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*HANDBOOKS PREPARED UNDER THE DIRECTION OF THE
HISTORICAL SECTION OF THE FOREIGN OFFICE.—No. 96 c & d*

THE RISE OF THE TURKS

THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

February
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THE RISE OF THE TURKS

CHRONOLOGICAL SUMMARY

- B. C.
1400. First mention of Hsiung-nu.
c. 250. Great Wall of China built.
- A. D.
c. 430. Settlement of the Tu-kueh.
567. Turkish Embassy to the Emperor Justin II.
582. Division of Tu-kueh into northern and western Turks.
630. Northern Turks conquered by Chinese.
659. Western Turks conquered by Chinese.
c. 680. Northern Turks regain their independence.
c. 714. Transoxiana becomes Muhammadan.
c. 750. Northern Turks conquered by Uighurs.
c. 1000. Uighurs converted to Islam.
c. 1050. The Seljuk leader Toghrul restores and seizes the temporal power of the Caliphate.
1071. Alp Arslan defeats the Emperor Romanus at Manzikert.
1092. Death of Malik Shah. Seljuk Empire falls into eastern and western divisions.
1219. Mongols under Jenghiz Khan overrun eastern Seljuk principalities.
1227. Ertoghrul settles near Erzerum.
1243. Defeat of the western Seljuks at Kuzadag.
1300-26. Osman reigns as an independent monarch.
1326. Orkhan captures Brusa.
1328-38. Orkhan captures Nicaea and Nicomedia.

I. THE TU-KUEH

IN general usage the word 'Turk' denotes the Turkish element of the Ottoman Empire. With greater accuracy, however, all who talk one of the dialects of the Turkish language may be called Turks. The Turkish-speaking peoples extend, at present, roughly from the Great Wall of China on the east to the limits of Turkey in Europe in the west, to northern Persia in the south, and Kazan in the north.

Chinese annals from 1400 B.C. to 200 B.C. make frequent mention of the Hsiung-nu, vigorous and barbarian nomads who wandered over the area north

of the Chinese frontier. In the third century B. C. the Great Wall of China was built as a protection against the incursions of these warriors. In the first half of the fifth century A. D. a subdivision of the Hsiung-nu moved eastwards and settled down in the service of another tribe. In the neighbourhood of their settlement was a hill known from its shape as Tu-kueh, or 'the helmet'. From this hill the Turks are said to have gained their name. The Tu-kueh soon revolted against their masters, and, with a remarkable rapidity, spread their conquests to the northern boundaries of Persia. It is interesting to notice the progress in civilization attained by the Turks between the earliest mention of the Hsiung-nu, who knew neither of writing nor of agriculture, and the sixth-century Turks, who had a script, a system of ranks, and emblems of royal authority for taxation or the levying of troops. The Turks were, in the main, warriors. A Chinese pilgrim who was entertained by the Khan of the western Turks in A. D. 630 and has left a description of the organization of the Khan's head-quarters, makes it clear that the Turks lived in camps, built no cities, and would not settle in any that they conquered. But the Turkish embassy to the Emperor Justin II in 567 had in view the opening up of the silk trade, and it would therefore appear that the Turks must have paid some attention to commerce. As in their later history, they were a means of communication between forms of civilization greater than their own; through them Nestorian Christianity and Zoroastrianism passed to China, and Chinese Buddhism was kept in contact with India.

2. THE NORTHERN AND WESTERN TURKS¹

In 582 the people divided into two communities, known as the northern and the western Turks. The inscriptions discovered during the last quarter of

¹ These early 'western Turks' should be kept distinct from the Seljuks and Osmanlis who became 'western Turks' as opposed to the Turks of Transoxiana and Kashgar.

a century on the River Orkhon, south of Lake Baikal, give a first-hand account of the northern Turks; while a great deal is known of the other branch from Chinese, Greek, Arabic, and Armenian sources.

The western Turks were, after a period of civil war, annexed by the Chinese in 659; but neither Turks nor Chinese held their territory strongly, and Transoxiana was conquered for Muhammadanism at the beginning of the eighth century. The direct consequence of this was the gradual conversion to Islam of the whole Turkish stock. The negative character of the Turkish paganism, the absence of a hierarchy and a priestly code, as well as the coincidence of the good points of Muhammadanism with the particular excellences of the Turkish temperament—'energy, obedience, and fighting spirit'—facilitated such a conversion.

The northern Turks were conquered and enslaved by the Chinese in A.D. 630. They recovered their independence fifty years later; but about A.D. 750 a coalition of three Turkish tribes, chief of whom were the Uighurs, occupied all their country.

3. THE UIGHURS

The Uighurs attained a very high level of culture, and recent archaeological research has brought to light a vast amount of Uighur literature and art from which we learn that Christianity, Buddhism, and Manichaeism were all practised in their kingdom, the utmost tolerance being observed. The Uighurs were certainly the most civilized of all the northern neighbours of China; their kingdom was temporarily destroyed in 847 by the Khirgiz, a northern Turkish tribe, but recovered under its greatest ruler, Bogra Khan. During the latter's reign, at the end of the tenth century, the people were converted to Islam. Up to the fifteenth century small Uighur principalities and states are found, while the Uighurs were extensively employed in Muhammadan chancelleries, playing much the same rôle in the government offices of Turkistan as the

Hindus under the Delhi Moghuls and the Bengalis under the British in India.

The Uighur language bears the closest resemblance to the Turkish of the Orkhon inscriptions, and continued to be employed as a literary medium at any rate down to the twelfth century. But prior to the conversion of the Uighurs to Muhammadanism their language had been widely used for the translation of Buddhist, Christian, and Manichæan works which have only been brought to light in recent years.

4. THE SELJUKS

Of greater importance to history than the Uighur Kingdom is the rise of the Seljuks. The latter were the ruling family of a branch of the group of tribes known as Ghuzz (Οὔζοι). They migrated first from the Khirgiz Steppes to Bokhara, where they embraced Islam in its orthodox form. They then moved westwards at the invitation of the weak Abbasid Caliphate; and in the middle of the eleventh century the Seljuk leader, Toghrul, expelled the Persian Viziers, and restored the temporal power of the Caliphate, only to take it for himself. Alp Arslan, the successor of Toghrul, conquered Egypt from the schismatic Fatimite Caliphs, and defeated the Byzantine Emperor Romanus at Manzikert (1071). The empire of his son, Malik Shah, was bounded on the east only by China. The contrast between these two warrior princes and their minister, Nizam ul-Mulk, a statesman of great learning, who founded numerous universities and is said to have been a friend of Omar Khayyam, marks the transition (never perhaps completely accomplished) between the wandering militant Turkish tribes and a settled non-Christian State. After Malik Shah's death in 1092 the unwieldy empire fell into eastern and western divisions. The eastern principalities were swept away by the hordes of Jenghiz Khan (1219), though the Turkish conquests of the latter kept their Turkish speech and customs. Numerous minor Turkish dynasties rose and fell. In an unpublished Persian MS. of the thirteenth

century the following curious account of the Turk occurs :

It is common knowledge that all races and classes while they remain among their own people and in their own country are honoured and respected ; but when they go abroad they become miserable and abject. The Turks, on the contrary, while they remain among their own people are merely a tribe among many tribes, and enjoy no particular power or status. But when they leave their own country and come to a Muhammadan country (the more remote they are from their own homes and relatives, the more highly they are valued and appreciated) they become Amirs and Generalissimos. Now from the days of Adam down to the present day no slave bought at a price has ever become King except among the Turks ; and among the sayings of Afrasyab, who was King of the Turks, and was extraordinarily wise and learned, was his dictum that the Turk is like a pearl in its shell at the bottom of the sea, which only becomes valuable when it leaves the sea and adorns the diadems of kings and the ears of brides.

The western Seljuk power grew at the expense of the Byzantine Empire. Konia became its capital ; and, but for the pressure of the Mongols, it is possible that Byzantium would have fallen to the Seljuks rather than the Turks. The hordes of Jenghiz Khan did not touch Konia ; but, even before the destruction of the Abbasid Caliphate, the Mongols came into touch with the Seljuks. The Seljuk Sultan was defeated at Kuza-dag in 1243.

5. THE OTTOMAN TURKS

It was during the subsequent struggles between Seljuks and Mongols that the Ottoman Turks first came into prominence. ' Viewed from Europe, they appear like the matador in the bull-fight, appointed to slay an animal maddened and weakened by the attacks of numerous foes. Viewed from Asia, they are merely another instance of the sudden rise of a small clan to eminence and empire.'¹ Tradition makes Khorassan the home of Suleiman, the founder of the family. His son Ertoghrul settled first at Erzerum, and then moved westwards in order to serve under the Seljuks of Konia. His service against the Mongols proved

¹ Sir C. Eliot, *Turkey in Europe*, p. 84.

valuable enough to secure him the fief of Eskishehir. Suleiman's grandson Osman (whence 'Osmanli' and 'Ottoman') proclaimed himself independent of the Seljuks; and his son Orkhan took Brusa, Nicaea, and Nicomedia from the Byzantine Empire. On the complete break-up of the western Seljuk Empire in the beginning of the fourteenth century, the Ottoman chiefs were lords of the province of Khudavendigyar, the modern official Turkish name for the vilayet of Brusa. Thence they spread their conquests over Turkey in Europe and Asia.

Note on the Words 'Tartar' and 'Mongol'

The word 'Tartar', or 'Tatar', is probably derived from the Chinese word 'Ta-ta', or 'Ta-tse', which first appears in the Christian era and corresponds more or less to the Greek term 'barbaros'; it was applied by the Chinese to the nomads beyond their northern frontiers much in the same way as the Turks were in the habit of classing all Europeans under the general name of Franks. The name 'Tartar' is now only used by and applied to the Turks of the Volga and Caucasus, the descendants of those Tartars who for several centuries ruled over central and southern Russia.

The names 'Mongol' and 'Moghul' have of course a common origin; and the Mongolians have survived as a race since the days of Jenghiz Khan. In the fifteenth century Russian Turkestan was known to Muhammadan writers as Moghulistan; and the famous Emperors of Delhi, the descendants of Tamerlane, were known as the Great Moghuls, though they were in reality not Moghuls, but Turks. The Ghaznawid dynasty of the tenth to the twelfth centuries, which preceded them in northern India, were, however, avowedly Turks, while the Slave dynasty which ruled over northern India from 1206 to 1290 was founded by a Turkish slave named Kutb-al-Din. The reason why the Delhi Emperors called themselves Moghuls rather than Turks was probably not unconnected with their desire to claim descent from the great Jenghiz Khan as well as from Tamerlane.

THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

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THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

1. ORIGIN OF THE NAME 'PAN-TURANIAN'

Turan is a Persian word. In Persian mediaeval poetry it means the steppes and deserts of Central Asia, in contrast to the settled country of Iran or Persia. The 'people of Turan' are the nomads (of many different languages and races) who constantly overran Persia from the north-east, till the Russians pacified Central Asia half a century ago.

Nineteenth-century philologists in Europe appropriated the name *Turanian* for the languages of north-eastern Europe and Asia which are 'agglutinative' in structure, in contrast to the Indo-European family. It was really a negative term—a provisional label for an unexplored mass. 'Turanian' research was first taken up seriously by the Magyars, who speak one of these agglutinative languages (of the Ugro-Finnic group) and have always felt themselves isolated among the Latin, Slavonic, and Teutonic peoples of Europe. A mediaeval Hungarian monk once made a pilgrimage eastward to discover his lost kinsmen, and lighted upon the Bashkirs of the Ural region; and during the Great War Magyar professors are said to have conducted a propaganda among Russian prisoners of war belonging to easterly Finnish tribes, to prove to them that the Magyars are their brethren and Buda-Pest their cultural home. Magyar Pan-Turanianism has followed in the wake of Russian Pan-Slavism. When the Russians remembered their kinship with the Balkan Slavs, and this movement took on a political form, the Magyars looked about for 'Turanian' anti-Slav allies, and naturally thought of the Turks. The famous Hungarian savant, Vambéry, was led by this Turanian idea to prosecute research among the Turkish-speaking peoples of Central Asia, but the Magyars addressed themselves

chiefly to the Osmanlis. When the Magyar struggle for independence in 1848 was crushed by the combined Austro-Russian armies, many leading Magyar refugees had found an asylum at Constantinople. In 1867 these exiles returned to Hungary and became a power in the newly-constituted Dual Monarchy. During the Balkan upheavals of 1875-8 the Magyars were violently pro-Ottoman, and a deputation of Magyar students presented a sword of honour to the Sultan during the Serbo-Turkish War.

This Magyar-Ottoman *rapprochement* was not really racial but political. It rested not on a common consciousness of 'Turanianism' but on a common hostility to certain Slavonic States. The same political motives have led people in Bulgaria to accept the Turanian label since the Bulgarian Government's intervention against Serbia and Russia in the European War. Yet the Bulgars rank to-day among Slavonic peoples. The original founders of the Bulgarian State, thirteen centuries ago, were certainly 'Turanian' nomads from the steppes; but they have left less trace on the Slavs upon whom they imposed themselves in the Balkan Peninsula than the Normans have on the people of England. Modern Bulgaria is a Slavonic State which has played for its own hand in defiance of Pan-Slav sentiment, and wishes for new sentimental catchwords that conform with its *Realpolitik*.

Thus Pan-Turanianism, in its origin, is at once artificial and European. The Osmanlis did not extract it for themselves from Persian literature (though they study Persian as we study the Greek and Latin classics); it was offered to them from Europe, and they have not been the wooers but the wooed. The Osmanli has no genuine sentiment for the Bulgar or the Magyar, who are both ex-subjects of his, like the Serb and the Greek. If supposed self-interest induces the Bulgar and Magyar to fight his battles, subscribe to his loans, give his young men technical instruction, and supply him with machinery, he will take full advantage of their services. But he feels no more kinship with them than with the

other Christian nations of Europe ;¹ and his principal object in this war was to rid the Ottoman Empire of external European influences, whether these are 'Central' or 'Entente', 'Turanian' or 'Teutonic'.

2. PAN-TURANIANISM AS PAN-TURKISM

A trained philologist may be conscious of some unity of structure in all Turanian languages as contrasted with the Indo-European family ; but to the uninitiated Osmanli there is no visible relation between his own language, which belongs to the Turkish group, and Magyar, which is Ugro-Finnic. On the other hand, the relation of the various Turkish dialects to one another is obvious to any one. It can be seen on the map in the names of rivers, mountains, and towns. The Turkish-speaking peoples stretch from Turkey in Europe through Anatolia, Transcaucasia, northern Persia, and Afghanistan, to Russian Central Asia and Chinese Turkestan, and, in a more broken chain, round the northern shores of the Black Sea, through Bulgaria, the Dobruja, Crimea, the Volga provinces and Siberia, to the neighbourhood of the Arctic Ocean.² They cover an even more extensive though less compact area than the Slavs ; and the different Turkish dialects are as readily intelligible to all Turks as the different Slavonic languages are to any speaker of one of them. It was therefore only natural that, as soon as the Ottoman Turks became linguistically conscious of their nationality, they should become conscious at the same time of their affinities with other Turkish-speaking peoples, just as the national revival of the separate Slavonic populations produced a common sense of Pan-Slavism among them.

¹ This is true even of the Turkish doctrinaire Pan-Turanians, as may be seen from the following quotation from 'Tekin Alp' : ' It is a matter of congratulation that the *rapprochement* between Magyars and Turks is being so well received here. . . . Yet the Turk's national idea cannot be the race theory, because the latter is really nothing but a Utopian dream.'

² See Map.

Pan-Turanianism, then, in the sense of a Pan-Turkish movement originating among the Ottoman Turks, is part and parcel of Ottoman Turkish nationalism, and can only be understood in relation to it.

3. TURKISH NATIONALITY IN THE OTTOMAN EMPIRE

The consciousness of nationality, like the word 'Pan-Turanian', has come to the Osmanlis from Europe. The Ottoman Empire began as the very opposite of a national State. It is not called after any people who inhabit it, but after the prince who founded it—Osman. It is true that Osman and his tribe were Turks; but they were only one out of a dozen Turkish States in Anatolia, and their Turkish neighbours were their most formidable rivals and enemies. They built up their power by conquests in Europe. Their best taxpayers were Christian subjects, their standing army Christian converts, their most loyal supporters apostate Albanians and Slavs, who changed their religion but kept their language. Till a century ago the Turkish nationality contributed practically nothing to the Ottoman State except the literary and official language of the governing classes; and that was so diluted with Persian and Arabic that it had little left in common with the vulgar Turkish of the Anatolian peasantry. The bulk of Anatolia was a comparatively late acquisition of the Empire. It was a neglected region, to a large extent practically independent, under local feudal chiefs.

During the last century, however, Anatolia has taken the place of the Balkan Peninsula as the 'home country' of the Ottoman Empire; for, while the Balkan provinces have been breaking away, the Asiatic provinces have been brought more and more under central control. The same Sultan who lost Greece broke the power of the feudal aristocracy in Anatolia and Kurdistan. The process of disintegration in Europe reached its climax in the Balkan War of 1912-13; the process of centralization in Asia Minor has been completed by the Committee of Union and

Progress since the Treaty of Bucarest, and especially since Turkey's entry into the European War.

The most significant change has been in the composition of the Ottoman army. The Janissaries, a hereditary professional army descended from forced Christian converts of all races, were destroyed in 1826. The modern Turkish army is organized on the nineteenth-century European basis of conscription from the civil population. Down to 1908 the conscripts were nominally drawn from the whole Moslem population of the Empire; and since the Revolution Christians and Jews have been made liable as well. But the Government never got hold of the nomads and mountaineers; the settled Arab population was not good military material nor easily mobilized on the most threatened frontiers, which till the present war were those in Europe. Both before and after 1908 the Moslem Turkish-speaking Anatolian peasantry have been the staple of the Ottoman conscript army, affording its most amenable recruits and its toughest soldiers; and the Anatolian upper classes have more and more supplied the centralized Empire with its officers and officials. Thus, when the conscious Turkish national movement began, the Ottoman State was already resting on a practical foundation of Turkish nationality.

4. THE BEGINNINGS OF TURKISH NATIONALISM

The cultivation of national consciousness by the Ottoman Turks was partly an imitation of older nationalist movements in Europe and partly the spontaneous product of similar conditions. Like most European nationalisms (Czech nationalism for instance), it started by being cultural rather than political. The first nationalist society was founded at Salonika in 1909, in the comparatively free atmosphere that prevailed during the first three years after the Young Turk Revolution. The founder of this society was a provincial notable—one Ziya Bey, of Diarbekir, who had come up to attend a Congress of the Committee of Union

and Progress. Diarbekir is a Turkish enclave in Kurdish and Armenian territory; and it is characteristic of nationalist movements that their most fanatical leaders come from the debatable borderlands.

Ziya Bey's group started a campaign to purge the literary Ottoman language of its Arabic and Persian borrowings, and replace these by old Turkish words which had never been admitted into Ottoman literature. This might seem a fantastic aim, for it is only through the adoption of foreign words, idioms, and rhythms that Turkish has been given literary form at all. Yet submerged languages in Europe have been revived under circumstances of almost equal difficulty, and this 'Pure Turkish' movement claims to have had complete success. The Turkish writers of the traditional school were routed; and the use of Arabic was even attacked in the ecclesiastical field. The Nationalists wished to translate the Koran, Friday Sermon, and Khutba (Prayer for the Caliph) into Turkish; and to remove the Arabic texts from the walls of Turkish mosques; but they had to drop this part of their programme, which was far in advance of ordinary Turkish opinion.¹

This phase of Turkish Nationalism lasted from 1909 to the Balkan War of 1912-13. It was a doctrinaire imitation of the linguistic Nationalism of Europe, so far unpolitical in character. Our chief information about it comes from *Türkismus und Pantürkismus*, by 'Tekin Alp',² a pseudonym which is believed to cover the name of Albert Cohen, a Salonika Jew.³ This work illustrates the artificial origins of the movement and its prospects of success. The Salonika Jews are inseparable from the Committee of Union and Progress;

¹ See Appendix III.

² Published as Part II of *Deutsche Orientbücherei* (edited by E. Jäckh) by Kiepenheuer, Weimar, 1915. English translation (*The Turkish and Pan-Turkish Ideal*) circulated officially by the Intelligence Division of the Admiralty War Staff, March 1917.

³ Salonikan by residence only and not by origin, to judge by his forename. His residence in Macedonia is proved by allusions in the book itself, where he actually calls himself a Macedonian.

and one of their number would hardly have taken up Pan-Turanianism so strongly unless he thought it had found favour in the eyes of the Committee of Union and Progress leaders. Cohen evidently feels it politic to identify himself with the Nationalism of the ruling race in Turkey, as the Jews in Hungary have identified themselves with Magyarization. But his book has to be used with caution ; for, though it was written after the Committee of Union and Progress had taken up the Pan-Turanian idea, it is impossible to tell how much (if any) of its contents represents the Committee of Union and Progress policy. On the whole it is safer to take 'Tekin Alp' as representing the doctrinaire school of Ziya Bey, and to judge the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress solely on the evidence of their political actions since the Balkan War.

5. THE EFFECTS OF THE BALKAN WAR

The Balkan War made Pan-Turanianism practical politics. The shock of this disaster penetrated to wider circles than had been affected by the academic movement of the previous years, and seems to have kindled a genuine desire for national regeneration among all educated Turks. A number of societies, with local branches in Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Turkestan, were founded to promote education, physical culture, emancipation of women, and other really constructive aims ; and from this time onwards the Government lent its support. The Ministry of Evkaf (or Religious Endowments) has made grants out of its enormous funds for the multiplication of national schools ; there has been a scheme for reforming the Medressés—the reactionary Moslem ecclesiastical seminaries ; and, during the present war, the Government has challenged the whole existing ecclesiastical order by sweeping legal reforms which will bring much of the former domain of the Sheriat (Sacred Law) under the civil jurisdiction. The Sheikh-ul-Islam resigned over this, but he was and remained an active 'Unionist',

and the *fait accompli* was accepted by his successor. It is possible that both were acting in collusion with the Government, calculating that this formal protest would be a safety-valve for discontent among the humbler members of the ecclesiastical body.¹

All these activities were inspirations from Europe, like the crusade for a pure Turkish language; but they were of a much sounder kind. The Osmanlis seem to have been impressed by the example of the Balkan States, which had built up their strength by internal reforms till they were able to beat Turkey in war. Unfortunately they also borrowed from them another idea—irredentism.

‘Observers,’ Tekin Alp writes, ‘who like myself are Macedonians and like myself had ample opportunity of gaining an intimate knowledge of the irredentist propaganda of the Bulgars, Greeks, Serbs, and Vlachs, are able to judge the significance of this national ideal, and how sweet and inspiring it is to go through the greatest dangers for such a cause.’

He proceeds to sketch the life-history of several young Macedonian Christians, who, before the Balkan War, had sacrificed everything to work for their national unification. This may, of course, simply represent ‘Tekin Alp’s’ personal philosophy, but it is probably true that the Balkan War did influence such public opinion as exists in Turkey in this direction. During the century ending in the years 1912–13 the centre of gravity of Turkey had actually shifted from Europe to Anatolia. After 1913 there was a corresponding change in the national consciousness. The Turkish nation abandoned the tradition of being a dominant race in Europe, resolved to develop its own latent possibilities in Anatolia, and conceived the ambition of making up for lost alien subjects by attracting to itself the scattered branches of the Turkish race outside the Ottoman frontiers.

¹ See *Zwei Kriegsjahre in Konstantinopel*, by Harry Stürmer, ex-correspondent of the *Kölnische Zeitung* (Payot et Cie., Lausanne. English translation, *Two Years of War in Constantinople*. Hodder and Stoughton, 1917). The incident is referred to in Chapter VIII.

6. THE POLICY OF THE COMMITTEE OF UNION AND PROGRESS

Irredentism gave a new significance to the linguistic reforms of the Ziya Bey group ; for the Ottoman literary language, relieved of its special Arabic and Persian borrowings and reinforced by an eclectic pure-Turkish vocabulary, might become a *lingua franca* for all who spoke the various living Turkish dialects. The Pan-Turanian movement was thus advancing on to purely political ground, and at that point it was taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.

The Committee of Union and Progress were not Nationalists to begin with, chiefly because they ignored the nationality problems of the Ottoman Empire. Their primary aim was to maintain the integrity of the Empire, especially in Europe ; and in this they agreed with Abd-ul-Hamid and all previous rulers of Turkey. They only differed as to the means, for, while Abd-ul-Hamid believed in despotism at home and a balance of jealousy among the European Powers, the Committee of Union and Progress held that Turkey's best safeguard was internal strength, and the best source of strength political liberty. Their ideas of liberty were drawn from the French Revolution. 'Liberty, Equality, and Fraternity' would be proclaimed ; all inhabitants of the Empire would rally to the State as free Ottoman citizens, just as Picards and Marseillais and Alsations rallied to the French Republic after 1789 ; and the question of Nationality would solve itself.

This actually happened during the first six weeks after the proclamation of the Constitution in 1908. Men of all creeds and races embraced each other in the streets. But then they drew apart again and considered how they might turn the new régime to their own advantage. The Balkan nationalities rejected the offer of a liberal Turkey altogether, and determined to take the first opportunity of completing their own unity and independence at Turkey's expense. Others, like

the Arabs, the Armenians, and the Constantinopolitan and Anatolian Greeks, recognized that secession was impossible, but took measures to defend their own national individuality within the Ottoman State. The Arabs formed the main opposition in the new Parliament; the Armenians also wished for decentralization, though they co-operated in Parliament with the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress found that the Turks were the only element in the Empire that was not opposed to centralization and had no political ideal incompatible with the Ottoman State idea. They therefore fell back upon their Turkish nationality, and came to think of Turkification as the natural means of achieving their ends. After the Balkan War they incorporated Turkification in their programme, but it is important to examine precisely what place they gave it.

7. TURKISH AIMS IN THE EUROPEAN WAR

It has been shown above that the Turkish version of Pan-Turanianism contains two general ideas: (a) to purify and strengthen the Turkish nationality within the Ottoman Empire, and (b) to link up the Ottoman Turks with the other Turks in the world. These objects were first pursued in the cultural sphere by a private group of 'Intellectuals', and promoted by peaceful propaganda. After 1913 they took on a political form and were incorporated in the programme of the Committee of Union and Progress. But, while for Ziya Bey's followers Pan-Turanianism was an end in itself, for the Committee of Union and Progress it is only an instrument. They will not give up movements like Pan-Islamism, that conflict with it, if these movements can still serve their turn; and they will not persist in it indefinitely in circumstances where it does not pay, as it has not paid in Syria, Mesopotamia, and Arabia.

The contrast between academic Pan-Turanianism

and the Pan-Turanianism of the Committee of Union and Progress¹ can be summed up as follows :

- (a) The first aim of the Ziya Bey group was to purge the Turkish language and culture from foreign (i. e. chiefly Arabic) influences. They were ready to violate some of the strongest prejudices of Islam for the sake of carrying this aim to its logical conclusion.

The first aim of the Committee of Union and Progress is to purge the Turkish State from foreign (i. e. chiefly European) influences : extra-territoriality of foreign subjects, foreign control of Ottoman finance, railways, raw materials, and education. The doctrinaires dared to defy Islam ; the Committee of Union and Progress are far too prudent to do so, but they have defied Europe. When the Concert of Europe broke down, they intervened in the war and denounced the Capitulations. And in 1916 they passed a ' language ordinance ' making the use of Turkish compulsory, after a year's delay, for banks, newspapers, trams, railways, steamship companies, book-keeping of private firms, and all business of a remotely public or legal character.²

- (b) The doctrinaires proposed to strengthen the Turkish nationality in Anatolia by education and social reform. The Committee of Union and Progress's method has been to exterminate the

¹ Of course some Committee of Union and Progress leaders have taken up Pan-Turanianism in its academic form. Dr. Nazim, for instance, is said to have been converted by a book he borrowed from the French Consul-General at Salonika—*Introduction à l'Histoire de l'Asie : Turcs et Mongols, des origines à 1405*, by M. Léon Cahun, a French savant, whose thesis it is that the ' Turanians ' were a brilliant race ruined by the adoption of Islamic culture. But Dr. Nazim was always a doctrinaire, and since the Balkan War he has not been one of the dominating personalities in the Committee of Union and Progress.

² The stringency of the original draft was afterwards somewhat relaxed in the passage of the Bill through the Senate.

- non-Turkish nationalities scattered through the country—first the Armenians and latterly the Greeks—and to give their lands and houses to ‘Muhajirs’ (Moslem refugees from the provinces lost in 1912–13, partly Turks, but partly Slavs from the Balkan peninsula and Greek-speaking Moslems from Crete). Another motive for the atrocities has been to make the war popular among the Turkish population by sating it with Armenian plunder—a purely temporary and opportunist aim; and they were also an appeal to that reactionary spirit of Moslem fanaticism against which the doctrinaires have declared war.
- (c) ‘Tekin Alp’ seeks to change the political ideal of the Ottoman Turk from Imperialism to Irredentism—from ruling over alien Christian nationalities in Europe to ‘liberating’ kindred Turkish populations in Russia and central Asia.

For the Committee of Union and Progress it is rather a quantitative problem. In the Balkan War they lost territory, population, and military prestige on their European frontiers. In the European War they hoped to compensate or even outbalance these losses by corresponding gains in Asia and Africa; and here we have a fourth motive for the Armenian massacres, for the Armenians were an alien block separating the Ottoman Turks of Anatolia from the Tatars of northern Persia and Russian Transcaucasia.

8. PAN-TURANIANISM AND PAN-ISLAMISM

The opportunism of the Committee of Union and Progress appears most clearly in their attempt to drive Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism in double harness, though the two creeds are diametrically opposed to one another. The Committee of Union and Progress are devotees to neither, but exploit them both.

Pan-Islamism is not really a religious doctrine. If it were, it would not be so incompatible with Pan-

Turanianism as it is. Pan-Islamism and Pan-Turanianism are rival political programmes for increasing the power of the Ottoman Empire abroad.

Most of the religious revivalism in Islam during the nineteenth century has been definitely anti-Ottoman. The Wahhabis of Nejd and the Mahdists of the Egyptian Sudan both regarded the Turks as little better than Franks and infidels ; the Senussi retired to the Libyan desert to escape the contamination of Stambul. It is noteworthy that the supporters of all these movements were (a) Arabs, (b) uncivilized, and (c) independent, by force of arms, of either Ottoman or European control. The Ottoman doctrine of Pan-Islamism appealed, on the other hand, to settled, civilized Moslem populations under the government of European Powers like Britain, France, and Russia. These populations had seen enough of European institutions to wish for them themselves. They aspired to become self-governing nations playing an independent part in international politics, and they admired Turkey because they believed her to be a Moslem State which already realized their ideal. They were not sufficiently well-informed to see through Turkey's European masquerade to the weakness and corruption underneath ; they only saw in Turkey a model of what they hoped themselves to become, an existing guarantee for the political future of the peoples of Islam. For Islam is theoretically a political as well as a religious society. The Caliph is the temporal ruler of all good Moslems, as well as their religious head. It is true that this political unity broke down within a century of Muhammad's death, and has never been fully restored. But, if the Caliph cannot exercise this universal power, the best alternative is that he should be an independent sovereign, powerful enough to make his wishes felt by the other sovereign States of the world ; and this condition is fulfilled by the Sultan-Caliph at Constantinople, for the Ottoman Empire is the strongest and most enduring Moslem State there has been since the fall of the Abbasids.

The possibilities of political propaganda on these

lines were perceived by Abd-ul-Hamid, and he exploited them cleverly. The Ottoman strategic railway from Damascus to Medina, largely built out of the contributions of the Faithful in foreign countries, is a good example of his diplomacy; and this diplomacy has been continued by the Committee of Union and Progress. In Tripoli, for instance, before the Italian conquest, the Ottoman Government was regarded by the natives as an irksome foreign oppression, but Enver Pasha succeeded in winning over native sympathies. The Libyan Arab now looks on the Turk as his natural ally against the European invader; and even the Senussi has made common cause with him during the European War. In Asia the Committee of Union and Progress have posed as the liberators of Moslem States caught in British or Russian toils. They sent a mission to the Amir of Afghanistan which seriously embarrassed him in his neutrality. In the districts of Western Persia which they invaded they persuaded the Persian Nationalists to give them armed support. They have suggested a triple alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan, based on the idea of political independence for Islamic States. The 'Holy War' proclaimed in the name of the Caliph by the Sheikh-ul-Islam¹ in October 1914 has turned out a fiasco, but that is because Turkey has suffered military defeat. The presupposition of the Pan-Islamic policy is Ottoman military prestige. If Turkish armies had marched victoriously into Tiflis, Cairo, and Teheran, and if the Allies had never threatened Constantinople or captured Baghdad, Pan-Islamism might have produced far-reaching military and political effects, and even now it is by no means bankrupt.

But this Pan-Islamic propaganda would be ruined at once by a logical following out of the Pan-Turanian idea. If the Ottoman Empire assumes the rôle of a Turkish National State instead of that of an Islamic Great Power, and if the party that brings about this

¹ The same who afterwards resigned over the question of legal reforms.

change regards Turkish Nationalism and Islam as ultimately irreconcilable, the moral links between Turkey and the Moslem populations of other States are thereby broken. There is no more salvation for non-Turkish Moslems in Turkey than in Britain or Russia or France ; and the Committee of Union and Progress have no more claim on them than their established Governments. The Committee of Union and Progress realize this very well, and have avoided committing themselves openly to the Pan-Turanian creed where it is in flagrant contradiction to the Pan-Islamic. The Allies have laid hold of anti-Islamic and anti-Arab declarations by Pan-Turanian writers, and acts of tyranny and repression by Committee of Union and Progress officials in the Arab provinces, and these have served excellently as anti-Turkish propaganda in the Arab world. But it would be difficult to convict the Committee of Union and Progress, as a party or a government, of a Pan-Turanian programme which would discredit their Pan-Islamic professions.

The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress is to exploit both movements at once, and of the two Pan-Islamism is the more useful to them abroad ; but at the same time it is clear that they set more store by Pan-Turanianism at home. Their object being to convert the Ottoman Empire into a highly organized militaristic State on the German pattern, they naturally find a more appropriate basis in common language than in common religion ; and the following passage occurs in a resolution passed at the Committee of Union and Progress Congress of October 1911 :

‘ The character of the Empire must be Muhammadan, and respect must be secured for Muhammadan institutions and traditions. Other nationalities must be denied the right of organization, for decentralization and autonomy are treason to the Turkish Empire. The nationalities are a negligible quantity. They can keep their religion but not their language. The propagation of the Turkish language is a sovereign means of con-

firming the Muhammadan supremacy and assimilating the other elements.'

This illustrates how the Committee of Union and Progress try to combine the two ideas in their internal policy, and on which they lay more stress. The suggestion that the subject nationalities 'may keep their religion but not their native language', is a complete reversal of the traditional policy of the early Ottoman conquerors, who allowed the Albanian and Bosnian nobility to keep not only their language but their estates when once they had accepted the Muhammadan religion.

9. PROSPECTS OF TURKISH IRREDENTISM ABROAD

On the other hand, in estimating the possibilities of Pan-Turanian propaganda among Turkish populations outside the Ottoman Empire, it may be assumed that no Ottoman Government will pursue a policy in any way prejudicial to the Pan-Islamic idea. It may also be assumed now that, if the political reunion of the scattered branches of the Turkish race becomes a practical possibility (which it is not at present), this will come about not through Ottoman military victories, but through the internal 'break-up' of Russia. This 'break-up' of Russia is frankly hoped for by 'Tekin Alp'—in fact it is the presupposition of his irredentist programme—but, writing before the Russian Revolution, he only looks forward to its being achieved from outside by the armies of Turkey and the Central Powers.

The following are the chief groups of Turkish-speaking population outside Turkey which come into consideration :

(a) *The Tatars of Kazan (about 1½ millions)*¹

These live along the middle course of the Volga, between Nizhni Novgorod and Samara. They are an almost isolated enclave, surrounded by Great Russians

¹ Including the Tatars of Astrakhan, along the lower course of the Volga.

on the west and Finnish tribes¹ on the north and south. They are also intermingled with Russians in Kazan itself. They have been under Russian government more than three hundred years; and the barrier between Islam and Christianity has been broken down more successfully here than anywhere else in the world. The Kazan Tatars are prosperous and educated. The other Turkish-speaking groups in Russia incline at present to follow their lead, and in the last few years their printing-presses have spread their influence widely through the Muhammadan world. The success or failure of Pan-Turanianism as an Ottoman-Turk irredentist movement largely depends on the attitude which the Kazan Tartars adopt towards it; and this in turn depends upon the political evolution of Russia.

The Kazan Tatars sent Red Crescent workers and relief funds to Turkey during the Balkan War, but their sympathy is not likely to take a political form. Geography and material interests bind them to Russia; and they have a conservative temperament which would disincline them to break away violently from a State under which they have lived for three centuries. They naturally objected to the Tsarist régime, and in particular to its policy towards the non-Russian nationalities. Before the Revolution their point of view was roughly that of the Cadets.² But they agreed neither with the anti-nationality policy for which the Cadets came to stand, nor with the extreme separatism of the Finns and Ukrainians, which would leave them isolated, by independent and probably chauvinistic States, from the Tatars of Crimea and Caucasus. They are almost certain to declare for the Kerensky programme of national autonomy within a federal Russian Republic; for, if Russia is success-

¹ Nominally Christian, virtually still pagan, without a culture of their own, and capable of being assimilated by Tatars or Russians—whichever have the final ascendancy in this region.

² That is, in internal policy. In foreign policy they were violently opposed to the acquisition of Constantinople by Russia, which the Cadets desired.

fully reorganized on this basis, they have a brilliant future before them as the possible leaders of the Turkish-speaking element in a democratic State containing a considerable majority of the Turkish-speaking populations of the world (about 16 millions out of about 27 millions altogether, whereas there are probably less than 8 million Turks in the Ottoman Empire).

In this event, Ottoman Irredentism will collapse. The rallying-point of Pan-Turanianism will be not Constantinople but Kazan; and, far from the Anatolian Turks attracting the Tatars into the Ottoman Empire, the Tatars of Russia will attract the Anatolian Turks.

This very desirable solution is chiefly endangered by the possibility of a Russian reaction. A movement in Russia for centralized military government and the repression of nationalities might produce among the nationalities a *sauve qui peut*, in which the Tatars would be carried away. They would then turn for support to the Ottoman Empire, and Ottoman Irredentism might gain the day, with disastrous results to the civilized world.

(b) *The Tatars of Crimea (under 200,000)*

will follow the lead of Kazan.

(c) *The Tatars of Western Siberia (about 50,000)*¹

will follow the lead of Kazan.

(d) *The Tatars of the Caucasus (over 2,000,000)*

These are also under the influence of Kazan. On the other hand, they have been under Russian government less than a century; they live close to the Ottoman frontier; they have adopted Ottoman-Turkish as their literary (i. e. newspaper) language; and they have a strong interest in common with the Anatolian Turks in their fear and hatred of the Ar-

¹ There are also in Western Siberia about 100,000 semi-Tatarized Ugro-Finns.

menians. In 1905 there was a racial war between the Tatars and Armenians in the Caucasus, and on the whole the Armenians had the best of it.

When Enver launched his disastrous invasion of the Caucasus in the winter of 1914-15, the Committee of Union and Progress sent out propagandists to follow the army, and drew up a scheme for partitioning the Caucasus and part of Turkish Armenia into autonomous Tatar, Georgian, and Armenian national States under Ottoman suzerainty. They tried, unsuccessfully, to persuade the Ottoman Armenians to co-operate with them in this scheme. As it was, the Ottoman armies never reached the Tatar districts of the Caucasus; and the only Russian subjects who sided with them were the Adshars, a Moslem tribe of Lazo-Georgian nationality in the district of Batum.

Since the Russian Revolution the idea of national autonomy for the Caucasus and the occupied districts of Ottoman Armenia has been revived, only this time on the basis of federalism under Russia instead of Turkey. Tatars, Georgians, and Armenians are already wrangling over the delimitation of their national frontiers; and it is noticeable that, whereas formerly the Tatars and Georgians tended to combine against the more vigorous and progressive Armenians, there is now a Georgian-Armenian *rapprochement*, while relations between Georgians and Tatars are strained because both are claiming the Adshars of the Batum district and the Lazes of the Ottoman Vilayet of Trebizond—the Georgians on the ground of race, the Tatars of religion. This, however, may only be a passing phase; and in the land question, which in the Caucasus is as important as the demarcation of national boundaries, the old grouping of Georgian and Tatar versus Armenian is appearing again.

The Tatars of the Caucasus are backward in civilization, and are paralysed by their sectarian division into Shias and Sunnis. If there is a government in Russia liberal enough to grant national autonomy, and strong enough to do justice between the various national

claims, they will remain loyal to Russia; in which case it may be predicted that Baku will in the end supersede Kazan as a political centre for the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and perhaps ultimately for all the Turks in the world. Kazan leads at present in virtue of its older culture, but Baku, with its oil-fields, has a greater industrial future; and, while Kazan is on the periphery of the Turkish world, Baku lies at its middle point. Kazan and Crimea, Anatolia and Azerbaijan, and the Central Asiatic *bloc* (via the Trans-Caspian Railway), are ranged in a circle round Baku, and are in easy communication with it. At the moment, too, the Baku Tatars seem to have produced stronger personalities among their leaders than the Tatars of Kazan. But the prospects of Baku depend upon the achievement of Russian federalism. If there continues to be chaos or repression in Russia, the Tatars of the Caucasus will certainly turn to the Ottoman Empire, in which they could easily be incorporated; for they are almost in touch geographically with the Anatolian Turks, have accepted their literary language, and have not yet outdistanced them in culture. In this event they would vegetate as an outlying province of the Ottoman Empire; and the economic and cultural development of Baku would be cut short.

(e) *The Turkish-speaking Populations in Persia*

The migrations from Central Asia, between the eleventh and thirteenth centuries A. D., which carried Turkish-speaking tribes to Kazan, the Caucasus, and Anatolia, also deposited them in the provinces of Persia north of the Central Desert, especially in the most north-westerly province, Azerbaijan.

These Turkish-speakers in Persia have at present no Turkish national consciousness. They are Shiites, like the Persians, not Sunnis, like the Anatolian Turks. Tekin Alp admits that they still write letters in Persian and read Persian newspapers; and, as a matter of

fact, Tabriz, the capital of Azerbaijan, has been the centre of the Persian Nationalist movement.

Tekin Alp wishes to give the Azerbaijanis a ' Turkish soul ', and tries to prove that this would strengthen Persia internally. It would really split Persian Nationalism, and drive the Persians proper into hostility towards the Ottoman Empire. The Committee of Union and Progress show no signs of committing such a blunder. Their policy during the war was to support Persian Nationalism in Persia, and to inflame it against the Anglo-Russian régime. They were playing for a strong united Persia, freed from Anglo-Russian control, which would then make an alliance with the Ottoman Empire and fall under Ottoman hegemony.

As matters have now turned out, the Committee of Union and Progress may still play for the smaller prize, and try to detach from Persia her Turkish-speaking populations. The Osmanlis have always coveted Azerbaijan; they occupied it more than once during the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, and they overran it for a few weeks in the winter of 1914-15, as an incident in their Caucasus offensive.

It is also possible that, if Persian Nationalism comes into power, it may adopt a chauvinistic internal policy, and try to Persianize its Turkish-speaking minority. In that case the Azerbaijanis might be roused to a consciousness of being Turks, and desire to cut themselves loose politically from Persia. They would turn first to the Tatars of the Caucasus, who also belonged to Persia before the Russian annexation, and who are only separated from the Azerbaijanis by an artificial frontier. The Azerbaijanis and Caucasian Tatars are bound in the end to gravitate in the same direction, whether this be towards the Ottoman Empire or towards Russia.

(f) *The Turkish-speaking Population in Afghanistan*

The provinces of Afghanistan between the Hindu-Kush and the Oxus are inhabited by a predominantly Turkish population. They were formerly independent

Turkish (Uzbek) khanates like Khiva and Bokhara. They were only annexed by Afghanistan in 1850-59. The situation is the same as in Persia. Pan-Turanian doctrinaires might like to rouse these Uzbeks to a sense of Turkish nationality; the Committee of Union and Progress would prefer to draw the State of Afghanistan into the Ottoman political orbit.

(g) *The Turks of Central Asia (about 13 millions, 12 millions of whom are under Russia)*

Turkish-speaking Central Asia is one of the largest continuous language areas in the world—larger than the Great Russian area and almost as large as the English or the Spanish-speaking area in America. It is bounded roughly by the Volga and Caspian on the west, the Trans-Siberian Railway on the north, the Altai Mountains on the east, the Kwen-Lun and the Pamirs on the south. The whole of it except the Tarim basin ('Chinese' or 'Eastern' Turkestan) at present belongs to Russia.¹ The continuity of its Turkish-speaking population is only broken by some Cossack settlements in the north, and by the Persian-speaking Tajik peasantry and townspeople along the Oxus and upper Syr Darya.

Within this area there are great economic and cultural contrasts. The Bashkirs in the Ural district are in transition from nomadism to agriculture. The Khirgiz, south of them, are still nomads, scattered over vast steppes. The Turkmans of the Trans-Caspian province (such as have survived the Russian conquest) are not only nomads but would still be predatory if they dared.² South-eastward, on the other hand, along the rivers, there is a fairly dense agricultural population.

¹ And the Tarim basin will in the end gravitate towards the rest of the Central Asiatic Turkish-speaking area. It rebelled against China in the sixties of last century, and maintained its independence for several years. During the last half-century it has been held down by force by Chinese garrisons.

² In the case of the Turkmans, civilization has produced degeneration. The Russian conquest overtook them in a more primitive stage than most other Turkish stocks in Central Asia.

In Ferghana, Samarkand, and Tashkend, the Russians have accomplished a great deal of irrigation during the last fifty years, and have successfully fostered the cultivation of cotton. In Chinese Turkestan, on the contrary, where European organization has not yet come to the rescue, agriculture is fighting a losing battle against wind and sand.

To set against these differences, there are powerful factors that make for unity—the common language, a common religion (for all these populations are devout Sunnis), and the common government and better communications that the Russian conquest has brought. The provinces along the Oxus and Syr Darya, for example, which are the heart of Turkestan, are now linked up directly with Kazan by the Russian railway from Orenburg to Tashkend across the Khirgiz Steppe, and with Baku by the Trans-Caspian Railway and the steamship service across the Caspian Sea.

The problem of Turkish Nationalism in Central Asia was infinitely remote before the Russian Revolution; the Revolution has made it imminent.

We have little direct information concerning the effect which the Revolution has had here. There is said to have been a rising in the autonomous khanates of Khiva and Bokhara, to extort a constitution from the Khans. Religious outbreaks are a more serious probability. Before the Russian conquest Central Asia was a hotbed of Sunni fanaticism. Khiva and Bokhara, which have never been brought directly under Russian administration, are likely to be fanatical still; and a spark struck here might set the whole region ablaze. Russia having fallen to pieces, Central Asia will be the first fragment to break away. Cut the Tashkend and Trans-Caspian Railways, and it is isolated from Russia by a difficult belt of steppe and desert. In the nineteenth century it took the Tsardom twenty years to traverse this belt and conquer the provinces beyond it. A Russia shattered by the European War and the Revolution may have to postpone its reconquest indefinitely, if not for ever.

The 'break-up' of Russia thus opens greater opportunities for Ottoman Irredentism in Central Asia than in any other Turkish-speaking area. In Central Asia, Pan-Turanianism and Pan-Islamism do not conflict with each other. The whole population is Turkish; the whole population is Sunni; and the present possessor is not an ancient Moslem State, but a recent Christian conqueror. If Russia vanishes as a power from Persia and Central Asia, it might still be open to Ottoman diplomacy to work for a Turkish-Islamic State in Central Asia, which would then be added as a fourth member to the projected Islamic alliance of Turkey, Persia, and Afghanistan.

Such a State in such an alliance would threaten India in the gravest way. It would create a vast anti-British group of peoples behind the anti-British tribes on the north-western frontier. And, if Russia breaks up, the British Empire will have to ward off this danger single-handed. The Pan-Turanian problem in Central Asia thus gives the British Empire a vital interest in the internal evolution of Russia—a permanent interest apart altogether from that of the merely European situation. Turkish-speaking Central Asia may either remain part of Russia and gravitate towards Baku and Kazan, or break away from Russia and gravitate towards Constantinople; and the latter alternative would directly prejudice our security.

(h) *The Yakuts (about 250,000)*

The Yakuts are a Turkish-speaking tribe thinly scattered over an immense area in the basin of the River Lena, extending to the shores of the Arctic Ocean. They are quite outside the range of any Pan-Turkish movement, for, in the first place, they are either pagans or nominal Christians, not Moslems; and, secondly, they are separated from the other branches of the Turkish race by a broad belt of non-Turkish populations—pagan Tungus and Buddhist Mongols.

10. PROSPECTS OF TURKIFICATION IN THE OTTOMAN
EMPIRE

A survey of the Turkish-speaking world outside Turkey seems to show that Ottoman Irredentism will only become a serious possibility if there is a 'break-up' of Russia. It remains to examine the other aim of Pan-Turanianism—the Turkification of the non-Turkish nationalities inside Ottoman Asiatic territory, which now seems likely to be confined to Anatolia.

The Turkish language possesses great vitality. Wherever Turkish-speaking peoples go, they impress themselves on the landscape; Turkish names of mountains, rivers, and towns (monotonous and unimaginative though they are) tend to drive out the ancient nomenclature; and the conquered populations begin to use Turkish as their household language, even though they do not intermarry with the Turks, and though they adhere jealously to their ancestral culture and religion. This process was taking place peacefully in Anatolia before the war. Among the Armenians in the Cilician Highlands it was practically complete. Their vernacular language had become Turkish instead of Armenian; and the dialect of the Greek enclaves in the Kaisaria district was in an amazing stage of transition from Greek to Turkish. The first translations of the Bible which the American missionaries found it advisable to make were into the Turkish language, written in Greek and Armenian characters, and that was early in the nineteenth century. Even without the racial war of extermination which the Committee of Union and Progress have waged in Anatolia and Armenia since the spring of 1915—first against the Armenians and now against the Greeks—the Turkish language would before long have become the universal vernacular speech of the Anatolian peninsula, from the Aegean to the Euphrates.

But the recent massacres and deportations have swept away not only non-Turkish languages, but non-Turkish cultures. The Turkish-speaking or semi-

Turkish-speaking Greeks and Armenians of Anatolia, with their religion, literature, education, industry, and economic efficiency, have been to a large extent removed; and their places have been taken by Muhajirs—Moslem emigrants from the lost Ottoman provinces in Europe, who are perhaps on a higher level than the native Turks of Anatolia, but are also brutalized by hardships and made fanatical by their voluntary exile. The Muhajirs are quite incapable of compensating for the lost Greeks and Armenians as a factor of civilization; and as (in Anatolia at any rate, whatever may happen in Armenia east of the Euphrates) there seems little prospect of repatriation for the Armenians still surviving in the Mesopotamian exile-camps, the country will presumably have to start after the war from the low-water mark of Turkish barbarism.

The native Anatolian Turk, diluted with the Rumelian Muhajir, will be the material on which the Turkish national movement will have to work. What are its prospects?

The prospects are bad if the Ottoman Government retains sufficient non-Turkish territory to give it still the status of a Great Power. In that event the Committee of Union and Progress will certainly sacrifice the Turkish nation in Anatolia to the demands of military imperialism, as it has always been sacrificed before. But, if the Ottoman State is confined to Anatolia, it is possible that these ambitions may be broken, and the constructive side of nationalism—represented in the Pan-Turanian movement by figures like Halidé Edib Hanum—may then come to the fore.

In that case one may prophesy for a Turkish National State in Anatolia the same course of development which the Balkan nationalities have gone through since their liberation from the Ottoman Empire. There is no reason to suppose that the Anatolian Turk is ultimately less capable of civilization than the Balkan peoples. There is very little in him of the real Turkish blood from Central Asia; the strongest strain in his race is the aboriginal Anatolian peasantry, which turned Turk

en masse after the Seljuks had overrun the country in the eleventh century A. D. The ancient Anatolian was able to assimilate the civilization of Greece and Rome ; why should his descendants not assimilate that of Modern Europe ? Only the process will be slow. The Turk now is much more backward than the Greek and the Serb a century ago ; and Islam does not assist the growth of a nation, as the Orthodox Church has done in the Balkans. The first stage in a Turkish national regeneration would have to be a struggle against the reactionary Islamic tradition—a real struggle and not the burlesque aping of European anti-clericalism which one finds in ‘Tekin Alp’. If a constructive movement of this kind really sets in, it will certainly be supported warmly by the Kazan and Baku Tatars and the other Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia ; and in fact, if the federalization of the Russian Empire and the break-up of the Ottoman Empire are both accomplished as a result of the war, the Tatars of Russia will probably play the same beneficent part in the *risorgimento* of the Anatolian Turks that the Russians themselves have played in the history of the Balkan Slavs. This is the only form in which the realization of the Pan-Turanian idea is either probable or desirable.

II. CONCLUSIONS

(a) The Ottoman Turk has no ‘Pan-Turanian’ sense of kinship with any nation in Europe. The policy of the Committee of Union and Progress towards Europe is quite unsentimental ; it aims at the maximum of European assistance to Turkey combined with the minimum of European control.

(b) The power of the Ottoman Empire rests *de facto* upon the Turkish population in Anatolia, and there is a very obvious linguistic kinship between all the Turkish-speaking populations in the world. It is therefore natural that a Turkish national consciousness should arise among the Osmanlis, and that this should be accompanied by a ‘Pan-Turkish’ consciousness as well.

(c) Nationalism was stimulated among the Osmanlis by the shock of the Balkan War, but it is important to distinguish between the doctrinaire nationalists and the Committee of Union and Progress. The Committee of Union and Progress always think in terms of the Ottoman State rather than of the Turkish nationality.

(d) Above all, the Committee of Union and Progress will never sacrifice their Pan-Islamic policy either to Turkish Nationalism at home or to Turkish Irredentism abroad.

(e) Turkish Irredentism clashes too much with Pan-Islamism to become a practical policy for the Committee of Union and Progress, but they might take it up in certain cases in the event of a 'break-up' of Russia.

(f) The 'break-up' of Russia gravely prejudiced British interests in Asia; the possibility of its being permanent depends largely on the attitude of the Turkish-speaking populations of Russia, and these have two centres—the old centre of Kazan and the newer centre of Baku. The policy of the Kazan and Baku Tatars towards the internal development of Russia therefore affects British interests directly.

(g) If the Ottoman Empire ceases to be a Great Power, there may be a genuine Turkish national revival in Anatolia. In such a revival, the Turkish-speaking peoples of Russia would probably play the same part that Russia herself has played towards the Balkan Slavs.

This is the only form in which the Pan-Turanian idea is ever likely to be realized,

APPENDIX

I

STATISTICAL TABLE OF TURKISH-SPEAKING POPULATIONS ¹

Yakuts	250,000	
Kazan (and Astrakhan) Tatar	1,500,000	
West Siberian Tatars ²	50,000 ²	
Crimean Tatars	200,000	
	<hr/>	
Total in Western Russia and Siberia		2,000,000
Tatars in the Caucasus		2,000,000
Bashkirs and Chuvashes	2,400,000	
Khirgiz	4,692,000	
Turkmans	290,000	
Other tribes in Russian Central Asiatic provinces (mostly sedentary)	2,772,000	
Tatars of Altai	?	
Sedentary Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	1,000,000	
Nomadic Turkish population of Khiva and Bokhara	500,000	
Turkish population of Chinese Turkestan	1,000,000 +	
	<hr/>	
Total in Central Asiatic Area		13,000,000 ±
Ottoman Empire (Constantinople and Ana- tolia)		8,000,000—
Persia, Afghanistan, and lost Ottoman pro- vinces in Europe		2,000,000 ±
		<hr/>
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±
		<hr/>
Turks in the Russian Empire	16,000,000 +	
Turks in the Ottoman Empire	8,000,000—	
Turks under other Governments	3,000,000 ±	
Total Turks in the World		27,000,000 ±

¹ Statistics can only be given in round numbers. Russia is the only country inhabited by Turks where there has been an official census, and even in Russia the last (and first) census was in 1897. The figures here given for Russia consist of estimates made in 1911 on the basis of the census of 1897. The rest of the figures are more conjectural still.

² Not including about 100,000 semi-Tatarized aliens (mostly Ugro-Finnish).

ADDENDUM. In 1909 the Moslem Ecclesiastical Court of Orenburg, an official body which, under the old régime, exercised authority over the Moslems of the Russian Empire, excluding the Caucasus, Crimea, and Central Asiatic provinces, and which, among other duties, kept a record of births and deaths, estimated the number of Moslems under its jurisdiction at 5,283,618. This is more than a million in excess of the figures given above for the Kazan, Astrakhan, and West Siberian Tatars, Chuvashes, and Bashkirs combined. The difference is probably accounted for by the inclusion of certain sections of the Khirgiz, whose territory is reckoned administratively as part of European Russia.

II

THE KURDS

From the Pan-Turanian point of view the Kurds have considerable importance as a negative factor. They are an Iranian people, speaking dialects of Persian, and their original home is in the mountain ranges which separate the plateau of Persia from the basin of Mesopotamia. South-eastward they are adjoined by kindred mountain populations—the Lurs and Bakhtiaris—and their expansion has been principally in the opposite, or north-westerly, direction.

This expansion has been closely connected with the Turkish migrations. When the Turks made their way from Central Asia into Northern Persia, in the eleventh century A. D., they did not dislodge the Kurds, who had occupied the western ramparts of the Persian plateau for about 3,000 years. They avoided the Kurdish mountains, and turned northwards into Azerbaijan, up the valley of the Araxes, and so into Armenia and Anatolia by a route that left Kurdistan untouched. Anatolia was their goal and Armenia their high road, with the result that, after migrations which went on intermittently for five centuries, Anatolia had become the seat of a new Turkish nation, while Armenia was left depopulated and half desolate. This was the Kurds' opportunity. Kurdish tribes drifted into the vacuum which the Turks had made; and they have gradually spread over the lake country of Urmia and Van, and the upper valleys of the Tigris and Euphrates, till they have come almost within sight of the Black Sea and the Mediterranean.

From the point of view of 'Pan-Turanian' geography, they have thus possessed themselves of a strategical position. Stretching in a broad arc from a point north of Aleppo to a point east of Baghdad, they form an almost continuous buffer between the Turkish-speaking populations of Anatolia, the Caucasus, and Azerbaijan, on the one hand, and the Arab world on the other. And what is still more important, they combine with the Armenians, and with certain indigenous mountain tribes of Armenia now classed as Kurds,¹ to cut off the Anatolian (Ottoman) Turks from all the Turks farther east. During the Armenian massacres of 1915, a Turkish gendarme said to a Danish Red Cross Nurse: ² 'First we kill the Arme-

¹ Chiefly in the Dersim highlands, between the two branches of the upper Euphrates.

² They were travelling from Erzerum to Sivas, along the ancient route of the Turkish migrations. (See Blue Book, Misc. 31 (1916), p. 253.)

nians, then the Greeks, and then the Kurds'; and so far as the Pan-Turanian idea was a motive for the treatment of the Armenians by the Committee of Union and Progress, the gendarme was stating the logical consequences of his superiors' policy.

On the other hand, under the old régime, before the Ottoman Empire began to be either a centralized or a nationalistic state, the Kurds were the most faithful and favoured supporters of the Ottoman Government; and their expansion towards the north and west was in great part due to Ottoman encouragement.

When the Osmanlis conquered Armenia at the beginning of the sixteenth century, their main concern was to establish a bulwark against Persia, and the Kurdish tribes served excellently for the purpose. Notwithstanding their Persian dialect, the Kurds have not, and never had, a vestige of Persian national feeling. Their social consciousness is limited by the tribe, the sole object of the tribal policy is to evade external control, and in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the Persian Government, which was near and powerful, seemed a more immediate menace to tribal independence than the distant Ottoman Government at Constantinople. The Ottoman Government was content with a nominal suzerainty over the Kurdish chiefs, and in return the Kurds guarded the Ottoman Empire's Persian frontiers—playing the same rôle here as the Bosniaks and Albanians in the Balkans.

Friction between the Kurds and the Ottoman Government began in the early nineteenth century, when Sultan Mahmud reduced the semi-independent Kurdish chiefs in Armenia and Kurdistan, and set up the beginnings of an official Ottoman administration in their place.¹ This centralizing policy was reversed about 1890 by Abd-ul-Hamid, who hoped to keep his various subjects in subjection by playing them off against each other and weakening them all. Abd-ul-Hamid gave the Kurds rifles, and their chiefs the title of commanders of Hamidié gendarmerie, and let them loose on the Armenians; but Ottoman policy was reversed again in 1908 by the Committee of Union and Progress, who hoped to regenerate the Empire by unity and internal strength. The Committee of Union and Progress attempted to call the Kurds to order, and they had a notable success in subduing the practically independent Milli Confederation built up by Ibrahim Pasha. But they could

¹ This was the Sultan who destroyed Ali Pasha of Janina and lost Greece; and it is notable that the Committee of Union and Progress, in pursuing the same policy from 1908 to 1913, were also successful against the Kurds (breaking up the power of Ibrahim Pasha), but failed to reduce Albania and lost Macedonia.

not call in the arms which Abd-ul-Hamid had given out, though they improved the situation by allowing the Christian population to bear arms too.

As soon, however, as they intervened in the European War, the Committee of Union and Progress went back deliberately to Abd-ul-Hamid's policy. They distributed more arms to the Kurdish tribes, encouraged them to take part in the invasion of Azerbaijan, and incited them against the Christians. From April, 1915, onwards, the massacres of Armenian convoys in course of deportation were generally carried out by Kurdish bands, reinforced by released criminals and Ottoman gendarmes. But not all the Kurds took the Government's side. In Cilicia, for instance,¹ the Kurds deplored the treatment of the Armenians, as did the rest of the Moslem population; and in the Dersim highlands the Kurdish or pseudo-Kurdish tribes have given shelter to Armenian refugees from Kharput and elsewhere.

The Kurdish sense of independence has been galled by the Ottoman conscription, and the percentage of Kurd deserters has notoriously been higher than that of Armenians, not to speak of Turks. Many of the Dersimli tribes refused altogether to supply recruits, and the Ottoman military authorities have failed to send punitive expeditions against them.

Russian influence among the Kurds dates from the Russian occupation of Azerbaijan, for, except in the Erivan district, there are practically no Kurds in the Caucasus provinces under direct Russian sovereignty. The occupation of Azerbaijan increased Russia's political prestige among the Kurds, and roughly coincided with the fall of Abd-ul-Hamid and the substitution of a régime in Turkey hostile to Kurdish privileges. The Russian Government, as a power making for disorder from outside, was more congenial to many Kurds than the Committee of Union and Progress in its first genuine enthusiasm for order and good government.

During the War the partisanship of the Kurds varied with the military situation. They were pro-Turk when the Turks were on the offensive in Azerbaijan and the Caucasus; they turned pro-Russian in the Ottoman territories which the Russians subsequently occupied. The Russian military authorities treated these Ottoman Kurds with extraordinary favour, left them their arms, and connived at their raids, not only upon returned Armenian refugees, but even upon the Russian line of communications. The Kurds were naturally a more congenial element than the Armenians to the Tsarist Government; but the Armenians complained that even after the Revolution

¹ Misc. No. 31 (1916), p. 498.

the Russian military authorities continued their pro-Kurdish policy.

But the future of the Kurds lies less in Armenia (under whatever régime Armenia may come) than in Northern Mesopotamia, which is certainly on the eve of economic development. So long as it lay fallow, the steppe-country between Aleppo and Mosul was an Arab domain—though the Kurds drove their flocks thither for the winter, and Ibrahim Pasha, the last great Kurdish chieftain, made his head-quarters at Viranshehr, on the edge of the plain.¹ But agriculture is now following the Baghdad Railway from Aleppo towards the east; and, where Kurd and Bedawi have taken to the land, the Kurd has shown himself so far to be the better man. If therefore the agricultural development of the country proceeds gradually, and if the local population is not swamped by reservoirs of manpower from abroad, northern Mesopotamia seems destined to become Kurdish land; and here, freed from their tribal tradition and their nomadic habits, the Kurds will be more susceptible to the influences of civilization.

III

ANTI-ISLAMIC TENDENCIES IN THE PAN-TURANIAN MOVEMENT

There are several distinct degrees of opposition to Islam in the Pan-Turanian movement:

- (a) Ziya Bey's group first came into conflict with Islam over the language question. They probably thought of translating the Koran, &c., into Turkish because they knew that the translation of the Bible and Christian liturgy into English and German at the Protestant Reformation had been the foundation of the modern English and German national literatures. The idea is not intrinsically contrary to the Muhammadan religion; but it is distinctly contrary to Islamic prejudice, and has therefore not been taken up by the Committee of Union and Progress.
- (b) The opposition of the Moslem ecclesiastics to the translation of the Koran into Turkish led the Turkish Nationalists into an attack on Islam as an ecclesiastical institution. This secularist movement, too, is partly an imitation of Europe, as 'Tekin Alp's' use of the word 'clericals' shows; but it also embodies

¹ And the Yezidis of Jibal Sinjar, though probably not Kurds by race, had already adopted the Kurdish language.

sound and necessary reforms like the secularization of Education and the Law, and steps in this direction have been taken by the Committee of Union and Progress themselves. The chief difference on this head between the Committee of Union and Progress and the doctrinaires is that, while the latter trumpet their 'anti-clericalism', the Committee of Union and Progress try to carry secularization through with as little friction as possible, and without ever admitting that their measures are anti-Islamic.

- (c) The Nationalists have also started a 'pre-Islamic' movement which is only paralleled in Europe by the 'Ur-Deutschum' of the Hindenburg wooden idols. They are making a sentimental cult of the pagan Turanian conquerors, like Jenghis Khan and Hulaku (both of whom, incidentally, were Mongols and not Turks). Members of the 'Turk Kuji' ('Turkish Power') Society—an association for the promotion of physical culture, probably modelled on the Slavonic 'Sokols'—have to take 'Turanian' club-names in place of Moslem (e.g. 'Oghuz' for 'Muhammad'); and a corps of Turkish Boy-scouts has been instituted, who likewise take 'Turanian' scout-names, cheer for the 'khakan of the Turks' instead of the 'Padishah', and carry flags with the Turkish wolf on them, though the representation of living creatures in art is tabu to good Moslems.

Enver was said to be the patron of these boy-scouts; a Turkish army order came into the hands of the British War Office, directing the troops to include the 'Grey Wolf' in their prayers; and the Turanian idea seems to have made a certain progress among individual Turks of distinction, even in this fantastic form. For instance, King Hussein's troops captured, on the corpse of a brother of the Turkish Commandant at Medina, a circular issued by the principal Pan-Turanian Society in Turkey, the 'Turk Ojaghi' ('Turkish Family'), in which the following passage occurs:

That monstrous figment of imagination which is known as the Community of Islam, and which has for long past stood in the way of present progress generally, and of the realization of the principles of Turanian Unity in particular, has now entered on a phase of decline and ruin. We need not apprehend from it any further danger to the execution of our hopes and principles. This is abundantly shown by the state of affairs among the Moslems in India. . . .

This circular derives a certain importance from its source and ownership, but there is no evidence that the 'Back to Paganism' movement has any influence over the policy of the Committee of Union and Progress.

IV

TEXT OF AN OPEN LETTER ADDRESSED TO M. TERESCHENKO, RUSSIAN MINISTER FOR FOREIGN AFFAIRS, BY THE EXECUTIVE COMMITTEE OF THE ALL-RUSSIAN MOHAMMEDAN COUNCIL, WITH REFERENCE TO THE PROCLAMATION BY ITALY OF HER PROTECTORATE OVER ALBANIA

'Italy has proclaimed the "independence" of Albania under her protectorate. If the press may be relied upon, this step taken by Italy was a complete surprise to the diplomatic representatives of the Powers allied to Italy. The diplomatic representatives of Russia, England, and France had made it clear to the Italian Government that in their opinion the problem of Albania should have been solved after the end of the war in an International Congress. The Albanian problem thus raised by the action of Italy, and the attitude which you, Minister-Citizen, have adopted in the matter as the responsible leader of the foreign policy of the Russian Democracy, induce the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council to address to you this open letter.

'The fate of Albania, which falls under the protectorate of a European Power, recalls in this respect the destinies of Algeria, Tunis, Egypt, Morocco, Afghanistan, and other Mohammedan countries. The history of the Mohammedan peoples of those countries arouses a strong sentiment of sympathy in the hearts of the many millions of free Mohammedans in Russia. And now to the tragedies overtaking the above-mentioned Mohammedan countries there is also added the tragedy of the Albanian people, which is being sacrificed to imperialistic designs of the Italian governing classes. The All-Russian Mohammedan Conference passed a resolution in Moscow in which it stated its attitude towards the war, "That this Conference thinks the cause of the world-slaughter lies in the imperialistic tendencies of European ruling classes, and it protests against that policy wherever it exists, because Mohammedans all the world over are victims of European imperialism".

‘The fate of Albania is a new illustration of European robbery in the history of imperialism, and again the victim is a mainly Mohammedan people. Hand-in-hand with the Russian Revolutionary Democracy and as a party to its formula of peace without annexations and indemnities based on the right of peoples to decide their own fate, the Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council expected from you a definite and uncompromising policy towards the Albanian problem.

‘But, alas ! that hope has not been fulfilled. The Committee expected that the leading organs of the Russian Revolution would have made their powerful voice heard. But that hope also has been falsified.

‘On behalf of many millions of Mohammedan Democrats in Russia, we therefore publish this protest.

‘Our Executive Committee thinks that in this problem you, as the Foreign Minister in the Provisional Government, could take clear and definite action.

‘Every people must decide its own fate by a plébiscite. In that way alone can the fate of the Albanian people be settled ; whereas you seem to be inclined to solve the Albanian problem by the International Peace Conference. The Russian democracy was entitled to expect from you a declaration of the Albanian people’s right to political self-determination in such a way as not to leave any occasion for doubt.

‘Only a policy like that traced above, worthy of the Russian Democracy, could inspire the All-Russian Mohammedan Council with confidence that the men responsible for the high authority of the Russian Revolution correspond to that great formula in problems of foreign as well as internal policy.

‘Your dubious and indecisive attitude towards the Albanian problem rouses suspicion and doubt among the Mohammedans of Russia, particularly in consequence of those bitter experiences of centuries past during which the Mohammedans all the world over have learnt the meaning of what is called European justice.

‘The Executive Committee of the All-Russian Mohammedan Council publishes this protest and considers it absolutely essential to inform you that, in the opinion of the Mohammedan democracy of Russia, the principles of cultural liberty and the right of political self-determination belong not only to the peoples of Europe but also to those of Asia and Africa. The Executive Committee assumes that you are acquainting our Allies with this point of view and that it is being thoroughly comprehended by their governing circles.’

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The Turanian-speaking Peoples

	Majorities	Minorities
Turks		
Ugro-Finns and Samoyeds		
Mongols and Manchu-Tungusians		



