

A historical map of Europe and the Mediterranean region, showing various countries and cities. The map is in a dark, aged style with yellow and red highlights. The word 'GERMANY' is prominently displayed in large, bold, yellow letters across the center of the map. Other visible cities include Amsterdam, Berlin, London, and Rome. The map also shows the North Sea, the Baltic Sea, and the Mediterranean Sea.

# THE SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GERMAN REVOLUTION

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EDGAR JULIUS JUNG

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OF THE GERMAN  
REVOLUTION

EDGAR JULIUS JUNG

TRANSLATED WITH AN INTRODUCTION  
BY ALEXANDER JACOB

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# Introduction

By Alexander Jacob

THE CONSERVATIVE Revolutionary, or neoconservative, movement in the Weimar Republic was an elitist political enterprise that sought to restore Germany to its original spiritual and worldly standing as leader of the former Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation. Constituted of such intellectuals as Oswald Spengler, Arthur Moeller van den Bruck, and Edgar Julius Jung, the neoconservatives aimed at destroying the foreign socio-political ethos of the Weimar Republic which had been forced on Germany by the socialists. Most of the neoconservatives were members of the elitist clubs of the time, the Juniklub, founded by Moeller van den Bruck, and its successor, the Herrenklub, and were naturally opposed to all populist and liberal democratic systems.

Of the Conservative Revolutionary thinkers, perhaps the most systematic theorist and political activist was the Munich lawyer Edgar Julius Jung. Jung was not only a political thinker and propagandist but also an active politician in the Weimar Republic, having begun his political career simultaneously with his legal practice soon after the First World War. Jung was born in 1894 in the Bavarian Palatinate and served as a volunteer in the war.<sup>1</sup> After the war, he joined a Freikorps unit and participated in the liberation of Munich from the Bavarian Soviet Republic in the spring of 1919. Before the Franco-Belgian occupation of the Ruhr (1923–25), Jung had completed his doctorate in law and began practice in Zweibrücken. His political activities during this time included organising terrorist resistance activities against the Ruhr occupation and serving on the directory of the Deutsche Volkspartei.<sup>2</sup> After the Ruhr crisis, Jung established himself as an attorney in Munich, where he lived until his death.

Jung acquired renown through his several political writings in the *Deutsche Rundschau*, and his major political treatise *Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen* (second edition, 1930)<sup>3</sup> was, according to Jean Neuhrohr, considered a sort of ‘bible of neoconservatism’.<sup>4</sup> In January 1930, Jung



joined the Volkskonservative Vereinigung,<sup>5</sup> a right-wing party formed initially by twelve Reichstag deputies who had seceded from the Deutschnationale Volkspartei<sup>6</sup> led by Alfred Hugenberg. Jung's attitude to the rising National Socialist party of Hitler was lukewarm in spite of his admiration of the 'positive energies' of the movement. Jung felt that the 'nation' was being raised by Hitler as an idol to hypnotise the unenlightened masses, whereas a true conservative movement would have sought to elevate the masses through the sanctification of its leadership by a strongly established church. In other words, the National Socialists were not sufficiently free of the individualism which clings to every person so long as he does not derive his inspiration from the supra-sensual, metaphysical and religious sphere.

The conservative parties, however, were too divided to form a solid alternative to the nationalist forces, especially after a second secession from the DNV created another splinter party, the Konservative Volkspartei.<sup>7</sup> Jung's attempt to impose his own brand of 'revolutionary' conservatism on the Volkskonservative Vereinigung met with little success, and when the DNV and the KVP joined forces in December 1930, the leadership of the new coalition was handed not to Jung but to Paul Lejeune-Jung. In the January of the following year, Jung and a few Bavarian conservatives formed the Volkskonservative Bewegung zu deutscher Erneuerung<sup>8</sup> as a political home for all those who, untouched by the slogans and magic formulas of partisan political life, were prepared to look at contemporary political problems from the sole perspective of the historical mission of the German people.<sup>9</sup>

However, Jung's refusal to cooperate with the more moderate conservatives like Heinrich Brüning and G. R. Treviranus, in order to promote his own brand of revolutionary conservatism, did not help his movement, which had lost virtually all political force by the spring of 1931. Jung's lack of enthusiasm for the Brüning chancellorship was explained by him in a draft of a letter to Brüning appended to a letter to Pechel dated 14 August 1931:

Only when the government is well on its way to returning to the concept of authority and to freeing itself from the sterility of German parliamentarism can these forces be placed in the service of the nation as a whole. In reorganizing the cabinet the goal should be the complete

abandonment of its party basis. Not the approval of parties, but professional and practical competence should determine the selection of those whom you, respected chancellor, will need to help you in the mastery of these difficult tasks.

Jung had always maintained a superior attitude to Hitler's populism. However, when Hitler and the National Socialist party gained massive victories in the state and regional elections of 24 April 1932, Jung seemed to welcome the legal accession of the Nazis to power. For, although Jung was still apprehensive of the extremist tendencies of the Nazis, he hoped that this legal process would obviate a forced seizure which would be a greater political 'debacle'. Besides, the tide of Nazi enthusiasm in the country was unstoppable and the conservative alliance merely looked on helplessly as the NSDAP won a resounding victory in the Reichstag election of November 1932.

Jung was surprised when Hitler shrewdly joined forces with the conservative Franz von Papen to form a coalition government in January 1933. When von Papen was appointed vice-chancellor after Brüning in 1933, Jung wrote to von Papen offering his services as a speech writer and intellectual adviser. On the advice of his close associate, Hans Haumann, von Papen invited Jung to join his government in an advisory and organisational capacity. Jung's intention in serving the von Papen administration was 'to surround [von Papen] with a wall of conservatives' who would provide the vice-chancellor with the required moral fortification against Hitler's rapid rise to power.<sup>10</sup> Hoping to restrain the extremism of Hitler with his conservative ideology, Jung served as speech writer for von Papen when von Papen, Hugenberg and Franz Seldte of the *Stahlhelm* joined to form the conservative Kampffront Schwarz-Weiss-Rot.<sup>11</sup> His speeches were all designed to impress the new coalition of right-wing forces with a conservative stamp rather than an extremist Nazi one. Jung defended the von Papen government against the Nazis' accusations of reactionarism by stressing the revolutionary nature of the new Right and highlighting the spiritual and ideological defects of Hitler and his party.

While von Papen endeavoured to combat the Nazi movement from a conservative standpoint, Jung published the present work in 1933 to subtly criticise the National Socialist agenda. Already in June 1933, Jung remarked to his friend Rudolf Pechel that, since the conservatives were

‘responsible that this man came to power; now we have to get rid of him’.<sup>12</sup> His opposition to Hitler took a more concerted form in early 1934 when he undertook extensive travels throughout Germany to develop a network of conservative supporters who would assist in overthrowing the Hitler regime. Von Papen himself was unaware of Jung’s efforts in this direction and Jung’s chief assistance came from Herbert von Bose, Günther von Tschirschky, and Ketteler. Jung even contemplated personally assassinating Hitler,<sup>13</sup> though fears that this drastic action might disqualify him from assuming a leading role in the new leadership after the Nazi dictatorship caused him to adopt the academic alternative of writing another speech for von Papen, which the latter delivered at the University of Marburg on 17 June 1934. The repeated attacks on the illegitimacy of the Hitler regime and the practical political failures of this regime in this speech forced Hitler, under counsel from Göring, Himmler and his assistant Heydrich, to get rid of the menace posed by Jung. Thus, along with Röhm and the SA officers who had become rebellious, Jung too lost his life in the ‘Night of the Long Knives’, on 30 June 1934.

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Jung’s *Significance of the German Revolution* was written to serve as a guide to the German Revolution that had just reached a historic milestone with Hitler’s accession to power in January of 1933. As a Conservative Revolutionary, Jung welcomed the victory of the National Socialists but wished to see the German Revolution proceed in a more conservative direction than that taken by Hitler.

He begins the work by pointing out the difference between nationalism and conservatism, stressing that the former focuses primarily on the state while the latter is more concerned with the development of the individuals constituting it. Nationalism needs to imbue the entire nation with a new spiritual fervour that is lacking in the National Socialist agenda. For this there is need of the ‘spirit’, a quality that is, as he will show later, best embodied in religion and not in politics *per se*.

Jung traces the history of nationalism in modern Germany from its emergence as a reaction to the liberal French Revolution to the incorporation of the strong Prussian state into the Bismarckian Reich in

1871, when the integrity of the military Prussian character was diluted in the growing tendency of the bourgeois Germans to view themselves as a German 'nation'. Then came the disaster of the First World War, which ended with the socialist revolution of the Weimar Republic. The defeat of Germany in the war entailed severe economic losses as well as forced inactivity not only for a huge number of unemployed people but also for the members of the military. The military officers who joined Hitler's movement were thus glad to have a role to play again in political affairs while the youth, who had not been adequately absorbed into the economic and governmental offices in the Weimar Republic, were glad to march along with the National Socialists. While the masses formed a major part of Hitler's electoral supporters, the class most attracted to his nationalism, however, was the same bourgeoisie that had supported Bismarck's Reich. The war defeat meant the loss of substantial personal property and wealth for them. The ensuing economic crisis was heightened by the fact that there was, during the Weimar Republic, a break with the more honest economic practices that had prevailed in the country before the war. There was also no strong upper class similar to the British, which could hold the bourgeoisie within the ethical and social restraints of an aristocratic tradition.

In order to make Germany a totally nationalist state, Hitler had just resorted to the strategy of *Gleichschaltung*, or a totalitarian imposition of the National Socialist ideology on all aspects of the economy and society. Jung believed that this 'coordination' would rob the individual units within these sectors of their autonomy. For example, the '*vorläufige Gesetz zur Gleichschaltung der Länder mit dem Reich*', which made the governors agents of the central leadership, deprived the provinces of their autonomous development, while the rural areas too were forced to accept electoral candidates not from their own familiar circles but those appointed by the National Socialist party. The new Labour Front (*Arbeitsfront*) formed by the regime also did not really address the core issue of the relationship between employers and employees. All these effects contributed to a collectivistic organisation of society that was dangerous to the German nation.

Further, the introduction of increasing legal clauses by the National Socialist regime rendered the state subject to a legalism that did not really attempt to control the masses but rather empowered them to act in an unrestrained manner against those agents of the old liberal structures that



Hitler wished to destroy. Jung had in mind here particularly the Jewish liberal institutions that were the targets of the National Socialists' anger. He believed that it was sufficient to destroy the liberal institutions that were responsible for Germany's economic and social problems and that it was not necessary to attack the individuals running these institutions as well. Jung maintained that the Jewish problem was a conflict of two different cultures rather than a racial one. Racial anti-Semitism would result in frontal attacks on Jewish persons themselves rather than on the institutions they represented.

The Conservative Revolution, on the other hand, was built on a substantial intellectual foundation that promoted a new German state and Reich based on an essentially spiritual view of society and politics. As Jung declares:

We are all politicians with a worldview; we all consider as the indispensable precondition for every creative politics, indeed for the reestablishment of the concept of the political in general, a new belief, in the transcendental sense. Each of us reaches in our arduous way the alternatives: downfall of the West or re-Christianisation, anti-Reich or Reich ...

This transcendental Christian aspect of the Conservative Revolution is indeed the ultimate goal of Jung's political ideal:

Against mechanisation, materialism and scientific thought there enters first a new universalism to which historical interpreters of the rank of an Othmar Spann<sup>14</sup> awaken. But beyond that ... [b]eyond the thought in biological ways ..., thus beyond the cosmological, the path leads to a new transcendence and therewith to a revitalisation of the Gospel.

In the building of a conservative state, Jung insists strenuously on the worthlessness of the masses — not because of their lack of education, for even academics nowadays are imbued with a mass mentality — but because the kernel of a new German state can only be the creative individual:

The moral order of the world, the higher life, is based on the creative individual. He represents historically the people and not the masses, about whom the historical writer reports little. Germany means Kant and Goethe, it means Bach and Beethoven, it means Bismarck and Nietzsche. It receives its image from the great shapers of the German spirit. They embody the soul of the people even when there is lacking an external contiguity between them and the *populus*. One who transfers the representation of the people to the masses undercuts the roots of the intellectual-moral life of the masses, who do not acquire from themselves any imprint but only from the higher breed that towers above them.

Indeed, as long as they remain proletarians, the masses should never be considered as political material and the only way nationalism can be redeemed in a conservative direction is through their total depoliticisation.

The problem of the spread of the proletarian mentality is due to the fact that modern humanistic education has effected a general confusion of the intellectual and the spiritual so that there has arisen a sharp division in the nation:

...on the one side, the camp of the undervalued manual work, on the other, that of an intellectual stratum inwardly arrogant and hostile to life. Both are inimical to culture because the former has lost the connection with the mind and the latter that with life.

The elevation of the masses cannot be achieved through nationalist propaganda but through the replacement of the intellectual with a spiritual view of life:

The infusion of the manual working masses with a nationalist disposition is a mechanical process and not yet the emergence of the German spirit among the people. Only a common body of experience creates a uniform nation. When the spiritual man has replaced the intellectual man, the gap in the nation is closed. But that first requires the experience of the body-soul unity in every German individual. He must find his way back to the cosmos and to God; in him freedom, Nature and spirit must be fused together.

The individual must, as in the Fascist ideology of Gentile and Mussolini, develop into a personality, or else the community of which he forms a part will only turn into a collective organisation:

The developed sociological forms are those of freedom, while the collective forms are those of wilfulness because in the latter the person as the bearer of freedom is suffocated. In the collective forms the responsibility for the development of his life is taken away from the individual and total security is granted to him, thus a world without tragedy in which fate is silenced and therewith also the call of God to master this fate.

And, in a clear reference to Hitler's fondness for public displays, he goes on to add that the true leader is one who sets his sights on a higher goal than that of immediate political popularity and power:

The truly spiritual man is gnawed by a concern not so much for the external formation of political life as for the future of German man. He lives in a cooler atmosphere than the 'man of the people'. From his historical, spiritual and moral commitment arise automatically doubts. He loves his people in a teleological tension that allows him to a certain degree a relative sober-mindedness with regard to daily life. He feels without uttering any words and his celebrations

are rare. His gaze stares entranced into the future; the destiny of his nation is for him decided in the earnest striving of the peoples and not in the celebration of the day.

As a contrast to Hitler's populism, Jung considers the religious politics of Italian Fascism and quotes Mussolini's definition of Fascism:

"Fascism is a religious conception of the world in which man is seen in his relationship, innate in him, to a higher law, to an objective will that rises above the individual and raises him to the consciousness of a spiritual community."

Mussolini's Fascism offers a glimpse of the genuine fusion of politics with a transcendental religion like Christianity:

As regards Mussolini's totalitarian conception of the state, two things are to be considered: one, the power that extends from the Catholic space, from the Eternal City Rome. The Spanish Fascist Giménez Caballero<sup>15</sup> goes so far as to call Mussolini the spirit of Catholicism, a view that is corroborated by the ease with which the master of the totalitarian state, Mussolini, cancelled civil marriage and gave it over to the Church. Roman Catholicism remains, in the heart of the Roman, a typically Italian matter, a feeling that considerably softens the dualism between state and church. Italianness and Catholicism together form a totality.

Thus,

Fascism is a feeling for life that has been reawakened, a fighting stance against Calvin and Rousseau, against 1789, equality and the sovereignty of the people, against comfort and the bourgeois. It is the revolt of the spirit against matter.

Italy also allowed the individual to thrive within the 'totalitarian' system of Fascism:

If Mussolini summarises his totalitarian conception of the state in the formula 'Nothing outside the state', this sort of state totalitarianism does not stand in any irreconcilable opposition to the idea of the German sovereign state that is imposed in all fields of life even when it recognises their autonomy. Obviously, all the life of a nation must proceed in the state but it does not need to go through the state, and the latter is the other form of totalitarian conception of the state such as that which threatens to enter the German space from Russia. Italy therefore allows to the personality a legally secured free space. All forms of planned economy, ultracapitalism, and state capitalism that could endanger "the right and the freedom of the individual" are rejected by Fascism just as it also ensures the free development of the intellectual and religious life. It remains pledged to Western culture while Russia has returned to eastern-Asiatic forms of rule.

Unfortunately, in Germany, the Christian political theology of a political economist like Adam Müller<sup>16</sup> was no longer possible on account of the weakening of Christianity as a political force. In Russia, Bolshevism had

discarded religion altogether. National Socialism offered its own social ideology as a substitute for religion, but this is indeed inadequate:

For, according to the Christian doctrine, a genuine worldview can be obtained only from religion; it must therefore encompass the universe and God. Christ says: I can die for the nation and the state but I cannot turn them into a religion. I can profess German nationalism and a socialist ethics on the basis of a transcendental faith, but I cannot set up nationalism and socialism in the place of religion.

Jung also pauses to discuss the value of the monarchy as an integral part of the Conservative Revolutionary worldview:

...the crown grows out of the history of a people. But, once it is born, it is due to the grace of God and lives its own life, which can as little be revoked as the life of other beings once it has been produced. A nation that destroys the crown murders a symbol that it has set up beyond itself, free from any attack from itself. It becomes subject once again to temporality, which it had already overcome with the crown.

In an oblique reference to the Führer principle, Jung adds:

...the crown artificially produced by the people, especially when it is newly gilded as part of a constitutional statute, is a fake, a copy, not an original, a mechanism, not genuine life. Crowns by the grace of the people always wobble.

He does note that the National Socialists too seemed inclined to create a sort of elite 'order' (inspired by the mediaeval Teutonic Order), but he points out that it is important that such an order be formed not through denomination by the party but through 'a new principle of selection according to which that person belongs to the ruling minority who has made a special contribution to the people and the state'.

In any case, the end result of a Conservative Revolution should be the spiritualisation of the individuals and organisations that constitute the nation:

Freedom in the state of the Conservative Revolution is based profoundly on the religious rebirth that sets the individual man before the restraints of conscience ...The infusion of our collectivist world with a personal spirit is the highest task of the German Revolution. In it does genuine nationalism come to be; it alone embodies historical man who has arisen in order to lead the German people once again into history, to bear witness to the German mission.

This German mission was clearly more than a merely state-oriented one. Whereas Moeller van den Bruck had introduced the idea of Germany's Third Reich, he had not proposed a clear vision of its extra-German scope.

Instead, he had focused more on the need to unite all German peoples together in a revived German Reich. Jung places great emphasis on the fact that Germany has a vital role to play in central Europe and even in Europe as a whole. For, the liberal doctrines of the French Revolution have had a far-reaching subversive effect on the continent that can be remedied only if the centre of power returns from Western to Central Europe:

The centre of gravity of Europe shifted from the centre of Europe to the West, the Holy Roman Empire of the German nation collapsed, new political forms emerged: the British Empire and the “civilisation” of the French national democracy. The traditional enmity between the two was forgotten when the West, and the world civilised by it, entered in 1914 against Central Europe to suppress it. Versailles and Geneva are the symbols of the victory of 1789. Every world-historical upheaval, every rescue of Europe that has lost its peace, therefore have as their precondition the return of the European centre of gravity to the centre. The conservative counter-revolution is, accordingly, to be evaluated in its state-creative capacity of revivifying the Reich idea in a revolutionary way. For, it alone opposes to the disintegrating effects of the national democratic state idea that binding force that can reorder the fragmented Europe.

The most dangerous result of the liberal order instituted by the French Revolution was indeed the rupture that it has caused between man and God:

The world was desacralised, and man deprived of God. Not only in the sense that the life of the individual was no longer an unbroken encounter with God but also in that the understanding, desiring emancipation, distanced itself ever farther from the cosmic life. The alienation happened equally from God as also from Nature. Man believed with fervour in civilisation; religion was secularised. Progress, technology, work, wealth, comfortable living, earthly power, state, nation are only a small part of the false gods whose images were erected.

Germany’s mission to regenerate Europe was based on the historical role that it had played for several centuries as the leader of the Holy Roman Empire. The suitability of the Germans for the organisation of Europe was thus vouchsafed by history:

The history of our people shows us as the defender of the Cross, as the protector and regulator of the peoples of Europe who live under the crown of the German Kaiser. The Reich and the Kaiser are the defending forces against paganism and the Anti-Christ; they have repelled for a millennium all attacks that surged against Christianity.

As well as by the Germanic character itself:

Our historical character is based on spiritual profundity. That is why we were not only the lords defending Christianity but also warriors for the purity of the Gospel. From that arose the inner confessional schism from which we suffer. It cannot be denied or removed with violence. At a higher level, however, it is surmountable: on that of the common fight against the Anti-Christ.



The uprising of the German people against Bolshevism is nothing but a return to our great historical task: to be defenders of the Christian doctrine of salvation.

The task of reviving the religious foundations of Europe was an urgent one and one that could be performed only by Conservative Revolutionaries who were truly Christian in spirit:

The revolutionary power of Christianity has been in effect since it created a new world: the West. This Christian West became in the nineteenth century tired and desecralised. It threatened to succumb to the Anti-Christ in the form of rationalism, this-worldliness and materialism. The action of re-Christianisation therefore rises with revolutionary force and its success will decide the existence or non-existence of the European cultural world.

If it be objected that Germany is itself cleft into two Christian denominations, Protestant and Catholic, Jung responds that this very division may serve as a strength in its religious mission for, while the Protestant Church is suited to the consolidation of the German state, Catholicism, by its nature, is an excellent instrument of the dominion of Germany over the rest of Europe:

The breadth of religious life that speaks through the German bi-religious condition can indeed be made useful to the historical development. For, a nation that includes Protestants and Catholics enjoys the advantage of uniting both cultural traditions in its worldview.

The need for a European German Reich was also based on the fact that smaller nations could not exist fruitfully on their own:

Commerce and the economy demand larger units, and civilisation and technology a more refined distribution of work, which small nations cannot afford. If they insist on their own statehood, they condemn themselves to an existence in which they can neither live nor die.

However, the rule of Germany over Europe must be not a militaristic but a spiritual one:

If this spiritual realm prevails, then even the military and strategic calculations of obstinate cabinets will be annulled. They are based on the militarisation of the entire national force, on the basic idea of national democracy, the universal military service. If we grant to the nations the certainty that their national life is no longer threatened by any state politics, that the national laws are internationally sacrosanct, they will return to their earth-bound natural life and leave the realm of state politics to those to whom it is a passion and a vocation.

The German Reich must order the nations under its care with justice, and justice, like dominion, is derived ultimately from God:

The great task of politics is ordering among those that are unequal, whether it be among men or among nations. This order will not occur without justice, and justice is impossible without rule. But only the one who utilises power in the Grace of God is called to rule.

# I. On the Necessity of This Work

THE STORMIER THE SEA, the more often does the sailor check the location of his vessel. So too we revolutionaries are pressured by the desire for certainty regarding our present position. The bourgeois can afford to shrug his shoulders and cover every event with the blanket term of 'revolution'. For him the revolution is an event that he allows to proceed above him; for us it is a long desired voluntary act of shaping. The revolutionary is like a rider who is proud of his pedigree horse but presses his legs and shortens the reins so that it does not take a single step without his willing it.

In the course of history lie many things that its instrument, man, cannot foresee. But precisely because of this he should not rely merely on the basics of a revolution and refrain from the duty of signifying and forming it. For, only thinking makes man; it controls the instincts and lends an inner meaning to events. Rational planning remains the characteristic of human activity. If it is suspended or if thought is restricted to justifying the instinctual life intellectually, then begins the sin against the spirit. But to planning belongs the sensible interpretation of the present; the future is nothing more than a linking to the present and continuation of that which has come to be.

The appeal of the essential and neglect of form give to a revolution its strength. But these are also its danger, which is so much greater in that it can be contested on rational grounds. The German Revolution has been characterised by all revolutionaries, and also by me, as an uprising of blood and spirit against intellect and doctrine. One invokes the battle of the 'soul' against the 'mind' (Ludwig Klages)<sup>17</sup> ; Nietzsche, the Romantics, and already the instinctual is glorified and intellectual discipline discredited. That the opposition of the intellect as the antagonist of the soul is merely polemical, and cannot be taken literally, but only dialectically, is then easily overlooked. The assumption of an actual dualism leads to a dangerous dichotomisation of life into a so-called intellectual and a so-called blood-related side. If small elaborations are added to it, such as theory and practice, the confusion is complete. Then only a small step separates one

from the false conclusion that one can also play off intellect and politics as enemies against each other.

The essential in a revolution does not stand in any opposition to the thinking intellect. On the contrary: revolutions are epochs of heightened intellectual activity, even when material cares and desires apparently overrun them. Every genuine revolution is the rise of a new measure of value in the intellectual sphere. Where this is not the case it is only a question of a social uprising or, indeed, only of a political coup.

Historical change is only seldom univocal and cannot therefore be easily reduced to a common denominator. So also the currents that flow together in the German Revolution of 1933 are of varied origins. But, just as it is important, after the merger, which of the headstreams gives the main stream its name, so also in the case of the German Revolution it will be decisive which intellectual orientation prevails in it and lends to it its historical stamp. The highest task of this work is to present the origins of the present events and to investigate their innate direction as well as to determine both their political stance and the course of the future.

For two decades the author of this work has been a champion of the German Revolution and fought for it. How could he not welcome the events of the last months? He places in the spiritual purity and the intellectual power of the German people that trust that a person thinking historically must have when he is aware of how slowly God's mills grind. Every event has its deep significance that often is evident only in retrospect. So I affirm the power of this awakening and am certain of the realisation of the German spirit with which this Revolution will be crowned.

## II. The Origins of the German Revolution

THE GERMAN REVOLUTION comes from two roots, the conservative and the nationalist. The conservative orientation aims at renewal of life, the nationalist at a new political ordering. In this juxtaposition there lies obviously nothing contradictory. For, political life is nothing but the social side of human life and divisible from the latter only tactically and not essentially. One can also view the distinguishing mark between the conservative and nationalist way of thought in the fact that the concept of the political among the conservatives is more broadly stretched, denoting merely the ordering force in human life, whereas the nationalist has in view mainly the ordering of the state, understanding by political every activity related to the state. The conservative conducts his, in the narrow sense, political activity based on the totality of his view of life. The nationalist, on the other hand, politicises life, relates everything to the state, and in this way succumbs to a narrowing of life.

There is no question that the post-war nationalism proceeded to demand not only a political sense but also a human attitude, thus becoming conservative. This begins where the waters of the two currents — of conservatism and of nationalism — begin to mix. Then nationalism, which is, according to its historical origins, indeed liberal, begins to become conservative. Not only in the sense that conservatism rubs off on nationalism but in the more significant one that the conservative principle of the age draws even the nationalists under its spell. In the nationalism of the post-war period, conservative and liberal elements are mixed in an apparent synthesis. But we must maintain the differentiation between conservative and nationalist. For, conservatism is the historically necessary revolutionary principle with which the liberal age has been replaced.

The nationalist current can be easily traced back to its origin. It is the reaction to that German liberty about which Conrad Ferdinand Meyer<sup>18</sup> has the revolutionary Ulrich von Hutten complain. It would be too much of a



digression to discover the conditionality of this liberty, to fix it in its geographical, historical, ethnic-biological and intellectual contexts. On this much that is good has been written by professional authors. Let us observe of this recent form of liberty just that the Marxist ‘internationalism’, which we revolutionaries — especially since the disastrous November 1918 days — felt as the crux of the German internal political tragedy, needs to be neither the necessary symbol of a workers’ movement nor of a foreign influence. The worker loses his fatherland only when he is rootless, and intellectual infiltration is the historical fault mostly of those who allow themselves to be infiltrated. The pre-war period stands even now under the banner of liberty. Thus our pre-war nationalism lacked a spiritual underpinning. Hence also the tense relations that prevailed between it and the ‘spirit’. The unfortunate condition of the Kaiserreich consisted in the fact that the political will to power of the German nation as something barbaric could be placed in an artificial opposition to the ‘other Germany’ of Bach, Kant, Goethe and Nietzsche. In Germany ‘the idea did not unite with the dagger’, to use Victor Hugo’s expression. The German spirit was without any weapons and German arms without any ideas.

The claim raised by democracy of being the real representative of German culture lost its justification in the post-war period because the intellectual centre of gravity shifted towards the right. At first silenced, scorned and maligned, but then acknowledged on account of its power and depth, nationalist literature proved its right to existence. But then again, the question ‘conservative or nationalist’ appeared in its full significance. For, nationalism created an intellectual worth only where it turned from a tendency into a basic human attitude but thereby attained that wholeness that constitutes the essence of conservatism. From a merely intellectual conviction nothing truly intellectual can be created, only from the inner life. The life of the peoples is secured when the life of the individual men, customs and classes is a nationalist one. Nationalism as a superficial tendency penetrates as little into the depths as clothes may make a man. In this way we find also the explanation for the surprising phenomenon that the Western nations have absorbed their Jews but do not exhibit an understanding of the Jewish question that would be appropriate to the German conditions. Their nationalism is rooted in life — or corresponds to life. This is true especially for the Romance countries, from which

nationalism derives its intellectual origin. For they are peopled by ‘nations’ that were never ‘peoples’ in Fichte’s sense. In England it is different because there the Jewish question was solved in a conservative manner: not by forcing the Jew to assume an English nationalist attitude but by letting him bow down to the superior aristocratic social order that holds the English world empire together intellectually and socially. There the Jews acknowledge the independent English social forms, among us they break all bonds, destroy our social structure and in this manner penetrate into leading positions. Therewith the emergence of a Jewish question in Germany becomes inevitable.

At this point begins the difficult problem of people and nation that has been fundamentally investigated and discussed by thinkers like Günther,<sup>19</sup> Stapel,<sup>20</sup> Boehm.<sup>21</sup> Is not ‘nation’ the form of ‘national consciousness’ precisely of the Western ‘nations’, is not the national state nourished and borne by nationalism merely the state form of France and its great Revolution? In England things are different. When England wished to regenerate itself after the war, it voted Conservatives, destroyed liberalism, which, according to its character, can most quickly produce nationalism and for that reason indeed set up the great propagandist Lloyd George during the war. Is the idea not at hand that nationalism as a national way of life could not be appropriate to the Germans, that, rather more, the great process of becoming a nation and the fusion of the German people into a historically viable unity was to occur in another way than that of the victory of a ‘tendency’? That it is much more a matter of the birth of a new attitude that corresponds to the German character and forces the individual German under the spell of nation and empire?

History showed us first the way that was prescribed to us from the collapse of the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation: the way in line with the West. The German patriot looked with envy at the closed nation of France, with justified anger at the doctrinaire cosmopolitanism of the German Left, not conscious itself that the workers’ internationalism was only the continuation of that degenerate cosmopolitanism that emerged with the spiritual decadence of the German bourgeoisie. Thus there arose, instead of the old Prussian conservatism which forfeited its significance and its basic attitude with the evolution of Prussia into the Bismarck Reich,

German nationalism. But when, in 1918, the undefeated army disintegrated in the utopia of national fraternisation, German freedom approached its end; the national democracy introduced late into Germany itself created the preconditions of that powerful counter-movement of German nationalism that had to come to power because no respectable nation can ever forgive itself an inner collapse like that of the years from 1918 to 1920. German democracy was burdened by a mortgage of defeatism that had to be removed if the German nation was to ever become viable again. This defeatism was so much more dangerous in that it was not only of a political sort but also related to defence policy. An essentially militaristic nation like the German cannot in the long run be held back from finding itself and acting in *Männerbund* and soldierly forms. When our enemies forced on us a ridiculous amount of military equipment and training, they laid to a certain degree the foundation for the German military associations. When the Freikorps did not have any more anti-Spartacist and border defence tasks, when every coup had become impossible, the militaristic men of the German nation had to move in a direction such as that of the SA. And so there developed from the party a militant political movement. In this way there arose that characteristic mixture of a propagandist party of the masses and revolutionary troops that is called National Socialism.

With the adoption of soldierly forms a decisive change in the nature of parties is achieved. To be sure, Marxism had already sinned against the spirit of parliamentarism when it incited its masses to demonstrations on the street. Therewith the path of purely intellectual debate was abandoned and that of terrorism entered upon. But the Social Democrats rejected 'militarism' even if their people maintained discipline as military veterans. It was different with National Socialism. It made use not only of military forms but also of the excellent officer material, whose powers had been freed by the forced disarmament. As politicians, the numerous officers put on leave would certainly not have been dangerous to the Weimar system, but as leaders of militant forms they became that. Even if not in the sense that the SA strode to a coup. The Revolution was accomplished still in a democratic way. The significance of the SA lies in the fact that it became the guarantor of the Revolution that had taken place.

The bourgeois parties were not equal to the new militant party form. What was formed from their ranks of semi-military forms remained a

pathetic imitation of the National Socialist model that could never be attained because the spirit of the bourgeois parties was outdated, defensive or indeed pacifistic. So the fate that these formations, from the Reichsbanner<sup>22</sup> to the Bayernwacht,<sup>23</sup> suffered was a historically logical one. It is different with the Stahlhelm,<sup>24</sup> which was never a political troop but a tradition-bearing defence organisation in which the foreign political determination of the concept of defence repressed the internal political battle spirit. As much as this was, in itself, natural so much more significant did this circumstance have to become for the course of the German Revolution.

If, in summary, one considers the nationalist current of the German Revolution, one can distinguish, first, the nationalism of a bourgeois sort, such as informed the basically liberal forces that emerged from the Alldeutscher Verband<sup>25</sup> and were to be found everywhere, whether in the Deutsche Volkspartei,<sup>26</sup> the Deutschnationale Volkspartei<sup>27</sup> or even in individual groups of the nationalist movement. And then the pure Wehrbewegung,<sup>28</sup> which drew the entire nationalist camp under its spell, especially in the form of the Stahlhelm, but also radiated to the German Left. Finally, National Socialism, a mixture of revolutionary nationalism and defence movement, whose impulse was directed predominantly to internal political goals.

The revolutionary impetus in National Socialism is varied. First, it was directed against the November rule,<sup>29</sup> and was therefore directed to conquest of state power and removal of the Weimar regime. In addition, there was the social revolutionary side of National Socialism, which is in no way clear and deserves more exact investigation. Here the more emotional socialism of the National Socialist leader is to be mentioned, which comes closest to the thesis of Spengler: socialism is not an economic form but a social ethos. The formulas, ‘public interest before private interest’ and ‘the indissoluble bond of intellectual and manual workers’, point to the fact that the National Socialist Party was in its foundational stage free of ideas that tended to socialistic *economic* forms. This wing was formed only later under the influence of theoreticians coming into the party. Just as it must be ascertained generally that, like the dying liberalism, even the collapsing Marxism always made stronger progress intellectually. One can explain the

collapse of its battle troop, Social Democracy, broadly by the fact that it became superfluous to the degree that its programme imbued the entire German nation, especially the bourgeoisie — which was not even aware of it. Consequently National Socialism had, on account of its anti-Marxist fighting position, to take up a position to a certain extent also against the bourgeoisie. A further socialist revolutionary side of National Socialism consists in what I would like to call its sociology. It became the party of the ‘dispossessed’, but in another sense than how Boehmer considered this in relation to Marxism. The ‘dispossessed’ of Marxism were the progeny of peasants who had become landless, who had become victims of industrialisation and urbanisation. The homeland of the Marxist ‘proletariat’ was the country. In the case of the dispossessed who gathered around National Socialism, it was another stratum of the population, the victims of the collapse of the bourgeoisie. The defeat in the war cost us the army, colonies, border provinces, the navy, and overseas trade establishments. The inflation destroyed bourgeois tradition and wealth. The deflation restricted the space of economic activity. Corporatisation and overcapitalisation reduced the number of independent subsistences. The unlimited increase of scholars cultivated an educated proletariat. An adventurous era tempted many less successful people to seek their salvation in politics. In this way there arose an enormous stratum of those restricted in their personal advancement. If one considers further the blindness with which the war generation was held back from entry into leading positions by the ossified upper class, the force with which a movement of outsiders advanced to the conquest of social and political positions becomes more understandable. It is just this dynamic that makes National Socialism unassailable but also gives it a social revolutionary character of a very special sort, namely, a pronounced individualistic one, though not in worldview but in method. One may just think how differently Marxism imagined the conquest of social and political power. Its historical conception, learnt from Karl Marx, rejected every individual action and every concern for the rise of the individual as being directed against the class. This is its chief differentiating trait from the Syndicalism of a Sorel,<sup>30</sup> who — to a certain degree against his will — influenced the social-revolutionary practice of National Socialism. Violent forays, the conquest of individual power positions,



especially the factory units, lie largely within the conception of Syndicalism. The social upheaval in a Europe that has become heavily populated indeed extends to all countries and will pass over none. Its form is directed by the history and character of individual nations. Among us fortunately it is not called Marxism, which would have become dangerous to German culture, but National Socialism, which elevates it and lends it a new rank.

As multihued as the shimmer of the waters of the National Socialist current may be, so singular is that revolutionary orientation that should be designated here with the catchphrase of revolutionary conservatism. Anyone who participates in it naturally comes from his own point of departure and has his own field of activity. But the worldview cloud that hangs over these fields of activity is the same. Everywhere the threatening dissolution of the eternal values is recognised, and the subversive effect of the liberal world of ideas and forms is ascertained as its cause. Since this shifting and dying liberal, individualistic age contains in itself no powers of renewal, it must be removed in a revolutionary way through a period of conservation. The revolutionary conservative sacrifices temporary values to rescue eternal ones. In this formula the apparent contradiction — on which those who think in a primitive way always stumble — between revolutionary and conservative is resolved. The foolish idea that a conservative is one who clings to the current status quo and wishes to halt the cycle of time violently comes from an age in which there was no genuine conservatism anymore and nobody had a correct view of it.

Such a return to vitality is the core of the German nationalist idea and of the new nationalist theory that views the peoples again as the bearers of history. This reaction against a purely political-historical conception is forced on the German people through the observation of the area of German settlement in Europe, by the insight that a coincidence of state and ethnic borders is not possible for the German people, through the fragmentation of Eastern Europe into many states and by the never silenced wailing of suppressed minorities. The age-old doctrine of German history is rediscovered — that the large nation of Central Europe between West and East has to come together and not break apart. There is no decision in favour of the West or the East, there is for us only the bridging. Nationalism is not a vital form for the Germans because its view is turned from the

borders inwards, whereas the view of the German people at all borders must naturally be turned outwards. That only a people who are ethnically conscious are equal to this task does not require any more explanation. In this way arises the doctrine of the independent people as a new ethnically conscious level at which the German people enter for the fulfilment of their world-historical task. From this way of considering foreign policy, which is consummated in the idea of a federation and the idea of a *Reich*, it is not far to a way of considering internal policy that strives for the natural ordering of the nation.

But the recollection of the conservative fundamental truths of history penetrates also political thought. It is no accident that men like von Gleichen,<sup>31</sup> Boehm<sup>32</sup> and Moeller van den Bruck<sup>33</sup> come together immediately after the end of the war. Whereas Boehm develops the nationalist doctrine outlined above, the observations of von Gleichen and his friends revolve around the concept of genuine state authority and a hierarchical national order. The genius of Moeller van den Bruck, defining the core of the entire revolutionary intellectual output, observes the great connection between the internal condition of a nation and its external situation as a nation among nations.

The impulse towards renewal of life not only changes the philosophical worldview but leads to a new foundation. Against mechanisation, materialism and scientific thought there enters first a new universalism, to which historical interpreters of the rank of an Othmar Spann<sup>34</sup> awaken. But beyond that, it does not remain at a return to the 'mothers' such as modern psychology (Klages, C. G. Jung) teaches it. Beyond the thought in biological ways (Kolbenheyer),<sup>35</sup> thus beyond the cosmological, the path leads to a new transcendence and therewith to a vivification of the Gospel. We would like to leave it to future historiography to position individual minds like Gogarten,<sup>36</sup> Stapel,<sup>37</sup> Ziegler<sup>38</sup> within intellectual history. Particularly marked is the impulse to a new theory of transcendence in the work of Georg Weippert.<sup>39</sup>

The conservative literature is rich in the political field. But even there it does not limit itself to the purely political but impinges on the Platonic conception of politics, strives therefore for a new total ordering. Thus Moeller van den Bruck moves from the arts to politics; thus I was forced in

my *Rule of the Inferior* to cross over from politics to religion. We are all politicians with a worldview; we all consider as the indispensable precondition for every creative politics, indeed for the reestablishment of the concept of the political in general, a new belief, in the transcendental sense. Each of us reaches in our arduous way the alternatives: downfall of the West or re-Christianisation, anti-Reich or Reich, as A. E. Günther<sup>40</sup> would say.

The Conservative Revolutionary movement belongs to the finest flowers of German intellectual life and has already today surpassed in inner strength the Romanticism of the nineteenth century. It has also encompassed an extended circle of highly qualified men, and influenced and shaped the worldview of the younger generation. What is present of conservative intellectual ideas in National Socialism is related to this orientation. An extremely fastidious detail-work constituted of thousands of trainings, speeches, talks, essays and writings has been accomplished in the last decade. The principle ideas of international law, the idea of the Reich, the renewal being prepared of our educational system, the idea of social orders, the aristocratic principle, housing- and work-camps, religious rebirth, population politics, all of this is the conservative ideology. But, above all, the German nation owes to this intellectual movement the undermining of the human rights ideology that the Weimar structure bore and, further, the destruction of the belief in formal law, dialectics and the intellect alone.

That this Conservative Revolutionary orientation is not present today in the consciousness of the broad masses remains as understandable as it is serious. Understandable because nationalism stands in the foreground and occasionally coincides with conservatism. Serious because the creative shaping of the future is based on the power of the Conservative Revolutionary idea.

### III. 1918–1933

THE GERMAN LEFT was pacifist and, around the end of the war, preached international fraternisation not through strategy but through conviction. Therewith it clashed with the law of life. When in 1919 it had to claim the help of the nationalist Freikorps for the building up of its state, the fate of the Weimar state was preordained. Perhaps it fulfilled a historical task that we too, as its sworn enemies, could admit: that of overcoming the war psychosis in the world. But it could not kindle enthusiasm. What happened in 1933 in the Garrison Church in Potsdam<sup>41</sup> was not possible in 1919 in Weimar. The great self-purification of the nation, the discarding of one's own feeling of guilt became possible only fifteen years after the world war. The admission of this fact does not contain any justification of the uncreative and feeble politics of the Weimar system that we fought against from the first day. But it arises from the insight that the German nation needed a fairly long time to recover from the November collapse.

The counter-movement against this mutineer revolution had to obtain a chance the moment that a youth had grown up that had not experienced the internal collapse with its numerous contingencies and had not been drafted into the work of Weimar. They tipped the scales in numbers and dynamism. This counter-movement was highly due, no matter under what name and what leadership. It could also have been accomplished in another form; it did not need to be eruptive. If France had not sought to perpetuate the Versailles system but had left us the universal military service, indeed tolerated the *Anschluss*,<sup>42</sup> the internal German and the European situation would have been different. If the power-holders of Weimar exercised rule instead of feeling themselves to be representatives of the masses, they would not have lost the people. If the intellectual alienation had been effectively combated, anti-Semitism would not have seized an entire nation. If the Jews had maintained a tactful restraint, the bitter fate of these days would have been spared them. If the state had conducted a creative economic policy instead of becoming the playball of interests, it would not have come to the collapse of the national economy. If one had in a timely

fashion incorporated the German youth in the state and economy, they would not have risen up against the senile. But precisely the circumstance that all these conditions were not fulfilled proves how deep the evil was rooted. There were at hand inevitabilities that could be halted only in a revolutionary way.

Along with this general ossification in the intellectual and political fields, the mechanisation of the economy, which robbed it of all elasticity and made it helpless against economic fluctuations, worked in the same direction. In this way, the international economic crisis became the practical crisis of capitalism. Morally, it has existed for a long time as the consequence of the atheistic condition of the economic men. Without religion there is no ethics capable of resistance. The age of the royal merchant, described often in literature, was over when the ledger no longer began or was kept with the phrase ‘with God’.<sup>43</sup> Today a complicated apparatus of wonderful accounting machines, index cards, auditors that lie outside the personal field of the so-called business leader, represent accounting. What do the handshake of the honourable businessman acting in good faith and a businessman’s honour mean? This backbone of the genuine private economy has been broken. Every leadership, even economic, receives its justification from the high degree of responsibility of the leader. A healthy people allow their possessions to be administered only by those who fulfil this task with a pure heart and clean hands and vouch for their privileged position with their head. If the state leadership is no longer represented by men of a high rank that is felt by the masses to be simply unattainable, then anybody would wish to rule because power beckons and appears only as a privilege, not as a duty. The same thing is true of the economy: where wealth is no longer earned in a humane way — it is not so much a matter of work performance as the spirit of the age wishes to believe — there arises in every person the desire to enjoy it. The ‘coordination’<sup>44</sup> of the economy attempted and partly implemented today proves, among other things, how far its bureaucratisation and collectivisation have proceeded. For, the genuine economy is borne by the true personality who can in no way be replaced through ‘coordination’ but can be replaced only through an organic promotion, and one according to tradition, by a new economic personality.

The decay and parasitism of the ‘godless businessman’ provoke violence. A new stratum strives for the possession of economic wealth scorning a law that lacks inward significance. In this way arises a ‘biological’ socialism, infinitely easier than Marxism and laughing at the utopia of a society without possessions and classes. Against this revolutionary uprising there is no external remedy. It could be countered only through spiritual and moral regeneration. The only effective medium through which the person can be bound to the community is his conscience. If this is lacking, the culture of personality collapses because then the collective prescribes to the individual the space within which he may develop. External force enters in the place of inner connection.

Nobody, insofar as he was somehow ‘anchored’ in the Weimar world, in the last fourteen years wanted to see the threatening revolt. Outside National Socialism it was known to only the Conservative Revolutionaries that the revolution of 1918 was only the beginning of a revolutionary development that perhaps extends over an age. The admonishers and warning voices were laughed at as utopians and romantics, decried as fools. Already in the Stresemann<sup>45</sup> era began the efforts to open the eyes of the ruling circles. Then came Brüning,<sup>46</sup> who indeed saw that the Weimar state was not viable but, caught in the primacy of foreign policy, undervalued the internal political tensions and therefore did not shape things in a creative manner. Von Papen<sup>47</sup> had the final opportunity to neutralise the pluralist forces (parties and economic interests) from above without mobilisation of the masses and to reestablish the state in its pure form. Naturally, that required time and nerves. But it required also a naturally revolutionary temperament that was absent in the legally-oriented bourgeois circles sustaining the government of von Papen. So the attempt of von Papen’s cabinet to reorganise the Reich remained stuck in its initial stage, the indirect route through the large popular movement had to be taken, a realisation of which von Papen himself drew the conclusion in January of this year.

Why indirect route? Because the goal of the German Revolution must be the depoliticisation of the masses, their disconnection from the state leadership. This Revolution leads to an anti-democratic principle of leadership, or it is lost. Of course, it can be objected that the fusion of the

masses into the 'nation' is the requirement of the day. But, as right as this knowledge may seem to everybody who bears in himself the collapse of the nation in 1918 as a tragic experience, one can still be divided in one's opinion on the psychological path that is to be taken for the attainment of the internal German unity. Indeed there is, along with the psychology of the masses, another psychology of the nation, a difference to which we shall return later.

The last months have vindicated those who declared the rottenness of our bourgeois world and our legal system. Thereby we mean precisely the German readiness to acknowledge the efficiency of legal clauses. With some generosity one can agree with the opinion of the legality of this Revolution. It is legal. But it is another question whether legality, compared to permanent law, is a desirable intellectual attitude. Here it must be said that the legal policy is so much more dangerous the more the bearers of a revolution appeal to the current law. For, a revolution is always an appeal to the eternal law that is invoked against a worn-out legal world. As contradictory as it sounds, breach of law strengthens the consciousness of law if it creates a new law, and legality weakens legal policy if it practically allows a frail law to disintegrate.

Already Machiavelli condemned the power-holders who relinquished their power. In this Revolution the bourgeois world, insofar as it was politically formed, has voluntarily relinquished power. There are only two possibilities: either it is so little viable that it withdraws as a sociological and intellectual force. Or it renews itself from within and fights in the revolutionary line for its life.

The foundation of the new regime on 30 January 1933 was not a revolutionary act and nevertheless it is the historically decisive event. At a juncture when there was announced a turnaround in the psyche of the nation, in which the democratisation and politicisation showed symptoms of fatigue, at this juncture, that is, precisely at the last minute, the nationalist government came to power. That its certificate of appointment displayed the signature of the only man in Germany whose authority was contested by nobody, of the 86-year-old victor of Tannenberg,<sup>48</sup> removed the last doubts.

Then, with the help of emergency decrees and with the deployment of the instruments of political power, with the captivating flamboyance of



National Socialist activity, legitimate government elections were implemented. The success was overwhelming and proved the collapse of German liberalism, to be sure, not in numbers but morally, including its key position, the centrist stronghold. The election victory provided the impetus to a revolutionary development that continues.

Here a short observation on the relation of state and revolution, statesman and popular tribune must be made. First, it must be stated that even a constitutional regime can become revolutionary if, through a coup, it suspends the constitution. Such a coup is not present following the conception of our revolutionary state leader, since the actual revolutionary act is contained in the Enabling Act.<sup>49</sup> Nevertheless, a regime can — in all legality — be revolutionary if it proceeds to radically change the intellectual, social and political condition of a nation. The act that is in a historical sense revolutionary is basically nothing but the creation of laws according to new legal principles. A revolution is then accomplished when a new law comes into force. Its scope is determined by the extent of the swing of the historical pendulum. The more fundamental the intellectual upheaval, the more lasting and far-reaching a revolution.

The difference between legality and illegality, which goes beyond that between evolution and revolution, is often only a tactical one. Of course, the revolutionary method guarantees greater freedom of movement tactically and therefore the possibility of clearing the rubble more quickly. Nevertheless, in the final analysis, it is a matter of the intellectual substance of the revolution and not of the methods. If the goal of an evolutionary development is more extensive than that of a revolutionary one, the historical effect is also deeper. However, the most radical revolutionary methods do not always guard against becoming stuck in the old attitudes. Only historical distance allows a judgement on whether only a change of government has taken place or only a coup or a genuine revolution. The real revolutionary act therefore lies in legally creative reorganisation for which the radicalism of the methods is only a means to an end.

This legal formulation is the responsibility of the statesman. His natural enemy is every foreign political power. The day that the leader of a popular movement attains political power there arises for him the necessity of stabilising this authority as the only one in the country. The revolutionary

on whom the state authority devolves in its entirety at twelve o'clock is, at one o'clock, the most conservative man in his nation. This conservative obligation does not contradict his revolutionary will to transform the nation and the state because it is only a matter of the consolidation of his power. Nevertheless, at first, he assumes a middle position. He must indeed merge the popular movement led by him into the new state and make it useful to it. It is his power source that conducts to him the political energies to penetrate the temporarily alien state with his style. On the other hand, there lives in the revolutionary popular movement a dynamic directed against the state that cannot be stopped suddenly. The more it is based on social, and not only on political, instincts, the stronger it is.

Where does the danger point lie? While the state apparatus is legally ordered to the last detail, that of a popular movement is based on voluntary discipline. The will is propagated in the administration from the top to the bottom without any resistance. In the popular movement there is only one will, from the bottom to the top. The more inconsiderate and vigorous the agitation was that unleashed it, the more powerful it is. Every agitation consists in changes that are offered as a redemption. The more comprehensive the popular movement, so much greater the number of those who feel empowered to present changes. Of course, the strict party organisation works against the attempt to manifest such changes or indeed to secure a following for this purpose. However, the expression of a will from below remains the danger of every revolution. Nothing therefore places greater demands on the political instinct and nerves of the revolutionary leader than the determination of the time when the state may relinquish the popular movement. Not in order to end the revolution but to consolidate the political power with whose help the revolutionary law is created. One who wishes to continue the revolution as a condition without laws is really not a revolutionary but a conscious or unconscious propagator of anarchy.

The path to the legal reorganisation of German life has been free ever since the Potsdam reorganisation of the Reich and the parliamentary session following it. No commentaries have been written on the Enabling Act and nothing spoken about it in the parliament. Noteworthy is the lack of resistance with which the opposition went along with this unique law, which, however, places the fate of an entire nation in the hands of a few

men. That democracy does not possess any more spirit or life was clear for a long time; but that it, at this hour of its funeral, put forth no one of an intellectual rank who made a funeral speech for it or assigned Marxism to its historical place remains a highly pathetic phenomenon and proof of a deserved fate. No reasonable person expected from political Catholicism that it would withdraw at this hour to the Weimar system. This would have been folly. Doubtful, however, is its renunciation of the Christian German position that should have been constructively elaborated and offered to the German Revolution. One cannot be free of the suspicion that, at this decisive moment, certain leaders of political Catholicism thought more of their own rescue than of the Christian German men. Here lies a danger point for the German Revolution, which should be dealt with in greater detail.<sup>50</sup>

Internal political tensions tend to reduce the susceptibility to international connections. It is therefore understandable if the German Revolution is seized with a consciousness of its European task only gradually. The great international revolutionary line that is intellectually already existent in Germany was not able until now to penetrate the popular movement in an appropriate manner. Perhaps this is impossible within the context of a popular movement and succeeds only at a statesmanly level. On it alone will the revolutionary way to the European future be opened.

In this way even the boycott,<sup>51</sup> which requires special attention as a decisive event of the German Revolution, becomes understandable. Nothing is more difficult to judge or to 'solve' than the Jewish question. It cannot be the task of this work to deal with the problem in detail. Let us mention only that, within the extensive camp of those who considered the Jewish position in Germany to be intolerable, two orientations evolved in the last decades: one which treated the Jewish question as a purely racial law and the other which saw in it the intolerable tension between different cultures. The author came already years ago to the conclusion that the Jewish question can be tackled only in the will to break the relative Jewish supremacy in Germany and that for this purpose the precondition of this supremacy must be attacked and removed. But this precondition is the liberal structure of our social and political order. One who transforms it removes the Jewish predominance. The other orientation considered matters individualistically,

as an opposition of Aryan and Semitic men. It had to end in the cul-de-sac of a frontal attack against Jewish men. For, such an attack had to end logically with the expulsion not only of half a million Jews but a much greater number of people of Jewish origin. That this is impossible in a Christian state is proven by the history of pogroms through the centuries. This danger of a frontal attack need not be considered in a sentimental manner but only in considering whether one can damage the Jewish position without harm to the Germans. This is possible only if the attack is directed only against this position and not directly against its human bearers. It may be tempting to use the Protocols of the Zionist Congresses for anti-Semitic propaganda. It is more useful to recognise its utility for an ethnic treatment of the Jewish question — for which Zionism itself strives. From which it can be seen that the Jews in Germany do not form a uniform but a very divided people: some wish not to assimilate, others to assimilate. One part has been living already in Germany for centuries, another part for ten years. Still others — the Eastern Jews — enjoy the protection of foreign citizenship. In addition, there is the mixture with German blood: all questions of immeasurable complexity. A major chapter of our historical fame is justice. Therefore one should do that which is inevitable without harshness in case such a procedure leads to the same goal. Where Jewish influence predominates it must be asked if it cannot be broken without violence. The ‘cold anti-Semitism’ of Switzerland shows how a nation must defend itself from foreign influences.

A way out of all these difficulties is possible only if there is, along with the state citizenship, an ethnic membership that is sharply demarcated, has definite legal consequences and appreciates fine differences. This task must be dealt with soon.

The Governors Law<sup>52</sup> belongs to those political occurrences to which the term ‘the trick of the Idea’, according to Hegel’s philosophy of history,<sup>53</sup> applies. That means that it is apparently produced through other considerations than the effects that it produces will be. Its ostensible purpose was a tactical one, namely that of taking from the provincial parliaments, in spite of their coordination, the right to ministerial elections. This apparently anti-federalistic act lay in the line of historical necessity. For, in the provinces, parliamentarism, lacking necessary adversaries and a

head of state independent of the parliament, had become still more intolerable than in the Reich because the provincial parliamentarism began to turn against the Reich. A pseudo-federalism of the Weimar system was repeatedly preached to deaf ears that a dynastic federalism without dynasties would by itself perish.<sup>54</sup> The Leipzig trial<sup>55</sup> had sealed its fate. If the Revolution had placed the nomination of the governors of the provinces simply in the hands of the Reich authority, this would have meant the final unification of the Reich on the French model. That this did not happen but an intermediate link was inserted in the form of the Reich governor opens the possibility of another variant of federalism. Comparisons arise with the Hohenstaufen age.<sup>56</sup> Even the modern federalist can therefore welcome this law even if for other reasons than those that the earlier democratic press cheered.

The nature of the so-called coordination is not as easy to interpret as its many friends and foes do. Especially, it is not a question of seeing in it only a comprehensive action of party political staffing. That a new regime cannot leave the lever of power in the hands of its enemies or so-called neutrals does not require further explanation. Every revolution must consolidate its power. And what was right for the republicans after 1918 is inadequate for the nationalists of 1933. Revolutionary power holders must depend on the loyalty of their tested members. The deeper the intellectual revolution is rooted, so much more comprehensive must the re-allotment of positions be. It is therefore a matter of saturating the entire public life with the new spirit and of breaking overt or hidden resistance that could be directed against the rule of the new values.

The special character of the coordination lies in its extension to the foreign political field, whereby the social revolutionary character of the German Revolution is hardened. One can again observe here the chief difference between the Marxist and the National Socialist methods: if Marxism wished to socialise everything in order to, in this way, implement the dictatorship of class, National Socialism is implemented directly in the private sphere. Therewith it comes up against the following choice: it must either relinquish a legal basis for its procedure or effect a totalitarian state, because an intrusion into the private sphere is possible only for the latter. If the extrajudicial seizures occur in a disciplined and planned way, they are

for that reason to be preferred. For, the coordination of the non-political life is a necessity. Only in this way can the living nationalist forces that are opposed by the liberal forms assert themselves. On the other hand, however, the coordination should not go beyond the removal of this liberal mechanistic structure. Otherwise it approaches state totalitarianism and damages the autonomous spheres of life and acts therefore against life instead of producing it. For, it is not true that the revolutionary vitality is ensured only by the fact that recruited National Socialists occupy a new district. There are, however, life spheres that possess their own autonomy and cannot be influenced by the political attitude. The inner situation of a medical research institution can be revolutionised by the intervention of a brilliant physician. Here it is a matter of his scientific capacity, not of his political thought. The clear formula of Hermann Göring that it is easier to make a good National Socialist out of a great artist than to make a great artist out of a good National Socialist is irrefutable. The farther therefore a life sphere extends from political legitimacy, the more it is subject to its own autonomy and the more dangerous does the coordination become. That it loses its deep historical significance where it is effected through opportunism needs hardly to be remarked. An artist with character is more useful to the German nation than a hypocritical worshipper of success who would like to make the most of his chance.

A radical act of the coordination was the formation of the Labour Front.<sup>57</sup> Therewith the demand for a uniform trade union system is fulfilled and the dubious competition of trade unions confronting one another on the basis of diverse worldview principles is removed. But one must be clear on the fact that therewith no organic economic forms, no genuine orders and corporate bodies have yet arisen. The Labour Front bears within it certain elements of liberal class oppositions that should not be strengthened by revivifying them with a national-revolutionary spirit. The tension between employee and employer should be removed in a fundamental way, summarily, through the establishment of a new natural relationship that exists among the individual economic branches.

The problem of the coordination becomes still clearer when one poses the question of who coordinates and what is coordinated. Thereby it becomes clear that the coordination can only be a revolutionary transitional measure

and not a final goal. It ensures the penetration of all of life with the National Socialist spirit. But it does not overcome the liberal world of forms. But this goal can be reached only by a change that should serve to draw all social energies from the naturally grown organisms instead of from the artificial collective organisations that do not come to life even though they are imbued with the spirit of a certain ideology.



# IV. The Counter-Revolution against 1789

WHEN ENGLAND and France created a new political order with their revolutions they became decisive bearers of history. The centre of gravity of Europe shifted from the centre of Europe to the west; the Holy Roman Empire of the German Nation collapsed; new political forms emerged: the British Empire and the 'civilisation' of the French national democracy. The traditional enmity between the two was forgotten when the West, and the world civilised by it, entered in 1914 against Central Europe to suppress it. Versailles and Geneva are the symbols of the victory of 1789. Every world-historical upheaval, every rescue of Europe that has lost its peace, therefore have as their precondition the return of the European centre of gravity to the centre. The conservative counter-revolution is, accordingly, to be evaluated in its state-creative capacity of revivifying the Reich idea in a revolutionary way. For, it alone opposes to the disintegrating effects of the national democratic state idea that binding force that can reorder the fragmented Europe. That the 'Decline of the West' is to be banished only through a Conservative Revolution is established in the course of history. The West has spoken its decisive words regarding recent history. The office of spokesman of European mankind devolves on us the moment liberalism is in agony. That the Conservative Revolution is the duty of the German nation is as obvious as the return of the historical pendulum to central Europe after the Versailles Treaty.

The two great models of democracy arose roughly at the same time: in America, organically on a colonial basis, and in France in a revolutionary way through the break with monarchy. This example was compelling for the world and was copied for a century and a half, most recently in Spain. The world war led to the loss of three imperial crowns. Their toppling signified the German readiness, under the pressure of the defeat and seduced by enemy propaganda, to pay the desired tribute to the Western state idea after territorial principalities<sup>58</sup> had spread at the cost of the ancient German

Reich idea and the imperial crowns. Versailles and Weimar became the guarantors of the Central European defeat and of the Western European victory.

Only an understanding of the spirit of the French Revolution enables us to set up a historical measure for the German Revolution. For it is clear that the German Conservative Revolution can prove its character as a counter-revolution only in a departure from the intellectual laws that governed the Liberal Revolution of 1789.

The French Revolution dissolved the mediaeval bonds; it is not only deliberately (for more than a decade the French churches were closed) but also unconsciously the revolution of atheism. The world was desacralised, and man deprived of God. Not only in the sense that the life of the individual was no longer an unbroken encounter with God but also in that the understanding, desiring emancipation, distanced itself ever farther from the cosmic life. The alienation happened equally from God as also from Nature. Man believed with fervour in civilisation; religion was secularised. Progress, technology, work, wealth, comfortable living, earthly power, state, nation are only a small part of the false gods whose images were erected.

If the democracy of the West was restrained in an aristocratic manner by the conservative bastions of an irreversible social order, among us, the nation of technological hunger, of the late development of capitalism, of frantic urbanisation and the enormous multiplication of the proletariat, it became boundless. Our democracy broke apart in its intermediate character. It had neither a healthy aristocratic or patrician upper class behind it nor nationalist masses. The upper bourgeoisie bearing the Weimar Republic developed no responsible upper class and could not prevail against the envy of the assailing petty bourgeois. Finally, the Weimar democracy sought refuge in a sort of nomocracy (Kelsen)<sup>59</sup> that was fought out before the Leipzig state constitutional court. It collapsed in its hostility to life.

Even the decision between the Western and German state idea, between a unified centralised state and a federative Reich, could not be taken. The dispute regarding that sank into endless deliberations.

The problem of the totalitarian state remained likewise unresolved. Perhaps the society had swallowed the state — that is the nature of democracy, perhaps the economy had conquered half of the state — that is

the nature of social democracy, but there was no resolution. State and society fell into a chain of entwinements that made both unfree and caused corruption at the points of contact. A decision had to be taken, a way out had to be found. The conservatives demanded genuine autonomy of the life spheres that are not primarily political. They were opposed by the followers of the totalitarian state and strove for it partly for practical reasons, partly as a final goal. Many saw in Fascist Italy or even in Bolshevist Russia the model of the future state itself; others were satisfied to demand the totalitarian state as a temporary resolution of conflict. Only through a concentration of all power in the state did they wish to clear the path for a new autonomy through a transfer of power.

How do the revolutionary efforts in Germany compare to the intellectual orientation of the French Revolution? The Social Democracy that had come to power in 1918 was by nature areligious, sometimes even anti-religious. These descendants of the Enlightenment, swollen with science, thought they were superior to God because they had read Haeckel's *The Riddle of the Universe*<sup>60</sup> in their youth. They had too little courage to abolish religion and too little drive to introduce the Cult of Reason of 1789. It was sufficient to repress religion, promote the atheist movement secretly and neutralise the state. The Weimar Republic is, like Bolshevist atheism, a late incursion of the Enlightenment into Central and Eastern Europe. To be sure, it is no longer a question of the belief in Reason of the French Revolution. We are already too distanced from the eighteenth century for that. But, in the place of the 'Goddess of Reason', there have entered the idols of work, the proletariat, and welfare. The Russian atheism is the logical consequence of historical materialism. It could not be easily transferred to Germany so strictly and unconditionally.

The German Revolution was initiated in 1933 with a festive mass,<sup>61</sup> and is therefore, according to the will of its leader, a conservative counter-revolution. With the unconditional certainty of political instinct there follows the reversal, and the belief in religion. I say in religion intentionally. For, a return to a clear belief in *God* lies beyond the possibility of the revolutionary will. It is not sufficient to want to believe, if God does not reveal Himself to those who seek Him.

For the author there is no doubt that genuine religiosity is solely belief in transcendence, that only it can establish true morality. But the spiritual form of a transcendental religion is given for the West in Christianity. It may have lost its taste; its churches may have lost their vitality. But so long as God does not reveal Himself anew, so long as no new belief is available, nobody will be able to take away its mission from Christianity. One therefore who criticises Christianity as a religious philosopher damages the religious foundations of the German nation. To do that theoretically only a reformer or a founder of a new religion would have the right. For, he would give with one hand what he takes with the other. But one who cannot found a new otherworldly religion becomes a destroyer when he attacks the old.

The belief in the cosmic dimension, the return to a universalist worldview, indeed already signifies a metaphysical attitude and therewith the entry into the counter-revolutionary orientation. This new universalism has penetrated extensively into the ideology of the German Revolution without for that reason being Christian, that is, transcendental. But beyond that there is, in the German Revolution, a good bit of this-worldliness. Against the instinctive belief in a counter-revolutionary religiosity stands an unconscious persistence in the Enlightenment ideas of 1789. Part of this, as its most excellent form, is the call to idealism, which for a long time has not been distinguishable from doctrinairism. Many symptoms also point to the fact that the religiosity of the German Revolution lies for the moment, and partially, in the direction of secularisation. The overvaluation of the things of this world, of nation and state, of the economy and legal questions, of human creative power and organisation, borders on the belief in miracles. Earthly power is too highly valued. One believes too much in the will and too little in grace. The superman of Nietzsche is still misunderstood; violence is too little supplemented with humility and love. The religious side of the German Revolution is thus still unclear. But it would betray an ahistorical way of thinking if one wished to presuppose in the present stage of the Revolution what can only be its mature fruit: the final emergence of a clear religiosity.

The decision between democracy and aristocracy has at the moment been taken in favour of the former. The attempt to group the state authority around the last great nobleman of the Prussian mould has been wrecked

with the cabinet of von Papen. Mr. Schacht<sup>62</sup> is not wrong when, during his last visit to America, he explained to the press that we had introduced democracy, that is, the merging of all powers in a popular leader, in Germany. The great identity between the state leadership and the state citizens, however, has not been established according to the ideal of democratic doctrinaires in the form of a rule of law but in a way much closer to life: through the fact that the masses of the nation see themselves embodied in one man as never before in history. His extraordinary authority is based on the disappearance of all distance, on the annulment of dialogue, to use an expression of Weippert's.<sup>63</sup>

If it is maintained that we have only now become a nation, this is false. For, we have been a nation in the historical sense for many centuries. One can indeed debate the thesis that we have become a nation only now. Influences of the state and state form (national democracy) play into the concept of the nation, which is why the French place the 'awakening' of their nation in the age of the great Revolution. The 'awakened' nation belongs to the conceptual world of Western political thought and was transplanted from there to the East, at first to the Western Slavic tribes (including Hungary) and then to the large nations of the Far East. But it is something different when Herder overhears the voice of the people<sup>64</sup> than when the *demos* demands self-government in a democratic revolution.

When England 'awoke', it found itself in another social situation than France. The social situation of Germany of 1933 is equally different from the French of 1789. In England there entered, in the place of the military nobility, the world-conquering and ruling businessman, in France there arose the modern bourgeois. How is it in Germany? When the bourgeoisie attained unlimited power in 1918, it lost its virtues, which were alive even at the time of the foundation of the Reich, and was already subverted by its opponent, its liberal proletarian mirror image, Marxism. It could not even assume its power correctly, let alone consolidate it. In the end it placed itself unconditionally under the protection of the army, of the Field Marshal<sup>65</sup> and the 'cabinet of barons'.<sup>66</sup> Then it had to yield to the *demos* in the form of National Socialism. The dictatorship of the proletariat, of which Karl Marx and his doctrinaire school had dreamed, did not arrive. Even the worker in the Jünger form<sup>67</sup> was not typical for the new Germany. The

concept of the Hitlerian worker is more conservative than that of Jünger and the socialist theoreticians of National Socialism. But common to all perhaps is that they consider as the people the 'working people' and that they consider work as the principal function of man. Here the historian discovers the origins of the bourgeois and economic worldview. The pleasant slogan 'There is only one nobility, that of the worker' is more revealing and of greater significance than those who read it thought it was. If everybody who wishes to replace the economic parasitism with work agrees with it, there lurks however behind this joy in a just economic order the justified question whether economics and work have become the meaning of life to such a degree that they alone can confer nobility. For, there are also other principles of selection than that of work performance, which lies in the economic field. Work and economic performance are typical concepts of the bourgeois world and if they are claimed for a new culture of workers and are played out against the bourgeois world, this is only a reaction against lazy representatives of this bourgeois world and against parasitical forms that capitalism has assumed. So it is a question here of nothing more than a purging action within the bourgeois ideational world.

But nobility is also a biological principle, actually acknowledged by National Socialism, even if the rationalistic overvaluation of breeding possibilities will cause many disappointments. But nobility remains as a spiritual demand, as something reaching beyond the practicality of life, as an impulse towards the image of God. The mission of man to overcome the sin of the Fall and to strive for freedom, which exists alone in God, constitutes his humanity and can always be exemplified only by a select few. There is indeed, along with the principle of performance, a principle of being — and therein lies the revolutionary demand of the Conservative Revolution. Apart from that, the fact that a man who is something will also perform something in general depends decisively on his being and not on the performance. From one's being comes the historical, the spiritual, the artistic act. It is not performances that are the individual stones that form the mosaic of history but acts. That the great man of deeds is also a good worker is obvious. But he does not work in order to work but he works in order to shape. Even the power of binding men together and ruling them lies beyond all performance and effort within the being of the ruling men. The appeal to conquer oneself is a charisma that can even be silent. Public

demonstrations are a performance principle transferred to the leader principle. In a democracy the leader must convince with words and this becomes so much stronger the more he can organise public demonstrations. The aristocracy, on the other hand, rules through its superior being. An elite must perform in order to be acknowledged; the aristocracy is beyond question so long as it is aristocratic.

The objection that where there is no aristocracy there must at least be an elite is completely justified, for an aristocracy can neither be nominated nor bred. It is formed by itself and is cultivated by itself. But one can, where it is present, collect it, group it around a leader and make its sociological conditions favourable. This presupposes that the nature of the aristocracy is recognised and the leader, who must in our age be the revolutionary state leader, has a masterly vision for human worth. I say expressly: for human worth. For, the political worth of a man is relative, for which reason also there is no primarily political aristocracy. If the aristocracy is called to political leadership, this is based in its human characteristics and not in its political attitude. It draws its capacity to serve the state from its humility before history, its gift for rule from its relationship of service to the nation, its honour from its loyalty, its lack of ambition from its self-worth.

National Socialism has, under the influence of biological ideas, fertilised by conservative literature and its own sensibility, which is affirmed by its leader, dealt with the question of the aristocracy in a thorough manner. At the moment it remains in the ideas related to political elites,<sup>68</sup> whereas Italian Fascism has been promoting the question of the aristocracy for years. But even in National Socialism the disposition to a higher understanding of aristocracy is present. The rightly understood racial question and the developed mythos of the blood point to the fact that the ideological goal of the formation of a new aristocracy is alive in National Socialism. The political elite can be the revolutionary nuclei of a new aristocracy but only when its standard is *virtus*.<sup>69</sup> A nationalist attitude alone is not this but only a sign of it being present potentially. But it is quite certain that the membership in a political organisation that can be acquired by anybody without his motives being investigated hardly forms the basis of a claim to being an elite, let alone an aristocracy. From this arises the problem of the present: the attempt at a democratic elite formation is



present; the attempt at a new aristocracy is lacking. But the way to it is open because the possibility of a collection around a leader that did not exist in the party state now exists. So long as voting flourished, no sociological upper stratum could appear or form itself anew in a nation whose social stratification had disintegrated. This has changed and it is a question of whether the 'aristocratic' currents prevail or whether the German Revolution remains bound to its democratic dynamic.

Recognising this at the present moment is as difficult as the determination of the future orientation of the state. This does not need to be a final goal but only a means to a goal. Carl Schmitt, as the chosen interpreter of the totalitarian state, pointed to the fact that at first the concentration of all power seems inevitable. Nothing is to be objected to that given the disintegration of all state authority, indeed of all politics, that lies behind us. What is necessary alone is clarity regarding the fact that the totalitarian state is conceivable only in two forms: as a hierarchy in which the priest rules or as a secularised community in which the state has become the church, state citizenship a religion, the popular assembly a religious service, the statesman a priest, and the leader of the nation a saint. This condition would be the end of Christianity and would have its parallel in Russia, even if the Christian churches continued to exist unmolested. Its danger is that the inner atheism would not become conscious to the person affected and, rather, concepts like religion and Christianity would continue to be used as if nothing had changed.

As a means to an end, the totalitarian measures that have now been initiated are understandable and necessary. In order to free the spaces in which organic life can develop, the mechanisms must first be destroyed which do not allow any genuine life to arise. This instinctive smashing of the 'chalk bastions' occurs with an elemental force, whereby unfortunately much is spared through political considerations of injustice. For, even liberal systems have their own legality. If a revolutionary temperament enters at the commanding position of a liberal apparatus, then a strengthening of its liberal content is to be feared.

The final goal of the German Revolution should not be the totalitarian state but the sovereign state that supervises the social aspects of life, balances them and guides them in the direction of national development but leaves them unmolested in their autonomy and protects their legal status.

This is the basic idea of the corporative state and the conception of the Christian state.<sup>70</sup> Only it offers the possibility of making the individual a person once again, of reestablishing a felicitous relationship of tension between the personality and the social realm.

Personality is possessed by the man who is creative in freedom. This freedom is something other than the political human rights of democracy. If the latter amounts to an irresponsible and dilettantish participation, the former is the natural space of responsible activity. The incorporation of the individual into the community is, in the totalitarian state, a direct and mechanistic one, in the Christian state an indirect and organic one. The totalitarian state is borne by the 'nation', which consists of men of the same rights and the same mentality, the Christian state by state-bound corporate bodies in which everybody stands in his place.

The totalitarian state is by its nature centralist and absolutist. It forfeits the exploitation of the natural tension that should exist between the people and the state. For, the people are the nursery from which all life, even that of the state, arises.

The corporative state is based on the idea of law, which becomes the slogan of the collecting and ordering state power. Its essence is not violence but law. Its power is therefore never endangered but secured.

The inner cohesion of the corporative state is guaranteed by voluntary commitment. Territorially considered, there is produced therefrom the necessity of the subdivision of the Greater German state, which is today called the Reich. This division of the Reich, which has nothing to do with the parliamentary provincial federalism that has been dragged to its grave, thrives on the autonomy of the German provinces and regions, the independence of the ethnic groups and tribes. On this a new legal condition can be founded, which is borne by the living powers of the people and makes them useful to the whole. The stronger the members, so much more powerful the whole. One may reject the organic state theory, but its formative power cannot be denied.

Thus the question of the totalitarian state is indivisible from that of the division of the Reich. The present condition, after the issuance of the Reich Governors Law,<sup>71</sup> is unstable. It both opens the way to the unified

nationalist state as the perfection of the Western state ideal and to German and, indeed, European federalism.

One can maintain that we needed a totalitarian state borne by the entire German 'nation' as the core and axis of the future Reich, that the Reich is the German mission and therefore something different from the German state. But to become equal to this German mission there is necessary not only the 'establishment' of a new social order but also of a constitutional structure that is by its nature capable of extension and points beyond the limits of the German state. With the rigid conception of sovereignty of the totalitarian state, no Reich can be striven for that could contain in itself the fulness and diversity of the central European space and merge into a higher unity. We can go beyond the state to the Reich only if we recognise different degrees of statehood, if our legal concepts extend not in breadth but in depth.

# V. The Political Power Play within

FORMAL DEMOCRACY has collapsed, the storming of the Bastille of Liberalism has succeeded. The pluralistic powers have been chained. The slogan of class warfare has been extinguished; the war- and especially the postwar-generation has triumphed; the German nation has begun its march into world history. These are all accomplishments of the first order. Without National Socialism the deathblows could not have been dealt with this decisiveness and speed. It undertook the removal of the rubble heap and bears rightly the honorary title of the advance guard of the German Revolution.

Bourgeois nationalism was, during the parliamentary era, the opponent of the Left. It has fulfilled its historical task as the nationalist Right. It has defended tradition and formed the support of the nationalist idea in the liberal state. It also granted protection to the young nationalism and prevented its total suppression. We owe to it the Reich presidency of the Field Marshal and, indirectly, the building up of the Reich army, which was conducted by some conservatives with its backing.

But the nationalism of the bourgeois variety remained stuck in the imaginal world of the Second Reich. Its vision was directed backwards; its sentiments lacked a spiritual substructure. Competent organisers, patriotic keynote speakers and handy political practitioners constituted its framework. It spoke about the spirit like an agitator, only to actually reject it. It dealt with the revolutionary intellectual forces without understanding, or patronisingly. One who spoke of the revolution and understood by that more than a state realm was considered a fantasist. One who attempted to clarify the great historical connections was accused of being a utopian. Bourgeois nationalism lost itself in 'practical' rescue programmes and neglected the force and the reality of ideas. It found the National Socialist ideas deficient and did not feel the hunger of the masses

for ideas. The people demanded only the rule of ideas and accepted it wherever it was offered.

Even in Harzburg<sup>72</sup> it had firm ground beneath its feet. After 30 January it lost it. It was shown that its task lay predominantly in parliamentary Germany. It lacked the intellectual and ethical impetus for the development of the German Revolution. The insignificance to which it has sunk today it has deserved on account of its denial of the mind and its neglect of the youth.

The role of a revolutionary brake that many wish to ascribe to it is a thankless and dangerous one. It rightly provokes the counteraction of the revolutionary, who must accomplish what the age demands. It is not conservative to hinder a necessary event. Conservative is only the maintenance of eternal and not of temporary values. But if a revolution is essentially conservative, the conservative must not inhibit but impel. However, not in the direction of dissolution but of new formation.

The military movement is the protector of the military honour and the military spirit. Its significance lies beyond the realm of politics. The future justification of its existence is not conditioned by internal politics but by foreign policy. It depends on the duration of the coercion that was imposed on us in Versailles.

If bourgeois nationalism as a liberal relic forfeited its right to political existence through the lack of resistance with which it renounced its position of power and abdicated its independent existence, historical judgement can hardly proceed more leniently in the case of the Catholic parties. For, even the Catholic parties were one of those liberal positions to be removed, which is the obvious task of the Revolution if it is not to violate its own laws. Perhaps there was a conservative worldview behind the Catholic parties. But precisely on the basis of this worldview it could establish itself openly as the Centre, that is, as the middle point and key position of German liberalism. The service of the Centre in preventing the sole rule of Marxism in 1919 is cancelled by the role of rescuer of Marxism, which it lent itself to for years. No genuine revolutionary therefore need go easy on a Centre position. It is not the conservative forces, not German Catholicism, that should be attacked but its unnatural political position, which extended into the centre of the parliamentary world as a foreign religious principle.

One who wishes to unify the German nation internally must remove the religious division at least on the political level. Religious faith should not become a means of forming the state political will. The artificial ghetto that was erected politically around Catholicism must fall so that the conservative Catholic forces may be freed. Their worldview universalism constitutes a political endowment that the coming Reich needs.

One who bore the Weimar system has played his part. Here the rules of the political game are valid, where always one wins and another loses. Therewith it means differentiating between those who, even within this system, served their nation honourably and the unmistakable enemies of national rebirth. The former have not deserved any defamation or retribution and an undisturbed private life should be granted to them. The latter should not be surprised if the wave of anger washes them away. The only thing that can save them is the highest virtue of the victor: generosity.

Things are more difficult within the so-called nationalist camp. Here there is much anxiety, disappointment and bitterness. The reasons for these are diverse. Here there are old soldiers and honorable nationalist politicians who worked and waited their entire life for the day of nationalist uprising. They could not understand that they were now pushed aside, that the Revolution does not sufficiently differentiate between them and the bearers of the Weimar system. They maintain that they differed from National Socialism only in the method and point to a life fully devoted to the nation and the Reich. They feel like the members of a besieged stronghold who, relieved after a brave resistance by fresh troops, are forgotten in the victory celebrations. Nobody will contest the justification of these feelings but everybody will understand the pride of these revolutionary troops whose impelling force was decisive. In such a situation, one must have the innate generosity to stand back and to trust historical justice, which always prevails. That requires patience and time. Others are rooted in the ideas of the constitutional state and cannot acquiesce in many violent actions. To them one must say that violence is an element of life.

Naturally, it is not a cultural form but a driving force that becomes at times necessary and produces good things. One suspects that a nation that is no longer capable of any violent expression is in biological decline. However, it demonstrates its cultural level through the ordering force through which it dams outbursts of violence and restrains excesses. A

certain resentment rules also over the recent recklessness with which new men are brought into leading positions. But is it not understandable that a revolutionary movement first places in leading positions the strongwilled fighting stratum, which for years marched towards the great goal with tenacity? Finally, one must think of the necessities that the leader of a victorious nationalist movement must take into consideration. He too must bend to the historical driving force, cannot for the moment act according to objective standards, which are valid only in stable conditions and in a small circle. It would be very narrow-minded to enforce considerations related to the qualifications of many high officials. Indeed, precisely the worship of dead knowledge and specialist qualifications led to that lifelessness of politics and the economy under which we all suffered. One must give time for great developments, overlook blemishes and trust the inherent organising force that lies within things and conditions.

As complete as the victory of National Socialism with all its effects is, so difficult is the question about the future internal political development, the new political power formation. It would mean remaining stuck in the liberal idealogical world if one wished to conclude from the collapse of the bourgeois parties that, in future, there will no longer be any political life or indeed that one who has not previously declared himself from the start a member of the NSDAP has forfeited the right to political existence.

The 'friend-foe' theory of Carl Schmitt<sup>73</sup> will be proved right because intellectual life is unthinkable without battle. There is a destructive and a constructive 'enmity' in politics. There is the will to mutual destruction which does not stop before a nation or a state, but there is also the competition for the best performance, the greatest commitment, for deserved rule. This sort of political battle should not die out if the life of a nation should not fade out. The vigilance regarding outsiders makes the ruler attentive to mistakes, helps him to discover the shortest way and the most successful means to the common political goal. No regime can exist without positive criticism because none is infallible and needs no improvement. The new law that the revolutionary creates determines not only the limits of the ruled but also those of the rulers, who, through voluntary subjection to their own law, grant lasting security to their rule.



True, least of all a revolutionary, authority cannot put up with malicious and subversive currents. But it is necessary to differentiate carefully between one who always rejects and one who raises his warning voice because moral and spiritual law does not let him rest in peace. Herein indeed is the essence of genuine responsibility: that it does not remain silent when the majority tends to celebration and complacency. Perhaps the eternal warners are beset by tragedy. But it is not necessary if the state leaders are magnanimous and listen to the conscience of the people, wherever it may be raised.

Therewith the question is broached that is more essential for the internal political formation of the German nation than all discussions of the fate of parties and organisations: the question of the few but decisive, the relation between politics and the mind. This question is not exhausted in the opposition of politics and education or indeed in that of a mass movement and an educated class. This educated class does not exactly coincide with the intellectual stratum. German academia has become intellectually very passive. Internally and externally it resembles the masses, feels today not only with the nation but with the masses. This mass mentality is not surprising since the educational ideal of the bourgeois age is dead and its virtues are no more.

One need not lose any words also on the intellectuals who 'coordinate' with flapping flags and glorify that which they mocked just years before. These intellectual jugglers discovered that the Freikorps men are heroes and not mindless goons only when the economy was clearly stable. Let us leave aside these latecomers to the German Revolution and let us speak of the striving German spirit! That it has more recognition than before, that the revolution has acquired for many of its representatives a worthy sign, is certain. But the German Revolution must finally be able to affirm the creative spirit wherever it may find it on account of its inner Germanness and not on account of its political affiliation. The Kaiserreich had its court poets, and the Republic imitated this example. The German Revolution is revolutionary precisely in that it breaks with these customs.

It is indeed the characteristic of the intellectual man that he can side with a party for an idea but declares himself a member of a party only with difficulty. He tends towards solitude for the sake of the purity of the idea. For, what lends significance to the life of an intellectual man if not the

striving for purity? Thus there are also in Germany many who sought the legacy of Nietzsche and Lagarde that helped to reestablish the mythos of the German Revolution and the new Holy Empire of the Germans. It gave to the German uprising its inner content and placed the German spirit in the balance so that it inclined towards the German Revolution. Is there any point in denying that in this camp of those not bound to the party spiritual battles are fought out? We hear the counter-question whether the few and the solitaries matter at all. Without any doubt! The community may stride over the individual but not over the personality. That would be un-German collectivism that would move Germany dangerously close to the East. The moral order of the world, the higher life, is based on the creative individual. He represents historically the people and not the masses, about whom the historical writer reports little. Germany means Kant and Goethe, it means Bach and Beethoven, it means Bismarck and Nietzsche. It receives its image from the great shapers of the German spirit. They embody the soul of the people even when there is lacking an external contiguity between them and the *populus*. One who transfers the representation of the people to the masses undercuts the roots of the intellectual-moral life of the masses, who do not acquire from themselves any imprint but only from the higher breed that towers above them.

Here we do not speak of the 'intelligence', which can be a characteristic even of an illiterate person. We speak of higher humanity that gives to a people its significance, which is manifest in the disciplined form, in strict thought, and in spiritual transfiguration. The truly spiritual man is gnawed by a concern not so much for the external formation of political life as for the future of German man. He lives in a cooler atmosphere than the 'man of the people'. From his historical, spiritual and moral commitment arise automatically doubts. He loves his people in a teleological tension that allows him to a certain degree a relative sober-mindedness with regard to daily life. He feels without uttering any words and his celebrations are rare. His gaze stares entranced into the future; the destiny of his nation is for him decided in the earnest striving of the peoples and not in the celebration of the day. Is such an attitude blameworthy or indeed justifiably reproached, that he consciously separates his way from that of the 'people'?

If such a distinction is criticised, it is because there is a confusion of 'spiritual' and 'intellectual'. The spiritual man is indeed not that intellectual

acrobat who owes his life to the collapse of the body-soul unity, such as arose from the modern humanistic educational ideal. The latter set as its educational goal the learned man in the place of the noble. In this way arose the split in our nation: on the one side the camp of the undervalued manual work, on the other that of an intellectual stratum inwardly arrogant and hostile to life. Both are inimical to culture because the former has lost the connection with the mind and the latter that with life. The social question, which also cannot be resolved but only drowned out by the collective singing of the German anthem, is nourished by this dichotomy. This opposition undermines all the preconditions for a genuine rule.

More dangerous is the cleft that opened up in the nineteenth century between the mind and reality. The army of highly trained specialists, economic specialists, academics tested ten times, that has conquered the ruling positions without any claim to genuine spirituality feels that it is the ruler of the harsh reality and looks patronisingly down on the spiritual 'dreamers'. The spirit becomes a playful matter of a false patronage and of fashionable salons. That the true intellectual is the one who imbues life with its meaning in all fields is lost to the arrogance of all those who operate the handles of power anywhere. By intellectual they mean a special type of half-respectable, half-comical old fogeys, who are maintained by the education department for the sake of the state. They find it natural that an intellectual lives on the edge of the nation. Why does he not bow to the organisation? How does he happen to have his own opinions on the affairs of the world?

Perhaps it is the fate of all wisdom that it only lies buried in books and is never applied the way the mind views it. History is a unique chain of follies that are ever renewed even though their bad outcome has already been made clear innumerable times. Every politician feels as if he is a new discoverer of America, who excels the deeds of a Columbus. History therefore seems to exist so that nothing may be learnt from it. Only the humble man, who is for that reason sure of himself and truly historical, can learn from it, one who is ready at every moment to answer to his own conscience. A spiritual man is one who is in an uninterrupted dialogue with God.

But even if one overlooks this general tragedy of the eternal repetition of these very foolishnesses, there still remains the special German tragedy: the

separation of spirit and violence, which constitute true power only when united. German nationalism, as it was developed in the post-Bismarckian period, stands under the curse of being without spirit. It lacked that fluid aura that issues from every biological whole, from the unity of body and soul, and transfigures every act of violence in a human way. It was this magical capacity that placed the French in the position of forming an international coalition against us. It was our lack of this capacity that allowed the world to think of a barbaric Germany.

The re-acquisition of the body-soul unity, the fusion of spirit and force, have become a fateful question for the German nation, for European culture. For the nation as a whole this goal can be attained only through a new educational ideal. The infusion of the manual working masses with a nationalist disposition is a mechanical process and not yet the emergence of the German spirit among the people. Only a common body of experience creates a uniform nation. When the spiritual man has replaced the intellectual man, the gap in the nation is closed. But that first requires the experience of the body-soul unity in every German individual. He must find his way back to the cosmos and to God; in him freedom, Nature and spirit must be fused together. It is this experience that created and marked the spiritual revolutionary of the post-war period. From it he receives his special relation to the political and revolutionary events. He could concur with the bourgeois nationalism as little as with the Weimar democracy. For the democratic propaganda that ruled post-war Germany he was, through his inner disposition, unusable. Did he thereby exclude himself from the fate of his people and the political leadership?

One can be a leader and statesman, live with the people, without being comprehensible to the masses. The appeal of this leadership lies in the deep layers, is irrational. Only democracy lives on the appeal of the word, all other state forms understand the unspoken, which is based not through proximity to the masses but distance, not through speeches but through deeds, not through being equal but through being different.

The way of a nation that becomes strong politically leads to inner depoliticisation. In depoliticisation is perfected the de-democratisation. The insight into the necessity of this connection made many a revolutionary of the spirit lonely when 30 January 1933 dawned. Can one criticise them

because they swung not without hesitation into the camp of the victorious movement?

For the children of democracy and the men of a liberal attitude, the decision was easy. If they did not deal with the membership in a party as a question of personal compatibility, they allowed themselves to be driven by the current of the development that led from the liberal camp of the left or centre parties to National Socialism. They are part of the politically interested men who, without their own worldview, seek in National Socialism the new worldview.

Matters are quite different for the politician with a worldview, that is, for one who obtained his inner position already years before. Here there is first the 'old guard' for whom National Socialism itself is a worldview. They evaluate one another not according to the party insignia but according to the battle spirit and service. For them National Socialism is more than a programme, more profoundly satisfying than a political attitude. It is a political faith, an inner strength similar to religious faith. Herein lies its parallel to Fascism, which Mussolini describes in the following manner:

'Fascism is a religious conception of the world in which man is seen in his relationship, innate in him, to a higher law, to an objective will that rises above the individual and raises him to the consciousness of a spiritual community.' Mussolini's Fascism coincides in this way with the 'concept of the political' of Carl Schmitt, which represents the degree of intensity of the connection or separation of men. This 'religious politics' (Mussolini) is, according to Carl Schmitt, total 'because, first, every matter can become potentially political and therefore be affected by the political decision and, secondly, because man is, in political participation, apprehended as a whole and existentially.'<sup>74</sup>

At this juncture begins the consideration of the enormous difficulties and conflict possibilities of this religious, essentially total politics. (Total politics and totalitarian state are related to each other as subject and object.) But it is not the first time that the concepts 'religious' and 'political' have been tied together. And nevertheless there is a clear difference between the political theology of an Adam Müller and the religious politics of the twentieth century. It is based in the differently formed situation of Christianity. For the political theology of Adam Müller, the religious point

of departure, Christianity, stands beyond question. The Italian and the German Revolutions affirm it likewise. But the practical situation is different because Christianity has lost its power of marking humanity, and secularisation phenomena are mixed with 'religious politics'. In other words: there is a difference if the religious politics emerges directly from Christianity, obtains its content from it, or if it itself wishes to become a religion, or more correctly expressed, a religious substitute. Mussolini rejects this consequence. He does not make Fascism a religion. Bolshevism conducts itself in a contrary way, as is well known. For it, religion is the 'opium of the people', in the place of which it offers Marxism as a substitute. In Germany, there is no clear differentiating line. The attempt to animate the religious forces from the political contains a double nucleus: that of the genuine religious reformation and that of the incursion of the political into religion.

Nobody who rightly assesses the religious seriousness of the German people will wonder that at this point misunderstandings and frictions arise. Precisely the religious men rooted in Christianity guard against seeing in National Socialism a 'worldview' because, in their view, the concept of 'worldview' includes a claim to the determination of one's attitude not only to this world but also to the one beyond. If it is the character of Western Christianity that it has developed itself from an organic natural religion into a revelation mediated by the human mind, it must be felt as a threat to the Christian domain if a religious incursion should occur from a this-worldly conception of the world. For, according to the Christian doctrine, a genuine worldview can be obtained only from religion; it must therefore encompass the universe and God. Christ says: I can die for the nation and the state but I cannot turn them into a religion. I can profess German nationalism and a socialist ethics on the basis of a transcendental faith, but I cannot set up nationalism and socialism in the place of religion.

Even those for whom nationalism and socialism represent the highest intellectual values are certainly unconsciously driven by deeper religious forces active in them. One who knows the old fighters from the Freikorps and the borderlands knows that what they at that time activated as a unique protest against a rotting environment could arise only from religious depths. Their moral strength and spiritual attitude was directed against the brewing Bolshevism when the political form of National Socialism still did not have

any validity. National Socialism grew out of their fighting spirit. The latter created the political forms and methods with which the masses were conquered. But is it necessary that the political form of National Socialism now in turn conquer also the Christian revolutionaries whose bodies formed the first defence against Marxism?

In the devotion to the country and the people, in the force of revolutionary will, there is no difference between the convinced National Socialist and the Conservative Revolutionary. The Conservative Revolutionaries have sealed their faith in the Revolution and in the German renaissance with their blood. They have held the flag of nationalism and heroism high and are hesitant to repeat their faith in the popular Revolution with words. That is done by those who, in the post-war years, when harsh decisions were being fought for, sought for their comfort and their advantage. But the victorious Revolution will honour the attitude of German men who have earned their spurs through their own responsibility and do not wish to be a part of those who now look for success.

There must always be men who seek for the confirmation of their life and ambition in their own responsibility. As necessary as the political organisation and the dividing line that it draws may be, so superfluous are these for those in whom the trusteeship for Germany always lives. For the fact of a common battle is more binding than any organisatory community. Of course it was necessary to storm the Weimar system from outside. But it was also necessary to raise towering signs of national resistance under the rule of this system. It was necessary that there were men who fought at the frontiers without thinking of the regime that ruled in Berlin. They even had to cooperate with the men of this regime on one matter or another in order to win them over in secret talks for national needs. This 'politics' was bitter and demanded self-discipline. And yet much was attained that was visible only to the one who is accustomed to evaluating historical results as the consequence of innumerable individual actions. In this way was extracted and built up from the Weimar system the nationalist German field of activity. The Conservative Revolutionary educational work was performed in the most diverse forms. The intellectual preparation of the German Revolution occurred in numerous scholarly works. That the power holders of the epoch behind us lost faith in themselves is due partly to this immediate influence. One should view history as a battle not only of

organised forces striving against one another but also of spiritual fronts that seldom coincide with organisations.

Why deny that the generation of the front, on whose shoulders the battle for German honour weighed heavily in the hard post-war years, observes with concern with what carelessness an ambitious post-war generation strides over them? It is not a matter of rewards, the war generation never vied for that — but to see that the probation is still valid, that justice in German provinces does not die. We cannot understand that a life of dedication should fade away beside the question of a timely alignment with the political organisation. This Revolution flared up for the destruction of the party state, for the creation of an organically ordered national community. Should it tolerate a division of a mechanical sort, a division of the people into Germans of first and second rank? If yes, then at most in the evaluation of every individual according to his performance for the people and the fatherland, his revolutionary will for a new Reich.

It is humanly naïve, in the Homeric sense, if every person wishes to be present at the ‘new ordering of the world’, for him to boast of his own service. But it is alarming when this happens at the cost of the honour and existence of others. The revolutionary government therefore proceeds forcefully against all denunciations. But that alone does not yet suffice. The preconditions for such cases must be destroyed: the division of the people into citizens of higher and lower rank. The conservative has nothing against privileges, is an enemy of equality. But the inequality that is established by the state should not be fortuitous but should be organically grown. It must be based on laws that weigh life and performance rightly.

The German renewal demands the selection of the ‘best’. But one does not become ‘better’ through one’s own volition but through God’s grace and strenuous effort. For the ‘best’ person his deeds are his witness, not his words.

Life does not stand still; it cannot also at a certain point become ‘frozen’. So the political life of the German people will also flow again; the victory of National Socialism will become history. Everybody will acknowledge it. But, on the free field that has now been prepared, the constructive forces will encounter one another; new communities will arise; new divisions will set in. Selflessness, discipline, chivalrousness, stateliness, higher humanity will be found. There will be only two camps now: that of those with



reverence and that of those without. But the Reich will be won by those that live in the fear of God.

# VI. The Christian Revolution

WHAT IS THE desired, the possible and the historically necessary goal of the German Revolution?

Liberal revolutions (like that of 1789) allow ideas to be deployed against tradition. In conservative revolutions, the powers of tradition, blood and the historical spirit rise up against intellectualism and doctrine. That is why the way and goal of a conservative revolution are hard to outline. It is not its programme that is essential but its power. And, nevertheless, the core of a conservative revolution encompasses the entire historical community-building, a turning away from the mechanistic.

The degenerate liberalism of our age is a mechanistic principle. And it still has its adherents. In the hearts of the last democratic doctrinaires slumbers the expectant opinion that what happens in Germany is nothing but a parliamentary turn to the right that will be followed in the foreseeable future by a counteracting rebound. They think that a great act of parliamentary democracy is being played out. Perhaps that would be true if civil rights alone had come to power. It is also conceivable that a so-called right-wing dictatorship would have concluded the monarchistic restoration. But then the bourgeois nationalism would perhaps have been satisfied with a constitutional parliamentary system connected to the political condition of the pre-war period: a dream that many in Germany dream. The National Socialist government does not summarily reject the restoration because it sees in the Italian example that the *continuum* of the crown has turned Fascism from a dictatorship into a system. But, on the other hand, National Socialism feels that the German Revolution is more than a restoration can be, that in it the secular task of the German nation lies enclosed.

For, the crown suits many constitutions because it does not indeed belong to any constitution but is the eternal symbol of rule through divine right. It stands to a certain degree outside human constitution and is directly incorporated in the natural and divine order (hereditary succession). The rights of the crown may, according to a constitution, be subject to human statutes, but the essence of the crown and therewith its right to self-

maintenance lie outside human jurisdiction. To be sure, the crown grows out of the history of a people. But, once it is born, it is due to the grace of God and lives its own life, which can as little be revoked as the life of other beings once it has been produced. A nation that destroys the crown murders a symbol that it has set up beyond itself, free from any attack from itself. It becomes subject once again to temporality, which it had already overcome with the crown. Nations that have spiritually comprehended the power of such a symbol decapitate inept kings rather than abolish the crown. But a nation that abolishes the crown on account of the incapacity of a bearer of it confuses an individual with mythos.

One who throws away a crown commits murder against mythos. Crowns can fall but cannot be cast off. As a corollary, the crown artificially produced by the people, especially when it is newly gilded as part of a constitutional statute, is a fake, a copy, not an original, a mechanism and not genuine life. Crowns by the grace of the people always wobble.

The crown as the genuine embodiment of national and imperial metaphysics may therefore remain outside any determinative observation of the future political formation. If its mythic power should become a living one even today, then only in the form of the Reich administration. Germany would be a monarchy without a crowned head. Over the Reich would hover the invisible crown, its manifestation would be left to fate.

If the question of the crown is posed by this work, this is not due to considerations of the state form. And also not because the interruption of the eternal right of the crown, as happened in 1918, pains the author. But because the metaphysics of this revolution is not comprehended by one who does not speak of the crown. Historical dialectics demands the opposition of popular sovereignty and rule by the Grace of God. It demands the inexorability of thinking without consideration of the simulacrum of the so-called political situation.

The way to the future of the German Revolution is decided in the formation of the state and the law. Is a balance of the natural will of the state and the desired political world that streams from below possible? Is there a new integration of the state? Do we have the power to set up the genuine democracy instead of the formal, to overcome the collective in an aristocratic manner, to found the new cultural form of the state? Or was Oswald Spengler right?

It would go beyond the scope of this work if it went into the complicated question of the constitutional state. The constitutional state in the sense of the rule of law belongs to the past; the age of the French human rights is past. One who concludes from this that an age of arbitrariness and violence would solve the eternal longing of the West for justice places himself outside European history. An intellectual invasion of Asia into Europe should be bitterly avenged. Modern industrialised nations can be nourished only where the clockwork of justice is maintained in the smallest cog. The nation of Luther, Kant and Goethe will never be made serfs. Thus it can only be a matter of establishing a constitutional state of Western stamp through a political new ordering of German law that lies beyond all arbitrariness and violence.

National Socialism has no firmly outlined political programme corresponding to its task of being the bearer of the conservative counter-revolution. It has, instead, an attitude that allows it freedom of creation. It includes 'directions' like any large movement but a uniform constructive will is only now developing. The Reich Chancellor has repeatedly declared his desire to make the entire German nation National Socialist even inwardly. This goal is an intellectual one. Following it there are, today, party members who are not National Socialists in the intellectual sense and outsiders who are.

That wish may also be interpreted as wanting the entire political Germany to be incorporated into the National Socialist Party. This interpretation is too formal. For, the day when the German nation has only one party, the political group formations begin anew, although at new levels and under unconditional incorporation into the National Socialist state. Would the actual political oppositions, conservative and liberal, celebrate their resurrection in a new form? Would Marxism also have an effect intellectually again within the scope of a National Socialist state?

All the circumstances speak for the probability that National Socialism seeks to establish the rule of a political minority. It comes therewith close to the rule of an order, which is determinedly exclusive. The expression 'exclusive' is appropriate because the famous question of National Socialist 'exclusiveness' is ambiguous. This 'exclusiveness' can be understood sociologically, in the sense of a selection, or in the religious sense, with the sole validity of National Socialist thought. Now, the rule of a select group is

imaginable that is tolerant in a worldview sense and indeed goes so far as to seek and promote spirituality everywhere. One may compare here the great speech of Mussolini in which he declared that the Fascist state guarantees for the first time to the 'intellectuals' that recognition that they have a claim to and that even today is held back from them in all other states. This belief in the spirit, which characterises Fascism, is expressed also by the introduction of Kantian philosophy as a subject of instruction in high schools. Here Fascism approximates to an aristocracy, which is in its essence intellectually broad and sociologically exclusive.

Often liberal is confused with tolerant. 'Liberal' is the final conclusion that all have rights and therefore there must be a majority. Tolerance, on the other hand, arises from the inner certainty of genuine rule that recognises and tolerates the multiplicity of life. If National Socialism tends towards exclusivity and intolerance, this is understandably on account of its fighting stance in a liberal world and against it. If, however, this liberal world were overcome and if it wished to proceed to the rule of an order, it would have to become sociologically exclusive and intellectually tolerant.

But the status quo opposes the rule of an order; the National Socialist movement is too broad and too all-encompassing for one to be able to speak of an organisation resembling an order. There is a difference if Mussolini marches to Rome with a handful of Blackshirts or if democracy acquires legality in the Garrison Church of Potsdam.<sup>75</sup> And the wheel of history cannot be turned back. An Order that is too large is a contradiction in terms. The significance of every anti-liberal movement is turned into its opposite when the minority that should rule is formed not according to the principle of selection but according to the principle of denomination (the party). During the time of the national opposition, the principle of denomination was natural and had to overshadow the idea of selection. Today, since National Socialism represents the state, it is different. It will either reorganise its party, as happened in Italy and Russia, or introduce a new principle of selection according to which that person belongs to the ruling minority who has made a special contribution to the people and the state.

Europe knows two state forms resembling an order: the Russian and the Italian.

The exemplary formation of the Russian soviet<sup>76</sup> system signifies a total departure from the Western formal democracy. The soviet system is a pyramidal construction from the cell to the top of the state with the help of indirect elections, which are the only sensible ones for every large state structure. This construction from below is matched from above by the comprehensive and supervisory state will. In contrast to Italy, where the highest Fascist authority determines the final electoral list, it is expressed in the form of the Communist 'terror' that operates already in the very first cell of the elections. This remains effective also in the next highest elections and is concerned with a gradual purging of the soviets of non-Communist constituents. Russia therefore has, theoretically, a perfect soviet democracy and, practically, the dictatorship of an order-like party.

In the coordination already dealt with there are similar efforts, apparently unconscious and temporary. They serve to secure the National Socialist dominance in the electoral bodies and to direct all public power to the victors of the Revolution. As a temporary phenomenon this measure is not dangerous. Things are different when it is a matter of the final constitutional condition, of the goal of the German Revolution. One who champions so-called organic democracy should not overlook the mechanical aspect of the coordination. But the leading National Socialists have in mind the opposite of a mechanisation of political life; that is proven by the insistence of the propaganda minister on a sort of Germanic democracy. Nevertheless, the concomitant phenomena of the coordination were to a certain degree mechanical, both in their method and in their effects.

Violence can always triumph only temporarily, can coordinate things only externally and never inwardly. Of course, it is an element of life recently discovered by Sorel and incorporated by Fascism into the system. Sorel therefore affirmed both Leninism and Fascism. He recognised the benevolent effect of violence for nations that were not disciplined. Is this true also for Germany? It underwent a Prussian schooling and is overdisciplined rather than the contrary. Among overdisciplined peoples, the personality worth suffers, whereby the development of their power is diminished and their spiritual reserve weakened. From this there arises the danger of the reduction also of military power, because the world war,

modern strategy and tactics have taught us to value anew the individual worth of the soldier.

In the peasant communities the coordination has brought about mechanical effects. In them the party politics did not succeed in prevailing in spite of frantic attempts at democratisation. Two thirds of the Prussian rural municipalities with less than two thousand inhabitants have practically not voted but amicably joined together in a single list that was organised from an estates perspective. In Southern Germany, there was still a sort of hereditary fiefdom as regards the mayoral office. They voted for a certain farmstead, an 'established farmer'. This expression proves how vital the estate mentality still is in the speech and imagination of the rural population. The coordination has pushed aside the 'established farmer' in favour of lists or candidates — who are not seldom landless or strangers to the land — put together in a party political manner. Thus significant points of departure for an organic democracy that had been preserved by the formal democratic age behind us were abandoned, and therewith the basic self-administration ideas of Stein.<sup>77</sup>

The other form of rule resembling an order is Fascism. The leaders of the German Revolution unanimously reject an imitation of Italian Fascism. It would not only be impossible but a betrayal of the German spirit whose rebirth is signified by the national uprising. Nevertheless, the question of German Fascism is a burning one. Exemplars are always tempting because they are convenient. Besides, Fascism has a basically European scope that also cannot be ignored by one who rejects Fascism as an 'export item'. In the fourteenth volume of the *Encyclopaedia*,<sup>78</sup> Mussolini elaborates: 'As an intellectually implemented conception of life, Fascism is a part of the general reaction of our century against the shallow and materialistic positivism of the nineteenth century. — Fascism is a historical conception of life. — Man is nothing outside history. — Fascism does not believe in a possible 'happiness' on earth as it was desired in the economic literature of the eighteenth century and has penetrated since that time into all teleological conceptualisations, according to which in a certain period of history a definitive ordering of the human race is to be expected. This means placing oneself outside history and life, which is in constant flow and change.' According to this, Fascism is a feeling for life that has been

reawakened, a fighting stance against Calvin and Rousseau, against 1789, equality and the sovereignty of the people, against comfort and the bourgeois. It is the revolt of the spirit against matter. One who considers that Italy, in contrast to Germany in the nineteenth century, did not bring forth any idealistic philosophy understands the influence of German idealism on Italy but also the difference between the two peoples.

As regards Mussolini's totalitarian conception of the state, two things are to be considered: one, the power that extends from the Catholic space, from the Eternal City Rome. The Spanish Fascist Giménez Caballero<sup>79</sup> goes so far as to call Mussolini the spirit of Catholicism, a view that is corroborated by the ease with which the master of the totalitarian state, Mussolini, cancelled civil marriage and gave it over to the Church. Roman Catholicism remains, in the heart of the Roman, a typically Italian matter, a feeling that considerably softens the dualism between state and church. Italianness and Catholicism together form a totality. But then it is to be considered that Mussolini's totalitarian conception of the state arises from time-conditioned needs and considerations of expediency. He must overcome the *campanilismo*<sup>80</sup> and create the preconditions for a strong national feeling, which did not really exist in Italy. The overcharged nature of the idea of a state is understandable in a land that was divided through the centuries into numerous city states, republics, principalities, etc. and was the booty of foreign conquerors. The guild and corporate body system that belongs to the German legal structure of our nation was completely lacking in Italy. Rightly does Ziegler emphasise the bureaucratic character of the Italian corporation, a consequence of the lack of estates-based constructs that we are so rich in. If Mussolini summarises his totalitarian conception of the state in the formula 'nothing outside the state', this sort of state totalitarianism does not stand in any irreconcilable opposition to the idea of the German sovereign state that is imposed in all fields of life, even when it recognises their autonomy. Obviously, all the life of a nation must proceed in the state but it does not need to go through the state, and the latter is the other form of totalitarian conception of the state such as that which threatens to enter the German space from Russia. Italy therefore allows to the personality a legally secured free space. All forms of planned economy, ultracapitalism, and state capitalism that could endanger 'the right and the



freedom of the individual' are rejected by Fascism, just as it also ensures the free development of the intellectual and religious life. It remains pledged to Western culture while Russia has returned to eastern-Asiatic forms of rule.

That means therefore that the total state of Fascism represents a comprehensive form to which the entire political life of the nation is bound. Obviously there are conflicts within the content of this form; they are fought out with spirited vigour, as the public declaration of Ferrara on the corporate state has demonstrated. Opposition as the expression of participation in the political life for the discovery of the best ways and the full deployment of statesmanly wisdom is just as much wished for as opposition that is directed against the existence of the Fascist state is impossible. The intellectual discussion within the educated stratum of Italy, which is smaller in relation to that of Germany, is lively and the 'religious policy' of Fascism has never sought to be itself a religion. An anti-Fascist group that the newspaper *Anti-Europa* publicises indeed strives for an affiliation to the pagan traditions of antiquity. The non-Christian but essentially pious Mussolini, however, has an outstanding understanding of the significance of Italian Catholicism.

Intellectually, historically, economically, sociologically, climatically, ethnologically, Italy has other conditions than Germany. Precisely nationalist thought determines that Italianness must diverge at a certain point from Germanness. The historical reaction against the liberal age will be a different one in the German space than in the Mediterranean region. Leopold Ziegler has emphasised in the *European Review* the indissociable manner in which the conception presented by him and me of the corporate state of mixed professional and agricultural estates is part of German history. In the German conception, corporation is the original cell of the will to communal life. One can vote in it because the exercise of the vote and electability are bound to conditions that can be called vital (rootedness in the land, integrity, family values, industriousness, sense of community, human virtues, etc.). Rational persuasion, agitation, mass psychosis, mechanical majorities, and the evil of formal democracy disappear. Speech often hides from the listener the inner being of the speaker and deadens the inner being of the listener. Expression suppresses the substance. There should be direct elections therefore only in the smallest cell where a man is elected on account of his inner worth and not of his speaking style, where

every man knows the other, where he comes from, what he is and what he accomplishes. With such a basis of selection, the construction from the cell to the summit is easy, if one uses indirect elections and composes a higher corporate body always through a selection from the next lower.

Perhaps National Socialism has achieved the miracle of nationalising the masses and neutralising tendencies that ignore nationalism. But no far-sighted person will venture the attempt to make Germany again the plaything of mass agitation. The danger of intellectual persuasion and seduction of the masses can be banished only when the masses are neutralised as the foundation of political leadership. For the masses and the people are as different as mass psychology and national psychology. Even a master of mass psychology does not rule the people but remains their exponent. Genuine rule and true leadership are based on national psychology. The mass psychologist lives in perpetual fear of one who masters the art of influencing the masses better than him. The national psychologist, on the other hand, builds his rule on the eternal fundamental facts of community life that are irrational.

There is, in the long run, only one means of preventing the sedition and subversion of the people: the transfer of the leadership selection from the rational to the irrational field, from the collective sociological structures to the naturally grown. If there enters further, from above, a strong corrective state will that brings together the disintegrating opinions, then a state is created in which freedom and authority coincide.

The thesis that 'the individual is nothing, the community is everything' is a polemical reversal of the individualist doctrine and overcomes individualism as little as Marxism does liberalism. It creates no new ordering relationship between the individual and the community but crushes personality. It is collectivist and can easily become mass individualistic even though it means otherwise. It does not resolve the question of the polarity of the individual and the community but denies it by an elimination of the individual. The individual man, however, is not only an individual, not only a member of a definite class, not only a part of the whole, not only a creature but also a person. As an individual he belongs to Nature, as a person to the realm of freedom, thus to that spiritual battlefield on which the image of God can be striven for. A man is not only a perfect natural

being but also an imperfect godlike being (Weippert).<sup>81</sup> As an individual he is subject to fate, as a person he is free and lives in the certainty that the way to God is assigned to him as a calling. For this reason the amount of his freedom cannot be attributed simply from the community. For, even the community is earth-bound and can receive its divine significance only through the free creative act of the person who believes in a divine destiny. If a man decides in favour of God, his natural connection with the human community is heightened and deepened through his freely chosen one with God.

The natural community forms — like the family, class and nation — encompass the individual not only as an individual but also as a person. The developed sociological forms are those of freedom, while the collective forms are those of wilfulness because in the latter the person as the bearer of freedom is suffocated. In the collective forms the responsibility for the development of his life is taken away from the individual and total security is granted to him, thus a world without tragedy, in which fate is silenced and therewith also the call of God to master this fate.

That such a collective conception contradicts the ‘historical’ emerges also from the declarations of Mussolini: ‘Fascism wants man to confront all difficulties consciously and with readiness. It understands life as a battle and expects especially that man create in himself the instrument (moral and spiritual) to build his life.’ But the man whose intellectual activity is weakened by the fact that the train of readymade opinions is given to him from above loses the capacity for this. If the German should become more than an obedient state citizen, if he should become the citizen and guarantor of the Reich, nationhood and Germanness must be experienced by every individual. The experiential contents, not the daily tasks, form the man.

The German Revolution is an uprising of the people. It is borne by the feeling that the people are the bearers of human history, that the past overvalued the states. The state is temporary, nations eternal. One cannot make nations, they grow according to the law whereby they arose and bear in themselves their indelible spiritual image. The Germans are the people of conscience, the ones who protest eternally, whether we think of the brazen Martin Luther or the prophetic Dostoevsky, who shares this mission with us. We are neither a formalistic people like the Romans nor a spiritually

chaotic one like the Russians. We live between the two with the mission of reconciling form and freedom.

One who forfeits freedom of decision loses the connection with God that alone keeps him from turning autocratically and arbitrarily against the community. One who listens to the voice of God and his blood, one who lives in the duty towards his people, stands under stronger self-control in his actions than the harshest state could impose on him. Freedom in the state of the Conservative Revolution is based profoundly on the religious rebirth that sets the individual man before the restraints of conscience.

If in such a state criticism becomes intense, it is directed at the higher and supporting councils and not at the lower for their misuse of their ignorance. The state leaders need public encouragement, reminders and warnings because the modern gigantic state cannot live without news media for publicity. The infusion of our collectivist world with a personal spirit is the highest task of the German Revolution. In it does genuine nationalism come to be; it alone embodies historical man who has arisen in order to lead the German people once again into history, to bear witness to the German mission.

For, in the longing of our people lives not only the true state of the Germans but also the Third Reich. This concept, coined already ten years ago by a great conservative, Moeller van den Bruck,<sup>82</sup> became the mythos of the Revolution. Perhaps in large sections of the population the difference between state and Reich is blurred because their thought is restricted to a lesser Germany. But in the German youth lives the idea of the Reich that is more than the state, that, rising above statism and national pride, is granted to the Germans as a calling.

The idea of a national state is the transference of individualistic doctrines of the individual man to the individual state. Its danger is the extermination of foreign peoples, its sin is eternal *irredenta*.<sup>83</sup> All the foreign policy of a national state revolves around foreign peoples within one's own borders or around one's own within foreign borders. The foreign policy of the national state gets lost constantly in entities bound to the soil and blood, such as are established by Nature and God. People-separating nationalism, the child of national democracy, must be superseded by the people-uniting respect for naturally grown ethnies. State and people are synonymous only in national

democratic thought. Since the coincidence of these twofold units never occurs, this false thought must be eliminated. The superstate (the Reich) is a form of government that rises above the ethnies, lies beyond them and can therefore leave them untouched. Only it cannot wish to be totalitarian; it must recognise autonomies and sovereignties, or else the rise of a structure above the ethnies is prevented that belongs to the course of history. Commerce and the economy demand larger units, and civilisation and technology a more refined distribution of work, which small nations cannot afford. If they insist on their own statehood, they condemn themselves to an existence in which they can neither live nor die.

Nations are equal, but only metaphysically, just as men too are equal before God. One who transfers the equality to this world sins against Nature and reality. Thus the equality of nations is unrealistic wishful thinking. Innumerable great men, historical development, geographical situation, blood-related power and intellectual abilities condition an earthly ranking of nations that is not arbitrary.

Every genuine revolution is a world revolution. If the Germans should rise to such a height, then an idea born of Germans must redeem the afflicted and fragmented continent. The history of our people shows us as the defender of the Cross, as the protector and regulator of the peoples of Europe who live under the crown of the German Kaiser. The Reich and the Kaiser are the defending forces against paganism and the Anti-Christ; they have repelled for a millennium all attacks that surged against Christianity. The character of the German people enables it for this suprastate task. It bursts through the limits of the egocentric national state and wishes to serve even others who live outside this political community. We can never be satisfied with the completion of the national state, which, indeed, would also be impossible given the constitution of our settled territory. In all historical dealings we must put ourselves in the position of the European space, in our natural geographical sphere. Our central situation in the continent gives us the political assignment of working in a balancing and nation-binding manner. We are the extant guarantor for the peace and security of Central Europe.

Our historical character is based on spiritual profundity. That is why we were not only the lords defending Christianity but also warriors for the purity of the Gospel. From that arose the inner confessional schism from

which we suffer. It cannot be denied or removed with violence. At a higher level, however, it is surmountable: at that of the common fight against the Anti-Christ. The uprising of the German people against Bolshevism is nothing but a return to our great historical task: to be defenders of the Christian doctrine of salvation.

This doctrine was a revolutionary incursion into the disintegrating antiquity. The revolutionary power of Christianity has been in effect since it created a new world: the West. This Christian West became in the nineteenth century tired and desacralised. It threatened to succumb to the Anti-Christ in the form of rationalism, this-worldliness and materialism. The action of re-Christianisation therefore rises with revolutionary force and its success will decide the existence or non-existence of the European cultural world.

The new Christian world is given to us as a duty. Only the German state that rises powerfully from the Revolution can fulfil the service to the Reich. It has become clear that the German Revolution contains a double core, two nuclei: one towards the German state and the other towards the Holy Empire of the Germans. That the state task was first taken up is natural. With the solemn deed in Potsdam was therefore newly founded not the German Reich yet but its precondition, the state of the Germans. If this reorganisation of the Reich took place at a Protestant altar, this is a symbol of the revolt of Protestantism that was directed against the destruction of the vital foundations of the Prussian state. For, this military state is the spirit of Protestantism. Once more Prussianism demonstrates its state-building and nation-forming power.

But now the Revolution stands at a turning point. The German people are two-fifths Catholic. This fact contains an impediment but also an impetus. It will hinder the will to a total state because a total state with two religions signifies an impossibility. If the view of this work, that the total state must by its nature be hierarchical or atheistic, is correct, the conclusions for our bi-religious country are clear: either the German Revolution will be secularised, and thus slide back into the currents of 1789, or it will be a real Christian counter-revolution. But then it must abandon the total state. For the total Christian state presupposes a single religion on which a state- or Reich-church can be built. Without wishing to deny on principle the possibility of a unification of the religions, this work represents the opinion

that the near future must reckon with the already present religious division. But therewith the dream of a state church disappears because it would exclude Catholicism. Consequently, it is not a matter of realising a total Christian state with regard to Protestantism and of remaining a sovereign state with regard to Catholicism. This would be a faulty construction with a downright dangerous, explosive effect. On account of all these considerations, there arises the impossibility of a total state for German conditions.

Should it be concluded from this that every plan of a powerful unification of German culture would be wrecked on the religious schism? There are not a few who tend to thoughts of this sort. They overlook the fact that a political unification and a strong state are also possible without that totality that is quite wrongly considered as the character of an anti-liberal state. From the liberal state indeed there arises not only the neutral state of the parliamentary system but also the total democracy of a Rousseau, which is essentially little different from the modern totalitarian state. One who wishes to oppose the conservative state-formation to the liberal must also abandon democracy and therewith return to a concept of the state that lies before the Age of Enlightenment. The sovereign state or dominion can by its nature forego totalitarianism just as all genuine empires of human history have not thought of offending suppressed peoples in their nation. Thus the vault of a German state can arch over a people of mixed religions without losing power. The breadth of religious life that speaks through the German bi-religious condition can indeed be made useful to the historical development. For, a nation that includes Protestants and Catholics enjoys the advantage of uniting both cultural traditions in its worldview. If Potsdam is a symbol, so also are Aachen, Trier, Cologne, Speyer, Regensburg, Bamberg and Vienna. Corresponding to the Catholic cultural tradition, which does not need to coincide always with the religious faith, is the historical radiation that is inherent in the actual heart of the Reich, the Rhineland. The homeland of German universalism lies on the Rhine, the axis of Charlemagne.

The Protestant line of the German Revolution leads to the strong German state, the Catholic to the Reich of the Germans. The centre of gravity of the Protestant cultural tradition lies in the idea of the state, that of the Catholic in the idea of the Reich. But both ideas form what was called the double

nucleus of the German Revolution. In the second phase of the German Revolution, which pertains to the Third Reich, Catholicism must prove its Germanness and find the task that it is given to it. After it lost its key political position it can so much more easily reflect on the innermost essence of Catholic politics: on the path to the Reich.

But therewith the field of vision of the German Revolution expands to the Europe surrounding it. We are surrounded extensively by nations that have not yet overcome national democracy. They suffer from the Balkanisation of Europe like us. Their emissaries hurry from one conference to another, which all collapse due to the fact that the European state structure totters and no vision of a redeeming order resuscitates the hope of the desperate nations. Herein lies the German task. We will burst through the moral ring around the German people if we make the weapons of the spirit charge against it, if we make the world understand that our revolution is a struggle for a new justice for tormented humanity, that we wish to establish a new order that, ending the social turmoils, also abolishes the chaos between nations. An order that, at first domestic German, stretches out to threatened Europe.

If this spiritual realm prevails, then even the military and strategic calculations of obstinate cabinets will be annulled. They are based on the militarisation of the entire national force, on the basic idea of national democracy, the universal military service. If we grant to the nations the certainty that their national life is no longer threatened by any state politics, that the national laws are internationally sacrosanct, they will return to their earth-bound natural life and leave the realm of state politics to those to whom it is a passion and a vocation. The nations at large love peace. They would agree if the warrior caste that is native to every vigorous nation solve the international difficulties, if the age of massive armies and monstrous arms were over. There will always be battles for power; the question of rule will be renewed daily. But they will be different and be decided differently if the natural development of the nations is secured, no matter how the battles of the states proceed. With the twilight of the democratic age a new army and a new strategy are announced. And therewith also the hope for us of rendering ineffective the weapon-filled ramparts at the German borders.

The banner of democracy fluttering over the white race since Calvin and Rousseau hangs limp on the mast in the days of the League of Nations,



which with magical symbolism chose Geneva as its seat.<sup>84</sup> The end of popular sovereignty draws nigh because a new piety arises that longs for the rule of the Grace of God.

This piety knows that there is only one place where men and nations are equal, before God. But the life of this world is manifold, is based on difference and struggle, and receives its significance from rank and worth. The great task of politics is ordering among those that are unequal, whether it be among men or among nations. This order will not occur without justice, and justice is impossible without rule. But only the one who utilises power in the Grace of God is called to rule. In the Reich is fulfilled the longing for the rule of God on earth, over the Reich hovers the invisible Crown.

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# Notes

[ ← 1 ]

I am indebted for much of my information regarding Jung's political career to Larry Eugene Jones' two significant articles on Jung, 'Edgar Julius Jung: The Conservative Revolution in Theory and Practice', *Central European History*, 21 (1988). pp. 142–74, and 'The Limits of Collaboration: Edgar Jung, Herbert von Bose, and the Origins of the Conservative Resistance to Hitler, 1933–34' in L. E. Jones and J. Retallack (ed.), *Between Reform, Reaction, and Resistance: Studies in the History of German Conservatism from 1789 to 1945*, Oxford and Providence, R.I.: Berg Publishers, 1993, pp. 465–501.

[←2 ]

‘German People’s Party’.

[←3 ]

See my edition of this work: Edgar Julius Jung, *Conservative Critique of Liberalism in the Weimar Republic. Paving the Way to Nazism. A Translation of Die Herrschaft der Minderwertigen. The Rule of Inferior People*, 2 vols., Lewiston, NY: Edwin Mellen Press, 1995.

[←4]

Jean F. Neurohr. *Der Mythos vom Dritten Reich: Zur Geistesgeschichte des Nationalsozialismus*, Stuttgart, 1957, p. 187 (cf. W. Struve, *Elites against Democracy*, Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press. 1973, p. 321). Hermann Rauschning (1887–1982), who was a member of the National Socialist Party between 1932 and 1934 but identified himself with the Christian Conservative Revolutionaries and became a vocal critic of National Socialism, was particularly impressed by Jung's *Herrschaft*, as he declared in his book *Die konservative Revolution* (1941): 'There was that writer, Edgar J. Jung, whose great book was the actual inspiration of my political life.'

[ ←5 ]

'People's Conservative Association'.



[ ←6 ]

‘German National People’s Party’.

[ ← 7 ]

‘Conservative People’s Party’.

[ ← 8 ]

'People's Conservative Movement for German Renewal'.

[←9]

*Vorbereitender Ausschuss der Volkskonservativen Bewegung zu deutscher  
Erneuerung, 'Aufruf!'*, Bundesarchiv: ZSg 1-275/1 (The translation is that of E. Jones,  
'Edgar Julius Jung', p. 156).

[←10]

See Jung's letter to Rudolf Pechel, 1 Feb. 1933, referred to in L. E. Jones, *Limits of Collaboration*, p. 475.

[ ← 11 ]

'Battlefront Black-White-Red'.

[←12 ]

Remark to Rudolf Pechel, Jan. 30, 1933, quoted in Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 160.

[←13 ]

Jung had earlier assisted in the plot to assassinate Franz Joseph Heinz-Orbis, the president of the Autonomous Republic of the Palatinate, a separatist state supported by French conspiracy (see F. Grass. 'Edgar Julius Jung', *Pfälzer Lebensbilder*, I [1964 — Transl., pp. 324–28).



[ ← 14 ]

Othmar Spann (1878–1950) was a conservative Austrian sociologist and economist who advocated the establishment of a corporative state.

[←15 ]

Ernesto Giménez Caballero (1899–1988) was a Spanish diplomat and political activist who supported Italian Fascism as the ideal political form for the entire Latin Roman Catholic world.

[←16]

Adam Müller (1779–1829) was a German political economist who opposed the economic individualism of Adam Smith and stressed the ethical and religious foundations of economic activity. Among his many notable works is *Von der Notwendigkeit einer theologischen Grundlage der gesamten Staatswissenschaften und der Staatswirtschaft insbesondere* (1819) ('On the Necessity of a Theological Basis for the Entire State Sciences and the State Economy in Particular'). — Transl.

[←17 ]

Ludwig Klages (1872–1956) was a German philosopher who propounded a vitalist philosophy in which the intellect was considered as the antagonist of the soul. His major work is called *Der Geist als Widersacher der Seele* ('The Spirit as Adversary of the Soul'), 1933. — Transl.

[←18]

Conrad Ferdinand Meyer (1825–1898) was a Swiss poet and novelist who wrote an epic poem on Ulrich von Hutten (1488–1523), the German knight who became a Protestant reformer. — Transl.

[←19]

Hans Friedrich Karl Günther (1891–1968) wrote several works on the racial history of Europe and the Indo-Europeans. As a racialist and eugenicist he was highly esteemed in the Third Reich. — Transl.

[←20 ]

Wilhelm Stapel (1882–1954) was a member of the Deutsche Christen Party from 1933 and presented a version of Protestant German nationalism in *Der christliche Staatsmann: Eine Theologie des Nationalismus* (1932) ('The Christian Statesman: A Theology of Nationalism'). He was a cultural rather than a racial anti-Semite and wrote a major work on the Jewish question in 1928, *Antisemitismus und Antigermanismus. Über das seelische Problem der Symbiose des deutschen und des jüdischen Volkes* ('Anti-Semitism and Anti-Germanism. About the Mental Problem of the Symbiosis of the German and Jewish People'). — Transl.

Max Hildebert Boehm (1891–1968) was a *völkisch* sociologist and one of the founders of the Juniklub. His works on ethnopolitics include *Das eigenständige Volk. Volkstheoretische Grundlagen der Ethnopolitik und Geisteswissenschaften* (1932) ('The Independent People: Theoretical Foundations of Ethnopolitics and the Humanities'). — Transl.



[←22 ]

The Reichsbanner Schwarz-Rot-Gold was an organisation formed in 1928 by members of the Social Democratic Party and the German Centre Party to defend parliamentary democracy. — Transl.

[←23 ]

The Bayernwacht ('Bavarian Guard') was a defence organisation during the Weimar Republic that came into conflict with the SA. It was disbanded in March 1933. — Transl.

[←24 ]

The Stahlhelm was an organisation of veterans of the First World War that served between 1918 and 1935 as the paramilitary wing of the monarchist Deutschnationale Volkspartei. — Transl.

[←25 ]

The Alldeutscher Verband ('All-German Association') was a militarist pan-Germanist organisation that existed from 1891 to 1939. — Transl.

[←26 ]

The Deutsche Volkspartei was a national-liberal party of the Weimar Republic between 1918 and 1933. — Transl.

[←27 ]

The Deutschnationale Volkspartei was a monarchist party that included national-liberal elements in its programme. — Transl.

[←28 ]

Their conservative traits are deliberately not discussed here. [The *Wehrbewegung* denotes the various militarist defence organisations active during the Weimar Republic.] — Transl.

[ ←29 ]

The Weimar Republic was first proclaimed in November 1918 after the sailors' mutiny that began in Wilhelmshaven in October of that year. — Transl.



[←30 ]

Georges Sorel (1847–1922) was a French social scientist whose intellectual positions fluctuated between liberal conservatism and socialism, and Marxism. He is famous for his 1908 work *Réflexions sur la violence*, and his ideas were used by both Marxists and Fascists. —  
Transl.

[←31 ]

Henrich von Gleichen-Rußwurm (1882–1959) was an aristocratic conservative publicist who, along with Moeller van den Bruck, founded the conservative Juniklub (1919). When the club was dissolved in 1924, he helped found the Herrenklub. — Transl.

[←32 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[ ←33 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[←34 ]

Othmar Spann (1878–1950) was a conservative Austrian sociologist and economist who advocated the establishment of a corporative state. — Transl.

[←35 ]

Erwin Kolbenheyer (1878–1962) was an Austrian writer who wrote *völkisch* historical novels based on German life and character such as, notably, the trilogy on *Paracelsus* (1925). He became a member of the National Socialist Party and was highly esteemed during the Reich. — Transl.

[←36]

Friedrich Gogarten (1887–1967) was an anti-idealistic Lutheran theologian who was for a time associated with the Swiss theologian Karl Barth. — Transl.

[ ←37 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.



[←38 ]

Leopold Ziegler (1881–1958) was a German philosopher who stressed the importance of religion in the development of human culture. He was a friend of Edgar Julius Jung and Franz von Papen and his works *Das heilige Reich der Deutschen* ('The Holy Empire of the Germans') (1925) and *Der europäische Geist* ('The European Spirit') (1929) were important contributions to the Conservative Revolution. — Transl.

[←39 ]

*Sündenfall und Freiheit* ('Fall of Man and Freedom'), Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg, 1933. [Georg Weippert (1899–1965) was a German national economist who participated in the Conservative Revolutionary movement and also supported the eastern settlement policies of National Socialism. — Transl.]

[ ←40 ]

A. E. Günther (1893–1942) was a member of the Freikorps as well as of the Juniklub. He edited a work called *Was wir vom Nationalsozialismus erwarten. 20 Antworten* ('What we expect from National Socialism: 20 Responses') (1932). — Transl.

[←41 ]

The ceremony for the reopening of the Reichstag after the Reichstag fire was held on 21 March 1933 in Potsdam. Hitler and Goebbels chose Potsdam since it was the centre of the Prussian state of Frederick the Great as well as of the Second Reich of Bismarck. — Transl.

[←42 ]

The annexation of Austria into the German Reich on 13 March 1938. — Transl.

[←43 ]

Mediaeval and Renaissance business ledgers were often headed with pious invocations to God. —  
Transl.

[←44 ]

*Gleichschaltung* — Transl.

[←45 ]

Gustav Stresemann (1878–1929) founded the liberal Deutsche Volkspartei in 1918 but gradually began to cooperate with the left-wing parties of the Weimar Republic and became chancellor in 1923. — Transl.



[←46 ]

Heinrich Brüning (1885–1970) was a member of the Catholic Deutsche Zentrumspartei (‘German Centre Party’) and served as Chancellor of the Weimar Republic from 1930 to 1932. — Transl.

[←47 ]

Franz von Papen (1879–1969) was a Prussian aristocrat and conservative Catholic politician who was a member of the Zentrumspartei. He became chancellor in July 1932 and was instrumental in bringing Hitler to power as chancellor in January 1933, when he himself served as vice-chancellor. — Transl.

[←48 ]

Paul von Hindenburg (1847–1934) led the Imperial German Army during the First World War and distinguished himself during the Second Battle of Tannenberg, against the Russians, in August 1914. He served as president of Germany from 1925 to 1934. — Transl.

[←49 ]

The Enabling Act of March 1933 allowed Hitler as chancellor to assume dictatorial powers. —  
Transl.

[←50 ]

This work was completed before the conclusion of the Concordat, which besides could not change anything in their basic attitude. [The Concordat between the National Socialist government and the Vatican as signed on 20 July 1933. — Transl.]

[←51 ]

The anti-Nazi boycott of German products was organised by US and European Jewish organisations from March 1933 in response to the anti-Jewish measures of the National Socialist regime. — Transl.

[←52 ]

According to the Reichsstatthaltergesetz of April 1933, the governors derived their authority from the Reich alone and not from the provincial governments. — Transl.

[ ←53 ]

According to Hegel, in his *Lectures on the Philosophy of History*, the universal Reason, or World-Spirit, works through men in such a hidden manner that they attribute to their own passions the operations undertaken by Reason for the accomplishment of its larger world-historical goals. — Transl.



[←54 ]

See, in this context, the author's *Föderalismus aus Weltanschauung* ('Federalism from a Worldview'), Schweitzer Verlag, Munich, 1931.

[ ←55 ]

The Leipzig trial held between September and December 1933 was conducted to examine the five Communists charged with setting the Reichstag on fire. — Transl.

[←56]

The Hohenstaufens were a Swabian dynasty that ruled the Holy Roman Empire from 1138 to 1254.

— Transl.

[←57 ]

The Deutsche Arbeitsfront was organised in May 1933 to replace the various trade unions in the country. It was led by Robert Ley. — Transl.

[←58 ]

A territorial state, unlike a ducal, is ruled solely on the basis of a given territory. — Transl.

[ ←59 ]

Government according to a system of law. Hans Kelsen (1881–1973) was an Austrian Jewish legal philosopher who opposed Carl Schmitt's more authoritarian view of the state as an embodiment of political concerns rather than of the rule of law. — Transl.

[ ←60 ]

Ernst Haeckel (1834–1919) was a German biologist and author of *Die Welträthsel* ('The World Riddles') (1899). He propounded a 'monist' theory of the evolutionary scientific connection between the human microcosm and the cosmos. — Transl.

[←61 ]

The *Tag von Potsdam* ('Day of Potsdam'), or celebrations for the reopening of the Reichstag after the Reichstag fire, began with religious services in both Protestant and Catholic churches, as well as in the Garrison Church (*Garnisonkirche*) of Potsdam. — Transl.



[←62]

Hjalmar Schacht (1877–1970) was a German economist who served as president of the Reichsbank between 1923 and 1930, and again from 1933 to 1939. — Transl.

[ ←63 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[←64 ]

Johann Gottfried von Herder (1744–1803) was a German philosopher and cultural historian who emphasised the concept of *Volk* in his collection of folk-songs, *Stimmen der Völker in ihren Liedern* ('Voices of the Peoples in their Songs') (1773). — Transl.

[←65 ]

Paul von Hindenburg, see above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[←66]

Franz von Papen's 1932 cabinet was called the 'cabinet of barons' or 'cabinet of monocles'. —  
Transl.

[ ←67 ]

Ernst Jünger (1895–1998) served in the First World War as a soldier and became an entomologist and author after the war. One of his most famous works is *Der Arbeiter* ('The Worker'), published in 1932, which proclaims the rise of a quasi-Communist worker type as the norm of technological society. — Transl.

[←68 ]

The doctrine of elites was founded by my Lausanne teacher Vilfredo Pareto. [Vifredo Pareto (1848–23) was an Italian economist and political scientist who taught at the University of Lausanne from 1893. He was the author of the essay *Un'applicazione di teorie sociologiche* (1901), which was translated into English as *The Rise and Fall of Elites: An Application of Theoretical Sociology*, Totowa, NJ: Bedminister Press, 1968. — Transl.]

[←69 ]

Latin: manly virtue. — Transl.



[ ←70 ]

The Concordat brings us a step nearer to this conception.

[ ←71 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[←72 ]

The Harzburg Front was an attempt of the right-wing parties, including the NSDAP, to form a unified front against the government of Heinrich Brüning. It was organised in 1931 under the chairmanship of Alfred Hugenberg, the leader of the Deutschnationale Volkspartei, but Hitler had already entered into talks with Hindenburg about being promoted as the chief nationalist candidate and the Harzburg Front did not succeed in achieving much in its opposition to Brüning. — Transl.

[←73 ]

Carl Schmitt (1888–1985) was a German jurist and political scientist whose works defended authoritarian government against liberal constitutionalism. In *Der Begriff des Politischen* ('The Concept of the Political'), published in 1932, he argued that the chief task of a state was to defend its political existence and sovereignty against its real 'enemies'. — Transl.

[←74]

Carl Schmitt, *Der Begriff des Politischen*, Hanseatische Verlagsanstalt, Hamburg.

[ ←75 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[←76]

Soviet: council — Transl.

[ ←77 ]

Heinrich Friedrich Karl Reichsfreiherr vom und zum Stein (1757–1831) was a prominent Prussian politician who was given wide-ranging powers by King Friedrich Wilhelm in 1807, when he was able to effect several social and military reforms, including the abolition of serfdom and the granting of autonomy to all Prussian towns and large villages. — Transl.



[←78 ]

In 1927 Mussolini, along with Giovanni Gentile, wrote a short work called *La dottrina del fascismo* ('The Doctrine of Fascism') which appeared as an entry on 'Fascism' in the *Enciclopedia Italiana* (1932). — Transl.

[ ←79 ]

Ernesto Giménez Caballero (1899–1988) was a Spanish diplomat and political activist who supported Italian Fascism as the ideal political form for the entire Latin Roman Catholic world. This view is presented especially in his work *La Nueva Catolicidad: Teoría general sobre el Fascismo en Europa: en España* ('The New Catholicity: A General Theory of Fascism in Europe: In Spain') (1933). — Transl.

[ ← 80 ]

'Parochialism'. — Transl.

[ ←81 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[ ←82 ]

See above p. <OV>. — Transl.

[ ←83 ]

Irredentism is the claim of a people to territory based on ethnic or historical considerations. —  
Transl.

[←84]

The League of Nations, which functioned between 1920 and 1946 as an intergovernmental organisation to maintain world peace, was based in Geneva, the city where the French Protestant reformer Jean Calvin (1509–1564) conducted most of his work. — Transl.