

António Costa Pinto

The Blue Shirts

Portuguese Fascists and the New State



SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS

The Blue Shirts

**Portuguese Fascists
and the New State**

António Costa Pinto

The Blue Shirts
Portuguese Fascists
and the New State

SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS, BOULDER
DISTRIBUTED BY COLUMBIA UNIVERSITY PRESS, NEW YORK
2000

This book was supported by the
Portuguese Institute for Book and Libraries



INSTITUTO PORTUGUÊS DO
LIVRO E DAS BIBLIOTECAS

Copyright 1999 by António Costa Pinto
ISBN 0-88033-982-9
Library of Congress Catalog Card Number 00-131-173

Printed in the United States of America

Contents

List of Figures	ix
Preface and acknowledgements	xi
1. Rolão Preto and the Origins of Portuguese Fascism	1
<i>Lusitanian Integralism, 2 • Rolão Preto: The Portuguese Valois, 15 • Fascism and the Radical Right in the 1920s, 32 • Fascism and the Breakdown of the Republic, 44 • Fascists and Conservatives under the Military Dictatorship, 52</i>	
2. The Emergence of National Syndicalism	69
<i>The Political Programme of National Syndicalism, 76 • National Syndicalist Political Activity, 87</i>	
3. The National Syndicalist Organisation: A Political and Social Profile	103
<i>The National Syndicalists, 105 • Leaders, Militants and Members, 120</i>	
4. National Syndicalism and the National Union: A Comparative Analysis	131
<i>The UN and Authoritarian Single Parties, 132 • The Fascists and the Government Party, 135 • The UN and National Syndicalism Compared, 141 • National Union -National Syndicalist Tension, 154 • Concluding Remarks, 158</i>	

5. "Without Power": Conflict and Prohibition	161
<i>Opposition to National Syndicalism, 161 • The Salazar Offensive: Separation versus Integration, 167 • The Crisis of 1933, 174 • The Salazarist Split, 178 • Preto's National Syndicalism: Integration and Exile, 184</i>	
6. "Against the Regime": The Conspiratorial Years, 1934-1945	193
<i>A Fascist Opposition? 198 • Pro-Coup Agitation, 201 • The Impact of the Spanish Civil War, 211 • A Persistent Sub-Culture, 215 • The Fascists and the New State, 220</i>	
7. National Syndicalism and International Fascism	225
<i>An "International Family", 226 • The Nature of Portuguese Fascism, 236 • A Variant of European Fascism, 240</i>	
<i>Sources and Bibliography</i>	245
<i>Index</i>	263

List of Figures

Figure 3.1: NS Organisational Structure (1933)	107
Figure 3.2: NS District Secretariats	114
Figure 3.3: NS National Leaders' Socio-Professional Profile	122
Figure 3.4: NS District Leaders' Socio-Professional Profile	123
Figure 3.5: NS Leaders' Political Origins	124
Figure 3.6: Rank of NS Military Members	126
Figure 3.7: National Distribution of NS Membership	128
Figure 3.8: Socio-professional Profile of NS Membership	129
Figure 4.1: Political Origin of UN Local Commissions	147
Figure 4.2: Socio-professional Composition of NS-UN District Commissions	150
Figure 4.3: National Distribution of NS-UN Membership, 1933	153
Figure 4.4: Socio-professional Composition of NS-UN Membership, 1933	154

Preface and Acknowledgments

This book about Portuguese fascism focuses on the National Syndicalist Movement (*Nacional Sindicalismo*, NS) led by Rolão Preto, and its relations with the Salazar regime. Like other cases where the crisis and downfall of democracy was led by authoritarian elites either in opposition to or alliance with the fascists, this study aims to analyse the factors that led to the rise of fascism, as well as the conditions for its success in the inter-war period.

The first chapter examines the foundation and political trajectory of Lusitanian Integralism (*Integralismo Lusitano*, IL), the main Portuguese radical right movement, and the political profile of the charismatic leader of the National Syndicalists, Rolão Preto. It analyses the main factors that led to the late emergence of fascism in Portugal, as well as the peculiarities of the fall of the Liberal Republic and the transition to authoritarianism in the twenties.

The second chapter looks at the foundation of National Syndicalism in the context of the Military Dictatorship established in 1926, and assesses its political and social characteristics.

The third chapter describes the organisational structure as well as the political and social profile of the leaders and members of the NS. The fourth chapter draws some parallels between NS and National Union (*União Nacional*, UN), the government's party, which became the single party of Salazar's New State (*Estado Novo*) regime.

The last three chapters of the book consist of a diachronic analysis of the growing tension between the fascists and Salazarism. Chapter five assesses the attitude of the fascists towards the formation of the New State and their 'forced integration' into the new authoritarian order. The sixth chapter, which is perhaps the most difficult to reconstruct empirically, looks at anti-Salazar radicalisation by a part of the movement, which culminated in the attempted coup of September 1935. To place this analysis in context, chapter seven undertakes an assessment of the role of the fascists in Salazar's New State in comparative perspective.

Given its monographic nature, this book does not analyse in detail the wider context in which the events described take place. For an introduction to the period and more details about context the reader can refer to a previously published book on the New State and European fascism¹.

Three kinds of primary sources were used to carry out research for the book: The records of the political police of Salazarism (PIDE/DGS) and of the Ministry of the Interior, held in the *Torre do Tombo* National Archives in Lisbon. Internal NS correspondence, mainly what is left of Rolão Preto's personal records and those of other national syndicalists were important, as were first-hand accounts, although there were few of these given that not many of the leaders and militants are still living.

The first of these sources allowed me to fill in some information gaps, given that NS left no formal party archives. The police files were essential, as they provided quantitative data on age, social profile and political careers of NS leaders and information allowing a reconstruction of their political action, particularly during the 'underground' period. The records of the Ministry of the Interior provided a more accurate idea of the initial strategy adopted by

¹ António Costa Pinto, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism. Problems of interpretation*, 1995, in this series. Also useful is the debate organised by the Camões Center of Columbia University on this issue published as "The History of Fascism Revisited: Portugal in the European Context", *Camões Center Quarterly*, Vol. 6/7, 1 & 2, Summer/Fall 1997, pp. 40-56. I would like to thank Kenneth Maxwell, who organised the debate, as well as Robert O. Paxton and Victoria De Grazia, for their comments.

the Salazar regime towards NS, as well as the level of the movement's local influence.

Internal correspondence and personal archives of key leaders avoided the adoption of an excessively formal approach based merely on censored official communiqués and statutes. Without consulting these sources the same conclusions could have been reached; nonetheless, they permitted a more realistic recreation of the political life of the Portuguese fascists, their doubts, internal debates, and tactical contradictions in the context of transition from democracy to authoritarianism.

The interviews that were carried out were mainly used to complement the above mentioned sources. The fact that there are so few survivors made it impossible to conduct a sample survey of the ideological attitudes of militants and leaders.

In conclusion, the main aim of the research is to contribute to our understanding of the conditions under which fascism emerged from among a wide spectrum of possible authoritarian solutions during the crisis of democracy after the First World War. In addition, it tests some analytical models in light of the Portuguese case. Prone as I am to occasional doubts as to the importance of this kind of work, I found a quotation that appealed to me. It is particularly apt to introduce a book on a peripheral case such as the one studied here: «The study of the lesser-known fascist movements is, in itself, a most interesting occupation; for it is in the sidelines of fascism, away from the historical dominance of Hitler and Mussolini, that some new light can be thrown on the problem of fascism”.² Even though the light thrown by this book may not be very bright, I hope I have managed to contribute to the study of this central phenomenon of Twentieth Century Europe.

* * *

This book is a revised and considerably summarised version of study carried out when I was a researcher at the European Univer-

² S. M. Cullen, “Learders and Martyrs: Codreanu, Mosley and José António”, *History*, 71, 1986, p. 430.

sity Institute in Florence in the eighties, which was published in Portuguese in 1994. Some of the information has been updated and, details and references of lesser interest to an international reader have been eliminated.

I would first like to thank Stuart J. Woolf, formerly a Professor in Florence, for the support he gave me in this and other projects, and Philippe C. Schmitter, with whom I spent a year at the Center for European Studies at Stanford University, where I wrote a number of these chapters.

Conversations with friends and colleagues as well as meetings at colloquia have also enriched my work. In the United State, I would especially like to thank Stanley G. Payne and Juan J. Linz. Payne was the first scholar that invited me to present a paper on National Syndicalism at a colloquium in the United States and I have always maintained excellent personal and professional relations with him. As for Juan J. Linz, his proverbial intellectual creativity and the importance of his works on the subject of this book are renowned. He combines his qualities as a political scientist and academic with a rare willingness to listen to and debate with younger people, even though it may interfere with the myriad projects he always has under way.

In recent years, I have been involved in a number of projects linked in some way or other to the subject of authoritarianism. Among the colleagues and friends that I have met along the way, special thanks are due to José Alvarez-Junco, Dirk Berg-Schlosser, Victoria De Grazia, Michel Dobry, Roger Eatwell, Norbert Frei, Emilio Gentile, Roger Griffin, Stein U. Larsen, Marc Lazar, Yves Léonard, Pierre Milza, Robert O. Paxton, Henri Rousso, Adrian Shubert, Zeev Sternhell and Marco Tarchi.

This book was translated into English by Stuart Lloyd-Jones at the University of Glasgow and Visiting Fellow at the Center for Modern Portuguese History of the ISCTE in Lisbon, and edited by my friend and colleague Alexandra Barahona de Brito. My thanks to both of them, as well as to Professor Stephen Fischer-Gallati, the editor of the Social Science Monographs.

Finally, I would like to thank the Center of International Studies of Princeton University for the excellent working conditions they provided and especially Flad and Nancy Bermeo to whom I owe the invitation to spend a semester at Princeton as LADF Senior Visiting Fellow. Although the projects that took me to Princeton are not connected with this study, it was there that I found the time and peace to prepare the English version of the book. Last but not least my thanks, as always, to Anne Cova, to whom this book is dedicated.

António Costa Pinto

Chapter One

Rolão Preto and the Origins of Portuguese Fascism

In February 1932, a group of fascist students in Lisbon founded an academic journal called *The Revolution* (*A Revolução*). Most of the founding members belonged to the student section of Lusitanian Integralism (*Integralismo Lusitano*, IL). The latter was a radical right-wing monarchic movement that followed the example of French Action (*Action Française*, AF) created in the 1910s. A few months later, the group invited Francisco Rolão Preto to be the journal's editor. He was a member of IL's Central Committee and his beliefs were similar to those professed by the group. In the summer of 1932, the National Syndicalist movement (*Nacional Sindicalismo*, NS) was launched nation-wide under Preto's charismatic leadership.

NS was founded during the transition to authoritarianism and unified the 'political family' which had played an important role in the crises and downfall of the Parliamentary Republic (1911-1926) but had been marginalised during the establishment of stable dictatorial rule under Salazar at the beginning of the 1930s.

NS belatedly unified fascist currents arising from the large but divided post-war radical right. It attracted the most radical members of the parties and ideological pressure groups created during the twilight years of the Parliamentary Republic. Before it was outlawed and its leaders exiled in the mid-thirties, NS had set up an organisation that included a sizeable army sector, and had organised several coup attempts against the Salazar regime.

Portuguese fascism was deeply influenced by the IL. Although many movements emerged during the post-war crisis that were not much influenced by Integralism, its impact on NS leaders and supporters was deep. The capacity of the IL to successfully legitimate a new reactionary ideology within Portuguese political culture with an obvious foreign ideological influence was decisive.

The ideological vitality of IL and its ability to permeate the elite conditioned the successful spread of fascism in Portugal. As stated by Hermínio Martins: “At the time when Italian Fascist and Nazi models assumed ‘world-historical’ importance, those most predisposed to learn and emulate them had all been grounded in the teachings and intellectual style of IL”. Indeed, IL guided almost all attempts to create Fascist parties, which thus “pre-empted the ground from other influences and paradigms of the extreme right”.¹

Lusitanian Integralism

IL was initially a club with a magazine founded on the eve of the First World War by a group of young monarchists who had been colleagues at the University of Coimbra before the Republican Revolution of 5 October 1910 that led to the defeat of the constitutional monarchy. After that, the group ceased to be a literary society and became politically active. Some of the group’s members took part in the first monarchic excursions from Spain against the recently established Republican regime. During their brief exile in France and Belgium they contacted AF, their key foreign ideological point of reference.

Following the passage of an amnesty law, the group returned to Portugal and founded the IL. They began to publish a doctrinal journal and entered the political and ideological battlefield. António Sardinha, IL’s principal theorist, had never been exiled and only became a catholic and monarchist after the Republican Revolution. Other members of the organisation, including Rolão

¹ Martins, H., ‘Portugal’, in: S. J. Woolf (ed), *European Fascism*, (New York: 1969), p. 305.

Preto, the youngest leader, however, had experienced life in exile and were more open to the influence of AF.² In 1916, when the Republican regime led Portugal into the War on the side of the Allies, the IL became a political movement. It launched a daily newspaper that popularised their political programme. Its goal was to restore an anti-liberal, de-centralised and traditional corporatist monarchy.

Integralism left a profound intellectual mark on twentieth century Portuguese culture. Although influenced by AF, it synthesised the ideals of a specifically Portuguese reactionary nationalism in a new and enduring way.

Integralism gave rise to an intellectual current based on numerous studies on national identity. It reinvented a medieval organic corporatist social “tradition”, which the liberalism ‘imported’ by the Republic allegedly sought to destroy. They rehabilitated the nineteenth century counter-revolutionary thought espoused by the supporters of King Miguel to boost their ideas. The first Integralists were rather dogmatic regarding the restoration of the monarchy. This complicated their relations with other anti-liberal forces, such as traditional Catholics and conservative Republicans. Until 1918, the Integralists focused on promoting pro-monarchic coups, eliminating the chance of forging a wider reactionary coalition, although they also worked enthusiastically with other anti-democratic forces.

Integralist Ideology

Until 1910, the University of Coimbra was the only university in the country, and the focus of all the political and ideological movements that dominated politics at the beginning of the twentieth century. Republicans, monarchists and social Catholics all established their first centres in Coimbra and formed the better part of the leadership of these movements. As students, the found-

² On IL see: Cruz, M. B. da, *Monárquicos e Republicanos sob o Estado Novo*, (Lisbon: 1987); Pinto, A. C., “A formação do Integralismo Lusitano (1907-17)”, *Análise Social*, Vol. XVIII (1982), pp. 1409-1419.

ing members of Integralism were initially active in literary and cultural life. Some, such as António Sardinha, were even republicans.³ Their early writings followed turn of the century literary nationalist currents. Their works entailed “the abandonment of French models and a return to national traditions, a wholesome ruralism, an ingenuous popular imagination and vernacular language”.⁴

The Integralists were renowned within Coimbra’s student community for their elitist attitudes and aristocratic intellectualism. Their social base, while above average, was not their main distinguishing feature. Some belonged to the petty aristocracy or the southern, Alentejo-based, land-owning elite, but not all possessed family fortunes.⁵ Rather than true aristocrats they were, above all, elitist in their intellectual outlook.

The 1910 Revolution took by surprise the Integralists, who had absorbed “the thought of Renan and Taine [...] and the heat of *Action Française* literature” by the time they finished their studies.⁶ These were the years when they read Le Bon, Barrès, Maurras and, through them, came to know the main proponents of *fin-de-siècle* nationalism.⁷ As Sardinha later recalled: “Charles Maurras once said ‘our writing has led us to politics [...] but our nationalism is essentially aesthetic’.⁸ As I reflect on our literary origins [...] I recognise that literature also led us to politics”.⁹ The proclamation of the Republic had a formative ideological impact on Integralism. For the Integralists, the Republic was a “crowd democracy” that led urban social groups to the political arena. Already

³ This was also the case of other future sympathisers, like Martinho Nobre de Melo. The majority of followers, however, were Monarchists, like Alberto Monsaraz and Luís de Almeida Braga.

⁴ Prado Coelho, Jacinto do, ‘Neogarretismo’, *Dicionário de Literatura*, vol. II, (Oporto: 1976), p. 711.

⁵ José Pequito Rebelo and Alberto Monsaraz had their own fortunes and were important financial contributors.

⁶ Raposo, H., *Folhas do meu cadastro*, (Lisbon: 1945), p. XXVII.

⁷ With regards Barrès, see: Sternhell, Z., *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme Français*, (Paris: 1972).

⁸ In the original: “*Les lettres nous ont conduit à la politique... mais notre nationalisme commence par être esthétique*”.

⁹ Sardinha, A., *Ao ritmo do ampulheta*, (Lisbon: 1925), p. 147.

imbued in traditional nationalism, their intellectual background railed against the Republic that represented the “principles of 1789”. Yet, as noted by a founding member, at this time the Integralists still lacked “the strong armour of a system”.¹⁰

The Republican Revolution physically separated the group, as some supported pro-monarchic revolts and participated in volunteer battalions that carried out insurgent attacks led from Galicia in 1911 and 1912. Following the defeat of these incursions, some went into self-imposed exile in France and Belgium. Their letters bear witness to the influence of AF. Although its ideology was already known, the French movement now became the model to emulate. When the group returned to Portugal immediately before the war, they created the IL, which was formally inaugurated in 1914. In a letter to a friend, Sardinha, then newly converted to catholicism and a monarchist, explained the link between his literature and ideological projects. Writing his book, *The Value of The Race (O Valor da Raça)*, which was published in 1915, he stated that he wanted to denounce and undermine “the enemy’s interpretation of our history”. In his view, the “historical crisis affecting our country makes imperious demands of what, under other circumstances, could be a psychologically peaceful and cultured youth”. Under the Republic, Integralists were “called to action”.¹¹ As he prepared the Integralist programme, Sardinha explained the ideological and political principles that should guide the IL:

“Monarchists, and the King himself, must be taught what a monarchy is. We have a precedent. The discredited Miguelist literature. It must be rehabilitated, and with the popularisation of the doctrines of *Action Française*, which are completely unknown among us, we must create a counter-revolutionary theory that can teach these people that democracy is a socially inferior form of government, which implies the rejection of all the selective criteria that only a monarchy can offer”.¹²

The Integralists concentrated on cultural activities during the first three years of their existence. They aimed to legitimise their

¹⁰ Raposo, H., *op. cit.*, p. XXVII.

¹¹ Braga, L. A., *Sob o pendão real*, (Lisbon: 1942), pp. 423-424.

¹² *Ibid.*, pp. 432-433.

interpretation of the nation's past, gain credibility and polarise the country's intellectual elite. Their major works date from this period. Articles in *Portuguese Nation (A Nação Portuguesa)*, recounted national history, sought new loyalties and 'discovered' the counter-revolutionary thought of nineteenth century Legitimists.¹³ Sardinha's nationalism was the most mystical. In *O Valor da Raça* he advocated a later abandoned race-based nationalism and traced the origins of the Portuguese to an imaginary *homo atlanticus*.¹⁴

The traditional nationalism espoused by the Integralists was based on the belief that Portuguese society had reached perfection during the Middle Ages. In their view, the Renaissance and Discoveries had threatened rural and the artisanal medievalism of that period. A social decadence had set in, which the "severe ethnic cleansing" of the Inquisition had been unable to stem. For them, until the nineteenth century the country's history had consisted primarily of a battle between a natural native peace and disturbing foreign influences. Liberalism was seen as having been present already in Germanic and Lutheran Absolutism. In their view, the torch of tradition was in the hands of the supporters of King Miguel who had lost the Civil War waged against the Liberals.

The Integralists sought to legitimate this apocalyptic vision of Portuguese history with reference to the literature of turn of the century academic and intellectual national élites.¹⁵ As in other European countries, their thought was based on counter-revolutionary ideas and elitist liberalism. It drew on Maistre's and Bonald's *christian conservatism*, Comte's, Le Play's, Renan's and Taine's *critical liberalism*, as well as the La Tour du Pin's and Barrès *radical conservatism*.¹⁶

According to Eugen Weber, AF inflamed all such groups "at a time when, dissatisfied with certain conditions obtaining around them, they were looking for a intellectual guide".¹⁷ Like other sim-

¹³ Defenders of King Miguel, defeated in 1834 by the liberals.

¹⁴ Sardinha, A., *O valor da raça*, (Lisbon: 1915).

¹⁵ Sardinha, A., *No princípio era o verbo*, (Lisbon: 1924).

¹⁶ Nolte, E., *Three Faces of Fascism*, (New York: 1964).

¹⁷ Weber, E., *Action Française. Royalism and Reaction in Twentieth-Century France*, (Stanford: 1962), p. 499.

ilar groups, particularly those in the 'Latin' countries, the Integralists followed the example of AF and Maurras. Noting the weakness of conservatives, Sardinha wanted to endow Integralism with "a doctrinaire body" without which he felt they would be "destined to defeat". In his view, there was no such thing as "reactionary mysticism", only "a mystical republic".¹⁸ The Integralists expounded this "reactionary mysticism" on the eve of the First World War.

The Integralists presented a coherent ideological alternative to liberal republicanism. They created a new dogma and political platform. Their programme was summed up in a long article published in *A Nação Portuguesa* by Pequito Rebelo, "The Democratic Republic vs. Integral Monarchism". It denounced the fallacy of a popular sovereignty based on the "basic psychology and inferior sentimental reactions" of the "crowd" and advocated the establishment of a traditional hierarchy.¹⁹ Universal suffrage was rejected for the corporatist representation of traditional organisations: the family, community and professions. A consultative and technical National Assembly representing these "organic forces" should replace the Parliament. The centralised Liberal State that destroyed local life and led to unrestrained urbanisation should disappear with anti-cosmopolitan decentralisation and ruralisation to allow a "largely agricultural country to fulfil its historic mission".²⁰ It was argued that corporatist representation would lead to the demise of liberal economics that caused "disastrous agitation and class war".²¹

Corporatism was presented as the alternative to liberalism and as the basis for the restoration of the monarchy. Historical legitimisation and reinforcing the theory of corporatism was much more important than any other anti-liberal elements in the ideology of IL, as shown by studies and texts published by the leaders of the movement.²² Early Integralist writings argued that rural and tra-

¹⁸ Sardinha, A., *op. cit.*, p. 193.

¹⁹ Rebelo, J. P., *Pela dedução à monarquia*, (Lisbon: 1945), p. 62.

²⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 61.

²¹ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

²² See, for example: Monsaraz, A. de, *Cartilha Monárquica*, (Lisbon: 1916).

ditional anti-capitalism was threatened by a process of modernisation dominated by 'plutocrats' and industrialists exploiting cheap rural labour. As they came closer to having power, after the dictatorship of Sidónio Pais in 1918, however, they dealt with the "social question" by advocating the creation of "organic syndicalism".

The Integralists had a deep impact among conservative élites. They legitimised the dictatorial ideal and a break with the established order. When defending "organic monarchy", the Integralists did not disguise their support for hierarchy and order. It was possible that a dictator hid in the shadow of the traditionally legitimate figure of the king, but the Integralists openly expressed support for a political system based on the abolition of all democratic institutions.

Their support for violence also set them apart from the passivity of conservatives under the Republic. According to Sardinha, the latter lacked the "school of violence" without which "they lack [ed] everything". As he said, "we are conservatives", but the passivity suggested by that title made them "renovators first and foremost".²³ The Integralists engaged in another lively polemic at the time, this time with republican intellectuals. Although the Integralists had jointly launched a journal with the so-called *Seara Nova* intellectuals, a group of liberal critics who performed a similar function to the Integralists among left-wing republicans, they engaged in a 'historical' political polemic with renowned *Seareiros* such as António Sérgio and Raul Proença.

A process of "fascistisation" of Integralism began in the post-war period, but the ideology of its founding members was based essentially on traditional anti-liberalism, 'historical' nationalism and a ruralism opposed to industrialisation. For the Integralists, socialism and communism were mere variants of liberalism and democracy and warranted little attention. Jacobin and anti-clerical republicanism, along with Masonry, were the real enemies. Integralism was an ideology typically developed in reaction to mod-

²³ Sardinha, A., *op. cit.*, p. 193.

ernisation in a country on the periphery of industrial Europe. Hence its success in winning over sectors threatened by modernisation. It became particularly attractive after Portugal entered the War and the already fragile Republic became even weaker. Whatever its incipient fascist elements and its concern with workers, Integralist political activity remained elitist, centred on a restricted university network and a small group of monarchic provincial notables. These constituted their bastions of support until the 1930s.

The Political Activity of Integralismo Lusitano

Unlike AF, Integralism did not lead to the creation of a consolidated political organisation. This was not only due to ideological factors, but also because of the nature of the Republican political system. The Integralists said that the Republic was “democratic” for propaganda purposes, but in reality enfranchisement was limited to the literate. The *caciquist* hegemony of the Democratic Party (*Partido Democrático*, PD) did not give them the political space to organise themselves properly. Even conservative republicans were unable to establish solid parties. Indeed, party structures were either weak or non-existent and they were no more than groups of notables.²⁴ Any attempt to promote rural electoral mobilisation was thus frustrated.

The political life of Integralism can be divided into three phases. During the first, from 1914 to the dictatorship of Sidónio Pais in 1917-1918, they dedicated themselves almost exclusively to ideological activity. The second, from 1918 to 1922 when their activities were suspended, was marked by attempts to organise a political movement. During the third and most diffuse, between 1922 and the dissolution of its Central Junta in 1932, the group began to fall apart rapidly.

With the 1917 coup of Sidónio Pais, the Integralists became a political movement. Although he was a republican, Sidónio Pais

²⁴ See: Wheeler, D. L., *Republican Portugal. A Political History, 1910-1926*, (Madison: 1978), and Lopes, F. F., *A 1ª República Portuguesa. Questão eleitoral e deslegitimação*, (Lisbon: 1994).

gave various Integralist sympathisers ministerial portfolios and adopted some of their ideas on corporatist representation. The dictator attempted to create a government party, and only allowed Catholics and Monarchists to continue their independent political activities. This led the Integralists to place men such as Sardinha and Pequito Rebelo on the Monarchist lists for Congress and Senate in 1918.

The propaganda phase of the Integralist movement was initiated in February 1917 with the launching of the monarchic newspaper, *The Monarchy (A Monarquia)*. The movement experimented with various organisational models, and it remained weak. However, it survived despite its fluidity, the frequent interruptions of its activities, and the number of schisms that it suffered in the 1920s. After the nomination of the Central Junta, which was formed by the movement's founders and remained practically unchanged until its dissolution, provincial and municipal juntas were established in accordance with the administrative division of the country. The Alentejo in the south was represented, but the great majority of juntas were concentrated in the centre, interior and north of the country, where representation was organised at the level of local councils. In the large urban centres, the Integralists were only represented within School Juntas representing university students.

Local notables, particularly rural landowners, many of them members of the petty aristocracy, generally took up posts at the district and council levels. The movement also attracted legitimists who, as members of the landed gentry (*senhores da terra*), had social, if not economic, power. These groups financed the movement and its local and national newspapers. Integralists who finished their university careers also took up professional posts within local councils. They gained some power as militants, but always under the protection of local élites. Under the influence the most radical and fascistic sectors of the movement, branches for employees and workers were set up in the post-war period, but these were ephemeral and did not alter the essential structure described above. The movement's leaders, including Sardinha, never hid their lack

of confidence in the masses or populism. Indeed, they essentially opposed the creation of mass bodies and resisted the fascistic pressures emanating from younger militants throughout the 1920s.

The instructions for the organisation of IL published in 1921 stated that it was a movement that was “nationalist by principle, syndicalist (corporativist) in means, and monarchic in aims”. The document noted that the movement was not “a new party preparing to take power, but on the contrary, a current of opinion seeking to free the Nation of clientelistic parties”.²⁵ Organisationally, the movement followed the model of the pre-war leagues. Its leadership never changed and provincial and local bodies were strictly controlled and lacked mechanisms for election. The movement adopted Christ’s Cross as their flag, which was later used by NS.²⁶ In the post-war period, IL proposed to AF leaders the organisation of an international congress of like-minded groups to discuss the creation of an international latin league against “democratic tyranny” and Masonry.²⁷ Maurras rejected this proposal, however, as he disliked internationalism of any kind.²⁸

Various factors contributed to the organisational weakness of IL. It was ideologically elitist and considered the restoration of the monarchy a primary goal. Thus, while they valued the Sidónio Pais dictatorship, they participated in pro-monarchic insurrections in 1918 and 1919 immediately after his death. Indeed, many leaders were wounded or went into exile after these battles. Its extreme dogmatism regarding the monarchic question kept it from working together with other parties. Its sectarianism affected its relations with other conservative groups, particularly the Social Catholics. The Catholic Centre Party (*Partido do Centro Católico*, PCC) was

²⁵ Integralismo Lusitano, *Instruções de organização aprovadas pela Junta Central*, (Lisbon: 1921), p. 5.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁷ This inspired some Brazilian groups that formed Brazilian Integralist Action (*Ação Integralista Brasileira*), as well as Spanish Action (*Acción Española*), formed in 1931, with which close links were maintained. See: Trindade, H., *O Integralismo: o fascismo brasileiro na década de 30*, 2nd. edition, (São Paulo: 1979), p. 251, and the chapter, ‘Acción Española y el Integralismo lusitano’, in Morodo, R., *Acción Española. Orígenes ideológicos del franquismo*, (Madrid: 1980), pp. 176-192.

²⁸ Raposo, H., *Dois nacionalismos*, (Lisbon: 1929), p. 143.

so bitterly attacked for recognising the Republican regime by participating in parliamentary elections that relations between it and the IL were almost severed.

IL was finally suspended due to a rupture within monarchist circles. Given King Manuel's hesitant support for the uprisings undertaken in his name in 1918, the Integralists cut ties with the monarch exiled in London and sought to negotiate a pact with the legitimist pretender.²⁹ This immediately provoked a split within the movement, as those who remained loyal to King Manuel broke away to form Traditionalist Portuguese Action (*Acção Tradicionalista Portuguesa*, ATP) in 1921. The following year, the legitimist pretender signed an agreement without the knowledge of the Integralists, which recognised King Manuel as the rightful king. With this, the Central Junta suspended all IL political activity in 1922, granting militants freedom of action. This 'freedom of action' partly accounts for Integralist penetration among conservative groups. They ceased to give as much importance to the question of monarchic restoration, and began to participate in radical right-wing organisations, employers' associations and military conspiracies. As a Portuguese historian has pointed out, "their ideological strength and influence among conservative circles increased in inverse proportion to the weakening of their political organisation".³⁰

The School Juntas remained active, however. From October 1922 onwards they were influenced by Italian Fascism and in 1923 by the Spanish dictatorship of Primo de Rivera. While they remained loyal to monarchic ideals, they paid less attention to the question of restoration. In 1923, *A Monarquia* announced that "Mussolini in Italy and Primo de Rivera in Spain represent the magnificent triumph of the truths and methods that *Integralismo Lusitano* has recommended to all right thinking Portuguese since 1914". They also claimed to have "a doctrine of salvation". If there

²⁹ See: Sardinha, A., *Processo dum rei*, (Oporto: 1937).

³⁰ Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, p. 147.

was “to be no King, then let there be a Dictator, for Portugal’s leader will be the man who gives the country its lost destiny!”³¹

The leaders of the Central Junta themselves began to participate in ‘unitary’ organisations of the radical right such as the Nuno Álvares Pereira Crusade (*Cruzada Nuno Álvares Pereira*, CNAP) alongside Catholics and Sidonists. They also co-operated in the politicisation of employers’ associations, particularly in the agricultural sector, and wrote some of the manifestos for many failed conservative military coups.

Employers’ associations intervened increasingly in post-war politics, particularly after the threat of agrarian reform proposed by sectors of the republican left. Pequito Rebelo, a founding member of the Central Junta, played an active role organising Alentejo landowners with the creation of the Catholic League of Alentejo Farmers (*Liga Católica dos Agricultores Alentejanos*). He was also responsible for turning the Central Association of Portuguese Agriculture (*Associação Central da Agricultura Portuguesa*) against the Republican regime.³²

The greatest contribution of the Integralists to the downfall of the Republic, however, came from within military circles, less as a result of direct action within the Armed Forces, and more of the abandonment of the cause of restoration. The Integralists were not the only group supporting military intervention, which culminated in the 1926 coup. Nonetheless, with the removal of republican officers immediately after the coup, the presence within the Armed Forces brought them as close to power as they ever got.

IL was at the heart of right-wing military conspiracies from the outset. As germanophiles, Integralists participated in an uprising opposing participation in the war on the side of the Allies in 1916. However, it was only under the rule of Sidónio Pais that relations were strengthened with military academy officers, who constituted

³¹ *A Monarquia*, 26 October 1923, p. 1.

³² Schwartzmann, K. C., *The Social Origins of the Democratic Collapse. The First Portuguese Republic in the Global Economy*, (Lawrence, Kansas: 1989), Telo, A. J., *Decadência e queda da 1ª República Portuguesa*, 2 vols., (Lisbon: 1980 and 1984).

an incipient praetorian guard of the dictatorship. Young monarchic officers sympathised with the Integralists, but the majority of the officer corps who was unconcerned with restoration distrusted them.

This situation altered radically in the immediate post-war period. On the one hand, the fall of Sidónio Pais and the restoration of the liberal regime led a large number of young Sidonist officers who had been previously uninvolved in monarchic politics into the fold of the radical right. On the other hand, the monarchic revolt of 1918 sounded the death-knell for the pro-restoration cause, thereafter leading the Integralists to support all right-wing military leaders attempting to overthrow the Republic. Hence the support received by the lieutenants (*tenentes*) of 28 May from the Integralists during early post-war coup attempts. Given this shift, monarchic officers sympathetic to the Integralist cause began to participate in conspiracies without reservations. This explains why Integralists authored proclamations for and participated in many attempted coups, notably those of 18 April 1925 and 28 May. More politically sophisticated than most military officers, the Integralists gave the cause an ideological coherence that transcended a mere call for the restoration of 'order on the streets'. The Integralists consolidated their contacts with the radical lieutenants and the unstable general Gomes da Costa, participating in the vast coalition of forces that were involved in the coup of 28 May.

From a strictly organisational point of view, the IL never recovered from self-dissolution in 1922. Reconstituting the movement became even more difficult some years later, after the death on the eve of the coup in 1925 of Sardinha, its uncontested leader. The remaining members of the Central Junta returned to party activity and re-organised the local juntas in the provinces. However, given the high number of desertions, only the Central Junta and an informal network of sympathisers, mostly student and provincial supporters, remained. Although the Integralists played an important role at the beginning of the dictatorship, the new political situation generated divisions among sympathisers. The fascist option was favoured by a large part of youthful and military supporters.

The Central Junta, on the other hand, remained loyal to the monarchy and supported all plans to establish a corporatist and radically anti-liberal order. They viewed the rise of Salazar and his politically hybrid system with mistrust. Although some 'second generation' Integralists, such as Marcello Caetano, immediately supported Salazar, a large part of the Integralist network got involved in fascistic organisations, and played a central role in the foundation of NS. It was in 1932 that Rolão Preto founded the movement, at the same time accepting the dissolution of the Central Junta of which he was the youngest member.

Rolão Preto: The Portuguese Valois

Having returned to Portugal after a brief exile in Spain on the eve of the Second World War, Rolão Preto produced new editions of his work on Italian Fascism originally written in 1922. The timing was fortuitous, as the work was part of various articles published in a debate with a PCC priest over the significance of Fascism.³³ Preto fixed all his hopes on the Berlin-Rome axis, now that his national plan had been defeated and his party had been destroyed. In his introduction to *Fascism (O Fascismo)*, which attacked the Salazar regime consolidated after Franco's victory in Spain, Preto extolled Italian and German Fascism.³⁴ As salazarist censorship applied equally to opposition on the right and left, Preto did not refer to Salazar directly but to the example of Dolfuss-Schuschnigg dictatorship in Austria.³⁵ He noted that the *Anschluss* had been an inevitable consequence of a 'catholic pseudo-Fascism', which had merely imitated the "coercive, overshadowing and paralysing traits" of fascism. It had created bureaucrats, organisations, and

³³ Articles published in *A Época* between August and October 1922.

³⁴ Preto, R., *O Fascismo*, (Guimarães: 1939).

³⁵ See: Botz, Gerhard, "Fascismo e autoritarismo in Austria: 'Heimwehr, nazionalsocialismo e "austrofascismo"', in Cazzola, R. and Rusconi, G. E., *Il 'caso Austria'. Dall'Anschluss' all'era Waldheim*, (Torino: 1988), p. 48. For an introduction to the many interpretations, see: Rath, J. and Schum, C. W., 'The Dolfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?' in Larsen, S. U., et. al. (eds), *Who Were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism*, (Bergen: 1980), pp. 249-256.

institutions “devoid” of ideas and a regime led by an individual who, being “exclusively catholic by temperament, education, and spirit” had led Austria to a tragic demise.³⁶

Optimistic about the future of european fascism, Preto confronted those who were not “real fascists” but wished to adopt aspects of fascism. “Either the system will not have a soul and fail, ending in the nation’s downfall and destroying all chances of a vital reaction; or, by a paradoxical miracle, the system will manage to survive [...] generating a climate of mystical exaltation despite its pallid leaders. In this case, like a great strong wave, it will inexorably and fatally wash over them”.³⁷ Salazar confronted this dilemma in 1939, but it was solved for him when the Nazis were halted in the Pyrenees. Preto’s belief in this “inexorable wave” had led him to accept NS leadership at the beginning of the decade. Defeated by Salazar, “a sad destroyer of souls”, he pinned all of his hopes on the war. Preto remained firmly within the anti-Salazar fascist camp until the shift in the war. He abandoned fascism only in 1945, although he opposed Salazar until the fall of the New State (*Estado Novo*) in 1974. While in Italy and Germany Fascism and Nazism emerged victorious, in Salazar’s Portugal it was Preto’s unknown catholic adversary of 1922 that emerged victorious.

Integralist Education

Born in the Beira Baixa region in 1896, Rolão Preto was the youngest founding member of IL. A seventeen year old monarchic émigré, he headed Portuguese Soul (*Alma Portuguesa*), the first Integralist journal published in Belgium in 1913 by young exiled monarchists, some of whom had participated in the anti-Republican incursions of 1911 and 1912.³⁸ This was one of the many publications created by young émigré students in France and Belgium under AF influence. Preto himself frequently visited the Paris headquarters of France’s main radical right-wing movement. As he

³⁶ Preto, R., *op. cit.*, pp. X-XI.

³⁷ *Ibid.*

³⁸ Only two editions were published, in May and September 1913.

later recalled, “I was in Louvain before the war, and visited Paris many times. I used to visit the offices of the *Action Française* in the Rue de Rome, where I met Charles Maurras, Bainville, Pujo, and Léon Daudet... I spent many evenings with them”.³⁹

Maurras had a profound influence on Integralism initially, but this dissipated in the post-war period. Others superseded his ascendancy over the political and intellectual formation of Portuguese Integralism. In the 1920s, the proto-fascist dissident Valois became Preto's new point of reference. Indeed, Preto claimed that he was inspired by two individuals from different generations and political circles whose paths had crossed during the first decade of the century: Georges Sorel and Georges Valois. Sorel was his true master. According to Preto, “it was he who made it all possible”.⁴⁰ In his final interview, Preto claimed that “while the Integralists were disciples of Maurras, the National Syndicalists were not — they had cut their ties with *Action Française* [...] Valois, well, he interested us: he had moved away from Maurras, he was *Action Française's* dissident”.⁴¹ Preto's intellectual and political journey from Integralism to Fascism did not make him an IL dissident but his path is in many ways comparable to that of the founder of *Le Faisceau*.

While obtaining a degree in Law at the University of Toulouse, Preto did not join his colleagues in Portugal in the wake of the 1914 amnesty for those involved in the 1911 and 1912 monarchic revolts. Although a founding member, because he was then in Toulouse he did not obtain a position on the Central Junta until three years after its creation in 1916. As the Integralists debated the transformation of the IL from an ideological pressure group to a political movement on the eve of the Sidónio Pais dictatorship, Preto returned to Portugal and became the head of IL social affairs. Unlike Sardinha, for example, Preto favoured political action over

³⁹ See interview with João Medina, 27 June 1975 in *Salazar e os fascistas: Salazar e o Nacional-Sindicalismo, a história de um conflito (1932-1935)*, (Lisbon: 1977), pp. 185-186.

⁴⁰ *Ibid.* The literature on Sorel is vast. For a general introduction see: Jennings, J. R., *Georges Sorel: The Character and Development of His Thought*, (London: 1985).

⁴¹ *Ibid.*

the ideological and cultural activities that had characterised the movement.

Most IL founding members were dedicated to promoting the ideals of a traditional, de-centralised, corporatist, and anti-liberal monarchy as a way to historically legitimate Integralist nationalism. Sardinha was the most creative ‘re-discoverer’ of Portuguese nineteenth century counter-revolutionary thought, re-inventing the nation’s past. For him and the majority of first generation Integralists the ‘social question’ and the ‘socialist threat’ were merely the products of a decadent Liberal regime that was the source of all evil. Young supporters, on the other hand, were shaped by prolonged exile and the adventures of war, which brought them into close contact with French intellectual ‘proto-fascism’ and Italian nationalism. Preto was decisively influenced by Corradini’s neo-nationalism in National Idea (*Idea Nazionale*) and by D’Annunzio.⁴²

The main themes of Preto’s writing in the Integralist press following his return to Portugal were “War”, “Nation”, “Socialism” and “organic syndicalism”. He wrote articles and books full of propaganda and simple formulae, unconcerned with the research and erudition normally associated with early Integralist writing. His were political chronicles designed to mobilise. After taking control of *A Monarquia* in 1920, Preto wrote regularly about the international situation and the ‘social question’ and was put in charge of ‘syndicalist’ or union policy. Preto agreed with the Integralists on the need to restore the monarchy as a means to overthrow liberalism, but his newspaper columns did not use the historical, ultramontane and ruralist language of contemporary Integralists. Issues related with workers became progressively dominant. His articles in 1918 and 1919 referred to socialism, marxism, the Second International and the Bolshevik Revolution, all revolutionary phenomena.

Sardinha, and a good part of IL founders, reinvented a ‘medieval corporatist monarchy’ and confirmed the superiority of

⁴² One of the first Portuguese Fascists, Homem Cristo Filho, published a magazine in Portugal in 1915 with Integralist support, bearing the same name. See: Barreira, C., *Nacionalismo e modernismo. De Homem Cristo Filho a Almada Negreiros*, (Lisbon: 1981).

aristocratic blood. They sought a return to a rural society and worried about how to stop a chaotic industrialisation, which had brought with it the evils of urbanisation. Preto, on the other hand, combined the ideas of Sorel and Valois in a nationalist response to the crisis of liberalism and to a potential revolutionary threat. Unlike other fascists, however, his syndicalist beliefs did not make him a believer in technological progress or modernisation. Indeed, Preto believed that by adopting these ideals, he was taking a strategic stance against such developments. This traditionalism was always present in his writings and activities even after he adopted the 'revolutionary' language of Fascism in the 1930s. But he did introduce fascist elements to the Integralist movement which, had they been adopted by the entire movement, may have led to the 'fascistisation' of IL in the 1920s.

The Great War and Nationalism

The nationalism espoused by Preto and the Integralists never deviated from the traditions of latin culture, which was initially French given the dominant influence of that culture among the Portuguese cultural elite. German nationalism and Nazism influenced Preto's activities in the 1930s, but they never overly impressed him. He discovered National Socialism relatively late. Preto combined French neo-nationalism of the pre-war period with the mystique of the action of Italian nationalism. His admiration for the French led him to state: "France is the centre of the world, it is the light that becomes the intense and radiant Latin light". In the same article, he praised the achievements of *Idea Nazionale*, and used an expression that became famous at his Fascist rallies in the 1930s, "By God, this shall come to pass!" Such statements were rare among his Integralist cohorts who were always concerned with finding national roots for their ideas.⁴³

In a letter to Corradini published in 1920, Preto revealed his belief in the rebirth of the new anti-democratic nationalism that

⁴³ See: Preto, R., 'A vaga nacionalista', *A Monarquia*, 9 December 1919, p. 1

would inaugurate a new classical epoch in the Latin countries. He felt that it was necessary to “believe in the triumph of the Latin order, the classical order that embraces and makes brothers of all people who are heirs to roman civilisation — France, Spain, Italy and Portugal”.⁴⁴ Preto remained faithful to latin neo-nationalism as he was profoundly marked by the imperialist and civilising myths of the “Latins” as world discoverers, “warriors and colonisers”. His first articles for *A Monarquia*, however, were more concerned with the present. He sought in the war the re-affirmation of an authoritarian nationalism as the only way to confront the post-war era.⁴⁵

For Preto, the war proved the bankruptcy of liberalism, pacifism, and the socialism of the Second International. It also proved that national interest preceded the belief of the socialists in a class-based internationalism transcending sovereign boundaries. For him, the war re-awakened “historic patriotism based on the hidden laws of life and national duty” and destroyed “the chimera of socialist universalism”.⁴⁶ It restored “the divine laws of universal conflict” and affirmed “life’s eternal principles”. The war in Europe and its profound consequences unequivocally confirmed the “grand principle of nationalist self-creation, and of the automatic differentiation of nations”.⁴⁷ The war also confirmed what authoritarian nationalists had claimed at the turn of the century: “the truth of old historical postulates regarding the organic conception of national societies: the duty that coheres classes and the individual in a common aim that is given meaning and content by national borders”. In his view, it bolstered the “idea of a necessary sacrifice that disciplines the spirit and makes it an integral and functional part of the national organism”.⁴⁸

Unlike most Integralists, Preto showed little concern with the future of counter-revolutionary and legitimist thought. For him, the war had caused an irreversible breach that made nationalism

⁴⁴ See: Preto, R., *A monarquia é a restauração da inteligência*, (Lisbon: 1920), p. 3. See also Corradini’s reply, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

⁴⁵ See his article ‘Para onde vais, democracia?’, *A Monarquia*, 10 October 1919, p. 1.

⁴⁶ Preto, *op. cit.*, p. 13.

⁴⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

⁴⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 9.

the single alternative to the crises of Liberalism and revolutionary menace. Indeed, the war revealed the virtue of nationalism, which was seen “as the only way to identify and unite individual and social interests, in present day civilisation”.⁴⁹ This was an organic nationalism based on a “social doctrine” that would control “man’s selfish instincts by not considering the individual as the *end* of social organisation but rather as a *means* to build the nation”.⁵⁰ In short, nationalism was seen as the only antidote to post-war revolutionary threats.

The nationalists faced the challenge of proving to the working classes that they were an organic part of the nation. They had to show that the sentiments uniting workers to their country were more powerful than the tenuous “solidarity of classes across frontiers, a solidarity propounded by the subjective dogmatism of those speculating about metaphysical revolutions”.⁵¹ Another, more serious, challenge was how to deal with the internationalisation of capital and the emergence of a ‘denationalised’ bourgeoisie in the nineteenth century that had formed “financial and commercial” groups and secret societies. In Preto’s view, the war undercut speculative “internationalism”. In his words: “if this bourgeoisie does not *look, sense or listen*, the nation will triumph against it; despite it and against it we will crush democracy and the approaching revolution that it carries within its pernicious flanks”.⁵²

Organic Syndicalism

There is nothing in Preto’s social or political background that indicates the fixation he later developed over the ‘social question’ and the ‘working class’. Unlike Valois, a former anarchist of modest social origins, Preto’s background was similar to that of other Integralist leaders.⁵³ Yet, between 1918 and 1934, when NS was

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 13-14.

⁵² Preto, R., ‘A revolução’, *A Monarquia*, 25 November 1919, p. 1.

⁵³ For Valois’s social origins, see: Douglas, A., *From Fascism to Libertarian Communism: Georges Valois Against the Third Republic*, (Berkeley: 1992).

banned, he attempted to ‘nationalise’ the working class, leading them towards ‘organic syndicalism’ and away from socialism and communism. In 1918 he did so by attempting to reconcile syndicalism with monarchism. Thus, in the 1930s, he supported ‘integral corporatism’ and replaced the monarch with a charismatic, fascist leader.

Preto founded the union section of the Integralist movement inspired by the brief pre-war flirtation of AF with the working class. Integralism was inspired by the *Cercle Proudhon*, as well as the Sorelian and Monarchist tract influenced by Valois, *The Monarchy and the Working Class (La Monarchie et la Classe Ouvrière)*, both tempered by a form of “integral corporatism”⁵⁴. In a country with a weak industrial base and a recent and still dispersed working class labouring in small workshops, the inclusion of Integralism’s rural anti-capitalism and anti-cosmopolitanism was more politically appealing.

Preto called for calm with the outbreak of the Bolshevik Revolution and the emergence of an external revolutionary threat. Preto noted that in Portuguese urban society there was, at that time, no “danger of a cataclysm subverting our social conditions”.⁵⁵ In his view, such an outcome was unlikely given the weak concentration of capital and the virtual absence of large industrial capitalist holdings. As he noted: “Is the force of national capitalism really excessive and tyrannical? No. And it is not for the obvious reason that the great industrialists who impose themselves on the state and freely tyrannise those who fall within the grasp of their ambitious tentacles abroad are unknown in Portugal”. Portuguese industry was still dominated “on a much larger scale than in the majority of European states, by urban and rural small proprietors. There is no better obstacle to revolution than a large *petite bour-*

⁵⁴ The inspiration of both the *Cercle Proudhon*’s output, and of Valois’s writings, especially the text quoted (Paris: 1914), are clearly visible in Preto’s earlier writings. On the *Cercle Proudhon* and Valois’s first phase see: Guchet, Y., *Georges Valois: L’Action Française, le Faïscisme, la République Syndicale*, 2nd Ed., (Paris: 1990), pp. 11-106; Sternhell, Z., *La droite révolutionnaire: les origines françaises du fascisme, 1885-1914*, (Paris: 1978), pp. 348-400; Mazgaj, p., *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, (Chapel Hill: 1979).

⁵⁵ Preto, R., ‘Serenamente’, *A Monarquia*, 13 March 1918, p. 1.

geoisie that has a natural interest in maintaining the general equilibrium". Equally, the working class in Portugal was not a menace, unlike in other European countries where "the importance of mass unionisation is truly formidable and may constitute a grave threat outside of our borders".⁵⁶

The call for calm did not prevent Preto from referring to an internal 'revolutionary threat' in an attempt to legitimate the incipient Fascist movement with which he was associated. Nonetheless, the "worker question" was secondary to the real enemy: the Liberal Republic.⁵⁷ It should be noted that Preto was writing during the Sidónio Pais dictatorship when the Integralists were still thinking of a monarchist restoration in the short term. Nonetheless, the dictatorship, influenced by Integralist corporatism, was a useful case study of "the weakness of the attempts by conservative parties to appeal to workers", and to find "a real convergence between our ideals and syndicalist aspirations".⁵⁸ Preto's organic syndicalist programme derived from "integral corporatism" which aimed to replace the classical liberal mechanisms of representation.

The new utopia presented to the *petite bourgeoisie* and the working class by the Integralists was that of an "organic society" to dignify the nation. Integralism's anti-capitalism was partly developed to counter the growing "de-nationalisation" of a capitalism that disregarded national frontiers and threatened to destroy the nation. According to the Integralists, a savage process of industrialisation had created a impoverished proletariat easily manipulated by socialist and revolutionary ideologies, while international capitalism had corrupted the political class. In response to this, they offered to protect the working class and limit exploitation, valuing their importance in "national production". Preto's rhetorical call to arms was "*Eternal nation*, the main reason for our social

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*

⁵⁷ See his articles of 1919 and 1920 in *A Monarquia*, particularly 'A revolução', 25 November 1919; 'Política de amadores - de crise a crise', 9 January 1920; 'A república encravada', 23 January 1920; 'A derrocada. Greves e revolução', 5 March 1920; 'A revolução nacional', 22 July 1920.

⁵⁸ Preto, R., 'Sindicalismo e monarquia', *A Monarquia*, 6 August 1918, p. 1.

existence". In his view, a "superior" national interest demanded an end to a free market. It called for stronger state intervention and the corporatist organisation of proprietors and workers into syndicates representing and regulating the interests of both. In his 'Twelve Principles of Production', Preto rejected "the separation of the elements of production. In other words, we reject the isolated existence of classes, an artifice that places the components of the whole in conflict". Some of Preto's anti-capitalist principles were moralistic and protective of workers. The fourth principle, for example, condemned "freedom of labour, free competition, free trade, all of which are opposed to production. We do not consider these rights but obligations".⁵⁹ Unlike capitalism, which ignored social tensions, and socialism, which served only to mutually destroy classes, "organic syndicalism" established a balance between them. This proved the benefits of "appropriate syndicalist and corporatist formulae rooted in the better days of social harmony and national labour".⁶⁰

Preto's national syndicalist programme and his allusions to national myths were influenced by the nationalism of Corradini and Rocco. Their decisive influence is apparent in the articles Preto published in *A Monarquia*, in his book of 1920, *The Monarchy is the Restoration of Intelligence*, as well as some of the texts that constituted the basis for an unpublished book, *The Social Monarchy (A Monarquia Social)*. This early influence counteracted the disillusionment felt by Preto with the marginalisation of Valois's syndicalism by AF leaders. Maurras had, more than anyone else, always questioned the advantages of syndicalism. Indeed, during the war Preto was astonished by the indifference of AF regarding the need to organise workers. They would respond "with the statement that the movement's victory would come about without the efforts I had deemed necessary to make within syndicalist circles".⁶¹ Preto only became enthusiastic about the French movement in 1922. At this time, Valois returned to corporatism with the creation of the French Confederation of Intelligence and Pro-

⁵⁹ Preto, R., *op. cit.*, p. 139.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 147.

⁶¹ Preto, R., 'Crónica social', *A Nação Portuguesa*, 2^a série, N^o 6, December 1922, p. 274.

duction (*Confédération de l'Intelligence et de la Production Françaises*, CIPF) and a campaign to convoke the General Estates (*Etats Généraux*) that led to break with AF.⁶²

Preto sought themes for mobilisation already in 1919 from those he thought of as “Italian Integralists” who were nationalists working “outside the system” and had broken with liberalism in 1914. These were themes that the reactionary AF was only timidly prepared to accept.⁶³ Rocco’s call for “national syndicalism” to subordinate the masses to a state built after the death of democracy was a more important source of inspiration for NS than Corradini’s mystical nationalism.⁶⁴ As the Italian historian Emilio Gentile points out: “unlike the reactionaries and traditional conservatives, Rocco accepted the presence of the masses in contemporary society and thought that, in a mass society, state absolutism should use unions to control and dominate this new protagonist of the modern world”.⁶⁵ The post-war crisis convinced Preto of this and brought him closer to the Italian nationalists. This showed that Preto was less concerned with the traditional pro-restoration stance of AF than other Portuguese Integralists.

Italian neo-nationalism and national syndicalism were partly inspired by the AF’s “organic” ideology. Nonetheless, as Rocco himself recognised, the ideology espoused by the French group required a revision before it could be applied to the Italian case. In the words of Adrian Lyttelton: “Rocco gave a new meaning to the notion of corporatist organisation, seen not as a medieval utopia concerned only with agriculture and artisanal industry but as a modern way to organise productive forces” within a rapidly industrialising society. Nationalists saw this as a positive development.⁶⁶

⁶² Over the CIPF and the convocation of the *Etats Généraux* see: Guchet, Y., *op. cit.*, pp. 155-168.

⁶³ Preto congratulated “our comrades...the Italian Integralists” for their electoral victory in 1919.

⁶⁴ Especially Rocco’s manifesto, published in *Política* in 1918, as well as his interventions at the Nationalist Congress in Rome in April 1919. See: Vivarelli, R., *Storia delle origini del fascismo. L'Italia dalle grande guerra all marcia su Roma*, (Bologna: 1991), pp. 291-298, and the reproduction of the manifesto, pp. 594-607.

⁶⁵ Gentile, E., *Il mito dello Stato Nuovo. Dall'antigiolittismo al fascismo*, (Bari: 1982), p. 190.

⁶⁶ Littleton, A., *La conquista del potere. Il fascismo dal 1919 al 1929*, (Bari: 1974), p. 32.

Although he supported the traditionalism of IL and AF, Rocco inspired Preto to organise “producers”.

Preto’s corporatist project involved the creation of a vast web of workers’ and employers’ unions on a regional and industry-by-industry basis, complemented by ‘Syndical Chambers’, to regulate salaries, arbitrate labour conflicts and represent each sector. Initially vague and very schematic, the project was often reviewed during the 1920s until it became the programme at the core of National Syndicalism in the 1930s. From the end of the War onwards, the programme served as agitation propaganda. It gave Integralism a new language that replaced aristocratic elitism with anti-capitalism and radicalised the anti-plutocratic themes.

Following the arrest of the director of *A Monarquia* in 1920, Preto was appointed editor and increased his journalistic activity. He wrote all the paper’s editorials and published articles on international issues. Nearly all his writing was concerned with the social question. He also published instructions for the formation of a union section on a daily basis. Indeed, until the dissolution of IL, Preto focused on creating the first unions. These efforts gained more support from service sector employees than the working class.

The Discovery of Italian Fascism

Like most within the Portuguese radical right, Preto supported Mussolini’s March on Rome. Before the Italian dictator had come to power, Preto had already observed how Fascism unified Italian nationalism with its call for revolutionary political action. Until 1921, Preto had referred only to the nationalists and D’Annunzio’s campaigns and it was only later that he began to refer to the *Fasci di Combattimento*.⁶⁷ From 1921 onwards, Preto supported Fascism, when the movement began to overcome its initial ideological confusion and became an electoral and political force.⁶⁸ In his

⁶⁷ See: Preto, R., ‘Alma Nova’, and ‘Fiume — cosa fatta capo ha’, *A Monarquia*, 26 September 1919 and 12 December 1919. On the first phase of D’Annunzio’s political life, see: Ledeen, M. A., *The First Duce: D’Annunzio at Fiume*, (Baltimore and London: 1977).

⁶⁸ See: Gentile, E., *Storia del partito fascista, 1919-1922: movimento e milizia*, (Bari: 1989).

view, Fascism confirmed his own beliefs and those of the nationalists. As he wrote in July 1922, “our organic syndicalism is essentially the basis of current syndicalist thought among Mussolini’s friends”.⁶⁹

He followed reports of political violence by the National Fascist Party (*Partito Nazionale Fascista*, PNF) delegations closely and supported their “fearless methods of combat” and “active propaganda”. He did not fail to note the combination of Fascism and Nationalism or, more accurately, the adoption by the former of the latter’s principles. Preto leapt to the defence of Italian Fascism in the summer of 1922 in a debate with a journalist-priest, the so-called Father Santa Cruz, in the pages of *Epoch* (*A Época*).⁷⁰ It appears to have been the first debate about Italian Fascism to take place on the pages of a Portuguese newspaper.

Preto defended the subversive legitimacy and illegal activities of the Fascists. In his words: “Fascism fights and imposes its truth against the constitutional order, established laws and the very principles governing the State”.⁷¹ In response to criticism from what he called “extreme right-wing Bolsheviks”, he stressed that “for all their exaggeration, violence, illegality and fearful nature [Fascism’s methods of combat] are the only way that victory can be achieved by élites who rally around the banner of the Nation in the hour of battle between the Nation and the anti-Nation, between Bolshevism and Nationalism”.⁷²

Santa Cruz expressed conservative catholic doubts regarding Fascism and its excesses. While admitting that he was a “neo-medieval syndicalist of a corporatist disposition”, he re-affirmed fears that this anti-Bolshevik “attack force” promoted “exaggerated, modern and pagan nationalist” beliefs.⁷³ He also claimed that “Fascism’s greatest error” was to seek to “convert occasional processes into a permanent propaganda and action, keeping the

⁶⁹ Preto, R., ‘Crónica social’, *Nação Portuguesa*, 2ª série, N.º 1, July 1922, p. 34.

⁷⁰ See: Cruz, M. B. da, *As origens da democracia Cristã e o salazarismo*, (Lisbon: 1980) for more on the Portuguese Catholic movement during the 1920s.

⁷¹ *A Época*, 24 August 1922.

⁷² *A Época*, 16 September 1922.

⁷³ *A Época*, 31 August 1922.

Nation under the noxious pressure of violence”.⁷⁴ Preto himself condemned some of Fascism’s “absurd mischief”, particularly when it targeted Catholics. But he still believed that it was the way to implement a nationalist project, and he cited Rocco in his attempts to emphasise the “highly moral” nature of Fascism: “*Ricondurre nelle masse assecate dalla demagogia socialista il sentimento nazionale*”.⁷⁵ Preto and Santa Cruz agreed on one point, albeit for different reasons: they both accepted that it was impossible to organise “a movement with the same characteristics as Mussolini’s party” in Portugal at that time.⁷⁶ Although he proclaimed that the day would come when “Portuguese nationalists [would] march on Rome”, Preto seriously doubted that this type of political action would ever succeed in Portugal.⁷⁷

Preto’s knowledge of Italian Fascism was still relatively weak. A true fascist organisational structure, adopted by all such parties in the 1930s, only became a model at the end of the 1920s after the PNF had taken power and been re-organised. By then, even the German Nazis followed the example set by the PNF.⁷⁸ Preto did not think that Portuguese nationalists should just import and emulate it. In his view, Integralism already had an ideology and organisational base that could be used to develop Fascism in Portugal. Preto later concluded that his Catholic opponent had been right after all. In his words: “Fascist action during the period of Bolshevik excess and tumult was military action. The Fascists only did what any regular army that knows its duty would have done”.⁷⁹

⁷⁴ A *Época*, 25 October 1922.

⁷⁵ A *Época*, 16 September 1922.

⁷⁶ A *Época*, 13 November 1922.

⁷⁷ See: Preto, R., ‘Crónica social’, in *Nação Portuguesa*, 2nd series, N^o 6, December 1922.

⁷⁸ See: Pombeni, P., *Demagogia e tirannide: uno studio sulla forma-partito del fascismo* (Bologna: 1984), pp. 19-122, and Gentile, E., *Storia del partito...*, pp. 461-543.

⁷⁹ A *Época*, 13 November 1922.

*Leadership Delayed:**Preto and the First Portuguese Fascist Movements*

In 1921 Preto created the Central Economic Council that aimed to co-ordinate the activities of the union sector and encourage the creation of Integralist trade unions. In 1922, the monarchic-syndicalist newspaper *A Revolução* was launched as a mouthpiece for Preto and the union sector.⁸⁰ This early Fascist experiment laid the foundations for NS. The newspaper was established by younger Integralists and targeted the working class and the *petite-bourgeoisie*. In it, Preto developed his concept of a “social monarchy”. He published a step-by-step guide on how to form Integralist unions and periodically responded to attacks by the anarcho-syndicalist newspaper, *The Battle (A Batalha)*. A new language, which included terms such as ‘comrades’, ‘revolution’ and ‘bourgeois’, was used to strengthen and lead groups already “affected by internationalism” and to re-acquaint them with “nationalism”. Preto devoted much energy in assuring traditional conservatives who disliked this “subversive” language that winning the support of the proletariat was a highly patriotic activity. He also used the newspaper to justify his break with republican legalism and to divide those who adopted “the dangerous bourgeois attitude of disdain for any proletarian demand or aspiration”.⁸¹

In March 1922, *A Revolução* prepared the ‘Manifesto of Integralist Unions’. Its success was limited. The only unions in Lisbon represented workers and employees in civil construction, commerce, banks and the still barely organised metal production sector.⁸² Others, such as the Covilhã Commercial Employees Union, were very weak. With the exception of the civil construction union, which was led by a contractor who believed in mixed employer-employee unions, other unions met with little success beyond the service sector⁸³. Preto’s attempts to organise a union

⁸⁰ *Revolução* was launched on 5 February 1922.

⁸¹ Preto, R., ‘A acção social do Integralismo’, *A Revolução*, 5 March 1922.

⁸² *A Revolução*, 5 March 1922.

⁸³ Preto, R., ‘Abaixo os partidos, viva a Nação. O sindicalismo orgânico’, *A Monarquia*, 30 May 1921, and ‘Movimento social. A organização sindical Integralista’, *A Monarquia*, 20 December 1921.

section were interrupted in May 1922 when the Central Junta announced the dissolution of IL, as a result of the Pact of Paris “betrayal” whereby the representatives of the legitimist pretender recognised King Manuel’s superior claim to the throne. This event delayed the emergence of an embryonic fascist organisation within Integralism. Although they returned to doctrinal activity, the Integralists never achieved their previous organisational success. While many leading Integralists, including Sardinha, had never really wanted to go beyond the elitist activity that had hitherto characterised the movement, the suspension of IL marked the end of Preto’s attempt at ‘fascistisation’.

The suspension of IL allowed Integralists to participate in Sidonist groups that were directly influenced by Fascism. Either for ideological reasons or because he had doubts regarding the success of Sidonism, Preto remained loyal to Integralism even though he led young Integralists and had been invited to lead several projects seeking to create a fascist movement. In 1923, Preto rejected an offer to lead Lusitanian Nationalism (*Nacionalismo Lusitano*, NL) a movement formed by João de Castro Osório directly inspired by Italian Fascism.⁸⁴ Castro Osório often tried to persuade Preto and Integralists to defend his project, as he was a Republican and feared that Integralism would remain dogmatically wedded to the restoration of the monarchy and alarm those who were “ready to accept a nationalist dictatorship”.⁸⁵ Castro Osório invited Preto to lead the movement, arguing: “As the nationalist organisation is the true State organisation [...] it is only fair that its corporatist organisation should be supervised by someone who is capable of leading it according to the right principles”.⁸⁶ Castro Osório attempted to reconstitute an Integralist union organisation with the creation of a National Labour Confederation “in opposition to the CGT”, the anarcho-syndicalist confederation.⁸⁷ Integralist leaders did not give

⁸⁴ See above.

⁸⁵ Letter from João de Castro Osório to Rolão Preto, 11 October 1923, Arquivo Rolão Preto (ARP).

⁸⁶ Undated letter from João de Castro Osório to Rolão Preto, ARP.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*

the NL the material and political support they requested, however. Even Preto gave it only minimal support.

Preto and other Integralist leaders attempted to establish a nucleus within the Armed Forces. They went as far as to participate in a number of the post-war conservative conspiracies, ranging from logistical manoeuvres to plots culminating in street protests. Preto's abandonment of attempts to construct his own political movement had reduced sectarianism within Integralism and its concern with the restoration of the monarchy. This allowed it to extend its political and ideological influence. Thus, Integralists united with other sectors of the radical right, particularly with Sidonists within the Army. They also participated in the re-organisation of employers' organisations, especially within the agricultural sector.

By the end of 1923, Preto's 'Let's go for it' form of political action was directed more at the military than at the civilian population. Other organisations were already beginning to support military uprisings.⁸⁸ Preto shifted his focus from the 'regime question' to find military leaders who could lead the conservative alliance. He was with Filomeno da Câmara during the Coup of 18 April 1925 and on 28 May 1926 he went to Lisbon with Gomes da Costa.⁸⁹ It was only after 1926, however, that Preto attempted to create a fascist movement with the *tenentes* of 28 May.

Preto and other fascists were able to co-exist peacefully within the Integralist family because of the weakness of IL as a political organisation, the abandonment of the restoration of the monarchy as a primary goal, the dispersal of its supporters, as well as the premature death of its leader and principle ideologue, António Sardinha. The 'family' abandoned some of Sardinha's most cherished dogmas and was able to attract more sympathisers, such as students and officers inspired by fascism. With the victorious military Coup of 28 May 1926, Preto was raised to new political

⁸⁸ Preto, R., 'Vamos a isto! Os triunfos do fascismo e de Primo de Rivera aproximam a hora resgatora do Luzismo', *A Monarquia*, 20 October 1923.

⁸⁹ Barbosa, J. P. Machado, *Para além da revolução... a Revolução. Entrevistas com Rolão Preto*, (Oporto: 1940), p. 108.

heights. In June of that year, during the brief rule of General Gomes da Costa, Preto came close to obtaining political power. Together with junior officers supporting Gomes da Costa, Preto outlined the constitution of a political organisation to place the dictatorship in the hands of elements sympathetic to Integralism.

Fascism and the Radical Right in the 1920s

The most salient characteristics of the emergence of fascism in Portuguese post-war society were the precocious adoption of the paradigm of Italian Fascism, on the one hand, and its weak and fragmented party political expression, on the other.

The first political reference to fascism appeared during the brief dictatorship of Sidónio Pais. An officer and university professor who had converted to politics, a member of a conservative Republican Party, a deputy, and former ambassador to Berlin, Sidónio Pais had a straightforward goal: to get Portugal out of the war. After initial programmatic hesitations, he opted for a populist presidentialism. He limited Republican Party political activity, established universal suffrage and held a plebiscite to declare himself president. Sidónio Pais presented a national plan for the creation of a corporatist state inspired by Integralism. He attempted to unite several conservative parties into a single entity and allowed the independent existence only of the monarchists and of a small Catholic Party.

Sidónio Pais's political discourse was anti-plutocratic during the period of war shortages, directed against the party oligarchies, and espousing a messianic nationalism. He managed to unite monarchists and conservative republicans. In all this, he made full use of his charismatic strengths. He surrounded himself with a group of young army officers who accompanied him and participated in his rallies. After his assassination by a rural union militant at the end of 1918, the monarchists rose in the north, leading the republicans to mobilise in the urban centres. With large numbers of military units declaring themselves neutral, the way was left open for the victory of the Democrats and a return to constitutional normality.

Sidonism became a point of reference for post-war Portuguese fascists, particularly for right-wing republican junior officers, intellectuals and students, who went on to create several parties that increasingly cited Mussolini's party as their model. Many cannot be characterised as fascist in any strict sense. Radical right is the most appropriate label given their perception of the nature of Fascism (and Mussolini's party), and the hodgepodge of ideological elements present within the groups. Some were heirs of Sidonism and united intellectuals, students and junior officers who were republican and laic. Others emerged from Integralism. The growing participation of army officers in these organisations was especially notable. Some were even founded by officers or had a high number of officers in leadership positions. The Sidónio Pais Centre founded in 1920, for example, had a committee of leaders of 33 of which 19 were officers, the majority of whom held commissions in the army. The neo-Sidonist National Republican Presidentialist Party (*Partido Nacional Republicano Presidencialista*, PNRP) founded in 1921 also had military officers in leading positions. These officers soon engaged in conspiratorial activities with former combatants from the fields of Flanders and the African war front. They were programmatically unified by their desire to restore order to political and social life and by various corporate demands, most notably increased pay.

Sidonists and veterans had already united during the first attempted coups of the 1920s and were now joined by civilian nationalist intellectuals. Many of the latter had participated actively in the Portuguese modernist movement. Such is the case of António Ferro, who later moderated his fascist beliefs and became Salazar's chief of propaganda. Less influenced by Integralism, these men were the most active promoters of Italian Fascism.⁹⁰ The first publications calling for 'Portuguese Fascism' appeared on the stands in 1923. In that same year NL, the first fascist party, was

⁹⁰ See, for example, *O Imparcial*, the neo-sidonista newspaper in which António Ferro wrote: "cards of condolence to the faltering and wavering Republic" and his articles about Italian fascism published in November 1922.

formed.⁹¹ This organisation was not just an ideological movement but a militia-like organisation that aimed to encourage mass action. When one compares the name of the newspaper, its political programme and its main leader, very few differences can be observed between NL and NS. Preto himself was invited to lead the NL. Attempts by these parties to create a fascist movement were condemned to failure, however, and they disappeared rapidly after April 1925 following the first serious military Coup against the Republican regime.

Lusitanian Nationalism

NL constituted the first attempt to create a fascist movement outside the orbit of Integralism under the parliamentary republic. Its mouthpiece, *The Dictatorship (A Ditadura)*, was subtitled 'The Journal of Portuguese Fascism'. It was short-lived, as it was founded in 1923 and had almost ceased publication by the time of the coup on 18 April 1925. Intellectuals who were peripheral to Integralism and retained strong republican sentiments, but had been 'fascistised' by the Sidónio Pais dictatorship created NL. Although it was set up when IL had ceased to exist, founder João de Castro Osório immediately attempted to gain the support of Integralist leaders, inviting Rolão Preto to participate in the new movement.

Castro Osório was the son of a well-known republican figure, Ana de Castro Osório. With his law degree recently completed, he began to make a name for himself in the literary field, writing ultra-nationalist theatre pieces.⁹² He was the author of the political programme of the movement founded with Raul de Carvalho, a member of Sidónio Pais's political police, who had a history of involvement in neo-Sidonist movements. His connections with employers' organisations and with the banking community gave NL financing. In July 1922, Castro Osório participated in an abortive

⁹¹ See: Pinto, A. Costa, 'O fascismo e a crise da Primeira República: os Nacionalistas Lusitanos (1923-25)', *Penélope. Fazer e desfazer a história*, N^o 3, Junho 1989, pp. 44-62.

⁹² See, for example: *Rainha Santa - elegia*, (Lisbon: 1923). In 1925, the bulletin of the *Cruzada Nuno Alvares Pereira* defined him as a fascist. He abandoned active politics on the eve of the coup of 28 May 1926.

military coup planned by Sidonists and Integralists, for which he received a short prison sentence.⁹³ After his release from prison, he busied himself with the foundation of NL. In June 1923 he founded *Portugal*, the mouthpiece of Nationalist Action (*Acção Nacionalista*, AN) with the assistance of other radical right-wing activists.

The manifesto of AN called for the organisation of a new syndicalism to combat the “mercenaries who live at the expense of workers’ sweat”. In 1923, the threat of fascism became the main theme of working class Anarcho-syndicalist and Communist newspapers. The articles were almost always translations, however, concerned nearly exclusively with the emergence of fascism in other European countries. By contrast, *A Batalha*, denounced NL from the very outset. They asked how the movement was financed and stated: “Some gentlemen snobs now understand that fascist nationalism has raised its head [and] they have to sow the vile seed of political banditry here in Portugal, which for some months has displayed its evil fruit in Italy.... [it] is fed by the dirty outpourings of the Monarchy and by the mistakes of the men of the Republic who enable it to germinate, grow, and flourish”. The CGT also denounced the formation of militias and their Sidonist origins: “some individuals are being regimented into the combative hosts of fascism. We are also aware that within this fascist organisation old supporters of Sidónio giving it the greatest support”.⁹⁴

The concerns expressed by the anarcho-syndicalist journal were well founded, as one of the key objectives of the movement was to create a national labour confederation. Castro Osório had asked Preto to lead the confederation, but his talks with Integralist leaders were unsuccessful and Castro was unable to rely on their support. In August 1923, the Centre of Lusitanian Nationalist (*Centro do Nacionalismo Lusitano*) was set up and *A Ditadura* became its mouthpiece. In 1923, its first programme enthusiastically backed employers’ organisations, calling for a “national dictatorship; the restoration of the death penalty; the disbanding of the GNR”. It

⁹³ Visconde de Porto da Cruz, *Paixão e morte de Sidónio*, (Funchal: 1928), pp. 80-82.

⁹⁴ *A Batalha*, 26 July 1923, p. 1.

also announced that “in all cities there will be a fascist militia, composed of unpaid volunteers” to respond to the “crimes of syndicalists and communists”.⁹⁵

The militia adopted fascist rituals. To adhere to the organisation, the initiate had to swear an oath summing up the movement’s programme: “As a Portuguese I want the government of my nation to be strong and nationalist and free from secret societies, political clientelism, bands of speculators responsible for the national crisis. I want a government that allows direct representation of the Nation’s social forces, transforming the existing system of national representation of social forces, municipalities, and organised professions. A government that will free and respect the family, the corporation, the municipality, and the Church. That will strengthen and dignify the Army so that it may defend the Nation. That property be protected in its rights and obliged to fulfil its duties to the Nation and, in particular, to workers”. Adherents also had to promise to “support any Portuguese government against foreign aggression and Bolshevism”, to obey the NL leader “in all acts of national voluntary service”, and to “do everything possible to ensure that the Portuguese people organise themselves in accordance with the principles of *Nacionalismo Lusitano*, against political oligarchies and plutocracies that tyrannise and annihilate the Nation”.⁹⁶

The left-wing republican parties and the union movement demanded that the Minister of the Interior order the immediate dissolution of NL. The Force (*A Força*) accused the organisation of supporting “irresponsible armed youths”. It defined the “fascist hordes of Loreto” as “Integralist Monarchists, republican dissidents from various groups especially from the Sidonist group, as well as young officers filled with aspirations, union dissidents, and anarchists without ideals”.⁹⁷ This characterisation of NL supporters was close to reality. Yet the movement was weak. In the field of anti-working class activity, it was only denounced for one attempted

⁹⁵ *O Imparcial*, 26 July 1923, p. 1.

⁹⁶ *A Ditadura*, 4 January 1924, p. 2.

⁹⁷ *A Força*, 4 November 1923, p. 2.

assault on the head office of *A Batalha*. The left-wing republican press noted that “a large group of Fascists wearing armbands” had “spent the night in the area around Largo da Trindade”. In reality, the only visible role played by these groups was to give civilian support to attempted coups.

NL’s programme appeared in Nationalist Revolution (*Revolução Nacionalista*).⁹⁸ The differences between NL and Integralism essentially concerned the ‘regime problem’, as the former ignored the question of the restoration of the monarchy. In every other respect the differences were insignificant, limited to NL’s radicalisation of old Integralist themes. Castro Osório’s history of the ‘nationalist current’ in Portugal led him to bring the ideologies of Integralism and Sidonism into his movement. In his words: “Integralism represents the intellectual reaction” and “Sidonism represents the spontaneous and sentimental reaction of nationalist energies. If we add to these two great movements of the Portuguese soul a nationalist intellectual reaction and the creation of a new Portuguese religious thought that is expressed by our poets and artists, then we have a synthesis of the movements that are preparing today’s perfect nationalism”.⁹⁹ In Castro Osório’s view, Sidónio Pais was not an “anti-liberal dictator” because of his “liberal education”. It was necessary to produce “a messiah, not a political *entrepreneur*”¹⁰⁰. For this young fascist, the leader had to be an animator of souls and capable of a “comprehensive authoritarianism” that enabled him to organise a new political regime using the popular energies he would awaken.

Castro Osório thus stripped his project of Integralism’s ‘aristocratic monarchism’ because in his view it was not conducive to mass mobilisation. He opposed republican authoritarianism and the revolutionary dictatorship (*Ditadura Revolucionária*) espoused by Basílio Teles. He ignored any regime proposal that he considered unimportant and all issues that divided forces that were opposed to democracy. Castro Osório advocated three measures

⁹⁸ João de Castro, *A Revolução Nacionalista*, (Lisbon: 1922).

⁹⁹ *Ibid.*, pp. 42-43.

¹⁰⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 30-31.

essential for the creation of an authority alternative to Liberalism: political dictatorship, “the technical transformation of government”, and corporatist representation. He foresaw the substitution of parliament by a chamber representing the provinces, employers’ organisations, trade unions, cultural academies, and a group with ‘superior values’ appointed by the figure of the dictator.

In the economic and social fields he advocated the “transformation of social war into social collaboration”, calling for the prohibition of strikes and lock-outs, the “repression of any anti-national or communist propaganda seeking to exploit the masses”, and the unification of forces “into groups according to production rather than class”.¹⁰¹ He also defended the family and paternal authority, the indissolubility of marriage, as well as the modification of inheritance laws to allow families to retain their patrimony. Catholicism was the obvious official religion of the state: “Portuguese activity is always aided by the catholic faith and for this reason Portuguese nationalism has to be catholic — catholic out of social necessity”.¹⁰²

To which groups was the message of the first Portuguese fascists aimed? The answer is given in the first edition of *Portugal*: “we must create a complete nationalist political philosophy, apply it to the study of all problems and propagate it by every method among the popular classes and the conservative middle classes”.¹⁰³ The writing of the fascist press was directed above all at the working class, appealing also to veterans and the country’s youth. *Portugal*’s manifesto was aimed towards working people, who he felt were “worth more to the Fatherland than the losers, the upper classes and bourgeoisie”, and he called workers to “our side in this grand task towards progress and liberation”, and to “run from red dictators and from regimes of fictitious and incompetent freedom that are the cause of your ruin”.¹⁰⁴

¹⁰¹ *Ibid.*, p. 65.

¹⁰² *Ibid.*, p. 59.

¹⁰³ *Portugal*, 2 June 1923, p. 2.

¹⁰⁴ *Portugal*, 2 June 1923, p. 1.

António de Cértima, a prolific writer and a regular contributor to *A Ditadura*, exploited the war theme and problem of soldiers betrayed by the Lisbon government.¹⁰⁵ This appeal to veterans was linked to calls to a new generation “who have ideals to improve a Portugal that is morally ill” and who, as the *après guerre* generation, was “a generation of sacrifice”.¹⁰⁶ The unification of conservative parties and pressure groups became *A Ditadura*’s central theme. Conservatives outside Portugal were constantly referred to, and their determination contrasted with the vacillations of their Portuguese counterparts, who were seen to “vegetate in a tranquillity, confidence in the State and the police” when “the State and propriety is submerged by an anarchic chaos they cannot prevent”.¹⁰⁷

At the end of 1923, NL pressured the conservative government of Ginestal Machado to dissolve parliament, and was severely chastised when his Ministry collapsed as a result. From then on, it turned to Cunha Leal. As reported by *A Ditadura*: “Dictatorship is salvation. The country’s life forces demand it. The Army desires it. The people also believe in it [...] why are we waiting? For a man? This man has a name [...] this man is Cunha Leal”.¹⁰⁸ Until the failed military coup of 18 April 1925, it is easy to verify the involvement of the movement in military conspiracies and its financial dependence on sectors of employers’ associations and banks. Financial supporters appeared in the advertisements, which sometimes took up to 60% of press space. NL’s major financial subsidiser was the Alliance Industrial Society (*Sociedade Industrial Aliança*), although several banks such as the Portuguese Industrial bank (*Industrial Português*) and the Popular Portuguese bank (*Popular Português*) were generous contributors.

The last attempted coup supported by NL took place on 18 April 1925. *A Ditadura* appealed to soldiers and peasants, those “who were being crucified in Flanders by the enemy’s machine

¹⁰⁵ See works like, *Epopéia maldita*, (Lisbon: 1924), and *Legenda dolorosa do soldado desconhecido em África*, (Lisbon: 1925).

¹⁰⁶ *A Ditadura*, 19 December 1923, p. 1.

¹⁰⁷ *A Ditadura*, 13 December 1924, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *A Ditadura*, 19 April 1923, p. 1.

guns”, and called for popular participation in the coup. Raul de Carvalho was arrested, but never tried.¹⁰⁹ After that, the NL began to dissolve. Of all the fascistic groups created in Portugal at the beginning of the 1920s, NL was perhaps closest to the classic fascist movement in terms of organisation, elite and political programme. Its elite was young and marginal to the political system. It adopted a virulent, para-military style, made nationalist appeals to war veterans, young people and the working class. It adopted a contradictory political programme that was suspicious of traditional conservative forces, particularly monarchists and catholics. Nonetheless, its mobilising capacity was weak, and its role in the defeat of the parliamentary republic negligible. NL supporters and those who wrote in its newspapers later joined other fascistic organisations, notably the 28 May League (*Liga 28 de Maio*) and NS. Overall, its leaders left no significant mark on the history of the period.

The Cruzada Nacional Nuno Alvares Pereira

In contrast to NL the CNAP had a greater cultural and political significance, particularly in the final years of the Parliamentary Republic. The CNAP was founded in July 1918 as a small nationalist league during the Sidónio Pais dictatorship and was heterogeneous and opposed to political parties. Its leadership changed every time it was re-launched. It was founded by Lieutenant João Afonso de Miranda, who invited members of all of the conservative parties (republicans, catholics, and monarchists) and military officers to join the leadership of the movement and to unite in “defence of the Fatherland” and to create “a patriotic mentality”.¹¹⁰ The CNAP cannot be considered a truly fascist party because of its social base and organisational structure. Nonetheless, in the final years of the liberal regime it carried out pro-authoritarian propaganda with important fascist references.

¹⁰⁹ *A Ditadura*, 19 April 1925, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ Miranda, J. A. de, ‘Para a história da Cruzada Nacional’, in *Cruzada Nacional Nuno Alvares*, N^o 1, November 1922, p. 40.

Auspiciously inaugurated under Sidónio Pais, the CNAP almost disappeared in the years that followed and only reappeared in 1921. In that year, it issued a 'Manifesto to the Nation', in which the diffuse nationalism of the past became a clear programme criticising liberalism and calling for a reform of the state. Its proclamation on its return to activity was: "Order on the streets. Order in the spirit. Order in the home, that's all. Without order, the State cannot survive".¹¹¹ Its programme became more authoritarian. It still considered itself a respectable organisation destined to "intensely raise the energies of the Portuguese people, awakening in them and radicalising in them the love for their land and the cult of their heroes". They also advocated a concrete political programme to "reconstitute the traditional family", "nationalise the scientific spirit", "promote the Nation's moral unity" and to thus "search for a solution to the problem of public order" and "solve, for once and for all, all of the conflicts between capital and labour".¹¹²

From the start, this programme to restore order used a discourse of patriotic historical legitimisation. As stated in its manifesto of 1921, the CNAP wanted "to reintegrate the Fatherland with the cult of its violated tradition, that is, with the cult of civic and domestic virtues [...] of public and private honour [...] of its heroes and great men, the cult of order, law, good will, tolerance".¹¹³ This manifesto, which the recently created *Seara Nova* considered revealing "of what the conservative minds of our country value", marked the national revitalisation of the CNAP.¹¹⁴

Its political activity was restricted in its first precarious years to occasional conferences and proclamations. It had a vague nationalist discourse that could embrace different sectors from the conservative opposition to the Democratic Party. Amongst its supporters were the leaders of conservative republican parties such as António José de Almeida, monarchists such as João de Barros, sev-

¹¹¹ Cruzada Nacional D. Nuno Alvares Pereira, *À Nação*, 20 September 1921.

¹¹² *Ibid.*

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Seara Nova*, N^o 1, 15 October 1921, p. 21.

eral senators and deputies, and even one former President, Teixeira Gomes. Among the Catholics who in 1922 supported the CNAP were Oliveira Salazar and the future Cardinal Cerejeira.¹¹⁵

The points of convergence were fragile. Any attempt to transform the CNAP into a league to undertake disciplined political action was condemned to failure for the simple fact that it united such diverse traditionalist and conservative political and intellectual elements. The movement consisted of the progressive but negative unification of a part of the conservative establishment opposed to the parliamentary republic. Those listed above were all well-known members of political parties and pressure groups to which they were politically and ideologically more connected than the CNAP. Indeed, for many lending their name constituted the only contribution towards the league.

Until 1926, the CNAP frequently appeared and vanished from the political scene.¹¹⁶ Each time it re-appeared its newspapers revealed the progressive isolation of parliamentarism and of the growth of what Juan J. Linz calls a “disloyal opposition”.¹¹⁷ Raul Proença, an attentive observer of the CNAP, was surprised when he saw the respectable names that supported the “monstrosities” in its proclamations. He remarked that there were “Republicans... who are greater enemies of the future than the most reactionary Integralists”.¹¹⁸ In 1922, associates of the CNAP included industrialists, Integralists and General Gomes da Costa, as well as conservative Republicans. By 1924, even João de Castro had joined. Between 1921 and 1924, the CNAP had enlarged its internal structure, creating district and local sections and even a ‘ladies’ central committee’.¹¹⁹ In January 1926, it re-modelled its leadership yet again, increasing the influence of the fascistic and conspirator-

¹¹⁵ *Cruzada Num’Alvares*, Nº 1, November 1922, pp. 5-2.

¹¹⁶ See: Pais, J. Machado, *As ‘forças vivas’ e a queda do regime liberal republicano*, Madrid, (mimeo: 1983), p. 219. The CNAP did not disappear as a result of the military coup, but its activities were increasingly unarticulated and its members followed different paths.

¹¹⁷ Linz, Juan, ‘Crisis, Breakdown, and Re-equilibration’ in Juan Linz and Alfred Stepan (eds), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, (Baltimore: 1978), pp. 37-38.

¹¹⁸ *Seara Nova*, Nº 1, 15 October 1921, p. 21.

¹¹⁹ *Cruzada Nacional*, 8 February 1924, p. 61.

ial sector. Filomeno da Câmara, a military conspirator of 18 April 1925 and extreme right activist during the military dictatorship, assumed the presidency of the organisation. Martinho Nobre de Melo, a Minister under Sidónio Pais and main ideologue during the final phase of the CNAP also joined, along with others from the extreme right of the political spectrum.¹²⁰

Organisationally, the CNAP was based on a militant model. Its mouthpiece, *The Reconquest (A Reconquista)*, edited by Martinho Nobre de Melo, was also called 'The Newspaper of the Workers' Leagues and of the Academy of the Supreme Commander'. Although it had negligible impact among workers, the academic propaganda commission successfully campaigned within the universities. On 9 January 1926, the CNAP organised a rally at the Geographical Society in Lisbon, which according to the press attracted "thousands of people". By this time, its discourse was more radical and its programmatic content clearer. In April 1926, as they appealed to Gomes da Costa, they stated: "We want the head of State to be the real *head*, and not a mere chancellor of the parties [...] we want [...] representation of the real and permanent interests of the Nation, and not of the transitory and selfish interests of the clientelistic parties [...] We want the elimination of direct or immediate State intervention [...] we want voluntary organic syndicalism with political and social privileges [...] We want freedom and privileges restored to the Catholic Church through a concordat".¹²¹

During the first months of 1926, the CNAP saw itself as the guiding force of "a great national movement seeking to put an end to the sterile fighting between the parties and to organise technically the public government".¹²² The CNAP cannot be considered the main force behind the victorious coup of 28 May 1926. Nonetheless, its leaders at the time managed to unify a small but powerful pressure group that attempted to dominate the military dictatorship, as proven by the coups associated with Gomes da

¹²⁰ *A Reconquista*, N^o 1, 15 January 1926.

¹²¹ *A Reconquista*, N^o 5, 1 April 1926, pp. 67-69.

¹²² Manifesto 'As academias do País' by the Academic Propaganda Commission in *A Reconquista*, N^o 6, 15 May 1926, p. 96.

Costa. The numerous adhesions from the Sidonist and Integralist camps testify to the political strength acquired by the CNAP by the beginning of 1926. Also important were the military, which they cultivated from the outset. Some of the *tenentes* of 28 May, including Mário Pessoa, were founding members.¹²³ Students also made a name for themselves within the academic section, especially Castro Fernandes, an NS founder. The names most associated with conservative republicanism thus gave way to a younger and more virulent extreme right.

The CNAP's fascist programme was criticised, once again, by *Seara Nova* intellectuals and Raul Proença in particular. As Proença noted: "In Portugal, the *Cruzada Nuno Alvares* has resolved to initiate a movement which is analogous to Italian Fascism". Proença also stated, somewhat ironically, that it was "a thing of much splendour, *chic*, that it includes the afternoon tea set, the elegant, pallid students, hardened military officers, and an apoplectic bourgeoisie".¹²⁴ References to Fascism and the Primo de Rivera dictatorship by the CNAP were restricted to the salons of the Geographical Society. In 1926, the only actors that conservative sectors wished to see on the streets were the military. Like its predecessors and successors, the CNAP merely prepared to board the carriage of the conspiratorial train already in motion since 1925.

Fascism and the Breakdown of the Republic

Having analysed the nature of post-war Portuguese fascism, it is important to assess its role in the defeat of liberalism. Thus, it is essential to understand the rupture caused by the coup of 28 May 1926 that led to a military dictatorship and the successive crises that led to the consolidation of the Salazarist New State in the 1930s.

Recent research about the fall of the parliamentary republic has shown the great ideological and political diversity of the social and political actors who contributed towards the crisis and the coup.¹²⁵

¹²³ Mário Pessoa later became an active member of the NS Military Secretariat.

¹²⁴ Proença, R., 'O fascismo e as suas repercussões em Portugal', in *Seara Nova*, N^o 77, 6 March 1926.

¹²⁵ There is a good description in António José Telo, *op. cit.*, pp. 187-225.

It is also important to note that the first years of the dictatorship were characterised by political instability and competition for hegemony. The coup was not merely a praetorian military intervention in political life. It was not just caused by the established military hierarchy overthrowing the government, but by a heterogeneous coalition of officials with the support of various parties and pressure groups. A divided and politicised Army defeated liberal republicanism for a number of reasons. Among the contributing causes were Portugal's intervention in the First World War and calls for coups by internal factions including conservative republicans, social catholics, extreme right-wing Integralists and associated fascist groups, which were particularly influential among junior officers and who had supported the Sidónio Pais dictatorship.

Conspiratorial groups carried out the coup, but the public and political parties knew its workings. Divisions among the various conspiratorial groups were more important than the resistance put up by the government. General Gomes da Costa was contacted by one of these groups to lead the coup. He went to Lisbon and negotiated the new authority with conservative republicans led by Admiral Cabeçadas. The event unfolded over several days and the Lisbon press described the negotiations. Military opposition to the conspiracy was weak and there was very little civilian mobilisation against it.

Opposition appeals to the military against the dominant PD was a permanent feature of life during the post-war Republic. To use Juan Linz's expression, the republican political system had no 'loyal opposition'. It was obvious to political actors that they had virtually no chance of obtaining power through the electoral system. Conservative republicans and notables linked to interest groups were used to resorting to extra-parliamentary methods to get close to power. Coalition and conservative governments were established in the post-war period, but only at times of crisis. The radicalisation of the conservative republican parties, among them the Nationalists, the *Reconstituintes* and the Liberal Republican Union, played a major role in the downfall of the Republic. It led them to 'appeal to the military' when the PD returned to power after the

1925 elections. Charismatic figures emerged from this spectrum of parties supporting the small, bellicose and elitist extreme right, such as the CNAP, in their appeals for military intervention and in the creation of organised groups within the Armed Forces. Cunha Leal was, perhaps, the most determined of these republican leaders.

The role of the Integralists was also important. Its conspiratorial and propaganda activities were more important than those of the PCC, which was more prudent and linked to the Church hierarchy. The Integralists had a significant following within the Armed Forces and played a central anti-democratic and radicalising role among some of the conspirators. The presence of both Integralists and PCC members in organisations such as the CNAP, as well as their involvement in the coup, however, shows how an important segment of the elite supported the coup within civilian circles. They gave military officers a political programme of sorts that transcended a mere call for 'order in the streets and in the government'.

The Portuguese case fits with Juan Linz's hypothesis about the fall of democratic regimes, given the heterogeneity of those involved in the military intervention. The coup effectively co-opted part of the republican regime's political elite which, along with many officials, aimed to re-establish some form of reformed constitutional order. It also gained the backing of the 'disloyal opposition' and excluded the dominant party from power.¹²⁶ The military dictatorship rapidly alienated part of the republicans and the radical right, a junior partner in the coup coalition, saw the new regime as an opportunity to come close to power.

When one examines the literature on the rise to power of fascist parties in Germany and Italy, the question arises as to why a fascist party did not defeat Portuguese liberalism. In other words, why did a fascist party not emerge during the crisis of democracy? This question is not necessarily the right one because it presupposes that fascists played a major role in the downfall of post-war democracy and this was sometimes not the case. In the majority of cases of post-war liberal and democratic regime collapse, fascists

¹²⁶ Linz, J. J., *op. cit.*, p. 82.

were either junior partners in reactionary coalitions or completely absent.

Fascist participation in the downfall of democracy has been described as the “taking of power by a well organised disloyal opposition, which has a base within mass society, which is predisposed to create a new social and political order, but which is not readily prepared to share power with members of the regime which has been overthrown, except as junior partners during a transitional period”.¹²⁷ This is one of the ways in which post-war democracy fell, but it was the exception, albeit a significant one, to the collapse of democracy promoted by the right in the first half of the twentieth century. Without affirming a structural causality, the secondary role of fascists was particularly evident in countries on the Eastern and Southern periphery of continental Europe with a social and political structure and a level of economic development similar to the Portuguese. Some research on Portugal has sought to explain the absence of a fascist movement at the beginning of the 1920s by overemphasising its presence in the movement leading to the overthrow of liberalism, even when such groups were fragmented and weak. These studies were somewhat voluntaristic and paid little attention to the actual scale of fascist involvement. They argued that Portugal displayed all the characteristics that classic studies find at the origins of fascism: modernism, futurism, nationalism, the trauma of war, a working class offensive, anti-communism, junior officers politicised by an extreme right, the *avant la lettre* fascism of Sidónio Pais, mass politics, the crisis of legitimacy of liberalism, as well as fascist groups. Yet it is important to pay attention to the actual role played by fascist groups and to explain why they were not the protagonists of the overthrow of liberalism or of the subsequent establishment of an authoritarian regime.

Levels of involvement are not synonymous with numbers, which can be an equally illusory measure. In 1919, Italian Fascism had as many militants as NL, then a small anonymous group, had in 1923. Yet, while the former took power in 1922, the latter had

¹²⁷ *Ibid.*

disappeared by 1925. There were fascists all over Europe, but this is not the key issue; the interesting question is why fascists came to power in some countries and not in others. In the Portuguese case, the important factor in comparative terms is the absence of a fascist movement in the process leading to the downfall of liberalism. The coalition of forces supporting the downfall of the regime was made up predominantly of conservative and radical right-wing parties. Fascism as a movement was only a fragmented junior partner.

The literature on post-war democratic collapse has continued to grow and has rejected many older and simplistic mono-causal explanations of the origin of authoritarian and Fascist regimes.¹²⁸ There seems to be unanimity on one point, however: Fascism was only one of a number of possible dictatorial outcomes and it is not accidental that it was Fascism and not other conservative or radical right-wing coalitions that took power in some countries.

The crisis of democracy in Portugal highlights the problem of interpreting the complex links between fascism and the various political families within conservatism in the first half of the twentieth century. The rise of fascism was only possible as part of a coalition encompassing various ideologies, interest groups and parts of the electorate until then represented by various conservative parties. This fact does not help one to understand what was unique and innovative about the phenomenon, however. As noted by Blinkhorn: "it cannot seriously be denied that as movements, parties and political ideologies, conservatism and fascism occupy very different positions within the early and mid-twentieth century European right converging at some points and conflicting at others".¹²⁹

There are structural conditions specific to Portuguese social and political developments from the end of the nineteenth century onwards that obviously differentiate this case from those where classic fascism emerged. As noted above, Portugal embarked on the turbulent period of the First World War without experiencing some

¹²⁸ See: Berg-Schlosser, D., Michell, J., (Eds), *The Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-39*, (London: 2000).

¹²⁹ Blinkhorn, M. (ed), *Fascists and the Conservatives*, (London: 1990), p. 13.

of the contradictions between domestic and foreign policy highlighted by studies of fascism. The ‘national question’ in Portugal, for example, had been solved. ‘State’ and ‘nation’ were unified reflecting the country’s homogeneity.¹³⁰ There were no national or ethnic minorities. Portugal did not wish to alter its frontiers. Possession of its colonies was guaranteed by the fact that the country was under Britain’s sphere of influence. It embarked on the ‘age of masses’ without experiencing the radicalisation generally associated with the rise of fascist movements.

During the second half of the nineteenth century Portugal was a barely industrialised country with a stable ‘oligarchic parliamentary’ system. The dynamic of social and political change was similar to that of countries on the periphery of Europe, countries that Mouzelis characterises as experiencing “early parliamentarism and late industrialisation”.¹³¹ The liberal oligarchy sought to exploit the African colonies and initiate a rather timid process of ‘import substitution industrialisation’. The political expression of the *fin-de-siècle* crisis was the emergence of a republican movement that could mobilise large parts of the up to then excluded urban middle and popular classes.¹³²

The First Republic failed to bring about a process of political democratisation.¹³³ Republican élites advocated universal suffrage, anti-clericalism and nationalism in defence of the colonies and against dependence on Britain. In 1910, a virulent anti-clerical policy was initiated. Secularising measures were largely inspired by the policies implemented during the last five years of the Third Republic in France. They had a profound impact on the Catholic hierarchy. Universal suffrage was never actually extended, howev-

¹³⁰ Pinto, A. C. and Monteiro, N. G., “Cultural Myths and Portuguese National Identity”, Pinto, A. C. (ed), *Modern Portugal*, (Palo Alto: 1998), pp. 206-217.

¹³¹ Mouzelis, N., *Politics in the Semi-Periphery: Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialisation in the Balkans and Latin America*, (London: 1986).

¹³² Almeida, P. T. de, *Eleições e caciquismo no Portugal oitocentista (1868-1890)*, (Lisbon: 1991).

¹³³ Pinto, A. C., “Portugal: Crisis and Early Authoritarian Takeover”, Berg-Schlosser, D., Michell, J., (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 356-493.

er, given the first monarchic revolts. The Democratic Party rapidly became the hegemonic party. Portugal's intervention in the war, defended by republicans to protect the colonies, and the crises that decision caused served only to accentuate the lack of legitimacy of parliamentary liberalism. Finally, a small but combative anarcho-syndicalist working class movement frightened economic élites, particularly as the Republican regime was unable to co-opt them.

It is important not to give undue emphasis to a "Portuguese *biennio rosso*" as a factor leading to the rise of authoritarianism. Other economic and social cleavages were more significant. As noted by Organski, urban-rural cleavages, together with the differences between traditional and modern élites that typified Portuguese society during the 1920s, better explain the defeat of Portuguese democracy than any conflicts between the industrial bourgeoisie and working class. One analysis of the structural factors contributing towards liberalism's downfall has shown that agricultural and industrial conflicts stemming from Portugal's peripheral status, as well as the lack of parliamentary unity, were determining factors aggravated in the post-war period.¹³⁴ The post-war crises of the Republic were a typical example of the difficulties that fascism encountered in societies in which competing movements and ideologies had 'occupied' the political space demanded by a process of incipient 'political massification'.¹³⁵

Participation in the war did not cause the economic or social problems experienced by the nations of Central Europe. It did not create the conditions for the extension of the appeal of fascism beyond the intellectual groups that initially espoused it. Portugal suffered its wartime 'humiliation' during the Sidónio Pais dictatorship when national battalions had been badly beaten on the front. The war ended with Sidónio Pais in power with the support of the military. The republicans managed to mobilise many veterans against Sidónio Pais, who felt 'betrayed' by the monarchists and

¹³⁴ Schwartzmann, K. C., *op. cit.*, p. 184.

¹³⁵ Linz, J. J., 'Political Space and fascism as a Late-Comer', in Larsen, S. U. (ed), *op. cit.*, pp. 153-189.

the regiments that had managed to avoid duty in France. Thus, the “veterans phenomenon” was not truly felt in Portugal, as these were absorbed by rural society or by emigration. The idea of a “*Victoria Mancata*” should be moderated, as Portugal managed to safeguard its colonial empire and had no claims on any other part of Europe to pursue.

The cleavage over secularisation was one of the most important that emerged under the First Republic. In the early 1910s, a group of Catholics put forward a political programme that advocated the restoration of the rights of the Church and an authoritarian alternative to liberalism. In cultural terms, there was little space for the emergence of a ‘fascist intelligentsia’ in Portugal. Indeed, “as hostile response to modern society and the concomitant rejection of liberalism and democratisation remain embedded in traditional religious forms, and reactionary or conservative politics is linked with the defence of the position of the Church there is little room for the emergence of a fascist intelligentsia”.¹³⁶ The Church and the PCC constituted powerful impediments to the “fascistisation” of university and intellectual élites, occupying the space of reactionary and anti-democratic options.¹³⁷

The ‘regime question’, or restoration of the monarchy, was another important cleavage. Integralism could have constituted the basis of Portuguese fascism but as it was wedded to the restoration of the monarchy it limited the mobilising potential of the Sidónio Pais dictatorship. The “regime question” also put paid to any understanding between Integralists and Social Catholics, both of which defended authoritarian corporatism as an alternative to liberalism.

The charismatic Sidónio Pais attempted to mobilise the right for the first time since the 1910 Revolution, using a populist discourse in the provinces. The dictatorship could have led to the develop-

¹³⁶ *Ibid.*

¹³⁷ About the Catholics see: Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, (Lisbon: 1980); Robinson, R. A. H., “Monarchists, Catholics and the First Portuguese Republic, 1910-1926”, Dadson, T. J., Oakley, R. J. P., Odber, P. A. (eds), *New Frontiers in Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian Scholarship*, (Lewiston: 1994), pp. 411-442.

ment of mobilising fascism in the 1920s. Yet the re-emergence of a conflict between monarchists and republicans due to the establishment of the “Monarchy of the North” destroyed the potential for unity among the anti-democratic right. In the early 1920s, employers’ associations offered some support to the small emerging fascist movements, but they tended to negotiate directly with the military and conservative pressure groups. The early prospect of military intervention also put paid to the militias, which disappeared in 1925 when it became clear that the threat of ‘chaos’ came not from the streets but from the parliament and government.

The social movements that were an inherent part of the development of rural Italian Fascism did not occur in Portugal. Similarly, the conditions for the creation of agrarian parties as in Eastern Europe did not emerge. The Republic maintained clientelistic pacts with the traditional élites in the north, and in the *latifundia* south rural unionism all but disappeared by the *biennio rosso* in 1920s, despite an important wave of syndicalism in 1910-12 following the inauguration of the republic.¹³⁸

The transition to authoritarianism in Portugal was certainly shaped by the absence of “mass” political and social representation in the 1920s and the maintenance of clientelistic relations. Thus, although the opposite was the case in Eastern Europe and in Romania in particular, the correlation between the weak development of fascism and the absence of political massification holds true for the Portuguese case.

Fascists and Conservatives under the Military Dictatorship

Paradoxically, it was the Military Dictatorship that permitted the organisation of a fascist movement and allowed it to come close to power. Rolão Preto saw that the opportunity had at last arrived to found a such a movement, as he had an influence among the lieutenants who had led the Coup of 28 May 1926, and worked in the shadow of military ‘barons’ who lacked the support of polit-

¹³⁸ Pereira, J. P., *Conflictos sociais nos campos em Portugal*, (Lisbon: 1982), pp. 77-117.

ical machines and stable pressure groups. As one contemporary observer noted, the regime established on 28 May 1926 did not present an alternative project to the liberal republic and was 'a dictatorship without a dictator'. Indeed, the regime resulted from a temporary compromise among senior officers and put forward various contradictory projects until the consolidation of authoritarianism under Salazar at the beginning of the 1930s.

It is difficult to analyse the first years of the Military Dictatorship using the typologies normally employed in the study of the inter-war dictatorships.¹³⁹ This is partly due to the nature of the republican regime and the concomitant weakness of the right-wing parties. Other divisions also affected the configuration of the party system and the political activity of the radical right under the dictatorship. The most important was the monarchic-republican cleavage. In addition, the regime brought to the fore corporate military tensions inherent to the institution and also led to the formation of political factions within the armed forces.

In an earlier study, a tripartite typology of the politico-ideological spectrum of the right was suggested, of possible analytical use in the study of political attitudes during the first years of the dictatorship.¹⁴⁰ The first group was defined as *liberal conservative* and was represented by conservative republican parties. They appealed to the military to support a coup to create a 'state of emergency' that would allow them to reform the 1911 Constitution, increase presidential powers and limit those of the parliament. This group wanted, above all, to re-model the party system by creating a strong conservative party supported by the state and able to contest the power of the PD legally.

The second *authoritarian conservative* group was extremely anti-liberal. It proposed the creation of an authoritarian regime, which would eliminate the republican party system altogether, and permit

¹³⁹ Payne, S. G., *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945*, (Madison: 1995), pp. 3-19; Eatwell, R., *Fascismo. Verso un modello generale*, (Rome: 1999); Blinkhorn, M. (ed), *op. cit.*, (London: 1990), pp. 1-13; Griffin, R., *The Nature of Fascism*, (London: 1991), pp. 27-55.

¹⁴⁰ Pinto, A. C., "The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: the 28 May League (1928-33)", *Luso-Brazilian Review*, Vol. 23, N^o 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 1-15.

the introduction of a single party system. Some members of this group proposed corporatist mechanisms for representation, while others propounded the creation of 'technocratic governments'. Ideologically, this group was associated with catholic or republican corporatists who sympathised with the authoritarian revision demanded by Oliveira Martins and Basílio Teles, and included catholics, monarchists, and authoritarian republicans.

The third group was the *radical right*. It proposed a complete break with democracy, arguing for the creation of a nationalist state based on integral corporatism. Fascist traces within this group became more notable in the post-war period as seen by attempts to create a mass party to support the Military Dictatorship and by emphasis on charismatic legitimisation. The chief ideological support of this group was Integralism, although republicanism and Sidonism were also present.

The dictatorship significantly changed the political spectrum and thus many of the attitudes hitherto held by political actors, particularly military officers, are difficult to understand according to this typology; one witnessed an increase in erratic political moves. In this context, it is important to consider the positions adopted by some parties in the early years of the dictatorship.

The PCC, which depended on the support of the Church hierarchy and some conservative republican parties, should be singled out as one of the political forces that immediately supported the dictatorship and acted as an important counterweight to the radical right. Like Cunha Leal's Liberal Republican Union and the Nationalist Party (*Partido Nacionalista*, PN), the PCC attempted to manipulate the new power-holders and become a support group, together with the conservative military elite, against the radical right. Until 1928, when their leader Salazar entered the government, the PCC was a powerful pressure group. It was only undermined when the Minister of Finance neutralised them at the beginning of the 1930s, after consolidating power.

The strength of the conservative republicans should also not be underestimated. Although weakened by the fall from power of Cabeçadas, they had an important sector in the Army. The legacy

of their influence is found in the amendments proposed to the 1933 Constitution, which were accepted but later ignored by Salazar.

Gomes da Costa's brief consulate unified fascist currents within the Military Dictatorship. Rolão Preto attempted to create a militia that could support the new regime, in association with junior officers and other advocates of the radical right. This was the period in which Preto came closest to power, behind the shadow of the old general. Following defeat in 1926, the most radical wing of the Integralist family gambled on the creation of a fascist party that would control the Military Dictatorship.

The National Union and the Lusitanian militias

The National Union (*União Nacional*, UN) and the Lusitanian Militias (*Milícias Lusitanas*, ML) were the first organisations set up by the fascists that tried to control the military dictatorship. Their attempt to take power led to Gomes da Costa's fall from power in June 1926, following the Coup carried out by Carmona and Sinel de Cordes. Apart from Rolão Preto, other fascists, including Martinho Nobre de Melo, the leader of the CNAP, were involved.

Preto established the movement's newspaper, The National Revolution (*A Revolução Nacional*). Its official director was Lieutenant Pinto Correia, Gomes da Costa's secretary. Nonetheless, the short-lived newspaper was directed by Preto who wrote under the pseudonyms 'Plures' and 'Pluribus', both for security reasons and to prevent being denounced by conservative republicans who opposed his association with monarchism. This secret direction was denounced by *Novelties* (*Novidades*) the catholic mouthpiece, which also criticised fascist militias.¹⁴¹

Preto advised the new authorities to destroy its enemies quickly: pluralist party system. He called on the old general to "unsheathe this sword" to use all means necessary and however drastic to purge the state apparatus. As he pointed out in one of his editorials, Mussolini had "occupied all the strategic defensive

¹⁴¹ At that time Preto denied his involvement with the newspaper. See his reply to *Novidades* in *A Revolução Nacional*, N^o 14, 6 July 1926, p. 1.

points of the State, uncompromisingly killing anyone who might support a reaction by politicians". He argued that Gomes da Costa should follow this example.¹⁴² Using a pseudonym allowed him to adopt a republican stance and make appeals to neutralise conservative republicans such as Cunha Leal and his party.¹⁴³

In June 1926, Martinho Nobre de Melo, a former minister in the government of Sidónio Pais and an Integralist by education, presented a political programme for the new dictatorship at a meeting in Lisbon's Geographical Society. In his speech he defended corporatism, a presidential dictatorship, and industrialisation. The organising commission of the National Union was also composed of Integralist leaders like Pequito Rebelo, as well as radicals and fascists such as Trindade Coelho.¹⁴⁴ The nationalist militias aimed to be fascist type para-military organisations. In July, Gomes da Costa sacked a number of his ministers and appointed Martinho Nobre de Melo and the Integralist, João de Almeida. Two days after the re-shuffle, Gomes da Costa was deposed and exiled to the Azores, his cabinet was overthrown and *A Revolução Nacional* was closed. His secretary and others were imprisoned.

Thus, the first attempt to create a mass party was stillborn. In the years that followed, however, the men behind these plans who were closely associated with the lieutenants of 28 May, participated in several attempted coups until 1928, when the stable 28 May League was founded.

For Preto and the Integralists following him, Gomes da Costa's defeat was a heavy blow. Not only were many of them forced into exile, but they also saw their newspapers and journals subjected to censorship and their demonstrations and meetings banned.¹⁴⁵ Yet, although unquestionably weakened, the IL Central Committee

¹⁴² Pluribus, 'Governar! Governar!', *A Revolução Nacional*, N^o 3, 23 June 1926, p. 1.

¹⁴³ Pluribus, 'Abaixo os partidos!', *A Revolução Nacional*, N^o 8, 29 June 1926, p. 1.

¹⁴⁴ Telo, A. J., *op. cit.*, Vol. 2, (Lisbon: 1984), p. 220. See also: Plures, 'A União Nacional' in *A Revolução Nacional*, 6 July 1926, p. 1.

¹⁴⁵ Increasing repression of the organisation can be seen in internal correspondence. Some Civil Governors prevented all meetings with Preto and other leading Integralists present, while censorship was heavy.

and the movement's academic and provincial committees continued to function.

In 1926, Homem Cristo Filho, who had returned to Portugal following the coup, founded Information (*A Informação*) with great pomp.¹⁴⁶ Homem Cristo supported an intellectual fascist 'internationalism' precociously, although he was always a marginal figure. The son of a well-known virulent republican journalist, Homem Cristo had been the editor of a journal, National Idea (*Ideia Nacional*) in 1915. Under Sidónio Pais he had been nominated Director of the Information Services for Friendly Allied Nations (*Director dos Serviços de Informação nos Países Amigos e Aliados*) and an itinerant ambassador. This supporter of 'Latin Fascism' was well placed among the Parisian extreme right-wing cultural elite, as shown by his association with the news agency and publisher, *Fast*. It was through this publisher that he printed his book, *Mussolini Bâtisseur d'Avenir*.¹⁴⁷ When he arrived in Portugal he supported Gomes da Costa. The latter's defeat put paid to Homem Cristo's plans, however. This time, Gomes da Costa's successor sent him into exile in August. Upon returning to France, he dedicated himself to a new international project, the organisation of Mussolini's 'Congress of Western Nations', dying some years later.

NL was launched a short time after the failed pro-democratic revolution of February 1927.¹⁴⁸ The same group set up the organisation. It was supported by the Integralists and some of the 28 May lieutenants, but was immediately repudiated by conservative republicans and the PCC. Some of its founders, such as Angelo César, Sebastião de Vasconcelos and Valadares Botelho went on to create the League. Cunha Leal's URL newspaper quickly denounced this attempt to organise the extreme right.¹⁴⁹ The PCC warned of the dangers of 'pagan nationalism', which perverted and

¹⁴⁶ N^o 1, 17 July 1926. See: Berreira, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 17-25.

¹⁴⁷ Filho, H. C., *Mussolini Bâtisseur d'Avenir: harangue aux foules latines*, (Paris: 1923). For other works see: Passerini, L., *Mussolini immaginario: storia de una biografia*, (Bari: 1991), pp. 61-76.

¹⁴⁸ Caldeira, A., 'O partido de Salazar: antecedentes, organização e funções da União Nacional (1926-34)', *Análise Social*, vol. XXII (94), 1986, pp. 944-945.

¹⁴⁹ *A Situação*, 19 March 1927.

corrupted the ‘young generation’, and reasserted that only the Church could prevent such ‘excesses’.¹⁵⁰ After initially contradictory messages to the militias, the government finally issued an official communiqué stating that “everything that has been said with reference to the government’s involvement in the organisation of militia corps is premature”.¹⁵¹ A later attempt to form a government party to support the dictatorship, this time by individuals close to the PCC, showed the contradictory ambience of the dictatorship.

Within the conspiratorial camp, the first reply from the fascist sector to exclusion from power was an attempted Coup, the so-called Fifi’s Coup (*Golpe dos Fifis*), led by Filomeno da Câmara at the end of 1927, who had led the 18 April 1925 movement¹⁵². Several units rose, with the support of Rolão Preto, the Integralists and several lieutenants who had supported Gomes da Costa. Filomeno da Câmara was defeated but was not arrested although he was ‘exiled’ to Angola in 1929, where he was appointed High Commissioner. Salazar later dismissed him after serious conflicts with colonials. At the end of 1927, after the conservative republican attempt to launch a group to ‘support the Dictatorship’, the radical right responded by creating the League, an organisation that served to launch NS.¹⁵³

The National 28 May League

The League was created at the end of 1927 and made its first public appearance in January 1928. Its emergence was prompted by

¹⁵⁰ *Novidades*, 17 February 1927.

¹⁵¹ *A Voz*, 3 March 1927.

¹⁵² This name was adopted in reference to the names of the two principal conspirators, Fidelino de Figueiredo and Filomena da Câmara.

¹⁵³ Some fascistic micro-organisations created by military officials and the political police at the end of the 1920s have been ignored. One of these, the National Militia, Legionnaires of the Nation (*Legionários da Pátria*), unsuccessfully attempted to gain recognition from the dictatorship in the 1930s. Its provisional headquarters were in central Lisbon and it offered unsolicited information on the activities of the opposition and made frequent requests for arms to the government. The Interior Minister prohibited them public activities and forced them to dissolve. Some members of this organisation later joined NS. For more over this organisation and their requests see: AGMI/ANTT Bundle 451 - box 4, and the testimony of an anti-fascist, Rocha, P., *Escrito com paixão*, (Lisbon: 1991), p. 35.

a peculiar set of events. In December 1927, Vicente de Freitas, then Interior Minister, announced plans for a new electoral law proposing local elections and a revision of the electoral roll for the forthcoming plebiscite to name General Carmona president. With the plebiscite and local elections in mind, the government announced that it intended to create a government party to 'support the dictatorship', which would be as inclusive as possible. A ministerial commission was nominated to create the party. The government sought to involve the administration in this proposal and set up the first district commissions. The new party's programme was never defined.

The creation of the League took place at the same time that the government decided to organise its own party. This was a clear sign of the difficulty that the dictatorship had in unifying its heterogeneous base of support, a fact already demonstrated by the coups and conspiracies carried out in 1926 and 1927. Integralists and junior officers who united under Gomes da Costa created the League. The organisation immediately criticised the government's project and claimed that the government party was no more than a vehicle for the recovery of the conservative republican parties.¹⁵⁴

After the plebiscite and fearing the reaction of the republican parties, the government postponed local elections and abandoned the creation of the government party. It should be noted that this party was the forerunner of Salazar's UN. It was governmental in origin, it used the State apparatus and presenting itself for election to legitimate the new regime.¹⁵⁵ The League sought to become a 'civil force to support the dictatorship' and, as stated by its first President, aimed to eliminate Bolshevism and neutralise working class unions with the creation of a 'white CGT'. It was hoped that it would ultimately become a 'united front' for those wanting "*for once and for all* to be free of party factions and the secret power... of Masonry". It claimed to represent "ideas... in action" that would be transmitted "to the government and State" and force "the Mason-

¹⁵⁴ *A Voz*, 17 January 1928.

¹⁵⁵ Caldeira, A., 'O partido de Salazar...', *op. cit.*, p. 952. Regarding the formation of Salazar's UN see: Cruz, M. B. da, *O partido e o estado no salazarismo*, (Lisbon: 1988), pp. 127-142.

ic Liberal organism [to] confront, head on, the true corporatist, syndicalist and christian Portuguese State".¹⁵⁶

By the end of the 1930, the preliminary statutes of the League defined its objectives: to boost the developments set in motion by the 'national movement of 28 May', "integrate the working classes into the spirit and goals of the dictatorship so that the government [...] is in constant touch with public opinion and the good wishes of the people", "agitate within academe", "develop a strong and modern social spirit", informed by "nationalist aspirations and sentiments", "maintain firmly an absolutely national character that respects the Republican regime", and to unite "behind the Head of State".¹⁵⁷

The organisation of the League was interrupted from the end of 1929 until late 1930. Then it re-organised itself, establishing a national network. The new League mirrored and competed with the government party's delegations. At the beginning of 1932, when the structure of the UN was already nearly established, the League had delegations in all of the main district capitals and approximately twenty local sub-delegations. This constituted a *de facto* national movement, which is remarkable when one considers strong resistance by a state apparatus engaged in the creation of the UN and pressure from the civil governors against the League.

The League had many military supporters, particularly among the lieutenants of 28 May. The military were among its leaders as well as sympathisers who were active spokespersons at rallies and public demonstrations. Middle and low ranking officers already known for their involvement in right-wing groups before and after the 1926 coup, constituted a real 'soviet' within the Army. They strengthened the influence of the League within institutions supporting the dictatorship and played an important role in consolidating local representations.¹⁵⁸ The lieutenants often participated

¹⁵⁶ *A Voz*, 17 January 1928, pp. 1-2. Raul Pereira Caldas, Count of Silves, was the League's first president. Caldas later participated with the National Syndicalists in a coup attempt against Salazar, for which he received a prison sentence.

¹⁵⁷ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 19 September 1931, p. 2.

¹⁵⁸ *A Voz*, 29 January 1928 and 16 January 1928.

formally in League public demonstrations, thereby giving the organisation a *de facto* military sector. The “virile ardour of the *tenentes*”, to use Preto’s words, was constantly referred to by League newspapers to shield the organisation from the government.¹⁵⁹

Unsurprisingly, national and local League leaders drew on the NL and, overwhelmingly, on Integralist militants, particularly students. The part of the CNAP that dominated in 1926 also supported it, and in 1928 what remained of the organisation joined the League. Martinho Nobre de Melo became one of the *Liga*’s leaders. Two army officers who had been cadets under Sidónio Pais and long-term militants of neo-Sidonist organisations in the post-war period led the district delegation in Leiria. The League’s leader in Évora was Silva Dias, an Integralist who had been involved in the 18 April 1925 coup attempt and Gomes da Costa’s secretary. In Coimbra the local delegation was composed of a group that had resigned from the UN and was mostly Integralists. In Lisbon the main forces were army officers and a group of students who had been members of the Integralist Student Junta in Lisbon in 1922. Thus, the overwhelming majority of League militants came from pre-existing organisations, but the numerous Integralist supporters are particularly noteworthy.

The League’s internal organisation was fluid. Once its Lisbon leadership had been re-organised, it promoted the creation of delegations over which national leaders had no real control. As far as we know, the national leadership was limited to the district delegation in Lisbon. The League was essentially a conglomeration of autonomous district and local level organisations. Thus, several delegations constituted in 1928 continued to function independently until the League was re-organised at the end of 1930. The fact that political activity continued in the absence of a formal national leadership was due in large part to the informal leading role of the Integralists, who determined part of political activity and promoted the creation of delegations throughout the country.

The most active Integralist sectors were the Student Juntas that had been formed at the end of the 1920s. An internal memo of the

¹⁵⁹ Preto, R., ‘Glória aos novos’, *Manuelinho D’Évora*, 10 September 1931, p. 4.

Lisbon Student Junta was highly critical of “the lack of Integralist activity over the last few years”. It called for the creation of a political organisation that would unite dispersed Integralists and other nationalists.¹⁶⁰ Before the founding of NS, the League effectively served as the mechanism that these young Integralists clamoured for. Internal correspondence suggests that Integralism effectively directed the organisation.¹⁶¹

By the beginning of 1932, the League possessed an appreciable number of delegations at the district and local levels, many of which had their own newspapers. Its political activities were directed at the urban *petite bourgeoisie* and the working class, to which end it formed delegations in the most industrialised areas. All the delegations had ‘worker sections’ and some had workers as local leaders, as in Coimbra and Lisbon. As noted by one working class member: “It is important that academic gowns should mix with boiler suits”.¹⁶² The student sector was the most militant in Lisbon, but it is difficult to assess their weight given lack of details on the social composition of membership, which did not exceed 10,000 at the beginning of 1932.

The membership claimed by League newspapers was almost certainly exaggerated for propaganda purposes. It was claimed in July 1931, for example, that 7,000 workers were paying members of the Lisbon delegation.¹⁶³ This number may be close to reality if the Coimbra delegation’s criteria, which included office and commercial employees, are adopted. According to an internal report from this delegation, the ‘workers’ section’ had 96 members in April 1932. Of these, 37 were employed in offices or trade, and the remaining 59 included eight railway workers, nine cobblers, as well as several bakers, bookbinders and stonemasons.¹⁶⁴ It should also not be forgotten that the League encouraged the unemployed to

¹⁶⁰ Memorandum, Junta Escolar do Integralismo Lusitano, n. d., ARP.

¹⁶¹ Letter from Carlos Proença de Figueiredo to Rolão Preto, 16 January 1932, ARP.

¹⁶² *Diário da Manhã*, 10 June 1931, p. 6.

¹⁶³ *União Nacional*, 4 July 1931.

¹⁶⁴ Letter from Carlos Proença de Figueiredo, 24 April 1932, ARP.

join, promising medical and food aid and asking employers to give preference of League job applicants.¹⁶⁵

The League was present at union meetings, a fact denounced by the anarcho-syndicalist and communist press from 1931 onwards. In 1932, before National Syndicalism had been created, anti-fascist expelled several League militants from union meetings and other organisations.¹⁶⁶ Many workers affiliated to the League later joined NS. During 1931, the League participated in all demonstrations promoted by the dictatorship and organised propaganda sessions throughout the country. These activities stand in stark contrast to the absence of official party activity. This and the emergence of the left-wing Socialist and Republican Alliance (*Aliança Republicana e Socialista*, ARS) may explain why the 1931 legislative elections were postponed.

Demonstrations and street activities were relatively scarce among groups supporting the dictatorship, but the League used propaganda and mobilisation with increasing frequency. On 25 March 1931, for example, League ‘worker commissions’ organised a homage to Carmona that was later called the March of the Torches (*Marcha dos Archotes*). One worker in Belém restated the League’s corporatist programme as well as paying homage to Carmona.¹⁶⁷ The League’s political activities were different from the ‘preventative conservatism’ of the dictatorship in its final years. They undertook an anti-communist campaign, appealed for the elimination of the political leaders of workers, and divulged the principles of corporatist syndicalism among its “politico-social readers”.¹⁶⁸ Some delegations provided meals for the unemployed whilst making demands for improvements in the living conditions of the working class and attacking the “selfish, usurious, and individualist middle class”.¹⁶⁹ The propaganda campaigns and mani-

¹⁶⁵ *A Voz*, 24 January 1928. For examples of League propaganda within worker circles and their “social security” and medical assistance programmes see the communiqué from the delegation of Caldas da Rainha, 30 June 1931, Bundle 454 - box 7, AGMI/ANTT.

¹⁶⁶ This theme is developed further in Chapter II.

¹⁶⁷ *O Século*, 26 March 1931.

¹⁶⁸ Liga Nacional 28 de Maio, *Cartilha de iniciação politico-social*, (Leiria: 1931).

¹⁶⁹ *Manuelinho D’Évora*, 3 March 1932, p. 3.

festos directed at workers gradually spread throughout the country, particularly in Lisbon, Leiria, Oporto and Braga. A speech proffered by a worker also normally accompanied the inauguration of new delegations.¹⁷⁰

The inauguration of a delegation usually became a propaganda rally. Some provoked violent incidents that, while not uncommon during the agitated period of the dictatorship, were nonetheless uncommon among regime supporters. Street violence between militants of the League and opposition groups in Lisbon became more frequent, although the most violent conflicts took place in the provinces. The official inauguration of the Évora district delegation is a case in point. Homage was paid to “subalterns of the Lisbon barracks” in the presence of 27 sympathising officers representing Lisbon’s youth section and members of other delegations. When they departed, some followers were involved in a gunfight with supporters of the democratic opposition, which resulted in the death of one person.¹⁷¹ The following day, the leader of the local delegation, Silva Dias, was shot leaving Rolão Preto in the Praça do Geraldo.¹⁷² In Marinha Grande, a hostile demonstration took place during the inauguration of a League sub-delegation, provoking more violent incidents.¹⁷³

At the national level relations with the UN were ‘excellent’. At the local level, however, tensions increased. The League’s press attempted to justify its activities, stating that the organisation was “more pugnacious, more youthful”¹⁷⁴, but this did not put paid to criticism. Two criticisms predominated: the absence of UN political activity and UN adhesion by conservative republicans.¹⁷⁵ In Évora, where the civil governor tried to prevent the establishment

¹⁷⁰ *Diário de Notícias*, 9 December 1930.

¹⁷¹ The man who died was a carpenter who, in the opinion of a former supporter of the League, had been a ‘Masonic-democrat’. Interview with Alberto Mota Capitão, 24 November 1984.

¹⁷² *Ibid.*, 10 December 1931, p. 3. Silva Dias was assassinated by supporters of the opposition in the Praça do Geraldo in response to the death of the carpenter the previous day.

¹⁷³ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 6 March 1932.

¹⁷⁴ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 31 October 1931.

¹⁷⁵ Ferreira, J., *Ao serviço da Pátria e do Rei: memórias políticas (1926-1974)*, (Lisbon: 1991), p. 62.

of the League, supporters refused to join the UN because there were old republicans on the UN's district commission.¹⁷⁶ Responding to the Civil Governor, one League founder stated that the UN had been "formed to stand still while we want to move".¹⁷⁷ Tensions at the local level became frequent between supporters of the League and the UN. The League's press always adopted an ironic tone when commenting about the government party. As the spokesman of the Évora delegation said to the administrator of Silves Council: "And the UN? Some time ago a local commission met on the day it took office but they have done nothing since".¹⁷⁸

The conflict in Coimbra was worse, where, for the first time, a group left the UN to join the League. In February 1932, the District Delegation was inaugurated in the presence of a majority of members of the government party's district commission, including Eusébio Tamagnini and Carlos Proença de Figueiredo. The event led to a direct confrontation with the UN. A conservative republican, Bissaia Barreto caused the resignation of these men, when he joined the UN, bringing with him "several of the district's party politicians".¹⁷⁹ The inaugural session turned into an anti-UN demonstration. After speeches denouncing the 'infiltration' of Republicans supporting parliamentarism, a motion of solidarity with the extinct district commission was passed, which noted that the UN "served the principles of totalitarian nationalism proclaimed by the government on 30 July 1930 with an ardent faith".¹⁸⁰

League delegations became hostile towards sectors of the dictatorial government, when Salazar made it clear that the UN would more readily accept conservative republican notables. The government's position, which unlike the League did not wish to create a mass, state-sponsored ideological party, was entirely coherent.

¹⁷⁶ Interview with Alberto Mota Capitão, 24 November 1984, and *Manuelinho D'Évora*, 21 April 1932, p. 1.

¹⁷⁷ *Manuelinho d'Évora*, 28 July 1932, p. 1.

¹⁷⁸ *Manuelinho d'Évora*, 12 November 1931, p. 1.

¹⁷⁹ Interview with Carlos Proença de Figueiredo, 20 July 1984.

¹⁸⁰ *Manuelinho d'Évora*, 25 February 1932, p. 1.

The League became more radical as Salazar, still Minister of Finance at the time, set about building a new regime. The passage of a new Constitution became the main point of conflict. The leaders of the League did not officially react to the new constitution, but its delegations were extremely critical. In their view, the constitution enshrined liberalism, did not provide for integral corporatism and included a commitment to pluralism. The Leiria delegation stated: “we will vote ‘no’ in the plebiscite”.¹⁸¹ At this time, the League increased conspiratorial pressures in an attempt to impose a candidate for government. In July 1930, João de Almeida had been arrested for “preparing a revolutionary movement to overthrow the government” with the assistance of the League.¹⁸² In 1932, the League’s military section exerted pressure on Carmona to nominate Almeida rather than Salazar, whom they described as “a man who represents all of today’s nationalist aspirations”. League newspapers also promoted him as the ideal candidate.¹⁸³ In the end, however, it was Salazar who won the day.

On 12 March 1932, Lopes Mateus was designated president of the League by the government. His task was to neutralise it and to study all possible means to bring it into the UN fold. His appointment put a stop to military conspiracies. Meetings between João de Almeida and other leaders like David Neto were also immediately suspended.¹⁸⁴ Martinho Nobre de Melo was ‘exiled’, becoming Portugal’s ambassador to Brazil. Salazar’s secretary, chief informer within the Army and a founding member of the league, Assis Gonçalves, asked Salazar what should be done about the League. Salazar chose not to reply, preferring to control the League while refusing any contacts with it.

Lopes Mateus halted the conspiracy but not activity by the delegations, which continued to function until they joined NS that summer. In a report analysing the situation within the League destined for Salazar, Assis Gonçalves was the first to recognise that

¹⁸¹ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 27 June 1932, p. 4.

¹⁸² Peres, D., *História de Portugal — suplemento*, (Lisbon: 1954), p. 468.

¹⁸³ Letter to the President of the Republic, n. d., ARP, and *Reacção*, 25 May 1932, p. 1.

¹⁸⁴ *Revolução*, 24 May 1932, p. 1.

“few of them are truly on our side” and that the majority of League supporters had gone on to form NS.¹⁸⁵ Gonçalves’s assessment was accurate. Rolão Preto travelled from one end of the country to the other after the foundation of NS and gained the support of the majority of League district and local delegations. Some delegations such as the one in Coimbra were closed by government order following an attack on the UN, only to re-open months later under the banner of NS. Thus, when in 1933 it was announced that the League had “collectively adhered” to the UN, the majority of League supporters had in fact already adhered to NS.¹⁸⁶

* * *

The Military Dictatorship created the political space for the emergence of a fascist movement in Portugal. Three main groups supported the dictatorship: small conservative republican parties, Catholics and a conglomeration of radical right-wing groups led by Integralists and Sidonists searching for a mass base. By the end of the 1920s, fascism had emerged and attempted to permeate the right. It was supported by a significant number of junior officers who exerted considerable influence within the barracks and the local administration. The fascists set up local organisations to compete with the government’s party. They inherited the small militias hurriedly created by the military ‘barons’. They mobilised sectors of the *petite bourgeoisie* during an unstable dictatorship that had become dominated by Salazar, the catholic ‘financial dictator’. Rolão Preto realised that the time had come to unify these elements into a single fascist party. Portuguese National Syndicalism was not the first attempt to unite a fascist current as an alternative regime to Salazar’s authoritarian control over the Military Dictatorship. Indeed, it was the last.

¹⁸⁵ Gonçalves, A., *Relatórios para Oliveira Salazar (1931-39)*, (Lisbon: 1981), p. 75.

¹⁸⁶ After the government took control of the League’s headquarters in Lisbon, its first president, the Count of Silves, unsuccessfully attempted to recover from the government the money he had loaned the League, and wrote to the Interior Minister and to Salazar to this end. Bundle 447-Box 10, AGMI/ANTT.

Chapter Two

The Emergence of National Syndicalism

The founders of National Syndicalism (NS) were students who had been members of the Integralist Lisbon Student Junta of at the end of the 1920s. All were Integralists, legitimists or former sympathizers of *Action Française*. At the beginning of 1931, António Pedro and Dutra Faria, along with others in the group, published a newspaper, National Action (*Acção Nacional*), the immediate predecessor of The Revolution (*A Revolução*).¹ These men were *League* militants but their political identity was Integralist. They differed from first generation Integralists, however, in terms of political activity and ideology.

This was apparent at a banquet held in Luso in December 1931, where participating Integralist League members, as well as supporters of other organisations, felt that only Integralism had remained coherent in the face of the “continuous breakdown of movements, more or less heterogenous *Cruzadas* and Leagues”.² As reflected in Politics (*Política*), the national Integralist student newspaper, the influence of fascism was growing. Rolão Preto and Alberto Monsaraz, former members of the Integralist Central Junta, for example, identified with fascism.

At the Luso meeting, Monsaraz noted the differences between Integralist thought in 1914 and post-war fascism. He saw the latter as popularising Integralist ideals. In his words: “without the war we

¹ N° 1, Lisbon, 14 April 1931.

² *Política*, 20 January 1931, p. 12.

would still be vegetating with a pre-1914 *Action Française* and *Idea Nazionale*". In his view, with the war the profiles of new leaders had appeared "like medallions on the tapestry of history [...] the great Mussolini, the greatest of them all, the Bonaparte of the counter-revolution, created the first New State".³ For Preto, who had been a fascist since the 1920s, Integralist ideals were "a collection of socio-political and economic doctrines capable of creating and maintaining an atmosphere for the integral restoration of the Portuguese nation". In his view, these doctrines should be used to establish a dictatorship that would accept monarchists and republicans but avoid "diversity of beliefs or antagonistic ideas".⁴

The Revolução Group

The majority of those who founded Revolution were students at the Lisbon University Faculty of Humanities and Law. Their adherence to a totalitarian "National Revolution" with mass appeal and a charismatic leadership was apparent already in articles written in League papers and others published prior to the launch of *Revolução*. António Pedro was the most active of the group prior of the creation of NS. Pedro had supported traditional monarchism in 1928 when he was only nineteen years old, launching a short-lived legitimist student weekly.⁵ By 1931 his editorials in National Action, which he launched together with Dutra Faria, had all the ingredients of a typical fascist discourse. He was the driving force behind the creation of what became an "academic nationalist evening paper" and the author of the first NS organisational projects.

Pereira de Matos, another founding member of NS acquired his "nationalist faith" in France where he had been an AF supporter. Matos was critical of Integralist apathy and its "incapacity to act". Dutra Faria responded to this accusation by calling for action but continued to sustain monarchist sympathies.⁶ The Spanish fascist

³ Ibid., p. 5.

⁴ Preto, R., 'Palavras claras: Integralismo e integralismos', *Política*, 31 March 1931, p. 3.

⁵ See his article 'Acto de fé', *A Bandeira*, N^o 1, 1 December 1928, p. 1.

⁶ *Ação Nacional*, N^o 4, 25 April 1931, p. 2.

newspaper, The Conquest of the State (*La Conquista del Estado*), found this monarchist streak rather “anachronistic”.⁷ Despite this traditionalism, National Action actually adopted positions similar to those of the Spanish Juntas of National Syndicalist Offensive (*Juntas de Ofensiva Nacional-Sindicalista*).⁸ As Dutra Faria proclaimed: “We are anti-conservative, anti-capitalist, anti-bourgeois. In short, we are nationalists, which means that we do not look backwards”.⁹

António Pedro’s cohorts were mostly members of Integralist Student Juntas. Many broke with the immobility of first generation Integralists.¹⁰ Garcia Domingues, the founder of NS in the Algarve wrote to Pedro in 1931 emphasising the “need to completely revise our values”. He also declared his intention to leave IL and criticised the monarchist tendencies of the movement’s first generation. He viewed himself as a member of the ‘fascist generation’, and concluded his letter saying that just as “the dream of Russian communism is universal” so must theirs be.¹¹ Until the publication of the first issue of *The Revolution* in February 1932, Pedro and his group continued to write for League regional papers. Dutra Faria did not attempt to disguise the fact that the aim of *The Revolution* was to create a fascist organisation with IL and League supporters. He lamented that Preto had failed to keep his promise to stay in Lisbon and direct this initiative: he believed that with Preto in Lisbon “within three months our Integralist organisation would be on a war footing — ready for anything”.¹²

Pedro was the first editor of *A Revolução*. In it he published the principles of the publication. He wanted “Portugal to follow its

⁷ *Acção Nacional*, N^o 5, 6 May 1931, p. 2.

⁸ António Pedro debated with Ledesma Ramos in *La Conquista del Estado*. See: ‘A Portugal o Portugal nos conquista?’ *La Conquista del Estado*, N^o 19, Madrid, 25 July 1931.

⁹ *Acção Nacional*, N^o 1, 14 April 1931, p. 1. See: Payne, S. G., *Franco y José Antonio*, (Madrid: 1997), pp. 135-210, and Ellwood, S., *Spanish Fascism in the Franco Era*, (London: 1987), pp. 7-28 for more information about the foundation of JONS.

¹⁰ This group created the so-called ‘Martinho club’ and considered itself “the cream of Integralist academics”. See Ferreira, J., *op. cit.*, p. 23.

¹¹ Letter from José Domingos Garcia Domingues to António Pedro, 28 September 1931, Exp. António Pedro, BNL.

¹² Letter from Dutra Faria to Rolão Preto, 10 February 1932, ARP.

Imperial destiny, free from the sacrilegious and grotesque clamouring of parliamentary democracy, under a new hierarchical and authoritarian order". In economic terms they sought "the suppression of free competition [...] controlled directly by the State in the national interest". In social terms, they desired "the defence of the family and the corporatisation of all professions into mandatory unions".¹³ Pedro was initially the group's most important ideologue. Until Preto became the director of the newspaper, Pedro was its driving force and created the organisational and editorial structures that sustained the paper.

In the first months of 1932, the Integralist youth section joined the *Revolução* group, generating unease among Integralist notables. The latter worried mostly about the paper's support for violence, its anti-capitalism and its identification with international fascism. The paper claimed to represent a new generation of Integralists eager for action and railed against the movement's "masters".¹⁴ It argued that "violence is the essential and intelligent principle of all good politics, because without it, in the face of adversity no conquests are possible".¹⁵ Although it defended private property, it condemned "the anonymous and free capital of financial speculators", which it wanted to see "regulated, controlled and inspected by the State".

Preto and Monsaraz were the only members of the old Central Junta to respond positively to *Revolução*. The others maintained a prudent distance, even though they did not oppose Preto's management of the newspaper. Hipólito Raposo doubted the viability of the initiative,¹⁶ and several leading Integralists criticised the "petulance of students who, without studies and only twenty years old, already want to put their doctrines into practice".¹⁷ Preto's management of *Revolução*, however, permitted Integralist youths to overcome their doubts and facilitated the adhesion of many Integralist branches to the group.

¹³ Pedro, A., 'Editorial', *Revolução*, Nº 1, 15 February 1932, p. 1.

¹⁴ Faria, D., 'Os nossos mestres', *Revolução*, 9 March 1932, p. 3.

¹⁵ Oliveira Guimarães, C. and A., 'Violência', *Revolução*, 18 February 1932, p. 2.

¹⁶ Letter from Hipólito Raposo to Rolão Preto, 5 May 1932, ARP.

¹⁷ Letter from Hipólito Raposo to Rolão Preto, n. d., ARP.

The founders of *Revolução* were acutely aware that it was virtually impossible to create a fascist movement with the support of Integralists without Preto. Writing in the name of Integralist youths in 1931, António Tinoco told him that “in Lisbon, Coimbra and Oporto today [...] we *only trust you* to turn our organisation into a serious undertaking [...] if you wish — and this is your duty, Sir — you can be everything with us, we who lack a *leader*. *Nationalist youths will only march with you, and with you we will be everything*”.¹⁸ Preto finally accepted the leadership of *Revolução* in mid-1932. The programmatic and organisational foundations of NS were then established a few months later.

National Syndicalism

Pedro made the first plans regarding the organisation of NS in the summer of 1932. It was to be the “economic and social” embryo of a new corporatist order and a vanguard for the construction of a “Nationalist State”. The ambiguity of the proposals was typical of fascist movements but internal correspondence shows that there were clear proposals to construct a political force to re-organise the remains of Integralism along fascist lines. The new movement aimed to save the League from being overtaken by the UN. Preto’s ‘Twelve Principles of Production’ of the 1920s served as the programmatic base. They contained “a complete economic, social and political theory that transcended the bourgeois mould of monarchists and constitutional republicans, the anti-natural and criminal madness of marxism, in accordance with the human truth of our traditional and revolutionary times”.¹⁹

NS saw itself as “a regular army” destined “to defend the Fatherland from the enemy and to impose, if necessary, any measures indispensable for its salvation”.²⁰ Early regulations did not give particular prominence to a personalised leadership. The movement

¹⁸ Letter from António Tinoco to Rolão Preto, 8 July 1931, ARP.

¹⁹ Pedro, A., ‘Nacional Sindicalismo: o que pretende e o que é a nossa organização’, *Revolução*, 10 October 1932, p. 1.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

was to be led by a six-member directorate representing a pre-corporatist structure.²¹ It was only in 1933 that Preto proposed statutes closer to the fascist model, which signalled a new radical anti-Salazarism. The swift growth of NS was essentially a result of the ability of the *Revolução* group led by Preto to capture the support of Integralists and League members when political tensions were high due to the formation of the UN. NS became a melting pot of fascists and conservatives, with the most conservative and ultramontane provincial elite on the periphery and a young radical fascist group at the centre. Although some of the more rigid typologies of right-wing political movements in the inter-war period make an important distinction between fascism and the radical right, NS ‘fascistised’ a significant part of IL, which had mobilised and led an important segment of the Portuguese radical right.

The *Revolução* group was at the core of the movement. Based in Lisbon, it set the pace and determined who would lead the organisation. The successful NS take-over of the local political Integralist machine was largely the doing of Preto and Monsaraz. NS took control of a large part of local Integralist and League networks, which had offices, newspapers and local organisations that still played an active role in local political life. The largest part of the League’s district delegations adhered almost immediately to NS. In Leiria, two Sidonist officers who led the local League branch altered the delegation’s name and the subtitle of its newspaper and placed everything under the control of NS. The same happened in Évora, where Integralists led the League delegation. In Coimbra, the delegation adhered to NS as well.

The League district leadership in Leiria justified the shift by stressing the similarity between the programmes of the organisations and arguing that “almost all of the National Syndicalists” had been and continued to be members of the League.²² The local branches that shifted to NS between September 1932 and January 1933 without altering local leadership structures made similar argu-

²¹ Pedro, A., ‘Nacional Sindicalismo: A ONS e a sua função política e social’, *Revolução*, 11 October 1932, p. 1.

²² *União Nacional*, Leiria, 27 February 1933, p. 1.

ments. The Àgueda and Anadia delegations, almost entirely composed of Integralists, did not even bother to justify their move. Integralist influence in NS was clear. In the districts of Vila Real, Oporto, Braga and Viseu, those nominated to lead the delegations were the men who had led local Integralist organisations, although in some of the districts the younger generation took the lead despite the mistrust of local 'notables'. NS leaders in Oporto were the youngest in the country. Augusto Pires de Lima, a founding member of the League, took command there. Oporto was also the place where differences among Integralists over how to deal with Salazar were most sensitive. In Braga there was trouble because a former member of the Central Junta, became the local NS organiser without officially joining the organisation.²³ The more radical local leaders did not want to work with someone they called "a pseudo-leader [...] the 'Grand Master' of the moribund monarchist cause".²⁴

In some places, young fascists organised local branches from scratch. In the Algarve graduates who had recently returned to the district, founded NS and established a network of local branches. Their newspaper, *The National Syndicalist* (*O Nacional Sindicalista*), was of a much higher standard, in terms of information and propaganda, than the remaining NS regional press. It contained more cultural and ideological material, clearly bearing the mark of international fascism. Although very rare, members of the UN who, after failed attempts to change the government's organisations formed some delegations, sought political autonomy and support for their fascistic ideals in NS. In Alcácer do Sal, local UN leaders joined NS and went on to severely criticise their former colleagues. Nonetheless, most of those involved in this process were former Integralists.

NS established a good organisational base with its new members as well as former supporters of the League and Integralism. It had several head offices, a network of approximately fifteen regional

²³ Letter from António Valadares Botelho to Rolão Preto, 7 January 1933, ARP.

²⁴ Letter from Carlos Salazar de Campos to Carlos Proença de Figueiredo, 19 July 1933, ARP.

and local newspapers and several thousand members. Moreover, unlike previous organisations of its kind, NS was openly fascist in terms of organisation, ideology and politics. Former Integralist Marcello Caetano defined what he called a “current of enthusiasm, generosity and youth” in a letter to Salazar. It was the “*first spontaneous* movement of opinion to emerge since the beginning of the dictatorship; a movement that was not painstakingly created by the Interior Minister, is not the result of the work of Civil Governors, does not sustain itself at the government’s expense, and is not merely an electoral machine”.²⁵

The Political Programme of National Syndicalism

The nature of inter-war fascism has provoked an unending debate among historians and has been analysed in many different ways, as in their search for a ‘third way’ between liberal capitalism and revolutionary marxism, fascists appropriated the vocabulary and revolutionary practices previously monopolised by socialists and communists.²⁶ Fascist attempts to transcend right-left divisions during the crisis of liberal democracy, the variety of political paths it adopted and the diversity of origins of fascist leaders and ideologues present serious interpretative challenges. The Portuguese case, however, does not challenge the sociological imagination or require any particular creativity in the field of typologies of early twentieth century right-wing ideologies.

National Syndicalism and Integralism

NS ‘fascistised’ IL by reinterpreting the cultural and ideological outlook of the organisation. Integralism was based on Maurrasian reactionary political and traditional monarchism. It reinvented a neo-traditional corporatism and ethno-historical nationalism suit-

²⁵ Antunes, J. F. (org.), *Salazar e Caetano: cartas secretas, 1932-1968*, (Lisbon: 1993), p. 92.

²⁶ See: Linz, J. J., ‘Some Notes Towards a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective’, in Laqueur, W. (ed), *Fascism: A Reader’s Guide*, (Berkeley: 1976), pp. 3-121; Griffin, R., *op. cit.*, (London: 1991) and Payne, S. G., *op. cit.*, (Madison: 1996).

able for a Latin nation State. As such, it did not share the idiosyncrasies of some of its Eastern European counterparts. Rolão Preto published a series of articles in Spain where censorship could be avoided, which made the most detailed analysis of the links between Integralism and National Syndicalism.²⁷ Preto described the origins of Portuguese fascism in Spanish Action (*Acción Española*) in 1933 and 1934. His serene analysis stood in stark contrast with the agitation-propaganda style of other writings in which he expressed himself like most fascist leaders “like a pamphleteer, with lots of words written in capital letters”.²⁸

As noted above, Integralism was a typical ideological reaction against modernisation, a Jacobin secularism that was more populist than democratising, and against the Republican *petite-bourgeoisie*. For NS the main threat was the communist and socialist project for the masses, and it responded by announcing the “nationalisation” of those “disinherited [by] capitalism”. Unlike *Action Française*, Integralism never became a political league; because the Republican system did not introduce universal suffrage, there was no need to form a movement for electoral purposes. However, by remaining a pressure group, it avoided the creation of organisational barriers that could prevent ideological changes within its leadership. It also avoided internal sectarian difficulties or fascist schisms. The sectarian differences among various groups arising from the adherence of the Integralists to the aim of restoring the monarchy were overcome in the name of a common objective: the overthrow of the Parliamentary Republic. Furthermore, although Rolão Preto was the first fascist among the founding members of Integralism, his concern with the social question and political activities failed to cause serious divisions within Integralism before the 1926 coup. This allowed many Integralists to subsequently support NS.

NS inherited the historical nationalism of IL but, like all fascist movements, it gave it a forward-looking mobilising character and

²⁷ Preto, R., ‘El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista’, *Acción Española*, N°34, Madrid, 16 October 1933, pp. 199-204.

²⁸ Chauí, M., ‘Apontamentos para uma crítica da Acção Integralista Brasileira’, in Chauí, M. and Franco, M. S. C., *Ideologia e mobilização popular*, (Rio de Janeiro: 1978), p. 46.

stripped it of some of its more reactionary and traditionalist tendencies. As Preto noted, Integralism represented the part of the elite that had defeated the republic but after the overthrow of liberalism action and movement were necessary to consolidate a “new order”. In his view, Integralism had made the same mistakes committed by the classical counter-revolutionary models of the monarchic pro-restoration groups: “The oft repeated error of the Portuguese socio-political conservatives when facing their adversaries consisted in reacting in opposition in a measure more or less equal to the attack, rather than recognising [...] the need for a New Revolution”.²⁹ Preto believed that the cycle of counter-revolutions was over and saw the attempted restoration of 1918 as the “last genuine counter-revolution”. In the post-war world of masses and revolutions, backward looking movements were condemned to suffer “the same fate of all counter-revolutions: defeat”.³⁰ As an elitist movement, Integralism had become exhausted. In Preto’s words: “the national Revolution that the Integralists demanded can only be characterised as aristocratic, by their aristocratic spirit. Their Revolution was organised from the top down: with the creation of select groups and the conquest of the State”. For him, it “had never been and could never be a mass movement”.³¹

With liberalism defeated, the ‘social question’ at the basis of socialist and communist revolutionary movements was the key subject that the extreme right had to address. As Preto wrote: “Politics today are conditioned by the economic and social. From now on, we must replace policies for the few with policies for the masses. Intervention in the true political battle has been left almost exclusively in the hands of intellectual and active elites. In the economic and social battle, the masses have their place. They have been awakened by a profound sense that their immediate interests are at stake, and are driven by a strong pragmatism that will not allow them to give in to the illusions of political order”.³²

²⁹ Preto, R., ‘El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista’, *Acción Española*, N^o 45, Madrid, 16 January 1934, pp. 880-881.

³⁰ Preto, R., *Ibid.*, p. 882.

³¹ Preto, R., *Ibid.*, p. 883.

³² Preto, R., *ibid.*, pp. 884-885.

Although ambiguous, Preto indefinitely postponed the issue of restoration in the name of mass politics. He recalled that “the united front that redeemed the Portuguese on 28 May 1926 required monarchists to momentarily sacrifice their goal to avoid the regime question before the common enemy”,³³ The issue had to be postponed again to create a new form of democracy based on a “community of the masses”.³⁴ For the creation of a new regime, a leader was essential. The movement was neither electoral nor individualistic, but the selection of a representative “in the public sphere” was necessary.³⁵ In his view, the people did not “believe that miracles come from the ballot box”. They wanted “to see and to hear their chief, to follow him and place their confidence in him”.³⁶

Preto linked traditional Integralism with Sorelian fascism. The young nationalist elite within his movement, however, was more marked by the ‘modern’ dimensions of fascism. Although present within the intellectual elite of the 1920s, futurism and modernism were marginal to Portuguese fascism. Nevertheless, it influenced the generation that founded *A Revolução*. António Pedro was the most affected by the association between literary aesthetics and political action.³⁷ Pedro, a poet, art critic and artist like Dutra Faria, was a typical member of the ‘fascist generation’. Together with another NS founder, Castro Fernandes, he set up a modern art gallery and publishing house in Lisbon, both called UP³⁸. After the repression and dissolution of NS, Pedro moved to Paris, broke all ties with the movement and became involved with the French surrealists. Pedro saw himself as the herald of a ‘new generation’ that sought to make ‘youth’ and ‘modernity’ the greatest symbols of fas-

³³ Preto, R., ‘El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista’, *Acción Española*, N^o 34, Madrid, 16 October 1933, p. 203.

³⁴ See: Mosse, G. L., *The Nationalisation of the Masses*, (New York: 1975); Gentile, E., *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, (Cambridge: MA, 1996).

³⁵ Preto, R., ‘El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista’, *Acción Española*, N^o45, Madrid, 16 January 1934, p. 885.

³⁶ Preto, R., *Ibid.*

³⁷ Pinto, A. C., ‘The Literary Aspirations of Portuguese Fascism’, in Larsen, S., et. al. (eds.), *Fascism and European Literature*, (Bern and New York: 1991), pp. 238-253.

³⁸ Pinharanda, J., “Portuguese Art in the Twentieth Century”, Pinto, A. C., (ed), *Modern Portugal*, (Palo Alto: 1998), pp. 243-269.

cism. For him, the fascist elite was young, modern and opposed to all things ‘old’ and ‘liberal’. In his words: “We, the men of the twentieth century, are indebted to the war, from the uproar of which we emerged to oppose the intellectual lyricism of Tolstoyan Christianity [...] to awaken with the new virility of the clan” a “reborn and gregarious collectivist instinct that is ready to accept an imperialist and constructive regime of strength”.³⁹ His writing reveals fascism’s violent anti-democratic nature that, while hardly innovative, was nonetheless radically anti-conservative and completely rejected ‘bourgeois values’ at a time when the New State led by Salazar was on the rise.

As far as Pedro was concerned, fascism should not engage in the mere preventative repression of liberalism; it had to promote a “revolutionary spirit” that would survive the defeat of liberalism. Quick action was required to introduce “social reforms” through corporatism. Almost all of Pedro’s fascist demands were made in the name of youth. He believed that young people should be entrusted all of the important tasks under a new regime.⁴⁰ The impact of communism was also evident in his writing. However, as he was fundamentally concerned with a critique of liberalism and conservatism, his texts were predominantly negative in tone.⁴¹ The fascist nature of his discourse is evident in its celebration of a virile youth conscious of its ‘revolutionary’ role as a vanguard of the authoritarian regime, a youth disciplined and dedicated to the Fatherland, entrusted with the most difficult tasks in the construction of the “New Order”.⁴² This type of discourse dominated the first phase of the newspaper’s existence, although in the provinces it co-existed with the discourse of Integralism, provoking internal debates that Rolão Preto tried to mitigate.

³⁹ Pedro, A., *Esboço para uma revisão de valores*, (Lisbon: 1932), p. 10.

⁴⁰ Pedro, A. and Faria, D., ‘Optimismo’, *Revolução*, 25 February 1932, p. 1.

⁴¹ Pedro, A., ‘Posição de guerra’, *Revolução*, 17 February 1932, p. 1.

⁴² Curiously, after supporting Salazar, Dutra Faria wrote a novella that replaced the fascist paradigm with traditional Catholicism. His main character, a former Communist, did not turn to fascism. Instead he became a wholesome apolitical Catholic defender of the rural way of life and of a historical identity based on religion and medieval castles. See Faria, D., *Diário de um intelectual comunista*, (Lisbon: 1936) and Pinto, A.C., ‘The literary aspirations...’ *op. cit.*, pp. 245-248.

Ideologies like Integralism met with some success in almost all of the peripheral nations of Europe where an, albeit still dominant traditional agrarian world was being undermined by an industrialisation and urbanisation that encouraged mobility and atomisation and threatened to destroy the traditional social fabric. Although linked to an elite threatened by the dynamics of social change that characterised the process of modernisation, emerging fascist movements obtained their support from the popular classes at a time when traditional mechanisms of political control were being eroded.

The ideology of some fascist movements constituted a break with some of the foundations of reactionary thought. A careful study of these ideologies seems to confirm Burrin's contention that the ideologues of movements such as IL or AF would mistrust "the mobilisation of the masses and the plebeian elites rather than the hierarchies of natural order; the plebiscite rather than the monarchic principle; the aim of creating a 'new man' rather than recognising that man is part of a national past that conforms with the eternal order that legitimates society; a civic cult instead of religion".⁴³ Fascist ideology and political programmes in Portugal and in other comparable countries did not represent such a clear break with reactionary ideologies, because in these countries fascist groups did not become political parties and thereby permitted some degree of organisational fluidity and the greater permeability of the fascist elite. In this context, fascism was ideologically ambiguous and was of a more reactionary populist character than movements elsewhere.

The Twelve Principles of Production

According to Preto, the basic principles of NS were the Twelve Principles of Production.⁴⁴ Quoting Mussolini's dictum that "to define is to restrict", Preto noted that NS was born "like all similar

⁴³ Burrin, P., 'Le fascisme: la révolution sans révolutionnaires', *Le Débat*, 38, January-March 1986, p. 166.

⁴⁴ Preto, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 139-142.

European movements, Fascist and Nazi, without a rigorously defined programme in the manner of the old parties".⁴⁵ Preto and the other leaders had several opportunities to develop each of these 'commandments' in programmatic terms, and a more concrete political programme was included in NS statutes, which all supporters had to accept as part of the affiliation ritual.

The nationalism of NS did not differ from that of Integralism. The first principle enshrined in the statutes defined the Portuguese nation as eternal, and the Fatherland as "a reality imposed by the land, climate, language, race and history".⁴⁶ Unlike the Integralists, who attempted to legitimise this ultra-nationalism historically, Preto looked towards the future⁴⁷. For him, nationalism was the key to national and "imperial" resurrection. He was ironic about "the nostalgic", claiming that "the pain and the passion of Portugal's imperial history always brings out this 'fatalism'...the strength of the country has never coincided with the beliefs of its national leader".⁴⁸ In his view, in the Portugal of the early 1930s, it was important to give the country an imperial consciousness to destroy "the useless laments before the Race's Wailing Wall".⁴⁹ In his view, "a people can only walk the imperial path when the ambience of its exaltation allows miracles of limitless faith, giving them the self-confidence and heroic disposition to make sacrifices".⁵⁰

Portuguese fascists supported an imperial mystique typical of ultra-nationalism. Their main concern was to make this the "sacred" myth of national identity. In their view, the Portuguese had an empire, but had become victims of Liberalism and external dependency, and they lacked a political system that could make them aware of this imperial heritage. As Preto wrote, "the empire is the interpretation of the popular will by a leader and it presup-

⁴⁵ Preto, R., 'El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista', *Acción Española*, N^o45, Madrid, 16 January 1934, pp. 886-887.

⁴⁶ Preto, R., *Orgânica do movimento Nacional Sindicalista*, (Lisbon: 1933), pp. 1-2.

⁴⁷ Vakil, A., "Representations of the 'Discoveries' and the imaginary of the Nation in Portuguese Integralism", *Portuguese Studies*, Vol. II, 1995, pp. 133-167.

⁴⁸ Barbosa, J. P. M., *op. cit.*, p. 48.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 47.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

poses absolute brotherhood between the people's desires and the decidedly illuminating will of their conductor".⁵¹ The overwhelming domestic concern of the Fascists, then, was the reconstruction of the "Nation" upon "communitarian foundations". Their solution was to promote an "organicist" ideal. This led them to reject "the solidarity of the universal proletariat above and against the nation's sacred boundaries".⁵²

The other Principles of Production were concerned with the structure of the proposed "organic" State and were based on the integral corporatist model inherited from the Integralists. The latter was based on a rejection of the individual and on the belief that the family was "the primary social cell" along with the municipalities, unions and the rest of the Nation's "natural bodies". This new form of "organic", not "political" national representation entailed the creation of a National Assembly "entirely constituted by the representatives" of these bodies.⁵³

The most prominent part of this text was dedicated to "the world of labour" and the economy. Labour was to be led by a corporatist system that represented "the organic conjunction of all the elements that compete within it". NS proposals in this area varied, however, and were altered according to evolving political conditions. In official documents, it recognised that property "is a natural right but one that must be defined in accordance with social utility". The movement recognised that "the nation's public and private economies must be disciplined and directed by the State that has a duty to control them and intervene whenever the public and collective good, equity or social justice so demand".⁵⁴ The State, "as the leader of national production", could not establish a "new tyranny". On the contrary, under NS it would take care of "the common good", and "the entire socio-economic nation will be constructed in harmony with its moral and material interests rep-

⁵¹ *Ibid.*, p. 60.

⁵² Preto, R., *A Monarquia...*, p. 139.

⁵³ Preto, R., *Orgânica...*, p. 3.

⁵⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 2.

resenting labour and the nation's civic life through its hierarchies".⁵⁵

NS anti-capitalism protected an imagined society of small producers threatened by industrial concentration. According to NS doctrine, finance capital that respected no boundaries and led "to the death of small employers and to the proletarianisation of the working masses" were the source of all evil and injustice and would "lead to the rebellion of the modern slaves".⁵⁶ This is a classical theme in some varieties of fascism. Preto spoke for the rural and urban classes about the future of liberal capitalism. For him, it would be a world controlled by faceless capitalists who would empty the countryside and transform Portuguese society into a giant agglomeration of proletarians and service employees. The rejection of capitalism coincided with the rejection of democracy; the latter's purpose was to ensure the absolute dominance of the former "over the nation". For Preto, capitalism, parliamentarism and centralisation were all sides of the same coin. "In order to dominate politics, liberal-democracy centralises and concentrates the profits of governing the country in a few hands".⁵⁷

Mobilising Themes

By the end of the 1920s, the military dictatorship had literally exhausted some of the great mobilising themes of native fascism. Conservative republicans and catholics dominated an important part of the dictatorship's elite. Nonetheless, some of fascism's opposition themes, its 'antis', particularly radical republicanism and liberalism, had already been excluded from the political scene. Thus, NS proposed the corporatist reorganisation of the state and the

⁵⁵ Preto, R., 'El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista', *Acción Española*, N° 49, Madrid, 16 March 1934, p. 48.

⁵⁶ Preto, R., 'El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista', *Acción Española*, N° 46, Madrid, 1 February 1934, p. 987.

⁵⁷ Preto, R., 'El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista', *Acción Española*, N° 47, Madrid, 16 February 1934, p. 1109.

creation of a militia that would organise elites and conquer the ‘masses’ for the regime. NS placed itself at the vanguard of the ‘National Revolution’ before other political forces and pressure groups backing the dictatorship. Its leaders proclaimed themselves supporters of a true reform of the state, which would eliminate the last traces of liberalism and prevent the re-conversion of old republican *caciques*. They would offer the dictatorship the support of the masses, compete with the communists and the anarcho-syndicalists for hegemony over the union movement and transform the masses into a disciplined body supportive of the new regime.

NS offered the regime squadrons educated in the movement’s school of political activity. Preto proclaimed “all power to the young”. In his view, “the reform of the State will only be effective and useful if responsibility for new mechanisms is given to the youth... who believe wholeheartedly in the triumph of the principles and new methods that inspire them”. He also pointed to the example of Mussolini: there are no “grey heads” at Chigi Palace.⁵⁸ He claimed leadership over the “young generation that had carried out the coup of 28 May” who were being betrayed by leaders within the dictatorial regime whose agreement with the republicans was delaying the construction of an “Integral State”.⁵⁹

Elections, supported by some within the regime, were the product of “a spirit of compromise and accommodation [that] could in no way be of interest to the Integral State”.⁶⁰ NS showed how the fascists had moved beyond the ‘regime question’. This is particularly important, as this was a party whose political elite had all been formed by Integralism. A short time after the creation of NS, Preto stated that “the political dilemma over republic or monarchy is not important now”.⁶¹

The resolution of the ‘social question’ was the central issue for NS. Salazar may have “resolved the financial problem”, but the reform of the state according to integral corporatism remained the

⁵⁸ Preto, R., ‘Todo o poder aos novos’, *Revolução*, 2 April 1932.

⁵⁹ Preto, R., ‘Comunicado de guerra’, *Revolução*, 23 February 1932.

⁶⁰ Preto, R., *Ibid.*

⁶¹ Preto, R., ‘República? Monarquia?’, *Revolução*, 8 November 1932.

only way to establish “a greater equilibrium of wealth for the better distribution of social justice” and to eliminate the communist threat.⁶² Preto’s propaganda speeches have to be analysed as those of a fascist movement competing for power during the transition towards an authoritarian regime when ‘anti-conservative’ was a negative label that was brandished systematically. The ‘anti-conservatism’ of the fascists was reflected, above all, in their aim to mobilise the masses through the creation of militias and nationalist unions, in their anti-plutocratic and populist discourse and in “bottom up” process of state reform. They criticised the government party for being “like Primo de Rivera’s *Unión Patriótica*, eclectic, electoral and conservative”.⁶³ NS working class propaganda in the 1930s provoked profound distrust among conservative elites who had organised into incipient political parties. Under a military dictatorship that Salazar dominated through a succession of pacts and palace coups, the ‘third way’ of the fascists represented a break from the ‘limited politics’ of the conservatives that characterised the regime installed in 1926.

NS defended catholicism, but it did not focus on the overthrow of the secular pillars inherited from the Parliamentary Republic, nor did it call for Catholic Integralism. Harassed by the CCP, which had gained the support of an important segment of the intellectual elite and students since the early 1920s, NS responded by criticising Catholics for their conciliatory positions and pragmatic centrism. In *Acción Española*, Preto described Salazar as a man of the “Catholic Centre, yet not of the Catholic Centre” in the sense that he was one of the leaders of this party but acted autonomously from in his rise to power. Nonetheless, “like Bruning, Don Sturzo and Monsignor Shepel” he was “naturally afraid of revolutionary nationalism”, and “logical adversary of all revolutions that do not come from above”.⁶⁴

⁶² Preto, R., *op. cit.*

⁶³ Preto, R., ‘El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista’, *Acción Española*, N^o 34, 16 October 1933, p. 203.

⁶⁴ Preto, R., ‘El movimiento Nacional Sindicalista’, *Acción Española*, N^o 45, Madrid, 16 January 1934, p. 886.

National Syndicalist Political Activity

The Wave of Rallies

NS demonstrations introduced Portugal to fascist choreography. The paramilitary parades, combat songs and charismatic ritualisation of Rolão Preto were the marks of its political activity. The movement's presence on the streets began in September 1932 and peaked at the Lisbon and Oporto rallies and the Braga demonstration of May 1933 that commemorated the 1926 military coup. In response to crescendo of activity, by 1933 anti-fascist action became generalised.

The first rallies were local and relied on the support of sympathisers within the administration, many of them military officers. Preto and the movement's 'young' founders made regular trips to the provinces to participate in propaganda activities organised by local leaders. These activities were always accompanied by paramilitary choreography as in the rally that took place in Alenquer at the end of 1932. The local delegation announced a rally for "the proletariat of Alenquer". They stated that they sought the "union of all Portuguese people" at a time when "those who have sold themselves to foreigners proclaim a class conflict that generates the confusion they take advantage of in order to obtain their secret goals". Their rallying cry was anti-communist. It favoured "an independent and free Fatherland", "for social justice" and supported "the family, the municipality, the union".⁶⁵ Preto arrived in Alenquer with other leaders expecting to be met by a uniformed local delegation and travelled in a cortege to the town hall where the local administration awaited them. The rally took place after a 'guard of honour' paraded before them.

This model was emulated in various cities and provincial towns. At the end of 1932, NS emerged as the only mobilising force supporting the dictatorship. Each time a local or district commission came to office, the movement took advantage of the occasion to organise demonstrations. They gave the Blue Shirts the support of

⁶⁵ Communiqué from the Alenquer Branch of National Syndicalism, 5 November 1932.

the most fascistic elements of local élites. In February 1933, the movement organised their first national rally in Lisbon to mark the first anniversary of the publication of *A Revolução*. The banquet at Edward VII Park in Lisbon marked Preto's undisputed leadership. NS papers began to treat him with increasing reverence and the designation Chief (*Chefe*) became common currency. His uniformed image appeared all over NS pamphlets in which he was routinely described as "a strong personality" who was almost "synonymous with the National Syndicalist movement".⁶⁶

Preto's speeches all followed the same simple pattern. He declared that National Syndicalism was the vanguard of the "National Revolution" and that it represented the youthful supporters of the dictatorship. He always mentioned the 'social question' and pursued anti-communist and anti-democratic themes. He supported civilian and military youths that were the basis for the reform of the state. He also criticised "conservatives" and "infiltrators". At the rally in Edward VII Park, Preto declared himself leader of an "unstoppable revolution" that had "to transform our glorious Fatherland!" He saluted "the fervent youth who will not lay down their arms" and the "lieutenants who immaculately and with integrity maintain their heroic military virtues". He stressed his identification with international fascism by saying that he was "beyond Fascism and Hitlerism", and immediately concentrated on the 'social problem' with the following systematically repeated formula: "to de-proletarianise the working masses and to prevent the proletarianisation of the middle classes".⁶⁷ The *Revolução* group always accompanied Preto, and at times substituted for him at some of the local rallies.

Following a rally at the Crystal Palace in Oporto, NS prepared a national demonstration in opposition to the official celebrations of the anniversary of the 1926 coup. On 28 May, approximately 3,000 supporters were mobilised in Braga. NS Secretary General, Alberto Monsaraz, left for the north to organise the parade while Pires de

⁶⁶ *Revolução dos trabalhadores*, N^o 4, 25 February 1933.

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 1.

Lima, the leader in the north, wrote to Preto confirming that “the Braga event is going to be one of the best and most extraordinary things that National Syndicalism has done”.⁶⁸ The movement was strongest in the north and the activism of its supporters assured a large turnout. Preto initiated a new phase in the life of NS of open conflict with the dictatorship in his speech. Symbolically, as if threatening the government, it was delivered close to the army barracks from where Gomes da Costa had led the uprising in 1926.

At NS national rallies the table was invariably reserved for the military officers sympathetic to the movement and to the eternal candidate to lead the dictatorship, General João de Almeida. Some of the lieutenants were regular speakers and were eulogised in NS newspapers.⁶⁹ *Revolução* presented their biographies in its ‘nationalist gallery’ (*galeria nacionalista*), and some wrote inflammatory articles about their role as guardians of the ‘National Revolution’. At the Coimbra rally of 21 May 1933, the table was reserved for University dons whose relations with Salazar were tense. Speakers included Eusebio Tamagnini, NS Secretary of the central region of the country, and Cabral Moncada, NS leader and Deputy Rector of the University.⁷⁰ NS rallies mobilised a hard core of fascists, but also Integralist personalities and members of other radical right-wing organisations who lent political and intellectual respectability to the movement’s virulent discourse.

Political violence developed in proportion to the increase in NS street mobilisations. Until 1933, NS activities had led to sporadic incidents of violence involving anti-fascist militants, particularly in the universities and at union meetings. From May 1933 onwards, however, violent street conflicts became commonplace. At the Coimbra rally, for example, opposition forces which had organised a visit to the grave of a republican, attacked NS supporters arriving from Lisbon at the railway station and NS coaches

⁶⁸ Letter from Augusto Pires de Lima to Rolão Preto, 25 May 1933, ARP.

⁶⁹ The military hierarchy later prevented officers from publicly associating themselves with National Syndicalism. See the official note in *Ideia Livre*, Anadia, 20 May 1933, p. 1.

⁷⁰ See: Moncada, L. C. de, *Memórias: ao longo de uma vida (pessoas, factos, ideias)*, 1888-1974, (Lisbon: 1992), pp. 185-186.

were met by the same group of pro-democracy demonstrators and a fight ensued⁷¹. It was only broken up with the arrival of the police.⁷² Preto and his followers were in the Hotel Avenida and required police protection upon leaving the building. NS newspapers praised the discipline of those who “with admirable order” had marched to the Quinta da Várzea where the banquet after the rally was held.⁷³ Internal reports noted that a group of fascists had left Coimbra “under a barrage of insults hurled at [them] by a multitude, which was held back by the police”.⁷⁴

Events at Coimbra marked the beginning of a series of confrontations with opposition forces. There were conflicts in several towns where NS campaigned.⁷⁵ During the build up to the Braga demonstration, street conflicts escalated. When NS supporters arrived in Oporto there was fighting in the Avenida dos Aliados. There were gunfights in Ponte de Lima, Guimarães and Braga. In Ermezinde, a group of railway workers attempted to derail the train carrying NS supports from Braga. When the train arrived at Ermezinde, there was a small group waiting for the National Syndicalists, who responded by opening fire. According to the police report, five were admitted to hospital for treatment, where Rolão Preto later visited them. NS made use of these incidents, forcing the government to make an official enquiry, which led to the imprisonment of eleven “agitators”, all of them railway workers.⁷⁶ At last the National Syndicalists had some “heroes”. Furthermore, they also began to denounce the “campaign of fear” that, in their view, aimed to legitimate attempts to ban the movement.⁷⁷

In June 1933 the NS prepared a demonstration to commemorate the Battle of Aljubarrota. In a letter to the government, Mon-

⁷¹ See: Vilaça, A., *Para a História Remota do PCP em Coimbra, 1926-1946*, (Lisbon: 1997), pp. 117-123.

⁷² See the report of events sent to Salazar, Arquivo Oliveira Salazar (AOS), CO/PC-3E, ANTT.

⁷³ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 28 May 1933, p. 8.

⁷⁴ Unsigned report, n. d., ARP.

⁷⁵ *Ordem Nova*, Anadia, 27 May 1933, pp. 1 and 4.

⁷⁶ Processo 104/1933, Tribunal Militar Especial.

⁷⁷ Preto later stated that fascist leaders had believed these opposition activities had been deliberately provoked by the dictatorship's police.

saraz announced the concentration of 10,000 members in uniform and appealed for a popular mobilisation but the Minister of the Interior refused to permit the meeting.⁷⁸

The 'Worker Temptation'

NS made the most successful attempt of any extreme right-wing group to penetrate the Portuguese labour and union movement. The only right wing conservative forces operating in this area were the Social Catholics. In the 1920s Preto's attempts to create an "organic syndicalist" alternative to "red internationalism" had never taken root. After several years of dictatorship, their margin for manoeuvre had been progressively reduced, leading NS to form fascist groups within existing unions. Some became the basis of Salazar's "national unions". The attention that labour newspapers began to dedicate to NS revealed how the movement had succeeded in penetrating an arena until then almost exclusively dominated by the old union movement of the First Republic.

In March 1934, Preto proudly noted the emergence of a new working class "élite" associated with NS. In his words, it was "a beautiful élite of propagandists", which had "emerged after a few months of nationalist and corporatist indoctrination".⁷⁹ Preto referred not only to union militants sympathetic to NS but also to regular speakers at NS rallies in Lisbon and Oporto: "They give a chance to the humble, the sons of people who from a tender age earn the bread they eat with the sweat of their brow". In his view, "new élites [will] rise from their ignorant ranks".⁸⁰ Editorials and articles were dedicated exclusively to the promotion of corporatism and pieces about how NS intended to deal with the "social problem".⁸¹ The 'social' orientation distinguished NS from other move-

⁷⁸ Letter from Alberto Monsaraz to Oliveira Salazar, 19 June 1933, AOS/CP-183, ANTT.

⁷⁹ Preto, R., 'Novas elites: propagandistas operários', *União Nacional*, Leiria, 11 March 1934, p. 1.

⁸⁰ Preto, R., *Ibid.*

⁸¹ Along with articles by Rolão Preto, National Syndicalists published books and pamphlets written by several leaders. See: Costa, N. da, *Para além da ditadura, I: soluções corporativas*, (Lisbon: 1933); Lima, A. de, *Revolução*, (Oporto: 1933); and Tinoco, A., *A revolução nacional dos trabalhadores*, (Lisbon: 1933).

ments supporting the dictatorship, making it the natural heir of the League. From the beginning, *Revolução* published the Workers' Page (*Página do Operário*) that later became a free supplement entitled The Workers' Revolution (*A revolução dos trabalhadores*), directed by António Tinoco, the most "national socialist" of the journal's founders.⁸² This supplement published news about the working class world, communiqués from local secretariats to workers and, censorship permitting, denunciations about the political activities of left-wing parties that influenced the unions, particularly by the communists and anarcho-sindicalists.⁸³

Employers were not immune to criticism. NS attacked them for not complying with working hour legislation, paying miserable wages, and for an unwillingness to talk with employees. The financial sector was a favourite NS target owing to speculation and high interest rates, which were responsible for the failure of many businesses, and made the lives of the rural proprietors and their dependants impossible. For NS, the "Nationalist State" of the future had great disciplinary tasks within the social and economic fields. It had to "nationalise" capital, discipline its owners, and ensure "social harmony", minimum salaries, retirement benefits and social security. According to the NS northern zone secretariat, the movement supported "a policy of decisive protection for agriculture, including obligatory agricultural labour, the enforced unionisation of all social classes, and State control of the banks".⁸⁴ *Revolução* engaged in various "anti-plutocratic" campaigns, the most important focusing on the milling industry. Entire pages were dedicated to denouncing the political manipulation of politicians and journalists by this industry, particularly those belonging to the republican camp.

Programmatically, there were divergent tendencies within NS. António Tinoco was closer to National Socialism. His articles and

⁸² N^o 1, 4 February 1933. *Revolução dos trabalhadores* was periodically 'devastated' by the dictatorship's censor. Some editions were completely banned.

⁸³ For material concerning the anarcho-sindicalists during this period see Freire, J., *Anarquistas e operários: ideologia, ofícios e práticas sociais: o anarquismo e o operariado em Portugal, 1900-1940*, (Oporto: 1993).

⁸⁴ Communiqué 'Ao povo do norte', reproduced in *Reacção*, Àgueda, 19 June 1933.

books revealed less respect for private property and more socialist beliefs than those held by Preto. His National Socialism meant 'anti-capitalism', which had little to do with the old rural anti-industrialism and it may have seemed excessive to some ultramontane notables in the provinces. The Guimarães delegation reaffirmed anti-capitalism and was opposed to "financiers and plutocrats who are, to a greater or lesser degree, irresponsible. National Syndicalism is against capitalism, that is, it is against that organisation of production that has established a predominance, more than a predominance, the tyranny of property and capital over technique and labour". "Organic collectivism" to be established by the "Syndicalist State" was the alternative to the "internationalist and red" collectivism of the communists.⁸⁵

NS slogan "we want the rich to be less rich so that the poor may be less poor" was used as evidence that the movement did not, as stated by their communist-influenced accusers, defend employers.⁸⁶ NS communiqués tried to show how the movement differed from the communists. It put forward a programme to resolve the "social problem". It called for the corporatist unionisation of all socio-professional groups, the establishment of a social minimum wage to protect the family and respect women's work in the home, invalidity and sickness benefits, social assistance for pregnant women and children, as well as a state policy for social housing.⁸⁷ By integrating the working class NS hoped to eliminate the revolutionary communist influence that permeated the unions. As it fought to gain recognition from the dictatorship in this field, NS presented anti-communism as a key element legitimising their existence under a regime that saw the "social problem" in merely preventative and repressive terms. "When we note the danger represented by the ever increasing threat of communism there are very few conservatives who do not shrug their robust shoulders in disdain, certain that there is nothing to it".⁸⁸ NS worker manifestos did not differ-

⁸⁵ Communiqué distributed by the Guimarães delegation, *Revolução*, 3 December 1932, p. 3.

⁸⁶ Communiqué from the Alenquer branch reproduced in *Alcácer*, 11 June 1933, p. 2.

⁸⁷ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 28 May 1933, p. 1.

⁸⁸ Preto, R., 'Cuidado, ricos!', *União Nacional*, Leiria, 7 March 1933, p. 1.

entiate communists from anarcho-syndicalists, which was still an important organisation at this time. Conscious of communism's international ascendancy, it only differentiated from the left the socialists that they associated with the "republican opposition". All other groups were denounced as 'reds'.

In September 1932, NS announced the inauguration of 'union houses' throughout the country. These were to be social, education and propaganda centres for organic syndicalism.⁸⁹ Centres of this kind only opened in Lisbon, Oporto, Alenquer and Bragança. Tense relations with the government complicated their existence, which ordered that they all be closed in 1934. Preto wanted to turn all NS local branches into "pre-union nuclei".⁹⁰ The real unions would be created later as an integral part of the future "corporatist and nationalist reorganisation of the State".

Some delegations, particularly those previously linked to the League, already had "worker sections" and support mechanisms for the working class such as legal aid offices, surgeries and unemployment assistance. It was these services that attracted members. The houses were organised voluntarily and were located in NS local offices. They only functioned effectively in Lisbon and in Oporto. Indeed, it was the judicial support offices that met with greatest success in these cities. NS also aimed to make the 'union houses' open to workers' demands. Although or perhaps because they were rare, *Revolução* proudly published details of visits by worker delegations not yet affiliated to the movement, such as the Lisbon bread distributors or the Braga hat makers.⁹¹ It also regularly announced trade union assemblies and interviewed their leaders.⁹² Although it is difficult to identify the presence of NS in trade unions, it is significant that the leaders of the latter allowed fascist reporters to attend general assemblies.

NS also began to form working class militants. Employees in the service sector were Integralists, while other workers came mostly

⁸⁹ *Revolução*, 1 September 1932.

⁹⁰ Preto, R., 'Quadros', *Revolução*, 6 September 1932, p. 1.

⁹¹ *Revolução*, 17 August 1932, and 18 November 1932. In this case it concerned the demands of some shop owners with their own offices.

⁹² *Revolução*, 16 March 1933, p. 4; 18 March 1933, p. 2; 14 January 1933, p. 4.

from the League. “Worker propagandists” rarely came from the old union movement. Francisco Moreira was an exception. A quarryman and former anarcho-syndicalist, Moreira had founded the Oporto Builders Union (*Sindicato da Construção Civil do Porto*) and been arrested and exiled to Spain under the Republic.⁹³ Other deserters of anarcho-syndicalism like Eduardo Frias who founded the movement in the Algarve may have brought militants to NS.⁹⁴ These examples were rare, however. The majority of militants were either drawn from within the movement or from the League and had no previous associations with either the left or independent unions.

The presence of NS was most marked in the north of the country, along the Oporto/Braga axis. The geographical spread of denunciations by the legal and the clandestine press associated with left-wing parties coincide with the areas of greatest NS presence, as do the violent confrontations between fascists and opposition in 1933 and 1934. NS opposition to the left attracted some employer affiliations. This is not the only explanation for the significant support it gained: most employers mistrusted anyone whose goal was to make them comply with the current legislation and of any unionisation efforts based on the protection of workers, even when made by ‘patriotic’ fascists. Among the few examples confirming the affiliation of employers is that of an industrialist from Loriga who joined NS and played an active role in employer associations.⁹⁵

Local NS propaganda consisted of the distribution of copies of the *Revolução dos Trabalhadores* in working class areas and at small rallies at factory gates. In the areas where the movement had

⁹³ *Ordem Nova*, Anadia, 21 May 1933, pp. 1-2. Attacked by the republican press as a former bomber, Moreira defended himself in *A revolução dos trabalhadores*, 20 May 1933, pp. 1 and 4.

⁹⁴ See his article ‘A CGT e o Nacional-Sindicalismo: carta aberta ao sr. Alexandre Vieira, antigo director da “Batalha”, órgão da Confederação Geral do Trabalho’, *O Nacional Sindicalista*, Nº 10, Faro, 19 February 1933, p. 4.

⁹⁵ See the letter from Cabral Leitão, which distinguished him from the narrow viewpoints adopted by some of the other employers in *Revolução*, 2 September 1932, p. 2. Regarding his positions within the employers’ associations, see Patriarca, F., *A Questão Social no Salazarismo*, Vol. 1 (Lisbon: 1995).

organised branches, all rallies included speeches by workers.⁹⁶ From January 1933, propaganda pickets became normal practice throughout the country. The movement's young Lisbon leaders participated in many such pickets, visiting several provincial locations in a single day. As noted above, NS was particularly strong in the north. In Barcelos the Civil Construction Worker's Union (*Associação de Classe dos Operários da Construção Civil*) protested against "individuals who said they were government agents [who] entered the offices to force workers there to give their names [...] in this manner they managed to take 65 affiliates from this association".⁹⁷ In Guimarães a similar denunciation was made by a group of workers from the textile factories.⁹⁸ Proof of NS power in the north is found in opposition newspapers. Their correspondents denounced methods of recruitment and eagerly reported the return of any 'repentants', who had seen through NS "illusions".⁹⁹

In many places NS delegates thanked employers for giving them permission to picket their establishments and for advising "their employees to join the National Syndicalists".¹⁰⁰ In Lisbon and the south bank of the Tagus, however, this type of activity was rare.

NS union activity was the main challenge the movement presented to the regime. At the Oporto Crystal Palace rally, for example, Francisco Moreira stated: "I will never cease to be a revolutionary against the bourgeois and capitalist society which has to this date only sought to exploit the working class. Here I am today, ready once more for battle in defence of the principles which are proclaimed by National Syndicalism".¹⁰¹ Vieira da Cunha, another active fascist unionist who had participated in the foundation of the Oporto District Tramway Employees' Union (*Sindicato Nacional do Pessoal dos Carros Eléctricos do Distrito do Porto*) in

⁹⁶ In the north of the country the adhesions they attracted were denounced by the socialist press.

⁹⁷ *República Social*, 20 May 1933, p. 3.

⁹⁸ *República Social*, 27 May 1933, p. 3.

⁹⁹ *Revolução Social*, 3 June 1933, p. 6.

¹⁰⁰ See the notices from local correspondents of several northern councils. *Revolução*, 8 June 1933, p. 6, and 23 June 1933, p. 4.

¹⁰¹ *A revolução dos trabalhadores*, N^o 11, 13 May 1933, pp. 1-2.

1934, also asserted the revolutionary character of the movement's working class members. Even old Integralist conspirators such as Brigadier João de Almeida wrote about "the exploitation by capitalists who don't work [...] while workers of all categories remain in the darkest misery".¹⁰²

NS left no significant mark in the rural world. Apart from limited activity in Évora it had no impact amongst the rural proletariat of the *latifundista* south. In the north, particularly in the districts of Vila Real and Bragança, the monarchic élite dominated. NS rural discourse was fundamentally directed at landowners.¹⁰³ It supported the demands of agrarian "vital forces" and of "medium sized farms", which were "the foundations of the national economy".¹⁰⁴ Preto made numerous allusions to the German National Socialists that, even though they were from a "largely industrialised" country attempted to save "medium sized farms that were entirely in the hands of usurers".¹⁰⁵

Rural rallies were sporadic and provoked great concern among the Civil Governors. There were propaganda activities in districts like Castelo Branco, Guarda, Aveiro and Leiria, but such activities were swiftly prohibited. Government delegates saw NS rural activity as an attempt to upset an area that they wanted to remain obedient and respectful of traditional social hierarchies. In Leiria, where NS brigades distributed manifestos and membership forms during small agitation rallies, the Civil Governor reported to Lisbon that the National Syndicalists had "cycled through some of the parishes in this council, stopping at the doors of the churches at the end of Mass, seeking to form groups, pretending to take pictures and adopting other tactics to hold the attention of country-folk. When they have a reasonable number of people assembled, they distribute their manifestos and organise rallies".¹⁰⁶ At these

¹⁰² See his Coimbra speech in *União Nacional*, Leiria, 28 May 1933, p. 1.

¹⁰³ For an example of the movement's few rural manifestos see: Ferreira, M. S., *Da vida agrária*, (Leiria: 1933).

¹⁰⁴ Preto, R., 'Acuda-se às classes médias!', *União Nacional*, Leiria, 10 December 1933, p. 1.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Report from the Civil Governor of Leiria to the Minister of the Interior, 19 July 1933, Bundle 463, AGMI/ANTT.

rallies they made statements “so audacious that they disorient the spirit of these simple country-folk with speakers who, presenting themselves as defenders of the New State, go on to promote doctrines that have never been defended by supporters of the dictatorship [...] disorientation is even greater when army officers are doing the speaking”.¹⁰⁷ The governor’s informants, supporters of the UN, confirmed that Lieutenant Virgulino had outlined positions “so similar to Bolshevik doctrines that a quarryman, who professed these ideas, declared to be entirely in accord with the affirmations made by this officer”.¹⁰⁸ This led to the prohibition of NS activities in the district.¹⁰⁹ The Civil Governors of Vila Real, Guarda and other districts, followed the example set by their counterpart in Leiria.¹¹⁰

In some of the northern regions provincial aristocratic notables provided ‘clients’ with uniforms for NS demonstrations. This was noted by a correspondent of *The Voice (A Voz)* who reported on one of Preto’s visits to the district of Vila Real: “Last Sunday Rolão Preto was in this city, staying at the home of the Count of Vila Real in Mateus. Many people of all social classes visited the location to greet the National Syndicalist leader, including around 20 who were dressed in the movement’s uniform”.¹¹¹ NS activities did not have any great practical consequences at an organisational level in the rural world, however. The same cannot be said about NS ‘free syndicalist’ activity: faced with the dictatorial government’s relative neutrality, it began to tenaciously close in on the ‘reds’.

NS militants gained most ground in the service sector, especially among bank and insurance employees.¹¹² They succeeded in

¹⁰⁷ The governor was referring to two lieutenants who were district leaders of National Syndicalism.

¹⁰⁸ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁹ Confidential circular N^o 1877 from the Civil Governor of Leiria to the Council Administrations, 4 August 1933, Bundle 463, AGMI/ANTT.

¹¹⁰ Report from the Civil Governor of Guarda to the Minister of the Interior, 4 May 1933, Bundle 462-box 15, AGMI/ANTT.

¹¹¹ *A Voz*, 10 August 1933, cited in *União Nacional*, Leiria, 20 August 1933, p. 8.

¹¹² The most well known case of the bank employees is not described here as it is well documented in Castanheira, J. P., *Os sindicatos e o salazarismo: História dos Bancários do Sul e Ilhas, 1919-1969*, (Lisbon: 1983).

forming the Portuguese Bank Employees' Association (*Associação Portuguesa dos Empregados Bancários*, APEB) at the end of 1932. Most of these NS militants were Integralists, although several had been members of the League before joining NS. The origin of a fascist presence among bank employees can be found in Preto's 'syndicalist' sermons during the 1920s. With the creation of the Union of Employees of the National Overseas Bank (*Sindicato dos Empregados do Banco Nacional Ultramarino*) in 1923, sympathisers and members of IL were proud to be "the first Portuguese workers to seriously organise in the anti-revolutionary camp".¹¹³ They proclaimed Valois to be their "master" and supported "the alliance between capital and labour". Their influence endured until the end of the 1920s.

In September 1932, raising the battle cry against the "revolutionary dominion initiated nine years ago", NS bank employees denounced the "Communists" who had led the union since 1931.¹¹⁴ The following month they, together with a group of 40 associates, attempted to overthrow the leadership by calling a General Assembly, proclaiming support for the "principles of National Syndicalism" were defeated, however. After this, the group created APEB at the end of December 1932. APEB had "national syndicalist" ideals and announced its intent to defend "co-operation between capital and labour", declaring that "at the right moment" it would become a part of "the structure of the True State".¹¹⁵

NS also had a significant presence among Lisbon insurance workers. They were led by Vasco do Amaral, who later became the leader of this sector's 'national union'. It also had a strong presence among office workers, although APEB was the movement's only autonomous syndicate. Although Unity (*Unidade*), the union's newspaper, continued to refer ironically to the "men in shirts", the APEB had managed to gain as many members in September 1933

¹¹³ *Ibid.*

¹¹⁴ *Revolução*, 31 October 1932, p. 5.

¹¹⁵ See APEB's statutes in *Revolução*, 11 February 1933, p. 2.

as the union they had left.¹¹⁶ Fascists were present in unions like the Lisbon Shop Assistants (*Caixeiros de Lisboa*), Public Transport Employees (*Pessoal da Carris*), railway workers (*Ferroviários*), and Oporto Municipal Transport (*Transportes Municipais do Porto*), as noted in the left-wing press and police reports to the Interior Ministry.¹¹⁷

In March 1933, the leadership of the union of Lisbon shop assistants proposed to expel a leader who had been accused of being a fascist owing to membership of the League.¹¹⁸ *Revolução* supported “nationalist” groups and denounced the union leaders for being Communists.¹¹⁹ In the same month, NS made its presence felt at the general assemblies of the Lisbon public transport worker union. It distributed communiqués supporting worker demands and denouncing the company’s English owners. The union’s First Secretary, Neves da Costa, was invited to leave.¹²⁰ *Revolução* accused the leadership of being “Communists” and criticised the transfer abroad of the company’s profits at the expense of the workers.¹²¹

NS highlighted its proximity to ‘nationalist’ unions and its collaboration in certain regions with the Catholics. Nonetheless, it is difficult to identify any NS activity in other parts of the union movement.¹²² The closest NS ever came to a ‘nationalist’ union was with the National Union of Hotel Industry Professionals (*Sindicato Nacional dos Profissionais da Indústria Hoteleira*). Created in 1931, the union was opposed to the employment in the industry of immigrant, particularly Galician, labour. NS actively supported this

¹¹⁶ *Unidade*, N^o 9, 9 February 1933. At the end of 1932, the union had 1,036 members compared to the 730 in APEB by mid-1933. See Castanheira, J. P., *op. cit.*, pp. 41 and 53.

¹¹⁷ Dispersed information on attacks against fascist members also indicates their presence in other areas. See, for example, the *Relatório do Governador Civil de Leiria ao Ministro de Interior* (Civil Governor’s report to the Interior Minister), 13 August 1932, Bundle 455-box 8, AGMI/ANTT.

¹¹⁸ Confidential Police Report N^o 28, 5 March 1933, Bundle 465-box 18, AGMI/ANTT.

¹¹⁹ *Revolução*, 21 April 1933, pp. 4-5.

¹²⁰ *Revolução*, 13 March 1933, p. 1, and Confidential Police Report N^o 13, 11 March 1933, Bundle 465-box 18, AGMI/ANTT.

¹²¹ *Revolução*, 15 March 1933, p. 3.

¹²² Despite the Catholic movement’s denunciation of NS, some priests belonging to the fascist movement were regular speakers at meetings of the Catholic Circle of Oporto Workers (*Círculo Católico de Operários do Porto*). *Revolução*, 28 March 1933, p. 5.

union, which was “entirely composed of Portuguese”, considering it an example of patriotism.¹²³ This relationship was not really ideological, however, and the creation of the union had nothing to do with NS. NS was active primarily in Lisbon and in areas where the anarcho-sindicalist and communist union *élite* were concentrated. In the provinces, NS essentially maintained an aggressive street presence and made sustained ‘pre-union’ local organisations.

Challenging Salazar

Confronted with attacks by various supporters of the dictatorship, Preto accused the conservative republicans of turning the UN against his movement. He cited NS internal service orders to prove that the movement was not hostile to the government party and to refute a conflict with Salazar.¹²⁴ This was a tactical expedient, however, as NS hoped that Salazar would be removed from power by the military. NS internal correspondence reveals the wide divergences between NS and Salazar and its hope that the dictator would be displaced, but many militants, particularly in the provinces, were sincere Salazarists who would have been surprised to see references to disagreements between their movement and the dictator.¹²⁵ Criticism of Salazar by NS militants was prudent. Nonetheless, they were intransigent in their defence of the ‘fascistisation’ of the state, and the rapid implantation of a corporatist order. They refused to join the UN or surrender to liberal republicanism in any way.

In a series of articles later published as a book, Preto accused Salazar of being a man of the “centre” when “the leaders of the nations freed from Europe’s ruins everywhere dress, as a sign of their faith in military virtues, in a *uniform* or in a *combat shirt*”. Salazar may have admired some aspects of fascism, but in Preto’s

¹²³ *Revolução*, 27 June 1933, p. 4.

¹²⁴ Preto, R., ‘Nós e a União Nacional’, *Revolução*, 26 May 1933, p. 1.

¹²⁵ Faced with divergences with Salazar, many regional leaders wrote to Preto to express their worries. See, for example, the letter from António Borges de Castro to Rolão Preto, 30 December 1932, ARP.

view he evidently did not accept it as a model and had “demonstrated his disagreement in no uncertain terms”.¹²⁶ Salazar was “a university formalist” who had saved the nation from financial bankruptcy, but he was not a “revolutionary’ leader”. In Preto’s words: “Salazar has accepted that others have given him his power without giving him their energy”. Preto felt that Salazar could “find within the nationalist generations the support for a revolutionary dynamic” but had refused to do so because he had “little faith in the ‘raw material’”.¹²⁷

In Preto’s view, Salazar did not understand the “social problem”, which he saw from a conservative perspective. His “cold empiricism” had excluded him from the “revolution” as he did not “share its fundamental ideals”. The conservatism of the UN, created according to “the balanced, pondered and serene criteria of the dictator don to ensure the victory of the centre” entirely reflected “the image of the financial dictator”. For Preto, “only totalitarian formulas evoke passion”.¹²⁸ As the spokesman for this passion, NS officially appealed to Salazar to abandon his conservative “good sense”. It also conspired with officers to overthrow him. At the Lisbon rally Preto addressed Salazar and called on him to “listen to the vibrating national soul, to the votes of the youth and if you want: *Alea jacta est*”. Before 1,000 supporters in Oporto, Preto denounced “social conservative” and “oppositionist” infiltration, warning of NS “revolt and ... readiness to march... to save the Terreiro do Paço... When the hour comes to march on Lisbon I cannot see, on that day of the supreme break, what can move Salazar against us!”¹²⁹

¹²⁶ Preto, R., *Salazar e a sua Época*, (Lisbon: 1933), pp. 6-7.

¹²⁷ Preto, R., *Ibid.*, p. 13.

¹²⁸ Preto, R., *Ibid.*, p. 31.

¹²⁹ *Comércio do Porto*, 9 May 1933, p. 6.

Chapter Three

The National Syndicalist Organisation: A Political and Social Profile

It is difficult to disassociate ideology from organisation with fascist parties, “because there is an explicit relationship between the structure of one and the content of the other”.¹ This association is clear in the very *rejection of the term party* for ideological reasons. Alternative terms used were legion, action, junta, falange or movement. Given that anti-liberalism was central to political programmes, the rejection of the word party was part of the refusal to identify with democracy. The organic vision of society shared by all fascist movements led to the ideological rejection of parties, which were considered divisive and synonymous with liberalism and democracy. This was not by any means unique to fascist movements; it was a trait common to many radical right-wing groups from the end of the nineteenth century.² NS had additional reasons not to call itself a party. It had been created under a military dictatorship when political parties were banned. Furthermore, the dictatorship was in the process of creating its own incipient party.

Fascist movements introduced new forms of organisation, particularly within the field of right-wing parties. In terms of internal structure, they were *highly autocratic and centralised mass parties*. Their main characteristics can be summarised as follows:³

¹ Trindade, H., *op. cit.*, p. 161.

² A classic example is AF although similar organisations could be found throughout Europe from the beginning of the twentieth century.

³ The bibliography on the internal structure of fascist movements is very small and, in many cases, unsatisfactory. Even in studies of political parties, the chapters dealing with internal

First, they had a *personalised leadership*. The leader's power had no formal limits and was legitimated by personal charisma.⁴ The sources of this legitimisation were the qualities inherent to the leader's personality, providence, or in the cases where religion was important, God.⁵ Hence, there was an *absence of guiding national institutions capable of decision-making*. Where such organisms existed, they tended to lose power gradually, becoming consultative organs to assist the leader.

Second, they adopted a vertical structure based on national, regional and local organs dominated by an autocratic centralism. The electoral principle was either non-existent or progressively abandoned, and replaced by delegation or nomination and the more or less regulated submission of the lower levels to leaders. As there were generally no formal mechanisms to regulate conflicts, disagreements often led to splits, expulsions or even the physical elimination of internal opposition.

Third, they had a militia or para-military structure. This was inherent to fascist parties, as they generally viewed themselves as political armies. Militias either dominated the party or co-existed alongside party structures, although militias and a central apparatus usually worked side by side. The para-military organisations were a strong instrument for internal political socialisation, with their use of hierarchical military uniforms, which revealed the hierarchy of ranks, ritualised initiation ceremonies and the use of salutes, flags and nationalist anthems.

structure are few and do not refer to fascist parties. Recent historical monographs have also not paid much attention to this and are generally descriptive, and do not give sufficient information to make comparisons. This typological description of the organisational structure of fascist movements is based on Bourderon, R., *Le fascisme: idéologie et pratiques (essai d'analyse comparée)*, (Paris: 1979), pp. 113-128, and Trindade, H., *op. cit.*, pp. 161-198. See also Panebianco, A., *Modelli di partito: organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici*, (Bologna: 1982), pp. 263-296. Two monographs have paid attention to internal structures: Héliquo Trindade's book and Chueca, R., *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco: un estudio sobre la FET-JONS*, ((Madrid: 1983), pp. 169-339. See also the summary by Tarchi, M., *Partito unico e dinamica autoritaria*, (Naples: 1981).

⁴ See: Willner, R., *The Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership*, (New Haven: 1984).

⁵ According to Article 47 of FET-JONS statutes, Franco answered only "to God and history". See Chueca, R., *op. cit.*, p. 441.

Fourth, the parties attempted to re-produce the institutions of a future regime. In the case of parties for which corporatism was a component of the political programme, there were consultative committees that constituted embryonic corporatist organisations. They also had sections for women, youth, trade unions and other mass organisations. Thus, they developed para-statal organs in preparation for power.⁶

This 'ideal-type' is most applicable to the fascist parties of the 1930s influenced by the Italian Fascist regime and German National Socialism. Some pre-war radical right-wing organisations such as *Action Française* anticipated a few of these elements, but it was not until the 1920s that they began to crystallise. From a historical perspective, until it reached power in 1922 the organisational evolution of the Italian Fascist Party was marked by a process of ambiguity and internal debate regarding the best model to be adopted, as well as by heterogeneous origins.⁷ Even in the parties created after the consolidation of this type of political organisation, internal crises in the initial phases led to alterations in statutes, which were usually initially more conciliatory with democratic principles.

The National Syndicalists

By 1932, NS had been fully constituted, although the party denied it for tactical reasons.⁸ The statutes were published in June 1932 and signed by Rolão Preto. They defined NS as "a movement of doctrine and action that proposes to make the workers' national revolution in Portugal".⁹ Preto delayed the definition of a concrete programme until the movement could "begin to make legislation".¹⁰ Believing in its national and political strength, and want-

⁶ Nolte, E., cited in Bourderon, R., *op. cit.*, p. 121.

⁷ See: Gentile, E., *op. cit.*, pp. 314-386, and Orlow, D., *The History of the Nazi Party, 1919-1933*, (Pittsburgh: 1969), pp. 11-128.

⁸ La Palombara's classical definition of a political party is adopted here: stable organisation; local organisations in regular contact with the central leadership; attainment of power as an objective; and vying for popular support. See La Palombara, J. and Weiner, M. (eds), *Political Parties and Political Development*, (Princeton: 1966), p. 6.

⁹ Preto, R., *Orgânica do movimento...*, *op. cit.*, p. 1.

ing to bargain with the dictatorship, NS gradually defined itself as an “economic and social movement”, the embryo of a corporatist organisation. The NS organisational model was similar to that adopted by other European fascist parties. Preto studied the organisational structure of some of these parties very closely, including the initial experience of Italian Fascism, Valois’s *Faisceau* and the Spanish JONS.¹¹

As shown in Figure 3.1, the structure defined by the movement’s statutes in 1933 when it was still operating legally, are close to the model outlined above. After the movement was banned in 1934, the structure suffered some alterations.

The Central Organisation

NS’s statutes gave the leader complete control.¹² He controlled the management of the movement and the nomination and dismissal of the delegates. He was the person with the last say on any matter concerning the movement, and was charged with upholding “the movement’s doctrine” and ensuring that “others uphold it”. The leader was thus the true depository of the movement’s ideology.¹³ This was reflected in the movement’s symbols. According to the statutes, only Preto could wear Christ’s Cross with a white background, on his right arm, to distinguish him from the other leaders.

Preto was the movement’s charismatic leader from the start. Despite his control over the organisation, as in other parties of the same family, his supremacy was not tension-free. In the case of Portugal, however, the tensions inherent to personalised leadership were exogenous rather than endogenous: the fact that Salazar was


¹⁰ *Ibid.*

¹¹ The JONS were less autocratic insofar as it partially adopted the electoral principle. See: Jimenez Campo, J., *op. cit.*, p. 329. On the structure of Valois’s *Faisceau*, see Sternhell, Z., ‘Anatomie d’un mouvement fasciste en France: le faisceau de Georges Valois’, *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*, Vol. 26, February 1979, pp. 5-39; Guchet, Y., *op. cit.*, pp. 179-265, and Soucy, R., *French Fascism. The First Wave*, (New Haven: 1986).

¹² Preto, R., *Orgânica do movimento*, p. 4.

¹³ *Ibid.*

Figure 3.1
NS Organisational Structure (1933)



* Clandestine

** Never formed

Source: 'Orgânica do Movimento Nacional Sindicalista', (Lisbon: 1933)

the driving force behind the creation of the official party, and had been recently nominated to lead the government.

Although respectful of Preto's leadership, the early statutes created bodies with decision-making powers. According to the first project, which was written by António Pedro, NS was led by a directorate constituted by representatives of commissions (for agriculture, industry and labour, among others) of a pre-corporatist nature. At the beginning of 1933, however, when the movement was organised on a national scale, Preto presented new statutes that eliminated power sharing. This immediately provoked tensions with a small sector of the organisation, which sought to reach an understanding with Salazar. Being in the minority, the group provisionally accepted Preto's statutes until the first NS Congress.

The Preto personality cult grew in 1933 as the movement took to the streets and the leader engaged in a national propaganda tour. The movement's newspapers began to call Preto the Chief (*Chefe*), and internal party correspondence reveals that he was quite revered. His supremacy was confirmed during the schism and reflected in many letters expressing loyalty to Preto by local militants, in which declarations of 'obedience' abound.¹⁴ After the split, there were some alterations in nomination rituals, with the explicit adoption of *power by delegation*. Thus, in 1934 nomination documents for district and local commissions began: "in the name of Rolão Preto, leader of National Syndicalism, I nominate comrade."¹⁵ The same was true of membership application forms, an 'honourable agreement' consisting of an oath of loyalty to the party and Preto.¹⁶ Former militants always referred to his qualities as a speaker and 'mass mobiliser': they laid Preto's most obvious claim

¹⁴ At the end of 1933 during the pro-Salazar schism, Preto received a wave of eulogistic letters, the most interesting from small branches in the north of the country. Among those received at the end of 1933, one from the Moncorvo branch announced: "for our Single Leader the moral oath of the Trench of Félgar... When there is need for the greatest sacrifice, the clamour will be filled with desire. Forward! So that no-one may shame us". Letter from an unknown militant to Rolão Preto, 30 December 1933, ARP.

¹⁵ Processo 1771/SPS, Archive PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹⁶ The second principle stated: "I accept... that the leader...", and the third "I recognise Rolão Preto as the only leader of the movement". Processo 1771/SPS, Archive PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

to the charisma of the fascist leader. They were also exactly the qualities that Salazar saw as signs of “chaos in power”.¹⁷

The General Secretariat, which led the movement, was led by the General Secretary and an assistant and stood at the top of the organisational pyramid. The nomination of district secretaries and the bureaucratic management of the organisation were the responsibility of the Secretariat. It issued ‘service orders’ distributed to the district and local leaders, which determined propaganda tasks and political activities. The service orders also served to inform members about the movement, especially after its newspapers were subjected to censorship.

The first NS General Secretary was Second Lt. Albino Neves da Costa, who initially organised the movement.¹⁸ At the beginning of 1933 he was replaced by Alberto de Monsaraz, who remained General Secretary until the split.¹⁹ Monsaraz led the organisation together with Preto, and was surrounded by members of the *Revolução* founding group. Following Monsaraz’s expulsion from Portugal and the banning of the movement, Júlio Pereira de Matos, Monsaraz’s former assistant and a member of the Revolution group, became the leader.

The Grand Council was a consultative committee with a statutory responsibility “to study the problems of doctrine and activity of interest to the movement”. It was divided into five sections: management, economic and financial, cultural, judicial and colonial. It had to “assist the leader through the mediation of its sections” by elaborating reports and publications in their given areas. Organisms like the Grand Council were of a clearly ‘para-statal’ nature. They were present in nearly all the fascist movements. In

¹⁷ Interview with Barradas de Oliveira, 17 July 1984.

¹⁸ Albino Neves da Costa was a young military engineer who was only in the post for a short period. He supported the split and went on to collaborate with the *Estado Novo* corporatist system.

¹⁹ He was the son of the Count of Monsaraz. A poet and writer, Monsaraz was a founder member of IL. He remained active in until the dissolution of NS, as well as during its clandestine phase. He was probably the most important financial contributor to the party.

the Portuguese case, it anticipated the corporatist institutions of the 'National Syndicalist State'.

Ideological proximity and competence determined who could join the Grand Council. An analysis of its composition confirms that "individuals who are not affiliated to National Syndicalism" were accepted, in accordance with the movement's statutes. Although the majority of members were NS supporters, some were only close to IL. The most important group in the Grand Council was that of professors from Coimbra University. All were well known dons mainly from the Law Faculty. They quickly became known as the 'dons group', and played an important role within NS, particularly during the pro-Salazar split. The Grand Council also included men like Alçada Padez and António Pedro, and others who sympathised with IL or Royalist Action (*Acção Realista*). Others, such as João Ameal and Manuel Múrias, were openly Salazarist and, although they had a very weak or non-existent role within the movement, they became agents of the Salazar regime when the internal crisis broke out in the autumn of 1933. Their status as influential personalities, as well as their ability to relate with the new government made them the leaders of the dissident faction within NS.

The Foreign Propaganda Secretariat (*Secretariado de Propaganda no Estrangeiro*, SPE) was nominally responsible for NS "propaganda in the foreign press" and the organisation of NS cells within the Portuguese émigré communities. The SPE performed an important role during NS's clandestine phase, but in practice it merely co-ordinated contacts with the press and translating articles in the foreign fascist press. It also ensured the maintenance of correspondence with international fascist bodies, particularly with the Italian CAUR, embassies and, albeit to a lesser extent, with other fascist parties. José Campos e Sousa was nominated by Preto as secretary of the SPE.

Although it was not in the statutes and operated clandestinely, the Military Secretariat (*Secretariado Militar*, SM) co-ordinated a sizeable group of NS sympathisers within the Armed Forces, most of them professional officers. Only Preto and a restricted group of

leaders were kept informed about SM operations. It co-ordinated the activities of around 30 Army officers and a smaller group of naval officers. Captain Crujeira de Carvalho was the head of the SM from its inception until the end of 1932.²⁰

Military NS sympathisers were mainly young officers, who acted as a pressure group within the Armed Forces. They had served in units such as Hunters 5 (*Caçadores 5*) and been League members since the 1926 coup. Some were Integralist monarchists and had prior political experience in small organisations created to combat republicanism. Several former militants recognised the important role played by the SM in NS political activities. The organisation worried Salazar and was eventually the main reason for his inhibited attack on the fascist movement. The SM put pressure on President General Carmona to participate in several anti-Salazar movements between 1932 and 1934. It participated in the attempted coup in September 1935, and remained active at least until 1938.

NS was banned early on so that its militia structure remained embryonic. According to the statutes, the militias were to have two components: *Shock Brigades* that should operate alongside the party structure and carry out policing functions at the movement's offices and the rallies. In addition, when necessary the militias could set up squadrons, *National Syndicalist Bodies*, composed of "appropriate" supporters. A commander with organisational autonomy was to lead the Shock Brigades, which were formed in mid-1933 after the first confrontations with anti-fascist militants. In June of that year, the General Secretary called on secretaries urgently to form "Shock Brigades in every city, self-defence formations commanded by Army officers, who can protect and efficiently guarantee the free expansion of our movement".²¹ Their creation was interrupted by government repression.

²⁰ For more on the activities of the SM, see Preto's statement of 1975 in Medina, J., *op. cit.*, p. 163; and the reports by Salazar's secretary on the penetration by NS of the Armed Forces in Gonçalves, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 11-116.

²¹ General Secretariat 'Service Order', signed by Alberto Monsaraz, 26 June 1933, AOS/CO/PC-3E, ANTT.

Some internal circulars referred to Shock Brigade cadets, but only two brigades in Lisbon and Oporto were actually created. The Lisbon Brigade came to be known as the Black Brigade (*Brigada Negra*). It was composed of about 60 men who were quite active on the streets (more so than the censored press would have the public believe if credit is given to police reports). Dutra Faria was the second in command of the Black Brigade. As he recalled 36 years later, it was made up of students and ne'er-do-wells that he described as "individuals who were perhaps not very acceptable from a bourgeois point of view".²² The emphasis on the creation of para-military organisations is apparent in the exhaustive questionnaire included in the application forms for individual membership. Prospective members had to describe their experience with firearms, military and "sporting" activities.

Other auxiliary organisations did not take root for reasons similar to those that curtailed the development of the brigades. Such was the case of the branches for Women, Children and Sport. Preto nominated Filomena Patrício Secretary of the Women's section of NS but she never took office.

District and Local Organisations

On the eve of the first NS Congress in September 1933, the organisation could boast a well-established network of district and local level organisations covering most of the country. Some NS publications refer to the existence of delegations in all districts and in 72 councils. This is certainly exaggerated. Nonetheless, NS covered most of country with a relatively stable network. In most cases local delegations were firmly established, having their own newspapers, contacts within the local administration and sources of finance. Only rarely did delegations emerge as the result of the efforts of 'outsiders'. The rapid process of implantation was possible due to pre-existing networks of influence and links with the old IL,

²² Faria, D., 'Carta a um fascista efervescente', *Diário da Manhã*, 8 November 1969, p. 3.

partly reorganised as the League. Members of these old organisations manned entire NS delegations.

Three area Secretaries nominated by Rolão Preto and directly responsible to the General Secretary, headed regional organisations. The country was divided into three zones, North, Centre and South, with headquarters in the three most important cities, Oporto, Coimbra and Lisbon. Selection criteria for the secretaries obeyed a prudent equilibrium. Alçada Padez, one of the movement's founders loyal to Preto was chosen to head the South delegation.²³ Eusébio Tamagnini, a university professor who led the Coimbra branch and a Grand Council 'notable', was chosen to control the district commissions in the Centre.²⁴ In the North, a young doctor, Augusto Pires de Lima, became the head. He had played an important role in the unification of local Integralist branches with the League, of which he had been the local founder at the end of the 1920s.²⁵

Fifteen district secretariats were researched (Figure 3.2). Only the Baixo Alentejo lacked a delegation. An NS nucleus was established in towns and villages in every other district, even when there was no secretariat. Generally speaking, district secretariats were composed of leaders who had been born and resided in the area. Sometimes a national 'notable' who had moved but been born in the district was a member of the secretariat, although such cases were rare.²⁶ As noted above, IL or League militants formed the majority of district secretariats. The exceptions were Coimbra and Leiria, where the Lisbon leadership re-structured the secretariats.

²³ A young Integralist and founder of NS, Padez remained by Preto's side during the clandestine period. He was deported for his participation in the attempted coup of 1935, and went on to collaborate in the campaigns of the 'democratic opposition', finally integrating himself into the anti-Salazar camp after the Second World War.

²⁴ A well-known professor at Coimbra University, he was nominated Minister of Education after the pro-Salazar split that he led. He was a member of the University's pro-German group during the war.

²⁵ Augusto Pires de Lima remained neutral during the split. He left for Argentina for personal reasons and adhered to the New State by joining the Portuguese Legion (*Legião Portuguesa*) created by the dictatorship in 1936.

²⁶ Brigadier João de Almeida was a member of the Guarda District Secretariat. He had already retired from the Army when he joined NS.

Figure 3.2
NS District Secretariats



In contrast with the district secretariats, which were almost entirely created by NS leaders, municipal secretariats had very diverse origins. Some were copies of former League bodies. Others, particularly in the north and centre, were Integralist. This permitted local NS activity even when there was insufficient capacity to organise a district secretariat, as in the cities of Aveiro and Portalegre. The municipal secretariats were stronger in the rural coun-

cils of the central coastal region and north, particularly in the industrial areas in these regions. It was weak in the *latifundista* south, which only had district level organisations. Nonetheless, municipal representations were established with some success in Évora, Alcácer do Sal and in parts of the Algarve. The diversity of municipal representations reflected the diversity of the political origin of members, the degree of their insertion in local society, as well as their social origins.

The majority of municipal organisations in the north was Integralist and solidly established at the local level, having newspapers and in some cases privileged links with the local administration. In cases where local groups had originated with the League, traditional loyalties were weaker and fascist militancy more accentuated. This was the case in Leiria. It is difficult to obtain a clear idea of the day-to-day life of local NS delegations. Nonetheless, internal reports by provincial delegations give us some idea, though experiences cannot be generalised. In many delegations, para-military elements became progressively less important, ensuring the dominant position of old Integralist groups. Newspapers reproduced national communiqués. Members participated in rallies, but local organisations and élite composition did not undergo any significant transformations.

Some council secretariats, however, were closer to the para-military model in terms of internal organisation and political activity. In one council in the north, for example, the local leader noted that: “the comrades here are organised and have already done some interesting things. They have an office, engage in military instruction with perfect service discipline and apply sanctions that range from suspension to expulsion”. He requested books for the office for political education in addition to those published by the movement: “I ask you, as you have in mind the mental development of our boys, which is necessarily low, to choose some books, obviously the masters of Integralism are not suitable, at least for now. [...] I suggest some of Hitler’s and Mussolini’s speeches, Alberto Esteves’s *A Família*, Rolão Preto’s *Para além do Comunismo*”.²⁷

²⁷ Letter from António Pacheco to Quitério, n. d. [1934], ARP.

NS statutes anticipated that the basic unit should be set up at the level of the parish council (*freguesia*), the smallest national administrative unit, and include, 'whenever possible', members of the professions. These units or cells, however, were never created, with the exception of student sections in the universities of Lisbon and Coimbra. Nonetheless, as noted above, various socio-professional NS groups existed within unions.

Internal Operation

The party's image as portrayed in the media and internal communiqués did not correspond with reality. In terms of internal operations, NS experienced two distinct phases: a legal phase between 1932 and 1933 followed by a clandestine phase from 1934 to 1936.²⁸ During the first period, NS institutionalised itself according to the statutes passed at its first congress. This section examines the first phase in the life of NS.

The organisation was built around a charismatic figure that brought together pre-existing groups dominated by Integralism. The formation of the party is an example of the *penetration* model of party organisation; in other words, the party was created around a personality and a core of 'political entrepreneurs' associated with him, and local groups were created or re-organised to ensure loyalty to this leadership.²⁹ Initially, the party's structure was fluid and dispersed. Various parallel links of solidarity inherited from previous political experiences and conspiracies remained strong, affecting the party's internal workings. Preto's authority was challenged on several occasions, albeit in a disguised form, while criticisms regarding the lack of definition over internal tensions increased up until the first congress. Despite this challenge, the leader remained the focal point of the organisation.

²⁸ Its clandestine structure survived until the beginning of the 1940s but after 1936, NS was little more than a network of Preto's 'political friends'.

²⁹ On this model of 'penetration' or 'diffusion' in the formation of political parties, see Eliasson, K., and Svaasand, L., 'The Formation of Mass Political Organisations: An Analytical Framework', *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 10 (1975), pp. 90-120, and Panebianco, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 104-110.

Although this was not mentioned in the statutes, the Revolution founding group was the *de facto* Lisbon District Secretariat. United by ties of friendship and an intense sociability, the “Lisbon soviet” constituted the better part of the NS newspaper editorial board and dominated a large part of the organisation.³⁰ This group was the most radical, the most anti-Salazarist, and certain of its self-declared status as Portuguese representatives of Europe’s ‘fascist generation’. It gave NS its distinct profile and was the basis of internal support for Preto. Its members were students or were formally unemployed and thus available and willing to dedicate themselves entirely to the organisation, making them full-time political activists. The relationship between this group and local party leaders was difficult, with the latter often accusing the ‘soviet’ of radicalism, disorganisation and authoritarianism. Preto, who regularly received complaints against Lisbon from the provinces, moderated these tensions. Old personal and political conflicts between the Integralists, particularly in the north, also caused several problems with the delegations.

A second group with some internal coherence was based in Coimbra. Its members had left the UN to join the League and were more moderate and predisposed to negotiate with the regime. The split within NS was caused precisely by this group’s attempts to come to an agreement with government. Preto, who had close relations with the Lisbon group, was accused of hesitation. He retired to his Beira home, leaving the party in the hands of the ‘soviet’, and attempted to place himself ‘above’ factional struggles,³¹ although he sometimes successfully attempted to control the more

³⁰ See Barradas de Oliveira’s memoir note ‘Evocação de dois anti-salazaristas: António Pedro e a política’, *A Rua*, Nº180, 27 December 1979, p. 7.

³¹ At the height of the crisis provoked by the schism the Lisbon ‘soviet’ radicalised its position against the pro-Salazar group and several of its leaders wrote to Preto, who had returned ill to his farm, criticising his conciliatory character. António Tinoco did not hesitate in appealing to Preto to “abandon this anarchy, this disorder with resolve and do everything” and the assistant General Secretary, Pereira de Matos, also accused the ‘comrade leader’ of seeking to make “so much folly that it will compromise the enthusiasm necessary at this moment”. See the letters from António Tinoco and Pereira de Matos to Rolão Preto, 2 January 1934 and 30 December 1933, ARP.

'revolutionary' impulses of the founding group and to maintain the movement's cohesion.

The delegations retained a high degree of autonomy. This meant that propaganda activities were largely uncoordinated, even though political or propaganda initiatives were significant. They exceeded those undertaken by the various conservative groups and the government itself. Relations between the leadership and the district and local delegations were more flexible than the statutes formally allowed for. Internal political correspondence demonstrates a certain degree of pluralism among militants and their ability to express differing attitudes within the party. The high level of committed militancy is perhaps the most notable aspect of NS party activity, particularly when its financial situation and the tough political context is taken into account.

NS newspapers co-ordinated and cemented the organisation nationally. As the national paper, *The Revolution* was the main vehicle for communication and for the diffusion of ideology and policies. Its existence was troubled, however, due to government repression and financial difficulties that led to the interruption of its publication on several occasions. A relatively large network of regional newspapers linked to local secretariats supported *The Revolution*. There were at least eleven regional papers as well as various newspapers 'sympathetic' to the movement that amplified the voice of *The Revolution* in the provinces. These papers constituted a Nationalist Press Federation (*Federação da Imprensa Nacionalista*), which controlled a vast number of local publications.

The paper was used to give instructions to the secretariats through its General Secretariat section. It also co-ordinated mass propaganda. It had pullout sections like *The Workers Revolution* directed at the working class. As censorship increased and the newspaper became paralysed, General Secretariat communiqués were distributed by internal mail in numbered 'service orders'. The local press was in a more comfortable position. It was more financially stable and had closer links with local élites. Most were old League organs or re-launched Integralist weeklies. Censorship was more benevolent given the relative lack of co-ordination among,

as well as a lack of government control over, regional censors. The prior existence of newspapers was also an advantage as it made banning them more difficult.

Nonetheless, when District Secretariats requested permission to publish new papers, their requests were 'lost in the corridors of power' and only the intervention of 'friends', particularly military 'friends', produced the desired authorisations. The Faro District Secretariat newspaper only received authorisation from the Interior Ministry through the intervention of Captain David Neto.³² In this matter, as in many others, the SM opened doors that would otherwise have remained closed. The newspapers provided important logistical support as in many cases NS local offices were also those for the newspapers or The Revolution delegations.

Financial support was a problem from the start. NS set up a fund-raising apparatus, a system of monthly dues and made appeals in newspapers, calling on the 'Friends of The Revolution', held raffles and sold portraits and stamps with the movement's symbols and images of Preto.³³ The movement continued to receive money until late 1935, even after it had been banned. But this kind of support did not even cover a tenth of the movement's expenses. Lack of funds was therefore a constant issue in internal reports.

It appears that the most secure and regular source of support came almost always from notables close to Integralism. Initially, governmental 'blue bags' controlled by 'friends' or influenced by military officers helped. As the movement moved further away from the regime, however, these doors began to close and debts mounted up. Several donations supported The Revolution when Preto took control of the newspaper and founded the movement. It was initially subsidised by Álvaro Sousa Rego. As noted by António Pedro, the fact that Rego was "extremely vain" and "married to a rich woman" helped. Rego was convinced that "the newspaper will bring not only notable influence but also a return on the

³² Letter from José Domingos Garcia Domingues to Rolão Preto, 22 November 1932, ARP.

³³ Some examples of this type of material can be found in Process N^o1771/SPS, Archive PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

investment".³⁴ He proved to be wrong, as it was not long before sales declined and new funds became necessary.³⁵

In 1933, the newspaper grew significantly funded by an important network of sympathisers that included many aristocrats. When the newspaper closed in the summer of that year after several run-ins with the censor, however, its debts were one of the main reasons behind the director's decision to change its name.³⁶ By contrast, most delegations and papers in the provinces were self-supporting. Some industrialists contributed generously in Lisbon and in the north in particular, not only for instrumental purposes but also because of personal connections with some NS leaders from the Oporto upper middle class.³⁷ There appear to have been no 'secret' funders, nor any indication that the movement received government support, as suggested by the anti-fascist parties.

Leaders, Militants and Members

Determining the number of members is always problematic in the study of fascist parties. Untimely dissolution, the disappearance of archives, banning and censorship all contribute to blurring the picture. Lack of empirical data has excited the socio-historical imagination; indeed, in several studies, imagination has replaced hard facts.³⁸ The problem is particularly acute in the study of German Nazism and Italian Fascism prior to their coming to power, as well as in the study of parties that never 'conquered the State'.

³⁴ Letter from António Pedro to Rolão Preto, 6 May 1932, ARP.

³⁵ Letter from Álvaro de Sousa Rego to Rolão Preto, 11 July 1932, ARP.

³⁶ Letter from António Tinoco to Rolão Preto, 19 January 1934, ARP.

³⁷ They were the principal targets of the collection. In July 1933, for example, a list of donors to the Oporto Secretariat was published to increase "propaganda within working class circles, unfortunately penetrated by communist ideals". It showed that donations ranged from 1000 to 5000 escudos, the latter donation sent anonymously from the National Lithography (*Lithografia Nacional*) and the former from an Integralist doctor, Mário Cardia. Nacional-Sindicalismo, Secretariado do Porto, circular dated 1 July 1933, APL.

³⁸ See: Larsen, S.U., et. al. (eds), *op. cit.*, (Bergen: 1980). This edited book represents the most rigorous comparative study of the social profile of Fascist movements. Other studies are Mühlberger, D. (ed), *The social bases of European fascist movements*, (London: 1987); Karvonen, L., *From White to Blue-and-Black: Finnish Fascism in the Inter-war Era*, (Helsinki, 1988); Gentile, E., *op. cit.*, (Bari, 1991); Brustein, W., *The Logic of Evil. The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933*, (New Haven: 1996).

Electoral participation is a good indicator for most Northern and Western European countries, but this is not so for Portugal. Not only are there documentary limitations, but NS existed under an authoritarian regime, which makes the gathering of information even harder. The disappearance of membership files and party archives does not permit the recreation of a rigorous profile. Painstaking cross-referencing of various sources, however, allows for a reconstitution of a picture of 200 of the élite and militant community. As far as members are concerned, it was possible to identify around 3,800 on the basis of membership lists periodically divulged by the National Secretariat.³⁹

At the end of 1933, several NS leaders and Preto announced that the movement had 50,000 members.⁴⁰ In a confidential letter to the Secretary General of CAUR in Rome some months later, the official in charge of foreign relations reported that the movement had a more moderate “total of 30,000 comrades”.⁴¹ Although lower, this figure was still significant for Portugal in the early 1930s. The 15% of members about whom there are details permits a limited social and political profile of the leadership and member-

³⁹ Data on leaders was obtained by cross-referencing a diverse set of source materials (principally from the movement's national and regional press and the political police files) that were submitted to some of the former militants during interviews. Those considered leaders are the national, district and local heads, as well as the directors and principal editors of the movement's newspapers. As far as the general membership is concerned, the lists published in the media and other documents found in the Rolão Preto Archive (ARP) served as a working base subjected to verification and modification following the oral testimonies. The 3800 members for whom some details exist do not represent a sample in the rigorous sense of the word.

⁴⁰ Preto repeated this figure several times, and it is regarded as a credible hypothesis by social scientists and has been cited in comparative studies of international Fascism. See, for example, Merkl, P., 'Comparing Fascist Movements' in Larsen, S. U. et. al. (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 756. It is unlikely, however, that actual membership was this large. Although there are no statistics on memberships during the 1930s, 50,000 is probably exaggerated, especially considering the political situation in which the movement was formed. That year the government's party reported that it had a little fewer than 20,000 members. It is more likely that NS membership base was close to that of the UN and did not exceed 25,000. This figure is reached through a study of the organisation's internal structure and the interviews conducted with former members.


⁴¹ Letter from José Campos e Sousa to Augusto Pescosolido, 26 May 1934, remitted by Coselschi to Caleazzo Ciano in a dossier entitled 'Movimento Nazional-Sindicalista dissidente in Portogallo', Miniculpop, Bundle 404, ACS, Rome.

ship, and also allows a comparison to be made with other fascist parties, as well as with the UN with which the NS shared political space in 1933.

The Leadership and the Militant Community

Significantly, of the 15,000 names published in the 1928 German edition of *Who's Who* did not include any of the leaders of the Nazi Party of 1933.⁴² The same can be said about their Portuguese counterparts. This was due to the youthfulness of both organisations. NS eulogies to youth were an exercise in self-promoting narcissism. At the age of 40 and 44, Rolão Preto and Alberto Monzaraz respectively, headed a group of leaders who were much younger. The majority was not yet 26, closer to the average age for European fascist leaders, which were mostly of the generation of the 1920s and 1930s. The 'excessive' youth of NS national leaders was an issue often debated internally. The political cleavage between the founders of the Revolution and local leaders, who

Figure 3.3
NS National Leaders' Socio-Professional Profile



⁴² Linz, J. J., 'Some notes towards...', p. 43.


were generally older, was often attributed to the difference in age. In correspondence addressed to Preto, ‘young boys from Lisbon’ were often criticised by provincial militants. Although members of the Grand Council and local leaders were somewhat older, only the former showed a notable age difference, as more than half its members were over 35.

Generational unity was the most important trait of NS élites, and is an important factor explaining the unity of the Lisbon leadership. The only other contemporary party with a similar age profile was the re-organised and clandestine Portuguese Communist Party (*Partido Comunista Português*, PCP), whose leaders were also mostly students at Lisbon University alongside the fascists.

NS national and district leaders were, in socio-professional terms, overwhelmingly students, intellectuals and young professionals (Figures 3.3 and 3.4).

Students or unemployed former students made up 36% of the national leadership, closely followed by professionals, especially lawyers. A large proportion of these groups interrupted their university studies to find occasional employment as journalists.


Figure 3.4
NS District Leaders’ Socio-Professional Profile



In the districts, rural landowners (34.5%) and professionals, especially lawyers, were dominant, although there were also military officers who had had local administrative responsibilities during the first years of the dictatorship. It is worth noting the presence in urban areas of some service sector employees and workers, especially in northern councils like Oporto.

In terms of political origins, almost all NS leaders came from other political organisations that they left to adhere to the fascist movement (Figure 3.5).⁴³ The chart below confirms the overwhelming presence of former Integralists who represented 38.5% of NS leaders. Only 11% began their political careers as NS leaders. A study of the origins of the local leaders would probably increase the number of Integralists in the movement, but lack of detail does not permit the drawing of precise conclusions.

Figure 3.5
NS Leaders' Political Origins



The national leadership was made up of members of the old Integralist Lisbon Student Junta at the end of the 1920s. Preto and Monsaraz were former members of the Integralist Central Junta. Those who had not been Integralists began their political careers in associated organisations during their student years, as in the case

⁴³ In Figure 3.5, militants of the League known for prior membership of Integralism have been regarded as Integralists. If this distinction is not made the number of former League militants would be much greater.


of António Pedro. Some had been sympathisers of foreign organisations, as was the case of Pereira de Matos who had been an AF militant. The League provided NS with entire local organisations but only a few dozen leaders. At the district level the tendency was similar, with only four former League leaders, two of them former cadets under the Sidónio Pais dictatorship. It should be remembered, however, that the large number of ‘unknowns’ (30.84%) does not permit great rigour in the determination of provenance. It is also worth remembering that many of the League district groups included Integralists, as in Oporto, Évora and Coimbra. It is only in the Grand Council that diversity of origins is found, although all Grand Councillors were from the radical right. Leaders and militants came overwhelmingly from the most radical and fascist Integralist sectors.

A former NS leader said in 1947 that some of the movement’s founders “came from the right and others from the left — with some leaving for the left, and others for the right”.⁴⁴ Although the second part of this statement is undeniably true, the first does not match the facts. The absence of members from the left and from syndicalism is evident. The few identified desertions from Anarcho-Syndicalism serve to confirm the hegemony of the radical right. The political origins of the Portuguese fascist élite do not have the ‘syndicalist’ or ‘socialist’ revisionist connections common in other European fascist movements, particularly those in France and Italy.⁴⁵ The political origins of militants confirm that NS inherited and re-organised the projects of the fascist organisations created in the aftermath of the 1926 coup, particularly the League.

⁴⁴ Letter from António Tinoco to the editor of *Vida Mundial*, 23 August 1947, p. 3.

⁴⁵ The ‘syndicalist’ and ‘socialist’ origins of European fascist leaders tends to be overstated in some cases, and does not resist quantitative analysis. Small fascist parties were created by former socialists, union members and, in the case of Jacques Doriot, communist militants, but these exceptions prove the rule that fascism’s origins lay within the conservative and radical right. The bibliography concerning the leftist origin of certain fascist movements is extensive. As an introduction to the theme, see Gregor, J. A., *The Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism*, (Berkeley: 1979); Burrin, P., *La dérive fasciste: Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933-1945*, (Paris: 1986); Brunet, J.-P., *Jacques Doriot: du communisme au fascisme*, (Paris: 1986).

Figure 3.6
Rank of NS Military Members



In ideological and political terms, however, Integralism was the basis of the party's élite.

Military officers occupied a very important place within NS, although most of them could not legally belong to the organisation. The SM not only co-ordinated affiliates but had an influence over a network of sympathisers, as shown by the presence of army officers at demonstrations (see Figure 3.6).⁴⁶

The overwhelming majority of military members were young lieutenants and recently promoted captains. The only general was Brigadier João d'Almeida, a monarchist and Integralist officer renowned for participation in conspiracies and coup attempts both before and after 28 May 1926. The fact that the majority of officers came from the League allows us to better understand the role of this organisation in bringing together Integralists and the Lieutenants of 28 May. Around 20 officers had occupied leadership

⁴⁶ This table shows both officers identified as activists within the SM and some sympathisers present at demonstrations often in defiance of the government, as well as those who participated in the 28 May League. Although the SM also included naval officers, there is only data about two that have not been included in the graph.

positions within the League at the beginning of the 1930s. Social and political solidarity among officers and founders date back to the days of the 1926 coup and were consolidated within several groups, and by publications and conspiracies until the foundation of the League in 1928. Many sympathisers joined the SM military nucleus, which participated in demonstrations and secret manoeuvres. The periodically tense relations between officers and Salazar also helped NS, allowing it to attract a larger number of officers than those habitually within their sphere of influence.


*National Distribution and
Socio-Professional Profile of Members*

As stressed at the beginning, information about NS members is scarce compared with that available about the militants. Despite this limitation, a systematic analysis permits a better understanding of tendencies and NS attempts to penetrate and establish itself among various sectors of contemporary Portuguese society.

The national distribution of NS recruitment indicates that it successfully penetrated urban areas, particularly in the more developed coastal areas and more so in the north than in the south and the rural districts in the interior (see Figure 3.7).

Lisbon, Oporto, Coimbra and Braga were the cities with the highest concentration of members and where NS was most politically active. The movement also attracted members in the more urbanised areas of the coastal regions in the Algarve and between Lisbon and Oporto and Braga in particular. It was only in the north, especially in Minho and the districts of Vila Real and Bragança, that one finds a significant numbers of members in the more rural areas. The contrast between the north and the south, particularly in the interior, reflects both population differences and the absence of a mobilising 'rural fascism' in the *latifundista* south. Mobilisation in the south was largely restricted to Setúbal, Évora and Beja. In organisational terms, NS delegations existed only in Évora and in one of the Setúbal councils. The distribution of members in the provincial districts north of Oporto is due to the pres-

Figure 3.7
National Distribution of NS Membership




ence of the local Integralist notables in certain rural councils like Braga and Bragança. In Braga there was a firmly established politically active NS group although only a local study can provide new evidence of their composition and distribution.

The graphs on socio-professional profile and national distribution point to the significant adhesion by sectors more sensitive to the 'integrating' and 'anti-plutocratic' fascist discourse: employees, students, small landowners and shopkeepers (Figure 3.8).

Some categories cannot be disaggregated and correlated, however, preventing global interpretations. Some over-represented

Figure 3.8
Socio-professional Profile of NS Membership



groups had past associations with fascist-type organisations, as was the case of small businessmen who account for 10.5% of members and had enthusiastically adhered to Sérgio Príncipe's Employers' Association (*Confederação Patronal*) after 1919. Also important were private sector employees (14%), a group that NS succeeded in gathering around it, which was the driving force of fascist unions. The poor response of public sector employees is not surprising, given that this group of bureaucrats exercised the prudence required by their jobs and led them to affiliate with the UN.⁴⁷ The adherence of some local civil servants to NS was probably a prod-

⁴⁷ According to the studies by Braga da Cruz and Caldeira, this cannot be verified. Caldeira has noted nevertheless that government employees were displaying the 'distended' public service of the First Republic, under which they were subjected to the political patronage of the old parties. Caldeira, A., 'O partido de Salazar...' p. 960.

uct of their having held previous administrative positions during the Military Dictatorship.

Workers represented 15% of those affiliated with the movement. This is important as it means that Portuguese Fascism was relatively successful amongst the working class which was the main target of NS propaganda. A prominent NS theme was that the integration of the workers into the corporatist system that NS wanted to create facilitated the battle against the Communists.

The national distribution of workers shows a tendency for adhesions to increase as one goes northward. Workers were practically absent in Setúbal and very weak in Lisbon, but they increased progressively in the small coastal towns, reaching a peak in Braga.⁴⁸ NS made no real inroads in the traditional worker areas and within the post-war union movement in Lisbon, Setúbal and Oporto. Nonetheless, union activity in Lisbon and close relations with some unions means that worker membership was probably higher than the available figures suggest. The most important base of working class support for the fascists were workers from small industrial units. The NS penetrated the old industrial centre in Braga as well as in other northern councils. The fascists took advantage of a politically favourable situation when the margin for manoeuvre of independent unions was legally limited, to make inroads among the working class. Despite methodological limitations, the figures discussed above tend to confirm earlier indications that fascism had penetrated working class and lower-middle class unions.

⁴⁸ The high number in Bragança, however, counsels us to be prudent. The 'blip' could be the result of simple manipulation or an undifferentiated mix of (e.g.) servants and shop assistants, included in the 'worker' category. However, there is internal correspondence showing that there were 500 'workers' affiliated to the movement in Vila Real. Letter from Sebastião Antas Botelho to Augusto Pires de Lima, 15 September 1933, APL.

Chapter Four

National Syndicalism and the National Union: A Comparative Analysis

Most fascist parties did not manage to obtain power in the post-war period. In some countries, where they participated in the downfall of democratic regimes, they were often relegated to a secondary role or 'co-opted' by new authoritarian regimes. Indeed, they were often violently repressed after attempts to take power in already non-democratic contexts. One way that these authoritarian regimes co-opted or reduced the power of fascist parties, was to create regime or single parties. The National Union (*União Nacional*, UN) of the Salazar regime is a case in point.

Both NS and the UN inherited different and contradictory projects of political parties under the Military Dictatorship. To a large extent, both were protagonists in the political conflicts that took place between the 1926 Coup and the institutionalisation of the Salazar regime. The co-existence of a fascist and a government party in Portugal for some years permits a systematic comparison between them, albeit in a limited way. It is important to explore the differences between them in order to understand the history of fascism, different types of regimes and Salazar's New State in particular.

A teleological perspective makes it difficult to legitimate a comparative exercise of this type: NS was a party of the 1930s, while the UN was the official party of a regime that lasted until 1974. Nonetheless, when both parties are assessed from the point of view of an observer in the late 1920s, a comparative analysis is warrant-

ed. The UN and NS were the products of various attempts to create a party that would dominate the Military Dictatorship. Both parties developed in a chronologically parallel fashion and were interconnected, as NS represented the response of fascistic sectors to the creation of the UN. The tensions between the two increased throughout 1933, until NS was finally banned and parts of it forced to enter the government party.

The different origins of the UN and NS present the most difficult objection to comparing the two parties. Can one say that the UN was a party in 1933 when it had no autonomy from the Salazar regime and the state apparatus? True for the entire duration of the regime, this was always considered strange by contemporary fascist observers. Even radical right ideologues like Manoilescu declared that the example of the UN was not to be followed in his defense of single parties.¹ It is therefore important to analyse some of the characteristics of these government parties, as they were the inspiration for various other regime parties of modern dictatorships.

The UN and Authoritarian Single Parties

The UN is an interesting example of party formation in an authoritarian context. Genetically, it is a typical example of a party created 'from above' that sought to monopolise political representation and to channel and neutralise the large and contradictory bloc supporting the dictatorship. The UN was a variant of parties that Linz has called "unified parties" and Sartori "authoritarian single parties". Generally speaking, they represent "the fusion from above of a new political entity" that either forces existing political groups to integrate or be excluded.² Such parties played some of the roles of single parties in totalitarian or Fascist regimes, but they dif-

¹ Manoilescu, M., *Le parti unique: institution politique des régimes nouveaux*, (Paris: 1936).

² See: Linz, J. J., 'Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes' in Greenstein, F. and Polsby, N. (eds), *Handbook of Political Science*, (Reading: Mass., 1975), vol. 3, p. 266; Huntington, S. P. and Moore, C. H. (eds), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, (New York: 1970); Sartori, G., *Parties and Party Systems: A Framework for Analysis*, (Cambridge: 1976). See also Tarchi, M., *op. cit.*, p. 99.

ferred from the latter in genetic, ideological and organisational terms, as well as in their relationship with the state and society. The main characteristics of such parties are as follows:

First, the nature of these parties is primarily determined by their having been formed under authoritarian political systems where pluralism has been eliminated or severely restricted, as well as by the fact that the government with the use of the state apparatus forms them. The founding 'agreement' may include, to varying degrees, previous parties or pressure groups that either played a leading role or merely participated in a victorious coalition.

Second, their function is to generate legitimacy. This is particularly important when elections and other forms of constitutional representation inherited from democracy are still in use, even if in a limited way. Such parties generally lack a representational monopoly and co-exist with other 'organic' political institutions over which they have no control. They are not the exclusive channel of access to power and do not mediate between all regime institutions, such as the Armed Forces, interest associations, religious institutions and other organisations, which also maintain independent channels. Such parties also play a restricted role in the formation of the political and governing elite. Their role is more to "limit dissidence than to organise consensus".³ As they are created by regimes that are usually non-mobilising or only attempt episodic mobilisation, they are also generally not responsible for mobilisation.

Third, they have a weak party apparatus with little autonomy from the government and administration. The government normally nominates their leaders. Their organisational structure does not penetrate civil society. They do not have socio-professional cells, educational or agitation bodies, and they do not control mass or para-military organisations. Membership is fluid, non-ideological and not demarcated from the mass of the 'Nation'. In many cases, it is not 'socially prestigious' to belong to the party.⁴

Fourth, they are ideologically more diffuse than totalitarian and fascist parties, given the generally heterogeneous nature of the

³ *Ibid.*, p. 114.

⁴ Sartori, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 41-42.

coalition involved in the overthrow of the previous regime, which may include institutions such as the Armed Forces, the Church and even conservative parties. The absence of codified ideology is also a product of their being a *post facto* non-competitive creation. The values guiding them are therefore more diffuse and 'negative'.⁵

In Portugal and Spain, this type of party had a precedent to follow; the National Republican Party (*Partido Nacional Republicano*, PNR) of Sidónio Pais and the Patriotic Union (*Unión Patriótica*, UP) of Primo de Rivera.⁶ Similar parties were created with varying degrees of success by other authoritarian regimes in the 1930s, notably in Austria, Hungary (with the Party of National Unity) and Poland (with the National Unity Camp).⁷

Franco's single party is very close to this model in terms of origin. It was created in 1937 when the new dictator forced several parties that participated in the nationalist coalition to join into a single party. The result was a party strictly controlled by Franco that nonetheless contained "various parties that were perfectly demarcated and recognised by the highest officials as such".⁸ It was possible to see the identity, weight and hegemonic power of each of these 'political families' within the party and ministerial elite. Unlike in Portugal, the Franco party was initially closer to the Italian Fascist model. In Portugal the UN remained indistinguishable

⁵ See: Linz, J. J., 'An Authoritarian Regime: Spain' in Allardt, E. and Rokkan, S. (eds), *Mass Politics: Studies in Political Sociology*, (New York: 1970), pp. 251-283.

⁶ See: Ben-Ami, S., *Fascism from Above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1921-1930*, (Oxford: 1983), and Gómes-Navarro, J. L., *El régimen de Primo de Rivera*, (Madrid: 1991), pp. 207-260.

⁷ Woolf, S. (ed), *Fascism in Europe*, (London: 1981), pp. 117-150 and 171-189. On the parties of the central and eastern European dictatorships, see: Rothschild, J., *East-central Europe Between the Two World Wars*, (Seattle and London: 1974); Polonsky, A., *The Little Dictators: The History of Eastern Europe Since 1918*, (London and Boston: 1975); Berend, I. V., *Decades of Crisis. Central and Eastern Europe before world war II*, (Berkeley: 1998); Wynot, E. D., *Polish Politics in Transition: The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935-39*, (Athens: 1974); Batkay, W. M., *Authoritarian Politics in a Transitional State. Istvan Bethlen and the Unified Party in Hungary, 1919-1926*, (New York: 1982). This example was to be followed by innumerable right wing dictatorships in the second half of the twentieth century. See: Brooker, P., *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships. The Ideological One-Party States*, (New York: 1995).

⁸ Chueca, R., *op. cit.*, p. 166.

from the state apparatus upon which it depended from the outset. Indeed, it sometimes appeared not to exist at all, particularly in the years of the 'fascist epoch'.

The Portuguese case is always at the extreme of the spectrum when compared with similar parties in the inter-war period, whatever the analytical perspective adopted in the study of state-party relations under single party regimes. Some party system typologies such as Sartori's go so far as to exclude the New State from the family of single party states, given that throughout the life of the regime, the UN did not perform the role that other parties like it did in other countries.⁹ The aim of this chapter, however, is less to understand the role of the UN within the Salazar regime, and more to compare the UN with NS.¹⁰

The Fascists and the Government Party

The UN as seen by the Portuguese Fascists

Preto defined the UN in 1945 as a "grouping of moderates of all parties, bourgeois without soul or faith in the national and revolutionary imperatives of our time". They were "sensible" people who are "only interested in the security and advantages of their personal positions".¹¹ The attitude of the fascists towards the government party was quite radical. They quickly understood that the party that the government was inviting them to join was the least likely way for them to achieve power or even to get close to it. In addition, of all the institutions of the regime it was the most disliked by the Fascists, the furthest removed from the "corporation of politics" they hoped to see implanted in Portugal. As the vanguard of the 'National Revolution', the National Syndicalists were radical critics of the UN. They initially adopted complementary positions for

⁹ Sartori, G., *op. cit.*, pp. 235-236.

¹⁰ Quantitative data concerning the UN was taken from Braga da Cruz, M., *op. cit.*, (Lisbon: 1988), and Caldeira, A., 'O partido de Salazar...', *op. cit.* The different socio-professional categories used by these authors and the non-differentiation of certain categories has forced the use, in each case, of their classifications.

¹¹ Cited on Braga da Cruz, M., *op. cit.*, p. 143.

tactical purposes, but opposition to the government party was already apparent among the majority of League delegations that formed the basis of NS.

Initial doubts were soon replaced by attacks. The UN was beginning to adopt the role of a single party, a role that the National Syndicalists felt they should fulfil. Thus, the Fascists quickly accused the party of attempting to play the role of the single party that they were making every effort to create. As noted in one of hundreds of NS articles and pamphlets on the subject, what the dictatorship needed was “mobilise a popular force” to carry out at least three tasks: “defend and collaborate with the Armed Forces to confront the revolutionary spirit of the enemies of the dictatorship”; “publicise the doctrines of the corporatist state”; and “intervene and direct the economic-administrative life of the new groups of the transformed State”.¹² In the view of the NS, the UN was none of these things: “Our dedication to the dictatorship allows us to speak to the government in the language of truth... [and we say]... that it is not”. One of the main objections to the UN was its selection of leaders “recruited from among the apathetic bourgeois masses” who were motivated by “old political influences, social respectability of age”. In the view of the NS, “they are absolutely incapable of the action and battle that are presently necessary”.¹³

The first reference to the UN by NS was complacent. It was felt that its dissolution could “create a very inconvenient atmosphere of dissatisfaction and ill-will”. They thought, “the venerable commissions of respectable gentlemen that constitute the *União Nacional* should therefore be allowed to remain. But in a way that facilitates and stimulates the project of a vigorous and conscious movement like the National Syndicalist”.¹⁴ From the end of 1932 onwards, however, NS began to attack the UN or the government through its party. Likewise, the Morning Daily (*Diário da Manhã*), the government mouthpiece, also attacked the NS early on. Its director, Sousa Gomes, a former member of the PCC, unleashed a

¹² *Alcácer*, N^o 33, Alcácer do Sal, 1 December 1932.

¹³ *Ibid.*

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

series of attacks on Portuguese fascism, accusing it of “mortgaging itself” to the Italian model and for supporting violence.¹⁵ The strongest criticisms came in 1933 after NS organisational and propaganda advances.¹⁶ In turn, NS newspapers reacted with virulent attacks on the government party, a fact that did not pass unnoticed by the press sympathetic to the UN.

Attacks in the Lisbon press or the *Diário da Manhã* normally consisted of criticism of the Fascist aspects of NS, which are not worth exploring here.¹⁷ At the local level, attacks focused on the association between NS and Integralism and monarchism, appearing in articles probably written by conservative republicans and catholics who had been nominated to UN district and council commissions. The UN Guarda district commission newspaper, for example, attacked NS for being “disguised Integralists” and demanded “clear and defined situations” and an end to “equivocations and confusion”. Alberto Monsaraz replied with an article on his Integralist past in which he refuted the assertion that NS was ‘monarchist’ and explained that many Integralists had never adhered to the movement.¹⁸

NS accused the UN of attracting “conservative, moderate and prudent elements incapable of the social battle in which National Syndicalism is engaged”, of being useful only in electoral battles, a submission to the liberalism of the constitution. NS criticised this from the outset, noting that the party acquiesced “to the individualist electoral sophism that we reject”. In its view, the UN was “logically designed for the electoral campaign that does not interest us”.¹⁹ As one NS newspaper noted: “It is our belief that the day is not far off when we will see the political balance swing from the *União Nacional* to National Syndicalism. This will be done by

¹⁵ See the editorials in *Diário da Manhã*, 17 September, 2 October, and 15 October 1932.

¹⁶ See: Dutra Faria’s response to these attacks in *Carta ao director do Diário da Manhã*, (Lisbon: 1933).

¹⁷ See the editorials in *Diário da Manhã*, 12 January, 16 January, and 5 February 1933.

¹⁸ Monsaraz, A., ‘Nacional Sindicalismo e União Nacional’, *União Nacional*, Leiria, 27 March 1933, pp. 3 and 6.

¹⁹ ‘União Nacional’ *Alcácer*, Nº 59, Alcácer do Sal, 18 June 1933, p. 1.

Salazar himself due to the harsh necessity of saving and perpetuating his grandiose plan".²⁰

In September 1933, when government repression made itself felt, NS began to divide the government into three largely irreconcilable groups. There was "the governing dictatorial current, whose accounts are in order and whose profits are in the finances, supported by a group that call themselves the *União Nacional*. The *União Nacional* is a strange amalgam of sincere supporters, the ill-willeds and opportunists who wage war and argue everywhere". There was a pragmatic current of "good, sincere men who believe in the material reconstruction of the nation: a school, a fountain and roads". Finally, there were "the National Syndicalists, animated by the mystic flame of national reconstruction guided by traditional values", a mysticism absent from all other currents.²¹ Following this logic, one columnist predicted three reasons for the victory of NS: the existence of "a doctrinal myth, a bright flame of faith and confidence", NS "activity among the proletariat" given that "the corporatism of the dictatorship was unknown to the *União Nacional* but is an integral part of National Syndicalism principles and of the organic State that the dictatorship has outlined"; and finally, because of the militia nature of NS. This made it "an excellent group of men who are used to physical combat [and] who will fight to defend the Fatherland and the sacred ideal".²²

An Italian Fascist View of the UN

Foreign Fascist observers who considered Salazar's single party and the absence of a youth movement as the regime's "most tragic weakness" later repeated many NS criticisms of the UN.²³ Although obviously less involved, the opinions of many Italian Fascists were almost identical to those of their Portuguese counter-

²⁰ 'Transcrição oportuna' *Alcácer*, N^o 69, Alcácer do Sal, 27 August 1933, p. 2. Reproduced from *União Nacional*, Leiria.

²¹ F. M., '1934', *Alcácer*, N^o 70, Alcácer do Sal, 3 September 1933, p. 2.

²² *Ibid.*

²³ CAUR, *Relazione sulla missione compiuta dall' Avv. U. Baldi Papini in Portogallo*, August 1935, Miniculpop, Bundle 404, ACS, Rome.

parts. In 1935 a CAUR delegation visited Portugal and sent an extensive report on Salazar's regime and its institutions to Rome, including extracts of conversations with Portuguese political leaders. Baldi-Papini studied the basic texts of the New State, spoke to UN leaders and declared himself surprised at the weakness of Salazar's party.²⁴

Relating the history of the overthrow of the Republic and Salazar's rise to power, Papini noted the differences with Italian Fascism. In Portugal "a police operation exercised by the army was sufficient, while in Italy there was a civil revolution with battles, blood, a 'March' and a collective spirit of regeneration". In his view, the New State lacked "a 'Duce', an elite, a doctrine, a revolutionary faith in which the popular spirit could bathe, born and sealed on the battlefield from the beginning".²⁵ Papini claimed that "the leader and founder" of the New State had not participate in the movement and had ended up creating a "personal regime without personality". His analysis of the institutions of the regime recognised fascist inspired traces, but he concluded, "while Fascism is a system of thought before a system of government, the *Estado Novo* is simply a system of government searching for ideological content".²⁶

The Italian Fascist noted that the UN officials with whom he talked "were perplexed when I asked what principles and means they intended to employ to form a new élite".²⁷ Papini recognised the existence of a single party but could not understand its lack of dynamism. In his view, the UN was restrained by a useless "structure", a "council of wise men" that was "removed from the masses". It did not have the attributes that could "encourage the people to participate in the life of the State [and] make them live in a climate

²⁴ See: Kuin, S., 'Fascist Italy and Salazar's Portugal, 1926-1936', *Yearbook of European Studies*, 3-Italy/Europe, (Amsterdam: 1990), pp. 101-118, and 'O braço longo de Mussolini: os CAUR em Portugal (1933-1937)', *Penélope*, N^o 11, 1993, pp. 7-20 for more information over the relations between the *Estado Novo* and the Italian fascist regime, and in particular on the CAUR's missions in Portugal.

²⁵ CAUR, *op. cit.*, p. 4.

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 10.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 11.

of ideal tension". The UN lacked militancy, "no discipline unites [the member], they have no duties. They ignore the military nature of Italian Fascism and German National Socialism".²⁸ Papini wondered why the UN did not have "a more masculine character [...] a more fascist character", why it was not "an organisation more capable of becoming a true mass party, alive and active". Papini noted that "a party, like a Church, must unite the faithful with ceremonies, rites and meetings".²⁹ The Italian delegate complained that he only received reticent responses to the questions most interesting "for us fascists".³⁰

Baldi-Papini put these and other questions to various UN leaders. Replies always focused on Salazar who, according to one of his interviewees, was "the soul of the people but not of the masses". Some gave more convincing explanations. The first was related to the need to prevent the re-emergence "of the rivalries and wars of *caciquismo*, especially in the provinces" that greater participation of the single party in political life might cause. The second was more credible in the view of this Fascist observer who reported to Rome with some exaggeration that it was "the Army that guarantees the *Estado Novo*, the army is the country's hidden patron, it is the Army, in sum, that opposes the resurgence of a powerful civil body, for fear of losing power".³¹ For Papini, the difficult compromise between Salazar and the Army after the foundation of the dictatorial regime was one of the main reasons why the UN had not been developed as a combative youthful organisation, despite the early promise of the School Vanguard Association (*Acção Escolar Vanguarda*, AEV).³² The Army partly explains the weakness of the UN. But, as the analysis will show, it was far from being the only cause.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 14.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 16.

³⁰ Although the Portuguese did not experience 'a party revolution that had created its own marks', Papini suggested UN leaders that they "could easily have created sacred symbols of the ex-combatants of the First World War".

³¹ *Ibid.*, p. 18.

³² *Ibid.*, p. 22.

The UN and National Syndicalism Compared

Salazar deliberately created the UN in 1930 when he was already the leading figure of the dictatorship despite being only Minister of Finance. The speech that launched of the party was vague in terms of its role and composition. Salazar incorporated all the parties supporting the dictatorship, whether republican, monarchic or catholic. Its first organic principles expressly declared that “all citizens, regardless of their political or religious beliefs” would be admitted as long as they adhered to the principles of Salazar’s speech of 30 June 1930.³³ He immediately stressed that its role was to give the regime “civic support” but that it was not meant to exercise power.

Organisational Structure

Comparing the organisational structures of the two parties is problematic as in the period studied the UN was practically indistinguishable from the state apparatus. For NS, the UN was a party dependent on the government and merely incipient, with no internal life. The UN is an example of extreme weakness among dictatorships with weak single parties. There was no internal party activity until 1933. From 1934 onwards, after the creation of the regime’s new institutions, the UN embarked on a period of lethargy from which it did not emerge until 1944. This lethargy can be partly explained by the affirmation by the regime that it did not attribute great importance to it, beyond its utility as an electoral and legitimating vehicle.

The Interior Ministry controlled the UN for the first years of its existence.³⁴ Ministerial dispatches instructed civil governors to create district and council commissions, which the Interior Minister could replace at will.³⁵ This dependence marked the party and, contrary to what one might expect, its inactivity was particularly

³³ Salazar, A. de O., *Discursos*, Vol. I, (Coimbra: 1935), pp. 69-96.

³⁴ Some attempts to designate a leadership failed owing to its diverse composition. See the Interior Ministry Circular to the presidents of the UN district commissions, 29 December 1931, Bundle 452-box 5, AGMI/ANTT.

³⁵ AOS/CO/PC-4, ANTT.

notorious in the 1930s. It practically disappeared after it nominated the leadership in 1932, published its statutes and chose the candidates for the National Assembly in 1934. In 1938 Salazar himself recognised that UN activities “were successively diminished until it had almost been extinguished”.³⁶ It was only on the eve of 1945, in the tension generated by the emergence of an electoral opposition to the regime that the UN came to life again.³⁷

Although it was founded in 1930 and its local commissions had been formed a few months later, the first Central Committee was only nominated in 1932. Even after its nomination, the Interior Minister and his district representatives continued to lead it and, in many cases, to re-organise council commissions, and inform them of the tasks to be fulfilled. The directive to support the *Diário da Manhã* or calls for provincial populations to come to Lisbon to participate in demonstrations was co-ordinated by the civil governors in conjunction with local leaders.³⁸ UN dependence on the national administrative apparatus was almost total. When it had to revitalise its local structures for the elections, for example, it was the Interior Minister and the Civil Governors who were entrusted with the task.

The Interior Minister mediated relations between the Central Committee and local commissions for many years. The absence of any real party life was apparent at the first UN Congress in 1934, which was more of a propaganda exercise for legitimisation and the elimination of competitors like the NS. Indeed, it was only after the Congress that the organisation’s statutes were altered to provide for a Congress.³⁹ Even after the creation of its tenuous organisational network, in the period under study the UN never

³⁶ Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, p. 140.

³⁷ See Schmitter, P., “The Impact and Meaning of ‘non-competitive, non-free, and insignificant’ Elections in Authoritarian Portugal, 1933-74” in Hermet, G., Rose, R., and Rouquié, A. (eds), *Elections Without Choice*, (London: 1978), pp. 145-168, and Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, pp. 194-227.

³⁸ *Diário da Manhã* was founded with public money to support and encourage *União Nacional*’s formation.

³⁹ Parreira, A., et. al, ‘O I Congresso da União Nacional’ in Various authors, *O fascismo em Portugal*, (Lisbon: 1980), pp. 209-210.

acquired notable levels of autonomy. This was manifest not only in its dependence on the government and administration, but in the lack of propaganda activities, ideological education, cultural intervention and the formation of socio-professional organs normally found in authoritarian regime parties such as the FET in Spain.⁴⁰

The New State later created state bodies for propaganda, youth and labour, but they were unconnected with the party. Civil servants were occasionally nominated to carry out specific tasks through the UN party network. In 1934, for example, the National Union Corporatist Studies Centre (*Centro de Estudos Corporativos da União Nacional*) was created to divulge the new principles of corporatism. Its members, however, were all civil servants led by the State Under-secretary for Corporations, Pedro Teotónio Pereira.

Although some New State leaders referred to fascist dictatorships, it was almost always to point out differences and the ideological and organisational authors of the UN were not inspired by the fascist model. Indeed, just as the 1933 Constitution represented a formal compromise with the principles of liberal representation, the UN represented an organisational compromise with conservative republicans at the local level.

The organisational ambiguity of the UN can be understood through internal correspondence between local leaders and the Interior Ministry. Members of the radical right nominated to local commissions, for example, complained in 1931 about the absence of internal party life and dependence on the administration. The majority supported typically clientelistic activities and inundated the Ministry with suggestions for nominations to local posts. This was perhaps the most durable and intense practice of UN commissions, affecting all areas of the state apparatus. From this perspective, the life of the UN was from the outset very active and at times intensely conflictive. Many of these conflicts were the prolonga-

⁴⁰ Even though strictly controlled, the FET developed an enormous bureaucracy including youth, propaganda and press, as well as union organisations that were at least until 1945 based on the Fascist model. See Chueca, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 169-398.

tion of cleavages among the various parties under the First Republic, which were brought into the UN.

The actual organisational model demanded by many UN founders called for the compromise formula. This is shown in supervisory circulars sent by the Interior Ministry to the civil governors. For the president of the Bragança district commission, who later became the Civil Governor, the UN was “a great and well-defined conservative republican party, into which all the forces of this tendency may enter” to assist the transition from military to civilian rule.⁴¹ Some UN council leaders were also members of the League who joined NS when they realised that the government party would never become the mobilising fascist party they wanted. Although the president of the Bragança district commission was proud about UN activities in his region, a leader of the council commission in Alcácer do Sal complained about the UN being an “inert body” without “a will to fight and without doctrine”. In his view, if the UN was to be more than a “body of *caciques* it needs an organisation, militancy and propaganda”.⁴² A year after writing this, the author became an NS founder leader in Alcácer do Sal. In short, although the regime later adopted some fascist institutions, the birthmarks of the UN weighed heavily throughout the Salazar regime.

National Leaders

The first national leaders nominated by Salazar to the UN Central Commission constituted more of a ‘college of cardinals’ than a political party leadership. They reflected the various ‘sensibilities’ of the Military Dictatorship and their average age was 50, older than the deputies of the New State’s first National Assembly and the members of other regime institutions.⁴³ Salazar invited person-

⁴¹ Letter from the president of Bragança district commission of the UN to the President of the UN [Interior Minister], 28 June 1931, Bundle 452-box 5, AGMI/ANTT.

⁴² Letter from Portugal Branco to the Interior Minister, 21 May 1931, Bundle 452-box 5, AGMI/ANTT.

⁴³ Schmitter, P. C., ‘The Social Origins, Economic Bases and Political Imperatives of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal’ in Larsen, S. U. et. al. (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 443.

alities from the monarchist and republican conservative camp, who shared a common bond to the state as they had had ministerial functions, as high-level civil servants or members of the military hierarchy. The first UN leader was the Interior Minister Colonel Lopes Mateus.

The composition of the Central Commission indicated that the party was meant to support the regime rather than militate for it. Salazar became President and Albino dos Reis, a former member of the Cunha Leal ULR, was nominated Vice President. The first Central Commission was composed by Bissaia Barreto, a former member of the Evolutionists who were quite influential in Coimbra, João Amaral, a judge and an Integralist monarchist, and Nuno Mexia, who had been linked to the Union of Economic Interests (*União dos Interesses Económicos*) in the 1920s. The remaining members had been either ministers or former ministers under the dictatorship. Passos e Sousa, a military officer and conservative republican with some influence over the Army, completed the list. Miguel Sousa e Mello of the PCC was chosen to head the Lisbon district commission.

This plurality does not mean that Salazar wanted or demanded the 'integration' or discipline of these diverse sectors in order to turn them into a governing élite, as Franco did in Spain. In the case of Spain, it was possible to distinguish between the various sectors within the leadership of the single party and to note a corresponding representation within the government and administration⁴⁴. This was not the case under Salazar. Appointment to lead the UN meant either 'retirement' or a prestigious pause from government duties. The party was not full of effective political leaders; rather, it was a body to place personalities who represented political currents or institutions like the Army, who acted like a 'con-

⁴⁴ The unified FET effectively supplied the Franco regime with a part of the national political élite, and it is possible to talk of 'circulation' between party, administration and government in Spain. See: Pi-Sunyer, C. *El personal político de Franco (1936-1945): contribución empírica a una teoría del régimen franquista*, (Barcelona: 1978), pp. 145-231, and Jerez Mir, M., *Elites políticas y centros de extracción en España, 1938-1957*, (Madrid: 1982), pp. 49-178.

sultative committee' with weak links to the district commissions mediated by the Interior Ministry.

The national leadership of the UN and NS were very different, both in terms of political origin and age. The absence of youth was a characteristic of the UN, particularly in the 1930s.⁴⁵ At the first Congress, 68% of the delegates were over 40 years old.⁴⁶ While most NS leaders belonged to the generation of 1920 and 1930, UN leaders belonged to those of 1900 and 1910. Political origins were also different. Those of the government party were much more diversified. While NS national leaders were clearly presented as an 'alternative élite' with ideological cohesion and a unity of origins much like other European fascist parties, UN leaders were predominantly representatives of the traditional conservative élite.

Local Leaders

The formation of UN local commissions was a relatively rapid process. Almost all of them had been set up by the middle of 1931. The Civil Governors under the guidance of the Interior Ministry initiated the process. Council commissions were chosen by the civil governor and sent to the Interior Ministry for approval. In cases where a district commission already existed, the civil governor's list was given to it before going to Lisbon. It was not until 1932 that a national leadership was created which suggests that the main aim of the government at this initial stage was to consult and screen local notables to test their possible usefulness to the new regime. The process also acted as a first inventory of resistance on the republican fringes and on the extreme right.

Owing to the vague and 'all encompassing' discourse of the early UN and the fact that it allowed parallel affiliations with other organisations supporting the dictatorship, such as the League, the monarchists and even the National Syndicalists, the process of forming some council commissions was very confused. Rolão Preto,

⁴⁵ Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, pp. 241-242.

⁴⁶ Parreira, A., et. al, 'O I Congresso...' *cit.*, p. 213.


for example, was actually affiliated to the UN. Many local commissions were unstable and fragile and political infighting was ferocious, sometimes leading to dissolution. Their composition was frequently altered, either because of the inactivity of members or because of changes imposed by Civil Governor to reflect the relative importance of local factions, although only when the Civil Governor was not himself a member of one such faction.

In mid-1931 the dictatorship used this network to organise a demonstration in Lisbon for the first time. The Ministry sent a circular to all of the commissions, paid for special trains from the provinces and the press was informed that the local commissions had mobilised around 14,000 people.

Political Origins

At the end of 1930, the Interior Minister instructed the civil governors to find out what the pre-1926 political affiliations of UN local leaders had been. Although there are analytical limitations associated with the categories used, given subsequent alterations and imprecision, the results of this enquiry reveals who were among the founding group of Salazar's single party after competi-

Figure 4.1
Political Origin of UN Local Commissions



tion had been eliminated. In accordance with a format provided for them by the Minister, the Civil Governors divided leaders according to four types: republicans, monarchists, Catholics and independents. The republicans were further divided wherever possible according to party affiliations. The identification of the political origins of 806 leaders in eight districts reveals the kind of people that the government tended to select in 1931 (Figure 4.1).⁴⁷

This confirms that a high percentage of leaders were members of republican parties, which adhered to the dictatorship. Caution must be exercised with respect to the high number of independents. If broken down, the 30% of independents would favour the republicans, as it is probable that this number includes republicans who had abandoned party affiliations prior to the overthrow of the Republic. The civil governors separated the Integralists from monarchists, of which there were only seven. Miscalculation aside, this gives some idea of their resistance to the UN. This is not strange, as many of the Integralists either resigned or were expelled from the UN in subsequent years.

If independent republicans or those without any party affiliation are excluded, the number of affiliates is greater and conservative republican parties predominate.⁴⁸ Among the conservative parties, the dominant parties were the Nationalist Party, the Cunha Leal ULR, which both supported the 1926 coup, attempted to gain hegemony under the dictatorship and were enemies of the PD. Many militants of these political parties, even those in Lisbon who were uncomfortable with Salazar, filled entire UN council commissions.⁴⁹

⁴⁷ See Bundle 451-box 4, AGMI/ANTT.

⁴⁸ Those classed as 'republican with no identified party affiliation' includes those who replied that they were 'republican with a party affiliation' without stating the party to which they were affiliated.

⁴⁹ Local disagreements were to provoke several denunciations to the Interior Minister. For example, in 1932 the president of the Freixo de Espada à Cinta UN commission accused Braga's Civil Governor and the president of the District Commission of altering the presidencies of the councils and the council administrations in favour of his friends. To 'damage' the governor and the district president, he accused them of favouring the old *caciques* of the PN. Letter from the President of the UN commission of Freixo de Espada à Cinta to the Interior Ministry, 14 September 1932, Bundle 455 - box 4, AGMI/ANTT.

Many Civil Governors classified all those who in 1931 had been disconnected from their parties of origin as 'independent republicans'. In the district of Vila Real, for example, the President of the UN district commission said that some local commissions were entirely composed of supporters of Cunha Leal who were by then "fully integrated into the *União Nacional*".⁵⁰ In the list sent by the Civil Governor, however, they appear as 'independent republicans'.⁵¹ It is possible to identify former republicans dominating local commissions, particularly from the PN and the ULR, which met with the approval of both civil governors and the Interior Minister. The large number of leaders whose affiliations are unknown or non-discriminated, however, limits a more precise analysis.

The official speech that launched the UN emphasised the adhesion of the conservative republican elite. Indeed, local leaders who declared previous affiliation to conservative republican parties often attended inaugurations of local delegations. Internal reports sent by those responsible for the selection of leaders to the Interior Ministry also proves that the criticisms and accusations against the UN by the League and NS were correct. However, it is unclear how much the old clientelistic machines of the parties of the liberal republican system were used by the UN. The figures for the district commissions are similar. 'Republicans' and 'independent republicans' dominated in Oporto, Faro and Coimbra. In the case of Vila Real, for which more precise details are available, the district president stated that in his commission: "they are all republicans and, although some have been members of different republican parties, they are today loyal to the *União Nacional*".⁵²

Although it is impossible to verify dual affiliations, UN directives, the refusal of the NS to join the party until the split, as well as its subsequent dissolution, indicate that there was little overlap.

⁵⁰ Report of the President of the Vila Real District Commission of the UN to the President of the UN Executive Commission, 3 July 1931, Bundle 455 - box 8, AGMI/ANTT.


⁵¹ Report of the civil governor of Vila Real to the Interior Ministry, 9 April 1931, Bundle 451 - box 4, AGMI/ANTT.

⁵² Report to the civil governor of Vila Real cited above.

Indeed, in 1933, only five out of 120 members of around eleven district commissions were dual affiliates.⁵³ This number was almost certainly higher in local commissions, although there is no available data to confirm this. Although they entered some of the local commissions of the UN in 1930, the fascists tended to choose more mobilising organisations such as the League. Their adhesion to NS revealed their preference for a more ideological and militant form of political activity.

The ideological origins of NS local leaders were much more uniform, stemming from Integralism, other forces resisting liberal republicanism, including young university students attracted to fascism who began their careers in the provinces. The UN was different, at least initially. Not only was it more diverse in terms of ori-

Figure 4.2
Socio-professional Composition of NS-UN District Commissions



⁵³ Survey of the district commissions of Lisbon, Viseu, Oporto, Faro, Guarda, Évora, Leiria, Setúbal, Viano do Castelo, Vila Real, Braga and Bragança.

gins, but it as more of a clientelistic machine than an ideological party. Efforts to capture a sizeable part of conservative republican party networks appears to have been intense, which explains the more moderate political discourse that characterised the party in the second half of the 1930s.

Socio-Professional Profile

The socio-professional profile of local and district commissions of both organisations was different. Nonetheless, it is hard to go any further than this, given that certain categories were not discriminated (Figure 4.2).⁵⁴

The composition of the district commissions differs only slightly. NS composition confirms the tendency typical of fascist parties to have higher numbers of categories such as students and unemployed, as well as low ranking military officers from the League. The local commissions show the same tendencies. Nonetheless, lack of comparable data on the UN and NS make a more rigorous analysis difficult.

Members

The nature of UN membership requires some previous clarification, as this category is hard to define. Duverger notes two forms of membership in modern political parties: *open* membership, which is characterised by joining and the payment of dues, and *regulated* membership, which presupposes a request for membership agreed to by a party organ.⁵⁵ Between 1930 and 1933, the period under comparative analysis, membership of the UN was unequivocally open. The organisation's statutes did not outline 'rights and duties' of members. Members only had to have "come of age and have full use of their political rights". It was only later, when local commissions were inundated with 'requests' and 'favours' that circulars

⁵⁴ Data referring to the UN was taken from Caldeira, A., 'O partido de Salazar...' *cit.*, pp. 976-977.

⁵⁵ Duverger, M., *Les partis politiques*, 3rd Ed, (Paris: 1957), p. 93.

appealed for greater control over requests for membership. Some descriptions of the formation of the UN corroborate its open nature. In its first years, applications to join the party were made at the offices of the civil governor and town halls and there were no requirements other than those noted above. Beyond sporadic mobilisations in Lisbon, UN members had no obligations or rights and did not participate in organisational work. The government was not worried about denunciations of ‘infiltration’, which mostly referred to clientelism rather than ‘political infiltration’ anyway. According to Duverger’s typology, it is possible to say that NS membership was also open. Membership forms were more ideological. The fact that they were not distributed directly by the administration presupposes a lower degree of clientelistic adhesion to the NS.

Geographical Distribution of Membership

At the end of 1933, the UN had around 20,000 ‘associates’ a number roughly similar to that of NS.⁵⁶ The geographical distribution of membership is somewhat different, but not as much as may have been expected (Figure 4.3).⁵⁷

NS was more firmly established in urban and coastal areas than the UN, being generally better represented in Lisbon, Coimbra, Oporto and Braga. The UN was unable to attract large numbers in the more developed areas, but was over-represented in the rural districts of the north and interior, such as Vila Real and Viseu, where it had 15%, and Guarda where it had 10%.

Social Origins


The UN never sought a popular clientele. As noted by Salazar, “we do not need to incite [the working class] to support us, neither do we have to encourage their demands only to later command that they be shot for their excesses”.⁵⁸ The instruments created to

⁵⁶ According to Braga da Cruz, in 1933 the UN had around 18,871 members.

⁵⁷ The data on the distribution of UN members in 1933 were taken from Cruz, M. B da, *op. cit.*, p. 233.

⁵⁸ Salazar, A. de O., *op. cit.*, p. 178.


Figure 4.3
National Distribution of NS-UN Membership, 1933



generate ‘consensus’ among popular social groups were created later and never came under the jurisdiction of the UN. The National Syndicalists, on the other hand, never ceased to search for a popular base.⁵⁹ While the UN had 58.2% of land-owning members, NS had a significantly greater number of private sector employees, students and manual labourers, the result of effective militancy among the middle class and workers (Figure 4.4).

⁵⁹ In the comparison between the socio-professional composition of the two organisations the categories presented by Manuel Braga da Cruz are used, but he does not disaggregate some categories such as ‘landowners’, and unites the categories ‘specialised manual labourers’ and ‘non-specialised manual labourers’. Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, p. 239.

Figure 4.4
Socio-professional Composition of NS-UN Membership, 1933



National Union — National Syndicalist Tension

The UN was a conglomeration of commissions dependent on the Interior Minister, plagued by internal divergences based on local clientelistic cleavages. Throughout 1933, as animosity between the government and the fascists grew, the Civil Governors, under orders from the Interior Ministry, began to dismiss fascists from posts inherited within local administrations. Local UN representations assisted them, but failed to develop a mobilising alternative. The more audacious governors made a few attempts at 'integration', usually those sent from Lisbon.

Two kinds of situations prevailed. The first was rare, and consisted of relatively peaceful coexistence between the two organisations. This happened where NS groups were recent and generally created by students who returned to their native cities and differed from UN local leaders due to their youth and desire to mobilise the popular classes. This was the case of the Algarve where NS was

founded by a group of local youths from the universities of Lisbon and Coimbra who were beginning their professional activities. The UN dated from 1931 and there were already significant social and generational differences within the local administration and between the local commissions of the two organisations. The complementary development of the political activity of both parties evolved without difficulties until the summer of 1933. The discourse of *The National Syndicalist* (*O Nacional Sindicalista*), the local NS newspaper founded the previous year, was similar to that of the party's newspaper in Lisbon, but the UN did not oppose local NS mobilisation. The latter represented 'order' and the former 'action' and each "with its characteristics" served the "national ideal".⁶⁰ Despite censorship of their local newspaper, NS developed its political activities without many limitations.⁶¹ The local UN leader was often at NS conferences.⁶² When government ministers visited the Algarve they were met by uniformed National Syndicalists who greeted them with the 'Roman salute'.⁶³

The second was more common, and consisted of situations of conflict. These occurred where ex-Integralists or League leaders who abandoned or were expelled from the UN had formed delegations. They normally happened with long-established local groups that had often participated in local councils under the dictatorship. NS centres of agitation and mobilisation radicalised their position when faced with neutralisation and a clear predominance of local conservative notables in the selection of UN leaders. Thus, the majority of councils and districts the two parties lived in a state of tension.

In Coimbra, conflicts between NS and the UN increased with the foundation of the local branch of the government party, especially since some founders had been expelled from the UN when conservative republicans like Bissaia Barreto were invited to join. Following the announcement of a public meeting at which Preto

⁶⁰ *O Nacional Sindicalista*, Faro, 5 March 1933, p. 1.

⁶¹ Antunes, J. F. (ed), *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁶² *O Nacional Sindicalista*, Faro, 15 January 1933, p. 1.

⁶³ *O Nacional Sindicalista*, Faro, 5 March 1933, pp. 4-5.

was to discuss 'the national revolution of the workers', the Civil Governor, under Interior Ministry orders, took drastic measures to close the delegation and prohibit any public demonstrations.⁶⁴ NS retaliated with slogans like "Down with Insolence" and "Down with Bissau Barreto". Although NS was supported by a significant number of university professors who sent a letter of protest to Salazar, the prohibition was not lifted. According to a report by the civil governor, the NS showed "a great deal of ill will against the politics of common sense" particularly against the fact that the district's conservative republicans had joined the UN. The Governor was also apprehensive about the NS political programme, which advocated the "rapid organisation of a nationalist State they call totalitarian and [...] anti-capitalist" and seemed to him "unreasonable and injudicious", as well as its constant lack of respect for the "authorities".⁶⁵ Coimbra was the only place where the UN commission shifted to NS. In most city councils the Fascists either refused nomination or were not chosen even though some were members of the UN.

In other cases, NS members of local administrations came under siege from Civil Governors supported by the religious hierarchy and local UN forces that sought to expel them from their positions. This was the case in one of the councils in the Beira Alta region, as reported by the Civil Governor of Guarda. In April 1933, the Fornos de Algodres town council undertook a series of reforms under the leadership of an NS militant, Lieutenant Castelo Branco. The civil governor wrote, "everything indicated their intention to take advantage of the enthusiasm of the festivities to benefit NS propaganda and undermine government action".⁶⁶ NS leaders "exceeded themselves" to such an extent in their speeches that the Bishop of Viseu hurriedly retired and the Civil Governor failed to show up. Although there was a local UN commission, the Gover-

⁶⁴ See Caetano's protest to Salazar in Antunes, J. F., *op. cit.*, p. 92.

⁶⁵ Report of the Coimbra Civil Governor to the Interior Ministry, 6 February 1933, Bundle 463 - box 15, AGMI/ANTT.

⁶⁶ Report from the Civil Governor of Guarda to the Interior Minister, 4 May 1933, Bundle 462 - box 15, AGMI/ANTT.

nor stressed that “the occasion was not suitable for them to take office”. Faced with complaints from the UN and the Governor, council leaders resigned and allowed their opponents to nominate a new commission sympathetic to the government. The police intervened and arrested all “the disorderly” of “low” social condition that demonstrated against the new commission. The government delegation considered the habitual NS accusations that this was the work of the “democratic opposition” to be unfounded “distractions”.⁶⁷

In the district of Leiria, reports by the Civil Governor opined that NS political activity and agitation were a form of “white communism” that confused the rural population. Such “disorientation” was even great “when encouraged by Army officers”. Despite prohibition, the governors continued to refer to the NS as a centre of “agitation”, particularly after part of the movement’s central services were transferred to Leiria at the end of 1933.⁶⁸ There are several other examples that indicate the multiple tensions existing between the local UN and NS delegations. The conflict led to the gradual elimination of centres of Fascist mobilisation and to their diminishing local status in favour of the generally republican and conservative notables of the UN. Ferocious denunciations of “opposition” and “infiltration” with which the fascists attacked the Salazarist party were not mere rhetorical ploys.

Not all the Civil Governors were as hostile towards the NS. The Civil Governor of Vila Real and former secretary to Salazar, Assis Gonçalves, received a delegation of “local National Syndicalist leaders” after Preto’s exile on the very day that Salazar banned the movement. In his report to Salazar, he noted that “they consider Rolão Preto to be their only leader, condenser and interpreter of their doctrines”. He added that “they judge themselves to be a force and sole guardians of the national revolution’s doctrines” and that “they believe it was they who made the revolution of 28 May”. He further noted that “they wish to collaborate with me, but

⁶⁷ *Ibid.*

⁶⁸ Confidential circular N^o 1877, from the Civil Governor of Leiria to the council administrators, 4 August 1933, Bundle 463, AGMI/ANTT.

with no-one else".⁶⁹ Assis Gonçalves ended his report optimistically, saying that "at the end of August, when I thought to meddle with the political and administrative organisations after getting involved in the local chessboard, we see that we can maintain our ideas and we can later see whether we can use them to get something done".⁷⁰

Concluding Remarks

Sartori notes about single party systems that "the more modernised and/or developed the society, the more anti-partism yields to unipartism — at least in the sense that the latter solution proves to be far less fragile and far more effective than the former".⁷¹ This tendency is confirmed by the historical experience of authoritarian and fascist regimes in the inter-war period. Indeed, in countries where the post-war democratic order included mass parties and large-scale social involvement in politics, successor regimes single parties were generally more important and mobilisational, independently of their degree of dependence on the state.

In Spain and Italy, single parties had numerous functions within the political system, even when they were dependent and controlled. This was not so in Portugal. One of the genetic reasons for this difference is the prior existence in Spain and Italy of fascist parties and a strong right. In both these countries the new single party incorporated several factions: in Italy, the Fascist Party incorporated groups such as the Nationalists;⁷² in Spain the movement incorporated even more elements because the Falange was much weaker. In both cases, however, the single parties became strong bureaucratic machines that mobilised, made propaganda, selected élites and acted as privileged channels to the masses. In Portugal, the forces of the right that participated in the overthrow of the lib-

⁶⁹ Gonçalves, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 128-129.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, pp. 130-131.

⁷¹ Sartori, G., *op. cit.*, p. 40

⁷² See: Gentile, E., 'La natura e la storia del partito fascista nelle interpretazione dei contemporanei e degli storici', *Storia Contemporanea*, N° 3, June 1985, pp. 521-607.

eral order had a very reduced party expression. Its parties never exceeded ideological pressure groups or groups of 'notables' and their activity was channelled through the Army and Church. In other words, the political culture of the right was crystallised in pre-party formations. It did not trust 'political massification' and made scarce use of mobilisational resources.

The NS constituted a project to create a mass fascist party. Its rapid growth confirmed the political modernisation of Portuguese society, particularly in the urban centres that had more experience with anti-authoritarian mobilisation. The NS élite presented itself as an 'alternative' leadership, just like their fascist counterparts elsewhere in Europe. Salazar's response, however, was not to 'forcibly unify' the fascists and thereby grant them an important role within the single party, as was the case in Spain. This remained the case even after the government forced the Fascists to integrate with the regime in 1934. Those that adhered to regime, however, chose to join other institutions other than the UN.

As shown by this analysis, it is possible to conclude that the fascist élite was initially excluded from the single party and that the efforts of the latter were focused on the incorporation of conservative élites, reflecting the political project of the emerging Salazarist regime. From this perspective, the UN was one of the parties closest to the 'antiparty' model advocated by official declarations. Beyond legitimating the new regime and 'excluding' mobilising forces, it was an important 'political channel' not so much for the masses but for local notables.⁷³ It can even be said that if in Italy the government controlled party mobilisation, in Portugal the UN was a state agent for the 'integration' of local élites and for political 'demobilisation'.

⁷³ Sartori, G., *op. cit.*, p. 41.

Chapter Five

"Without Power": Conflict and Prohibition

Ever attentive to Portuguese political events, the British Embassy was a careful observer of the development of National Syndicalism. By July 1933, British diplomats feared that Salazar's position was in danger of being undermined by its unprecedented growth "in numbers and in strength".¹ By the summer of 1933, however, NS faced a dilemma. NS internal correspondence reveals that from early 1933 the movement had unsuccessfully tried to reach an agreement with the regime. It wanted to play a leading role in the creation of new corporations and to participate in the creation of a new order with the institutionalisation of the its militias.² While it formally recognised Salazar's success in improving state finances, NS opposed his increasing monopoly on political power. Thus, they rejected his new constitution, claiming that it represented the victory of liberal principles over integral corporatism. As a result, NS began to oppose the UN and became increasingly involved in military-led anti-Salazar conspiracies.

Opposition to National Syndicalism

The Church

The hierarchy of the Catholic Church and the PCC — key elements within the dictatorship from the downfall of Gomes da

¹ Report, 12 July 1933, FO 371/17415, PRO.

² Circular from Alberto Monsaraz to the district secretaries, 29 July 1934, 24 July 1933, ARP.

Costa onwards — were an important obstacle to the development of the Fascists. Although they shared part of the Integralist political programme, differences between Catholics and Integralists in the post-war period developed into open animosity between the two groups. The Church began to criticise fascist and Integralist doctrines developed in the 1920s, and after the coup in 1926 it increased pressure against militia-style parties advocating an “exaggerated nationalism”.³

The Church feared that power-holders and the military in particular might come to support the Fascists. When NS announced the creation of a nationalist student organisation including “monarchists, republicans, catholics and atheists”, the official Church paper, *Novidades*, responded by saying that “only a nationalism that professes statism and seeks to replace religious faith with a socio-political mysticism can include catholics and atheists — both bowing before a new god — the Divine State”. It concluded that “no true catholic can accept this”.⁴ From the autumn of 1932 onwards the attacks increased in number and intensity. NS positions were denounced as anti-catholic and of exacerbating old quarrels between the Church, *Action Française*, and Italian Fascism.⁵ The official Church press condemned these movements for promoting a “pagan and agnostic nationalism”, a heresy that slighted “eternal truths in order to revere a deified state”.⁶

Fascist leaders deliberately ignored their critics and continued to proclaim their loyalty to catholicism. Some branches in the north where many Integralist parish priests were active local NS leaders reacted strongly, however. The NS weekly paper in Àgueda, for example, published an article probably written by the local NS leader, the parish priest Eugénio de Belonor, accusing the

³ Cruz, M. B. da, ‘As elites católicas nos primórdios do salazarismo’, *Análise Social*, vol. XXVII, 1992, pp. 547-574.

⁴ *Novidades*, 5 January 1932, p. 1

⁵ See: Weber, E., *op. cit.*, pp. 219-255; Pollard, J. F., *The Vatican and Italian Fascism: A Study in Conflict, 1929-32*, (Cambridge: 1985); Koon, T. H., *Believe, Obey, Fight: Political Socialisation of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943*, (Chapel Hill: 1985), pp. 116-142.

⁶ ‘Condenando excessos’, *Novidades*, 1 January 1933, p. 1.

Church of seeking to take advantage of NS "mistakes" to "issue hasty interdictions seeking to prevent Portuguese catholics from collaborating with the NS".⁷ Belonor criticised PCC militants who "had shown they were incapable [of anything] worthwhile in the socio-economic field".⁸ Yet *Novidades* insisted on reasserting its criticism of "political unionism" and denied it had any Christian traits. On the contrary, it was "influenced by an excess of nationalism and practical secularism, a fact that has earned similar movements in other countries the condemnation of the Church". The only solution was for fascism to "Christianise itself and become part of the Social Catholic movement for which the known, confirmed and practised forces of truth and justice constitute the only instruments capable of defending societies threatened by revolutionary violence".⁹

Father Abel Varzim, who later became the driving force within the Catholic Youth Workers (*Juventude Operária Católica*, JOC), was a leading Social Catholic and the author of *Catholicism and National Syndicalism*, the most systematic Social Catholic refutation of NS ideals and political methods¹⁰. Varzim outlined the restrictions that the Church should impose upon "this new pantheist religion", anticipating the tactics used by the Church hierarchy to resist the creation of regime organisations such as the Portuguese Youth (*Mocidade Portuguesa*, MP), which robbed the Church of its 'rightful' territory¹¹. Varzim lamented that in its battle against socialism and communism, the Church had as an ally the "exaggerated and totalitarian nationalism" of fascism, which was essentially "based on Hegelian state theory", which he believed had to be combated "in the name of catholic principles".¹²

⁷ 'Não! Não confundimos nada!', *Reação*, 14 January 1933, p. 1.

⁸ *Ibid.*

⁹ 'Novos messias', *Novidades*, 31 January 1933, p. 1.

¹⁰ Abel Varzim was an active member of Catholic Action (*Ação Católica*) and in working class politics, which later caused problems for Salazar's dictatorship. See: Rezolla, I., *O Sindicalismo Católico no Estado Novo, 1931-1948*, (Lisbon: 1999).

¹¹ Varzim, A., *Catolicismo e Nacional Sindicalismo*, (Lisbon: 1933), p. 16.

¹² See his articles criticising Rolão Preto and his book *Balizas*, in *Novidades*, 10 October 1932.

Varzim opposed Fascist attempts to seek an alliance with the Church, even as Salazar demanded the dissolution of the PCC and the Church hierarchy concentrated on a “new Christian crusade to re-conquer Portugal”. Varzim stated that “the Church condemns as immoral exaggerated state intervention in the economy, its educational monopoly and the imposition of statutes or regulations of association”.¹³ He also condemned the NS corporatist model of obligatory unionisation, its totalitarian youth projects and its desire to monopolise education, which could not be “reconciled with catholic doctrine”.¹⁴

The Church hierarchy also co-operated with local authorities against NS, attempting to isolate areas where the party was politically powerful within municipal councils. Meanwhile, the Church supported the consolidation of authoritarian rule and was content to see the regime adopt catholic principles in its activities, ideology and symbolism. On the other hand, however, it strongly opposed any attempt by the regime to create fascist-style organisations, and made efforts to ensure that the MP and the Legion promoted Christian rather than fascist ideals.

Opposition from the Left

By the beginning of the 1930s, the margin for legal manoeuvre of forces opposing the regime had been eliminated. The PD, which had had a virtual monopoly on power during the First Republic and was subsequently implicated in various attempts to bring down the dictatorship, saw many of its leaders exiled and its membership dwindle. The leaders of the small conservative republican parties, whose legal margin for manoeuvre had also been limited, remained silent, chose exile or joined the regime. All of the opposition frequently attacked National Syndicalism, but it is important to highlight the positions of the Communists, Socialists and Anarcho-syndicalists, which were closest to the working class. These groups

¹³ Varzim, A., *op. cit.*, p. 34.

¹⁴ *Ibid.*

competed most closely with the Fascists and therefore feared fascist activity the most.

The Communists viewed the NS as a virulent fascist militia.¹⁵ They feared that "the devious, Jesuitical and cunning policies of the Catholic Centre" would be replaced by "the more brutal oppression of Rolão Preto's National Syndicalism".¹⁶ In 1933, PCP clandestine papers and internal circulars began to highlight the NS threat. The party organised various events to challenge the NS public demonstrations.¹⁷ The PCP did not distinguish between NS and the Salazarist regime. For them, the *Estado Novo* could not be sustained merely by the "the high command of the Army"; it also needed this new Fascist front in order to survive.¹⁸

For the Communists, the New State would inevitably turn fascist with the aid of NS, which they believed the regime was financing. The Communists claimed that the NS was a "gang of brigands with Nazi pretensions". In their view, Preto's party was a "a new appendage of reactionary capitalism bribed by Integralists, industrialists, finance capitalists and landowners", a gang also sustained "by the coffers of the dictatorship", which had started to "freely provoke the proletariat".¹⁹ They saw the NS as the vanguard of an anti-working class offensive, which was aided by the government's introduction of corporatist legislation and the obligatory integration of independent unions into the new system.

The Anarcho-syndicalists also linked the fascist nature of the regime with NS. Like the Socialists, they recognised the danger of NS appeals to the more 'backward' sectors of the working classes.

¹⁵ For an introduction to the position of the international communist movement, see Beetham, D., *Marxists in Face of Fascism: Writings by Marxists on Fascism from the Inter-war Period*, (Manchester: 1983), pp. 1-62.

¹⁶ *Frente Vermelha*, Nº 1, September 1933, p. 3.

¹⁷ Initially a minority within Anarcho-syndicalism, the PCP began recruiting students and intellectuals who went on to constitute the hard core of the clandestine party, as previous working class leaders had been deported to a camp in Tarrafal, in the Islands of Cape Verde. Nunes, J. A., 'Sobre alguns aspectos da evolução política do Partido Comunista Português após a reorganização de 1929 (1931-33)', *Análise Social*, vol. XVII (67-68), 1981, pp. 715-731; Pereira, J. P., *Álvaro Cunhal, Uma Biografia Política*, (Lisbon: 1999).

¹⁸ 'Contra o Nacional Sindicalismo! Por uma frente única anti-fascista de massas!', PCP communiqué, 1933.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*

Although they ridiculed NS attempts to conciliate “an all powerful state with the interest of the proletariat”, the Anarcho-syndicalists were aware that the regime might support NS militias. This led many to counsel a pre-emptive offensive.²⁰ With their newspaper, *A Batalha* long closed down, the Anarcho-syndicalists waged their battle through the free unions and their papers.

The old Portuguese Socialist Party (*Partido Socialista Português*, PSP) engaged in the most conspicuous denunciation of NS. At the beginning of the 1930s, the PSP still represented a significant section of the worker movement.²¹ Loyal to a legal reformist strategy, the PSP maintained a legal press that covered the peoples’ houses (*casas do povo*) and had a national network of correspondents.²² Their press systematically denounced European fascism and Soviet Socialism and defended social democracy. As stated in one of the party’s communiqué’s: “Neither Communism nor National Syndicalism will do! We stand between the two!”²³

Ramada Curto and other Socialists made it clear that ideological differences between the two were a matter of “style” rather than “content”.²⁴ Like the Communists and Anarcho-syndicalists, the Socialists believed that NS was an “unmasked fascism paid for by the bourgeoisie and high finance” to “divide the working masses”.²⁵ The Socialists criticised NS organic syndicalism for being elitist and anti-popular.²⁶

This collective left-wing view of NS as an agent of ‘fascistisation’ led to violent street protests. It is difficult to obtain precise information regarding the relative weight of various opposition forces involved in attacks on NS, but the material available indi-

²⁰ ‘À juventude trabalhadora! Ao proletariado!’ communiqué of the *Federação Regional Portuguesa das Juventudes Anarco-sindicalistas* (Portuguese Regional Federation of Young Anarcho-syndicalists), n. d. [1933].

²¹ For a history of the Socialist Party, see: Mónica, M. F., *O movimento socialista em Portugal (1875-1934)*, (Lisbon: 1985), and Patriarca, F., *op.cit.*

²² ‘Trabalhadores’, communiqué signed by ‘a group of labourers’ [socialists], n. d., Proc. Cr. 167/933 PIP, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

²³ *República Social*, Oporto, 20 May 1933, p. 1.

²⁴ *República Social*, Oporto, 27 May 1933, p. 3.

²⁵ *Ideias do Integralismo*, (Lisbon: 1933).

²⁶ *República Social*, Oporto, 20 May 1933, p. 1.

cates that Socialists co-operated with Communists and Anarcho-syndicalists in violent confrontations with Fascists throughout the country.²⁷ Clandestine Communist communiqués refer to confrontations with NS in Coimbra, Vila Real, Ermezinde and Braga as products of the "spontaneous heroism of local proletarian vanguards".²⁸ In Lisbon, Oporto and Coimbra Anarcho-syndicalist, Communist, Socialist and republican protesters participated in anti-fascist rallies against NS, highlighting opposition unity against the regime.

There was a confrontation between NS and the opposition during 28 May anniversary commemorations in Braga. The attack on an NS train in Ermezinde included a failed attempt to derail the train and gunfights with NS militants. Many railway employees were implicated in the attack and as the political police later discovered only one of them, an former parish leader and supporter of the PD, had a previous political record. This did not prevent the Communists from claiming credit for the attack. The Portuguese Federation of Young Communists (*Federação da Juventude Comunista Portuguesa*) in Coimbra claimed that they had left 18 Blue Shirts wounded and the rest trapped in the Hotel Avenida, and attacked NS lorries in Oporto and various other northern locations. Although the Communists played a significant role in the confrontations, it would be mistaken to minimise the role of other opposition forces. Indeed, the Communists did not have organised cells in most of the places where street conflicts occurred.

The Salazar Offensive: Separation versus Integration

Salazar had obtained power despite opposition from the NS elite and, from the end of 1932 onwards, he maintained a prudent distance from National Syndicalism. Neither side lost opportunities to emphasise their political and doctrinal differences. António Ferro, the New State propaganda chief and the most important

²⁷ 'Contra o Nacional Sindicalismo...' Cit.

²⁸ *O Jovem*, N^o 21, July 1933, p. 3.

recorder of Salazar's thought, did not share the dictator's political background. He was an extroverted, cosmopolitan intellectual who had been associated with Portuguese modernism and futurism in the 1920s and had been fascinated by Sidónio Pais.²⁹ But in his interviews with Salazar, he showed how the dictator distanced himself from European and Portuguese Fascism.

Salazar believed that fascist totalitarianism tended "towards pagan Caesarism, a new state that does not recognise moral or judicial limitations". He further contended that, even if fascism was legitimate it was not suitable for "a poor, sick country" like Portugal, where it was necessary to "proceed slowly, step by step".³⁰ The chief of the New State rejected fascism, its ideology, nationalism, integral corporatism, violence, militias as well as its charismatic leadership. On 28 May 1933, when the Fascists marched in Braga to commemorate the 1926 coup, Salazar denounced them as people who were "always agitated, excited and discontented" and who would "continue to demand the impossible: More! More!"³¹

The delicate political situation, however, prevented Salazar from acting against NS. In 1933 Salazar convened the Council of Ministers to discuss the growth of NS. Some Ministers favoured rapid repressive measures against the movement, but others were more conciliatory. On 7 July, NS was discussed by the Council again and was also always an issue in government talks with President Carmona.³² The government party still did not have a strong capacity to intervene, and NS reliance on President Carmona and the Armed Forces also prevented Salazar and his backers from adopting stronger measures. On 7 June 1933 Preto was received officially by President Carmona and demanded that the President concede NS the right to act freely, protesting against Salazar's offensive. The President assured Preto that "all nationalists have a role to play in the new political situation created by the 1926 Coup".³³

²⁹ Ferro, A., *Obras: I — Intervenção modernista*, (Lisbon: 1987).

³⁰ Ferro, A., *Salazar: o homem e a sua obra*, (Lisbon: 1933), p. 148.

³¹ Salazar, A. de O., *op. cit.*, p. 225.

³² Nogueira, F., *Salazar, vol.II: os tempos aureos (1928-1936)*, (Lisbon: 1977), p. 237.

³³ Barbosa, J. M. P., *op. cit.*, p. 126.

Salazar attempted to replace the War Minister, but was foiled by the Army's demand that the President should reject the proposal. Nevertheless, he managed to nominate an Army officer as Minister of Interior who had vociferously opposed NS as Civil Governor of Évora. This nomination led to the immediate repression of NS activity and propaganda, with a strict application of censorship laws. The Military Secretariat of the NS, however, controlled some Army units and had some influence within military circles, which worried the government. Reporting to Salazar, Lieutenant Assis Gonçalves warned that NS military sympathisers were calling for a "ministerial re-shuffle that could lead to a military figure taking over as head of the government".³⁴ He proposed that these sympathisers should be purged, but Salazar's attempt to purge Lieutenant Carvalho Nunes, President Carmona's assistant and an NS sympathiser, was unsuccessful.³⁵ By June 1933, Preto felt safe enough to attack the government in a public speech, secure in the knowledge that the military would protect him.³⁶

Corporatist Legislation

The promulgation of corporatist legislation in the summer of 1933 had an enormous impact on NS, given that the creation of a corporatist state was one of its main aims and propaganda themes. The National Labour Statute (*Estatuto Nacional do Trabalho*, ENT) declared the corporatist principles of the New State, and was largely inspired by the Italian *Carta del Lavoro*, although tempered by the regime's catholicism.³⁷ The promulgation of the ENT provoked tensions within NS because it "stole [their] thunder".³⁸ The corporatism of the Constitution of 1933 had not given organic elements the monopoly on political representation desired by the Fascists. It

³⁴ Gonçalves, A. *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89 and 96-100.

³⁵ Nogueira, F., *op. cit.*, p. 238.

³⁶ Barbosa, J. M. P., *op. cit.*, p. 126.

³⁷ Lucena, M. de, *A evolução do sistema corporativo português, vol. I: o salazarismo*, (Lisbon: 1976), p. 179.

³⁸ Report, 31 August 1933, FO 371/1715, PRO.

conciliated liberal and corporatist principles of representation. The President and National Assembly were elected by direct universal suffrage, although the latter, as well as the Corporatist Chamber (*Câmara Corporativa*) seldom met and had few real powers beyond rubber-stamping executive decisions.

The ENT was approved in September 1933 and announced in speeches that sought to combine the influence of Italian Fascism with the principles of social catholicism. The newly created National Unions (*Sindicatos Nacionais*) were completely subordinated to the National Institute for Labour and Welfare (*Instituto Nacional do Trabalho e Previdência*, INTP). Finances and the selection of leaders were subject to state approval. The state could also dismantle any union that was deemed to have acted against the spirit of the ENT.

The old independent rural unions were dissolved and replaced with *casas do povo*. The government refused to recognise the existence of rural class distinctions and appointed large landowners as “associate protectors” to lead rural centres.³⁹ The ENT provided for the creation of the National Federation for Happiness at Work (*Federação Nacional para a Alegria no Trabalho*, FNAT) designed to cater to the cultural and leisure needs of workers. Together with the National Propaganda Secretariat (*Secretariado de Propaganda Nacional*, SPN), the FNAT co-ordinated the activities of the *Doppo Lavoro*, an Italian inspired organisation.⁴⁰

Decrees governing the employers’s unions (*grêmios*) and organisations representing proprietors and liberal professionals were more prudent and moderate. Employer associations could continue their activities for a ‘transitional period’ that in many cases lasted as long as the regime itself. Formally, the organisation of the *grêmios* could be either voluntary or compulsory, depending on how the State viewed their potential impact on “national economic interests”.⁴¹ Indeed, it was this, rather than a search for any coher-

³⁹ Wiarda, H. J., *Corporatism and Development: The Portuguese Experience*, (Amherst: 1977), pp. 112-113.

⁴⁰ De Grazia, V., *The Culture of Consent: Mass Organisation of Leisure in Fascist Italy*, (Cambridge: 1981).

⁴¹ Schmitter, P. C., *Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal*, (London: 1975).

ence within the corporatist structure, that determined the organisation of the *grémios*.⁴²

The ENT and subsequent legislation outlined the creation of a whole series of intermediate organisations that would lead to the creation of Corporations. In the *de facto* absence of these Corporations, however, the Corporatist Chamber representing national "organic elements" was nominated by the Corporatist Council (*Conselho Corporativo*), which was led by Salazar.

The government gave the independent unions two months to accept the new system. Pedro Teotónio Pereira, recently nominated Under-Secretary of State for Corporations, had been an Integralist and invited NS members to participate in the creation of the corporatist system. Pereira wrote that it was not "possible to accuse the authorities of a lack of will or of a lack of dynamism",⁴³ but while some supporters accepted the invitation, most NS leaders reacted coldly to the new legislation and sought to distance themselves from it. They denounced it as being imbued with the "eclecticism" already apparent in the new constitution and reasserted that their distance from the government was "exactly the distance that separates integral solutions from half solutions".⁴⁴

For the fascists the government had recognised and adopted some of their principles but had mixed them with conservatism. In their view, "the government puts its laws in the *Diário do Governo*, and says to workers and bosses: There you are, help yourselves! And they do not".⁴⁵ Unlike Hitler's and Mussolini's dictatorships where "myths" and "militias" were "dedicated to revolution", the Portuguese regime maintained "a docile bureaucracy and local delegates of an unprepared central power, which are impotent and lack political education". The corporatist structures were, like the UN an "amorphous and amalgamated political organisation without defined aims and tainted by social conservative origins infiltrated by liberalism".⁴⁶

⁴² Rosas, F., *O Estado Novo nos anos trinta: elementos para o estudo da natureza económica e social do salazarismo (1928-1938)*, (Lisbon: 1986).

⁴³ Pereira, P. T., *Memórias*, vol. I, 2nd ed., (Lisbon: 1973), p. 128.

⁴⁴ *Alcácer*, 13 August 1933.

⁴⁵ *Ibid.*

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

The support of some NS founding members to the corporatist project immediately caused a crisis, forcing NS to clarify its position with respect to the regime. Assis Gonçalves reported to Salazar that there were “two currents within National Syndicalism”. The first consisted of “Preto’s supporters who are opposed to Salazar” and the second were “the boys’ that Pereira has taken by the hand” and were willing to support the regime.⁴⁷ The regime’s corporatist legislation was much more important for National Syndicalism while the latter was still in the process of institutionalising itself and establishing a collective identity. As noted by Panebianco, at this stage of development any political party “organisation is still an instrument for the realisation of certain objectives and its identity refers almost exclusively to its leader’s ideology”.⁴⁸ For NS corporatism was a key programmatic objective and the cornerstone of its plans to re-organise the state. Although Salazar’s programme diverged from theirs, his use of corporatist language was nonetheless a severe blow to NS attempts to establish a distinct identity and also allowed some of its leaders to join the regime.

The First Repressive Measures

The regime’s first weapon against NS was censorship. In the summer of 1933 the publication of *Revolução dos Trabalhadores* was interrupted and in September of the same year it was banned, along with most NS propaganda.⁴⁹ NS General Secretariat service orders announced that the suspension reflected “the government’s general offensive against National Syndicalism”.⁵⁰ As censorship signified a *de facto* if not formal prohibition of the movement, this interpretation was strikingly accurate. From June 1933 onwards, all references to NS activities and similar European parties were censored. Even the word “comrade” was replaced by “reader”.⁵¹ In the

⁴⁷ Gonçalves, A., *op. cit.*, p. 103.

⁴⁸ Panebianco, A., *op. cit.*, p. 111.

⁴⁹ Letter from an unidentified militant to Rolão Preto, n. d., ARP.

⁵⁰ NS General Secretariat Service Order N^o 7, signed by Albert Monsaraz, ARP.

⁵¹ *Ibid.*

words of an NS district leader: "Comrades are now friends such that the newspaper has the pot-bellied air of the tranquil bourgeoisie".⁵²

Contrary of what the anti-Fascist opposition believed, the Interior Ministry and its local delegations attempted to limit Fascist activities. In some districts NS offices were closed preventatively. At the beginning of the summer of 1933, the Interior Minister issued instructions to Civil Governors to prohibit public NS demonstrations, and NS branches only managed to overcome these bureaucratic impediments with much effort. Instances of repression multiplied throughout 1933.

The Civil Governors proved to be very hostile and complied zealously with the Minister's orders, which they not only enforced but even made more severe. The Civil Governor of Vila Real, for example, published a proclamation justifying the prohibition of outfits "with any social or political significance" as there was no need to "encroach upon attributes solely conferred upon the Armed Forces" and the UN gave the "government all the moral support" it needed.⁵³ In the wake of anti-Fascist attacks on NS, Civil Governor reports accused the party of attempting to use official inquiries into the events to "obtain positions of power", to "undermine" the UN and gain control over the municipal authorities supportive of the government party.⁵⁴

Despite these measures, National Syndicalism managed to express itself through its various regional newspapers where censorship was more lax. They even managed to organise demonstrations, hiring a tugboat to greet Italo Balbo when he visited Lisbon.⁵⁵ Internal party circulars began to attack Salazar, accusing him of orchestrating the campaign of repression and calling for a campaign to denounce the arbitrary measures. Indeed, on the eve of their first Congress, the leaders of the party were already playing a part in military conspiracies against Salazar.

⁵² Letter from Abrantes Tavares to Rolão Preto, 24 September 1933, ARP.

⁵³ *Ideia Livre*, Anadia, 24 June 1933, p. 1.

⁵⁴ Report from the civil governor of Viana do Castelo, Bundle 46-box 15, AGMI/ANTT.

⁵⁵ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 10 September 1933, p. 1.

The Crisis of 1933

The government bureaucracy began to harden its stance after Salazar wrote some notes that called for an “attempt to isolate the leaders”, to “prohibit demonstrations” and “offices” and to reject “positions” supported by NS.⁵⁶ From May 1933 onwards, the government sought to promote a moderate pro-government force within NS that it hoped would favour integration with the UN. The Grand Council was the most vulnerable NS institution. It included nationally prestigious figures that conferred political legitimacy to the NS but played a small role in its internal affairs.

In the summer of 1933, the Coimbra ‘dons’ favoured an accommodation with Salazar. José Cabral emerged as the leader of this group. Although a member of the Grand Council, Cabral was not a founding member and consequently had never had an important role within the organisation. His rapid rise was entirely due to his privileged connections with Salazar.⁵⁷ The Coimbra initiative aimed primarily to set up a form of collective leadership to limit the powers of Preto and Monsaraz and to eventually replace them altogether. In response to this pressure, “half a dozen prestigious and knowledgeable people” decided to create a directorate that was nominated in September before its creation had been formally approved.⁵⁸ Those nominated to serve were Preto, Monsaraz, the three area secretaries and José Cabral representing the Grand Council.

Cabral supported the most radical positions, seeking to alter NS statutes so as to eliminate the individual responsibilities of the leader and thus unequivocally recognise Salazar as the sole leader of the ‘National Revolution’.⁵⁹ When a survey of the members indicated that Preto was guaranteed to win, Monsaraz called for a Congress for the following month, in the midst of increasing internal conflict.

⁵⁶ AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁵⁷ Nogueira, F, *op. cit.*, p. 258.

⁵⁸ Letter from Carlos Proença de Figueiredo to Rolão Preto, 3 June 1933, ARP.

⁵⁹ Letter from José Virgulino to Augusto Pires de Lima, 7 October 1933, APL.

The First NS Congress:

"For power, Against power, Without power?"

The First NS Congress was held on 12 November 1933 at the home of the General Secretary with governmental authorisation. Monsaraz did not disguise his animosity towards Salazar. He accused the Prime Minister of ignoring public and private invitations to negotiate and of shifting from initial "indifference" to an "offensive" hostility. For him, the central question to be resolved at the Congress was the future of relations between National Syndicalism and the regime. Only three responses were possible: "For power. Against power. Without power".⁶⁰ The attitude to adopt towards the corporatist organisations of the regime was also an important topic as many NS members had already accepted positions within the system. For the Secretary General, the ENT maintained the distinction between workers and employers, and anonymous societies were still "the hiding-place of unscrupulous plutocrats." It constituted a surrender to the "bourgeoisie and capitalists" opposed by NS. For that reason, NS supporters were to abstain from collaboration.⁶¹

At the core of the conflict was the issue of compliance with those that supported the government and called for an end to individual leadership, the condition *sine qua non* of integration with the regime. General Secretary delegates visited district and municipal delegations calling on them to support Preto and preparing the replies to the previously distributed questionnaire. The choice was simple: they were either for or against their leader and the government corporatist organisation. The large majority of replies favoured Preto, but he feared that the provincial delegates would not follow Lisbon's radical anti-Salazarism.

The Secretary General, the secretaries of the three areas, the Grand Council and the managers of NS newspapers participated in the Congress, although the criteria to select district delegates is unclear. Some replies to the questionnaire indicate that delegates were bound to positions previously determined by local branches.

⁶⁰ Alberto Monsaraz's circular on the first NS Congress, n. d., APL.

⁶¹ *Ibid.*

It was hoped that 150 delegates would attend the Congress. The official report states that there were 300 militants present. This is almost certainly exaggerated, but the core of the militant community was certainly present. Various reports regarding the results of the meeting were unanimous: Rolão Preto emerged victorious.⁶²

Monsaraz opened the Congress with a report describing the first year of NS, its growing distance from Salazar and increasing repression. Recalling a conversation in which Salazar accused NS of engaging in propaganda that was “virtually indistinguishable from that of the Communists”, the Secretary General accused Salazar of being a conservative, an enemy of NS principles.⁶³ Cabral led the attack on Preto with the support of other members of the Grand Council.⁶⁴ Although defeated, they split the founding core of the party. Many of the ‘dons’ supported them. The Lisbon ‘soviet’ and a large majority of district and council delegates backed Preto. He closed the Congress with a conciliatory speech and proposed that the Directorate gain “powers to re-organise the movement” in order to define with the government “its autonomy or the conditions for it to co-operate with the government whilst maintaining this autonomy”.⁶⁵

The Directorate met on the same day. Its composition had not been altered, with the minority opposed to Preto balanced with the group supporting him. It decided to transfer the Secretary General to Leiria where it had been decided that Preto would reside. National Union (*União Nacional*), until then a district newspaper, became the party’s national mouthpiece; not only was it obvious that *A Revolução* would not rapidly re-emerge, but it was necessary to avoid censorship and to take advantage of the as yet weak co-ordination among regional censorship services. Days later, *União Nacional* reported on the Congress and portrayed an image of una-

⁶² Official report of the UN Congress in *União Nacional*, Leiria, 19 November 1933, pp. 1 and 8.

⁶³ Interview with Barradas D’Oliveira, 17 and 23 July 1984.

⁶⁴ Some of the leaders at the Congress considered Lumbrals to be the main contact with Salazar who would be charged with ‘mining the movement’. Ferreira, J., *op. cit.*, p. 78.

⁶⁵ General Secretariat circular, 14 November 1933, ARP.

nimity in sharp contrast to reality. The personality cult around Preto was reinforced and his victory described as "proper to a privileged intelligence, the intelligence of the leader". It re-affirmed NS's identity as a "revolutionary nationalist" party distinct from the regime.⁶⁶ The Lisbon press was notified by the pro-Salazar group and presented its own version of events. According to *The Century* (*O Século*), the changes had been notable and "José Cabral was trusted by the entire National Syndicalist organisation" and Preto's leadership ceased to exist.⁶⁷

The Impossible Agreement

A few days after the Congress, in an interview with *Novidades* that did not sympathise with NS, Cabral described the event very differently. He recognised that there were differences within the party between those who understood "the policies of Dr. Salazar" and those who "were in disagreement with him".⁶⁸ When asked if Preto would continue to head NS he refused to answer, and attempted to justify the need for a purified NS that could complement the government party. The secessionists met with Salazar and the Interior Minister as NS representatives a few days later. According to a report of the meeting, the new NS would maintain its "autonomy and organisational independence", but would work "in the political arena in concert with the *União Nacional*". It would not be hostile to the government party, and would not oppose it. It would "support the *Estado Novo* and the actions that it undertakes through [the party]".⁶⁹

União Nacional quickly distanced itself from the positions adopted by the secessionists. It stated that they represented only "themselves" and that "we as true National Syndicalists will not delegate our representation to these gentlemen".⁷⁰ Days later Preto

⁶⁶ *Ibid.*, pp. 1 and 3.

⁶⁷ *O Século*, 15 November 1933, p. 1.

⁶⁸ *Novidades*, 17 November 1933, pp. 1 and 5.

⁶⁹ *Revolução Nacional*, 8 March 1934, p. 3.

⁷⁰ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 10 December 1933, p. 6.

disowned the decisions made by this group saying that “they do not hold any positions of authority, nor do they have any mandate authorising them to speak in the name of National Syndicalism. Therefore, they are exclusively and personally responsible for any initiative they make, and everything they have said on this subject is premature”.⁷¹ In the service order reporting these events, Monsaraz was clear. He called for a denunciation of “any parody of the National Syndicalist movement that would probably arise as a crude manoeuvre to undermine the revolutionary, fascist, European and modern spirit of the National Workers’ Revolution”.⁷²

Strengthened by government support, Cabral announced new statutes and a new leadership that would unite NS “forces with those of the government, in the fight against extremism and all forces of national disintegration. It will constitute a vanguard for ideas and action, with unquestionable influence in Portuguese social life”. He accused Preto and Monsaraz of “being influenced by the romantic image of events caused by similar movements abroad”. He emphasised that “here there is no thought of gaining power, but only, and this is not insignificant, of assisting it in defeating the enemies of the Nation and influencing powers about how to gradually fulfil national syndicalist aspirations”.⁷³

The Salazarist Split

The secessionists gave the impression that a re-organised NS would emerge without Preto, but their real objective was to neutralise the movement and its leaders with the support of the New State propaganda apparatus. Salazar did not protect the secessionists and never authorised their transformation into an official regime militia. Nonetheless, some still believed that it was possible to create a Fascist organisation within the regime. In their agreement with Salazar and the Interior Minister, the secessionists theoretically ensured organisational autonomy and the “freedom to

⁷¹ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 24 December 1933, p. 1.

⁷² General Secretariat Service Order, November 1933, AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁷³ General Secretariat communiqué, n. d., [1933].

pursue their own doctrinal programme", albeit in "convergence with the *União Nacional*".⁷⁴

During the first months of 1934, the secessionists attempted to re-organise NS. The most active among them, however, were almost immediately co-opted by the regime. Amaral Pyrait and Castro Fernandes, two founders of *Revolução Nacional*, began to work for the INTP, and Oliveira e Silva was nominated to the presidency of AEV, the regime's first youth movement.⁷⁵ The secessionists never fully re-organised themselves, however. Their most important role was to select affiliates for national unions. They only made one public appearance on a May Day parade in 1934 organised by the INTP and the SPN.⁷⁶ Their activity was limited and media references to what they did were systematically suppressed, leading some Civil Governors who supported their integration into the region to wonder whether this was really on the agenda.

The Cabral group became very confused because repressive measures contradicted government declarations of support.⁷⁷ Some supporters of the regime scorned the group for the backing it received from the Minister of the Interior. Censorship led to all references in the secessionist newspaper to activities to be cut, as well as the more "excessive" editorials on social themes.⁷⁸ The Morning Daily (*Diário da Manhã*) continued to attack the group and Manuel Múrias, the editor of *Revolução Nacional*, wrote to Salazar saying that it would "be enough for you [to] tell us [that] we are wrong and that our efforts are useless. We will retire quickly without complaining or rebelling".⁷⁹

Regime support for the group was merely instrumental.⁸⁰ A few months after its creation, Salazar ordered the Interior Ministry to

⁷⁴ *Revolução Nacional*, 8 March 1934, p. 3.

⁷⁵ *Revolução Nacional* was financed by the government through the SPN. Report by José Luís Supico to the Interior Minister, May 1934, AOS/CO/PC-12D, ANTT.

⁷⁶ *Revolução Nacional*, 3 May 1934, p. 4.

⁷⁷ Bundle 470 - box 23, AGMI/ANTT.

⁷⁸ Lisbon Censorship Bureau Bulletin N^o 112, Bundle 460 - box 14, AGMI/ANTT.

⁷⁹ Letter from Manuel Múrias to Salazar, 13 July 1934, ARP.

⁸⁰ See some of the report to the police and the references to violent confrontations between supporters of both factions in Bundle 461 - box 14, AGMI/ANTT.

refuse requests to organise street parades.⁸¹ Regime attitudes varied towards the members of the ‘don’s group’ whose position regarding Salazar were unclear. As some later confessed in their memoirs, Salazar nominated some to government positions and sent others abroad where they could be “kept quiet”.⁸²

Instruments of Integration

The secessionists did not constitute a new internal tendency within the New State. Salazar feared the emergence of political institutions that united fascist elements and ended up rejecting proposals to that end. Although dissidents were relatively strong in some institutions such as the corporatist bodies, efforts to create a fascist militia within the regime were occasional and limited. Integration took place on an individual basis and in different ways, and it essentially entailed the abandonment of previous political loyalties and an acceptance of the values and employment opportunities offered by the regime.

The corporatist apparatus recruited many NS members: intellectuals who were converted into INTP civil servants, as well as union militants. Some NS leaders who had abandoned the movement after the split initiated the ‘corporatisation’ of the union movement. Although former National Syndicalists were a minority and did not constitute a coherent group, they were among the most dynamic within the apparatus, seeking to promote fascistic national unions, particularly when they were responsible for organisation or constituted a significant minority prior to the dissolution of the free unions.

Throughout the 1930s, they were a ‘fascistising pressure group’ that sought to introduce institutional fascist elements to the Sala-

⁸¹ Letter from José Luís Supico to the Interior Minister, 1 June 1934, AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁸² Cabral Moncada was nominated to be a judge at the International Tribunal in Sarre, and Eusébio Tamagnini was appointed Education Minister. See: Moncada, L. C., *op. cit.*, p. 183. During the war, some members of this group constituted the germanophile ‘hard core’ of Coimbra University. See: Torgal, L. R., *A Universidade de Coimbra e o Estado Novo*, (Coimbra: 1999).

zar regime 'from below'. The Under Secretary of State for Corporations inhibited their activities, however, and in most cases support for Salazarism implied moderation or even a complete change of political beliefs. Indeed, "the majority of dissidents became devoted Salazarists".⁸³ Some distanced themselves rapidly from fascism and professed new found beliefs in a more 'catholic' form of authoritarian corporatism.⁸⁴

The AEV paramilitary youth organisation created by the regime in January 1934 constituted the government's response to NS.⁸⁵ The AEV was short-lived and replaced two years later by the MP, which was less politicised than its predecessor.

The AEV was self-defined as an organisation dedicated to combating communism among the youth. António Ferro's speech at the inauguration ceremony of the AEV at the São Carlos Theatre was particularly interesting as it highlighted the desire to integrate NS youth into AEV ranks. The propaganda chief declared that Salazar was a "revolutionary" unlike those who were "disciples of the theatrics of Hitler or Mussolini" and were "revolutionary in name only". He confessed that "he had belonged to this group" but that he admired the "character and intelligence" of Salazar. In his view, "behind his public mask of calm and imperturbability, there is a man who is more restless, more revolutionary and more forward looking than all of the disordered cliques and movements that seek power and always end up in police stations".⁸⁶

Throughout 1934 its members participated in pro-regime demonstrations and played a key role in creating a fascistic mystique around Salazar. The AEV publication, Forward! (*Avante!*), was written by SPN employees. Articles outlined the aim of an élite youth New State organisation. Delegates of the Italian National Fascist Party and Nazi Party wrote articles with information about fascist youth movements in their countries. The AEV

⁸³ Ferreira, J., *op. cit.*, p. 79.

⁸⁴ See: Fernandes, A. de C., *O corporativismo fascista*, (Lisbon: 1938), pp.13-31.

⁸⁵ Pinto, A. C. and Ribeiro, N. A., *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda: a juventude nacionalista nos primórdios do Estado Novo*, (Lisbon: 1980).

⁸⁶ Cited in Pinto, A. C. and Ribeiro, N. A., *op. cit.*, pp. 30-31.

was a voluntary organisation and gave military training soon after its foundation.

The AEV was an SPN dominated organisation and inspired by similar fascist movements. Its 'godfather' was António Eça de Queiroz, a member of the propaganda apparatus and Portugal's representative at the international meeting of fascists at Montreaux. After the dissolution of NS, AEV activity declined until the end of 1934, highlighting the government's lack of interest. It is difficult to ascertain the degree to which NS student sympathisers supported the AEV, although some young Preto sympathisers were in the vanguard of the organisation. The creation of the AEV constituted a small regime concession to those demanding a process of fascistisation, mass politics and a fascistic voluntarism. Its disintegration confirmed that Salazar was not about to allow, and much less support, such institutions beyond their tactical utility.

The First UN Congress

Secessionist hopes that the movement would be incorporated into the regime were definitively crushed when the first UN Congress was held in May 1934. The Congress aimed to consecrate Salazar as the "single leader" and legitimate the dissolution of all political parties, including those that supported the dictatorship. Albino dos Reis, a former republican, stated that "this Congress will fulfil the desired and perfect unity of political forces that support the present situation, by their integration into a single hierarchy through which they will receive directions from a higher authority".⁸⁷ A study of this Congress has revealed that "the tone that was to dominate the Congress was, in large measure, adopted with the National Syndicalists and Rolão Preto in mind, which Salazar was preparing to eliminate".⁸⁸

Some leading NS dissidents participated as delegates at the Congress. None belonged to the organising committee, however, and none were nominated to leading positions. The AEV was crit-

⁸⁷ Cited in Parreira et. al., 'O primeiro congresso...' *cit.*, p. 216.

⁸⁸ *Ibid.* See also Cruz, M. B. da, *op. cit.*, p. 135.

icised. Lopes Mateus, founder and principal organiser of the UN, said that it was necessary to evict "ridiculous low exhibitionism" and "irritating provocation" and to reject the armed militias that "the army does not regard very kindly".⁸⁹

In his speech to the Congress, Salazar defined the place of the New State in European politics. He claimed that "Portuguese history and Christian latin civilisation" had been "diverted from their true path at certain points in time". He outlined the differences distinguishing the Portuguese regime from other nationalist European authoritarian and fascist states. He considered that the former was "as far removed from foreign individualist liberalism and leftist internationalism" as it was from "other theoretical and practical systems that have appeared abroad in reaction to it". The only point of contact between the two was the "corporatist idea". To clear up all doubts, he emphasised the differences in terms of "conception of the state and organisation of the political and civil support of the government". In his view, other nationalist states were "essentially pagan" and therefore "naturally incompatible" with Portuguese "Christian civilisation".⁹⁰

Salazar's words were intended less to explore the differences between the New State and fascism, and more to warn NS supporters. The dictator also noted that the election of a new National Assembly was the immediate task at hand. Salazar cleared up all doubts regarding the nature of the single party of the dictatorship, stating that it was a "civic association" and subordinated to the government. For Salazar, the only real purpose of UN Congress was to legitimate the UN as the party of the regime. This is apparent in the fact that only one motion was presented to discuss the UN itself at the Congress.⁹¹ The role of NS delegates was substantially reduced after the Congress. Thus, the first UN Congress marked the beginning of the monopolisation of political sphere by Salazar's party. It legitimated the dissolution of NS and prevented any attempt to institutionalise fascist elements emerging within the New State.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 226.

⁹⁰ Salazar, A. de O., *op. cit.*, pp. 334 and 337.

⁹¹ Parreira et. al., 'O primeiro congresso...' *cit.*, p. 221.

Preto's National Syndicalism: Integration and Exile

In May 1934, the NS officer in charge of international affairs responded to a request for information by the CAUR Secretary General about the NS split. He stated that "one hundred opportunist and ambitious bourgeois conservatives joined forces with the present Prime Minister, Dr. Salazar, a man of the centre, a Brüning type anti-fascist, an anti-revolutionary conservative who is our worst enemy".⁹² In his view, "as fascists, we are in the middle of a battle against a centrist, tyrannical and extremely unpopular government".⁹³

Despite this discourse, in its last months as a legal organisation, NS made various attempts to achieve conciliation with the government and secessionists to ensure its survival. As noted above, the split had led a considerable number of NS supporters to accept positions within the government. Ideological and political radicalisation became more accentuated within an NS dominated by the Lisbon 'soviet'.⁹⁴ Many militants, however, did not support this radicalisation.⁹⁵ Between November 1933 and March 1934 NS leaders tried to re-organise the party to mitigate the confusion caused by the split and to keep 'waverers' from taking leading positions in the regions and local offices. Assistant General Secretary Pereira de Matos travelled around the country with other Lisbon leaders replacing local leaders and creating a clandestine communication system.⁹⁶

Although most local branches remained loyal to Preto, the secretary of the north opted for neutrality. Preto's supporters won the vote and the losers left the meeting amidst jeering.⁹⁷ In Coimbra, most district branches were with Preto. The 'dons', however, adopted a conciliatory stance towards the regime. Most of the

⁹² Letter from José Campos e Sousa to Augusto Pescosolido, 26 May 1934, Minculpop, Bundle 404, ACS, Rome.

⁹³ *Ibid.*

⁹⁴ Pereira de Matos, National Syndicalism 'Comunicado N^o 1' n. d., [January 1934?].

⁹⁵ Interview with Luís Forjaz Trigueiros, 10 January 1985.

⁹⁶ Letter from Pereira de Matos to Rolão Preto, 8 January 1934, ARP.

⁹⁷ Letter from Augusto Pires de Lima to Rolão Preto, 25 December 1933, ARP.

remaining northern district secretariats remained within the organisation. The 'notables' hesitated, however. According to one report, only "the small fry have stuck with us".⁹⁸

Some regional leaders loyal to Preto harboured the hope that Salazar would need NS. In Viseu, the district secretary was convinced that "without us, without our faith, without our spirit of impartiality and sacrifice, the New State will not go beyond the creation of a Cabinet without life or conditions to resist and perpetuate itself".⁹⁹ In several councils, however, branches were demobilised.

The disorientation described by a leader from Alcácer do Sal must have been shared by many local branches, who admitted to "despondency" over the possible "disintegration of National Syndicalism". He predicted the rapid re-conversion of the Cabral group into "a branch of the *União Nacional*", and was preoccupied with the fact that "a great part, perhaps the majority of our comrades or sympathisers [were] collaborating with the regime" particularly "the boys nominated to INTP district delegations".¹⁰⁰ In his view, this put the NS "in a very difficult position because of the possibility of hostility with the government and the life of the clandestine organisation".¹⁰¹

Preto received several telegrams and letters from local secretariats declaring their loyalty during the split. Vila Real secretary wrote: "You alone are the absolute and sovereign leader of National Syndicalism ... all the comrades of Vila Real are with me in recognising you, and remain always alert to your orders in every respect...".¹⁰² The anti-Salazarist tone of the internal NS correspondence was made public in successive communiqués distributed on the streets. These denounced the "small group of bourgeois politicians who resolved to act at this moment, protected and

⁹⁸ Letter from António Tinoco to Rolão Preto, 19 January 1934, ARP.

⁹⁹ Letter from Vasco Santa Rita to Rolão Preto, 10 January 1934, ARP.

¹⁰⁰ The pro-Preto attitude in the November 1933 Congress was the yardstick for some nominations to the corporatist apparatus, and several of those who had voted for Preto complained that they had been passed over.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Manuel de Portugal Branco to Rolão Preto, 10 January 1934, ARP.

¹⁰² Letter from Euclides Portugal to Rolão Preto, n. d., ARP.

assisted financially by some official entities". They reinforced the "revolutionary" and "prolabour" language of National Syndicalism.

Their discourse was close to a form of nationalist "labourism", made ever more explicit, above all by the Lisbon "soviet".¹⁰³ In a clandestine pamphlet, NS was described as a force destined to "revolutionise society as it is, ending the misery that envelopes the working classes which are oppressed by capitalism, and will raise the workers to the deserved dignity of free men".¹⁰⁴ The pamphlet also stated that like "all fascist movements" NS had Rolão Preto as a leader who was "an extraordinary figure able to galvanise energies, lead the multitudes... guide Portugal's generous youth in this hard climb to conquer a new society where there will be bread and justice for all".¹⁰⁵

This position was closer to National Socialism. Corporatism was subordinated to themes dear to French fascists with left-wing origins.¹⁰⁶ Preto began to follow this 'socialist' shift. In editorials he criticised "political and social conservatism". He defined their activity an "incessant and opportunist counter revolution" opposed by the "the restless agitation of the new generations, fed up with the inglorious tyranny of politicians and capitalist oligarchies".¹⁰⁷ Before the government increased repressive measures in the wake of the failed uprising of 18 January 1934, Preto declared that he was the defender of the "small fry" who had participated in it, and stated that defeating communism was above all "to defeat misery and injustice".¹⁰⁸

Confronted with the consolidation of the "counter revolution", the fascists proclaimed a passage to 'revolutionary' politics. As noted by António Pedro: "what the counter revolution and the national revolution have in common is the end of one and the beginning of the other. Without the former, the latter is not possible". If the national revolution "did not progress to a second stage,

¹⁰³ Lisbon District Secretariat communiqué, March 1934, ARP.

¹⁰⁴ Clandestine communiqué signed by 'Fernão Vasques', 13 March 1934, ARP.

¹⁰⁵ *Ibid.*

¹⁰⁶ Burrin, P., *op.cit.*

¹⁰⁷ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 28 January 1934, p. 1.

¹⁰⁸ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 4 April 1934, p. 1.

the regime would remain "provisional" or, to quote Preto, a "preventative tyranny".¹⁰⁹

On 1 May 1934, Preto published a manifesto responding to government and secessionist attacks. Remembering his 1910 exile and his participation in the creation of Integralism and in the events leading to the 1926 coup, he asked: "Did I achieve nothing within the State? Obviously only those who control the State can undertake any work within it". He denounced those who "immodestly serve an organisation that I created and launched" forcefully taking "another's property as their own".¹¹⁰ Re-stating the "revolutionary" nature of international fascism, Preto declared that NS was "the Portuguese part of this creative breath that will move the world".¹¹¹

The government began to systematically repress all NS activity, even as it promoted the split and supported the secessionist paper financially. Preto's movements were severely restricted. After a commemoration of the first anniversary of the Oporto Union House (*Casa Sindical*) in February 1934, Preto's participation in meetings and visits to local branches were practically prohibited.¹¹² The government hoped to prevent him from "disorienting" the branches that had adhered to the regime. In January 1934 NS delegates were arrested and expelled from Braga after Preto led a meeting of 300 NS supporters, including some secessionists.¹¹³ Preto was also to be prevented from going to Oporto by the Civil Governor and several rallies in which he was to participate were banned.¹¹⁴ In March, the government closed the Oporto Union House and the head office in Lisbon was closed in April. In the beginning of May, several Oporto based National Syndicalists were arrested after violent confrontations with the pro-government faction. There were also confrontations between the two

¹⁰⁹ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 7 April 1934, p. 1.

¹¹⁰ Preto, R., 'Em legítima defesa', 1 May 1934, Proc. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹¹¹ *Fradique*, 24 May 1934, p. 1.

¹¹² *União Nacional*, Leiria, 11 March 1934.

¹¹³ Report of the civil governor of Braga to the Interior Ministry, 15 January 1934, Bundle 469 - box 22, AGMI/ANTT.

¹¹⁴ Report of the administrator of Alijó Council, Bundle 468 - box 21, AGMI/ANTT.

groups in Lisbon. According to an internal Lisbon memorandum, by the end of May about 29 members had been imprisoned for 15 days in the north of the country.¹¹⁵

Despite these attacks, NS managed to organise pickets when the 18 January 1934 revolt took place. NS sympathisers shouted slogans of support for Preto when Salazar visited Oporto in May 1934 and organised a parade to commemorate the anniversary of the 1926 Coup.¹¹⁶ On 28 May about 300 uniformed NS supporters led by a lieutenant marched in front of the Great War monument and organised a rally where a trade unionist spoke in the name of the NS workers. In the north several branches periodically challenged the law and demonstrated. In Braga there were confrontations between National Syndicalists and anti-fascists in June 1934 leading to several arrests. From May onwards, imprisonment began to affect the leadership. Incarceration was usually meant to intimidate insofar as it never lasted longer than a week. Some members of the Lisbon 'soviet' had been imprisoned when distributing propaganda characterised by the director of the political police as "white communism". In April the police interrupted a meeting of the Lisbon District Secretariat and arrested several of its leaders for interrogation.¹¹⁷ On 21 May General Secretary Monsaraz was arrested in Lisbon along with two other leaders.¹¹⁸

The Appeal to President Carmona and the Military

The Preto group had most faith in the Army and when resisting governmental and secessionist attacks, it exploited conflicts between the military and Salazar and put pressure on Carmona to support them. Salazar's informants noted that some high-ranking officers like Brigadier João D'Almeida as well as Generals Farinha Beirão and Schiappa de Azevedo were potential leaders of conspir-

¹¹⁵ Report from an unidentified militant, s.d., ARP.

¹¹⁶ Lisbon district secretariat Service Order, 19 January 1934, AOS/CO/PC-3F, and *União Nacional*, Leiria, 23 June 1934, p. 8.

¹¹⁷ Notebook 4,935, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹¹⁸ Notebook 5,022, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

acies against the dictator, and had the backing of President Carmona.¹¹⁹

The Spanish press denounced the role of NS and Monsaraz in Salazar's imminent fall.¹²⁰ At a meeting at a barracks in Lisbon, Luna de Oliveira, the NS military secretariat chief said to Carmona that he only recognised him as head of the nation, and the War Minister, who was also present, indirectly criticised Salazar as well. Preto immediately joined the chorus of homage to the President, calling him "the moral centre of the state". He paid tribute to the military, who had been "so often misunderstood and seldom appreciated". Significantly, he re-affirmed that "throughout our history, hope always lay with the military".¹²¹ Although he criticised Salazar for diminishing the role of the Chief of State, Carmona refused to demand his resignation the following day when he was received in Belém. In an attempt to oblige the President to take an unequivocal and public stance in his support, Salazar offered his resignation knowing that it would be refused. Salazar thus outmanoeuvred the President and, for the first time, gained Carmona's support thus ensuring his position. In the face of an "apparent divergence" with Salazar, President Carmona declared that he was "entirely in accord with the direction of [the] government".

The crisis unequivocally strengthened Salazar and weakened Carmona, even though the President retained the power to dismiss the Prime Minister.¹²² The AEV was mobilised for a demonstration to celebrate the anniversary of Salazar's nomination as Finance Minister. The military back-tracked and shortly afterwards the UN held a Congress under the motto "A Single Leader". At the end of June, Alçada Padez, NS Secretary of the southern area, delivered a lengthy statement by Preto to the President, but by then military

¹¹⁹ Nogueira, F, *op. cit.*, p. 259.

¹²⁰ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 21 April 1934.

¹²¹ Preto, R., 'O chefe da Nação e o exército', *União Nacional*, Leiria, 5 May 1934, p. 1.

¹²² One of Salazar's former ministers exaggeratedly stated that "this political moment must be considered very important in the development of the *Estado Novo*", as after the crisis, "Carmona will be placed in an almost impossible political position to remove the Head of Government at some stage, although he can legally remove him at any time". Nogueira, F, *op. cit.*, p. 262.

support for NS had weakened. Nonetheless, the statement noted that Preto wanted to “speak to the country”.¹²³

Preto assessed the political situation since the 28 May coup, and saw tensions within the Military Dictatorship as a contest between “two conceptions”: one was in favour of a “revolution — total and profound — that seeks to transform the state [...] and society”; the other favoured “reform, which is the conception of political and social conservatives”. Preto concluded that unfortunately “the national revolution has not secured, as in Italy and in Germany, the possession of the state for those who dream, prepare and victoriously rise [...] this is the fundamental difference”. In his view, “none of the men who presently constitute the dictatorship of our country contributed in any way to the 28 May movement. Thus, it is natural that the nationalists, the unique and vigilant defenders of the dictatorship, should express the most fair reservations regarding such a government”. Preto accused the government of persecuting his movement and supporting the secessionists. He also repeated that the UN was an “eclectic group, composed of the most antagonistic political currents that lack a nationalist conscience”.

Preto referred to the agonising situation of the “lower and middle classes” and the sensitive issue of the military to which the nation always appealed when “national politics are wrapped in a confusing Gordian knot”. Preto finally appealed for a personal intervention by the president to ensure freedom of action for NS, a peaceful amnesty and the reorganisation and re-arming of the Army.¹²⁴ Carmona refused to react, as he saw Preto’s statement as a proposal to distance himself from Salazar and align himself with the April manoeuvres. Several NS militants, including General Secretary Monsaraz, were arrested for purportedly distributing Preto’s proclamation.¹²⁵ The secessionists who had joined the UN insisted that Salazar take firm action and liquidate the movement.

After a long meeting with the chief of the political police, Salazar decided to dissolve NS. On 4 July, Preto was brought to Lis-

¹²³ Representation from the leader of National Syndicalism to His Excellency the President of the Republic, 20 June 1934, Proc. Cr. 1174/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹²⁴ *Ibid.*

¹²⁵ Notebook 5,022, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

bon as a prisoner and kept in solitary confinement.¹²⁶ He continued to protest against "the violence of which I am victim" and wrote a letter to Salazar that the movement distributed clandestinely a few days later.¹²⁷ Monsaraz was arrested a few days later and made identical protests, declaring himself a "precursor of the New State and a nationalist forever".¹²⁸ On 11 July, the Council of Ministers decided to exile both NS leaders for six months. Some NS militants took to the streets shouting "Viva Rolão Preto!" and a few protest telegrams were sent to the government, but there was no official NS response. One NS leader in Oporto announced the radicalisation of some branches in a letter to Salazar. He concluded that: "the UN is nothing but a swindle imposed by Your Excellency on those who helped you". He then added: "we warn you about and remind you of the recent death of the Austrian Chancellor", noting too that the NS would not "disarm and await[ed its] moment".¹²⁹

On 29 July Salazar formally announced the banning and dissolution of NS. He stated that the movement was "inspired by certain foreign models in terms of ideology and political activity" and that it "exalted the value of youth, the cult of violence through direct action, the principle of the superiority of political power in social life" and that it showed a "propensity to group the masses" behind a leader. He said that NS constituted "the circle of an arc that unites the commonly held and confused aspirations of the Portuguese political extreme" and noted that it wanted to be "the party that [controlled] the destiny of the revolution". For him, the "creation of a militia" could not but cause "worries, unnecessary worries, given the responsibilities of the Army". He also felt that rather than contributing to order, the NS was "a perturbing and disintegrating element within the nationalist forces of the New State". This made its dissolution necessary. NS supporters were

¹²⁶ Proc. Cr. 1174/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹²⁷ Representation from the leader of National Syndicalism sent from prison to the President of the Council of Ministers, Proc. Cr. 2772/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT. See also: AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

¹²⁸ Proc. 1184/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹²⁹ AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

asked to join the UN or the AEV. Salazar noted that those who refused would, from that moment on, be considered either “indifferent or enemies”.¹³⁰

The official note also referred to the Cabral group, which days later held a Directorate meeting. The Directory stated that it hoped “the *União Nacional* will shortly become a cohesive, homogeneous, disciplined, active unit espousing select political values”, and expressed its “firm desire to collaborate with an *União Nacional* of this type”.¹³¹ The paper of the Cabral group was closed some time later, as Salazar was not prepared to support any form of militias, even those supporting the regime. The British Embassy transmitted this information to London with some satisfaction. The author of the Embassy report exaggeratedly stated that NS took “its inspiration from the Italian Embassy” and described Preto as a “vain man with a strong sense of intrigue”.¹³²

¹³⁰ Official notice, *Diário de Notícias*, 29 July 1934, p. 1.

¹³¹ *Revolução Nacional*, 6 August 1934, p. 1.

¹³² Report, 11 July 1934, FO 371/18886, PRO.

Chapter Six

"Against the Regime": The Conspiratorial Years, 1934-1945

The expulsion of Preto and Monsaraz from Portugal to Spain marked the beginning of open NS opposition to the Salazar regime. It is worth analysing the nature of this opposition, not only because it has largely been ignored but also because it offers a useful example of the tensions that arose between fascist movements and emerging authoritarian regimes elsewhere. Usually, NS is only mentioned in connection with the attempted coup of 10 September 1935, but in organisational terms it was active until the beginning of the Second World War.

During the second half of the 1930s, the Salazar regime distanced itself from the Military Dictatorship and began to consolidate its own brand of authoritarianism. As it did so, many radical right wingers and fascists decided to join the regime. Those who did not were subject to police repression. This process of 'reluctant' integration continued until the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War despite several attempted coups and the regime's refusal to adopt fascist trappings.

From 1934 onwards, the NS as a political movement was increasingly affected by tensions between the military and the authoritarian regime that they had helped to establish. With the political use of the praetorianism of the 1926 coup exhausted, the regime rapidly re-defined its relations with the military. Portugal's peripheral situation and its neutrality during the Second World War were important insofar as the country was not part of the

strategic plans of Nazi Germany and Fascist Italy during the war. This gave the Salazar regime the opportunity to speedily deal with internal fascist pressures, which persisted in other countries that were allied to or occupied by the leading Axis powers.¹

The clandestine period of NS can be divided into two phases. The first, between 1934 and 1936, was characterised by attempts to organise the downfall of Salazar. The second, between 1936 and the end of the Second War, consisted of the survival of a network of political friends led by Preto with only minimal party structures. Until 1936, NS had a leadership, an organisation and a nucleus of disciplined militants that pursued clear ideological and political goals. After the failed coup of September 1935, and the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War in particular, the organisation was badly shaken and many of its leaders deserted. This left only a rather diffuse network of sympathisers, making the movement more flexible and weak, until its definitive collapse.

Very little is known about NS during the clandestine period. It is clear, however, that the aim of the leadership after Preto's exile was to reorganise a clandestine anti-Salazar resistance movement, and to use newspapers and offices as fronts for propaganda and organisation as far as possible. At the end of 1934, Monsaraz wrote to António Pedro from Spain suggesting that the movement should "reorganise itself on a new, more solid, basis. In a manner more suited to long resistance that will enable it to survive" until repression had passed.² Such an organisation had existed in skeletal form before the exile of the two leaders. It included the Organisation Commissariat (*Comissariado de Organização*, COMORG) responsible for overseeing the District Commissariats (*Comissariados Distritais*) in Leiria, as well as the movement's heavily censored newspaper, *União Nacional*. Clandestine political management was placed in the hands of the National Syndicalist Action Committee (*Junta de Acção Nacional Sindicalista*, JANS).

¹ Durand, Y., *Le nouvel ordre européen nazi, 1938-1945*, (Brussels: 1990).

² Letter from Alberto Monsaraz to António Pedro, 17 December 1934, António Pedro Estate, BNL.

New papers closely associated with NS were founded to complement *União Nacional*. *Fradique*, a weekly publication dedicated to cultural matters, was published in Lisbon in early 1934. It supported NS positions and Preto contributed with articles under a pseudonym. A year later, the NS student wing attempted to relaunch *Revolução* under the new title, *Revelação*, but it was quickly suspended by censors and its offices searched by the police. Most NS provincial papers either disappeared or changed affiliation, although about five regional papers remained associated with the movement until the 1940s.

The JANS was part of the founding nucleus associated with the Lisbon 'soviet' and were leading oppositionists to the *Estado Novo*.³ After returning to Portugal, Monsaraz refused to accept his former position as Secretary General, but he continued to play an important part in the movement until 1936.⁴ NS maintained strong groups in some district and provincial capitals, the most active in Oporto, which was repeatedly raided by the police. In Braga, Leiria, Coimbra, Viseu, Vila Real and Viana do Castelo the number of activists declined drastically, but an organisational core survived. There is no information about the activities of most of groups. However, the case of the Viana do Castelo is documented and surprisingly the commission continued to exist after 1934, albeit with a much reduced network.⁵

There is much evidence of continued activity in this period. Membership fees were paid, membership cards were distributed, stamps with Preto's face on them were sold, and service order circulars were issued updating the members about NS political positions. The gradual isolation of various groups throughout the country reinforced the personality cult around Preto. The proposal to adopt a version of the old *Maria da Fonte* anthem dates from this period. It glorified Preto as the leader of a popular uprising against Salazar.⁶

³ Interview with Barradas D'Oliveira, 17 July 1984.

⁴ Letter from Alberto Monsaraz to Rolão Preto, 15 December 1936, ARP.

⁵ See the district Civil Governor's reports for the years 1934 and 1935, Gonçalves, A., *op. cit.*

⁶ The words of the anthem are as follows: *Viva, viva, Rolão Preto* (Hooray, Hooray, for Rolão Preto) / *Que há-de salvar a nação* (Who will save the nation) / *Das garras do usurário*

Despite this activity, clandestine life led to a drastic fall in numbers of members from 1934, greatly reducing the importance of NS affiliates. Nonetheless, the COMORG and district commissariats were able to maintain a network of supporters that exceeded their expectations, fuelling the belief that they could mobilise and generate mass support for conspiratorial plans underway. New recruits were mostly students and intellectuals from the small group associated with *Revelação*, which was aligned with Preto.⁷ Internal reports show that in January 1936, NS had 1,541 members. This figure is probably not exaggerated as it was used by one COMORG leader to highlight lack of popular support for NS and led to his dismissal.⁸ Lisbon, Oporto and Braga continued to be the areas of greatest support. In Vila Real, Civil Governor reports agreed with COMORG estimates. The majority of members (75% according to the official responsible for collecting membership fees) were “humble peasants and labourers who hoped to receive bread and justice from us... they follow us as they follow anything else”.⁹ Many also joined regime organisations and, in some districts, Salazar’s national unions.¹⁰

The Military Secretariat continued to play an important role until 1935, although its membership diminished significantly. The tactical alliances forged with other opposition groups, however, generated internal divisions after the attempted coup. With the

(From the clutches of the moneylender)/ *E dar-lhe justiça e pão* (And give it justice and bread) / *Nesta luta tão renhida* (In this close fought battle)/ *entre o Estado e a Nação* (Between State and Nation)/ *A vitória há-de ser desta* (Victory is for the Nation)/ *Comandada por Rolão* (Led by Rolão Preto). Proc. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁷ Mello e Castro, who later worked on Caetano’s reforms of the single party, was on of them. He was president of the Coimbra Academic Association and a member of Preto’s group during the clandestine period. Proc 921-SS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁸ Circular from Lt. Marino Sanches Ferreira to the District Commissions, September 1936, ARP.

⁹ *Ibid*,

¹⁰ In addition to those referred to in Chapter II, other sources refer to this movement. In the district of Vila Real, for which we have more precise information, the National Syndicalist group was lead by elements connected the ‘national unions’ and the corporatist apparatus. Gonçalves, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156. The report of the Treasury Commission states that “it is impossible to count the number of National Syndicalists who have joined the *União Nacional*”.

clear aim of breaking up the movement, many NS military members were disciplined and subjected to punitive transfers. As enemies of the regime, NS members were regularly arrested.¹¹ In addition to the repression that befell those associated with the coup attempt, the organisation was subjected to police surveillance and civil administrative controls whenever it got involved in local political activities. In August 1935, some local NS leaders from the north were arrested for "agitation against the *Estado Novo*".¹² Months later, nearly the whole of the Oporto District Commission was arrested following the distribution of a manifesto about the events of 10 September.¹³ These arrests continued for a variety of motives, usually after denunciations by local authorities associated with the UN. In October 1936, one NS member from Tarouca was imprisoned.¹⁴ Former and active leaders were punished for sporadic and individual incidents. In 1936 António Pedro spent a week in prison for "insulting" Salazar at a commemoration dinner.¹⁵ Most NS leaders were imprisoned in April 1938 after an attempted coup by the monarchist Paiva Couceiro. Although they were not involved in the attempt they spent two months in jail and were only let out at the end of May.¹⁶

Like the liberal republican opposition, the Fascists were subjected to a mostly 'preventative' repression that was less arduous than that experienced by the Communists and Anarcho-syndical-

¹¹ Information regarding political prisoners is not reliable. In the 1970s and the beginning of the 1980s, an official commission, the Commission of the Black Book on the Fascist Regime (*Comissão do Livro Negro sobre o Regime Fascista*), published a series of books about political prisoners under Salazarism, which aimed to be exhaustive. It was with some surprise that the author confirmed that, of all the jailings and deportations described in this text none were referred to in that study. It is only through consultation of PIDE archives that one can discover the number of National Syndicalists arrested. See the volume covering the period in question, *Presos políticos no regime fascista, Vol. II (1936-1939)*, (Lisbon: 1982).

¹² Proc. 1726/35, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹³ They were freed in May 1936, two months later. Proc. 291/36, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹⁴ Proc. 1472/36, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹⁵ He had criticised Salazar, whom he called 'Lazarus', and claimed that he would not 'bow before a regime with which I do not agree'. When he was arrested, António Pedro was already leaving the organisation. Proc. Cr. 1794/36, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

¹⁶ Proc. 203/38, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

ists. The Fascists were not sent to the infamous concentration camp at Tarrafal in Cape Verde where the government sent the left-wingers, nor did they spend time in other notorious prisons.

A Fascist Opposition?

In the first official policy position adopted after the imprisonment or exile of NS leaders, the JANS began to openly support the downfall of Salazar. It continued to defend the spirit of 28 May and the military leaders whose “redeeming force” had been “debased and forgotten”, while “true nationalists are persecuted, imprisoned, mistreated and exiled”. The JANS viewed the regime as “an ignominious oligarchy of meddlers protected by the censors and sustained by Salazar” and the UN “an employment agency like the old Democratic Party”.¹⁷

The adoption by the Salazar regime of some of the principles of the movement and the consequent changes in the nature of NS opposition activity, led the party to reconsider its strategy. The “national worker revolution” suffered liberalising changes that can only be considered a credible part of the founding principles after the teleological exercise made by former Fascist leaders. The revision of the political programme entailed minimising worker and social concerns or reviving the de-centralising tradition of Integralism. This shift was clear in the movement’s minimal demands: amnesty, the end of censorship, the “functional organisation of national representation”, the re-organisation and “speedy and efficient rearming” of the Army, colonisation of the overseas provinces “favouring metropolitan emigration”, and protection for the rural way of life and agricultural production.¹⁸

In October 1934 JANS issued a communiqué about the forthcoming National Assembly elections that were to complete the ‘constitutionalisation’ of the regime. NS challenged the govern-

¹⁷ Manifesto entitled ‘Aos portugueses’ signed by ‘A group of National Syndicalist revolutionaries’, 24 July 1934, Proc. 164/36, TME.

¹⁸ Nacional Sindicalismo, Ano IV, ‘Programa mínimo’, n. d., Proc. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

ment "to hold free elections" stating that "even though we are in principle opposed to any form of representation that is not organic, we agree for the time being... with certain types of political representation".¹⁹ It supported the establishment of press freedom, an amnesty for political prisoners and campaigned for the freedom of all those "who defend political and social programmes that are compatible with the dignity of the people within the boundaries of the Portuguese Nation".²⁰ Following the election of government candidates, the National Syndicalists declared their opposition to the "electoral farce", and "Salazar's discretionary power", restating their belief in a "profound revolution [that is] indispensable for the re-conquest of public freedom".²¹

Preto gave a speech at an official banquet soon after his return from Spain, which was attended by several nationalist intellectuals and was informally organised by the SPN. In it, he emphasised his opposition to Salazarist authoritarianism.²² He continued to seek a 'third way', although no longer with the ideological clarity of old Integralist formulae. He criticised the backward-looking nationalism adopted by the New State. As he said, "we are fed up — we have the courage to proclaim it — of the tedious and atrophying litanies... making brilliant cascades of the now impotent and useless heroes of our past march before our eyes... Always the Gamas, the Albuquerque, the Pachecos... Enough!" The nation, he stressed, "is tired of so much looking back". In contrast, he emphasised the issue of "freedom", defending a "personalism" that could to combat liberalism and communism: the first had shown itself unable to guarantee liberty; the second had succeeded in creating "another tyranny: the tyranny of the State".²³ His preferred theme was youth and criticism of those "who daily demonstrate their mea-

¹⁹ Communiqué, 'O nacional Sindicalismo em período eleitoral desafia o governo a fazer eleições livres!' signed by the JANS, November 1934.

²⁰ *Ibid.*

²¹ Communiqué, 'Depois da impudente farça eleitoral', JANS, 24 December 1934, Proc. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

²² Preto, R., 'Em frente!': discurso pronunciada pelo Dr. Rolão Preto no banquete dos intelectuais nacionalistas, (Castelo Branco: 1942).

²³ Preto, R., *Ibid.*, p. 2.

gre reactionary, conformist and unconfessed conservative souls". In his view, "the virile age of nationalism coincides with the age of the leadership of the young". A youthful revolutionary elite was working on a "break" that was "neither against the right nor the left, but for the Nation and against the anti-Nation".²⁴

Preto's book, *Justice (Justiça)*, summarised NS political positions. It was completed in May 1936 and swiftly seized by the authorities because of its outspoken criticism of Salazarism.²⁵ In it, Preto declared: "Man, Nation, Family, Union, Corporation — all the formulae given a renewed and strong interpretation by the genuine revolutionary — quickly lose true meaning and happiness when in contact with counter-revolutionary conditionalism".²⁶ He continued to believe in the creation of corporations and thought that corporatism would limit "power through regional and union liberties" based on a "functional representation sanctioned by organically expressed popular suffrage".²⁷ He also believed in charismatic leadership, one with the "devoted soul of an apostle" and not a "bureaucratic temperament".²⁸ His emphatic criticism of the capitalist system and the growing presence of a National Socialist component in his political discourse brought him closer to those who shifted gradually towards fascism from the ranks of socialism in the 1930s.

Preto continued to praise the Army, "those who still retain the highest degree of civic virtues: discipline, heroism and the spirit of sacrifice".²⁹ The Armed Forces continued to have a central place in NS clandestine propaganda. During the 1934 elections, NS published manifestos against Salazar's intention to control the War Ministry in order to better exert control over the military and subjugate the Armed Forces. The National Syndicalists claimed that with the assistance of "his obedient servants" in the National Assembly, now controlled by the UN, Salazar would at all costs

²⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 3.

²⁵ Preto, R., *Justiça!*, (Lisbon: 1936).

²⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 32.

²⁷ *Ibid.*, pp. 94-95.

²⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 190.

²⁹ Preto, R., *op. cit.*, p. 19.

"attempt to conquer the highest level of command, the War Ministry. From there he can turn the Army that does not hide its intolerance of him into the supreme tool of his personal despotism".³⁰

Pro-Coup Agitation

NS conspiratorial activities did not alter greatly with Preto's exile and focused on increasing the movement's reduced influence within the military. With the repression of demonstrations and the inability to mobilise the masses from 1934 onwards, NS became increasingly caught up in conflicts between some sectors of the Armed Forces and the regime. The influence of the Military Secretariat in conspiratorial activities declined, as many young officers expressed displeasure with the movement's support of "all those who are against Salazar" or, in other words, exiled republican officers. This was one of the main reasons that led to the reduction in the number of officers prepared to participate in the 1935 coup.

Many conspiracies were made during the movement's clandestine phase, the majority of them more concerned with the tensions between the Armed Forces and the authoritarian regime over corporate matters, mediated by President Carmona. What follows describes the conspiracies in which NS was actively involved.

In October 1934 military NS supporters acted together with other military opposition movements. President Carmona received General Vicente de Freitas, dismissed by Salazar, who outlined Army misgivings and made it clear that he would support the President's re-election, believing that Salazar would see this as a provocation. The political police, that watched the Military Secretariat very closely, advised political leaders that a transfer of military officers from some units would effectively neutralise the organisation. After military chiefs announced that they would be unable to prevent "army units or the GNR to enter into conflict" Salazar forced the resignation of the War Minister.³¹

³⁰ Communiqué 'Depois da impudente farça eleitoral', *cit.*

³¹ Nogueira, F., *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 285.

Monsaraz wrote to Preto about the neutralisation of the Military Secretariat. In his words, “Lazarus [the name adopted for Salazar in internal correspondence] has endured... On 1 October he was lost. What saved him was the Spanish Revolution and its ardent communists who, at the crucial moment, struck far into the hearts of our troops that are disgracefully more conservative than revolutionary”.³² Upon his return from exile in January 1935, Preto immediately resumed control of the organisation and visited the provincial groups that still functioned. In February he was greeted in São Bento station in Oporto by a group of NS supporters. It was on this occasion that he made his first public speech, at the previously described banquet of nationalist intellectuals in Lisbon’s Prince Edward VII Park.³³ The contents of the speech did not encourage a ‘truce’ with the regime. In addition, Preto sent instructions to the NS newspaper that NS should “completely disown the corporatist New State and everything to do with it”, noting that “until further orders” it was the duty of the movement to cease the battle against the left, “their men and organisations”.³⁴

Preto’s movements were severely restricted, both by the police and local authorities, which were punished at the slightest sign of hesitation when dealing with him.³⁵ The Civil Governor of Vila Real, on discovering that Preto wished to celebrate May Day with corporatist unionists sympathetic to NS, authorised him “to see his friends” only.³⁶ The conservative media consistently accused him of “campaigning throughout the country in favour of insurrection”. Preto emphatically denied any involvement with conspiratorial groups and noted that his “programme of revolutionary national-

³² Letter from Alberto Monsaraz to António Pedro, 17 December 1934, António Pedro Estate, BNL.

³³ Lisbon Censor Service Bulletin N^o 152, 4-10 March 1935, Bundle 466 - box 14, AGMI/ANTT.

³⁴ *Modus Vivendi* do semanário *União Nacional*, March 1935, reproduced in Marino Sanchez Ferreira’s circular, *cit.*, ARP.

³⁵ The administrator of the Mealhada Council, for example, was immediately dismissed for having attended Preto’s birthday lunch. Report of the Civil Governor of Aveiro to the Interior Ministry, 14 September 1935, Bundle 451, AGMI/ANTT.

³⁶ Report in Gonçalves, A., *op. cit.*, pp. 155-156.

ism" was compatible with "public freedoms and the dignity of the person".³⁷

The September 1935 Coup

On 10 September 1935, NS and Preto made an alliance with opposition forces and some exiles in Spain in an attempt to overthrow Salazar. Unlike previous conspiracies in which NS members had played only a secondary role under military command, this time Preto planned the political programme of the conspirators. NS led this conspiracy and its defeat thus represented the end of the Portuguese Fascist movement.

The Coup was supposed to have taken place on 26 August but was postponed because of the preventative arrest of some of its key leaders. Initially, as Preto later confessed, the aim had been to mobilise and "march on Lisbon".³⁸ This idea was swiftly abandoned, however, after various police arrests. Despite the success of police action, the conspirators determined to carry on days later. It is difficult to reconstruct the origins of the Coup but, contrary to Preto's later claims and JANS clandestine publications, it is clear that the NS was involved in negotiations with the democratic opposition.³⁹ According to the programme, "the republican regime was accepted by Preto's cohorts, who promised to respect it and thereby give themselves time to prepare a new constitutional order, the abolition of censorship and amnesties".⁴⁰

The story of the Coup is easy to recount. Some NS officers led the operation from barracks in Lisbon and surrounding areas, while Commander Mendes Norton took control of the warship *Bartholomeu Dias*, then anchored in the Tagus. Ground force operations were co-ordinated from the Penha de França barracks in Lisbon,

³⁷ Nacional-Sindicalismo, 'Cópia da carta que o chefe Dr. Rolão Preto dirigiu aos jornais *Diário de Notícias* e *A Voz*', Proc. Cr. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

³⁸ See Preto's testimony in Medina, J., *op. cit.*, p.164.

³⁹ As Preto declared after the war, he met with Ribeiro de Carvalho during his exile in 1934 in the Spanish border town of Valência de Alcantara. See the interview with Preto in *Vida Mundial*, 26 July 1947, p. 7.

⁴⁰ Fernandes, V. da G., *Depoimento inacabado: memórias*, (Lisbon: 1975), p. 55.

where the secretary of the NS military section Lt. Soares de Albergaria, was duty officer. Preto, Captain Crujeira de Carvalho, leader of the Military Secretariat, and Alçada Padez, who led the movement's southern section, waited in Cascais for the uprising before issuing an ultimatum demanding that President Carmona force Salazar to resign.⁴¹ Other NS supporters such as Preto's brother-in-law, who had taken part in the 1934 attempts, also participated. Civilian pickets led by a regional official co-ordinated the movement. Captain Jaime Batista, a participant in previous conspiracies, led a group from Lisbon's Praça do Chile. Several sergeants and republican officers also participated.⁴²

Differing accounts of the conspiracy do not permit an accurate assessment of the forces that would emerge victorious should the Coup turn out to be successful. Nonetheless, the alliances described in the programme suggest that the aim was to establish a coalition government including NS Army officers and civilian republicans. According to a report by the British Ambassador, Preto was to become Head of Government, Mendes Norton Foreign and Maritime Minister, and Lt. Col. Manuel Valente and Alçada Padez War and Justice Ministers, respectively.⁴³

NS military supporters' movements were carefully watched by the police who knew the identities of all those involved in the "revolutionary conspiracy due to erupt in October 1934".⁴⁴ They arrested many of the conspirators in Penha da França. Mendes Norton was arrested by a fellow officer, which prevented him from taking control of the warship.⁴⁵ Receiving news of failure, Preto fled to the outskirts of Leiria and then escaped to Spain. Alçada Padez was arrested immediately, imprisoned and sent to the Azores with António Tinoco, a JANS leader captured in hiding in the

⁴¹ Proc. 177/35, TME.

⁴² Proc. 1646/SPS, Arch PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁴³ According to the British Embassy, João de Almeida, who had been invited to participate, had denounced the coup. Note dated 25 September 1935, FO 371/19725, PRO.

⁴⁴ Proc. 1646/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT. Also *Diário de Notícias*, 13 September 1935, p. 2.

⁴⁵ According to Barradas D'Oliveira, Mendes Norton was a monarchist who sympathised with National Syndicalism. Interview with Barradas D'Oliveira, 17 July 1984.

north two months later.⁴⁶ The police arrested 40 of those implicated in the conspiracy, eight of whom were tried by the Military Tribunal.

According to police reports, the political affiliation of those implicated was heterogeneous, including republicans, socialists and some Masons within both groups.⁴⁷ Clearly, however, most important military and civilian figures in the conspiracy were members of National Syndicalism.⁴⁸ The tactical alliance between Preto and the JANS and the Republicans led to some NS militants like Mário Pessoa to refuse to participate in the Coup. Such agreements only served to increase the internal instability of the movement, which Preto attempted to compensate by denying their existence.

Prior to 10 September, Preto had issued an internal circular affirming that the "National Syndicalist movement has no political alliances".⁴⁹ It also stated that "the arrest of one or more elements of National Syndicalism cannot implicate the entire movement". He requested that NS members trust their leader, who would return "at an opportune moment". In response to government controlled press attacks, the circular remembered that "on the eve of his victory" Hitler had been "dismissed as a mere sign painter" and that Mussolini had been described "as an actor".⁵⁰ Thus, as a result of the failure of the Coup, as well as of its nature, NS district commissions were forced to deny any alliances with 'internationalists' or 'democrats'.⁵¹

In the days following the failed Coup, Salazar met with the chief of the political police and issued his first official statement to

⁴⁶ Notebook N^o 5760, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT. Both returned from the fortress of São João Baptista after the June 1936 amnesty.

⁴⁷ The deportation of National Syndicalists led to the creation of a support committee for the prisoners in Lisbon University's Law Faculty, which was supported by communist and republican students, as well as NS members. Interview with Fernando Piteira Santos, 22 December 1984.

⁴⁸ Proc. 1646-SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁴⁹ Proc. Cr. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

⁵¹ Nacional-Sindicalismo, secret circular of the Oporto Municipal Commissariat, 16 September 1935, Proc. Cr. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

the press. The Council of Ministers immediately punished officers and civilians involved in the conspiracy, dismissing them from public office. The pro-Salazar conservative press promoted the idea that the coup had been the result of an ‘unholy alliance’ between left and right wing opponents of the government. It also noted the last minute disagreements within the “alliance”, particularly those between NS members demanding “that Rolão Preto lead the coup” and republican officers who preferred that the coup be led by “a prestigious high ranking officer”.⁵² The strongest criticism came from the catholic press. It claimed that “improvised Hitlers and Mussolinis abound, but the political forces those leaders have garnered in their own countries is reduced to nothing more than theatrical arrogance by their imitatory and fanatical admirers”.⁵³

Salazar used the Coup to act against a group of right-wing officers. In September he banished Paiva Couceira to Spain for having written a letter to Mário Pessoa that strongly criticised Salazar’s colonial policy and had been widely distributed in the barracks. Couceiro was a ‘hero’ of the military campaigns in Africa, as well as the leader of the most important attempts to restore the monarchy following the establishment of the Republic in 1910. In 1911 and 1912 he had led monarchist incursions from Spain in which Preto had participated, and was the leading figure of ‘Monarchy of the North’ in 1918. He was a highly respected figure among conservative monarchists for this reason. In the letter that led to his expulsion, Couceiro accused Salazar of undermining the Armed Forces and reducing their presence in the colonies. In his view, Salazar had thereby weakened Portugal’s ability to respond to threats to its sovereignty over Angola and Mozambique, one of the most sensitive issues of Portuguese overseas policy since the British Ultimatum of 1890.⁵⁴

In a long and extremely ideological official note issued a few days later, Salazar felt sufficiently confident to record his differences with the restless officers and civilians behind the Coup. He

⁵² *Diário de Notícias*, 13 September 1935, p. 2.

⁵³ *Novidades*, 23 September 1935, cited in Cruz, M. B. da, ‘As elites...’, *cit.*

⁵⁴ British Embassy Report, 25 September 1935, FO 371/19725, PRO.

claimed that among the "revolutionaries of Penha de França there were a certain number of officers... who claimed to be nothing less than the true representatives of the ideals of 28 May".⁵⁵ He defined the differences between the conspirators and his regime, declaring that "the embarrassments caused by those calling themselves friends of the regime who pursue individual revolutionary conspiracies will cease because we consider them enemies of the National Revolution on principle".

Salazar emphasised three dichotomies noted in previous speeches between "force and violence", "politics and administration", as well as between conflict and the "constitutionalisation of the National Revolution". Salazar repudiated "government violence" that lacked "moral or clearly defined legal limits", re-affirmed his belief that politics had "destroyed administration"⁵⁶, and noted that the "constitutionalisation" of the new regime would guarantee that "the fundamental principles of the regime will bear fruit", countering those who wanted "the dictatorship to continue as before, unstable and uncertain".⁵⁷

As he prepared measures to reform the Armed Forces and ensure their subordination to civilian authority, Salazar praised the officers who had overthrown the First Republic, but he removed them from the political sphere and restricted their role "to the maintenance of order and the defence of the Fatherland". The dictator recognised nonetheless that the activity of the government depended on the support of the Armed Forces, as he had never considered the possibility of seeking "a militia or armed force" to support him or the government "in the event of a revolt or violent opposition".⁵⁸

As it ceased to be an autonomous Fascist organisation, NS became increasingly dependent on support from the Army. In a clandestine response to Salazar, the JANS noted its concern and support for those imprisoned after the failed coup, amongst them

⁵⁵ Salazar, *op. cit.*, vol. II, p. 69.

⁵⁶ *Ibid.*, p. 72.

⁵⁷ *Ibid.*, p. 74.

⁵⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 78.

“good nationalists to whom we owe a great debt”.⁵⁹ There were obvious attempts to fuse NS and Army demands. The JANS explained how the troops had with “their fervent revolutionary enthusiasm sought to modify the structure of the State” and that Salazar had become “cold” towards the Army. The JANS rejected the proposed reform of the Armed forces, wondering how it did not find such attitudes “strange” and always regarded Salazar’s “candidates for the office of War Minister with reservations”.⁶⁰

The Paiva Couceiro Conspiracy of 1938

Despite military conspiracies, Salazar’s position was secure from 1937 onwards. In contrast to the situation at the beginning of the decade, Salazar was no longer reluctant to arrest and expel conspirators. The attempted coups and conspiracies against his regime had only served to strengthen his resolve. Nonetheless, conspiracies against the New State continued throughout the Spanish Civil War, usually involving groups of discontented right-wing officers and civilians. The most significant occurred in 1938, involving individuals united in their opposition to the regime’s political and administrative control over the Armed Forces.

At the end of October 1937, Paiva Couceiro published an open letter to Salazar again accusing him of jeopardising the “integrity of the Nation” by concentrating on the “universal panacea of a balanced budget” and reducing the size of the Armed Forces.⁶¹ After his arrest, Couceiro stated from his prison cell that Salazar’s behaviour could lead to “the collapse of the empire at any moment”.⁶² Banished again, only this time for two years, Couceiro went to Spain where Franco’s police watched him.⁶³ Preto still wanted Cou-

⁵⁹ Communiqué of the JANS, ‘Ex. Sr. Presidente do Ministério’, September 1935, Proc. 1771/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁶⁰ *Ibid.*

⁶¹ See a copy of this letter in Raposo, H., *Folhas do meu cadastro. Vol. II (1926-1952)*, (Lisbon: 1986), pp. 91-100.

⁶² *Ibid.*, p. 100.

⁶³ Some Integralists experienced intimidatory arrest for attempting to visit Couceiro in prison. Proc. 3387/SPS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

ceiro as an ally after the unsuccessful coup of 10 September. He sent an NS delegation to Spain to try to convince Couceiro to lead a new coup attempt, but the group was arrested at the border upon its return to Portugal.⁶⁴ In 1938, however, Preto reversed his position, probably because of the agreement reached with the authorities after his return in 1936. He forbade NS participation in any new conspiracies planned by Couceiro in Spain, which he did not believe would succeed. In a letter to an NS leader in the North, Preto lamented "the situations that certain adventurers put poor Couceiro in, a venerated old man who sees his name subjected to every kind of vexation".⁶⁵ Preto's appeals had the desired effect, although a hard core of intransigent followers disillusioned with Preto's agreement agreed to participate in the preparation of the coup.⁶⁶

By this time, the police had greater freedom to repress officers and in April 1938 it made a series of preventative arrests. The strategy was to expel senior officers from the country, as was later the case with civilian supporters of previous conspiracies.⁶⁷ Most civilians were condemned to two years imprisonment. Paiva Couceiro was the victim of collaboration between the Portuguese and Spanish police forces and sent to a small village in Tenerife where his every move was watched. The police arrested all 'usual suspects' including half a dozen NS members, the majority of whom were released after proving that they had not been involved in the conspiracy by showing the authorities copies of internal circulars written by Preto.⁶⁸

The 1938 conspiracy probably represented the final opportunity to use the 'spirit of 28 May' to mobilise right-wing civilians and officers, Integralists and disillusioned National Syndicalists in reaction to military reforms and to prevent stricter civilian control over

⁶⁴ Proc. 5399/SR, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁶⁵ Letter from Rolão Preto to Moreira Lopes, 12 March 1938, Proc. 203/38, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁶⁶ Proc. 203/38, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁶⁷ AOS/CO/PC-3H, ANTT.

⁶⁸ The arrests affected the Oporto National Syndicalists, with district leaders being detained. Proc. 203/38, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

the Armed Forces. By 1939 the civilian dictatorship was already consolidated even though throughout the long-lived New State the military was the force most feared by Salazar. On the eve of the Second World War, Salazar finally relaxed: political and administrative control over the Armed Forces peaked while the Republican menace in Spain disappeared with Franco's victory. The speech delivered by Salazar to Army and Navy officers in 1938 marked what one political sociologist has termed the victory of "a civilian police dictatorship" over the old Military Dictatorship of 1926.⁶⁹ Two important steps achieved this victory: Salazar's control of the War Ministry in mid-1936 and the reform of the Armed Forces in 1937.

After the September 1935 conspiracy, Salazar made a last effort to obtain the War portfolio and was successful in 1936. Between September 1935 and his control of the War Ministry, Salazar established government controlled co-ordinating bodies responsible for defence matters, over which he presided. He used them to increase his own control over defence matters. His provisional control of the Ministry gave Salazar a final say on promotions and transfers of senior officers. Although he was only interim War Minister, Salazar retained the portfolio until the end of the Second World War.

As War Minister he presented proposals for the reform of the Armed Forces that later constituted the most important instrument of civilian control over the military. Salazar's reforms not only consolidated civilian authority but also led to the greatest quantitative and qualitative reduction of the Portuguese Armed Forces since the First World War. The officer corps had already suffered significant reductions with the dismissal and transfer to the reserves of officers implicated in the various conspiracies and revolutions undertaken after 1926. In the years that followed the reform, it was reduced by almost 30% thus "reaching the lowest recorded level since 1905". Several legislative measures were also passed to reinforce ideological and police control over the Armed

⁶⁹ Carrilho, M., *op. cit.*, p. 423.

Forces. These led to the supremacy of Captain Santos Costa who, as Salazar's assistant, was made Under-Secretary of State in charge of the military. Santos Costa's supremacy went unchallenged until the end of the 1950s.⁷⁰

These measures contrast with the progressive militarisation of other European states and can only be understood in the context of tensions between the Armed Forces and the new regime, which by the end of the 1930s had been resolved in favour of the latter. Salazar had suffered continual challenges and humiliations at the hands of the Armed Forces. He had therefore prudently used President Carmona as a mediator until he had gained complete control. Unconvinced of the ageing President's loyalty, Salazar used his position to capture the power Carmona still retained over the Armed Forces. The NS, caught up in the regime-military tensions, was once again outmanoeuvred and its power declined dramatically on the eve of the Second World War. From 1938 onwards, conspiracies became a police matter, and the police authorities easily controlled the small number of known malcontents.

The Impact of the Spanish Civil War

Studies of the New State emphasise the impact on the regime of the Spanish Popular Front's electoral victory in February 1936 and the outbreak of the Civil War five months later.⁷¹ The possibility of a 'Red' victory was seen as a dangerous threat. The regime's reaction was to adopt a new political discourse, introduce new symbols and create militias, measures that many have taken to indicate a process of 'fascistisation'. Martins, for example, considers that this dynamic clearly indicated "a new degree of regime fascistisation, or, at least, a phase of political development that went beyond Christian corporatism, traditionally and conventionally authoritarian, which probably constituted its initial 'project'".⁷²

⁷⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 422.

⁷¹ Oliveira, C., *Salazar e a Guerra Civil de Espanha*, (Lisbon: 1987).

⁷² Woolf, S. J., (ed), *op. cit.*, p. 448.

Before the Spanish Civil War, Salazar had consistently refused to consider either the creation of militias or the fascistisation of the UN. In 1936, however, the regime created a paramilitary youth organisation and permitted the emergence of a militia clearly inspired by Fascist examples. The Portuguese Legion (*Legião Portuguesa*, LP) was founded in September 1936 after an anti-communist rally organised by the official national unions. It arose from a genuine demand from fascists who had recently adhered to Salazarism. Although he authorised the formation of these organisations, Salazar decreed that were to be subject to governmental control. Typically, Salazar moderated their declarations of principles and forced them to accept military command, while preventing NS from exercising any authority within them.

The Portuguese Youth (*Mocidade Portuguesa*, MP) was also the product of similar demands. The Education Ministry that sought to unite young people in a paramilitary organisation to replace the moribund AEV drew up several plans. Between May and September 1936, MP membership was open to all, including young people who were not attending schools. MP growth was also a product of the victory of the Popular Front in Spain. Voluntary membership joined together youths of the 'lower middle class' and workers from various sectors. Thus, in its first few months, the social base of MP "was similar to that of the National Syndicalist movement".⁷³ Later, MP volunteers who were not at school were transferred to the LP and membership of the youth organisation was made obligatory for all youths at school. At the same time, MP was placed under the aegis of the Education Ministry and was 'christianised' after a Church hierarchy campaign. All these measures stemmed its growth and led it to co-exist alongside other predominantly catholic youth organisations.

The authorisation of a voluntary and politicised militia like the LP can only be explained by the radical atmosphere provoked by the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War. It is interesting to note, however, that the creation of such an organisation was one of the

⁷³ Kuin, S., *Mocidade Portuguesa: 'mobilisation' of youth during the Portuguese Estado Novo regime, (1936-1974)*, (Florence: 1991).

demands of the National Syndicalists who had broken with Preto and aligned themselves with Salazar at the end of 1933. In 1934, the *Revolução Nacional* group had stated their desire to remain a militia yet in 1935 Salazar had refused an identical request by a group of corporatist syndicalists who had broken with Preto.⁷⁴ The main driving force behind the LP was this group and it was not a coincidence that the inaugural rally of the LP was organised by a corporatist apparatus in which dissidents from the NS participated. The first president of the LP General Council was the Coimbra professor Costa Leite (Lumbrales), who had led the secession at the 1933 NS Congress.

The place of the LP in the collective memory of the New State is inversely proportional to its actual role under the regime. Together with the MP, its 30,000 "uniformed, organised and instructed" members' dominated regime choreography between 1936 and 1939.⁷⁵ With the end of the Spanish Civil War and the discreet return of pro-Franco Portuguese volunteers (the *Viriatos*), LP involvement in regime rallies and commemorations was reduced to the distribution of propaganda and information during elections. From the outset, army officers led the LP and it was controlled by the War Ministry even in peacetime. Out of the five LP leaders, two had to be serving officers and one had to have the rank of commander.⁷⁶ Furthermore, military officers commanded all LP district commissions.

The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War led the exiled Preto to propose a political truce to allow him to return to Portugal.⁷⁷ Several NS internal documents indicate this change in the face of the 'Red' menace and refer to the existence of a pact with the government. In December 1936, Preto wrote to the JANS ordering the

⁷⁴ This initiative to create some 'armed syndicalist militias', which was rejected, came from the National Syndicalist group of bank employees. See Chapter V.

⁷⁵ In 1939, the *Legião* had 53,000 members, 30,000 of them active. Confidential report from the President of the *Legião Portuguesa* Central Committee to Salazar, 27 April 1939, AOS/CO/PC, ANTT.

⁷⁶ Carrilho, M. *op. cit.*, p. 314.

⁷⁷ Barbosa, J. P. M., *op. cit.*, p. 129.

suspension “of all propaganda and party activity”.⁷⁸ Days later, COMORG referred to “a political truce” but instructed National Syndicalists not to join government organisations.⁷⁹ Inevitably, Preto soon re-initiated hostilities against Salazar. With the creation of the LP, National Syndicalism lost the last of its leitmotifs and many active members in the various provincial commissions abandoned the movement in favour of the Salazarist organisation.

In his letter of resignation of September 1936, Marino Sanchez Ferreira, an NS founder, expressed the sentiments of many defectors, reiterating his doubts about the 1935 alliance with the democrats. His differences with NS leaders were exacerbated when *União Nacional* was instructed not to publish any criticisms of left-wing opposition forces. Ferreira wrote that as “a soldier dedicated to Lusitanian nationalism” he was not going to waste any more time and would adhere to the new organisation, even although it was controlled by the regime.⁸⁰ The LP attempted to prevent known National Syndicalists from joining between 1936 and 1937. In a confidential letter to Salazar, the LP president noted his pride in resistance to NS infiltration. In his words, “these elements are not in the Legion. The few that were the object of suspicion have systematically been prevented from joining with a rigour that exceeds that exercised in any other field”.⁸¹

Relations between the LP and the other organisations created or supported by the regime were not always peaceful. Salazar was adamant that the LP and MP remain separate and he repeatedly rejected all proposals to unite them, even under his control. The UN had always been suspicious of militias and continued to dominate local administrative bodies without formal links to either organisation. After initial alarm, the Army and the Church saw their traditional prerogatives safeguarded within both organisations. The Church retained its own organisations and ‘christianised’ MP to make it more amenable to its teachings. The Army

⁷⁸ Communiqué of the JANS, January 1937, AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁷⁹ COMORG circular, 11 January 1937, AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁸⁰ Circular signed by Marino Sanchez Ferreira, *cit.*, ARP.

⁸¹ Report cited above, AOS/CO/PC, ANTT

dominated the LP and a sizeable number of reserve officers had paid positions within it.

It is important to acknowledge the differences between the two organisations, however. While MP was swiftly de-politicised and deliberately 'christianised', the LP retained the political and militarised structure typical of contemporary fascist militias. It is not worth comparing these organisations with their counterparts in the other authoritarian and fascist regimes in Europe. Nonetheless, it should be noted that the Portuguese organisations were much more modest in scale and more closely controlled by the state than similar organisations elsewhere.⁸² Their brief presence in the political arena was far less significant than that of organisations under the Vichy regime, for example, which was politically and ideologically close to Salazarism. With the end of the Spanish Civil War, LP leaders feared an impending loss of status and called on Salazar to allow its continued existence as there was still "a great deal to do in our task to reinvigorate patriotism. For this reason, the Legion judges that its mission must not be terminated".⁸³ Although he retained the LP, Salazar ensured that it was irreversibly weakened.

The dynamic set in motion by the Civil War in Spain sounded the death-knell for the NS movement. By 1939 the clandestine organisation was reduced to a small group of Preto's 'political friends'.

A Persistent Sub-Culture

On the eve of the Second World War, a journalist who published a series of interviews with Preto, Plácido Barbosa, wrote to him saying "he had been introduced to many National Syndicalists in Lisbon".⁸⁴ Who were the NS sympathisers that continued to dream of 'revolution', and how many of them were there?

⁸² Kuin, S., 'Mocidade Portuguesa nos anos trinta: a instauração de uma organização paramilitar de juventude', *Análise Social*, vol. XXVIII (122), 1993, pp. 555-588; Rodrigues, L. N., *A Legião Portuguesa. A Milícia do Estado Novo, 1936-1944*, (Lisbon: 1996); Carrilho, M., *op. cit.*, pp. 313-317; Oliveira, C., *op. cit.*, pp. 221-226.

⁸³ Report cited above, AOS/CO/PC, ANTT.

⁸⁴ Letter from Plácido Barbosa to Rolão Preto, 7 July 1939, ARP.

By 1939, NS had only 300 members spread throughout the country. Some provincial groups had been bled dry by desertions, leaving only a 'hard core'. A formal party structure, complete with office bearers and internal circulars, only served to unite a small group of 'political friends'. Some were still prepared to support each rumoured military movement. In August 1939, for example, a local leader arranged a meeting in Anadia in Preto's name to prepare the NS branch "to assist a movement structurally led by the military" and distributed NS armbands for identification purposes.⁸⁵

The LP president always feared an association with NS, which he believed to be peopled by those desiring "to achieve the National Revolution by the most violent means possible". He therefore prohibited any LP members from participating in conspiracies and purged the organisation of the few who had managed to infiltrate it.⁸⁶ Nevertheless, given common pro-Axis positions during the war, there was some collaboration between the two organisations and some dual affiliations.

The outbreak of the Second World War breathed new life into NS.⁸⁷ The use of the NS network by Axis propaganda services boosted the weak organisation and ensured its support for fascist ideology. However, as noted above, Italy and Germany did not heavily support Portuguese fascism. Indeed, the movement was peripheral to the strategic project of both German National Socialism and Italian Fascism. Portuguese Fascists never gained the backing that these regimes gave to their Central, Eastern, and Northern cohorts.⁸⁸ Hitler's Germany remained distant from Salazar's regime. Mussolini's Italy attempted to establish increasingly close contacts at institutional levels. Yet Salazar greatly mistrusted Ital-

⁸⁵ Report of Inspector Francisco Sales Vale, Coimbra, 30 August 1939, Proc. 921-SS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT. Some police reports also refer to the complicity of some *Legião* groups. AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁸⁶ Report cited above, AOS/CO/PC, ANTT.

⁸⁷ Telo, A., *Portugal na Segunda Guerra (1941-45)*, 2 vols., (Lisbon: 1991); Rosas, F., *Portugal entre a guerra e a paz*, (Lisbon: 1990).

⁸⁸ As in Norway, for example, where a small Fascist movement was guided to power. See: Hoidal, O. K., *Quisling: a study in treason*, (Oslo: 1989).

ian proposals to create an organisation to defend the 'Latin' world.⁸⁹

The Axis powers constructed a propaganda machine much more efficient than that of the Allies during the first few years of the war.⁹⁰ Despite strict government instructions to official censors to ensure that the Axis and the Allies received equal treatment, the British and German information and propaganda services quickly managed to infiltrate and divide the political police, the media, and even regime institutions. Some of the more 'Fascistic' organisations such as the LP were quite ready to accept Axis propaganda. Recent research, however, indicates that "the sectors most active in the defence of German principles were those situated at the margins of the regime".⁹¹ Contrary to what one might expect, old admirers of Italian Fascism such as Salazar's propaganda chief António Ferro were from the outset openly in favour of Britain. The crusade against the Soviet Union galvanised those on the extreme right, while Catholic forces lost no opportunity to voice opposition to Nazism. In turn, Salazar's initial concern was to prevent Spain from siding with the Axis powers and from invading Portugal.

Meanwhile, increasing doubts concerning the policies of fascist regimes marked Preto's ideological evolution. Defending Italian Fascism enthusiastically, he re-edited his writings of the early 1920s about the Italian regime in 1938. This time he noted that "after seventeen years of re-birth and intense innovation" Italian Fascism should have learned how to develop its plan for "social justice", "create the new élite" and moderate its "flights of domination".⁹² In an official communiqué about the war, NS declared its support for continued Portuguese neutrality and the old alliance between Portugal and Britain. It raised fears of eventual Spanish involvement in the war and denounced German imperialism.

⁸⁹ Kuin, S., 'O braço longo de Mussolini...', *cit.*

⁹⁰ Telo, A. J., *Propaganda e guerra secreta em Portugal, 1939-45*, (Lisbon: 1990).

⁹¹ Barros, J. L. de, 'Anglofilia e Germanofilia em Portugal durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial' in Various Authors, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra Mundial: contributos para uma reavaliação*, (Lisbon: 1989), p. 98.

⁹² Preto, R., *op. cit.*, p. xv.

Nonetheless, NS used the war to reinforce its internal political standing.⁹³ In 1939 Preto publicly denounced the Soviet-German Treaty.⁹⁴ After the German invasion of the Soviet Union, NS began to serve the Axis propaganda machine and became involved in the organisation of pro-Axis events, as well as in the publication and distribution of pro-Axis publications. The NS commission in Coimbra distributed pro-German propaganda in December 1939.⁹⁵ These activities were assisted by Italian and German agents and involved not only NS, but also the LP and some professors at the university.⁹⁶

Italian propaganda, with which NS sympathised most, was not as extensive but also used the NS network by direct contacts with local offices. In other provincial centres, as in Elvas, NS and the LP were Axis propaganda centres. According to a report by the political police, Preto had been in Elvas in 1942 and invited pro-Axis sympathisers to join his movement.⁹⁷ At the beginning of the 1940s, NS still controlled a reasonable number of local newspapers that had managed to survive the banning of the movement and were controlled by current and former members who had since joined the LP. Generally speaking, in 1943 NS participated in Axis propaganda, independently of its different positions regarding the New State. Even supporters of the schism who had joined regime institutions were fervent Axis supporters, and journals subsidised by the Germans counted on their active collaboration.⁹⁸ NS attitudes during the war, however, only served to confirm that no matter how deep their involvement in the dissemination of Axis propaganda, their position under Salazarism was becoming less important.

⁹³ Circular of the JANS, n.d., AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT. There were several attempts to negotiate with the government in 1940 through Mário Pessoa. Letter from Rolão Preto to Mário Pessoa, 13 March 1940, AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

⁹⁴ Lupi, L. C., *Memórias: diário de um inconformista, 1938-1945*, (Lisbon: 1972), p. 261.

⁹⁵ Proc. 921-SS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

⁹⁶ Some former National Syndicalists who had left during the schism of 1933.

⁹⁷ Telo, A. J., *op. cit.*, p. 31.

⁹⁸ It is impossible to describe them in detail here. It extended to the publication of propaganda books, collaboration in newspapers such as *A Esfera* (exclusively German propaganda), and the development of activities within the *Legião*, etc.

It was perhaps the position adopted by Preto regarding the war that led to the small split at the beginning of the 1940s, leading a group of NS Axis supporters to form National Corporatism, a copy of NS led by Vergílio Godinho.⁹⁹ Many National Syndicalists of the clandestine generation participated, even while maintaining dual membership.¹⁰⁰ Talks between Preto and the secessionists failed and in 1945 both attempted to form a Labour Party sharing the same basic principles. National Corporatism acted strictly in accordance with German propaganda. Until the end of the war their publications and sympathisers were supported financially by German money. In 1942, the two movements negotiated with the German propaganda services to support a fascist newspaper and publishing house, despite NS mistrust of the Nazis.¹⁰¹

In 1944, attempts were made to contact other extreme right-wing groups to organise a response to the wave of strikes and growing Communist inspired agitation. In the end, however, some NS men moved closer to the positions of the democratic opposition. In November 1945, during the illusory liberalisation of the post-war period, many sections of the opposition created a series of political parties that were swiftly dissolved, including Preto's and Godinho's Labour Parties.¹⁰² The latter's was officially called Labour Social Action (*Acção Social Trabalhista*, AST) and was basically a reorganised version of National Corporatism. Its programme called for the right to a job and accepted "methods that are called democratic" based on a "revised corporatist system".¹⁰³

⁹⁹ Vergílio Godinho, lawyer, writer, and Nazi sympathiser, joined National Syndicalism during its clandestine phase. Interview with Barradas D'Oliveira, 17 July 1984, and with Fernando Piteira Santos, 22 December 1984.

¹⁰⁰ Letter from Julião Vieira to João Manuel da Costa Figueira, 2 July 1942, ARP.

¹⁰¹ Letter from Julião Vieira to Rolão Preto, 21 June 1942, ARP.

¹⁰² *Diário de Lisboa*, 6 November 1945.

¹⁰³ See these programmes in Proc. 1089/SS, Arch. PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

The Fascists and the New State

The New State survived the Second War and it was not until the 1970s that it was overthrown by the military, forty-two years after the foundation of NS. Most NS supporters and militants who had abandoned the movement in the early 1930s joined the Salazar regime. However, unlike the first wave of integration after the 1933 split, which represented an organised adhesion, later 'integrations' were usually personal and erratic, connected with social networks and political influence. The study of the 'integration' of the Fascists calls for particular methodological caution as, unlike in Franco's Spain, it did not become one of the forces with an ability to influence the selection of the regime's political and administrative elite.

Research on the political careers of NS leaders under the New State until 1942 shows that dissident National Syndicalists were incorporated into the mobilising regime institutions during the 1930s. Those who left National Syndicalism as a result of the 1933 split were rapidly integrated into the regime, although they only managed to gain an influence over the corporatist apparatus. Many joined corporatist organisations as INTP delegates, national union leaders or as regime propagandists¹⁰⁴. António Ferro's propaganda bureau was another forum for 'integration' that included men such as Dutra Faria and Barradas D'Oliveira.

Few NS members had parliamentary or UN careers, the least appealing and receptive of the political institutions of the regime. The first New State National Assembly rewarded José Cabral for his role in the anti-Preto split. At the local level it is harder to present a clear picture. In 1936, the LP was an 'integrational' vehicle that absorbed a significant number of local fascist sympathisers, but not a single NS leader occupied a leading position within it. Nonetheless, many National Syndicalists went on to found LP district branches. Of the 1500 NS affiliates at the beginning of 1936, the majority had joined LP, although it was uncommon for local

¹⁰⁴ See: Valente, J. C., *Estado Novo e Alegria no Trabalho. Uma História Política da FNAT (1935-1958)*, (Lisbon: 1999).

leaders to obtain equivalent positions within the Salazar militia. As far as local leaders most associated with Integralism are concerned, most sustained or returned to old traditionalist monarchist positions, joined the UN and actively participated in local politics.

Although there is no exhaustive analysis of the nature, origin and method of recruitment to the regime elite, it seems clear that the Fascist party was not a source of recruitment of New State political élites. NS did not leave a mark on the regime, either in cultural or elite terms. Its leaders were split between those opposing Salazar, those who gave him qualified support, and those who were faithful to him, and all of them had secondary positions in the propaganda and corporatist apparatus. Their adherence to the regime reflected a shift in their political attitudes, and few joined the small governmental élite. It was only in the 1960s that some of the young Fascists of the 1930s occupied important positions within the regime. Castro Fernandes, a friend of António Pedro, became Minister for the Economy and leader of the UN; Barradas D'Oliveira ended his political career as a director of the *Diário da Manhã*; Gonçalves Rapazote became Interior Minister on the eve of the regime's downfall. Their nomination, however, had nothing to do with previous Fascist affiliations.

The hard core clandestine opponents of the regime, among them Preto, adopted what can be called a *tout court* fascist opposition to Salazarism. They were very few in numbers, however. As they abandoned fascism, their paths crossed with those of the 'democratic opposition' during electoral campaigns, and they lost any organised identity of their own. In the brief months of hesitation after the end of the war, some 28 May militants united with the republican-socialist opposition but they subsequently adopted different paths. Some former Fascists joined left-wing parties after the war. António Tinoco, for example, joined the *seareiro* António Sergio, in an attempt to form a Socialist Party. After his long stay in Britain as a BBC journalist, António Pedro returned to Portugal hoping to found a newspaper to "defend democratic institutions, fundamental freedoms, modernisation and industrialisation".¹⁰⁵ He

¹⁰⁵ V-91, António Pedro Estate, BNL.

went on to become a leading light of the Portuguese Surrealist movement and left his mark in the arts and theatre. As noted in a study of his work, Pedro “was a Fascist in 1934 and a Socialist in 1948” but his “fascism and socialism” had “a common denominator: a visceral repugnance for the cold paternal provincialism of Oliveira Salazar”.¹⁰⁶

Pedro, Tinoco and Preto participated in General Norton de Matos’s 1949 presidential election campaign, the first time that the presidency had been contested since Carmona’s election in 1928. In 1951, Preto and other former NS leaders allied themselves with moderate republicans to promote Quintão Meireles’ presidential candidacy.¹⁰⁷ Preto was a regular presence at opposition electoral campaigns and had a particularly important role in the 1958 campaign of another New State dissident, General Humberto Delgado.

The anti-Salazarism of the other former NS Integralists was more moderate and largely motivated by their preference for a monarchist solution. Alberto Monsaraz is a case in point. In the 1950s Monsaraz lamented the contamination of IL by sorelian ideals, a contamination that in his view had led directly to fascism, a “western violence” that had perverted “patriotic and Christian” nationalism.¹⁰⁸ Like Preto, Monsaraz returned to Integralist ideology, recovering his belief in a de-centralised, organic and popular monarchy that would support an independent monarchist movement, either at the margins of the regime or in opposition to it. Throughout the 1950s, tensions were caused by the UN’s rejection of a hypothetical restoration of the monarchy. The progressive distancing of the regime from a new generation of monarchists, which presented separate election lists in the 1960s, was linked to the influence of Preto and others that had revised old IL and NS ideals.

Preto traces an account of the downfall of fascism in 1945 in his book, *Bourgeois Betrayal (Traição Burguesa)*, published at the end

¹⁰⁶ França, J. A., ‘O político e o jornalista’ in Various Authors, *António Pedro (1909-1966)*, (Lisbon: 1979), p. 43.

¹⁰⁷ Cruz, M. B. da, ‘A oposição eleitoral ao salazarismo’, *Revista de História das ideias*, vol. 5, 1983, p. 724.

¹⁰⁸ Monsaraz, A., *A verdade monárquica*, (Lisbon: n. d.), pp. 53-59.

of the war. The book criticised fascist regimes for becoming victims of social and political compromises with the bourgeoisie.¹⁰⁹ Preto had been moving towards a 'left-wing' fascism since the outbreak of the war. After it, he criticised the weakness of Mussolini who had reduced "an immensely proud plan to the terrifying Calvary of his tragic and revolting death", and emphasised that Fascism "lost its true meaning, once allied to the bourgeoisie".¹¹⁰ The German Nazis were similarly criticised. Preto condemned the agreements between Hitler and bourgeois elements after the true "revolutionary assault" of National Socialism. He denounced the elimination of the left and social-minded sectors of the NSDAP by Hitler due to his fear of being "overwhelmed by conservative forces and extreme nationalism".¹¹¹ Thus, "the entire left wing of the party" had been "offered as a sacrifice to bourgeois allies".¹¹² It is worth quoting Preto's view of the end of National Socialism in 1945:

Living in a heroic time, a mystical imperialist nationalist doorway has certainly opened... the German people raised it to the summit of their History, bravely, united, morally grandiose, as people who know how to suffer in battle and fall on the supreme sword; as for the rest, the social and political structures, the conquests in the field of Labour, Technology and Assistance, the limits imposed on the ambitions of the Junker élites, their record deserves the consideration of History when the hour comes to pass serene judgement. But neither the glorious clarions of nationalist mysticism nor the powerful social projections of Nazi efforts can make us forget what Nazism represented — the deception of the revolutionary hopes that gave birth to National Socialism.¹¹³

Preto sought refuge in the specific nature of the Portuguese case. He accepted that he had followed the "fascist model", but rejected the label.¹¹⁴ Unlike other fascist leaders of the 1930s, Preto embarked on the post-war period with a reconverted 'social' fas-

¹⁰⁹ Preto, R., *A traição burguesa*, (Lisbon: 1945).

¹¹⁰ *Ibid.*, p. 150.

¹¹¹ *Ibid.*, pp. 152-153.

¹¹² *Ibid.*, p. 155.

¹¹³ *Ibid.*, p. 156.

¹¹⁴ *Ibid.*, p. 246.

cism, which he thought was represented by the victorious Labour Party in Britain. Left and right were a “phantasmal battle of myths” that the struggle against Salazarist immobilism should leave behind. Preto later distanced himself from fascism as well as some of the counter-revolutionary ideologues of the early twentieth century. In his view, Maurras and Sorel were “perhaps the two who [had] the greatest responsibility for the hard and anti-human climate” due to their “perspectives” and “expeditious methods”.¹¹⁵

¹¹⁵ Preto, R., *Inquietação*, (Lisbon: 1963), p. 18.

Chapter Seven

National Syndicalism and International Fascism

It is difficult to speak of an 'international family' of fascist movements. Despite attempts to create 'internationals' along the lines of the Italian CAUR, the ideology and political strategy of the fascist movements did not transcend national boundaries. Nonetheless, both the German and Italian dictatorships set up international relations institutions that supported movements in the Balkans and Eastern Europe. The CAUR, for instance, were set up to counter-balance the growing influence of Nazism.¹ Political institutions associated with the Nazi Party developed parallel diplomatic structures, which also happened, albeit on a smaller scale, in the Italian case. This parallel diplomacy occurred mainly in countries that the fascist regimes considered strategically important, or where there were significant numbers of German or Italian emigrants, essentially in Central and Eastern Europe and Latin America.² Portugal was not important for either reason.

The diplomatic strategy of the fascist powers did not initially involve support for political parties. It was only during the Second World War that a network of parties was used for propaganda purposes, although this was not the most important form of fascist diplomacy. The rise of the Nazis, however, made fascism an inter-

¹ Ledeen, M. A., *Universal Fascism*, (New York: 1972); Borejsza, J. W., *Il fascismo e l'Europa Orientale. Dalla propaganda all'aggressione*, (Rome and Bari: 1981).

² The bibliography on this theme is enormous. For an introduction see Larsen, S. U., (ed), *Fascism Outside Europe*, (New York: Forthc.).

national political phenomenon, as the party became a point of reference for the political activities of other movements.

An “International Family”

NS propaganda was marked by its identification with European fascism. It was at the heart of the movement’s identity and distinguished it from Salazarism and other political ideologies and forces. International developments were followed closely and became a point of reference for NS political activity and propaganda. Reference to international events was particularly important given that Portugal was progressing towards the consolidation of a still contested authoritarian order.

When asked about NS identification with Italian Fascism in a United Press interview, Preto prudently replied: “they are evidently similar movements, sons of the same social anguish, of the same collective necessity. In each country, however, the revolutionary wave breaks and extends in a different way and has unique characteristics and rhythms. Fascism, Hitlerism are totalitarianisms that deify the Caesarist State, others seek to find in the Christian traditions of the Portuguese people the formula that permits the harmonisation of the undisputed sovereignty of national interest with our dignity as free men, as living spiritual beings”.³ This interview was often cited when other authoritarian groups, particularly the catholics, accused him of being a mere follower of international phenomena.

Despite this demarcation, fascist conquests in Europe were a central element of NS propaganda. Identification with fascism was a structural component of NS political activity, helping to mobilise sectors of the political and cultural elite, which identified with it and lacked organisational expression. There were two key aspects to NS references to international events. The movement identified with regimes where fascism had won the day. These were upheld as positive examples of “revolution”. It also noted the solidarity

³ *Revolução*, 10 January 1933, p. 2.

among fascist movements, particularly those ideologically close to NS, or those that emphasised “social” and “corporatist” concerns. Almost all NS leaders wrote articles and participated in debates about fascism. Attitudes to National Socialism ranged from reserved to unconditional support, but Italian Fascism and movements close to it were identified with completely.

NS saw itself as an integral part of the fascist wave that seemed ready to dominate the political fortunes of Europe after Hitler’s rise to power. NS newspapers, and Preto’s editorials in particular, followed Hitler’s rise and his initial state reforms with enthusiasm. Thus, part of the conservative press, particularly the catholics, criticised Nazism. NS responded to all attacks by excessively defending nazification measures and was only more moderate regarding racist policies, although the persecution of the Jews was excused by many writing for the fascist press.

For Preto, Hitler’s ascendancy represented “the new cadence of the National Revolution in progress” embodying the “strong edifice of the New State” throughout Europe. He supported Hitler’s “revolutionary” strategy and expressed doubts regarding the German dictator’s surrender to electoral principles, a move that could “compromise his position”. He preferred to see Hitler “free of political compromises, armed, vigilant and determined” to redeem Germany.⁴ Preto was certain that neither the “*Centrum* nor the violence of liberal reaction, nothing, could detain the breaking wave of Germany’s national instinct” and he felt that Hitler “owned the era”.⁵ Younger NS leaders were even more unconditional in their support for Hitler. They expressed fewer reservations regarding National Socialism than Preto. They saw it as the great ideological movement of their generation. Hence the following statement in the first edition of *O Nacional Sindicalista*: “Hitler, great animator of the multitudes [is the] perfect incarnation of a generation that loves and wants to fight, that ardently seeks to destroy the myths and sophisms of the past and to replace them with the magnificent realities of nationalism”.⁶

⁴ Preto, R., ‘A hora de Hitler’, *Revolução*, 23 March 1932, p. 1 and 4.

⁵ Preto, R., ‘Não!’ *Revolução*, 26 April 1932, p. 1.

⁶ *O Nacional Sindicalista*, Faro, N^o 1, 18 December 1932.

The instrumental nature of Preto's editorials on Nazi Germany was particularly evident when he commented on the tensions between conservative authoritarians and fascists resolved in favour of the latter. Preto always stressed the similarities between Salazarism and the Dolfuss regime, and criticised the conservative authoritarian mistrust of fascist movements.⁷ Nazism's 'social' and 'anti-plutocratic' tendencies were held up as a model to follow. The racist dimension was ignored. The fascist press criticised those who saw the persecution of the Jews as the dominant issue. It stressed "the Nazi's slow and methodical battle to conquer the State, the liquidation of the opposition parties, the absorption of similar currents of opinion, and the extermination of the only two forces that seriously oppose them — Jewish capitalism and marxism".⁸ Although closer to Italian Fascism, NS portrayed the Nazi dictatorship as heroic, ignoring initial tensions between Italian Fascism and Nazism. NS criticised the "conservative" non-fascist dictatorship in Lisbon, and promoted itself as the alternative force that would create and consolidate a real "New State".

Solidarity with sister movements was greater when the framework was closer to NS ideologically and culturally. This was the case with the JONS and the Falange in Spain. The activities of Brazilian Fascists like Severino Sombra's Labour League (*Legião do Trabalho*, LT) and Plínio Salgado's Brazilian Integralist Action (*Acção Integralista Brasileira*, AIB) were followed with enthusiasm. Severino Sombra spent two years in exile in Lisbon between 1932 and 1934 and participated in some NS rallies.⁹ After the foundation of AIB, which incorporated Sombra's movement, the Portuguese fascists supported Salgado, who was also in exile in Portugal.¹⁰ As noted in an article of January 1933: "our Brazilian comrades also want our principles, adapted more or less to suit their circumstances, to proliferate exuberantly on the other side of the Atlantic".¹¹ Relations with the Falange were intense and became

⁷ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 14 January 1934, p. 1.

⁸ *Alcácer*, 21 May 1933, p. 2.

⁹ *Revolução*, 19 January 1933.

¹⁰ *Revolução*, 5 January 1933, p. 5.

¹¹ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 14 January 1934.

particularly important when Preto was exiled to Spain. These were the movements and “comrades” to which NS was most closely associated. To a lesser extent, the NS also identified with O’Duffy’s Irish “Blue Shirts” and Mosley’s “Labour” fascists, who once sent compliments to their Portuguese counterparts.¹²

The activities of fascist movements and the support they received from fascist regimes contrasted with Salazar’s “prudence” and his “lack of combativeness and modernism”.¹³ However, NS condemned the extremist myths and violence of some Eastern European movements such as the Iron Guard.¹⁴ In response to a murder perpetrated by the Romanian fascists, for example, NS noted that although they regarded “with sympathy the Nazi ‘Iron Guard’ movement”, they could not “but deplore the excesses that it commits, which bring no prestige to the movement”.¹⁵

Foreign fascist movements were often referred to in internal correspondence, particularly after tensions with the Lisbon government had intensified. In the summer of 1933, an NS leader wrote to Preto about the possibility of responding with violence to government attacks. He referred to the Irish Blue Shirts “who beat their chests to threaten De Valera, saying that if he wants violence he’s going to get violence”, concluding that “Hitler suffered great persecution and many propaganda disasters before he won. Nothing will convince us that we will not win”.¹⁶

Contacts with the German and Italian embassies were also used to boost domestic political legitimacy. PNF and NSDAP delegations regularly attended NS rallies.¹⁷ Visits by Fascist dignitaries

¹² Public reports of these contacts were censored at the end of 1933, such that Mosley’s letter was not published. See: Processo 466-box 19, AGMI/ANTT. For more on Mosley see: Thurlow, R., *Fascism in Britain*, (Oxford: 1987). For the Irish Blue Shirts see: Manning, M., *The Blueshirts*, (Dublin: 1971) and Cronin, M., *The Blueshirts and Irish Politics*, (Dublin: 1997).

¹³ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 28 January 1934.

¹⁴ For more on the Romanian Iron Guard see: Weber, E., ‘The Man of Archangel’, *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (April 1966), pp. 101-126; Ioanid, R., *The Sword of the Archangel: Fascist Ideology in Romania*, (Boulder: 1990).

¹⁵ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 14 January 1934.

¹⁶ Letter from an unidentified NS leader to Rolão Preto, n. d. [1933], ARP.

¹⁷ See, for example, reports of Preto’s regular presence at Italian Embassy receptions. *Revolução*, 24 July 1933.

were also exploited for propaganda purposes. When Italo Balbo arrived in Lisbon in September 1933, a delegation of uniformed NS leaders hired a tugboat to receive him.¹⁸ This ambassadorial search for legitimacy did not prevent NS from demonstrating its extreme nationalism whenever possible. In March 1933, for example, when rumours circulated that Mussolini had proposed to Britain the ‘internationalisation’ of Portuguese colonies, NS immediately organised a demonstration in front of the British Embassy that was prohibited by the government.¹⁹ Despite ideological differences and a greater identification with Latin fascism, Hitler’s rise to power and identification with an international “fascist family” constituted an important element in showing the distinct nature of NS political activity and propaganda.

Iberian National Syndicalism

Programmatically, culturally and politically there were many affinities between the Portuguese and Spanish Fascists. There were numerous exiles on both sides of the border, and there were ideological similarities and friendships binding radical right-wing leaders from both countries. This permitted a mutual understanding and very rapid cross-fertilisation. At the beginning of the century, contacts between Portuguese and Spanish cultural élites were closer than they were fifty years later, when *Action Française*, dominated the renovation of the Iberian radical right, particularly within traditional monarchist circles.²⁰ The 1910 Republican Revolution in Portugal led to the emergence of IL as a doctrine and pressure group, much earlier than the emergence of its Spanish equivalent, Spanish Action (*Acción Española*, AE), but their programmes were very similar. Created in 1931 after the fall of Primo de Rivera, AE was immediately supported by Integralists.

Both inspired by AF, IL and AE were traditionalist, corporatist and monarchist alternatives to Liberal Republicanism, supported

¹⁸ *União Nacional*, Leiria, 10 September 1933, p. 1.

¹⁹ *Revolução*, 26 March 1933.

²⁰ See: Cuevas, P. C. G., *Acción Española*, (Madrid: 1998), pp. 88-96.

by similar elitist and aristocratic social networks. Although they admired Italian Fascism, the founders of both movements were quite reactionary and railed against economic, social and political modernisation. Both Portugal and Spain had experienced dictatorships under Sidónio Pais and Primo de Rivera, respectively.²¹ Although relations between the founders of Portuguese and Spanish National Syndicalism had been overshadowed by the Galician question and Portuguese fear of Spanish expansionism, ideological and political beliefs were almost identical.²² The youths that founded *Revolução* had an identical programme to Ledesma Ramos's Conquest of the State (*Conquista del Estado*).²³ Although Ledesma considered Integralist support for the restoration of the monarchy as being "anachronistic", ideological and programmatic similarities were strong. Morodo notes that Preto's 'Twelve Principles of Production' had a "clear influence on nascent Spanish Fascism".²⁴ When NS was founded its texts were well received by AE.

Iberian National Syndicalists had the same cultural base. The reactionary element was perhaps more evident in the Portuguese

²¹ See: Preston, P. *Las derechas españolas en el siglo XX: autoritarismo, fascismo y golpismo*, (Madrid: 1986); Meneses, F. R., "Sidónio Pais: The Portuguese 'New Republic' and the Challenge to Liberalism in Southern Europe", *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 28 (1), 1998, 109-130.

²² An example of this mistrust can be found in the article "Los 'Nazis' de Portugal" which was written by Ramiro Ledesma Ramos, and published in May 1933 in the first edition of the magazine *J.O.N.S.* See: Ledesma Ramos, R., *Escritos políticos, 1933-1934*, (Madrid: 1985), pp. 71-72. There are several examples of promptly denounced verbal excesses of both sides. At the beginning of 1931, Ledesma referred to Portugal's 'embezzled independence'. When Rolão Preto published his study of Portuguese National Syndicalism in *Acción Española*, Onésimo Redondo attacked the magazine in his regional paper for airing the views of a movement that defended the integration of Galicia into Portugal, citing Preto's phrase 'the Portuguese of the other side of the Minho River'. Redondo's complaint was probably the product of his personal observations of Portuguese National Syndicalism during his brief exile in Lisbon in 1933. In fact, the Portuguese National Syndicalists referred to the Galician question only occasionally and never made any official territorial claims. Preto himself immediately denied any 'expansionism'. See: *Acción Española*, N^o 45, 16 January 1934, pp. 881-882. On the Galician question, see: Nuñez Seixàs, X. M., 'Portugal e o galeguismo até 1936: algumas considerações históricas', *Penélope*, N^o 11, 1993, pp. 67-81.

²³ The adoption of the name National Syndicalism by the Portuguese fascists was based on Ledesma Ramos's JONS. See: Ledesma Ramos, R., *Fascismo en España? La Patria libre. Nuestra Revolución*, (Madrid: 1988), p. 69.

²⁴ Morodo, R., *op. cit.*, p. 189.

case, as monarchism was more important than in Spain. However, as Javier Tusell notes, imperial nationalism, corporatism, traditional catholicism and the rural-industrial dichotomy shaped both movements in equal measure.²⁵ Both had social catholic influences and saw the “New State” as an organic structure that would replace liberalism.²⁶ Both supported “vertical syndicalism” to unite producers, opposed communist labour politics and had a ‘revolutionary’ discourse in which a despised ‘modernism’ clashed with an undisguised ruralism.

The rural-industrial cleavage was common to both fascist movements. Despite the attempt by both movements to appeal to the proletariat and the urban middle classes, ruralism remained an important ideological component. In Portugal this was visible in Preto’s speeches, and in Spain it was apparent in “the image of the small rural landowner” and the peasantry, a class “free from political disputes” and thus the “carrier of the ‘essence of the nation’”.²⁷ They projected a mythical image of a society of small-scale producers that would inspire the proletariat to integrate with the ‘national community’ through a corporatist system.

Religion was a more complex issue. Catholic traditionalism was important in both movements. They differed, however, due to the existence of other political parties closer to the catholics. The existence of parties and organisations inspired by social catholicism constituted powerful barriers to fascist political activity in Portugal and Spain.²⁸ Furthermore, their ‘anti-bourgeois’ and ‘anti-conservative’ radicalism reflected a predominantly secular urban social reality. The Fascists were conscious that large segments of society “were already secularised and that efforts at national integration, particularly of the labouring classes, on a religious basis would be impossible”.²⁹

²⁵ Tusell, J., *La dictadura de Franco*, (Madrid: 1988), pp. 287-289; Payne, S., *op. cit.*, pp. 135-240.

²⁶ As Primo de Rivera wrote to the Portuguese journalist Oscar Paxeco. See: Jiménez Campo, J., *El fascismo en la crisis de la II República*, (Madrid: 1979), pp. 53-154.

²⁷ Jiménez Campo, J., *op. cit.*, pp. 149-150.

²⁸ Montero, J. R., *La CEDA: el catolicismo social y político en la II República*, 2 vols., (Madrid: 1977).

²⁹ Linz, J. J., ‘Some notes toward...’ *op. cit.*, p. 19.

The two parties were also similar organisationally and sociologically.³⁰ Both were small movements that never became mass parties. Both were based on the support of students and intellectuals and did not move beyond urban middle-class circles. The adherence of workers to NS was a result of the clandestine situation of left-wing parties, as well as the capacity of NS to mobilise workers unattached to independent unions. In Spain, right-wing organisations that competed with the Falange were more successful in this arena under the Second Republic, although their following was reduced.³¹

The Portuguese movement had more Army officers than the Spanish Falange. The Spanish fascists and other right wing forces appealed for military intervention, but had much less influence on the military than their Portuguese counterparts. Spain's neutrality during the First World War, as well as the Primo de Rivera dictatorship partly explain this difference; both helped to prevent the emergence of significant breaches within the military, making it more difficult for fascists to penetrate junior officer ranks.³² By contrast, in Portugal the Army had been divided and politicised, such that civilian radical right-wing organisations had a greater influence over the military. It is possible to say that the 1936 coup in Spain was more praetorian than the intervention leading to the 1926 Coup in Portugal. As Ricardo Chueca notes about the military rebellion that led to the Spanish Civil War: "of the many interpretations ventured, one thing is certain: there was a genuine and strict military *pronunciamiento*".³³

NS was closer to the JONS led by Ledesma Ramos than to Primo de Rivera, at least in its final years. After the split in the movement, the group that remained with Preto emphasised their

³⁰ The only attempt to compare the social bases of the two Iberian fascist movements is M. Blinkhorn, 'The Iberian states', in Mühlberger, (ed), *op. cit.*, (London: 1987), pp. 320-348.

³¹ Montero, J. R., *op. cit.*, pp. 747-779.

³² Linz, J. J., *Fascism, Breakdown of Democracy, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes: Coincidences and Distinctions*, mimeo, 1986.

³³ Chueca, R., *op. cit.*, (Madrid: 1983), p. 140.

differences with traditional reactionary positions and moved closer to a “Social Fascism” that distanced it from the Falange.

It was only during his Spanish exile, that Preto met the leader of the Spanish fascists. According to Preto, José Antonio was working on the Falange programme, which appeared to him to make many of the “concessions to capitalism” that had already brought Portugal “within sight of revolt”.³⁴ During the Civil War, the small Falange was brought into a new party under Francoist control. Preto expressed his lack of confidence in their ability to decisively influence the new regime. Shortly before Franco’s victory, Preto noted that “if the Falange manage to defeat the resistance of certain reactionary sectors, as I hope, it will have to undertake the great task of the National Syndicalist Revolution”.³⁵ The outbreak of the Spanish Civil War led Preto to declare a political truce with Salazar and to unconditionally support the nationalist front. He met Franco in Salamanca, and was not impressed. In 1937, Preto spoke as NS leader on Radio Seville, leading Salazar and the Portuguese government to successfully appeal to Francoist authorities to prohibit “any propaganda” by the National Syndicalists.³⁶

After his return to Portugal, NS contacts with FET-JONS were sporadic. According to internal reports, Preto’s delegates maintained regular contact with the Galician Fascists. During the Civil War, one of these delegations visited the offices of the Galician People (*Pueblo Galego*). The director of this newspaper, Jesus Suevos, was a member of the old JONS (by this time a part of FET y de las JONS) and agreed with Preto.³⁷ These contacts were marginal and of little significance, however, and were stifled by co-operation between Salazarist and the Nationalist authorities when FET-JONS was incorporated into Spain’s single party.

³⁴ Medina, J., *op. cit.*, p. 171.

³⁵ Barbosa, J. P. M., *op. cit.*, p. 184.

³⁶ AOS/CO/PC-3F, ANTT.

³⁷ Letter from José Francisco da Silva to Rolão Preto, n.d., [1937?], Archive PIDE/DGS, ANTT.

National Syndicalism and Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB)

AIB was the most successful of all the Latin American fascist movements and followed a path identical to NS. After a period of growing tension with the Vargas regime, it was forced to disband³⁸. Following several failed attempts to bring down the dictator, AIB leaders were sent into exile, some to Italy, and others, their leader Plínio Salgado among them, to Portugal.³⁹

The transition from oligarchic liberalism to democracy, and the overthrow of liberalism in 1930s Brazil cannot be analysed here, but the process led the fascists to develop a political discourse and mobilisation strategy was very similar to that of the Portuguese organisation.⁴⁰ AIB was the product of the unification of several fascist groups created at the beginning of the 1930s. The cultural influence of IL had been important for Brazilian monarchist movements like Brazilian Imperial National Renovation Action (*Acção Imperial Patrionovista Brasileira*, AIPB) created in 1928 and Portuguese authoritarian literature had some impact in Brazil from the 1920s onwards. Plínio Salgado was closely influenced by Portuguese Integralism.⁴¹ This is obvious in his constant references to their theorists, particularly Hipólito Raposo and Rolão Preto. Although National Socialism and republicanism influenced Brazilian leaders such as Gustavo Barroso, Salgado was a catholic and identified more with the traditionalist and spiritual corporatism of IL. Indeed, social catholicism had an important influence on AIB

³⁸ See: Deutsch, S. M., *Las Derechas. The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939*, (Stanford: 1999); Trindade, H., 'Integralismo: Teoria e prática política nos anos 30' in: *História geral da civilização brasileira*. Vol. III *Brazil republicano*, (São Paulo: 1981), pp. 297-335.

³⁹ Salgado, P., *Minha segunda prisão e meu exílio*, (São Paulo: 1980).

⁴⁰ On the evolution of the Brazilian political system during the first half of the 20th century see: Trindade, H., 'Bases da democracia brasileira: lógica liberal e prática autoritária (1822-1945)' in: Rouquie, A., Lamounier, B., and Schvarzer, J. (eds), *Como renascer as democracias*, (São Paulo: 1985), pp. 46-72. For an introduction to the formation of the Vargas regime, see: Levine, R., *The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-1938*, (New York: 1970).

⁴¹ Trindade, H., *op. cit.*, p. 251.

élites in contrast with National Syndicalism, whose élite was more secular.

Like other fascist movements, AIB sought to create an original nationalist programme. However, its 'Integral State' was very similar to the 'National Syndicalist State' proposed by Portuguese fascists. Integralist and National Syndicalist theories of corporatism significantly influenced the Brazilian fascists. Salgado in particular synthesised Italian thought with António Sardinha's corporatism. AIB's political programme regarding 'municipal autonomy', for example, was lifted straight out of Integralist theory and adapted to Brazilian reality.⁴²

The Nature of Portuguese Fascism

The fascists were divided and merely junior partners in the large coalition that brought down Portuguese liberalism. They represented a minority among the groups most affected by radical republicanism. The independent organisations founded during the 1920s were not strong, merely a few among the many groups appealing for a military coup. NS was only a small and lately formed part of the fascist current within the vast anti-liberal coalition that sustained the Military Dictatorship. It was deeply influenced by the cultural forces shaping Integralism. NS was programmatically committed to an ideology of reaction against modernisation. It evolved in an authoritarian political context in which its main enemies already lacked a wide margin for manoeuvre. The Portuguese fascists were a by-product of the institutionalisation of the Military Dictatorship. They gained strength because they were able to mobilise and garner the support of junior officers at a time when the republican parties were suspended and the dictatorship hesitated over the creation of new institutions.

The fascist élite originated with the radical right, emerging from a youthful group that challenged the reactionary traditionalism and pro-restoration dogma of IL. The emergence of this fascist

⁴² *Ibid.*

élite under an authoritarian political order allowed them to use IL provincial network as well as those of other fascist parties created at the end of the 1920s.

Socially, NS had two particularly notable characteristics. First, its influence among young army officers and, second, a high number of working class members. The support of a significant number of junior officers gave NS the capacity to mobilise the actors who had played a central role in bringing down the Republic in the 1920s, particularly during the unstable years of the Military Dictatorship. NS upset the chain of command, as lower ranking officers took up government and local administration posts, and the top brass found it very difficult to restore the hierarchy the first years of the dictatorship.

The fascists organised themselves as a political party, which claimed to be the faithful repository of the spirit of the 'revolution of 28 May'. They supported military values and a radical turnover in the conservative political élite to allow for the rise of the young civilians and military officers who had participated in the 1926 coup. The fascists exalted the '*tenentismo*' of the 28 May League for some years, as it expressed resistance to stabilisation and the concomitant re-establishment of the chain of command.

The high number of working class supporters should be assessed in context, as it is not indicative of a particularly significant fascist 'working class' success or of a fascist alternative within the union movement. The fascist movement developed under a dictatorial regime that severely limited the scope of action of free unions. The movement aimed to create an embryo corporatist system while remaining flexible in terms of its ability to mobilise and form support groups in the unions of the service sector in particular, which later became a part of Salazar's corporatist 'national unions'.

The fascist strategy, however, was overtaken by the 'constitutional pacts' between the military élite and Salazar, which joined conservative groups within the UN, and put down fascist groups through violent and administrative repression. The conflict between the fascists and other authoritarian pressure groups that dominated Salazarism were expressive of a conflict that its typical

of the majority of transitions to authoritarianism undertaken in the presence of weak fascist movements.⁴³ Its rapid resolution in favour of Salazarism and the concomitant defeat of the recalcitrant fascists can be summarily explained as follows.

Since 1910, there had been competing political movements and ideologies able to work with the military chiefs of the dictatorship, which did not threaten the position and values of the military. Juan Linz points out that even if its younger members sympathised with the fascists, in a transition to authoritarian rule the military tends to seek out bureaucratic élites and conservative parties rather than fascists.⁴⁴ This was certainly the case with the Military Dictatorship established in 1926.

The 'constitutionalisation' and gradual civilianisation of the dictatorship was negotiated according to a government initiative involving part of the civilian élite, mostly law professors, led by the then young Finance Minister, António de Oliveira Salazar. The fascists had a 'negligible influence' over these processes, as they were blocked by the existence of an authoritarian right, which was supported by powerful institutions such as the Church, most military officers, as well as landowning and industrial groups.

The Spanish fascists were numerically and sociologically comparable to their Portuguese counterparts. In Spain, however, the military coup led to a prolonged civil war, which permitted the fascists to leave a strong mark on the Franco regime. By contrast, in Portugal the military coup led to the establishment of a 'preventative' dictatorship under which the fascists only had scope for action when there were crises over the creation of institutions. Further, there were no other domestic and foreign factors that came to the aid of the fascists in Portugal.

In other cases, external factors have been significant. In Vichy France, for example, and some Eastern and Northern European countries, the outbreak of the Second World War influenced many right-wing dictators not to eliminate or swiftly dissolve native fas-

⁴³ Griffin, R., *op. cit.*, pp. 116-145.

⁴⁴ Linz, J. J., *op. cit.*, p. 71.

cist movements. In countries where democracy survived, as in Belgium, Norway, and Denmark, the fascist movements were negligible phenomena right up until the eve of the German occupation. By contrast, in Portugal, as in Brazil, international variables did not shape what was a spontaneous decision by governing elites to eliminate contending native fascist movements.

Some inter-war dictatorships used the fascists for propaganda purposes.⁴⁵ In Portugal, however, the 'integration' of fascists into the Salazar regime was timid due to the bureaucratic prudence of the New State élite, which placed former fascists in secondary regime institutions. Consequently, the fascists influenced neither the configuration of the political élite, nor the main institutions of Salazarism.

Those who resisted incorporation got involved in the 1935 coup and gradually evolved towards a 'social' and 'left-wing' fascism, which led some, albeit only a small number, to become oppositionists to the Salazar regime after 1945. The majority became New State converts, however, particularly in the wake of the Spanish Civil War. By 1939, the Salazar regime was consolidated, replacing the unstable Military Dictatorship.

The most important genetic characteristic of the New State is that it was born out of a military intervention. For many years, the President of the Republic was the guarantor of the interests of the Armed Forces. The party of the New State was weak, non-mobilising, serving only as a complement to the bureaucratic-administrative machine. The state apparatus was only de-militarised very slowly, as evidenced by Salazar's prudence in removing officers who exercised political functions. Some of these officers were sent to the single party. Others worked in government services, such as the censorship board, which retained a strong military presence, or the political police, which was led by army officers. When Salazar permitted the creation of a militia in 1936, its leaders and top echelons were always army officers.

The New State meant the hegemony of a traditionalist, catholic, and anti-democratic right. Social catholicism and the

⁴⁵ Linz, J. J., *op. cit.*, p. 71.

Church hierarchy constituted important instruments limiting the fascistisation of the Salazar regime. In other words, these elements constituted the axis of a 'functional alternative' to the role that fascism played in other countries in consolidating a new authoritarian order in the 1930s.

Clearly, the New State, like most other dictatorships of the time, imported ideas and institutions from the two existing fascist models. Parts of the corporatist legislation, the propaganda apparatus, the Legion and the youth organisation were based on the fascist example. But they were swiftly abandoned when the Spanish Civil War ended.

A Variant of European Fascism

Some studies have identified NS as sharing strong ideological traits with a so-called "Latin fascism". Although not particularly apt, this expression reflects the attempt to identify cultural traits common to what were sometimes very different inter-war fascist movements in the Iberian Peninsula, France, Belgium and Latin America. It is useful nonetheless to highlight some NS traits and compare it with other contemporary fascist movements. Those who argue in favour of the concept of 'generic fascism' agree upon the existence of two variants. The National Socialist model, whose influence was greatest within the fascist movements in Northern and Central Europe, and the Italian model that, along with AF, was the one favoured by fascist movements in western and southern Europe. This does not mean that NS, the Spanish Falange, *Le Faisceau*, or even Belgian Rexism were not affected by the rise of Nazism, particularly its organisation, ideology and 'social' aspects. Nonetheless, other more durable cultural influences characterised the majority of fascist movements in countries where a strong authoritarian right conditioned fascist political activity.

The association of fascist movements with groups and ideologies that reacted against modernisation during the first half of the twentieth century was not always easy. Almost all claimed to have a 'revolutionary myth,' distinguished themselves from traditional

reactionaries and advocated anti-bourgeois and anti-capitalist 'social' strategies. Nonetheless, their cultural origins and political practices did not transcend traditional left-right political dichotomies⁴⁶.

Without actually discussing the validity of theories of modernisation, it is important to acknowledge that movements like NS were very marked by Latin reactionary politics. Radical right-wing movements in Portugal and Spain identified with restorationism, integral corporatism and traditional catholicism. In each of these countries, movements inspired by these principles formed the basis of national fascism and were fascistised to varying degrees. AF in France, and AE, Spanish Renewal (*Renovación Española*, RE), Popular Action (*Acción Popular*), as well as the Carlists in Spain were organisationally more significant than IL and the PCC in Portugal. They all emerged in conjunction with the rise of 'mass politics', which Portugal experienced only on a much smaller scale.⁴⁷ From this perspective, the movement that most closely resembled NS was Georges Valois's *Faisceaux*.

More so than in other countries, in Portugal the emergence of fascist movements were created by radical right-wing dissidents, mainly the younger élites who were disillusioned by the inability of older leaders to adapt to the post-war situation. These old élites proved to be prisoners of an elitist reaction and could not adapt to mass politics and accept the mobilisation of urban industrial workers in particular. As noted by Payne "the historical importance of fascism has tended to obscure what were two important new authoritarian anti-leftist forces in inter war Europe: radical fascism proper and what, for lack of a better definition, may be called the 'new right' (or modern, 20th century authoritarian right)".⁴⁸ Tensions between fascists and Integralists were not as exacerbated as

⁴⁶ Paxton, R. O., "The Five Stages of Fascism", *The Journal of Modern History*, 70 (March 1998), pp. 1-23.

⁴⁷ On Carlism see: Blinkhorn, M., *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939*, (Cambridge: 1975).

⁴⁸ Payne, S. G., 'Introduction,' in: Larsen, S.U. et. al. (eds), *op. cit.*, p. 421. See also, Levy, C., "Fascism, National Socialism and Conservatives in Europe, 1914-1945", *Contemporary European History*, 8, 1999, pp. 97-126.

those between AF and the French fascist movements, but this was only because Integralism never became a political party and had collapsed by the end of the 1920s.

These fascist movements were thus born on the margins of the radical right. They represented a generation's revolt against the right's inability to confront the fundamental problems posed by the new urban and industrial centres of Western Europe and the galvanising threat of communism. Valois's criticism of AF anticipated many of the writings of the young Iberian fascists, from Ledesma Ramos and José António Primo de Rivera to Rolão Preto at the beginning of the 1930s.⁴⁹ Nationalism and integral corporatism were integrated into a 'modern' context, secularised and even 'proletarianised'. These movements supported a 'Totalitarian State' that could integrate a national community divided and polarised by democracy and communism. The populist strategy, the primacy of 'workers,' para-military ideology and symbolism and the agitation of the masses all distinguished them from those who had originally inspired them, leading to the birth of new fascist centres. Different levels of economic and social development notwithstanding, in countries like Spain, and Portugal, fascism was from the outset an urban youth movement that emerged as a 'revolutionary' response to a left-wing threat.

Operating in the presence of a strong radical right, movements like the Portuguese and Spanish National Syndicalists radicalised the 'social' and 'popular' dimensions and distinguished themselves from the right less by ideological principles and more by their political practice. By contrast, in Belgium traditionalist integralist Catholic elements co-existed with the ideal of a popular decentralised monarchy. Leon Degrelle's Rexism was an example of a movement with the same origins although balanced by catholicism.⁵⁰ Like Preto, Degrelle shared similar cultural influences and was doubly affected by the French radical right and Italian Fascism.

⁴⁹ In addition to the works already cited, see: Sternhell, Z., *Ni droite ni gauche: l'idéologie fasciste en France*, (Paris: 1983).

⁵⁰ Schepens, L., 'Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium, 1919-1940' in: Larsen, S.U. et. al (eds), *op. cit.*, pp. 512-513.

It was only after the occupation that the Rexists proceeded with 'nazification' like other movements in 'German Europe'.⁵¹

The political culture within which fascist movements developed in Spain and Portugal did not lead to the elaboration of original theories of government. Mussolini's dictatorship was the regime model for the Latin cultural universe in the 1930s. It was a mobilising regime seeking mass support and supposedly capable of eliminating class war. It introduced 'syndicalist corporatism' and was able to 'nationalise' the working classes, combining the values of a traditional 'Latin imperialism' with the mystique of modernity. Mussolini's fascism, rather than National Socialism, was National Syndicalism's most important international reference, despite its different origins.

⁵¹ On Dagrelle's political and intellectual development, see Chertok, R.H., *Belgian Fascism*, unpublished dissertation, Washington University, 1972. On the evolution of Rexism during the war, see: Conway, M., *Collaboration in Belgium: Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement*, (New Haven and London: 1993).

Sources and Bibliography

PRIMARY SOURCES

PRIVATE ARCHIVES

Rolão Preto Archive, Lisbon

Political correspondence (1916-1945), internal circulars and other documents referring to National Syndicalism.

Augusto Pires de Lima Archive, Oporto

Political correspondence (1929-35), internal circulars and other documents referring to National Syndicalism.

PUBLIC ARCHIVES

Arquivo Nacional da Torre do Tombo, Lisbon

PIDE/DGS Archive

Criminal Processes n° 23/A/29, 203/38, 291/36, 596/36, 1112/SPS, 1113/SPS, 1174/SPS, 1184/SPS, 1472/36, 1594, 1646/SPS, 1726/35, 1750/SPS, 1771/SPS, 1772/36, 1794/36, 2051/SPS, 2166/35, 2772/SPS, 3387/SPS, 4401/SPS.

Processes 167/933/PIP, 22/45/SR, 36/49/SR, 51/45/SR, 51/SIR/45, 399/SR, 1173/48/SR, 1788/73/SR, 2330/65/SR, 5399/SR, 7265/SR, 921-SS, 1089-SS.

Notebooks n° 2284/SS, 2488, 4935, 4936, 5022, 5760, 5761, 7843, 8070, 8071, 8555.

Interior Ministry Archive

Bundles, 425, 451, 452, 454, 455, 460, 461, 462, 463, 465, 466, 467, 468, 469, 470.

Oliveira Salazar Archive

CO/PC-3A, CO/PC-3F, CO/PC-3H, CO/PC-3J, CO/PC-IN, CO/PC-2C, CO/PC-12D, CP-042, CP-183, CP-262.

National Library, Lisbon

António Pedro Folios
V-9, V-CR/146-148.

OTHER ARCHIVES

Public Record Office, London

Reports on Portugal (1932-35).

Archivio Centrale dello Stato, Rome

Miniculpop, Busta 404.

Arquivo do Tribunal Militar Especial, Lisbon

Processes 104/1933, 177/35, 164/36.

INTERVIEWS

Alberto Mota Capitão, Lisbon, November 28 1984.

Vasco da Gama Fernandes, Lisbon, February 5 1986.

Carlos Proença de Figueiredo, Lisbon, July 20 1984.

Barradas d'Oliveira, Lisbon, July 17 and 23 1984.

Fernando Piteira Santos, Lisbon, December 22 1984.

Luis Forjaz Trigueiros, Lisbon, November 29 1984 and January 10 1985.

NEWSPAPERS

NS Newspapers

Alcácer, Alcácer do Sal, 1932-33.

Manuelinho d'Évora, O, Évora, 1932.

Nacional Sindicalista, O, Faro, 1932-33.

Nacionalista, O, Lamego, 1933.

Ordem Nova, Anadia, 1932-33.

Propaganda e Defesa, Portalegre, S. D.

Reacção, Águeda, 1932-33.

Ressurgimento, Funchal, 1933.

Revelação, Lisbon, 1935.

Revolução, Lisbon, 1932-33.

Revolução Nacional, Lisbon, 1934.

União Nacional, Leiria, 1932-36.

Tradição, Vila da Feira, 1932-33.

Tribuna, Luanda, 1933.

Press Sympathetic to NS

Alto Concelho de Alenquer, O, Alenquer, 1932.

Fradique, Lisbon, 1934-35.

- Justiça, A, Marco de Canavezes, 1932.
Notícias de Barcelos, Barcelos, 1932-33.
Povo da Lousã, Lousã, 1932-34.
Verdade, Alenquer, 1932-33.

BOOKS

Works of Rolão Preto and Other NS Leaders

- Barbosa, J. P. Machado, *Para Além da Revolução... A Revolução. Entrevistas com Rolão Preto*, (Porto: 1940).
 Belonor, Eugénio de, *Revolução Social*, (Porto: 1933).
 Costa, A. Neves da, *Para Além da Ditadura-Soluções Corporativas*, (Lisbon: 1933).
 Domingues, José Domingos Garcia, *O Pensamento Alemão*, (Lisbon: 1942).
 Faria, Dutra, *Carta ao Director do Diário da Manhã*, (Lisbon: 1933).
 ———, *Roda do Tempo-crónicas*, (Lisbon: 1936).
 ———, *Diário de um Intelectual Comunista*, (Lisbon: 1936).
 Fernandes, António de Castro, *O Corporativismo Fascista*, (Lisbon: 1938).
 Ferreira, Jacinto, *Ao Serviço da Pátria e do Rei. Memórias políticas (1926-1974)*, (Lisbon: 1991).
 Ferreira, Marino S., *Da Vida Agrária*, (Leiria: 1933).
 Frias, Eduardo, *1000 Pensamentos de Adolfo Hitler*, (Lisbon: 1942).
 Liga Nacional 28 de Maio, *Cartilha de Iniciação Político-social*, (Leiria: 1931).
 Lima, A. Pires de, *Revolução*, (Porto: 1933).
 Moncada, Luís Cabral de, *Memórias ao Longo de uma Vida. Pessoas, factos, ideias*, (Lisbon: 1992).
 Monsaraz, Alberto de, *Cartilha Monárquica*, (Lisbon: 1916).
 ———, *A Verdade Monárquica*, (Lisbon: S. D.).
 Pedro, António, *Esboço para uma Revisão de Valores*, (Lisbon: 1932).
 Preto, Rolão, *A Monarquia é a Restauração da Inteligência*, (Lisbon: 1920).
 ———, *Para Além do Comunismo*, (Coimbra: 1932).
 ———, *Salazar e a sua Época*, (Lisbon: 1933).
 ———, *Balizas. Manual do Sindicalismo Orgânico*, (Lisbon: S. D.).
 ———, *Carta aos Comunistas*, (Lisbon: S. D.).
 ———, *Nacional Sindicalismo*, (Lisbon: S. D.).
 ———, *Orgânica do Movimento Nacional Sindicalista*, (Lisbon: 1933).
 ———, “El Movimiento Nacional-Sindicalista Português”, *Acción Española*, Madrid, N° 34, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, Octubre 1933-Abril 1934.
 ———, *Revolução Espanhola*, (Lisbon: S. D.).
 ———, *Justiça*, (Lisbon: 1936).
 ———, *O Fascismo*, (Guimarães: 1939).
 ———, *Em Frente! Discurso pronunciado pelo Dr. Rolão Preto no banquete dos intelectuais nacionalistas*, (Castelo Branco: 1942).

- _____, *Para Além da Guerra*, (Lisbon: 1942).
 _____, *A Traição Burguesa*, (Lisbon: 1945).
 _____, *Inquietação*, (Lisbon: 1963).
 Tinoco, António, *A Revolução Nacional dos Trabalhadores*, (Lisbon: 1933).

SECONDARY SOURCES

NEWSPAPERS *

- Acção*, Lisbon, 1936-38.
Acção Nacional, Lisbon, 1931.
Avante!, Lisbon, 1932-33.
Bandeira, A, Lisbon, 1928.
Batalha, A, Lisbon, 1923.
Boletim do INTP, Lisbon, 1934-35.
Comércio do Porto, Porto, 1932-34.
Cruzada Nacional, Lisbon, 1924.
Cruzada Nacional Nun' Alvares, 1922.
Diário da Manhã, Lisbon, 1931-35 and 1969.
Diário de Notícias, Lisbon, 1932-35.
Ditadura, A, Lisbon, 1923-25.
Época, Lisbon, 1922.
Elétrico, O, Lisbon, 1933.
Esfera, A, Lisbon, 1942-45.
Força, A, Lisbon, 1923.
Frente Vermelha, 1933.
Ideia Livre, A, Anadia, 1932-33.
Imparcial, O, Lisbon, 1923.
Independência de Águeda, Águeda, 1932-34.
Integralismo Lusitano-Estudos Portugueses, Lisbon, 1932.
Jornal de Notícias, Porto, 1932-35.
Jovem, O, Lisbon, 1933.
Monarquia, A, Lisbon, 1917-23.
Nação Portuguesa, Lisbon, 1922-25.
Novidades, Lisbon, 1932-34.
Ordem, A, Porto, 1932-33.
Palavra, A, Porto, 1927-28.
Política, Lisbon, 1929-30.
Portugal, Lisbon, 1923.
Reconquista, A, Lisbon, 1926.

* Dates refer to the years consulted.

Renovação, Porto, 1930.
 República Social, Porto, 1932-34.
 Revista Portuguesa, 1936-1940.
 Revolução, Lisbon, 1922-23.
 Revolução Nacional, Lisbon, 1926.
 Século, O, Lisbon, 1932-33.
 Rua, A, Lisbon, 1979.
 Unidade, Lisbon, 1933.
 Vida Mundial, Lisbon, 1947.
 Voz, A, Lisbon, 1928-31.

BOOKS

- Antunes, José Freire, (Org.), *Salazar e Caetano. Cartas secretas, 1932-1968*, (Lisbon: 1993).
- Ascensão, Leão Ramos, *O Integralismo Lusitano*, (Lisbon: 1943).
- Braga, Luis Almeida, *Sob Pendão Real*, (Lisbon: 1942).
- Bretes, Faustino, *Ideias do Integralismo*, (Lisbon: 1932).
- Caetano, Marcelo, *Minhas Memórias de Salazar*, (Lisbon: 1977).
- Campos, Fernando, *A Genealogia do Pensamento Nacionalista*, (Lisbon: 1931).
- Castro, João de, *A Revolução Nacionalista*, (Lisbon: 1922).
- , *Rainha Santa-elegia*, (Lisbon: 1923).
- Cértima, António de, *Epopeia Maldita*, (Lisbon: 1924).
- , *Legenda Dolorosa do Soldado Desconhecido em Africa*, (Lisbon: 1925).
- Cruz, Visconde de Porto da, *Paixão e Morte de Sidónio*, (Funchal: 1928).
- Fernandes, Vasco da Gama, *Depoimento Inacabado. Memórias*, (Lisbon: 1975).
- Ferrão, Carlos, *O Integralismo. Autópsia de um mito*, (Lisbon: 1964-1965).
- Ferro, António, *Obras, I - Intervenção Modernista*, (Lisbon: 1987).
- , *Salazar. O Homem e a Obra*, (Lisbon: 1933).
- Filho, Homem Cristo, *Mussolini Batisseur d'Avenir. Harangue aux foules latines*, (Paris: 1923).
- Gonçalves, Assis, *Relatórios para Oliveira Salazar (1931-1939)*, (Lisbon: 1981).
- Integralismo Lusitano, *Instruções de Organização aprovadas pela Junta Central*, (Lisbon: 1921).
- Lupi, Luis C., *Memórias. Diário de um inconformista (1938 a 1945)*, (Lisbon: 1972).
- Manoilescu, Mihael, *Le Parti Unique. Institution Politique des Régimes Nouveaux*, (Paris: 1936).
- Nogueira, Franco, *Salazar, Vol. II - Os Tempos Aureos, (1928-1936)*, (Lisbon: 1977).
- Pereira, Pedro Teotónio, *Correspondência para Oliveira Salazar, Vol. I*, (Lisbon: 1987).
- , *Memórias, Vol. 1, 2ª edição*, (Lisbon: 1973).

- Peres, Damião, *História de Portugal - suplemento*, (Lisbon: 1954).
- Ramos, Ramiro Ledesma, *Escritos Politicos, 1933-1934*, (Madrid: 1985).
- _____, *Fascismo en España? La Patria Libre. Nuestra Revolucion*, (Madrid: 1988).
- Raposo, Hipólito, *Dois Nacionalismos*, (Lisbon: 1929).
- _____, *Folhas do meu Cadastro*, (Lisbon: 1945).
- _____, *Folhas do meu Cadastro. Vol. II (1926-1952)*, (Lisbon: 1986).
- Rebello, José Pequito, *Pela Dedução à Monarquia*, (Lisbon: 1945).
- Rocha, Pedro, *Escrito com Paixão*, (Lisbon: 1991).
- Salazar, Oliveira, *Discursos*, Vol. I, (Coimbra: 1935).
- _____, *Discursos e Notas Políticas*, Vol. II, (Coimbra: 1945).
- _____, *Inéditos e Dispersos*, 2 Vols., (Org. de) Manuel Braga da Cruz, (Lisbon: 1997-1998).
- Salgado, Plínio, *Minha Segunda Prisão e meu Exílio*, (São Paulo: 1980).
- Sardinha, António, *O Valor da Raça*, (Lisbon: 1915).
- _____, *Ao Princípio era o Verbo*, (Lisbon: 1924).
- _____, *Ao Ritmo da Ampulheta*, (Lisbon: 1925).
- _____, *Processo dum Rei*, (Porto: 1937).
- Valois, George, *La Monarchie et la Classe Ouvrière*, (Paris: 1914).
- Varzim, Abel, *Catolicismo e Nacional Sindicalismo*, (Lisbon: 1933).
- Vilaça, Alberto, *Para a história remota do PCP em Coimbra, 1921-1946*, (Lisbon: 1997).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

- AA. VV., *Historikerstreit*, (München: 1987).
- AA. VV., *O Fascismo em Portugal*, (Lisbon: 1982).
- AA. VV., *Dicionário de Literatura*, (Porto: 1976).
- AA. VV., *Salazar e o Salazarismo*, (Lisbon: 1989).
- AA. VV., *O Estado Novo - Das origens ao fim da autarcia, 1926-1959*, 2 Vols., (Lisbon: 1987).
- AA. VV., *Portugal na Segunda Guerra Mundial. Contributos para uma reavaliação*, (Lisbon: 1989).
- Abse, Tobias, "Varieties of Fascism", *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 28(4), 1998, pp. 551-560.
- Almeida, Pedro Tavares de, *Eleições e Caciquismo no Portugal Oitocentista (1868-1890)*, (Lisbon: 1991).
- Aquarone, Alberto, *L'Organizzazione dello Stato Totalitario*, (Torino: 1965).

- Ayçoberry, Pierre, *La Question Nazi. Les interprétations du National Socialisme. 1922-1975*, (Paris: 1979).
- Azéma, Jean-Pierre et Bédarida, François, (Sous la direction de), *Vichy et les Français*, (Paris: 1992).
- Barreira, Cecília, "Sindicalismo e integralismo: o jornal "A Revolução" (1922-23)", *Análise Social*, vol. XVII (67-68), 1981, pp. 827-838.
- , *Nacionalismo e Modernismo. De Homem Cristo Filho a Almada Negreiros*, (Lisbon: 1981).
- Barros, J. L. de, 'Anglofilia e Germanofilia em Portugal durante a Segunda Guerra Mundial' in Various Authors, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra Mundial: contributos para uma reavaliação*, (Lisbon: 1989), pp. 98-110.
- Baruch, Marc Olivier, *Servir L'État français. L'administration en France de 1940 à 1944*, (Paris: 1997).
- Batkay, W. M., *Authoritarian Politics in a Transitional State. Istvan Bethlen and the Unified Party in Hungary, 1919-1926*, (New York: 1982).
- Beetham, David, *Marxists in Face of Fascism*, (Manchester: 1983).
- Ben-Ami, Shlomo, *Fascism from above: The Dictatorship of Primo de Rivera in Spain, 1923-1930*, (Oxford: 1983).
- Berend, I. V., *Decades of Crisis. Central and Eastern Europe before world war II*, (Berkeley: 1998).
- Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, and Mitchell, Jeremy (Edited by), *The Conditions of Democracy in Europe, 1919-1939*, (London: 2000).
- Blinkhorn, Martin, *Carlism and Crisis in Spain, 1931-1939*, (Cambridge: 1975).
- , "The Iberian States", Detlef Mühlberger (edited by), *The Social Bases of European Fascist Movements*, (London: 1987), pp. 320-348.
- , (Edited by), *Fascists and the Conservatives*, (London: 1990).
- Borejsza, Jerzy W., *Il Fascismo e L'Europa Orientale. Dalla propaganda all'aggressione*, (Roma-Bari: 1981).
- Botz, Gerhard, *Krisenzonen einer Demokratie. Gewalt, Streit und Konfliktunterdrückung in Österreich seit 1918*, (Frankfurt: 1987).
- , "Fascismo e Autoritarismo in Austria. Heimwehr, nationalsocialismo e 'austrofascismo'", Roberto Cazzola e Gian Enrico Rusconi (A cura di), *Il "Caso Austria". Dall' "Anschluss" all'era Waldheim*, (Torino: 1988), p. 24-50.
- Bourderon, Roger, *Le Fascisme. Idéologie et pratiques. Essai d'analyse comparée*, (Paris: 1979).
- Bracher, Karl Dietrich, *The German Dictatorship*, (Harmondswoth: 1978).
- , e Valani, Leo, (A cura di), *Fascismo e Nacional Socialismo*, (Bologna: 1986).
- Brooker, Paul, *The Faces of Fraternalism. Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, and Imperial Japan*, (Oxford: 1991).
- , *Twentieth-Century Dictatorships. The Ideological One-Party States*, (New York: 1995).
- Brunet, Jean-Paul, *Jacques Doriot. Du Communisme au Fascisme*, (Paris: 1986).

- Brustein, William, *The Logic of Evil. The Social Origins of the Nazi Party, 1925-1933*, (New Haven: 1996).
- , and Berntson Marit, "Interwar Fascist Popularity in Europe and the Default of the Left", *European Sociological Review*, Vol. 15, Nº 2, pp. 159-178.
- Buchanan, Tom, and Martin Conway, (Edited by), *Political Catholicism in Europe, 1918-1965*, (Oxford: 1996).
- Burrin, Philippe, 'Le fascisme: la révolution sans révolutionnaires', *Le Débat*, 38, January-March 1986, p. 164-176.
- , *La Dérive Fasciste. Doriot, Déat, Bergery, 1933-1945*, (Paris: 1986).
- , "Politique et Société: Les structures du pouvoir dans L'Italie Fasciste et L'Allemagne Nazie", *Annales ESC*, May-June 1988, nº 3, pp. 615-637.
- Cabral, Manuel Villaverde, "The Aesthetics of Nationalism: Modernism and Authoritarianism in Early Twentieth-Century Portugal", *Luso Brazilian Review*, Vol. XXVI, 1, 1989, pp. 15-43.
- Caldeira, Arlindo Manuel, "O partido de Salazar: antecedentes, organização e funções da União Nacional (1926-34)", *Análise Social*, vol. XXII (94), 1986, pp. 943-977.
- Campo, Javier Jiménez, *El fascismo en la crisis de la II Republica*, (Madrid: 1979).
- Carrilho, Maria, *Forças Armadas e Mudança Política em Portugal no Séc. XX. Para uma explicação sociológica do papel dos militares*, (Lisbon: 1985).
- Castanheira, José Pedro, *Os Sindicatos e o Salazarismo. História dos Bancários do Sul e Ilhas, 1919-1969*, (Lisbon: 1983).
- Cerqueira, Silas, "L'Église catholique et la dictature corporatiste portugaise", *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*, vol. XXIII, nº 3, June 1973, pp. 473-513.
- Chauí, Marilena et alli, *Ideologia e Mobilização Popular*, (Rio de Janeiro: 1978).
- Chueca, Ricardo, *El fascismo en los comienzos del régimen de Franco. Un estudio sobre la FET-JONS*, (Madrid: 1983).
- Collotti, Enzo, *Fascismo, Fascismi*, (Firenze: 1989).
- Comissão do Livro Negro sobre o Fascismo, *Presos Políticos no Regime Fascista, Vol. II - (1936-1939)*, (Lisbon: 1982).
- Conway, Martin, *Collaboration in Belgium. Léon Degrelle and the Rexist Movement*, (New Haven: 1993).
- Cronin, Mike, *The Blueshirts and Irish Politics*, (Dublin: 1997).
- Cruz, Manuel Braga da, *As Origens da Democracia Cristã e o Salazarismo*, (Lisbon: 1980).
- , *Monárquicos e Republicanos sob o Estado Novo*, (Lisbon: 1987).
- , *O Partido e o Estado no Salazarismo*, (Lisbon: 1988).
- , *O Estado Novo e a Igreja Católica*, (Lisbon: 1998).
- Cuevas, Pedro Carlos González, *Acción Española. Teología Política y Nacionalismo Autoritário en España, 1913-1936*, (Madrid: 1998).
- De Felice, Renzo, *Mussolini. Il rivoluzionario, 1883-1920*, (Torino: 1965).
- , *Intervista sul fascismo*, (A cura di) M. A. Ledeen, (Bari: 1975).

- De Grand, Alexander J., *The Italian Nationalist Association and the Rise of Fascism in Italy*, (Lincoln and London: 1978).
- De Grazia, Victoria, *The Culture of Consent: Mass organization of Leisure in Fascist Italy*, (Cambridge: 1981).
- , *How Fascism Ruled Women. Italy, 1922-1945*, (Berkeley: 1992).
- Deutsch, Sandra McGee, *Las Derechas. The Extreme Right in Argentina, Brazil, and Chile, 1890-1939*, (Stanford: 1999).
- Dobkowski, Michael N., and Wallimann, Isidor, (Edited by), *Radical Perspectives on the Rise of Fascism in Germany, 1919-1945*, (New York: 1989).
- Dobry, Michel, "Février 1934 et la découverte de l'allergie de la société française à la 'Révolution fasciste'", *Revue Française de Sociologie*, XXX, 1989, pp. 511-533.
- Douglas, Allen, *From Fascism to Libertarian Communism. Georges Valois against the Third Republic*, (Berkeley: 1992).
- Durand, Y., *Le nouvel ordre européen nazi, 1938-1945*, (Brussels: 1990).
- Duverger, Maurice, *Les Partis Politiques*, (Paris: 1957).
- Eatwell, Roger, and O'Sullivan, Noël, *The Nature of the Right*, (London: 1989).
- , "Towards a New Model of Generic Fascism", *Journal of Theoretical Politics*, 4-1^o, April 1992, pp. 1-68.
- , "On defining the 'Fascist Minimum': the centrality of ideology", *Journal of Political Ideologies* (1996), 1, pp. 303-319.
- , *Fascism. A History*, (London, 1996).
- , *Fascismo. Verso un modello generale*, (Rome: 1999).
- Eliassem, K. and Svaasand, L., "The formation of mass political organizations: an analytical framework", *Scandinavian Political Studies*, 10 (1975), pp. 90-120.
- Ellwood, Sheelagh, *Prietas las Filas. História de Falange Española, 1933-1983*, (Barcelona: 1984).
- Ferreira, José Medeiros, *O Comportamento Político dos Militares. Forças armadas e regimes políticos em Portugal no séc. XX*, (Lisbon: 1992).
- França, José Augusto, "O político e o jornalista", AA. VV., *António Pedro, 1909-1966*, (Lisbon: 1979), p. 43-45.
- Frei, Norbert, *L'État hitlérien et la Société allemande, 1933-1945*, (Paris: 1994).
- Freire, João, *Anarquistas e Operários. Ideologia, ofícios e práticas sociais: o anarquismo e o operariado em Portugal, 1900-1940*, (Porto: 1993).
- Friedrich, Carl J., and Zbigniew K. Brzezinski, *Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy*, (Cambridge: 1956).
- Gallagher, Tom, *Portugal. A twentieth-century interpretation*, (Manchester: 1983).
- Gentile, Emilio, *Le Origini dell'Ideologia Fascista*, (Bari: 1975).
- , *Il Mito dello Stato Nuovo dall'Antigiolittismo al Fascismo*, (Bari: 1982).
- , 'La natura e la storia del partito fascista nelle interpretazioni dei contemporanei e degli storici', *Storia Contemporanea*, N^o 3, June 1985, pp. 521-607.
- , *Storia del partito fascista, 1919-1922. Movimento e milizia*, (Bari: 1989).
- , *La Via Italiana al Totalitarismo*, (Roma: 1995).

- _____, *The Sacralization of Politics in Fascist Italy*, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1996).
- Gertz, René, *O Fascismo no Sul do Brazil. Germanismo, Nazismo, Integralismo*, (Porto Alegre: 1987).
- Goméz, Hipólito de la Torre, *La Relación Peninsular en la Antecámara de la Guerra Civil de España, 1931-36*, (Mérida: 1989).
- Graham, Lawrence S., "Portugal: The Bureaucracy of Empire" 1, *LADS Occasional Papers*, Series 2, Nº 9, (Austin: 1973).
- _____, "Portugal: The Decline and Collapse of an Authoritarian Order", *Contemporary Political Sociological Series*, (Beverly Hills: 1975).
- Gregor, A J., *The Young Mussolini and the Intellectual Origins of Fascism*, (Berkeley: 1979).
- _____, *The Fascist Persuasion in Radical Politics*, (Princeton: 1974).
- Griffin, Roger, *The Nature of Fascism*, (London: 1991).
- _____, (Editor), *Fascism*, (Oxford: 1995).
- Guchet, Yves, *Georges Valois. L'Action Française, Le Faisceau, La République Syndicale*, (Paris: 1990).
- Halls, W. D., *Politics, Society and Christianity in Vichy France*, (Oxford: 1995).
- Hoidal, O. K., *Quisling: a study in treason*, (Oslo: 1989).
- Huntington, Samuel P., and Clement H. Moore, (Edited by), *Authoritarian Politics in Modern Society*, (New York: 1970).
- Ioanid, Radu, *The Sword of the Archangel. Fascist ideology in Romania*, (Boulder: 1990).
- Jacobelli, Jader, (A cura di), *Il fascismo e gli storici oggi*, (Bari: 1988).
- Janes, Emanuel, *Nacionalismo e Nacionalistas na Madeira nos anos Trinta, 1928-1936*, (Funchal: 1997).
- Jennings, J. R., *Georges Sorel. The character and development of his thought*, (London: 1985).
- Karvonen, Lauri, *From white to blue-and-black. Finish fascism in the inter-war era*, (Helsinki: 1988).
- Kater, Michael H., *The Nazi Party. A Social profile of Members and Leaders, 1919-1945*, (Cambridge, Mass.: 1983).
- Kelly, David, *The Czech Fascist Movement, 1922-1942*, (New York: 1995).
- Kershaw, Irwin, *The Nazi Dictatorship. Problems of Interpretation*, (London: 1985).
- Kirk, Timothy, *Nazism and the Working Class in Austria. Industrial Unrest and Political Dissent in the National Community*, (Cambridge: 1996).
- Kitchen, Martin, *The Coming of Austrian Fascism*, (London: 1980).
- Kofas, John V., *Authoritarianism in Greece. The Metaxas Regime*, (Boulder: 1983).
- Koon, Tracy H., *Believe, Obey, Fight. Political Socialization of Youth in Fascist Italy, 1922-1943*, (Chapell Hill and London: 1985).
- Kuin, Simon, "Fascist Italy and Salazar's Portugal, 1926-1936", *Yearbook of European Studies*, 3-Italy-Europe, (Amsterdam: 1990), pp. 101-118.
- _____, "Mocidade Portuguesa nos Anos Trinta: a instauração de uma organização paramilitar de juventude", *Análise Social*, 122, 1993, pp. 555-588.

- _____, "O Braço Longo de Mussolini: os C. A. U. R. em Portugal (1933-1937)", *Penélope*, n° 11, 1993, pp. 7-20.
- Lagunas, Angela Cenarro, *Cruzados y Camisas Azules. Los orígenes del franquismo en Aragón, 1936-1945*, (Zaragoza: 1997).
- LaPalombara, Joseph and Weiner, Myron (Edited by), *Political Parties and Political Development*, (Princeton: 1966).
- Laqueur, Walter, (Edited by), *Fascism. A Reader's Guide. Analyses, Interpretations, Bibliography*, (Berkeley: 1976).
- Larsen, Stein U., *et alli* (Edited by), *Who Were the Fascists. Social Roots of European Fascism*, (Bergen: 1980).
- _____, *et alli* (Edited by), *Fascism and European Literature*, (Bern and New York: 1991).
- _____, *et alli* (Edited by), *Modern Europe after Fascism*, 2 Vols., (New York: 1998).
- _____, (Edited by), *Fascism Outside Europe*, (New York: Forthc.).
- Leal, Ernesto Castro, *António Ferro. Espaço Político e Imaginário Social, 1918-32*, (Lisbon: 1994).
- Ledeen, M. A., *Universal Fascism*, (New York: 1972).
- _____, *The First Duce. D'Annunzio at Fiume*, (Baltimore and London: 1977).
- Ledesma, Manuel Pérez, "Una Dictadura 'por la gracia de Dios'", *Historia Social*, 20, Otoño 1994, pp. 173-193.
- Léonard, Yves, *Salazarisme et Fascisme*, (Paris: 1996).
- Levine, R., *The Vargas Regime: The Critical Years, 1934-1938*, (New York: 1970).
- Levy, Carl, "Fascism, National Socialism and Conservatives in Europe, 1914-1945: Issues for Comparativists", *Contemporary European History*, 8, I (1999), pp. 97-126.
- Lewis, Paul H., "Salazar's Ministerial Elite, 1932-1968", *Journal of Politics*, 40, August 1978, pp. 622-647.
- Linz, Juan J., "An Authoritarian Regime: Spain", Erik Allardt and Stein Rokkan (Edited by), *Mass Politics. Studies in Political Sociology*, (New York: 1970), pp. 251-283.
- _____, "Totalitarian and Authoritarian Regimes", F. Greenstein and N. Polsby (Edited by), *Handbook of Political Science*, (Reading, Mass.: 1975), vol. 3, pp. 175-411.
- _____, "Some notes toward a Comparative Study of Fascism in Sociological Historical Perspective", Walter Laqueur (Edited by), *op. cit.*, (Berkeley: 1976), pp. 3-121.
- _____, and Alfred Stepan (Edited by), *The Breakdown of Democratic Regimes*, (Baltimore: 1978).
- _____, "Political Space and Fascism as a Late-Comer", Stein U. Larsen *et alli* (Edited by), *op. cit.*, pp. 153-189.
- _____, *Fascism, Breakdown of Democracy, Authoritarian and Totalitarian Regimes: Coincidences and Distinctions*, Mimeo., 1986.

- Lipset, Seymour M., *Consenso e Conflictos. Ensaios de Sociologia Política*, (Lisbon: 1992).
- Lopes, Fernando Farelo, *Poder Político e Caciquismo na I República*, (Lisbon: 1994).
- Lucena, Manuel, *A Evolução do Sistema Corporativo Português*, Vol. I - O Salazarismo, (Lisbon: 1976).
- _____, "The evolution of portuguese corporatism under Salazar and Caetano", Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler, eds., *Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and its Antecedents*, (Austin: 1979) pp. 65-66.
- _____, "Interpretações do Salazarismo: notas de leitura crítica-I", *Análise Social*, Vol. XX (83), 1984-4º, pp. 423-451.
- Luebbert, Gregory M., *Liberalism, Fascism, or Social Democracy. Social Classes and the Political Origins of Regimes in Interwar Europe*, (New York: 1991).
- Lytelton, Adrian, *The Seizure of Power. Fascism in Italy, 1919-1929*, (Princeton: 1987).
- Manning, M., *The Blueshirts*, (Dublin: 1971).
- Marques, A. H. Oliveira, "The Portuguese 1920s: a general survey", *Revista de História Económica e Social*, nº 1, Janeiro-Junho 1978, pp. 87-103.
- _____, *História de Portugal*, Vol. III, (Lisbon: 1982).
- _____, e Serrão, Joel, (Direcção de), *Nova História de Portugal*, Vol. XII, *Portugal e o Estado Novo* (Coord. de Fernando Rosas), (Lisbon: 1992).
- Martins, Hermínio, "Portugal", Stuart Woolf (Edited by), *European Fascism*, (New York: 1969), pp. 302-336.
- _____, "The Breakdown of the Portuguese Democratic Republic", *Seventh World Congress of Sociology*, Varna, mimeo., 1970.
- _____, *Classes, Status e Poder e outros ensaios sobre Portugal Contemporâneo*, (Lisbon: 1998).
- Mattoso, José, (Dir. de), *Historia de Portugal*, 8 Vols., (Lisbon: 1992-1994).
- Mazgaj, Paul, *The Action Française and Revolutionary Syndicalism*, (Chapel Hill: 1979).
- Mazower, Mark, *Inside Hitler's Greece. The Experience of Occupation, 1941-44*, (New Haven: 1993).
- Medina, João, *Salazar e os fascistas. Salazarismo e Nacional-Sindicalismo. A história de um conflito, 1932-1935*, (Lisbon: 1977).
- _____, *Salazar em França*, (Lisbon: 1977).
- Meneses, Filipe Ribeiro de, "Sidónio Pais, the Portuguese 'New Republic' and the Challenge to Liberalism in Southern Europe", *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 28(1), 1998, 109-130.
- Menze, Ernst A., (Edited by), *Totalitarianism Reconsidered*, (Port Washington: 1981).
- Milza, Pierre, *Les Fascismes*, (Paris: 1985).
- _____, *Le Fascisme Français. Passé et Présent*, (Paris: 1987).
- _____, *Mussolini*, (Paris: 1999).

- Mir, Miguel Jerez, *Elites Políticas y Centros de Extracción en España, 1938-1957*, (Madrid: 1982).
- Mommsen, Hans, *From Weimar to Auschwitz*, (Princeton: 1991).
- , *The Rise and Fall of Weimar Democracy*, (Chapel Hill and London: 1996).
- Mónica, Maria Filomena, *Educação e Sociedade no Portugal de Salazar. A escola primária salazarista, 1926-1939*, (Lisbon: 1978).
- , *O Movimento Socialista em Portugal (1875-1934)*, (Lisbon: 1985).
- Montero, Jose M., *La CEDA. El catolicismo Social y Político en la II Republica*, 2 vols., (Madrid: 1977).
- Moore, Clement H., "The Single Party as Source of Legitimacy", Samuel P. Huntington and Clement H. Moore (Edited by), *op. cit.*, (New York: 1970), pp. 49-72.
- Morlino, Leonardo, *Come cambiano i regime politici. Strumenti di analisi*, (Milano: 1980).
- Morodo, Raul, *Acción Española. Orígenes ideológicos del franquismo*, (Madrid: 1980).
- Mosse, George L., *The Nationalization of the Masses*, (New York: 1975).
- , (Edited by), *International Fascism. New Thoughts and New Approaches*, (London: 1979).
- , *Masses and Man. Nationalist and fascist perceptions of reality*, (New York: 1980).
- , *The Fascist Revolution. Toward a General Theory of Fascism*, (New York: 1999).
- Mouzelis, Nicos, *Politics in the Semi-Periphery. Early Parliamentarism and Late Industrialization in the Balkans and Latin America*, (London: 1986).
- Mülberger, Detlef, (Edited by), *The Social Bases of European Fascist Movements*, (London: 1987).
- , *Studies in the Sociology of the Nazi Movement*, (London: 1991).
- Navarro, José Luis Gomez, *El Régimen de Primo de Rivera*, (Madrid: 1991).
- Nobécourt, Jacques, *Le Coronel de La Roque ou les pièges du nationalisme chrétien, 1885-1946*, (Paris: 1996).
- Nolte, Ernst, *Three Faces of Fascism*, (New York: 1964).
- O'Donnell, Guillermo, *Modernization and Bureaucratic-Authoritarianism*, (Berkeley: 1973).
- Nunes, J. A., "Sobre alguns aspectos da evolução política do Partido Comunista Português após a reorganização de 1929 (1931-33)", *Análise Social*, vol. XVII (67-68), 1981, pp. 715-731.
- Oliveira, César, *Portugal e a Segunda República de Espanha, 1931-1936*, (Lisbon: 1987).
- , *O Salazarismo e a Guerra Civil de Espanha*, (Lisbon: 1988).
- Organski, A. F. K., *The Stages of Political Development*, (New York: 1965).
- Orlow, Dietrich, *The History of the Nazi Party: 1919-1933*, (Pittsburgh: 1969).
- , *The History of the Nazi Party: 1933-1945*, (Pittsburgh: 1973).

- Pais, José Machado, "A crise do regime liberal republicano: algumas hipóteses explicativas", AA. VV., *O Estado Novo - das origens...*, pp. 129-144.
- Panebianco, Angelo, *Modelli di partito. Organizzazione e potere nei partiti politici*, (Bologna: 1982).
- Passerini, Luisa, *Mussolini Immaginario. Storia di una biografia 1915-1939*, (Bari: 1991).
- Parreira, A., et alli, "O I Congresso da União Nacional" in AA.VV, *O fascismo em Portugal*, (Lisbon: 1980), pp. 209-210.
- Patriarca, Fátima, *A Questão Social no Salazarismo*, 2 Vols., (Lisbon: 1995).
- Pauley, Bruce F., *Hitler and the forgotten Nazis. A History of Austrian National Socialism*, (Chapel Hill: 1981).
- Paxton, Robert O., *Vichy France. Old Guard and New Order*, (New York: 1972).
- _____, *Le Temps des Chemises Vertes. Révoltes paysannes et fascisme rural, 1929-1939*, (Paris: 1996).
- _____, "The Five Stages of Fascism", *The Journal of Modern History*, 70 (March 1998), pp. 1-23.
- Payne, Stanley G., "Salazarism: "fascism" or "bureaucratic authoritarianism"?", AA. VV., *Estudos de História de Portugal. Homenagem a A. H. Oliveira Marques*, vol. II - sécs. XVI-XX, (Lisbon: 1983), pp. 523-53.
- _____, *The Franco Regime, 1936-1975*, (Madison: 1987).
- _____, *A History of Fascism, 1914-1945*, (Madison, 1995).
- _____, "Authoritarianism in the Smaller States of Southern Europe", H. E. Chehabi and Alfred Stepan (Edited by), *Politics, Society and Democracy. Comparative Studies (essays in honor of Juan J. Linz)*, (Boulder: 1995), pp. 183-196.
- _____, *Franco y José Antonio. El extraño caso del fascismo español*, (Madrid, 1997).
- Pereira, J. Pacheco, *Conflictos sociais nos campos em Portugal*, (Lisbon: 1982).
- _____, *Alvaro Cunhal. Uma Biografia Política*, (Lisbon: 1999).
- Pinto, António Costa, and Ribeiro, Nuno, *A Acção Escolar Vanguarda (1933-1936). A juventude nacionalista nos primórdios do Estado Novo*, (Lisbon: 1980).
- _____, "The Radical Right and the Military Dictatorship in Portugal: the 28 May League (1928-33)", *Luso-Brazilian Review*, Vol. 23, Nº 1 (Summer 1986), pp. 1-15.
- _____, "Fascist Ideology Revisited: Zeev Sternhell and His Critics", *European History Quarterly*, Vol. 19 (1986), pp. 465-483.
- _____, "O fascismo e a crise da Primeira República: os Nacionalistas Lusitanos (1923-25)", *Penélope. Fazer e desfazer a história*, Nº 3, Junho 1989, pp. 44-62.
- _____, "The Literary Aspirations of Portuguese Fascism", Stein U. Larsen and B. Sandberg (Edited by), *op. cit.*, (Bern: 1991), pp. 238-253.
- _____, "The Radical Right in Contemporary Portugal", Luciano Cheles et alli (Edited by), *Neo-Fascism in Europe*, (London and New York: 1991), pp. 167-190.

- _____, "The "New State" of Salazar - An Overview", Richard Herr (Edited by), *Portugal, Democracy and Europe*, (Berkeley: 1993), pp. 73-106.
- _____, *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism. Problems of interpretation*, (New York: 1995).
- _____, "Modernity versus Democracy? - The Mystic Nacionalism of Fernando Pessoa", Zeev Sternhell (Edited by), *The Intellectual Revolt against Liberal Democracy, 1870-1945*, (Jerusalem: 1996), pp. 343-355.
- _____, et Cova, Anne, "Femmes et Salazarisme", Christine Fauré (Sous la dir. de), *Encyclopédie politique et historique des femmes*, (Paris: 1997), pp. 685-699.
- _____, (Edited by), *Modern Portugal*, (Palo Alto: 1998).
- _____, and Monteiro, Nuno G., "Cultural Myths and Portuguese National Identity", Pinto, A. C. (Ed.), *op. cit.*, (Palo Alto: 1998), pp. 206-217.
- _____, "Portugal: Crisis and Early Authoritarian Takeover", Dirk Berg-Schlosser and Jeremy Mitchell (Edited by), *op. cit.*, (London: 2000), pp. 356-382.
- _____, and Almeida, Pedro Tavares de, "On Liberalism and Civil Society in Portugal", Nancy Bermeo and P. Nord (Edited by), *Civil Society before Democracy*, (New York: Forthc.).
- Pires, Daniel, *Dicionário das Revistas Literárias Portuguesas do Século XX*, (Lisbon: 1986).
- Pi-Sunyer, Viver, *El Personal Político de Franco (1936-1945). Contribución empírica a uma teoria del régimen franquista*, (Barcelona: 1978).
- Pollard, John F., *The Vatican and Italian Fascism. A Study in Conflict, 1929-32*, (Cambridge: 1985).
- Polonsky, Antony, *The Little Dictators. The History of Eastern Europe since 1918*, (London and Boston: 1975).
- Pombeni, Paolo, *Demagogia e Tirannide. Uno studio sulla forma-partito del fascismo*, (Bologna: 1984).
- Portela, Artur, *Salazarismo e artes plásticas*, (Lisbon: 1982).
- Preston, Paul, *Las Derechas Españolas en el Siglo XX: autoritarismo, fascismo, y golpismo*, (Madrid: 1986).
- _____, *Franco. A biography*, (London: 1993).
- Ramirez, Manuel, *España, 1939-1975. Régimen Político e Ideologia*, (Barcelona: 1978).
- Ramos, Rui, "O Estado Novo perante os poderes periféricos: o governo de Assis Gonçalves em Vila Real (1934-39)", *Análise Social*, vol. XXII (90), 1986, pp. 109-135.
- Rath, John, and Schum, Carolyn W., "The Dolfuss-Schuschnigg Regime: Fascist or Authoritarian?", Stein U. Larsen et alli (Edited By), *op. cit.*, (Bergen: 1980), pp. 249-256.
- Rémond, René, *Les Droites en France*, 4^a ed., (Paris: 1982).
- Rezolla, Inácia, *O Sindicalismo Católico no Estado Novo, 1931-1948*, (Lisbon: 1999).
- Ribeiro, Maria da Conceição, *A Polícia Política no Estado Novo, 1926-1945*, (Lisbon: 1995).

- Robinson, Richard A. H., "The Religious Question and the Catholic Revival in Portugal, 1900-30", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 12 (1977), pp. 345-362.
- , *Contemporary Portugal. A history*, (London: 1979).
- , "Monarchists, Catholics and the First Portuguese Republic, 1910-1926", Dadson, T. J., Oakley, R. J. P., Odber, P. A. (eds.), *New Frontiers in Hispanic and Luso-Brazilian Scholarship*, (Lewiston: 1994), pp. 411-442.
- Rocha, Clara, *Revistas Literárias do Século XX em Portugal*, (Lisbon: 1985).
- Rodrigues, Luís Nuno, *A Legião Portuguesa. A Milícia do Estado Novo, 1936-1944*, (Lisbon: 1996).
- Rogger, Hans, and Eugen Weber (Edited by), *The European Right. A historical profile*, (Berkeley: 1965).
- Rosas, Fernando, *O Estado Novo nos anos trinta. Elementos para o estudo da natureza económica e social do Salazarismo, 1928-1938*, (Lisbon: 1986).
- , "Cinco pontos em torno do estudo comparado do fascismo", *Vértice*, 13, Abril de 1989, pp. 21-29.
- , *O Salazarismo e a Aliança Luso-Britânica*, (Lisbon: 1988).
- , *Portugal entre a Guerra e a Paz*, (Lisbon: 1990).
- Rothschild, Joseph, *East Central Europe between the Two World Wars*, (Seattle and London: 1974).
- Sartori, Giovanni, *Parties and Party Systems-A framework for analysis*, (Cambridge: 1976).
- Schepens, Luc, "Fascists and Nationalists in Belgium 1919-1940", Stein U. Larsen et Alli (Edited by), *op. cit.*, pp. 512-513.
- Schmitter, Philippe C., "Corporatism and Public Policy in Authoritarian Portugal", *Contemporary Political Sociological Series*, Sage Professional Series, Vol. I, (London: 1975).
- , "Liberation by *Golpe*: Retrospective Thoughts on the Demise of Authoritarian Rule in Portugal", *Armed Forces and Society*, vol. II, n° 1, November 1975, pp. 5-33.
- , "The Impact and Meaning of 'Non-competitive, Non-Free and Insignificant' Elections in Authoritarian Portugal, 1933-74", Guy Hermet, Richard Rose and Alain Rouquié (Edited by), *Elections Without Choice*, (London: 1978), pp. 145-168.
- , "The 'Régime d'Exception' That Became the Rule: Forty-Eight Years of Authoritarian Domination in Portugal", Lawrence S. Graham and Harry Makler (Edited by), *Contemporary Portugal. The Revolution and Its Antecedents*, (Austin: 1979), pp. 2-46.
- Schwartzman, Katheen C., *The Social Origins of the Democratic Collapse. The First Portuguese Republic in the Global Economy*, (Lawrence, Kansas: 1989).
- Seixas, Xosé M. Núñez, "Portugal e o Galeguismo até 1936. Algumas Considerações Históricas", *Penélope*, N° 11, 1993, pp. 67-81.
- Serra, João B. and Matos, Luís Salgado de, "Intervenções Militares na Vida Política", *Análise Social*, (72-73-74), vol. 1, 1982, pp. 1165-1195.

- Sirinelli, Jean-François, *Histoire des Droites en France*, Vol. 1 - Politique, (Paris: 1992).
- Soucy, Robert, *French Fascism. The First Wave*, (New Haven and London: 1986).
 ———, *French Fascism: The Second Wave, 1933-1939*, (New Haven and London: 1995).
- Sternhell, Zeev, *Maurice Barrès et le nationalisme Français*, (Paris: 1972).
 ———, *La Droite Révolutionnaire Les origines françaises du fascisme. 1885-1914*, (Paris: 1978).
 ———, “Anatomie d’un mouvement fasciste en France: le faisceau de Georges Valois”, *Revue Française de Sciences Politiques*, Vol. 26, Fev. 1979, pp. 5-39.
 ———, *Ni Droite ni Gauche. L’idéologie fasciste en France*, (Paris: 1983).
 ———, et alli, *Naissance de L’idéologie Fasciste*, (Paris: 1989).
- Stone, Marla Susan, *The Patron State. Culture & Politics in Fascist Italy*, (Princeton: 1998).
- Sugar, Peter, (Edited by), *Native Fascism in the Sucessor States. 1918-1945*, (Santa Barbara: 1971).
- Tarchi, Marco, *Partito Unico e Dinamica Autoritaria*, (Napoli: 1981).
- Telo, António José, *Decadência e Queda da I República Portuguesa*, 2 vols., (Lisbon: 1980 and 1984).
 ———, *Propaganda e Guerra Secreta em Portugal, 1939-45*, (Lisbon: 1990).
 ———, *Portugal na Segunda Guerra, 1941-45*, 2 vols., (Lisbon: 1991).
- Thurlow, R., *Fascism in Britain*, (Oxford: 1987).
- Torgal, Luís Reis, *A Universidade e o Estado Novo. O caso de Coimbra, 1926-1961*, (Coimbra: 1999).
 ———, *A Universidade de Coimbra e o Estado Novo*, (Coimbra: 1999).
- Trindade, Hêlgio, *O Integralismo. O fascismo brasileiro na década de 30*, 2ª edição, (São Paulo: 1979).
 ———, “Integralismo: teoria e práxis política nos anos 30”, *História Geral da Civilização Brasileira*, vol. III-Brazil Republicano, (S. Paulo: 1981), pp. 297-335.
 ———, ‘Bases da democracia brasileira: lógico liberal e práxis autoritária (1822-1945)’, Rouquie, A., Lamounier, B., and Schvarzer, J. (eds), *Como renascer as democracias*, (São Paulo: 1985), pp. 46-72.
- Turner JR, Henry Ashby, “Fascism and modernization”, Henri A. Turner Jr. (Edited by), *Reappraisals of Fascism*, (New York: 1975).
 ———, *Hitler’s Thirty Days to Power. January 1933*, (London: 1996).
- Tusell, Javier, *La dictadura de Franco*, (Madrid: 1988).
- Valente, J. C., *Estado Novo e Alegria no Trabalho. Uma História Política da FNAT (1935-1958)*, (Lisbon: 1999).
- Vajda, Mihaly, *Fascism as a Mass Movement*, (London: 1976).
- Vakil, A., “Representations of the ‘Discoveries’ and the Imaginary of the Nation in Portuguese Integralism”, *Portuguese Studies*, Vol. II, 1995, pp. 133-167.
- Vargues, Isabel Nobre (Coord. de), *Do Estado Novo ao 25 de Abril*, 2 Vols., (Coimbra: 1994-1995).

- Vivarelli, Roberto, *Storia delle origini del fascismo. L'Italia dalle grande guerra alla marcia su Roma*, 2 Vols., (Bologna: 1991).
- Weber, Eugen, *The Action Française*, (Stanford: 1962).
- _____, "The Man of Archangel", *Journal of Contemporary History*, 1 (April 1966), pp. 101-126.
- Wheeler, Douglas L., *Republican Portugal. A political history, 1910-1926*, (Madison: 1978).
- _____, "The Military and the Portuguese Dictatorship, 1926-1974: 'The Honor of the Army'", Lawrence S. Graham and Harry M. Makler (Edited by), *op. cit.*, pp. 191-219.
- _____, "In the Service of Order: The Portuguese Political Police and the British, German and Spanish Intelligence, 1932-1945", *Journal of Contemporary History*, Vol. 18 (1983), pp. 1-25.
- _____, *A Ditadura Militar Portuguesa, 1926-1933*, (Lisbon: 1988).
- Wiarda, Howard J., *Corporatism and Development. The Portuguese Experience*, (Amherst: 1977).
- Williamson, Peter, *Corporatism in Perspective. An introductory guide to corporatist theory*, (London: 1989).
- Wilner, A. Ruth, *The Spellbinders. Charismatic Political Leadership*, (New Haven: 1983).
- Winok, Michel, *Nationalisme, antisémitisme et fascisme en France*, (Paris: 1982).
- Winston, Colin M., *Workers and the Right in Spain*, (Princeton: 1985).
- Wolf, Dieter, *Doriot. Du communisme à la collaboration*, (Paris: 1969).
- Woolf, S. J., (Edited by), *European Fascism*, (London: 1968).
- _____, (Edited by), *The Nature of Fascism*, (New York: 1968).
- Wynot, Edward D., *Polish Politics in Transition. The Camp of National Unity and the Struggle for Power, 1935-39*, (Athens: 1974).
- Yagil, Limore, *L' "Homme Nouveau" et la révolution nationale, 1940-1944*, (Paris: 1997).
- Zarnowski, Janusz, (Editor), *Dictatorships in East-Central Europe. 1918-1939*, Polish Historical Library n° 4, (Wrocław: 1983).

Index

- ACAP. *See* Central Association of Portuguese Farmers (ACAP)
- Action Française (AF): compared with IL, 69-70, 77; and fascism, 105; Catholic Church and, 162; Valois and, 24-25; mentioned, 2, 24, 125, 240, 241, 242.
See also France; Maurras; Valois
- AEV. *See* School Vanguard Association
- AF. *See* Action Française
- AE. *See* Spanish Action
- Africa, 33, 206
- Águeda, 75, 162
- AIB. *See* Brazilian Integralist Action
- ALPB. *See* Brazilian Imperial National Renovation Action,
- Albergaria, Lieutenant Soares de, 204
- Alcácer do Sal, 75, 115, 144, 185
- Alentejo, 10, 113
- Algarve, 75, 115, 154
- Allardt, Erik, 134n
- Alliance Industrial Society, 39
- Aljubarrota, Battle of, 90
- Almeida, António José de, 41
- Almeida, General João de, 56, 66, 89, 97, 113, 126, 188, 204
- Almeida, Pedro Tavares de, 49n
- Alvarez-Junco, Jose, xiv
- Amaral, João, 145
- Amaral, Vasco do, 99
- Ameal, João, 110
- Anadia, 75, 216
- Anarcho-syndicalists: denouncing fascism, 36-37; confronting NS, 165-167; mentioned, 30, 35, 50, 92, 101, 197
- Angola, 206
- Antunes, José Freire, 76, 155n, 156n
- APEB. *See* Portuguese Bank Employees' Association,
- Argentina, 113n
- Armed Forces. *See* Army
- Army: in World War I, 45, 50; under Sidónio Pais, 50; politicization of, 45, 52-67; fascism and, 44-67; the IL, conspiracies, and, 13, 30-32; May 28 1926 Coup, 44-52; NS and, 126-127, 168, 173, 188-189, 190, 198, 201-209; Salazarism and, 209-211; LP and, 212-215. *See also* Military Dictatorship
- ARS. *See* Socialist and Republican Alliance
- AST. *See* Labour Social Action
- Austria, 15, 134, 191, 228. *See also* Dolfuss, Engelbert
- Aveiro, 97, 114
- ATP. *See* Traditional Portuguese Action
- Azevedo, General Shiappa de, 188
- Azores, 56, 204, 205n
- Bainville, Jacques, 17
- Balbo, Italo, 173, 230
- Baldi-Papini, U., 138n, 139, 140. *See also* CAUR
- Barbosa, José Machado Plácido, 31n, 82n, 168n, 169n, 213n, 215, 215n, 234n
- Barcelos, 96
- Barreira, Cecília, 18n, 146n
- Barrès, Maurice, 4, 6
- Barreto, Bissaia, 145, 155, 156
- Barros, João de, 41
- Barros, Julia Leitão de, 217n
- Barroso, Gustavo, 235. *See also* AIB; Brazil
- Batista, Captain Jaime, 204
- Batkay, W. M., 134n
- BBC, 221
- Beetham, David, 165
- Beja, 127

- Beira, 117, 156
 Beirão, Caetano, 188
 Beirão, General Farinha, 188
 Belgium, 2, 5, 16, 239, 240, 242
 "Belonor, Eugénio de", 162, 163
 Ben-Ami, Shlomo, 134n
 Berend, I., 134n
 Bergery, Gaston, 125n
 Berg-Schlosser, Dirk, xiv, 48n, 49n
 Bermeo, Nancy, xiv
 Blinkhorn, Martin, 48, 53n, 233, 241n
 Bon, Gustave le, 4
 Bonald, Louis de, 6
 Bonaparte, 70
 Borejsza, Jerzy W., 225n
 Botelho, António Valadares, 57, 75n
 Botelho, Sebastião Antas, 130n
 Botz, Gerhard, 15n
 Bourderon, Roger, 104n, 105n
 Braga, 64, 75, 88-90, 94, 95, 127, 128, 130, 148n, 152, 167, 168, 187, 188, 195, 196
 Bragança, 94, 97, 127, 130n, 144
 Branco, Alfredo Freitas, 35n
 Branco, Manuel Portugal, 144n, 185n
 Branco, Lieutenant Castel, 156
 Brazil, 66, 235, 239. *See also* AIB; AIPB; Salgado, Plínio; Vargas, Getúlio
 Brazilian Imperial National Renovation Action (AIPB), 235
 Brazilian Integralist Action (AIB), 11n, 228, 235
 Britain. *See* England
 British Ultimatum, 206-207. *See also* England
 Brito, Alexandra Barahona de, xiv
 Brooker, Paul, 134n
 Brunet, Jean-Paul, 125n
 Brüning, 86, 184
 Brustein, W., 120n
 Burrin, Philippe, 81, 125n, 186n
 Cabeçadas, Admiral, 45, 54
 Cabral, José, 174, 176, 177-179, 185, 192, 220
Caciquismo. *See* Clientelism
 Caetano, Marcello, 15, 76, 156n
 Caldas da Rainha, 63n
 Caldas, Raúl Pereira, 60n, 67n
 Caldeira, Arlindo, 57n, 59n, 129n, 135n, 151n
 Camara, Filomeno da, 31, 42, 58
 Cape Verde, 165n, 198
 Campo, Javier Jimenez, 232n
 Campos, Carlos Salazar de, 75n
 Capitão, Alberto Mota, 64n, 65n
 Cardia, Mário, 120n
 Carlists, 241
 Carmona, General Óscar, 55, 59, 63, 111, 168, 169, 188-190, 201, 211, 222
 Carrilho, Maria, 21n, 213n, 215n
Carta del Lavoro, 169. *See also*, Italy, Mussolini, PNF
 Carvalho, Captain Crujeira de, 111, 204
 Carvalho, Raúl de, 34, 40
 Carvalho, Lieutenant Colonel Ribeiro de, 203n
 Castanheira, José Pedro, 98n, 100n
 Castelo Branco, 97
 Castro, António Borges de, 101n
 Castro, João de. *See* João de Castro Osório
 Castro, José Guilherme de Melo e, 196n
 Catholic Centre Party (PCC), 11, 32, 46, 51, 54, 57, 58, 86, 136, 145, 161, 163, 241
 Catholic Church: conflict with First Republic, 49, 51; and IL, 11-12, 27-28; NL and, 36; CNAP and, 43; supports Army takeover, 54; and Military Dictatorship, 53-55, 161-162; role in Salazarism, 159, 214, 238-240; and corporatist institutions, 169-171; and NS, 86, 161-164, 226; and National Unions, 91; and Fascism and Nazism, 27-28, 217, 227. *See also* Catholic Centre Party
 Catholic League of Alentejo Farmers, 13
 Catholic Youth Workers (JOC), 163
 CAUR: mission to Portugal, 138-140; report from NS to, 121, 184; Montreaux, 182; mentioned, 225
 Cazzola, Roberto, 15n
 Central Association of Portuguese Agriculture (ACAP), 13
 Centre of Lusitanian Nationalist, 35
Centro Católico. *See* Catholic Centre Party
Cercle Proudhon, 22
 Cerejeira, Cardinal, 42. *See also* Catholic Church
 Cértima, António de, 39
 César, Ângelo, 57
 CGT. *See* General Confederation of Labour (CGT)

- Charisma: in fascist parties, 22, 104; Sidónio Pais and, 51; and the breakdown of the First Republic, 46; Preto as a charismatic leader, 88, 106-109
- Chauí, Marilena, 77n
- Chertok, Ronald Henry, 243n
- Chueca, Ricardo, 104n, 134n, 143n, 233
- Ciano, Galeazzo, 121n. *See also* Italy, Mussolini, PNF
- CIPF. *See* French Confederation of Intelligence and Production
- Civil Construction Worker's Union, 96
- Clientelism: and the First Republic, 9, 52; in the UN, 150-152; denounced by NS, 136-138
- CNAP. *See* Nuno Alvares Pereira Crusade
- Codreanu, C., xiii
- Coelho, Jacinto do Prado, 4n
- Coelho, Trindade, 56
- Coimbra, 61, 62, 65, 67, 73, 74, 89, 90, 97n, 110, 113, 125, 127, 145, 149, 152, 155, 167, 184, 195
- Colonialism, 230
- Communism, 8, 20, 22, 71, 78, 86, 93, 163, 181, 199, 232
- Communist Party. *See* Portuguese Communist Party
- Comte, Auguste, 6
- Constitutions: of 1911, 53; reform of, 53; of 1933, 55, 56; mentioned, 143
- Conway, Martin, 243n
- Cordes, General Sinel de, 55
- Corporatism: IL and, 54; social Catholicism and, 54, 73, 211; NS and, 72-73, 110, 171-172; 1933 constitution and, 169-170; institutions of, 169-172; labour and, 165, 170. *See also* FNAT, INTF, National Unions
- Corporatist Chamber, 170, 171
- Corradini, Enrico, 18, 19, 20n, 24, 25
- Correia, Lieutenant Pinto, 55
- Coselschi, 121n. *See also* CAUR, Italy, Mussolini, PNF
- Costa, Second Lieutenant Albino Neves da, 91n, 100, 109
- Costa, Captain Santos, 211
- Costa, General Gomes da, 14, 31, 32, 42, 43, 45, 55-59, 61, 89, 161
- Couceiro, Paiva, 197, 206, 208, 209
- Cova, Anne, xiv
- Covilhã Commercial Employees Union, 29
- CP. *See* Employers Association
- Cronin, M., 229n
- Crusade. *See* Nuno Alvares Pereira National Crusade
- "Cruz, Father Santa", 27, 28
- Cruz, Manuel Braga da, 3n, 12n, 27n, 51n, 59n, 129n, 135n, 142n, 146n, 152n, 153n, 162n, 182n, 222n
- Cuevas, P. C. G., 230n
- Cullen, Stephen M., xiii
- Cunha, Vieira da, 96
- Cunhal, Álvaro, 165n
- Curto, Ramada, 166
- Dadson, T. J., 51n
- D'Annunzio, Gabriele, 18, 26
- Daudet, Léon, 17
- Déat, Marcel, 125n
- Degrelle, Léon, 242, 243n
- Delgado, Humberto, 222
- Democratic Party, 9, 32, 41, 45, 50, 53, 148, 164, 198
- Democrats. *See* Democratic Party (PD)
- Denmark, 239
- Deusch, Sandra M., 235n
- Dias, Silva, 61, 64
- Dobry, Michel, xiv
- Dolfuss, Engelbert, 15, 191, 228. *See also* Austria
- Domingues, José Domingos Garcia, 71, 119n
- Doriot, Jacques, 125n
- Douglas, Allen, 21n
- Durand, Yves, 194n
- Duverger, Maurice, 151n, 152
- Eastern Europe, 47, 52, 134n, 216, 225, 238
- Eatwell, Roger, xiv, 53n
- Elections, 85
- Eliasssem, K., 116n
- Ellwood, Sheelagh, 71n
- Elvas, 218
- Empire, 82. *See also* colonialism
- Employers Association (CP), 129
- England, 49, 161, 192, 204, 206, 217, 221, 224, 230
- Ermezinde, 167
- Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional* (ETN), 169-171, 175. *See also* corporatism
- Esteves, Alberto, 115
- ETN. *See* *Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional* (ETN)

- European University Institute, xiii-xiv
 Evolutionist Party, 145
 Évora, 61, 64, 65, 74, 125, 127
- Faisceau*, Le, 17, 106, 240, 241. *See also*
 AF, France, Valois
- Falange, 158, 228, 233, 240. *See also* FET;
 Franco; Rivera, Jose António Primo de;
 Spain
- Faria, Dutra, 69, 70, 71, 72n, 80n, 112,
 137, 220
- Faro, 119, 149
- Fascist Party (PNF). *See* National Fascist
 Party
- Fernandes, António de Castro, 44, 79,
 179, 181n, 221
- Fernandes, Vasco da Gama, 203n
- Ferreira, Jacinto, 64n, 71n, 176n, 181n
- Ferreira, Lieutenant Marino Sanches,
 97n, 196n, 214
- Ferro, António, 33, 166, 168n, 181, 217,
 220
- FET y de las JONS, 134, 143, 145, 234.
See also Falange; Franco; Spain
- Figueira, José Manuel da Costa, 219n
- Figueiredo, Carlos Proença de, 62n, 65,
 75n, 174n
- Figueiredo, Fidelino de, 58
- Filho, Homem Cristo, 18n, 57
- First Republic: and democratisation, 49;
 party system of, 144, 164; radical right
 and, 2-44; Army intervention, 44-47;
 breakdown of, 44-52, 207
- First World War. *See* World War I
- Fischer-Galati, Stephen, xiv,
- Flanders, 33
- FNAT. *See* National Federation for Hap-
 piness at Work
- França, José Augusto, 222n
- France, 2, 5, 16, 18-20, 50, 57, 125, 186,
 238, 240. *See also* *Action Française*;
Faisceau; Maurras, Charles; Valois
- Franco, Francisco, 15, 104n, 134, 145,
 210, 220, 234, 238. *See also* Falange;
 FET; Spain; Spanish Civil War
- Franco, Maria Sylvia Carvalho, 77n
- Free Masonry, 8, 59
- Frei, Norbert, xiv
- Freitas, General Vicente de, 58, 201
- French Confederation of Intelligence
 and Production (CIPF), 24-25
- Futurism, 47, 168
- Galicia, 5, 101, 231, 234
- General Confederation of Labour
 (CGT), 30, 35, 95n
- Gentile, Emilio, xiv, 25, 26n, 28n, 79n,
 105n, 120n, 158n
- Geographical Society, 43, 44, 56
- Germany, 16, 46, 120, 122, 190, 194,
 216, 217, 219, 223, 225, 226
- Godinho, Virgilio, 217, 219
- Gomes, Sousa, 136
- Gomes, Teixeira, 42
- Gómes-Navarro, José Luis, 134n
- Gonçalves, Lieutenant Assis, 66, 67,
 111n, 157, 158, 169, 172, 195n, 196n,
 202n
- Grazia, Victoria De, xiin, xiv, 170n
- Great Britain. *See* England
- Greenstein, F., 132n,
- Gregor, A. J., 125n
- Griffin, Roger, xiv, 53n, 76n, 238n
- Guarda, 97, 98, 113, 137, 156
- Guchet, Yves, 22n, 25n, 106n
- Guimarães, 90, 93
- Guimarães, Claudio Correa de Oliveira,
 72n
- Hermet, Guy, 142n
- Hitler, Adolf, 115, 171, 205, 206, 223,
 227. *See also* Germany; National
 Socialist Party
- Hoidal, Oddvar K., 216n
- Hungary, 134
- Huntington, Samuel P., 132n
- IL. *See* Lusitanian Integralism (IL)
- Industry, 22, 56, 81, 232
- Integralismo Lusitano* (IL). *See* Lusitan-
 ian Integralism (IL)
- Integralists. *See* Lusitanian Integralism
 (IL)
- INTP. *See* National Institute for Labour
 and Welfare (INTP)
- Ioanid, Radu, 229n
- Iron Guard, 229. *See also* Romania
- Italy, 12, 16, 19, 20, 33, 46, 120, 134,
 139, 140, 159, 162, 190, 192, 194, 216-
 218, 225, 226, 228, 231, 242
- Jennings, J. R., 17n
- JOC. *See* Catholic Youth Workers
- JONS. *See* Spanish Juntas of National
 Syndicalist Offensive

- Karvonen, Lauri, 120n
 Koon, Tracy H, 162n
 Kuin, Simon, 139n, 212n, 215n, 217n
- Labour League (LT), 228. *See also* AIB;
 Brazil; Salgado, Plínio
 Labour Social Action (AST), 219
 Laqueur, Walter, 76n
 Larsen, Stein U., xiv, 15n, 50n, 79n,
 120n, 144n, 225n, 241n, 242n
 Latin America, 240
 Lazar, Marc, xiv
 Leal, Francisco Cunha, 39, 46, 54, 56,
 57, 145, 148, 149
 Ledeen, M. A., 26n, 225n
Legião Portuguesa (LP). *See* Portuguese
 Legion (LP)
 Legitimists, 6, 10, 12, 69
 Leiria, 61, 64, 66, 74, 97, 98, 113, 115,
 157, 176, 195, 204
 Leitão, Carlos Cabral, 95n
 Leite, João Pinto da Costa, 213
 Léonard, Yves, xiv
 Levine, Robert, 235n
 Levy, Carl, 241n
 Liberal Republican Union, 45, 54, 56,
 57, 145, 148, 149
 Lima, Augusto Pires de, 75, 89, 91n,
 113n, 130n, 174n, 184n
 Linz, Juan J., xiv, 42, 45, 46, 50n, 76n,
 132, 134n, 232n, 233n, 238n, 239n
 Lloyd-Jones, Stewart, xiv
 London, 12
 Lopes, Fernando Farelo, 9n
 Lopes, Moreira, 209n
 Louriga, 95
 LP. *See* Portuguese Legion
 LT. *See* Labour League
 Lucena, Manuel de, 169n
 Lupi, Luis C., 218n
 Lusitanian Integralism (IL): emergence
 of, 2-3; and *Action Française*, 4-8, 69-
 70, 77; and fascism, 8, 29-30; program
 of, 3-9; and Army conspiracies, 31-32;
 in Military Dictatorship, 58-67; and
 NS, 69-84
 Lusitanian Militias (ML), 55
 Lusitanian Nationalism (NL): formation
 of, 34; programme, 37; Preto and, 30; IL
 and, 31, 34-38; and Italian Fascism, 47
 Luso, 69
 Lyttelton, Adrian, 25
- Machado, Ginestal, 39
 Maistre, Joseph de, 6
 Manning, Maurice, 229n
 Manoïlesco, Mihail, 132
 Manuel, King, 12, 30
 Martins, Hermínio, 2, 211
 Martins, Oliveira, 54
 Marxism, 18, 73
 Mateus, Colonel Lopes, 66, 145, 183
 Matos, General Norton de, 222
 Matos, Julio Pereira de, 70, 109, 117n,
 125, 184
 Maurras, Charles, 4, 7, 11, 17, 224. *See*
also Action Française; France; Valois
 May 28th League: formation, 58-59;
 organisation, 60-62; and NS, 66-67;
 conflict with UN, 64-67; mentioned,
 40, 56, 100, 111, 127, 136, 155
 Maxwell, Kenneth, xiin
 Mazgaj, Paul, 22n
 Medina, João, 17n, 111n, 234n
 Meireles, Admiral Quintão, 222
 Mello, Miguel Sousa e, 145
 Melo, Martinho Nobre de, 43, 55, 56, 61,
 66
 Meneses, F. R., 231n
 Merkle, Peter, 121n
 Mexia, Nuno, 145
 Miguel, King, 3, 5, 6. *See also* legitimists
 Military Dictatorship: spectrum of the
 right and, 53-54; the fascists and, 52-
 67, 130, 236
 Military. *See* Army
 Milza, Pierre, xiv
 Mir, Miguel Jerez, 145
 Miranda, João Afonso de, 40n
 Mitchell, Jeremy, 48n, 49n
 ML. *See* Lusitanian Militias
Mocidade Portuguesa (MP). *See* Por-
 tuguese Youth (MP)
 Modernist movement, 47. *See also* Por-
 tuguese Modernism
 Moncada, Luis Cabral, 89, 180n
 Mónica, Maria Filomena, 166n
 Monsaraz, Alberto, 4n, 7n, 69, 72, 88,
 90, 91, 109, 111n, 122, 124, 137, 161n,
 174-176, 178, 189, 191, 193, 194n,
 195, 202, 222
 Monteiro, José R., 232n, 233n
 Monteiro, Nuno G., 49n
 Moreira, Francisco, 95, 96
 Morodo, Raúl, 11, 231

- Mosley, O., xiiin, 229
- Mosse, George L., 79n
- Mouzelis, Nicos, 49
- Mozambique, 206
- MP. *See* Portuguese Youth (MP)
- Müllberger, Detlef, 12n, 233n
- Múrias, Manuel, 110, 179
- Mussolini, Benito, 12, 20, 55, 57, 81, 85, 115, 171, 205, 206, 223, 230, 243. *See also* Italy; PNF
- Nacional Sindicalismo* (NS). *See* National Syndicalist Movement (NS)
- Nacionalismo Lusitano* (NL). *See* Lusitanian Nationalism
- National Corporatism, 219
- National Fascist Party (PNF): Preto and, 26-28; as a model, 33; delegation in Portugal, 181; mentioned, 26, 28, 46, 105, 229
- National Federation for Happiness at Work (FNAT), 170
- National Institute for Labour and Welfare (INTP), 170, 179, 180, 220. *See also* corporatism
- National Labour Statute (ETN). *See* *Estatuto do Trabalho Nacional*
- National Propaganda Secretariat (SPN), 170, 179, 181, 182, 199
- National Republican Party (PNR), 134
- National Republican Presidentialist Party (PNRP), 33
- National Socialism: Preto and, 19, 97; mentioned, 46, 122. *See also* Germany, National Socialist Party
- National Socialist Party: and PNF, 28, 225; NS and, 92-93, 219; mentioned, 181, 223. *See also* Germany, Hitler, National Socialism
- National Syndicalism (NS). *See* National Syndicalist Movement (NS)
- National Syndicalist Movement (NS): formation of, 69-76; and the 28 May League, 66-67; ideology of, 73-86; mobilizing themes, 84-86; and the working class, 91-101, 127-130; organization, 103-120; élite of, 120-127; membership, 127-130; and the UN, 131-159, 182-188; the Church and, 161-164; viewed by the Communists, 89-101, 164-167; the Socialists and, 164-167; and corporatist legislation, 169-172; crisis of 1933, 174-180; and military conspiracies, 188-192, 201-203, 208-211; and the September 1935 Coup, 203-208; and the Second World War, 215-218; Axis propaganda and, 217-219; in comparison, 163-5; and Salazarism, 101-102, 161-224. *See also* Preto, Francisco Rolão
- National Union (UN): and authoritarian single parties, 132-135; and clientelism, 152-154; formation from above, 141-144; tension with the May 28 League, 60-67; leaders of, 144-151; membership, 151-154; organization, 141-144; Study Centre of, 143; parallels with Francoism, 134, 143, 145, 158-159; parallels with Eastern Europe, 134; parallels with Italy, 134, 138-140, 158-159; viewed by CAUR delegate, 138-140; and political élites, 144-146; tensions with NS, 154-156.
- National Union of Hotel Industry Professionals, 100
- National Unions, 91, 170, 196. *See also* corporatism
- National Unity Camp (Poland), 134
- Nationalism: french, 19, italian, 18-19, 25; Preto and, 20, 82-83; and Sidónio Pais, 32
- Nationalists. *See* Nationalist Party
- Nationalist Party (PN), 45, 54, 148, 149
- Nationalist Press Federation, 118
- Neto, Captain David, 66, 119
- NL. *See* Lusitanian Nationalism (NL)
- Nogueira, Franco, 168n, 169n, 189n, 201n
- Nolte, Ernst, 6n, 105n
- Norton, Commander Mendes, 203, 204
- Norway, 216n, 239
- NS. *See* National Syndicalist Movement (NS)
- NSDAP. *See* National Socialist Party
- Nunes, João Arsénio, 165n
- Nunes, Lieutenant Carvalho, 169
- Nuno Alvares Pereira Crusade (CNAP): formation, 40; programme, 41-44; mentioned, 13, 40-44, 55
- Oakley, R. J. P., 51n
- Odber, P. A., 51n
- O'Duffy, E., 229
- Oliveira, Barradas de, 109n, 117, 176n, 195n, 204, 219n, 220n, 221

- Oliveira, Captain Luna de, 189
 Oliveira, César, 211n, 215n
 Oporto, 64, 73, 75, 87, 88, 90, 91, 94, 95, 96, 102, 112, 120, 124, 125, 127, 130, 149, 152, 167, 187, 188, 191, 195, 196, 202
 Oporto Builders Union, 95
 Oporto District Tramway Employees' Union, 96
 Organski, A. F. K., 50
 Orlow, Dietrich, 105n
 Osório, Ana de Castro, 34
 Osório, João de Castro, 30, 34, 35, 37, 42
- Pacheco, António, 115
 Padez, Alçada, 110, 113, 189, 204
 Pais, José Machado, 42n
 Pais, Sidónio. *See* Sidónio Pais Dictatorship
 Palombara, Joseph La, 105n
 Panebianco, Angelo, 104n, 116n, 172n
 Paris Pact, 30
 Parreira, Anabela B., 142, 182n, 183n
 Party of National Unity (Hungary), 134
 Passerini, Luisa, 57n
 Patriarca, Fátima, 95n
 Patrício, Filomena, 112
 Patriotic Union (UP), 86, 134. *See also* Rivera, Primo de; Spain
 Paxeco, Óscar, 232n
 Paxton, Robert O., xiin, xiv, 241n
 Payne, Stanley G., xiv, 53n, 71n, 76n, 232n, 241n
 PCC. *See* Catholic Centre Party
 PCP. *See* Portuguese Communist Party
 PD. *See* Democratic Party
 Pedro, António, 69-73, 74n, 79, 80, 108, 110, 117n, 119, 120n, 125, 186, 194, 197n, 202n, 221
 Pereira, José Pacheco, 52n, 165n
 Pereira, Pedro Teotónio, 143n, 171, 172
 Peres, Damião, 66n
 Pescosolido, Augusto, 121n, 184n
 Pessoa, Mário, 44, 205, 218n
 Pin, La Tour du, 6
 Pinharanda, João, 79n
 Pinto, António Costa, xiin, 3n, 34n, 49n, 53n, 79n, 181n
 Pi-Sunyer, C. Viver, 145
 Play, Le, 6
 PN. *See* Nationalist Party
 PNF. *See* National Fascist Party
 PNR. *See* National Republican Party
 PNNR. *See* National Republican Presidentialist Party
 Poland, 134
 Pollard, John F., 162n
 Polonsky, Anthony, 134n
 Polsby, N., 132n
 Pombeni, Paolo, 28n
 Ponte de Lima, 90
 Popular Portuguese Bank, 39
 Portalegre, 114
 Portugal, Euclídes, 185n
 Portuguese Bank Employees' Association (APEB), 99
 Portuguese Communist Party (PCP): 92, 93, 99, 101, 123, 130, 164, 165, 160, 167, 197
 Portuguese Federation of Young Communists, 167
 Portuguese First Republic. *See* First Republic
 Portuguese Industrial Bank, 39
 Portuguese Legion (LP), 212-215, 218, 220
 Portuguese Modernism, 33, 168
 Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP), 164-167
 Portuguese Surrealist movement, 222
 Portuguese Youth (MP), 163, 212-215
 Preston, Paul, 231n
 Preto, Francisco Rolão: early life, 16-17; and *Action Française*, 16-19; and IL, 16-32; and Valois, 16-26; and Italian Nationalists, 24-27; and Italian Fascism, 26-28, 225-243; under Military Dictatorship, 52-67; forms NS, 69-76; opponent of Salazar, 193-224; arrested and exiled, 190-192. *See also* IL; NS
 Príncipe, Sérgio, 129
 Proença, Raul, 8, 42, 44
 PSP. *See* Portuguese Socialist Party
 Pujó, Maurice, 17
 Pyrrait, António do Amaral, 179
- Queiróz, António Eça de, 182n
 Quisling, V., 216n
 Quitério, José, 115
 Ramos, Ramiro Ledesma, 71n, 231, 233, 242,
 Rapazote, Gonçalves, 221
 Raposo, Hipólito, 4n, 5n, 11n, 72, 208n
 RE. *See* Spanish Renewal

- Rebello, José Pequito, 4n, 7, 10, 13, 56
Reconstituintes, 45
 Redondo, Onésimo, 231n
 Rego, Álvaro de Sousa, 119, 12n
 Reis, Albino dos, 145, 182
 Renan, Ernest, 6
 Republican Party, 32
 Rezolla, Maria Inácia, 163n
 Ribeiro, Nuno Afonso, 181n
 Rita, Vasco Santa, 185n
 Rivera, General Miguel Primo de, 12, 31n, 44, 86, 134, 230, 233, 234. *See also* Patriotic Union; Spain
 Rivera, José António Primo de, xiii, 232n, 242. *See also* Falange
 Robinson, Richard A. H., 51n
 Rocco, Alfredo, 24-26, 28. *See also* Italy
 Rocha, Pedro, 58n
 Rodrigues, Luis Nuno, 215n
 Rokkan, Stein, 134n
 Romania, 52, 229. *See also* Iron Guard
 Rosas, Fernando, 171n
 Rose, Richard, 142n
 Rothschild, Joseph, 134n
 Rouquié, Alain, 235n
 Rousso, Henri, xiv
 Rumania. *See* Romania
 Rusconi, Gian Enrico, 15n
- Salgado, Plínio, 228, 235. *See also* AIB; Brazil
 Salazar, Oliveira: member of CNAP, 42; Caetano and, 15; and Catholic Church, 54; anti-totalitarianism of, 168; and the military, 86, 210-211, 237; and NS, 75, 108, 111, 167-169, 178-192, 203-215; viewed by CAUR delegate, 138-140; political elite analyzed, 238; single party of, 106, 141-150, 182-183; militias and, 212-215
 Santos, Fernando Piteira, 205n, 219n
 Sardinha, António, 2, 4-6, 7n, 8, 10, 12n, 14, 17, 18, 30, 31, 236
 Sartori, Giovanni, 132, 133n, 135n, 158, 159n
 Schepens, Luc, 242n
 Schmitter, Philippe C., xiv, 142n, 144n, 170n
 School Vanguard Association (AEV), 140, 179, 180, 182, 189, 212
 Schum, Carolyn W., 15n
 Schuschnigg, Kurt Von, 15. *See also* Austria
 Schwarzer, Jorge, 235n
 Schwartzman, Kathleen C., 13n, 50n
 Second International, 18, 20
 Second World War. *See* World War II
 Seixas, Xosé M. Núñez, 231n
 Sérgio, António, 8
 Setúbal, 130
 Shepel, Monsignor, 86
 Shubert, Adrian, xiv
 Sidónio Pais Centre, 33
 Sidónio Pais's Dictatorship: program of, 32; corporatism and, 109; II and, 11, 16, 23; and fascism, 32-33, 47; and World War I, 45, 50; mentioned, 8, 9, 231
 Silva, Ernesto de Oliveira e, 179
 Silva, José Francisco da, 234n
 Silves, 65
Sindicatos Nacionais. *See* National Unions
 Socialism, 8, 18, 20, 22, 78, 163
 Socialist and Republican Alliance (ARS), 63
 Socialist Party. *See* Portuguese Socialist Party (PSP)
 Sombra, Severino, 228
 Sorel, George, 17, 19, 22, 79, 222, 224
 Soucy, Robert, 106n
 Sousa, General Passos e, 145
 Sousa, José Campos e, 110, 121n, 184n
 Spain, 12, 15, 20, 77, 95, 145, 158, 159, 189, 193, 199, 204, 206, 209-211, 215, 217, 220, 228, 229, 231-233, 241-243. *See also* Franco; Falange; FET
 Spanish Action (AE): II and, 230-231, Preto write for, 77-79, 86; mentioned, 11n, 231, 241
 Spanish Civil War, 193, 208, 212, 213, 215, 234, 239, 240
 Spanish Juntas of National Syndicalist Offensive (JONS), 71, 106, 233
 Spanish Renewal (RE), 241
 Spanish Second Republic, 233
 SPN. *See* National Propaganda Secretariat
 Stepan, Alfred, 42n
 Sternhell, Zeev, xiv, 4n, 22n, 106n, 242n
 Sturzo, D., 86
 Suevos, Jesus, 234
 Supico, José Luis, 179n, 180n
 Svaasand, L., 116n
- Taine, 6
 Tamagnini, Eusébio, 65, 89, 113, 180n

- Tarchi, Marco, xiv, 132n
 Tarrafal, 165n, 198
 Tavares, António Abrantes, 173n
 Teles, Basílio, 37, 54
 Telo, António José, 13n, 56n, 216n, 217n
 Thurlow, Richard, 229n
 Tinoco, António, 73, 91n, 92, 117n, 120n, 125n, 185n, 204, 221
 Torgal, Luís R., 180n
 Toulouse, 17
 Totalitarianism: Preto and, 102, 226; Salazar and, 168
 Traditional Portuguese Action (ATP), 12
 Trigueiros, Luís Forjaz, 184n
 Trindade, Hélgio, 11n, 103n, 104n, 235n
 Tusell, Javier, 232
 28 May League. *See* May 28th League
- UIE. *See* Union of Economic Interests
 UN. *See* National Union
 Union of Economic Interests (UIE), 145
 Union of Employees of the National Overseas Bank, 99
União Patriótica (UP). *See* Patriotic Union
 UP. *See* Patriotic Union
 Urbanization, 19, 22, 50, 81
- Vakil, Abdoolkarim, 82n
 Vale, Francisco Sales, 216n
 Valente, José Carlos, 22n
 Valente, Colonel Manuel, 204
 Valera, De, 229
 Valois, Georges: Preto and, 21-25; mentioned, 17, 21n, 24, 25, 99, 106, 241
 Vargas, Getúlio, 235
 Varzim, Padre Abel, 163, 164
 Vasconcelos, Sebastião, 57
 Viana do Castelo, 173n, 195
 Vieira, Alexandre, 95n
 Vieira, Julião, 219n
 Vila Real, 75, 97, 98, 127, 130, 149, 152, 167, 173, 185, 195, 196, 202
 Vilaça, A., 90n
 Virgulino, Lieutenant José, 98, 174n
Viriatos, 213
 Viseu, 75, 152, 195
 Vivarelli, Roberto, 25n
- Weber, Eugen, 6, 162n, 229n
 Weiner, Myron, 105n
 Wheeler, Douglas, 9n
 Wiarda, Howard J., 170n
 Willner, Ruth, 104n
 Women: NS and, 105
 Woolf, Stuart J., xiv, 2n, 134n, 211n
 World War I: IL and, 13-14; and Portuguese Army, 45; mentioned, 7, 9, 48, 49. *See also* Army
 World War II: neutrality in, 193; NS and, 216-219; mentioned, 210, 220, 225
 Wynot, Edward D., 134n

António Costa Pinto is Senior Fellow at the Institute of Social Sciences and Professor of Modern European History and Politics at the ISCTE, University of Lisbon. He has been a Visiting Professor at Stanford University (1993-94) and a Senior Visiting Fellow at Princeton University (1996). His previous books include *Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism* (1995) and, Ed., *Modern Portugal* (1998).

Also by António Costa Pinto

Salazar's Dictatorship and European Fascism

1996 230 pp. Cloth ISBN 0-88033-968-3

«This book makes a major contribution to the comparative analysis of authoritarian regimes in twentieth-century Europe (...)

There are very few politically taxonomic studies dealing with authoritarian systems that equal the rigor of this analysis. It succeeds at one and the same time in elucidating the boundaries of Salazarism and generic fascism, and adds in important ways to our understanding of the general phenomenon of rightist authoritarianism in early and mid-twentieth century Europe. It is thus both an important contribution to Portuguese studies and to comparative politics.»

— Stanley G. Payne, University of Wisconsin, Madison

«The Salazar regime has been generally neglected in comparative politics and Portuguese Fascism even more. The work of António Costa Pinto succeeds extremely well in placing the regime in the context of the theoretical debates over non-democratic regimes and for the first time analyses in detail, with empirical data, the role of the fascist movement in Portuguese politics. Those of us working on non-democratic politics and on fascist movements are greatly indebted to him for filling a serious vacuum.»

— Juan J. Linz, Yale University

«...This work will long stand as a basic reference for any and all interested in Portugal experience with forty-eight years of authoritarian rule.»

— Lawrence S. Graham, University of Texas, Austin

«... an excellent introduction both to the latest research on Portugal, and the wider issues related to generic fascism»

— Roger Eatwell, University of Bath

SOCIAL SCIENCE MONOGRAPHS

Distributed by Columbia University Press
www.columbia.edu/cu/cup