative insignificance of maximal re-

5. D-r. A. Petermanns Mitteilungen, 1920, Dezember - Heft, Priv. - Doz Schultz, "Die Verstellung des Landbesitzes in Sibirien," S. 254.

movals of its regions from the sea coast (no more than 1,600 kilometers), but also by the *non-freezing* and the *non-insularity* of the seas towards which these regions gravitate. Similar circumstances also have a softening effect on the "continentality" in the southern half of North America: but not in Canada and the adjoining parts of the United States. Given the lesser politico-military tensions which characterize the New World, the insularity of those bodies of water, onto which these regions open up — the Hudson Bay and the Gulf of Saint Lawrence — has, so far, perhaps no bearing on economic calculations. But the freezing of these bodies of water makes central Canada and the adjoining part of the United States, despite the fact that "technically" these regions are removed from the Hudson Bay for no more than 1,000-1,200 kilometers, the most "continental" realm of the world after regions of Russia-Eurasia . . . Russia-Eurasia, on the one hand, and Canada, along with the adjoining region of the United States, on the other, are not only the most "continental" countries of the world, but, each taken independently, also the coldest, at least among the regions having economic significance in modern times. More precisely, they are countries with the lowest mean annual temperatures. Here the connection between "continentality" and the nature of climate becomes apparent, and moreover, a certain parallelism takes shape — even if it is only formally logical — between the properties of climatology and those economic properties which occupy our attention in the present essay. As is well-known, the fundamental distinction in climatology is the distinction between the continental and the marine climates (*Das Land — und Seeklima*), deriving from the fact that land and water are characterized not by identical properties "in relation to insulation and to the study of warmth, that is to the two basic factors that determine air temperature. — The specific thermal capacity of water is greater than the thermal capacity of any other known body. Assuming equal weight, the thermal capacity of a unit of solid earth surface will be marked at 0.2, and assuming equal volumes, it will be 0.6 of the thermal capacity of water." Is not this antithesis somewhat analogous to the antithesis, in the realm of international and interregional economic exchange, of the principle of utilizing continental proximities to the "oceanic" principle, expressed in the independence from distance of the combined economically-supplementary countries? Just as the climatological antithesis is based on the specific thermal capacity of water and land, so the economic antithesis is based on the difference in the cost of transportation by sea and by land . . .

For those countries that are distinguished among the areas of the world by their "continentality," the prospect of being "the backwoods of world economy" becomes a basic reality in the case of intensive in-

involvement in world's oceanic trade . . . In the case of isolation from the world, their lot is economic primitiveness associated with the system of "natural economy" . . . In the case of involvement in "world economy," they are confronted with the inescapable power of economico-geographical "deprivation" . . . The entire "oceanic" world is fully counting on the continental countries to accept submissively the burden of this deprivation; with that, to the disposal of the countries of the "oceanic" sphere there will come additional products, and there will emerge additional markets for the selling of their own. But is there no opportunity opening up for the "continental" areas, avoiding the isolation of a primitive natural economy, to eliminate, at least in part, the unfavorable consequences of "continentality"? The way to such an elimination is in the breaking off, within the bounds of the continental world, of the completeness of the dominance of the principle of the oceanic "world" economy, in the creation of economic co-supplementation of separate, spacially adjoining, areas of the continental world, in their development, conditioned by a reciprocal bond . . . If a "continental" country, while selling one or another commodity on the world market, receives, after accounting for transportation costs, minimal earnings, then is it not possible to sell this commodity with greater profit, if it is not sent to "the world market," but somewhere "nearby," "in proximity"? If buying a particular commodity on the world market turns out to be more expensive for one country than for all others because of the added transport cost, then why not buy this commodity somewhere, whence the transport costs less — for a price, which, given the difference in transport costs, would represent a gain? — Thus both from the perspective of the seller and that of the consumer of the intracontinental world, there emerge incentives for reciprocal trade. And this trade will come about under the following condition: if there is a demand for a given commodity produced in the "continental" region within the neighboring continental countries; and if a given commodity, necessary for the continental region, is produced within the bounds of neighboring continental areas. When this condition is present, it is to the advantage of the intracontinental consumer to make the purchase within the bounds of the continental world, because the transport cost from an intracontinental production site is cheaper than delivery from the world market. This is in the case when the intracontinental seller sells his commodities at the production site at full world market price; but it is reasonable to expect a discount — after all, in the case of transporting the commodity for sale to the world market the seller would not receive for himself the full world market price, but would have to be content with the part of the aforementioned price that would remain after accounting for the transport cost of the product from the intracontinental production

site to the world market. It makes sense to the seller to do business with the intracontinental consumer in all cases when the latter agrees to leave in his possession even a fraction of the sum which otherwise would be spent for the delivery of a commodity to the world market. In all the above cases, the seller will receive more than he would have received on the world market . . . Let us designate the transport cost of a unit commodity from an intracontinental production site to an intracontinental consumption site by the symbol "z," the cost of *exporting* the same commodity unit from a continental production site to the world market by "x+a," with "x" designating the cost of land transport to the nearest point on the ocean (or sea) coast, and "a" designating the cost of marine transport from that point to "the world market." The cost of *importing* a unit of the given product from the world market to the intracontinental center of consumption we will designate as "b+y," with "b" as the cost of marine transport from "the world market" to the port that is nearest to the continental center, and "y" as the cost of land transport from that port inward. Upon accepting these designations, we can assert that the intracontinental attraction will remain in force, that is, that there will be an advantage for the intracontinental producer and consumer to conduct exchange with each other, without resorting to the world market, as long as $z < x+a+b+y$, that is, as long as the cost of intracontinental transport will be less than the cost of delivering a given product from the intracontinental production center to "the world market" plus the cost of transporting that same commodity from the world market to the intracontinental consumption site. And the greater is the difference:

$$(x+a+b+y)-z,$$

the more effective, in economic terms, will be the intracontinental attraction . . . This difference, in this or that proportion, may be split between the intracontinental seller and buyer to their mutual benefit. In what proportion they shall split it between themselves — that depends on the specific circumstances of intracontinental demand and supply . . . By splitting the difference, the intracontinental seller and buyer can eliminate—at least in part — the consequences of economico-geographical "deprivation" of the sites of their economic activity. The lower the "z" is, and, consequently, the greater is this difference, the less effect, all else being equal, will the economico-geographical "deprivation" have on the intracontinental selling and purchasing prices.

As has been mentioned above, in order for such a "sharing" to come about, there must exist, within the bounds of the continental world, the appropriate production and the corresponding demand . . . It becomes

clear in what sense the economic development of continental countries is conditioned by their reciprocal bond. Favorable results of intracontinental trade for intracontinental areas can be realized only when the economic condition of these areas offers a scope for such trade. The evolution of one or another of the continental regions beyond the condition of natural economy is demanded, within a continental world, not only by the interests of its own economic development, but also by the interests of fellow continental countries surrounding it, by the interests directed precisely to a *specific intracontinental region, located at such and such latitude and longitude, and not to any other country of the world*. The earlier developed countries, lying on the ocean shores, may, thanks to the disregard for distances characteristic of the oceanic realm, search for an economic "complement" to themselves along the entire expanse of the planet, and any country of the world, regardless of its location, will satisfy their needs, as long as it provides the necessary products cheaply enough! — But the interests of an intracontinental region that has reached a certain level of success are concerned with the problem of development not of "one or another" area of the world economy in general, but of very specific areas — those located nearby — in trade with which — and with them only! — it can overcome the specifically unfavorable consequences of "continentality" . . . Of course, the demand for international and interregional trade, manifested in the realm of "oceanic" economy, is not accidental; upon that trade, as an expression of "the international division of labor," rests the economic development of modern times; not accidental, in a certain sense, is the combination of any given regions of the "oceanic" realm, which fulfill—along the trade routes — reciprocal needs. At present a combination of certain "complementary" countries is being realized — for example, frozen meat is shipped to England primarily from New Zealand. And in time, other areas will combine with equal success: frozen meat will come to England not from New Zealand but, perhaps, from Argentina. Within the continental world, however, not only is the demand for international and interregional exchange far from being arbitrary (here also it is a factor of economic success), but so is also the combination of specific, economically complementary regions and districts; certain countries of the intracontinental realms are welded tightly together by a bond of economic reciprocity. This bond proceeds from the fact that, because of transport expenses, nowhere else can the necessary products be received more cheaply than from a given, nearby country. It would be unfortunate for the Ural mining and metallurgical region, if it were to receive meat for a long time not from the Ufa or Perm' provinces or western Siberia, but from New Zealand or Argentina.

But it should not be thought that the principle of intracontinental economic attractions is reflected in the economic life only of the particularly "continental" areas. Even in such oceanic countries as England or Japan, the abovementioned conditions are operative, within certain limits; there too, for example, it is more advantageous for cities to live on the production of their surroundings (to the extent that the needed products are produced there) than to receive them from the outside. Intracontinental attractions are most relevant where 1) the sphere of adjoining continental regions has *the greatest spacial continuation* and where 2) these regions present *the greatest diversity* of economic environment. Factors of the first kind broaden the spacial zone, within which the intracontinental attractions are operative; factors of the second kind multiply the number of economic goods (commodities, products!), to which these attractions are applied.

It should be noted here that the intracontinental sphere has the property of drawing into a particular intracontinental trade not only regions remote from the ocean-sea, but also those maritime districts that lie between those regions and the sea. These maritime districts are situated on the route of the intracontinental products to the world market; and they are closer to the intracontinental countries, than is the world market. And, because these maritime territories are consumers, it is to their advantage to buy products from the countries of their *Hinterland*. Thanks to their proximity to these countries, they can, taking advantage of the difference (determined, according to our assumption, by the cost of transport) between the world market price and the price from a particular continental "backwoods," receive the commodity more cheaply, than if they would have brought it in for themselves from the world market. Because they are producers, it makes sense for them to sell their commodities to intracontinental buyers — as long as those buyers indicate a demand for them. Even if they sell a product at the production site at full world market price (a case inconceivable in a different situation), they will still deliver it to intracontinental buyers at a price lower than that which the latter would have had to pay for the same commodity, had it been brought in from the world market. . . . The larger the *Hinterland* and the more economically diverse its regions, the more decisive is this link between the maritime districts and their *Hinterland*, because of the greater number of the needed products that a maritime country can find in nearby intracontinental districts and the greater number of its own creations it can sell there . . .

Once we postulate the most rudimentary assumptions, we will understand just how grandiose, self-contained as economic spheres, are such politico-economic formations as China, North America, or Russia . . .

Looking at only the eastern parts of China, we see how the areas fit only for "northern" grain cultures, with mean annual temperatures below zero (parts of Manchuria along the middle Amur), are connected, in continental continuity, to provinces with flourishing agricultural cultures characteristic of a moderate belt (middle and southern Manchuria), followed by areas of cotton and rice, increasingly warmer, subtropical and, finally, tropical, near the southern extremity of China. These areas are situated among districts of abundant industrial resources — above all, iron and coal — where the mining and metallurgic industry already exists, and in the future may develop into a very formidable one — so formidable, that, on the basis of natural resources, as best we can tell, only the industry of North America is capable of competing with it . . . China in its general natural conditions fairly closely resembles the eastern (the most productive and important) zone of North America (an assertion that has its climatological basis in the fact that both of these geographical areas are similarly positioned on the eastern side of a continent!). But in North America the severe (and simultaneously beneficial for human development!) regions of wheat culture are represented more prominently (the black-earth of Minnesota, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta!), and more tightly bound together with the climatically moderate regions of the central states and New England, as well as with the cotton districts of the South, and with the abundant tropical resources of the states of Florida and Texas . . . And, at last, Russia. It is true that the gamma of climatic variety of agricultural regions does not have within Russia the same fullness as in China and North America. China includes within its bounds agricultural regions with mean annual temperatures from -2 degrees to +21.7 degrees Celsius (Canton) and even higher, and North America (as an aggregate of the United States and Canada) ranges from the severest temperatures in which a human being can live to southern Florida, where the mean annual temperature is +25 degrees Celsius. In contrast, in Russia the climatic gamma begins with the coldest climates, but is cut off at the mean annual temperature of +16 degrees Celsius (the Batumi area), and no expansion that seems feasible for Russia in its near future can substantially alter this fact: northern Persia (its warmest place is on the Caspian coast) and the Afghan Turkestan would add to the Russian world regions of mean annual temperatures of +17 and +18 degrees Celsius. Only an outlet to the Persian Gulf would give Russia areas that approximate the tropics in mean annual temperature (Bushehr, +23.1 degrees Celsius). Yet even these areas have significantly lower winter temperatures than those of the tropics (January in Bushehr is +13.0 degrees Celsius) . . . In spite of this climatic "deficiency," Russia contains within itself a wondrous wealth and variety of regions of the temperate-

cold zone (the forested and agricultural non-black-earth North, the black-earth "Center," the South, the East), supplemented by the temperate-warm regions (the northern Caucasus, the Crimea) and partially subtropical ones (Transcaucasus, Turkestan). Within these regions one encounters areas predisposed by nature exclusively toward the forest economy (the taiga!), those richly endowed for agriculture (the black-earth!), and those preordained as areas of "pure cattle-raising" (the Caspian and the Kirghiz steppes!). And throughout this realm there are interspersed regions possessing resources for the development of industry (above all, the Donetsk basin, the Urals, the Altai, the Semirech'e; furthermore, as a region of "white coal," the White Sea-Ladoga district). On the basis of what we already know, it is necessary to concede that these resources — as far as iron and coal are concerned — cannot, in the aggregate, be equated with the resources of China and North America. But they are sufficiently in line with the resources of the great industrial countries of the West — England and Germany — within their European boundaries, and surpass everything that, according to our knowledge, is possessed in this respect by the rest of the world (that is, all of Western Europe, England and Germany excepted, all of Africa, Australia, South America, and South Asia) . . .

To what conclusion, then, will our observations of the diversity of the economic environment of the regions comprising, respectively, China, North America, and Russia, lead us, if they are compared with the aforementioned considerations concerning the position of given geographical worlds in relation to the ocean, and also in regard to the intracontinental "attractions" that emerge within "continental" realms? Does this diversity indicate that these realms are nearing the condition of "economic self-sufficiency"? — This supposition is absurd, because "self-sufficiency" is postulated as something absolute, as a kind of "Chinese wall" . . . It is quite probable that in the near future the erection of such an economic "wall" will be beyond even China's capabilities . . . But in rejecting the idea of utopian "self-sufficiency," it is impermissible to close one's eyes to the essentially different circumstances faced by the different politico-economic units of the world economy in their relationship to "the world market" in modern times, and which they will inevitably continue to face in the future. For some of them the interaction with the world market accomplishes the most fundamental processes of economic trade, processes of "equalization" of extractive and manufacturing industries, of "industry" and agriculture, and also the processes of economic "supplementation" of industrial as well as agricultural regions of the temperate zone by the agricultural lands of the warm zone (the importation of cotton, rice, tea, coffee, spices, and so forth). This order of phenomena dominates those

Politico-economic units, in which the tariff and geographical boundary envelops a relatively narrow circle of lands, and where the regions enveloped by that boundary are relatively homogeneous in their economic environment: for example, those regions that are clearly predestined, in the aggregate, for the predominance of "industry" within their bounds, a fact which leads to the necessity of importing agricultural products; and to the degree that those same regions are agricultural, they lie within one and the same climatic zone. Such are the main industrial countries of Western Europe, England and Germany. As countries that are, in accomplishment and potential, primarily "industrial," they turn to the world market in their demand for food products, and for raw materials from the temperate as well as the warm zones. Things are different, however, in places where a customs and spacially unified entity is shared by lands that are essentially industrial and those that are essentially agricultural, lands that are of the temperate as well as the warm zones. Here, the processes of "equalization" of industry and agriculture, and the reciprocal supplementation between the lands of different climatic zones proceed within the bounds of a given geographical realm without the mediation of "the world market" to a far greater degree than in the politico-economic formations of the first type. Instead of reflecting the flow of the fundamental processes of the industrial-agricultural and interclimatic exchange (as it occurred and continues to occur in relation to the external trade of Germany or England), the articles of external trade of these economic-geographical realms acquire the traits of apparently separate correctives or corrections, applied to the phenomena, accomplished within these realms, of reciprocal supplementation and reciprocal equalization of the basic branches of economic life. These correctives and corrections will become less relevant and there will be fewer of them, the more economic success will be attained, in accordance with the circumstances of their economic potential, by the lands of the intracontinental world. That is, the more obstacles will the natural-geographical conditions of a given realm erect to its entrance onto the world market, the more "deprived," the more "continental" a given realm is in terms of opportunities for oceanic exchange.

These two conditions act in opposite directions on the structure of feasible relations of modern Russia to "the world economy." It would be crazy to proselytize to an exhausted and ravaged country the principles of economic "self-sufficiency"; what intracontinental attractions can there be, when there is nothing to "attract"! But it would be wrong to think that the condition of intensive importation of foreign commodities and, above all, finished products—financed, in the best case, by the exportation of raw materials — which will follow Russia's reopening for economic trade,

that this condition will be normal and prolonged . . . Of all the great units of the world economy, it is Russia which is the most "deprived" in respect to opportunities for oceanic trade. And Russia, having discovered in the recent centuries of its existence, and, particularly, in recent years, the great potentialities of its political and cultural might and the great strain of its search, will not be content with the role of "the backwoods of world economy" dictated by its deprivation. And in its economic striving, Russia will inevitably come to the intensification of its agriculture within the bounds of temperate-cold and temperate-warm regions, to the enlargement of the used (which in many cases means irrigated) area of the subtropical regions adjoining it, and in part to the reconstruction, in part to the creation, of a newly powerful industry satisfying its internal demands — there, where there are natural conditions for this, that is, first and foremost, in some southern and eastern borderland-European and Asian provinces, and then in the Center and the Northwest . . . The transport deprivation of a huge sphere of Russia's regions (related to their "continentality") will prompt them not to rely on the world market and call to life, within their own bounds, centers of production of many, heretofore imported, products; the creation of these centers will in turn broaden the base and intensify the activity of intracontinental attractions. We can be certain that in the intensive utilization of the principle of continental proximities the geographical world of Russia-Eurasia will indeed manifest a certain "self-sufficiency," not literal, of course, but in the sense of completing within the bounds of that world the fundamental phenomena of reciprocal equalization and reciprocal balancing of the major geographico-economic elements of modern economy. In the environment of the politico-economic units of the world, Russia-Eurasia will appear as a unit primarily of self-sufficiency, and, at that, as a combination of regions that is determined not by the whims of political fate, as we see in the example of current "colonial" "oceanic" empires, but, as long as the technology stays the same, as a pressing, unavoidable, reciprocal attraction of lands, drawn to one another by the force of their "oceanic deprivation." This reciprocal attraction is determined by an objective geographico-technical factor. State policy, directed toward the establishment of "self-sufficiency" can merely supplement and increase the influence of this factor . . .

The policy that prevailed in Russia for a long time of seeking "an outlet to the unfrozen sea" should be evaluated from the point of view of these circumstances and categories. It is impossible, of course, to dispute the basis of the strivings of the *Hinterland* to possess a sea coast. But our theoreticians of the oceano-maritime policy were not motivated by this striving alone. Because the approach of the Russian *Hinterland* to the sea

coast scarcely gives an outlet to an "unfrozen," and more so, "open" sea, they sought that outlet even outside the basic sphere of the lands of the Russian world; they found it on the Liaoutung Peninsula. But the "Dal'nii" [Far-Off] settlement that they established there turned out to be truly "Superfluous." Those who ordered it built did not understand that, in that search for "an outlet to the sea," the ocean, as a means of facilitating basic industrial-agricultural and interclimatic exchange, was not in front of them but behind their backs — not the ocean-world, but the ocean-continent. For that which is provided in economic terms by the ocean by connecting, for example, England to Canada, as a land of wheat, to Australia, as a land of wool, and to India, as a region of cotton and rice, is provided within the bounds of the Russian world by the continental union of the Russian industrial regions (of Moscow, the Don, the Urals, and potentially, also that of the Altai-Semirech'e) with the black-earth provinces (wheat!), the Russian cattle-raising steppes (wool!), and "the Russian subtropics": Transcaucasus, Persia, the Russian Turkestan, and potentially also the Afghan and the Chinese Turkestan, and Kul'dzha (cotton and rice!) . . . And in regards to the actual and the feasible economic self-assertion of these regions, which creates their reciprocal economic link and "self-sufficiency," the outlet to the ocean through *Dal'nii* was really an outlet into nowhere . . .

We cannot forget even for a minute the tragic wretchedness of Russia's contemporary economy. But, even aside from the sorrows of the moment, even in view of future prospects shaped by success and creativity, it will always, to a certain degree, remain imperfect, and not only in the sense that it is incapable, in its bowels, to satisfy, for example, its demands for specifically tropical products, but in many other senses as well. And therefore, to a certain degree, the sea, as a link to "the world market," is necessary and will remain necessary for Russia; but it is necessary to understand the essentially limited role that befalls the lot of the "oceanic," "marine" principle in building Russia's economy . . . We should secure an effective guarantee that an opponent's navy will not be allowed to pass through the straits and come to devastate the shores of the Black Sea. It is useful to obtain an outlet to the Persian Gulf (if only from the point of view of the opportunity to organize, using such an "outlet," a cheaper and more convenient way to bring tropical products into Russia's interior). But it must be remembered, that in the matter of the economic formation of Russia, both of these issues are, in a certain sense, secondary in principle. But whatever outlet to the Mediterranean Sea or the Indian Ocean Russia will obtain, sea surf will not bring its foam to the "Cliff" of Simbirsk. And Simbirsk, together with the immense sphere of other regions and places of Russia-Eurasia, will have to continue

orienting itself not to the obtained outlet to a "warm" sea, but to the continentality all around it. . . The economic future of Russia lies not in the aping of the "oceanic" policy of others, a policy that is in many ways inapplicable to Russia, but in the comprehension of its own "continental nature" and in an adaptation to this nature.

AFTERWORD: THE EMERGENCE OF EURASIANISM*

I

Eurasianism emerged quite formally and officially in the year 1921, when four young Russian intellectuals published a collective volume, *Iskhod k Vostoku*, that is, *Exodus to the East*.¹ The four were Prince Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi, to be famous as a linguistic scholar, Petr Nikolaevich Savitskii, an economist-geographer and specialist in many subjects, Petr Petrovich Suvchinskii, a gifted music critic and many-sided intellectual, and Georgii Vasil'evich Florovskii, a theologian, intellectual historian, and also a person of numerous interests with a remarkable breadth of knowledge.

The first Eurasian symposium, *Exodus to the East*, was followed by others. As early as the following year, 1922, the second volume, entitled *Na Putiakh*, *On the Way*, came out, with two new authors joining the orig-

* First published in *California Slavic Studies*, 4 (Berkeley and Los Angeles: Univ. of California Press, 1967), 39-72. Reprinted with permission from the University of California Press. Republished in Nicholas V. Riasanovsky, *Collected Writings, 1947-1994* (Los Angeles: Charles Schlacks, Jr., Publisher, 1993), pp. 126-51, and, in a somewhat abridged Russian translation as "Vozniknovenie evraziistva" in *Zvezda* (St. Petersburg), No. 2 (1995), pp. 29-44. I decided to republish in a contracted form my 1967 article on "The Emergence of Eurasianism" as one approach to Eurasianism and especially to *Exodus to the East*. The contraction eliminated my now unnecessary lengthy summary of the volume, which at the time of the original publication of the article was both a rare item and one available only in Russian.

I feel deeply grateful to numerous colleagues and students whose comments and criticism helped me to write this article. In particular, I am indebted to Professors Georges Florovsky, Roman Jakobson, and George Vernadsky, and to Mr. P. P. Suvchinskii. I would also like to thank the Center for Slavic and East European Studies of the Institute of International Studies, University of California, Berkeley, and the Russian Research Center, Harvard University, for their assistance.

1. *Iskhod k Vostoku. Predchustviia i sversheniia. Utverzhdenie evraziitsev*. Stafii Petra Savitskogo, P. Suvchinskogo, kn. N. S. Trubetskogo i Georgiia Florovskogo (Sofia: Tipografiia "Balkan," 1921).

inal four.² Its ten essays ranged from Florovskii's analysis of "patriotism, just and sinful," to Trubetskoi's formulation of "the Russian problem" and from P. M. Bitsilli's and Savitskii's reconsideration of the role of the Asian nomads in the history of the old world to Suvchinskii's appreciations of Leskov and Blok. It so happened that the two new authors of the second symposium, A. V. Kartashev, an older specialist in Russian religious and church history, and P. M. Bitsilli, a historian, did not really share the Eurasian assumptions and did not stay with the movement. But other emigré intellectuals appeared to make their contributions. While the third Eurasian joint volume introduced no major new names, the fourth published in 1925 included articles by L. P. Karsavin, who was to become the principal religious thinker of the movement, and G. V. Vernadsky [Vernadskii], who developed into the main Eurasian historian, as well as a piece by the outstanding literary critic Prince D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii. The fifth volume, which came out in 1927 and in Paris rather than Berlin, contained an essay by N. N. Alekseev who has often been described as the political scientist of Eurasianism. Altogether, seven consecutively numbered symposia appeared, the last in 1931. Other Eurasian literary undertakings included a special joint volume directed against Roman Catholicism, *Rossia i latinstvo — Russia and Latinism* — published in 1923, a *Eurasian Chronicle*, twelve volumes of which came out in the period from 1925 through 1937, and programs of the movement formulated in the twenties and thirties, as well as some books and many booklets and articles written by individual Eurasian authors. Savitskii proved to be especially prolific. The Eurasians could even boast, although usually not for long, of weeklies, monthlies or other periodicals in such centers of Russian emigration on the European continent as Paris, Brussels, and Tallinn. In addition, a few Eurasian works were published in England.³

2. *Na Putiakh. Utverzhenie evraziitsev. Kniga vtoraiia. Stat'i Petra Savitskogo, A. V. Kartasheva, P. P. Suvchinskogo, kn. N. S. Trubetskogo, Georgiia V. Florovskogo, P. Bitsilli* (Moscow, Berlin: Gelikon, 1922).

3. A useful, although by no means exhaustive, bibliography of Eurasian literature is provided in the only book devoted to Eurasianism: Otto Böss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier. Ein Beitrag zur russischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden: O. Harassowitz, 1961). The Eurasians' own annotated bibliography of Eurasian writings during the first decade of the existence of the movement can be found in Stepan Lubensky, "Bibliographie de l'Eurasisme," *Le Monde slave* (March 1931), pp 388-422. The same bibliography was published in Russian as an appendix to the seventh Eurasian joint volume: S. Lubenskii, "Evraziiskaia bibliografiia 1921-1931," *Tridtsatye gody. Utverzhenie evraziitsev. Kniga VII* (Paris: Izdanie evraziitsev, 1931), pp. 285-317. "Stepan Lubenskii" was one of Savitskii's pseudonyms. See also and especially Mr. Ilya Vinkovetsky's bibliographical article and select bibliography in the present volume.

In effect, in the 1920s and 1930s Eurasianism acquired some prominence and attracted much attention among Russian exiles in Europe. Eurasian publications were supplemented by "seminars," public lectures, formal debates and private disputations. Throughout the existence of the movement, its members were engaged in a constant, many-faceted, and often violent polemic.⁴ To be sure, of the original four creators of Eurasianism only Savitskii continued as an indefatigable champion and leader of the new school. Florovskii left the movement after 1923 and subjected it to a masterful critique⁵; Suvchinskii gradually became less active; and even Trubetskoi, although he apparently maintained his own Eurasian views until his death in 1938, broke for several years with the movement. But new leaders, some of whom have already been mentioned, emerged. Eurasianism gained its main following among Russian students and other young Russian intellectuals in exile. Vast political designs and hopes soon came to occupy the center of attention, supplementing and in part replacing the original emphasis on a spiritual revolution and the creation of a new *Weltanschauung*. The Eurasian "party" expected to supplant the Communist Party and lead the new Russia to a glorious future.⁶ It was their attitude or attitudes toward Soviet Russia — ambivalent and "dialectic" already in *Exodus to the East* — that both divided the Eurasians repeatedly among themselves and also accounted for the greatest hostility between them and other White Russians. Some Eurasians actually returned to Russia. There were claims of betrayal and reports of Soviet agents in the midst of the movement. Weakened by division and disappointed in its millennial hopes, Eurasianism may be considered to have come to its end with the Second World War, although a few writers, notably Professor Vernadsky, have continued to enrich the Eurasian literature in the post-Second World War period.

The intellectual evolution of Eurasianism went along a number of distinct lines, often closely related to particular scholarly disciplines. Still, most Eurasians, whether writing as economists, geographers, geopoliti-

4. For the Eurasians' own account of the polemic during the first decade of the movement, see P. N. Savitskii, "V bor'be za evraziistvo," *Tridtsatye gody*, pp. 1-52. Also published in 1931 as a separate booklet.

5. G. V. Florovskii, "Evraziiskii soblazn," *Sovremennye zapiski* (Paris), No. 34 (1928), pp. 312-46.

6. *Exodus to the East*, of course, had its political side and, especially, its political implications. Still, there is no doubt that Eurasianism became more "political" in the years following. In connection with the grandiose Eurasian political ambition to replace the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, it might be mentioned that the Eurasians claimed some following in Soviet Russia. The 1927 program of the movement was referred to as "the Moscow program."

cians, linguists, anthropologists, religious thinkers, political theorists, or historians, concentrated on defining and developing the new and crucial concept of Eurasia proclaimed in *Exodus to the East*. Savitskii followed his essays in the original volume, which as we have seen dealt with such topics as the deep significance of the temperature of Russia-Eurasia and of its position in regard to the world sea-ocean, with a constant stream of articles and monographs on Eurasian geopolitics.⁷ The basic configuration of the land mass, climate, vegetation, and vegetational zones, as well as much else were analyzed in these works in support of the assertion of a distinct nature of Eurasia and in particular of its difference from Europe.

Trubetskoi continued his fascinating "Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture" with certain other brilliant, if highly questionable, contributions, such as his "Concerning the Turanian Element in Russian Culture."⁸ Following some of Trubetskoi's suggestions, another outstanding linguist, R. O. Jakobson [Iakobson], discovered the Eurasian association of languages: in Eurasia languages, including those of quite different genetic origins, were linked by two jointly present traits, monotony and the distinct division of consonants into hard and soft, which affected meaning.⁹ While Trubetskoi and Jakobson were blazing a trail in linguistics, with the languages of Eurasia only a part of their total interest, others tried to apply crudely some new medical and anthropological research to the same task of establishing the identity of the Eurasians. Thus an article published in 1927, in the eighth number of the *Eurasian Chronicle*, claimed that because of the statistical distribution of blood types among the Russians "Russia is situated [in that respect too] be-

7. See especially the following separately published works of Savitskii, in addition to his very numerous contributions to Eurasian symposia and periodicals: *Geograficheskie osobennosti Rossii. Chast' 1. Rastitel'nost' i pochva* (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927); *Rossiiia - osobyi geograficheskii mir* (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927); *Mestorazvitie russkoi promyshlennosti* (Berlin: Izd. evraziitsev, 1932). See also his appendix, entitled "Geopoliticheskie zametki po russkoi istorii," to G. V. Vernadskii, *Nachertanie russkoi istorii* (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927).

8. Kn. N. S. Trubetskoi, "O turanskom èlemente v russkoi kulture," *Evrasiiskii vremennik. Neperiodicheskoe izdanie pod redaktsiei Petra Savitskogo, P. O. Suvchinskogo i kn. N. S. Trubetskogo. Kniga chetvertaia* (Berlin: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1925), pp. 351-78. Also published, together with "The Upper and Lower Stories of Russian Culture" and two other studies by Trubetskoi, in Kn. N. S. Trubetskoi, *K probleme russkogo samopoznaniia. Sobranie statei* (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927), pp. 34-53.

9. R. O. Iakobson, *K kharakteristike evraziiskogo iazykovogo soiuza* (1931). Republished in Roman Jakobson, *Selected Writings. I: Phonological Studies* (The Hague: Mouton, 1962), pp. 144-201. See also *Evrasiia v svete iazykoznaniiia* (1931). (This booklet contains an "announcement of a discovery" by Savitskii and a report by Jakobson.)

tween the European and the Asian group; it virtually adjoins the Asian group, and it has very little in common with the European."¹⁰

Although, as already mentioned, Father Florovskii left the Eurasian camp shortly after it had been set up, some other members of the movement, notably L. P. Karsavin, proceeded to deal with religious and quasi-religious issues in Eurasian terms. In the very nature of things, and especially so because the Eurasians remained strongly Orthodox, no distinct Eurasian faith could be proclaimed to correspond to the unique geopolitical, ethnic, and cultural characteristics of Eurasia. Nevertheless, much ingenuity was spent on delineating the alleged religious predispositions and qualities of the Eurasian character, the peculiar aspects of religious life in Eurasia, or the concept of symphony, of harmonious multiplicity in unity, supposedly fundamental to the Eurasian relationships. In the religious sphere, the Eurasian critique of the West found expression in particular in a violent attack on the Roman Catholic Church. At the same time the Eurasians came to regard the non-Christian peoples and beliefs of Eurasia as "potentially Orthodox," as striving to develop into Orthodoxy.¹¹

Eurasian political theory and political views in general, developed by Savitskii, N. N. Alekseev and others, often strike the reader as adaptation to circumstances rather than as a body of fundamental belief.¹² Still, cer-

10. V. T., "Poniatie Evrazii po antropologicheskomu priznaku," *Evraziiskaia khronika*, vypusk VIII (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927), pp. 26-31, quoted from p. 26.

11. L. P. Karsavin's able and sophisticated writings related to Eurasianism included such books and booklets as *Tserkov', lichnost' i gosudarstvo* (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927) and *O lichnosti* (Kaunas: Kaunas Universitetas, 1929), as well as numerous contributions to both Eurasian and non-Eurasian periodicals and symposia. See, for example, L. P. Karsavin, "Uroki otrechennoi very," *Evraziiskii vremennik*. Neperiodicheskoe izdanie pod redaktsiei Petra Savitskogo, P. P. Suvchinskogo i kn. N. S. Trubetskogo. Kniga chetvertaia, pp. 82-154. Another religious writer of note, V. N. Il'in, also contributed to Eurasian periodicals, but broke with the movement in 1934. It should be added that Savitskii, Trubetskoi, Suvchinskii, and a number of other Eurasians all liked to emphasize the religious foundation of their ideology and to treat religious aspects and problems of Eurasianism. As to the attack on Catholicism, see especially the already-mentioned symposium *Rossia i latinstvo*, as well as Karsavin's article cited above (Berlin, 1923). The best critique of the relationship between Eurasianism and religion is to be found in Florovskii's above-mentioned article, which abounds in such comments as the following concerning national differences in Christianity: "And, the most important point, the entire meaning and value is not in that which is different, but in that which is one in Christ; and He, in the words of the apostle, is the same now and forever. . . ." Florovskii, "Evraziiskii soblazn," p. 344. (Italics in the original.)

12. In addition to numerous contributions to Eurasian periodicals and symposia, N. N. Alekseev wrote a number of books and booklets, including: *Na putiakh k budushchei Rossii. (Sovetskii stroi i ego politicheskie vozmozhnosti)* (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo,

tain basic doctrines do stand out. The Eurasians believed in ideocracy, that is, in the reign of an idea, implemented by a ruling party representing the idea. The model government should be demotic, broadly supported by the people and acting in the interests of the people, but not democratic. Communist Russia and Fascist Italy were ideocracies, weakened, however, by the fact that their master ideas had no ultimate spiritual and religious sanction. Eurasianism was to become the successful ideocracy of Eurasia.

Eurasian geographical, economic, geopolitical, ethnic and cultural analyses culminated in the Eurasian history of Russia-Eurasia. Suggested first in 1922 in two articles in the second symposium, P. M. Bitsilli's "The East and 'the West' in the History of the Old World" and Savitskii's "The Steppe and the Settlement," Eurasian history received its full development in Professor Vernadsky's voluminous writings.¹³ Vernadsky stressed the decisive significance of the relation between the steppe and the forest societies on the enormous Eurasian plain, the ethnic and cultural complexity of Russia, and the major and organic contribution of eastern peoples,

1927); *Sobstvennost' i sotsializm. Opyt obosnovaniia sotsial'no-ekonomicheskoi programmy evraziistva* (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1928); *Religiia, pravo i npravstvennost'* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1930); *Teoriia gosudarstva. Teoreticheskoe gosudartvovedenie, gosudarstvennoe ustroistvo, gosudarstvennyi ideal* (Paris: Izd. evraziitsev, 1931); *Puti i sud'by marksizma. Ot Marksa i Engel'sa k Leninu i Stalinu* (Berlin: Izd. evraziitsev, 1936). Almost all contributors to Eurasian publications wrote something on political matters. See also the programs of the movement, which are usually referred to by the year of publication: *EvrAziistvo. Opyt sistematicheskogo izlozheniia* (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1926); "the Moscow program" published as "EvrAziistvo. (Formulirovka 1927 g.)," *EvrAziiskaia khronika*, vypusk IX (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927), pp. 3-14; *EvrAziistvo. Deklaratsiia, formulirovka, tezisy* (Prague: Izd. evraziitsev, 1932). For further, and updated, information, see Mr. Ilya Vinkovetsky's bibliographical essay and select bibliography, which follow my contribution to the present volume.

13. Professor G. V. Vernadsky's major Eurasian writings range in time from *Opyt istorii Evrazii s poloviny 6 veka do nastoiashchego vremeni* (Berlin: Izdanie evraziitsev, 1924) and *Nachertanie russkoi istorii* (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927) to such post-Second World War volumes as *The Mongols and Russia* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1953) and *The Origins of Russia* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1959). I do not accept Dr. Böss's opinion — he refers in particular to the fourth edition of Vernadsky's *A History of Russia* published in 1954 (Böss: *Die Lehre der Eurasier*, p. 34, n. 140) — that Vernadsky's later writings are no longer Eurasian; they are to be sure less dogmatic and generally broader in their approach. Professor Vernadsky agrees with my view on the matter. For bibliography, see Alan D. Ferguson, "Bibliography of the Works of George Vernadsky," *Essays in Russian History: A Collection Dedicated to George Vernadsky*, ed. Alan D. Ferguson and Alfred Levin (Hamden, Conn.: Archon Books, 1964), pp. xi-xxv. Professor Vernadsky's latest relevant study is his article "The Eurasian Nomads and Their Impact on Medieval Europe: A Reconsideration of the Problem," *Studi medievali*, 3 Series, IV, 2 (Spoleto: Centro Italiano di studi sull'altro Medioevo, 1963), 1-34.

especially the Mongols, to Russian history. Other Eurasians produced such works as *The Scythians and the Huns*, *The Legacy of Genghiz Khan*, and *Genghiz Khan as Commander and His Legacy*.¹⁴

II

There are several ways of looking at Eurasianism or parts of it. Dr. Böss considered it in the context of Russian intellectual history — *Ideengeschichte* was his term — and was primarily interested in the intellectual content of the movement.¹⁵ Eurasianism also belongs to the general history of Russian emigration following 1917, which remains to be written. Specific points of interest are many. Savitskii applied geopolitics to Russia in an original manner, Vernadsky introduced Eurasianism into the contemporary discussion of Russian history, while some of Trubetskoi's and Jakobson's Eurasian writings formed a part of their larger contributions to linguistics. Certain aspects of the movement as a whole invite investigation. At the present time we do not know the exact composition of the group, let alone its connections or alleged connections in the Soviet Union. Also, it is not clear precisely how Eurasianism fitted into the broader European intellectual context within which the Eurasians were operating.

Other problems, too, come readily to mind. One of these is the fascinating question of the origins or emergence of Eurasianism. Almost always complicated, the problem of origins presents a special difficulty in this case. The difficulty lies in the fact of a striking disjointedness, in a lack of fundamental connection between Eurasianism and preceding Russian views of the world. While particular ties between Eurasian ideas and earlier doctrines can be readily established, the total Eurasian outlook, including the very concept of Eurasia, strikes a reader conversant with Russian intellectual history as something radically new. The Eurasians themselves took pride in the novelty of their ideology, while their opponents considered them violent iconoclasts and often simply failed to understand them. Frequently, for example, the Eurasians were charged with erroneously asserting the Asian nature of Russia or even simply with exaggerating Asian influences on Russia, the critics failing to comprehend the larger claims of

14. N. P. Toll', *Skify i gunny. Iz istorii kochevogo mira* (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927); I. R., *Nasledie Chingiz-Khana. Vzgljad na russkuiu istoriiu ne s Zapada a s Vostoka* (Berlin: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1925); E. D. Khara-Davan, *Chingiz-Khan kak polkovodets i ego nasledie* (Belgrade: Izd. avtora, 1929). "I. R." stood as a pseudonym for Trubetskoi.

15. Böss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier*.

the movement. The older generations of Russian exiles in particular were sincerely and thoroughly baffled by Eurasianism which seemed entirely foreign to their education and outlook. In trying to suggest answers to the perplexing question of where Eurasianism came from, it seems best to group contributing factors under three headings: the course of world history, intellectual developments in Russia and Europe in general, and social and psychological elements.

III

The Eurasians had a catastrophic view of history. To quote Suvchinskii in *Exodus to the East*: "There are frightening times, terrifying epochs, like apocalyptic visions, times of great realizations of the Mystery, times frightening and blessed. . . ."16 What, then, were for the Eurasians the apocalyptic visions and the great realizations of their age and indeed of their day and hour? First and foremost stood, of course, the great Russian Revolution. It occupied the central position in the entire Eurasian ideology and movement, determining in large part everything in it, from the original religious and moral fervor to the later political plans and squabbles. Florovskii perhaps expressed best the spiritual reaction among the Eurasians to the years of revolution, civil war, famine, epidemics, and general economic and social breakdown in Russia: "For years and years we have been living on hate, on malice, on the thirst for vengeance, on the thirst for victory and retribution. Some kill. Others die. All hate. . . . What is frightening is not that human beings die but that they stop being human."17 Or to repeat Savitskii's anguished cry, a cry which combined despair with blazing hope: "Russia in sin and godlessness, Russia in loathsomeness and filth. But Russia in search and struggle, in a bid for a city not of this world. . . ."18

In fact, as we have seen, the Eurasians distinguished from the start two main aspects of the Russian Revolution. On the one side stood the rebellion against God, all the destruction, the entire horror of the Revolution. In this respect the Revolution marked a catastrophic culmination of the long-range Westernizing trend of Russian history which had led to an increasing separation of both the educated people and the governing circles from religion and from all native foundations. The Bolsheviks represented the logical extreme of the Westernizing intelligentsia. But the Revolution had another side as well: the great cataclysm destroyed the old

16. *Iskhod k Vostoku*, p. 14.

17. *Ibid.*, p. 13.

18. *Ibid.*, p. 2.

world and brought submerged popular forces into play. Bolshevism itself would be only a passing moment, for it did not correspond to the nature or the will of the aroused Russian masses. Only an organic religious ideology, such as Eurasianism, could be an adequate guide for the Russians and for all the peoples of Russia-Eurasia. The Eurasians proclaimed themselves ready to replace the Communists in the government of the U.S.S.R.

They also considered their "constructive" attitude toward the Russian Revolution as a leading distinction between them and other groupings of Russian exiles and a main reason why they, rather than these others, would lead new Russia. In effect, so the Eurasians asserted, all other Russian emigrés tried to deny the reality of the October Revolution and to turn the clock back, to 1861, 1905, or the Provisional Government of 1917. Only they themselves faced reality and looked ahead.

Although the Russian Revolution exercised the overwhelming influence on Eurasianism, two other major contemporary historical events also affected the movement profoundly. These were the First World War and the rise of the colonial peoples. From the Russian point of view, the War blended with the Revolution and even was overshadowed by the Revolution. Still, the two were by no means identical. Moreover, it was the First World War, which had spread to almost all of Europe and to other continents, rather than the Revolution within Russia, which represented the more obvious general historical divide, the end of the old epoch and the coming of a new age. Eurasianism can be appropriately considered as one of the post-First World War European ideologies distinguished by their bitter rejection of the past and their vague messianic hopes for the future.

With frightening insensitivity and cold-bloodedness Europe lived through the war. It had been necessary to deform and adapt culture for many years so that it could pass such a trial and not explode. European culture passed the trial, proving its elasticity, its ability to push deep down the problems and the injunctions of the spirit. For a time everything spiritual dutifully retreated and assumed the protective covering of neutrality or of silence. However, such treason could not be without results. Having been able to maintain itself in its external aspect, European culture inevitably begins to decay internally. It has no faith any longer, and no one has faith in it.¹⁹

19. P. Suvchinskii, "Vechnyi ustoi," *Na Putiakh*, pp. 99-133, quoted from p. 109.

And in a still more sweeping and abstract statement, again by Suvchinskii:

The earth fell ill. After a long painful process of evaporation of the water of life from the body of the earth, by means of an unhealthy fire of false-abstract ideas, only salt was left. But this salt of the earth was bitter and not wise. Water became vapor; earth became salt. Salt tortures with thirst; in addition, it irritates the wounds, and these are so numerous on the ancient body of the earth. Water soared high above the earth, now in azure mists, now in clouds, while the body of the earth languished in heat and pain. . . . Only after a worldwide shock, only after heavenly lightning tore in thunder through the high clouds, rain began to fall. Up to now, only drops. The earth is so red-hot that these drops are burned and absorbed immediately. Their healing quality is barely felt. But if drops fall — one can also expect a bountiful downpour.²⁰

The third major contemporary historical development which found strong reflection in Eurasianism cannot be designated as precisely as the great Russian Revolution or the First World War. It has been described by such phrases as the rise of colonial peoples, the decline of imperialism, or the gradual loss by the so-called white race of its dominant global position. The Eurasians linked, or, better, tried to link, their own violent turning against the West to the worldwide rebellion against control by European powers. The timing of the Eurasian interest in the colonial peoples and problem deserves attention. While *Exodus to the East* marked the inauguration of Eurasianism, it had one clear, if not comprehensive, predecessor, namely, Trubetskoi's sweeping treatment of *Europe and Mankind*, published in book form the preceding year, 1920.²¹ Moreover, Trubetskoi claimed in the preface that the ideas expressed in the book "had

20. *Ibid.*, pp. 111-12. The fact that Eurasianism was in many important ways similar to its contemporary European ideologies and movements is all the more interesting because it cannot be explained by simple borrowing, but rather reflects the pervasive intellectual mood of the age.

21. Kn. N. S. Trubetskoi, *Evropa i chelovechestvo* (Sofia: Rossiisko-bolgarskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1920). A revised German edition appeared soon after: *Europa und die Menschheit*. Aus dem Russischen übersetzt von S. O. Jacobsohn [Yakobson] und F. Schlözer. Mit einem Vorwort von Otto Hoetzsch (München: Drei Masken Verlag, 1922). [For a recent English-language translation, see N. S. Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity*. Edited, with a postscript, by Anatoly Liberman, Preface by V. V. Ivanov, Kenneth Brostrom, principal translator (Ann Arbor, Mich.: Michigan Slavic Publications, 1991), pp. 1-64]

been formed in my consciousness already more than ten years ago."²² Earlier publication, however, had seemed undesirable because these ideas were too advanced then and simply would not have been understood.

Europe and Mankind constituted an out-and-out indictment of Western imperialism. Trubetskoi argued that the alleged universal civilization, progress and higher values which the colonizers claimed to bestow upon the colonized were merely the chauvinism of Europe made all the more dangerous by its larger claims which misled and seduced non-European intellectuals. If one condemned the narrow-minded and aggressive patriots of a given locality, of Prussia, or of Germany, why should one defer to the much more dangerous and far-ranging patriots of Europe? Contrary to the prevailing opinion, other cultures were bound to be hurt by their borrowings from Europe. Because of their different psychologies and own cultures, native peoples could never enter the civilization of Europe as equal partners and develop fully and creatively within its framework. In terms of European culture they would always be second-rate. Their own cultures, on the other hand, were in no sense inferior to European culture. They were simply different. The plotting of all cultures on a continuum with that of Europe at the summit represented one of the most pernicious intellectual errors of the age. Indeed, it was precisely this insidious ability of Europeans to make the exploited peoples, that is, the educated classes of those peoples, see things the European way which accounted in large part for the European domination of mankind. Therefore, in order to throw off the European yoke, the intellectuals of other societies, blinded by Europe, had first to recover their sight and to see the falsity as well as the evil of European claims and pretensions. Then they could lead their peoples in an irresistible bid for independence.

Launched by Trubetskoi, the Eurasian consideration of the colonial problem became a significant element of the movement, affecting Eurasian prognostications and plans. Russia-Eurasia did not stand alone against Europe. Other societies and cultures were also in essence antagonistic to this exploiter of the world. Eurasia could thus ally itself with them, perhaps even lead them. The ideology of Eurasianism, while organically linked to Eurasia, contained nevertheless the more broadly applicable message of rebellion against Europe in the name of an authentic native culture. Intellectuals in other lands needed precisely what the Eurasians possessed: an ability to see through European intellectual deceit. In the second Eurasian symposium, published in 1922, Trubetskoi

22. *Ibid.*, p. III.

analyzed "the Russian problem" as follows²³: Russia could no longer be considered in any sense a great European power. In fact, its prostration meant certain exploitation and control by Western powers, either through the Bolsheviks, or, if the Bolsheviks did not prove amenable, through some other, probably "liberal," government. Russia would become clearly a colonial country. Even if the entire West, as some expected, should turn socialist, the position of Russia would not improve one bit. On the contrary, socialists would exploit Russia more than ever, and Russian backwardness and subservience to the "model" states of the West would be accentuated. Yet Russian humiliation meant in fact a great Russian opportunity. A colonial country herself, Russia could lead other colonial countries, in particular her "Asian sisters," in a decisive struggle against the Romano-Germanic colonizers.

There is no reason to doubt Trubetskoi's sincerity or to ignore the fact that the Russian view of the colonial problem fitted neatly into the rebellion of the Eurasians against the West and into their general ideology. In other words, that view deserves to be taken at face value. It did not exhaust, however, either the complexity of the problem or of the Eurasian reaction to it. While the Eurasians wanted to make Russia into a future leader of the colonial world, its past activities in such countries as China or Persia ranged it with the colonizers rather than the colonized. Much more important, the Russian empire itself, and after it the Soviet Union, contained very many non-Russian nationalities. With this in mind, Eurasianism can be considered as a determined defense of Russia, one and indivisible, in an age when empires crumbled. And indeed, if the Russian empire were a symphonic unity of peoples – more than that, if there were no Russian empire at all but only one organic Eurasia – the issue of separatism lost its meaning. The burden of Eurasian thought, to repeat, was precisely the development of such a concept of Eurasia. One does not have to agree with Eurasian arguments in order to see that they had much more intellectual content and sophistication than such manifestations of imperialisms on the defensive as the bare-faced assertion that the Angolans are Portuguese or the forlorn cry of *Algérie française*. This approach to Eurasianism finds support in the stalwart patriotism of the members of the group, a patriotism which can be best and most continuously documented for Savitskii, but which also extended to Trubetskoi and to many other Eurasians.²⁴

23. Kn. N. S. Trubetskoi, "Russkaia problema," *Na Putiakh*, pp. 294-316.

24. A further suggestion might be made in discussing the implicit as well as the explicit attitudes of the Eurasians toward the rise of colonial peoples, their subconscious together with their conscious motivation. As will be indicated later in this study, self-identification

The great Russian Revolution, the First World War, and the rise of the colonial peoples set the stage for Eurasianism. That teaching, however, must be understood also in its own terms, that is, in terms of intellectual history.

IV

Quite naturally, Russian intellectual history provided much of the essential background for Eurasianism. Many elements of the Eurasian teaching had been proclaimed by earlier Russian thinkers, often prominent men whose works were well-known to Savitskii, Trubetskoi and their associates. More than that, entire significant aspects of the new ideology were linked clearly and closely to the past, and, in fact, can be considered as a continuation of certain major traditions of Russian thought. This would be true, for example, of the emphasis on Orthodoxy, as well as of patriotism, nationalism, and anti-Westernism characteristic of the Eurasian movement. The Eurasian attitude toward Peter the Great, negative yet ambivalent, represented a recurrent position in the continuous Russian debate about the great reformer and his work. The apocalyptic tone and the messianic notes of Eurasianism had also more than one predecessor in the Russian past.

The Eurasians were, of course, aware of these connections. Reference need only be made to Father Florovskii's essay in *Exodus to the East* which linked Eurasianism to the entire Russian and general Orthodox religious past.²⁵ The following year, Savitskii discussed the matter at greater length in an article entitled "Two Worlds" and published in the second Eurasian symposium.²⁶ The two worlds, which engaged in a mortal struggle in Russia throughout the nineteenth century, were, on the one hand, the world of Gogol' and the Slavophiles, of Dostoevskii, Vladimir

with "Scythians," "Mongol ancestors," "Asia" or other proto-Eurasian concepts, which blossomed among certain Russian writers immediately before and immediately after the Revolution, had a remarkably ambivalent character, combining hate and love, combat to the death and harmony, terror and salvation. It might therefore be argued that the Eurasian views of non-Russian peoples, the concept of Eurasia itself, were based on a deep subconscious fear of "the yellow peril," which spread at the time in certain circles in Europe in general and also apparently in Russia following Vladimir Solov'ev's late writings and the Russo-Japanese War. In the crucial case of Trubetskoi one cannot fail also to notice the close link to Solov'ev and Solov'ev's views through Trubetskoi's father and uncle. See my "Prince N. S. Trubetskoi's 'Europe and Mankind,'" *Jahrbücher für Geschichte Osteuropas*, 12 (July 1964), 207-20.

25. Georgii V. Florovskii, "O narodakh ne-istoricheskikh (Strana ottsov i strana detei)," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, pp. 52-70, especially pp. 68-69.

26. Petr Savitskii, "Dva mira," *Na Putiakh*, pp. 9-29.

Solov'ev, and Konstantin Leont'ev, of such painters as Aleksandr Ivanov and Vrubel', in a word, the world of Russian spirituality; and on the other hand, the world of the Westernizers and critics of the first half of the century, later of Dobroliubov, Pisarev, and Mikhailovskii, finally of the Bolsheviks, that is, a world of positivism, scientism, and of blasphemous "nihilism" in regard to all "non-scientific" foundations of human existence. The Eurasians had no difficulty making their choice. "To the first apostles of Christianity, to the sources, to the initial moments of a great historical cycle lead the ardor and the illumination which permeate Khomiakov and Dostoevskii, Leont'ev and Solov'ev. To late times of disbelief (epicurean or communist, this does not matter), to periods of 'enlightenment' — the lot of declining cultures — lead the nihilistic-'scientific' ideologies. . . ."²⁷ The first was the way of life, the second, of death.

Looking back, the Eurasians reserved perhaps their greatest praise for "the early Slavophiles."²⁸ They admired the strong religious foundation of that school of thought, the brilliance of Khomiakov's theology, the penetrating and sweeping Slavophile critique of the West, and the affirmation of native Russian principles and authentic Russian culture. They agreed in large part with the Slavophile denunciation of Peter the Great as well as with the unfavorable judgment of imperial Russia in general, a judgment which seemed to be fully confirmed by the catastrophic events in 1917. Indeed, occasionally the Eurasians singled out "the early Slavophiles" as the only nineteenth-century Russians who might have had an essentially correct view of the world, and they also spoke of their agreement with Slavophilism "in spirit," if not in terms of specific doctrines.

Still, similarities between Eurasianism and Slavophilism should not be overemphasized. There were also differences. For example, the Eurasians accused the Slavophiles of not having recognized sufficiently the importance of economic development — incidentally, a not entirely just accusation. Much more important, the Eurasians believed in the significance and the power of the state. The Slavophiles had been, by contrast, strongly "anti-state," to the point of being considered religious anarchists by some

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 11-12.

28. In addition to numerous references to the Slavophiles in works dealing with other topics, the Eurasians devoted a few articles to Slavophilism, such as: V. N. Il'in, "Evraziistvo i slavianofil'stvo," *Evraziiskaia khronika*, vypusk IV (Prague: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1926), pp. 1-21; I. K., "Ekonomicheskie vozzreniia slavianofilov," *Evraziiskaja khronika*, vypusk VII (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927), pp. 29-30. (This last item is a summary of a report read by N. S. Zhekulin in a Eurasian seminar in Prague in December 1926.) See also L. P. Karsavin's edition of A. S. Khomiakov's famous booklet *O Tserkvi* (Berlin: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1926).

critics.²⁹ Perhaps an even more fundamental divide stemmed from the fact that Slavophilism had been free on the whole from calculations of distances and of temperatures, from analyses of vegetation zones and blood types, from geopolitics and crude cultural anthropology, in sum, from the pseudo-scientific paraphernalia and approach of Eurasianism. In this sense, it was precisely in spirit that Savitskii, Trubetskoi and many of their associates differed from the early Slavophiles. The Eurasians emphasized with a special vehemence that the concept of mankind was a mere abstraction without content, whereas the highest meaningful grouping in human history was a cultural unit such as Eurasia.

The very points of difference between the Eurasians and the Slavophiles suggest other Eurasian ancestors in the Russian past, and notably among the "hard" nationalist, Panslav, and "scientist" writers of the second half of the nineteenth century.³⁰ Much more prominent than all others stands N. Ia. Danilevskii, whose magnum opus, *Russia and Europe*, first published in book form in 1871, can be considered as the one nineteenth-century work which Eurasianism resembled the most. Danilevskii, like the Eurasians later, used pseudo-scientific arguments — taken in his case primarily from his own field of specialization, botany — to present a naturalistic view of the history of humanity divided into absolutely distinct cultural types. In addition, he directed a violent, sustained, and comprehensive attack against the European type. Trubetskoi's definition of "Europe" in *Europe and Mankind* and elsewhere, as well as similar descriptions and definitions by some of his associates, read remarkably like the following passage from *Russia and Europe*:

Coercion³¹ (*Gewaltsamkeit*) is one of such characteristics common to all the peoples of the Romano-Germanic type. Coercion in turn is nothing else than an excessively developed feeling of personality, of individuality, in accordance with which a man who possesses it places his own way of thinking, his interests so highly that any other way of thinking, any other interests must of necessity

29. To be sure, the Slavophiles regarded the state as necessary: a necessary evil. They were especially concerned that the state not move beyond the proper sphere of its activity and encroach upon the spiritual freedom of the people.

30. N. F. Fedorov, a peculiar thinker of that period who defies standard classification, can also be considered an ancestor of the Eurasians. For Eurasian appreciations of Fedorov, see A. S. Adler, "N. F. Fedorov," *Evrasiiskaia khronika*, vypusk X (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1928), pp. 101-02; and especially, V. N. Il'in, "O religioznom i filosofskom mirovozzrenii N. V. Fedorova," *Evrasiiskii sbornik. Kniga VI* (Prague: Tipografiia "Politika," 1929), pp. 17-23.

31. The Russian word, italicized in the original, is *nasil'stvennost'*.

cede to them, willingly or unwillingly, as less than equal. Such a forcing of one's way of thinking on others, such a subjugation of everything to one's own interests, does not even seem, from the point of view of an excessively developed individualism, of an excessive feeling of one's own dignity, as something unjust. It appears as a natural subjugation of a lower element to a higher one, in a sense even as a benefaction to this lower element.³²

It is in rereading Danilevskii that one often finds both the spirit and the letter of Eurasianism.

But Eurasian similarities to Danilevskii, too, had their limitations. If Savitskii, Trubetskoi and certain other Eurasians read like Danilevskii, Florovskii, Suvchinskii, or Karsavin did not. If the Slavophile analogy broke down in part because of the pseudo-scientific aspects of Eurasianism, the analogy with Danilevskii's scheme suffered from the spiritual fervor of the Eurasians as well as from their religious, esthetic and broadly cultural interests. To paraphrase their own schemes of classification, the Eurasians can perhaps be defined as situated between the Slavophiles and Danilevskii although closer to Danilevskii. This indeed might be a more concrete formulation of that tension between freedom of the spirit and determinism which Dr. Böss considers to be the fundamental contradiction of Eurasianism.³³ Much in Eurasianism can thus be illuminated by reference to the Slavophiles, Danilevskii, and other related Russian thinkers of the nineteenth century – much, but by no means everything. Above all, the fact remains that neither the Slavophiles nor Danilevskii knew anything about Eurasia. We must, therefore, look elsewhere for the intellectual antecedents of that central concept of the Eurasian teaching.

More precisely, we have to search for two distinct Eurasias, because two different fundamental concepts of Eurasia emerge from the volumi-

32. N. Ia. Danilevskii, *Rossia i Evropa. Vzgliad na kulturnye i politicheskie otnosheniia slavianskogo mira k germano-romanskomu*, 3rd ed. (St. Petersburg: Izdatel'stvo N. Stakhanova, 1888), p. 191. In one place Danilevskii remarked: "Comparative philology could serve as the basis for a comparative psychology of tribes, if someone would succeed in reading in the differences of grammatical forms the differences in psychological processes and in the views of the world from which the first-mentioned differences are derived." (*Ibid.*, p. 113.) Trubetskoi in effect proceeded to do precisely what Danilevskii had suggested. He had, to be sure, various predecessors, including the Slavophiles.

33. The polarity between the Slavophiles and Danilevskii was, of course, highly relative rather than absolute. In particular, there were strong elements of determinism in the Slavophile teaching. See my *Russia and the West in the Teaching of the Slavophiles: A Study of Romantic Ideology* (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1952); and "Khomiakov on *Sobornost'*," *Continuity and Change in Russian and Soviet Thought*, ed. Ernest J. Simmons (Cambridge, Mass.: Harvard Univ. Press, 1955), pp. 183-96.

nous writings of the Eurasians: a geopolitical concept and an ethnic-cultural one. The first was developed especially by Savitskii; the second, by Trubetskoi. The Eurasians, of course, upheld both of them; and in fact the two can be considered complementary. Thus, the geopolitician of the movement, Savitskii, continued to write passionate poetry to the steppe and his steppe ancestors, to the entire "windswept, boundless steppe world of the Bashkirs, the Mongols, and the Turkmen, of ebb and flow through the centuries, of portentous rapid changes!"³⁴ Trubetskoi too, for his part, found in geopolitical arguments additional support for his exposition of the ethnic, linguistic, and generally cultural uniqueness of Eurasia. Still, the two concepts were by no means identical. In particular, the geopolitical view did not at all logically derive from or depend on ethnic and cultural considerations. Geopolitics could be applied in the abstract without worrying about the particular nature of the people or peoples inhabiting the land. Or it could be used to explain the evolution of the Russians along the lines of, for example, Turner's famous hypothesis, which, needless to say, does not in the least depend on a symphonic cultural synthesis of the white settlers and the Indians. The Eurasians tried to bring different aspects of their teaching together as best they could; yet, geopolitical Eurasia remained distinct from the ethnic-cultural one.³⁵

And it was that geopolitical Eurasia which had rather obvious origins. While the concept owed little to nineteenth-century Russian thought, it can be considered a product of Savitskii's application of European, especially German, geopolitical theories to Russia. The very term "Eurasia" was apparently introduced by an Austrian geologist, Eduard Suess.³⁶ As a young student of the famous economist and intellectual, Petr Struve, at the Polytechnic Institute in Petrograd, Savitskii was immersed at the time of the First World War in geopolitical literature. In formulating Eurasianism he created his own geopolitical doctrine. The step was a natural one to

34. P. Vostokov, *Stikhi* (Boulogne sur Seine: Sklad izd.: E. A. Vetchorine, 1960), p. 221. From the poem "The Northerners and the Steppe People" (pp. 220-22). See also the entire section entitled "The Steppe Element" (Stepnoe), pp. 209-22. I am relying here on the suggestion that "P. Vostokov" was used by P. Savitskii as one of his pseudonyms. A number of articles thus signed and dealing with current Soviet problems and affairs appeared in *Le Monde slave* (Paris) between 1930 and 1938. To the same periodical Savitskii contributed articles under his own name and as "S. Lubenskii" (this was the signature under an article on Eurasianism).

35. My argument here is not only logical. It is interesting to observe how numerous Eurasian writings deal with merely one of these two concepts of Eurasia, as a closed system, without any apparent need for the other.

36. Böss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier*, p. 25, n. 100. See pp. 25-33 for a good discussion of Eurasian geopolitics and its antecedents.

take both because the huge Eurasian land mass, one possible version of "the heartland," was bound to loom large in much geopolitical thinking and because Savitskii had the added incentives of his close acquaintance with his fatherland as well as of fervent patriotism. Although essentially West European, especially German, in derivation — as are so many movements in modern Russian thought — geopolitical Eurasianism had certain Russian predecessors, notably some earlier scholars of Russian geography, botany, or mineralogy, such as the specialist in soils, V. V. Dokuchaev. It should also be added that geographical interpretations had traditionally been very prominent in Russian historiography.

Opponents of Eurasianism sometimes criticized the geopolitical concept of Eurasia, challenging, for example, the alleged geopolitical uniqueness of the area or the extremely sharp contrasts drawn by the Eurasians between it and Europe. But they reacted much more strongly to the other identification of Russians and Russian culture with Eurasia, a concept which included non-Russian, often Asian, nationalities of the Russian state, which accounted for much of the notoriety of the movement and the tremendous polemics which it aroused.

From the time of Peter the Great and his reforms, educated Russians identified themselves, their culture, and their country with the West, with Europe. This was the attitude of the Russian representatives of the Age of Reason, of Alexander I and his enlightened advisers, of the Decembrists, of the Westernizers, of the liberals, the Marxists, and most of the Populists, and of the great bulk of Russian intellectuals in general. Moreover — a point often insufficiently appreciated — even those Russians who went against the current and rose in opposition to the West, for example, the Slavophiles, the upholders of Official Nationality, or such arch-conservatives as Konstantin Leont'ev and Konstantin Pobedonostsev, formulated their conflict with the West as essentially a fraternal conflict, perhaps all the more bitter for that reason, but nevertheless fraternal. Self-identification in terms of Orthodoxy, the Byzantine heritage, the Russian people, or Slavdom almost inevitably implied a close relationship to other Christians, other heirs of the classical world, and other European peoples or groups of peoples. Therefore, not surprisingly if the above is kept in mind, time and again the same Russians who vehemently denounced Europe and postulated a fundamental contrast and opposition between Russian and Western principles nevertheless identified themselves with Europe, with the West, as soon as they turned to consider

Asian peoples.³⁷ Against this background, the ethnic and cultural concept of Eurasia burst like a bombshell.³⁸

Still, while the Russian intellectual tradition provided no foundation for Eurasia, two recent developments in Russian culture contributed to the emergence of that concept. These were the growth of scholarship in relevant fields and a new trend in Russian literature. The growth of relevant scholarship extended, of course, much beyond Russia. For instance, it was only towards the end of the nineteenth century and the beginning of the twentieth that Turkic and especially Finno-Ugric scholarship, developed by many specialists in a number of countries, had progressed sufficiently for Trubetskoi and Jakobson to engage in their fascinating theorizing concerning the Eurasian association of languages. Perhaps even more immediately relevant for Eurasianism were studies detailing the rich cultural background of ancient Russia and linking elements of Russian and non-Russian cultures. An account of this scholarship would far exceed the scope of this work. Yet it is important to realize that in field after field

37. For such a reaction by two leading proponents of Official Nationality, S. Uvarov and M. Pogodin, see my "Russia and Asia: Two Nineteenth-Century Russian Views," *California Slavic Studies*, 1 (1960), 170-81.

38. To be sure, certain non-Russian writers, especially Poles, had been presenting Russia as essentially Asian. The Russians themselves, however, had determinedly opposed that view as vicious slander. In fact, one of the charges against the Eurasians became the "help" they rendered to those "enemies of Russia." See, e.g., E. Spektorskii, "Zapadno-evropeiskie istochniki evraziistva," *Vozrozhdenie*, May 21, 1927. I am unable to cite a single nineteenth-century Russian intellectual who was consistently willing to identify himself or his country with Asia. References in that connection to M. L. Magnitskii are apparently mistaken. Magnitskii, a notorious reactionary, was an extreme and bitter critic of the West and a loud champion of Russian superiority. But he based this claim of superiority squarely on Orthodoxy and did not identify Russia with Asia (see his "Sud'ba Rossii," *Raduga* [Revel], 1 [1833]. Cf. a Eurasian view of Magnitskii: V. N. Il'in, "M. L. Magnitskii," *Evraziiskaia khronika*, vypusk X [Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1928], pp. 85-86). More interesting is the following passage in Dostoevskii: "This [the conquest of Asia] is necessary because Russia is not only in Europe, but also in Asia; because the Russian is not only a European, but also an Asian. Not only that: in our coming destiny, perhaps it is precisely Asia that represents our main way out." (F. M. Dostoevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 21 vols. [St. Petersburg: Prosveshchenie, 1896], XXI, 514.) Incidentally, the word for "way out" here, "iskhod," is the same as in *Iskhod k Vostoku*, *Exodus to the East*. But it should be kept in mind that Dostoevskii insisted on his identity as a Slav, a European, and even as "an Aryan." Indeed, he wanted Russia to advance in Asia in order to strengthen itself for a future role in Europe, spoke of the Russian *mission civilisatrice*, and compared the potentialities of a Russian expansion eastward to the results of European expansion to America. (See the same article from which the above quotation was taken, "Geok-Tepe. Chto takoe dlia nas Azia," and its sequel "Voprosy i otvety": *ibid.*, pp. 513-23. Dostoevskii's Pan Slavism is not documented here, but it is abundantly documented elsewhere, for example, in numerous other articles in *Dnevnik pisatel'ia*.)

and topic after topic Russian scholars were discovering a new and largely "non-Western" richness in the Russian and "pre-Russian" past, and its connections with other civilizations. Archeology, history of art with its discovery of the "Scythian style," music, literature with its new links between Kievan epos and those of Persia and the Turkic peoples, investigations of folklore, history, and much else, all contributed to a fuller appreciation of Russia as a cultural and historical entity and suggested to some the need of a new scholarly synthesis.³⁹ This expansion of knowledge and awareness concerning the Russian past may be seen in a striking, even exaggerated, manner by comparing Vernadsky's writings on ancient Russia with standard nineteenth-century accounts.

For the first time — except, perhaps, for the extremely controversial case of the "Varangians" — non-Russian peoples were being thought of as integral parts of Russian historical development. A remarkable case in point would be the section of Kliuchevskii's lectures on Russian history where the historian discusses the relationship between the Great Russians and the Finnic tribes. Professor V. O. Kliuchevskii, it hardly needs recalling, taught during the last part of the nineteenth and the first part of the twentieth centuries, until his death in 1911, at the University of Moscow, considered the leading Russian university. He was almost certainly the most popular historian of Russia on the eve of the Revolution.

Kliuchevskii's analysis of the Finnic contribution to the emergence of the Great Russians occupies twenty pages in the fourth edition of his celebrated *Course of Russian History*.⁴⁰ Finnic tribes had established themselves in the northern part of the great Russian plain before the Slavs. They were responsible for thousands of non-Russian place names in that vast area, for example, for names of rivers ending on *va* including Moskva itself, *ua* meaning water in Finnic. When the Slavs came into the region, the meeting of the peoples had in general a peaceful character. Russian records and popular tradition preserve no memory of warfare; the Finnic tribes were according to all evidence an exceptionally quiet and peaceful people, while the Russians, mostly peasants, wanted to settle down in the enormous and largely virgin territory rather than engage in conquest. As a result, the two peoples found themselves scattered and

39. The Eurasians themselves mention many of the relevant works. Long lists of them, for example, can be found in Vernadsky's bibliographies. In this connection, special attention should be paid to the development of Oriental studies in Russia. See especially V. Bartol'd, *Istoriia izucheniia Vostoka v Evrope i Rossii*. 2nd ed. (Leningrad: Leningradskii institut zhivikh vostochnykh iazykov, 1925).

40. Prof. V. Kliuchevskii, *Kurs russkoi istorii*, Part I, 4th ed. (Moscow: Tipografiia Mosk. Gor. Amol'do — Tre'iakovskogo uchilishcha glukhonemykh, 1911), pp. 361-82.

intermingled in the vast area, a fact confirmed by the intermingling of Finnic and Russian geographical names. When the Great Russian type and society, differentiated from the Ukrainian and the White Russian, finally emerged in central and north European Russia, they bore unmistakable evidences of a Finnic impact and indeed had incorporated Finnic elements within themselves. The very physical type of the Great Russian indicated Finnic influence: more pronounced facial bones and a darker pigmentation of skin and hair than in the case of other Slavs, as well as a different nose. Similarly, the Great Russian language was probably affected by its non-Russian and non-Slavic neighbors. "The ancient phonetics of Kievan Russia changed especially noticeably in the northeastern direction, that is, in the direction of the Russian colonization which created the Great Russian people through an amalgamation of Russian population and Finnic. This leads to the supposition of a relation between the two processes."⁴¹ Even more obviously, "popular beliefs and customs of the Great Russians preserve to our days clear indications of Finnic influence."⁴² In particular, the religious beliefs of the two peoples became extremely closely intertwined as well as thoroughly confused, with the primitive deities of the poorly developed Finnic paganism generally becoming demons for the advancing Orthodox in the area. In a sense, then, local population managed to adhere to some extent to both faiths. Finally, Finnic tribes contributed to the rural nature of the emerging Great Russian society, for they themselves were a rural, as well as a socially undifferentiated, people.

Needless to say, Kliuchevskii did not create Eurasianism, nor was he himself at all a Eurasian. The significant fact is precisely that such views as those expressed by the famous Moscow professor in regard to the Great Russians and the Finnic peoples were becoming part of established scholarship. In other words, the Eurasians could find much to build on. It is worth noting that Kliuchevskii, like the Eurasians later, spoke in terms of a real synthesis between the Russians and the Finnic peoples, going far beyond assertions of limited contact or circumscribed influence. The synthesis perhaps remained somewhat one-sided, because Kliuchevskii was fundamentally concerned with the Russians, not the Finnic tribes, and because he stressed the inclusion of these tribes into the Great Russian people. Nevertheless, the process of inclusion had taken centuries and indeed continued, as Kliuchevskii himself emphasized repeatedly in his discussion of the matter. Trubetskoi, incidentally, started his ethnographic in-

41. *Ibid.*, p. 371.

42. *Ibid.*

terest in the non-Russian peoples of the Russian empire with the same Finnic tribes.⁴³

However, although the rapidly developing Russian scholarship could provide abundant material for the concept of Eurasia, it could not supply its *idée maîtresse*. After all, Kliuchevskii felt himself no more to be a Eurasian than did Khomiakov or Danilevskii. The new self-identification had to come from elsewhere, and it appears to be linked to an elusive, yet striking, new trend, or trends, in Russian literature.

The remarkable literary and artistic renaissance which came to Russia in the first decades of the twentieth century brought with it many new themes and visions. It would appear that it was in the context of that renaissance that a new self-definition, or self-definitions, no longer Western either directly or by fraternal association, emerged. In considering possible links of these definitions with the concept of Eurasia, it is important to realize that the Eurasians, young though they were, belonged themselves to the cultural renaissance. Later they developed some of its main themes, such as the rebellion against the atheism and the materialism of the preceding period – and of the Bolsheviks – the search for an organic society or the attempt to redefine the relationship between the intelligentsia and the people. In fact, one of the interesting aspects of Eurasianism is precisely its continuation of certain renaissance themes which were smothered in Russia proper by the communist government. In reading *Exodus to the East* and other Eurasian literature one is repeatedly reminded of *The Signposts – Vekhi*.

The new self-definition or self-definitions were expressed by several writers or groups of writers at about the same time. For example, Velimir Khlebnikov, a leading Futurist poet, declared in 1912: "I know about the mind of a continent, not at all similar to the mind of islanders. A son of proud Asia does not come to terms with the peninsular intellect of the Europeans."⁴⁴ He also castigated, for example, Kant who "intending to determine the boundaries of human reason determined the boundaries of German reason. The absent-mindedness of a scholar . . ."⁴⁵; and he generally directed some of his iconoclasm against the foundations of the

43. "From the age of thirteen I began to be interested in scholarly matters, my studies being concerned especially with ethnography and ethnology. In addition to Russian folklore, I became interested in particular in Finno-Ugric peoples inhabiting Russia." "Notes autobiographiques de N. S. Troubetskoy communiqués par R. Jakobson," p. XV. The notes occupy pp. XV-XXIX in N. S. Troubetskoy, *Principes de phonologie* (Paris: C. Klincksieck, 1949).

44. Velimir Khlebnikov, *Sobranie proizvedenii* (Leningrad: Izdatel'stvo pisatelei v Leningrade, 1933), V, 179.

45. *Ibid.*, p. 183.

West and of a Western orientation in Russia. Professor Roman Jakobson, a most important witness and indeed participant, attaches considerable significance to the Futurist roots of the Eurasian revolt.⁴⁶ It is worth remembering that at least one of the original four Eurasians, Suvchinskii, pointed to Futurism as the cultural form of the coming organic and creative age.

Fascination with Asia and identification with Asian or quasi-Asian peoples developed especially among the so-called Symbolists. In 1910-11, Andrei Belyi, one of the most important and prominent writers of the period, published *St. Petersburg*, a remarkable tale of the capital city in 1905, of a gathering revolution, violence, and nightmare. "Asian" elements abounded in Belyi's novel, especially in its striking nightmare sequences. A mysterious Persian, a figure of delirium, materialized, or seemed to materialize, at one point, a Mongol face glared from a wall, the horsemen of Genghiz Khan again rode in the steppe. *St. Petersburg* may well be interpreted as a depiction of a fatal conflict between the city of Peter, a symbol of order, organization, rationality, and Westernization in Russia, and the seething, revolutionary, "Asian" masses.⁴⁷ "Asia," then, was inside Russia, not merely outside. But Belyi's identification with "Asia," went beyond this rather vague and abstract general scheme, for the two main protagonists of his tale, the Ableukhovs, father and son, the important bureaucrat and the undecided revolutionary, were explicitly of Mongol origin, and it was his own ancestors that came to the younger Ableukhov in his frenzied visions.

Even more memorable than Belyi's was the somewhat similar vision of the supreme poet of the age, Aleksandr Blok, which found its best expression in a poem entitled "The Scythians" written on the thirtieth of January, 1918:

You are millions. We are hordes and hordes and hordes.
Just try, fight us!
Yes, we are Scythians! Yes, we are Asians,
With slanting and greedy eyes!

And several stanzas later, always addressing the West:

46. Conversations with Professor R. O. Jakobson in the winter of 1961-62.

47. Belyi's earlier novel, *The Silver Dove* (1908-09), contained in a weaker form some "proto-Eurasian" elements. The two novels were meant to constitute the first two parts of a trilogy, *East and West*, the third part of which was never written.

Russia is a Sphinx. Rejoicing and grieving,
 And bathed in black blood,
 It looks, looks, looks at you
 With both hatred and love!⁴⁸

Blok's vision, like Belyi's, combined hatred and love, massacre and the coming of a new world, all-pervasive terror and a kind of exultation. As the epigraph for his poem Blok selected the words of Vladimir Solov'ev, the man who exercised in so many ways a dominant influence on Blok's age: "Panmongolism! Although the name is savage, still it caresses my ear." Behind Belyi and Blok a reader might see Vladimir Solov'ev's preoccupation with "the yellow peril," terror turned into identification and exultation. Again, as in the case of Belyi who dealt quite explicitly with the revolutionary year of 1905, Blok wrote his poem in the wake of the October Revolution of 1917 and at the same time that he was writing his celebrated revolutionary poem, "The Twelve." In terms of Eurasian ideology, Blok's formulation was more precise than Belyi's, for he presented his Russians-Scythians not simply as Asians, but rather as an independent third element between Europe and Asia, which had for centuries protected the West, had "held the shield between two hostile races, the Mongols and Europe!"⁴⁹ Blok and Belyi were not alone. In 1916-18 there developed a movement known as "The Scythians," linked to the Symbolist school and led by the critic R. Ivanov-Razumnik, which combined the new self-identification in opposition to Europe with a revolutionary and apocalyptic tone and messianic hopes.⁵⁰ In fact many critics ascribe Blok's poem to Ivanov-Razumnik's influence.

Neither Khlebnikov, nor Belyi, nor Blok, nor any other poet created Eurasianism. The significant fact, rather, is that at the same time that scholars advanced their studies of non-Russian peoples of the Russian empire and of the relationship of these peoples to the Russians, artistic imagination, in more cases than one, also seized upon these "Asians," "Mongols," "Scythians" to the point of identification with them. The stage was set for the flowering of a full-fledged new ideology, strikingly different in its self-definition and orientation from the Russian intellectual tradition. Trubetskoi could well write on the twenty-eighth of July, 1921, the year of the formal inauguration of Eurasianism: "The new direction is being

48. Aleksandr Blok, *O rodine* (Moscow: Gos. izdatel'stvo khudozhestvennoi literatury, 1945), pp. 88-91. For the circumstances of the writing of the poem, see, e.g., K. Mochul'skii, *Aleksandr Blok* (Paris: YMCA Press, 1948), pp. 411-13.

49. Blok, *O rodine*, p. 88.

50. *Skify*. Sbornik 1-2. 2 vols. (Petrograd: Knigoizdatel'stvo "Skify," 1917-18).

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carried in the air," and cite in the first instance Blok and two other poets as evidence for his assertion.⁵¹

V

The social and psychological background of Eurasianism can be mentioned briefly, not because the subject is unimportant, but because its main outlines are reasonably clear. True, a full treatment would require extensive dealing with a variety of factors. For example, it may be significant that three of the original four Eurasians, Savitskii, Florovskii, and Suvchinskii came from the Ukraine. The fourth, Trubetskoi, belonged to a princely family derived from Grand Prince Gedymin of Lithuania and possessing strong historical links with western Russia. The Eurasians were concerned with Ukrainian, and to a lesser extent White Russian, separatism.⁵² Again, it would be interesting to establish the social origin of every Eurasian, which could, for one thing, throw some light on the relationship between Eurasianism and the Russian gentry.⁵³ Certainly a number of Eurasians, including such leaders as Savitskii and Trubetskoi, came

51. N. S. Trubetskoi's letter to R. O. Jakobson. I am very grateful to Professor Jakobson for letting me see and use Trubetskoi's unpublished correspondence. "Eurasian" notes can be found also in the writings of some other authors of approximately the same period, such as V. Briusov, M. Tsvetaeva, B. Pil'niak, and M. G. Rozanov. See Gleb Struve, *Russkaia literatura v izgnanii. Opyt istoricheskogo obzora zarubezhnoi literatury* (New York: Izdatel'stvo Chekhova, 1956), pp. 40-49. If Professor R. E. Steussy is to be believed, Pasternak's *Doktor Zhivago* constitutes the latest major Eurasian work, with the mysterious Evgraf as the prime representative of Eurasia in contrast to the main protagonist's Westernism. If so, the novel certainly continues the Eurasian literary "tradition" of love and hatred, violence and terror, revolution and epochal changes. (R. E. Steussy, "The Myth behind 'Dr. Zhivago,'" *The Russian Review*, 18 [July 1959], 184-98.) Pasternak did belong to the cultural renaissance, to the age of Belyi, Blok, and so on.

52. See, for instance, Trubetskoi's treatment of the Ukrainian and White Russian languages, e.g., in Kn. N. S. Trubetskoi, "Obshchieslavianskii èlement v russkoi kulture," published in his *K probleme russkogo samopoznaniia. Sobranie statei* (1927), pp. 54-94 and chart. Occasionally the Eurasians engaged in formal discussion with Ukrainian patriots: *Evraziiskaia khronika*, vypusk X (Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1928), contained Professor D. I. Doroshenko's letter "On the Ukrainian problem" ("K Ukrainskoi probleme," pp. 41-51) and Trubetskoi's answer to it ("Otvèt D. I. Doroshenku," pp. 51-59). Doroshenko's letter had been occasioned by Trubetskoi's article "On the Ukrainian problem" (Kn. N. B. Trubetskoi, "K Ukrainskoi probleme," *Evraziiskii vremennik. Kniga piataia* [Paris: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927], pp. 165-84). In general Ukrainian nationalists turned against Eurasianism, considering it to be another Great Russian device to dominate and oppress the Ukrainians.

53. Mr. Joseph A. Kessler, a graduate student at the University of California, Berkeley, is writing a doctoral dissertation on "Turanianism" in Hungary, seeking, among other things, to connect that movement with the gentry. [Available in the University of California Library as *Turanism and pan-Turanism in Hungary: 1890-1945.*]

from the gentry. It is noteworthy that critics of the movement constantly contradicted one another and generally experienced great difficulties when it came to determining the place of the Eurasians on the conventional Right-Left political and ideological continuum. Similarly, as a friend of mine, an economist, pointed out, the attitude of the Eurasians towards industrialization, and modernization and economic development as a whole, is not entirely clear. While many Eurasian writings, especially Savitskii's, urged this development, others seemed to represent a reaction against it.

These and other such issues appear, however, of secondary significance compared to the fundamental fact, or rather combination of facts, that the Eurasians were young Russian intellectuals in alienation from their society and in exile in the West. Alienation has been a fruitful concept in the study of the Russian intelligentsia, and much has been made, for example, of its greater or lesser intensity in connection with such developments as the growth of Russian liberalism around the turn of the century. In the case of the Eurasians, the alienation was almost complete. In the words of Florovskii, "Russia vanished."⁵⁴ Or, to quote another pregnant statement: "byt ischez," "the way of life vanished." Of course, individual Eurasians could achieve something, at times much, in their new lives, as scholars and teachers, for instance, in Western universities. But, as members of a generation nurtured and educated in Russia to assume their rightful place in the intellectual and cultural evolution of their fatherland, they were effectively wiped out. Older people had already said their word. Younger people would be brought up under the new system which denied intellectual freedom, denied the intelligentsia, and they would presumably adjust to the system at least in part. Older people would maintain their well-established views and attitudes in exile or, quietly, in the Soviet Union. Younger people would fully belong to tragic Soviet history. But for Eurasians everything disappeared, and potential salvation could be found only in a maximalist, fantastic doctrine of their own. It is not so surprising, after all, that the Eurasians belonged to a single generation, without real predecessors or real successors.

The exile in the West was also of major importance. There has been, of course, a strong anti-Western trend in the Russian intellectual tradition, a trend often stimulated by sojourns in the West. In this connection, one thinks immediately of the great writer Fonvizin in the eighteenth century and of many intellectuals in the nineteenth, such as the Slavophile Ivan

54. *Iskhod k Vostoku*, p. 11.

Kireevskii, whose letters from Germany are so very revealing.⁵⁵ Yet Ivan Kireevskii and numerous others like him, went to "Europe" merely for a visit, to meet prominent scholars and men of letters, sporadically attend lectures in one or two leading universities, travel, see treasures of art and other things of interest, and then return to their fatherland and their estates. By contrast, there was no return for the Eurasians. They moved from Sofia to Prague, or Vienna, or Berlin, or Paris, but they remained in the West. The many hardships of a permanent exile followed the tragedy of revolution and civil war. Under the circumstances, anti-Westernism became one of the strongest emotions within the Eurasian movement. The ideological insistence on an absolute break with Europe, which as indicated above distinguished the Eurasians even from those earlier Russian intellectuals who had been anti-Western, possessed its psychological counterpart.

And in general those critics who like to contrast fact and fiction, reality and aspiration, misery and dreams of grandeur, can claim Eurasians for their own. In a sense, Eurasianism constituted a desperate bid to reestablish vanished Russia, to transmute fragmented and rootless existence in a foreign society into an organic and creative life at home. The scope of the dream corresponded to that of the loss. As to the precise benefits and rewards to be distributed in the Eurasian utopia, the evidence is incomplete and in part contradictory, because, for one thing, Eurasian views on the role of private property in the Russia of the future underwent change during the evolution of the movement. Yet one point at least remained clear: an ideocracy was to be ruled by ideocrats.

There remains the question of why some Russian intellectuals of that particular generation, a small minority to be more exact, became Eurasians, whereas others did not. A full answer could be given only after a detailed study of each individual case, and perhaps not even then. Still, one distinguishing trait appears to stand out, at least as regards the leaders of the movement. This trait is a certain unorthodox turn of mind, unconventionality, originality. The argument is not tautological. For example, Vernadsky's works, such as his *Ancient Russia*, abound in unorthodox views, non-Eurasian views as well as Eurasian.⁵⁶ Both Trubetskoi and Jakobson have been outstanding among modern linguists for pioneering insights and in general for originality of thought. Savitskii turned early against his teachers and has worked all his life on a synthesis of his own.

55. I. V. Kireevskii, *Polnoe sobranie sochinenii*, 2 vols. (Moscow: Izd. A. I. Koshelevym, 1861), I, 19-79.

56. George Vernadsky, *Ancient Russia* (New Haven: Yale Univ. Press, 1943).

Suvchinskii's main preoccupation in 1921 and the years following seems to have been a search for an original, new, and creative answer to problems of history and culture.

How such a search by talented and displaced young Russian intellectuals could lead to Eurasianism is a fascinating topic which I tried to sketch in this study.

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EURASIANISM IN ITS TIME: A BIBLIOGRAPHY*

This bibliography is not exhaustive. Its aim is to present the classic Eurasian canon and a sampling of scholarly studies, with an emphasis on those works that are available in English.¹

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1. The Russian term "evraziistvo," rendered here as "Eurasianism," has also been translated into English as "Europasianism," and "evraziitsy," rendered here as "Eurasians," appear in some other English texts as "Europasians" and "Eurasianists." The term "Evraziia" (Eurasia), is used in Eurasian texts to designate a geographical entity distinct from both Europe and Asia rather than the combination of the two. For the Eurasians' own definition of "Eurasia," see P. N. Savitskii, *Geograficheskie osobennosti Rossii. Chast' 1: Rastitel'nost' i pochvy* (Praga: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1927), pp. 50-51.

A comprehensive bibliography of Eurasianism is scheduled for release later this year: "O Evraziï i evraziitsakh (bibliograficheskii ukazatel')." Pod redaktsiei A. A. Kozhanova. Vstupitel'naia stat'ia A. V. Antoshchenko. Sostaviteli: A. V. Antoshchenko, R. M. Beliaeva, N. G. Evseeva, N. V. Egorova, M. F. Tikunova (Petrozavodsk: Izdatel'stvo Petrozavodskogo universiteta, 1996). The first annotated Eurasian bibliography, which appeared in French and Russian and covered the first ten years of Eurasianism, was compiled, fittingly, by the tireless Petr Savitskii himself. Writing under a pseudonym, he allowed himself to make critical observations: Stepan Lubensky, "Bibliographie de l'Eurasisme," *Le Monde slave* (March 1931), 388-422, and Stepan Lubenskii, "Evraziiskaia bibliografiia 1921-1931. Putevoditel' po evraziiskoi literature," *Tridtsatye gody. Utverzhenie evraziitsev; Kniga VII* (Parizh: Izdanie evraziitsev, 1931), pp. 285-317. One of the best, although outdated, bibliographies of Eurasianism is "Bibliographie," on pages 125-30 in Otto Böss, *Die Lehre der Eurasier. Ein Beitrag zur russischen Ideengeschichte des 20. Jahrhunderts* (Wiesbaden: Otto Harassowitz, 1961). A recent bibliography in a Moscow journal (A. A. Troianov, R. I. Vil'danova, "Bibliografiia evraziistva," *Nachala*, No. 4 [1992], pp. 103-12) is strong on Russian primary sources but weak on foreign-language publications and contains numerous mistakes. Some of the bibliographies dedicated to individual Eurasians are very good. Two of the best are both in English: "References" to Anatoly Liberman's postscript "N. S. Trubetzkoy and His Works on History and Politics" on pages 376-89 in N. S. Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity* (Ann Arbor: Michigan Slavic

Even this modest aim has its challenges. The Eurasians were not a formal party, and the boundaries of their movement were malleable. Participants in the Eurasian publications naturally differed in the degree of their dedication to the movement's declared principles, which also changed over time. Moreover, even the most dedicated Eurasians sometimes produced works that had nothing to do with Eurasianism. These works are not included in this bibliography, but matters become trickier when the Eurasian nature of a particular work is up for debate.² The issue is further complicated by the fact that some of the publications are all but impossible to locate.

Recognizing the seminal status of *Exodus to the East* (Iskhod k Vostoku), this bibliography is organized to emphasize the primary sources from the formative, early years of Eurasianism. The collective works of Eurasians are presented first. The two most significant series here are the *vremenniki* (also known as the *sborniki*, compendia, 1921-1931) and the *khroniki* (chronicles, that is volumes of *Evraziiskaia khronika*, 1925-1937), both developed under the guidance of Savitskii.³ Of the two, the compendia, split into numbered "books" (*knigi*), stand out because they began to come out first (starting with *Exodus to the East* itself), introduced Eurasianism, and produced a greater impression on the intellectual community. The early compendia in particular brought together a diverse, extremely gifted group of contributors all trying to make sense of post-revolutionary Russia and their own lives in exile. These Eurasian publications offered a forum for the innovative ideas of a new generation of Russian intellectuals. Such dynamic early participants as Florovskii and Kartashev parted company with Eurasian publications before the chronicles even began to appear in 1925.⁴ By that time, Eurasianism, which had begun as

Publications, 1991) and Andrew Blane's "The Published Writings of Georges Florovsky" on pages 341-401 of Andrew Blane, ed., *Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman* (Crestwood, NY: St. Vladimir's Seminary Press, 1993).

2. For example, Trubetskoi, Savitskii, Alekseev and Il'in accused the newspaper *Evraziia* of betraying Eurasianism in favor of the Soviet line. See the pamphlet: N. N. Alekseev, V. N. Il'in, P. N. Savitskii, "O gazete 'Evraziia' (Gazeta 'Evraziia' ne est' evraziiskii organ)" (Parizh: [s. n.], 1929). Trubetskoi's letter to the editor, originally published in *Evraziia*, No. 7 (Jan. 5, 1929), is also included in this pamphlet.

3. See the compendia and *Evraziiskaia khronika* listings in the bibliography below.

4. Florovskii's often misunderstood article "Okamenennoe beschustvie" in *Put'*, No. 2 (1926), pp. 128-33, was not a defense of Eurasianism as a whole, but an attack on those critics of Eurasianism who failed to comprehend its basic underpinnings and acknowledge its truths. He was out of the Eurasian camp long before the publication of that article: "My break with the Evraziitsy came . . . [at] a kind of meeting in Berlin, in August 1923, at which I was rejected, and where I rejected them. . . . My rejection was absolute for I said: 'There is an intolerant spirit here; you want to be involved in political intrigue and that is not for

a loose creative collaboration of contributors who "on certain issues think differently from one another,"⁵ was being transformed into a more overtly political movement. To emphasize their prominence in early Eurasianism, the contents of the seven numbered compendia (also united by the designation *Utverzhdenie evraziitsev* [Affirmation of the Eurasians]) along with the unnumbered volume *Rossia i latinstvo* (Russia and Latinism, 1923), are broken down by articles in the bibliography below.

The other Eurasian serials, including the chronicles, are not presented in such detail. Nevertheless, it should be noted that although on the whole the level of the contributions to the chronicles may readily be judged lower, cruder and more dogmatic than that of the compendia, some of the individual articles were quite compelling. All the while, Savitskii, the main editor of *Evraziiskaia khronika*, remained a true believer and kept the publication in line with Eurasian programs which he himself helped draft. The same orthodoxy did not apply to all publications that claimed to be Eurasian, as evidenced by the events around *Evraziia* (1928-1929), a Paris-based publication under the direction of Prince Dmitrii Petrovich Sviatopolk-Mirskii (1890-1939) that over time took on an increasingly pro-Soviet line, and drew the ire of Savitskii and Trubetskoi among others.⁶ Mainline Eurasianism was able to survive the threatening rift with pro-Soviet Eurasianism in the late 1920s, and reemerge again in the 1930s. Paris-based *Evraziiskie tetradi* (1934-1936) and the later, Berlin-based chronicles (1935-1937) were a testament to its continuing vitality.

After listing the collective publications of the Eurasians, this bibliography goes on to mark their individual works. The four authors of *Exodus to the East* are presented first, and more thoroughly, with their periodical articles as well as monographs. Even though Georgii Vasil'evich Florovskii (1893-1979, known as Georges Florovsky in the West), who would become one of the most prominent theologians of Orthodox Christianity, was the first of the four to break with Eurasianism, his contribution to it is considerable. With their eloquent calls for a sincere spiritual awakening, his three passionate essays in *Exodus to the East* give the volume a reli-

me'." (G. V. Florovskii in Andrew Blane, "A Sketch of the Life of Georges Florovsky," in Blane, ed., *Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman*, pp. 11-217, quoted from p. 39.)

5. Introduction to *Iskhod k Vostoku. Predchuvstviia i sversheniia. Utverzhdenie evraziitsev* (Sofia: Tipografiia "Balkan," 1921), p. iii.

6. See Alekseev et al., "O gazete 'Evraziia' (Gazeta 'Evraziia' ne est' evraziiskii organ)." For a discussion of *Evraziia* and another periodical, *Evraziets* (The Eurasian, published in Brussels), which was not Eurasian at all and therefore not in this bibliography, see pages 346-48 in Liberman, "N. S. Trubetzkoy and His Works on History and Politics," pp. 295-389.

gious and literary sensibility that transforms it into a far greater work than it otherwise would have been. A measure of Florovskii's contribution is provided by the fact that his lone essay in the second Eurasian compendium *Na putiakh* (On the Way, 1922) entitled "O patriotizme pravednom i grekhovnom" (On Patriotism Righteous and Unrighteous) drew high praise from Savitskii even in 1931, many years after Florovskii's substantial disagreements with the Eurasians became public.⁷ Florovskii's early attachment to Eurasianism and appreciation for its attractions made his 1928 critique of the movement, "Evraziiskii soblazn" (The Eurasian Temptation), in *Sovremennye zapiski* particularly masterful. "The fate of Eurasianism," he began that article, "is a story of a spiritual failure. It is impossible to ignore the Eurasian truth. But it should be stated straight off and bluntly that it is a truth of questions, not a truth of answers, a truth of problems, and not of solutions. It so happened that Eurasians were the first to be able to see more than the others, to be able not so much to pose, as to overhear, the vital and sharp questions of the day in the process of creation. To handle these questions, to answer them clearly — that they were not able to do. . . ."⁸

Despite his sharp criticism of Eurasianism, Florovskii never dissociated himself from his own articles in the early Eurasian publications: "I myself," he claimed, "was never a Eurasian in the sense of doctrine. I am responsible only for what I wrote in the symposia, not for the writing of the others."⁹ He maintained close ties to Savitskii, who was married to his wife's sister. Indeed, in his later years, Florovskii remembered the early Eurasians as a group of people who happened to be in Sofia at the same time and came to be bound by personal relations. Trubetskoi was a close friend, at whose house he sometimes baby-sat. The historian Petr Mikhailovich Bitsilli (1883-1953), a contributor to *Na putiakh* and *Rossia i latinstvo*, had earlier been Florovskii's tutor at Odessa University, and became a good friend despite a fifteen-year age difference. Things would change when Suvchinskii went to Berlin, Trubetskoi moved to Vienna, and Savitskii and Florovskii left for Prague, but at the time of *Exodus to the East*, Florovskii recalled, "there was no real group, nor party. . . . It was not supposed to be anything but a symposium. In such a publication

7. Savitskii made this assessment under a pseudonym; see his Stepan Lubensky, "Bibliographie de l'Eurasisme," pp. 388-422, or the same work in Russian, "Evraziiskaia bibliografiia 1921-1931," pp. 285-317.

8. G. V. Florovskii, "Evraziiskii soblazn," *Sovremennye zapiski*, 34 (1928), p. 312.

9. Florovskii in Blane, "A Sketch of the Life of Georges Florovsky," p. 38.

everyone simply says for himself what he wants. . . . Later, however, some people tried to make out of it a party and a program'.¹⁰

Florovskii's brother-in law, Petr Nikolaevich Savitskii (1895-1968) was perhaps the most ardent of these organizers. He seems to have given over his life after 1921 to Eurasianism, and virtually all his publications, unlike those of the other participants in *Exodus to the East*, carry the Eurasian stamp. It is believed that he went, apparently unwittingly, to a GPU-sponsored "Eurasian congress" in Moscow in 1926 or 1927.¹¹ Besides the works listed in the bibliography, he published some other articles under pseudonyms (Vostokov, Lubenskii [Lubensky in French]) as well as his own name, primarily in *Le monde slave* (Paris). Savitskii stayed in Prague throughout the Second World War, and after the Red Army took Czechoslovakia he was arrested and sent first to prison and later to a concentration camp in Mordovia. In 1956 he was allowed to return to Prague, where he lived out the rest of his life in poor health, and endured another arrest in 1961.¹²

Just as Florovskii gave *Exodus to the East* religious vitality, Petr Petrovich Suvchinskii (1892-1985) contributed a sense of elevated mysticism. Pierre Souvtchinsky, as he was known in the West, continued to be published in Eurasian publications into the early 1930s. But Suvchinskii came to be associated with the aforementioned journal *Evraziia* and contributed to that publication even after it was strongly reproached by Trubetskoi and Savitskii.¹³ Savitskii's displeasure with Suvchinskii's break with mainline Eurasianism seems to have played a part in his 1931 evaluation of Suvchinskii's early Eurasian articles. Not only did he call Suvchinskii's "Vechnyi ustoi" (from *Na putiakh*) "incomprehensible" but he also avoided mentioning Suvchinskii altogether when writing about *Exodus to the East*.¹⁴

If Savitskii was Eurasianism's keeper of the flame, Prince (*kniaz'*) Nikolai Sergeevich Trubetskoi (1890-1938, known as Trubetzkoy from his

10. *Ibid.*, pp. 38-39.

11. Liberman, "N. S. Trubetzkoy and His Works on History and Politics," p. 345. Prior to his exile from Russia, Savitskii, an economic geographer, had been one of Petr Bergardovich Struve's (1870-1944) most gifted students at St. Petersburg's Polytechnic Institute; Mark Bassin, "Russia between Europe and Asia: The Ideological Construction of Geographical Spaces," *Slavic Review*, 50 (1991), 14 n. 64. For more on the geographical conceptions of the Eurasians, with an emphasis on Savitskii, see *ibid.*, pp. 13-17.

12. *Ibid.*, pp. 348-49

13. See Suvchinskii's articles "Revoliutsiia i vlast'," *Evraziia*, No. 8 (1929), "Tret'e nachalo," *ibid.*, No. 9 (1929), "Pax Eurasiana," *ibid.*, No. 10 (1929), and "O sovremennom evraziistve," *ibid.*, No. 11 (1929).

14. See Lubenskii, "Evraziiskaia bibliografiia 1921-1931," pp. 285-86, 288.

days in Vienna) was no less a pillar. In drawing the distinction between the Romano-Germans and the rest of the world, his 1920 book *Evropa i chelovechestvo* (Europe and Mankind) established the pattern for much of his later Eurasian thought. Trubetskoi continued to publish Eurasian works for much of the rest of his life, but in contrast to Savitskii, he also produced an impressive body of work that was not related to Eurasianism. Indeed, it was as a linguist developing structuralism and phonology that he received much of his world acclaim.

Trubetskoi's ardent anti-Romano-Germanic stance has been widely noted by critics,¹⁵ but what has not been appreciated as widely is that the same stance prevented him and other mainstream Eurasians from endorsing the kind of a Russo-German-Japanese "Transcontinental Bloc" alliance advocated at the time by the Nazi geopolitician Karl Haushofer (1869-1946). Haushofer's geopolitics did share some important traits with Eurasianism. Both developed in the same years and were motivated by a strong resentment of the post-World War I order. Indeed, according to Milan Hauner, it was around 1921, the year of *Exodus to the East*, that Karl Haushofer began to evolve his geopolitical thought after reading Halford J. Mackinder's short but seminal "Geographical Pivot of History" (1904). Where Mackinder (1861-1947) saw a threat, Haushofer perceived an opportunity, as he sought to develop a force based around continental dominance of the "Heartland" to counteract the maritime supremacy of Great Britain and the United States. The pillars of Haushofer's "Transcontinental Bloc" were to be Germany, Japan and the Soviet Union, and they were to be joined by such potential powers as China and India after those countries' imminent revolt against their colonial oppressors. Haushofer believed that British colonies in Asia would soon be emancipated and that joining them in an alliance was crucial to German interests. The trouble was that Germany was poorly positioned in relation to Asia, and thus needed the Soviet Union, with its Eurasian "Heartland," to be its link to the region.¹⁶ This scheme was cloaked in

15. For a recent example, see Thomas S. Noonan's review of N. S. Trubetskoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity*, in *Modern Greek Studies Yearbook*, 9 (1993), 553-55.

16. Milan Hauner, *What is Asia to Us?: Russia's Asian Heartland Yesterday and Today* (London and New York: Routledge, 1992), pp. 171-74; Karl Haushofer, *Geopolitik des Pazifischen Ozeans* (Berlin: Vowinckel, 1924); Sir Halford J. Mackinder, "The Geographical Pivot of History," *Geographical Journal*, 23 (1904), 421-37; reprinted (with introduction by E. W. Gilbert), *The Royal Geographical Society*, London, 1951. For more on Mackinder, see: W. H. Parker, *Mackinder: Geography as an Aid to Statecraft* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1982), and James Trapier Lowe, *Geopolitics and War: Mackinder's Philosophy of Power* (Washington, DC: University Press of America, 1981).

Haushofer's writings by what one close observer called "political mysticism."¹⁷ Trubetskoi and Savitskii, despite being in Vienna and Prague, did not fall under the Nazi spell that enchanted some other Russian emigrés, and one need only remember their basic view of the undesirability of Romano-Germanic culture to understand why. If, in the earlier days, some Eurasians looked on fascism, particularly Italian fascism, with a degree of approval, those sympathies dissolved over time. "[O]ur views on the idea governing a truly ideocratic state," Trubetskoi wrote in 1935, "are irreconcilable with the colonial imperialism so manifest in the modern European ideocratic ('fascist') movements."¹⁸ Trubetskoi was repulsed by the anti-Semitism promoted within the Russian emigré community by the Nazis both on the grounds that it was benefiting the German regime's interests and because he rejected the anthropological materialism of the Nazis.¹⁹ He also actively opposed the Nazis' assertion that the original home of the Indo-Europeans had been in Germany. Trubetskoi paid for all this when the Gestapo searched his Vienna apartment and interrogated him at length in the spring of 1938, not long before his death in June of that same year. As the former editor of *Evraziiskaia khronika* and propagator of views similar to Trubetskoi's, Savitskii too had reason to fear Nazi reprisals; however, he was able to live through the Nazi occupation of Prague only to be arrested later by the Soviets.²⁰ Thus, despite the Eurasian endorsement of ideocratic, demotic state rule, and despite

17. "One stared in awe at the ponderous expressions in Haushofer's *Journal of Geopolitics* (*Zeitschrift für Geopolitik*), and marveled at his travail in clothing simple geography with political mysticism." Edmund A. Walsh, *Total Power: A Footnote to History* (Garden City, NY: Doubleday, 1948), p. 4. For a first-hand account of Haushofer's final days before his suicide, his own defense of geopolitics, and an examination of how his geopolitical ideas were used by the Nazis, see pages 3-67 and 344-53 of the same book.

18. N. S. Trubetskoi, "Ob idee-pravitel'nitse ideokraticheskogo gosudarstva," *Evraziiskaia khronika*, 11 (1935), translated as "On the Idea Governing the Ideocratic State," in Trubetzkoy, *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity*, p. 274.

19. "Ideas of 'racism' are being propagated quite actively in Russian circles, hardly to the displeasure of the German government. While preparing its attack on the U.S.S.R. with the goal of seizing the Ukraine, the German general staff is interested in having as many sympathetic elements as possible both in Russia and the Ukraine. And since the idea of German rule in its pure form can attract no one except the Germans themselves (along with some self-seeking and short-sighted landowners), anti-Semitism is being promoted as a means of drawing Russians toward contemporary Germany." "Eurasianism rejects economic materialism and finds no reason to embrace an anthropological materialism, whose philosophical foundation is far weaker than that of economic materialism." N. S. Trubetskoi, "O rasizme," *Evraziiskie tetradi*, No. 5 (1935), translated as "On Racism," in *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity*, pp. 277-78, 287.

20. Liberman, "N. S. Trubetzkoy and His Works on History and Politics," pp. 334-35, 348.

the fact that Eurasian works continued to be published in Berlin in the late 1930s, Eurasians logically perceived German Nazism as basically incompatible with Eurasianism.²¹

Several Eurasians published their works in English. Of all the Eurasians, the historian Georgii Vladimirovich Vernadskii (George Vernadsky, 1887-1973), particularly through the first four editions of his *History of Russia* (1929) and his controversial *The Mongols and Russia* (1953), was the most responsible for bringing Eurasian views to English-language readers. By all accounts, however, Vernadskii's Eurasianism mellowed and became less dogmatic over time. While Vernadskii was at Yale University, the well-known linguist Roman Osipovich Jakobson (Jakobson, 1896-1982), whose primary Eurasian work was not in English and who developed Eurasian linguistics along with his close friend and correspondent Trubetskoi, was at Harvard University. Two Eurasian works released by the same London publisher in 1928 reflected an earlier, more strident time for the movement: *Russia in Resurrection*, written anonymously by "an English Europasian," and Petr Nikolaevich Malevsky-Malevitch's *A New Party in Russia*. Taken together, these well-written books offer a fairly accurate reflection of Eurasian ideology at its most politically developed stage, that is, after the codification of Eurasianism in the 1926 and 1927 programs, but before the scandal with *Evrasiia* beginning in late 1928. The suggestion by a recent Russian journal that Malevsky-Malevitch wrote both books appears wrong: the books are different in style, although Malevsky-Malevitch did write a glowing review for *Russia in Resurrection* in the *Eurasian Chronicle*.²² The "English Europasian," however well-versed in Eurasianism, writes about it from a non-Eurasian but sympathetic outside point of view, consistently stressing how a Eurasian victory in Russia would help revive the Christian spirit in Britain.

Eurasianism drew a strong and sometimes angry response from the Russian emigré press. It was the movement's former participants and not

21. Still, the entire range of the relationship and attitude of different Eurasians to German geopolitics on the one hand and fascism on the other remains to be explored. As for the issue of the Eurasian attitude toward the Jews, besides Trubetskoi's "O rasizme" cited above, see L. P. Karsavin's "Rossiia i evrei," *Versty*, 3 (1928), 65-86, and Ia. A. Bromberg's *Zapad, Rossiia i evreistvo. Opyt peresmotra evreiskogo voprosa s predisloviem V. I. Il'ina* (Praga: Izd. Evraziitsev, 1931), "O neobkhodimom peresmotre evreiskogo voprosa," *Evrasiiskii sbornik*, Kn. VI (1929); "Evreiskoe vostochnichestvo v proshlom i budushchem," *Tridtsatye gody* (1931), pp. 191-211, and "Rasizm i evrei," *Evrasiiskie tetrady*, 6 (1936), 1-17.

22. "Bibliografiia evraziistva," "Nachala," No. 4 (1992), p. 107; [A review of] "Russia in Resurrection" by an English Europasian. London 1928. Geo Routledge and Sous [sic], *Evrasiiskaia khronika*, 10 (1928), 74.

its opponenets from the start, however, who came up with the most cogent arguments. Florovskii's aforementioned "Evraziiskii soblazn" was perhaps the most perceptive critique of the movement from the religious point of view, particularly apt because of Eurasianism's ideocratic claims. *Sovremennye zapiski*, the same periodical that published Florovskii's essay in 1928, had earlier published two essays on Eurasianism by his old Odessa University tutor Bitsilli ("Narodnoe i chelovecheskoe" [The National and the Human], "Dva lika evraziistva" [The Two Faces of Eurasianism]). The philosopher Nikolai Aleksandrovich Berdiaev (1874-1948), who had some sympathies for Eurasian views, challenged the movement in his *Put'* articles. These articles, like all of Berdiaev's work, are thought-provoking and original. The historian Pavel Nikolaevich Miliukov (1859-1943), on the other hand, like many older emigrés, simply failed to understand Eurasianism.²³

As for scholarly studies, much of Eurasianism remains unexplored. Otto Böss wrote the only monograph devoted to the movement. Nicholas V. Riasanovsky's "Prince N. S. Trubetskoy's 'Europe and Mankind'" and "The Emergence of Eurasianism" focus primarily on the early stages of Eurasianism. Anatoly Liberman's postscript entitled "N. S. Trubetzkoy and His Works on History and Politics" to Trubetskoi's *The Legacy of Genghis Khan and Other Essays on Russia's Identity* provides a thorough, sympathetic scholarly account of Trubetskoi's Eurasian activities as well as a brisk look at other Eurasians, and a review of literature on Eurasianism. A far more critical view of Eurasianism is taken by Charles J. Halperin in his articles on Vernadskii. Andrew Blane's "A Sketch of the Life of Georges Florovsky" in *Georges Florovsky: Russian Intellectual and Orthodox Churchman* covers Florovskii's entire varied life. Mark Bassin's "Russia between Europe and Asia" provides a quick but revealing glance at Savitskii's (and other Eurasians') geographical conceptions in their historical setting.

Eurasianism has come into vogue in Russia over the last few years. Although it received increasing attention since the advent of *glasnost'*, Eurasianism really emerged as an object of popular and scholarly fascination only after the disintegration of the Soviet Union. There is a certain logic for this new interest in Eurasianism. Quite aside from the content of their ideas, the best Eurasian writers were impressive literary craftsmen, and their vivid Russian prose still produces on the reader a powerful impression that contrasts sharply with the all too familiar drone of official

23. For references, see Bitsilli's, Berdiaev's, and Miliukov's entries in the bibliography.

Soviet views. This impression is heightened by the proximity of the Eurasians to the Russian Silver Age, which has long been an object of fascination to Soviet-era Russian intellectuals. In recent years, Russian historians have been engaged in a search for the missing, suppressed links in their society's intellectual history, and Eurasian theory is easily one of the most elaborate and ambitious of such links. More to the point, the disintegration of the Soviet Union has not only prompted, but forced, its former citizens to redefine their identities, and it so happens that Eurasianism, openly discussed for the first time after years of suppression, seems to provide answers to many of their questions.²⁴ Different groups emphasize those features of Eurasianism that they find appealing.²⁵ For example, Russian communists like Eurasianism's seeming justification of the Soviet Union reconstituted as Eurasia. They are attracted to the same qualities of the Eurasian movement, like its acceptance of the revolution, that repulsed many of the "White" emigrés in the 1920s and the 1930s.²⁶ Nationalists, on the other hand, see in Eurasianism a basis for a romantic notion of a Great Russia in its own independent sphere, mighty and capable of repelling both Western and Eastern powers.²⁷ Even some supporters of liberal democracy perceive the basis for a more harmonious society in the Eurasian supposition of a kinship of the peoples of Eurasia. And politicians like Kazakhstan's president Nursultan Nazarbaev want to draw on Eurasian ideas to minimize the differences and promote unity between the Christians and the Moslems living on Eurasian territory.²⁸ With so many agendas in play, the old order shat-

24. Not coincidentally, the increase in the popular appeal of Eurasianism has paralleled the growing popular distrust for what are commonly understood to be Western prescriptions to Russia's problems and the growing nostalgia for some aspects of the old Soviet Union.

25. On the other hand, the considerable vulnerability of Eurasianism as a doctrine and a system is enhanced by the very fact that it can represent so many different things to different people. And certainly many people living in Russia today find the overall claims of Eurasianism unacceptable on religious, nationalistic, or purely logical grounds.

26. This is not to say all Communists share this view, or that any communists endorse Eurasianism in full.

27. Other Russian nationalists remain staunchly resistant or hostile to Eurasian influences.

28. Indeed, many subjects that occupied Eurasians in the 1920s and 1930s have made their way into popular Russian (non-Eurasian) political discourse. In a striking example, Savitskii's assertion on the very last page of *Iskhod k Votoku* that Russia would benefit from "an outlet to the Persian Gulf" (P. N. Savitskii, "Kontinent-Okean (Rossiia i mirovoi rynok)," *Iskhod k Vostoku*, p. 125 [p. 112 in the present volume]) is echoed by Vladimir Zhirinovskii in his book *Poslednii brodok na iug* [Last Thrust to the South] (Moskva: LDP, 1993). The word "Evraziia" has been used in various contexts by prominent political figures from Mikhail Gorbachev to Gennadii Ziuganov.

tered, and the future of the former Soviet Union still unsettled, it is easy to see why the subject of Eurasianism has become highly politicized. Not surprisingly, ideologues and popularizers of all stripes have twisted Eurasian ideas to fit their own particular aspirations. Their creations, which differ greatly from the original ideas of Eurasianism, cannot be termed "Eurasian," and it is even debatable if they should properly be called "neo-Eurasian."

Perhaps the single person most responsible for bringing new attention to Eurasianism was the popular geographer Lev Nikolaevich Gumilev (1912-1992).²⁹ Known as "the last of the Eurasians," Lev Gumilev, as the son of poets Nikolai Gumilev and Anna Akhmatova, had a familial link to some of the greatest figures of the Silver Age. The popular rumor that he had spent time with Savitskii in a prison camp after the Second World War was put to rest by Gumilev in an interview, in which he claimed to have instead met him while on a trip to Czechoslovakia in the 1960s. By that time, he had read a few, but not many, Eurasian works.³⁰ Gumilev's own ideas, including his theory of ethnogenesis and the concept of "passionarnost'," went well beyond the pale of traditional Eurasianism. His indulgence in cosmism was far more pervasive than that of the *Evrasiia* contributors rejected by both Trubetskoi and Savitskii.³¹ But that indulgence apparently only added to his appeal, for, in the words of one commentator, Gumilev "represents a type of intellectual, much revered in Russia; he lectures with pseudo-scientific erudition on the phantastic principles of world-history."³² Gumilev's influence was no doubt considerably enhanced by his dignified public bearing and the talent of an engrossing story-teller.

Since Gumilev's death, the cause of neo-Eurasianism has been advanced by others. One would-be neo-Eurasian, Aleksandr Dugin, seems to owe a much greater debt to the likes of Haushofer and the German

29. Perhaps the most straightforwardly historical of his major works is L. N. Gumilev, *Drevniaia Rus' i Velikaia step'* (Moskva: "Mysl'," 1989); his *Ethnogenesis and Biosphere* (Moscow: Progress Publishers, 1990) is available in English.

30. L. N. Gumilev, *Ritmy Evrazii* (Moskva: Ekropos, 1993), pp. 26-27.

31. Other intellectuals have endeavored to link Eurasianism and cosmism even tighter; according to Michael Hagemester, "[t]he philosophers Fedor Girenok, Arsenii Gulyga, and the writer Iurii Linnik are among those who are presently attempting to weld Eurasianism and Russian cosmism into an ideology of salvation for the third millennium." Michael Hagemester, "The Revival of Eurasianism," a paper delivered before the Fifth World Congress of Central and East European Studies in Warsaw in August 1995, p. 4.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 3.

political philosopher Carl Schmitt than to Savitskii and Trubetskoi.³³ His occult-laced "Eurasianism" is based on a vision of an age-old incessant struggle for world domination between the secret orders of "Eurasians" ("the Great Land," traceable to Rome) and "Atlantists" ("the Great Ocean," traceable to Carthage). The authors of *Exodus to the East* are depicted not as creators of Eurasianism, but merely as members of the secret Eurasian order acting, along with Haushofer, as its "disclosers."³⁴ Whatever Dugin, who is a member of the circle that has gathered around the opposition newspaper *Zavtra* (formerly *Den'*), is trying to achieve, it seems to have very little to do with Eurasianism in the classic sense.

Scholarly discussions of Eurasianism, on the other hand, have been uneven and stifled in Russia by a kind of hero worship. Many scholars remain awestruck, and understandably so, by the very names and the weight of accomplishments of the likes of Trubetskoi and others. Others appear more interested in drawing moralistic lessons or in serving ideologies than in objective analysis. Still others are evidently hampered by their lack of exposure to primary sources, and, in some cases, perhaps confused by the obfuscations produced by the modern "neo-Eurasians." This state of affairs should change considerably as the major works of the original Eurasians become widely available to all interested scholars. As more and more of these materials get republished in Russia in unedited form — and that process has already begun — the level of Russian scholarship on Eurasianism should rise.³⁵ Indeed, there are already

33. See Aleksandr Dugin, "Karl Shmitt: piat' urokov dlia Rossii," *Nash sovremennik*, No. 8 (1992), pp. 129-35.

34. Aleksandr Dugin, *Konspirologiia: nauka o zagovorakh, tainykh obshchestvakh i okkul'tnoi voine* (Moskva: Arktogeia, 1993), p. 95. Dugin, who calls himself a "conspirologist," appears to use obfuscation as a deliberate strategy. He also edits a "Eurasian" journal called *Elementy*.

35. Currently, Russia is in the midst of a boom in the republication of old Eurasian articles. Unfortunately, however, these articles are being republished in new compilations, and thus out of their original contexts. See, for example: L. V. Ponomareva, *otvetstvennyi redaktor, Evraziia. Istoricheskie vzgliady russkikh emigrantov* (Moskva: Institut vseobshchei istorii RAN, 1992); L. I. Novikova and I. N. Sizemskaiia, *redaktory-sostaviteli, Rossiia mezhdru Evropoi i Aziei: Evraziiskii soblazn. Antologiia* (Moskva: "Nauka," 1993).

This bibliography does not undertake to list all the modern Russian republications and publications on Eurasianism. But for a taste of different scholarly approaches, see: S. G. Kliashorny, "Rossiia i tiurkskie narody: Evraziiskaia perspektiva," *Zvezda*, No. 9 (1995), pp. 199-207; S. S. Khoruzhii, "Transformatsiia slavianofil'skoi idei v XX veke," *Voprosy filosofii*, No. 11 (1994); V. A. D'iakonov, "O nauchnom sodержanii i politicheskikh interpretatsiakh istoriosofii evraziistva," *Slavianovedenie*, No. 5 (1993), pp. 101-15; Iu. Linnik, "Evraziitsy," *Sever*, No. 12 (1989), pp. 138-53; L. Novikova, I. Sizemskaiia, "Dva lika evraziistva," *Svobodnaia mysl'*, No. 7 (1992), pp. 100-10; F. I. Girenok, "Evraziiskie tropy," *Vestnik vysshei shkoly*, Nos. 7/9 (1992), pp. 34-43. One of Russia's foremost scholars, Dmitrii Sergeevich

numerous contributions by Russian authors to an area of study that had not, at least until recently, received much scholarly attention in the West. Moreover, broad access to the long unavailable Soviet archival materials on Eurasians is bound to shed light on a whole host of issues. The same intellectual climate that has made Eurasianism such a fertile topic for discussion in the recent years, also gives Russian scholars an enviable opportunity to develop new insights on the movement.

Russia's current turbulent times have prompted the country's citizens to seek new signposts. In this connection, it is noteworthy that it was in the midst of another gut-wrenching transformation, after the collapse of another order nearly eighty years ago, that some of the brightest minds of a particular generation of Russian exiles felt compelled to come together to develop Eurasianism. Their radically new vision was prompted by a feeling of great disorientation and bitter disillusionment with the fate of their country and the signposts of the past. Eurasians developed some intriguing theories, some of which have left a prominent imprint on scholarship. But the main impulse of Eurasianism was desperate and emotional, grounded in the intense pain that these young scholars felt in losing their world. Sensing their hopes draining out as they looked around post-war Europe and saw what appeared to them to be the weak will of the opponents of the Bolshevik regime and an uncertain future for themselves, they lashed out in desperation. It was in later years, as they took the time to reflect on the creation of their youth, that some of them tried to fashion a real system out of Eurasianism, and others rejected it altogether, concluding, along with Florovskii, that Eurasianism in its dogmatic form constituted not only a radical departure from traditional Russian points of view, but also a self-delusion that would lead Russia to a *cul-de-sac*. Still, even as they came to oppose what they now saw as temptation on moral, ethical, or scholarly grounds, they did not repudiate the pointed "truth of questions" within Eurasianism which had made it powerful and vital at its inception. They acknowledged the positive and at times brilliant contributions of individual scholars who identified themselves as Eurasians and the validity of some Eurasian theories, but rejected Eurasianism as a totalistic world view. Perhaps today's Russians, who have unearthed Eurasianism at a time when their world is again trembling, and who perceive a strong kinship between themselves and those dispossessed but searching exiles of the past, will ultimately arrive at a similar conclusion. The road will not be easy.

Likhachev, has made interesting, if brief, comments about Eurasianism: D. S. Likhachev, "Nel'zia uiti ot samikh sebia. . .," *Novyi mir*, No. 6 (1994), pp. 113-20, and "Kul'tura kak tselostnaia sreda," *ibid.*, No. 8 (1994), pp. 3-8.

Collective Publications of the Eurasian Movement

COMPENDIA

Iskhod k Vostoku. Predchuvstviia i sversheniia. Utverzhdenie evraziitsev. Stat'i Petra Savitskogo, P. Suvchinskogo, kn. N. S. Trubetskogo i Georgiia Florovskogo. Sofiia: Tipografiia "Balkan," 1921. [125 pp.] Contents: P. Savitskii, "Povorot k Vostoku"; P. Suvchinskii, "Sila slabykh"; G. Florovskii, "Razryvy i sviazi"; P. Suvchinskii, "Epokha very"; G. Florovskii, "Khitrost' razuma"; P. Savitskii, "Migratsiia kul'tury"; G. Florovskii, "O narodakh ne-istoricheskikh (Strana otsov i strana detei)"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Ob istinnom i lozhnom natsionalizme"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Verkhi i nizy russkoi kul'tury (Etnicheskaia osnova russkoi kul'tury)"; P. Savitskii, "Kontinent-Okean (Rossiia i mirovoi rynok)."

Na putiakh. Utverzhdenie evraziitsev; Kniga II. Stat'i Petra Savitskogo, A. V. Kartasheva, P. P. Suvchinskogo, kn. N. S. Trubetskogo, Georgiia V. Florovskogo, P. Bitsilli. Moskva, Berlin: Gelikon, 1922. [356 pp.] Contents: P. Savitskii, "Dva mira"; A. Kartashev, "Reforma, reformatsiia i ispolnenie Tserkvi"; P. Suvchinskii, "Vechnyi ustoi"; P. Suvchinskii, "Znamenie bylogo (O Leskove)"; P. Suvchinskii, "Tipy tvorchestva (Pamiati A. Bloka)"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Religii Indii i khristianstvo"; G. Florovskii, "O patriotizme pravednom i grekhovnom"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Russkaia problema"; P. Bitsilli, "'Vostok' i 'Zapad' v istorii Starogo Sveta"; P. Savitskii, "Step' i osedlost'."

Evraziiskii vremennik. Neperiodicheskoe izdanie pod redaktsiei Petra Savitskogo, P. P. Suvchinskogo i kn. N. S. Trubetskogo. Utverzhdenie evraziitsev; Kniga III. Berlin: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1923. [174 pp.] Contents: P. Savitskii, "Poddanstvo idei"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Udveri (Reaktsiia? Revoliutsiia?)"; P. Suvchinskii, "K preodoleniiu revoliutsii"; N. Arsen'ev, "Novye Kamni"; M. Shakhmatov, "Podvig vlasti"; P. Suvchinskii, "Inobytie russkoi religioznosti"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Vavilonskaia bashnia i smeshenie iazykov"; P. Savitskii, "Proizvoditel'nye sily Rossii"; Ia. Sadovskii, "Opponentam evraziistva."

Rossia i latinstvo. Sbornik statei. Stat'i P. M. Bitsilli, Georgiia Vernadskogo, V. N. Il'ina, A. V. Kartasheva, Petra Savitskogo, P. P. Suvchinskogo, kn. N. S. Trubetskogo i Georgiia V. Florovskogo. Berlin: [s.n.], 1923. [219 pp.] Contents: P. Savitskii, "Rossia i latinstvo"; P. Suvchinskii, "Strasti i opasnost"; P. Bitsilli, "Katolichestvo i Rimskaia Tserkov"; G. Vernadskii, "Soedinenie tserkvei v istoricheskoi deistvitel'nosti"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "Soblazny edineniia"; A. Kartashev, "Puti Edineniia"; G. Florovskii, "Dva Zaveta"; V. Il'in, "K probleme liturgii v Pravoslavii i Katolitsizme."

Evraziiskii vremennik. Neperiodicheskoe izdanie pod redaktsiei Petra Savitskogo, P. P. Suvchinskogo i kn. N. S. Trubetskogo. Utverzdenie evraziitsev; Kniga IV. Berlin: Evraziiskoe knigoizdatel'stvo, 1925. [445 pp.] Contents: P. Savitskii, "Evraziistvo"; P. Suvchinskii, "Idei i metody"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "My i drugie"; L. Karsavin, "Uroki otrenchennoi very"; V. Il'in, "Stolb zloby bogoprotivnoi"; V. Sezeman, "Sokrat i problema samopoznaniia"; M. Shakhmatov, "Gosudarstvo pravdy"; V. Il'in, "K vzaimootnosheniiu prava i npravstvennosti"; G. Vernadskii, "Dva podviga Sv. Aleksandra Nevskogo"; Kn. D. Sviatopolk-Mirskii, "O moskovskoi literature i protopope Avvakume"; Kn. N. Trubetskoi, "O turanskom elemente v russkoi kul'ture"; Ia. Sadovskii, "Iz dnevnika Evraziitsa"; P. Savitskii, "Khoziain i khoziaistvo."

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